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Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya framing of the IsraelPalestine conflict during war and calm periods
Mohamad Hamas Elmasry, Alaa El Shamy, Peter Manning, Andrew Mills and Philip J Auter International Communication Gazette 2013 75: 750 originally published online 18 April 2013 DOI: 10.1177/1748048513482545 The online version of this article can be found at: http://gaz.sagepub.com/content/75/8/750

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Article

Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya framing of the Israel Palestine conflict during war and calm periods
Mohamad Hamas Elmasry
The American University in Cairo, Egypt

the International Communication Gazette 75(8) 750768 The Author(s) 2013 Reprints and permission: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1748048513482545 gaz.sagepub.com

Alaa El Shamy
Ain Shams University, Egypt

Peter Manning
University of Technology, Sydney, Australia

Andrew Mills
Northwestern University, Qatar

Philip J Auter
University of Louisiana, Lafayette, USA

Abstract This framing study compares Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya coverage of the IsraelPalestine conflict during the 2008/2009 Gaza conflict and one year later, during a period of calm. Findings suggest that both networks used framing mechanisms to highlight Palestinian perspectives over Israeli ones and frame Palestinians as victims of Israeli aggression. The networks regularly described Palestinian casualties and showed images of Palestinian grief, provided more voice to Palestinian sources, and personalized Palestinian deaths. Keywords Al-Arabiya, Al-Jazeera, Arab news, content analysis, framing, Israel, IsraelPalestine conflict, Palestine, war reporting

Corresponding author: Mohamad Hamas Elmasry, The American University in Cairo, Abdul Latif Jameel Hall, Room P022, New Cairo, 11835, Egypt. Email: elmasry_m@aucegypt.edu

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Introduction
It has been more than 15 years since satellite news network Al-Jazeera burst on to the media scene in the Middle East, replacing western perspectives with indigenous ones. Now, Al-Jazeera provides news feeds all over the world, has more foreign bureaus than any other television network, has arrived in Europe, Canada and the United States as a competitive broadcaster, and become a player in the politics of its own region. Al-Arabiya, broadcast out of Dubai but owned by a Saudi corporation, has been AlJazeeras main competitor in the region since it began broadcasting in 2003. How do these two regional networks differ? Specifically, how do they differ over coverage of one of the most intractable and important problems of their own region: the Israeli-Palestinian dispute? This study is designed to shed light on these questions. The study a comparative content analysis of Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya coverage of the IsraelPalestine conflict during the 2008/2009 invasion of Gaza and one year later, during a period of relative calm will add empirical findings to the growing bodies of literature on Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, respectively, and help show how two powerful Arab news networks covered the IsraelPalestine conflict at two different points in time. This study follows a tradition of research into news coverage of the IsraelPalestinian conflict. Most of these studies have analyzed American and other western reportage and concluded that coverage is slanted heavily in favor of Israeli perspectives. A separate thread of research more relevant to our proposed study, but much smaller in size has examined Arab news coverage of the conflict. In contrast to research about western news, this research has found that Arab news media have advanced Palestinian perspectives and discounted or muted Israeli voices (see Literature review to follow). The body of literature on Arab news coverage of IsraelPalestine, however, has lacked conceptual grounding and done little to explain the nature of specific news frames embedded within Arab news coverage of the IsraelPalestine conflict. This study, conceptually grounded in media framing theory, empirically examines specific aspects of news framing of the IsraelPalestine dispute. Prominence, sourcing, keywords, images of grief, personalization, and direction are analyzed quantitatively to show how Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya covered the IsraelPalestine conflict both during a crisis period and a period of relative calm.

Literature review
A good deal of scholarly literature about Arab press environments has been produced, with most research noting that most Arab governments have historically used press laws, license laws, penal codes, political ideology, and brute intimidation to ensure content conforms to government interests (Elmasry, 2011, 2012; Mellor, 2005, 2007; Rugh, 2004; Sakr, 2001a). Government ownership continues to be the dominant ownership structure in most of the Arab region, but more independent and opposition news outlets have appeared over the past 1015 years as media reforms have brought increased freedoms to some Arab countries (see Ayish, 2002; Cooper, 2008; Elmasry, 2012; Hafez, 2002; Mellor, 2005). A major change in the Arab press environment occurred in 1991, at the time of the first Gulf War. At that time, Arabs were exposed en masse to American satellite news

