ART III SEC 1 -MMDA V.

BEL AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION = Open Neptune street (Police power is with the legislature) Petitioner MMDA wanted to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic so it sent a notice to BAVA as regards the same BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road beside Bel-Air Village The appellate court held that MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street because the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati MMDA contends that its order is valid pursuant to its regulatory and police powers SC held that police power is lodged primarily in the national legislature, which may delegate it to: o President o Administrative boards o Lawmaking bodies of LGUs Metro Manila is a body composed of several LGUs and due to RA 7924, it was declared as a special development and administrative region On the other hand, MMDA is the development authority tasked with the administration of metro-wide basic services in Metro Manila Unlike Sanggunians, through which LGUs exercise legislative power, the Metro Manila Council, which is the policy-making body of the MMDA, is limited to: o Approving metro-wide plans, programs, and projects o Issuing rules and regulations for the implementation of the same o Approving the annual budget of the MMDA o Promulgating rules and regulations for the delivery of basic services, collection of services and regulatory fees, fines, and penalties The MMDA is not a LGU it has no police nor legislative power and, therefore, it cannot require the opening of Neptune Street -----HIERARCHY OF RIGHTS-----PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION V. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. = Strike (primacy of human rights over property rights) Petitioner is a labor Union composed of employees of the respondent, PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS, and it decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacanang to protest against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police The Union informed the respondent company of the intended demonstration But the company warned the Union that the workers, without leave of absence who fail to report for work, shall be dismissed for violation of the NO LOCKOUT, NO STRIKE in the CBA The company eventually filed charges against petitioner with violation of the CBA The COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ruled in favor of the company and found the Union guilty for having bargained in bad faith The SC held that there is a primacy of human rights over property rights, which include: o The right to freedom of expression o The right to peaceful assembly o The right to petition for redress of grievances In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the right of free expression and the right of assembly occupy a preferred position o For a law that restricts or impairs property rights to be valid, there has to be a reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its purpose that the law is not arbitrary, discriminatory, or oppressive o For a constitutional infringement of human rights, there has to be a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil that the State has the right to prevent ! In this case, there was none The SC also held that it was the company that was guilty of unfair labor practices for restraining its employees from exercising their rights The decision of the CIR was reversed and the employees were reinstated -DUNCAN ASSOCIATION V. GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES = Marrying someone from a competing company (valid management prerogative; right to trade secrets; right to economic interests) Tecson was hired by GLAXO as a MEDICAL REPRESENTATIVE and he signed a contract of employment that has a stipulation regarding any existing or future relationship with employees of competing companies and that resignation will be in order in case of conflict of interest Tecson married Bettsy of ASTRA, a competitor After being unable to resolve the issue, Tecson was transferred from the Camarines SurCamarines Norte sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao Sur sales area because he refused to resign Petitioner contends that GLAXO: o Violated the equal protection clause, as it crease distinctions between employees based on marriage o Restricts the employees right to marry

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o Constructively dismissed Tecson SC held that it was a valid exercise of management prerogative and that GLAXO has a right to guard its trade secrets, strategies, etc. from competitors SC also held that the prohibition is reasonable as the GLAXO has a right to protect its economic interests While our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the worker because management has rights, too SC further held that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the State or those acting under color of its authority The equal protection clause erects no shield against merely private conduct, except when the State becomes entwined in the wrongful private conduct

