Tantuico v. Republic, 204 SCRA 428 (91) Facts: A case was filed by the PCGG vs.

the Marcoses & Tantuico, the latter on the theory that he collaborated & aided the Marcoses in concealing the ill-gotten wealth. Tantuico filed a motion for a bill of particulars. The SolGen opposed the motion saying that the matters sought by Tantuico are evidentiary in nature & that the complaint was sufficient as it contains the essential elements of a cause of action. Held: A complaint is defined as a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause or causes of action. Its office or purpose is to inform the defendant clearly & definitely of the claims made vs. him so that he may be prepared to meet the issues at trial. The complaint should inform the defendant all the material facts on w/c the plaintiffs rely to support his demand The complaint should inform the defendant of all the material facts on w/c the plaintiff relies to support his demand; it should state the theory of a cause of action w/c forms the bases of the plaintiffs claim of liability. The rules on pleading speak of two (2) kinds of facts: the first, the ultimate facts, & the second, the evidentiary facts. The term ultimate facts as used in Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, means the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. TEST: A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out w/o leaving the statement of the cause of action insufficient. Ultimate facts are important & substantial facts w/c either directly form the basis of the primary right & duty, or w/c directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. The term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by w/c these material elements are to be established. It refers to principal, determinate, constitutive facts, upon the existence of w/c, the entire cause of action rests. Evidentiary facts are those facts w/c are necessary for determination of the ultimate facts; they are the premises upon w/c conclusions of ultimate facts are based. Where the complaint states ultimate facts that constitute the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, & (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right, the complaint states a cause of action, otherwise, the complaint must succumb to a motion to dismiss on that ground of failure to state a cause of action. However, where the allegations of the complaint are vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions, the proper recourse would be, not a motion to dismiss, but a motion for a bill of particulars [G.R. No. 127130. October 12, 2000] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERNESTO EBIAS y MAGANA, accused-appellant. DECISION MENDOZA, J.: This case is here on automatic review in view of the imposition by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Siniloan, Laguna of the death penalty on accused-appellant Ernesto Ebias for the complex crime of murder with frustrated murder. A new trial is sought by accused-appellant on the ground of newly-discovered evidence. The facts are as follows: On December 13, 1994, accused-appellant Ebias and a John Doe were charged with murder with frustrated murder in an information [1] filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna who alleged That on or about 12:00 oclock noon on July 8, 1994 at Barangay Dambo, Municipality of Pangil, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while conveniently armed with a deadly weapon (home made gauge 12 sulpak) with evident premeditation and with treachery and take advantage of superior strength, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot once Ronaldo Narez and Tirso Narez by the said weapon thereby inflicting upon Tirso Narez multiple gun shot wounds in the abdomen and right shoulder which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the surviving heirs of the victim; and Ronaldo Narez sustained gun shot wound in the right leg, thus, accused has performed all the acts of execution which could have also produced the felony of Murder as a consequence with respect to said victim which nevertheless did not produce the felony by reason of cause independent of the will of the accused, that is, due to the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Ronaldo Narez which prevented his death and to his damages and prejudice. That the qualifying and aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime. When arraigned, accused-appellant Ernesto Ebias pleaded not guilty whereupon trial proceeded. Evidence was presented by the prosecution showing the following: On July 7, 1994 at around 12 noon, Ronaldo Narez and his cousin, Tirso Narez, went to get some jackfruit in Barangay Dambo, Pangil, Laguna. On their way, they saw two men sitting by the roadside. As they were nearing the place where the two men were, the latter waved at them. Ronaldo and Tirso Narez ignored the summon and continued walking. When they were about 15 meters from the men, they heard one of the men, who was brandishing a bolo, say Boy, tirahin mo na. The other man then drew his sulpak and shot them. Ronaldo and Tirso Narez ran towards the kaingin. Ronaldo Narez realized that his right leg was bleeding. Nonetheless, he managed to reach his house and told his father what had happened. Ronaldo was taken to the Pakil Hospital for treatment. Tirso, who had also been taken to the same hospital, suffered a gunshot wound on his stomach.[2] He died from his injuries the next day, on July 9, 1994.[3] On July 11, 1994, Ronaldo Narez executed an affidavit identifying his assailant as a certain Boy Marantal. In his affidavit, marked as Exhibit B, Ronaldo stated: 2 : Ano ang dahilan at ikaw ay nandidito sa tanggapan ng Pulisiya ng Pangil, Laguna at ikaw ay kinukunan ng salaysay? : Sa dahilan po na kami ay binaril na ang aking kasama ay namatay at ako ay may tama. 3 : Kailan at saan naman nangyari ang bagay na ito, kung iyong tanda? : Noong pong petsa 8 ng Hulyo, 1994, humigit kumulang sa oras alas 12:00 ng tanghali sa Brgy. Dambo, Pangil, Laguna. 4 : Sino naman ang bumaril sa inyo, kung iyong nakikilala? : Ang bumaril po sa amin ay akin po lamang nakilala sa alias Boy Marantal at kung aking makikitang muli ay aking maituturo. 5 : Maaari bang iyong isalaysay ang buong pangyayari sa ikaliliwanag ng imbistigasyong ito? : Noong pong kami ay nasa karsada ay may nakita kaming dalawang tao na kami ay tinatawag at kinakawayan at kami po ay hindi naman lumapit at pagkatapos po ay sila ang lumapit sa amin at nang ang layo sa amin ay humigit kumulang na labing limang dipa ay aking narinig itong may dalang itak na mahaba na nakalagay sa kaluban na nakasukbit sa baywang at ang sabi dito sa kasama niya na nakasoot na patigue ang pangitaas ay BOY TIRAHIN MO NA at pagkatapos po ay may kinuha sa likod itong alias Boy sa kanyang likod na isang parang tobo at ito ay pumuto k at kami pong dalawa ng aking kasama ay nanakbo na papuntang kaingin at sa pagtakbo naming iyon ay kami ay nagkahiwalay hanggang sa aking maramdaman na ang aking binti ay kumikirot at nang aking tingnan ay may sugat ito hanggang sa ako ay makarating sa aming bahay at sinabi ko sa aking Tatay na ako ay may tama ng baril at ako po ay dali-dali nilang inilabas sa karsada at ako ay kanilang dinala sa hospital ng Pakil, Laguna upang magamot at hindi pa ako gasinong natatagalan ay may dumating na isang traysikel at aking nakita na ang ibinababa ay ang aking pinsan at ito ay may tama din at nang kami po ay isakay sa Mobile ng Pangil PNP upang ilipat sa Sta. Cruz, Laguna sa hospital ay aking nakita na ang aking pinsan ay may tama sa tiyan at ibaba ng kanang balikat at pagkatapos po ay nitong madaling araw ng petsa 9 ng Hulyo 1994 ay namatay ang aking pinsan. 6 : Ano pa ang sumunod na pangyayari, kung mayroon man? : Wala na po akong alam. 7 : Paano mo naman nalaman na Boy Marantal ang pangalan nintong bumaril sa inyo? : Dahil po sa iyon po ang aking pagkakilala sa kanya na aking natandaan. 8 : Ito bang si Boy Marantal na ito ay matagal mo nang nakikilala? : Hindi ko po siya masyadong kilala pero isang beses ko na siyang nakita at pangalawa ay nang kami ay barilin. 9 : Alam mo ba naman kung tiga saan itong si Boy Marantal? : Hindi po pero sa aking pong palagay sa naninirahan din sa Brgy. Dambo, Pangil, Laguna. 10 : Anong klasing baril naman ang ibinaril sa inyo, kung iyong alam? : Isa pong de sabog na yari sa tobo na kung tawagin ay Sulpak. 11 : Ilan beses naman kayong binaril? : Isa pong beses lamang. 12 : May mga nakakita ba naman sa pangyayari ng kayo ay barilin? : Wala po dahil sa malayo sa kabahayan ang pinangyarihan. 13 : Ano naman ang tunay na pangalan ng iyong pinsan na namatay na iyong kasama ng barilin? : Tirso Nariz po na nakatira sa Brgy. Dambo, Pangil, Laguna.[4] About a month later, on August 16, 1994, Ronaldo executed another affidavit (Exhibit F) in which he said that accused-appellant Ernesto Ebias was the same Boy Marantal who shot him and his cousin on July 8. Ronaldo said in his latest affidavit: 2 : Ano ang dahilan at ikaw ay nandidito sa tanggapan ng Pulisiya ng Pangil, Laguna at ikaw ay kinukunan ng salaysay?

: Sa dahilan po na nais kong ipabatid na nakilala at nakita ko na ang bumaril sa amin noong July 8, 1994, humigit kumulang sa oras alas 12:00 ng tanghali sa Brgy. Dambo, Pangil, Laguna. 3 : Kailan mo naman nakita o nakilala ang taong iyong sinasabi na bumaril sa inyo, kung iyong tanda? : Noong pong petsa 15 ng Agosto, 1994, humigit kumulang sa oras alas 7:00 ng gabi sa Brgy. Dambo, Pangil, Laguna. 4 : Ano naman ang pangalan ng bumaril sa inyo, kung iyong nakikilala at iyong nakita? : Napagalaman ko na lamang po dito sa Himpilan ng Pulisiya ng Pangil, Laguna na ang pangalan ay si Ernesto Ibeas na naninirahan sa Brgy. Dambo, Pangil, Laguna. 5 : Bakit mo naman ngayon lamang itinuro ang bumaril sa inyo, sa anong dahilan? : Dahilan po na ngayon ko po lamang nakita ang taong bumaril sa amin. 6 : Bakit mo naman ngayon lamang nakita? : Sa dahilan po na ako po ay nagtigil sa San Pablo City at nang ako po ay umuwi sa Brgy. Dambo, Pangil, Laguna ay doon ko po nakita ang bumaril sa amin. 7 : Ano naman ang ginawa mo nang iyong makita at makilala ang taong bumaril sa inyo? : Nang aking pong makita ang taong bumaril sa amin ay aking pong ipinaalam sa Hepe ng Brgy. Tanod na si Jose de Guia. 8 : Inuulit ko sa iyo, may taong nandito sa aming Himpilan ng Pulisiya ng Pangil, Laguna, ito ba ang iyong nakikilala? : Iyan pong taong iyan ang bumaril sa amin (Witness identified the person of ERNESTO EBIAS residing at Brgy. Dambo, Pangil, Laguna). 9 : Nang makilala mo ba na si Ernesto Ebias, ito ba ay mapapatunayan mo sa Husgado na siya na ang bumaril sa inyo? : Opo. 10 : Hindi ka kaya nagkakamali sa pagkakilala mo kay Ernesto Ibeas na siya ang bumaril sa inyo? : Hindi po. 11 : Sino ang kasama mo nang ikaw ay barilin? : Ang akin pong pinsan na si Tirso Nares at ito ay namatay.[5] During the trial, Ronaldo Narez reiterated in open court that accused-appellant Ernesto Ebias and Boy Marantal were one and the same person.[6] However, he could not identify accused-appellants companion as the latters face was covered with a yellow handkerchief. [7] Accused-appellants defense consisted of denial and alibi. A defense witness, Isagani Maray, claimed that accused-appellant Ebias, together with several laborers, was working in a citrus plantation in Pangil, Laguna on the day in question. [8] Maray admitted, however, that the plantation where accused-appellant was allegedly working was only around 10 meters from the place of the incident.[9] Accused-appellant claimed that he was at the Vista Villamayor Citrus Plantation at the time of the commission of the crime. At around 12 noon of that day, when the shooting took place, he ate lunch at his house with Isagani Maray and other members of his family.[10] On May 15, 1996, the court rendered a decision, finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime of murder with frustrated murder. The dispositive portion of its decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused ERNESTO EBIAS y MAGANA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of MURDER with FRUSTRATED MURDER as charged, qualified by the qualifying circumstance of treachery, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and pursuant to the provision of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences him the maximum penalty of death. To indemnify the heirs of Tirso Narez, in his death the amount of P50,000.00 and as actual damages the amount of P12,000.00 representing the amount spent in the wake, funeral and for coffin. To indemnify Ronaldo Narez as actual damages the amount of P2,000.00 representing medical expenses. To pay the cost. SO ORDERED.[11] On appeal to this Court, accused-appellant maintained that the prosecution failed to comply with the rules for the protection of the rights of the accused during confrontations with alleged eyewitnesses before the police. He further contended that the trial court erroneously gave credence to the testimony of a perjured eyewitness upon whose sole testimony hinged the entire case against him. Lastly, he argued that the trial court failed to appreciate uncontroverted facts established by the defense as well as admissions against interests made by the prosecution witnesses.[12] On November 20, 1998, accused-appellant filed a motion seeking the appointment of a counsel de oficio for Leonardo Eliseo, a death convict at the National Bilibid Prison, who wrote a letter confessing to the commission of the crime for which accused-appellant was held liable.[13] In a resolution, dated April 27, 1999, the Court denied accused-appellants motion for lack of merit.[14]On February 3, 2000, accused-appellant moved for new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence. Accused-appellant averred that new and material evidence had been discovered by the defense, consisting of a confession made by Leonardo Eliseo, also a death row convict, that he committed the crime for which accused-appellant was convicted and sentenced to death.Accused-appellant further alleged that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced during his trial because it was only after his conviction that he came to know of Eliseos responsibi lity for the crime and his willingness to confess. Accused-appellant asserted that Eliseos confession would probably change the judgment if it was introduced in evidence.[15] Attached to accused-appellants motion for new trial was an affidavit[16] executed by Leonardo Eliseo narrating his participation in the shooting of Tirso and Ronaldo Narez. The affidavit reads in full as follows: AKO, si bilanggong LEONARDO ELISEO Y SAN LUIS, 33 taong gulang, kasalukuyang nakakulong dito sa Pambansang Piitan at nakaselda sa I-B, Maximum Security Compound, Muntinlupa City, matapos makapanumpa ng ayon sa Saligang Batas, ay malayang nagsasalaysay ng mga sumusunod: 1. Na noong ika-20 ng Hunyo 1994, pumunta kami sa Barangay Lambak, Mabitak, Laguna sa bahay ng aking kumpare na si Berting mga ganap na alas 9:00 ng gabi na kasama ang aking kaibigan na si Boy, para mag-inuman. 2. Na may isang bisita si Berting na hindi ko na matandaan ang pangalan na nagkwento na may isa daw Bombay sa kanilang barrio na maganda daw holdapin dahil pag nadale daw namin ito at tiba-tiba kami dahil kadalasan ay marami daw itong dalang pera at alahas; 3. Na aming tinandaan ito at kinabukasan ay minatiyagan na namin itong bombay at pinagplanuhan naming holdapin ito. Hinanap namin ang lugar na madalas niyang puntahan at may nag-tip sa amin kung kailan ang magandang petsa na siguradong may dala itong malaking pera. At natiyak namin sa ika-8 ng Hulyo 1994 ay may dalang malaking pera daw itong Bombay; 4. Na noong ika-8 ng Hulyo 1994, alas 6:00 pa lang umaga habang hinihintay namin ang pagdaan noong Bombay na aming inaabangan, may dalawang lalaki na hindi namin kilala ang lumabas mula sa gubat; 5. Na noong sila ay papalapit na sa amin ay medyo kinabahan kami at naglakad papalayo subalit patuloy pa rin kami nilang sinundan; 6. Na agad naman dumaan ang sasakyan ng Bombay na dapat sana naming hoholdapin. At dahil sa inis dahil hindi namin naisakatuparan ang planong panghoholdap sa Bombay ay binaril ko ang dalawang taong sumusunod sa amin na may kalayuan na humigit kumulang sa limampung metro, sa pamamagitan ng armas ko na shotgun; 7. Na tinamaan ko po ang isa sa tiyan samantalang ang isa ay sa hita, at habang ang isa sa kanila ay bumulagta at ang isa naman ay paika-ikang tumakbo, kami naman ay naglakad lang papalayo at papauwi sa aming bayan; 8. Na ako ay nagbibigay ng salaysay ngayon dahil naawa po ako sa taong nahatulan ng bitay sa kasalanan na ang may kagagawan ay ako. 9. Na ginawa ko ang salaysay na ito sa harap at patnubay ni Public Attorney Abelardo D. Tomas, Public Attorneys Office Muntinlu pa, matapos niyang ipaliwanag sa akin ang aking mga karapatan at maipaalala na sa salaysay kong ito ako ay mananagot sa isang napakabigat na krimen. BILANG PATUNAY na ang lahat ng aking isinalaysay dito ay pawang katotohanan lamang, ay nakahanda po akong lagdaan ito ngayong ika-4 ng Disyembre 1999, dito sa Lungsod ng Muntinlupa. (signed) LEONARDO S. ELISEO N98P-1209 WITH MY ASSISTANCE (signed) ATTY. ABELARDO D. TOMAS Public Attorneys office SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 14th December 1999. (signed) JOSELITO A. FAJARDO Assistant Director (Officer Administering Oath) The question now is whether or not Eliseos confession constitutes newly-discovered evidence warranting a new trial in favor of accusedappellant. For newly-discovered evidence to be a ground for new trial, the following requisites must concur: (a) the evidence is discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such weight that, if admitted, could probably change the judgment.[17]