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network CNN, and by comparison perceived their own networks to be lacking in professionalism (Sakr, 2005). In the wars aftermath, Arab news networks were established that followed some aspects of CNN reporting style. Al-Jazeera, established in 1996 in Doha, Qatar, and Al-Arabiya, a Saudi-owned and Dubai-based network created in 2003 to compete with Al-Jazeera, are currently the two largest Arab news networks. Both stations are part of the new breed of western-style satellite news networks in the Arab world. Many important studies on Al-Jazeera have been produced since the network was established (Auter et al., 2005; Ayish, 2010; Barkho, 2007; El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002; Figenschou, 2005; Johnson and Fahmy, 2008; King and Zayani, 2008; Lynch, 2006; Miles, 2005; Pintak, 2008; Sakr, 2001b; Valeriani, 2010; Zayani, 2005, 2008; Zayani and Ayish, 2006; Zayani and Sahraoui, 2007). These studies have focused on the networks journalistic practices, agenda, viewers, and coverage patterns, as well as how other journalists regard it, and its sometimes prickly relationship with the US administration. The hostility that has often characterized the relationship between Al-Jazeera and the US government which has accused the network of provoking anti-American sentiment (Fahmy and Al Emad, 2011) is noteworthy. The tensions have been marked by Americas targeting of Al-Jazeera offices during wartime (International Federation of Journalists, 2003). Studies have also been done comparing Al-Jazeera with major western media like the BBC and CNN. Some research has documented criticisms of Al-Jazeera. Complaints have ranged from objections over lack of access for interviews (Figenschou, 2010) to calls for a more democratic model similar to the US Public Service Broadcasting network (Ayish, 2010) to demands for less scrutiny of Al-Jazeera and more of the media systems within which such channels are regulated (Ayish and Sakr, 2010). By comparison, there have been few studies of Al-Arabiya and, even then, only in a comparative context (see Valeriani, 2010; Zayani and Ayish, 2006). Governments in the West, and some within the Arab region, have criticized the Arab networks, particularly Al-Jazeera, for their allegedly distorted presentations of reality and deleterious role in affecting public opinion. As Zayani and Ayish (2006: 493) say: The editorial mobilization of these channels is perceived as constituting a direct challenge to the western, and more specifically, American hegemony. Audiences in the Arab world appear to find Al-Jazeera more credible than western news networks. In the Auter et al. (2005) study involving 5379 Arab users of AlJazeera in 137 countries belief in the channels credibility had a direct effect in bonding viewers to the Al-Jazeera family, and to more intensive use of its website. The concentration on Al-Jazeera and its sizeable cultural and political impact has not, however, been to the detriment of other, broader media studies in the Middle East over the past decade. In retrospect, many of the studies appear to be a prelude to 2011 events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, now dubbed the Arab Spring. The Arab protests arose out of frustration with dictatorship, corruption, and sociopolitical inequity, but state-run media in the region were also a focus of popular angst. Lynch (2006, 2008), Sakr (2007a, 2007b), Mellor (2005, 2008), and Pintak (2008) speak of a new, informed Arab street hungry for more reliable information from their journalists, satellite TV, and social media. Valeriani also notes the passing of print as a dominant media form in the Arab world (2010: 40).

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It is in this context of enormous change that one 65-year-old problem Palestine continues to call for attention. While Al-Jazeera made much of its mark through its reporting on Iraq and Afghanistan following 11 September 2001, there is no doubt that the network regards what happens in Palestine as a matter of major interest.

Research into IsraelPalestine news coverage

There is a vast body of literature on western coverage of the IsraelPalestine conflict. A possible break in US coverage notwithstanding (see Roy, 2010), most studies point to biased coverage which gives prominence to Israeli perspectives and marginalizes Palestine perspectives (see Aqtash et al., 2004; Deprez and Raeymaeckers, 2010; Dunsky, 2008; Elmasry, 2009; Friel and Falk, 2007; Handley and Ismail, 2010; Ismail, 2010; Kandil, 2009; Manning, 2003; Noakes and Wilkins, 2002; Philo, 2012; Philo and Berry, 2004; Richardson and Barkho, 2009; Thomas, 2011; Viser, 2003). Relatively few English-language studies have examined Arab news coverage of the IsraelPalestine conflict, with studies showing perhaps unsurprisingly given broad and constant Arab support for the Palestinian cause that Arab news outlets give more voice to Palestinian perspectives than Israeli ones and portray Palestinians as victims of Israeli aggression (see Aqtash et al., 2004; Dajani, 2003; Mellor, 2005; Wolfsfeld et al., 2008). Research shows that Arab news media have a stronger interest in the IsraelPalestine conflict than other issues (see Ayish, 2002), and that Arab news coverage tends to lack objectivity in its reportage of the issues, nearly always slanting its news against Israel and in favor of the Palestinians (Mellor, 2005). Some research has also suggested a lack of professionalism in standards of accuracy, timeliness, balance, context, and comprehensiveness (Dajani, 2003). El Tounsys (2002) analysis found that Arab satellite stations played to the interests of their audiences by seemingly voicing the positions of the local populations. For example, many stations showed a great deal of graphic footage of the violence of the second Palestinian intifada (Arabic for uprising), photographs of the Al-Aqsa Mosque and Dome of the Rock, and nationalist movies and documentaries (such as Nasser 56) documenting the Palestinian plight. Ayishs (2002) study of pan-Arab satellite stations showed strong support for the Palestinian cause. The satellite stations devoted a disproportionate amount of coverage to the Palestinian issue and highlighted Palestinian suffering. It is in this contested field of Arab political change, Arab media development, and apparent Arab consensus around the IsraelPalestine issue that this study examines how the two largest Arab news networks approached one of the longest standing political conflicts in the world.

Framing theory
Framing theory suggests that the specific ways messages are packaged and delivered can impact how communication recipients comprehend and evaluate messages. The framing perspective is important to news media studies in large part because news texts are provided meaning through framing (Gamson, 1989). Gamson and Modigliani (1987: 143) define a media frame as the central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning.

