Playing with basic law: Devolution Plan of Musharraf - 1

BBC's Tim Sebastian had ruined Tanveer Naqvi Lt. General [General Musharraf's National Reconstruction Bureau's Chief lanner! and his so"called #evolution lan in one of his $ro%ram &ard Tal'. (ne must have )oined issue *ith Lt."Gen +Rtd, Tanvir Naqvi *hen he sa-s that the arm- has ..the ri%ht.. to amend the Constitution. S$ea'in% on the BBC/ the chief of the National Reconstruction Bureau/ ho*ever/ tried to soften the im$act of his remar's b- sa-in% that the %overnment *as not %oin% to amend ..the *hole Constitution... This evades the real issue/ *hich is0 does the arm- have a ri%ht at all to amend the nation.s basic la*1 2s $er #ail- #a*n Columnist Mr 2-a3 2mir [dated 45 2$ril 4666 i.e. (ne -ear after 7lle%al Martial La* Re%ime of General Musharraf and Co! had *ritten on the cronies in General Musharraf's Cabinethtt$088***.da*n.com8*ee'l-8a-a3846666945.htm "QUOTE" But to return to the wizards of this dispensation, the strangest case is that of Lt-Gen Tanvir Na vi and his district devo!ution p!an" No #idding, Gen Na vi is a $right officer" %hoever heard hi& spea#ing during the 'ar$-(-)o&in &i!itar* e+ercises when Genera! ,s!a& Beg was ar&* chief ca&e awa* great!* i&pressed" But the profession of ar&s is one thing, po!itics uite another" -as he ever cast his vote in an e!ection. -as he ever $een near a vi!!age po!!ing station in his !ife. ( dou$t it" (f a de!egation of N,TO co&&anders were visiting /a#istan the $est person to address the& fro& the present crop of serving or retired genera!s wou!d $e Gen Na vi" But if an e!ection p!an were $eing put together ( wou!d #eep Gen Na vi at a distance of a hundred &i!es" 01/( 2esearch and News Bu!!etin 3Greater /rovincia! ,utono&*4 http566www"sdpi"org6he!p6research7and7news7$u!!etin6n$8anfe$9:6artic!es6(n ;<92etrospect"ht& 1uring <99: ,N/ 0enator ,sfand*ar %a!i said when Gen /ervez )usharraf assu&ed power and presented his seven- point agenda, there was a !itt!e hope as it contained the issue of provincia! dishar&on*" -owever, he said, the devo!ution p!an presented $* LtGen =retired> Tanveer Na vi even snatched a !itt!e $it autono&* which the provinces had $een en8o*ing" -e said the devo!ution shou!d $e fro& federa! to provinces and then fro& provinces to districts" B* putting the districts direct!* under the federa! s*ste& for si+ *ears, the provincia! govern&ents have $een &ade post offices and the chief &inisters shou!d $e ca!!ed post&asters genera!, he added" "UNQUOTE" Lets have a loo' at the so"called Refroms thrusted do*n the throats of 5:6 Million

a'istanis b- 2 M2RT72L L2; R<G7M< durin% 5==="466:. 7nternational Crisis Grou$ had $ublished a detailed and an im$artial re$ort in 4669. >or 'ind $erusal 1evo!ution in /a#istan5 2efor& or 2egression. << )arch <99: htt$088***.crisis%rou$.or%8home8inde?.cfm1id@4A9=Bl@5 1E?OLUT(ON (N /,@(0T,N5 2EAO2) O2 2EG2E00(ON. << )arch <99: EBECUT(?E 0U)),2D ,N1 2ECO))EN1,T(ON0 a'istan's militar- %overnment launched a cam$ai%n for $olitical devolution in 4666 that it said *as aimed at transferrin% administrative and financial $o*er to local %overnments. The scheme *as to stren%then local control and accountabilit- and/ accordin% to resident erve3 Musharraf/ Cem$o*er the im$overishedC . 7n $ractice/ ho*ever/ it has undercut established $olitical $arties and drained $o*er a*a- from the $rovinces *hile doin% little to minimise corru$tion or establish clear accountabilit- at a local level. The reforms/ far from enhancin% democrac-/ have stren%thened militar- rule and ma- actuallraise the ris's of internal conflict. Dnder the #evolution of o*er lan announced in 2u%ust 4666/ local %overnments *ere to be elected on a non"$art- basis in $hased votin% bet*een #ecember 4666 and Eul- 4665. #istrict and sub"district %overnments have since been installed in 565 districts/ includin% four cities. ($eratin% under its res$ective $rovincial Local Government (rdinance 4665/ each has its Na3im and Naib Na3im +ma-or and de$ut- ma-or,/ elected council and administration. Li'e $revious local %overnment $lans/ Musharraf's called for re"establishin% elected local councils at district and sub" district levels. 