Accused-appellant claims that it was only during his confinement at the Maximum Security Compound of the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa that he met Leonardo Eliseo, a fellow death convict, and learned from the latter his alleged participation in the shooting of Tirso and Ronaldo Narez and that even with the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have earlier known of the confession of Leonardo Eliseo. The Solicitor General does not dispute these allegations. He opposes accused-appellants motion for new trial, however, on the ground that Eliseos confession can not change the outcome of the judgment against accused -appellant because it can not overturn Ronaldo Narezs positive and unerring identification of accused-appellant as the person responsible for the crime.[18] To be sure, the uncorroborated testimony of a lone witness is sufficient basis for the conviction of the accused if it is credible, positive, and constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt that the latter is guilty.[19] In this case, the trial court relied primarily on the positive identification made by Ronaldo Narez in convicting accused-appellant. The trial court ruled: The Court after a perusal of the testimonies of these witnesses for the prosecution, and the defense, is more inclined to believe the former. Accused Ernesto Ebias alias Boy Marantal and his companion whose name remains unknown, and is still at-large, were positively identified by Ronaldo Narez to be the person who shot them. He could not be mistaken. The incident happened at more or less 12:00 oclock noon of July 8, 1994. The distance of accused from the victims is about fifteen (15) meters only. The defense was not able to overthrow the testimonies of the prosecution, which was straightforward, convincing as to leave no space for doubt. Accused w[as] positively identified to be the author of the crime. It is a well settled rule that greater weight is given to the positive identification of accused by prosecution witness. (Peo. vs. Canada, G.R. No. 65728, Sept. 15, 1986 (144 SCRA 121) Defenses negative evidence cannot outweigh prosecution witnesses testimony on affirmative matters. At best, his denial is a self-serving negative evidence that can not be given greater weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. (People of the Philippines vs. Ramir Carizo, et. al., G.R. No. 96510, July 6, 1994)[20] To be sure, Ronaldo Narez remained steadfast and unshaken in his testimony that it was accused-appellant whom he saw shoot him and his cousin. However, questions arise regarding the circumstances surrounding the identification made by Ronaldo Narez of accused-appellant as the person who shot him and his cousin resulting in the latters death. First. Ronaldo Narez identified the person who shot them as Boy Marantal. But it was not established how he came to know him by that particular name. In both his affidavit and his testimony, Ronaldo quoted the assailants companion as telling the latter, Boy, tirahin mo na.[21] Obviously, the surname Marantal did not come from the unidentified companion. Ronaldo Narez stated in his affidavit that he knew accused-appellants name to be Boy Marantal. He said: 7.) : Paano mo nalaman na Boy Marantal and pangalan nitong bumaril sa inyo? : Dahil po sa iyon po ang aking pagkakilala sa kanya na aking natandaan. 8.) : Ito bang si Boy Marantal na ito ay matagal mo nang nakilala? : Hindi ko po siya masyadong kilala pero isang beses ko na siyang nakita at ang pangalawa ay nang kami ay barilin.[22] How Ronaldo came to know accused-appellants alias to be Boy Marantal has not been shown. When questioned on cross-examination, Ronaldo Narez testified: Q You do not know the full name of Ernesto Ebias according to you before the incident? A Not yet, mam. Q But you know a certain Boy Marantal? A Yes, mam. Q Who is that Boy Marantal? A One and the same person Ernesto Ebias. Q Presumably Ernesto Ebias is more popular in your locality as alias Boy Marantal? A Yes, sir.[23] Indeed, it appears from his affidavit executed on August 16, 1994 that it was only later when he learned from the police that the real name of Boy Marantal was Ernesto Ebias. This raises the suspicion that Narez was influenced by matters other than his own personal perception in identifying Ebias as the person who had shot them. While Ronaldo Narez insisted that accused-appellant was known by the alias of Boy Marantal, no other witness was presented by the prosecution to corroborate his testimony that accused-appellant was known in their locality by that name. To the contrary, Santiago Narez, a prosecution witness, testified that accused-appellant was known by the nickname or alias Estoy. [24] Second. Accused-appellant had been a long time resident of Barangay Dambo, Pangil, Laguna before the incident.[25] In fact, Ronaldo Narez testified that he knew accused-appellant personally because the latter was a family friend who would sometimes visit their house.[26] Yet, in the affidavit he executed before the police on July 11, 1994, he stated that he was not familiar with the person who shot them because he only saw the latter once before the incident.[27] It is settled that the prosecution bears the burden not only of proving beyond reasonable doubt that a crime has been committed but also the identity of the person or persons who should be held responsible therefor. [28] The identification of the culprit by an eyewitness must thus be examined with caution to determine whether it fulfills the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.There seems to be no reason why eyewitness Ronaldo Narez should fail to recognize accused-appellant as the person who shot them considering that the crime was committed in broad daylight and the latter was a neighbor who was even considered as a family friend. In a similar case, the credibility of the eyewitness was considered diminished by the fact that she remained silent as to the identity of the perpetrator during the initial investigation of the crime and inexplicably failed to state why she remained so if she truly knew who the culprit was.[29] Third. Ronaldo Narez said in his second affidavit (Exhibit F): 3 : Kailan mo naman nakita o nakilala ang taong iyong sinasabi na bumaril sa inyo, kung iyong tanda? : Noong pong petsa 15 ng Agosto, 1994, humigit kumulang sa oras alas 7:00 ng gabi sa Brgy. Dambo, Pangil, Laguna. 4 : Ano naman ang pangalan ng bumaril sa inyo, kung iyong nakikilala at iyong nakita? : Napagalaman ko na lamang po dito sa Himpilan ng Pulisiya ng Pangil, Laguna na ang pangalan ay si Ernesto Ibeas na naninirahan sa Brgy. Dambo, Pangil, Laguna. 5 : Bakit mo naman ngayon lamang itinuro ang bumaril sa inyo, sa anong dahilan? : Dahilan po na ngayon ko po lamang nakita ang taong bumaril sa amin. 6 : Bakit mo naman ngayon lamang nakita? : Sa dahilan po na ako po ay nagtigil sa San Pablo City at nang ako po ay umuwi sa Brgy. Dambo, Pangil, Laguna ay doon ko po nakita ang bumaril sa amin. 7 : Ano naman ang ginawa mo nang iyong makita at makilala ang taong bumaril sa inyo? : Nang aking pong makita ang taong bumaril sa amin ay aking pong ipinaalam sa Hepe ng Brgy. Tanod na si Jose de Guia. 8 : Inuulit ko sa iyo, may taong nandito sa aming Himpilan ng Pulisiya ng Pangil, Laguna, ito ba ang iyong nakikilala? : Iyan pong taong iyan ang bumaril sa amin (Witness identified the person of ERNESTO EBIAS residing at Brgy. Dambo, Pangil, Laguna).[30] It would thus seem that accused-appellant was the only person shown to Ronaldo Narez for identification. We have set our face against such procedure. The identification of the accused during a show-up or where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification is highly suggestive.[31] For confronted with a single suspect, an eyewitness would most likely yield to police pressure to identify the suspect as the perpetrator of the crime, substituting fancy for fact, suspicion for guilt. We cannot with certainty say that such is not the case here. This on the one hand. On the other hand, we cannot say that Ronaldo Narez was mistaken in identifying accused-appellant as the person who shot him and his cousin. After all, he never deviated from his testimony that he saw accused-appellant when the latter shot them. The crime was committed at noontime with the shooter a mere fifteen meters away from his victims. Ronaldo Narez was thus able to see his attacker in full view. We cannot, therefore, discount Ronaldo Narezs positive identification of accused-appellant as the person who shot him and his cousin. There is thus a need for a new trial in order to determine the veracity of Ronaldo Narezs positive identification vis--vis the alleged confession made by Leonardo Eliseo since no less than a life is at stake. We recognize that [c]ourt litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal interpretat ion of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such trut h.[32] Hence, a liberal interpretation of the rule granting a motion for new trial is called for. [33] We cannot in good conscience convict accused-appellant and impose upon him the death penalty when evidence which would possibly exonerate him may be presented by him in a new trial. Neither can we acquit him on the sole ground that another person confessed to having committed the crime. In previous cases, we granted the accuseds motion for new trial on the basis of affidavits executed either by witnesses or by the perpetrators of the crime as they tend to establish the innocence of the accused. [34] In People v. Amparado[35]and Cuenca v. Court of Appeals,[36] affidavits confessing to the actual commission of the crime were executed by the supposed culprits.The Court remanded the cases to the trial court because of the possibility that, should the affidavits be proven true, the conviction of the accused could be reversed or at least modified. As has been said, the overriding need to render justice demands that an accused be granted all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a crime of which he is charged.[37]

On the other hand, we cannot discount the possibility that the confession by Leonardo Eliseo is a last-ditch effort by accused-appellant to avoid the death penalty. For this reason, this case should be reopened only for the purpose of allowing the defense to present the testimony of Leonardo Eliseo and for the prosecution to present any rebutting evidence which it may desire to present. WHEREFORE, without vacating the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, at Siniloan, Laguna, this case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 276, of Muntinlupa City for the purpose of allowing the presentation of the testimony of Leonardo Eliseo and any evidence which the prosecution may wish to present to rebut such testimony. In accordance with Rule 121, 6 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, evidence already in the record shall stand and the new evidence shall be taken into account by the trial court and considered with evidence already in the record and, thereafter, judgment should be rendered accordingly. SO ORDERED SPOUSES VICENTE and GLORIA MANALO, Petitioners, v. HON. NIEVES ROLDAN-CONFESOR, in her capacity as Undersecretary of Labor and Employment, JOSE SARMIENTO as POEA Administrator, CAREER PLANNERS SPECIALISTS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and SPOUSES VICTOR and ELNORA FERNANDEZ, Respondents. P.M. Castillo, for Petitioners. Fides C. Cordero-Tan and Roberto M.J. Lara for Private Respondents. SYLLABUS 1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS OF FACT. Only substantial evidence was required to establish administrative findings of fact. This holds true even if the determination may result in the suspension of authority or license to operate a particular line of business and will not justify requiring a higher degree of proof. 2. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; MANIFEST BY A COMPLETE TURN-ABOUT OF POEA ON THE BASIS OF THE SAME FINDINGS OF FACTS. Public respondent POEA on the basis of the same findings of facts executed a complete turn-about and adopted a different factual conclusion. This is grave abuse of discretion. Public respondents may be correct in saying that where two conflicting versions are supported by substantial evidence, the administrative body may choose which to uphold and for that reason even flip-flop on its factual findings without thereby incurring grave abuse of discretion. In this case however, public respondents reversed the penalty, not on the basis that one version is more believable than the other, but that the testimonies of complainants, after describing them to be "more convincing than respondents stand" and which "inspired bel ief," were not clear and convincing. Thus, to that extent, public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion correctable by certiorari. 3. ID.; EVIDENCE; UNCORROBORATED EVIDENCE MAY BE THE BASIS OF JUDGMENT. The tergiversation of the penalty imposed just because the testimonies were "uncorroborated" was a patent mistake. There is no law, rule or jurisprudence that states that an uncorroborated evidence is ipso facto insufficient and the penalty of suspension or P40,000.00 fine may not be imposed for illegal exaction, even if the charge was substantially proved and restitution of the money exacted was ordered. Even in criminal cases (People v. Babac, G.R. No. 97932, 23 December 1991, 204 SCRA 968 and other cases cited) which require proof beyond reasonable doubt, a credible, convincing and positive testimony of a lone witness is sufficient to sustain conviction. The original Order regarded and characterized the subject testimonies as "convincing" and "inspired belief" . 4. ID.; ID.; ONLY PREPONDERANCE THEREOF REQUIRED IN CIVIL CASES. Admittedly, an appellate court may not reverse an award for civil liability because an obligation was not established beyond reasonable doubt for, in civil cases, only a preponderance of evidence is required. 5. ID.; ID.; SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RULE IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES. An administrative body may not require a degree of proof higher than the substantial evidence contemplated in Sec. 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, and the rules of administrative due process enunciated in Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635, G.R. No. L-46496, 27 February 1940), otherwise, what would prevent an agency from demanding proof beyond reasonable doubt or require at least two or more witnesses to support an administrative finding of fact. Then, an agency may even create its own degree of proof - like requiring five witnesses, or an evidence be totally uncontested, to prove a claim - all in the spirit of the relative independence of administrative bodies from technical rules. 6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COURTS; JUDICIAL POWER INCLUDES AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF ANY BRANCH OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT. The judicial power vested in the Supreme Court and all lower courts necessarily includes the authority to "determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government" (Art. VIII, Sec. 1, Constitution). 7. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES GENERALLY UPHELD ON APPEAL; EXCEPTIONS. Judicial review of administrative findings of fact may be made ." . . when there has been a denial of due process, or mistake of law or fraud, collusion or arbitrary action in the administrative proceeding, where the procedure which led to factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest (Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. v. Factoran, Jr. [G.R. No. 75501, 15 September 1987, 154 SCRA 49, 57]). 8. ID.; ACTIONS; ISSUES CAN NOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. As regards the remaining issue on procedure, the same is deemed waived as it is brought to Us only for the first time in this motion for reconsideration. DECISION BELLOSILLO, J.: In Our Decision of 19 November 1992, We set aside the Orders of respondent Undersecretary of Labor dated 5 July and 9 October 1991, as well as the Resolution of respondent POEA of 4 February 1991, and reinstated instead its Order of 7 May 1990.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad Briefly, the facts in retrospect: Petitioners sued private respondents for illegal exaction, false advertisement and violation of other pertinent labor laws, rules and regulations. In its 7 May 1990 Order, POEA suspended the authority of Career Planners Specialists International, Inc. (CAREER), for four (4) months for illegal exaction on two counts or, in lieu thereof, a fine of P40,000.00 was imposed, plus restitution of P28,714.00 to petitioners-spouses Vicente and Gloria Manalo, meted on respondent therein Filipino Manpower Services, Inc. (FILMAN), also a fine of P40,000.00 on two counts of misrepresentation, and reiterated its perpetual disqualification from recruitment activities. On 4 February

