241. 232 SCRA 478 [G.R. No. 98400 May 23, 1994] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.

CHERRY BONDOC Y LIWANAG, accusedappellant. BELLOSILLO, J.: FACTS: On 6 October 1989, Lucita Romero Corpuz went to the Manila City Jail bringing her 1 year and 4 months old daughter, Carla May, with her to visit her husband, Antonio Corpuz, but was not allowed this time to bring her daughter inside. Cherry Bondoc, appellant, who was standing in front of the gate approached her and volunteered take care of the child while Lucita visits her husband. After Bondocs explanation of her good intentions, Lucita entrusted her child to her but after fifteen minutes both Bondoc and the child were nowhere to be found and a woman told Lucita that the appellant had left with the child; fearing that her child was kidnapped, Lucita reported the kidnapping to the WPD, which was recorded in the police blotter and then published in the Peoples Journal. Appellant was then placed under arrest for kidnapping, and on 19 Jan. 1990 an information for kidnapping for the purpose of selling was filed against her but she denied the charges, nevertheless, trial court convicted her, hence this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court is right in convicting the appellant of kidnapping defined and penalized under Art. 270 of The Revised Penal Code. HELD: The trial court observed that Lucita, testifying before the court in a spontaneous, straightforward and candid manner, pointed to and identified appellant as the person to whom she entrusted Carla May and who later absconded with her child; that prior to Lucita's identification in court she had immediately pointed to the appellant as the kidnapper of her child on the day she saw appellant at the Herbosa police station when Carla May was presented.1 The bare denial of appellant that Lucita was not the one who entrusted Carla May to her constitutes self-serving negative evidence which is not sufficient to overcome the positive testimony of Lucita. As the denial of appellant was weak, uncorroborated and inherently improbable, the clear and straightforward testimony of the prosecution witnesses should prevail. Even if there is no evidence to show appellant's intention to sell the young girl for profit, the two elements of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Art. 270 of The Revised Penal Code are already present, namely: (a) The offender has been entrusted with the custody of a minor person, and (b) The offender deliberately fails to restore said minor to his parents or guardian. 10 With the positive testimony of Lucita, the prosecution has proved the presence of the above elements to establish the criminal liability of appellant. Moreover, appellant has admitted the existence of the two elements by testifying that after having been given custody of the child, she kept the latter in her sister's house for three (3) or four (4) days without seeking any assistance from the police authorities so that the child could be immediately returned to her mother. This admission shows the falsity of her claim of innocence. Instead, it affirms her deliberate refusal to return the child to her mother.2 Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

1 2

p. 484 p. 485

242. 31 Phil. 509 [G.R. No. 10331 September 27, 1915] THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. JOAQUIN SILVANO, defendant and appellant. TORRES, J.: FACTS: Francisca Fabian and her husband lived in a house that belonged to Simon de los Reyes; that they occupied a room therein next to the sala, which latter room was rented by Joaquin Silvano, in company with two married couples; that on July 8, 1913, while the woman Fabian, an old lady named Marciana de los Santos and a little girl named Eusebia Juan were asleep in the said room, Fabians husband having left for Cebu on the previous day, Joaquin Silvano, taking advantage of this circumstance, entered the room by cutting a ribbon with which the door latch was fastened; that Francisca Fabian was awakened by the noise made by defendants entry and turned up the light of a lamp which stood on a table, whereupon she saw and recognized the defendant who was already inside the room; that the defendant said to her: If youre not willing, Ill kill you, to which she replied by asking him why he had entered her room; that defendant was carrying a pocket knife in his hand; that she became afraid and took refuge beside the old lady Marciana de los Santos; and that at this moment defendant put out the light and precipitately left the room. It was afterwards discovered that the ribbon with which the girl Eusebia Juan had fastened the room door had been cut in two, and this ribbon was presented in evidence as Exhibit A. The facts classify the crime as forcible entry of a dwelling, inasmuch as it was committed by means of violence upon the door of the dwelling of the offended party, and by intimidation. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant is guilty of the crime of forcible entry of dwelling punished under Art. 491, par. 2, of the Penal Code. HELD: Joaquin Silvano had no authority to enter the said room without the permission and consent of its inmates. Notwithstanding this, early in the morning of the affair, taking advantage of the absence of Francisca Fabians husband and of Franciscas being asleep with her companions, he cut the ribbon, which fastened the door and, on being discovered, threatened her with death. [] The circumstances of defendants being a boarder in the same house does not alter the nature of the crime Neither can the circumstance of the door being fastened by a weak and inadequate ribbon support the claim that there was no breaking in, since before going to sleep the prosecuting witness closed and fastened her door, thereby giving it to be understood that she did not wish anyone to enter without her express consent. Defendant did not prove that early in the morning of the crime he entered the room with the permission of the offended party, and in the absence of proof of such consent it is to be presumed that he entered it against her will, as shown by the reproaches she addressed to him on seeing him inside the room and also by the complaint which she immediately made to the owner or proprietor of the house, who, in consequence, forthwith investigated the occurrence. 1 [] the record discloses satisfactory and convincing proof of the defendants guilt as the proved perpetrator of the crime of forcible entry of a dwelling, committed with violence or intimidation, against the tacit will of the offended inmate of the room.2 Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
1 2

