Article III. Section 6- 14 of the 1987 Constitution Marcos vs.

Manglapus Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime. The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Manotok vs. Court of Appeals Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been violated. Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication that the business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf. Legaspi vs. CSC Facts: -Civil Service Commission denied Valentin Legaspis (petitioner) request for information on the civil service eligibilities of 2 people employed as sanitarians, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, in the Health Department in Cebu. -Petitioner claims that his right to information is guaranteed by the Constitution prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information. -the Solicitor General challenges the petitioners standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not

possess any legal right to be informed of the civil services eligibilities of the government employees concerned. -SolGen further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks. Issue: WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil service eligibilities of the Health Department employees. Held: Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligible for the position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi. Ratio: The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right. We find no cogent reason to deny his standing to bring the present suit. In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973 Constitution and the New Charter expressly mandate the duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records, documents, papers and in addition, government research data used as basis for policy development, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case. But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security. It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. Valmonte vs. Belmonte

Facts: Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986, requesting to be "furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos" and also to "be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due to serious legal implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred the letter to the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his opinion "that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts." On 20 June 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte wrote Belmonte another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." On 26 June 1986, Ricardo Valmonte, Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy Del Castillo, Rolando Bartolome, Leo Obligar, Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo Bagatsing, Jun "Ninoy" Alba, Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro, and Rolando Fadul filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that Belmonte be directed: (a) to furnish Valmonte, et. al. the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information. Issue: Whether Valmonte, et. al. may access GSIS records pertaining to behest loans secured by Imelda Marcos in favor of certain members of the opposition in the Batasang Pambansa. Held: The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 states that "The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution. The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the

public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well in checking abuse in government. Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. As stated in Legaspi, The people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern", and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest", and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law." Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of "public interest" or "public concern", and is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. Herein, the information sought by Valmonte, et. al. is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately before the 7 February 1986 election through the intercession of the former First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos. In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. However, a second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced through mandamus proceedings, viz., that the information sought must not be among those excluded by law. On this matter, Belmonte has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of the petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power. Although it may be true that when the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. Such competing interests of these rights need not be resolved in the present case. The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. Thus, neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, Belmonte, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature, and hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated. It may be observed, however, the concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny. In fine, Valmonte, et. al. are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured. Gonzales vs. Narvasa FACTS: Petitioner wrote a letter to the Executive Secretary requesting for information with respect to the names of executive officials holding multiple positions, copies of their appointments, and a list of recipients of luxury vehicles previously seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to the Office of the President. Petitioner filed this petition to compel the Executive Secretary to answer his letter.

HELD: It is the duty of the Executive Secretary to answer the letter of the petitioner. The letter deals with matters of public concern, appointments to public offices and utilization of public property. The Executive Secretary is obliged to allow the inspection and copying of appointment papers. Akbayan Citizens Action Party vs. Aquino Facts: The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) at the sidelines of the Asia-Europe Summit in Helsinki in September 2006 was hailed by both Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a milestone in the continuing cooperation and collaboration, setting a new chapter of strategic partnership for mutual opportunity and growth (for both countries). JPEPA which has been referred to as a mega treaty is a comprehensive plan for opening up of markets in goods and services as well as removing barriers and restrictions on investments. It is a deal that encompasses even our commitments to the WTO. The complexity of JPEPA became all the more evident at the Senate hearing conducted by the Committee on Trade and Commerce last November 2006. The committee, chaired by Senator Mar Roxas, heard differing views and perspectives on JPEPA. On one hand the committee heard Governments rosy projections on the economic benefits of JPEPA and on the other hand the views of environmental and trade activists who raised there very serious concerns about the country being turned into Japans toxic waste basket. The discussion in the Senate showed that JPEPA is not just an issue concerning trade and economic relations with Japan but one that touches on broader national development concerns. Issues: Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted from the general rules on transparency and full public disclosure such that the Philippine government is justified in denying access thereto. Held: The Court held: Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be 'ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved' the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japenese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations. It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest.

SSS Employees vs. Court of Appeals Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the unions demands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking. Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter. Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that the Civil Service law and rules governing conc erted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so. In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denomi nated as government employees and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commissions memorandum prohibiting strikes. Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate. United Pepsi-Cola vs. Laguesma FACTS: Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears that on March 20, 1995 the union filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc.

However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the ground that the route managers are managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for union membership under the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, which provides: Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own. Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of the order, dismissed. Hence, this petition. Pressing for resolution its contention that the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial employees to be ineligible to form, assist or join unions, contravenes Art. III, 8 of the Constitution which provides: The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. ISSUES: Whether Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from forming, joining or assisting labor unions, violates Art. III, 8 of the Constitution. Art.245 is the result of the amendment of the Labor Code in 1989 by R.A. No. 6715, otherwise known as the Herrera-Veloso Law. Unlike the Industrial Peace Act or the provisions of the Labor Code which it superseded, R.A. No. 6715 provides separate definitions of the terms managerial and supervisory employees, as follows: Art. 212. Definitions. . . . (m) managerial employee is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of this Book. The distinction between top and middle managers, who set management policy, and front-line supervisors, who are merely responsible for ensuring that such policies are carried out by the rank and file, is articulated in the present definition. 30 When read in relation to this definition in Art. 212(m), it will be seen that Art. 245 faithfully carries out the intent of the Constitutional Commission in framing Art. III, 8 of the fundamental law. *Framers Intent: MR. LERUM. My amendment is on Section 7, page 2, line 19, which is to insert between the words people and to the following: WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE

STATE OR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS. In other words, the section will now read as follows: The right of the people WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE STATE OR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS to form associations, unions, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abrid ged. Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, 8 infringed by a ban against managerial employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art. III, 8 is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes not contrary to law. In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor organizations.

Facts: Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF. The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.

Republic vs. Vda. De Castellvi FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of the taking of property under the power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present. ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and occupied the property as lesse. HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959. The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the property under a contract of lease. Garcia vs. Court of Appeals City Government vs. judge Ericta

HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. Meralco vs. Pineda Facts: For the purpose of constructing a 230 KV Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Tower 220 at Pililla, Rizal, the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) needed portions of the land of Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Gil de Guzman, Lucito Santiago and Teresa Bautista (simple fee owners), consisting of an aggregate area of 237,321 square meters. Despite MERALCO's offers to pay compensation and attempts to negotiate with Arayon, et. al., the parties failed to reach an agreement. On 29 October 1974, a complaint for eminent domain was filed by MERALCO against 42 defendants (including Teofilo Arayon Sr., Gil de Guzman, Lucito Santiago, and Teresa Bautista) with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXII, Pasig, Metro Manila. Despite the opposition of Arayon, et. al., the court issued an Order dated 13 January 1975 authorizing MERALCO to take or enter upon the possession of the property sought to be expropriated. On 13 July 1976, Arayon, et. al., filed a motion for withdrawal of deposit claiming that they are entitled to be paid at P40.00 per square meter or an approximate sum of P272,000.00 and prayed that they be allowed to withdraw the sum of P71,771.50 from MERALCO's deposit-account with the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Pasig Branch. However, Arayon, et. al.'s motion was denied in an order dated 3 September 1976. Pursuant to a government policy, MERALCO on 30 October 1979 sold to the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) the power plants and transmission lines, including the transmission lines traversing Arayon, et. al.'s property. On 11 February 1980, the court issued an Order appointing the members of the Board of Commissioners to make an appraisal of the properties. On 5 June 1980, MERALCO filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has lost all its interests over the transmission lines and properties under expropriation because of their sale to the NAPOCOR. In view of this motion, the work of the Commissioners was suspended. On 9 June 1981, Arayon, et. al. filed another motion for payment, but despite the opposition of MERALCO, the court issued an order dated 4 December 1981 granting the motion for payment of Arayon, et. al. (P20,400 or P3.00 per square meter without prejudice to the just compensation that may be proved in the final adjudication of the case). On 15

