Axiomathes (2013) 23:269289 DOI 10.

1007/s10516-011-9170-z ORIGINAL PAPER

Exemplication, Then and Now

Fred Wilson

Received: 25 April 2011 / Accepted: 7 July 2011 / Published online: 30 July 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Abstract Exemplication can be found in ontologies from the ancient world, such as those of Plato and Aristotle, and more recent ontologies, in particular those that take what exists to be determined by the empiricists Principle of Acquaintance. This study examines some of the ways in which exemplication takes different forms in these different ontologies. Exemplication has also been criticized as an ontological category. This paper examines a number of these criticisms, to see the extent to which they are viable. Keywords Exemplication Ontologies Universals Properties Particulars

1 I Peleus to his son Achilles, Always be pre-eminent. So goes Homer, anyway. But pre-eminent in what? Recall how the Iliad begins: Rage of Achilles, son of Peleus, let that be your song, O Muse1 , that is, Rage, is the rst word of the Iliad, and therefore the rst IndoEuropean word of which we have a record. So the muse inspires Homer to create, in the way that poets create, a narrative concerning the rage of Achilles. It is a part of the story of the Greek conquest of Troy. Indeed, it is a central part, since the rage of Achilles, so strong is it, that he withdraws from the battle, which, since he is greatest of the Greek heros, the Greeks come near to defeat and disaster. Homer continues:
1

Homer (1999, p. 12).

F. Wilson (&) University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, USA e-mail: fwilson@chass.utoronto.ca

123

270

Axiomathes (2013) 23:269289

the accursed rage which brought countless sorrows upon the Acheans and sent down to Hades many valiant souls of warriors, and made the men themselves to be spoil for dogs and birds of every kind. Achilles is here, in his rage, as elsewhere, pre-eminent, that was the charge of Peleus. It would have been better for the Greeks, however, if he had not been pre-eminent in his rage. Contrary to Peleus, there are things where pre-eminence is not a virtue. Now, Achilles is clearly a hero, and there are many other heros in the Iliad, and many gods and goddesses. Everyone of them is at least eminent in many things, and many are, like Achilles, pre-eminent. We get no guidance from Peleus or from anywhere in the Iliad about how we might nd a way by means of which we can distinguish what characteristics belong to a man who is not only pre-eminent but also virtuous. Now turn to another Greek word: : paideiathe process of educating a , usually translated as virtue, man to become a good citizen with or arete which for the Greek meant excellence, or, in Peleus phrase, pre-eminent, so actually means something closer to what we would express through that arete phrases like being the best you can be, or achieving the very best you are is frequently associated with bravery, for both Greek capable of. For Homer, arete and Trojan heros; but it is also used to connote effectiveness, and came to have this more general meaning to the Athenians in the age of Socrates. The man or woman is a person who achieves the highest degree of effectiveness in his or her with arete exercises all his or her capacities and undertakings; the person who displays arete uses all his or her faculties2: strength, bravery, like Achilles, wit, and also deceptiveness, like Odysseus, or like Hercules and the Augean stables, and, like all three, endurance, to effectively achieve real results. Above all, for any Greek at the time of Socrates, it meant being pre-eminent in the virtues characterizing a citizen (which may be different in Athens and, say, Sparta). But warlike virtues had become less signicant and civic virtues like justice had become more important between the time of Homer and the time of Socrates. One might also mention that athletics of a man. were also part of the arete Arete was the goal of education. In a man this was acquired through the process was the of education; being able to exercise ones capacities as required by arete goal of paideia. The main task of a youth becoming educated was to acquire by memory the poems of Homer, the Iliad and the Odyssey. This role of the poems came with their standardization, in a written text. An important role in this standardization seems to have been played by the Athenian tyrant Hipparchus, who reformed the recitation of Homeric poetry at the Panathenaic festival; it is likely that this reform involved the production of a canonical written text. Whatever the latter may be, the memorized Homer set the standards of at which the youth of Greece and in particular the youth of excellence or arete Athens were to aim: their end became that of pre-eminence, and they could achieve that by imitating the heros of the Homeric poems. Homer had, through his poetry, provided each youth with an image or images of heros who had achieved pre2

It is almost always a man in Homer, a he and not a she, and so we should so speak that human virtue is represented by the virtue of a man; we can therefore use the simple he and not worry about the more complicated he or she. But at the same time we should remember that Homer makes clear that we also nd human virtue and, indeed, pre-eminence in human virtue in Penelope.

123

Axiomathes (2013) 23:269289

271

eminence that could be set before the mind, and then could be imitated, as the . The core of a youths sought in their own lives that same excellence, that arete moral life is the emulation of the Homeric heros. We rst have to relate this culturally ingrained view of moral standards and how they are learned with the views of their greatest critic, Socrates. In the Phaedo,3 Socrates develops and defends an ontology on the basis of which he can argue that, contrary to the usual opinion in Athens and in Greece of that age, there is nothing to fear in death.4 The world, according to this ontology, has three sorts of entities. There is, rst, the world of ordinary things, the world we know in our everyday experience, the world of ordinary things, the world of sensible appearances. These sensible appearances are in themselves unconnected; there are changes, but just what follows what is a contingent matter: Socrates is sitting in his cell, so far as that sensible event is concerned there is nothing in it that implies what its successor will bedoes Socrates drink the hemlock? Or does he nip off to the safety of Thebes? One could explain why this follows that, why one event necessitates its successor, if one could nd a connection between them, but so far as our sense experience of the world goes, there is no such necessary connection. To explain is to unify, unify by means of a necessary connection. Socrates proposes that events in the world of sensible appearances are brought about by entities of the second sort. Sensible appearances, as it turns out, occur in souls, or no s. Souls are entities, and, more specically, entities that are active: one sensible appearance follows another because that is what is brought about by an active soul. Neither souls nor their activities are given to us in sense experience, but we know by our reasoning, by our reason, that souls are there, that they do exist. Thus, although we do not see the soul of Socrates, we know by reason that the activity of his soul determines that Socrates sitting in his cell is followed by his drinking of the hemlock, rather than by his nipping off to Thebes. The activity of the soul provides the connection that unies, and therefore explains, the pattern of appearances. Socrates is an active entity that causes changes in the world as it appears to us in our sense experience. He is sitting in his cell, and later is drinking the hemlock. The being of Socrates, what Socrates is and what he becomes, is determined by the activity of his soul; that activity provides the connection that explains. But the soul is not simply an entity that strives: it strives in a certain direction. Socrates argues that it is because his soul is striving after justice or the good that he is and is about to become in a certain way rather than another. Here is Socrates quarrel with Anaxagoras. The latter had introduced soul or no s, into his metaphysics, but did not do so in a way that could explain why Socrates was about to drink the hemlock. Anaxagoras had no s as causal activity, but that activity had no direction; he cannot tell us why Socrates is about to drink the hemlock rather than nip off to Thebes. Socrates has an answer: this answer is in terms of his third
3 4

See Plato (1977, 97c1 ff). Also Wilson (2001, pp. 81120; 2004b).

