G.R. No.

115129 February 12, 1997 Facts: The petitioners wife was suffering from a debilitating ailment and with forewarning of her impending death, she expressed her wish to be laid to rest before Christmas day to spare her family of the long vigils as it was almost Christmas. After his wife passed away, petitioner bought materials from herein private respondents for the construction of her niche. Private respondents however failed to deliver on agreed time and date despite repeated follow-ups. The niche was completed in the afternoon of the 27th of December, and Barzaga's wife was finally laid to rest. However, it was two-and-a-half (2-1/2) days behind schedule. Issue: Was there delay in the performance of the private respondent's obligation? Ruling: Yes. Since the respondent was negligent and incurred delay in the performance of his contractual obligations, the petitioner is entitled to be indemnified for the damage he suffered as a consequence of the delay or contractual breach. There was a specific time agreed upon for the delivery of the materials to the cemetery. This is clearly a case of non-performance of a reciprocal obligation, as in the contract of purchase and sale, the petitioner had already done his part, which is the payment of the price. It was incumbent upon respondent to immediately fulfill his obligation to deliver the goods otherwise delay would attach. An award of moral damages is incumbent in this case as the petitioner has suffered so much.

REPUBLIC VS. LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION 21 SCRA 279 FACTS: In the early afternoon of August 17, 1960, barge L1892, owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation was being towed down the Pasig River by two tugboats when the barge rammed against one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan bailey bridge, smashing the posts and causing the bridge to list. The river, at the time, was swollen and the current swift, on account of the heavy downpour in Manila and the surrounding provinces on August 15 and 16, 1960. The Republic of the Philippines sued Luzon Stevedoring for actual and consequential damage caused by its employees, amounting to P200,000. Defendant Corporation disclaimed liability on the grounds that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees that the damages to the bridge were caused by force majeure, that plaintiff has no capacity to sue, and that the Nagtahan bailey bridge is an obstruction to navigation. After due trial, the court rendered judgment on June 11, 1963, holding the defendant liable for the damage caused by its employees and ordering it to pay plaintiff the actual cost of the repair of the Nagtahan bailey bridge which amounted to P192,561.72, with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint. ISSUE: Was the collision of appellant's barge with the supports or piers of the Nagtahan bridge caused by fortuitous event or force majeure? RULING: Yes. Considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an immovable and stationary object and uncontrovertedly provided with adequate openings for the passage of water craft, including barges like of appellant's, it was undeniable

that the unusual event that the barge, exclusively controlled by appellant, rammed the bridge supports raises a presumption of negligence on the part of appellant or its employees manning the barge or the tugs that towed it. For in the ordinary course of events, such a thing will not happen if proper care is used. In Anglo American Jurisprudence, the inference arises by what is known as the "res ipsa loquitur" rule The appellant strongly stressed the precautions taken by it on the day in question: that it assigned two of its most powerful tugboats to tow down river its barge L1892; that it assigned to the task the more competent and experienced among its patrons, had the towlines, engines and equipment double-checked and inspected' that it instructed its patrons to take extra precautions; and concludes that it had done all it was called to do, and that the accident, therefore, should be held due to force majeure or fortuitous event. These very precautions, however, completely destroyed the appellant's defense. For caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical in so far as they exempt an obligor from liability) by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, "events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable" (Art. 1174, Civ. Code of the Philippines). It was, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as was commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening was not impossibility to foresee the same. The very measures adopted by appellant prove that the possibility of danger was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen, and was not caso fortuito.

Facts: In 1956, Sofia Castro-Crouch (plaintiff-respondent) was vacationing in Pangasinan in her parents house.That same year in November, her mother, Consolacion died. On the day of her mothers death she addressed a telegram to her father Ignacio who was then in the US announcing Consolacions death. Thetelegram was accepted by Telefast (defendantpetitioner) in its Dagupan office after payment of requiredfees or charges.The telegram never reached the addressee. Consolacion was interred without her husband and childrenbesides Sofia.Sofia went back to the US and learned that the telegram never reached her father. Thus, she and her siblings and their father sued Telefast for damages arising from the breach of contract by the defendant.Petitioner-defendant Telefast interposed that the reason why the telegram never reached the addresseeis because of technical and atmospheric factors beyond its control. It appears though that no attemptmade by defendant to inform Sofia for that matter or any reason at all that explains why the telegram reached the addressee.The CFI ruled in favor of Sofia and her co-plaintiffs awarding her damages she prayed for. Telefastappealed before the IAC which affirmed the decision of the CFI.Hence this appeal. Issues: Whether or not petitioner is liable for damages arising from the breach of contract even though that therewas a technical and atmospheric factors that lead to its failure to comply with terms of the contract? Held: Yes. Art. 1170 of the Civil Code provides, Those who in the performance of their obligation are guilty of fraud, delay, negligence, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. Art. 2176 also provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.In the case at bar, petitioner and private respondent Sofia C. Crouch entered into a contract whereby, for a fee, petitioner undertook to send said private respondents message overseas by telegram. This,petitioner did not do, despite performance by said private respondent of her obligation by paying therequired charges. Petitioner was therefore guilty of contravening its obligation to said private respondentand is thus liable for damages.Also, it is evident that petitioner did not do anything to advise the plaintiff of the circumstances which leadto its failure to comply with its obligation. It is apparent that such tantamount to gross negligence. Hencebad faith