1991, however, on the basis of the same facts, POEA reversed itself on the penalty imposed on illegal exaction, reasoning that a clear and convincing evidence was necessary to justify the suspension of the authority/license of CPSI. On appeal, Undersecretary Confessor sustained POEA in reversing itself and held that the charge of illegal exaction should be supported by other corroborative circumstantial evidence, and on 9 October 1991 denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners. In Our decision, We stressed that only a substantial evidence was required to establish administrative findings of fact. This holds true even if the determination may result in the suspension of authority or license to operate a particular line of business and will not justify requiring a higher degree of proof. On the dispute regarding the failure of petitioners to state in their testimonies the exact date of payment of the recruitment fee of P40,000.00 and their conflicting versions on how the P30,000.00 cash was presented, even POEA must have considered it trivial as it did not even touch on the issue. For, indeed, what is more important is that peso bills were delivered to and received by respondentspouses. We further stated that with the payment of a check for P10,000.00, which remains undisputed, the charge of unlawful exaction was clearly established since according to POEA only P3,000.00 was legally chargeable. On 11 December 1992, private respondents Victor and Elnora Fernandez and CPSI (excluding FILMAN) filed a motion for reconsideration primarily arguing that there was sufficient legal and evidentiary basis for the order of reconsideration issued by POEA as well as the orders of DOLE sustaining the same, and that this Court substituted its own discretion for that of POEA and DOLE. On 15 December 1992, public respondents also filed their own separate motion for reconsideration arguing that" [t]he POEA and DOLE Orders dated 4 February 1991, 5 July 1991 and 9 October 1991, finding private respondents not guilty of illegal exaction, are themselves Supported by substantial evidence, and are therefore not subject to judicial inquiry."cralaw virtua1aw library We disagree. According to POEA itself, in its original Order of 7 May 1990 "After a careful evaluation of the facts and the evidence presented, We are more inclined to give weight to complainants (petitioner spouses herein) posture. Complainants version of the case spontaneously presented in their pleadings specifically during the clarificatory questioning is, to our mind, more convincing than respondents (sic) stand. Moreover, the manner by which complainants narrated the whole incident inspired belief in the allegation that respondent CAREER is indeed guilty of illegal exaction (Emphasis supplied)."cralaw virtua1aw library Nothing could be clearer than these categorical statements. We are surprised why, on the basis of the very same findings, public respondent POEA executed a complete turn-about and adopted a different factual conclusion. This is grave abuse of discretion. Contrary to the present claim of respondents, there is nothing in the assailed orders which states that the version of private respondents has become more believable than that of petitioners. For that reason, the position of POEA expressed in its original Order that the" [c]omplainants version of the case . . . is, to our mind, more convincing than respondents (sic) stand," an d that" [m]oreover, the manner by which complainants narrated the whole incident inspired belief in the allegation that respondent CAREER is indeed guilty of illegal exaction," remains unreversed, even up to now. This view finds support in the fact that public respondents reconsidered only the penalty of suspension or P40,000.00 fine to be imposed on CPSI, while the other orders, i.e., restitution of P28,714.00 to complainants and the P40,000.00 fine on FILMAN, remained undisturbed. The assailed orders were virtually saying that while the testimonies of petitioners met the substantial degree of proof requirement (otherwise petitioners could not have been entitled to restitution), the penalty of suspension or P40,000.00 fine could not be imposed on CPSI because the same testimonies did not meet the clear and convincing evidence requirement. In short, there was no change in the findings of fact, but only an escalation of the degree of proof. The tergiversation of the penalty imposed just because the testimonies were "uncorroborated" was a patent mistake. There is no law, rule or jurisprudence that states that an uncorroborated evidence is ipso facto insufficient and the penalty of suspension or P40,000.00 fine may not be imposed for illegal exaction, even if the charge was substantially proved and restitution of the money exacted was ordered. Even in criminal cases (People v. Mision, G.R. No. 63480, 26 February 1991, 194 SCRA 432; People v. Catubig, G.R. No. 71626, 22 March 1991, 195 SCRA 505; People v. Base, G.R. No. 92124, 6 May 1991, 196 SCRA 688; People v. Santiago, G.R. No. 46132, 28 May 1991, 197 SCRA 556; People v. Aquino, G.R. No. 83214, 28 May 1991, 197 SCRA 578; People v. Lazo, G.R. No. 75367, 19 June 1991, 198 SCRA 274; People v. Sampaga, G.R. No. 91539, 30 September 1991, 202 SCRA 157; People v. Babac, G.R. No. 97932, 23 December 1991, 204 SCRA 968), which require proof beyond reasonable doubt, a credible, convincing and positive testimony of a lone witness is sufficient to sustain conviction. The original Order regarded and characterized the subject testimonies as "convincing" and "inspired belief" .chanrobles virtual lawlibrary The subsequent categorization of petitioners testimonies as" [m]ere allegation of complainant" (p. 2, POEA Resolution of 4 F ebruary 1991; see also p. 2, respondent Undersecretarys Order of 5 July 1991) is startli ng, coming as it does from the same body which found CPSI guilty of illegal exaction" [a]fter a careful evaluation of the facts and the evidence presented." The same may also be said of a later pronouncement that there was "no concrete evidence or proof to support the POEA Administrators initial findings" (p. 2, respondent Undersecretarys Order of 5 July 1991; see also p. 2, POEA Resolution of 4 February 1991). As regards the failure of petitioners to state the exact date when the payment was made and their different versions on how the money was bundled together, public respondents may not now complain that these circumstances remain unexplained. It should be noted that petitioners were questioned separately and they were not told of the discrepancies in each others testimony. We consider it unjust for public respondents to expect petitioners to explain inconsistencies which were not brought to their attention, or of which they were given no chance to explain, and then discredit their testimonies on the basis of said inconsistencies. Public respondents may be correct in saying that where two conflicting versions are supported by substantial evidence, the administrative body may choose which to uphold and for that reason even flip-flop on its factual findings without thereby incurring grave abuse of discretion. In this case however, public respondent reversed the penalty, not on the basis that one version is more believable than the other, but that the testimonies of complainants, after describing them to be "more convincing than respondents stand" and which "inspired belief," were not clear and convincing. Thus, to that extent, public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion correctable by certiorari.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph Admittedly, an appellate court may not reverse an award for civil liability because an obligation was not established beyond reasonable doubt for, in civil cases, only a preponderance of evidence is required. Likewise, an administrative body may not require a degree of proof higher than the substantial evidence contemplated in Sec. 5, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court, and the rules of administrative due process enunciated in Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635, G.R. No. 46496, 27 February 1940), otherwise, what would prevent an agency from demanding proof beyond reasonable doubt or require at least two or more witnesses to support an administrative finding of fact. Then, an agency may even create its own degree of proof like requiring five witnesses, or an evidence be totally uncontested, to prove a claim all in the spirit of the relative independence of administrative bodies from technical rules. The Court is charged with having unjustifiably invaded the turf of public respondents. We need only stress that the judicial power

vested in the Supreme Court and all lower courts necessarily includes the authority to "determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government" (Art. VIII, Sec. 1, Constitution). Clearly then, even presidential prerogatives are not beyond judicial review when, as in this case before Us, there is grave abuse of discretion or an utter disregard of the law. In Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. v. Factoran, Jr. (G.R. No. 75501, 15 September 1987, 154 SCRA 49, 57), We reiterated the rule that judicial review of administrative findings of fact may be made ". . . when there has been a denial of due process, or mistake of law or fraud, collusion or arbitrary action in the administrative proceeding (L-21588 Atlas Development and Acceptance Corp. v. Gozon, etc. Et. Al., 64 O.G. 11511 [sic] [1987]), where the procedure which led to factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest (Ateneo de Manila University v. CA, 145 SCRA 100-101 [1986]; International Hardwood and Veneer Co., of the Philippines v. Leogardo, 117 SCRA 967; Baguio Country Club Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 118 SCRA 557; Sichangco v. Commissioner of Immigration, 94 SCRA 61; and Eusebio v. Sociedad Agricola de Balarin, 16 SCRA 569)."cralaw virtua1aw library Respondents assert that FILMAN, as the deploying agency of petitioners, was legally entitled to charge P10,000 for both petitioners, hence, its acceptance of a check for the same amount was not an overcharge. Here, public respondents appear confused. Their orders and resolutions prove otherwise. It is undisputed that the Fernandez spouses demanded and received the check for P10,000.00, but the subject orders and resolutions of public respondents did not particularly indicate whether the check was received by the Fernandezes in their capacity as officers of CPSI or of FILMAN. Nevertheless, since the check was delivered to the Fernandezes in the office of CPSI and in the absence of proof that at that time the latter represented themselves as officers of FILMAN, there is no conclusion other than that the Fernandezes indeed acted as officers of CPSI. Moreover, the same amount represented by the check was the object of CPSIs pra yer for recovery of placement fees in its answer with counterclaim and position paper filed before respondent POEA (Annexes "C" and "D", Petition; Rollo, pp. 75-79 and 115-117). If, as alleged, the Fernandezes did receive the check as officers of FILMAN, then CPSI and the Fernandez couple (and the other respondents as well) have to do a lot of explaining as to why CPSI prayed for an award of placement fees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Significantly, the original order of POEA deducting from the amount to be reimbursed the sum of P3,000.00 as appropriate placement fees of both petitioners is a clear manifestation that a private recruitment entity (CPSI) and not a private employment agency (FILMAN) was entitled to those fees. As regards the remaining issue on procedure, the same is deemed waived as it is brought to Us only for the first time in this motion for reconsideration. WHEREFORE, finding no substantial argument to warrant modification of Our Decision of 19 November 1992, much less a reversal, and for lack of merit, We Resolve to DENY WITH FINALITY the motions for reconsideration respectively filed by public and private respondents. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 200569 - PACIFICO MENDIGO y GALLENO, petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
The Case Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the decision[1] and the resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 4, 2011 and February 9, 2012, respectively, in CA-G.R.CR No. 33196. Sometime in April 2005, AAA, a three-year old child, was in the bedroom of petitioner Pacifico Mendigo when the latter inserted his finger in AAA's vagina, and thereafter put his penis inside her mouth. AAA reported the incident to her mother, BBB, who, in turn, accompanied her daughter to the National Children's Hospital for examination. After a few days, AAA told BBB that the petitioner again inserted his finger in her private parts, and his penis in her mouth. Afterwards, AAA and BBB reported the incident to the police. The prosecution charged the petitioner with the crime of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City. In its decision of February 10, 2010, the RTC found the petitioner guilty, beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The trial court also ordered the petitioner to pay the victim the following amounts: P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, with the following modifications: (a) the indeterminate penalty was increased to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum; (b) the amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages were reduced to P30,000.00, respectively; and (c) the amount of exemplary damages was increased to P30,000.00. The CA held that AAA positively identified the petitioner as the person who sexually assaulted her; it found her testimony categorical, consistent, straightforward, spontaneous, and unshaken by the grueling cross-examination The CA further ruled that the victim's inability to recall the exact date of the rape was not fatal to her cause, because date is not an essential element of rape. It added that a rape victim cannot be expected to keep an accurate account of her traumatic experience, more so if she was a minor. The CA likewise ruled that the alleged inconsistencies in the victim's testimony referred only to minor and trivial matters that bear no materiality to the commission of the rape. The appellate court also found unmeritorious the petitioner's claim that the information failed to state the exact date of the rape, as this issue was raised for the first time on appeal. It, nonetheless, explained that the information is sufficient as long as the offense was committed at any time as near as to the actual date at which the offense was committed. Finally, the CA disregarded the petitioner's denial, as this defense cannot take precedence over the victim's positive testimony. It ruled that the findings of facts and the assessment of the witnesses' credibility are matters best left to the trial court because of its unique position of having observed the witnesses' deportment on the witness stand. In the present petition, the petitioner claimed that AAA was not a credible witness, as her testimony was full of inconsistencies. He also maintained that the medical findings did not support the victim's claim that she had been raped. He further argued that he should be acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove that the sexual assault happened on the date stated in the information.

The Court's Ruling We stress that both the RTC and the CA found AAA's testimony to be credible and convincing. It is settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, regarding the credibility of witnesses, are binding upon this Court, particularly when affirmed by the CA. This is so because of the judicial experience that trial courts are in a better position to decide the question of credibility, having heard the witnesses themselves and having observed firsthand their deportment and manner of testifying under grueling examination. At any rate, the alleged inconsistencies regarding the testimony of the prosecution witnesses relate only to trivial matters, and consequently do not materially impair or impugn the very testimony of the victim. We also find unmeritorious the petitioner's claim that he should be acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove that the sexual assault happened on the date stated in the information. As found by the CA, the victim repeatedly declared that the sexual assault transpired in April 2005. Contrary to the petitioner's claim, the medical findings supported the lower courts' finding that AAA had been raped, as it showed that AAA suffered laceration on her private parts. In any case, a medical certificate is not indispensable to prove the commission of rape, for it is merely corroborative evidence. In this case, the lone testimony of the victim, AAA, which is credible, is sufficient to warrant the petitioner's conviction.cralaw WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition outright, and AFFIRM the decision dated October 4, 2011 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated February 9, 2012, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979 RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA SANTIAGO, respondents. Francisco D. Rilloraza, Jr. for petitioners. Angel A. Sison for private respondent. GUERRERO, J.: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, First Division, 1 promulgated on May 4, 1973 in CA G.R. No. 36523-R which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated December 15, 1964 and allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel. * It appears that on June 24, 1961, herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3617, for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and designating therein petitioner as the principal beneficiary and executrix. There is no dispute in the records that the late Isabel Andres Gabriel died as a widow and without issue in the municipality of Navotas, province of Rizal her place of residence, on June 7, 1961 at the age of eighty-five (85), having been born in 1876. It is likewise not controverted that herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago and petitioner Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales are nieces of the deceased, and that private respondent, with her husband and children, lived with the deceased at the latters residence prior an- d up to the time of her death. The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "F", which is typewritten and in Tagalog, appears to have been executed in Manila on the 15th day of April, 1961, or barely two (2) months prior to the death of Isabel Gabriel. It consists of five (5) pages, including the pages whereon the attestation clause and the acknowledgment of the notary public were written. The signatures of the deceased Isabel Gabriel appear at the end of the will on page four and at the left margin of all the pages. The attestation clause, which is found on page four, reads as follows: PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI Kaming mga nakalagdang mga saksi o testigo na ang aming mga tinitirahan ay nakasulat sa gawing kanan at kahilira ng aming mga pangalan sa ibaba nito, ay pagpapatutuo na ipinakilala ipinaalam at ipinahayag sa amin ni Isabel Gabriel na ang kasulatang ito na binubuo ng Limang Dahon (Five Pages) pati na ang dahong ito, na siya niyang TESTAMENTO AT HULING HABILIN, ngayong ika 15 ng Abril, 1961, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing testadora na si Isabel Gabriel ang nasabing testamento sa ibaba o ilalim ng kasulatan na nasa ika apat na dahon (page four) at nasa itaas ng patunay naming ito, at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon (and on the left hand margin of each and every page), sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing testadora, at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng patunay ng mga saksi at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa't dahon ng testamentong ito. At the bottom thereof, under the heading "Pangalan", are written the signatures of Matilde D. Orobia, Celso D. Gimpaya and Maria R. Gimpaya, and opposite the same, under the heading "Tirahan", are their respective places of residence, 961 Highway 54, Philamlife, for Miss Orobia, and 12 Dagala St., Navotas, Rizal, for the two Gimpayas. Their signatures also appear on the left margin of all the other pages. The WW is paged by typewritten words as follows: "Unang Dahon" and underneath "(Page One)", "Ikalawang Dahon" and underneath "(Page Two)", etc., appearing at the top of each page. The will itself provides that the testatrix desired to be buried in the Catholic Cemetery of Navotas, Rizal in accordance with the rites of the Roman Catholic Church, all expenses to be paid from her estate; that all her obligations, if any, be paid; that legacies in specified amounts be given to her sister, Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago, her brother Santiago Gabriel, and her nephews and nieces, Benjamin, Salud, Rizalina (herein petitioner), Victoria, Ester, Andres, all surnamed Gabriel, and Evangeline, Rudyardo Rosa, Andrea, Marcial, Numancia, Verena an surnamed Santiago. To herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago, who was described in the will by the testatrix as "aking mahal na pamangkin na aking pinalaki, inalagaan at minahal na katulad ng isang tunay na anak" and named as universal heir and executor, were bequeathed all properties and estate, real or personal already acquired, or to be acquired, in her testatrix name, after satisfying the expenses, debts and legacies as aforementioned. The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales, herein petitioner, assailing the document purporting to be the will of the deceased on the following grounds: 1. that the same is not genuine; and in the alternative 2. that the same was not executed and attested as required by law; 3. that, at the time of the alleged execution of the purported wilt the decedent lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness; and in the second alternative 4. That the purported WW was procured through undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the principal beneficiary, and/or of some other person for her benefit. Lutgarda Santiago filed her Answer to the Opposition on February 1, 1962. After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment, the summary and dispositive portions of which read: Passing in summary upon the grounds advanced by the oppositor, this Court finds: 1. That there is no iota of evidence to support the contentio that the purported will of the deceased was procured through undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner, or of some other person for her benefit; 2. That there is insufficient evidence to sustain the contention that at the time of the alleged execution of the purported will, the deceased lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness; 3. That sufficient and abundant evidence warrants conclusively the fact that the purported will of the deceased was not executed and attested as required by law; 4. That the evidence is likewise conclusive that the document presented for probate, Exhibit 'F' is not the purported win allegedly dictated by the deceased, executed and signed by her, and attested by her three attesting witnesses on April 15, 1961. WHEREFORE, Exhibit "F", the document presented for probate as the last wig and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel is here by DISALLOWED. From this judgment of disallowance, Lutgarda Santiago appealed to respondent Court, hence, the only issue decided on appeal was whether or not the will in question was executed and attested as required by law. The Court of Appeals, upon consideration of the evidence adduced by both parties, rendered the decision now under review, holding that the will in question was signed and executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961 in the presence of the three attesting witnesses, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, signing and witnessing the document in the presence of the deceased and of each other as required by law, hence allow ed probate. Oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales moved for reconsideration 3 of the aforesaid decision and such motion was opposed 4 by petitioner-appellant Lutgarda Santiago. Thereafter. parties submitted their respective Memoranda, 5and on August 28, 1973, respondent Court, Former Special First Division, by Resolution 6 denied the motion for reconsideration stating that:

The oppositor-appellee contends that the preponderance of evidence shows that the supposed last wig and testament of Isabel Gabriel was not executed in accordance with law because the same was signed on several occasions, that the testatrix did not sign the will in the presence of all the instrumental witnesses did not sign the will in the presence of each other. The resolution of the factual issue raised in the motion for reconsideration hinges on the appreciation of the evidence. We have carefully re-examined the oral and documentary evidence of record, There is no reason to alter the findings of fact in the decision of this Court sought to be set aside. 7 In her petition before this Court, oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales contends that respondent Court abused its discretion and/or acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in reverssing the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial court. The Court, after deliberating on the petition but without giving due course resolved, in the Resolution dated Oct. 11, 1973 to require the respondents to comment thereon, which comment was filed on Nov. 14, 1973. Upon consideration of the allegations, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition, as well as the Comment 8 of private respondent thereon, We denied the petition by Resolution on November 26, 1973, 9 the question raised being factual and for insufficient showing that the findings of fact by respondent Court were unsupported by substantial evidence. Subsequently, or on December 17, 1973, petitioner Rim Gabriel Goes fried a Motion for Reconsideration 10 which private respondent answered by way of her Comment or Opposition 11 filed on January 15, 1974. A Reply and Rejoinder to Reply followed. Finally, on March 27, 1974, We resolved to give due course to the petition. The petitioner in her brief makes the following assignment of errors: I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document, Exhibit "F" was executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the three instrumental witnesses were credible witness II. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the lower court that the preparation and execution of the win Exhibit "F", was unexpected and coincidental. III. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that Atty, Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit "F". IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under the typewritten words "Pangalan" and "Tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in the same occasion. V. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's finding that it was incredible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the wilt Exhibit "F , without any note or document, to Atty. Paraiso. VI. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the trial court that Matilde Orobia was not physically present when the Will Exhibit "F" was allegedly signed on April 15, 1961 by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and the other witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. VII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture takings as proof that the win was improperly executed. VIII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the grave contradictions, evasions, and misrepresentations of witnesses (subscribing and notary) presented by the petitioner had been explained away, and that the trial court erred in rejecting said testimonies. IX. The Court of Appeals acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision. X. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court and admitting to probate Exhibit "F", the alleged last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel. It will be noted from the above assignments of errors that the same are substantially factual in character and content. Hence, at the very outset, We must again state the oft-repeated and well-established rule that in this jurisdiction, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not reviewable, the same being binding and conclusive on this Court. This rule has been stated and reiterated in a long line of cases enumerated in Chan vs. CA (L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737, 743) 12 and Tapas vs. CA (L-22202, February 27; 1976, 69 SCRA 393), 13and in the more recent cases of Baptisia vs. Carillo and CA (L32192, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 214, 217) and Vda. de Catindig vs. Heirs of Catalina Roque (L-25777, November 26, 1976, 74 SCRA 83, 88). In the case of Chan vs. CA, this Court said: ... from Guico v. Mayuga, a 1936 decision, the opinion being penned by the then Justice Recto, it has been well-settled that the jurisdiction of tills Court in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. More specifically, in a decision exactly a month later, this Court, speaking through the then Justice Laurel, it was held that the same principle is applicable, even if the Court of Appeals was in disagreement with the lower court as to the weight of the evidence with a consequent reversal of its findings of fact ... Stated otherwise, findings of facts by the Court of Appeals, when supported by substantive evidence are not reviewable on appeal by certiorari. Said findings of the appellate court are final and cannot be disturbed by Us particularly because its premises are borne out by the record or based upon substantial evidence and what is more, when such findings are correct. Assignments of errors involving factual issues cannot be ventilated in a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals because only legal questions may be raised. The Supreme Court is not at liberty to alter or modify the facts as set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reversed. Where the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, a minute scrutiny by the Supreme Court is in order, and resort to duly-proven evidence becomes necessary. The general rule We have thus stated above is not without some recognized exceptions. Having laid down the above legal precepts as Our foundation, We now proceed to consider petitioner's assignments of errors. Petitioner, in her first assignment, contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document, Exhibit "F", was executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the three instrumental witnesses were credible witnesses. She argues that the require. ment in Article 806, Civil Code, that the witnesses must be credible is an absolute requirement which must be complied with before an alleged last will and testament may be admitted to probate and that to be a credible witness, there must be evidence on record that the witness has a good standing in his community, or that he is honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. According to petitioner, unless the qualifications of the witness are first established, his testimony may not be favorably considered. Petitioner contends that the term "credible" is not synonymous with "competent" for a witness may be competent under Article 820 and 821 of the Civil Code and still not be credible as required by Article 805 of the same Code. It is further urged that the term "credible" as used in the Civil Code should receive the same settled and well- known meaning it has under the Naturalization Law, the latter being a kindred legislation with the Civil Code provisions on wigs with respect to the qualifications of witnesses. We find no merit to petitioner's first assignment of error. Article 820 of the Civil Code provides the qualifications of a witness to the execution of wills while Article 821 sets forth the disqualification from being a witness to a win. These Articles state: Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in article 806 of this Code. "Art. 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will: (1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines, (2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony. Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthythiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony , or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code. We reject petitioner's contention that it must first be established in the record the good standing of the witness in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness, because such attributes are presumed of the witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party. We also reject as without merit petitioner's contention that the term "credible" as used in the Civil Code should be given the same meaning it has under the Naturalization Law where the law is mandatory that the petition for naturalization must be supported by two character witnesses who must prove their good standing in the community, reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, their honesty and uprightness. The two witnesses in a petition for naturalization are character witnesses in that being citizens of the Philippines, they personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by the Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of the Naturalization Law (Section 7, Commonwealth Act No. 473 as amended). In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they merely attest the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities attendant to said execution. And We agree with the respondent that the rulings laid down in the cases cited by petitioner concerning character witnesses in naturalization proceedings are not applicable to instrumental witnesses to wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines. In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental witnesses, namely, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is satisfactorily supported by the evidence as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, which findings of fact this Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon. Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to any disqualification of any of the said witnesses, much less has it been shown that anyone of them is below 18 years of age, of unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write. It is true that under Article 805 of the New Civil Code, every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or

more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another, While the petitioner submits that Article 820 and 821 of the New Civil Code speak of the competency of a witness due to his qualifications under the first Article and none of the disqualifications under the second Article, whereas Article 805 requires the attestation of three or more credible witnesses, petitioner concludes that the term credible requires something more than just being competent and, therefore, a witness in addition to being competent under Articles 820 and 821 must also be a credible witness under Article 805. Petitioner cites American authorities that competency and credibility of a witness are not synonymous terms and one may be a competent witness and yet not a credible one. She exacerbates that there is no evidence on record to show that the instrumental witnesses are credible in themselves, that is, that they are of good standing in the community since one was a family driver by profession and the second the wife of the driver, a housekeeper. It is true that Celso Gimpaya was the driver of the testatrix and his wife Maria Gimpaya, merely a housekeeper, and that Matilde Orobia was a piano teacher to a grandchild of the testatrix But the relation of employer and employee much less the humble or financial position of a person do not disqualify him to be a competent testamentary witness. (Molo Pekson and Perez Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344; Testate Estate of Raymundo, Off. Gaz., March 18,1941, p. 788). Private respondent maintains that the qualifications of the three or more credible witnesses mentioned in Article 805 of the Civil Code are those mentioned in Article 820 of the same Code, this being obvious from that portion of Article 820 which says "may be Q witness to the execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this Code," and cites authorities that the word "credible" insofar as witnesses to a will are concerned simply means " competent." Thus, in the case of Suntay vs. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500, the Supreme Court held that "Granting that a will was duly executed and that it was in existence at the time of, and not revoked before, the death of the testator, still the provisions of the lost wig must be clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses. 'Credible witnesses' mean competent witnesses and not those who testify to facts from or upon hearsay. " emphasis supplied). In Molo Pekson and Perez Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344, the Supreme Court held that "Section 620 of the same Code of Civil Procedure provides that any person of sound mind, and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf, or dumb and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will. This same provision is reproduced in our New Civil Code of 1950, under Art. 820. The relation of employer and employee, or being a relative to the beneficiary in a win, does not disqualify one to be a witness to a will. The main qualification of a witness in the attestation of wills, if other qualifications as to age, mental capacity and literacy are present, is that said witness must be credible, that is to say, his testimony may be entitled to credence. There is a long line of authorities on this point, a few of which we may cite: A 'credible witness is one who is not is not to testify by mental incapacity, crime, or other cause. Historical Soc of Dauphin County vs. Kelker 74 A. 619, 226 Pix 16, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1010. (Words and Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 340). As construed by the common law, a 'credible witness' to a will means a 'competent witness.' Appeal of Clark, 95 A. 517, 114 Me. 105, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 837. (lbid, p. 341). Expression 'credible witness' in relation to attestation of wins means 'competent witness that is, one competent under the law to testify to fact of execution of will. Vernon's Ann. Civ St. art. 8283. Moos vs. First State Bank of Uvalde, Tex . Civ. App. 60 S.W. 2nd 888, 889. (Ibid, p. 342) The term 'credible', used in the statute of wills requiring that a will shall be attested by two credible witnesses means competent; witnesses who, at the time of attesting the will, are legally competent to testify, in a court of justice, to the facts attested by subscribing the will, the competency being determined as of the date of the execution of the will and not of the timr it is offered for probate, Smith vs. Goodell 101 N.E. 255, 256, 258 111. 145. (Ibid.) Credible witnesses as used in the statute relating to wills, means competent witnesses that is, such persons as are not legally disqualified from testifying in courts of justice, by reason of mental incapacity, interest, or the commission of crimes, or other cause excluding them from testifying generally, or rendering them incompetent in respect of the particular subject matter or in the particular suit. Hill vs. Chicago Title & Trust co 152 N.E. 545, 546, 322 111. 42. (Ibid. p, 343) In the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined by the statute, that is Art. 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his credibility depends On the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth. Thus, in the case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that: "Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a given matter because he is competent, but may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe his testimony." In fine, We state the rule that the instrumental witnesses in Order to be competent must be shown to have the qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications under Article 821 and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of belief and entitled to credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be first established on record that the witnesses have a good standing in the community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the contrary is established otherwise. In other words, the instrumental witnesses must be competent and their testimonies must be credible before the court allows the probate of the will they have attested. We, therefore, reject petitioner's position that it was fatal for respondent not to have introduced prior and independent proof of the fact that the witnesses were "credible witnesses that is, that they have a good standing in the community and reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. Under the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth assignments of errors, petitioner disputes the findings of fact of the respondent court in finding that the preparation and execution of the will was expected and not coincidental, in finding that Atty. Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit "F", in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under the typewritten words "pangalan" and "tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in the same occasion, in holding credible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will without note or document to Atty. Paraiso, in holding that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was signed on April 15, 1961 by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and the other witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, in holding that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture takings as proof that the will was improperly executed, and in holding that the grave contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations of the witnesses (subscribing and notary) presented by the petitioner had been explained away. Since the above errors are factual We must repeat what We have previously laid down that the findings of fact of the appellate court are binding and controlling which We cannot review, subject to certain exceptions which We win consider and discuss hereinafter. We are convinced that the appellate court's findings are sufficiently justified and supported by the evidence on record. Thus, the alleged unnaturalness characterizing the trip of the testatrix to the office of Atty. Paraiso and bringing all the witnesses without previous appointment for the preparation and execution of the win and that it was coincidental that Atty. Paraiso was available at the moment impugns the finding of the Court of Appeals that although Atty. Paraiso admitted the visit of Isabel Gabriel and of her companions to his office on April 15, 1961 was unexpected as there was no prior appointment with him, but he explained that he was available for any business transaction on that day and that Isabel Gabriel had earlier requested him to help her prepare her will. The finding of the appellate court is amply based on the testimony of Celso Gimpaya that he was not only informed on the morning of the day that he witnessed the will but that it was the third time when Isabel Gabriel told him that he was going to witness the making of her will, as well as the testimony of Maria Gimpaya that she was called by her husband Celso Gimpaya to proceed to Isabel Gabriel's house which was nearby and from said house, they left in a car to the lawyer's office, which testimonies are recited in the respondent Court's decision. The respondent Court further found the following facts: that Celso Gimpaya and his wife Maria Gimpaya obtained residence certificates a few days before Exhibit "F" was executed. Celso Gimpaya's residence certificate No. A-5114942 was issued at Navotas, Rizal on April 13, 1961 while Maria Gimpaya's residence certificate No. A-5114974 was issued also at Navotas, Rizal on April 14, 1961. The respondent Court correctly observed that there was nothing surprising in these facts and that the securing of these residence certificates two days and one day, respectively, before the execution of the will on April 15, 1961, far from showing an amazing coincidence, reveals that the spouses were earlier notified that they would be witnesses to the execution of Isabel Gabriel's will. We also agree with the respondent Court's conclusion that the excursion to the office of Atty. Paraiso was planned by the deceased, which conclusion was correctly drawn from the testimony of the Gimpaya spouses that they started from the Navotas residence of the deceased with a photographer and Isabel Gabriel herself, then they proceeded by car to Matilde Orobia's house in Philamlife, Quezon City to fetch her and from there, all the three witnesses (the Gimpayas and Orobia) passed by a place where Isabel Gabriel stayed for about ten to fifteen minutes at the clinic of Dr. Chikiamco before they proceeded to Atty. Cipriano Paraiso's office. It is also evident from the records, as testified to by Atty. Paraiso, that previous to the day that. the will was executed on April 15, 1961, Isabel Gabriel had requested him to help her in the execution of her will and that he told her that if she really wanted to execute her will, she should bring with her at least the Mayor of Navotas, Rizal and a Councilor to be her witnesses and that he (Atty. Paraiso) wanted a medical certificate from a physician notwithstanding the fact that he believed her to be of sound and disposition mind. From this evidence, the appellate court rightly concluded, thus: "It is, therefore, clear that the presence of Isabel Gabriel and her witnesses Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya including the photographer in the law office of Atty. Paraiso was not coincidental as their gathering was pre-arranged by Isabel Gabriel herself." As to the appellate court's finding that Atty. Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit ' L which the petitioner assails as contradictory and irreconcilable with the statement of the Court that Atty. Paraiso was handed a list (containing the names of the witnesses and their respective residence certificates) immediately upon their arrival in the law office by Isabel Gabriel and this was corroborated by Atty. Paraiso himself who testified that it was only on said occasion that he received such list from Isabel Gabriel, We cannot agree with petitioner's contention. We find no contradiction for the, respondent Court held that on the occasion of the will

