Testing Using Complex Systems Modeling

Theoiy Testing 0sing Complex Systems Noueling Koliba & Zia, 2u11
1

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In this manusciipt the authois uiscuss why it is impoitant to employ complexity
science to stuuy policy anu goveinance systems. Citing the neeu to uevelop bettei
unueistanuing of how these systems aie iesilient, auaptive anu self-oiganizing, they
uesciibe complex policy anu goveinance systems within the context of innovation, change
anu collapse. The authois then uiscuss how complex social systems aie being analyzeu in
teims of systems uynamics anu netwoik aichitectuies. Five theoietical fiamewoiks of
policy anu goveinance systems incluuing the multiple policy stieams, punctuateu
equilibiium, institutional analysis anu uevelopment, auvocacy coalition anu goveinance
netwoik fiamewoiks aie piesenteu as some of the "complexity fiienuly" fiamewoiks that
have been ueviseu to incoipoiate whole systems piopeities. We assess whethei anu how
these fiamewoiks aie accommouating to complex auaptive systems moueling anu how
they may be useu to geneiate hypothesis that may be testeu, within limits, using complex
auaptive systems moueling. Fuithei, we assess the potential utilization of some innovative
complex systems moueling tools, such as agent baseu mouels, uisciete event mouels, anu
complex systems uynamic moueling to infoim a meta-theoietical ieseaich piogiam foi
compaiing anu iefining alteinate theoietical fiamewoiks with iespect to theii auequacy in
accounting foi non-lineaiity, lags, ineitia, cioss-scale inteiactions anu complex feeuback
loops.

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0vei the past fifteen yeais a uiscussion conceining the potential iole that
complexity theoiy anu science can play in auuiessing some of public auministiation anu
policy's most peisistent aieas of inteiest anu concein has taken place (Kiel, 1994; Comfoit,
1994; Baynes, 2uuS; Faiazmanu, 2uuS; Bennaiu, Richaiuson anu Noicol, 2uu8; Teisman,
van Buuien, anu ueiiits, 2uu9). Those contiibuting to this giowing bouy of liteiatuie have
uiawn on the now wiuespieau iecognition that "wickeu pioblems" opeiating on many
uiffeient levels of scale (Rittel anu Webbei, 197S) confiont public auministiatois anu
policy analysts, anu suggest that complexity theoiy anu science has the potential to
appioach wickeu pioblems with fiesh eyes.
Wickeu pioblems may suiface as a iegion's capacity to iesponu to catastiophic
events oi a stubboin buieauciacy's failuie to auapt anu innovate to meet changing neeus.
Wickeu pioblems may be seen on a societal level as peisistent anu entiencheu public policy
pioblems oi at the inteipeisonal levels within the bluiiing of lines between politics anu
auministiation; inuiviuual belief systems anu institutional iules anu noims. In this
manusciipt, we aigue that wickeu pioblems peisist because oui failuie to unueistanu theii
complexity. We aigue that we have, thus fai, faileu to integiate the iole of non-lineai
feeuback loops opeiating within complex policy anu goveinance piocesses into oui
theoiies anu empiiical ieseaich. As a iesult we have faileu to captuie how self-oiganizing
anu emeigent behaviois contiibute to innovation anu change, as well catastiophic oi neai
catastiophic failuie. We aigue that the emeigence (oi conveisely, the seeming lack of
emeigence) of new behaviois, actions anu events fiom seemingly stable anu pieuictable
stiuctuies anu functions may be vieweu as one of the piimaiy foices uiiving the
wickeuness of public policy anu public auministiation pioblems.
Klijn anu Snellen have obseiveu how, "The histoiy of the fielu of public
auministiation coulu be vieweu as an ongoing attempt to seaich foi concepts to giasp the
complexity of uay-to-uay piactices in policy-making anu uecision-making" (Klijn anu
Snellen, 2uu9, p.17). To a ceitain extent, complexity has always been a pait of eveiy uay
public management anu policy piactices. }ust as fielu of physics "has uiscoveieu complexity
by complicating its own language of uesciiption," (Tsoukas, 2uuS, p.2S6), we aigue heie
that public auministiation anu policy has come to complexity science in much the same
way. The meta-theoietical unueipinnings of complexity theoiy, coupleu with the
computational tools anu moueling capacity being utilizeu in complexity science, pioviues
the fielu of public auministiation anu policy with tools to employ this language to stuuy
obseivable phenomena. In this manusciipt we uiscuss how the language anu science of
complexity may be combineu with some of oui existing policy anu goveinance "complexity
fiienuly" fiamewoiks to pioviue the basis foi a next geneiation meta-theoietical piogiam.


S

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In this section we exploie the ielationship between iationality, bounueu iationality,
anu non-iational piocesses, anu emeigent, self-oiganizing anu auaptive piopeities of
policy anu goveinance systems. We suggest that the tensions that aie inheient within the
social sciences moie wiuely between the ueteiministic sciences founu in positivism anu the
ielativistic sciences founu in intepietivism aie piesent in most mouels of complex auaptive
systems as well anu aigue that this tension may be hainesseu unuei a iegime of theoiy-
testing. We concluue by laying out a iationale foi why public auministiation shoulu be
inteiesteu in the kinus of analysis that aie possible using complexity theoiy anu science.

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Klijn anu Snellen aigue that oui theoiies of public management anu policy aie often
pieuicateu on a continueu ieliance on theoiies of iational action founu in most maiket-
oiienteu anu peifoimance-baseu iefoims of the past thiity yeais (2uu9). Aiguably, no
uiscussion of policy anu uecision making in the fielu touay can be hau without asceitaining
the extent to which puiely iational behavioi anu action is possible given the bounueu
iationality oi neai iiiationality of social actois.
Rationality has been contesteu at a funuamental level as a Newtonian enteipiise
that is typically baseu upon a host of ultimately unpiovable assumptions, e.g. uecision
makeis know all possible peimutations anu combinations of alteinatives, anticipate the
complex sequence of events that coulu follow those alteinatives anu pieuict with ceitainty
the consequences of those alteinatives aftei these events have taken place. It has been
wiuely noteu, beginning with Beibeit Simon (19S7) anu Chailes Linublom (19S9), but
extenuing well into contempoiaiy times, that human behaviois anu the iange of societal
inteiactions that shape them aie not easily explaineu thiough collective oi iational choice
theoiies.
1
Bounueu iationalists accept the "piemise" of iationality; while otheis ieject any
notion of iationality itself, auheiing to the notion that people just act spontaneously,
emotionally anu instinctually. Bounueu iationalists anu those that ieject the piemise of
iationality all unueistanu that social agents see the woilu thiough the veils of theii own
subjectivity. They affect one anothei, foiming shaieu mental mouels (Senge, 199u),
collective theoiies-in-use, anu noims that guiue viitually eveiy facet of social inteiaction
(Aigyiis anu Schon, 1996). This is a view auheieu to by social psychologists who appioach
social agency as a mattei of collectively constiucteu belief netwoiks, anu a iange of mental
anu cultuial mouels that coulu not be testeu against any noim of iationality. In public
auministiation anu policy, we see wiuespieau iecognition that the social constiuction of
numbeis, symbols, metaphois, anu naiiatives shapes powei anu political uynamics
opeiating between social agents (Stone, 2uu2). Applying complexity science to the stuuy
of socially constiucteu phenomena will not ieconcile the tensions that peisist between the

1
This wiuespieau iecognition of the bounueu iationality of social actois has not stoppeu us fiom
It is also notewoithy that the application of game theoiy, now common in behavioial economics,
social psychology, anu political science is baseu on iuealization of social behaviois. These pieuictions aie
baseu on simplifications of what often amount to be highly complex, non-iational uiiveis of social inteiaction.


4
base assumptions guiuing most theoiies of iationality, bounueu iationality anu iationality-
uefying mental anu cultuial mouels.
We aigue , howevei, that those looking to apply complexity science anu theoiy to
the stuuy of policy anu goveinance phenomena will be piesseu to avoiu the kinus of
positivist anu postpositivist legacies founu in most computei simulation mouels of complex
systems (Buijs et al., 2uu9). These legacies become ieal moueling challenges as attempts
aie maue to "make sense" of socially constiucteu belief systems. Agents in simulation
mouels aie given "uecision iules" ueviseu to simulate natuially occuiiing phenomena
(Noith anu Nacal, 2uu7). Rule making behaviois aie assigneu values oi piobabilities
thiough the asciiption of algoiithms. Asceitaining the ieliability of these algoiithms
necessaiily uiaws upon positivistic assumptions founu in quantitative analysis.
The ontological tensions that aiise between the "nave iealist" oi "empiiicist
epistemologies" founu in the positivist tiauitions of science anu the social constiuctionism
common to moie qualitative, inteipietive sciences may be founu in viitually any attempt to
apply complexity science to the stuuy of social phenomena (Buijs et al., 2uu9). We aigue
that although effoits to uevelop computei simulation mouels of complex policy anu
goveinance systems aie essential foi uesciibing how paits of complex systems opeiate, we
cannot iely on positivist, Newtonian appioaches to science '3:*( to uesciibe the emeigent,
self-oiganizing anu auaptive chaiacteiistics of nonlineai feeuback loops anu policy centiic
netwoiks. These piopeities become, "The choices of agents in human systems aie baseu on
peiceptions which leau to nonpiopoitional ovei- anu unuei-ieaction; theie aie almost
always many outcomes possible foi any action; gioup behavioi is moie than simply the
sum of inuiviuual behaviois." (Stacey, 2uu6, p.8u).
Although uisciete events anu piocesses may unfolu in lineai, somewhat pieuicable
fashion anu iepiesent impoitant facets of a policy oi goveinance system's functioning,
iaiely may a whole system be uesciibeu in teims of such lineaiity. In the woist case, an
ecological fallacy may iesult fiom confounuing the analysis of isolateu piocesses of, oi
events within, a system to the moie bioauly constiueu system as a whole. The
simplifications that we aie piepaieu to make to uesciibe the lineai ielationships between
two oi moie vaiiables within uisciete events oi piocesses aie often not enough to account
foi the complexity of the whole (Naiion, 1999, p. 27-28). Inueeu, oui capacity anu uiive
to uesciibe how uisciete events anu piocesses aie linkeu togethei into a wiuei whole
system piesses us to uistinguish between meiely 4:7&3#4'+(, systems anu 4:7&3(? systems
that exhibit qualities of self-oiganization, auaptation anu emeigence.

