Wesleyan University

Levi-Strauss and Marx on History Author(s): Jerzy Topolski Reviewed work(s): Source: History and Theory, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1973), pp. 192-207 Published by: Blackwell Publishing for Wesleyan University Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2504910 . Accessed: 06/08/2012 23:07
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Blackwell Publishing and Wesleyan University are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to History and Theory.

http://www.jstor.org

LEVI-STRAUSSAND MARX ON HISTORY

JERZY TOPOLSKI

The great influence of Claude Levi-Strauss'structuralism on contemporary humanisticthoughtand the fact that Levi-Strauss frequentlycites Marx and emphasizeshis relation to Marx's theory of history make it appropriateto comparethe opinions of Levi-Straussand Marx on history. Much remainsto be clarifiedby such a comparison,mainly because an attempthas not been made to make a comprehensivejuxtapositionof the views of both authors, but, secondly, because quite frequently the partial analyses which have been made, including Levi-Strauss',operate under an inadequateinterpretation of Marx'sthought. In my subsequentremarksI shall attemptto make a comparativeanalysis concerning history,but with referenceto the generaltheoriesof both authors. I shall treat history as both everythingthat has occurredin the past and as the study of the past, or historiography. These two meanings of the word historycannot be separatedin our analysis,because, if anythinglinks LeviStrauss and Marx, it is primarilythe close connection of ontological and views in their systems. For this reason I shall first concern methodological and Marx's theories of the historicalprocess and myself with Levi-Strauss' only then with their views on more strictly methodologicalproblems. With referenceto methodological problems,I shallbe interested in modelprimarily buildingand explanationprocedure.It is clear at this point that I proposeto transcendthe border of methodologyof history strictly understoodand encroach on the broaderfield of the methodologyof the social sciences.
II

structuralism The connection betweenLevi-Strauss' andMarx'sthoughtis often explicatedfrom the followingpassagefrom the EighteenthBrumaireof Louis Bonaparte:"Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as this statementconstitutes,as it were, they please."'Accordingto Levi-Strauss, the fundamental premisecommonto himselfand the authorof Das Kapital.
1. K. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte [1869] (New York, 1969),
15.

LEVI-STRAUSS AND MARX ON HISTORY

193

What does it mean that people do not make their history just as they please? Levi-Strauss is not the only one who has raised this question in contemporary social theory, but he is one of those who consider that they remain in the orbit of Marx's theory or who state that they are developing it. In order to facilitate our further analysis, I shall cite one of Levi-Strauss' basic theoretical statements. Stressing that men do not act freely because they are directed by the unconscious universal structure of the human mind, he shows the place of historical research in the social study of man: Anthropology cannot remain indifferentto historical processes and to the most highly conscious expressionsof social phenomena. But if the anthropologistbrings to them the same scrupulousattention as the historian, it is in order to eliminate, by a kind of backwardcourse, all that they owe to the historical process and to conscious thought. His goal is to grasp, beyond the conscious and always shifting images which men hold, the complete range of unconscious possibilities. These are not unlimited, and the relationshipsof compatibilityor incompatibilitywhich each maintains with all the others provide a logical framework for historical developments, which, while perhaps unpredictable, are never arbitrary. In this sense, the famous statement by Marx, "Men make their own history, but they do not know that they are making it," justifies, first, history and, second, anthropology.2 Levi-Strauss' statement clearly shows his views on historical process and historical study: (1) Reality presents people with a given (but finite) set of actions possible to accomplish; however, which of these actions will be undertaken is determined by the universal, unconscious structures of the human mind which are identical for all men. (2) The task of the structural method is to "reach" these deep, unconscious structures, thus explaining the shape ("architecture") of the social reality. (3) The task of history - of the historical method - is to provide descriptive material for the structural procedure in order to "cleanse" it of everything added by the historical process and consciously acting man.

m It is easy to note here the closely associated ontological and methodological presuppositions of L6vi-Strauss' theory previously mentioned. This, however, is a connection at whose base we observe a petition principii. The source of this error is the acceptance by Levi-Strauss of a hypothesis about hidden structures of the human mind, a hypothesis which does not
2. C. Lvi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology [1958] (New York and London, 1963), 23-24.