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As a result of framing, events are structured in such a way as to identify them from a particular social perspective and suggest solutions based on that perspective of events (Entman, 1993). Lippmann (1946) has pointed out that the purpose of news is specifically to point out key elements of a story for the audience to focus on. According to Entman, framing is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and / or treatment recommendation for the item described (1993: 52). Whether framing is done intentionally, as in the case of advocacy journalism, or unintentionally, in order to fit a complex story within a limited time/space window, portions of the story are emphasized while others are de-emphasized or excluded. This can result in one event being represented in a variety of different ways by different news organizations. Entman (1993) explains that message writers use various devices including word choice, visual images, placement of information, and associations, among other things to frame messages. Research has identified two general types of framing: episodic and thematic. The former type of frame is more focused on individual examples of big events, while the latter is more issue-oriented (Iyengar, 1991). Framing has been studied as both an independent and dependent variable. When looking at it as an independent variable, framing studies have focused on how the media create frames for the audience to utilize when interpreting events. When researched as a dependent variable, framing studies look at how and why frames are adopted by members of the media (Tewskbury and Scheufele, 2009). Past research has shown that story framing can have a significant effect on audience opinions on key issues (see DellOrto et al., 2004; Scheufele, 2000). Framing research is somewhat controversial because it varies so much from study to study making it virtually impossible to generalize or to utilize a frameset developed in one study to perform a new framing analysis. Frames are also often neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive (Tankard, 2001). In fact, during the period in which a news event is covered, Chyi and McCombs (2004) point out that the event is often framed and reframed again and again, in order to keep the story fresh. Following Entmans (1993) explication of framing devices, this study includes analyses of prominence how the news networks under study highlight some perspectives over others through coverage frequency, length of news reports, and news format depth and other framing devices, including dominant topic selection, word choice, and sourcing. The present study seeks to answer the following broad research question: RQ: How did Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya frame the IsraelPalestine conflict during the 2008/2009 invasion of Gaza and one year later, during a period of relative calm?

Methodology
To answer the research question, a content analysis was carried out comparing Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya coverage of the 2008/2009 Gaza war period and the corresponding period of relative calm exactly one year later. Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya were selected for analysis because they are the leading regional providers of Arab broadcast news, because of their positions of influence within

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Arab media, and since they have unique political leanings. Al-Jazeera is Qatar-owned, and has been accused of taking anti-American and anti-Israeli tones. Al-Arabiya, meanwhile, is owned by the Saudi-controlled MBC group and has sometimes been accused of being too friendly to western interests. It is important to know how stations with major sway over Arab public opinion, but with different ownership styles, cover IsraelPalestine. Such an analysis is especially important given the Arab worlds generally sympathetic view towards the plight of Palestine. It is expected that both Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya will support Palestinian positions and be critical of Israeli actions. What is of interest here, though, is how these stations express Palestinian support, and how they as Arab stations seen as leaders in the region differ on key aspects of IsraelPalestine coverage. The Gaza war period 27 December 200818 January 2009 was selected because it was one of the more cataclysmic events in modern IsraelPalestine relations. Because coverage during crises can differ markedly from periods of relative peace, a calm period exactly one year after the war period (27 December 200918 January 2010) was also analyzed. In all, 46 nights of Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya coverage all 23 nights of the 2008/2009 conflict and 23 nights in 2009/2010 were analyzed. We analyzed both stations one-hour flagship evening newscasts every night for the duration of the 23-day war period, and the 23-day calm period. All IsraelPalestine news reports appearing on the flagship newscasts were analyzed. A total of 309 reports were examined over the two time periods and across the two stations. The unit of analysis was the broadcast news report. The coding scheme consisted of a variety of variables intended to measure various aspects of news framing selection, salience, word choice, specific news frames, and direction, among others. The following variables and coding categories were included in the coding scheme:  Length of news reports (1 minute or less; 1:01 2 minutes; 2:01 3 minutes; 3:01 4 minutes; 4:01 5 minutes).  News format (anchor reader, VO, VOSOT, package, and other).  Use of correspondents (yes or no).  Report location (Palestinian location, Israeli location, Jerusalem, studio, illegal Israeli settlement, other, no location).  Breaking news (yes or no).  Dominant topic (war recap-casualties, international/regional diplomatic efforts to end crisis, Fatah/Hamas relations, protests, Egyptian government vs Hamas, the Egyptian crossing point, IsraelPalestine peace process, prisoners, IsraelPalestine clashes, Al-Aqsa Mosque, occupation, tunnels, and other).  Words used to describe Israeli violence (aggressor-related words, self-defense related words, more neutral word choice).  Palestinian and Israeli casualty descriptions (yes or no).  Death counts of Palestinians and Israelis (yes or no).  Images of grieving Palestinians and Israelis (yes or no).  Information sources (Palestinian, Israeli, international, other Arab, no source attributed).  On-camera interviews with Israeli government officials, Israeli citizens, Hamas officials, Fatah officials, and Palestinian citizens.

