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G.R. No. 106053 August 17, 1994 OTTOMAMA BENITO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ABDALAWE M. PAGRANGAN, and the Heirs of the Deceased Mayoralty Candidate MURAD KISMEN SAMPIANO OGCA, represented by CABILI SAMPIANO, respondents. Pedro Q. Quadra and Macarupung B. Dibaratun for petitioner. Mangurun B. Batuampar and Romaraban D. Macabantog for private respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.: This special civil action for certiorari seeks to set aside the following resolutions of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), viz: (a) Resolution dated June 11, 1992 in SPA No. 92-147 and SPA No. 92-145 denying the Motion to Suspend the Proclamation of Murad Kismen Sampiano Ogca in the event that he is elected mayor of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur; (b) Resolution dated June 29, 1992 in SPC No. 92-303 directing the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur to proclaim the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes during the May 11, 1992 election as the winner for the contested office; and (c) Resolution dated July 6, 1992 in SPC No. 92- 163, SPC No. 92303, and SPC No. 92-357 declaring the proclamation of Ottomama Benito as winning candidate for mayor of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur null and void and of no force and effect. In the last resolution, the Municipal Board of Canvassers was likewise directed to set aside the certificate of canvass and proclamation and to prepare a new certificate of canvass indicating therein that the winning candidate for mayor is Hadji Murad Ogca but placing the information that he died on May 20, 1992 for the purpose of applying the rule on legal succession to office pursuant to Section 44 of R. A. 7160. Petitioner assails the above-mentioned resolutions on the ground that they were issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The facts of the case are as follows: Petitioner Ottomama Benito and the deceased Hadji Murad Kismen Sampiano Ogca were candidates for mayor in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur in the May 11, 1992 election. On May 1, 1992, Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Deputy for Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, Sultan Kisa D. Mikunug filed a petition for disqualification against Murad Kismen Sampiano Ogca. Mikunug alleged that at around five o'clock in the afternoon of April 28, 1992, while inside a billiard hall, Ogca asked him to work for the former's re-election. However, 1 when Mikunug refused, Ogca struck him on the head with a billiard cue. On May 6, 1992, the COMELEC referred the disqualification petition to its Law Department for investigation. In turn, the Law Department referred the same to the Director of the Office of the Regional Election Director of Cotabato City for 3 investigation. On June 10, 1992, the Regional Election Director of Cotabato City issued a resolution stating that there was a prima 4 facie case against Ogca and that the latter was probably guilty of the charges in the petition for disqualification. Thereafter, nothing more was heard of the petition for disqualification. In the meantime, on May 20, 1992, candidate Ogca was killed in an ambush while returning home from the residence of Lanao del Sur Governor Saidamen Pangarungan in Marawi City. On the same date, petitioner, probably not aware of the death of his opponent, filed a motion to suspend the proclamation of Ogca as elected mayor of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, contending that there was strong evidence of guilt against him in 5 the disqualification case. Resolving the motion to suspend proclamation, the COMELEC, on June 11, 1992, denied the same stating that Murad Kismen Sampiano Ogca was dead, hence, his proclamation as winner was essential to pave the way for succession by 6 the Vice-Mayor-elect as provided for in Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A. 7160). Meanwhile, the Municipal Board of Canvassers when asked to exclude from tallying, counting and canvassing all votes for and in the name of deceased mayoralty candidate Ogca, ruled, on May 30, 1992, that: 1. The Board shall continue counting/tabulating all the votes cast for deceased Mayoralty Candidate Murad K. S. Ogca and Vice Mayoralty Candidate Cadal Luks in the Statement of Votes by Municipality/Precinct (CE Form No. 20-A) for purposes of records only and for the reference and guidance of the Commission on Elections, but it shall not include them (Deceased Candidates) in the Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation of winning candidates (CE Form No. 25) in case they won (sic), it being moot and academic.