making on April 15, 1961, the list was given immediately to Atty. Paraiso and that no such list was given the lawyer in any previous occasion or date prior to April 15, 1961. But whether Atty. Paraiso was previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses on a prior occasion or on the very occasion and date in April 15, 1961 when the will was executed, is of no moment for such data appear in the notarial acknowledgment of Notary Public Cipriano Paraiso, subscribed and sworn to by the witnesses on April 15, 1961 following the attestation clause duly executed and signed on the same occasion, April 15, 1961. And since Exhibit "F" is a notarial will duly acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses before a notary public, the same is a public document executed and attested through the intervention of the notary public and as such public document is evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. (Yturalde vs. Azurin, 28 SCRA 407). We find no such evidence pointed by petitioner in the case at bar. Likewise, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under the typewritten words "pangalan ' and "tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in the same occasion merits Our approval because tills conclusion is supported and borne out by the evidence found by the appellate court, thus: "On page 5 of Exhibit "F", beneath the typewritten words "names", "Res. Tax Cert. date issued" and place issued the only name of Isabel Gabriel with Residence Tax certificate No. A-5113274 issued on February 24, 1961 at Navotas Rizal appears to be in typewritten form while the names, residence tax certificate numbers, dates and places of issuance of said certificates pertaining to the three (3) witnesses were personally handwritten by Atty. Paraiso. Again, this coincides with Atty. Paraiso's even the sale must be made to close relatives; and the seventh was the appointment of the appellant Santiago as executrix of the will without bond. The technical description of the properties in paragraph 5 of Exhibit F was not given and the numbers of the certificates of title were only supplied by Atty. Paraiso. " It is true that in one disposition, the numbers of the Torrens titles of the properties disposed and the docket number of a special proceeding are indicated which Atty. Paraiso candidly admitted were supplied by him, whereupon petitioner contends that it was incredible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will Exhibit "F" without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso, considering that Isabel Gabriel was an old and sickly woman more than eighty-one years old and had been suffering from a brain injury caused by two severe blows at her head and died of terminal cancer a few weeks after the execution of Exhibit "F". While we can rule that this is a finding of fact which is within the competency of the respondent appellate court in determining the testamentary capacity of the testatrix and is, therefore, beyond Our power to revise and review, We nevertheless hold that the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the testatrix dictated her will without any note or memorandum appears to be fully supported by the following facts or evidence appearing on record. Thus, Isabel Gabriel, despite her age, was particularly active in her business affairs as she actively managed the affairs of the movie business ISABELITA Theater, paying the aparatistas herself until June 4, 1961, 3 days before her death. She was the widow of the late Eligio Naval, former Governor of Rizal Province and acted as coadministratrix in the Intestate Estate of her deceased husband Eligio Naval. The text of the win was in Tagalog, a dialect known and understood by her and in the light of all the circumstances, We agree with the respondent Court that the testatrix dictated her will without any note or memorandum, a fact unanimously testified to by the three attesting witnesses and the notary public himself. Petitioner's sixth assignment of error is also bereft of merit. The evidence, both testimonial and documentary is, according to the respondent court, overwhelming that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was signed on April 15, 1961 by the testatrix and the other two witnesses, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. Such factual finding of the appellate court is very clear, thus: "On the contrary, the record is replete with proof that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was signed by Isabel Gabriel on April '15, 1961 along with her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. The trial court's conclusion that Orobia's admission that she gave piano lessons to the child of the appellant on Wednesdays and Saturdays and that April 15, 1961 happened to be a Saturday for which reason Orobia could not have been present to witness the will on that day is purely conjectural. Witness Orobia did not admit having given piano lessons to the appellant's child every Wednesday and Saturday without fail. It is highly probable that even if April 15, 1961 were a Saturday, she gave no piano lessons on that day for which reason she could have witnessed the execution of the will. Orobia spoke of occasions when she missed giving piano lessons and had to make up for the same. Anyway, her presence at the law office of Atty. Paraiso was in the morning of April 15, 1961 and there was nothing to preclude her from giving piano lessons on the afternoon of the same day in Navotas, Rizal." In addition to the testimony of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya that Matilde was present on April 15, 1961 and that she signed the attestation clause to the will and on the left-hand margin of each of the pages of the will, the documentary evidence which is the will itself, the attestation clause and the notarial acknowledgment overwhelmingly and convincingly prove such fact that Matilde Orobia was present on that day of April 15, 1961 and that she witnessed the will by signing her name thereon and acknowledged the same before the notary public, Atty. Cipriano P. Paraiso. The attestation clause which Matilde Orobia signed is the best evidence as to the date of signing because it preserves in permanent form a recital of all the material facts attending the execution of the will. This is the very purpose of the attestation clause which is made for the purpose of preserving in permanent form a record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure in the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty they may still be proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2nd ed., Sec. 132; Leynez vs. Leynez, 68 Phil. 745). As to the seventh error assigned by petitioner faulting the Court of Appeals in holding that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture-takings as proof that the win was improperly executed, We agree with the reasoning of the respondent court that: "Matilde Orobia's Identification of the photographer as "Cesar Mendoza", contrary to what the other two witnesses (Celso and Maria Gimpaya) and Atty. Paraiso said that the photographer was Benjamin Cifra, Jr., is at worst a minor mistake attributable to lapse of time. The law does not require a photographer for the execution and attestation of the will. The fact that Miss Orobia mistakenly Identified the photographer as Cesar Mendoza scarcely detracts from her testimony that she was present when the will was signed because what matters here is not the photographer but the photograph taken which clearly portrays Matilde Orobia herself, her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya. " Further, the respondent Court correctly held: "The trial court gave undue importance to the picture takings, jumping therefrom to the conclusion that the will was improperly executed. The evidence however, heavily points to only one occasion of the execution of the will on April 15, 1961 which was witnessed by Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. These witnesses were quite emphatic and positive when they spoke of this occasion. Hence, their Identification of some photographs wherein they all appeared along with Isabel Gabriel and Atty. Paraiso was superfluous." Continuing, the respondent Court declared: "It is true that the second picture-taking was disclosed at the cross examination of Celso Gimpaya. But this was explained by Atty. Paraiso as a reenactment of the first incident upon the insistence of Isabel Gabriel. Such reenactment where Matilde Orobia was admittedly no longer present was wholly unnecessary if not pointless. What was important was that the will was duly executed and witnessed on the first occasion on April 15, 1961 , " and We agree with the Court's rationalization in conformity with logic, law and jurisprudence which do not require picturetaking as one of the legal requisites for the execution or probate of a will. Petitioner points to alleged grave contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations of witnesses in their respective testimonies before the trial court. On the other hand, the respondent Court of Appeals held that said contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations had been explained away. Such discrepancies as in the description of the typewriter used by Atty. Paraiso which he described as "elite" which to him meant big letters which are of the type in which the will was typewritten but which was Identified by witness Jolly Bugarin of the N.B.I. as pica the mistake in mentioning the name of the photographer by Matilde Orobia to be Cesar Mendoza when actually it was Benjamin Cifra, Jr. these are indeed unimportant details which could have been affected by the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory such that by themselves would not alter the probative value of their testimonies on the true execution of the will, (Pascual vs. dela Cruz, 28 SCRA 421, 424) for it cannot be expected that the testimony of every person win be Identical and coinciding with each other with regard to details of an incident and that witnesses are not expected to remember all details. Human experience teach us "that contradictions of witnesses generally occur in the details of certain incidents, after a long series of questionings, and far from being an evidence of falsehood constitute a demonstration of good faith. In as much as not all those who witness an incident are impressed in like manner, it is but natural that in relating their impressions, they should not agree in the minor details; hence the contradictions in their testimony." (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). It is urged of Us by the petitioner that the findings of the trial court should not have been disturbed by the respondent appellate court because the trial court was in a better position to weigh and evaluate the evidence presented in the course of the trial. As a general rule, petitioner is correct but it is subject to well-established exceptions. The right of the Court of Appeals to review, alter and reverse the findings of the trial court where the appellate court, in reviewing the evidence has found that facts and circumstances of weight and influence have been ignored and overlooked and the significance of which have been misinterpreted by the trial court, cannot be disputed. Findings of facts made by trial courts particularly when they are based on conflicting evidence whose evaluation hinges on questions of credibility of contending witnesses hes peculiarly within the province of trial courts and generally, the appellate court should not interfere with the same. In the instant case, however, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court had overlooked and misinterpreted the facts and circumstances established in the record. Whereas the appellate court said that "Nothing in the record supports the trial court's unbelief that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso;" that the trial court's conclusion that Matilde Orobia could not have witnessed anybody signing the alleged will or that she could not have witnessed Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sign the same or that she witnessed only the deceased signing it, is a conclusion based not on facts but on inferences; that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture-takings, jumping therefrom to the conclusion that the will was improperly executed and that there is nothing in the entire record to support the conclusion of the court a quo that the will signing occasion was a mere coincidence and that Isabel Gabriel made an appointment only with Matilde Orobia to witness the signing of her will, then it becomes the duty of the appellate court to reverse findings of fact of the trial court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over the lower courts. Still the petitioner insists that the case at bar is an exception to the rule that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Again We agree with the petitioner that among the exceptions are: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded

entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the presence of each other as required by law. " Specifically, We affirm that on April 15, 1961 the testatrix Isabel Gabriel, together with Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and his wife Maria Gimpaya, and a photographer proceeded in a car to the office of Atty. Cipriano Paraiso at the Bank of P.I. Building, Manila in the morning of that day; that on the way, Isabel Gabriel obtained a medical certificate from one Dr. Chikiamko which she gave to Atty. Paraiso upon arriving at the latter's office and told the lawyer that she wanted her will to be made; that Atty. Paraiso asked Isabel Gabriel to dictate what she wanted to be written in the will and the attorney wrote down the dictation of Isabel Gabriel in Tagalog, a language known to and spoken by her; that Atty. Paraiso read back to her what he wrote as dictated and she affirmed their correctness; the lawyer then typed the will and after finishing the document, he read it to her and she told him that it was alright; that thereafter, Isabel Gabriel signed her name at the end of the will in the presence of the three witnesses Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya and also at the left-hand margin of each and every page of the document in the presence also of the said three witnesses; that thereafter Matilde Orobia attested the will by signing her name at the end of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of pages 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the document in the presence of Isabel Gabriel and the other two witnesses, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya; then, Celso Gimpaya signed also the will at the bottom of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of the other pages of the document in the presence of Isabel Gabriel, Matilde Orobia and Maria Gimpaya; that Maria Gimpaya followed suit, signing her name at the foot of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of every page in the presence of Isabel Gabriel, Matilde Orobia and Celso Gimpaya; that thereafter, Atty. Paraiso notarized the will as Page No. 94, Book No. IV, Series of 1961, in his Notarial Register. On the occasion of the execution and attestation of the will, a photographer took pictures, one Exhibit "G", depicting Matilde Orobia, the testatrix Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya, Maria Gimpaya and Atty. Paraiso, taken on said occasion of the signing of the will, and another, Exhibit "H", showing Matilde Orobia signing testimony that he had earlier advised Isabel Gabriel to bring with her at least the Mayor and a Councilor of Navotas, Rizal to be her witnesses for he did not know beforehand the Identities of the three attesting witnesses until the latter showed up at his law office with Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961. Atty. Paraiso's claim which was not controverted that he wrote down in his own hand the date appearing on page 5 of Exhibit "F" dissipates any lingering doubt that he prepared and ratified the will on the date in question." It is also a factual finding of the Court of Appeals in holding that it was credible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will, Exhibit "F", without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso as against the contention of petitioner that it was incredible. This ruling of the respondent court is fully supported by the evidence on record as stated in the decision under review, thus: "Nothing in the record supports the trial court's unbelief that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso. On the contrary, all the three attesting witnesses uniformly testified that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will to Atty. Paraiso and that other than the piece of paper that she handed to said lawyer she had no note or document. This fact jibes with the evidence which the trial court itself believed was unshaken that Isabel Gabriel was of sound disposing memory when she executed her will. Exhibit "F" reveals only seven (7) dispositions which are not complicated but quite simple. The first was Isabel Gabriel's wish to be interred according to Catholic rites the second was a general directive to pay her debts if any; the third provided for P1,000.00 for her sister Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago and P2,000.00 for her brother Santiago Gabriel; the fourth was a listing of her 13 nephews and nieces including oppositor-appellee Rizalina Gabriel and the amount for each legatee the fifth was the institution of the petitioner-appellant, Lutgarda Santiago as the principal heir mentioning in general terms seven (7) types of properties; the sixth disposed of the remainder of her estate which she willed in favor of appellant Lutgarda Santiago but prohibiting the sale of such properties to anyone except in extreme situations in which judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting, (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee. (Roque vs. Buan, et al., G.R. No. L-22459, Oct. 31, 1967; Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., G.R. No. L22533, Feb. 9, 1967; Hilarion Jr. vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-19570; Sept. 14, 1967). Petitioner's insistence is without merit. We hold that the case at bar does not fall within any of the exceptions enumerated above. We likewise hold that the findings of fact of the respondent appellate court are fully supported by the evidence on record. The conclusions are fully sustained by substantial evidence. We find no abuse of discretion and We discern no misapprehension of facts. The respondent Court's findings of fact are not conflicting. Hence, the well-established rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its findings of fact are binding and conclusive and should not be disturbed by this Tribunal and it must be applied in the case at bar in its full force and effect, without qualification or reservation. The above holding simply synthesize the resolutions we have heretofore made in respect ' to petitioner's previous assignments of error and to which We have disagreed and, therefore, rejected. The last assignments of error of petitioner must necessarily be rejected by Us as We find the respondent Court acted properly and correctly and has not departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision by the Supreme Court, and as We find that the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the decision of the trial court and admitting to probate Exhibit "F", the last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel. We rule that the respondent Court's factual findings upon its summation and evaluation of the evidence on record is unassailable that: "From the welter of evidence presented, we are convinced that the will in question was executed on April 15, 1961 in the presence of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya signing and witnessing the same in the the will on a table with Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sitting around the table. Atty. Paraiso, after finishing the notarial act, then delivered the original to Isabel Gabriel and retained the other copies for his file and notarial register. A few days following the signing of the will, Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and another photographer arrived at the office of Atty. Paraiso and told the lawyer that she wanted another picture taken because the first picture did not turn out good. The lawyer told her that this cannot be done because the will was already signed but Isabel Gabriel insisted that a picture be taken, so a simulated signing was performed during which incident Matilde Orobia was not present. Petitioner's exacerbation centers on the supposed incredibility of the testimonies of the witnesses for the proponent of the will, their alleged evasions, inconsistencies and contradictions. But in the case at bar, the three instrumental witnesses who constitute the best evidence of the will making have testified in favor of the probate of the will. So has the lawyer who prepared it, one learned in the law and long in the practice thereof, who thereafter notarized it. All of them are disinterested witnesses who stand to receive no benefit from the testament. The signatures of the witnesses and the testatrix have been identified on the will and there is no claim whatsoever and by anyone, much less the petitioner, that they were not genuine. In the last and final analysis, the herein conflict is factual and we go back to the rule that the Supreme Court cannot review and revise the findings of facts of the respondent Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED G.R. No. L-10902 January 31, 1958 FLORIDA LAGMAY and ESTEBAN MADRUO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. EMERENCIANA QUINIT, VICENTE GUNDRAN, MARCELA GUNDRAN, and CIRPRIANA GUNDRAN, defendants-appelleess. Raymundo Meris-Morales for appellants. Modesto Carino and Bautista and Bautista for appellees. REYES, J.B.L., J.: On October 12, 1929, Patricio Basto, now deceased, registered owner of an individual one-half portion of the land described in Original Certificate Title No. 25620, sold said property to the spouses of Emerenciana Qiuntinand Teodoro Gundran for the sum of P280 redeemable within ten years (Exh."A"). The redemption period expired without Basto exercising his right torepurchase. Sometime in July, 1948, plaintiffs Florida Lagmay and Esteban Madruno filedthe present action (Civil Case No. 10330) against defendant Emerenciana Quinit (since widowed) and her children, claiming that they had bought fromQuinit in 1943, for the amount of P450, the same land that Quinit and her deceased husband had acquired from Patricio Basto under the deed Exh. "A", asevidenced by the writing in the Ilocano dialect appearing at the back of thelast page of Exh. "A", and praying that Quinit be ordered to execute the formal deed of sale as well as to deliver possession of the land in question to them. After trial, the court below found that the writing at the back of the lastpage of Exh. "A", was subrogation of the rights of the vendor a retro Patricio Basto in favor of the plaintiffs spouses; that before the filing of the present case, Civil Case No. 9859 was filed by one Floserfida Basto(relative of Patricio Basto) against appellee Emerenciana Quinit, caimingownership of the land in question as successor of Patricio Basto by virtue of a repurchase allegedly made by her relative Florida Lagmay and EstebanMadruno (herein plaintiffs-appellants) during the Japanese occupation byvirtue of the writing at the back of Exh. "A"; that said Case No. 9859 was,however, amicably settled with Basto receiving P350 from defendant Quinitand heein plaintiffs Lagmay and Madruno the amount of P450, in considerationfor which both Basto and plintiffs waived, in favor of Quinit, whatever rights they had acquired under the writing at the back of Exh. "A"; and rendered judgment holding that plaintiff have no more right to the property in question and dismissing their complaint. From the judgment of the trial court, plaintfffs appealed directly to thisCourt, assigning as sole error that the lower court erred in interpreting inthe writing in the Ilocano dialect at the back of Exh. "A" as a subrogationin their favor of the interest of Patricio Basto in the deed of sale con pacto de retro Exh. "A", instead of interpreting it as an absolute sale of the land in question by defendant-appellee Quinit to them. We find no merit in the appeal. In th first place, the writing in questionis in the Ilocano dialect and no translation thereof appears to have beenpresented evidence. Admission of this writing was objected to by defendantson the gorund that it was not in an official language, and the same was admitted

