Tutorial Notes for PHLA10 Nov.

6th and 13th 2013 Daniel Walsh Knowledge Epistemology From episteme (Greek for knowledge) What is knowledge? 3 kinds: o Acquaintance. I know my daughter. o Ability She knows how to paint. o Factual (propositional) I know that she is in the classroom. Were interested in factual knowledge. We want to know: What is factual knowledge? Were looking for necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. o Necessary conditions (only if) o Sufficient conditions (if) o Necessary and sufficient conditions (if and only if) X knows P (proposition) only if: o P is true. If P is false, X doesnt know P. And only if o X believes P. If X doesnt believe P, then X doesnt know P. These are necessary conditions. But theyre not sufficient: o I believe that my wife is at home, it turns out that she is. But I dont know this. As far as I know, she had to run to the store. o I believe P. P is true. How can I know that P is true?

o The truth of my belief that P must be guaranteed by some relation between me and the world. o A relation must be in place that ensures that my belief that P corresponds veridically to a state of affairs in the world. o Justification is proposed as this relation. Justification, on the standard view, completes the set of conditions individually necessary and collectively sufficient for knowledge. The standard account of knowledge o Knowledge is justified true belief (the JTB theory of knowledge). But there are seemingly good reasons to thing that these are not collectively sufficient for knowledge. Counterexamples will have to be beliefs that are justified, true and unknown. And the key thing to notice is that it is possible to be justified in believing something false (Think on this). The relation (justification) often offers no guarantee. o I buy a lottery ticket. I believe it will lose. I am justified in believing this. And in fact it does loose. I have a justified true belief. But do I have knowledge. It might have won. o I learn from a reliable source that it will rain tomorrow. The weather channel indicates a 99% chance of rain. I come to believe that my car will get wet tomorrow. It turns out that the weather channel miscalculated and it doesnt rain tomorrow. Nevertheless my neighbor splashes my car while washing his with a hose. The Smith case: Assumption: If X is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and X deduces Q from P, then X is justified in believing Q. I was justified in believing that my car would get wet tomorrow because that is entailed by it will rain tomorrow and I was justified in believing the latter.

 Smith is told by a trustworthy member of the hiring committee that Jones will get the position. He is justified in believing that Jones will get the position. He knows that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. He infers that the one who will get the position has ten coins in his pocket. He is justified in believing that the one who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket (given our assumption). It turns out that the member of the committee was putting him on. Smith (and not Jones) gets the position. And by chance Smith also has ten coins in his pocket. It turns out that his belief that the one who sill het the position has ten coins in his pocket was a justified true belief. Skepticism Skepticism is the view that we cannot have factual knowledge or that we cannot have certain sorts of factual knowledge. Bills argument: o 1. We can know only what we can be absolutely certain of. o 2. We can be certain of (almost) nothing. o 3. Therefore we know (almost) nothing. Skeptical arguments include some form of possibility that undermines knowledge. Consider this skeptical argument about beliefs about the external world: 1. Our evidence for the propositions we believe about the external world does not guarantee their truth. a. Possibly there is an evil demon deceiving us with respect to this evidence for the propositions we believe about the external world (undermining possibility). b. We cannot rule out the evil demon hypothesis.

2. Knowledge requires evidential certainty, i.e., S knows P if and only if Ss evidence for P guarantees its truth. 3. Therefore, we do not know any of the propositions we believe about the external world. Foundationalism Descartes was looking for a foundation for knowledge truths that cannot be doubted on which further knowledge can be built. Descartes: It seems that all a posteriori beliefs can be doubted. Here again is the basic skeptical argument: o For any a posteriori proposition P, there are possible scenarios on which the evidence we have for P is untrustworthy (e.g., the evil demon scenario). o We cannot rule out the scenarios. o Knowledge requires evidential certainty. o Therefore we cannot know P. Descartes has similar concerns even about certain a priori beliefs. Any proposition such that if you believe it it must be true cannot be doubted. o E.g., I seem to be in a classroom. o I may not in truth be in a classroom but it cannot be doubted by me that I seem to be in one. But propositions about the world around us are not like this. Descartes: How can we build on indubitable truths to knowledge about the world around us? Heres the thing o God would not deceive us such that (under normal circumstances and given due diligence etc.) we are systematically mistaken about the world around us. o God exists (to be proven).

o And so we are not (under normal circumstances and given due diligence etc.) mistaken about the world around us. What is the Cartesian circle? The idea: o Descartes wants knowledge. o He finds some indubitable propositions. o He cant doubt them. But can he know them? o For this he needs a guarantee. o Indubitable propositions he thinks are indubitable because that are clear and distinct, i.e., fully apprehended. o God would not systematically deceive us with respect to clear and distinct propositions. o God exists. o Therefore the indubitable propositions are known. o But heres the thing Descartess proof for God is thought trustworthy because it employs only clear and distinct premises. o Thus, runs the objection, Descartes runs a circle. Reliability Theory of Knowledge (RTK) Descartes thought and many still think that knowledge is internally certifiable. Ive thrown the term evidential certainty around. A problem, as weve seen is that a posteriori truths in particular are not evidentially certain. And so if knowledge is to be secured internally (i.e., due to some facts about your own beliefs etc. such as how theyre justified), then itll have to be the case that the proposition is o (a) a priori true, o (b) arrived at immediately by introspection, or

o (c) derived from propositions a priori or arrived t immediately by introspection. But most knowledge isnt secured this way. Rather its inferred from premises which are either assumed or justified by other beliefs which in turn require justification. o I appear to be in a class right now. (subjective claim) o If I appear to be in a class right now I am in a class right now. (linking claim) o Therefore I am in a class right now. (conclusion) Although the first may be indubitable, the second is an assumption or is a product of some justification. The problem is that the linking premises are not guaranteed (as the skeptical arguments have illustrated). Perhaps then a new approach to knowledge is needed. On the reliability theory of knowledge (RTK) S knows P if and only if o 1. S believes P. o 2. P is true. o 3. S is reliable with respect to P. This is often called externalism (as opposed to internalism). Condition (3) needs an explanation. Bill gave an example of a thermometer. A reliable thermometer is a thermometer that gives accurate readings under the conditions under which it was intended to operate. Perhaps were like thermometers, but that we measure truth. And perhaps we know the truths if and only if (1) we believe them, (2) theyre true and (3) the conditions are such that were reliable with respect to them. Some important points with respect to the thermometer: o The thermometer is reliable under the correct conditions even if its the case that there are possible conditions under which its not. Its sufficient that its functioning properly under the right conditions. o The thermometer is reliable under those conditions even if we dont know its reliable under those conditions or we dont know that the

right conditions are in place. The reliability of the thermometer does not depend on what we think about it. Perhaps these apply to us too. With these considerations in mind it would seem that the skeptical argument at least cant work against it in the same way. o It wont do to posit an undermining possibility such as an evil demon. o So long as the right conditions are in fact in place, we know P. Notice that this makes knowledge relative to circumstances. False barn illustration: o S lives in a place where there are only real barns. o S is a reliable Barn spotter under home conditions. She sees a barn under home conditions and believes its a barn. It is a barn. She knows its a barn. o But then she goes to a place where there are mostly false barns. o She doesnt know that this is the case. She sees a barn and believes its a barn. It is a barn. But she doesnt know its a barn. o Shes not a reliable barn spotter there. o Notice that this change has nothing to do with her frame of mind. o Its basis is external.