Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez on November 22, 2010

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity. ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles. HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

Constitutional Law Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power

Lutz vs. AranetaGR L-7859, 22 December 1955 First Division, Reyes JBL (J): 8 concur Facts: AWalter Lutz, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, sought torecover the sum of P14,6666.40 paid by the estate as taxes from the Commissioner under Section e ofCommonwealth Act 567 (the Sugar Adjustment Act), alleging that such tax is unconstitutional as it levied forthe aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which is in his opinion not a public purpose. Issue: Whether the tax is valid in supporting an industry.

Held: The tax is levied with a regulatory prupose, i.e. to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilizationof the threatened sugar industry. The act is primarily an exercise of police power, and is not a pure exercise oftaxing power. As sugar production is one of the great industries of the Philippines; and that its promotion,protection and advancement redounds greatly to the general welfare, the legislature found that th e generalwelfare demanded that the industry should be stabilized, and provided that the distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its component to enable it to resist the added strain of the increase in tax that ithad to sustain. Further, it cannot be said that the devotion of tax money to experimental stations to seekincrease of efficiency in sugar production, utilization of byproducts, etc., as well as to the improvement ofliving and working conditions in sugar mills and plantations, without any part of such money being channeleddiectly to private persons, constitute expenditure of tax money for private purposes.The tax is valid.

TIO vs. VRB 151 SCRA 208 GR No. L-75697, June 18, 1987 "The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one industry over another." FACTS: The petitioner assails the validity of PD 1987 entitled an "Act creating the Videogram Regulatory Board," citing especially Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government. Petitioner contends that aside from its being a rider and not germane to the subject matter thereof, and such imposition was being harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or unlawfully restraints trade in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. ISSUE: Is PD 1987 a valid exercise of taxing power of the state? HELD: Yes. It is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as those rest in the discretion of the authority which exercises it. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one industry over another.

OSMEA 220 GR No. 99886, March 31, 1993

vs. SCRA

ORBOS 703

" To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of the power to tax, there must be a standard which implies that the legislature determines matter of principle and lays down fundamental policy." FACTS: Senator John Osmea assails the constitutionality of paragraph 1c of PD 1956, as amended by EO 137, empowering the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve the increase of fuel prices or impose additional amounts on petroleum products which proceeds shall accrue to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) established for the reimbursement to ailing oil companies in the event of sudden price increases. The petitioner avers that the collection on oil products establishments is an undue and invalid delegation of legislative power to tax. Further, the petitioner points out that since a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created. It thus appears that the challenge posed by the petitioner is premised primarily on the view that the powers granted to the ERB under P.D. 1956, as amended, partake of the nature of the taxation power of the State. ISSUE: Is there an undue delegation of the legislative power of taxation? HELD: None. It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF as a special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special fund." With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general policy of the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment the resources of the Fund.
Taxicab Operators v. The Board of Transportation [GR L-59234, 30 September 1982] Facts: Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of

Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of public convenience. On 10 October 1977, Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular 77-42 which phases out old and dilapidated taxis; refusing registration to taxi units within the National Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old. Pursuant to the above BOT circular, Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular 52, dated 15 August 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the NCR, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981. On 27 January 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT (Case 80-7553), seeking to nullify MC 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. On 16 February 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a Manifestation and Urgent Motion, praying for an early hearing of their petition. The case was heard on 20 February 1981. On 28 November 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition praying that the case be resolved or decided not later than 10 December 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection of their interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on 1 January 1982. Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that the records of the case could not be located. On 29 December 1981, the present Petition was instituted. The Supreme Court denied the writs prayed for and dismissed the petition; without costs. 1. Rationale behind exercise of police power The overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

Velasco vs. Villegas [G.R. No. L-24153 (120 SCRA), February 14, 1983]

Facts: Petitioners herein are members of the Sta. Cruz Barbershop Association. This is an appeal from the lower court's(LC) order dismissing their suit for declatory relief. They are challenging the constitutionality of Ord. No. 4964. They contend that it amounts to deprivation of properties and their means of livelihood without due process of law. The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person." Respondent in its reply, said that the Ordinance No. 4964 is constitutional and such is just an exercise of the state's inherent power (police power). Issue: Whether or not the assailed Ordinance violated the petitioner's right to property and their means of livelihood. Held: Ordinance is Constitutional. Petition is dismissed, LC decision affirmed.

Enactment of such (Ordinance) is a valid exercise of Police Power. The objectives of the Ordinance are: (1) To impose payment of license fees for engaging in the business of massage clinics, and; (2) To forestall possible immorality which might grow from the construction of a separate room for massaging customers. This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. And for that reason, the petitioners rights were not violated and they are not deprived of the due process of law.

Pollution Adjudication Board vs. CA et al.