See Turnbull (1963) and Vlastos (1969). For a general and extended discussion of the Aristotelian metaphysics, see Wilson (1999), Logic and the Philosophy of Science in Early Modern Thought: Seven Studies, Study One in particular.

123

272

Axiomathes (2013) 23:269289

sort of entity. Socrates is about to drink the hemlock because he is striving after the good: this is an ideal form and he is striving to exemplify in the way he is and is to become this ideal form. Ideal forms are the third sort of entity in Socrates ontology. The form gives direction to the striving. We can see why Socrates holds that he can explain change where Anaxagoras cannot. Socrates is moved by his soul. Here he and Anaxagoras agree. But there Anaxagoras ends5: Anaxagoras provides no reason why Socrates should move from where he is at to his drinking the hemlock. There is, however, no striving without a good at which the striving aims. Anaxagoras leaves out this crucial entity, the good. Socrates, by way of the forms, makes it integral to his explanation-scheme. Socrates explains, Anaxagoras does not. Socrates gives an argument, which is not without force, to establish the ideality of the forms. Consider, he says, equality, that is, perfect equality. Any pair of equals that we are given in our sensible experience of the world are not perfectly equal; these things are only imperfectly equal. But in order to identify something as imperfectly equal one must perforce know what perfectly equal isjust as when we identify something as not-red one must perforce know what red is. However, all equals that we know by sense are imperfectly equal. What it is for something to be perfectly equal, while, as we have seen, is given to us, it cannot be given to us in sense experience. Perfect equality, this ideal form of equality, is therefore not part of the world as we know it by sense; it is outside that worldan entity we have come to know by our reason. The forms, then, are not sensible, but instead rational, not sensible, but instead ideal. What holds for equality also holds for justice. Any justice that we know in the world of sensible appearances is imperfectly just. But to know what it is to be imperfectly just, one must know what it is to be perfectly just. Perfect justice is therefore given to us, not through sense, but through reason. Socrates, as an active soul, is striving to be just, that is, or at least as just as he can be: he is striving to exemplify in the way he is and is to become this ideal form of justice. So he shall drink the hemlock rather than nip off to Thebes, since to be just is to conform to the laws of ones state, in this case Athensjust as, at the Battle of Thermopylae, conformity to the laws of Sparta requires its sons, even when they could have ed, to ght the Persians to their own death.6 A death of which they have no fear. The ideal form or exemplar is not known by sense; no one whom we might know in the sensible world in which we all live conforms in his or her behaviour to that standardnot even Socrates, who is clearly arrogant, and through that is like the rest of us, falling short of the ideal standard. We are all, even the best of us, imperfectly just. The ideal form of justice is therefore not an entity of the world of sense, but lies outside that worldit is located neither here nor there, in a timeless
5 6

This is not entirely fair to Anaxagoras; see Wilson (2009, p. 20ff).

Recall from Herodotus the inscription that later Greeks were to place at the site of the battle: Stranger, announce to the Spartans that here We lie, having fullled their laws. Laws could be orders; but orders conveys the suggestion that an element of arbitrariness is possible, whereas it is clear that the orders were made in conformity to the laws, and so understood they too have the force of laws.

123

Axiomathes (2013) 23:269289

273

world, existing eternally, in the sense of being outside of time, and never changing. We do know this world, though not by sense; it is known, rather, by our reason, which leads us to it. But one must note that the image of Achilles that the Athenians expected one to emulate is also nowhere; it is the creation of poets. Whether one is Socrates striving to exemplify in his own life as we see it the form of ideal justice or Alcibiades striving to exemplify in his life as we see it the form one nds in the image, created by Homer, of Achillesin either case, the form that is being emulated is not a sensible particular, located here and nowthough, to be sure, the image created by the poets is of an entity of the sort that is known by sense, where the form of justice that Socrates emulates is known by reason.7 The ideal form of justice, that is, perfect justice, is an entity outside of time. It therefore is, as we have said, eternal and in that sense immortal. Now, what distinguishes the gods, the gods of Olympus, according to Homer, from ordinary humans, is that they are immortal. The ideal forms to which Socrates directs our attention, are also immortal. They are therefore gods, and to dwell among the forms is to dwell among the gods, also as Socrates insists. The virtuous or just life consists in the imitation of the forms, and specically the form of justice. In the world we know by sense experience we cannot escape imperfection. But we can act to eliminate so far as possible these evils. The way to eliminating or mitigating these evils is to turn away from the world of the sense to the realm of the godsthat is, the formscontemplating them and patterning our lives like the patterns we are contemplating in the gods. As Theodorus, Socrates interlocutor, in the Theatetus, puts it, the escape-route [from evil, from imperfection] is assimilation to God, in so far as this is possible. (Theatetus, 176b) This Platos famous rule of homoiosis theoi, that virtue consists in the assimilation to God or the gods. Of course, the gods of Olympus are immortal, as Homer presents them, in the sense of omnitemporalexisting at all times. Immortality in the sense of omnitemporalilty is the only way in which creatures of esh and blood, creatures as we experience them by our senses, could be immortal. Portraying the gods as simply omnitemporal rather than as eternal is one of the ways in which Homer misrepresents the gods: it misrepresents the gods as entities like ourselves, creatures of esh and blood and knowable by sense. Homer misrepresents the human also. For Homer, humans are limited to the world of sense experience. But that is an incomplete picture. Humans also have the
7

According to Plato, Aristotle tells us, sensible entities participate (methexis) in the forms (Ideas), but he means by participation what is meant by imitation. As Aristotle explains in the Metaphysics: Things of this other sort, then, he called Ideas, and sensible things, he said, were apart from these, and were all called after these; for the multitude of things which have the same name as the Form exist by participation in it. Only the name participation was new; for the Pythagoreans say that things exist by imitation of numbers, and Plato says they exist by participation, changing the name. (Meta. 987b)

The position of the Republic concerning the education the young is that the poets (read: Homer) are to be excluded from the Ideal City because the present images, e.g., of Achilles, which the young are seduced by the beauty of the poetry to imitate. Better, Plato argues, to imitate the ideal form of justice. Forms are like images created by the poets: they are entities that are to be imitated.