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 Words used to describe Palestinian violence (aggressor-related words, selfdefense related words, more neutral word choice).  Overall direction of report toward Israeli government (positive, negative, and neutral).  Overall direction of report toward Palestinian citizens (positive, negative, and neutral).  Overall direction of report toward Israeli citizens (positive, negative, and neutral).  Overall direction of report toward Hamas (positive, negative, and neutral).  Overall direction of report toward Egypt (positive, negative, and neutral).  Overall direction of report toward the USA (positive, negative, and neutral).  Overall direction of report toward the United Nations (positive, negative, and neutral).  Personalization of Israeli victims (yes or no). (Note: Personalization here refers to the documentation of personal details about victims, including name, occupation, marital status, and number of children.)  Personalization of Palestinian victims (yes or no). Two Qatar University undergraduate students were hired as research assistant coders. Both were trained extensively on the coding scheme. At the conclusion of training, inter-coder reliability was tested on 32 sample reports using both percent agreement and Scotts pi. Generally speaking, percent agreement scores above 90% are considered acceptable. However, for variables with several coding levels/categories, slightly lower percent agreement scores may be acceptable. Scotts pi, a more conservative measure which accounts for chance agreement, is a useful indicator of inter-coder reliability and can be used in conjunction with percent agreement. Scotts pi scores above .6 are considered adequate and scores above .7 are considered good (see Shoemaker, 2003). Percent agreement scores for the 13 variables examined ranged from 78% to 100%, with all but two variables producing scores of at least 84% and all but three scoring at least 88%. Scotts pi scores for all but two variables were at least .63, and scores for all but three variables were at least .68. Two variables images of grieving and word choice produced Scotts pi below .40. These variables were kept in the study, however, because percent agreement scores for these two variables 95% for images of grieving (61 coding agreements, 3 coding disagreements) and 94% for word choice (60 coding agreements and 4 coding disagreements) were high, and because Scotts pi is an insufficient, and often inaccurate, measure of reliability for dichotomous coding measures (Andsager et al., 2006; Neuendorf, 2001; Potter and Levine-Donnerstein, 1999). When there are only two answer options available to coders (such as on questions requiring yes or no responses), a very small number of disagreements can drastically and disproportionately lower Scotts pi scores. Inter-coder reliability scores are presented in Table 1.

Findings
Content analysis results show some stark differences, and some similarities, in the ways Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya reported on and framed the IsraelPalestine crisis during the two periods under study.

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Table 1. Intercoder reliability results. Variable News report format Use of correspondent Report location Breaking news Dominant topic Palestinian and Israeli casualty descriptions Death counts Images of grieving Information sources On-camera interviews Word choice Direction Personalization % Agreement 84% 94% 88% 97% 91% 89% 92% 95% 78% 94% 94% 79% 100% Scotts pi .76 .76 .76 .84 .87 .69 .63 .38 .72 .77 .30 .68 1.0

Prominence
Prominence which can be measured in a variety of ways, including total amount of coverage, placement of coverage, news outlet-generated reports, and total number of breaking news stories, among others is an important aspect of content studies that compare how news outlets treat different sides in a conflict (Elmasry, 2009). This content study analyzed the frequency with which the two networks covered IsraelPalestine, the length of their news reports, news formats, use of correspondents, and breaking news. The networks ran a total of 309 IsraelPalestine reports on their flagship evening newscasts during the calm and war periods combined, with Al-Jazeera (n 168) producing slightly more reports than Al-Arabiya (n 141) overall. As anticipated, coverage of the crisis spiked during the war period, with the networks running a combined total of 200 stories during the 23-day escalation, compared with 109 reports during the calm period. Interestingly, the frequency of Al-Jazeeras coverage of IsraelPalestine was relatively consistent across the two periods. The network produced 88 reports during the war period and 80 during the calm period. Al-Arabiya, meanwhile, produced 112 reports during the war period and only 29 during the calm period. These findings suggest both a steady interest in IsraelPalestine on the part of Al-Jazeera, and that Al-Arabiyas attention to the issue is heavily dependent upon serious escalation. Cross-tabulation of time period of coverage by newspaper indicated statistically significant differences, w2 (1, N 225) 24.57, p < .001. Total number of reports is not sufficient as a measure of total coverage allotted. Another illustrative measure is the total length of news reports. On the whole, Al-Jazeera produced significantly longer reports than Al-Arabiya and devoted considerably more time to the IsraelPalestine issue. Nearly half (44.6%) of Al-Jazeeras reports were more than three minutes long, and only 20.2% were one minute or less in length. Al-Arabiya, by comparison, ran a very large number of short reports (61% of all Al-Arabiya reports were one minute or less in length), and ran only a small number of longer reports (13.5% of Al-Arabiya reports were longer than three minutes). Also, 24.4% percent of Al-Jazeeras reports were between two and three minutes in length, compared with just 13.5% of Al-Arabiya reports.

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Table 2. News networks and format. Format Anchor reader VO VOSOT Package Other Total Al-Jazeera 2 (1.2%) 28 (16.7%) 36 (21.4%) 93 (55.4%) 9 (5.4%) 168 Al-Arabiya 0 68 37 35 1 (0%) (48.2%) (26.2%) (24.8%) (.7%) 141 Totals 2 96 73 128 10 (.6%) (31.1%) (23.6%) (41.4%) (3.2%) 309

w2 (4, N 309) 49.37, p < .001.

Table 3. News networks and correspondents. Correspondent/field reporters Yes No Total

w2 (1, N 309) 28.38, p < .001.