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On July 6, 1992, the COMELEC issued a resolution declaring the proclamation of petitioner an absolute nullity and of no force and effect. The certificate of canvass and proclamation was set aside. The Municipal Board of Canvassers was likewise directed to prepare a new certificate of canvass indicating therein that the winning candidate for mayor was Hadji Murad Ogca but with the information, in parenthesis, that he died on May 20, 1992, for the purpose of applying the rule on 12 legal succession to office pursuant to Section 44 of R. A. No. 7160. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner faults the COMELEC with lack of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for the following reasons, viz: xxx xxx xxx COMELEC HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER SPC NO. 92- 303. THAT JUNE 29, 1992 RESOLUTION IS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO xxx xxx xxx THE COMELEC RESOLUTION OF JULY 6, 1992 [ANNEX A] IS ALSO NULL AND VOID BECAUSE THE COMELEC HAS NO JURISDICTION. IT WAS ALSO ISSUED IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW. xxx xxx xxx THE INTERLOCUTORY ORDER OF JUNE 11, 1992 ISSUED IN SPA NOS. 92-147 AND 92-146 (sic) DENYING THE MOTION TO SUSPEND PROCLAMATION WAS ISSUED WITH GRAVE 13 ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION. The petition must fail. The proclamation of petitioner Ottomama Benito as mayor-elect of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers was not a valid proclamation. It appears from the record that during the May 11, 1992 election, the deceased mayoralty candidate Murad Sampiano Ogca obtained a total of 3,699 votes as against petitioner's 2,644. Thereupon, it was the duty of the Municipal Board of Canvassers to proclaim as winner the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers, instead of performing what was incumbent upon it, that is, to proclaim Ogca as the winner but with the information that he died, to give way to legal succession to office, went on to proclaim herein petitioner, the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes as winner, believing that the 14 death of Ogca rendered his victory and proclamation moot and academic. This cannot be countenanced. In every election, the people's choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must, at all times, be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, no one can be declared elected in his place. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes dies, or is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest 15 number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. For to allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to
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Since the early case of Gardiner v. Romulo (26 Phil. 521), this Court has made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the 21 results. This bent or disposition continues to the present. The same principle still holds true today. Technicalities of the legal rules enunciated in the election laws should not frustrate the determination of the popular will. Where, as in this case, the proclamation is null and void, the same is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office does not deprive the COMELEC of the power to declare such nullity and annul the 22 proclamation. Consequently, petitioner's contention that the Commission on Elections had no jurisdiction to resolve the appeal filed by herein private respondents turns to naught. The said appeal, though filed a day too late, was not frivolous. Neither was it interposed for dilatory purposes. It sought to give effect, not to frustrate, the will of the people. Therefore, we declare the questioned resolutions dated June 29, 1992 and July 6, 1992 of the public respondent valid and effective. Finally, the resolution of the COMELEC dated June 11, 1992 denying the petitioner's motion to suspend proclamation of deceased candidate Ogca is likewise assailed. Petitioner argues that the votes for deceased Ogca should not have been counted based on Section 6 of R. A. No. 6640. This provision, however, applies only to candidates who have been declared by finally judgment to be disqualified. In the present case, there is no final judgment declaring the deceased Ogca disqualified, hence, the provision does not cover him. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
KAPUNAN, J.: Petitioner Alfonso C. Bince, Jr. and private respondent Emiliano S. Micu were among the candidates in the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992 for a seat in the Sanguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan allotted to its Sixth Legislative District. Ten (10) municipalities, including San Quintin, Tayug and San Manuel, comprise the said district. During the canvassing of the Certificates of Canvass (COC's) for these ten (10) municipalities by respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) on May 20, 1992, private respondent Micu objected to the inclusion of the COC for San Quintin on the ground that it contained false statements. Accordingly, the COCs for the remaining nine (9) municipalities were included in the canvass. On May 21, 1992, the PBC rules against the objection of private respondent. 1 From the said ruling, private respondent Micu appealed to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which docketed the case as SPC No. 92-208. On June 6, 1992, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution which reads: Acting on the appeal filed by petitioner-appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu to the ruling of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan, dated May 21, 1992, the Commission en banc tabulated the votes obtained by candidates Atty. Emiliano S. Micu and Atty. Alfonso C. Bince for the position of Sangguniang Panlalawigan member of the province of Pangasinan, using as basis thereof the statement of votes by precinct submitted by the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan, as (sic) a result of said examination, the Commission rules, as follows: 1. That the actual number of votes obtained by candidate Alfonso C. Bince in the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan is 1,055 votes whereas petitioner/appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu obtained 1,535 votes for the same municipality.
