Was Rousseau a totalitarian or a democract?

Rousseau is commonly seen as a founder of modern totalitarianism, but this is a short-sighted and unfounded view. It rests on the allegations that; firstly, conceptual relationships asserted by Rousseau misconstrue the character of freedom; and secondly, that his account of the nature of the General Will and its articulation in collective decision-making comprises an illiberal vision, redolent of the totalitarian subordination of the individual to the collective. his essay aspires to illustrate that these allegations are unfounded, with an e!position Rousseau"s views on freedom along with what he postulated as the "General Will", followed by an e!amination of the more abstract ideas behind his thought as well as the practical implications for this. #undamentally, the $uestion of whether Rousseau"s political thought its democratic or totalitarian is a $uestion of his conception of liberty. It is indeed freedom that is the central preoccupation of Rousseau. %nlike his predecessors such as &obbes and &ume who saw freedom merely in terms of its physical dimensions, Rousseau carries these ideas farther; 'showing a deep awareness of informal and structural constraints on our realistic range of values(. )&ampsher-*onk, p.+,-. the liberty being propounded by Rousseau was not the "negative freedom" found in &obbes" work, in which the incapaciting effects of our environment act as a restraint. Rather, it is "positive freedom" / obedience to what one truly wants, that Rousseau is concerned with. 0cting in according to selfish desires is nonsensical, 'the mere impulse of appetite is slavery(. )Rousseau p. 12+. "General Will". he concept of the "General Will" is the guiding thread of the Social Contract, itself set out as answering the $uestion posed in the Discourses of whether a civili3ed social conte!t can be arrived at, in which humans can live together without compromising their freedom. Rousseau seeks4 'to find a form of association that defends 5 protects with the whole collective force the person and goods of each associate, and through which no one, in rue freedom comes about from acting toward the collective good. he truly rational citi3en pursues, in Rousseau"s words, the

uniting with all, would obey no one but himself, and remains as free as before( )ibid, p.+6+. he e!istence of a general will emerges from a rich tradition of social thinking and theology at that time. &is assumption is that there is 'an ob7ective common good, distinct from the particular interests or wishes of the individuals composing society(. )&ampsher *onk p+82. It is not simply the total outcome of whatever the masses will, but the wants corresponding with what is good for us, in addition to those not decided for us by others, but which we endorse through our own faculties of reason. he assertion that people do not know what is good for them, along with the argument that liberty consists in having what the collective believes is in everyone"s interest, not in choosing what one wants, is, from a democratic viewpoint, $uestionable. 0t first glance, this criticism appears valid. 9ut it is only on a deeper reading of the Social Contract, taken in the conte!t of Rousseau"s works as a whole, that we come to see Rousseau for the true, albeit radical, democrat that he is. :ritics point to the "General Will" as being a tyrannical force in Rousseau"s line of thinking. almon declares Rousseau the "father of totalitarian democracy", describing the general will as an ob7ective standard that people must be coerced into obeying. &owever Rousseau himself states that the "General Will" 'considers only the common interest( )Rousseau, p. 1;+. thus implying that the purpose of the "General Will" is to facilitate self-rule, negating this supposed oppressive power. '0s long as a certain number of men consider themselves to be a single body, they have but one will which relates to the common security and to the general welfare(. )Rousseau p. 82. With this basic understanding, it is now crucial to e!amine more closely the abstract principles underlying Rousseau"s philososphy, along with the practical underpinnings in order to understand the democrat in Rousseau. #irstly, there is the fallacy of composition claim / that 'being myself isn<t the same as being part of a collectivity where we obey ourselves through ma7oritarian procedure where I can be outvoted( )&ampsher-*onk, p.+8,. 9ut if we grant that citi3ens have a sense within them of what is right and good for

the wider collective , since it is 'vital for the health of any community that its members keep a sense of the notion that something could be generally beneficial which didn<t accord with their personal interest(. )ibid, p.+8,. 0nd as Rousseau sees it, If the community<s general will does not accord with the individual<s general will, then the individual<s general will is mistaken. his belief, far from being totalitarian, is simply founded on an empirical assumption, not that mankind is altruistic, but rather that each individual has deep rooted interest in securing conditions of their own liberty, and further, that the only legitimate sovereign is the will of the people. hus, on an e!amination of the thinking behind the Social Contract, it becomes clear that it is not a doctrine espousing unconditional control over sub7ects. his leads us to an investigation into the more practical elements of Rousseau"s thought. Rousseau introduces the concept of the "=egislator" as a charismatic figure of authority. his role is necessary to overcome certain obstacles in the establishment of the "General Will" as it re$uires an omniscient guiding figure to illuminate the common interest to unaware. his, again, lends itself to accusations of totalitarianism, and could be viewed in a dictatorial light. &owever, this role, like the tutor in Emile, is a political educator and does not have any legal authority. In fact, it is certainly possible to draw paralells between Rousseau"s "=egislator" and the role that the media plays in modern democratic nation-states, or that religion has played across all varieties of political regimes over the centuries. In its operations, Rousseau"s state shows little sign of totalitarianism. It is difficult to lay this claim against a social contract whereby each citi3en voluntarily enters into an agreement where he will remain, at worst, in a situation no worse off before; 'a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.> ?ach participates on an e$ual footing with other individuals. Rousseau<s ideal form of political authority has us creating the laws we give ourselves. his, surely, is not totalitarianism. @trikingly enough, Rousseau is fle!ible about what particular regime is best /

monarchy, oligarchy etc, however he repudiates the idea of representative govenment and insists on the practise of separation of powers. 0n important condition that Rousseau lays down is that his vision may only be realised in small-scale states, as the larger the community grows the more the "General Will" becomes diluted. his is understandable and makes the possibility of democracy more likely, as smaller states will be more likely to share in a common mindset. #urther, it is impossible to deny the contribution that Rousseau has made to democratic theory. &is belief that the people in their collective capacity are only legitimate source of sovereignity is remarkable given his that he wrote during the waning years of absolutism. Regarded as radical at the time, this came to be highly influential for legions of democratically-minded thinkers such as o$ueville, who looked at 0merica through lenses shaped by Rousseau and celebrated functioning e!amples of a government of the "General Will" such as Aew ?nglans"s independent townships. he combined apparent restriction of choice inherent in Rousseau<s conception of liberty as the achievement what the whole deems to be in the collective"s interest, alongside his designation of e!tensive powers to the "General Will" certainly leaves him open to allegations of coerciveness, not to mention the oppressive connotations associated with his insistence that those who disagree must be 'forced to be free(. )Rousseau p. +82. &owever, given that an essential precondition for this is that every citi3en has e$ual and informed powers of decision-making, it is difficult to mark it out as necessarily totalitarian. #urthermore, since there is no way of ob7ectively identifying the limitations of the scope of democratic decision-making outside of the decision making arena itself, it is impossible to say that Rousseau"s thought strays outside the realm of democracy. hus, taking Rousseau"s works as a whole, and granting that humans both understand and endeavour to achieve a certain common liberty, it can be said that Rousseau, although in a uni$ue fashion, is indeed a democrat. )Word :ount4 +B,+.

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