Value-Based Reasoning and Emotive Language

ABSTRACT There are emotively powerful words that can modify our judgment, arouse our emotions and influence our decisions. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the structure of the reasoning underlying the inferences that they trigger, in order to investigate their reasonableness conditions and their effectiveness. The use of ethical! words in argumentation can be e"plained through the analysis of their twofold dimension, i.e. the logical, systematic process that is grounded on them, and the heuristic processes triggered by emotions that they arouse. #n the one hand, arguing using ethical words is shown to be based on value$based practical reasoning grounded on hierarchies of values and ma"ims of e"perience for evaluative classification. #n the other hand, ethical words provide representations bound to the interlocutor%s e"periences and judgments, which trigger specific emotions yielding a particular reaction. This chain of judgments and reactions and the potential fallaciousness thereof can be investigated through the heuristic processes of reasoning, and e"amining the relationship thereof with the systematic ones. &'()#R*S+ argumentation schemes, value$based reasoning, central$peripheral process, emotions, heuristics, emotive words, persuasion, rhetorical strategies

,. -.TR#*/CT-#. The 01,2 -talian presidential election can be considered as a rhetorical battlefield. The different parties 3especially the right$ and left$wing coalitions4 focused more on attac5ing the alternatives than promoting constructive programs. -n this conte"t, a crucial role was played by rhetoric and in particular by emotive words. The voters were not provided with slogans describing long$term plans, but mainly with terms crystalli6ing negative properties of the competing parties. -nstead of reporting and describing comple" reasoning or lengthy discourses, the newspapers 7uoted such emotive characteri6ations and contributed to creating a war of epithets. This political e"ample highlights a fundamental argumentative strategy, the use of emotive or ethical terms. -f we leave for a moment the political and statistical considerations and analy6e this tactic from a philosophical, argumentative and linguistic perspective, we are left with unanswered 7uestions. The first one can be formulated as follows+ )hat ma5es a word emotive8 There are words 9 or rather concepts 9 that do not simply describe a fragment of possible reality. Terrorist! is not simply used to refer to a person who commits specific actions with a specific intent. )ords such as torture! or massacre!, freedom! or peace! carry with them something more than a simple description of a state of affairs, a mere conceptual content 3Stevenson ,:;;+ 0,14. These words have a magnetic! effect 3Stevenson ,:2<+ ,=4, an imperative force, a tendency to influence the interlocutor%s decisions 3Stevenson ,:2<+ ,>$,:4. They are strictly bound to moral values yielding value judgments and triggering specific emotions. )hen we accuse a party of torture, massacre, or horrible crimes, the effect on the audience goes beyond the description of an action. )e cannot sever these concepts from a system of values leading to specific value judgments and, conse7uently, specific reactions and decisions. -n this sense, these words 1

are ethical. -n the modern psychological terminology, we can say that there terms carry emotional valence! 3?rijda @ Aes7uita, 0111+ ;:4. At the same time, they presuppose and trigger a value judgment that can lead to an emotion. -n politics and other domains of human communication, these terms play a crucial role 3Schiappa 0112B Carefs5y 011;4. They change the evaluation of a state of affairs, and modify the interlocutor%s attitudes and choices concerning it. They hide the comple"ity of a judgment on a comple" entity or event, providing the hearer with a pre$pac5aged suggested evaluation, an allegedly objective representation pointing out only specific ethical 3or rather evaluative4 dimensions. These powerful instruments of persuasion raise problems that e"ceed the domain of rhetoric and argumentation, but that are crucial for understanding the mechanism of the rhetorical effect that they trigger. Dow can a word be emotive8 Dow can value judgments be related to emotions8 )hy are emotions used to affect decisions8 The answers to these 7uestions need to be searched for in the analysis of the comple" structure of emotions and the reasoning mechanisms that have been investigated under the label of heuristics! or peripheral processes! 3Eetty et al. 011;B Eetty @ Cacioppo ,:>=4. 0. TD' E#)'R A.* TD' /S'S #? 'A#T-F' )#R*S Attac5ing the competing parties and politicians is a strategy that is fre7uently used during the elections in many countries. Dowever, in the 01,2 -talian presidential elections the number and the originality of the attac5s were unusual. As a matter of fact, three individuals dominated the scene, showing an incredible creativity in forging new epithets for depicting their 3possible4 rivals in a negative manner+ Beppe Grillo, leader of the Aovimento H Stelle, Silvio Berlusconi, the politician who ruled the country for the last ,> years, and Aario Aonti, the outgoing prime minister. )hile the political campaign of Grillo was centered on public speeches, organi6ed as polemic and comic shows, Berlusconi heavily relied on advertisements and programs on the several mass media of his property 3TF channels, newspapers, maga6inesI4 and ads sent by ordinary mail. ?inally, Aonti did not organi6e a massive political campaign, but rather released interviews in which he e"plained his program. The communication tactics of the three parties mirror the type of strategy adopted, and the type of ethos, or rather communicative character, of the person representing them. Grillo acted as a comic actor and polemical public spea5er, defending his positions by pointing out the critical issues of the political and economic behavior in -taly in a funny and entertaining fashion. Aonti, as a famous professor and economist, underscored the economic problems of the country, proposing a program to face them. Berlusconi acted as the victim of a conspiracy aimed at discrediting him and, at the same time, he also embodied the prototypical ideals of the stereotypical -talian male. The attac5 strategies grounded on emotive words varied noticeably depending on the politician. Grillo used the strategy of amplification 3Juintilianus, Institutio Oratoria, F-, 0, 02$21B Calboli Aontefusco 011;4, namely the classification of an entity or an event using indignant language 3Aristotle, Rhetoric --, 0;, 24, based on a slight manipulation of circumstances or facts that are or can be commonly accepted. Juintilian illustrated this tactic with the e"ample of a dishonest man turned into a robber!, or the wounds of 2

another transformed into a simple injury 3Institutio Oratoria, F---, ;, ,4. The strategy of distorting reality is based on the similarity between the altered image of reality and what is commonly regarded as real. The effectiveness of this dialogical move can be enhanced by combining the distortion with other communicative tactics. Grillo e"ploits in particular one of them, the use of the comic role. Dis characteri6ation of the opponents are funny, e"aggerated, and at the same time they place the interlocutor in a scenario in which the boundary between reality and fiction is blurred 3Aeyer 0111B Smith @ Foth 01104, and lead the interlocutor to a negative judgment based on a limited dimension of the issue. ?or instance we can consider his description of the left$wing opponent, Eier Kuigi Bersani,+ Case ,
Bersani is not a fascist. De is only a loser. But - accuse him of having made arrangements with former fascists and masons for twenty years, sharing among them also the bones of this Country.!

