The Royal African Society

Ambiguous Amin Author(s): Peter Woodward Source: African Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 307 (Apr., 1978), pp. 153-164 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal African Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/721601 Accessed: 16/04/2009 14:51
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AMBIGUOUSAMIN
PETER WOODWARD SINCE HE SEIZED POWER in 1971 PresidentAmin has becomeAfrica'smost publicized leader. Not surprisingly he has also beenthe subjectof discussion amongst academics and in additionto a numberof writings fromthis quarter two biographies haveappeared as well.l However, the picturewhichemerges of the man and his regimeis still far from clear,indeed,recentpublications have raisedmore questionsthan they have resolved hence the title of this piece. It has not been possiblefor this authorto resolvethese issues. Academics and journalists have been threatened and killed by those who hold poslJer in Uganda. Amin'smost prolific discussant in academic circles,Ali Mazrui,was, when Professorof PoliticalScienceat Makerere University, warnedthat he might be in dangerfrom Amin by the then Vice-Chancellor, FrankKalimuzo, whowashimselflatermurdered.2Two investigative Americans,one a journalist andthe otheran academic, havebeenkilled,whileAmin playedcatandmousewiththe life of lecturer DennisHills. Instead, thisarticle is intended to reviewthe literature on Aminnot onlyto illustrate the ambiguity concerning himwhichcurrently exists,butthe verydifferent schoolsof thought at presentemergingin Africanpolitics. The only new themes which will be introduced reflectthis writer'sinterestin Sudanesehistoryand politics, to which Aminologists have briefly but suggestivelydrawn attention. In orderto simplifydiscussion the questions to be discussed are: who is Amin, why was there a militarycoup in Ugandain 1971,who can eventssincethat time be explained, and whatprojections for the futurehavebeen suggested ? No reference to Amin'sphysicalor mentalcondition will be considered since this writerconsiders himselfunqualified to comment on this subject.

Who is Amin ? There have been a numberof minoruncertainties concerning his personal details. Thereis slightuncertainty overhis dateof birth he saidit was 1926, neighbours said 1925;anddisputeoverthe originof the nameDada whether it resultedfrom the clevercover-upof an adulterous relationship with a colleague'swife or was a term meaning'patriarchal father'which he inherited fromhis grandfather.However, by far the most important quesiionconcerns the community withinUgandato whichAminbelongs.
Peter Woodwardtaught political science at KhartoumUniversity between 1968 and 1971 and presently is at Reading University. His book on Sudanese politics is to appear later this year. 1. Judith Listowel, Amin (London, IUP, 1973). D. Martin, GeneralAmin (London, Faber, 1974). 2. A. A. Mazrui, 'Academic Freedom in Africa', African Agairs 74 (1975) p. 399. 153

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On seizing power Amin declared himself to be a Kakwa and a Ugandan. There are approximatelysixty thousand Kakwain Uganda, with its population of some ten million, mainly in the West Nile area in the north-west of the country. They are a ' Sudanic' tribe, closely relatedto the Bari of the southern Sudan, and are traditionally pastoralists. The Kakwa reside not only in Uganda but in Sudan and Zaire as well. Early writings on Amin stress the importance of this background. Lady Judith Listowel, his first biographer, wrote, 'Some of his recent measures illustrate all too well that he had leapt from a peasant background into the sophisticated world of modern politics without any intermediatefeudal preparation'.3 In his book on Amin's Uganda Mazrui also stressed the importance of the Kakwa background.4 It was the characteristicsof the Kakwa which resulted in Amin and his fellow tribesmen being prominentin the army. They were simple, unlikethe politicallysophisticated Bantupeoples of southernUganda, physicallypowerful,and as pastoralists revealed innate militaristic qualities and great reserves of stamina. Moreover Amin the Kakwa, rather than the educated Ugandans who deminated the goveramentbefore 1971, was the common man to whom the latter so earnestly wished to appeal, and hence he had an immediate popularity which they had never achieved. However,within menths of Amin siezing powerrumourscirculatedsuggesting that more important than Amin's Kakwa identity was the fact that he was a Nubi, a member of a unique East African communitydescendedpredominantly from the Nilotic tribes of the southern Sudan and who, at one time at least, regarded themselves as Sudanese. The stories received academic credence in an article by Aidan Southall in which he declared, ' GeneralAmin is a Nubi, and the history of the Nubi is importantfor the understanding of contemporary events. The present regime is more and more dominantlya Nubi regime, and its core strength is a Nubi strength.'5 Southall acknowledged that his description of the Nubi was drawn largely from a postgraduatestudent's research paper based on material collected before the coup of 1971.fi The Nubi community was createdby the total isolationof the Equatoriaregion of the Egyptian Sudan as a result of the uprising of the followers of Ahmad al-Mahdi in the Sudan, 1882-5. The troops of the governor of Equatoria,Emin Pasha, contained not only a motley array of Egyptians and northern Sudanese, but a number of local inhabitantsfrom the southern tribes who attachedthemselves