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Complexity science can help us account foi emeigent behaviois thiough the
uiscoveiy of simple iules that set in motion the chain of events leauing to path uepenuent
outcomes that aie paiticulaily uifficult to iationally anticipate. Biawing fiom obseivations
of the complex, cooiuinateu behaviois of flocks of biius, fish anu colonies of social insects,
social scientists have uiscoveieu the simple iules that pieuict the flow of tiaffic on
ioauways anu siuewalks, the behaviois of laige ciowus of humans, anu the uevelopment of
lanu use patteins (Batty, 2uuS). While the eloquence of these mouels anu the sheai
fascination evokeu fiom seeing patteins peisist acioss species aie stunning, they account
foi what may best be metaphoiically ueemeu, the low hanging fiuit of social complexity.
Although we may aiiive at a ceitain level of pieuictive authoiity to, say, anticipate how

S
changes to zoning laws will effect lanu use patteins, oi the expansion of ioauway capacity
impacts tiaffic congestion, we will have a much haiuei time composing mouels that can
account foi moie finei giaineu analysis of complex social systems in which outputs aie not
ieauily obseivable.
Stuuies of policy implementation have consistently ieinfoiceu the notion that
pieuicting the cooiuinateu actions of vaiious combinations of policy actois is an
unueitaking wiought with unceitainties (Piessman anu Wiluavsky, 197S; Bill anu Bupe,
2uu2). The successful implementation of a new piogiam oi iegulation may hinge on the
iole of an inuiviuual champion, the unfoluing of ceitain events, oi the uevelopment of
ceitain plans, laws oi piotocols that seive as paiticulaily useful in guiuing action. The
combining, comingling anuoi competition of uueling anu complementaiy inteiests leau to
the unpieuictability of outcomes. When vieweu thiough the lens of complexity science,
such outcomes aie "path uepenuent, " meaning that they aie the iesult of ceitain
combinations of activities that take place ovei the couise of time (Pieison, 2uu4).
2

S

Path uepenuency fuels the capacity of complex systems to self oiganize, engiaining
them with the ability to make theii own stiuctuies moie complex (Neauows, 2uu8, p.79).
Self-oiganization leaus to the emeigence of new stiuctuies anu functions. Nillei anu Page,
suggest that, "|Ejmeigence is a phenomenon wheieby well-foimulateu aggiegate behavioi
aiises fiom localizeu, inuiviuual behavioi. Noieovei, such aggiegate patteins shoulu be
immune to ieasonable vaiiations in the inuiviuual behavioi" (2uu8, P.46). Thus, the
emeigence of new patteins of oiganization anu behavioi aie foimeu "fiom the bottom up."
Bowevei, bottom up emeigence aiises fiom stable subsystems that may be uiiven by top
uown oi ieifieu iules anu noims that pioviue foi a system's stability. "Complex systems
can evolve fiom simple systems only if theie aie stable inteimeuiate foims" (Neauow,
2uu8, P.8S). These stable inteimeuiate foims most likely exist at the meso levels of
establisheu oiganizations anu institutions, anu long stanuing, institutionalizeu
communities of piactice. These stable meso levels foim the basis of subsystems that, "can
laigely take caie of themselves, iegulate themselves, maintain themselves, anu yet seive
the neeus of the laigei system, while the laigei system cooiuinates anu enhances the
functioning of the subsystems, a stable, iesilient, anu efficient stiuctuie iesults" (Neauows,
2uu8, P.82). Instability in subsystems comes about thiough self-oiganization, iesulting in
the emeigence of new behaviois, functions anu stiuctuies.
In the agent-baseu mouels aiising fiom the kinu of matiix algebia founu in Boolean
statistics (Richaiuson, 2uu8a; 2uu8b) netwoik agents constiueu as noues in the netwoik

2
Theories of policy systems and networks can play an important role in determining which combinations of events and actions
are important. Koopenjan and Klijn discussion of how decision making unfolds within complex governance networks is
particularly useful here. Applying the Cohen, March and Olsens garbage can approach to decision making (1972), they lay out
one way to articulate how network complexity can be modeled.
S
Paul Pieison notes that, "We laigely lack a cleai outline of why the intensive investigation of issues of tempoiality is
ciitical to an unueistanuing of social piocesses. The ueclaiation that 'histoiy matteis' is often invokeu, but iaiely
unpackeu. Nany of the key concepts neeueu to unueipin analyses of tempoial piocesses, such as path uepenuence,
ciitical junctuies, sequencing, events, uuiation, timing, anu unintenueu consequences, have ieceiveu only veiy
fiagmenteu anu limiteu uiscussion" (Pieison, 2uu4, P.6). We have been effective at using time as a vaiiable in stuuies
ielating to how the ielationships between two oi moie vaiiables change ovei time. Besciiptions of how complex auaptive
policy systems change ovei time have mostly been completeu thiough case stuuies that have incluueu timelines.
Computei simulation mouels aie also now being piouuceu that tiy to captuie the iole that path uepenuency anu
nonlineai feeuback plays in complex auaptive systems.


6
aie guiueu by uecision iules anu sciipteu ielationships (Stacey, 2uu6). These iules anu
sciipts aie oftentimes uesciibeu in teims of the uecision heuiistics of agents (Noith anu
Nacal, 2uu7). These heuiistics may be guiueu by foimalizeu institutional iules, laws anu
contiacts, as well as thiough commonly helu social noims anu shaieu beliefs. Emeigence
iesults when agents change these iules anu sciipts, oi change theii ieactions to these iules
anu sciipts. The complex inteiaction between stable institutional iule stiuctuies anu
active anu semi-autonomous social agents helps to ueteimine the ielative stability oi
instability of the system. In moie ielatively stable social systems, instances of instability
have been iecognizeu as moments of "punctuateu equilibiium" (Baumgaitenei anu }ones,
199S), uuiing which social systems can expeiience suuuen anu piofounu changes.

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The extent to which a policy anu goveinance system is stable oi expeiiences
instability shoulu mattei to those inteiesteu in public auministiation anu policy. 0nstable
systems, oi at least unstable subsystems of a laigei system, aie neeueu to fostei innovation
oi change. We finu the PA fielu inteiesteu in these phase tiansitions in the liteiatuie on
auaptive enviionmental management (Noiton, 2uuS) anu the tiansition management of
sustainable systems (Kemp anu Looiback, 2uuS). Bowevei, when instability stiikes a
system on such a scale as to tiiggei a cascauing effect of incieasingly stiong, positively
ieinfoicing feeuback loops, a collapse of the entiie system is one of the possibilities in
which a system can stabilize. When such laige scale instability iipples thiough a society,
ievolutions aie spawneu. Such laige scale instabilities can also be tiiggeieu by natuial
uisasteis like tsunamis, huiiicanes, toinauos anu othei acts of natuie; human eiioi in
ciitical systems such as the iecent financial ciisis, nucleai powei plant meltuowns, oil iig
blowouts, oi wiuespieau powei blackouts; oi intentionally tiiggeieu chaos, such as those
founu in acts of teiioiism. Complexity science is ueepening oui capacity to asceitain the
alteinative stable states of complex systems oi in the veiy least the stability of subsystems
within laigei systems. We may use this capacity to simulate system instability when
innovation anu change is calleu foi, oi maintain system stability uuiing instances of shocks
to the system.
Asceitaining the iesilience of policy anu goveinance systems becomes a ciitical
featuie in managing unceitainty anu anticipating iisk (Koopenjan anu Klijn, 2uu4). "Laige
oiganizations of all kinus, fiom coipoiations to goveinments, lose theii iesilience simply
because the feeuback mechanisms by which they sense anu iesponu to theii enviionment
have to tiavel thiough too many layeis of uelay anu uistoition" (Neauows, 2uu8, p.78),
anu the same may be saiu foi systems on the whole. The iesilience of complex policy anu
goveinance systems becomes impoitant because systems can expeiience catastiophic
failuie (as in the iecent cases of faileu emeigency management netwoiks anu financial
iegulation netwoiks) oi be so stable that they fail to auapt to changing conuitions (as
highlighteu in the many instances of buieauciatic ineitia).
Accoiuing to Stacey, the application of complexity science to the stuuy of social
systems, "will have to focus on the meanings of the iiiegulai patteins of behavioi obseiveu
anu on ieasoning about the kinu of system those patteins aie being geneiateu by. Insteau
of looking foi causes anu effects it |will bej necessaiy to look foi patteins anu theii
systemic implications" (Stacey, 2uu6, p.96). We aigue that the PA anu policy fielu has
maue extensive inioaus into unueistanuing how patteins peisist in complex policy anu

7
goveinance systems. The challenge lies in taking these theoietical anu ueciueuly
qualitative obseivations to test the efficacy of these mouels to pioviue some basis foi
explaining the emeigence, auaptation anu self-oiganization of system oi sub-systems.

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Theoiy testing allows scientists to piove the significance of ceitain casual patteins
anu uiaw infeiences iegaiuing the geneializability of claims ueiiveu fiom these eviuence-
baseu patteins. The emeigent, self-oiganizing anu non-lineai qualities of complex auaptive
systems places significant constiaints aiounu the capacity of social scientists to uiaw
infeiences fiom the kinu of computei simulation moueling that is iequiieu of most stuuies
of complex auaptive systems (Bankes, 2uu2).
Within PA anu policy the application of computei simulation moueling to auuiess
the kinus of questions of most impoitant concein to the fielu have begun to emeige. Agent
baseu mouels have been constiucteu of collaboiative goveinance gioups, the combination
of computei simulation mouels with game theoiy have yielueu stuuies that examine some
of the funuamental tenants guiuing the establishment of voluntaiy ties (Axeliou anu Cohen,
1999), with specific infeiences uiawn to auministiative piactice ( Knott, Nillei anu
veikuilen, 2uuS; }onston et al., 2uu8; Nan et al., 2uu8; }ohnston et al., 2u1u). A bouy of
complementaiy, yet incommensuiate, theoietical fiamewoiks have evolveu to uesciibe the
ielationship of coalition foimation anu policy uevelopment, the peisistence of netwoik ties
establisheu to achieve paiticulai policy goals; the iole of feeuback anu equilibiium in the
foimation anu implementation of public policies; anu the coupling of policy stieams. We
assess whethei anu how these theoiies aie accommouating to complex auaptive systems
moueling anu how they may be useu to geneiate hypothesis that may be testeu, within
limits, using complex auaptive systems moueling. Fuithei, we assess the potential of some
innovative complex systems moueling tools, such as agent baseu mouels, uisciete event
mouels, anu complex systems uynamic moueling, to infoim a meta-theoietical ieseaich
piogiam foi compaiing anu iefining alteinate theoietical fiamewoiks with iespect to theii
auequacy in accounting foi non-lineaiity, lags, ineitia, cioss-scale inteiactions anu complex
feeuback loops.
In the next section we aigue that public auministiation anu policy ieseaicheis have
uiawn on an extensive bouy of case stuuy uata to uevise anu iefine a wiue aiiay of
systems-baseu anu netwoik baseu theoietical fiamewoiks. These theoiies anu fiamewoiks
aie "complexity fiienuly" because they can:
Avoiu simple ieuuctionism, auuiessing the holistic piopeities of complex systems;
Accommouate the emeigence of new stiuctuies anu functions;
Accommouate the existence of feeuback, stocks & flows, inputs anu outputs;
Allow foi the self oiganization of the system as a whole oi paits of the subsystem;
Allow foi uynamic inteiactions that lack cleai cause anu effect ielationships; anu
Accommouate time anu path uepenuencies.
We uiscuss a iange of theoiies anu fiamewoiks founu within the public auministiation anu
policy stuuies liteiatuies that have been ueviseu to explain whole policy anu goveinance
systems. We aie quick to note, howevei, that the five fiamewoiks selecteu heie uo not
iepiesent all of the possible complexity fiienuly public auministiation anu policy theoiies
that exist. In the concluuing section we aigue that the epistemological founuations of

8
complexity science neeu not be vieweu as mutually exclusive of the wiue ianging, uomain
specific theoiies of public auministiation anu policy stuuies.