123

274

Axiomathes (2013) 23:269289

capacity to reach beyond the world of sense to the transcendent world of the ideal forms. This capacity is their reason. This Homer leaves out. It is through this capacity that Socrates is able to explain to his interlocutors why he has no fear of death. As a philosopher he is constantly turning away from the world of sense towards the forms. In the world of sense he is, to be sure, guided by the forms, by the gods, including among the latter his daimon. But to know that which he or she is to strive to exemplify in his or her own life, he or she must turn away from the world of sense to the transcendent realm of the forms. And insofar as he or she achieves knowledge of the forms, he or she achieves immortality. The philosopher is constantly dying, turning away from the world of sense. But when we see how this is done, we see that he or she achieves immortality, in the sense of eternality. And we also see that there is nothing to fear in death. With this metaphysics in mind we can see what is wrong with the common way of educating the youth of Athens. The youth are expected to exemplify, in their own behaviour, the behaviour of the Achean heros like Achilles and of the Achean gods like Zeus. This behaviour is not that of a just person, the examples in the Iliad are all examples of imperfect justice: Achilles propensity to quickly anger and the propensity of Zeus to rape are not things worthy of emulation. One should, therefore, not strive to exemplify cases of imperfect justice, like the anger of Achilles, but rather, as Socrates does, strive to emulate the form of perfect justice not the sort of justice one can nd in the world of sensible appearances but the ideal form of justice to which reason directs our attention. The poets, then, as Socrates argues in the Republic, ought not be allowed to seduce the youth in any city which aims to have virtuous citizens; it is the philosophers, masters of reason rather than poetry, to whom the education of youth ought to be entrusted. For us, the point is that Achilles, Zeus, and the ideal form of justice to which reason leads us are exemplars that are to be emulated. If the poets and the ordinary citizens to whom the education of youth is to be entrusted have their way, then Achilles and Zeus are the exemplars that are to be imitated in the lives of the citizens; if Socrates the philosopher is correct then it is the ideal form of justice, that is, the exemplar, the prime exemplar, that ought to be imitated in ones own life and in the lives of the citizens. The point of the exemplar is that the pattern that it exemplies be exemplied by any person who takes the exemplar to set the pattern that he or she strives to exemplify in his or her own life. Jeffrey Grupp8 has taken on the task of showing that any ontology makes no sense if it involves anything like exemplication, something by means of which the entities in the world of sensible entities located in space and time are linked or connected to entities which are neither here nor there but are located rather in a timeless world of ideal forms. He tells us that platonic exemplication may leave one puzzled as to how exactly it can tie or connect unlocated (*L) universals to located (L) physical particulars (p. 30). Grupp deals with a number of ways in which a philosopher might make exemplication part of his metaphysics. We shall look further at his views, but right now let us look at the metaphysics we have been examining, that which Plato develops in the Phaedo.
8

Grupp (2003).

123

Axiomathes (2013) 23:269289

275

Now, a person, aiming to do what is right, can emulate Homers Achilles; or, to put the same in different terms, with the image of Achilles before his or her mind, this person can strive after the form found in Achilles. He or she can imitate the form of what is right or just found in the image of Achilles created by the poets and exemplify in his or her own life the pattern of behaviour found in Achilles. Others, too, can strive after the same form, and imitate in their own lives the behaviour of Achilles. These persons are, of course, located, in Athens or Miletus or Sparta or wherever. Yet the image of Achilles is not located anywhere; it is unlocated. The one, that is, the image of Achilles, is connected to the many, through the strivings of the latter to imitate the former. But the form of justice presented in the image of Achilles is imperfect relative to the standard of perfect or ideal justice to which our reason, prodded by Socrates, has led us. Some, Socrates for example, strive to imitate this ideal form of justice. The form they do attain falls short of the ideal, but still, it is the ideal form that they strive to imitate. The ideal form of justice, which is, to be sure, unlocated, is nonetheless connected to the many all of whom are located but are also those who strive to exemplify in their own lives that ideal form. There appears to be no problem with the many exemplifying the standard found in Homers Achilles. Equally there would appear to be no problem with the many exemplifying, or striving to exemplify, the standard found in the ideal form of justiceprovided, of course, such an ideal standard exists, but then we also know that Socrates, through his and our reason, has led us to recognize the existence of such an ideal form. We admire Babe Ruth. He is an exemplar, and anyone can try to exemplify in his or her own life the life of Babe Ruth. Why does that youth holding the bat in this way follow upon his holding the bat in this other way? Answer: Because that is the way Babe Ruth swung the bat and the youth is imitating Babe Ruth as an exemplar. The youths swing of the bat is, if you will allow the expression, Ruth-ish. Similarly: Why has that youth exiled himself from his city when the magistrates angered him? Answer: Because that is the way Achilles behaved when Agamemnon affronted him and the youth is imitating Achilles as an exemplar. The behaviour of the youth is noble, like that of Achilles; what he did was the noble thing to do. Similarly: Why does Socrates drink the hemlock after being condemned rather than nipping off to Thebes? Because that is what the ideal form of justice requires and Socrates is imitating that form as an exemplar. What Socrates was doing was the just thing to do. We all know what it means to imitate Babe Ruth. We all know what it means to imitate Achilles. It is just this that Socrates means when he argues that we must imitate the ideal form of justice. Several persons can, in their sensible appearances, display the Ruth-ish behaviour of the exemplar. This is unproblematic. Similarly, several persons can, in their sensible appearances, display the noble behaviour of Achilles, the exemplar being imitated. This is unproblematic. Again, and also similarly, several persons, e.g., Seneca,9 Cato of Utica,10 can in their
9 10

Seneca the philosopher was ordered by Nero to commit suicide.

Cato the Younger, of Utica, who had been educated under the guidance of Antipater of Tyre, a Stoic philosopher, refused to accept the triumph of Caesar over the Republic and his becoming de facto the ruler of Rome; and when Caesar defeated the last of the Republicans at the Battle of Thapsus, then, with the stern righteousness demanded by the Republic, he refused to grant to Caesar the right to pardon him, and committed suicide. He stabbed himself, but in doing so knocked over an abacus. The noise alerted his

123

276

Axiomathes (2013) 23:269289

sensible appearances, display the righteous behaviour of the ideal form of justice, the exemplar being imitated. There is, in other words, nothing problematic about exemplication, that is, participation in an exemplar being imitated, in this metaphysics. The notion of an ideal form as an exemplar to be imitated may be problematic, but once that is granted, exemplication or imitation is unproblematic. Just as imitating Babe Ruth or imitating Achilles is unproblematic. Grupp is therefore wrong in his claim that any metaphysics that is in some reasonable sense Platonic and requires a notion of exemplication must be wrong.