December 1981, Arayon, et. al. filed an Omnibus Motion praying that they be allowed to withdraw an additional sum of P90,125.50 from MERALCO's deposit-account with PNB. By order dated 21 December 1981, the court granted the Omnibus Motion. Arayon, et. al. filed another motion dated 8 January 1982 praying that MERALCO be ordered to pay the sum of P169,200.00. On 12 January 1982, MERALCO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Orders and to declare Arayon, et. al. in contempt of court for forging or causing to be forged the receiving stamp of MERALCO's counsel and falsifying or causing to be falsified the signature of its receiving clerk in their Omnibus Motion. On 9 February 1982, the court denied MERALCO's motion for reconsideration and motion for contempt. In said order, the Court adjudged in favor of Arayon, et. al. the fair market value of their property taken by MERALCO at P40.00 per square meter for a total of P369.720.00; the amount to bearing legal interest from 24 February 1975 until fully paid plus consequential damages in terms of attorney's fees in the sum of P10,000.00; all these sums to be paid by MERALCO the former with costs of suit, minus the amount of P102,800.00 already withdrawn by Arayon, et. al. Furthermore, the court stressed in said order that "at this stage, the Court starts to appoint commissioners to determine just compensation or dispenses with them and adopts the testimony of a credible real estate broker, or the Judge himself would exercise his right to formulate an opinion of his own as to the value of the land in question. Nevertheless, if he formulates such an opinion, he must base it upon competent evidence." MERALCO filed a petition for review on certiorari. Issue: Whether the court can dispense with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners in an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation. Held: In an expropriation case where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. The appointment of at least 3 competent persons as commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them or where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive (Manila Railroad Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286) Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all. Moreover, in such instances, where the report of the commissioners may be disregarded, the trial court may make its own estimate of value from competent evidence that may be gathered from the record. The "Joint Venture Agreement on Subdivision and Housing Projects" executed by ABA Homes and Arayon, et. al. relied upon by the judge, in the absence of any other proof of valuation of said properties, is incompetent to determine just compensation. The judge's act of determining and ordering the payment of just compensation without the assistance of a Board of Commissioners is a flagrant violation of MERALCO's constitutional right to due process and is a gross violation of the mandated rule established by the Revised Rules of Court. NPC vs. Jocson Sumulong vs. Guerrero

Facts: On December 5, 1997 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Hosing Project to provide housing facilities to lowsalaried government employees, covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares in Antipolo, Rizal. This included the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong (6,667 sq.m.) and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing (3,333 sq.m.). The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings. Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Phil. Natl Bank, representing the total market value of the subject 25 ha. of land, pursuant to P.D. No. 1224 which defines the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of just compensation. On January 17, 1978, respondent Judge Buenaventura S. Guerrero issued a writ of possession pertaining to the subject parcels of land. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the possession of their property without due process of law. This was however, denied. Hence, this petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge and assailing the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1224, as amended. Petitioners contend that the taking of their property subsumed under the topics of public use, just compensation, and due process. Issue: (1) Whether socialized housing as defined in P.D. 1224, as amended, for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not public use since it will benefit only a handful of people, bereft of public character, hence it is not a valid exercise of the States power of eminent domain. (2) Whether NHA has the discretion to determine the size of the property/properties to be expropriated. (3) Whether P.D. 1224, as amended, allows unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors. (4) Whether petitioners were denied due process because their parcels of land were immediately possessed by the NHA by virtue of the writ of possession ordered by the respondent judge. Held: (1) P.D. 1224 defines socialized housing as, the construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower class members of our society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities. The public use requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. The taking to be valid must be for public use. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate to state then that at present, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. Ergo, socialized housing falls within the confines of publ ic use.

(2) The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the particular property/properties to be taken for socialized housing purposes and how much thereof may be expropriated. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion, which petitioners failed to demonstrate, the Court will give due weight to and leave undisturbed the NHAs choice and the size of the site for the project. The right to use, enjoyment and disposal of private property is tempered by and has to yield to the demands of the common good. (3) Yes. The provisions on just compensation found in Presidential Decrees No. 1224, 1259, and 1313 are the same provisions found in P.D. No.s 76, 464, 794, and 1533 which were declared unconst itutional for being encroachments on judicial prerogative. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitute for just compensation. (4) Yes. The petitioners were denied of due process. P.D. 1224, as amended, violates procedural due process as it allows immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of property without giving the owner his day in court. Respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a writ of possession without notice and without hearing. Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA Facts: On 22 December 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees. Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon. Luis R. Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin with the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur (Hon. Benjamin V. Panga presiding; Special Civil Action Nos. P-17-89 and P-19-89). Forthwith, the Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. The San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the motion. The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. In an order dated 6 December 1989, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that San Joaquin may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of possession in an order dated 18 January 1990. The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in the order dated 26 February 1990. The San Joaquins filed their petition before the Court of Appeals, praying (a) that Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order dated December 6, 1989 (i) denying the motion to dismiss and (ii) allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated February 26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction. The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial

court, and ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the San Joaquins from agricultural to non-agricultural land. The Province of Camarines Sur filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the establishment of the Pilot Development Center and the housing project are deemed for public use. Held: Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. In delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments. While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other legislations. It is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use. Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication. Section 9 of BP 337 does not intimate in the least that local government units must first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to the applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries. Further, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept was that the condemned property must actually be used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the new concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project. The expropriation of the property authorized by Resolution 129, Series of 1988, is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution. Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum the general welfare. Thus, the decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a)

nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property of the San Joaquins; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify the property of the San Joaquins property from agricultural to non-agricultural use. EPZA vs. Dulay Facts: On 15 January 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and covering a total area of 1,193,669 square meters, more or less, for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. The proclamation included, among others, 4 parcels of land with an aggregate area of 22,328 square meters owned and registered in the name of the San Antonio Development Corporation. The EPZA, therefore, offered to purchase the parcels of land from the corporation in accordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree (PD) 464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the property. EPZA filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession against the corporation, to expropriate the aforesaid parcels of land pursuant to PD 66, as amended, which empowers EPZA to acquire by condemnation proceedings any property for the establishment of export processing zones, in relation to Proclamation 1811, for the purpose of establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone. On 21 October 1980, Judge Ceferino E. Dulay issued a writ of possession authorizing EPZA to take immediate possession of the premises. At the pre-trial conference on 13 February 1981, the judge issued an order stating that the parties have agreed that the only issue to be resolved is the just compensation for the properties and that the pre-trial is thereby terminated and the hearing on the merits is set on 2 April 1981. On 17 February 1981, the judge issued the order of condemnation declaring EPZA as having the lawful right to take the properties sought to be condemned, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the filing of the complaint. The respondent judge also issued a second order appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. On 19 June 1981, the three commissioners submitted their consolidated report recommending the amount of P15.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation for the properties. On 29 July 1981, EPZA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of 19 February 1981 and Objection to Commissioner's Report on the grounds that PD 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners; and that the compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by PD 1533. On 14 November 1981, the trial court denied EPZA's motion for reconsideration. On 9 February 1982, EPZA filed the petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary restraining order, enjoining the trial court from enforcing the order dated 17 February 1981 and from further proceeding with the hearing of the expropriation case. Issue: Whether the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in Presidential Decree 1533 is valid and constitutional, and whether the lower values given by provincial assessors be the value of just compensation.

Held: Presidential Decree 76 provides that "For purposes of just compensation in cases of private property acquired by the government for public use, the basis shall be the current and fair market value declared by the owner or administrator, or such market value as determined by the Assessor, whichever is lower." Section 92 of PD 464 provides that "In determining just compensation which private property is acquired by the government for public use, the basis shall be the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower." Section 92 of PD 794, on the other hand, provides that "In determining just compensation when private property is acquired by the government for public use, the same shall not exceed the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower." Lastly, Section 1 of PD 1533 provides that "In determining just compensation for private property acquired through eminent domain proceedings, the compensation to be paid shall not exceed the value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property or determined by the assessor, pursuant to the Real Property Tax Code, whichever value is lower, prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriate Government office to acquire the property." The provisions of the Decrees on just compensation unconstitutional and void as the method of ascertaining just compensation under the said decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the Supreme Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. Further, various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for expropriation. The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into account. The value of land is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often land described as "cogonal" has been cultivated for generations. Buildings are described in terms of only two or three classes of building materials and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Thus, tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation. Mun. of Daet vs. CA NAPOCOR vs. CA Facts: A contract was forged between the government through the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) and PECORP, Inc. (PECORP, formerly Pacific Equipment Corporation, as partyCONTRACTOR on 27 June 1974 for the construction of the Mariveles Dam 1 and appurtenant structures of the water supply system of the Bataan Export Processing Zone at Mariveles, Bataan. It was agreed upon that the contract is of a "Cost-Plus a Percentage" type meaning, PECORP will be paid a certain percentage as fee based on the "Actual Final Cost" of the work, and what constitutes "Actual Final Cost" is the total cost to NAPOCOR of all the work performed by PECORP which includes cost of materials and supplies, structures, furnitures, charges, etc. and all other expenses as are inherent in a Cost- Plus and Percentage Contract and necessary for the prosecution of the work that are approved by NAPOCOR. In a letter dated 11 July 1974, NAPOCOR communicated to PECORP that it was inclined to contract directly