-n this case, his attac5 is highly emotional and based on heavy e"aggerations. De uses words such as fascist! and mason!0, he describes him as a loser! and depicts his actions as sharing the bones of a country!. Dowever, the grounds of his attac5 are or can be shared by the audience, as Bersani directly or indirectly supported members of the Earliament having strong right$wing positions or connections with masonic organi6ations 3illegal in -taly4. A similarly charged description is provided on the right$wing 3Kega .ord4 politician, Roberto Aaroni+ Case 0
De is a dreaming barbarian. De always dreams of fooling us.

-n this case, Grillo amplifies the poorly refined manners of the politician and its party in general, adding a comment on his real intentions. The strategy of reducing a person to few adjectives the negative traits allows the audience to draw an easy value judgment on him, grounded on li5ely facts that can be also un5nown to someone in the public. ?or instance, he describes the ?iat C'#, Sergio Aarchionne 3a figure e"tremely relevant for the -talian economy and employment, often involved in political discussions4 ta5ing for granted the fact that he has his residence in Swit6erland. -n this fashion, Grillo depicts him as a foreigner plunderer+ Case 2
A Swiss citi6en who wears a cashmere jersey and pursues the policy of disintegrating the -talian industry.

These descriptions are e"treme and funny. They provide a clear clue for an easy value judgment, based on the emphasis on few negative traits 3other of his descriptions involve calling Berlusconi the bouncing dwarf! and Aonti father Aerrin!, the priest in the '"orcist4 and the omission of other positive achievements or 7ualities. Dowever, the
1

http+LLwww.ilgiornale.itLnewsLinterniLebetino$fallito$salma$tutto$grillo$insulto$insulto$>2;2:=.html 3Retrieved on ; Aarch 01,04. 2 Aasonry is illegal in -taly, and fre7uently related with high$level criminal organi6ations.

audience e"pects the use of such e"travagant epithets from a showman 5nown for his comic$political shows. The force and grounds of the attac5 are considered in a type of dialogue different from the real one, mar5ed by jo5es and e"aggerations aimed at entertaining. A completely different approach can be found in Aonti%s statements. De is not jo5ing at allB on the contrary, he acts pursuant to his character and his role of economist, statesman and intellectual. De grounds his attac5s, mostly directed against Berlusconi, on emotional and sour descriptions. ?or instance we can consider the following statement2+ Case ;
Berlusconi continues ma5ing promises, trying to buy the votes of the -talian people with the money of the -talian people.! MIN According to Aonti, this can lead to popularity, but this would be a challenge for a Country that is basically without memory. - do not want to believe that the -talians do not remember their past.!

Dere, Aonti accuses Berlusconi of buying the votes of the -talians, and at the same time poisons the well of his possible supporters, classifying them as people without memory! 3referring to the disastrous conditions of -talian economy left by Berlusconi%s government4. -n another interview he e"plicitly pointed out the mismanagement of his predecessor, claiming to be distressed when some jac5asses say that they have left -taly in good conditions in 01,,.! ; This attac5 is aimed at arousing both anger against his opponent 3Berlusconi is deceiving and stealing for his own interest4 and contempt towards the supporters thereof 3people without memory are li5e puppets4. The emotion of anger is combined with fear in the following similitude drawn between Berlusconi and the Eied EiperH+ Case H
According to the outgoing prime minister, the promises made by Silvio Berlusconi are similar to the Eied Eiper of Damelin who lures away the mice. The fact that the -talians can believe to some words stated by that mouth reminds me of the Eied Eiper, who ta5es the mice to drown!, said the professor. De admits+ Berlusconi has already deceived the -talian people three times. The first time - was also deceived.!

Dere, Aonti underscores the deceitful and treacherous character of Berlusconi by describing his promises as aimed at luring! the -talians to disaster and deceiving! them. De points out his unjust and detrimental actions against the people to trigger anger, while the story of the Eied Eiper is intended to underline the danger through the fear for the possible conse7uences. The reaction of Berlusconi to this attac5 follows the character that he plays, characteri6ed by victimi6ation 3he is the victim of an injustice and a conspiracy4 and

http+LLwww.unita.itLitaliaLmonti$nega$nessuna$spaccatura$su$voto$disgiunto$,.;>0<:0 3Retrieved on 2 Aarch 01,04. 4 http+LLwww.ilsole0;ore.comLartLnoti6ieL01,2$10$,HLmonti$interviene$inchieste$7uesti$1>02;1.shtml8 uuidOAb.0sd/D 3Retrieved on 2 Aarch 01,04. 5 http+LLwww.repubblica.itLpoliticaL01,2L1,L,;LnewsLmontiPsitua6ionePgravePcolpaPdiPchiPhaP governatoPprima$H1H;1<;HL 3Retrieved on 2 Aarch 01,04.

closeness to his idea of the stereotypical -talian man 3aggressive, womani6er, vulgar and soccer fan4 3emphasis added4=+ Case =
)ho claims this is a scumbagB this is an action of a scumbag, as the spread is something that is independent from everything. These are the claims of the left wingB these are lies, it is not the truth!. Berlusconi raises his voice and states again that this this part of the conspiracy, as they wanted to clear a government away in order to pursue the interest of the other 'uropean countries.! And then concerning the pied piper!+ -, a pied piper8 De also deceived us, and this is a real hoax and we have been all deceived. )e hoped that this man were what he appeared to be. Erobably he also wants to ta" my pipe!I!

The vulgar and ungrounded epithets 3in another interview he called Aonti a madman!<4 and the off$color jo5e are aimed at showing a resemblance between the billionaire and the ordinary man 3or at least the prototype depicted by him4. The indignant language, ta5ing for granted the falsity of the claims of a famous economist 3 these are lies!4 and a secret plan of the other 'uropean countries 3 conspiracy!4, is intended to convey the simple picture of a victim, to be sympathi6ed with. De then replies to Aonti%s attac5 3which was actually grounded on economic figures4 by accusing him of deceiving the people. Dowever, different from Aonti%s remar5s, Berlusconi%s counterattac5 is not grounded on any reason, e"cept for the popular dissatisfaction with the austerity measures. -n this political debate also Berlusconi%s criminal charges 3and convictions4 could have played an important role, but the leader of the right$wing coalition managed to present them as part of the conspiracy against him 3emphasis added4>+ Case <
The judges of the court of Ailan should be tried, as they are horrible defamation machines. -t is a true scandal!. Then Berlusconi added that As. Bocassini Qthe public ErosecutorR should be tried for her use of the resources of the state to set up an inexistent accusation.! -t is a barbarous country, in which one is accused of indirect support to the Aafia only because one goes to a dinner. )e have reached a level of sickness that we need to defeat now.!