194

JERZY TOPOLSKI

permit verification by any empirical evidence. In addition, it is not associated with any method that would permit such verification. Levi-Strauss accepts the existence of the hidden attributes of the human mind which make themselves known through a given shape of reality; however, at the same time, such a reality is for him a representation (a "sign") of the unconscious structure of the human mind. Hence a hypothesis which ought to be the subject of verification is accepted out of hand. This vicious circle will accompany us in the course of the entire analysis of Levi-Strauss' views. We do not find such an error in Marx's theory. Marx does not share with Levi-Strauss a belief in the existence of a Universal Mind making man an abstract, nonhistorical entity. Marx's main premise concerning man can be subjected to empirical verification. Marx regards man as a rational being and the historical process as a result of purposeful human activity. LUvi-Strauss' assumption about the deep structures of the human mind which can be read in the shape of human culture is based, at least in view of the current state of studies of the functioning of the brain, on a subjective conviction; while Marx's assumptions about the reality of human purposes can be studied with all the methods of the empirical sciences.

IV

Freud's and Fromm's method to "reach" the deep structures of the human mind is psychology, while for Levi-Strauss it is the structural linguistics of F. Saussure, R. Jakobson, L. Hjelmslev, and other researchers. For structural linguistics the distinction between language (langue) and speech (parole) is one of the most characteristic features. Speech is a subjective use of language for verbal communication. Language is a set of certain structures of which the phonological structure is the basic one. Superimposed on it are morphological and phraseological structures. Phonemes (elements of the phonological structure or phonemic system) are elementary particles of language (langue) which serve the function of differentiating words. Therefore the phonemes always appear in opposed pairs based on their distinctive features (such as sonority and soundlessness, vocality and consonantality, and so forth). In sum, the phonological as well as the morphological structures are defined codes governing the use of phonemes of which people unconsciously take advantage when speaking. Fascinated by the new linguistic theory, Levi-Strauss recogmzes: Linguistics occupies a special place among the social sciences, to whose ranks it unquestionablybelongs. It is not merely a social science like the others, but, rather, the one in which by far the greatest progress has been made. It is prob-

LEVI-STRAUSS AND MARX ON HISTORY

195

ably the only one which can truly claim to be a science and which has achieved both the formulation of an empiricalmethod and an understandingof the nature of the data submittedto its analysis.3 Levi-Strauss recognizes that like a language, which is a code, and a speech, which is a message transmitted by the language, other kinds of human behavior can also be regarded as codes referring to nonverbal forms of communication. Such a code is represented in different systems of dressing, feeding, kinship, and so on. Human culture can be regarded as a sum of all such codes. As with the use of language, so other types of human behavior are also ruled by definite laws (the basic structures of the human mind), independent of consciousness and the will of man. Therefore, when making a verbal utterance man is referring to the verbal signs, and he uses other codes to transmit the nonverbal signs. Thus the whole human culture is for Levi-Strauss a "significant set."4 So with language as in social (and at the same time historical) reality, we have the following pattern which constitutes the object of structural analysis.

tures of the univrds struc> human mind

Codes of human behavior

Manifestation of universal structures in human behavior

Without such an analysis the world remains for L6vi-Strauss unintelligible. Only through the procedure of "structuralism" (i.e., through discovery of the universal structures of the human mind) does the world become intelligible. Because of these universal structures all human codes (languages) are homologous and can be easily submitted to the structural analysis by means of suitable transformations. As can be seen in the above figure, man's activity is understood in it as a steady reproduction of those same behaviors constrained by the hidden forces. There is no place for history understood as a result of conscious and purposeful human activity. The introduction of purposefully and consciously acting man fully utilizing his practical experience (i.e., his historical experience) into the figure destroys it. In this context Levi-Strauss' attitude to history is consistent. History only causes problems for him, muddying his concept of integration (through linguistics) of social sciences with the natural sciences. The price of such an integration would be the elimination of consciously and purposefully acting man from the model of the social sciences.
3. Ibid., 31. 4. Levi-Strauss,The Savage Mind [1962] (Chicago, 1967), 8.