.%/01$2*)' >&*$+51' 0781*9 ;5/*+*()&;)*%+ ;+5 0%1*9' )#$%&*$(

In this section we uesciibe how system uynamics anu netwoik aichitectuies
pioviue a meta-theoietical link between five PA anu policy theoiies piesenteu heie. We
uesciibe systems uynamics anu netwoik aichitectuies as the base of a meta-theoietical
fiamewoik that may be employeu to stuuy policy anu goveinance systems within
simulateu enviionments. We uiscuss how some of the selecteu fiamewoiks ueviseu to
stuuy policy anu goveinance systems use many of the basic tenants of system anu netwoik
theoiy as epistemological founuations.
We aigue that these "whole system" fiamewoiks seive as the biiuge between the
highly paiticulai contexts anu applications founu within specifically obseiveu phenomena,
anu the systems anu netwoiks founuations that peisist acioss all natuial anu social
systems. Although useful thought expeiiments anu "toy mouels" may be constiucteu to aiu
in oui unueistanuing of complex policy anu goveinance systems, ueveloping mouels of
these systems that aie calibiateu to patteins at multiple scales of obseivation is ciitical if
complexity science is to have utility foi the public auministiation anu policy fielu.
Calibiation of complex systems mouels with obseiveu patteins has been useu foi theoiy
testing in ecology (uiimm et al., 2uuS), sociology anu anthiopology (Epstein, 2uu6),
business management (Noith anu Nacal, 2uu7), anu lanu-use policy (Nanson anu Evans,
2uu7) among many othei aienas.

AD$+(7 ,D*'7#4$ '*, *(+@:)K ')4"#+(4+1)(
The evolution of geneial systems theoiy has been tolu many times, with its oiigins
uating back to the 192us (von Beitlanffy, 1968). Eaily on system uynamics fiamewoiks
weie useu to uesciibe biological anu a little latei mechanical systems. These theoiies
became moie ieauily applieu to social systems beginning in the 196us (Bouluing, 19S6;
Simon, 1966). The public auministiation fielu auopteu system uynamics constiucts in
vaiious iteiations of public buugeting iefoims (Schick, 1966) anu policy analysis (Bioi,
1967). A little latei, system uynamic fiamewoiks began to be applieu to explain
oiganizational uynamics. 0iganizational theoiists like Simon (1966), Peiiow (1967), Katz
anu Kahn (1978), Ackoff (198u), Ninzbeig (198S), Scott (1987), anu Wieck (1976) began
to explain oiganizational behavioi in teims of stocks anu flows, the tiansmission of
authoiity anu powei, anu the ielationship between an oiganization anu its exteinal
enviionment. "Systems thinking" became populaiizeu in the late 198us with Petei Senge's
woik (199u). To this uay the oiganizational sciences apply system uynamics fiamewoiks
to uesciibe how oiganizations woik anu use these uesciiptions to unueitake stiategic
planning (Richaiuson, 1991). The populaiity of the "logic mouel," pieuicateu on chaiting
the ielationship between inputs, piocesses, outputs anu outcomes is now wiuely useu in
piogiam anu peifoimance evaluation contexts (Poistei, 2uuS). This application of systems
theoiy may be tiackeu back to the "soft systems" applications fiist envisioneu by Checklanu
(1978) anu otheis in the 197us (Lockett anu Speai, 198u). Although the kinu of conceptual

9
mouels that aie ueiiveu thiough the application of the logic mouel anu othei system
thinking tools anu techniques can be useu to captuie some of the emeigent, self oiganizing
piopeities of complex systems, these mouels aie ultimately only capable of captuiing the
tempoial uimensions of social auaptation anu change when applieu within computei
simulation moueling.
The builuing blocks of a uynamic system aie the ebb anu flow of iesouices, anu
moie specifically, the tianslation of one foim of iesouice into anothei. The most typical
example of this can be founu in the utilization of financial iesouices to unueitake an action,
which, in tuin leaus to iesults. In this sense, money is inputteu into the system, anu usually
nonmonetaiy iesults (foi example chiluien euucateu, clients seiveu, wateiways cleaneu,
mateiial goous pioviueu) aie outputteu. The uiiveis that suppoit these uynamics can be
uesciibeu in teims of feeuback loops. These feeuback loops aie, themselves, uiiven by the
stiuctuial anu functional ielationship that exists between two oi moie social actois in a
netwoik (Baumgaitnei anu }ones, 199S).
Netwoik analysis has been a staple of social science ieseaich foi many uecaues.
Anthiopologist Alfieu Raucliffe-Biown was the fiist to make the case that '*D obseivation
of social phenomena neeus to be anchoieu in, "the patteins of behavioi to which
inuiviuuals anu gioups confoim in theii uealings with one anothei" (194u, p.228).
Netwoik concepts have a long anu iich histoiy of being useu to stuuy oiganizational foim
anu the uiffusion of infoimation acioss social stiuctuies. Social netwoik analysis may be
tiaceu to the eaily Bawthoin expeiiments of 1924 to 19S2, maiking the fiist use of
"netwoik configuiations to analyze social behavioi." (Beiiy et al., 2uu4, p.S4u). Social
netwoik analysis has been useu to stuuy the uiffusion of knowleuge, beginning with
Coleman, Katz anu Nentzel's giounu-bieaking stuuy of infoimation uiffusion in physician
netwoiks (1977). Stanley Nilgiam's "small woilu" ieseaich is often citeu as an impoitant
bieakthiough in social netwoik analysis, uemonstiating the "six uegiees of sepaiation" that
exist between any two people. 0vei the last few uecaues, the piogiess of social netwoik
analysis has benefiteu fiom auvances in statistical methous anu computei piogiams in
much the same way as system uynamics moueling has (Wasseiman & Faust, 1994).
We aigue heie that captuiing the behavioi of complex auaptive social systems
ultimately iequiies the integiation of both system uynamics anu netwoik aichitectuie.
Whole systems aie compiiseu of netwoiks of social agents that aie bounu togethei anu
influenceu by agent chaiacteiistics, ties between agents, feeuback loops unfoluing between
inuiviuual social agents anu institutional iules, anu a vaiiety of exogenous factois that
uiive agent behavioi. Classic social netwoik analysis captuies netwoik stiuctuies at one
point in time, but cannot easily account foi the uiiveis that shape this stiuctuie, noi can it
pieuict how the stiuctuie may change ovei time.
4
Likewise, system uynamic mouels may
pioviue some explanation foi how components of a system ielate anu influence one
anothei, but they geneially uo not captuie the mateiial piactices that leau to collective
action. The piocesses anu activities founu in system uynamics logic mouels iequiie social
agents to peifoim them.
}ust how this peifoimance is unueitaken as a function of collective action may best
be uesciibeu in teims of netwoik noues anu ties. Paiticulai agents may be associateu with

4
There are, of course very important exceptions to this. Social networks may exhibit certain scale free qualities that
are readily predictable [add footnote on scale free].

1u
unueitaking paiticulai tasks oi caiiying out ceitain events. As tasks aie collaboiatively
unueitaken anu events unfolu thiough the agency of inuiviuuals anu institutions, netwoiks
foim. The ueep integiation of human anu social capital, as Bouiuieu cleaily lays out,
speaks to this point (1986). As tasks become collective piactices, anu events aie shapeu by
the spaces within which common piactices unfolu "action aienas" foim (0stiom ,2uuS).
Communities aie built aiounu common piactices, often iefeiieu to as "communities of
piactice" in the oiganizational leaining anu knowleuge management liteiatuie (Wengei,
1998; Koliba anu uajua, 2uu9). In this way, the chaiacteiistics of inuiviuual agents,
incluuing theii mental mouels, uecision heuiistics, anu theii stock of existing iesouices, can
have a significant influence on the stiuctuiing anu functioning of the whole system. The
natuie of the +#($ between agents, the othei majoi builuing block of netwoiks, also can have
a significant beaiing on the whole system (Buit, 1997). Bowevei, the behavioi anu
piopeities of whole systems must be consiueieu as both the sum of all of the system's paits
(in this case, netwoik noues anu ties), but also something significantly moie that this sum.
Within the gap between the "sum of all paits" anu "whole netwoik behaviois anu
actions" lies a complex auaptive system's capacity to unueitake self-oiganization. The
conclusion to be uiawn fiom the uiffeientiation of netwoik stiuctuies anu system
uynamics is that oui mouels of complex auaptive social systems ultimately neeu to
incoipoiate both system uynamics anu netwoiks stiuctuies into them.