7t $romised substantial autonom- for elected local officials and/ most notabl-/ $laced an elected official as overall head of district administration/ mana%ement and develo$ment/ reversin% a centur-"old s-stem that subordinated elected $oliticians to bureaucrats. Musharraf's scheme ostensibl- aimed at establishin% the foundations of %enuine local democrac-. &o*ever/ the main rationale for devolution *as and remains re%ime le%itimacand survival. 2side from the *ides$read alle%ations of ri%%in% and mani$ulation that have shado*ed them/ the non"$artisan nature of the local elections has e?acerbated ethnic/ caste and tribal divisions and undermined the or%anisational coherence of $olitical $arties. #evolution/ in fact/ has $roved little more than a cover for further centralised control over the lo*er levels of %overnment. #es$ite the rhetoric from 7slamabad of em$o*erment/ local %overnments have onl- nominal $o*ers. #evolution from the centre directl- to the local levels/ moreover/ ne%ates the normal conce$t of decentralisation since a'istan's $rinci$al federal units/ its four $rovinces/ have been b-$assed. The misuse of local %overnment officials durin% the 2$ril 4664 $residential referendum and the (ctober 4664 %eneral elections has left little doubt that these %overnments *ere $rimaril- instituted to create a $liant $olitical elite that could hel$ root the militar-'s $o*er in local $olitics and dis$lace its traditional civilian adversaries. >riction is %ro*in% bet*een various levels of %overnment/ es$eciall- since the militartransferred $o*er/ at least formall-/ to the central and $rovincial %overnments that *ere formed after the 4664 elections. These tensions are $artl- the result of the manner in *hich the devolution $lan *as devised and im$lemented in the absence of elected officials and a%ainst the stron% o$$osition of the ma)or $olitical $arties/ civil societ- and media. #es$ite its lac' of domestic le%itimac-/ the devolution $lan has considerable su$$ort from donors/ *ho mista'enl- believe it is advancin% democrac- and buildin% do*n militar- rule. >or no*/ the militar-'s bac'in% as *ell as this e?ternal su$$ort *or's in its favour. But lo* domestic acce$tance undermines its lon%"term $ros$ects/ and the militar-'s $olitical

en%ineerin% that accom$anies it is *idenin% divisions at the local and $rovincial levels. Some of these could *ell lead to %reater domestic violence and instabilit-. 2ECO))EN1,T(ON0 To the Govern&ent of /a#istan5 5. #emonstrate a commitment to real $olitical devolution b-0

+a, $lacin% the Local Government (rdinance +LG(, before each $rovincial %overnment for revie* to create the necessar- $olitical acce$tance of the schemeF +b, holdin% local %overnment elections on a $art- basis/ *ith direct $olls for district officialsF and +c, refrainin% from im$osin% $olitical disci$line on local officials and misusin% them for $olitical ends such as $artisan electioneerin%. 4. Ta'e ste$s to*ard decentralisation from federal to $rovincial levels b-0 +d, reducin% the number of federal ministries involved in and hence ca$able of e?ercisin% control over local %overnmentF and +e, allo*in% the re$resentation and $artici$ation of $rovincial and national assemblle%islators in 'e- local %overnment bodies such as the district develo$ment advisorcommittees. G. #evolve administrative and fiscal $o*ers to local units/ in $articular b-0 +f, %ivin% district %overnments %reater control over bud%etar- resources and increasin% allocations for develo$ment/ es$eciall- in $oorer districtsF and +%, lin'in% $rovincial $o$ulation"based fiscal transfers to each district's level of $overt-/ fiscal and develo$ment needs.