196

JERZY

TOPOLSKI V

How does man conceivedby the authorof TristesTropiquesdifferfrom the world of nature?Who says man says languageand who says languagesays society,Levi-Strauss arguesmanytimes.Hence the distinguishing factor of the society is language.Social use of language (understoodas a code) in turn involvesthe fact that man is able to make a distinction betweena sign (verbal or nonverbal) and the reality communicated by a sign; but in making this distinctionhe is unawareof the natureof this reality.Hence the researcher's task is to discoverthis reality.For Levi-Strauss this realityis shaped by the alreadymentioned universal and formallaws (structures),for Marxthis reality is a creationof purposefully actingman.
All behavior, according to Levi-Strauss writes Susan Sontag is a

language,a vocabularyand grammarof order; anthropology proves nothing about human nature except the need for order itself. There is no universal truthabout the relationbetween,say, religionand social structure.There are only modelsshowingthe variability of one in relationto others.To the general reader,perhapsthe most strikingexampleof Levi-Strauss' theoreticalagnosticismis his view of myth.He treatsmythas a purelyformalmentaloperation, withoutany psychological contentor any necessaryconnectionwith rite.6 Levi-Strauss claims that amongthe universallaws of the human mind the basic one is the capabilityof grasping realityin binaryoppositions.Underconditionsof societalexistencethe distinctive pairshave culturalsignificance. The for sociallife is the processof communication most important whichtakesplace of words, persons, throughthe mediumof a broadlyunderstood"exchange" and thingsgovernedby the sameformalrules.L6vi-Strauss statesthat, "in any society, communication operateson three differentlevels: communication of of of messages." women, communication goods and services,communication Communication takes place throughdifferent"totalities"of signs. The nonverbalsigns are used eitheras the partsof "paradigmatic" (metaphoric)series of "syntagmatic" (metonymic) chains. E. Leach compares this method of of realityto an orchestral score with referenceto which a "structuralization" perpendicular readinghas a metaphoriccharacter,and a horizontalreading a metonymiccharacter.7 Recognizingthe shapingof differentsets of codes in differentsocieties and in the different ways they manifestthemselvesin humanactivity,Levi-Strauss, consistentwith his theory,emphasizesmanytimes that man'sdecision-making
5. Susan Sontag, "The Anthropologist as Hero" in Claude Levi-Strauss: The Anthropologist as Hero, ed. Nelson Hayes and Tanya Hayes (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), 194. 6. StructuralAnthropology, 296. 7. E. Leach, Claude Levi-Strauss(New York, 1970), 52.

LEVI-STRAUSS AND MARX ON HISTORY

197

can be compared with a game whose results at the moment are not known but whose rules are a priori imposed. First, man is like a player who, as he takes his place at the table, picks up cards which he has not invented, for the cardgame is a datum of history and civilization. Second, each deal is the result of a contingent distribution of the cards unknown to the players at the time. One must accept the cards, which one is given, but each society, like each player, makes its interpretationsin terms of several systems. These may be common to them all or individual: rules of the game or rules of tactics. And we are well aware that different players will not play the same game with the same hand even though the rules set limits on the gamesthat can be played with any given one.8 In such a concept of man playing cards with reality according to previously set rules, a game in which not only rules are handed down but in which the distribution of cards is a matter of chance, there is no possibility of any other explanation of historical process than the recurrence to a contingency too. In a conversation with G. Charbonnier, Levi-Strauss explains in the following way a fact that intrigues historians, namely, why a dynamically developing civilization flourished during a given period to a greater degree in one part of the world and to a lesser degree in another: Suppose an inveterateroulette player sets out not only to pick the lucky number, but to work out a very complex combination dependent on, say, ten or a hundred previous spins of the wheel, and determined by certain rules regarding the alternationof red and black, or even and odd numbers. This complex combination might be achieved right away, or at the thousandthor millionth attempt or never at all. Yet it would never occur to us to say that, had he accomplished his combination only at the seven hundred and twenty-fifth attempt, all the previous attemptswere indispensable to his success.9 Hence, all historically developed civilization (i.e., the breaking with primitive existence) is an accidental event unconnected with the historical continuity of human actions and their effects. History is not "a continuous flow of events but a discontinuous choice by men of those incidents and processes which are fitted into a logical order by a human mind."10 History thus is an unrelated collection of different events, the knowledge of which does not help us at all in making the world intelligible.
VI

This kind of interpretation of the historical process is fully opposed to Marx's concept of man and history. Marx understood the statement that people do not
8. The Savage Mind, 95. 9. G. Charbonnier,Conversationswith Claude Levi-Strauss (London, 1969), 25. 10. L. Rosen, "Language, History, and the Logic of Inquiry in Levi-Strauss and Sartre,"History and Theory 10 (1971), 285.