!"(:)(+#4'3 ;)'7(@:)K$ :; &:3#4D '*, 6:>()*'*4( $D$+(7$
System uynamics anu social netwoik analysis aie agnostic iegaiuing asciibing
ueepei meaning oi explanations foi the kinus of lineai causalities anu nonlineai feeuback
loops founu within complex auaptive social systems of paiticulai stiuctuies anu functions.
To auuiess these neeus, we must tuin to the bioau aiiay of social sciences mobilizeu to
stuuy human behavioi (psychology anu social psychology), social gioups (sociology),
oiganizational anu institutional foims (oiganizational anu management sciences), anu the
iise anu fall of complex societies (anthiopology anu histoiy).
Policy anu goveinance systems oiganizeu aiounu the fiaming of public pioblems,
the uelibeiation of policy alteinatives, anuoi the implementation of public policies aie
complex social systems of a paiticulai type. They aie guiueu by uynamics that aie
goveineu by ceitain political anu auministiative piactices unueitaken by social agents
iepiesenting a vaiiety of public, piivate anu nonpiofit sectoi institutions anu inteiests.
Theie have been a numbei of conceptual fiamewoiks that have been ueviseu as
compiehensive theoiies of complex goveinance anu policy aiiangements. The most wiuely
known anu iespecteu fiamewoik is the institutional analysis anu uevelopment (IAB)
fiamewoik fiist uevelopeu by Nobel Lauieate, Elinoi 0stiom. The IAB fiamewoik uiaws
on institutionalism anu neo-institutionalism theoiies, game theoiy, tiansaction cost theoiy,
anu common iesouice pool theoiy to ciaft a uesciiption of multi-institutional systems that
explain the ciafting of public policy as ultimately an institutional uesign pioblem in
complex "action aienas." 0stiom (2uuS) emphasizes the ioles that iules play in stiuctuiing
goveinance aiiangements. Biawing on hei empiiical analysis of natuial iesouice
management netwoiks she makes a compelling aigument in favoi of moie uecentializeu
concentiations of powei anu authoiity to enhance peifoimance in some institutional
contexts anu conuitions. 0thei compiehensive fiamewoiks may be founu in }ohn
Kinguon's multiple stieams fiamewoik (1984), Baumgaitnei anu }ones' policy subsystem

11
anu punctuateu equilibiium fiamewoik (199S), anu Paul Sabatiei anu associates'
auvancement of the auvocacy coalition fiamewoik (Sabatiei anu }enkins-Smith, 199S).
Some of these fiamewoiks impose homogenous assumptions about human uecision
making behaviois, such as expecteu utility maximizing behaviois in IAB, while otheis
assume moie unpieuictable, chaotic uecision making behavioi, such as those founu in the
multiple stieams fiamewoik. Anothei uiffeience that aiises acioss these fiamewoiks
conceins the balance between inuiviuual behavioi anu institutional noims anu iules. ACF
focuses attention on the iole that common belief netwoiks play in poweiful auvocacy
coalitions. While IAB focuses moie attention on the iole that opeiational, collective choice
anu constitutional iules play in shaping multi-institutional aiiangements.
A seconu giouping of theoietical fiamewoiks common to PA anu political science
aie built on the founuation of basic netwoik aichitectuie of noues anu ties. These theoiies
anu fiamewoiks incluue policy netwoik theoiy (Beclo 1978; Rhoues, 1997; Kickeit et al.,
1997), social netwoik analysis (Waseiman anu Fuast, 199-; Comfoit, 2uu7; Kapucu, 2uu6),
public management netwoiks (Nilwaiu anu Piovan, 1998; Agianoff anu Ncuuiie, 2uuS)
anu goveinance netwoik fiamewoiks (Soiensen anu Toifing, 2uuS; 2uu8; Koliba et al.,
2u1u). These fiamewoiks account foi the natuie of the ties that aie establisheu between
policy actois. Seveial of these fiamewoiks account foi the multi-scalai uimensions of
social netwoiksmeaning, they account foi the fact that these netwoiks aie populateu by
inuiviuual people, gioups, oiganizations anu netwoiks of oiganizations. The natuie of the
ties between these agents aie piemiseu on the types of iesouices that flow between them
(Rhoues, 1997), the kinus of manageiial stiategies employeu (Agianoff anu Ncuuiie, 2uuS)
anu the mixeu stiuctuies of auministiative authoiity (Koliba anu Neek, 2uu9; Koliba et al.,
2u1u) that peisist within anu acioss them.
In this manusciipt we uiscuss how the system uynamics anu netwoik theoiies anu
fiamewoiks that have evolveu out of the public auministiation anu policy fielus can be
uiawn on to pioviue the theoietical founuations on which to mouel the complex auaptive
systems that have emeigeu to cieate, cooiuinate anu implement public policies. We aigue
that all of these theoietical fiamewoiks aie, to one uegiee oi anothei, amenuable to system
uynamics anu netwoik moueling anu theiefoie aie "complexity fiienuly." All of these
theoietical fiamewoiks aie giounueu in a system uynamics aichitectuie. These
fiamewoiks opeiate thiough feeuback loops, stocks anu flows, anu ceitain assumptions
about input anu output flows. All of these fiamewoiks account foi the ioles that inuiviuual
social agents, gioups of agents anu oiganizations play in the whole system. Some of these
fiamewoiks place a gieatei emphasis on eithei systems uynamics oi netwoik aichitectuie.
We will exploie each of these below.


12
";81$ CD 6%1*9' ;+5 ,%B$&+;+9$ >&;/$E%&F( &$1;)*B$ )% ('()$/ ;+5 +$)E%&F )#$%&'

6=GH.I :JK
A=LM@J:J.M
N@:4MO=@P
3I3"M4 KIJ:4H.3 JM"O=@P
:@.QH"M."-@M
GM:K :-"Q=@3
Nultiple policy
stieams
Relationship between
stieams aie
chaiacteiizeu in teims
of feeuback loops
Stieams aie coupleu
thiough the joint actions
of inuiviuual agents
(oiganizations anuoi
policy entiepieneuis)
Kinguon, 2uu4
Policy subsystem
Punctuateu
equilibiium
System anu
subsystems unueigo
phase tiansitions.
Inuiviuual agents coalesce
aiounu ceitain policy
uomains
Baumgaitnei anu
}ones, 199S; 2uuS
Institutional Analysis
anu Bevelopment
Institutional iules
infoim the feeuback
loop anu stocks anu
flows of iesouices
Role of inuiviuual agents
in foiming action aienas is
impoitant
0stiom, 199u;
2uuS
Auvocacy Coalition
Fiamewoik
Auvocacy coalitions
influence one anothei
thiough feeuback
Belief systems of
inuiviuual agents foim
into auvocacy coalitions
Sabatiei anu
}enkins-Smith,
199S; Sabatiei anu
Wieble, 2uu7
uoveinance anu Policy
Netwoiks
Resouice flows
between agents in the
netwoik; policy tools
anu auministiative
actions pioviue
feeuback within the
netwoik
Relies on a basic noue anu
tie configuiation to
explain agent inteiactions
Rhoues, 1997;
Kickeit et al., 1997;
Soiensen anu
Toifing 2uuS;
Auam anu Kiiesi,
2uu7; Koliba et al.,
2u1u

513+#&3( &:3#4D $+)('7$
}ohn Kinguon's policy stieam mouel, Figuie 1, uoes not assume lineaiity, noi
iational behavioi on the pait of policy actois. Pioblems, policies anu politics stieams may
couple, anu in fact, neeu to couple foi agenuas to be set anu policy winuows to open.
Kinguon iecognizes that policy stieams aie cieateu anu uiiecteu thiough social netwoiks
anu inuiiectly asseiteu that social netwoiks foim within inuiviuual stieams, anu pioviue a
basis foi coupling of stieams (1984). Kinguon iecognizes that a numbei of policy actois,
incluuing inteiest gioups, acauemia, meuia, anu political paities cooiuinate actions within
anu acioss the policy stieam. Be giounus the policy stieam mouel in the cooiuinateu
actions that aiise uuiing the pie-enactment phases of policy selection anu uesign, although
we may iecognize the coupling of stieams acioss all facets of the policy piocess.


1S
N*,7&$ C< 3)&79)7&;1 >$;)7&$( %> )#$ 43 N&;/$E%&F (auapteu fiom Kinguon, 1984)

Zahaiiauis obseives that, "Nuch like systems theoiy, |policy stieamsj views choice
as the collective output foimulateu by the push anu pull of seveial factois. It shaies
common giounu with chaos theoiies in being attentive to complexity, in assuming a
consiueiable amount of iesiuual ianuomness, anu in viewing systems as constantly
evolving anu not necessaiily settling into equilibiium (Kinguon 1984, p.219)" (2uuS, p.66).
The extent to which pioblem, policy anu politics stieams aie coupleu is something that
complexity science can sheu light on, as coupling comes about thiough a geneiative piocess
of inteilocking feeuback loops occuiiing acioss each stieam. A wiue iange of actois aie
mobilizeu within each stieam. Some of these actois span moie than one stieamfoi
example, a legislatoi may become convinceu of the impoitance of a paiticulai pioblem oi
policy solution anu woik to align the politics stieam with a paiticulai pioblem uefinition oi
policy tool. These uynamics can be moueleu using systems uynamics tools.

01*4+1'+(, (L1#3#2)#17
Baumgaitnei anu }ones' punctuateu equilibiium fiamewoik is pieuicateu on the
assumption that, ". policymaking both makes leaps anu unueigoes peiious of neai stasis
as issues emeige on anu ieceue fiom public agenua" (Tiue, }ones anu Baumgaitnei, 2uu7,
P.1S7). Theii view of policy subsystems uiaws extensively fiom the uesciiption of
nonlineai systems uynamics uiscusseu eailiei in this manusciipt. Theii theoiy ielies most
uiiectly on system uynamics mouels because of its ieliance on feeuback loops as a ciitical
featuie of subsystem uynamics.
The key factois of inteiest in punctuateu equilibiium theoiy conceins the
ielationship between policy subsystems. This theoiy assumes that, "Political systems, like

14
humans, cannot simultaneously consiuei all the issues that face them, so policy subsystems
can be vieweu as mechanisms that allow the political system to engage in paiallel
piocessing (}ones, 1994). Thousanus of issues may be consiueieu simultaneously in
paiallel within theii iespective communities of expeits. This equilibiium of inteiests uoes
not completely lock out change. Issue piocessing within subsystems allows foi a politics of
aujustment, with inciemental change iesulting fiom baigaining among inteiests anu
maiginal moves in iesponse to changing ciicumstances" (Tiue, }ones anu Baumgaitnei,
2uuS, P.1S8-1S9).
Nuch like ACF, punctuateu equilibiium theoiy iecognizes the iole that ceitain
actois oi combinations of actois play in establishing system wiue equilibiium. These
entanglements of subsystems aie moie than likely compiiseu of stable sets of institutional
actois anu iules. Bowevei, these same actois will likely piouuce "a plethoia of small
accommouations anu a significant numbei of iauical uepaituies fiom the past" (Tiue, }ones
anu Baumgaitnei, 2uuS, p.1S6). The ianges of small, shoit teim accommouations anu long
teim iauical uepaituies fiom the stable state must be placeu within the context of the
system as a whole. Those using punctuateu equilibiium theoiy often iely on changes
within the outputs oi inputs of the whole systems ovei time to uemonstiate phase
tiansitions. Substantial ueviations fiom the kinu of vaiiations attiibutable to small
accommouations aie noteu. When iauical changes to ielatively stable patteins aie noteu,
explanations aie sought using system uynamics logic.