p. 512 p. 513

243. 42 Phil. 69 [G.R. No. L-17332 August 18, 1921] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, vs. OLIMPIO DE PERALTA, defendant and appellant. VILLAMOR, J.: FACTS: On the half month of October 1919, Olimpio de Peralta succeeded Toledo, former president of Philippine Marine Union. The latter looking for a desk glass went to a room of house No. 507 of Jaboneros Street, which was rented to the said association and under the privilege of Toledo as the president of said union. De Peralta entered the room in question in the morning of the 16th of the same month, which gave rise to the information for trespass to dwelling against Peralta, in which it is alleged that he entered the room of Toledo against the will of the occupant. Then a trial proceeded which sentenced the accused to suffer two months and one day of arresto mayor, and a fine of 400 pesetas, and costs, hence from this, an appeal was taken. ISSUE: Whether or not the act of De Peralta constitutes the crime of trespass to dwelling? HELD: After a careful study of the testimony given in the case, we are of the opinion that the accused, after calling at or near the door, pushed it and without the permission of the occupants entered the room with the object of taking away the desk glass. There is no evidence that Toledo had expressed his will in the sense of prohibiting the accused Peralta from entering his room, and the mere fact that the latter entered it, without the permission of the occupant, does not constitute the offense of trespass to dwelling provided for and penalized in article 491 of the Penal Code. In order that this crime may exist it is necessary that the entrance should be against the express or presumed prohibition of the occupant, and the lack of permission should not be confused with prohibition. In the decisions of the courts of Spain, as well as in those of this jurisdiction, it has been held uniformly that this crime is committed when a person enters another's dwelling against the will of the occupant, but not when the entrance is effected without his knowledge or opposition.1 "It is not necessary, in the ordinary life of men, in order to call at the door of a house or enter it, to obtain previous permission from the owner who lives in it. With the utmost good faith may a person, to whom entrance has not been denied beforehand, suppose that the owner of the room has no objection to receiving him in it." And in the present case it is to be supposed that the members of the "Philippine Marine Union," among them the accused, had something familiarity which warrants entrance into the room occupied by the president of the association, particularly when we consider the hour at which the act in question happened (between half past ten and eleven in the morning), the fact that the door of the room was not barricaded or locked with a key, and the circumstance that the room in question was part of the house rented to said association. For the reason above stated, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the accused Olimpio de Peralta is acquitted, with costs of both instances de oficio. So ordered. 2 Johnson, Araullo, Street and Avancea JJ., concur.

1 2

p. 71 pp. 71-72

244. 12 Phil. 283 [G.R. No. L-4655 December 19, 1906 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. ALEJANDRO DIONISIO AND NICOLAS DEL ROSARIO, defendants and appellants. CARSON, J.: FACTS: On 6 January 1908, the defendants entered a house situated on Calle Santo Cristo, Binondo, Manila; the defendants found and entered the principal door of a house, occupied by Lim Chio Long, half-open. Without opposition from the present occupant of lower part of the house, they proceed to the upper story, also without opposition, and they talked with one of the inmates, who invited them to sit down and stay for about two hours. Then they made inquiries of her as to whether or not the Chinamen who lived in the house smoked opium; that the woman told them that she did not know, but they could wait until the Chinamen came home; that the defendants told her that they were secret service men, and desired to make search for opium; that they then entered the other rooms on the upper floor which they found some opium and a pipe; that they questioned the woman, making notes of the information furnished, and threatening to take everybody in the house to jail. The Chinaman heard the noise, he returned, and then a dispute ensued. As a result of the disturbance caused by the dispute between the Chinaman and the defendants, the police entered the house and arrested both the defendants and the Chinaman. That the defendants, while it is true that they had sought employment as secret service agents, had failed in their efforts to secure such employment, and were acting wholly on their own initiative. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court is correct in convicting the defendants of the crime of forcible entry into the dwelling of another? HELD: While the facts proven would appear to be sufficient to sustain a conviction upon a charge of the commission of an assault, and perhaps of attempted estafa or robbery, we do not think that they warrant a conviction of the crime of forcible entry into the dwelling of another. In the case of the United States vs. Pedro Dulfo 1 No. 4133, decided August 10, 1908, we held that "it is an essential element of the offense under consideration, as defined and penalized in the Penal Code, that the entry must have been made without the consent or, more accurately speaking, against the will of the occupant of the dwelling house, and it is, therefore, the duty of the prosecution to affirmatively establish this fact, before a conviction can be had upon a complaint charging its commission."1 In the case at bar, there is no proof whatever of opposition on the part of the owners of the house to the entry of the defendants. On the contrary, the action of the occupant of the lower part of the house in permitting the defendants to enter the house and go upstairs without objection, was at least an implied permission to enter if there was no objection on the part of the woman occupying the upper floor of the house; and her conduct in entering into amicable conversation with the defendants when they came upstairs, and later inviting them to sit down and await the return of the other persons living there, leaves no room for doubt that the entry of the defendants was not against her will and that she interposed no objection or opposition to their doing so.2 Arellano, C.J. Torres, Mapa, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur. Johnson, J., did not sit in this case.
1 2