198

JERZY TOPOLSKI

make their history just as they please entirely differently than Levi-Strauss. We have to do here with two opposite models of understanding the historical process, or, in other words, two contrasting models of man. One of them could be called fatalistic and the other activistic. In the former, the factors on which human activity is based are independent of man's purposeful decision-making. In the latter, man acts in a conscious, purposeful manner not directed by factors which are not connected with his activity. The fatalistic model manifests itself in the form of three basic submodels. In the first of these submodels, the factors on which man's actions are dependent are "external" in relation to man, are located beyond him. Among different kinds of these submodels we can classify theories of historical process joining human actions with such factors as God, the geographical environment, deterministic laws (present among others in the fatalistic interpretation of Marx's thought), and self-realizing progress (characteristic, among others, for the rationalistic views on historical process of the Enlightenment). In the second of these submodels, the factors determining human actions exist "inside" man. To this submodel belongs all psychoanalytical interpretations of history which use the tool of Freud's theory. In the third submodel, on the other hand, the factors on which human actions are dependent pertain equally to the forces "external" in relation to man and to mechanisms hidden in him. Such an interaction of two sets of factors is characteristic of Fromm's conception of history. The activistic model demonstrates itself through at least two submodels: the free-will model and the dialectical model. The first of these submodels recognizes human activity as a manifestation of the unconstrained free will of man. Sometimes it is associated with restrictions of a fatalistic type, such as, for example, God's will - mixing the activistic interpretation (model) with the fatalistic one. The second submodel takes into consideration the interrelation between man's decision-making and the conditions in which this decision-making takes place. This interrelation between two mentioned factors is not direct, but through the factor of human knowledge of the condition of action. This knowledge can be more or less adequate and different for different individuals and social groups. It is easy to see that Levi-Strauss' vision of man and history fulfills the conditions of the first model in its second submodel's form. The activistic model in its dialectical form is characteristic of Marx. It appears in different works of Marx in more abstract or more realistic forms. In the theoretical parts of Das Kapital where, among others, the concept of a rational capitalist, having full awareness of the conditions of his decision-making, appears, we have the more abstract approach. In The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte there are real men and social classes who act; in this case also they act with an

LEVI-STRAUSS AND MARX ON HISTORY

199

in whichthey makedecisions.Marxshowsthat awareness of the circumstances this awarenesscan be sometimesdeformed.This was the case of the French was deformed whose historicalconsciousness peasantsin Eighteenth Brumaire has nourishedamong tradition by the Napoleoniclegend.We read: "Historical the Frenchpeasantry thata mannamedNapoleonwouldreturn the superstition in the fullnessof time bringingthem all that their heart could desire."' For Marx, who accepts the model of a rationalman, man is acting consciously and purposefullyon the basis of his knowledgeof the conditionsof action.His activity- that is, his practice- is more or less effectivedepending on how adequateis such knowledgeabout the conditionsof action which he takes into considerationduring his activity. Certain permanentattitudes arise in man's mind, and certaintypes of knowledgeaccumulateas a result of long-termpractice.As the resultof practice,at a certainstage of historical with those tried methods development, the humanmind attaineda "satiation" of man. of thinking (for example, rules of logic) heretofore characteristic That is why Marx said that the humanmind, such as it is, alwaysremainsthe - that is knowledgeaboutthe world- changes. samewhile man'sawareness At a given time, in certainplaces, man began to think historically,and this introducedmoments of dynamicsin his structureof thinking, a conviction about the variabilityand creative role of man, eliminatingattitudeswhich tendedto maintainthe world unchangedand to reproduce,as primitivecommunitiesdo, the same states of things.'2When effectiveactivityis of concern to him, acting man takes into considerationthe condition in which he acts. in the action, but Sometimesdifferentpsychicalprocessescause disturbances influence. man, who wantsto attainhis goal, tends to eliminatethis deforming No. He is limitedby the conditionsin whichhe acts and Does he act "freely"? by his knowledgeabout these conditions.Here we observe a dialecticaljunction of objectiveand subjectivefactors. To Marx, man is not waiting solely for this or that combinationof fate; he does not play a game with the reality but is, as Marxsays in his famous Theseson Feuerbach(1845), changingthe conditions of his actions. M. Godelier, who himself tends to a "dynamic structuralism," points to the necessityof makinga differencebetween formal of thought due to historical structuresof thinking and the transformations progressin learningabout the world.'3 The previously cited statement of Marx from the Eighteenth Brunaire did not take into consideration. includedstill anotherpart which Levi-Strauss In it Marx explainswhat he means by the opinion that people do not make
11. The Eighteenth Brumaire,23. 12. Cf. J. Topolski, Swiat bez historic [World without History] (Warsaw, 1972). 13. M. Godelier, "Mythe et Histoire: "Reflexions sur les fondements de la pensee sauvage,"Annales (mai-aouft,1971), 553.