2 II There is, however, something inadequate about the metaphysics that Socrates develops in the Phaedo. It remains an open question, why does, or ought, Socrates strive after the form of human justice, rather than, say the form of doggie justice? If he strove to live up to the standard of dogs, seeking only an animal existence, then in all likelihood he would nip off to Thebes; but he doesnt do that because he is instead striving to imitate the form of human justice. If the Phaedo is correct in what it says about souls, then souls are activities, but are, in the account of the Phaedo, in fact simply bare activities. They are separate from the forms, and, since explanation requires unication, that separation implies that there is no explanation why a soul strives in one direction rather than another: whither they go is merely contingent. So, why doesnt Socrates seek doggie justice and nip off to Thebes? What explains his staying to drink the hemlock? The third man argument is at hand. Socrates striving after human justice needs explaining; on the Phaedo model, Socrates striving after human justice must be a striving after a formthat is, another form, a super-form, as it were, of human justice. But this super-form is also separate from Socrates and so his striving after this from requires explanation; this explanation will be in terms of Socrates striving after yet another form, a supersuper-form, or, perhaps, a superduper-form. However, this too is separate, the direction of Socrates striving here again requires explanationwhich will require an appeal to a supersuperduper-form. And so on: there is an innite regress, which never yields the desired explanation, and is therefore vicious. Aristotle saw how to meet this challenge: close the gap.11 That is, eliminate the separation of the souls and the forms. Place the forms instead directly in the souls, and make them inseparable from the souls. So, aiming at human justice is inseparable from the striving of Socrates soul. Socrates of necessity strives after human justice; that is just what he is: if Socrates is separated from his aiming at human justice then Socrates ceases to be.
Footnote 10 continued servants who summoned a physician who attempted to bandage the wound. Cato, upon awakening, thrust him away, tore off the bandages, and expired. Lucan wrote his epitaph, Victrix causa deis placuit sed victa Catoni (The conquering cause pleased the gods, but the conquered cause pleased Cato, Lucan 1.128). Plutarch reports that Caesar commented that Cato, I grudge you your death, as you would have grudged me the preservation of your life. He is said to have died reading the Phaedo. There is a famous painting of his suicide by Luca Giordano in the gallery at Nice.
11

See Wilson (2001, p. 122 f).

123

Axiomathes (2013) 23:269289

277

Socrates as a soul of necessity has a certain form, namely, that of humanity, and this determines that he aims to instantiate or exemplify human justice, rather than doggie justice, and that he will after all drink the hemlock. Furthermore, if something is of necessity, then we can do nothing but acquiesce to it: any other attitude would be unreasonable, attempting to will an end that one cannot achieve. Any end that one is committed to as a matter of metaphysical necessity is an end that not only determines ones being, what one is and what one will become, but also determines what one ought to be. On Aristotles scheme the form is inseparable from the soul: in other words, the form is itself an active entity. In striving at an end that is what one will become, the form exists only potentially. The soul is a form that is itself striving, that is, striving to become actual; it aims to actualize itself. The soul that moves one aims at its instantiation in being; the soul determines that one exemplify the form that the soul isexemplify that form in the world of ordinary experience, sensible experience. Thus, consider Socrates. Socrates is, as Aristotle speaks, a substance. This substance has various sensible characteristics present in it, and which are therefore predicated of it, for example, sitting in a jail cell is a sensible characteristic of the substance Socrates, and is predicated of that substance. Socrates is sitting the jail cell. Since he is that way, that is his way of being. These sensible appearances are present in things taken to be substances. A substance has such and such a sensible appearance, followed by another sensible appearance. The active form of the substance explains such a change. The form, as the active cause of such a change, is not a sensible characteristic, and is not present in the substance as the sensible characteristics are present in the substance. It lies behind or underneath the sensible characteristics, and unlike the latter is not given in our sense experience of things. As Spinoza taught us to speak, let us take for granted that informed soul is the nature of the ordinary thing or, as Aristotle speaks, the substance which is ensouled, then the soul as a striving to bring its form into being is natura naturans, nature naturing or nature begetting, while the form as brought into being is natura naturata, nature natured or nature begotten. Socrates as a substance has an active form as its soul. The striving aims to bring it about that he (that is, the substance) sitting in the cell is followed by him drinking the hemlock. There is an alteration in the sensible characteristics of the substance; in such an alteration, the substance changes from one way of being to another.

3 III Grupp objected to an ontology that was Platonic, in the sense of having a timeless or eternal form exemplied in sensible particulars, that it made no sense. Such an ontology required, he claimed, that when one or more sensible particulars exemplied a form, this required that exemplication both be located (L), where each one of the particulars is located, and that it not have a location (*L), just as the form to which it relates has no location: nothing can be both L and *L, so the exemplication needed by Platos ontology cannot exist, and the ontology therefore fails. We argued that Platos ontology escapes this criticism so long as the forms are

123

278

Axiomathes (2013) 23:269289

thought of as parallel in appropriate respects to the images created by the poets. What the ontology requires is not that we have something that is L & *L, but only that entities in time be like or imitate entities that are not in time: as the images created by Homer and the poets show, things that are nowhere, the images, can be like things that are somewhere, the sensible particulars, and, while L & *L may in some sense be true, in any sense of L that is here in use, the conjunction is not a formal contradiction. For Aristotles ontology, the active form or nature of a substance, the natura naturans, is, like a Platonic form, outside the world of ordinary experience, and, in that sense, is timeless, or eternal. This nature is exemplied by sensible particulars which are in time. Unlike a Platonic form, however, the nature itself is also given to us, as the natura naturata, exemplied in the patterns of sensible appearances of those substances, one or many of them, of which it is the nature or form. For Plato, exemplication connects a form, which is not in time, with sensible particulars which are in time. For Aristotle, the form is not only outside of time, it is also in time: the form or nature itself is also, as natura naturata, in time. Now, as with Plato there is no reason why we should nd it problematic that a timeless entity should be connected to entities in time. Think of things in time as located serially in a line, the order of the things on the line representing the temporal order of the things. Now take an entity which is outside time; we can take it to be in a three-dimensional space in which the line of temporally ordered things also exists. The temporally ordered line can bend and turn in the three-dimensional space, without affecting the temporal order of the things on the line. In particular, it can bend and turn so that the entity not on the line, outside the temporal order, can touch not just one but ever so many objects on the line. It is not hard to conceive how an entity which is timeless can be connected to one or more entities that are in time. What is more difcult is the timeless form as natura naturata being exemplied multiply as a sensible entity in many particulars scattered throughout time and space. Here Grupps argument has greater force. There is an obvious sense in which the nature as natura naturata is multiply located. The active form that is the soul of an ordinary thing or substance derives, one sees clearly, from the forms of Platos ontology of the Phaedo. But the forms have become very different entities. In Plato the forms are not to be found anywhere in the world of sense. A form attracts the soul and the soul is attracted to that form, and strives to exemplify in the world of ordinary experience the form to which it is attracted. For Aristotle, the form as an active soul is, like a Platonic form, not in the world of sense; it is not given to us in our sense experience of things. But it does bring about its own being in the world of sense experience. Natura naturans is not known by sense, but what it brings about is natura naturata, its own being in the ordinary world, and this, the being of the form, is known by sense. The form outside the ordinary world of sense, and knowable there only by reason, makes itself manifest in that world of sense, and knowable there by sense. In Plato, the form is a patternmerely a pattern, if one wishesfor things in the world of ordinary experience. In Aristotle, the form is an active cause of things in the world of ordinary experience coming to have a certain pattern, coming to be in a certain

123

Axiomathes (2013) 23:269289

279

pattern. But it is necessary to keep in mind that the way that the form makes itself manifest in sense, the way that the form causes itself to be exemplied in the world of sense, is exactly the same form, the active potentiality made actual, made actual through the very activity which it is. This is the crucial difference from Plato: in Plato the form is given to reason and not to sense, in Aristotle the form is given both to reason and to sense.