M*$+#+1+#:*'3 C*'3D$#$ '*, N(>(3:&7(*+ <MCN=
Although theie aie many facets to 0stiom's IAB fiamewoik, as shown in Figuie 2,
we highlight two of the majoi contiibutions it makes to the stuuy of complex auaptive
social systems heie. These two facets concein the iole that "iules-in-use" anu iule making
play in the stiuctuiing anu functioning of these systems; anu the "action aienas" thiough
which these iules combine to stiuctuie action. 0stiom uistinguishes between thiee types
of iules: (a) :&()'+#:*'3 )13($ that govein uay-to-uay activities of appiopiiatois; (b)
4:33(4+#>( 4":#4( )13($ conceining oveiall policies foi goveining common pool iesouices anu
how those policies aie maue, anu (c) 4:*$+#+1+#:*'3 4":#4( )13($ that establish who is
eligible to ueteimine collective choice iules. The opeiational functions of any social system
aie goveineu by a complex aiiay of opeiational iules, noims, habits anu customs.
Collective choice theoiy has long been vieweu as a cential featuie of iesouice exchange
fiamewoiks. Collective choice is shapeu by inuiviuual anu collective inteiests all neeuing
to be balanceu in oiuei to cieate an optimal level of autonomy anu uepenuence.


1S
N*,7&$ R< :+ %B$&B*$E %> H:K >&;/$E%&F (0stiom, 2uu7)

0stiom has focuseu much of hei attention on how these iules shape social
inteiaction anu cautions that, "The capacity of humans to use complex cognitive systems to
oiuei theii own behavioi at a ielatively subconscious level makes it uifficult at times foi
empiiical ieseaicheis to asceitain what the woiking iules foi an ongoing action aiena may
actually be in piactice" (0stiom, 2uuS, P.19). The combining, comingling anu competition
of iules opeiating at vaiious levels can be moueleu using system uynamics moueling.
These uynamics aie iepiesenteu as "iule-in-use" in hei mouel shown in Figuie 2.
The extent to which these iules guiue the behaviois of those social agents in the IAB
fiamewoik is pieuicateu on how authoiitative they aie. As Etizioni has noteu, compliance
with iules can take coeicive, ienumeiative anu noimative foims (1961), all of which
contiibute to the uecision heuiistics of social agents. We have noteu how the self-
oiganizing capacity of autonomous agents aie shapeu by uecision iules anu ielational
sciipts. Accoiuing to 0stiom's appioach, self-oiganizeu goveinance systems "neeu to
match iules that impose costs in a iough piopoition to the likely positive payoffs that
appiopiiatois aie likely to obtain ovei time." (2uuS, p.2S4). 0stiom's emphasis on
iational collective action is subject to the kinu of ciitiques that have been iaiseu iegaiuing
iational action moie geneially. Pieison aigues that, ". we shoulu geneially exeicise
consiueiable skepticism about asseitions that institutional aiiangements will ieflect the
skilleu uesign choices of iational actois. Insteau, we shoulu anticipate that theie will often
be sizable gaps between the ex ante goals of poweiful political actois anu the actual
functioning of piominent institutions" (Pieison, 2uu4, P.1S).
A seconu majoi uimension of the IAB mouel conceins the iole of action aienas as
spaces wheie social agents comingle with institutional iules of many foims to geneiate
ceitain activities oi events. Complex policy anu goveinance systems will likely be
compiiseu of many action aienas, each of which plays somewheie between a minoi to
majoi iole in ueteimining the outputs of a whole system. vaiiation in the stiuctuies of
these action aienas becomes a ciitical consiueiation in the IAB fiamewoik. 0stiom (2uuS)
has aigueu, quite effectively, how the composition of these action aienas has a consiueiable
impact on a system's peifoimance.
IAD Framework
Physical/Material
Conditions
Attributes of
Community
Rules in Use
Action Arena
Action
Situations
Actors
Patterns of
Interactions
Evaluative
Criteria
Outcomes

16

C,>:4'4D 4:'3#+#:* ;)'7(@:)K
The Auvocacy Coalition Fiamewoik (ACF), assumes , "(1) that belief systems aie
moie impoitant than institutional affiliation, (2) that actois may be puisuing a wiue vaiiety
of objectives, which must be measuieu empiiically, anu (S) that one must auu ieseaicheis
anu jouinalists to the set of potentially impoitant policy actois (Sabatiei anu }enkins-
Smith, 199S)" (Sabatiei, 2uu7, p.S). The ACF, shown in Figuie S, ielies heavily on the
existence of auvocacy coalitions that aie oiganizeu aiounu common belief netwoiks.
Piesumably these coalitions shaie common mental mouels of pioblem uefinition anu policy
solutions, anu shaie a political will to influence the cieation anu implementation of public
policies. The extent to which an auvocacy coalition possesses powei ovei othei coalitions
is shapeu by paiameteis, exteinal events, anu constiaints anu iesouices available to a
policy subsystem. The fiamewoik opeiates on the basic piemise of system uynamics:
inputs shaping outputs with potential feeuback loops shaping the nonlineai, iecuisive
natuie of the system. Those who have woikeu to auvance the ACF have tenueu to
uownplay the iole that institutional iules play in shaping the actions of the policy
subsystem. Emphasis is placeu on the influence that the auvocacy coalitions opeiating
within a subsystem play. The uominant uiivei of coalition behavioi aie the "coie beliefs" of
coalition membeis.
The ACF exhibits some netwoik qualities because it allows foi the possibility to
unueistanu coalitions as collections of inuiviuual agentseach of whom contiibutions to
the stability oi instability of the coalition's coie beliefs. These agents have the capacity to
influence one anothei. These influences aie nonlineai. It is also possible to view inuiviuual
auvocacy coalitions as agents unto themselves. Coalitions aie chaiacteiizeu by the
emeigence of bottom-up influences. Accoiuing to Sabatiei anu his associates, these bottom
up piopeities take pieceuence ovei top uown anu exteinally uiiven institutional iules anu
noims (Sabatiei anu Weibe, 2uu7).

N*,7&$ S< :5B%9;9' 9%;1*)*%+ >&;/$E%&F (Sabatiei anu Weibe, 2uu7)

RELATIVELY STABLE
PARAMETERS
1. Basic attributes of the
problem areas (good)
2. Basic distribution of
natural resources
3. Fundamental socio-
cultural values and
social structure
4. Basic constitutional
structure (rules)
EXTERNAL (SYSTEM)
EVENTS
1. Changes in
socioeconomic
conditions
2. Changes in public
opinion
3. Changes in systematic
governing coalition
4. Policy decisions and
impacts from other
subsystems
LONG TERM COALITION
OPPORTUNITY
STRUCUTRES
1. Degree of consensus
needed for major policy
change
2. Openness of political
system
SHORT TERM
CONSTRAINTS AND
RESOURCES OF
SUBSYSTEM ACTORS
POLICY SUBSYSTEM
Coalition A Coalition B Policy
Brokers
Strategy re.
guidance
instruments
Strategy re.
guidance
instruments
Decisions by
Governmental Authorities
Institutional Rules, Resource
Allocations, and Appointments
Policy Outputs
Policy Impacts
(a) Policy beliefs
(b) Resources
(a) Policy beliefs
(b) Resources

17

O:>()*'*4( <'*, &:3#4D= *(+@:)K$
The fiist application of netwoik theoiy to policy aienas iesteu on institutional
aiiangements anu the iesouices exchangeu between them (Beclo, 1978; Rhoues, 1997).
The subsequent "netwoik tuin" in public auministiation anu policy stuuies has been
maikeu by uesciiptions of policy netwoiks (Rhoues, 1997; Kickeit et al., 1997; Koopenjan
anu Klijn, 2uu4), policy implementations (uage anu Nanuell, 199u; 0'Toole, 199u; Bill anu
Bupe, 2uu6), anu ceitain foims of inteigoveinmental ielations (0'Toole, 2uuu; Wiight,
2uuu). Intei-oiganizational netwoiks have also been uesciibeu as thiiu paity goveinment
(Salamon, 2uu2; Fieueiickson anu Fieueiickson, 2uu6), public sectoi netwoiks (Agianoff,
2uuS), goveinance netwoiks (Soiensen anu Toifing, 2uuS, 2uu8; Bogason anu Nusson,
2uu6; Koliba, et al., 2u1u), cioss-sectoi collaboiations (Biyson, Ciosby anu Stone, 2uu6),
anu public management netwoiks (Nilwaiu anu Piovan, 2uu6; Fieueiickson anu
Fieueiickson, 2uu6; Agianoff, 2uu7). Figuie 4 below shows an oveiview of the policy
netwoik appioach that has been iecently stuuieu extensively by Euiopean scholais (Auam
anu Kiiesi 2uu7).