conditionally, subject to plaintiffs' presenting official translation thereof (t.s.n. pp. 12-13), which they never did. Consequently,said writing is not admissable in evidence (Sec. 57 Rule 123, Rules of Court). In the second place, by limiting their appeal to the legal question of the correct interpretation of the writing in the Ilocano dialect at the back ofExh. "A", appellants are deemed to have admitted the trial court's findingsthat whatever rights they had acquired under said writing had been bought back from them by appellee Quinit for the sum of P450 incident to the settlement of the former case No. 9859 and that therefore, they have no more rights of the land in question. In view thereof, the question of the true nature and import of the contract noted in Exh. "A" has become moot and academic. The judgment appealed from is, therefore, affirmed, with costs against appellants Florida Lagmay and Esteban Madruno. So ordered. A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994 STATE PROSECUTORS, complainants, vs. JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Manila, respondent. PER CURIAM: In assaying the requisite norms for qualifications and eminence of a magistrate, legal authorities place a premium on how he has complied with his continuing duty to know the law. A quality thus considered essential to the judicial character is that of "a man of learning who spends tirelessly the weary hours after midnight acquainting himself with the great body of traditions and the learning of the law; is profoundly learned in all the learning of the law; and knows how to use that learning." 1 Obviously, it is the primary duty of a judge, which he owes to the public and to the legal profession, to know the very law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. Party litigants will have great faith in the administration of justice if judges cannot justly be accused of apparent deficiency in their grasp of the legal principles. For, service in the judiciary means a continuous study and research on the law from beginning to end. 2 In a letter-complaint 3 dated August 19, 1992, respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was charged by State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno V. Tac-an with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, committed as follows: 1. That on August 13, 1992, respondent judge issued an Order dismissing eleven (11) cases (docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92- 101969, inclusive) filed by the undersigned complainant prosecutors (members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors) against the accused Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions, as consolidated in CB Circular No. 960, in relation to the penal provisions of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as amended, . . .; 2. That respondent Judge issued his Order solely on the basis of newspaper reports (August 11, 1992 issues of the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Daily Globe) concerning the announcement on August 10, 1992 by the President of the Philippines of the lifting by the government of all foreign exchange restrictions and the arrival at such decision by the Monetary Board as per statement of Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia; 3. That claiming that the reported announcement of the Executive Department on the lifting of foreign exchange restrictions by two newspapers which are reputable and of national circulation had the effect of repealing Central Bank Circular No. 960, as allegedly supported by Supreme Court decisions . . ., the Court contended that it was deprived of jurisdiction, and, therefore, motu, prop(r)io had to dismiss all the eleven cases aforementioned "for not to do so opens this Court to charges of trying cases over which it has no more jurisdiction;" 4. That in dismissing aforecited cases on August 13, 1992 on the basis of a Central Bank Circular or Monetary Board Resolution which as of date hereof, has not even been officially issued, and basing his Order/decision on a mere newspaper account of the advance announcement made by the President of the said fact of lifting or liberalizing foreign exchange controls, respondent judge acted prematurely and in indecent haste, as he had no way of determining the full intent of the new CB Circular or Monetary Board resolution, and whether the same provided for exception, as in the case of persons who had pending criminal cases before the courts for violations of Central Bank Circulars and/or regulations previously issued on the matter; 5. That respondent Judge's arrogant and cavalier posture in taking judicial notice purportedly as a matter of public knowledge a mere newspaper account that the President had announced the lifting of foreign exchange restrictions as basis for his assailed order of dismissal is highly irregular, erroneous and misplaced. For the respondent judge to take judicial notice thereof even before it is officially released by the Central Bank and its full text published as required by law to be effective shows his precipitate action in utter disregard of the fundamental precept of due process which the People is also entitled to and exposes his gross ignorance of the law, thereby tarnishing public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. How can the Honorable Judge take judicial notice of something which has not yet come into force and the contents, shape and tenor of which have not yet been published and ascertained to be the basis of judicial action? The Honorable Judge had miserably failed to "endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts" in the case at bar contrary to Rule 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct constituting Grave Misconduct; 6. That respondent Judge did not even ha(ve) the prudence of requiring first the comment of the prosecution on the effect of aforesaid Central Bank Circular/Monetary Board resolution on the pending cases before dismissing the same, thereby denying the Government of its right to due process; 7. That the lightning speed with which respondent Judge acted to dismiss the cases may be gleaned from the fact that such precipitate action was undertaken despite already scheduled continuation of trial dates set in the order of the court (the prosecution having started presenting its evidence . . .) dated August 11, 1992 to wit: August 31, September 3, 10, 21, & 23 and October 1, 1992, all at 9:30 o'clock in the morning, in brazen disregard of all notions of fair play, thereby depriving the Government of its right to be heard, and clearly exposing his bias and partiality; and 8. That, in fact, the motive of respondent Judge in dismissing the case without even waiting for a motion to quash filed by the counsel for accused has even placed his dismissal Order suspect. Pursuant to a resolution of this Court dated September 8, 1992, respondent judge filed his comment, 4contending, inter alia, that there was no need to await publication of the Central Bank (CB) circular repealing the existing law on foreign exchange controls for the simple reason that the public announcement made by the President in several newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign exchange controls was total, absolute, without qualification, and was immediately effective; that having acted only on the basis of such announcement, he cannot be blamed for relying on the erroneous statement of the President that the new foreign exchange rules rendered moot and academic the cases filed against Mrs. Marcos, and which was corrected only on August 17, 1992 but published in the newspapers on August 18, 1992, and only after respondent judge had issued his order of dismissal dated August 13, 1992; that the President was ill-advised by his advisers and, instead of rescuing the Chief Executive from embarrassment by assuming responsibility for errors in the latter's announcement, they chose to toss the blame for the consequence of their failures to respondent judge who merely acted on the basis of the announcements of the President which had become of public knowledge; that the "saving clause" under CB Circular No. 1353 specifically refers only to pending actions or investigations involving violations of CB Circular No. 1318, whereas the eleven cases dismissed involved charges for violations of CB Circular No. 960, hence the accused cannot be tried and convicted under a law different from that under which she was charged; that assuming that respondent judge erred in issuing the order of dismissal, the proper remedy should have been an appeal therefrom but definitely not an administrative complaint for his dismissal; that a mistake committed by a judge should not necessarily be imputed as ignorance of the law; and that a "court can reverse or modify a doctrine but it does not show ignorance of the justices or judges whose decisions were reversed or modified" because "even doctrines initiated by the Supreme Court are later reversed, so how much more for the lower courts?" He further argued that no hearing was necessary since the prosecution had nothing to explain because, as he theorized, "What explanation could have been given? That the President was talking 'through his hat' (to use a colloquialism) and should not be believed? That I should wait for the publication (as now alleged by complainants), of a still then non-existent CB circular? . . . As it turned out, CB Circular No. 3153 (sic) does not affect my dismissal order because the said circular's so-called saving clause does not refer to CB Circular 960 under which the charges in the dismissed cases were based;" that it was discretionary on him to take judicial notice of the facts which are of public knowledge, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 129; that the contention of complainants that he acted prematurely and in indecent haste for basing his order of dismissal on a mere newspaper account is contrary to the wordings of the newspaper report wherein the President announced the lifting of controls as an accomplished fact, not as an intention to be effected in the future, because of the use of the present perfect tense or past tense "has lifted," not that he "intends to lift," foreign exchange controls. Finally, respondent judge asseverates that complainants who are officers of the Department of Justice, violated Section 6, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court which provides that "proceedings against judges of first instance shall be private and confidential" when they caused to be published in the newspapers the filing of the present administrative case against him; and he emphasizes the fact that he had to immediately resolve a simple and pure legal matter in consonance with the admonition of the Supreme Court for speedy disposition of cases. In their reply 5 and supplemental reply, 6 complainants aver that although the saving clause under Section 16 of CB Circular No. 1353 made specific reference to CB Circular No. 1318, it will be noted that Section 111 of Circular No. 1318, which contains a saving clause substantially similar to that of the new circular, in turn refers to and includes Circular No. 960. Hence, whether under Circular No. 1318 or Circular No. 1353, pending cases involving violations of Circular No. 960 are excepted from the coverage thereof. Further, it is alleged that the precipitate dismissal of the eleven cases, without according the prosecution the opportunity to file a motion to quash or a comment, or even to show cause why the cases against accused Imelda R. Marcos should not be dismissed, is clearly reflective of respondent's partiality and bad faith. In effect, respondent judge acted as if he were the advocate of the accused. On December 9, 1993, this Court issued a resolution referring the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as revised, there being no factual issues involved. The corresponding report

and recommendation, 7 dated February 14, 1994, was submitted by Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad, with the approval of Court Administrator Ernani Cruz-Pao. The questioned order 8 of respondent judge reads as follows: These eleven (11) cases are for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions as consolidated in CB Circular No. 960 in relation to the penal provision of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as amended. The accused Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos pleaded not guilty to all these cases; apparently the other accused in some of these cases, Roberto S. Benedicto, was not arrested and therefore the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person; trial was commenced as against Mrs. Marcos. His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, announced on August 10, 1992 that the government has lifted all foreign exchange restrictions and it is also reported that Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia said that the Monetary Board arrived at such decision (issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 11, 1992 and issue of the Daily Globe of the same date). The Court has to give full confidence and credit to the reported announcement of the Executive Department, specially from the highest official of that department; the Courts are charged with judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, without introduction of proof, the announcement published in at least the two newspapers cited above which are reputable and of national circulation. Per several cases decided by the Supreme Court (People vs. Alcaras, 56 Phil. 520, People vs. Francisco, 56 Phil. 572, People vs. Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000, People vs. Crisanto Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225), among others, it was held that the repeal of a penal law without re-enactment extinguishes the right to prosecute or punish the offense committed under the old law and if the law repealing the prior penal law fails to penalize the acts which constituted the offense defined and penalized in the repealed law, the repealed law carries with it the deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons charged with violations of the old law prior to its repeal. Under the aforecited decisions this doctrine applies to special laws and not only to the crimes punishable in the Revised Penal Code, such as the Import Control Law. The Central Bank Circular No. 960 under which the accused Mrs. Marcos is charged is considered as a penal law because violation thereof is penalized with specific reference to the provision of Section 34 of Republic Act 265, which penalizes violations of Central Bank Circular No. 960, produces the effect cited in the Supreme Court decisions and since according to the decisions that repeal deprives the Court of jurisdiction, this Court motu proprio dismisses all the eleven (11) cases as a forestated in the caption, for not to do so opens this Court to charges of trying cases over which it has no more jurisdiction. This order was subsequently assailed in a petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Manuel T. Muro, Judge, RTC of Manila, Br. 54 and Imelda R. Marcos," docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 29349. When required to file her comment, private respondent Marcos failed to file any. Likewise, after the appellate court gave due course to the petition, private respondent was ordered, but again failed despite notice, to file an answer to the petition and to show cause why no writ of preliminary injunction should issue. Eventually, on April 29, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 9 setting aside the order of August 13, 1992, and reinstating Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969. In finding that respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of dismissal, the appellate court held that: The order was issued motu proprio, i.e., without any motion to dismiss filed by counsel for the accused, without giving an opportunity for the prosecution to be heard, and solely on the basis of newspaper reports announcing that the President has lifted all foreign exchange restrictions. The newspaper report is not the publication required by law in order that the enactment can become effective and binding. Laws take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation unless it is otherwise provided (Section 1, Executive Order No. 200). The full text of CB Circular 1353, series of 1992, entitled "Further Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulation" was published in the August 27, 1992 issue of the Manila Chronicle, the Philippine Star and the Manila Bulletin. Per certification of the CB Corporate Affairs Office, CB Circular No. 1353 took effect on September 2 . . . . Considering that respondent judge admittedly had not seen the official text of CB Circular No. 1353, he was in no position to rule judiciously on whether CB Circular No. 960, under which the accused Mrs. Marcos is charged, was already repealed by CB Circular No. 1353. . . . xxx xxx xxx A cursory reading of the . . . provision would have readily shown that the repeal of the regulations on non-trade foreign exchange transactions is not absolute, as there is a provision that with respect to violations of former regulations that are the subject of pending actions or investigations, they shall be governed by the regulations existing at the time the cause of action (arose). Thus his conclusion that he has lost jurisdiction over the criminal cases is precipitate and hasty. Had he awaited the filing of a motion to dismiss by the accused, and given opportunity for the prosecution to comment/oppose the same, his resolution would have been the result of deliberation, not speculation. I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. 10 Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. 11 The provincial guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. 12 Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. 13 To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. 14 This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. 15 But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known. 16 Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. 17 Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. 18 Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a mere newspaper account which is sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twice removed, took judicial notice of the supposed lifting of foreign exchange controls, a matter which was not and cannot be considered of common knowledge or of general notoriety. Worse, he took cognizance of an administrative regulation which was not yet in force when the order of dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence dictates that judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective. 19 The reason is simple. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a fact. Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not proper for him, to have taken cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the same was not yet in force at the time the improvident order of dismissal was issued. II. Central Bank Circular No. 1353, which took effect on September 1, 1992, further liberalized the foreign exchange regulations on receipts and disbursements of residents arising from non-trade and trade transactions. Section 16 thereof provides for a saving clause, thus: Sec. 16. Final Provisions of CB Circular No. 1318. - All the provisions in Chapter X of CB Circular No. 1318 insofar as they are not inconsistent with, or contrary to the provisions of this Circular, shall remain in full force and effect: Provided, however, that any regulation on non-trade foreign exchange transactions which has been repealed, amended or modified by this Circular, violations of which are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, the regulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern. Respondent judge contends that the saving clause refers only to the provisions of Circular No. 1318, whereas the eleven criminal cases he dismissed involve a violation of CB Circular No. 960. Hence, he insists, Circular No. 960 is deemed repealed by the new circular and since the former is not covered by the saving clause in the latter, there is no more basis for the charges involved in the criminal cases which therefore warrant a dismissal of the same. The contention is patently unmeritorious. Firstly, the second part of the saving clause in Circular No. 1353 explicitly provides that "any regulation on non-trade foreign transactions which has been repealed, amended or modified by this Circular, violations of which are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, theregulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern ." The terms of the circular are clear and unambiguous and leave no room for interpretation. In the case at bar, the accused in the eleven cases had already been arraigned, had pleaded not guilty to the charges of violations of Circular No. 960, and said cases had already been set for trial when Circular No. 1353 took effect. Consequently, the trial court was and is supposed to proceed with the hearing of the cases in spite of the existence of Circular No. 1353. Secondly, had respondent judge only bothered to read a little more carefully the texts of the circulars involved, he would have readily perceived and known that Circular No. 1318 also contains a substantially similar saving clause as that found in Circular No. 1353, since Section 111 of the former provides: Sec. 111. Repealing clause. - All existing provisions of Circulars 365, 960 and 1028, including amendments thereto, with the exception of the second paragraph of Section 68 of Circular 1028, as well as all other existing Central Bank rules and regulations or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of this Circular, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly: Provided, however, that regulations, violations of which are the