3. Listowel, Amin, p. 13. 4. A. A. Mazrui, Soldiersand Kinsmenin Uganda: the makingof a military ethnocracy (London, Sage, 1975). The book incorporatesa numberof Mazrui'sarticleson Uganda, a list of which appearson p. 313. 5. A. Southall, ' General Amin and the Coup: great man or Historical inevitability?' 3'ournalof Modern African Studies, (1975), pp. 85-105. This edition of that Journal somewhat perplexed this reader by publishing as the preceding article Mazrui's 'The Resurrection of the Warrior Tradition in African Political Culture' which painted a very differentpicture of Uganda's experience. 6. A. Wanji, The Nubi Community: an Islamicsocial structure in East Africa, Makerere University, sociology WorkingPaper, No. 115.

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to the Egyptian forceand adoptedIslamicpractices.7 EminPashawas eventually and somewhat reluctantly rescuedby Henry Morton Stanley,who wasin the habit(notto saythe business) of rescuing well-publicized Europeans lost in Africa.8 But Emin'smen mainlyrejectedStanley'ssavinghand and remained in the areaof northern UgandaandEquatoria underrepeated attacks from Mahdistforcesuntil beingfoundand recrviited as soldiersof Britainby Frederick Lugardin 1892,following whichthey werestationed at a number of garrisonposts across Uganda.9 In additionto the historicalbackground Wanji'spaper brieflydescribesthe community as he knew it. The Nubis are not exclusively Kakwabut includepeopleof othertribalorigins,Bantu, Niloticsand ' Sudanics',such as the Acholi,Nyoro,and Lugbara.The community regardsitself as one of orthodoxMuslims,but not all of Uganda's Muslims(estimated at six per cent of the population) are Nubis. As Muslims the Nubiswereomitted fromthe educational systemwhichdeveloped Uganda's intelligentsia. They live in towns,andthougha numberengagein tradingand transportation, esteemmilitary careers to the extentof becoming an 'hereditary militarycaste'.l? As a result of the deployment of Sudanese troopsof the Egyptian armyin EastAfricain WorldWarI Nubisarealsofoundin Kenyan and Tanzaniantowns, and in 1948 establisheda SudaneseEast African Society.llThe community functions through marriages, andreligious andsocial gatherings of Nubisfromdifferent towns. Wanji stresses thatat suchgatherings the exclusiveness of the community is emphasized, and storiesof the period of isolationin Equatoria and of military valourdisplayed then are recounted. DavidMartin, Amin's secondbiographer, haslittleto offerregardiIlg the Nubis, with whomhe too identifies Atnin,but does add that in Ugandathey havea reputation for homicide, especially with poisons,and sadisticbrutality. Southallarguesthat Amin'soriginalclaimto be a Kakwaand a Ugandan was an attemptto coverup this more significant Nubi identitywhichwould haveled to his immediate rejection by manyUgandans. Fromthe biographies Amin appears to have been broughtup by his mother,who was a Lugbara, and a campfollower of the army. Following a spellas bell boy in a Kampala hotel he joinedthe Kings AfricanRiflesin 1946. But perhaps this is a less thanconclusive resolution of the question of whether Aminis a simplesoldier
7. Emin Pasha began life as a German called Edward Schnitzer, his Muslim name was Muhammudal-Amin (the Paithful One). 8. For his own account see Stanley, H. At., In DarkestAfrzca,(London, SampsonLow 1890), Vol. II, chs. XXIV & XXV. 9. For his own account see Lugard, F. D., TheRise of Our East AfricanEmpire,(Edinburgh, 1893; London, Cass, 1968) Vol. II, pp 216-219. 10. Southall, GeneralAmin, p. 88. 11. The term Nubi was conferredupon them by the Bagandabecause of their alleged place of origin-most likely the Nuba mountains of the central Sudan though possibly Nubia in the northern Sudan. (The term 'Sudanese' was used by the British in the Sudan until the 1930s to refer not to the inhabitantsof that country, who were generally known either by their tribe or as Arabs, but to Islamized negroids who made up a substantial part of the recruits for the Egyptian army and later the Sudan Defence Force. Lugard was amongst those who refer to the Nubis as Sudanese, as will be seen.)