)ith his emotive epithets, Berlusconi ta5es for granted ungrounded facts 3the judges aim at discrediting honest citi6ensB the charges against him are false4 and arouses anger against what he calls the dictatorship of the public prosecutors.! Dis blatant denial of proved facts and previous judgments cannot be based on reasons. ?or this reason, he simply amplifies the alleged injustice of the -talian legal system and minimi6es the charges pressed against him and his collaborators 3the connections with Aafia become dinners!4. These e"amples show how emotive words can be used as instrument for providing the interlocutor with an emotional description, namely a representation aimed at arousing
6

http+LLwww.ilmessaggero.itLprimopianoLpoliticaLberlusconiPmontiPsottoPchocLnoti6ieL0;;2H<. shtml 3Retrieved on 2 Aarch 01,04. 7 http+LLwww.unita.itLitaliaLberlusconi$l$anm$insorge$nessuna$barbarie$,.;H:H;, 3Retrieved on 2 Aarch 01,04. 8 http+LLwww.ilmessaggero.itLprimopianoLpoliticaLberlusconiPmontiPsottoPchocLnoti6ieL0;;2H< . shtml 3Retrieved on 2 Aarch 01,04.

an emotive reaction. This reaction is interconnected with a value judgment, in the sense that at the same it presupposes such an evaluation and leads the interlocutor to draw it through the emotion. Dowever, this tactic is not as simple as it appears to be. The three political characters use the same instrument of persuasion within different more comple" strategies. The emotional epithets were accepted within Grillo%s comic role as part of hilarious caricatures. Aonti%s sour remar5s are grounded on his presupposed and commonly shared authority and superior 5nowledge. Berlusconi uses emotive words to turn the political confrontation into a street fight, where the criticisms against his political figure become attac5s against himself as an ordinary man:. Dis acting mirrors the impulsive and indignant reaction of an unjustly offended person. 'motive words can have a noticeable impact on the audience%s judgments and decisions. -n order to analy6e their effectiveness, it is necessary to ta5e into consideration two distinct and connected dimensions of this instrument+ their logical function as implicit and condensed arguments, and their rhetorical effect consisting in arousing emotions. 2. TD' ARG/A'.TAT-F' STR/CT/R' #? 'A#T-F' )#R*S Stevenson defined emotive words as words that involve a wedding of descriptive and emotive meaning , and have the power of directing attitudes 3Stevenson ,:;;+ 0,14. These words are used to refer to a fragment of reality, but at the same time they have the tendency to encourage future actions 3Stevenson ,:2>+ ;:$H14 and lead the hearer towards a change by affecting his system of interests 3Stevenson ,:;;+ 0,14. This tendency amounts to a disposition of such terms to be used to achieve a specific effect, to move the hearer and change his attitude towards action. Stevenson%s account can be analy6ed from two distinct perspectives. #n the one hand, it is possible to investigate the structure of the reasoning leading from the predication of a word to a reason to act. #n the other hand, it is necessary to analy6e what ma5es a word magnetic! 3as Stevenson describes the emotive meaning4, namely strongly encouraging a course of action. 3.1. Choices and judgments The first step consists in in7uiring into what lin5s a word to a possible choice, and for this reason we need to build on the logical approaches to ethical judgments 3Toulmin ,:H1B von )right ,:=2aB ,:=2bB Dare ,:=2B &upperman 01104. #n this view, ethical judgments are means to lead the interlocutor to action on the basis of common 5nowledge 3a commonly accepted rule of behavior4 and criteria of classification 3what is a good action, a good goal, or more simply a good car, etc.4. These two components are strictly combined 3Dare ,:=2+ 0;4+
Ket us imagine a society which places a negative value upon industryB there seem to be such societies in the world, in which the industrious man is regarded as a mere nuisance. Such a society could never 3if it spo5e 'nglish4 e"press its moral standards by using the word SindustriousS, li5e us, for commending people, only with a totally different descriptive meaningTi.e. commending them for totally
9

This tactic was also used when he e"plained he some open criticisms to his politics as attac5s from the supporters of Uuventus 3 they must be supporters of UuventusV!4, the rival of the team he owns.

different 7ualities, for e"ample that of doing as little wor5 as possible. -f they did that, we should say that they had changed the meaning of the 'nglish word SindustriousS. The descriptive meaning of SindustriousS is much too firmly attached to the word for this sort of thing to be allowedB these people would be much more li5ely to use the word in its normal descriptive meaning, but neutrally or pejorativelyB i.e. to give it no, or an adverse, prescriptive meaning .

*epending on what is considered to be desirable for a given community, the classification of a state of affairs, an action or a behavior as good! varies. This perspective is rooted in the Aristotelian ethical system, which regards every decisions as always aimed to a goal, which amounts to what is good 3or better4, or what appears to be good 3or better4 3 icomachean !thics ,,,2a ,H4, for everything aims at the good! 3the desirable, WXYXZ[\4 3"opics ,,=a, ,>B see Burnyeat, ,:>1, p. >24. This account underscores the crucial importance of the principles of inference 3specific loci4 that we use to judge something as desirable or more desirable, or, on the contrary, undesirable or more undesirable 3Rhetoric, ,2=0b 0$,>4. Together with the ideal and philosophical principles of value judgments, based on what shall be considered as proper for the nature of man, Aristotle provides more practical, or rather rhetorical, criteria, grounded on what is usually the case among people. #n this view, values, or principles of choice, are structured in hierarchies 3Eerelman @ #lbrechts$Tyteca ,:H,4 depending on a man%s culture and personal dispositions+
?urther, a man of a given disposition ma5es chiefly for the corresponding things+ lovers of victory ma5e for victory, lovers of honour for honour, money$loving men for money, and so with the rest. These, then, are the sources from which we must derive our means of persuasion about Good and /tility. 3 Rhetoric ,2=2b ,$ H4 -n the same way also it is in certain places honourable to sacrifice oneSs father, e.g. among the Triballi, whereas, absolutely, it is not honourable. #r possibly this may indicate a relativity not to places but to persons+ for it is all the same wherever they may be+ for everywhere it will be held honourable among the Triballi themselves, just because they are Triballi. Again, at certain times it is a good thing to ta5e medicines, e.g. when one is ill, but it is not so absolutely 3"opics ,,Hb ,:$0<4.