Al-Jazeera 55 (32.7%) 113 (67.3%) 168

Al-Arabiya 11 (7.8%) 130 (92.2%) 141

Totals 66 (21.4%) 243 (78.6%) 309

In terms of news format, Al-Jazeera relied predominantly on packages (fully edited reports produced by reporters in the field and featuring video and interview sound) while Al-Arabiya relied more heavily on more simple voice overs (VOs), where a studio anchor reads news over video footage. A total of 55.4% of Al-Jazeeras reports were packages, while Al-Arabiya employed the use of VOs 48.2% of the time. Both networks also relied relatively frequently on VOSOTs (VOs with interview sound), with Al-Jazeera using VOSOTs 21.4% of the time and Al-Arabiya using VOSOTs for 26.2% of its reports. Results, displayed in Table 2, show statistically significant differences, w2 (4, N 309) 49.37, p < .001. Perhaps not surprisingly given its large budget and general interest in the Israel Palestine issue, Al-Jazeera positioned correspondents/field reporters (at the scene of events) in its news reports far more frequently than Al-Arabiya (Table 3). Al-Jazeera used correspondents in 55 of their 168 reports (32.7%), with Al-Arabiya only using correspondents in 11 of 141 reports (7.8%). A chi-square test showed these differences to be statistically significant, w2 (1, N 309) 28.38, p < .001. Al-Jazeera also was more likely than Al-Arabiya to position field reporters inside Palestinian and Israeli territories. Al-Arabiya rarely sent reporters into the field and instead relied heavily on reports delivered from Al-Arabiyas Dubai-based studio. In all, Al-Jazeera placed reporters in Palestinian locations in 17.3% of its reports, in Israeli locations in 9.5% of reports, in Jerusalem in 3.0% of reports, and in the studio in 38.1% of reports. Al-Arabiya, meanwhile, used the studio to deliver 74.5% of its reports, Palestinian locations for 5.0% of reports, and Israeli locations for just .7% of reports. Al-Arabiya did not use Jerusalem as a site for any of its field reporting. These results were found to be statistically significant, w2 (7, N 309) 59.94, p < .001. Although neither station was likely to present IsraelPalestine news as breaking news and neither station presented any breaking news stories during the calm period Al-Jazeera was more likely to present breaking news than Al-Arabiya during the war period. Al-Jazeera presented 10 breaking news stories during the conflict period, a total

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of 11.4% of its IsraelPalestine reports during that time period. Al-Arabiya presented just one breaking news story during the war period (.9% of its war-period reports).

Other framing devices

Entmans (1993) classic elucidation of framing both highlighted the importance of framing within communication processes and explained how framing can play itself out in communication texts. Entman argued that communicators use various mechanisms including keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences (1993: 52) to highlight certain aspects of a given reality and suppress others. This content analysis of Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya coverage of the IsraelPalestine conflict included several measures designed to assess how the networks framed actors and events in the two time periods under study. The measures included dominant topic selection, word choice, death toll counts, sourcing, and overall direction. Since personalization and de-personalization of people and groups can also play an important role in how conflicts stories are framed (see Elmasry, 2009; Ross, 2003), the study also analyzed the extent to which Israeli and Palestinian victims of violence were personalized. Dominant topic. Within the broad topic of IsraelPalestine news, Al-Jazeera and AlArabiya chose to narrowly define news along a specific topic range. Both networks, for example, situated many of their IsraelPalestine reports within the more specific war recap and diplomatic efforts topics, with reports consisting largely of casualty summaries or international and regional efforts undertaken to end the crisis. Al-Arabiya was more likely than Al-Jazeera to focus on these more narrow issues. A total of 30.5% of Al-Arabiyas reports took the war recap focus, compared with 20.2% for Al-Jazeera. Al-Arabiya focused 35.5% of its IsraelPalestine reports around the more specific topic of diplomatic efforts, compared with 24.4% for Al-Jazeera. Meanwhile, Al-Jazeera discussed 19.0% of its reports within the context of protests, with Al-Arabiya taking this focus only 7.1% of the time. Al-Jazeera concentrated on the Egyptian crossing point in 12.5% of reports, compared with just 2.1% for Al-Arabiya. Word choice. In light of media research that shows word choice dictates frames (see Elmasry, 2009; Entman, 1993), the present content analysis also included an examination of precise word selection. Specifically, one coding scheme measure assessed the words that Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya used to describe Israeli and Palestinian violence. The coding sheet item corresponding to this measure asked whether self-defense-related words (like protection, response, and retaliation), aggressor-related words (like murder, massacre, or slaughter), or more neutral word choices were used to describe acts of Israeli-perpetrated and Palestinian-perpetrated violence. With regard to Israel-perpetrated violent acts, both networks tended to avoid the emotionally charged self-defense and aggressor-related words, but Al-Jazeera was more likely to condemn Israeli offensives. Al-Jazeera opted for more neutral descriptors in 75.6% of reports describing Israeli violence, and Al-Arabiya did so nearly all of the time, in 96.5% of its reports describing Israeli violence. Al-Jazeera used aggressor-related words in 22.6% of reports describing Israeli violence, while Al-Arabiya did so in just

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Table 4. Israeli violence and news network. Israeli violence Self-defense-related words (defense, protection, response, counter, etc.) Aggressor-related words (murder, ambush, savage, slaughter, massacre, etc.) More neutral phrasing Total
w2 (2, N 309) 26.48, p < .001.