pp. 285-286 p. 286

245. 28 Phil. 279 [G.R. No. L-9444 October 29, 1914] THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. SOFRONIO DE LA CRUZ, defendant and appellant. ARELLANO, C.J.: FACTS: Sofronio de la Cruz was charged with threatening Dolores Coronel through in a letter with death or the burning of her house unless she gave him P500; the said letter was found by Rafaela Coronel, who lives with Dolores, and then turned it over to neighbor, Agustin Coronel, who read it to Dolores, a 70 yr. woman, who became nervous and uneasy upon seeing herself thus threatened. Tito Coronel then reported the matter to the municipal president, who went to Dolores house and took precautionary measures; upon return t o the town hall a man, Sofronio de la Cruz, was held under arrest by the Constabulary and was searched; upon him was an envelope inside a pocketbook with the name Dolores Coronel written on it with the similar handwriting as the letter used to threat Dolores. De la Cruz had been arrested and taken to the town hall for a similar letter, which was addresses to one Andres Valenzuela that seemed that both letters were written by the same hand. De la Cruz says that Tito Coronel wrote the name of Dolores Coronel in the envelope found in him; but Tito was made write a name in court for comparison and it was evident that it was not like that of any of the letters. ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI of Pampanga is correct in sentencing the defendant guilty of threats under Art. 494 of the Penal Code. HELD: The trial court having held that the anonymous threat (Exhibit A) was written by the defendant, and there being no ground for the contrary, the legitimate conclusion from the facts is to sustain such finding, which is certainly corroborated by the other data furnished by the witness Florentino Nacu regarding the presence in Guagua of the defendant, who was a resident of Angat, Bulacan. The conclusion in law therefore is for the guilt of the defendant, who is guilty of the crime penalized in paragraph one of article 494 of the Penal Code; and there must be imposed upon him the penalty lower by two degrees than that fixed by the law for the crime he threatened to commit. For having made the threat and demanding a sum of money, even though he did not obtain it, the penalty should be in the maximum degree, however, as he made the threat in writing. The penalty fixed by the law for the crime he threatened to commit, which is homicide, is reclusion temporal (art. 404), so the lower by two degrees, according to scale No. 2, is prision correccional, which in its maximum degree is four years two months and one day to six years. The penalty of four years two months and one day of prision correccional in the judgment appealed from being in this degree and the imposition of the accessories of the law and the allowance of half of the time of detention suffered and the payment of the costs all being proper, said judgment is affirmed, with the costs of this instance.1 Torres, Johnson, Carson, and Araullo, JJ., concur. Moreland, J., concurs in the result.

pp. 284-285

246. 14 Phil. 450 [G.R. No. L-5348 November 16, 1909] THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. ALEJO PAGUIRIGAN, defendant and appellant. ELLIOT, J.: FACTS: The defendant, Paguirigan, was charged with having threatened to kill Sotero Pascua, Vicente Marquez, and Maximo Lopez. The men were engaged in transplanting rice upon a land, which was claimed by Paguirigan; that while they are working the defendant appeared, and flourishing a cane in an excited manner, ordered them to stop their work and leave, at the time threatening to kill them unless they obeyed; they obeyed the order and the incident was closed. From these facts, the defendant was convicted and sentenced under the second part of article 494 of the Penal Code to one month and one day of arresto mayor, and to pay a fine of 325 pesetas, and in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of 12 pesetas a day, said subsidiary imprisonment not to exceed ten days, and to pay the costs of this prosecution. The court found no extenuating or aggravating circumstances, and gave the defendant the benefit of article 11 of the Penal Code, for the purpose of reducing the penalty from the medium to the minimum degree. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant should have been convicted and punished of the crime of grave threats. HELD: Upon these facts the defendant should have been convicted under the third subdivision of article 589, instead of article 494 of the Penal Code. The threats referred to in article 494 consist in formally threatening a private person with some injury to himself or his family which would amount to a crime. A threat made in jest or in the heat of anger is a misdemeanor only under article 589. Subdivision 3 of article 589 provides that "Those who shall threaten another, by words and in the heat of anger, with an injury that would constitute a crime, and who by their subsequent actions show that they persisted in the intention which they gave utterance to in their threat; provided that, in view of the circumstances of the deed, it should not be included in Book II of this code," shall be punished with the penalty of from one to five days of arrest, or a fine of from 15 to 125 pesetas. The fact that the threat was made in the heat of anger, and that the subsequent actions of the party show that he did not seriously intend to carry the threat into execution, reduce the offense from a crime to a misdemeanor.1 Under the authority of these decisions the defendant should have been convicted and punished for a misdemeanor. The sentence is therefore reversed, and the defendant is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of 125 pesetas, and in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in the provincial jail of La Union, at the rate of 15 pesetas or P3 a day, said subsidiary imprisonment not to exceed ten days, and to pay the costs of this prosecution. So ordered.2 Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, and Moreland.