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peasant-the archetypal commonman-holding power or a memberof a utiique and exclusivegroup. The consequences for the interpretation of Ugandan politicsafterhis seisureof poweraresignificant, as will be seen. WhydidAminseizepower ? In manymilitary coupsin Africathe question of why soldiersseizedpower tends to precedediscussion of the identityof the new rulers. At one time the answerto the formerquestionwas most commonly given by reference to the real and allegedshortcomings of the overthrown regime,based in part uponthe accusations and promises of the new rulers. Increasingly, however, analysisof the armedforcesthemselves and discussion of such knowledge as is available of the leadingpersonalities in them have given a more rounded pictureof the reasonswhy coupsoccur.l2 But, true to form, commentators pointedto the repression, corruption and mismanagement of Obote'sgovernment, while Amin produceda statementcontaining eighteenpoints for the country's reform. His actionwon applause especially amongstthe Bagatlda, whose hereditary leaderthe Kabakahad been Uganda'spresidentuntil his overthrow by the then primeministerMilton Obotein 1966(afteran attack on his palacecommanded by Amin),Britishexpatriates who dislikedObote's socialism,seniormembersof the Conservative Partyembarrassed by Obote duringthe Commonwealth Conference at Singapore,BritishForeignOffice officials(one of whosenumberhad been humiliated by the Ugandagovernment),andthe Israelimilitarymissionin Ugandawhosefuturein the country was threatened by shiftsin Obote's foreignpolicy. But such observations, and the accusations built on them, were a stopgap beforemorefar reaching interpretations of Amin'srise to poweremergedin the followingyears. Predictably these includedtwo of the most popular comparative approaches to the analysis of new states,one in the vein of dysctional modernization developed by SamuelHuntington, andthe otherthe Marxist-Leninist approach updatedby the recentwritingsof AndreGunder
Frank.l3

The dysfunctiotlal modernization approach wasgivenanAfrican andUgandat representation in the interpretation presented by Mazruiof the Oboteyears whichpreceded Amin'scoup. In this view Uganda's independence was won by a smallgroupof urbanorientated western-educated men who had limited appreciation of the predominantly illiterate peasant smallholders whoconstitute the overwhelming majorityof the population. The detachedintelligentsia weremoreconcerned withtheirrivalries for powerthanstrengthening the new
12. See, for instance, the studies of the Nigerian militaryby N. J. Miners) TheNigerian Army 1956-1966 (London, Methuen, 1971) and R. Luckham, The NigerianMilitary: a sociological analysisof authorityand revolt, 1960-67 (Cambridge,CUP, 1971). 13. S. P. Huntington,PoliticalOrderin Changing Societies(New Haven, Yale UP, 1968). A. G. Frarik)On Capitalist Underdevelopment (London: OUP) 1975).