200

JERZY

TOPOLSKI

their history as they please: "They do not make it [history] under circumstances chosen by themselves but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past."'4 This statement by no means justifies structural anthropology's questioning the role of historical experience in human practice.

VII

The question arises as to how close Levi-Strauss' structural analysis is to Marx's model method (called by Marx the abstraction method). In other words, we can ask if Levi-Strauss' methodological rules are similar to Marx's methodology of social inquiry and at the same time to his methodology of history. There are, as we shall see, fundamental and irreconcilable differences which are strictly connected with the divergences in the ontological views of both authors. For Marx there is historical research which makes world and man intelligible, for Levi-Strauss this aim can be achieved only through structural analysis. Only structural analysis can transcend the "observational level" of the research and "reach" deeper levels of reality: "On the observational level, the main - one could almost say the only - rule is that all the facts should be carefully observed and described, without allowing any theoretical preconception to decide whether some are more important than others."15 Such a positivistic approach to the research is, as Levi-Strauss repeats very often, the historian's or the ethnographer's task. This task consists in "gathering data," while anthropology and sociology "deal with models constructed from these data.""' Here we come to the heart of the structuralist method. It consists in modelbuilding from the empirical data. In order to reconstruct this method we should first ask what model in Levi-Strauss' methodology means. Structuresare models, the formal properties of which can be compared indetask is thus to recognize and isolate pendentlyof their elements. The structuralist's levels of reality which have strategicvalue from his point of view, namely which The essential value admit of representationas models, whatever their type. . of these [structural]studies is to construct models the formal propertiesof which can be compared with, and explained by, the same properties as in models to other strategiclevels.'7 corresponding In order to answer the question arising here, we must return to Levi-Strauss' notion of structure in its methodological meaning. Its already characterized ontological status is defined by certain permanent brain-function properties
14. 15. 16. 17. The Eighteenth Brumaire, 15. StructuralAnthropology, 280. Ibid., 285. Ibid., 284-285.

LEVI-STRAUSS AND MARX ON HISTORY

201

which are independent of human practice. Of course a structure understood in this way can be characterized in a more or less general manner. Having in mind the same formal characteristics linking all structures, Levi-Strauss frequently uses the concept of "form" common for all structures or, on a somewhat lower level of generalization, for a group of structures. What kind of common "form" do Levi-Strauss' structures possess? Generally speaking these are certain systems of relation. Each such relation system is a set of ordered pairs (known from the set theory) whose elements remain in opposition to each other and which possess mutually exclusive qualities. In other words, for Levi-Strauss structure is a classification where the relation of opposition is the criterion of division. These classifications have a simple or frequently a dendrite form: "The part played by motivation, however, diminishes, and that of arbitrariness increases progressively as we turn our attention higher: the terminal branches can no longer compromise the tree's stability nor alter its characteristic shape."18 Hence it could be said that for structuralists of Levi-Strauss' type, the main task of studying society consists of formulating statements about distinctive elements of certain totalities which are defined as "structures."The statements about these structures are models; however, a model can be called a structure only when the structure revealed by the model is truly a structure. When does such a case occur? Levi-Strauss furnishes only some formal tests. In the case of such a true structure: 1) A change of one element results in the change of all the remaining elements. 2) Each structure is capable of being transformed into some other structure. 3) Each element explains the existence of others. 4) A structure reflects the observed facts. The last condition seems to have non-formal character, but the reference to the empirical data has in Levi-Strauss' work a special meaning. The model is not subject to test by the empirical data; the only problem is whether these data are more or less complete and well described. From what we have said, it seems clear (and Levi-Strauss does not deny this) that the models in the structural analysis are understood as research tools; their methodological character is purely instrumentalist. They can be discovered only by a sort of intuition, their correspondence to reality is solely a question of the structuralist faith. For sober researchers who do not allow themselves to be misled by the structuralist poetic associations, they can be only pure fictions and trivialities of elementary logic. It is not an accident that numerous anthropologists accuse Levi-Strauss of not taking facts into consideration. Thus, for example, E. Leach speaks of Levi-Strauss' contempt "of ethnographic evidence,"19while T. 0. Beidelman writes: "Another feature
18. The Savage Mind, 159. 19. Leach, Claude Levi-Strauss,104.