Classifying a state of affairs or an entity as good! or bad!, or rather desirable! or undesirable! depends on considerations about the nature of the thing itself, but also on the purpose in relation to which a thing is regarded as good or bad. ?or instance, a man can consider a 5nife as good, as it cuts well, while another can consider it as bad, as it is dangerous or not nice 3von )right ,:=2a4. #n this perspective, values can be thought of as the reasons for classifying something as desirable or not, and at the same reasons for action. By pointing out the 7ualities of a course of action, an event or an object 5nown to fall within the categories of the interlocutor%s desirable or undesirable things!, the spea5er can provide him with a reason to act in a specific fashion. This process of reasoning is twofold. #n the one hand, the spea5er needs to classify a state of affairs as falling within a value. #n the other hand, the desirability of a state of affairs triggers a pattern of reasoning leading a decision to act. 7

3.#. $trategies of classification and commitments The first type of reasoning can be described as a passage from the commitment to a specific abstract goal 3honesty shall be praisedLsought after4 to the commitment to a specific one 3this man shall be praisedLsupported4. This transfer of commitments can be thought of as a passage from some 7ualities of the state of affairs to its classification according to a value, and another, proceeding from values, from the commitment to an abstract desire to a concrete one. The first reasoning process is the most important one, as it yields a classification of the entity that is directly and prototypically associated with a value judgment. -n the e"amples mentioned above it is possible to notice different strategies of value$laden classifications+ ,. Attribution of a negative habit a. Bersani is a loser 3case ,4. b. MAaroniN is a dreaming barbarian 3case 04. 0. Aentioning previous actions a. MBersaniN made arrangements with former fascists and masons for twenty years, sharing among them also the bones of this Country 3case ,4. b. Berlusconi has already deceived the -talian people three times. The first time - was also deceived.! 3case H4. 2. Aetaphorical or analogical predications 3prototypes4 a. MBerlusconiN reminds me of the Eied Eiper, who ta5es the mice to drown 3case H4. b. The judges of the court of Ailan are horrible defamation machines 3case <4. The three strategies used to trigger value judgments differ according to the comple"ity of the underlying reasoning. -n the first case, a habit is attributed to an entity 3to be a loserB to be a dreaming barbarian4. This habit is commonly valued negatively by a certain community based on specific grounds 3losers are incapableB dreaming barbarians are unable to ma5e sound and realistic judgmentsI4. -n particular, habits are commonly regarded as reasons for future actions+ as Thomas A7uinas put it, habit causes act by way of efficient causality! 3Thomas A7uinas, $umma "heologiae 0H, ,a 0ae, <,, a24. ?or this reason, habits 9 and in particular the ones that are commonly associated with negative actions 9 are strictly, prototypically bound to value judgments. The second and the third strategies are indirect, i.e. they do not involve a direct attribution of negative habits, but rather a pattern of reasoning leading to a classification. The second strategy consists in listing or mentioning the victim%s negative behavior, emphasi6ing their wic5edness or their occurrence. -n both cases the reasoning is grounded on a causal relation between actions and habits+ act causes habit, by way of final causality, in respect of which we consider the nature of good and evil! 3Thomas A7uinas, $umma "heologiae 0H, ,a 0ae, <,, a2B see also H, a04. A habit is a disposition to act in a certain fashion, which is caused by previous actions. The spea5er should show that the subject matter of his attac5 commonly perpetrates a certain negative action, 8

which is often hard to show. Aonti%s inductive generali6ation based on Berlusconi%s previous behavior can represent this type of reasoning. Dowever, when the spea5er cannot provide evidence of the victim%s past actions or wants to yield a stronger conclusion less subject to rational assessment, he can avail himself of more rhetorically effective tactics. A common instrument for supporting the attribution of a negative habit is the mentioning of ungrounded generali6ations containing indignant language 3sharing the bones of the CountryB fascists and masons4, which are hard to disproof and at the same time can lead to immediate emotive reactions 3hatred4. The third strategy consists in the use of metaphorical e"pressions or the comparison with entities that are prototypically bound to a specific value judgment. The clearest case is Aonti%s description of Berlusconi as the Eied Eiper, who is prototypically considered to be a deceiver, a person luring people to a disaster. -n this case, the reasoning is by analogy, as the two entities are simply compared. Another similar tactic is the use of metaphorical e"aggerations 3 defamation machines!4, which convey the negative judgment through a classification that can be judged as non$serious. The use of metaphors and indignant generali6ations are e"tremely effective both from a reasoning and dialogical perspective. The spea5er leads the interlocutors to a conclusion based on an emotion, and at the same time hedge the ris5 of being critici6ed for an incorrect or ungrounded judgment. -n case of Grillo his comic character justifies the use of e"aggerations, while Berlusconi plays the role of the offended person acting out of just indignation or anger. -n both cases the rhetorical part that they are playing is used strategically to avoid criticisms. ?rom a reasoning perspective, the three strategies are all aimed at attributing a specific habit to an entity. This classification constitutes the starting point for the comple" relation between judgment and commitments, which e"plains both the dialectical and rhetorical effects of this move. The first step consists in the analysis of the relationship between a classification and a value judgment, which can be represented with the following scheme 3)alton, Reed @ Aacagno 011>+ 2,:4+ Argumentation scheme ,+ Argument from classification

?or instance, if a man ruins willingly his own country, he will be classified as evil! or contemptible!, while if someone fights for improving it, he can be classified as honorable!. *epending on what is considered to be desirable or contemptible 3see the second boo5 of Aristotle%s "opics4, the habit will lead to a value judgment on the entity. This value judgment can be directly bound to the desirability or undesirability of the entity or the state of affairs, depending on whether the habit is directly associated with a 9

value judgment 3cowards are contemptible4 or, rather, with a more generic moral habit 3deceivers are untrustworthy4. This scheme can be applied to the analysis of case H above+

This type of reasoning is bound to a distinct one, representing the passage from a value judgment to a commitment to bring about a specific state of affairs. A dangerous or untrustworthy person can be negatively judged 3he is bad4, but a subse7uent step is needed to lin5 a judgment with a commitment, or a potential disposition, to act accordingly. ?or this reason, the idea of reasoning from values is crucial, as it leads from a generic and commonly accepted reason to act to its specific instantiation. ?or instance, untrustworthiness is a reason for disapproving of a person, or not believing in him. The passage from the instantiation of a value to the specific commitment concerning it can be represented as follows 3)alton, Reed @ Aacagno 011>+ 20,4+ Argumentation scheme 0+ Argument from Falues

The generic shared value is a reason to act accordingly. This reason needs to be specified in order to become a principle triggering a specific behavior or action, i.e. an assent to an evaluative impression! 3Brennan 011H+ ><4. This scheme can be applied to the aforementioned e"ample as follows+