-STAR PAPER CORPORATION V. SIMBOL = Marrying someone in the same company (company policy unreasonable) Simbol was employed by STAR PAPER and he married Dayrit, also an employee of the same company Because of a company policy that in case employees get married, one of the spouses should resign, Simbol resigned Comia was also an employee who married a co-employee and was forced to resign and so was Estrella Respondents later filed a case for unfair labor practice and constructive dismissal The NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION declared the dismissal illegal and ordered the reinstatement of the employees The SC held that there is a requirement of reasonableness in order to uphold the questioned employment policy of STAR PAPER, banning spouses from working in the same company o In this case, SC found no reasonable business necessity as petitioner solely contends that it did not want to have 2 or more employees related between the 3rd degree o In other words, STAR PAPER failed to show how the marriage of co-employees with each other would be detrimental to business operations, unlike the case of Duncan -----PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS-----BANCO ESPANOL FILIPINO V. PALANCA = I did not receive the summons (judicial due process; actual notice not required) Palanca was indebted to BANCO and he had his parcel of land as security to his debt Due to the failure of Palanca to make his payments, Banco executed an instrument to foreclose on the mortgage of Palancas property But Palanca left for China and he never returned until he died Since Palanca is a nonresident, Banco has to notify Palanca about their intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper The lower court further orderd the clerk of court to furnish Palanca a copy and that it would be sent to Amoy, China The court eventually granted Bancos petition to execute Palancas property After 7 years, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Palance as his administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Palanca never received the summons. SC held that due process, as applied to a judicial proceeding, is satisfied if: o There is a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it o The court or tribunal must acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or the property that is the subject of the proceeding o The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard o Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing In a foreclosure case, notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner is essential, which is done through: o Publication o Mailing, if the residence is known The notification is constructive or substituted service and it does not constitute a service of process in any true sense o This mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the absent owner shall receive actual notice, which is not absolutely necessary The law proceeds from the presumption that property is to be in the possession of its owner and he may be safely held to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been institute for its condemnation and sale o In other words, it is the duty of the real estate owner to take measures that he will be represented when his property is called into question -FABELLA V. COURT OF APPEALS = Teachers on strike (administrative due process)

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DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-work order to public school teachers who went on strike Teachers from MANDALUYONG HIGH SCHOOL did not comply and, as such, administrative cases were filed against them and they were required to explain in writing why they should not be punished for violation of civil service laws and regulations A COMMITTEE was tasked to investigate the matter and the TEACHERS filed a case with the RTC, alleging that the committee acted with GADALEJ because it shifted the burden of proof to them The RTC case was dismissed and the investigating committee rendered a decision finding the teachers guilty The teachers filed a case for certiorari with the SC, which reversed the decision of the RTC Thus, the RTC set the case for trial and issued an Order, stating that Carino and the other respondents must appear personally or they will be declared in default The respondents were not able to attend because of prior commitments and were represented instead by their counsel, but the RTC declared them in default and the hearing was conducted ex parte with only the teachers allowed to present their evidence The RTC rendered a decision reversing that of the committee and ordered the reinstatement of the teachers, as it found that the teachers were denied due process of law Carino then filed an appeal with the CA, but the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC SC held that due process, as applied to an administrative proceeding, is satisfied if: o The right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings that may affect a respondents legal rights o A real opportunity: ! To be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel ! To present witnesses and evidence in ones favor ! To defend ones rights o A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty and impartiality o A finding by said tribunal that is supported by: ! Substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing ! Contained in the records ! Made known to the parties affected The SC also held that the MAGNA CARTA for PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS, which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving the same, was not followed o In this case, the committee that investigated the case did not have competent jurisdiction because its composition did not follow that which was required by the MAGNA CARTA ! The committee did not include a member from an existing teachers organization o Thus, the proceeding undertaken and the decision rendered by the said committee was void The SC finally held that that the inclusion of a representative from a teachers organization was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal o And an impartial tribunal would give substance and meaning to the right to be heard o The essence of procedural due process in any proceeding is embodied in the basic requirements of: ! Notice ! Real opportunity to be heard

-NON V. JUDGE DAMES = Students exercising constitutional rights within school (punishment too harsh) Non and 12 other students of the MABINI COLLEGE participated in unruly mass actions within school premises They violated their rally permits, which only allowed them to rally in the school basketball court and, therefore, it resulted in the disruption of classes They were denied re-enrollment for the next semester The SC held that although highest regard must be afforded to the exercise of the rights to free speech and assembly, school authorities are not powerless to discipline students, especially when conduct: o Disrupts classwork or o Involves substantial invasion of the rights of others The SC also held that the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process o Students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them o Students shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired o Students shall be informed of the evidence against them o Students shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf o The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee o The penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed

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The SC finally held that the penalty of non-enrollment was clearly excessive and disproportionate to the offense committed According to jurisprudence, if the concept of proportionality between the offense committed and sanction imposed is not followed, then an element of arbitrariness intrudes