202

JERZY TOPOLSKI

The interrelatedtendencies towards of his field is its relative superficiality. are important since they allow L6visuperficialityand oversimplification Straussto interpretwith great freedom what he considers the basic forces behind these [dying]cultures."20 This freedom,supporting itself with the concept of universalstructuresof these structures the human mind, gives him a directive of "approaching" of models from (events) the elements which history throughthe "cleansing" introduced.This cleansing in connection with the comparisonsof different or model-levelof the research. modelspresents"thelevel of experimentation" demonstrate substantial resistancein relation As Levi-Strauss says, structures "to diachrony"and flow permanentlythroughtime. Therefore,in order to make structuralist analysis as simple as possible, Levi-Straussfirst of all thatis, societies"withno history."In primitive communities, analyzes primitive true for all mankindappear,as it were, in the most communities "structures" of man. "undisturbed" state, therebyprovidingthe key to the understanding And here, again, we can observe that we have to do with a type of petition are resistantto history, is made that "structures" principii. For an assumption and then society is examinedwithout history, that is, history is excluded in seekingproof for that assumption. mixed, and at Limitedto societies without historicalthinking,territorially the same time freed of the requirementsof historical method, information about myths, food systems, structuresof kinship, taboos, and so on can be for the phonemic broughtinto the following scheme, which is characteristic
system :21
S

=(U; R, A,. ..,A

T1,. . ., Tm),

where U is a set of distinctivequalitiescorrelatedwith itself by the relation

of opposition R&,with which these qualities create ordered pairs Al, . . . , An.

In the case of the phonemicsystem,these qualitiesare phonemes,in the case in the case of food systems, of myths,mythemesor "grossconstituent units,"22
gusthemes, etc. T1, . . ., Tm are chains of phonemes, mythemes, gusthemes,

totalities. etc. creatingcertainsyntagmatic analysis. The model-levelof the researchis reservedonly to the structuralism for history which "organizesits data in relation to conscious Characteristic level" of the research or expressionof social life"23is the "observational which have to the buildingof the so-called "statisticmodels"24 "ultimately" show the frequencyof events.
20. The Journal of InterdisciplinaryHistory 1 (1971), 512. 21. J. Kmita, L. Nowak, Studia nad teoretycznymi podstawami humanistyki [Studies on Theoretical Foundations of the Social Sciences] (Poznan, 1968), 201. 22. StructuralAnthropology, 211. 23. Ibid., 18. 24. Ibid., 285.

LEVI-STRAUSS

AND

MARX

ON HISTORY

203

VIII

Marx does not exclude history from the model method. He also transcends the "observational" level of the research and recommends going "deeper" below the "surface phenomena" through the model method. But a fundamental difference separates the model method of Marx from that of LeviStrauss. Marx's models, as compared with Levi-Strauss' structure-models, do not have an instrumentalistic character. They are not only research tools (like Max Weber's ideal types); they have a realistic character. In other words, Marx's models are realistically understood ideal types, that is, ideal types which have their reference in objective reality. Such an ideal type (model) is a real object in its simplified version. Thus Marx's model-building consists in the formulation of statements about the objects which have been submitted to special procedure of "simplification" or (in Marx's words) "abstraction." During this abstraction procedure we suspend (do not take into consideration) the influence of various secondary factors which deform the action of main factors and the manifestation of basic relationships and regularities. In such a manner we still have to do with a real object; it is only observed in an idealized condition. Thus the formulation of models statements pertaining to realistically understood ideal types enables us to "grasp" the complex reality, to make it more intelligible. The model in Marx's sense can be characterized in the following manner:
(x) [Ti (x) a,
..