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institutions bequeathed to them,and produced a seriesof politicalcrisesfrom 1964 to 1966 which culminated in Obote'scaptureof the presidencywith Amin's military assistance. From then on, Mazrui suggests, a militaryintelligentsia alliancewas established. The militarywere essentiallyloyal, but limitedeconomic growthand increased popular resentment led Oboteto attempt to buildinsteadan intelligentsia-peasant complex by meansof a move to the left andthe declaration of the Common Man'sCharter. This attempt, thoughof limited successin itself, encouraged Amin to believethat Obote regarded his servicesas less than indispensable and createdthe situationfor the coup. The underdevelopment interpretation of Amin'scoup has been most fully expounded by E. A. Brettwhoidentified threeareasof contradiction.14 First, Ugandainherited a classical colonial economy baseduponthreemajor exports, coffee, cotton and copper. Attempts at economicgrowth involved little re-structuring and the contradictions soon surfaced. The expansion of the activities of international capitalism in Uganda produced onlya limitedincrease in outputbut encouraged Africans,especially the elite, manyof whomwere simultaneously employedin the state sector,to becomethe begionings of a nationalbourgeoisie. However,the lack of effectiveeconomicgrowth led to the latter'sincreasing frustration, thoughthey frequently blamedthe Asian commercial community for theirlackof successratherthanthe limitations of international capitalism. Secondly, the colonial periodhadbeenoneof uneven economic growth, especially as between northandsouth. The resulting rivalry for accessto resources ratherthan 'traditional' ethnicdivisionsunderlay the battles between Ugandan politicians. Communities located in the south harboured greatresentment at theirdefeatin 1966. Finally,the peasants felt their lackof benefitfrom the attainment of independence. Such agricultural growthas new investment did stimulate frequently involvedthe use of technologyfromwhichtheyderived fewnewopportunities foremployment. World marketpricesfor exportsweremovingto their detriment. Obote'smove to the left was designedto meet this risingdiscontent, but it had little positive effect while it frightenedinternational capitaland its Asian and Ugandan collaborators.The weakpoliticalinstitutions couldnot containthe conflicts generated by the contradictions, while Obotehimselffelt threatened by the militarywhoseinfluence grewfollowing the iIltervention of 1966,and 'by its [the military's] potentialinternalconflicts'. (In a less far-reaching analysis, M. F. Lofchiealso suggesteda class interpretation of Obote'soverthrow in whichhis moveto the left wasseenby the armyandmanycivil servants as an unacceptable threatto theirprivileged positions.l5) 14. E. A. Brett, The Political Economy of GeneralAmin. IDS Bulletin(1975), pp.1522. See also his unpublishedpaper, ' Relationsof Production,the state and the Ugandan crisis', presentedto the Annual Conferenceof the PSA of the UK, Nottingham, 1976. 15. M. F. Lofchie, ' The Uganda coup- class action by the military',3'ournal of Modern African Studies (1972), pp. 19-35. (Lofchie's analysis of the class orientation of the army is sharplyat variancewith that of Mazrui, as will be seen).

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For all the differences of approach betweenMazruiand Brett there is a marked similarity of outcome. A slow-growing economyfailedto matchthe expectations of manyUgandans, andthe struggles of politicians hadweakened politicalinstitutions. The isolatedObote'srelationswith the armedforces, with whose help he had defeatedhis main civilianrival, were deteriorating and eventually the opportunity for a coup occurred. However, anotherclose observer of Uganda has queried all pointsof sucharlalyses. Michael Twaddle has pointedout that there was no particular economicor politicalcrisis in January 1971,indeedthereweresignsof an improvement in Obote'sposition especially in the country's opportunity to engage in a novelformof competitive electionslater in the year.lfi Insteadhe suggestsotherconditions existedin which a coup might be attempted. Obotehimselfwas out of the country, often a risky undertaking for Africanrulers,but far from fearingdivisions amongst the armedforces(as suggested by Brett)he regarded the existence of very realrivalries as a safeguard to his position. In MichaelTwaddle's view divisions withinthe military suchas existedin Ugandado makecoupsdifficult to start,but they also makeit difficult to stop them once they get underway. Furthermore in a situation of government control of the media, to whichUganda had