10

This reasoning step binds the judgment to a specific commitment. Falues are considered to be reasons to act, and need to be specified according to the predication. This type of reasoning e"plains also the rhetorical effect of classifying a person according to a commonly shared value, which leads to a commonly accepted commitment. The value judgment binds the interlocutor, belonging to a certain community, to the behavior that is commonly accepted to be the most appropriate in the given circumstance. The attribution of a value judgment to an entity can be described according to two distinct types of reasoning. The first pattern leads from a habit, a characteristic, a behavior, or a comparison to a judgment. This judgment corresponds to a more generic positive or negative habit or an evaluation of the subject%s desirability or undesirability. The second type of reasoning describes the commitment structure of the predication of value judgments, yielding a commitment to a generic behavior concerning a specific entity, based on generally accepted relations between commitment and values. 3.3. %udgments and actions The second component of ethical reasoning is the passage from moral judgment to a commitment to a specific action. The decision$ma5ing process can be thought of as a pattern of reasoning connecting a desired action, or rather a declaration of intention! or commitment to bringing about a state of affairs 3von )right ,:<0+ ;,4 with its grounds 3Anscombe ,::>+ ,,4. A spea5er can reason in two distinct fashions 3von )right ,:=2b+ ,=,B ,:=2a+ Ch. F---4. The first reasoning is from a commitment to bring about a specific state of affairs to the commitment to the productive or necessary means to bring it about 3what Abelard would call the consensus, i.e. the decision to engage in a specific 3good or bad4 activity, aimed at pursuing a specific 3good or bad4 goal, see Abaelardus, !thica, =2= A4+ Argumentation scheme 2+ Eractical reasoning

11

This type of reasoning lin5s the commitment to a generic commitment concerning a specific circumstance to a particular action. ?or instance, if my commitment is to disapprove of Berlusconi, and the best way to e"press my disapproval is not to vote for him, - should not vote for him. Clearly this decision is only one possibility among different courses of action leading to the same outcome 3for e"ample, - could obtain the same result by attac5ing him publicly, etc.4. A different type of reasoning proceeds from an action which is the necessary or productive cause of a desirable or undesirable state of affairs. )e can represent this type of reasoning as the argument from conse7uences 3from )alton, Reed @ Aacagno 011>+ 2204+ Argumentation scheme ;+ Argument from conse7uences

?or instance, if my choice of voting for a certain party supports the nomination of a contemptible or untrustworthy person, - should not vote for such a party 3necessary cause4. #n the contrary, if my support to a certain party results in an honorable person being elected, - should vote for it. These patterns of reasoning need also to ta5e into consideration the so$called foreseeable conse7uences 3von )right ,:=2a+ Ch. =4. Ay goal of having my ta"es reduced can be goodB however, if the productive cause thereof also results in economic problems for the country or the election of a person unfit to govern the state in which - live, - will be pursuing an unreasonable goal 3- choose a hierarchically inferior value over the superior one4. This structure of reasoning that can mirror the 7uasi$logical dynamic effect of emotive words is comple" and re7uires a noticeable effort, in addition to information that a simple classification cannot provide. Dowever, the ideal rationality is often 7uite different from reality. As mentioned above, the strategies of classification can heavily rely on generali6ations or descriptions that are inherently wea5 or ungrounded, but at the same time they are effective given their emotional impact on the hearer. Aoreover, as Aristotle pointed out, the desirable can also be what appears! to be good. The crucial force of emotive words lies in this subtle difference between grounded and deceptive or unsupported classifications, and between what the interlocutor believes to be desirable 3or undesirable4 and what he perceives as such. This difference between reasonableness and effectiveness can be e"plained by ta5ing into account the distinction between systematic 3or central4 and heuristic 3or peripheral4 reasoning, and focus on the mechanism of practical rationality 3Brennan 011H+ >0$>24. -n order to analy6e this other evaluative and decisional process we need to investigate the second dimension of emotive words pointed out above, namely reason why they are emotive.! 12

;. 'A#T-#.S A.* )#R*S Dow can some words trigger emotions8 Dow can an instrument that represents concepts, commonly used to refer to reality, bring about an emotional state8 A possible answer can be found in the cognitivist approaches to emotions. These studies focus on the rational, or rather conceptual, dimension of emotions, showing how they are strictly interwoven 3Eugmire ,::>+ <B 'lster ,:::+ Ch. ;4. ?or instance, an emotion of fear! presupposes a value judgment on what is feared. -f it is not considered as undesirable and probable, it cannot be feared 3Keighton ,:>>+ 01HB Ben Ce%ev 0111+ ;<H4. Similarly, anger involves the perception of an offence against the self. 'motions presuppose a specific evaluation of a state of affairs or entity, which ma5es them essentially different from feelings 3*e Sousa ,:><4. To feel an emotion corresponds to implicitly appraise a state of affairs 3Solomon, 0112+ <$>4+
MIN emotions are interestingly similar to beliefs. )e can now e"plain this similarity by claiming that emotions are judgments 9 normative and often moral judgments. - am angry at Uohn for ta5ing 3 stealing! begs the 7uestion4 my car! entails that - believe that Uohn has somehow wronged me MIN. The moral judgment entailed by anger is not a judgment about my anger MIN. Ay anger is that judgment. -f - do not believe that - have somehow been wronged, - cannot be angry 3though - might be upset, or sad4. Similarly, if - cannot praise my lover, cannot be in love 3though - might want her or need her, which, traditional wisdom aside, is entirely different4. -f - do not find my situation aw5ward, cannot be ashamed or embarrassed. -f - do not judge that - have suffered a loss, cannot be sad or jealous. MIN emotions in general do appear to re7uire this feature+ to have an emotion is to hold a normative judgment about one%s situation.

'motions can be defined by considering their appraisal component and their action tendency 3Eugmire 011H+ ,=B &eltner @ Kerner 01,1+ 20;4. The first component corresponds to the evaluative judgments of whether an event is good or bad and whether people%s current actions and environment correspond to their personal goals and e"pectations! 3&eltner @ Kerner 01,1+ 2,H4. This component is of fundamental importance in rhetoric, as it can be modified by means of argumentation. As 'lster put it 3,:::+ H=4, if MIN emotions do not act li5e charms or enchantments but depend on beliefs, they are amenable to rational argument designed to change the belief.! The second component is the organi6ing principle that motivates specific behaviors or reactions. ?or instance, the emotion of fear will result in a tendency to flee or reduce uncertainty, while anger will lead the agent to restore justice. The value judgment 3or rather the cognitive change4 is the reason for a physical and psychical reaction that can drive us to action 3?rijda @ Aes7uita 0111+ ;=4. The relationship between value judgments and emotions highlights another important characteristic of emotional appraisal, i.e. its cultural dependence 3&eltner @ Kerner 01,1+ 20<4. As emotions are grounded on value judgments, and values are placed in hierarchies that depend on the culture and the individual disposition, emotions are also influenced by culture 3Smith @ Ka6arus ,::1+ =0<4. An individual%s past e"periences become criteria for evaluating a state of affairs as good or not 3*amasio ,::;+ 0;=4. Dowever, culture embodies the e"periences of a community, and in this fashion provides 13