Accordingly, the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the province of Pangasinan is directed to CREDIT in favor of petitioner/appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu with 1,535 votes and candidate Alfonso C. Bince with 1,055 votes in the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan. 2
Twenty-one (21) days after the canvass of the COCs for the nine (9) municipalities was completed on May 20, 1992, private respondent Micu together with the Municipal Boards of Canvassers (MBCs) of Tayug and San Manuel filed with the PBC petitions for correction of the Statements of Votes (SOVs) earlier prepared for alledged manifest errors committed in the computation thereof. In view of the motion of herein petitioner to implement the Resolution of June 6, 1992 which was alleged to have become final, the PBC, on June 18, 1992, credited in favor of the petitioner and private respondent the votes for each as indicated in the said resolution and on the basis of the COCs for San Quintin and the other nine (9) municipalities, petitioner had a total of 27,370 votes while the private respondent had 27,369 votes. Petitioner who won by a margin of 1 vote was not, however, proclaimed winner because of the absence of authority from the COMELEC. Accordingly, petitioner filed a formal motion for such authority. On June 29, 1992, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Supplemental Order 3 directing the PBC "to reconvene, continue with the provincial canvass and proclaim the winning candidates for Sangguniang Panlalawigan for the Province of Pangasinan, and other candidates for provincial offices who have not been proclaimed 4 as of that date. In the meantime, on June 24, 1992, the PBC, acting on the petitions for correction of the SOVs of Tayug and San Manuel filed by private respondent and the MBCs of the said municipalities, rules "to allow the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan to correct the Statement of Votes and Certificates of Canvass and on the basis of the corrected documents, the Board (PBC) will continue the canvass and thereafter proclaim the winning candidate. 5 On June 25, 1992, petitioner Bince appealed from the above ruling allowing the correction alleging that the PBC had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The appeal was docketed as SPC No. 92-384. On July 8, 1992, private respondent Micu filed before the COMELEC an urgent motion for the issuance of an order directing the PBC to reconvene and proceed with the canvass. He alleged that the promulgation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2489 on June 29, 1992 affirmed the ruling of the PBC dated June 24, 1992. Similarly, petitioner Bince filed an urgent
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As directed therein, the PBC on July 21, 1992, by a vote of 2-1 with its Chairman Atty. Felimon Asperin dissenting, proclaimed candidate Bince as the duly elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pangasinan. Assailing the proclamation of Bince, private respondent Micu filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt and to Annul Proclamation and Amended Urgent Petition for Contempt and Annul Proclamation on July 22 and 29, 1992, respectively, alleging that the PBC defied the directive of the COMELEC in its resolution of July 9, 1992. Acting thereon, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution on July 29, 1992, the decretal portion of which reads: The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES: 1. To direct Prosecutor Jose Antonio Guillermo and Supt. Primo Mina, vice-chairman and secretayr, respectively, of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan, to show cause why they should not be declared in contempt of defying and disobeying the Resolution of this Commission dated 09 July 1992, directing them to RECOVENE immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificates of Votes as corrected, of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the Municipalities comprising the 6th District of Pangasinan; and to PROCLAIM the winning candidate of the Provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid; instead they excluded the corrected Certificated of Canvass of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan; 2. To ANNUL the proclamation dated 21 July 1992, by the said Provincial Board of Canvassers (dissented by Chairman Felimon Asperin), of candidate Alfonso Bince;
3. To DIRECT the Provincial Board of Canvassers to recovene immediately and proclaim the winning candidate for the second position of the Provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass submitted by the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of all the municipalities in the 6th District of Pangasinan, in accordance with law. 9
Consequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before this Court seeking to set aside the foregoing resolution of the COMELEC, contending that the same was promulgated without prior notice and hearing with respect to SPC No. 92-208 and SPC No. 92-384. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 106291. On February 9, 1993, the Court en banc 10 granted the petition ratiocinating that: Respondent COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the petitioner's proclamation without the requisite due notice and hearing, thereby depriving the latter of due process. Moreover, there was no valid correction of the SOVs and COCs for the municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel to warrant the annullment of the petitioner's proclamation. 1. Petitioner had been proclaimed, had taken his oath of office and had assumed the position of the second elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan for its Sixth Legislative District. Such proclamation enjoys the presumption of regularly and validity. The ruling of the majority of the PBC to proclaim the petitioner is based on its interpretation of the 9 July 1992 Resolution of respondent COMELEC which does not expressly single out the corrected COCs of Tayug and San Manuel; since, as of that time, the only corrected COC which existed was that for San Quintin, which was made by the PBC on 18 June 1992, the majority of the PBC cannot be faulted for ruling the way it did. the 9 July 1992 Resolution (Rollo, p. 51) merely directed it: (1) To RECOVENE immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificates of Votes, as corrected, of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the municipalities comprising the 6th District of Pangasinan;