9. 7m$rove the deliver- of )ustice in local %overnment throu%h securit- sector reform/ notabl- b-0 +h, e?$editin% the formation and o$erationalisation of district/ $rovincial and national safet- commissions and $olice com$laints authoritiesF and

+i, allocatin% more resources and staff to the district $olice. To DN# / the international financial institutions and 'e- donor %overnments/ includin% the D.S.0 A. <ncoura%e the a'istan %overnment stron%l- to devolve $olitical/ administrative and financial res$onsibilities to the $rovinces. H. Re"evaluate and reorder devolution $ro%ram assistance in order to em$hasise sustained hel$ for *ider institutional reforms that address the lon%standin% $roblems of $overt-/ economic %ro*th/ $ublic sector corru$tion and inefficienc-. :. Lin' su$$ort for devolution to $ro%ress on $olice reforms and $rovide bud%etarsu$$ort and other assistance to im$rove service incentives and conditions and build ca$acit- for investi%ation and $rosecution functions. 1E?OLUT(ON (N /,@(0T,N5 2EAO2) O2 2EG2E00(ON. (" (NT2O1UCT(ON5 (n 59 2u%ust 4666/ resident Musharraf unveiled his %overnment's Local Government lan/ intended to build %enuine democratic institutions and em$o*er the $eo$le at the %rassroots. The main stated ob)ectives are $olitical devolution/ administrative decentralisation/ and the redistribution of resources to local %overnments. 7n his *ords0 The basic issue is to em$o*er the im$overished and ma'e the $eo$le the master of their o*n destin-. ;e *ant to introduce essence of democrac- and not sham democrac-/ *hich $romotes the $rivile%ed. #evolution *ill brin% far"reachin% consequences and *ill chan%e [the! fate of the countr-. 7n revivin% local %overnments/ Musharraf *as follo*in% in the footste$s of his $redecessors. Successive militar- rulers have t-$icall- instituted lo*er tiers of %overnment as a substitute for democratisation at the $rovincial and national levels. Local %overnments have mainl- been used to0 +5, de$oliticise %overnanceF +4, create a ne* $olitical elite to challen%e and undermine the $olitical o$$ositionF +G, demonstrate the democratic credentials of a re%ime to domestic and e?ternal audiencesF and +9, undermine federalism b- circumventin% constitutional $rovisions for $rovincial $olitical/ administrative/ and fiscal autonom-. Li'e his $redecessors/ Musharraf quic'l- sei3ed u$on local %overnment. ;ithin a month of his cou$/ he set u$ a National Reconstruction Bureau +NRB, under a retired %eneral to develo$ a scheme for devolution. #rafted *ith technical assistance from the Dnited Nations #evelo$ment ro%ramme +DN# ,/ the CLocal Government lan 4666C +LG lan 4666, called for reestablishment of elected councils at the sub"district and district levels )ust li'e resident and >ield Marshal 2-ub's Basic #emocrac- and resident and General Iia"ul"&aq's local bodies. But unli'e $revious s-stems/ Musharraf's $lan $romised to vest e?tensive $olitical and administrative authorit- in district and sub"district %overnments b$rovidin% for matchin% federal and $rovincial %rants to hel$ them fulfil their ne* res$onsibilities. <ach level *as to have an elected na3im and naib na3im +ma-or and

de$ut- ma-or,/ elected councils and administration. >or the first time in a'istan's histor-/ elected officials *ere to be $laced at the a$e? of district %overnment/ *ith e?ecutive $o*ers and res$onsibilities for la* and order to Censure the su$remac- of the $olitical leadershi$ over the administrationC . ;hile the ostensible aim of Musharraf's devolution scheme ma- be the transfer of administrative/ $olitical and financial authorit- to the lo*er tiers of %overnment/ the realit- is star'l- different. Local %overnments in fact e?ercise onlnominal autonom- *ith res$ect to administrative and financial matters in their res$ective )urisdictions. S*ee$in% as it loo's/ the ne* s-stem's telltale mandate is in the requirement that all local elections must be $art-less. Local %overnments have $roved to be 