. , an (X)]
.

which means: for each x, if x is T then x is a,, . . , an, where T! signifies Marx's ideal type (abstraction) among a set of possible types of a given kind, while a,, ... a., the varied behavior of that ideal type.25 The building of realistic models, which is the cornerstone of Marx's methodological program, is strictly connected with an historical approach. It is historical knowledge which enables us to set forth hypotheses concerning the main and secondary factors. Very often, as Marx shows, we can find in the past the more simple forms of different phenomena. Sometimes these undeformed, "classic" phenomena were characteristic only for certain regions. Such "ready" models Marx uses very often in his study. This is the case of capitalism analyzed in Das Kapital, where English capitalism plays the role of an ideal type. The same can be said about the "natural"economy characteristic of early stages of human history, but regarded as an ideal type in several chapters of the first volume of Das Kapital. In history, the model method enables one to "grasp" historical change and, at the same time, structural relationships. Marx's typology of social and economic development in which
25. Cf. J. Topolski, "The Model Method in Economic History," The Journal of EuropeanEconomic History 2 (1972), 4.

204

JERZY TOPOLSKI

different socio-economic formations are distinguished is one of the most important results of Marx's model-building procedure. We have cited another example from the Eighteenth Brumaire. Here Marx described the influence on the political behavior of the French peasantry of its faith in the name Napoleon. The realistic models can be submitted to the concretization procedure. Levi-Strauss' "experiments on models" do not present such a possibility. Marx's concretization consists in more or less gradually eliminating the idealizing assumptions. In this way the model is "getting closer" to the reality. This concretization always depends on the needs of a given research or analysis. Sometimes our historical study is more "concrete," sometimes more "theoretical." In Marx's works we find easily examples of both approaches. The best example is Das Kapital itself. The first volume of that work has both historical and theoretical character. In its theoretical analyses Marx treats capitalism and different economic categories in their "pure" form, while the next volumes give a most complex and realistic image.26 Let us analyze the law of value, which is one of the fundamental notions in Das Kapital. In the first volume this law was formulated in its simple form: the price of the commodity corresponds to its value. This model formulation was indispensable for Marx to start his analysis of the capitalistic system. Then he could submit his model to the concretization procedure eliminating different idealizing assumptions. The effect of this procedure we see in the third volume. The law of value, after some twelve idealizing assumptions have been eliminated, assumed more concrete form: "The assumption that the commodities of the various spheres of production are sold at their values implies of course only that their value is the center of gravity around which prices fluctuate."27 Concretization is simultaneously a procedure of verification. Hence, this verification does not here depend on multiplying empirical data, but on observing the prognostical value of concretized statements. If, on the basis of a suitable concretized statement, it is possible to make effective predictions or explanations, the statement attains the status of a verified statement. Nothing of the kind is possible with Levi-Strauss' structures. They remain irreversible, not susceptible to confrontation with empirical material. IX Levi-Strauss' position with reference to the explanation procedure in the social sciences is wholly compatible with structural methodology. For Levi26. Cf. L. Nowak, U podstaw marksowskiejmetodologii nauk [Foundations of Marx's Methodology] (Warsaw, 1971). 27. K. Marx, Capital, III (Chicago, 1909), 209-210.