the criteria for the evaluative judgment 3see ?rijda @ Aes7uita ,::>4. #n this perspective, an emotion is in part culture$dependent, as it is a system of concepts, beliefs, attitudes, and desires, virtually all of which are conte"t$bound, historically developed, and culture$specific! 3Solomon 0112+ ><4. The same action or fact can be considered as offensive in one culture and not$offensive in another 3?rijda @ Aes7uita 0111+ H:$=,4. Culture, in this sense, provides the hierarchies of values needed for assessing the perceived event and eliciting the corresponding emotion 3Aes7uita @ )al5er 01124. -n -taly Berlusconi%s attac5 on the judges can be regarded as a sign of his strength and power, eliciting admiration. -n other cultures, the same behavior would have resulted in 7uite different judgments 3such as insolence4 and therefore emotions 3for instance, anger4,1 3see 'lster ,:::+ 0,=4. The strict relationship between value judgments, culture and emotion is the ground of the rhetorical construction of emotions, in which emotive words play an essential role. This cognitive approach to emotions has its bac5ground in Aristotle%s account set out in his Rhetoric, which influenced and anticipated many findings of modern theories of emotions 3'lster ,:::+ ;>4. The Stoics pointed out the strict dependence of the cognitive component and the evaluative one in emotions. They showed the relation between the perception 3or imagination4 of a specific state of affairs 3phantasia4 and the emotion itself, which consists in a false judgment of assent to an evaluative impression 3Brennan 011H+ ><4. This judgment, which concerns on the one hand the truth of the perception, and on the other the desirability or non$desirability of the subject matter, brings about an impulse or intention, which is then translated into action 3Bob6ien ,::<+ <=4. This mechanism of emotions was clearly used by Juintilian in his description of the strategies of amplification, used to trigger emotions 3see the comparable idea of framing effect in 'lster ,:::+ 0H04. Juintilian underscored the function that a vivid representation! has in discourse 3see also the notion of vividness effect! described by ?rijda ,::>+ 0<=4. The orator should amplify some details of a state of affairs to add additional force to things unjust, cruel or hateful!, so that he can awa5en emotions which either do not naturally arise from the case or are stronger than the case would suggest! 3Institutio Oratoria, F-, 0, 0=$214. )ords can be used to depict a scene that resembles reality, or that is similar to a situation that is potentially related with the audience%s dramatic e"periences and memories. The likeliness of the image, or rather of the potentially e"perienced circumstance, that a word refers to and describes can trigger an immediate value judgment 3the situation is bad and should be avoidedB the action was unjust4, resulting in an emotion 3such as fear or anger4 3Institutio Oratoria, F-, 0, 0:$2,4+
But how are we to generate these emotions in ourselves, since emotion is not in our own power8 - will try to e"plain as best - may. There are certain e"periences which the Gree5s call ]X^WX_`Xa, and the Romans visions, whereby things absent are presented to our imagination with such e"treme vividness that they seem actually to be before our very eyes. -t is the man who is really sensitive to such impressions who will have the greatest power over the emotions. Some writers describe the possessor of this power of vivid imagination, whereby things, words and actions are presented in the most realistic manner, by the Gree5 word
10

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/08/books/in-italian-ways-tim-pa ks-a!ain-t ies-toe"plain-italy.html#pa!ewante$%all &'et ie(e$ on 18 )eptembe 2013*.

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b\]X^WX_`cW[dB and it is a power which all may readily ac7uire if they will. MIN - am complaining that a man has been murdered. Shall - not bring before my eyes all the circumstances which it is reasonable to imagine must have occurred in such a conne"ion8 Shall - not see the assassin burst suddenly from his hiding$ place, the victim tremble, cry for help, beg for mercy, or turn to run8 Shall - not see the fatal blow delivered and the stric5en body fall8 )ill not the blood, the deathly pallor, the groan of agony, the death$rattle, be indelibly impressed upon my mind8

The mechanism of emotive words is twofold. #n the one hand, words can be used to trigger emotionsB on the other hand emotions have an epistemic effect, altering our perception of the described events. The words and descriptions that Juintilian mentions have an effect that goes beyond the mere outcome of informing us of an event. They depict a scene that we can imagine, compare with our memories, and judge. ?or this reason, they can ma5e us e"perience a specific emotion, something we can perceive as real, an apparent reality! that becomes present to our senses and we cannot doubt of 3?rijda @ Aes7uita 0111+ =:B Clore @ Gasper 0111+ 0=4. The audience cannot doubt of the anger that it feels against the merciless assassin described by Juintilian. ?or this reason, his deeds, his cruelty, his hatefulness become apparently real. The li5elihood of the event becomes perceived as real because of the emotions e"perienced. As 'lster put it 3,::;+ 0;4, a crucial fact about the emotions is that they have the capacity to alter and distort the cognitive appraisal that triggered them in the first place.! #n this perspective, emotive words can be used to instill beliefs! and generate emotions that are irrational,! as grounded on beliefs that not based on the total available information 3'lster ,::;+ 2=4. By providing the audience with an emotional representation of a person, a group or an issue, it is possible to arouse an emotion, and in this fashion give the interlocutor something more powerful than sheer information or truth+ the sensation or the appearance of truth. *epicting individuals, groups, or issues from an emotional perspective or as actors in emotional events evo5es emotions, and the emotions instill the belief constituting its appraisal dimension into the hearers 3?rijda @ Aes7uita 0111+ ;<4. The grammar of emotions becomes the grammar of the emotive words. )hen Grillo calls Ren6i, a left wing politician, little moron! and Bersani 3the leader of the left wing coalition4 a loser that has shared with masons and e" fascists the bones of -taly!, he is not simply telling jo5es. Dis first description is aimed at depicting Ren6i as an inferior, triggering contempt, namely the emotion e"pressing the subjectSs superiority over the object! 3Ben Ce%ev 0111+ 2:14. The second funny characteri6ation combines the judgment of Bersani%s inferiority with his allegedly unjust and evil actions, arousing anger and contempt at the same time. Berlusconi does the same when describes Aonti as a scumbag! or a madman!, or when attac5s the judges by calling them defamation machines! or dictators. Aonti%s image of the Eied Eiper provides a strongly emotional representation of the alleged dangers in which the -talians are running, awa5ening fear. As seen above, emotive words are implicit arguments and instruments for arousing emotions. Dowever, what ma5es emotive words so powerful in redirecting attitudes and choices8 Dow can the rational dimension of emotions affect the rational assessment of a state of affairs8 A possible e"planation can be found in the analysis of the 5ind of reasoning that emotions trigger. 15