and separately with Philippine Grouting and Guniting., Inc. (GROGUN) for the drilling and grouting work on the construction project and consequently, PECORP will not be entitled to any fees for said task. Contending that such NAPOCOR-GROGUN arrangement will violate its rights under the NAPOCORPECORP contract, PECORP made known to NAPOCOR its desire to bring the matter to arbitration. The NAPOCOR-GROGUN drilling and grouting contract, nonetheless, pushed through on 23 August 1974. As a result of such purported "withdrawal", it appeared that the drilling and grouting work ceased to be a Part of the NAPOCOR-PECORP contract. Roughly 5 years after, PECORP on 14 June 1979 presented to NAPOCOR 4 claims, i.e. (1) Fee on the cost of drilling and grouting which is 10% of the Actual Final Cost of P6,962,519.50, or P696.251.95; (2) Fee on the minimum guaranteed equipment rental which is 10% of the Actual Final Cost of P1.67 million, or P167,000.00; (3) Fee on the inventory of unused stocks and POL, P155,844.95; and (4) Reimbursement of Medical Hospital expenses re: TK-001 Accident case, or P50,085.93, coupled with a request for arbitration. A board of arbitrators was thereafter convened. But after a series of written communications among the board, NAPOCOR and PECORP, it appeared that NAPOCOR was willing to arbitrate on claims (3) and (4) only. As NAPOCOR was uncompromising, PECORP filed an action in the Regional Trial Court of Manila to compel NAPOCOR to submit/confirm/certify all the 4 claims for arbitration, where judgment was thereafter rendered in favor of PECORP. After the trial court denied NAPOCOR's motion for reconsideration of its decision, the Court of Appeals, on appeal, affirmed the same but deleted the award of attorney's fees. However, in affirming said decision which merely ordered NAPOCOR and PECORP to arbitrate on all 4 claims, the appellate court went further in disposing of issues which could have been appropriately ventilated and passed upon in the arbitration proceedings. From the adverse judgment, NAPOCOR filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether PECORP is entitled to the collection of fees for drilling and grouting work conducted by GROGUN under the NAPOCOR-GROGUN contract. Held: The NAPOCOR-PECORP Contract is for the construction, complete, of the Mariveles Dam 1. Drilling and grouting work is just a part of the complete construction of the total project, hence, covered by and within the scope of the NAPOCOR-PECORP Contract. The word "Project" is defined in the contract to mean the Dam and Appurtenant Structures. Drilling and Grouting is part of the dam or appurtenant structures, and therefore a part of PECORP's scope of work. Article 1725 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "The owner may withdraw at will from the construction of the work, although it may have been commenced, indemnifying the contractor for all the latter's expenses, work and the usefulness which the owner may obtain therefrom, and damages," is not applicable herein inasmuch as (a) there was actually no withdrawal from the "construction of the work," but only a transfer of a part of the construction, which is the drilling and grouting work, and (b) said drilling and grouting still forms part of the project as a mere NAPOCOR-GROGUN sub- contract. Since the NAPOCOR-GROGUN Contract did not amend nor nullify the "cost plus" provision of the NAPOCOR-Pecorp Contract, therefore, appellee Pecorp is still entitled to the said 10% fee. Further, the allegation that PECORP withdrew its claim for fee on the minimum guaranteed equipment rental hours of P167,000.00 is without merit, as it is clear that withdrawal is only a proposal conditioned upon NAPOCOR's adjudication, endorsement and approval of

all the 3 other claims. However, as the record shows, NAPOCOR refused to certify for arbitration all the said 3 other claims, hence, the withdrawal was rendered null and void. These were the findings of the Court of Appeals which were approved by the Supreme Court. Republic vs. Primo Mendoza Where the landowner agrees voluntarily to the taking of his property by the government for public use, he thereby waives his right to the institution of a formal expropriation proceeding covering such property. Failure for a long time of the owner to question the lack of expropriation proceedings covering a property that the government had taken constitutes a waiver of his right to gain back possession. The landowners remedy in such case is an action for the payment of just compensation, not ejectment. Here, the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the eviction of petitioner from the property that it has held as government school site for more than 50 years. The evidence on record shows that the respondents intended to cede the property to the City Government of Lipa permanently. In fact, they allowed the city to declare the property in its name for tax purposes. And when they sought to have the bigger lot subdivided, the respondents earmarked a specific portion for the City Government of Lipa. Under the circumstances, it may be assumed that the respondents had agreed to transfer ownership of the land to the government, whether to the City Government of Lipa or to the Republic of the Philippines, but the parties never formalized and documented such transfer. Consequently, petitioner should be deemed entitled to possession pending the respondents formal transfer of ownership to it upon payment of just compensation. De Knecht vs. Bautista Facts: The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal Road Project, originally called for the expropriation of properties along Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City. Later on, however, the Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension pass through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. Because of the protests of residents of the latter, the Commission on Human Settlements recommended the reversion to the original plan, but the Ministry argued the new route withh save the government P2 million. The government filed expropriation proceedings against the owners of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, among whom was petitioner. HELD: The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets is arbitrayr and should not receive judicial aprpoval. The Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost factor is so minimal that it can be disregarded in making a choice between the two lines. The factor of functionality strongly militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, while the factor of social and economic impact bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta Avenue. While the issue would seem to boil down to a choice between people, on one hand, and progress and development, on the other, it is to be remembered that progress and development are carried out for the benefit of the people. Republic vs. De Knecht Facts: De Knecht was one of the owners of several properties along the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets

which the Government sought to expropriate to give way to the extension of EDSA and the construction of drainage facilities. De Knecht filed a case to restrain the Government from proceeding with the expropriation. Her prayer was denied by the lower court but upon certiorari, the SC reversed the lower court decision and granted the relief asked for by De Knecht ruling that the expropriation was arbitrary. The case was remanded to the lower court. No further action was taken despite the SC decision until two years later, in 1983, when the Government moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the Legislature has since enacted BP 340 expropriating the same properties for the same purpose. The lower court denied tthe motion. Appeal. RULING: While it is true that said final judgment of this Curt on the subject becomes the law of the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of petitioner to take private properties for public use upon payment of just compensation is so provided in the Constitution and the laws. Such expropriation proceeding may be undertaken by the petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation. When BP 340 was passed, it appears that it was based on supervening events that occured after the 1980 decision of the SC on the De Knecht case was rendered. The social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared. Moreover, the said decision is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the Government in thereafter making its own independent assessment of the circumstances then pravailing as to the propriety of undertaking the expropriation of properties in question and thereafter by enacting the corresponding legislation as it did in this case. The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting BP 340. Thus the anterior decision of the Court must yield to the subsequent legislative fiat Abella vs. NLRC FACTS: PETITIONER Abella leased a farmland from Ramona for a period of 10 years and renewable for another 10 years at the option of the former. Abella hired the private respondents Quitco and Dionele. Abella renewed the lease for another ten years. At the expiration of the lease, she dismissed both private respondents and turned over the hacienda to the owners. Private respondents filed a complaint against petitioner. for overtime pay, reinstatement, and illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled that the dismissal was warranted by the cessation of business, but the respondents are entitled to separation pay, invoking Art. 284 of the Labor Code, as amended. ISSUE Whether or not private respondents are entitled to separation pay. RULING The Court upheld the ruling of the Labor Arbiter that Article 284 is the applicable law in this case. Art 284, as amended refers to employment benefits to farm hands who were not parties to petitioner's lease

contract with the owner of Hacienda Danao-Ramona. That contract cannot have the effect of annulling subsequent legislation designed to protect the interest of the working class. It is well-settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. It is the kind of interpretation which gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor." The policy is to extend the applicability of the decree to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor. Ortigas & Co. vs. CA Facts: Ortigas & Co. sold to Emilia Hermoso a parcel of land located in Greenhills Subdivision, San Juan with several restrictions in the contract of sale that said lot be used exclusively for residential purposes, among others, until December 31, 2025. Later, a zoning ordinance was issued by MMC (now MMDA) reclassifying the area as commercial. Private respondent (Ismael Mathay III) leased the subject lot from Hermoso and built a single storey building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company. Ortigas & Co. filed a petition a complaint which sought the demolition of the constructed car sales company to against Hermoso as it violated the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale. Trial court ruled in favor of Ortigas & Co. Mathay raised the issue to the Court of Appeals from which he sought favorable ruling. ISSUE: Whether or not the zoning ordinance may impair contracts entered prior to its effectivity.

