Should we think of human rights as nothing other than politics?

Human rights are international instruments in order to protect people universally from severe political, legal, and social abuses.Examples of human rights are the right to freedom, the right to private life, the right to fair trial, the right to human decency and the right to engage politically.These rights are enforced on national and international level. Usually in strong nation-states, these rights are addressed to governments in order to be enforced. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the main source of human rights, followed by other human rights treaties in international organizations such as the United Nations , the Council of Europe etc. The most tempting question about human rights is not whether they exist, but if they can be enforced and if they are nothing other than politics. The human rights instruments are a crucial attempt to form a moral and legal framework against several atrocities that we have seen throughout the recent past. It seems that now more than ever, human rights have become one of the most discussed topics in the global political agenda and seem to part of the agenda of many international institutions like the United Nations, the World Bank. Of course this is because , we might live in the era of human rights, but we also live in an era, where they are frequently abused. For some, this might be considered as a positive path for hum any, but some other are more critical about it, arguing that they might 'be worse than ineffective'. (Bell, 2010, p.240). One of their criticisms is 'conceptual inflation', meaning that because they are so prominent everything is translated into a human right, thus it becomes hard to distinguish on all different claim, and the second criticism is that they are political, meaning that they are not used in ways to meet their ends. (Bell, 2010, p.240) In this essay, the question I will try to answer is whether human rights should be understood as nothing other than politics. My argument to this question is that throughout the twentieth century it seems to be that they have been mostly used as political instruments, thus constituting them as politics. However, I should not undermine the fact that in some cases they have proven to function as a catalyst, being something a lot more than just politics and embodying their initial role, protecting crucial aspects of human agency. Why is then just politics?Human rights became international only after the Second World War. It was the first time that people could challenge unjust state law or state oppressive practices, based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. After sixty years, modern states have ratified human rights conventions and some have incorporated their rights and remedies into the structure of their constitution ( Ignatieff, 2000, p. 6). For new states to enter the United Nation, is a pre-condition to ratify intentional human rights covenants. This global diffusion of human rights maybe be seen as a moral progress, however is raises questions about the motives of those who have advanced this practice ( Ignatieff, 2000, p. 7). Many nongovernmental organizations appeared to defend the abuse and oppression against human rights. States lost their monopoly in defending rights and these nongovernmental organizations claimed that they defend human rights more effectively. However, Ignatieff argues that here a problem of particularism conflicting with universalism. There groups have claimed that they believe that human rights are

universal, while they use human rights language in order to defend particular national groups or minorities ( Ignatieff, 2000, p.9). Ignatieff says that particularism conflicts with universalism 'at the point at which one's commitment to a group leads one to countenance human rights violations towards another group' ( Ignatieff, 2000, p. 9). For instance persons who are interested in the violation of the rights of Palestinians, may not be equally interested about the rights# violation of the Israelis. I believe that despite the fact that human rights activists would like to show themselves as impartial and 'in defense of universal moral claims designed to delegitimize political' ( Ignatieff, 2000, p.9), that is simply impossible. According to my conjectures activism is political, but Ignatieff says that 'human rights politics is disciplined or constrained by moral universals' ( Ignatieff, 2000, p. 9). Thus, activists, through moral universalism, manage to disciple their partiality. ( Ignatieff, 2000, p. 9). At this point, I think it is useful to point out that human rights activists represent the rights and interests of minorities, without being elected by those who they represent. However, although acutely political, they manage to monitor the respect that states show to Human Rights Conventions, thus making the rhetoric of human rights a reality. ( Ignatieff, 2000, p. 10). Moreover, human rights could be associated with nationalism. Usually people try to find remedies in their domestic rights, before using the solution of human rights conventions. Those how are stateless find refuge to the language of human rights, however, they also seek remedy in statehood for themselves. Ignatieff stresses that international human rights helped nationalism to grow, since they 'have encouraged the core claim of nationalist movements to collective self-determination' (Ignatieff, 2000, p. 15). Those who would need more the benefits of international human rights,seem to be interested in collective self-determination. Thus, nationalist movements seem to appeal more those who lack statehood or rights or home ( Ignatieff, 2000, p. 15). But, even the stateless or minorities that are ruled by ethnic majorities, need international human rights 'as a juridical source of legitimacy for the right to refuse legal but immoral orders'( Ignatieff, 2000, p16). State sovereignty is conditional as far as the proper behavior towards human rights is concerned. When the state fail to secure them, in some cases intervention is not just an option, but a sanction ( Ignatieff, 2000., p. 17). So far we have observed that human rights are rather imperial, but they are also political when seen as a 'discourse for the adjudication of conflict' ( Ignatieff, 2000, p.20). Rights are in conflict. Ignatieff argues that there purpose is to create a ' common framework, a common set of reference points that can assist parties in conflict to deliberate together' ( Ignatieff, 2000, p.20). Thus, I reckon that human rights are not above politics. When there is a conflict of right, this comes to an end in terms of means, not in terms of ends. Ignatieff is right to say that human rights ' is nothing other than politics, one that must reconcile moral ends to concrete situations and must be prepared to make painful compromises not only between means and ends, but between ends themselves' ( Ignatieff, 2000, p.21-22). However, politics have another role, as well. Politics helps us understand when we should not bear anymore with deliberation and compromise. Rights are there when making amends does not help, and the extent of abuse asks for action.