G.R. No. 93891, 11 March 1991 Third Division, Feliciano (J), 4 concur FACTS: Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation was involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater being directly discharged into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan- Tinerejos River. Petitioner Board, an agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions, have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the

applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the river. Petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations. Solar, however, with preliminary injunction against the Board, went to the Regional Trial Court on petition for certiorari, but it was dismissed upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and not certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and academic. Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. In addition, the Court of Appeals declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same time, the CA said that certiorari was a proper remedy since the Orders of petitioner Board may result in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the case might be moot and academic, "larger issues" demanded that the question of due process be settled. Petitioner Board moved for reconsideration, without success. Arguing that that the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution were issued in accordance with law and were not violative of the requirements of due process; and the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper subjects of a petition for certiorari, Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre for petitioner asked the Supreme Court to review the Decision and Resolution promulgated by the Court of Appeals entitled "Solar Textile Finishing Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication Board," which reversed an order of the Regional Trial Court. In addition, petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board contends that the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the River provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the

1982 Effluent Code. Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before the Board made no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the ground that Solar had been denied due process by the Board. HELD: The Court found that the Order and Writ of Execution were entirely within the lawful authority of petitioner Board. Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like here. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. Hence, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal. The Court gave due course on the Petition for Review and the Decision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution were set aside. The Order of petitioner Board and the Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court were reinstated, without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the Board.

Tablarin vs. Gutierrez [G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987]

Facts: The petitioners seek admission into colleges or schools of medicine. However the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT). Republic Act 2382 as amended by R.A. 4224 and 5946, known as the Medical Act of 1959 created, among others, the Board of Medical Education (BME) whose functions include "to determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine" (Sec. 5 (a). Section 7 of the same Act requires from applicants to present a certificate of eligibility for entrance (cea) to medical school from the BME. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, established a uniform admission test called National Medical Admission Test as additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility. Petitioners then filed with the RTC a petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Sec. of educ, BME from enforcing Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no. 2 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as condition for securing (cea). Issue: Whether or not Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and

MECS Order no. 2 violate the constitution as they prescribe an unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement Held: The legislative and administrative provisions impugned in this case constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements-i.e., the completion of

prescribed courses in a recognized medical schoolfor admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current state of our social and economic development, are widely known. The Court believes that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improving the quality of medical education in the country."

Balacuit v CFI G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988

J. Gancayo

Facts: Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by theMunicipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969. This called for a reduction to of the ticket price given to minors from 7-12 years old. There was a fine from 200-600 pesos or a 2-6 month imprisonment The complaint was issued in the trial court. A TRO was then issued to prevent the law from being enforced. The respondent court entered its decision declaring the law valid. Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power. Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the power of' the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Section 15(n) of Republic Act No. 523 where it states that the Muncipal board can only fix license fees for theaters and not admission rates. The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by invoking the general welfare clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the cited law.

Issue:

Does this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of admission to these places of exhibition and amusement whether under its general grant of power or under the general welfare clause as invoked by the City?

Held: The ordinance is under neither and thus unconstitutional. Petition granted.

Ratio: 1. Kwong Sing v. City of Manila- the word "regulate" was interpreted to include the power to control, to govern and to restrain, it would seem that under its power to regulate places of exhibitions and amusement, the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan could make proper policeregulations as to the mode in which the business shall be exercised. In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by the local government. People v. Chan- an ordinance of the City of Manila prohibiting first run cinematographs from selling tickets beyond their seating capacity was upheld as constitutional for being a valid exercise of police power. The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to enact the ordinance in question under its power to regulate embodied in Section 15(n), now invokes the police power as delegated to it under the general welfare clause to justify the enactment of said ordinance

To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts. Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive, unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade, and violative of the right of persons to enter into contracts, considering that the theater owners are bound under a contract with the film owners for just admission prices for general admission, balcony and lodge. Homeowners Association- the exercise of police power is necessarily subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the regard, the respect and the obedience due to the prescriptions of the fundamental law The court agreed with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would for themselves. A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents; however, the petitioners are

the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. Theordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be difficulty in its implementation because as already experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of theordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order to avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this undesirable practice and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age of children. This is, however, not at all practicable. We can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare. Respondent further alleges that by charging the full price, the children are being exploited by movie house operators. We fail to see how the children are exploited if they pay the full price ofadmission. They are treated with the same quality of entertainment as the adults. Moreover, as a logical consequence of the ordinance, movie house and theater operators will be discouraged from exhibiting wholesome movies for general patronage, much less children's pictures if only to avoid compliance with the ordinance and still earn profits for themselves. A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license, revocable at the will of the proprietor of the theater or it may be evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable consideration, the purchaser has acquired the right to enter the theater and observe the performance on condition that he behaves properly. Such ticket, therefore, represents a right, Positive or conditional, as the case may

be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale. This right is clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of property. As such, the owner thereof, in the absence of any condition to the contrary in the contract by which he obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases and at such price as he can obtain. In no sense could theaters be considered public utilities. The State has not found it appropriate as a national policy to interfere with the admission prices to these performances. This does not mean however, that theaters and exhibitions are not affected with public interest even to a certain degree. Motion pictures have been considered important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perceptions by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits are considerable. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. 34 The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause.

Although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence.