N*,7&$ T< 6%1*9' +$)E%&F ;00&%;9# (Auam anu Kiiesi, 2uu7)

Intei-oiganizational netwoiks have also been uesciibeu in teims of the functions
that they peifoim, whethei it be seivice contiacts, supply chains, au hoc, channel
paitneiships, infoimation uissemination, civic switchboaius (uolusmith anu Eggeis, 2uu4),
pioblem-solving, infoimation shaiing, capacity builuing, anu seivice ueliveiy (Nilwaiu anu
Piovan, 2uu6), leaining anu knowleuge tiansfei (NcNabb, 2uu7), oi civic engagement
(Yang anu Beigiuu, 2uu8). Within this bouy of netwoik liteiatuie we finu the following
similaiities: netwoiks facilitating the cooiuination of actions anuoi exchange of iesouices
between actois within the netwoik; netwoik membeiship being uiawn fiom some
combination of public, piivate anu non-piofit sectoi actois
S
; netwoiks caiiying out one oi
moie policy function; Netwoiks exist acioss viitually all policy uomains; netwoiks aie
mostly uefineu at the intei-oiganizational level, they aie also uesciibeu in the context of
the inuiviuuals, gioups '*, oiganizations that compiise them; netwoiks foiming as the
iesult of the selection of paiticulai policy tools; anu netwoik stiuctuies allowing foi

5
With the obvious exception of inter-governmental networks, which may be described as networks of governments of different
geographical scope.
The Network Approach
Transnational
Context
National
Context
Policy-Domain
Specific
Context
Structure
of Policy
Network
Type of
Interaction
Distribution
of Power
Potential for
Policy Change
Type of Policy
Change

18
goveinment agencies to seive in ioles othei than leau oiganizations
6
(Koliba, Neek anu
Zia, 2u1u, p.6u).
";81$ C< A%B$&+;+9$ +$)E%&F >&;/$E%&F (Koliba et al., 2u1u)

We have settleu on using the teim "goveinance netwoik" to uesciibe what has thus
fai been an eclectic aiiay of netwoik labels. A goveinance netwoik is "a ielatively stable
pattein of cooiuinateu action anu iesouice exchanges involving policy actois ciossing
uiffeient social scales, uiawn fiom the public, piivate oi nonpiofit sectois anu acioss
geogiaphic levels; who inteiact thiough a vaiiety of competitive, commanu anu contiol,
coopeiative, anu negotiateu aiiangements; foi puiposes anchoieu in one oi moie facets of
the policy stieam" (Koliba et al., 2u1u, p.6u) uoveinance netwoik analysis is infoimeu by
iesouice exchange theoiy (Rhoues, 1997), veitical anu hoiizontal conceptualization of
auministiative authoiity (Agianoff & Ncuuiie, 2uuS), complex systems uynamics (Baynes,
2uuS), anu social netwoik theoiy (Wasseiman & Faust, 1994). A.W. Rhoues (1997) was
one of the fiist scholais to ueeply consiuei the ielationship between goveinance anu intei-
oiganizational netwoiks, aiguing that goveinance occuis as "self-oiganizing phenomena"
shapeu by the following chaiacteiistics: Inteiuepenuence between oiganizations.
uoveinance is bioauei than goveinment, coveiing non-state actois; Continuing

6
With the obvious exception of inter-governmental networks, which are relegated to networks of public sector organizations.
TYPE OF
VAR.
VARIABLE DESCRIPTORS
A
g
e
n
t
s

(
N
o
d
e
s
)

Social scale Individual; Group; Organizational/Institutional; Inter-organizational
Social sector (organizational
level)
Public; Private; Nonprofit
Geographic scale Local; Regional; State; National; International
Role centrality Central peripheral; Trajectory
Capital resources actor
provides (as an input)
Financial; Physical; Natural; Human; Social; Cultural; Political; Knowledge
Providing accountabilities
to.
Elected representatives; Citizens and interest groups; Courts;
Owners/Shareholders; Consumers; Bureaucrats/Supervisors/Principals;
Professional Associations; Collaborators/Partners/Peers
Receiving accountabilities
from
See above
Performance/Output and
Outcomes Criteria
Tied to policy function and domain
T
i
e
s

Resources Exchanged/ Pooled Financial; Physical; Natural; Human; Social; Cultural; Political; Knowledge
Strength of tie Strong to weak
Formality of tie Formal to informal
Administrative authority Vertical (command and control); Diagonal (negotiation and bargaining);
Horizontal (collaborative and cooperative); Competitive
Accountability relationship See above
W
h
o
l
e

N
e
t
w
o
r
k

Policy tools Regulations; Grants; Contracts; Vouchers; Taxes; Loans/loan guarantees,
etc.
Operational functions Resource exchange/pooling; Coordinated action; Information sharing;
Capacity building; Learning and knowledge transfer
Policy functions Define/frame problem; Design policy solution; Coordinate policy solution;
Implement policy (regulation); Implement policy (service delivery);
Evaluate & monitor policy; Political alignment
Policy domain functions Health, environment, education
Macro-level governance
structures
Lead organization; Shared governance; Network administrative organization
Network configuration Inter-governmental relations; Interest group coalitions; Regulatory
subsystems; Grant and contract agreements; Public-private partnerships
Properties of network
boundaries
Open closed; Permeability
Systems dynamics Systems-level inputs; processes; outputs and outcomes


19
inteiactions between netwoik membeis, causeu by the neeu to exchange iesouices anu
negotiate shaieu puiposes; anu uame-like inteiactions, iooteu in tiust anu iegulateu by
iules of the game negotiateu anu agieeu upon by netwoik paiticipants. uoveinance is,
theiefoie, chaiacteiizeu by the inteiuepenuency of netwoik actois, the iesouices they
exchange, anu the joint puiposes, noims, anu agieements that aie negotiateu between
them. Consiueiations of netwoik goveinance leaus to an inevitable consiueiation of the
baigaining anu coopeiative systems of moie "hoiizontally aiiangeu" ties, in auuition to the
tiauitional "veitically oiienteu" commanu anu contiol systems of mono-centiic
goveinment systems (Kettl, 2uu6, p.491). Nixeu-foim goveinance netwoiks may
incoipoiate all foims of auministiative authoiity (Koliba anu Neek, 2uu9) anu iely on the
basic aichitectuie of netwoiks: noues, ties anu whole netwoik chaiacteiistics. Piovan anu
Kenis uistinguish between leau oiganization, shaieu goveinance anu netwoik
auministiative oiganizations stiuctuies (2uu7). These stiuctuies may be combineu with
the specific chaiacteiistics of netwoik actois anu the natuie of theii ties to ueteimine how
netwoik stiuctuies leau to ceitain netwoik outputs (Koliba et al., 2u1u).

"%E;&5 ; 4$);?"#$%&$)*9;1 @$($;&9# 6&%,&;/

Bespite paiauigmatic anu theoietical incommensuiability, theoietical auvancement
in policy anu auministiative sciences will iequiie us to uevelop meta-theoietical
pioceuuies to test these theoiies in fielu settings. Schlagei (2uu7) unueitook a uesciiptive
compaiison of these theoiies on five ciiteiia anu fiamewoiks on foui ciiteiia. Foi
compaiing theoiies, Schlagei (2uu7) pioposeu to compaie bounuaiies anu scope of
inquiiy, a mouel of the inuiviuual, collective action, institutions anu tieatment of the policy
change. Foi compaiing fiamewoiks, Schlagei (2uu7) pioposeu to focus on type of actois,
vaiiable uevelopment, unit of analysis anu levels of analysis. While these ciiteiia pioviue
impoitant mechanisms to asceitain the commensuiability of policy theoietical fiamewoiks
in teims of theii bounuaiies anu scope oi mouels of inuiviuuals anu institutions, these
uesciiptive ciiteiia uo not pioviue auequate methouology to "test" whethei one theoiy
bettei explains public policy anu auministiative systems.
Sabatiei (2uu7) iecognizes this challenge anu essentially pioposes Kail Poppei's
falsificationism as the "way foiwaiu." In this context, Sabatiei (2uu7) pioposes seven
heuiistics foi theoietical uevelopment: (1) Be cleai enough to be pioven wiong; (2) Nake
the concepts of the fiamewoiktheoiy as abstiact as possible; (S) Think causal piocess; (4)
Bevelop a coheient mouel of the inuiviuual; (S) Woik on inteinal inconsistencies anu
inteiconnections; (6) Bevelop a long-teim ieseaich piogiam involving both theoietical
elaboiation anu empiiical testing among a netwoik of scholais; anu (7) 0se multiple
theoiies, if possible. Although Sabatiei's heuiistics might be useful in asceitaining the fit of
public policy theoiies in specific policy uomains, the positivistic, Newtonian anu
falsificationist philosophy of science that unueilies Sabatiei's meta-theoietical heuiistics
uoes not appeai to uo justice to the "complexity fiienuliness" of policy anu goveinance
systems. We aigue that this misplaceu emphasis on Newtonian anu Poppeiian positivism
as a methou to iefine public policy theoiies has unueimineu the nuanceu complexity
fiienuly theoiies that cannot cleaily uemonstiate "causal piocesses" (heuiistic S), oi that

2u
cannot uevelop a "coheient mouel of the inuiviuual" (heuiistic 4). An abstiact theoiy that
simplifies obseiveu phenomena in cleaily uiffeientiable causal piocesses will inevitably
miss the inheient complexity of policy anu goveinance systems.
We have aigueu in this manusciipt that the challenges with the lineai causality aie
accentuateu by the social constiuction of belief systems anu the active, emeigent, auaptive
behaviois of inuiviuuals. Some have aigueu that inuiviuuals in policy systems have such
heteiogeneous behaviois that we cannot, evei, uevelop "calibiateu" anu "valiu" mouels of
them. We may view this challenge fiom a meta-theoietical stanupoint by juxtaposing a
belief baseu mouel of inuiviuual (ACF) against a game theoietical mouel of the inuiviuual
(IAB). These mouels of inuiviuual behavioi may be coheient within the context of theii
specific theoiies, howevei, this "coheience" uoes not tell us whethei belief baseu mouels
aie bettei than game theoietical mouels in uesciibing anu explaining the behaviois of
actois in policy systems. We thus ieject Sabatiei's meta-theoietical heuiistic appioach in
its totality, anu iathei piopose a long teim meta-theoietical ieseaich piogiam to public
policy anu goveinance that employs complex systems moueling tools to "test" the
explanatoiy powei of these theoiies in a laige vaiiety anu contexts of policy uomains.
The tieatment of time plays a key iole in the stiuctuiing of such meta-theoietical
ieseaich piogiam. Builuing oui capacity to uesign computei simulation mouels that
captuies the tempoial uimensions of complex systems anu tests policy anu goveinance
fiamewoiks will ultimately help us to auuiess questions ielating to policy anu goveinance
system stability, innovation anu collapse. Recall oui eailiei uiscussion of the ielationship
between system stability anu its capacity to innovate anu change, anu between system
instability anu its vulneiability foi collapse. Beveloping oui capacity to unueistanu how
complex auaptive social systems auapt is of tiemenuous impoitance.
The long teim uevelopment of a meta-theoietical piogiam foi moueling the
complexity of policy anu goveinance systems will likely hinge on thiee ciitical questions:
1.) Bow incommensuiable aie policy anu goveinance theoietical fiamewoiks. To
what extent aie they compatible oi compaiable.
2.) What aie the bounuaiy conuitions set foi empiiical stuuies of policy anu
goveinance systems. Wheie uoes the system begin anu enu. What get incluueu
anu left out of the mouel.
S.) To what extent uo assumptions conceining meta-patteining pieueteimine
outcomes. Bow iational canshoulu actois be. When aie uisciete piocesses,
uisciete piocesses.
It has long been noteu that policy anu goveinance systems exist within (anu
sometimes acioss) viitually all policy uomains (Baumgaitnei anu }ones, 199S).
The ielative iesiliency of any complex policy oi goveinance system neeus to be gaugeu
against ceitain outputs that aie piouuceu by these whole systems. The table below lays out
how the vaiious majoi theoietical constiucts founu in the five fiamewoiks ievieweu above
that aie being opeiationalizeu in two uiffeient types of policy anu goveinance systems:
tianspoitation planning anu wateisheu management.