4 IV There is a sense in which Platos thought moves by way of metaphor. The soul aims to imitate the form, or to assimilate itself to the form: these relations connect the timeless world of the forms and the sensible world of ordinary experience, but their basic sense clearly derives from the world of sense. Exemplication is but another way of speaking of the way in which ordinary things imitate the forms: it is a part of the metaphorical structure in which Platos thought moves. There is a sense, too, in which even the forms are metaphors. To be sure, Socrates uses an argument to establish the existence of the forms and to establish that we do know these forms. But the way in which they work in the overall structure of the ontology is based in metaphor: they work in the ontology in more or less the way in which the images created by Homer and the poets work in the lives of ordinary Athenians. In Aristotle, it is not the same. To be sure, the active form, just as with the soul and the forms in the Phaedo, is not given in sense: we know them and that they exist through reason, not sense. In fact, if we think of the world as limited to the world of sense experience, the world as delineated by an empiricist Principle of Acquaintance, then one can still recognize the role of metaphor. This is the idea that cause consists in activity. For both Plato and Aristotle the active causes transcend the world of sense experience, and are known only by reason. The views are the same, insofar as they both take cause to be essentially an activity. It brings about the exemplication of the form or nature in the world of sense experience. For Plato, however, the form is wholly transcendent. For Aristotle, in contrast, while the form does transcend the world of sense experience, it is also immanent in that world. The active form that brings about its own exemplication in the world of sense is the natura naturans. But the natura naturata which is the nature of the thing made manifest in the world of ordinary experience, is given to us in sense. And this nature or form in the sense of natura naturata will be one entity that is present in many entities, the sensible particulars that exemplify itone entity exemplied by many entities. And we can see this form present in the particulars that exemplify it. The form is not something distinct from a particular which that particular imitates; rather, the form is present in the particulars, it is something which those particulars can correctly be said to be. Socrates in his behaviour exemplies the form of justice; Socrates is just, and we can see this fact, we can see the form of justice exemplied in his behaviour. But there is a metaphor that carries the thought of both. This metaphor consists in thinking of causation as activity on the model of the human will.

123

280

Axiomathes (2013) 23:269289

For both Plato and Aristotle the notion of cause is clearly anthropomorphic. If one thinks of doing ontology by the way of a Principle of Acquaintance, then cause in this sense will have no place in ones ontology: there are no two ways about it, causation does not existthat is, of course, as Hume argues, causation in the sense of activity which establishes a necessary connection between cause and effect. There is still causation as it appears in the world of sense that must be analyzed. Hume, John Stuart Mill, and Bertrand Russell all did important work in disentangling causation as limited to the world of ordinary experience and the metaphysical notion of cause as an activity which transcends that experiential world. The point is that the notion of cause as a transcendent activity effecting necessary connections amongst things in the world of experience is irremediably anthropomorphic, and grounded in thought which is essentially metaphor.

5 V Before turning to the issue of one entity being multiply-located in the realm of sensible appearances, there is another point that must be made. Platos forms are not given in sense. They occupy a realm of being (Platos heaven, if you wish) that is separate from the realm of sense, a timeless realm distinct from the realm of sensible particulars located at places in time, and also in space. Grupp suggests that a timeless form which is an unlocated entity [must] reach across to the located, in order to connect to the located. (p. 36) And since the located can only be at a place, the unlocated must become located. (ibid.) We have seen that this is not so. Still, that is what Grupp holds, and he goes on to suggest that the Platonist will have to introduce a relation which does the job of connecting the form and the particulars; this is the task, he says, of the relation of exemplication. However, the same problem arises: crossing from one realm of being to the other, it must be both located and unlocated. Exemplication cannot do the job it is asked that it do. This is, however, unfair: Platonic exemplication is taken to be analogous to the relation of imitation that obtains between the image of a Homeric hero. The image of the hero is located nowhere in the realm of ordinary things, but the entities in the latter, the Athenians say, can unproblematically imitate in their own behaviour and therefore exemplify the behaviour of the hero; and so also can Socrates exemplify unproblematically the ideal form of justice. It is true that exemplication must reach across the gap that separates the two realms, that of reason and that of sense, but that does not require it to be both located and unlocated: the question of where it is simply does not arise. However, in the Aristotelian metaphysics the form as natura naturata is an entity in the same realm as the particulars that exemplify it: both are sensible. It would seem, then, that the form is not at a single place, and is therefore unlocated, while it must also be located, namely located at any place where there is a particular which has that form. In order to avoid this conclusion, the Aristotelian must introduce a relation, what he or she calls exemplication, that links what is located to what is unlocated. But this simply resolves the problem by re-creating it in a different guise: it turns out that the relation of exemplication introduced to avoid entities which are

123

Axiomathes (2013) 23:269289

281

both located and unlocated will itself have to be a relation that is both unlocated and located. And it cannot be avoided as the Platonist avoided the similar challenge to the notion of exemplication that he or she uses. The Platonist avoids it because the exemplication that he or she uses is imitation. But for the Aristotelian, it is not true that the sensible particular imitates the form; rather, the form as natura naturata is a sensible entity present in the sensible particular, it is that form, even as Socrates is just, and just in a way which we can see. And since the form is itself in each particular that exemplies it, it would seem to be located at each place where such a particular is located and also seem to be unlocated, neither here nor there, neither specically now nor specically then, nowhere specically and no when specificallyyet also specically here and specically here also and specically there and there and there, or perhaps just specically here but it could also perhaps be there also. Again we seem to have Grupps contradiction: located and unlocated.

6 VI There is a further problem that Grupp does not discuss. It is a problem for any metaphysics, including those of Plato and Aristotle, that divides entities into a realm accessible to sense but not to reason and a realm accessible to reason but not to sense. We can use the language of forms, but similar remarks will hold for any other metaphysics that divides entities into a realm of reason and a realm of sense, e.g., Kant or Russell (the Russell of the Problems of Philosophy). In such an ontology, there are forms, known by reason, and appearances, all of which are particular things, known by sense. The appearances exemplify the forms. For example, let us say that the sensible particular Socrates exemplies the form of justice. We then have the fact that Socrates is just. Ontologically the difference between the two realms is bridged by exemplication, perhaps problematically in some ontologies, as Grupp suggests, but even if the answer is inadequate it is still an answer. But how do we know the fact that the connector really does connect? We know the subject Socrates by sense, not by reason, and we know the form which is predicated of this subject by reason, and not by sense. We know the subject and we know the predicate. But how do we know how the fact in which the form is connected to the subject? By what faculty are we supposed to know that the subject exemplies one form rather than another, for example, that Socrates is really knavish, like Alcibiades, or a brute like Thrasymachus, rather than just? We are never told. We deserve an answer.12

7 VII All this has been exemplication then. Lets switch to more recent times, exemplication now.

12

Compare Grossmann (1963b).