subject of pending actions or investigations, shall be considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, the regulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern. It unequivocally appears from the section above quoted that although Circular No. 1318 repealed Circular No. 960, the former specifically excepted from its purview all cases covered by the old regulations which were then pending at the time of the passage of the new regulations. Thus, any reference made to Circular No. 1318 necessarily involves and affects Circular No. 960. III. It has been said that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge. 20 This means that a judge should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality and as to his integrity. While a judge should possess proficiency in law in order that he can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that he should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before him should have confidence in his impartiality. Thus, it is not enough that he decides cases without bias and favoritism. Nor is it sufficient that he in fact rids himself of prepossessions. His actuations should moreover inspire that belief. Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. 21 Moreover, it has always heretofore been the rule that in disposing of controverted cases, judges should show their full understanding of the case, avoid the suspicion of arbitrary conclusion, promote confidence in their intellectual integrity and contribute useful precedents to the growth of the law. 22 A judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of general law to particular instances, that ours is a government of laws and not of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such a system if he seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding on him. Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of the law. 23 These are immutable principles that go into the very essence of the task of dispensing justice and we see no reason why they should not be duly considered in the present case. The assertion of respondent judge that there was no need to await publication of Circular No. 1353 for the reason that the public announcement made by the President in several newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign exchange controls is total, absolute, without qualification, and immediately effective, is beyond comprehension. As a judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, respondent is supposed to be well-versed in the elementary legal mandates on the publication of laws before they take effect. It is inconceivable that respondent should insist on an altogether different and illogical interpretation of an established and well-entrenched rule if only to suit his own personal opinion and, as it were, to defend his indefensible action. It was not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of yielding to first impressions. 24 He having done so, in the face of the foregoing premises, this Court is hard put to believe that he indeed acted in good faith. IV. This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act of respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality. The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the cases as early as possible is no license for abuse of judicial power and discretion, 25 nor does such professed objective, even if true, justify a deprivation of the prosecution's right to be heard and a violation of its right to due process of law. 26 The lightning speed, to borrow the words of complainants, with which respondent judge resolved to dismiss the cases without the benefit of a hearing and without reasonable notice to the prosecution inevitably opened him to suspicion of having acted out of partiality for the accused. Regardless of how carefully he may have evaluated changes in the factual situation and legal standing of the cases, as a result of the newspaper report, the fact remains that he gave the prosecution no chance whatsoever to show or prove that it had strong evidence of the guilt of the accused. To repeat, he thereby effectively deprived the prosecution of its right to due process. 27 More importantly, notwithstanding the fact that respondent was not sure of the effects and implications of the President's announcement, as by his own admission he was in doubt whether or not he should dismiss the cases, 28 he nonetheless deliberately refrained from requiring the prosecution to comment thereon. In a puerile defense of his action, respondent judge can but rhetorically ask: "What explanation could have been given? That the President was talking 'through his hat' and should not be believed? That I should wait for the publication of a still then non- existent CB Circular?" The pretended cogency of this ratiocination cannot stand even the minutest legal scrutiny. In order that bias may not be imputed to a judge, he should have the patience and circumspection to give the opposing party a chance to present his evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor's proofs might not be adequate to overthrow the case for the other party. A display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of the trial is a norm of conduct which is inconsistent with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 29 At the very least, respondent judge acted injudiciously and with unjustified haste in the outright dismissal of the eleven cases, and thereby rendered his actuation highly dubious. V. It bears stressing that the questioned order of respondent judge could have seriously and substantially affected the rights of the prosecution had the accused invoked the defense of double jeopardy, considering that the dismissal was ordered after arraignment and without the consent of said accused. This could have spawned legal complications and inevitable delay in the criminal proceedings, were it not for the holding of the Court of Appeals that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. This saved the day for the People since in the absence of jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not set in. To stress this point, and as acaveat to trial courts against falling into the same judicial error, we reiterate what we have heretofore declared: It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial court's judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. . . . . Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated. The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue . . . which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction . . . . 30 It is also significant that accused Marcos, despite due notice, never submitted either her comment on or an answer to the petition for certiorari as required by the Court of Appeals, nor was double jeopardy invoked in her defense. This serves to further underscore the fact that the order of dismissal was clearly unjustified and erroneous. Furthermore, considering that the accused is a prominent public figure with a record of influence and power, it is not easy to allay public skepticism and suspicions on how said dismissal order came to be, to the consequent although undeserved discredit of the entire judiciary. VI. To hold a judge liable for rendering a manifestly unjust order through inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be clearly shown that although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his duty that diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of any public service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation, and even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied, it nevertheless results logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the legal precept. 31 In the present case, a cursory perusal of the comment filed by respondent judge reveals that no substantial argument has been advanced in plausible justification of his act. He utterly failed to show any legal, factual, or even equitable justification for the dismissal of the eleven criminal cases. The explanation given is no explanation at all. The strained and fallacious submissions therein do not speak well of respondent and cannot but further depreciate his probity as a judge. On this point, it is best that pertinent unedited excerpts from his comment 32 be quoted by way of graphic illustration and emphasis: On the alleged ignorance of the law imputed to me, it is said that I issued the Order dismissing the eleven (11) cases against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos on the basis of newspaper reports referred to in paragraph 2 of the letter complaint without awaiting the official publication of the Central Bank Circular. Ordinarily a Central Bank Circular/Resolution must be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, but the lifting of "all foreign exchange controls" was announced by the President of the Philippines WITHOUT QUALIFICATIONS; as published in the Daily Globe, August 11, 1992" the government has lifted ALL foreign exchange controls," and in the words of the Philippine Daily Inquirer report of the same date "The government yesterday LIFTED the LAST remaining restrictions on foreign exchange transactions, . . ." (emphasis in both quotations supplied) not only the President made the announcement but also the Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia joined in the announcement by saying that "the Monetary Board arrived at the decision after noting how the "partial liberalization" initiated early this year worked." Therefore, because of the ABSOLUTE lifting of ALL restrictions on foreign exchange transactions, there was no need to await the publication of the repealing circular of the Central Bank. The purpose of requiring publication of laws and administrative rules affecting the public is to inform the latter as to how they will conduct their affairs and how they will conform to the laws or the rules. In this particular case, with the total lifting of the controls, there is no need to await publication. It would have been different if the circular that in effect repealed Central Bank Circular No. 960, under which the accused was charged in the cases dismissed by me, had provided for penalties and/or modified the provisions of said Circular No. 960. The Complainants state that the lifting of controls was not yet in force when I dismissed the cases but it should be noted that in the report of the two (2) newspapers aforequoted, the President's announcement of the lifting of controls was stated in the present perfect tense (Globe) or past tense (Inquirer). In other words, it has already been lifted; the announcement did not say that the government INTENDS to lift all foreign exchange restrictions but instead says that the government "has LIFTED all foreign exchange controls," and in the other newspaper cited above, that "The government yesterday lifted the

last remaining restrictions on foreign exchange transactions". The lifting of the last remaining exchange regulations effectively cancelled or repealed Circular No. 960. The President, who is the Chief Executive, publicly announced the lifting of all foreign exchange regulations. The President has within his control directly or indirectly the Central Bank of the Philippines, the Secretary of Finance being the Chairman of the Monetary Board which decides the policies of the Central Bank. No official bothered to correct or qualify the President's announcement of August 10, published the following day, nor made an announcement that the lifting of the controls do not apply to cases already pending, not until August 17 (the fourth day after my Order, and the third day after report of said order was published) and after the President said on August 17, reported in the INQUIRER's issue of August 18, 1992, that the "new foreign exchange rules have nullified government cases against Imelda R. Marcos, telling reporters that the charges against the widow of former President Marcos "have become moot and academic" because of new ruling(s) which allow free flow of currency in and out of the country" (Note, parenthetically, the reference to "new rules" not to "rules still to be drafted"). The INQUIRER report continues: "A few hours later, presidential spokeswoman Annabelle Abaya said, RAMOS (sic) had "corrected himself'." "He had been belatedly advised by the Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia and Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon that the Monetary Board Regulation excluded from its coverage all criminal cases pending in court and such a position shall stand legal scrutiny', Mrs. Abaya, said." I will elaborate on two points: 1. If the President was wrong in making the August 10 announcement (published in August 11, 1992, newspapers) and in the August 17 announcement, SUPRA, and thus I should have relied on the Presidential announcements, and there is basis to conclude that the President was at the very least ILL-SERVED by his financial and legal advisers, because no one bothered to advise the President to correct his announcements, not until August 17, 1992, a few hours after the President had made another announcement as to the charges against Imelda Marcos having been rendered moot and academic. The President has a lot of work to do, and is not, to my knowledge, a financier, economist, banker or lawyer. It therefore behooved his subalterns to give him timely (not "belated") advice, and brief him on matters of immediate and far-reaching concerns (such as the lifting of foreign exchange controls, designed, among others to encourage the entry of foreign investments). Instead of rescuing the Chief Executive from embarrassment by assuming responsibility for errors in the latter's announcement, these advisers have chosen to toss the blame for the consequence of their failing to me, who only acted on the basis of announcements of their Chief, which had become of public knowledge. xxx xxx xxx The Court strongly feels that it has every right to assume and expect that respondent judge is possessed with more than ordinary credentials and qualifications to merit his appointment as a presiding judge in the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, stationed in the City of Manila itself. It is, accordingly, disheartening and regrettable to note the nature of the arguments and the kind of logic that respondent judge would want to impose on this Court notwithstanding the manifest lack of cogency thereof. This calls to mind similar scenarios and how this Court reacted thereto. In one case, an RTC Judge was administratively charged for acquitting the accused of a violation of CB Circular No. 960 despite the fact that the accused was apprehended with US$355,349.00 while boarding a plane for Hongkong, erroneously ruling that the State must first prove criminal intent to violate the law and benefit from the illegal act, and further ordering the return of US$3,000.00 out of the total amount seized, on the mistaken interpretation that the CB circular exempts such amount from seizure. Respondent judge therein was ordered dismissed from the government service for gross incompetence and ignorance of the law. 33 Subsequently, the Court dismissed another RTC judge, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, for gross ignorance of the law and for knowingly rendering an unjust order or judgment when he granted bail to an accused charged with raping an 11-year old girl, despite the contrary recommendation of the investigating judge, and thereafter granted the motion to dismiss the case allegedly executed by the complainant. 34 Similarly, an RTC judge who was described by this Court as one "who is ignorant of fairly elementary and quite familiar legal principles and administrative regulations, has a marked penchant for applying unorthodox, even strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of controversies, exhibits indifference to and even disdain for due process and the rule of law, applies the law whimsically, capriciously and oppressively, and displays bias and impartiality," was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. 35 Still in another administrative case, an RTJ judge was also dismissed by this Court for gross ignorance of the law after she ordered, in a probate proceeding, the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of the complainant, without affording due process to the latter and other interested parties. 36 Only recently, an RTC judge who had been reinstated in the service was dismissed after he acquitted all the accused in four criminal cases for illegal possession of firearms, on the ground that there was no proof of malice or deliberate intent on the part of the accused to violate the law. The Court found him guilty of gross ignorance of the law, his error of judgment being almost deliberate and tantamount to knowingly rendering an incorrect and unjust judgment. 37 ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court finds respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He is hereby DISMISSED from the service, such dismissal to carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from reemployment in the government service. 38 Respondent is hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST immediately from rendering any judgment or order, or continuing any judicial action or proceeding whatsoever, effective upon receipt of this decision. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 89114 December 2, 1991 FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR., petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, MATEO A. T. CAPARAS, AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents. Kenny H. Tantuico for petitioner. PADILLA, J.:p In this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan, dated 21 April 1989, denying his motion for a bill of particulars as well as its resolution, dated 29 May 1989, which denied his motion for reconsideration; to compel the respondent PCGG to prepare and file a bill of particulars, or that said respondent be ordered to exclude petitioner as defendant in Civil Case No. 0035 should they fail to submit the said bill of particulars; and to enjoin the respondent Sandiganbayan from further proceeding against petitioner until the bill of particulars is submitted, claiming that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in promulgating the aforesaid resolutions and that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy for him in the ordinary course of law other than the present petition. As prayed for, this Court issued on 1 August 1989 a temporary restraining order "effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering the respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from further proceeding in Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG 35), entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, et al." pending before it. 1 The antecedents are as follows: On 31 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the PCGG, and assisted by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035, entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, et al." for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. 2 The principal defendants in the said Civil Case No. 0035 are Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos. Petitioner Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. was included as defendant in Civil Case No. 0035 on the theory that: (1) he acted in unlawful concert with the principal defendants in the misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nation's wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and

other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of power; 3 (2) he acted as dummy, nominee or agent, by allowing himself to be incorporator, director, board member and/or stockholder of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by the principal defendants; 4 (3) he acted singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one another, in flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with gross and scandalous abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines, embarked upon a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth ; 5 (4) he (petitioner) taking undue advantage of his position as Chairman of the Commission on Audit and with grave failure to perform his constitutional duties as such Chairman, acting in concert with defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, facilitated and made possible the withdrawals, disbursements and questionable use of government funds; 6 and (5) he acted as dummy, nominee and/or agent by allowing himself to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to plaintiff, or to be incorporator, director, or member of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez in order to conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally obtained. 7 On 11 April 1988, after his motion for production and inspection of documents 8 was denied by respondent court in its resolution 9 dated 9 March 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars, 10 alleging inter alia that he is sued for acts allegedly committed by him as (a) a public officer-Chairman of the Commission on Audit, (b) as a private individual, and (c) in both capacities, in a complaint couched in too general terms and shorn of particulars that would inform him of the factual and legal basis thereof, and that to enable him to understand and know with certainty the particular acts allegedly committed by him and which he is now charged with culpability, it is necessary that plaintiff furnish him the particulars sought therein relative to the averments in paragraphs 2, 9(a), 15, 7 and 17 of the Second Amended Complaint so that he can intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and prepare for trial. The particulars sought for in the said motion are as follows: a. Relative to the averments in paragraphs 2, 9(a) and l5 of the Second Amended Complaint : i) What are the dates of the resolutions (if on appeal) or the acts (if otherwise) issued or performed by herein defendant which allowed the facilitation of, and made possible the, withdrawals, disbursements and questionable use of government funds; ii) What ministries or Departments, offices or agencies of the government were involved in these questionable use of government funds; iii) What are the names of the auditors who had the original audit jurisdiction over the said withdrawals, disbursements and questionable use of government funds; iv) How much government funds were involved in these questionable-disbursements, individually and in totally? v) Were the disbursements brought to herein defendant for action on pre-audit, post-audit or otherwise or where they initiated and/or allowed release by herein defendant alone, without them undergoing usual governmental audit procedures, or in violation thereof.? vi) What were herein defendant's other acts or omission or participation in the matter of allowing such disbursements and questionable use of government funds, if any? b. Relative to paragraphs 7 and 17 of the Second Amended Complaint: i) In what particular contract, dealing, transaction and/or relationship of any nature of Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Juliette Gomez Romualdez or Benjamin T. Romualdez did herein defendant act as dummy, nominee or agent? Please specify the dealings, the dates, the corporations or entities involved, the government offices involved and the private and public documents, if any, showing herein defendant's complicity, since he is not aware of any such instance. More basically, please specify whether the defendant is a dummy or nominee or agent and of which corporation or transaction? ii) What particular government concession, order and/or policy obtained by Ferdinand E. Marcos, or Imelda R. Marcos, or Juliette Gomez Romualdez and/or Benjamin T. Romualdez allowed them either singly or jointly to accumulate ill-gotten wealth by using herein defendant as instrument for their accomplishment. Likewise please identify the nature of the transactions, the dates and the document showing complicity on the part of herein defendant; he is not aware of any such instance. iii) Please specify the name or denominate the particular government concession, order and/or policy prejudicial to the interest of the government which was obtained by either of the above-named four defendants through the participation of herein defendant as a dummy, nominee or agent of herein defendant. Please likewise identify the government office involved, the dates and other particulars, likewise defendant is not aware of any such instance. iv) Please name and specify the corporation whether stock or non-stock, whether government or private, beneficially held and/or controlled by either of the four above defendants, where herein defendant is an incorporator, director or member and where his inclusion as such incorporator, director or member of the corporation was made in order to conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally obtained by the aforementioned four defendants, how many shares are involved and what are their values, how and when have they been acquired. The Solicitor General, for and in behalf of respondents (except the respondent Sandiganbayan), opposed the motion. 11 After the petitioner had filed his reply 12 thereto, the respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated on 21 April 1990 a resolution 13 denying the petitioner's motion for a bill of particulars on the ground that the particulars sought by petitioner are evidentiary in nature, the pertinent part of which resolution reads, as follows: We are of the considered opinion that the allegations in the Expanded Complaint are quite clear and sufficient enough for defendant-movant to know the nature and scope of the causes of action upon which plaintiff seeks relief. They provide the factual scenario which, coupled with other allegations set forth in the "Common Averments" and further specified in the "Specific Averments" of herein defendant-movant and his co-defendants' illegal acts which are within defendant-movant's peculiar and intimate knowledge as a government official and corporate executive, will enable him to make the proper admission, denials or qualifications, set out affirmative and/or special defenses and thereafter prepare for trial. Evidentiary facts or matters are not essential in the pleading of the cause of action, nor to details or probative value or particulars of evidence by which these material evidence are to be established (Remitere vs. Yulu, 6 SCRA 251). The matters which he seeks are evidentiary in nature and, being within his intimate or personal knowledge, may be denied or admitted by him or if deemed necessary, be the subject of other forms of discovery. 14 Petitioner moved for reconsideration 15 but this was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan in its resolution 16dated 29 May 1990.

