FRANCISCO GALIAN vs. THE STATE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., FACTS: 1. The property was insured for P3,000.00.

The day following the fire, the insured presented an itemized statement of the goods contained in the house at the time of the fire totally valued at P4,512. The insured property was not a total loss, and some of it was afterward sold by the insured at public auction for the net amount of P120.40 2. The complaint prays for the recovery of the total amount of the policy less two-thirds of the P120.40, or P2,919.74. 3. The insurance company interposed a special defense to the effect that the policy had been forfeited by reason of the fact that the claim presented by the plaintiff was fraudulently false in that (a) the insured had alleged a total loss, (b) that not all the articles listed in the plaintiff's claim of loss were in the house where and when the fire occurred, and (c) that the plaintiff had attributed much greater value to the articles included in the list than they were worth. 4. The defendant introduced three witnesses to estimate the value of the property contained in the house who testified that the value of the household effects ranged from 500 to 1,500.00.Witnesses did not believe that there was P4,000 worth of property caught in f the fire. 5. Lower court did not consider competent the testimony of the plaintiff and his brother as to the value of the property on the ground that neither was qualified to appraise the property. The court then proceeded to determine that the property was worth P1,500 at the time of the fire, based upon an offer of compromise made to the plaintiff by the defendant company at the figure. This offer was introduced in evidence, it is claimed, without objection by the defendant company, and the court held that this failure of the defendant to object to the admission of the offer of compromise rendered it competent evidence. Thereupon, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff was entered for P1,500, with interest from the date the complaint was filed. Both parties excepted to this judgment, and moved for a new trial on the ground that the judgment was manifestly against the weight of the evidence. These motions being overruled, they have brought the case to this court by separate bills of exception. ISSUE: 1. What was the value of the property? 2. WON the plaintiff is qualified to appraise the value of its household effects? 3. WON the plaintiff alleged a total loss? HELD: The property was worth P4,512. The salvage amounted to P120.40. This leaves a partial loss amounting to P4,391.60. As the property was insured for only P3,000, the insurer must bear a portion of the loss represented by a fraction the numerator of which is the amount of the insurance and the denominator of which is the value of the property at the time of the fire. This entitles the insured to a judgment against the insurrer for 2,919.92. Let judgment be entered accordingly, without costs in this instance. So ordered. 2. YES. There is nothing in the whole list, except the jewelry, but what may be legitimately described as household effects furniture, clothing, dishes, kitchen utensils, etc. They are with which all people of ordinary education and refinement are reasonably familiar. Such articles are on sale in retail shops everywhere and the prices are readily available to anyone seeking the information. Not only this, but most of them are articles which persons with a reasonably fair income purchase for their own convenience and comfort. Hence, information as to their value must necessarily be acquired by all such individuals. While the knowledge of some persons on the subject may be greater than that possessed by others, this is true of all other
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branches of knowledge and equally as true of experts. For these reasons we cannot subscribe to the proposition that none but experts can testify as to the values of ordinary household articles. The knowledge of values in most cases does not depend upon professional or other special skill; and witnesses without having any special experience or training as would entitle them to be called experts, may yet have gained such knowledge of the land, or other subject under inquiry, as to aid the court or jury in arriving at a conclusion. . . . Persons by their common experience and observation necessarily gain some common use by all or nearly all; and their evidence as to such values is not excluded by the fact that experts may have more accurate knowledge as to such values. Obviously the witness must have some means of knowledge as to the nature and quality of the articles in question before he is qualified to express an opinion as to values. It would be an idle ceremony to allow witnesses to give their opinions in evidence, unless they had better means of knowledge as to the subject matter of their testimony than the jury might possess in common with all other persons. The qualification of the witness is, of course, a question for the court. (Jones on Ev., sec. 363.) The plaintiff was intimately acquianted with the articles described by him. He, no doubt, had purchased most of them. One could hardly expected to be in much better position to estimate the value of the articles than this. We conclude, therefore, that the preponderance of the evidence is to the effect that the quantity and quality of the goods contained in the house at the time of the fire were substantially those described by the plaintiff in his claim of loss.
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We do not understand that the plaintiff at any time alleged a total loss. The list presented by him the day after the fire is designated as a "Statement of household furniture and personal effects . . . on hand" at the time of the fire. He latter offered to abandon the remains of the fire, and still later caused these remains to be sold at public auction. These facts clearly negative the assertion that he alleged a total loss. Clause 17 of the conditions of the policy reads: "If the property hereby insured shall, at the breaking out of any fire, be collectively of greater value than the sum insured thereon, then the insured shall be considered as being his own insurer for the difference, and shall bear a ratable proportion of the loss accordingly. Every item, if more than one, of the policy shall be separately subject to this condition."