123

282

Axiomathes (2013) 23:269289

Let us turn in particular to an ontology that restricts itself to what is for Plato and Aristotle the world of sensible appearancesa world often said to be delineated by the empiricists Principle of Acquaintance: admit into ones ontology only those entities which are of a sort with which one is acquainted in sensory experience (or inner awareness). An ontology of this sort has but one realm of entities and not two, a realm in which all entities are given in sense experience. In this world there are particular things and sensible properties. There are facts in this world: sensible particulars are the subjects in these facts and in these facts sensible properties are predicated of these subjects. There are no transcendent entities as in Platonism and Aristotelianism. It is that part of the world of the Aristotelian, the world of sensible particulars where the naturae naturatae are exemplied by those particulars. Some of the problems raised by transcendent entities, mainly epistemological, do not arise for this ontology; but others, of the sorts raised by Grupp, do apply, at least to some versions of this ontology. The problems into which exemplication can fall do not disappear. Let us see. One version of this ontology was defended by Herbert Spencer. He held that whatever was given in sense had to be located at a specic place.13 If my shirt, that is, Freds shirt, was red and there was another shirt, Herbs, the very same colour, the very same shade of red, then there was with regard to Freds shirt a property which made it red, that shade of red, rather than green, say, or any other colour, and there was also with regard to Herbs shirt a property which made it red, just the shade of red it was rather than green or blue or whatever. The two shirts were both red, the same shade of red, but further, Spencer held, the property that made Freds shirt red was different from the property that made Herbs shirt red. Freds red was different from Herbs red. For the property of each, like the shirts they characterized, was differently located. As one now speaks, the properties were tropes. John Stuart Mill disagreed: properties are not tropes; rather, properties are universals. The red of Freds shirt is the very same entity as the red of Herbs shirt. To be sure, the red in Freds shirt is in an entity, a particular, that is located at one place, and the red in Herbs shirt is in another entity located at another place. In that sense, the red about which we are talking is located at (at least) two places. It is wholly located at each of two places. Mill puts the argument that characteristics of things are not tropes in this way. He states Spencers view thus (using attribute where we have used property): he (Spencer) maintains that we ought not to say that Socrates possesses the same

See Spencer (1902, p. 294). More recently, properties as individualized properties has been defended by Sellars (1963b); see in particular his Naming and Saying. For criticism of Sellars, see Hochberg (1984a), Mapping, Meaning and Metaphysics; to which Sellars (1977) replied in his Mapping, Meaning and Metaphysics; to which Hochberg (1984c) further replied in his Sellars and Goodman on Predicates, Properties and Truth. For a systematic critique of Sellars metaphysics, see Wilson (2007b), Acquaintance, Ontology and Knowledge..

13

123

Axiomathes (2013) 23:269289

283

attributes which are connoted by the word Man, but only that he possesses attributes exactly like them. Mill then goes on to object that Mr. Spencer is of the opinion that because Socrates and Alcibiades are not the same man, the attribute which constitutes them men should not be called the same attribute. If every general conception, instead of being the One in the Many, were considered to be as many different conceptions as there are things to which it is applicable, there would be no such thing as general language. A name would have no general meaning if man connoted one thing when predicated of John, and another though closely resembling thing when predicated of William. The things compared are many, but the something common to all of them must be conceived as one14 Mill is surely correct: sensible particulars are presented to us in just that way, with properties presented as existing in those particulars, and where those properties are presented as one and the same in several particulars. (And where Mill speaks of properties, the same remarks hold for the entities of the realm of sensible appearances in the Aristotelian metaphysics; the natura naturata is a set of properties, and so what is said in a Millian ontology about properties holds pari passu for natura naturata.) Properties are presented as universals, and not as tropes: the world that we are presented with in our sensible experience contains no tropes. There are two sorts of entity, particulars and universals, just as in a Platonistic or Aristotelian world. But where these latter two ontologies have these kinds separate from each other, in different realms, creating the problem of how one could know facts in which entities from different realms are connected to one another, this does not apply to the ontologies that restrict themselves to the world of sensible appearances. In an ontology of the latter sort, each property is connected to one, or more, particulars. But these connections do not cross from one realm to another, different realm, where the entities in the different realms are known in different ways. There is but one realm in which both universals and particulars exist, the ones in the many. Connections of properties to things are connections wholly within a single realm. The epistemological problems created by having facts consist of entities in separate realms, one of reason and one of sense, do not arise. There are other problems, however, parallel to some of the problems Grupp raised with regard to Platonism. There is, however, one way of presenting Grupps central problem that remains to be discussed.

Mill (1978, Book II, Ch. ii, sec. 3, note). On the issue of tropes, see Wilson (2007c), Universals, Bare Particulars, and Tropes: The Role of a Principle of Acquaintance in Ontology..