'einstruments in the militar-'s mani$ulation of the a'istani $olit- to ensure re%ime survival. #istrict na3ims +ma-ors, used $ublic funds and other state resources to sta%e $ro" Musharraf rallies durin% the 2$ril 4664 $residential referendum and to su$$ort the a'istan Muslim Lea%ue +Juaid"i"23am, + ML"J,'s $arliamentar- candidates in the 4664 national $olls. Local %overnments have also had si%nificant utilit- for the militar-'s divide" and rule tactics. B- )u?ta$osin% more than 566 ne* local %overnments bet*een it and the $rovinces/ the centre/ *here the militar- continues to maintain its %ri$ on the levers of state $o*er/ has been stren%thened at the cost of a'istan's four federatin% units. 7f a'istan's chequered $olitical histor- is an- barometer/ the question of devolution cannot be addressed in isolation from the lar%er issue of $rovincial autonom-. #evolution of $o*er/ authorit- and resources is central to the viabilit- of an- multi"ethnic/ multi"re%ional state. 2lthou%h the federal $rinci$le is enshrined in the 5=:G constitution/ a'istan's civil" militar- rulin% elite has been averse to devolvin% $o*ers to the $rovincial level. 7nstead/ it has often used the administrative and coercive $o*ers at its dis$osal to e?tend the centre's control over the $rovinces. Since militar-"ins$ired devolution is directed to local levels/ it enhances tensions bet*een the centre and the $rovinces. Such schemes undermine the ver- conce$t of federalism and increase ethno"re%ional rifts. This centralisation of $o*er and authorit- led to a'istan's brea'"u$ in 5=:5/ *hen the <ast *in% rebelled a%ainst the centre's $olitical control and fiscal e?$loitation. 7n $resent"da- a'istan/ ethnic tensions/ fuelled b- bitter resentment a%ainst a un)abi"dominated militar-/ are risin% in the smaller federal units of Sindh/ Baluchistan and the North ;est >rontier rovince +N;> ,. 7n the un)ab itself/ a'istan's lar%est $rovince/ the militar- has bar%ained o$$ortunisticall- alon% biradari +caste/ tribal/ sub"re%ional, lines and unleashed equall- divisive forces b- deliberatelsu$$ressin% $art- $olitics. This re$ort e?amines resident Musharraf's devolution scheme in relation to its stated $olitical/ administrative/ financial/ and la* enforcement ob)ectives and assesses the im$act on $olitical stabilit-/ federal"$rovincial relations/ and ethno" re%ional relations. ((" B,C@G2OUN1 ," GENE2,L ,DUB @-,NE0 B,0(C 1E)OC2,CD ;hile rudimentar- forms had e?isted in $arts of British 7ndia/ the colonial state's need for centralised/ authoritarian rule miti%ated a%ainst the develo$ment of an- real elected s-stem of local %overnment. a'istan inherited the British s-stem in *hich the de$utcommissioner +#C, +administrative head of the district, virtuall- controlled all facets of district %overnment0 administration/ develo$ment/ revenue and criminal )ustice. D$on assumin% $o*er in 5=AK/ a'istan's first militar- ruler/ General 2-ub Lhan/ o$ted for an elaborate/ thou%h nominall- em$o*ered/ local bodies scheme. &avin% sus$ended the constitution/ the re%ime needed for its survival to create at least a semblance of democratic re$resentation at some level. 7n 5=A=/ 2-ub formall- introduced his CBasic #emocrac-C +B#, $lan/ declarin% that the nation *as not -et read- for full democrac-. CThe scheme of Basic #emocraciesC / he said/ Chas been evolved after a careful stud- of the e?$erience of other countries and of the s$ecial conditions $revailin% in our landC. Dnder