Perhaps not surprisingly, if I want to advocate that human rights are politics, I would like to explain to my reader that before establishing justice and human rights to ethnic minorities or seriously oppressed populations, one should bear in mind that stability and maybe on a constitutional framework. Stability is a precondition for the protection of human rights. A good case to look at is that of Kurdistan. The problem here is not to offer humanitarian assistance to the oppressed but a constitutional framework to secure their rights in the four state that have a Kurdish minority, instead of promoting collective self-determination of the Kurds that could cause instability and perhaps a civil war ( ignatiefff, 2000, p. 26). The same applies to constitutionalism, which is 'a sine qua non of effective human rights protection in multiethnic states'. ( ignatieff, 2000, p.32). State sovereignty is still vibrant for securing human rights and nongovernmental organizations seem to be insufficient on their own. Nevertheless , human rights are politics since they have paved the way to humanitarian intervention. When human rights have being violated, intervention took place in order to provide protect of human rights. However, looking in examples of intervention, I would say that most of them look more than politics decisions rather than an attempt to save oppressed people. Usually they are inconsistent because they are driven out of interest. Also, Ignatieff argues that 'interventions require us to take side with one party in a civl war'. ( ignatieff, 2000, p.45). Therefore, this adds an extra point to the argument that human rights are politics, since it could be argued that interventions, instead of promoting human rights, act as a 'universalistic basis for foreign policy'. ( Ignatieff, 2000, p. 47). On the other side of the fence the are those, who have argued that human rights are more than politics. Many theories have been developed, ranging from naturalist theories that consider human rights as natural to agreement theories that 'conceptualize human rights as standards that might be objects of agreements among members of cultures whose moral and political values are in various aspects dissimilar' ( Beitz, 2009, p. 74) . In conclusion, It is true that human rights are moral and legal claims that relate to interests that human beings share ( Bell, 2010, p.246). Those who look for a justification of human rights a, look for a ' common standard', which stands between comprehensive and minimalist. (Bell, 2010, p. 248). Primarily , human rights are here for protecting certain aspects of human agency. Bells argues that to be an agent, you have to able to have a life of your own and that your choice are real and feasible. ( Bell, 2010, p.248). When someone has all these and is able to pursue the life he/she wants, means that he has a degree of autonomy. However, at the same time as human being we are dependent and vulnerable to the abuse of power. Therefore, in order to be capable of delivering our commitments or of forming meaningful relationships, we need certain conditions that can both assist us to achieve our choices and to protect ourselves from abuses. ( Bell, 2010, p.248-249). In this sense, one could argue that ' a justificatory minimalism' of human rights is required. References

Beitz, Ch., The idea of Human Rights, 2009, Oxford :Oxford University Press Bell, D., Ethics and World Politics, 2010, Oxford : Oxford University Press Ignatieff, M., Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, 2000, Princeton : Princeton University Press