14

123

284

Axiomathes (2013) 23:269289

8 VIII The sensible properties that Mill is discussing of course never appear separately. They are given to us in sense and are always as it were bundled; they are bundled into the particular things that are given to us in sense. The relation between the property and the bundle, Grupp suggests, amounts to the exemplication tie found in Platonism. Grupp argued that exemplication could not do the job required of it (though we argued that this was incorrect with regard to Platonism) because it had to connect entities which are located (L), that is, sensible particulars, to entities that are not located (*L), the forms: exemplication had to be both L and *L, which is impossible. This problem does not arise in an ontology in which properties are tropes. The relation that corresponds to exemplication in Platonism connects a bundle to a property which is a trope; it connects one entity, the bundle, which is located, to another entity, a trope, which is also located. Here we do not have to say that the connection between the two entities is both L and *L. Grupps contradiction does not arise.15 Tropes, however, do not exist: as Mill argued, properties are universals and not tropes. As a universal, a property will be in several or in many particular things, just as, we may recall, a natura naturata of the Aristotelian has to be exemplied in many particulars. The particular things will be located (L) at specic places, but the universal will not be at any specic place and therefore will not be located (*L). The bundling tie that is supposed to relate the universal to the bundle will therefore be both L and *L. The bundling tie connects a bundle s as a subject of which a property P is predicated.16 In fact, P is present in s, it is part of the bundle. So are other properties
15 Aristotelian natures or forms are each common to several individual substances. For example, humanity, as an active form, is common to Socrates, Alcibiades, and even Stephen Harper. That makes the form as natura naturata, a set of sensible properties, a universal. What individuates it into each individual? Some argue that sensible properties are not universals but instead are tropes, each a particular in itself. So, the humanity that we observe in Socrates in our sense experience, though indistinguishable from the humanity that we observe in Alcibiades, is in fact different from the latter humanity: sensible properties are as individual as the individuals they characterize. That solves the problem of individuation. But it wont do, for the reasons given by Mill. There are three other possible solutions for the Aristotelian. One is the supposition that there is some sort of entity, not given in sense, that is purely individual; prime matter it was often called. However, while not given in sense, they are supposed to individuate properties that are given in sense. That makes the supposition of such an entity hard to defend. It does not seem acceptable. Another solution is to hold that, besides the properties determined by the form, the essential characteristics, there are other, accidental characteristics. Substances which share a common form or nature, as Socrates and Alcibiades share the form humanity, while not differeing in their essential properties, will always differ in their accidental characteristics, as Socrates is snub-nosed while Alcibiades is hawk-nosed. This seems the most reasonable solution, but it does have its own problems. It does seem to presuppose the Identity of Indiscernibles, which many nd unacceptable. Yet another solution is to adopt the position of the empiricist, that what individuate the individuals given in sense is the sensible element in the individual we can refer to as its extension, as James called it, or area. Of this element, we will have more to say below. However, even if it works for the empiricist, it still creates problems for the Aristotelian metaphysics: the natura naturata of the Aristotelian is not quite the same, in ontological terms, as the individual things the empiricist takes to be given in sense. But this is not the point to explore these issues, interesting as they may be. 16

For the working out of an ontology like this, see Goodman (1951). For a sensitive analysis of Goodmans ontology, see Hausman (1967).

123

Axiomathes (2013) 23:269289

285

which are predicated of s. Let us suppose that Q and R are other properties in the bundle. We have a bundle because P, Q, and R are, let us say, with (W) one another. The entity we have called a bundle really is a fact, namely, the fact that the three properties stand in the relation of being with each other: W(P,Q,R) Now, as James has pointed out,17 within every fact like this, within every phenomenal bundle, as a sensible part of that bundle, is an element which he calls extensity or voluminousness: we are, he says, accustomed to distinguish from among the other elements the element of voluminousness. (1890, p. 134) This element is discernable in each and every sensation, he insists, surely correctly, though, he adds, it is more developed in some than in others. (ibid. p. 135) Each bundle contains exactly one such element of extension, one such area, and no such area is in more than one bundle. Assuming that there are no tropes, that properties are universals, it this sensible element of extensity which enables us to distinguish bundles as things which are individual or particular.18 Let R, in our example, be an area. The relation of being With bundles this with Red and Square to make some one thing; it is a Red Square in the world of sensible appearances. We then have a fact or bundle W(P,Q,R) which is distinguished from all other bundles by the presence in it, and unique to it, of the area R. Since this bundle is distinguished from all other bundles by the presence of R, we can therefore refer to this fact, that is, this bundle, using the statement of fact W(P,Q,R) as a name of the fact rather than a sentence, or, rather, use it as a denite description. We can then speak of the The R bundle and we can form the subject-predicate sentences The R bundle is P The R bundle is Q We could even abbreviate the denite description as Joe, so that The R bundle = Joe
17 18

James (1890, Ch. xx, p. 134).

It can be argued that this element is that sort of individuating entity that some have called a bare particular. Bergmann is one; see his (1964b) Synthetic A Priori, p. 288ff. See also Wilson (2007d), Effability, Ontology and Method. This entity, unlike the other elements, the properties proper, in a bundle, is supposed to be in itself bareleading many ontologists to dismiss it as analogous to one of Lockes substances, something I know not what. However, as James makes clear, we do know it: it is given in sense. But bareness is probably not a fair characterization; it can be argued that the other elements in the bundle, the properties proper, are equally bare. See Wilson (2004a).

123

286

Axiomathes (2013) 23:269289

and we can form the subject-predicate sentences Joe is P Joe is Q We can, in other words, treat the bundle as an individual or particular thing of which the constituent elements other than the area R are predicated of that particular.19 The elements other than the area unique to the bundle thus appear on this way of speaking as predicated of the area functioning as an individuator. Note, however, that the is which one would, on this way of speaking, think of as an exemplication tie is not primitive nor unanalyzable; we have just shown how it can be analyzed. If we take the is to represent a tie of exemplication, then Grupps objection that the tie located (L) at one end, that of the individual which is located, but is not located (*L) at the other end. At this other end, where it attaches to the elements other than the area; these other elements are properties taken to be universals, entities that are in themselves one but which are attached to many individuals. However, we should analyze this tie as it ought to be analyzed, using the more basic relation, the bundling relation W. In this ontology, then, the basic entities are ordinary things presented to us in our sensory experiences; they are the sensory appearances (the mere appearances) as found in Plato and Aristotle. The ordinary things are presented as complex entities, bundles with various sensory elements as parts. These sensory elements include properties like red or green or square, but also, in every bundle, a further sensory element, the area or extensity which the properties cover, as by a colour, or surround, as by a circle. Once we see this we recognize how misleading is Grupps remark that One entity located at two places arguably is not a description of one entity but of two entities; and it is thus arguable that a universal, being one entity multiply located, is self-contradictory inasmuch as it is both one entity and more than one entity simultaneously. (Grupp 2003, p. 28) One must say, in reply, that one entity, say X, being related to two other entities, say Y and Z, does not transform X into two entities. There is, for example, Me or Fred, whom we met earlier, is one entity who is related to each of my two daughters as parent to child. Being thus related by the same relation to two entities does not make Me to be more than one entity. It is simply dogma that insists that one entity being at two locations causes that entity to divide into two entities.20 It is to dogmatically insist, without argument, that properties must be tropes; it is dogmatic because, as Mill insists, it is quite clear, if one consults ones experience of these things as given in sense, that properties arent tropes, that they really are as they appear to be, namely, entities that can be the same in more than one individual, that is, universals. The property Red being related by the bundling relation W to two areas A1 and A2 does not cause Red to become two entities. A universal, which is
19 Goodmans ontology in his (1951) Structure of Appearance is of this pattern. This sort of ontology is analyzed in detail in Bergmann (1967), Realism. 20

See Grossmann (1963a).