On February 23, 1993, private respondent Micu filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion before the COMELEC praying that the latter hear and resolve the pending incidents referred to by this Court. Private respondent was obviously referring to SPC No. 92-208 and SPC No. 92-384, both cases left unresolved by the COMELEC. Consequently, the First Division of the COMELEC set the cases for hearing on March 8, 1993. During the hearing, both Micu and Bince orally manifested the withdrawal of their respective appeals. Also withdrawn were the petitions to disqualify Atty. Asperin and to cite the Board for contempt. The parties agreed to file their respective memoranda/position papers by March 15, 1993. Petitioner Bince filed his Position Paper on March 12, 1993 arguing that the withdrawal of SPC No. 92-208 affirmed the ruling of the PBC dated May 21, 1992 and even if it were not withdrawn, Section 16 of R.A. 7166 would have worked to terminate the appeal. Bince likewise asserts that his appeal in SPC No. 92-384 became moot and academic in view of this
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On July 20, 1993, private respondent Micu filed a Motion for reconsideration of the above-quoted resolution. On September 9, 1993, the COMELEC en banc granted the private respondentls motion for reconsideration in a resolution which dispositively reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Emiliano S. Micu is granted. The Resolution of the Commission First Division is hereby SET ASIDE. The proclamation of petitioner Alfonso Bince, Jr. on July 21, 1992 is hereby declared null and void. Accordingly, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is hereby directed to reconvene, with proper notices, and to order the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Manuel and Tayug to make the necessary corrections in the SOVs and COCs in the said municipalities. Thereafter, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to include the results in the said municipalities in its canvass. The PBC is likewise ordered to proclaim the second elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Sixth Legislative District of Pangasinan.
SO ORDERED. 13
This is the resolution assailed in the instant petition for certiorari. We do not find merit in this petition and accordingly rule against petitioner. Respondent COMELEC did not act without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the proclamation of petitioner Alfonso Bince, Jr. and in directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan to order the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel to make the necessary corrections in the SOVs and COCs in said municipalities and to proclaim the winner in the sixth legislative district of Pangasinan. At the outset, it is worthy to observe that no error was committed by respondent COMELEC when it resolved the "pending incidents" of the instant case pursuant to the decision of this Court in the aforesaid case of Bince, Jr. v.COMELEC on February 9, 1993 Petitioner's contention that his proclamation has long been affirmed and confirmed by this Court in the aforesaid case is baseless. In Bince, we nullified the proclamation of private respondent because the same was done without the requisite due notice and hearing, thereby depriving the petitioner of his right to due process. In so doing, however, we did not affirm nor confirm the proclamation of petitioner, hence, our directive to respondent COMELEC to resolve the pending incidents of the case so as to ascertain the true and lawful winner of the said elections. In effect, petitioner's proclamation only enjoyed the presumption of regularity and validity of an official act. It was not categorically declared valid. Neither can the COMELEC be faulted for subsequently annulling the proclamation of petitioner Bince on account of a mathematical error in addition committed by respondent MBCs in the computation of the votes received by both petitioner and private respondent. The petitions to correct manifest errors were filed on time, that is, before the petitioner's proclamation on July 21, 1992. The petition of the MBC of San Manuel was filed on June 4, 1992 while that of still, the MBC of Tayug was filed on June 5, 1992. Still, private respondent's petition was filed with the MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel on June 10, 1992 and June 11, 1992, respectively, definitely well within the period required by Section 6 (now Section 7), Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Section 6 clearly provides that the petition for correction may be filed at any time before proclamation of a winner, thus: Sec. 6. Correction of errors in tabulation or tallying of results by the board of canvassers. (a) Where it is clearly shown before proclamation that manifest errors were committed in the tabulation or tallying of election returns, or certificates of canvass, during the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election