H. 'A#T-#.S A.* E'R-ED'RAK R'AS#.-.G 'motions can be instrument for instilling beliefs. They create an apparent reality, something that we perceive as real even if it is not. They lead us to act on an amount of information that often is not optimal 3'lster ,::;+ 024. )hen we fear a person that deceived the citi6ens, we strengthen or commit ourselves to that belief. )hen we feel contempt for a leader, we are led to hold his inferiority as true, even if no evidence is provided. )hen we hate the officers of a public institution, we do not need further proofs to judge their actions as unjust. 'motions provide us with a picture of reality that is more li5ely than the one supported by data and proofs. The reasoning triggered by emotions was clearly described by Juintilian. #n his view, the orator should amplify a description to arouse a passion, because passions trigger a form of reasoning that is different from the systematic one. The judge, when overcome by passions, abandons all attempts to en7uire into the truth of the arguments, is swept along by the tide of passion, and yields himself un7uestioning to the torrent! 3Institutio Oratoria, F-, 0, =4. 'motions, as seen above, presuppose and provide the agent with an appearance of reality, an appraisal that is not the result of a careful assessment, but the outcome of an immediate and simplified perception, an interaction between the individual%s concerns and the object 3Clore @ Gasper 0111+ 214. 'motions ma5e us jump to conclusion, trigger generali6ations based on single e"periences 3?rijda @ Aes7uita 0111+ HH4, resulting in attributing a single episodic characteristic 3 he loo5s dangerous!4 to inner, essential properties 3he his evil4, or e"tending an event 3 he behaved badly!4 over time 3 he has always been bad!4. Such beliefs are strong, as they are felt, and what is present to the senses cannot easily be doubted to e"ist! 3?rijda @ Aes7uita 0111+. =<4. ?or this reason, emotional judgments are hasty, biased and automatic conclusions of right and wrong 3*amasio ,::;B Greene @ Daidt 01104, in the sense that they are not grounded on a sufficient assessment of the information available, nor can they be easily rebutted by more lucid and careful thoughts 3&eltner @ Kerner 01,1+ 22,4. This fast appraisal triggers an immediate action tendency, a sudden decision to act in conformity with the emotion e"perienced 3Koewenstein @ Kerner 01124. This combination of hasty and biased judgment and decision$ma5ing attitude characteri6es the emotional thin5ing 3?rijda @ Aes7uita 0111+ =;4+
'motion$steered thin5ing shows four features that may help e"plain its influence upon beliefs. The first is instrumentality. )e entertain thoughts that might help to achieve our emotional goals, and because they might help. 'motional thin5ing tries to solve the problems posed by the emotional predicament. The second is motivational force. The more urgent our goals, the greater the inclination to do what may help to reach them, including thought. 'motional thin5ing is driven by emotional urge. The third is control of the scope of thought. 'motional thin5ing is loath to waste time and energy by attending to irrelevant detail or indulging in comple" inferencing. The fourth feature is motivated bias. 'motional thin5ing is biased towards beliefs that support oneSs emotional aims, and towards retrieving or generating information that does.

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'motional thin5ing is e"tremely powerful because it re7uires little processing effort by the agent. De has not to carefully evaluate all the evidence concerning comple" issues and syntheti6e itB a momentary feeling can trigger empirical generali6ations, leading to strong and persistent value judgments 3&eltner @ Kerner 01,1+ 22,4. 'motional reasoning has been analy6ed as different from the central! or systematic type of reasoning, which re7uires effort, time and information 3Chen @ Chai5en ,:::4. 'motions provide the individual with easily accessible information, namely mental contents that immediately come to mind 3&ahneman 0112+ =::B <1=4. These accessible contents, constituted by prototypes, stereotypes 3namely generali6ations accessible because of their emotional valence4 or changes affecting one%s emotions spare the individual the effort to process information and result in an easy, heuristic judgment 3&ahneman 0112+ <,=4. ?or instance, the similarity of an object with a prototype results in similar judgment 3&ahneman 01124B the similarity between two emotional e"periences results in a judgment on the similarity of the situations or objects triggering them 3Clore @ Gasper 0111+ 0=B Eetty et al. 011;+ >=4. This fast and easy type of reasoning has been called as peripheral or heuristic route to persuasion 3Eetty et al. 011HB Chen @ Chai5en ,:::4. -nstead of assessing a political leader based on his achievements, records, or values, which would result in great effort, a person may resort to a much less comple" judgment, grounded on a heuristic attribute that comes more readily to mind! 3&ahneman 0112+ <1<4. ?or instance, the attributes of being a madman!, a scumbag!, a moron!, a dictator!, a barbarian! or a pied piper! come easily to mind, as they have triggered an emotional response. 'ven when such attributes are completely irrelevant 3 scumbag!4 or utterly false 3 dictator!, madman!4, they provide us with a criterion, a peripheral route to judgment. Sometimes emotive words are needed in order to summari6e in a condensed argument and principle of heuristic reasoning more comple" reasoning. Aonti%s choice to engage in the battle of insults can be partially e"plained by the need of providing the voters with an alternative route to a judgment, a shortcut to his comple" economic and political considerations. Dowever, if the appearance of reality is good when it mirrors it, it can become highly deceitful when conceals it 3Eetty et al. 011H+ ,1>4+
MIN sometimes the peripheral route might be the only strategy possible. ?or e"ample, there are some issues or objects for which there are few strong arguments 3e.g., imagine trying to sell cigarettes with a high tar content4. -t is not surprising that in these cases, ads typically contain hardly any information about the merits of the product 3because there are none or very few4 and instead contain attractive endorsers or majestic scenery.

)hen arguments supporting honesty or correctness cannot be provided, when judgments based on past records cannot be suggested, when reasons for believing that a candidate is credible or is acting for the good of country cannot be found, the only resort is to ta5e the other route. -n this case emotive words are no longer pre$pac5aged reasoning, but mas5s, instruments for deceiving. Aoreover, the effect of these emotional epithets can be devastating on the other route, the rational one 3Koewenstein @ Kerner 01124. The central and systematic process can be affected by various variables 3Eetty et al. 011H4. 'motive words can inhibit the central and more effort$re7uiring type of reasoning and trigger the other, fast and biased, process 3Clore @ Gasper 0111+ 214+ 17

#nce an emotion is e"perienced, the system no longer operates as a scientist, carefully weighing the pros and cons of the belief implied by the emotion. -nstead, the emotional person acts li5e a prosecutor or a defense lawyer see5ing by any means to find evidence for the belief. Eresumably, the e"periential aspect of the emotion is itself responsible for this process of interrupting the flow, providing information, and, through associated beliefs, guiding attention.

