CHAVEZ VS ROMULO G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004 A mere license is always revocable.

This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in order to deter the rising crime rates. Petitioner questions the ban as a violation of his right to property.

FACTS: Pursuant to PGMAs speech stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places, PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane Jr. issued the Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence. It revoked all existing Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR), subject to renewal. Francisco Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the DILG to reconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines. His request was denied. Thus, he went to court to challenge the constitutionality of said guidelines.

This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in order to deter the rising crime rates. Petitioner questions the ban as a violation of his right to property. ISSUES: 1. WON the revocation of permit to carry firearms is unconstitutional and a violation of the peoples right to property 2. WON the issuance of the assailed guidelines is a valid exercise of police power HELD: 1. NO. The right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. Being a mere statutory creation, the right to bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute right. A license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right. In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that: Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. 2. YES. It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the issuance of the guidelines is the interest of the public in general.

In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence. Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right protected under our Constitution. Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights. The US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co, held: The correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State is always revocable. Chavez v. Romulo citizens right to bear arms - The right to bear arms cannot be classified as a fundamental right under the 1987 Constitution the right is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. It is erroneous to assume that the US Constitution grants upon the people the right to bear arms. The Second Amendment pertains to the citizens collective right to take arms in defense of the state, not to the citizens individual right to own and possess arms. Doctrine: A license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right.

National Development Company and New Agrix vs. Philippine Veterans Bank (192 SCRA 257) Facts: Agrix Marketing executed in favor of respondent a real estate mortgage over three parcels of land. Agrix later on went bankrupt. In order to rehabilitate the company, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1717 which mandated, among others, the extinguishing of all the mortgages and liens attaching to the property of Agrix, and creating a Claims Committee to process claims against the company to be administered mainly by NDC. Respondent thereon filed a claim against the company before the Committee. Petitioners however filed a petition with the RTC of Calamba, Laguna invoking the provision of the law which cancels all mortgage liens against it. Respondent took measures to extrajudicially foreclose which the petitioners opposed by filing another case in the same court. These cases were consolidated. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent on the ground of unconstitutionality of the decree for violation of the separation of powers, impairment of obligation of contracts, and violation of the equal protection clause . Hence this petition. Issue: 1. WON the respondent is estopped from questioning the constitutionality of the law since they first abided by it by filing a claim with the Committee? 2. WON PD 1717 is unconstitutional? Rulings: 1. On the issue of estoppel, the Court held that it could not apply in the present case since when the respondent filed his claim, President Marcos was the supreme ruler of the country and they could not question his acts even before the courts because of his absolute power over all government institutions. The creation of New Agrix as mandated by the decree was also ruled as unconstitutional since it violated the prohibition that the Batasang Pambansa(Congress) shall not provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations unless such corporations are owned or controlled by thegovernment. 2. YES. PD 1717 was held unconstitutional on the other grounds that it was an invalid exercise of police power . It had no lawful subject and no lawful method. It violated due process by extinguishing all mortgages and liens and interests which are property rights unjustly taken. It also violated the equal protection clause by lumping together all secured and unsecured creditors. It also impaired the obligation of contracts, even though it only involved purely private interests.

MMDA v. Garin, 456 SCRA 176, GR 130230 (2005) Facts: The issue arose from an incident involving respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) by MMDA. His driver's license was confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on August 1995. Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court. Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for preliminary injunction, contending that: in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution. The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and therefore unlimited fines and other penalties on erring motorists. The trial court rendered the assailed decision in favor of herein respondent. Issue: 1. WON MMDA, through Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 could validly exercise police power. Held: YES. Police Power, having been lodged primarily in the Legislature, cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991. A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs." Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. Thus,

The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself. * Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the "Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority." The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall "install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 4136 and P.D. No. 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding," and that "for this purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose."

Beltran vs Secretary of Health (November 25, 2005) Petitioners in this case comprise the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks, a duly registered non-stock and non-profit association composed of free standing blood banks. Public respondent Secretary of Health is being sued in his capacity as the public official directly involved and charged with the enforcement and implementation of RA 7719 or the National Blood Service Act. Section 7 of RA 7719 provides phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the said provision on the ground, among others, that such represents undue delegation if not outright abdication of the police power of the state. Facts: In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, with the assistance of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) released its final report of a study on the Philippine blood banking system entitled Project to Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking System. It was revealed that of the blood units collected in 1992, 64.4 % were supplied by commercial blood banks, 14.5% by the PNRC, 13.7% by government hospitalbased blood banks, and 7.4% by private hospital-based blood banks; showing that the Philippines heavily relied on commercial sources of blood. It was further found, among other things, that blood sold by persons to blood commercial banks are three times more likely to have any of the four (4) tested infections or blood transfusion transmissible diseases, namely, malaria, syphilis, Hepatitis B and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) than those donated to PNRC. Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was then enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. One of the provisions of the said act was the phasing out of commercial blood banks within 2 years from its effectivity. Petitioners, comprising the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks assail the constitutionality of RA 7719 on the ground among others that it is an improper and unwarranted delegation of legislative power. According to petitioners, the Act was incomplete when it was passed by the Legislature, and the latter failed to fix a standard to which the Secretary of Health must conform in the performance of his functions. Petitioners also contend that the two-year extension period that may be granted by the Secretary of Health for the phasing out of commercial blood banks pursuant to Section 7 of the Act constrained the Secretary to legislate, thus constituting undue delegation of legislative power. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER Held: In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the

hands of the Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or any other appointee or delegate of the Legislature. Except as to matters of detail that may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards, an act of the Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of commercial blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.

The Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act. Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the phase-out period for commercial blood banks shall be extended for another two years until May 28, 1998 based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety. This power to ascertain the existence of facts and conditions upon which the Secretary may effect a period of extension for said phase-out can be delegated by Congress. The true distinction between the power to make laws and discretion as to its execution is illustrated by the fact that the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. RATIONALE: Petitions dismissed. The court upholds the validity of RA 7719. The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is a primordial governmental concern. RA 7719 was enacted in the exercise of the States police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety. ** Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires the interference of the State; and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the objective sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Police power is the State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Thus, persons may be subject to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the State and to its fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated.

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION vs. CITY OF MANILA G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009

FACTS: On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) with the RTC of Manila and prayed that the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional. On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta.Mesa Tourist Development Corporation filed a motion to intervene, which was granted by the RTC. MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff which was also granted by the RTC. On January 14, 1993, the RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. The City then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court referred the same to the Court of Appeals. The City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Local government code and the Revised Manila charter. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. Operators of drive-in hotels and motels argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance. CA ruled in favor of the City. ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional and a valid exercise of Police power

HELD: Yes. For an ordinance to be a legitimate exercise of police power: (1) It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. (2) It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. (3) A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected. It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments have gained notoriety as venue of prostitution, adultery and fornications in Manila since they provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers. Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected will be curtailed as well. We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative. The Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the unjustified prohibition.

The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect wash rates from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments. We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However wellintentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions. The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and the like. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends does not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricts the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. RATIONALE: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be

avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.