becomeaccustomed duringObote'spresidency, rumours spreadrapidly andthe resulting confusion can help a determined coup-maker. Michael Twaddle's purpose wasto counter existing interpretations of Uganda's coupin theBritish press,andhadlittleto sayabout Amin's motives, butMartin's biography offersa numberof reasonsfor his actionsome of which are also mentioned by Mazrui. It is clearthatObotehadwarned Aminthathe required explanations of certainaccusations upon his returnfrom the Commonwealth Conference in Singapore and Martingives an accountof these. Brigadier Okoya, Amin'snumber two in the army,had accused his commander-in-chief of cowardice shortlybeforehe andhis wife werefoundmurdered. A difficult policeinvestigation had linkedthe suspectswith Amin. Amin had for some timebeen givingunauthorized assistance to the southernSudanese resistance movement, the AnyaNya: this wasproving embarrassing to Obotewhosought improved relations withthe newleft-wing military regime in Sudan. Furthermore thereweremissing army fundsandequipment, someofwhichwerebelieved tohavegoneto the AnyaNya. Finally Martin hintsthatAminwasencouraged andperhapsaided by Israel'smilitarymissionin Ugandawhich had been actively supporting the AnyaNya andwasfearfulthat Obote,in his search for improved relationswith Khartoum, was likelyto halt its activities. Putting Twaddle's and Martin'saccountstogetherit becomesunnecessary to delve far intoUgandan politics to reachan explanation forthe coup. The conditions foran attemptexisted,while Amin stood to lose his positionas the army's commander (andperhaps meet a worsefate) if he failedto act quickly. His
16. M. Twaddle, ' The Amin Coup', 3rournal of Commonwealth Political Studies(1972), pp.99- 112

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sueeess was by no means assured when he began his attempt but eireumstanees and luck were favourableto him and he beeame president. As to the aecusations themselves,it may seem extraordinary that the eommanderof the Ugandan army should seize power beeause of eharges largely relatingto his involvement in a guerilla war in neighbouringeountry, but it is less so when Amin's Nubi origins are eonsidered. Possibly it was just military adventurismthat involved Amin in the Sudan, but perhapsit refleetedhis sense of identity with southern Sudanese. Whatever the reason some 500 Anya Nya are reported to have played a erueial part in the eoup itself, and subsequently 1,500 were reeruited into the UgandaIlarmy. Explainingeventsin Ugandasince1971 While not wishing to go over the atrocious and bizarre events whieh have oecurred in Uganda sinee 1971 it is revealing to examine diseussion of them both as an attemptto revealdimensionsof Uganda'sexperieneeand a eonsideration of the merits and de-merits of the approaehesput forward. Brett's eontribution is essentially to extend to analysis of Uganda's politieal eeonomyin a way whieh illustratesthat while Amin's elevationis understandable it solves none of the basie problems. Amin's expulsion of the Asians was an attempt to win the support of the national bourgeoisie,but the Asians' Afriean sueeessors were inexperieneed and the eeonomy deelined still further under their management. The expansionof the size of armedforees and the demands from them for improved equipment and eonditions made the already overgrown state plaee still more strain on the eeonomy. (It might be added that the further eollapse of governmentalinstitutions was symbolizedby the abduetion and murder of the ehief justice and former prime minister Benedieto Kiwanuka.) This proeessof ' aeeeleratedregression' is understandable (though rising prices for eoffee in world marketsmay help Uganda) but it only aeeounts for one aspeet of Uganda's experienee; other eountries in serious eeonomie diffieulties have not suffered eoups, notably Uganda's neighbour Tanzania, nor have eoups neeessarilyresulted in atroeitiesof the kind that have oeeurred under Amin's rule. In his book and essayson UgandaMazruihas advanceda galaxyof explanatory themes, a numberof whieh appearto be very readilyapplieable. His suggestion that the Kakwa Amin was the 'eommon man' erystallizedinto a class analysis engagingly entitled, 'The Lumpen Proletariat and the Lumpen Militariat: African soldiers as a new political class.'l7 After two years of Amin's rule observers were pointing to what appeared to be a deliberate attack upon the country's intelligentsia. Amin's initial cabinet of highly educated civilians was threatened with compulsory drill and induetion into the armed forees,
17. A. A. Mazrui,' The Lumpen Proletariat andthe Lumpen Militariat:AfricanSoldiers as a New Political Class', Political Studies(1973).