LEVI-STRAUSS AND MARX ON HISTORY

205

Strauss the classic causal explanation lay far from the main task of scientific study, while for Marx the researcher's attention should focus on the explanation of the chronological changes. The same can be said about the explanation of human actions. Here also the differences which separate Marx's and LeviStrauss' concepts of explanation in the social sciences are irreconcilable. Above all, the author of The Savage Mind is an opponent of any explanation accomplished on the "conscious" level. Explanation by discovering the purpose of human action or the meaning of a cultural object (the answer to the question why a given object has been created) does not interest him. He regards it as scientifically barren, not advancing our knowledge about the world. Also, explanation by the circumstances (causes) preceding the explained event does not appear in structural methodology. We have here a situation similar to the one created by C. G. Jung's archetypes or by Sigmund Freud's unconscious instincts. Like Levi-Strauss' theory, these are theories which cannot have any use for interpreting conscious and purposeful activities. Hence, what explanation model is characteristic for LUvi-Strauss' structuralism? In each case it is not an explanation which takes into consideration as an explanans human conscious and purposeful actions. Neither is it an explanation which takes into consideration as components of the explanans general laws reflecting relationships between different elements of reality. Thus Levi-Strauss' explanation procedure does not fit either causal laws on a Hempelian model or the interpretation of human actions on a "conscious" level. The latter is called by J. Kmita the humanistic interpretation.28 Levi-Strauss' main explanation constructs are his "structures" or "models" which, as we know, reflect the non-empirical properties of the human mind. Such a "structure" has a permanent character regardless of historical events and time factors. In other words, this is a structure which does not confer reality on a definite developmental direction, as is the case with the explanation concept of J. Piaget. Thus, Levi-Strauss' structures have, ex definitione, the properties of maintaining a system in a state of equilibrium. For LeviStrauss, explanation is simply the discovery of the necessity of the explained element (behavior, object) in the structure. Confirmation of the fact that it does fulfill a defined function in that structure essential for the maintenance of that structure, Levi-Strauss says, demonstrates its structural value. "Nothing can be conceived beyond the fundamental requirements of its structure," he argues.29As we see, it is a kind of functional explanation. We can find this explanation by reference to a structural "value" on many pages of LeviStrauss' works. For example, explaining what determines the existence of an avunculate: "we must treat it as one relationship within a system, while the
28. Cf. J. Kmita, Z metodologicznych problem6w interpretacjihumanistycznej [Methodological Problems of Humanistic Interpretation](Warsaw, 1971). 29. StructuralAnthropology, 48.

206

JERZY TOPOLSKI

system itself must be considered as a whole in order to grasp its structure."30 In another place, pondering over tribal structure, Levi-Strauss states that: various types of grouping found in these societies- specifically, three forms of dual organisation,clans, sub-clans, age grades, associations, etc. - do not represent, as they do in Australia, so many functional groups. They are, rather, a series of expressions, each partial and incomplete, of the same underlying structure, which they reproduce in several copies without ever completely exhausting its reality.31 Let us now ask what kind of value functional explanation referring to the supra-empirical structure has. From the methodological point of view it is an explanation of very low value. It is a kind of ad hoc explanation based on a vicious circle. Explanans, in this explanation, is based on the same evidence as explanandum, which is the object of its explanation. "Hence the situation," J. Kmita writes, "is such that theory arises at the base of empirical material which at the same time is to constitute its explanandum; this theory does not take into consideration any new material, no new, possible empirical evidence for itself."32 For Marx, the central figure, whose actions are submitted to the explanation procedure, is man acting consciously and purposefully. The motivation structure of human actions which we observe in Marx's analyses can be summarized in the following manner: MS - (U; G, K, V) where MS signifies the motivation structure; G, goals; K, knowledge of condition of action; V, system of values (preferences) of acting man (or social group). Thus in order to explain human decision-making and human actions it is indispensable to try to reconstruct such elements as acting man's goal (or goals), knowledge of conditions of action and the system of values of acting man (or of an acting social group). All Marx's explanations of human actions fulfill the rules of this model. On the other hand, all Marx's explanations of historical processes or historical facts which are not expressed in terms of human actions (as, for example, the rise of capitalism) fulfill the rules of a deductive model of explanation which is regarded as the main explanation model in the social sciences. In view of the inadequacy of LUvi-Strauss'methodology, what determines his popularity? We explain it by a certain impasse in which the social sciences, dominated by positivistic views, found themselves, and by the subject matter
30. Ibid., 46. 31. Ibid., 130. Method32. J. Kmita, "C. LUvi-Straussapropozycje metodolodiczne" [LUvi-Strauss' ological Propositions],Studia Filozoficzne 3 (1971), 134.

LEVI-STRAUSS AND MARX ON HISTORY

207

which Levi-Strauss deals with, finding willing readers in the world of modern civilization as in J. J. Rousseau's time. L6vi-Strauss' reply on the needs of change is poetically beautiful, but from a methodological point of view it is but an ornament on the building of social sciences. However, its rather substantial scientific role is indirect. Structuralism motivates thinking, it introduces a refreshing ferment into many disciplines (including history), andimportant in each field of research - the inspiration for unstereotyped associations. University of Poznan'