Dela Cruz v Paras G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983 Fernando, CJ: Facts: 1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs. Petitioners contended that the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. 2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.' The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction: On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938. 3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one bit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. 4. Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid

NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. 1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs. 2. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself. 3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business. 4. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.

City Government of QC vs Judge Ericta & Himlayang Pilipino

Police Power Not Validly Exercised
Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF. The law basically provides that at least six (6)

percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid. HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-31249 August 19, 1986 SALVADOR VILLACORTA as City Engineer of Dagupan City, and JUAN S. CAGUIOA as Register of Deeds of Dagupan City, petitioners, -versusGREGORIO BERNARDO and HON. MACARIO

OFILADA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan respondents. Victor T. Llamas, Jr. for respondents.

CRUZ, J.: This is a petition for certiorari against a decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan annulling an ordinance adopted by the municipal board of Dagupan City. The ordinance reads in full as follows: ORDINANCE 22 AN ORDINANCE REGULATING SUBDIVISION PLANS OVER PARCELS OF LAND IN THE CITY OF DAGUPAN. Be it ordained by the Municipal Board of Dagupan City in session assembled: Section 1. Every proposed subdivision plan over any lot in the City of Dagupan, shalt before the same is submitted for approval and/or verification by the Bureau of Lands and/or the Land Registration Commission, be previously submitted to the City Engineer of the City who shall see to it that no encroachment is made on any portion of the public domain, that the zoning ordinance and all other pertinent rules and regulations are observed.

Section 2. As service fee thereof, an amount equivalent to P0.30 per square meter of every lot resulting or win result from such subdivision shall be charged by the City Engineer's Office. Section 3. It shall be unlawful for the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City to allow the registration of a subdivision plan unless there is prior written certification issued by the City Engineer that such plan has already been submitted to his office and that the same is in order. Section 4. Any violation of this ordinance shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two hundred (P200.00) pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months or both in the discretion of the judge. Section 5. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval. In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a quo declared: From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that would justify the enactment of the questioned ordinance. Section 1 of said ordinance clearly conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not require subdivision plans to be submitted to the City Engineer before the same is submitted for approval to and verification by the General Land Registration Office or by the Director of Lands as provided for in Section 58 of said Act.

Section 2 of the same ordinance also contravenes the provisions of Section 44 of Act 496, the latter being silent on a service fee of PO.03 per square meter of every lot subject of such subdivision application; Section 3 of the ordinance in question also conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not mention of a certification to be made by the City Engineer before the Register of Deeds allows registration of the subdivision plan; and the last section of said ordinance imposes a penalty for its violation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose. In other words, Ordinance 22 of the City of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivision owner additional conditions. xxx xxx xxx The Court takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in bringing to a halt the surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the government. But as already intimidated above, the powers of the board in enacting such a laudable ordinance cannot be held valid when it shall impede the exercise of rights granted in a general law and/or make a general law subordinated to a local ordinance. We affirm. To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage

licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnaping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of passports, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra vires. So many excesses are attempted in the name of the police power that it is time, we feel, for a brief admonition. Regulation is a fact of life in any well-ordered community. As society becomes more and more complex, the police power becomes correspondingly ubiquitous. This has to be so for the individual must subordinate his interests to the common good, on the time honored justification of Salus populi est suprema lex. In this prolix age, practically everything a person does and owns affects the public interest directly or at least vicariously, unavoidably drawing him within the embrace of the police power. Increasingly, he is hemmed in by all manner of statutory, administrative and municipal requirements and restrictions that he may find officious and even oppressive. It is necessary to stress that unless the creeping interference of the government in essentially private matters is moderated, it is likely to destroy that prized and peculiar virtue of the free society: individualism. Every member of society, while paying proper deference to the general welfare, must not be deprived of the right to be left alone or, in the Idiom of the day, "to do his thing." As long as he

does not prejudice others, his freedom as an individual must not be unduly curtailed. We therefore urge that proper care attend the exercise of the police power lest it deteriorate into an unreasonable intrusion into the purely private affairs of the individual. The so-called "general welfare" is too amorphous and convenient an excuse for official arbitrariness. Let it always be remembered that in the truly democratic state, protecting the rights of the individual is as important as, if not more so than, protecting the rights of the public. This advice is especially addressed to the local governments which exercise the police power only by virtue of a valid delegation from the national legislature under the general welfare clause. In the instant case, Ordinance No. 22 suffers from the additional defect of violating this authority for legislation in contravention of the national law by adding to its requirements. WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court annulling the challenged ordinance is AFFIRMED, without any pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera and Paras, JJ., concur.

TATEL VS. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC [207 SCRA 157; G.R. No. 40243; 11 Mar 1992]

Facts:

Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac. Complaints were received by themunicipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioners warehouse. A committee was then appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from itsinvestigation on the matter that an accidental fire within thewarehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. According to respondent municipal officials, petitioners warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioners warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning Article 694 of the Civil Code

(2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipalityof Virac is unconstitutional and void.

Held: The storage

of abaca and copra in petitioners warehouse is a nuisance under the provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a valid municipal ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be unfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade, 5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The purpose of the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of government. The lower court did not err in its decision.