Hence, petitioner filed the present petition. The principal issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the disputed resolutions. Petitioner argues that the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG 35) pertaining to him state only conclusions of fact and law, inferences of facts from facts not pleaded and mere presumptions, not ultimate facts as required by the Rules of Court. On the other hand, the respondent Sandiganbayan, by and through the Solicitor General, contends that the essential elements of an action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth are: (1) an accumulation of assets, properties and other possessions; (2) of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees; and (3) whose value is out of proportion to their known lawful income, and that the ultimate facts establishing these three (3) essential elements of an action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth are sufficiently alleged in the complaint. Hence, petitioner is not entitled to a bill of particulars. A complaint is defined as a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause or causes of action.17 Like all other pleadings allowed by the Rules of Court, 18 the complaint shall contain in a methodical and logical form a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies for his claim, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts. 19 Its office, purpose or function is to inform the defendant clearly and definitely of the claims made against him so that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial. The complaint should inform the defendant of all the material facts on which the plaintiff relies to support his demand; it should state the theory of a cause of action which forms the bases of the plaintiff's claim of liability. 20 The rules on pleading speak of two (2) kinds of facts: the first, the "ultimate facts", and the second, the "evidentiary facts." In Remitere vs. Vda. de Yulo, 21 the term "ultimate facts" was defined and explained as follows: The term "ultimate facts" as used in Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, means the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action insufficient. . . . (Moran, Rules of Court, Vol. 1, 1963 ed., p. 213). Ultimate facts are important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. The term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be established. It refers to principal, determinate, constitutive facts, upon the existence of which, the entire cause of action rests. while the term "evidentiary fact" has been defined in the following tenor: Those facts which are necessary for determination of the ultimate facts; they are the premises upon which conclusions of ultimate facts are based. Womack v. Industrial Comm., 168 Colo. 364,451 P. 2d 761, 764. Facts which furnish evidence of existence of some other fact. 22 Where the complaint states ultimate facts that constitute the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right, the complaint states a cause of action, otherwise, the complaint must succumb to a motion to dismiss on that ground of failure to state a cause of action. 23 However, where the allegations of the complaint are vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions, the proper recourse would be, not a motion to dismiss, but a motion for a bill of particulars. 24 Thus, Section 1, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court provides: Before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, within ten (10) days after service of the pleading upon him, a party may move for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial. Such motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. In this connection, the following allegations have been held as mere conclusions of law, inferences from facts not alleged or opinion of the pleader: (a) the allegations that defendants appellees were "actuated by ulterior motives, contrary to law and morals, with abuse of their advantageous position as employers, in gross and evident bad faith and without giving plaintiff . . . his due, wilfully, maliciously, unlawfully, and in summary and arbitrary manner", are conclusions of law, inferences from facts not alleged and expressions of opinion unsupported by factual premises;25 (b) an allegation of duty in terms unaccompanied by a statement of facts showing the existence of the duty, is a mere conclusion of law, unless there is a relation set forth from which the law raises the duty; 26 (c) an averment . . . that an act was "unlawful" or "wrongful" is a mere legal conclusion or opinion of the pleader; 27 (d) the allegation that there was a violation of trust was plainly a conclusion of law, for "a mere allegation that it was the duty of a party to do this or that, or that he was guilty of a breach of duty, is a statement of a conclusion, not of a fact;" 28(e) an allegation that a contract is valid or void, is a mere conclusion of law; 29 (f) the averment in the complaint that "defendant usurped the office of Senator of the Philippines" is a conclusion of law not a statement of fact inasmuch as the particular facts on which the alleged usurpation is predicated are not set forth therein; 30 and (g) the averment that "with intent of circumventing the constitutional prohibition that 'no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law', respondents maliciously and illegally for the purpose of political persecution and political vengeance, reverted the fund of the salary item . . . and furthermore eliminated or abolished the said position effective 1 July 1960" is a mere conclusion of law unsupported by factual premises. 31 Bearing in mind the foregoing rules on pleading and case law, let us now examine the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint against the petitioner to determine whether or no they were averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial. If the allegations of the said complaint are vague, indefinite or in the form of conclusions, then petitioner is entitled to a bill of particulars. The allegations in the complaint pertaining to the alleged culpable and unlawful acts of herein petitioner are quoted hereunder as follows: GENERAL AVERMENTS OF DEFENDANTS' ILLEGAL ACTS 9. (a) From the early years of his presidency, Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos took undue advantage of his powers as President. All throughout the period from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986, he gravely abused his powers under martial law and ruled as Dictator under the 1973 Marcos-promulgated Constitution. Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos, together with other Defendants, acting singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one another, in flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with gross and scandalous abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines, embarked upon a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth;

(b) Upon his unfettered discretion, and sole authority, for the purpose of implementing the plan referred to above, Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos ordered and caused, among others: (b-i) the massive and unlawful withdrawal of funds, securities, reserves and other assets and property from the National Treasury, the Central Bank, the other financial institutions and depositories of Plaintiff; (b-ii) the transfer of such funds, securities, reserves and other assets and property to payees or transferees of his choice and whether and in what manner such transactions should be recorded in the books and records of these institutions and other depositories of Plaintiff; 10. Among others, in furtherance of the plan and acting in the manner referred to above, in unlawful concerted with one another and with gross abuse of power and authority, Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos; xxx xxx xxx b. Converted government-owned and controlled corporations into private enterprises and appropriated them and/or their assets for their own benefit and enrichment; c. Awarded contracts with the Government to their relatives, business associates, dummies, nominees, agents or persons who were beholden to said Defendants, under terms and conditions grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the Government; d. Misappropriated, embezzled and/or converted to their own use funds of Government financial institutions, particularly those allocated to the Office of the President and other ministries and agencies of the Government including, those conveniently denominated as intelligence or counter-insurgency funds, as well as funds provided to Plaintiff by foreign countries, multinationals, public and private financial institutions; e. Raided Government financial and banking institutions of billions of pesos in loans, guarantees and other types of financial accommodations to finance dubious and/or overpriced projects of favored corporations or individuals and misused and/or converted to their own use and benefit deposits found therein to the financial ruin of Plaintiff and the Filipino people; xxx xxx xxx h. Sold, conveyed and/or transferred Government property, real and/or personal, to corporations beneficially held and/ or controlled by them or through third persons, under such terms and conditions grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the Government; i. Engaged in other illegal and improper acts and practices designed to defraud Plaintiff and the Filipino people, or otherwise misappropriated and converted to their own use, benefit and enrichment the lawful patrimony and revenues of Plaintiff and the Filipino people. 11. Among the assets acquired by Defendants in the manner above-described and discovered by the Commission in the exercise of its official responsibilities are funds and other property listed in Annex "A" hereof and made an integral part of this Complaint. 12. Defendants, acting singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one another, for the purpose of preventing disclosure and avoiding discovery of their unmitigated plunder of the National Treasury and of their other illegal acts, and employing the services of prominent lawyers, accountants, financial experts, businessmen and other persons, deposited, kept and invested funds, securities and other assets estimated at billions of US dollars in various banks, financial institutions, trust or investment companies and with persons here and abroad. V SPECIFIC AVERMENTS OF DEFENDANTS' ILLEGAL ACTS xxx xxx xxx 14. Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, acting by themselves and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their relationship, influence and connection with the latter Defendant spouses, engaged in devices, schemes and strategems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino people, among others: (a) obtained, with the active collaboration of Defendants Senen J. Gabaldon, Mario D. Camacho, Mamerto Nepomuceno, Carlos J. Valdes, Delia Tantuico, Jovencio F. Cinco, Cesar C. Zalamea andFrancisco Tantuico, control of some of the biggest business enterprises in the Philippines, such as, the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation (BENGUET) and the Pilipinas Shell Corporation, by employing devious financial schemes and techniques calculated to require the massive infusion and hemmorrhage of government funds with minimum or negligible "cashout" from Defendant Benjamin Romualdez. The following are the general features of a classic take-over bid by Defendant Benjamin Romualdez: xxx xxx xxx (ii) The shares were held in the name of corporations which were organized soldely ( sic) for the purpose of holding title to them. These corporations did not have any operating history nor any financial track record. Projected cash flow consisted almost solely of future and contingent dividends on the shares held. In spite of these limitations, these companies enjoyed excellent credit lines from banks and other financial institutions, as evidenced by the millions of pesos in loan and guarantees outstanding in their books;

(iii) The "seed money" used to wrest control came from government and taxpayers' money in the form of millions of pesos in loans, guarantees and standby L/C's from government financial institutions, notably the DBP and PNB, which were in turn rediscounted with the Central Bank; (iv) Additional funding was provided from the related interests; and (v) This intricate (sic) skein of inter-corporate dealings was controlled and administered by an exclusive and closely knit group of interlocking directorate and officership xxx xxx xxx (g) Secured, in a veiled attempt to justify MERALCO's anomalous acquisition of the electric cooperatives, with the active collaborations of Defendants Cesar E. A. Virata, Juanita R. Remulla, Isidro Rodriguez, Jose C. Hernandez, Pedro Dumol, Ricardo C. Galing, Francisco C. Gatmaitan, Mario D. Camacho and the rest of the Defendants, the approval by Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos and his cabinet of the so-called "Three-Year Program for the Extension of MERALCO's Services to Areas Within The 60kilometer Radius of Manila", which required government capital investment amounting to millions of pesos; xxx xxx xxx (1) Caused the National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC) to dispose of its interest in the oil plants located in Tanauan, Leyte, which were owned and operated by its subsidiary, the NIDC Oil Mills, Inc., in favor of the SOLO II, Inc., a corporation beneficially held and controlled by Defendant Benjamin Romualdez, with the active collaboration of Defendants Jose Sandejas, Francisco Tantuicoand Dominador G. Ingco, under terms and conditions grossly disadvantageous to NIDC, to the grave and irreparable damage of Plaintiff and the Filipino people. (2) Defendant Francisco Tantuico, taking undue advantage of his position as Chairman of the Commission on Audit and with grave failure to perform his constitutional duties as such Chairman, acting in concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, facilitated and made possible the withdrawals, disbursements and questionable use of government funds as stated in the foregoing paragraphs to the grave and irreparable damage and injury of Plaintiff and the entire Filipino people. xxx xxx xxx 17. The following Defendants acted as dummies, nominees and/ or agents by allowing themselves (i) to be used as instruments in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to Plaintiff, or (ii) to be incorporators, directors, or members of corporations held and/or controlled by Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, and Juliette Gomez Romualdez in order conceal ( sic) and prevent recovery of assets illegally obtained: Francisco Tantuico . . . 17.a. THE NAMES OF SOME OF THE CORPORATIONS BENEFICALLY HELD AND/OR CONTROLLED BY THE DEFENDANTS BENJAMIN (KOKOY) ROMUALDEZ, FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND IMELDA R. MARCOS WHERE THE POSITIONS/PARTICIPATIONS AND/OR INVOLVEMENTS OF SOME OF THE DEFENDANTS AS DUMMIES, NOMINEES AND/OR AGENTS ARE INDICATED ARE LISTED IN ANNEX "B" HEREOF AND MADE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THIS COMPLAINT. xxx xxx xxx 18. The acts of Defendants, singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one another, constitute gross abuse of official position and authority, flagrant breach of public trust and fiduciary obligations, acquisition of unexplained wealth, brazen abuse of official position and authority, flagrant breach of public trust and fiduciary obligations, acquisition of unexplained wealth, brazen abuse of right and power, unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines, to the grave and irreparable damage of Plaintiff and the Filipino people. (Emphasis supplied) Let us now analyze and discuss the allegations of the complaint in relation to which the petitioner pleads for a bill of particulars. As quoted above, paragraph 9(a) of the complaint alleges that "Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos, together with other Defendants, acting singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one another, in flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with gross and scandalous abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines, embarked upon a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth." In the light of the rules on pleading and case law cited above, the allegations that defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos, together with the other defendants "embarked upon a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth" and that said defendants acted "in flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with gross and scandalous abuse of right and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines", are conclusions of law unsupported by factual premises. Nothing is said in the complaint about the petitioner's acts in execution of the alleged "systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth", or which are supposed to constitute "flagrant breach of public trust", "gross and scandalous abuse of right and power", and "violations of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines". The complaint does not even allege what duties the petitioner failed to perform, or the particular rights he abused. Likewise, paragraph 15 avers that "defendant Francisco Tantuico, taking undue advantage of his position as Chairman of the Commission on Audit and with grave failure to perform his constitutional duties as such Chairman, acting in concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos facilitated and made possible the withdrawals, disbursements and questionable use of government funds as stated in the foregoing paragraphs to the grave and irreparable damage and injury of Plaintiff and the entire Filipino people." In like manner, the allegation that petitioner "took undue advantage of his position as Chairman of the Commission on Audit," that he "failed to perform his constitutional duties as such Chairman," and acting in concert with Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, "facilitated and made possible the withdrawals, disbursements, and questionable use of government funds as stated in the foregoing paragraphs, to the grave and irreparable damage and injury of plaintiff and the entire Filipino people", are mere conclusions of law. Nowhere in the complaint is there any allegation as to how such duty came about, or what petitioner's duties were, with respect to the alleged withdrawals and disbursements or how petitioner facilitated the alleged withdrawals, disbursements, or conversion of public funds and properties, nor an allegation from where the withdrawals and disbursements came from, except for a general allegation that they came from the national treasury. On top of that, the complaint does not even contain any factual allegation which would show that whatever withdrawals, disbursements, or conversions were made, were indeed subject to audit by the COA. In this connection, it may well be stated that the Commission on Audit (COA) is an independent, constitutional commission, which has no power or authority to withdraw, disburse, or use funds and property pertaining to other government offices or agencies. This is done by the agency or office itself, the chief or head of which is primarily and directly responsible for the funds and property pertaining to such office or agency. 32 The COA is merely authorized to audit, examine and settle accounts of the various government offices or agencies, and this task is performed not by the Chairman of the COA but by the COA auditors assigned to the government office or agency subject to COA audit.

Thus, in each agency of the government, there is an auditing unit headed by an auditor, whose duty is to audit and settle the accounts, funds, financial transactions, and resources of the agency under his audit jurisdiction. 33The decision of the auditor is appealable to the Regional Director, 34 whose decision, is in turn, appealable to the COA Manager. 35 Any party dissatisfied with the decision of the COA Manager may bring the matter on appeal to the Commission proper, a collegiate body exercising quasi-judicial functions, composed of three (3) COA Commissioners, with the COA Chairman as presiding officer. 36 It is only at this stage that the COA Chairman would come to know of the matter and be called upon to act on the same, and only if an aggrieved party brings the matter on appeal. In other words, the Chairman of the COA does not participate or personally audit all disbursements and withdrawals of government funds, as well as transactions involving government property. The averments in the particular paragraph of the complaint merely assume that petitioner participated in or personally audited alldisbursements and withdrawals of government funds, and all transactions involving government property. Hence, the alleged withdrawals, disbursements and questionable use of government funds could not have been, as held by respondent Sandiganbayan, "within the peculiar and intimate knowledge of petitioner as Chairman of the COA." The complaint further avers in paragraph 17 that "(t)he following Defendants acted as dummies, nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves (i) to be instruments in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions, order and/or policies prejudicial to Plaintiff, or (ii) to be incorporators, directors, or members of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Benjamin (Kokoy) T. Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez in order to conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally obtained: Francisco Tantuico . . ." 37 Again, the allegation that petitioner acted as dummy, nominee, or agent by allowing himself "to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to Plaintiff" or "to be (an) incorporator, director, or member of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled" by the Marcoses and Romualdezes, is a conclusion of law without factual basis. The complaint does not contain any allegation as to how petitioner became, or why he is perceived to be, a dummy, nominee or agent. Besides, there is no averment in the complaint how petitioner allowed himself to be used as instrument in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth, what the concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to plaintiff are, why they are prejudicial, and what petitioner had to do with the granting, issuance, and or formulation of such concessions, orders, and/or policies. Moreover, Annex "A" of the complaint lists down sixty-one (61) corporations which are supposed to be beneficially owned or controlled by the Marcoses and Romualdezes. However, the complaint does not state which corporations petitioner is supposed to be a stockholder, director, member, dummy, nominee and/or agent. More significantly, the petitioner's name does not even appear in Annex "B" of the complaint, which is a listing of the alleged "Positions and Participations of Some Defendants". The allegations in the complaint, above-referred to, pertaining to petitioner are, therefore, deficient in that they merely articulate conclusions of law and presumptions unsupported by factual premises. Hence, without the particulars prayed for in petitioner's motion for a bill of particulars, it can be said the petitioner can not intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and for trial. Furthermore, the particulars prayed for, such as, names of persons, names of corporations, dates, amounts involved, specification of property for identification purposes, the particular transactions involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as would support the conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. On the contrary, those particulars are material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint in order that the defendant may, in fairness, be informed of the claims made against him to the end that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial. Thus, it has been held that the purpose or object of a bill of particulars is . . . to amplify or limit a pleading, specify more minutely and particularly a claim or defense set up and pleaded in general terms, give information, not contained in the pleading, to the opposite party and the court as to the precise nature, character, scope, and extent of the cause of action or defense relied on by the pleader, and apprise the opposite party of the case which he has to meet, to the end that the proof at the trial may be limited to the matters specified, and in order that surprise at, and needless preparation for, the trial may be avoided, and that the opposite party may be aided in framing his answering pleading and preparing for trial. It has also been stated that it is the function or purpose of a bill of particulars to define, clarify, particularize, and limit or circumscribe the issues in the case, to expedite the trial, and assist the court. A general function or purpose of a bill of particulars is to prevent injustice or do justice in the case when that cannot be accomplished without the aid of such a bill. 38 Anent the contention of the Solicitor General that the petitioner is not entitled to a bill of particulars because the ultimate facts constituting the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth have been sufficiently alleged in the complaint, it would suffice to state that in a motion for a bill of particulars, the only question to be resolved is whether or not the allegations of the complaint are averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable the movant properly to prepare his responsive pleading and to prepare for trial. As already discussed, the allegations of the complaint pertaining to the herein petitioner are deficient because the averments therein are mere conclusions of law or presumptions, unsupported by factual premises. In the light of the foregoing, the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the questioned resolutions. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the resolutions dated 21 April 1989 and 29 May 1989 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The respondents are hereby ordered to PREPARE and FILE a Bill of Particulars containing the facts prayed for by petitioner within TWENTY (20) DAYS from notice, and should they fail to submit the said Bill of Particulars, respondent Sandiganbayan is ordered TO EXCLUDE the herein petitioner as defendant in Civil Case No. 0035. SO ORDERED