Basic #emocrac-/ the countr- *as divided into K6/666 *ards +sin%le member constituencies of 5/666 to 5/466 $eo$le each, to elect a CBasic #emocratC on a non"$artbasis. Local councils *ere created at the district and sub"district levels of union/ tehsil +;est a'istan, and thana +<ast a'istan,. Rou%hl- half the members of local councils *ere officiall- nominated/ not directl- elected. ;hile these councils received state funds to $erform munici$al and civic functions/ the district administrative bureaucrac- retained virtuall- total authorit- over them/ includin% the $o*ers to overrule council decisions and sus$end the e?ecution of their orders. Besides servin% on the local councils/ Basic #emocrats constituted the <lectoral Colle%e that selected the $resident. 7n 5=H6/ 2-ub used this ne* institution to have himself confirmed as $resident for five -ears throu%h a referendum that %ave him a =A.H $er cent vote. &avin% abro%ated the 5=AH constitution/ 2-ub $romul%ated a ne* one in March 5=H4. >ederal in $rinci$le/ it established a unitar-/ $residential %overnment. 2s $resident/ 2-ub arro%ated to himself unchallen%ed e?ecutive $o*ers and the authorit- to dismiss the national and $rovincial le%islatures. rovincial autonom- *as circumscribed further throu%h the a$$ointment of %overnors/ ans*erable to the centre. Basic #emocrats *ere retained as the <lectoral Colle%e for both the resident and members of the National 2ssembl- and $rovincial le%islatures. 7n creatin% these local bodies/ 2-ub's intent *as not to decentralise or democratise authoritbut to e?tend centralised control over the federal units throu%h a ne* %rass roots $olitical base. The scheme *as remar'abl- *ell orchestrated for e?tendin% direct $atrona%e to/ and mani$ulation of local $o*er structures. Controllin% access to the state's resources/ the district bureaucrac- *as able to $enetrate and mani$ulate local $olitics b- dealin% directl- *ith the ne* elite/ b-$assin% $oliticians and $olitical $arties and thus isolatin% them from the %eneral electorate. 7n this *a-/ %overnance *as de$oliticised and localised under the control of centrall- a$$ointed bureaucrats. 2t the end of his $residential tenure in 5=HA/ 2-ub sou%ht re"election in a contested $oll. ;hile he defeated his $rinci$al civilian o$$onent/ >atima Einnah/ alle%ations of electoral ri%%in% and mani$ulation from the o$$osition further *ea'ened the declinin% credibilit- of his local %overnment s-stem. The denial of $rovincial autonomand s-stematic su$$ression of $olitical vie*s fuelled domestic dissent and/ combined *ith s'e*ed economic $olicies that mostl- benefited a small industrial elite/ e?acerbated $olarisation alon% re%ional/ class and ethnic lines. 7n <ast a'istan/ resentment over denial of economic and $olitical autonom- b- a un)abi"dominated civil"militarestablishment %alvanised a $o$ular movement for $rovincial autonom- under Shei'h Mu)ibur Rehman's 2*ami Lea%ue. 7n the *estern *in%/ lac' of o$$ortunit- for $olitical $artici$ation and coercive authoritarian rule bred alienation and frustration amon% ethno" re%ional %rou$s/ urban intelli%entsia/ students and labour unions. B- 5=H=/ violent $rotests and countr-*ide stri'es cri$$led 2-ub's authorit-. 2s it declined/ the militarhi%h command *ithdre* its su$$ort and handed $o*er to his arm- chief/ General Mah-a Lhan. (ne of Mah-a's first ste$s *as to scra$ CBasic #emocrac-C. Lac'in% le%itimac- and $ublic sanction/ 2-ub's discredited s-stem did not survive its creator. But 2-ub's $olitical en%ineerin%/ aimed at le%itimisin% the militar-'s control over $olitics at ever- level/ undermined federalism/ e?acerbated re%ional frictions and culminated in civil *ar and dismemberment of the a'istani state. B" GENE2,L '(,-UL--,QE0 LOC,L GO?E2N)ENT 0D0TE) 7n Eul- 5=::/ the arm- under General Iia"ul"&aq de$osed the elected a'istan eo$le's art- + , %overnment of rime Minister Iulfi'ar 2li Bhutto. 7ronicall-/ local %overnment had remained defunct durin% the brief democratic interlude from 5=:4 to 5=::. 2lthou%h the %overnment $romul%ated a eo$le's Local Government (rdinance in 5=:A/ the elections *ere never held. Li'e 2-ub/ Iia sa* merit in institutin% local bodies in order to cloa' a hi%hl- centralised/ authoritarian s-stem of %overnment under the %arb of