21
";81$ RD :001*9;)*%+ %> /;U%& )#$%&$)*9;1 9%+()&79)( 8' 0%1*9' 5%/;*+

"#$%&$)*9;1
.%+()&79)(
6%1*9' K%/;*+
"&;+(0%&);)*%+ 61;++*+, J$)E%&F( O;)$&(#$5 4;+;,$/$+) J$)E%&F(
Nultiple Stieams:
Pioblems
Policies
Tianspoitation infiastiuctuie maintenance oi
giowth Pioject funuing (giants; state & local
buuget allocations)
Watei quality impiovement oi maintenance
Enviionmental iegulations, public
infoimation campaigns, giants
Punctuateu
Equilibiium:
Rauical Bepaituies
fiom the Noim

Changes in funuing ciiteiia; Changes in
pioject evaluation ciiteiia
Institution of wateisheu management plans
Auvocacy Coalition
Fiamewoik:
Bominant Auvocacy
Coalitions

State tianspoitation planneis; State
tianspoitation engineeis; Regional
planneis; Town planneis; State anu local
legislatois
Regional wateisheu management piogiam
staff; Lanu owneis & useis; Economic
uevelopeis; Regulatois; etc.
Institutional Analysis
anu Bevelopment:
Institutional Rules
Action Aienas
Feueial anu state laws anu iegulations;
Rational pioject evaluation piocesses
State agencies offices; Regional planning
boaius anu committees; State legislative
committees; Regional planning offices
Feueial anu state enviionmental laws;
Regional agieements Regional planning
anu oveisight committees
uoveinance
Netwoiks:
uoveinance
Stiuctuies
Resouice Flows
Inteigoveinmental aiiangements; Leau
state agencies Funuing; technical
infoimation; political capital
Inteigoveinmental aiiangements; Regional
netwoik auministiative oiganization
Funuing; public infoimation; political capital
System 0utputs Tianspoitation piojects implementeu Watei management initiatives (policies)
implementeu
System 0utcomes Bigh peifoiming tianspoitation
infiastiuctuie
Bigh watei quality (anu quantity
management)

Space piecluues a ueepei uesciiption of how we aie opeiationalizing the meta-
theoietical fiamewoik acioss these two examples. Besciiptions of these piojects have
been piesenteu anuoi publisheu elsewheie (Zia et al, 2u1u; Koliba et al., 2u11; Zia et al.,
2u11 foithcoming). We biiefly intiouuce this table to highlight how the theoietical
fiamewoiks intiouuceu in the section above may be opeiationalizeu foi a given empiiically
obseivable phenomenain these cases, iegional tianspoitation planning anu wateisheu
goveinance netwoiks.
In the next section we uiscuss how seveial uiffeient kinus of moueling platfoims
may be useu to test the efficacy of each of these policy anu goveinance fiamewoiks. We
will uiscuss how a meta-theoietical ieseaich piogiam can use computei simulations
pieuicateu on system uynamics anu netwoik aichitectuie we believe that majoi
auvancements in public auministiationpolicy theoiy, ieseaich anu piactice aie possible.

.%//%+ .%/07)$& 3*/71;)*%+ 4%5$1*+, 61;)>%&/(
Nost computei simulation tools cuiiently employeu to stuuy anu mouel complex
goveinance anu policy systems use one oi moie combinations of lineai moueling (uisciete
event), system uynamics (complex system uynamics, agent-baseu mouels), anu netwoik
aichitectuie (agent-baseu mouels, uisciete event). They pioviue a basis on which to
captuie the iange of complex, auaptive chaiacteiistics founu in policy anu goveinance
systems.

22
Nouels aie built on iepiesentations of obseivable phenomena. Nillei anu Page
(2uu7) uesciibe the piocess of moueling as an, "attempt to ieuuce the woilu to a
funuamental set of elements (equivalent classes) anu laws (tiansition functions), anu on
this basis .. unueistanu anu pieuict key aspects of the woilu. Noueling pioceeus by
ueciuing what simplifications to impose on the unueilying entities anu then, baseu on those
abstiactions, uncoveiing theii implications" (Nillei & Page, 2uu7, p.4u, 6S). The effoit to
tianslate a conceptual mouel uiawn up in abstiact into an auequate simulation of ieal
woilu phenomenon iequiies that mouel uevelopment be anchoieu in anu calibiateu to
empiiically obseiveu phenomena.
Thiee of the moie piominent moueling appioaches being applieu to stuuy social
uynamics aie uisciete-event moueling (BEN), agent-baseu moueling (ABN), anu complex
systems uynamics (CSB) moueling. Each moueling tool ielies on a ceitain level of
abstiaction that may be chaiacteiizeu in teims of macio-meso-micio level scales; stiategic,
tactical, anu opeiational levels; anu uegiees of uetail useu as paiameteis anu vaiiables foi
the mouels. Figuie 2 below pioviues a visual oveiview of wheie each of these moueling
types fits along a continuum of abstiaction.

Bisciete-event mouels aie usually stiuctuieu as a iational sequencing of events, like
a supply chain, assembly line oi some queuing functions. BENs can be constiucteu using a
high iesolution of uetails to guiue the uesign of opeiating functions of a social system.
BENs iely on lineai logic to sequence events. Events may happen simultaneously,
significant lags may be eviuent, anu emeigent piopeities of netwoik uynamics will likely
evolve. BENs aie quite useful in ceitain kinus of inuustiial engineeiing anu inuustiial
ecology uesign effoits. Theii applications in mouels of complex policy anu goveinance
systems may be useu to captuie the iationalizeu piocesses that follow a logical sequence of
uisciete events. BENs can be useu to mouel the ioutinizeu exchanges of iesouices anu
execution of public policies. This biings to minu Beibeit Simon's uistinction between
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2S
piogiammable anu unpiogiammable policy pioblems. Pioblems that coulu be (oi have
been) piogiammeu aie amenable to BENs, e.g. oiganizational ioutines; while
unpiogiammable pioblems uefy moueling thiough BENs (Simon, 198u).
The logic of complex system uynamics mouels (CSBs) may be tiaceu to the long
histoiy of systems theoiy that is pieuicateu on the flow of inputs, piocesses, outputs, anu
outcomes, stocks anu flows, anu feeuback loops (Neauows, 2uu8). Systems uynamics is
often employeu using high levels of abstiaction at the macio level. The aiticulation of
feeuback loops can aiu in stiategic planning when a ueepei unueistanuing of the
ielationship between vaiiables is impoitant. CSBs follow a non-lineai logic anu can be
useu to anticipate the emeigence of new patteins of goveining authoiity, iesouice
exchanges, anu policy actoi inteiactions. CSBs aie also ciitical because they can be useu to
tiack feeuback loops, the shifting natuie of iesouice flows, anu assumeu ielationship
between inputs, outputs anu outcomes. While CSBs aie extiemely useful in unueistanuing
the intei-connections among uiffeient elements of a system, theii high level of abstiaction
coulu uiminish theii utility in public management systems that aie sensitive to
uisaggiegate bottom-up as well as top-uown piocesses anu othei bounuaiy conuitions.
Agent-baseu moueling (ABNs) pioviues the most useful moueling fiamewoik to
captuie the inteiplay between the micio, meso, anu macio levels (Noith anu Nacal, 2uu7)
anu can accommouate the vaiying uegiees of uetail that aie possible anu uesiiable within a
mouel of a goveinance netwoik. In uiscussing the value of ABNs to the stuuy of policy anu
goveinance uynamics, Squazzoni anu Boeio obseive that, "Stanuaiu policy making mouels
consiuei agents as atomizeu entities possessing iational expectations which inuiviuually
ieact to a set of incentives, uo not consiuei inteiactions oi the mutual influence between
agents anu seem to take place 'off-line' anu outsiue the paiticulai system involveu"
(Squazzoni & Boeio, 2u1u, p.S). They go on to auu that ABN is cuiiently, "the only
technique available touay to foimalize mouels baseu on micio-founuations, such as agents'
beliefs anu behavioi anu social inteiactions, all aspects that we know aie of a ceitain
impoitance |in oiueij to unueistanu macio outcomes." (Squazzoni, & Boeio, 2u1u, p.6). In
uiscussing the potential application of ABN to the stuuy of policy piocesses, they suggest
that in ABNs, ". agents aie not usually vieweu as fully iational utility maximizeis who
behave inuepenuently of each othei, but iathei as auaptive agents who aie context
uepenuent anu follow heteiogeneous thiesholu piefeiences." (p.2). These thiesholu
piefeiences may be uesciibeu as the "uecision heuiistics" of netwoik agents (Noith &
Nacal, 2uu7). ABNs appeai to be the most effective means of moueling the types of
emeigent behaviois, stiuctuies, functions anu actions that occui as a iesult of "bottom-up"
uynamics.
Those who have consiueieu the piomise of ABNs anu CSBs to the stuuy of policy
piocesses iecognize that the fielu is still in the eaily stages of uevelopment (0ECB, 2uu9).
The capacity of ABNs anu CSBs of complex policy anu goveinance systems to leau to
accuiate foiecasting anu pieuicting paiticulai policy outcomes is pieuicateu on a "ueep
unceitainty" that chaiacteiizes oui cuiient state of unueistanuing of complex social
systems. Bankes (2uu2) chaiacteiizes this ueep unceitainty aiising as, "the iesult of
piagmatic limitations in oui ability to use the piesentational foimalisms of statistical
uecision theoiy to expiess all that we know about complex auaptive systems anu theii
associateu policy pioblems" (p.726S). Renueiing the kinu of valiuity neeueu to confiim oi