HELD: Yes. The zoning ordinance, as a valid exercise of police power may be given effect over any standing contract. Hence, petition is denied.

RATIO: A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. Nonimpairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract. Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Supreme Court already upheld subject ordinance as a legitimate police power measure.

Magtoto vs. Manguera

Facts: No preliminary facts are available in the body of the case. Judge Miguel M. Manguera of the Court of First Instance (Branch II) of Occidental Mindoro (in GR L-37201-02) and Judge Judge Onoftre A. Villaluz of the

Criminal Circuit Court of Pasig, Rizal (in GR L-37424) declarede admissible the confessions of the accused in said cases (Clemente Magtoto in GR L-37201-02; and Maximo Simeon, Louis Mednatt, Inocentes De Luna, Ruben Miranda, Alfonso Ballesteros, Rudolfo Suarez, Manuel Manalo, Alberto Gabion, and Rafael Brill in GR L-37424). District Judge Asaali S. Isnani of Court of First Instance (Branch II) of Zamboanga de Sur (in GR L-38928), on the other hand, declared inadmissible the confessions of the accused in said case (Vicente Longakit and Jaime Dalion), although they have not been informed of their right to remain silent and to counsel before they gave the confessions, because they were given before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. Petitions for certiorari were filed with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the right to counsel and to be informed in such right, incorporated in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, applies prospectively or retroactively. Held: Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution granted, for the first time, to a person under investigation for the commission of an offense, the right to counsel and to be informed of such right. And the last sentence thereof which, in effect, means that any confession obtained in violation of this right shall be inadmissible in evidence, can and should be given effect only when the right already existed and had been violated. Consequently, because the confessions of the accused in GRs L-37201-02, 37424 and 38929 were taken before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution in accordance with the rules then in force, no right had been violated as to render them inadmissible in evidence although they were not informed of "their right to remain silent and to counsel," "and to be informed of such right," because, no such right existed at the time. The argument that the second paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, which was added by Republic Act 1083 enacted in 1954, which reads that "In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at anytime with his attorney or counsel," impliedly granted to a detained person the right to counsel and to be informed of such right, is untenable. The only right granted by said paragraph to a detained person was to be informed of the cause of his detention. But he must make a request for him to be able to claim the right to communicate and confer with counsel at any time. The historical background of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution shows that the new right granted therein to a detained person to counsel and to be informed of such right under pain of his confession being declared inadmissible in evidence, has and should be given a prospective and not a retroactive effect. Furthermore, to give a retroactive effect to this constitutional guarantee to counsel would have a great unsettling effect on the administration of justice in this country. It may lead to the acquittal of guilty individuals and thus cause injustice to the People and the offended parties in many criminal cases where confessions were obtained before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and in accordance with the rules then in force although without assistance of counsel. The Constitutional Convention could not have intended such a disastrous consequence in the administration of justice. For if the cause of justice suffers when an innocent person is convicted, it equally suffers when a guilty one is acquitted. People vs. Taylaran

Galmab vs. Pamaran

Facts: on 21 August 1983, former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. was gunned down to death inside the premises of the Manila International Airport (MIA) in Pasay City. To determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the tragedy, PD 1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board which later became more popularly known as the Agrava Board. Pursuant to the powers vested in it by PD 1886, the Board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and testified and/or produced documentary and other evidence either in obedience to a subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the Board. Among the witnesses who appeared, testified and produced evidence before the Board were General Fabian C. Ver, Major General Prospero Olivas, Sgt. Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo Mojica, Sgt. Pepito Torio, Sgt. Prospero Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido. Upon termination of the investigation, 2 reports were submitted to President Ferdinand E. Marcos. One, by its Chairman, the Hon. Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava; and anotherone, jointly authored by the other members of the Board namely: Hon. Luciano Salazar, Hon. Amado Dizon, Hon. Dante Santos and Hon. Ernesto Herrera. The reports were thereafter referred and turned over to the Tanodbayan for appropriate action. After conducting the necessary preliminary investigation, the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan 2 Informations for murder one for the killing of Sen. Benigno S. Aquino (Criminal Case 10010) and another for the killing of Rolando Galman (Criminal Case 10011), who was found dead on the airport tarmac not far from the prostrate body of Sen. Aquino on that same fateful day. In both criminal cases, Ver, et. al. were charged as accessories, along with several principals, and one accomplice. Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. In the course of the joint trial, the prosecution represented by the Office of the Tanodbayan, marked and thereafter offered as part of its evidence, the individual testimonies of Ver, et. al. before the Agrava Board. Ver, et. al., through their respective counsel objected to the admission of said exhibits. Gen. Ver filed a formal "Motion to Exclude Testimonies of Gen. Fabian C. Ver before the Fact Finding Board as Evidence against him in the above-cases" contending that its admission will be in derogation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination and violative of the immunity granted by PD 1886,a nd thus prayed that his testimony be rejected as evidence for the prosecution. Major Gen. Olivas and the rest of the other accused likewise filed separate motions to exclude their respective individual testimonies invoking the same ground. The Tanodbayan opposed said motions contending that the immunity relied upon by Ver, et. al. in support of their motions to exclude their respective testimonies, was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their right against selfincrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board. On 30 May 1985, The Tanodbayan having no further witnesses to present and having been required to make its offer of evidence in writing, the Sandiganbayan, without the pending motions for exclusion being resolved, issued a Resolution directing that by agreement of the parties, the pending motions for exclusion and the opposition thereto, together with the memorandum in support thereof, as well as the legal issues and arguments, raised therein are to be considered jointly in the Court's Resolution on the prosecution's formal offer of exhibits and other documentary evidences. On 3 June 1985, the prosecution made a written "Formal Offer of Evidence" which includes, among others, the testimonies of Ver, et. al. and other evidences produced by them before the Board, all of which have been previously marked in the course of the trial. Ver, et. al. objected to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence on the same ground relied upon by them in their respective motion

for exclusion. On 13 June 1985, The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution, admitting all the evidences offered by the prosecution except the testimonies and/or other evidence produced by Ver, et. al. in view of the immunity granted by PD 1886. The Tanodbayan, along with Saturnina and Reynaldo Galman moved for the reconsideration of the said Resolution, but were denied. They filed two separate petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the right against self-incrimination or to not to witness against oneself applies also in the proceeding before the Agrava Board. Held: Although referred to and designated as a mere Fact Finding Board, the Board is in truth and in fact, and to all legal intents and purposes, an entity charged, not only with the function of determining the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing, but more importantly, the determination of the person or persons criminally responsible therefor so that they may be brought before the bar of justice. The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other similar investigation of its sort, to the ascertainment and/or determination of the culprit or culprits, their consequent prosecution and ultimately, their conviction. And as safeguard, the Presidential Decree guarantees "any person called to testify before the Board the right to counsel at any stage of the proceedings." Considering the foregoing environmental settings, it cannot be denied that in the course of receiving evidence, persons summoned to testify will include not merely plain witnesses but also those suspected as authors and co-participants in the tragic killing. And when suspects are summoned and called to testify and/or produce evidence, the situation is one where the person testifying or producing evidence is undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense and not merely in order to shed light on the facts and surrounding circumstances of the assassination, but more importantly, to determine the character and extent of his participation therein. Among this class of witnesses were the respondents, suspects in the said assassination, all of whom except Generals Ver and Olivas, were detained (under technical arrest) at the time they were summoned and gave their testimonies before the Agrava Board. This notwithstanding, PD 1886 denied them the right to remain silent. They were compelled to testify or be witnesses against themselves. Section 5 of PD 1886 leave them no choice. They have to take the witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or refused to do so, The jeopardy of being placed behind prison bars even before conviction dangled before their very eyes. Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves, both of which are sacrosantly enshrined and protected by our fundamental law. Both these constitutional rights to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself were right away totally foreclosed by PD 1886. When they so testified and produced evidence as ordered, they were not immune from prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them. It must be noted that initially the provision in our organic laws were similar to the Constitution of the United States and was as follows "That no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself." As now worded, Section 20 of Article IV reads: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other import except to make said provision also applicable to cases other than criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to testify against himself" applies to Ver, et. al. notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case. No doubt, Ver, et. al. were not merely denied the said sacred constitutional rights, but also the right to "due process" which is fundamental fairness. The review of the pleadings and their annexes, together with the oral arguments, manifestations and admissions of both counsel, failed to