1 2

pp. 451-452 pp. 453-454

247. 21 Phil. 237 [G.R. No. 6660 January 17, 1912] THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. TEOFILO OSORIO, defendant and appellant. TORRES, J.: FACTS: On 14 February 1910, in Dalaguete, Cebu, the defendant, Teofilo Osorio, a Cebu police force clerk and two policemen, Mateo Navarro and Bartolome Dicdiquin, devised a scheme to extort money from Yap Buyco, a Chinaman; that the defendant arranged that his younger brother, Simplicio, to place a can with opium in the store of Buyco, then after this Teofilo with the two policemen went to the store while pretending as the chief of police. With one of the policemen carrying a revolver they proceeded to search the store without any search warrant or warrant of arrest and then found the can of opium that was planted beforehand; the defendant began to intimidate Buyco with aid of Navarro, who was carrying a revolver, and told Buyco that he would be arrested and charged with illegal possession of opium and be jailed unless he paid P1,000. However, the friends of Buyco intervened and mediated the deal, Osorio consented to reduce the sum to P300 and it was immediately paid by Buyco. The defendant additionally told Buyco to no worry about the opium, because he himself would be responsible, before going away; then the defendant kept the money and spared a mere P10 to the other policeman who was standing guard at the door. ISSUE: Whether or not the acts done by the defendant be classified as a crime of grave threats. HELD: The facts stated, and duly proven in this case, point to the crime of robbery, committed by means of intimidation of the person of the Chinaman Yap Buyco, which is provided for and punished by articles 502 and 503, No. 5, of the Penal Code; for the threatening the person of the injured the plaintiff the thief succeeded the sum of P300. delivered through the formers fear that if he did not do so, he would arrested and turned over the courts as a smuggler and possessor of opium, which the defendant claimed to have found in his store.1 Neither can the crime in question be characterized as threats, because such crime depends upon the moral pressure which threat of future injury exerts upon a person to obtain, at some future time, the end sought. When the crime consists in materially taking possession of or securing, on the spot, the delivery of the money or other personal property, through the effect of fear or fright which imminence of the injury threatened produces in the mind of the person intimidated, the nature of the penal act is altered and constitutes, not threats but the crime of robbery with intimidation defined by article 515 of the Penal Code of Spain, identical with 502 for the Philippines; and the facts should be characterized. Such is the principal established by the supreme court of Spain in a judgment of June 16, 1900. Robbery then is unquestionably the proper classification for the crime committed against said Chinaman, from whom sham officers of the law succeeded in securing the sum of P300, under pressure and menace of arrest, indictment and trial for violation of the opium law, for such procedure constitutes intimidation.2 Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur
1 2

p. 239 p. 241

248. 36 SCRA 17 [G.R. No. L-28716 November 18, 1970] FELIX CAISIP, IGNACIO ROJALES and FEDERICO VILLADELREY, Petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents. CONCEPCION, C.J.: FACTS: Cabalag and her husband cultivated a parcel of land in Hacienda Palico, which was owned by Roxas y Cia and Caisip as the overseer of the land, while the father of Cabalag previously tenanted the land cultivated. On a relevant date, Guevarra sought recognition as a lawful tenant from the Court of Agrarian Relations but such was dismissed as it was held that he wasnt a tenant thereof making Roxas file a case for forcible entry against Guevarra, on which he won; the court ordered Guevarra to vacate the lot. Meanwhile there was an altercation between Cabalag and Caisip over cutting of sugar cane; Cabalag was being asked to leave by Caisip but she refused and was then charged with grave coercion. When she was again seen in the Hacienda and weeding, she was forcibly dragged by policemen and Caisip, which prompted for the filing of a case of grave coercion. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are liable of the crime of grave coercion. HELD: It is, accordingly, clear that appellants herein had, by means of violence, and without legal authority therefor, prevented the complainant from "doing something not prohibited by law," (weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her "to do something against" her will (stopping the weeding and leaving said lot), "whether it be right or wrong," thereby taking the law into their hands, in violation of Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant Caisip argues that, not having used violence against the complaining witness, he should be acquitted of the charge.1 In other words, there was community of purpose between the policemen and Caisip, so that the latter is guilty of grave coercion, as a co-conspirator, apart from being a principal by induction. In the commission of the offense, the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and disregard of the respect due the offended party, by reason of her sex, were present, insofar as the three appellants herein are concerned. As regards appellants Rojales and Villadelrey, there was the additional aggravating circumstance of having taken advantage of their positions as members of the local police force. Hence, the penalty of imprisonment meted out to appellants herein, which is the minimum of the maximum prescribed in said Art. 286, and the fine imposed upon them, are in accordance with law. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendantsappellants. It is so ordered.2 Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur. Dizon, J., is on leave. Makasiar and Villamor, JJ., took no part.