decentralisation. 7n Se$tember 5=:=/ he revived local %overnments throu%h $rovincial ordinances. Dnli'e *ith 2-ub's B#s/ some functions of $rovincial %overnments *ere dele%ated to local bodies but the- *ere to o$erate under $rovincial control. Iia established three tiers of local %overnment in rural areas0 union councils +consistin% of villa%es,/ tehsil +sub"district, committees and 3ila +district, councils. 7n urban areas/ to*n committees *ere established for to*ns *ith $o$ulations bet*een A/666 and G6/666F munici$al committees for to*ns *ith a $o$ulation u$ to 4A6/666/ and munici$al8metro$oli tan cor$orations for ma)or cities + esha*ar/ Lahore/ Larachi, *ith $o$ulations in e?cess of 4A6/666. <lections to union councils8to*n committees *ere held in 5=:=/ 5=KG/ and 5=K: on a non"$art- basis/ *ith K6 $er cent of members elected b- universal adult suffra%e and 46 $er cent reserved for $easants/ *or'ers/ tenants/ and *omen. Councillors served as the electoral colle%e for choosin% the heads +chairmen and vice chairmen, of 3ila and tehsil councils. The main res$onsibilit- of the local councils *as to mana%e small"scale $ublic *elfare and develo$ment activities +*ater su$$l-/ sanitation/ maintenance and mana%ement of hos$itals and schools, in their )urisdictions. The list of council functions *as e?tensive but the revenue base *as limited des$ite the dele%ation of some ta?ation $o*ers b$rovincial %overnments. The bul' of their funds came as federal transfers and to a lesser e?tent allocations from $rovincial 2nnual #evelo$ment ro%rams +2# ,. Similar to the B# scheme/ Iia's local councils *ere not entrusted *ith %eneral administration/ la* and order or $olicin%/ *hich *ere retained bcivil bureaucrats +commissioners and de$ut- commissioners, *ho also served as e? officio/ non"votin%/ members of these councils. Dnli'e the B# s-stem/ Iia's local %overnment officials did not form an electoral colle%e for $rovincial or national assemblies or the $residenc-. 7n the first local bodies elections/ in Se$tember 5=:=/ the 2*am #ost +>riends of the eo$le, %rou$/ a cover name for the a'istan eo$le's art-/ secured si%nificant re$resentation. Their success *as a rude shoc' to the militar- %overnment. To forestall their victor-/ Iia $ost$oned indefinitel- national elections scheduled for 5: and 46 November 5=:=. The $rimar- motivations for Iia to create local bodies *as to le%itimise the militar- %overnment/ broaden its su$$ort base be-ond the militar-/ and use the ne*lcreated and $liable local elite to undermine its $olitical o$$onents. 7n essence/ the local bodies $rovided the Ccivilian base of his militar- %overnment/ su$$ortin% it in return for economic and $olitical benefitsC. Graduall-/ these local %overnments became a vast mechanism for e?tendin% state $atrona%e to $ro"militar- $oliticians/ $rovidin% the militar%overnment *ith am$le sco$e for sta%in% favourable/ non"$artisan elections. 7n due course/ the ne* local elites formed the core of Iia's rubber stam$ $arliament/ elected in non"$art- national elections in 5=KA. But these local bodies could not assua%e $o$ular demands for $artici$ation or besto* an- lastin% le%itimac- on the militar- %overnment. <ventuall-/ a revolt *ithin the $arliament tri%%ered b- the militar-'s refusal to share anmeanin%ful authorit- *ith elected $oliticians led to dissolution of the democratic faNOade it had so assiduousl- manufactured. Tainted b- its association *ith a militar- dictator/ Iia's local %overnment scheme *as allo*ed to deca- under elected %overnments in the 5==6s. Local bodies *ere dissolved in the N;> in 5==5/ in Sindh in 5==4 and a -ear later in the un)ab $rovince. ;hile corru$tion and mismana%ement *ere often cited/ the $rimar- reason for scra$$in% these local bodies *as almost al*a-s $olitical. ;ar- of the electoral influence of local officials/ elected %overnments $referred to run local councils throu%h a$$ointed administrators/ re%ular federal and8or $rovinciall- a$$ointed civil servants. CDnfortunatel-/ elected %overnments *ere at lo%%erheads *ith local bodiesC/ sa-s a senior $olitician/ Cbecause the- *anted to 'ee$ local $olitics under control for fear of losin% out to their rivalsC.