reveal adherence to and compliance with due process. The manner in which the testimonies were taken from Ver, et. al. fall short of the constitutional standards both under the "due process clause" and under the "exclusionary rule" in Section 20, Article IV. In the face of such grave constitutional infirmities, the individual testimonies of Ver, et. al. cannot be admitted against them in any criminal proceeding. This is true regardless of absence of claim of constitutional privilege or of the presence of a grant of immunity by law. Issue (2): Whether the right against self-incrimination need to be invoked before the board in order to prevent use of any given statement against the testifying witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Held (2): Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which grants "use immunity"; and the other, which grants what is known as "transactional immunity." The distinction between the two is as follows: "Use immunity" prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. On the other hand, "transactional immunity" grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates. Presidential Decree 1886, more specifically Section 5 thereof, belongs to the first type of immunity statutes. It grants merely immunity from use of any statement given before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence do not render the witness immuned from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against selfincrimination. He is merely saved from the use against him of such statement and nothing more. Stated otherwise, he still runs the risk of being prosecuted even if he sets up his right against self-incrimination. The dictates of fair play, which is the hallmark of due process, demands that Ver, et. al. should have been informed of their rights to remain silent and warned that any and all statements to be given by them may be used against them. This, they were denied, under the pretense that they are not entitled to it and that the Board has no obligation to so inform them. Hence, the right against self-incrimination need not be invoked before the Board in order to prevent use of any given statement against the testifying witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution. A literal interpretation is repugnant to Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution, which is the first test of admissibility. Said provision renders inadmissible any confession obtained in violation thereof. This exclusionary rule applies not only to confessions but also to admissions, whether made by a witness in any proceeding or by an accused in a criminal proceeding or any person under investigation for the commission of an offense. In fine, in view of the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or to answer questions under Sec. 4 of PD 1886, the testimonies compelled thereby are deemed immunized under Section 5 of the same law. The applicability of the immunity granted by PD 1886 cannot be made to depend on a claim of the privilege against self- incrimination which the same law practically strips away from the witness. People vs. Judge Ayson Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the

Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal. Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission and statement of accused. Held: No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination (only to witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not present in case at bar). This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself. It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must claim it and could be waived. Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include: 1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. 2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. 3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him. Gamboa vs. Judge Cruz Facts: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a line-up of 5 detainees including petitioner, he was identified by a complainant to be a companion in a robbery, thereafter he was charged. Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice and in the

absence of his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. The court denied said motion. Hearing was set, hence the petition. Issue: Whether or Not petitioners right to counsel and due process violated. Held: No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. He had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel. On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.

People vs. Dimaano Facts: Maricar charged her father Edgardo Dimaano of 2 counts of Rape and 1 count of attempted rape. She was 10 years old when she was first sexually abused in Sept 1993. On Jan 1996, Maricar and her mother went to Camp Crame where they filed a complaint upon advise of a relative of theirs. The Medico-Legal Officer at the PNP Crime Lab found Maricar to have suffered deep healed hymenal lacerations and was in a non-virginal state. Edgardo denied the accusations against him claiming he was in the office from 7am to 9pm. Trial court found Maricars testimony credible and spontaneous, and disregarded the compromise agreement and the Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng Sumbong since Maricar was not assisted by a lawyer when she signed the same. CA affirmed with modifications. Issues:(1) Whether or not the evidence adduced by the prosecution has overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused (2) Whether or not the voluntary and due execution of the affidavit of desistance by Maricar should have been duly considered as a factor which put to doubt the reasons behind the filing of the criminal charges of rape against her father - NO Held: (1) YES. The credibility given by the Trial Court to the rape victim is an important aspect of evidence. The

trial court and CA gave due credence to the testimony of Maricar who was only 12 years old when she narrated to the court the violations of her person. The SC found no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court and CA. Ma ricars credibility was not diminished by her failure to report the sexual abuses to the authorities and her relatives despite opportunities to do so. Delay in reporting rape incidents, in the face of threats and violence cannot be taken against the victim, more so if the lecherous attacker is her father. Delay of 2 years is not an indication that the testimony has been fabricated. The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force and without consent. Maricar was under 12 years of age when she was raped such that proof of force or consent is immaterial where force is not an element of statutory rape and free consent is presumed. Conviction will therefore lie provided that sexual intercourse is proven. (2) NO. Courts attach no persuasive value to desistance, especially when executed afterthought. The unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that after the victim goes through all the trouble, will suddenly withdraw or turn around and declare that she is no longer interest. Maricar repudiated the affidavit of desistance in open court by stating that no lawyer assisted her when she signed the desistance. Close scrutiny of the affidavit of desistance shows that Maricar never retracted her allegation that she was raped by her father and neither did she give any exculpatory fact that would raise doubts about the rape. Note: Dimaano was convicted of rape but acquitted of attempted rape for failure to allege acts constitutive of the latter. It merely stated tried and attempted to rape Maricar where such is a conclusion of law INSUFFICIENT for the court to render conviction of the accused. (Rule 110 Sec 6) People vs. Musa

to the kitchen and found a cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen. They asked Musa about its contents but failed to get a response. So they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest. Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana inside it is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence.

Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspects lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the plain view of the object. In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the plain view of the police. They arrested the accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in search for other evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the plain view of said object. Therefore, the plain view does not apply. The plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.

People vs. De Jesus

Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a surveillance and test buy on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani to Musas house and gave the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00. The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house, the NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From his position, Belarga could see what was going on. Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more marijuana and gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and came back, giving Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected it. He raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the latter moved in and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room but did not find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went

Facts: This Case is an information filed with the court of first instance of Quezon City wherein Nilo De Jesus together with Wilfredo Yalong were charged of Murder, One Peter Doe alias Pepito was also charged but has not been brought to trial, the two accused was convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

The son of the deceased, Fernando De Los Santos, is the only one eye witness. He made an statement that in the afternoon of May 21, while taking a nap, he was awakened by the shout of a small boy informing that his father, Feliciano De Los Santos, was engaging in a quarrel. He went to the place and saw Yalong in the act of aiming a gun at his father. He shouted to his father to run, but his father was fired before he could do so. While his father was on his feet, appellant De Jesus grabbed the gun from Yalong and fired at his father and after the shooting De Jesus and Yalong both ran way. Fernando went home to look for his brother, a policeman. When they returned to the crime scene, Fernando could no longer feel the pulse of

his father. His brother hunted the killers while he himself went to the authorities to report the incident and the people behind the shooting. Their father was brought to the hospital but it was pronounced dead on arrival.

With respect to De Jesus, he fired no shot at the deceased. His co-accused owned sole authorship of the shooting. The Presence of both appellants at the store where the shooting took place was not pre-arranged and purely coincidental. If there was previous agreement in kill or harm the deceased, appellant would not have chosen the store to perpetrate the heinous offense. If De Jesus was in conspiracy with him, De Jesus should have also armed himself with weapon.

Accused Nilo De Jesus denied the imputation. He narrated that it was Wilfredo Yalong who did the firing, and that Fernando de Los Santos was not there to witness the incident. On the other hand, Wilfredo Yalong Interposed Self Defense that when the victim ran towards him and tried to stab him, he pulled out his gun from his waist and fired two shots at the victim. What would instantly strike attention is the variance in the testimony of the lone eye witness on one hand and the two appellants on the other as to who fired the fatal shots.

The liability of De Jesus on ground of Conspiracy has therefore not been established beyond doubt, as it should be as the guilt itself. The court do not agree with the finding of the trial court that the shooting of the deceased was attended with the qualifying circumstances of treachery. To constitute treachery the means adopted in killing the victim must be consciously and deliberately chosen to insure its execution without any risk to thee offender arising from the defense which the victim might make.