1 2

p. 23 pp. 24-25

249. 11 Phil. 543 [G.R. No. 4812 October 30, 1908] THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. ROMUALDO MENA, defendant and appellant. CARSON, J.: FACTS: On or about 21st day of December 1907, the 3 carabaos of the defendant trespassed and damaged the rice paddies of Ceferino Flora, who then took possession of the animals and refused to return them to the defendant unless he is compensated with. The defendant knows that he need to compensate Flora for the damage but he said that he was unable to do so in kind, because at the time he does not own rice and it seemed that the damage was questionable. Flora, with his son, took the carabaos to deposit it to the justice of peace until the issue is settle, however, on the way they encountered the defendant with some friends; Flora refused to surrender the animals then the defendant drew his bolo and rushed at Floras son cutting the mecate used to lead the carabao, and with threats of bodily injury, compelled him to release the other carabao. The defendant further made threats of bodily injury and also compelled Flora himself to release the carabao he was riding. ISSUE: Whether or not the actions of the defendant fall under the crime of unlawful coercion. HELD: Without entering upon a discussion of the respective rights of the parties, we are of opinion that, granting it were true that the complaining witness had no lawful right to take possession of the carabaos or to take the carabaos to the justice of peace, and granting further that the accused had a right to have the carabaos turned over to him, when he demanded them of the complaining witness, nevertheless, the crime of coaccion (unlawful coercion), as defined and penalized in article 497 of the Penal Code, was committed by him, when with violence he compelled the complaining witness to turn over the carabaos against his will, it being clearly understood by the defendant and his friends that the complaining witness was not seeking to appropriate the animals or to carry them off as his property, and that he merely asserted s right to the possession of the carabaos for the purpose of taking them to the justice of the peace in order that the question of the damages might be adjusted. The acts committed by the defendant clearly fall within the foregoing definition of the crime of coaccion. With violence he compelled the complaining witness to do that which he did not desire to do that is to say, to turn over the possession of the carabaos and it matters not whether it was just or unjust that they should thus have been turned over to the defendant; whether it was or was not the duty of the complaining witness to turn them over on demand, the defendant was guilty of the crime of coaccion unless he was lawfully authorized to enforce his demand when the complaining witness refused compliance therewith. 1 Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur. Arellano, C.J., concurs in the result.

p. 545

250. 76 Phil. 119 [C.A. No. 762 February 6, 1946] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. SILVERIO NEBREJA ET AL., defendants. SILVERIO NEBREJA, appellant. FERIA, J.: FACTS: The appellant an encargado of hacendero , Mateo Maningat, who bought an estate that is being oppoed by Nicomeds Jonson, who claims a parcel of it. On 5 October 1942, Jonson and others were plowing the parcel of land claimed by him, the seven defendants led by the appellant were all armed with bolos except for the appellant and a Mariano Magno; that they ordered Jonson to stop plowing the land because they would plow it; Jonson refused and told them he has the right to plow it and it is still in his possession because there was still no decision from the litigation it was involved in and no order from the court to deliver it to another. The appellant replied that if they will not heed their order they would get hurt, then he grabbed the rope of the carabao Jonson is riding and the ones with bolos surrounded them; Jonson cowed, then the defendants took possession of the land for them to plow, he reported to the authorities and went back to the land with them; the sergeant asked the appellant if what Jonson told them was true, he answered in affirmative and stated that he should plow the land. The sergeant warned the appellant and his men that if they did not stop plowing they would be taken to the municipal building; as he refused and said he is ready for anything they were arrested. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant is guilty of the crime of grave coercion. HELD: Appellant's defense is an alibi, that is, that in the morning of October 5, 1942, when the alleged crime was committed, he was at the Central Azucarera Don Pedro in Nasugbu, Batangas, talking with a certain Captain Mauchi, and that when he returned to the Lian, Batangas, in the afternoon of the same day, he was arrested and thrown in jail. This alibi set up by the appellant has no probative value, because it is not supported by evidence, for neither Captain Mauchi nor any one from the sugar central was presented to support it. The negative testimony of the negative co-defendants, who pleaded guilty and were convicted, to the effect that the appellant was not in the land when they were arrested are not strictly in support of the alibi that the appellant was in said sugar central, and is contradicted by Arsenio Nebreja, one of his co-accused who was presented as a witness of the defense, who categorically testified that the appellant was among the arrested in the place where the offense was committed in the morning of October 5, 1942, and by the positive testimony to that effect of the offended party, Felipe Balbal and Sergeant Caraig. Besides, considering the short distance between the municipality of Lian and Nasugbu and the available means of transportation, it was not impossible to the appellant, according to the lower court which took judicial notice of that fact, to have been in the sugar central at Nasugbu in the morning of October 5, 1942, and to have returned to Lian in the same morning in time to commit the offense charged.1 The contention of attorney for the appellant that the latter, being an "encargado" of the owner of the land, had the right to eject forcibly the offended party from the land and prevent him from plowing it, does not deserve serious consideration, for no person may take the law into his own hands.2
1 2