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5. When the motion for reconsideration was denied on December 1, 1998, 30 petitioner filed on December 18, 1998 before the Commission on Elections a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and asked the trial court to defer the proceedings of Election Case No. 11-27 until after his petition shall have been finally resolved which was granted by the trial court. Hence, the scheduled revision of the ballots on December 14, 15, 16 and 17, 1998 was cancelled and the proceedings of the case held in abeyance; 31 6. As the Comelec En Banc did not give due course to petitioner's prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court, upon motion of the private respondent, issued an order for the revision of ballots on February 8, 1999. 32 On said day, neither the petitioner's counsel nor his designated revisors appeared, instead the petitioner, assisted by his numerous armed men, numbering around 30 stated ( sic) in strategic places, prevented the court personnel to enter the court premises. Were it not for the maximum
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TORRES, JR., J.: Assailed herein is the October 12, 1995 Resolution 1 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) dismissing the Petition Ad Cautelam of the Petitioner Teodoro Q. Pea in HRET Case No. 95-014. Petitioner questioned the election of the private respondent Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr. as Member of the House of Representatives representing the Second District of the province of Palawan. Petitioner and the private respondent were contenders for the said Congressional Office in the May 8, 1995 elections. On May 12, 1995, upon canvassing the votes cast, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Palawan proclaimed the private respondent as the winner. On May 22, 1995, the instant petition was filed with the HRET, wherein the petitioner, as protestant, averred that: 7. The elections in the precincts of the Second District of Palawan were tainted with massive fraud, widespread vote-buying, intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities committed before, during and after the voting, and during the counting of votes and the preparation of election returns and certificates of canvass which affected the results of the election. Among the fraudulent acts committed were the massive vote-buying and intimidation of voters, disenfranchisement of petitioner's known supporters through systematic deletion of names from the lists of voters, allowing persons to vote in excess of the number of registered voters, misappreciation, misreading and non-reading of protestant's ballots and other irregularities. 8. According to the Statement of Votes by Precinct/Municipality/City, the protestee allegedly obtained 52,967 votes, while the protestant allegedly obtained 46,023 votes, or a difference of 6,944 votes. A copy of said document is attached hereto as Annex "B". 9. Had the massive fraud, widespread intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities not been committed, the result of the elections for Member of the House of Representatives would have been different and the protestant would have garnered the highest number of votes for the Office of Member of the House of Representatives in the Second District of Palawan, which was the true expression of the will of the voters of the Province of Palawan.
10. The proclamation by the members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Palawan that the protestee was allegedly the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Second District of Palawan is contrary to law and to the true expression of the will of the voters of the Province of Palawan. 2
Private respondent-Protestee Abueg filed an Answer With Affirmative Defense, Counterclaim and Counter-Protest3 on June 5, 1995, to which Pea filed a Reply on June 23, 1995. Subsequent to the filing of his Answer, Abueg filed a Motion to Dismiss 4 the Petition on June 22, 1995, averring that the HRET has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition, the same being insufficient in form and substance. In essence, the motion to dismiss anchors its challenge on the fact that the petition failed to allege the precincts where the massive fraud and disenfranchisement of voters occurred, nor did it point out how many votes would be gained by the protestant as a result of the same. Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss 5 on July 10, 1995, attaching thereto a Summary of Contested Precincts, naming 700 precincts where election irregularities allegedly occurred. In its Resolution of October 12, 1995, the respondent HRET ruled that although it had jurisdiction over the petition, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives, the said petition, however, fails to state a cause of action, and is therefore, insufficient in form and substance, meriting its dismissal. The HRET states pertinently: There are 743 precincts in the second congressional district of Palawan which is comprised of Puerto Princesa City and the municipalities of Aborlan, Balabac, Bataraza, Brooke's Point, Narra, Quezon, and Marcos (Ordinance appended to the 1973 Constitution). The Protestant failed to specify which are the 700 precincts, out of the said 743 precincts, that are included in his protest; he even failed to allege the municipalities where the protested precincts are located. Worse, the body of the Petition does not even mention the 700 precincts. Reference to them is made only in the Prayer. These omissions prevent Protestee from being apprised of the issues which he has to meet and make it virtually impossible for the Tribunal to determine which ballot boxes have to be collected.