Issue: In the absence of treachery as qualifying circumstances the crime committed is only homicide and not murder as charged. Wherefore the judgment of conviction as to appellant Nilo de Jesus is reversed and the latter is hereby acquitted. With respect to appellant Wilfred Yalong, the judgment is modified. He is hereby found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer the penalty of four years of correccional to eight years of prision mayor. People vs. Lucero

1. Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting Nilo De Jesus on crime of murder 1. Whether or not there is a conspiracy between Nilo De jesus and Wilfredo Yalong in Killing Feliciano De Los Santos., 1. Whether or not Wilfredo Yalong be free from criminal liability by invoking self defense 1. Whether or not that the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstances of treachery Held. The Court Find more convincing the testimony of the appellant that only Yalong fired the two shots that hit the deceased, one fatally on the breast. De Jesus testimony Corroborate Yalongs admission which it makes it reliable and therefore convincing. The foregoing observation places the whole testimony of the witness in grave doubt, Appellant De Jesus positively stated that Fernando was not at the scene and the court inclined to agree with him.

What is plain from the credible evidence on record that De Jesus had no participation on the shooting. Yalong admitted to be the only one who fired the gun at the deceased twice.

Facts: Accused-appellant was convicted for robbery with homicide. While he was in custodial investigation the accused cannot afford a lawyer thus one was provided for him in the person of Atty. Peralta as his counsel. Counsel explained to the accused his constitutional rights but Atty. Peralta observed no reaction from the accused. He left to attend the wake of a friend and the police authorities started to take statements from the accused. Apparently during the custodial investigation no counsel was around while accused gave his extrajudicial confession which was used against him as evidence in court and merit his conviction. Issue: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of the accused may be admissible during the trial.

From Yalongs testimony, credibly corroborated by an impartial witness, he acted to defend himself because the deceased tried to stab him. No evidence was presented to rebutt the testimonial evidence, with the deceased shown to be the aggressor against Yalong, the reasonableness of the means used by Yalong to repel the aggression may however, not be assessed in his favor. The deceased was in a state of drunkenness so he was not as dangerous as he would if he had been sober, his aim proved faulty and easily evaded as shown by the fact that Yalong was not hit by the stab attempts blows directed against him, at best the court grant incomplete self defense in his favor.

Held: Appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extrajudicial confession. The constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be provided with a counsel. This is a constitutional guarantee to protect the accused against the hostility and duress from the authorities during custodial investigation. Any confession or statement made without the presence of a counsel during the investigation is deemed to be inadmissible as evidence in court. It appears that when the accused was taken with his statements his counsel was not around. Therefore his

extrajudicial confession cannot be used as evidence against the accused during his trial. The court erred in admitting it as evidence and as a basis of conviction therefore the accused is acquitted. Lumanog vs. People

Atty. Sansano on June 20, 1996, still the said confession must be invalidated. To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. A confession is not valid and not admissible in evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of the rights of persons under custodial investigation. Atty. Sansano, who supposedly interviewed Joel and assisted the latter while responding to questions propounded by SPO2 Garcia, Jr., did not testify on whether he had properly discharged his duties to said client. While SPO2 Garcia, Jr. testified that Atty. Sansano had asked Joel if he understood his answers to the questions of the investigating officer and sometimes stopped Joel from answering certain questions, SPO2 Garcia, Jr. did not say if Atty. Sansano, in the first place, verified from them the date and time of Joels arrest and the circumstances thereof, or any previous information elicited from him by the investigators at the station, and if said counsel inspected Joels body for any sign or mark of physical torture.

Facts: Appellants were the accused perpetrators of the ambush-slay of former Chief of the Metropolitan Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine Constabulary (now the Philippine National Police), Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla.

The principal witness for the prosecution was Freddie Alejo, a security guard employed assigned at 211 Katipunan Avenue, Blue Ridge, Quezon City, where the ambush-slay happened. As a purported eyewitness, he testified on what he saw during the fateful day, including the faces of the accused. All the accused raised the defense of alibi, highlighted the negative findings of ballistic and fingerprint examinations, and further alleged torture in the hands of police officers and denial of constitutional rights during custodial investigation. The trial court however convicted the accused-appellants. The CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. The CA upheld the conviction of the accused-appellants based on the credible eyewitness testimony of Alejo, who vividly recounted before the trial court their respective positions and participation in the fatal shooting of Abadilla, having been able to witness closely how they committed the crime.

People vs. Pinlac

Facts: The accused was convicted for two separate criminal cases for robbery and robbery with homicide. He assailed his conviction on the contention that the court erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession as evidence which was taken by force, violence, torture, and intimidation without having appraised of his constitutional rights and without the assistance of counsel.

Issue: Whether or not due process was observed during the custodial investigation of the accused. Held: The court find it meritorious to declare that the constitutional rights of the accused was violated in the failure of the authorities in making the accused understand the nature of the charges against him without appraising him of his constitutional right to have a counsel during custodial investigation. Moreover the prosecution merely presented the extrajudicial confession of the accused which is inadmissible as evidence and the other evidences provided therein are merely circumstantial and subject for rebuttal. The court acquitted the accused.

Issue: Was the extra-judicial confession of accused Joel de Jesus taken during the custodial investigation valid?

Held: NO, the extra-judicial confession of accused Joel de Jesus taken during the custodial investigation was NOT valid. Police officers claimed that upon arresting Joel, they informed him of his constitutional rights to remain silent, that any information he would give could be used against him, and that he had the right to a competent and independent counsel, preferably, of his own choice, and if he cannot afford the services of counsel he will be provided with one (1). However, since these rights can only be waived in writing and with the assistance of counsel, there could not have been such a valid waiver by Joel, who was presented to Atty. Sansano at the IBP Office, Quezon City Hall only the following day and stayed overnight at the police station before he was brought to said counsel. Even assuming that custodial investigation started only during Joels execution of his statement before

People vs. Nitcha

 murder; claim that arrest was illegal for want of preliminary investigation Act of posting a bail bond, apart from the fact that he entered a plea of not guilty, is tantamount to foregoing the right to question the assumed irregularity; Bail is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua (absolute); Bail is a matter of discretion when the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua; If accused ins convicted by the crime (reclusion perpetua), bail is neither a matter of right nor a matter of discretion. Bail must not be granted.

People vs. Judge Donato

Govt of HK vs. Olalia Jr.

Facts: Juan Antonio Munoz, who was charged before the Hongkong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of accepting an advantage as an agent, conspiracy to defraud, was penalized by a common law of Hongkong. A warrant of arrest was issued and if convicted, he may face jail terms. On September 23, 1999, He was arrested and detained. On November 22, 1999, Hongkong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for his extradition. Juan Antonio Munoz filed a petition for bail, which Judge Felixberto Olalia granted. Petitioner (Hongkong Administrative), filed a petition to vacate such order, but it was denied by the same judge. ISSUE: Whether or not Juan Antonio Munoz has the right to post bail when there is nothing in the Constitution or Statutory law providing a potential extradite a right to bail. HELD: The Philippines committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person (Sec. 2 Art II 1987 Constitution) have the obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extradite, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, aright to due process under the Constitution. The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hongkong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition.

Facts: Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to the court once every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this main condition of his bail. It was contended that: 1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from detention when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA) 2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address; 3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity; 4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address; 5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose identity and address were also found to be false; 6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was offered and paid for his arrest. This however was denied. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail. Held: Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a capital offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a capital offense that the right becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearing the prosecution. Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him.

Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. De La Camara vs. Enage

Facts*: November 7, 1968 Then Magsaysay Misamis Oriental Mayor de la Camara was arrested and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged participation in the killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other laborers of the Tirador Logging Co., on August 21, 1968. 18 days later, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the CFI a cases of multiple frustrated murder and for multiple murder against petitioner, his co-accused Tagunan and Galgo. January 14, 1969- An application for bail filed by petitioner with the lower court, premised on the assertion that there was no evidence to link him with such fatal incident of August 21, 1968. He likewise maintained his innocence. Respondent Judge started the trial of petitioner on February 24, 1969, the prosecution resting its case on July 10, 1969. As of the time of the filing of the petition, the defense had not presented its evidence. August 10, 1970- Judge Enage issued an order granting petitioners application for bail, admitting that there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that petitioner would flee even if he had the opportunity, but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00 (P840,000.00 for the 14 counts of multiple murder plus P355,200.00 for the 12 counts of multiple frustrated murder.) There was a motion for reconsideration to reduce the amount. Enage however remained adamant. De la Camara then files a petition for certiorari assailing Enages order and prays for its nullification. March 5, 1971- Enage answers that set forth the circumstances concerning the issuance of the above order and the other incidents of the case, which, to his mind, would disprove any charge that he was guilty of grave abuse of discretion. It stressed, moreover, that the challenged order would find support in circulars of the Department of Justice given sanction by this Court. He sought the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit. March 31, 1971- both De la Camara and Enage did not appear at the hearing with De la Camara, upon written motion was given 30 days to submit a memorandum in lieu of oral argument, Enage in turn having 30 days from receipt of memorandum to file his reply. De la Camara submitted the memorandum on April 6, 1971. May 26, 1971-Enage, instead of a reply, submitted a supplemental answer wherein he alleged that petitioner escaped from the provincial jail on April 28, 1971 and had since been remained at large. There was a reiteration then of the dismissal of his petition for lack of merit, to which petitioner countered in a pleading dated June 7, 1971, and filed with this Court the next day with this plea: The undersigned counsel,

therefore, vehemently interpose opposition, on behalf of petitioner, to respondents prayer for dismissal of the present petition for lack of merit. For, the issue in this case is not alone the fate of petitioner Ricardo de la Camara. The issue in the present petition that calls for the resolution of this Honorable Tribunal is the fate of countless other Ricardo de la Camaras who may be awaiting the clear-cut definition and declaration of the power of trial courts in regard to the fixing of bail. * While the facts of this case is moot and academic, it did not preclude the SC from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required. ISSUE: WAS THE AMOUNT OF BAIL ORDERED BY ENAGE EXCESSIVE? HELD: Yes yes yo kabayo! Sayang lang at pumuga/tumakas si mayor, kaya nga moot (court) & academic ang petition DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, this case is dismissed for being moot and academic. Without pronouncement as to costs. SCs rationale for requirement of non-excessive bail: 1. Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the lass of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is not beyond the realm of probability, however, that a person charged with a crime, especially so where his defense is weak, would just simply make himself scarce and the frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is intended as a guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. Nor is there anything unreasonable in denying this right to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong, as the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the proceeding against him with a death sentence, an ever present threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted. 2. Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is understandable why. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found in the fundamental law. Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of August 10, 1970 fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 is clearly violative of this constitutional provision. Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in this case that the Department of Justice did recommend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the two offenses. 3. There is an attempt on the part of respondent Judge to justify what, on its face, appears to be indefensible by the alleged reliance on Villaseor v. Abao case. The guidelines in the fixing of bail was there summarized, in the opinion of Justice Sanchez, as follows: (1) ability of the accused to give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases. Enage ignored the decisive consideration appearing at the end of the above opinion: Discretion, indeed, is with the court called upon to rule on the question of bail. We must stress, however, that where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will

not hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy. No attempt at rationalization can therefore give a color of validity to the challenged order. Nor is there any justification then for imputing his inability to fix a lesser amount by virtue of an alleged reliance on a decision of this Tribunal. Even if one were charitably inclined, the mildest characterization of such a result is that there was a clear misreading of the Abao opinion when such a meaning was ascribed to it. No doctrine refinement may elicit approval if to do so would be to reduce the right to bail to a barren form of words.

Scotys Dept. Store vs. Micaller US vs. Luling Facts:

Olaguer vs. Military

Facts: In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians. They were charged with (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted. HELD: The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the time the case reached the SC Olaguer and his companions were already released from military confinement. When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released from their confinement in military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become moot and academic. But the military court created to try the case of Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still continues to subsist. ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning. HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military courts or tribunals during the period of martial law in all cases involving civilian defendants. A military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned.

A complaint was filed in the CFI of Manila charging appellant F. Luling with a violation of Section 316 of Act No. 355 of the United States Philippine Commission. The complaint alleged that: o The accused was a employed as a customs officer of the Government of the Phil. Islands. o Using such capacity, he solicited from one Rufino Elord the sum of 100 pesos in order to secure the importation of certain rolls of paper in which a large quantity of opium was hidden. The defendant was duly arrested, arraigned, tried, found guilty, and convicted by the lower court. In his appeal before the Supreme Court, the appellant contended that Section 316 of the said act was unconstitutional in that the State is without right or authority to enact a law by virtue of which certain facts only shall constitute prima facie proof of guilt. o The said provision provides in part: And evidence of such soliciting, demanding, exacting , or receiving, satisfactory to the court in which such trial is had, shall be regarded as prima facie evidence that such soliciting, demanding, exacting, or receiving was contrary to law, and shall put upon the accused the burden of proving that such act was innocent and not with unlawful intention. The reception of gift by any officer or employee in the Philippine customs service from any importer or exporter, either directly or indirectly, shall prima facie be deemed to be a violation of the provisions of this section.

ISSUE: Whether the said provision was unconstitutional HELD: No. Judgment of conviction was affirmed. RATIO: No rule has been better established in criminal law that every man is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In criminal prosecution, therefore, the burden is upon the state to prove every fact and circumstance constituting the crime charged, for the purpose of showing the guilt of the accused. While that is the rule, many of the States have established a different rule and have provided that certain facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that then the burden is put upon the defendant to show or to explain that such facts or acts are not criminal. ( Sanders v. State, Fuller v. State, US v. Gooding,) Commonwealth v. Minor: In case of statutory crimes, no constitutional provision is violated by a statute providing that proof by the state of some material fact/s shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that the burden is shifter to the defendant for the purpose of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are committed without unlawful intention.

Unlike common law offenses, in the Phils., no act is a crime unless it is made so by statute. The state having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within certain well defined limitations, has a right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and then put upon the defendant the burden of showing that such act/s are innocent and are committed without any criminal intent. Hence, Sec. 316 of Act No. 355 does not violate any of the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. With regard to the defendants guilt, the Supreme Court held that the lower court committed no error in finding that the offense had indeed been committed.

People vs. Mingoa

Facts: Found short in his accounts as officer-in-charge of the office of the municipal treasurer of Despujols, Romblon, and unable to produce the missing fund amounting to P3,938 upon demand by the provincial auditor, Aquino Mingoa was prosecuted for the crime of malversation of public funds in the Court of First Instance of Romblon. Mingoa explained to the examining officer that some days before he had, by mistake, put the money in a large envelope which he took with him to a show and that he forgot it on his seat and it was not there anymore when he returned. But he did not testify in court and presented no evidence in his favor. Having been found guilty as charged and sentenced to the corresponding penalty, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. But that court certified the case to the Supreme Court on the ground that it involved a constitutional question. Issue: Whether Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use" violates the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved cannot be sustained. Held: The validity of statutes establishing presumptions in criminal cases is now a settled matter, Cooley, in his work on constitutional limitations (8th ed., Vol. I, pp. 639-641), says that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence." In line with this view, it is generally held in the United States that the legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proved they shall, be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience. The same view has been adopted here as may be seen from the decisions of the Supreme court in US vs. Tria (17 Phil 303); US vs. Luling (34 Phil 725); and People vs. Merilo (GR L-

3489, 28 June 1951). The statute in the present case creates a presumption of guilt once certain facts are proved. It makes the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming, upon proper demand, any public funds or property with which he is chargeable prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. The ultimate act presumed is that the officer has malversed the funds or property entrusted to his custody, and the presumption is made to arise from proof that he has received them and yet he has failed to have them forthcoming upon proper demand. Clearly, the fact presumed is but a natural inference from the fact proved, so that it cannot be said that there is no rational connection between the two. Furthermore, the statute establishes only a prima facie presumption, thus giving the accused an opportunity to present evidence to rebut it. The presumption is reasonable and will stand the test of validity laid down in the above citations. Herein, Mingoa's explanation is inherently unbelievable and cannot overcome the presumption of guilt arising from his inability to produce the fund which was found missing. If the money was really lost without Mingoa's fault, the most natural thing for him to do would be to so inform his superiors and apply for release from liability. But this he did not do. Instead, he tried to borrow to cover the shortage. And on the flimsy excuse that he preferred to do his own sleuthing, he even did not report the loss to the police. Considering further, as the prosecution points out in its brief, Mingoa had at first tried to avoid meeting the auditor who wanted to examine his accounts, and that for sometime before the alleged loss many teachers and other employees of the town had not been paid their salaries, there is good ground to believe that Mingoa had really malversed the fund in question and that his story about its loss was pure invention. People vs. Holgado

Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. He pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was presented to indict the latter.

Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court. Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney. This was violated. Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The record does not

show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court. People vs. Simben Delgado vs. CA

February 1977 with the Court of Appeals an "Urgent Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment, to Recall the Records and Allow the Movant to Personally Receive Copy of the Decision." The motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 20 April 1977. On 11 May 1977 an Order was issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila directing the arrest of Delgado and the confiscation of her bond for failure to appear at the execution of judgment on 11 May 1977. On 27 May 1977, Delgado filed a Motion for the Reconsideration of the Order denying her Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgments, etc.. and prayed that she be granted a new trial on the ground that she was deprived of her right to be defended by competent counsel (Yco not being a member of the Philippine Bar). On 3 June 1977, the Court of Appeals denied Delgado's motion. Delgado filed a petition for "Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for a Writ of preliminary injunction" with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Delgado is entitled to a new trial, inasmuch as Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, Delgados counsel, is not a member of the Philippine bar. Held: A accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the bar in a criminal case filed against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due process. Herein, since Delgados "lawyer," Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, is not a real lawyer, the Court remanded the case to the trial court for new trial. People vs. Regala

Facts: Emma R. Delgado -- together with Gloria C. Tortona, Celia Capistrano and Catalino Bautista alias Atty. Paulino Bautista (at large) -- was charged with estafa thru falsification of public and/or official documents resulting in deceiving one Erlinda Rueda, a Medical Technologist, in arranging her travel to the United States. All the accused (except Catalino Bautista) pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and trial on the merits ensued. Delgado was assisted and represented by her counsel de parte, Atty. Lamberto G. Yco. On 13 December 1973, the date set for the continuation of the defense evidence, said Atty. Yco failed to appear despite proper and previous notice. Instead, he sent a telegram requesting for postponement on the ground allegedly that he was sick. No medical certificate was however submitted. The trial fiscal objected, believing that the motion was dilatory because there had been numerous postponements in the past at Delgado's behest. The trial Court sustained the fiscal's objection thereto, considered Emma Delgado to have waived presentation of her evidence, and considered the case submitted for decision. Thereafter, a judgment of conviction was rendered by the trial court, dated 20 March 1974, finding Gloria C. Tortona, Emma R. Delgado and Celia Capistrano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public and/or Official Documents, and sentencing each to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as minimum to 6 years, also of prision correccional, as maximum, to pay a fine of P5,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the offended party Erlinda Ruedas in the amount of P7,431.00. Each was further ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the complainant moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00, and one fourth of the costs of the proceedings. Tortona did not appeal from the decision. Capistrano and Delgado appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issue of "whether or not on the basis of the evidence and the law the judgment appealed from should be maintained." On 6 December 1976, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court as to Delgado and reversing the judgment as to Capistrano. On 27 December 1976, an entry of final judgment was issued and on 1 February 1977, the records of the case were remanded to the lower court for execution of judgment. Believing that there was irregularity in the sending of notices and copy of the decision as Delgado was not informed or notified of said decision by her counsel on record, Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, Delgado filed on 17

murder with assault upon an agent of a person in authority defective information; Accused cannot be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with assault absent any allegations in the information of the essential elements of an assault that appellant knew that the assault victim was an agent of a person in authority; The fact that the crime of assault was proved by evidence of the prosecution without any objection on the part of the accused does not cure the defect because to do so would be convicting an accused of a crime not properly alleged in the information.

Enrile vs. Salazar

In February 1990, Sen Enrile was arrested. He was charged together with Mr. & Mrs. Panlilio, and Honasan for the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder which allegedly occurred during their failed coup attempt. Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed for the habeas corpus alleging that the crime being charged against him is non existent. That he was charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process; denied his right to bail; and arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause.

ISSUE: Whether or Enriles arrest is valid. HELD: Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he was denied bail although ordinarily a charge of rebellion would entitle one for bail. The crime of rebellion charged against him however is complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murders the intention of the prosecution was to make rebellion in its most serious form so as to make the penalty thereof in the maximum. The SC ruled that there is no such crime as Rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. What Enrile et al can be charged of would be Simple Rebellion because other crimes such as murder or all those that may be necessary to the commission of rebellion is absorbed hence he should be entitiled for bail. The SC however noted that a petition for habeas corpus was not the proper remedy so as to avail of bail. The proper step that should have been taken was for Enrile to file a petition to be admitted for bail. He should have exhausted all other efforts before petitioning for habeas corpus. The SC further notes that there is a need to restructure the law on rebellion as it is being used apparently by others as a tool to disrupt the peace and espouse violence. The SC can only act w/in the bounds of the law. Thus SC said There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province. People vs. Ortega

doctrine in our jurisdiction is that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be a violation of this constitutional right Conde vs. Rivera

municipal midwife of Laguna Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial; Where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable time, accused is entitled relief through mandamus or habeas corpus. Mateo Jr. vs. Villaluz

cold neutrality of an impartial judge Due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to assure litigants of his being fair and just; What a trial requires is an impartial and disinterested tribunal. Garcia vs. Domingo

Facts: Appellants Ortega, Jr. and Garcia were charged with murder. The Information alleged that the accused-appellants, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, without any justifiable cause, with treachery and evident premeditation and with abuse of superior strength and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab repeatedly with a pointed weapon on the different parts of the body of the victim thereby inflicting serious physical injuries which directly caused his death. Appellants Ortega and Garcia pleaded not guilty to the charge. RTC, however, found both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Facts: For the convenience of the parties the trial was held in the air conditioned chamber of the respondent judge Garcia. The complaint was under the premise that such act is in violation of the right to hold a public trial. Issue: Whether or not such proceeding of holding trial in the chamber of the judge in violation to the principle of right to a public trial. Held: It is not in violation of the right to a public trial since the trial was still open to public and there is no showing that the public was deprived to witness the trial proceeding.

Issue: Whether or not Appellant Garcia was adequately informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Held: No. The Information accused Appellant Garcia (and Appellant Ortega) of attack[ing], assault[ing], and stab[bing] repeatedly with a pointed weapon on the different parts of the body one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y ABLOLA. The prosecutions evidence itself shows that Garcia had nothing to do with the stabbing which was solely perpetrated by Appellant Ortega. His responsibility relates only to the attempted concealment of the crime and the resulting drowning of Victim Masangkay. The hornbook

Fajardo vs. Garcia

request to serve written interrogatories to a doctor The constitutional guarantee to an accused to compulsory process to secure the production of evidence in his behalf was not violated by the trial

judge who refused to grant the request of the accused for leave to serve written interrogatories to his doctor who treated their injuries who already left abroad. That the said medical testimony on the injuries they sustained was vital to their defense can still be adduced thru other witnesses and hospital records.

provision in the constitution allowing trial in absentia means that he waives his right to meet the witnesses face to face; an express waiver of appearance has the same effect; HOWEVER, such waiver of right does NOT release the accused from his obligation under the bond to appear in court whenever so required; the accused may waive the right but not the obligation to appear in court.

People vs. Miyake

Facts: Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale, following a complaint filed by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and Rosamar del Rosario. Marasigan had also charged her with estafa by means of false pretenses. Only Marasigan was able to testify, however, as the other two complainants were abroad. Generillo was represented by her mother, while del Rosarios sister testified in court on the latters behalf. Held: Right of accused to confront del Rosario and Generillo was not afforded her. Testimonies of sister and mother, respectively, mere hearsay. Although testimonies from the previous case could have been used, the decision convicting the accused of another crime (in that previous case, estafa) cannot be sustained for being violative of the accuseds right to confront witnesses.

People vs. Seneris

parricide; prosecution witness died While the right of confrontation and cross-examination are fundamental rights, they can be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right; If the party was given the opportunity to confront or cross-examine a witness but failed to take advantage of it, he forfeits the right and the testimonies given in direct examination will be received or ed on record; Where the prosecution witness was partially cross-examined but prior to the next hearing, he dies, his testimony cannot be stricken off the record.

Go vs. People Carredo vs. People

malicious mischief Accused may be compelled to be present at the trial for the purposes of identification unless he unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment that he is the person named; The