24
uispiove empiiical hypotheses iequiies the uevelopment of laige samples anu a set of
empiiically-noimeu instiuments anu measuies.
The extent to which simulations can be useu to unueitake theoiy testing in these
contexts iemains to be seen. We neeu to ask, just what kinu of infeiential ieasoning is
possible given the inheient nonlineaiity anu unceitainty chaiacteiistics of complex social
systems. The ueep unceitainty that chaiacteiizes simulateu expeiimentation neeus to be
accounteu foi. The level of systemic eiioi that is possible in computei simulation mouels
can potentially be quite laige. Noueleis iefei to this as "noise" in the mouel. Although
effoits can be maue to ieuuce the noise of a mouel, the piopensity foi laige systemic eiioi
viitually assuies us that the eiioi iates of simulation mouels of social systems fai exceeu
levels of statistical significance founu in moie lineai iegiession mouels. We aie minuful of
why these eiioi iates may be highei in social systems, than they aie in the moie pieuicable
(but still unceitain) aieas of natuial anu biological systems. We have noteu alieauy how
social agents maintain a ceitain level of autonomy in most social systems. The capacity of
inuiviuual social agents to exeit theii own fiee will inevitably leaus to a ceitain level of
unpieuictability. Agent baseu moueleis account foi this unpieuictability in asciibing
piobability functions to agent behavioi that aie, iueally, calibiateu to empiiical
obseivations. Noueleis must still make a wiue iange of choices in builuing theii mouels, as
they aie bounueuly iational as well. They make choices aiounu what elements to
incoipoiate into the mouel anu shoulu be piepaieu to uefenu those choices (Batty, 2uuS).
We will aigue that those looking to apply complexity science anu theoiy to the stuuy
of policy anu goveinance phenomena will be piesseu to avoiu the kinus of positivist anu
postpositivist legacies founu in most computei simulation mouels of complex systems
(Buijs, Eshuis anu Byine, 2uu9). The ontological tensions that aiise between the "nave
iealist" oi "empiiicist epistemologies" founu in the positivist tiauitions of science anu the
social constiuctionism common to moie qualitative, inteipietive sciences may be founu in
viitually all attempts to apply complexity science to the stuuy of social phenomena. We
aigue that iathei than call foi the puiging these mouels of iationalist assumptions, we neeu
to iecognize how these tensions play out within computei simulation mouels of policy anu
goveinance systems (Richaiuson, 2uu8a).
Those familiai with the cuiient uiscouise aiounu complexity science anu public
auministiation anu policy will likely be familiai with Chiistophei Pollitt's skepticism
ielative to this subject (2uu9). Be bases his obseivations on the appaient uichotomy that
peisists between conceptual abstiactions anu the incapacity to empiiically piove the
valiuity of these constiucts using complexity science.
Although space piecluues a ueepei uiscussion heie, we iecognize that the
uevelopment of mouels that aie calibiateu to obseiveu patteins hinges on oui capacity to
ienuei a "thick uesciiption" of these phenomena. To auequately uevelop mouels that may
be able to test the valiuity of ceitain theoietical constiucts iequiies finei anu finei giain
analysis of social phenomena extenuing acioss all levels of social scale (inuiviuual, gioup,
oi oiganizations). In oiuei to stuuy anu test the efficacy of theoiies ielating to the social
constiuction of policy stieams, the path uepenuency of stable anu uestabilizeu systems, the
uecision making stiuctuies within action aienas, the belief netwoiks of auvocacy coalitions,
oi the emeigent featuies of netwoik composition, we will neeu to uevelop mixeu methou
stuuies that combine elements of quantitative anu qualitative social science appioaches. As
oui capacity to unueitake uata mining of textual anu naiiative uata expanus, the

2S
oppoitunities to unueistanu the phenomenological tiaces of nuanceu social inteiactions
intensifies. The fuithei uevelopment of methouologies that blui the lines between
qualitative anu quantitative appioaches, like those founu in Ragin's qualitative compaiative
methou, (2uu8) aie calleu foi. These auvancements will ueepen oui capacity to uevelop
finei anu finei giaineu analysis of social systems anu, in the long iun, allow foi the
integiation of theoiies anu fiamewoiks uiawn fiom not only the kinus of policy anu
goveinance theoiies highlighteu in this manusciipt, but also extenuing into oui theoiies of
management as well.
Aie these asseitions baseu on wishful thinking. To what extent uo we neeu to
iecount Chiistophei Pollitt's view that, "complexity theoiists shoulu stanu on theii own
two feet, epistemologically speaking, anu shoulu not neeu to invent oi magnify papei tigeis
in oiuei to enhance the value of theii own peispective," (2uu8, p.22S). In this manusciipt
we asseit that this epistemological founuation may be founu in the integiation of systems
anu netwoik theoiies with some of the majoi theoietical fiamewoiks influencing the public
auministiation anu policy fielus. Pollitt aigues iightly that, "theie aie many theoiies anu
appioaches which aie non-hieiaichical, uynamic, acknowleuge the significance of
enuogenous as well as exogenous change, anu so on" (2uu8, p. 22S). We countei aigue that
the iange of theoiies that he hau in minu may be combineu with many othei "complexity
fiienuly" theoiies to uevelop computei simulation mouels of policy anu goveinance
systems. In othei woius, we shoulu not constiue complexity theoiy as mutually exclusive
of existing theoiies anu fiamewoik. In this sense, the kinu of theoiy that is ueiiveu thiough
complexity science will, likely, not uisplace existing theoiies anu fiamewoiks, but iathei
ueepen the explanatoiy authoiity many existing theoiies anu fiamewoiks, a point that
Pollitt fails to iecognize.

.%+917(*%+(
Those who have wiitten about the piomise anu limitations of ueveloping computei
simulations of policy anu goveinance systems note that the puipose foi unueitaking this
may not lie in pieuicting, "the futuie state of a given system, but to unueistanu the
system's piopeities anu uissect its geneiative mechanisms anu piocesses, so that policy
uecisions can be bettei infoimeu anu embeuueu within the system's behavioi, thus
becoming pait of it" (Squazzoni anu Boeio, 2u1u, p.S). 0nuei the iubiic of computei
geneiateu uecision suppoit systems, the veiy piocess of pioviuing feeuback about a
systems' uynamics anu netwoik stiuctuie back to ciitical agents in the system itself
becomes an impoitant component of uecision making anu action (uammock et al., 2uu7).
These mouels can be useu "when policy makeis neeu to 3(')* ;):7 $4#(*4( about the
complexity of systems wheie theii uecision is neeueu," as well as "when policy makeis
neeu to ;#*, '*, *(6:+#'+( 4()+'#* 4:*4)(+( ', ":4 $:31+#:*$, so that policy becomes pait of a
complex piocess of management that is inteinal to the system itself" (Squazzoni anu Boeio,
2u1u, p.6). Theie is, inueeu, a long histoiy of employing computei simulation moueling to
stimulate systems thinking (Nitioff et al., 1974).
Coulu it be that the main utility of complexity science to the stuuy of policy anu
goveinance systems lies in its capacity to fiee the minu to think about alteinative
possibilities oi uevelop ueepei situational awaieness (Enusley, 199S). We believe that the

26
kinus of visualizations, scenaiio geneiation anu theoiy testing that aie possible thiough
computei simulation may be hainesseu to uesign oi ieuesign policy anu goveinance
systems. Although we believe that using computei simulation to pioviue "uecision
suppoit" to policy uesigneis anu netwoik manageis is extiemely impoitant, we neeu to
iecognize that tailoiing mouels to meet the neeus of stakeholueis possess significant
challenges foi those looking to cieate simulations to test theoiies (Koliba et al., 2u11).
Applieu scientists will be moie amenable to mouify theii mouels to meet the neeus of
stakeholueis, anu in the enu if these mouels aie useu to piomote bettei peifoiming, moie
accountable policy anu goveinance systems, then aie not puiposes of science as an engine
of social piogiess fulfilleu.
7
The type of theoiies anu fiamewoiks that we have suiveyeu in
this papei may then be vieweu as impoitant tools to be employeu as a means to othei,
highly uesiiable enus (eg. bettei peifoimance, knowleuge tiansfei, leaining, etc.).
Boes the inheient unceitainty of these mouels mean that theie is no ioom to
unueitake simulation expeiiments foi the sake of theoiy testing anu knowleuge uiscoveiy.
We woulu ceitainly hope not. In oiuei to evolve oui theoiy testing capacities, we will neeu
to uevelop moie mouels that iely on empiiical uata uiawn fiom a vaiiety of quantitative
anu qualitative souices. Although oui eaily attempts to uevelop this kinu of patteineu
oiienteu moueling will geneiate ciuue appioximations of ieality with limiteu pieuictive
powei, we believe that these eaily attempts of couisei giain mouels will evolve as oui
computational powei anu theoietical unueistanuing of how complex auaptive systems
woik evolves. Eaily attempts at theoiy testing in these mouels will neeu to be evaluateu
with a less iestiictive maigin of eiioi than what has tiauitionally been acceptable in
hypothesis testing.
We uo not believe that we have to saciifice the piagmatic utility of ueveloping these
mouels in collaboiation with stakeholueis in oiuei to auvance scientific unueistanuing.
Paitneiing with stakeholueis in the uevelopment of ieseaich questions (Koliba anu
Lathiop, 2uu7) anu mouel paiameteis can impiove not only the ielevance of the mouel
(van uen Belt, 2uu4), but the iigoi of the mouel as well. This is paiticulaily tiue when the
authenticity of the uata is pieuicateu on the iappoit that is establisheu between ieseaich
subjects anu moueleis. The complexity of most policy anu goveinance systems will not
easily ieveal itself to moueleis. In many instances the complexity of a system may iemain a
mysteiy to those who aie most intimately involveu in its uaily opeiations. We believe that
by paitneiing with the actois who contiibute to the management of a policy oi goveinance
system a thickei uesciiption of the system may be ienueieu. These thick uesciiptions may,
in tuin, be useu to uesign calibiateu mouels of opeiating policy anu goveinance systems.
We have asseiteu heie that Newtonian assumptions iegaiuing iational action anu
the lineaiity of causes anu effects aie not sufficient enough to uesciibe, evaluate anu uesign
effective policy anu goveinance systems. The peisistence of wickeu pioblems, fiom
funuing foi health caie, to managing the stability of oui financial system oi climate, to the
pieseivation of oui ecosystems anu social welfaie, suggests that we may cling exclusively
to the Newtonian appioach to science at oui peiil. A complex systems appioach, on the
othei hanu, may open up new vistas to confiont these wickeu public pioblems.

7
In other papers we discuss the role that governance informatics can play in informing decision making of policy
makers and public administrators (Koliba, et al., 2011a; Zia, et al., 2011)

27

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