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while reports suggested that school teacherswere being singled out for murder in many places.l8 Eventually cabinet rule disappeared,together with several ministers, while between three and five thousand educated Ugandans fled to Kenya and Britain. Mazrui suggests that though the soldiers were motivated by resentmenttowardsthe intelligentsiathey lackedthe coherenceof a developed class and their behaviourhas thus beeIlakinto the lumpenproletariat. Certainly as Uganda has come under more direct military rule there has been a decline in discipline. In 1973 the five regions of Uganda were converted into nine provinces, and 728 soldiers, many of them privates were appointed as chiefs. It appears that they took to heart Mao's dictum that power grows from the barrelof a gun refined by Mazrui into the hypothesisthat in primitive economic conditionscontrolof the means of destructionmattersmore than ownership of the means of production for a number of the new 'chiefs' were subsequently accused of murder. The suggestion that the lumpen militariatreflects the common man coming to power fits readily with another of Mazrui's themes that we are witnessing the re-Africanization of Africa. Military rule, rather than constitutional government in the hands of intellectuals, reflects indigenous African society. The ethnocentrismof Africansocietiesencouragesthe rejectionof alien elements, such as the Asians. 'Intimidatory leadership' is more customary in Africa than the pursuit of democraticideals (in spite of the exhortationsof President Nyerere in neighbouringTanzania). The ways of the warrior-king,including the references to dreams and divine inspirationsas the origin of policies, are readily appreciatedby Amin's audience in Uganda. However, while re-Africanizationmakes Amin attractive in certain ways, it also involves a raising of tension within Uganda. In particularthe Ugandan army has long been weighted towards particularethnic groups, a relic of the colonial practice of recruiting from the safe and soldierly areas in the north of the country. This has had two results. The first was that the coup itself increased ethnic consciousness within the army and led to frequent clashes between members of the ethnic groups who were significantly represented within it; in particularthe Langi (to whom Obote belongs) and Acholi appear to have been singled out for attack. The second was that other groups with little or no representationhave increasinglyidentifiedthe region itself in ethnic and community terms. The total effect has been to prevent the emergence of any form of effective military-agrariancomplex in Uganda and to increase the level of bloodshed in an already violent country: as indicated by the title of his book Mazrui labels the outcome a 'military ethnocracy'.
18. Detailed charges of atrocities against Amin include the letter from Milton Obote to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. OAU, May 1973, published as the appendixto Mazrui, Soldiersand Kinsmen; and the ' Open letter to GeneralIdi Amin', by his formerforeign minister,WanumeKibedi, June 1974, Paris (mimeo). The annual African Contemporary Record 1971-2 gives a resume of events in Uganda. See also Africa Confidential, 15 September 1974, Uganda: Nubians and Southern Sudanese.

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Uganda of variousthemesin relationto contemporary Mazrui'sdiscussion but one (towhichthis articlelacksthe spaceto do justice)is oftenpersuasive, is open to question. He suggeststhat the aspectof his conclusion important fasterin East Africathan in West of Africais proceeding re-Africanization to which the latterwas penetration European greater the of because Africa Africait was that West of penetration higher the of result a As exposed. whichled in the conmovements with its earlyand strongnationalist region of the continentand hence in comparative politicaldevelopment temporary attentionshouldbe shiftedto studies,but in the study of re-Africanization the other side of the continent. Apartfrom an initial sense of shock that there continent as the normof the re-Africanized shouldbe projected Uganda conclusion. There are a numberof Mazrui's for querying areotherreasons AfricanEmpire,where othermilitaryregimesin Africa,such as the Central in which but thereare othercountries havebeen committed, greatbrutalities the rule of law still applies;and there are also a some attemptto maintain in East Africa. A particularly numberof survivingciviliangoveraments, is of the claimthat in repetition furtherproblemarisesfromthe constant andtherefore thatthis is a uniquecommunity a Nubi for Wanjihas suggested is muchreduced. sigiificance comparative of Uganda's discussion of the Nubis also of the importance