Al-Jazeera 3 (1.8%) 38 (22.6%) 127 (75.6%) 168 (54.4%)

Al-Arabiya 0 (0%) 5 (3.5%) 136 (96.5%) 141 (45.6%)

Totals 3 (1.0%) 43 (13.9%) 263 (85.1%) 309

3.5% of its reports about Israeli-perpetrated attacks. Table 4 shows these results, which indicate statistically significant differences. With respect to Palestinian attacks on Israel, both networks almost exclusively avoided both the aggressor-related and defense-related terminology. Only 1.8% of Al-Jazeera reports described Palestinian acts as acts of self-defense, and only .6% of Al-Jazeera reports used the aggressor-related words to describe Palestinian violent actions. Al-Arabiya, meanwhile, did not use any defense-related or aggressor-related words to describe Palestinian violent acts. Casualty descriptions, death counts, and images of grieving. Given the importance of death coverage in an ongoing violent conflict, the present content analysis included measures examining casualty descriptions, death tolls/counts, and images of grief. Both Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya were much more likely to describe Palestinian casualties than Israeli casualties. Al-Jazeera described Palestinian casualties in 40.5% of its reports across the two periods under study, and Al-Arabiya did so in 39.0% of its reports. Al-Jazeera only discussed Israeli casualties in 8.3% of reports, and Al-Arabiya in 7.8% of reports. A total of 25.6% of Al-Jazeera reports and 7.1% of Al-Arabiya reports explicitly mentioned precise Palestinian death tolls. Precise Israeli death tolls, meanwhile, were only mentioned in 4.2% of Al-Jazeera reports and .7% of Al-Arabiya reports. Consistent with the findings on casualty descriptions and death counts, both stations were also more likely to show images of Palestinians grieving than of Israelis grieving. Al-Jazeera showed images of Palestinians grieving in 10.7% of it reports, and AlArabiya showed such images in 7.8% of its reports. Neither station showed a single image of Israeli grief during the sample period. Part of the large disparity between Palestinian and Israeli casualty descriptions, death toll mentions, and images of grieving owes to the fact that many more Palestinians than Israelis died in the 2008/2009 Gaza war period. Nonetheless, the finding is important because past research has noted the tendency for some American news outlets to highlight Israeli victims of violence more than Palestinian victims in spite of much larger Palestinian death tolls (Ackerman, 2001). Sourcing. This research also examined the ways in which Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya used information sources in their coverage of the IsraelPalestine conflict. Specifically, the study looked at which sources the networks attributed information to, and which sources were given on-camera interviews.

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Table 5. Information attribution. Al-Jazeera Palestinian sources Israeli sources Other Arab sources International sources No source attributed Total number of sources cited Total number of reports 74 (44.0%) 34 (20.2%) 65 (38.7%) 35 (20.8%) 21 (12.5%) 229 168 Al-Arabiya 34 30 34 28 34 (24.1%) (21.3%) (24.1%) (19.9%) (24.1%) 160 141

Note: Multiple information sources may have been used in a single news report.

Al-Jazeera attributed information to Palestinian sources in 44% of reports, Israeli information sources in 20.2% of reports, international sources in 20.8% of reports, and other Arab sources (e.g. Egyptians) in 38.7% of reports. Al-Arabiya used Israeli information sources (21.3% of reports) and international sources (19.9%) to about the same degree as Al-Jazeera, but was considerably less likely to rely on Palestinian sources (24.1% of reports) and other Arab information sources (24.1%). The differences in the way the networks used Palestinian, w2 (2, N 309) 14.29, p .001, and Arab sources, w2 (1, N 309) 7.48, p .006, were found to be statistically significant. Al-Arabiya was also more likely to avoid attributing sources at all, something that occurred in 24.1% of Al-Arabiyas reports. Al-Jazeera did not attribute information in 12.5% of its reports. These results are presented in Table 5. News networks frequently provide on-camera interviews with particularly important sources. Measuring the number of on-camera interviews granted to particular sides in a debate or conflict can offer insights into whether balance is provided or whether one side is given more substantial voice. The content analysis carried out here counted the number of on-camera interviews given to Israeli government officials, Israeli citizens, Palestinian government officials (from Fatah and Hamas), and Palestinian citizens. Both networks gave on-camera interviews to Israeli government officials relatively infrequently. Al-Jazeera granted 10 such interviews, or in 6.0% of its reports, and AlArabiya nine interviews, or 6.4% of its reports. Israeli citizens were given even less voice. Al-Jazeera interviewed Israeli citizens on camera in 4.2% of its reports, while Al-Arabiya did not interview any. Palestinian government officials, collectively, were given more airtime by the networks. Hamas, the Palestinian government authority in charge of Gaza, was interviewed on camera 24 times by Al-Jazeera (14.3% of all Al-Jazeera reports during the two periods). Al-Arabiya interviewed Hamas on camera 12 times, or in 8.5% of its reports. Fatah, meanwhile, was interviewed on air by Al-Jazeera eight times (4.8% of Al-Jazeeras reports) and three times by Al-Arabiya (2.1% of its reports). Palestinian citizens were the most represented group on Al-Jazeera. They were interviewed 40 times, or in 23.8% of all Al-Jazeera reports. Al-Arabiya interviewed Palestinian citizens on camera 10 times (7.1% of Al-Arabiya reports). These data are presented in Table 6. These sourcing figures should be viewed in light of budgetary freedom and professionalism. Al-Jazeeras budget gives the network more latitude to seek out more sources and to