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Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was denied by the respondent tribunal on November 14, 1995. In this Petition for Certiorari, filed on December 29, 1995, petitioner argues that the respondent HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to having acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the election protest of petitioner considering that: I THE PETITION AD CAUTELAM DATED 22 MAY 1995 STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AND IS SUFFICIENT IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE. II ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PETITION WAS INITIALLY DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT FAILED TO SPECIFY THE CONTESTED PRECINCTS, SAID DEFECT WAS CURED WHEN PETITIONER
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KAPUNAN, J.:
Danilo Manalastas, Ferdinand Meneses and Ernesto Punzalan were among the four (4) candidates for mayor of the municipality of Mexico, Pampanga during the May 8, 1995 elections. On May 24, 1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Ferdinand Meneses as the duly elected mayor, having garnered a total of 10,301 votes against Danilo Manalastas' 9,317 votes and Ernesto Punzalan's 8,612 votes.
On May 30, 1995, Danilo Manalastas filed an election protest docketed as Election Case No. E-005-95 before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, challenging the results of the elections in the municipality's forty-seven (47) precincts. 1 In due time, Ferdinand Meneses filed his answer with counter protest impugning the results in twenty-one (21) precincts 2 of the 47 protested by Manalastas. On June 2, 1995, Ernesto Punzalan filed his own election protest docketed as Election Case No. E-006-95, also before the RTC in San Fernando, Pampanga, questioning the results of the elections in one hundred and fifty seven (157) precincts. 3Meneses, on his part, filed an answer with counter-protest with respect to ninety-six (96) precincts 4 of the 157 protested by Punzalan.
Since the two (2) election protests involved the same parties and subject matter, they were ordered consolidated and were jointly tried by the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 44. Succinctly, the election contests sought the nullification of the election of Meneses allegedly due to massive fraud, irregularities and other illegal electoral practices during the registration and the voting as well as during the counting of votes such as: a. the registration of flying voters; b. the preparation of ballots by persons other than the registered electors concerned; c. the use of electoral fraudulent practice such as the "lansadera;" d. false reading of votes for the petitioner/protestant; e. the counting of illegal and marked ballots and stray votes as votes for the respondent/protestee; f. switching of ballots in favor of respondent/protestee; g. tampering with the ballots for the petitioner/protestant after having been cast, so as to annul the same or to substitute therefor illegal votes for respondent/protestee; h. the adding of more votes to those actually counted for the respondent/protestee and the reducing of the votes actually counted for the petitioner/protestant in the preparation of the corresponding election return;
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What should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid down by the HRET that a ballot is considered valid and genuine for as long as it bears any one of these authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and (c) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the presence of red or blue fibers in the ballots. It is only when none of these marks appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject to rejection. Similarly, Section 211 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines" provides that in the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is a clear and good reason to justify its rejection. Certainly, the inefficiency of an election officer in failing to affix his signature at the back of the ballot does not constitute as a good and clear reason to justify the rejection of a ballot.
Second. Punzalan contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring valid (a) the ballots wherein the signatures of the BEI chairmen were different from their respective signatures appearing on several COMELEC documents, (b) those group of ballots allegedly written by one (1) hand and (c) a number of single ballots written by two (2) persons. He argues that the trial court's findings on the authenticity of said handwritings must prevail over the findings of the COMELEC because: 1) the finding of the Regional Trial Court was based first on the findings of the revisors with the assistance of an expert witness in the person of Atty. Desiderio Pagui; (2) the finding of the Regional Trial Court was arrived at after an adversarial proceeding where both parties were represented by their lawyers and the expert witness was cross-examined; and (3) on the other hand, the findings of the public respondent were made unilaterally, without any hearing and without the presence of the lawyers of the parties and of the parties themselves. 15
. . . . With respect to the contention that a technical examination of the ballots should have been ordered to determine whether they had been written by two or more persons, or in groups written by only one hand, we hold that the Commission en banc did not commit an abuse of its discretion in denying petitioner-protestee's request. The rule is settled that the Commission itself can make the determination without the need of calling handwriting experts. Nor was evidence aliunde necessary to enable the Commission to determine the genuineness of the handwriting on the ballots, an examination of the ballots themselves being sufficient . . . . 20
In Bocobo v. COMELEC, 21 we likewise ruled that:
. . . . Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting; this can be done by the COMELEC itself. We have ruled that evidence aliunde is not allowed to prove that a ballot is marked, an inspection of the ballot itself being sufficient (Penson v. Parungao, 52 Phil. 718) . . . . 22
In the case at bar, the opinion of Atty. Pagui, who was claimed to be a handwriting expert, was not binding upon the COMELEC especially so where the question involved the mere similarity or dissimilarity of handwritings which could be determined by a comparison of existing signatures or handwriting. 23 Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting "with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge." In Lorenzo v. Diaz, 24 this Court enumerated the tools to aid one in the examination of handwriting, thus:
The authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm, presence of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades, etc., that may be found between the questioned signature and the genuine one are not decisive on the question of the former's authenticity. The result of examination of questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are other factors that must be taken into consideration. The position of the writer, the condition of the surface on which the paper where the questioned signature is written is placed, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or paper used, played an important role on the general appearance of the signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, or direct or circumstantial competent evidence of the character of a questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between the questioned handwriting and an authentic one. 25 Indeed, the haste and pressure, the rush and excitement permeating the surroundings of polling places could certainly affect the handwriting of both the voters and the election officers manning the said precincts. The volume of work to be done and the numerous documents to be filled up and signed must likewise be considered. Verily, minor and insignificant variations in handwriting must be perceived as indicia of genuineness rather than of falsity.