However,a returnto the suggestion under of Uganda themein the examination possibleexplanatory raisesanother on placedgreatemphasis the Amin. Wanjistatesthat the Nubi community and a numberof afterthe Mahdistuprising, storiesof the periodof isolation of this period. For a start emergedfrom a brief investigation similarities SelimBey, bore forceafterEmin'sdeparture, of the Egyptian the commander on his character to Amin,and judgements physicalresemblance a remarkable ring. Stanleywrote,'He is six foot high,largeof girth,about havea familiar fifty yearsold, blackas coal. I am ratherinclinedto like him . . . I readin a tendencyto pet his atiimalism. He is not a man this man'sface indolence, arenot unlikethoseof Amin'sBritishofficers to conspire.'l9 The judgements on their loyalseniorNCO. Lugardwrotelaterthat Selim was, 'A Sudanese with no otherblood in him. He is no fool, however,and I saw that in the firstfive minutes,and that I had met a man who was shrewdand suspicious commentwhich is not unlikethat from some of those and strong-willed',20 who havemet Aminsincehis seizureof power. Whilenot wishingto suggest Postthe resemblance thatSelimBeyis aliveandwellandlivingin the Command to amln ls strllllng. a characteristic of the Nubi stressestheir militarism, Wanji'sdescription six hundred Some them. upon wkenhe came Lugard impressed whichgreatly paraded thousand, three of force a to Selimof according men, the remainder
19. Stanley, In DarkestAfrica, p. 138. 20. Quoted in Perham, M., Lugard the Years of Adventure(London: Faber, 1956), p. 276.

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for Lugard. Officershad replacedtheir outworn uniforms with crudely made outfits from the cotton their slaves had grown, but they were distinguishableas attempts at Egyptian army dress. Isolation had been well rewarded by promotion- one detachment of forty men contained the Egyptian equivalents of two majors,three captains,five lieutenants,three sergeantmajors,five sergeants, seven corporals,one bugler and fourteen privates. In spite of being out of touch with Egypt for ten years they retainedan immense loyaltyto the Khedive. Lugard summed up, 'In short amongst all the outward savagery of soldiers dressed in hides, of naked women, and grass huts, there was a noticeablealmost pathetic attempt to maintain the status they claimed as soldiers of a civilized govermnent.21 Amin, for all his troubles in the army, has repeatedly stressed the significance of military discipline, as mentioned he once sought to drill civilian ministers, and he has spoken of turning his country into one large army. He has created some exotically named military units, notably the Suicide RevolutionaryMechanized Battalion. He has promoted men in quixotic manner, including a taxi driver who was rapidly promotedto the ranlr of major. He has awarded himself the VC, DSO and MC. He professes respect for his former British CO and love for the Queen. The economic survival of the Nubis also has some parallels in the contemporary situation. Selim's men from the main camp and the outposts (to whom Egyptian clerks sent official despatchesfrom Selim) preyed upon the tribes of northern Uganda, southern Sudan and the Congo; Lugard described them as a 'horde of locusts'.22 In addition to food they took women and slaves, many of whom were assimilatedinto camp life. Ofiicers had fifty to one hundred followers each, and even privates had a few. The total communitynumbered some nine thousand. The military certainly appear to have battened on Uganda since Amin came to power. The size of the armed forces has grown and may be as large as twenty thousand men (and women). It is suggested that this includes several thousand southern Sudanese, perhaps some men from Zaire and four hundred Palestinians. These 'mercenaries' appear particularlyprominentin the immediateguard of the Presidenthimself. Such consumer goods as reach Uganda appear ear-markedfor the military, while within Uganda it seems that local garrison commanders, and even ordinary soldiers, feel free to commandeerwhatever takes their fancy. The military appear to have benefitted from the distribution of the businesses confiscated from the Asians, and Nubis have been said to have become prominent in the retail trade. Amin has defended the Nubis publicly, referring to them as a 'unique tribe', and has suggested that assimilation is possible, 'everybody is free to become a member of the Nubian tribe', who he describes as, 'a very
21. Lugard, The Rise of Our EasternAfrican Empire,p. 218. 22. Interesting comments on the relations of the Egyptian forces and African tribes are given in articlesby Sir John Grayin the Uganda3rournal, see his Rwot OchamaPayera, (1948), pp. 121-128; Acholi History 1860-1901, I & II, (1951), pp. 121-143, (1952) pp. 32-50.