)ea5 arguments are perceived as stronger when the attention needed for the systematic processing lowers 3Eetty et al. 011;4. #n this perspective, emotive words are instruments of decision ma5ing that can be e"tremely effective. Dowever, just li5e all powerful instruments, they can be also e"tremely dangerous. The fragment of reality that they bring to the interlocutor%s attention, the apparent reality that they provide can be a synthesis or a mas5. 'motive words can provide a symbolic, summari6ed reason for a conclusion, but at the same time they can act as strategies for prevent a careful assessment of a situation. Clearly, when the evidence that such words are simply lies or e"aggerations is too clear, the strategy itself ris5s turning against the spea5er. ?or this reason, other tactics are used to prevent possible criticisms or increase the burden of an attac5. Grillo acts in a comic environment, where e"aggerations are regarded as instruments for triggering humor and entertainment. Accusing him of distorting reality with his epithets would be li5e accusing him of being entertaining. Berlusconi plays between two roles, acting as a light$hearted and mundane entertainer and a serious politician according to his communicative purposes. Aoreover, by turning political attac5s into a fight of personal insults and playing the indignant and angry role, he manages to shift a debate into a 7uarrel, twisting the intentions of his opponents. =. C#.CK/S-#. -n the late$medieval dialectical theory, fallacies were described according to two criteria+ their reason for the semblance, the plausible appearance that ma5es the people assent to the argument, and a reason for the failure, for their being wea5 or invalid 3&ret6mann, &enny @ Einborg ,:>0+ ,0;4. 'motive words provide an appearance of reality, a perception of a state of affairs that ma5es them instruments for easily drawing a value judgment in conditions of lac5 of time, resources or information. Dowever, the same semblance of reality can be used to replace it with a distorted image, and lead the interlocutor to a judgment based on irrelevant or false attributes. The inner rationality of these words fades away when peripheral thin5ing ta5es the place of the systematic one. 'motive words are powerful and dangerous instruments, both for the audience and for the spea5er. ?or this reason, they are often combined with side tactics that leave unaltered their rhetorical 3persuasive4 effect while affecting their dialectical and dialogical force. A comic actor cannot be accused of e"aggerating or being irrelevant, an angry man cannot be blamed for being aggressive or voicing his personal opinions 3even if publically and when acting as a public figure4.

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&ahneman, *. 301124. A perspective on judgment and choice. (merican 5sychologist, H> 3:4, =:<$<01. &eltner, *., @ Kerner, U. 301,14. 'motion. -n Gilbert *., S. ?is5e @ G. Kind6ey 3'ds.4, "he -andbook of $ocial 5sychology 3pp. 2,<$2H04. .ew (or5+ )iley. &ret6mann, .., &enny, A., @ Einborg, U. 3'ds.4 3,::14. "he Cambridge history of later 2edieval philosophy. .ew (or5+ Cambridge /niversity Eress. &upperman, U. 301104. !thical 6no'ledge. Kondon+ Routledge. Keighton, S. 3,:>>4. Aodern theories of emotion. "he journal of speculative philosophy, 0, 01=$00;. Koewenstein, G., @ Kerner, U. 301124. The role of affect in decision ma5ing. -n R. *avidson, R. Scherer @ D. Goldsmith 3'ds.4. Dandboo5 of affective sciences 3pp. =,:.=;04. #"ford+ #"ford /niversity Eress. Aes7uita, B. @ )al5er, R. 301124. Cultural differences in emotions+ a conte"t for interpreting emotional e"periences. )ehaviour Research and "herapy ;,+ <<<9<:2. Aeyer, U. 301114. Dumor as a double$edged sword+ four functions of humor in communication. Communication theory, ,1 324 , 2,1922,. Eerelman, C., @ #lbrechts$Tyteca, K. 3,:H,4. Act and person in argument. !thics, =, 3;4, 0H,$0=:. Eetty, R., @ Cacioppo, U. 3,:>=4. The elaboration li5elihood model of persuasion. (dvances in experimental social psychology, ,:, ,02$,>:. Eetty, R. '., Ruc5er, *., Bi6er, G., @ Cacioppo, U.T. 3011;4. The elaboration li5elihood model of persuasion. -n U. S. Seiter @ G. D. Gass 3'ds.4, 5erspectives on persuasion+ social influence and compliance gaining 3pp. =H$>:4.Boston+ Allyn @ Bacon. Eetty, R., Cacioppo, U., @ Strathman, A. @. Eriester, -. 3011H4. To thin5 or not to thin58 '"ploring two routes to persuasion. -n T. Broc5. @ A. Green 3'ds.4, 5ersuasion0 5sychological insights and perspectives 30nd ed., pp. >,$,,=4. Thousand #a5s, CA+ Sage Eublications. Eugmire, *. 3,::>4. Rediscovering emotion. 'dinburgh+ 'dinburgh /niversity Eress. Eugmire, *. 3011H4. $ound $entiments. Integrity in the !motions. #"ford+ Clarendon Eress. Juintilian, A. 3,::=4. Institutio Oratoria. Translated by D. '. Butler. Cambridge, Aass.+ Darvard /niversity Eress. Schiappa, ', 301124. .efining Reality. .efinitions and the 5olitics of 2eaning. Carbondale and 'dwardsville+ Southern -llinois /niversity Eress. Smith, C., @ Ka6arus, R. 3,::14. 'motion and Adaptation. -n K. Eervin 3'd.4, -andbook of 5ersonality0 theory 7 research 3pp. =1:$=2<4. .(+ Guilford Eress. Smith, C., @ Foth, B. 301104. The role of humor in political argument+ Dow eStrategerye and eKoc5bo"ese changed a political campaign. (rgumentation and advocacy, 2:, ,,1$,0:. Solomon, R. 301124. ot 5assion8s $lave. .ew (or5+ #"ford /niversity Eress. Stevenson, C. 3,:2<4. The 'motive Aeaning of 'thical Terms. 2ind, ;=, ,;$2,. Stevenson, C. 3,:2>4. 'thical Uudgments and Avoidability. 2ind, ;< 3,>H4, ;H$H<. Stevenson, C. 3,:;;4. !thics and *anguage. .ew Daven+ (ale /niversity Eress. Thomas A7uinas 3011=4. $umma "heologiae0 &olume #9 3U. ?earon, ed.4. Cambridge+ Cambridge /niversity Eress.

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Toulmin, S. 3,:H14. (n !xamination of the 5lace of Reason in !thics . Cambridge+ Cambridge /niversity Eress. Fon )right, G. 3,:=2a4. "he varieties of goodness. Kondon+ Routledge. Fon )right, G. 3,:=2b4. Eractical -nference. "he 5hilosophical Revie', <0 304, ,H:$,<:. Fon )right, G. 3,:<04. #n so$called practical inference. (cta $ociologica, ,H, 2:$H2. )alton, *., Reed, C., @ Aacagno, ?. 3011>4. (rgumentation $chemes. Cambridge /niversity Eress, .ew (or5. Carefs5y, *. 3011;4. Eresidential Rhetoric and the Eower of *efinition. 5residential $tudies :uarterly, 2; 324, =1<$=,:.

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