In Go Fay v. Bank of the Philippines Islands, 26 this Court held that carelessness, spontaneity, unpremeditation, and speed in signing are evidence of genuineness. In U . S. v. Kosel, 27 it was ruled that dissimilarity in certain letters in a handwriting may be attributed to the mental and physical condition of the signer and his position when he signed. Grief, anger, vexation, stimulant, pressure and weather have some influence in one's writing. Because of these, it is an accepted fact that it is very rare that two (2) specimens of a person's signature are exactly alike. On the issue of the genuineness of the handwriting on the ballots, it is observed that the specimens examined by Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui, presented by Punzalan as an expert witness, were mere certified true copies of the ballots and documents concerned. 28 This fact raised a cloud of doubt and made the findings suspect. Consequently, the examination of the ballots themselves by the COMELEC should not be brushed aside. Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court (the COMELEC in this case) to make itself the comparison of the disputed handwriting "with writings admitted as genuine by the party whom the evidence is offered." Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive in the sense that they must be accepted as true on the subject of their testimony, but are generally regarded as purely advisory in character; the courts may place whatever weight they choose upon such testimony and may reject it, if they find that it is consistent with the facts in the case or otherwise unreasonable. 29
In the same manner, whether or not certain ballots were marked had been addressed by the COMELEC by personally and actually examining the ballots themselves. We find no compelling reasons to disturb its findings.
In closing, we would like to stress a well-founded rule ensconced in our jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. 30 An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative.
Prescinding from the foregoing, we find that respondent COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in G.R. No. 132435. The petitions in G.R. Nos. 126669, 127900 and 128800 are rendered moot by the preceding disquisition.
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MEDIALDEA, J.: This petition seeks the reversal of the decision of respondent Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch 9, Quezon City rendered in an appealed election case and which decision proclaimed herein private respondent Roberto Miguel as the duly elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Teachers Village East, Quezon City, in the Barangay Elections held on May 17, 1982, with a plurality of twenty-four (24) votes over herein petitioner Sergio Bautista. Both the petitioner Sergio Bautista and private respondent Roberto Miguel were candidates for the office above mentioned. After canvass, petitioner Bautista was proclaimed the winner by the Barangay Board of Canvassers on May 17, 1982 with a plurality of two (2) votes. On May 25, 1982, Roberto Miguel filed a protest before the City Court of Quezon City, (docketed as Election Case No. 82408) on the ground of fraud and illegal acts or practices allegedly committed by Bautista. The latter filed an answer but filed no counter protest. It appears that the results of the election in all the four (4) voting centers in Bgy. Teachers Village East, Quezon City were contested. A revision and recounting of the ballots was conducted which resulted in a tie. The votes obtained by both of the protagonists were as follows: 1. In Voting Center. No. 519: MIGUEL = 126 votes BAUTISTA = 180 votes Protestant-appellant contested the ruling of the lower Court on the following ballots: Exhs. a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, and o. Protestee-appellee contested the ruling of the lower Court on the following ballots: Exhs. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. 2. In Voting Center No. 520: MIGUEL = 152 votes BAUTISTA = 122 votes Protestant-appellant contested the ruling of the lower Court on the following ballots: Exhs. P, Q and R. 3. In Voting Center No. 521: MIGUEL = 150 votes BAUTISTA = 136 votes Protestant-appellant contested the ruling of the lower Court on the following ballots: Exhs. 6 and 7. 4. In Voting Center No. 522: MIGUEL = 222 votes BAUTISTA = 212 votes