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the first time he refers to people'.23 In a later article, in which for friendly possibility of assimilation, in Nubi community, Mazrui discusses the the prolonged period of rule the rapid growth of Islam as a result of a particular Amin.24 by easily be exaggerated. It seems The importanceof the Nubi explanationcan the deterioratingsituation that Amin's coup was a Nubi plot, and if in unlikely turn increasinglyto those followed it is understandablethat he should which this unique communitydoes not whom he felt most close his involvement in to is required concerning explain all his actions-much more material necessarily Nevertheless the examinaNubis before any firm conclusion is possible. the as other explanations of the little that is kllown about them is as suggestive tion contemporaryUganda. of Uganda? Whither can also be projectedinto the The themes discussed in explanation of Amin face that challenge. Brett and certain writers have not hesitated to future, coup after another, the 'acceleratedregression' with one attempted anticipates reversal in the pattern until, CThe oddone perhaps successful, but no major by those forces [underof the population whose lives are being destroyed mass destruction of the come to recognize the necessity for the total development] and its replacementby a innerstructure of the capitalist mode of production and equality.'25 Meanwhile it mode of production based upon cooperation two revolutionaryregimes: the is noteworthythat Amin receives succour from in support of his rule. SovietUnion and Libya have both been active as unlikely. At the conclusion just seem Mazrui's earlier prognostications he suggests that the soldiers' of his discussion of the CLumpenMilitariat' result in their embourgeoisement. involvement in commerce may eventually of the widespreaddeveloppossibility the Later, as indicated, he has considered an Islamic state. ment of Islam, which might conceivably produce the Nubi contribution conversion and But aside from possible assimilation to offer a future of change. After to the explanationof Amin does not appear history as a dialecticaldeveloppresentingthe Nubi SouthallinterpretsUgandan upper Nile in the early nineteenth ment from Egypt's colonialaspirationson the and may represent the ' Haitian century. Amin is the ultimate synthesis history of the Nile valley can be alternative' to development. Yet the recent suggested that social and political interpreted differently. Historians have the watersof the Nile for centuries influenceshave flowed againstthe currentof concernas well. Muhammed and this can be appliedto the period of Southall's century began and the process Ali pushed into the Sudan as the nineteenth
p. B295. Record1973-74 (London: Collings, 1975), 23. Africa Contemporary from Emin Pasha to Amin Dada, Uganda in Strangers Religious Mazrui, A. 24. A. AfricanAgairs (1977), pp. 21-38. p. 24. 25. Brett, Relationsof Production,

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later culminated in the rise to power in Uganda of a community apparently derived from and identifying with the southern Sudan. Yet there has always been resistance of the southerly group to rulers from the immediate north. Northern Sudanesesuccessfullyejectedthe Egyptiansin the nineteenthcentury, and the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in this century. Southern Sudanese tribesmen put up stern resistance against Egyptian, Mahdists, British and eventually northern Sudanese, and won regional autonomy. Perhaps, as Ugandan exiles sometimes suggest, Amin, the Nubis alld the 'mercenaries' will become identified as foreigners, against whom concertedaciion should be taken, especially if the suffering of population grows.26 It seems as plausible as class consciousness or a process of embourgeoisementtransforming the situation. And if not then the ' Haitian alternative'will survive. The theme of synthesis suggests another conclusion to the discussion of academic writing on Amin. In its infancy political writing about Africa was largely concerned with colonial administrationon the one hand and political aspects of social anthropologyon the other. Now the imperialand indigenous worlds have synthesizedinto colonially-builtblack-ruledstates. This synthesis may make life harder for political scientists for those in power may well be hostile to the probing of would-be students,as Amin's Ugandaillustrates. The limitation on the empirical investigationwhich the subject requires encourages the advancementof speculativeexplanationswhich may acquire an undeserved acceptance. Amin remainsan ambiguousfigure.
26. In the recent book by Henry Kyemba, State of Blood: the insidestory of Idi Amin (London: Corgi, 1977), the Nubis are depicted as distinct from other Ugandans (see especiallyp. 112).