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Table 6. On-camera interviews. Al-Jazeera Israeli government Israeli citizens Hamas Fatah Palestinian citizens Total on-camera interviews Total reports 10 7 24 8 40 (4.2%) (4.2%) (14.3%) (4.8%) (23.8%) 89 168 Al-Arabiya 9 (6.4%) 0 (0.0%) 12 (8.5%) 3 (2.1%) 10 (7.1%) 34 141

conduct more on-camera interviews than Al-Arabiya. Moreover, the reliance on sources is more consistent with Al-Jazeeras goals of professionalism and to offer a comprehensive analysis of the IsraelPalestine issue. The overwhelming reliance on Palestinian sources by both networks, but particularly by Al-Jazeera likely contributes to the networks direction of coverage, which gave more voice to the Palestinian narrative. Direction. The coding scheme also considered the overall direction of reports toward Palestinians, Israelis, and other political actors directly or indirectly involved in the crisis. Direction measures, frequently employed by media scholars in content analyses, attempt to assess the overall impression a typical news consumer would come away with about a particular story or actor. This analysis used a three-point scale to measure direction toward IsraeliPalestinian conflict actors, with 3 representing an overall positive portrayal, 1 representing an overall negative portrayal, and 2 representing a neutral portrayal. t-Tests showed significant differences in how Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya portrayed four groups: Hamas, Egypt, the USA, and the United Nations. Al-Jazeeras reports were, overall, positive-facing toward Hamas (M 2.23, SD .53) while Al-Arabiyas reports were more negative (M 1.86, SD .61). A t-test showed these differences to be statistically significant, t(110) 3.4, p .001. Al-Jazeera took a highly critical tone toward the Egyptian governments role in the crisis (M 1.53, SD .69), while Al-Arabiyas tone toward Egypt was more positive (M 2.26, SD .59). These findings might reflect larger political relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, on the one hand, and Qatar and Egypt, on the other hand, t(104) 5.59, p < .01. Al-Arabiyas coverage of the USAs role in the crisis was relatively positive (M 2.27, SD .80), while Al-Jazeeras was mostly negative (M 1.76, SD .58). This difference in tone toward the US might be further evidence of the influence of ownership on news slant. A t-test showed these differences to be statistically significant, t(44) 2.4, p .02. Interestingly, Al-Arabiyas coverage of the United Nations diplomatic role in the conflict was highly positive (M 2.62, SD .51), a finding consistent with this studys dominant topic findings that highlighted the Saudi-owned networks greater emphasis on diplomacy. Al-Jazeera, meanwhile, was more neutral toward the UN (M 2.10, SD .58). These differences were found to be statistically significant, t(23) 2.30, p .032. Both networks news reports were, on the whole, negative toward the Israeli government, with no significant differences in the way the networks treated the Israeli

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government (M 1.40 for Al-Jazeera; M 1.46 for Al-Arabiya). Both networks were also highly positive in their overall direction toward Palestinian citizens (M 2.60 for Al-Jazeera; M 2.73 for Al-Arabiya) and, interestingly, Israeli citizens (M 2.54 for Al-Jazeera; M 2.44 for Al-Arabiya). Both networks were also neutral, overall, in their coverage of Fatah (M 1.93 for Al-Jazeera; M 2.07 for Al-Arabiya). Al-Jazeeras neutral stance toward Fatah is noteworthy given Al-Jazeeras historic sympathy with Hamas, Fatahs political rival. Personalization. Personalizing victims in news reports in the form of offering personal details such as name, occupation, and family situation can humanize victims and de-legitimate violent actors (Elmasry, 2009). The present content analysis showed that Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya sometimes personalized Palestinian victims of violence particularly during the war period but never personalized Israeli victims. Al-Jazeera personalized Palestinian victims in 18 of its reports (10.7% of all reports). Thirteen of these presentations occurred during the war period and five in the calm period. AlArabiya personalized Palestinian victims in 12 reports (8.5% of all reports), 10 during the war period and two during the calm period.

Discussion
The purpose of this study was to conduct a comparative content analysis of coverage of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict by the two major Arabic-language satellite networks, AlJazeera and Al-Arabiya. This content study focused on two different periods, a relatively calm period in late 2009 and early 2010 and the same period exactly one year earlier during the Israeli invasion of Gaza, when millions of television viewers across the Arab world were captivated by the violent confrontation between Israelis and Palestinians. The reach and influence that these satellite networks have throughout the Arab world should not be underestimated. One only needs to look to the extensive coverage these networks devoted to the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 and 2012 to understand their ability to shape opinions and even influence the outcome of events throughout the region. Concerning the IsraeliPalestinian story, results suggest that although both Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya devoted considerable time and resources to coverage, especially during the period of conflict, Al-Jazeera devoted considerably more time and resources to the story and arguably produced journalism of higher professional standards. For example, more than half (55.4%) of the reports that appeared on Al-Jazeera were package stories filed by reporters on the scene in Israel or the Palestinian territories. Such stories are considered to be of a high professional standard and, importantly, are expensive to produce. On the other hand, Al-Arabiyas broadcasts relied heavily on voice overs (48.2% of their coverage), where a studio-based anchor read narration over video footage purchased from news services like Reuters and the Associated Press. This is considerably cheaper than sending a correspondent into the field, but it is also of a lower professional standard because the network is forced to report unverified, second-hand information. Al-Jazeeras ability to devote what seems at times unlimited resources to a big story like the IsraelPalestine conflict likely stems from the fact that it is not a commercial venture,