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VITUG, J.: The 28th May 1997 decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ("HRET"), which affirmed the proclamation of herein private respondent Jose Tan Ramirez declaring him to be the duly elected Representative of Eastern Samar for having obtained the plurality of votes over petitioner Marcelino Libanan, and the 20th June 1997 resolution of the HRET, which denied with finality petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are sought to be annulled in this special civil action for certiorari. Petitioner Marcelino Libanan and private respondent Jose Ramirez were among the candidates for the lone congressional seat of Eastern Samar in the May 1995 elections. After the canvass of the returns was made on 13 May 1995, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Eastern Samar proclaimed respondent Ramirez to have been duly elected Representative of the District with a total of forty-one thousand five hundred twenty-three (41,523) votes, compared to petitioner's forty thousand eight hundred sixty-nine (40,869) votes, or a margin of six hundred fifty-four(654) votes over those of petitioner. Petitioner Libanan seasonably filed an election protest before the HRET claiming, among other things, that the 08th May 1995 elections in Eastern Samar were marred by massive electoral irregularities perpetrated or instigated by respondent Ramirez, as well as his leaders and followers, in the twenty-three (23) municipalities of the lone district of Eastern Samar with the aid, in various instances, of peace officers supposedly charged with maintaining an orderly and honest election. Petitioner contested seventy-nine (79) precincts in five (5) municipalities. He also maintained that the election returns and/or ballots in certain precincts were tampered with, substituted, or systematically marked in favor of respondent Ramirez. Libanan prayed that, after due proceedings, the HRET should issue an order to annul the election and proclamation of Ramirez and to thereafter so proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Eastern Samar. In his answer and counter-protest, with a petition for preliminary hearing on the special and affirmative defenses, respondent Ramirez denied the charges. He counter-protested the results of the elections in certain precincts where, he claimed, Libanan engaged in massive vote buying, lansadera, terrorism and tearing of the list of voters to disenfranchise voters therein listed. Accordingly, he prayed, inter alia, for the dismissal of the protest and the confirmation of his election as the duly elected representative of the Lone District of Eastern Samar. After some peripheral issues were settled by the HRET, the revision of ballots in the protested precincts commenced on 20 February 1996. The HRET noted that Libanan contested a total of seventy-nine (79) precincts. It was noted during the revision, however, that six (6) of the contested precincts, namely, Precincts Nos. 14, 15, 16, 18, 19 and 20 of Arteche, were found to have been merged during the 08 May 1995 elections into three (3) precincts, i.e., Precincts Nos. 14 and 19, Precincts Nos. 15 and 16 and Precincts Nos. 18 and 20. Thus, only seventy-six (76) ballot boxes were actually opened for revision, one of which, Precinct No. 4-1 of Guiuan, did not contain any ballot. On 22 February 1996, while the revision of the counter-protested precincts was being held, Ramirez filed an "Urgent Motion to Withdraw/Abandon Counter-Protest in Specific Municipalities/Precincts" praying that he be granted leave to 1 withdraw and abandon partially his counter-protest in certain precincts. Libanan filed an opposition thereto but the motion was eventually granted by the Chairman of the HRET and subsequently confirmed in a resolution by the tribunal. On 21 March 1996, the HRET designated a Hearing Commissioner and a Deputy Hearing Commissioner for the reception of evidence. Following that reception, the respective memoranda of Libanan and Ramirez were filed. The evidence and the issues submitted by the parties for consideration by the HRET related mainly to the proper appreciation of the ballots objected to, or claimed by, the parties during the revision. No evidence was presented in support of the other allegations of the protest (like the alleged tampering of election returns) and of the counter-protest (such as the alleged tearing of some of the pages of the computerized list of voters to disenfranchise legitimate voters and the use of goons to terrorize and compel voters to vote for Libanan), nor were these issues discussed in the memoranda of the parties. The HRET thus concentrated, such as can be rightly expected, its attention to the basic appreciation of 2 ballots. The particular matter focused in this petition deals with what petitioner claims to be spurious ballots; on this score, the HRET has explained: No spurious ballot was found in this case. For a ballot to be rejected for being spurious, the ballot must not have any of the following authenticating marks: a) the COMELEC watermark; b) the signatures or initial of the BEI Chairman at the back of the ballot; and c) red and blue fibers. In the present case, all the ballots examined by the Tribunal had COMELEC watermarks.
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