p. 121 p. 122

251. 165 SCRA 391 [G.R. No. L-47646 September 19, 1988] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HON. CESAR R. MARAVILLA and MANUEL B. GADON alias EDRING, defendants-appellants. CRUZ, J.: FACTS: According to Remy G. Gomboc, a 24-year old saleslady, the accused, Manuel B. Gadon grabbed her left breast against her will that caused her shock, indignation and shame, and then said that she kicked him angrily but missed and the man ran away. She then filed a complaint for acts of lasciviousness in the municipal court against Gadon; in the absence of the judge, the mayor conducted the preliminary investigation and issued a warrant of arrest and fixed a bail that was immediately posted by the accused; the municipal judge, herein respondent, annulled the preliminary investigation and the warrant of arrest for failure to ask searching questions, then dismissed the case. The complainant re-filed her charge of acts of lasciviousness against the accused, after the preliminary investigation the respondent judge held that there was no prima facie showing of the designated crime. Accordingly, the charge was changed to unjust vexation in a complaint that was file subsequently. ISSUE: Whether or not prosecution for unjust vexation suspends the period of prescription for acts of lasciviousness. HELD: The crime of unjust vexation, while concededly different from the crime of acts of lasciviousness, is embraced by the latter and prosecution for this crime will suspend the period of prescription for the former crime. A common characteristic of the two offenses is molestation of the offended party. Where it is not shown that this was accompanied by lewd designs, the accused may not be convicted of acts of lasciviousness but may nevertheless be held guilty of unjust vexation, as the lesser offense. In fact, conviction or acquittal of either offense should bar prosecution for the other offense under the rule on double jeopardy. The other reason is based on a more familiar and accepted principle. It is settled that what controls is not the designation of the offense but its description in the complaint or information, as we have held in numerous cases. Hence, even if the crime alleged in the complaint first filed on May 10, 1977, was expressly denominated acts of lasciviousness, the prescriptive period for the crime of unjust vexation was interrupted because that was the crime described by the complainant. In her complaint, she clearly said that the accused "in a bestial manner, criminally, willfully, feloniously and intentionally held my left breast against my will by means of force, deceit and treasonable manner." This Court has repeatedly held that "when the facts, acts and circumstances are set forth in the body of an information with sufficient certainty to constitute an offense and to apprise the defendant of the nature of the charge against him, a misnomer or innocuous designation of a crime in the caption or other parts of the information will not vitiate it; in such case, the facts set forth in the charge controls the erroneous designation of the offenses and the defendant stands charged with the offense charged in the statement of facts. Such erroneous designation may be disregarded as surplusage ."1

pp. 398-399

252. 98 Phil. 646 [G.R. No. L-7712 March 23, 1956] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellant, vs. BERNARDO REYES, ET AL., defendants and appellees. PARAS, C.J.: FACTS: Bernardo Reyes and Mariano Reyes is accused of the crime of coercion, that on 26 August 1953, they conspired and helped each other, through deceit and misrepresentation, seized and take possession of a passenger jeep without the knowledge and consent of owner, Agustin Blasco, for the debt of the latter. They refused to return the said jeep despite repeated demands to the damage and prejudice of the owner. The court dismissed the information upon motion of the defendants because violence is not alleged, notwithstanding the fact that the offense charged is coercion under Art. 287, par. 1 of the RPC. An appeal to the CFI of Manila was dismissed for lack of merit has elevated the case to the SC in third instance with contention that the offense charged is coercion or unjust vexation under Art. 287, par. 2 of the RPC. ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the defendants is meritorious. HELD: We agree with Appellants contention. Although the offense named in the information is coercion, it does not necessarily follow that the applicable provision is the first paragraph, since the second paragraph also speaks of coercions. Inasmuch as the recitals in the information do not include violence, the inevitable conclusion is that the coercion contemplated is that described and penalized in the second paragraph. The offense falling under the second paragraph cannot include violence as an element; otherwise it would come under the first paragraph. Another view we take of the case is that the information, though wrongly calling the offense charged as coercion alleges facts sufficiently constituting unjust vexation, now mixed with coercion and also penalized under the second paragraph of Article 287. Under the old Penal Code, other coercions and unjust vexations were considered misdemeanors against persons treated under a separate chapter. The principal feature of coercion under the first paragraph is that there be a taking by a person of his debtors property for the purpose of applying it to the payment of debt. This feature is recited in the information, consummated not by violence (distinguishing element specified in the first paragraph of Article 287), but thru deceit and misrepresentation no less effective than actual force in depriving the offended party of his free will.1 The contention of Defendant-Appellees that the present appeal would place them in double jeopardy is unfounded. Where the complaint or information is in truth valid and sufficient, but the case is dismissed upon petition of the accused on the ground that the complaint or information is invalid and insufficient, such dismissal will not bar another prosecution for the same offense and the Defendant is estopped from alleging in the second prosecution that the former dismissal was wrong because the complaint or information was valid. (Morgan, Comments on the Rules of Court 52 ed., Vol. II, p. 802.)2 Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.
1 2