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but rather one that is owned and funded by the wealthy Gulf country of Qatar, whose population had the highest per capita GDP in the world in 2012 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012). At Al-Jazeera, resources are not heavily limited. Al-Arabiya, however, is owned by the Saudi-controlled MBC group, which is a commercial venture owned by shareholders who do not enjoy the type of wealth possessed by the Qatari government. The issue of professional standards does not only relate to funding. At Al-Arabiya, the amount of airtime devoted to stories about the IsraelPalestine conflict was significantly less than at Al-Jazeera, suggesting that Al-Arabiyas stories were not as complete, compelling, or contextual. At Al-Arabiya, results showed that 61% of stories were shorter than a minute, whereas at Al-Jazeera almost 70% of the stories were longer than two minutes. Perhaps this difference in airtime suggests that senior producers at Al-Jazeera have ascribed a greater level of importance to stories about the IsraelPalestine conflict than their colleagues at Al-Arabiya. It was noted earlier in the article that Arab satellite channels have been criticized for a lack of professionalism across the board. A key finding of this study that tends to confirm this criticism is the significant number of reports on both networks that cited no source of information whatsoever, raising serious questions about the reliability and accuracy of information communicated in those reports. At Al-Jazeera 12.5% of the reports cited no sources whatsoever and at Al-Arabiya, a full 24.1% of the reports cited no sources. Coverage by both networks overwhelmingly tended to view the Palestinians as victims and the Israelis as the aggressors. However, the networks differed in their treatment of various Palestinian, Israeli, and international actors surrounding the conflict. That both networks tended to view Palestinians largely as victims and Israelis as aggressors is consistent with the prevailing opinion across the Arab world and much of international political and legal opinion (see Finkelstein, 2010; United Nations Human Rights Council, 2009). For example, the results indicate that both networks showed numerous images of grieving Palestinian families, but there were no images of grieving Israeli families, even though there were casualties on both sides of the conflict. Also, both networks reported personal details like names and ages of the Palestinian victims of violence, but neither station personalized any of the Israeli victims. Where the networks do differ, however, is in how intensely they tended to denounce Israeli actions. Al-Jazeera, for example, described violent Israeli actions in harsher terms than Al-Arabiya. Also, Al-Jazeera mentioned a precise Palestinian death toll in 26% of its reports, as if to constantly remind viewers that the Palestinians were overwhelmingly the casualties in the conflict, whereas Al-Arabiya mentioned a precise Palestinian death toll in just 7% of its reports. Also, Al-Jazeera tended to interview more Palestinians both officials and regular citizens on camera than Al-Arabiya, giving Palestinians more on-air opportunities to tell their side of the story. When it came to the direction of coverage, Al-Arabiya was negative toward Hamas, and positive toward Egypt, the USA, and the United Nations. Al-Jazeeras direction of coverage was the opposite, positive toward Hamas and critical of Egypt, the USA and the United Nations. Neither of these points is surprising because Al-Jazeera has long been sympathetic to Hamas, yet it has questioned western involvement in Middle Eastern affairs. Al-Arabiya, on the other hand, has been more sympathetic toward Fatah, the political rivals of Hamas, and has often tended to support US foreign policy in the Middle East.

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It is telling that when authoritarian Arab regimes faced popular uprisings in 2011 and 2012, a common and early reaction in every situation was an attempt to disrupt the work of Arab satellite networks like Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya. This has been a common tactic as regimes have struggled with popular protests in Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, and, most recently, in Syria. Satellite feeds have been jammed; news bureaus have been raided and television equipment destroyed or seized; and reporters, camera operators, and producers have been imprisoned, attacked, and, in the most extreme cases, killed. It is likely that the frames employed by Arab satellite television networks, especially in the protracted violent conflicts in Libya and Syria, have indeed played a role in influencing and shaping the outcome of these uprisings. Understanding the ways these same satellite networks employed frames during the Gaza war is therefore instructive as media scholars attempt to understand the role Arab television networks played during the Arab Spring. Indeed, the Gaza war of 2008 and 2009 was arguably the last time a politically charged, protracted, and violent news event captivated millions of viewers across the Arab world in the lead-up to the Arab Spring. Media scholars who focus on the Arab world have their work cut out for them. Satellite networks in the Arab world have devoted months of airtime to coverage of uprisings across the region, providing scholars with a wealth of material to examine. In particular, scholars should not limit their examination to content, as this study does, but rather they must also examine the role Arab satellite channels have played throughout the Arab Spring in shaping public opinion, in decision- and policy-making by the regions crumbling regimes and by the new governments that have replaced them. Acknowledgments and funding
The authors would like to thank Qatar University for their funding of this research, and Dr. Siham Al-Qaradawi for her support and encouragement.

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