123

Axiomathes (2013) 23:269289

287

one, can be related to several individuators, which are many, without itself becoming many. Contrary to Grupp, there is no contradiction in supposing a universal to be multiply-located, that is, related simultaneously to two different individuators. James makes an effective comparison of sensorial elements and relations, asking us to think of thoughts of these as parts of the lives of birds. Our experience of the world is like a birds life, which seems to be made up of an alternation of ights and perchings. The sensorial elements are like the perchings of the bird, and the relations are like ights where there is, as it were, a passage, a relation, a transition from it [a perch], or between it and something else. (James 1890, p. 243) James point is that relations are as much a feature of the world as we experience it as are non-relational properties. For us, the point is that properties come bundled in the world as we experience it. To be bundled is to stand in a relation, and that relation is there, in the world as we experience it. To be bundled into a thing which is an individual is for a property to be exemplied by that individual. It is not quite what it was then, for Plato and Aristotle, but it is what exemplication is now, what it has become in an ontology delineated by a Principle of Acquaintance. And what it has become, what it is now, is non-problematic. Grupp supposes that there is a problem for the defender of properties as universals who introduces exemplication as a relation that ties universals as non-located things to particulars as located things. But, surely, there are two reasons for introducing exemplication or something like it. One reason is that which appears in the substance ontology deriving from Plato and Aristotle. The soul as active brings a property into being, that is, causes it to be that a given particular thing comes to have present in it a property of that sort. Exemplication of the form in the particular is what the soul causes. The other reason is this. It is found in an ontology that restricts itself to the sensible world, that is, the world as delineated by a Principle of Acquaintance. In such a world the reason for a tie is that it is simply a fact that we experience properties, or, more exactly, sensory elements, as standing in a relation, namely, being with another, that bundles them into particular things. It is a fact that the sensory elements taken to be properties and the sensory elements we have called areas as individuators do stand in the bundling relation: that relation is given to us in the world as we experience it. The relations being there, in the world, is why it is introduced. It does solve a philosophical problem, that of tying universals to particulars, as Grupp says, but that is not the reason for introducing it: we have it in our ontology simply because it is there, and we see it there. In fact, we use it to solve philosophical problems because we have it there, because it is available: if it wasnt there, if it didnt exist, if it was not available, we could not use it to solve our problems. Further, we see it in our experience actually relating properties as universals to individuators, so the problems that Grupp attempts to raise must be spurious. The problems he raises turn on his use of the notion of being located. For him, an entity, if located at one place cannot also be located at another. But why not? For him, if there is an entity that is multiply located, then it is not an entity, it is not one but must be many. But why can it not be one in many? Why is it that an entity located at one place cannot also be located at another. But why cant it be that way? The truth is, that it can be so. For a property to be located is for it to be

123

288

Axiomathes (2013) 23:269289

in one bundle, and this is compatible with its being bundled into another bundle. The same property being multiply located is a fact of experience. Just look and see. Properties are therefore universals. And they are located in many different particular things. Thats a fact. That fact does not make universals impossible. A property is a one that is in many, and unproblematically so; we just see that that is the way the world is. As Berkeley said, one should not create a dust and then complain that you cannot see.

References
Allaire EB et al (eds) (1963) Essays in ontology. Nijhoff, The Hague Bergmann G (1964a) Logic and reality. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison Bergmann G (1964b) Synthetic a priori. In: Bergmann G (1964a) Logic and reality. pp 272391 Bergmann G (1967) Realism. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison Goodman N (1951) The structure of appearance. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Grossmann R (1963a) Sensory intuition and the dogma of localization. In: Allaire EB et al (eds) (1963) Essays in ontology. pp 5063 Grossmann R (1963b) Conceptualism. In: Allaire EB et al (eds) (1963) Essays in ontology. Nijhoff, The Hague, pp 4049 Grupp J (2003) The impossibility of an exemplication tie between particulars and universals. Metaphysica 4:2738. The same paper appeared in Dialogue 43:491498 (2002) Page references are to the former Hausman A (1967) Goodmans ontology. In: Hausman A, Wilson F (eds) (1967) Carnap and Goodman. Nijhoff, The Hague, pp 195 Hausman A, Wilson F (1967) Carnap and Goodman. Nijhoff, The Hague Hochberg H (1984a) Mapping, meaning and metaphysics. In: Hochberg H (1984b) Logic, ontology and language. Philosophia Verlag, Munich, pp 157184 Hochberg H (1984b) Logic, ontology and language. Philosophia Verlag, Munich Hochberg H (1984c) Sellars and Goodman on predicates, properties and truth. In: Hochberg H (1984b) Logic, ontology and language. pp 185195 Hochberg H, Mulligan K (eds) (2004) Relations and predicates. Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt Homer I (1999) trans: Murray AT, rev: Wyatt WF, 2 vol, 2nd edn. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Loeb Classical Library) James W (1890) The principles of psychology, 2 vol. Henry Holt & Co., New York; Dover edition reprint (Dover, New York, 1950), page references are to the latter Langlet B, Monnoyer JM (eds) (2009) Gustav Bergmann: phenomenological realism and dialectical ontology. Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt, pp 1768 Mill JS (1978) System of logic, 8th edn. (vols 7 and 8 of his collected works, Robson J (ed) [University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1978], originally published, Longmans Green, London, 1872) Plato P (1977) trans: Grube GMA. Hackett, Indianapolis Sellars W (1963a) Naming and saying. In: Sellars W (1963b) Science, perception and reality. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, pp 225246 Sellars W (1963b) Science, perception and reality. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London Sellars W (1977) Mapping, meaning and metaphysics. Midwest Stud Philos 2:219220 Spencer H (1902) Principles of psychology, vol 2. D. Appleton and Co., New York Turnbull RG (1963) Aristotles debt to the natural philosophy of the Phaedo. Philos Q 8:131143 Vlastos G (1969) Reasons and causes in the Phaedo. Philos Rev 78:291325 Wilson F (1999) Logic and the philosophy of science in early modern thought: seven studies. University of Toronto Press, Toronto Wilson F (2001) Socrates, Lucretius, Camus: two philosophical traditions on death. Edwin Mellon Press, Lewiston

123

Axiomathes (2013) 23:269289

289

Wilson F (2004a) Bareness, as in bare particular: its ubiquity. In: Hochberg H, Mulligan K (eds) (2004) Relations and predicates. Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt, pp 81112; reprinted in Wilson F (2007b) Acquaintance, ontology and knowledge, pp 329363 Wilson F (2004b) Socrates argument for immortality: Socrates, Maritain, Grant and the ontology of morals. Maritain Stud 20:326 Wilson F (2007a) Acquaintance, ontology and knowledge. Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt Wilson F (2007b) Acquaintance, ontology and knowledge. In: Wilson F (2007a) Acquaintance, ontology and knowledge. pp 1108 Wilson F (2007c) Universals, particulars, and tropes: the role of a principle of acquaintance in ontology. In: Wilson F (2007a) Acquaintance, ontology and knowledge. pp 363398 Wilson F (2007d) Effability, ontology and method. In: Wilson F (2007a) Acquaintance, ontology and knowledge. pp 537608 Wilson F (2009) Bergmanns hidden Aristotelianism. In: Bruno L, Monnoyer JM (eds) (2009) Gustav Bergmann: phenomenological realism and dialectical ontology. pp 1768

123