p. 648 p. 647

253. 607 SCRA 355 [G.R. No. 176291 December 4, 2009] JORGE B. NAVARRA, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, SAMUEL NAMANAMA, FELIXBERTO LAZARO and DANILO MEDINA, respondents. CARPIO-MORALES, J.: FACTS: Far East Network of Integrated Circuit Subcontractors Corporation (FENICS) leased the premises of Food Terminal, Inc. (FTI) in Taguig, Metro Manila from 1995 up to 2002. It appears that before the expiration of the lease contract or on the night of September 16, 2002, armed elements of the FTI took over the FTI premises in Taguig, Metro Manila and forced two building custodians to leave following which the gates were welded, drawing FENICS president - herein petitioner Jorge B. Navarra to file before public respondent, Office of the Ombudsman, a complaint for grave coercion, malicious mischief, and/or grave threats against herein private respondents Samuel Namanama (Namanama, head of FTIs legal department) and Danilo Medina (Medina, FTIs Senior Manager) along with Felixberto Lazaro (FTIs Legal Assistant). By Resolution of February 22, 2005, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer Janet CabigasVejerano found probable cause to hale private respondents into court for grave coercion under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code. ISSUE: Whether or not alleged information against respondents constitutes grave coercion. HELD: Ordinarily, the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsmans determination of whether probable cause exists, except when the Ombudsman commits grave abuse of discretion. "Probable cause" is defined as "such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." For grave coercion to lie, the following elements must be established: 1) that a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; 2) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, threats, or intimidation; and 3) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right. In the case at bar, the affidavits of petitioner and his witnesses prima facie show that the elements of grave coercion are present. Whether FENICS is indebted to FTI is immaterial. It is elementary that in no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto, and that he who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the competent court if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.1 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the Ombudsman dated September 1, 2005 is SET ASIDE, and the Ombudsman is ORDERED to file an Information for Grave Coercion under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code against private respondents.2
1 2

pp. 362-363 p. 365

254. 575 SCRA 102 [G.R. No. 163898 December 23, 2008] ROBERTO BARBASA, petitioner, vs. HON. ARTEMIO G. TUQUERO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice, GRACE GUARIN, NESTOR SANGALANG, VICTOR CALLUENG, respondents. QUISUMBING, J.: FACTS: Petitioner assails the decision of the CA, which dismissed his petition for certiorari and denied his motion for reconsideration, respectively; there is no found reason to reverse Resolution of the Secretary of DOJ ordering City Prosecutor of Manila to move for dismissal of criminal case against private respondents. Petitioner is the president of Push-Thru Marketing Inc., which leases commercial stalls in Tutuban Center, owned by Tutuban Properties, Inc.; On 30 June 1999, Angelino Hipolito, Push-Thru Marketing merchandising officer, received a disconnection notice of utilities from private respondent Grace Guarin, Credit and Collection Manager fo TPI, for failure of Push-Thru to settle outstanding obligations. Petitioner settled the charges fro CUSA, utilities and electricity, which payment was accepted by Guarin but failed to pay back rentals. On 1 July 1999, Guarin and others together with TPI head security and armed guards disconnect the electicity of Push-Thru stalls. Then, petitioner filed a criminal complaint for Grave Coercion against TPI and its officers and private respondents; it alleged that TPI and its officers cut off the electricity of the stalls in a violent and intimidating manner and by using the aid of several armed guards to intimidate and frighten petitioner and employees and agents. ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of private respondents constitute a crime of grave coercion. HELD: After carefully considering petitioners appeal, we are in agreement to deny it for utter lack of merit. The crime of grave coercion has three elements: (a) that a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so; in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.1 Petitioners appeal gives us no sufficient reason to deviate from what has already been found by the Secretary of Justice and the Court of Appeals. The records show that there was no violence, force or the display of it as would produce intimidation upon petitioners employees when the cutting off of petitioners electricity was effected. On the contrary, it was done peacefully and after written notice to petitioner was sent. We do not subscribe to petitioners claim that the presence of armed guards were calculated to intimidate him or his employees. Rather, we are more inclined to believe that the guards were there to prevent any untoward or violent event from occurring in the exercise of TPIs rights under the lease agreements. If the respondents desired a violent result, they would have gone there unannounced or cut petitioners electricity through less desirable and conspicuous means.2
1 2

p.109 p. 110

255. 503 SCRA 234 [G.R. No. 165065 September 26, 2006] MELCHOR G. MADERAZO, SENIFORO PERIDO, and VICTOR MADERAZO, JR., petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. CALLEJO, SR., J.: FACTS: On 27 January 1997, accused and other public officers of the Municipality of Caibiran, in their official capacity have connived, confederated and mutually helped each other without any authority of law, forcibly ejected, Medaria Veritiao from the market stall she was leasing from the municipality, compelling her to give up occupation to said market against her will, to the damage and prejudice of Verutiao and detriment of public service. On 22 Dec. 1996, Verutiao closed her stall then went to Mindanao to spent Christmas holidays and returned on 15 Januarry 1997, then on the 17th, she received a letter-order from Mayor Melchor Maderazo, directing her to vacate the stall within 24 hours for failure to pay rental, and the lease had been cancelled. Then on the 21st, the mayor padlocked the leased premises, and then opened on the authority of the mayor on the 27th; the contents of the stall were inventoried and taken to the police station by Victor Maderazo. Verutiao was in her farm while these happen, she considered the incident as a political harassment since her husband is an opposition candidate for councilor. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in convicting petitioners of the crime of unjust vexation. HELD: The second paragraph of the Article is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, could unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent person. Compulsion or restraint need not be alleged in the Information, for the crime of unjust vexation may exist without compulsion or restraint. [] The paramount question to be considered is whether the offenders act caused annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed. The main purpose of the law penalizing coercion and unjust vexation is precisely to enforce the principle that no person may take the law into his hands and that our government is one of law, not of men. It is unlawful for any person to take into his own hands the administration of justice.1 We agree with respondents contention that based on the evidence on record, the overt acts of petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Victor Maderazo, Jr., on January 27, 1997, annoyed, irritated and caused embarrassment to her. It was petitioner Melchor Maderazo who ordered petitioner Victor Maderazo, Jr. to have the stall reopened, to conduct an inventory of the contents thereof, and to effect the transportation of the goods to the police station. Petitioner Victor Maderazo, who was a Sangguniang Bayan member, obeyed the order of the Mayor. Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it was unlocked, and the contents thereof taken from the stall and brought to the police station, the crime of unjust vexation was nevertheless committed. For the crime to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be present when the crime was committed by said petitioners. It is enough that the private complainant was embarrassed, annoyed, irritated or disturbed when she learned of the overt acts of the petitioners.2

1 2

pp. 247-248 pp. 248-249

256. 603 SCRA 638 [G.R. No. 183619 October 13, 2009] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. SALVINO SUMINGWA, appellant. NACHURA, J.: FACTS: Sometime in August 1999, AAA together with her brothers and her father, appellant herein, was in their residence watching television; appellant called AAA to sit in front of him and told her that it was not good for a girl to have small breasts and then he inserted his hands into AAAs shirt and fondled the breasts, AAA resisted. On September 1999, AAA and appellant was left in their house, appellant ordered AAA to join him inside the masters bedroom, he removed his under garments and forced AAA to grasp and fondle his penis to ejaculation and told her not to be malicious about it. Several other incidents of the same nature happened including, the appellant forcing AAA to lie down in bed while rubbing his penis to her vaginal orifice, which happened on several occasions; telling her he wanted to have sex but she refused angering the appellant and threatening her with a bolo; pulling her from doing school work then kissing her on the lips in the view of her best friend; and a last incident wherein inside the comfort room the appellant undressed AAA and rubbed his penis on her vagina while they were standing. AAA decided to report the sexual abuses to her grandmother and was brought to the NBI to be examined by a medico-legal; it was then found in the examination that no extragenital physical injuries on AAA but there were old, healed, and incomplete hymenal lacerations. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant is guilt of the crime of unjust vexation. HELD: Appellant was charged with Unjust Vexation, defined and penalized by Article 287 of the RPC, which reads: ART. 287. Light coercions. Any person who, by means of violence, shall seize anything belonging to his debtor for the purpose of applying the same to the payment of the debt, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and a fine equivalent to the value of the thing, but in no case less than 75 pesos. Any other coercion or unjust vexation shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos, or both. The second paragraph of this provision is broad enough to include any human conduct that, although not productive of some physical or material harm, could unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent person. The paramount question to be considered is whether the offenders act caused annoyance, irritation, torment, distress, or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it was directed. Appellants acts of embracing, dragging and kissing AAA in front of her friend annoyed AAA. The filing of the case against appellant proved that AAA was disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of appellant.1

p. 660