-LAO GI V. COURT OF APPEALS = Deporting aliens (due process is also required) The Secretary of Justice rendered Opinion 191, finding Lao Gi alias Chia, Sr. a Filipino citizen, but the Opinion was subsequently revoked because it was found that said citizenship was obtained via fraud A charge for deportation against Chia and his entire family was filed with the COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION (CID) Lao Gi et al. filed a motion to dismiss with the CID, but this was opposed by the private prosecutor The CID set the deportation case in motion and ordered the registration of Chia, Sr. and his family as aliens Lao Gi et al. filed a case with the SC, alleging that no evidence had yet been presented to support the charges of fraud in the acquisition of citizenship The SC held that although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied o A preliminary investigation must be conducted to determine, if there is a sufficient cause to charge the respondent for deportation o The issuance of warrants of arrest, arrests without warrant, and service of warrants, search warrants, matter of bail, motion to quash, and trial should be in accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure o The charge against an alien must specify the acts or omissions complained of, which must be stated in ordinary and concise language o The intervention of a private prosecutor should not be allowed in deportation cases ! The possibility of oppression, harassment and persecution cannot be discounted The SC ordered the CID to continue hearing the deportation case against petitioners and thereafter, based on proper evidence before it, resolve the issue of citizenship Chia, Sr. and his family o In this case, the initial decision of the CID was rendered without proper evidence -PEOPLE V. NAZARIO = Fishponds (void for vagueness has strict requirements) Nazario was charged for violating municipal ordinances of the municipal council of PAGBILAO, QUEZON The said ordinances impose a P3.00 tax per square hectare of fishpond, which starts 3 years from the approval by the Bureau of Fisheries, or starting from the year 1964 in case it operated before the said year Nazario assails the ordinances for being ambiguous and uncertain, as well as vague insofar as the date of payment Nazario also claims that, being a lessee, he is neither owner nor manager within the scope of the definition of the law The SC held that a statute may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application." Vague statutes are repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: o It violates due process for failure to accord persons fair notice of the conduct to avoid o It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions, becoming an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle But the statute must be utterly vague on its face it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction o It is to be distinguished from legislation couched in imprecise language, but which nonetheless specifies a standard, though defectively phrased o It must further be distinguished from statutes that are apparently ambiguous, yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities The SC held that the ordinances are far from vague and merely poses a simple mathematical problem as to the dates of the payment, which may nevertheless be computed The SC further held that being the one who benefits and profits from the fishponds, the petitioner falls squarely within the coverage of the term operator or manager of the said fishpond for the purpose of the tax -CORONA V. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION = Shortened license (deprivation of property in violation of substantive due process) The PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY issued AO 04-92, limiting the term of appointment of harbor pilots to 1 year, subject to yearly renewal or cancellation, as opposed to the previous

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rule that once license has been acquired, said pilots may exercise the profession until age 70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental or physical incapacity Respondents filed an appeal with the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, but Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, Corona, dismissed the appeal o According to Corona, although the exercise of ones profession falls within ambit of property rights, the AO was not a wrongful deprivation of the same, but merely a regulation Respondents filed a case with the RTC and the latter ruled in their favor, reversing the decision of the Office of the President, because due process was not properly accorded Petitioners then elevated the case to the SC, but the SC was also convinced that AO 04-92 was issued in disregard of respondents right against deprivation of property without due process of law The SC held that due process involves two matters: o Procedure the manner by which the law is enforced o Substance requires that the law is fair, reasonable, and just The SC also held that in terms of procedure, due process was observed because the respondents were able to question the AO four times before reaching the SC o Jurisprudence holds that as long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, then he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law because the opportunity to be heard is the very essence of procedural due process o Moreover, due process is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action complained of The SC further held that as a general rule, the requirements of notice and hearing as the requirements of procedural due process are essential only when an administrative body exercises quasi-judicial functions o In this case, the PPA exercised its quasi-legislative function However, the SC held that in terms of substantive due process, the AO was unreasonable and superfluous, amounting to deprivation of property without due process of law o The license granted to harbor pilots is a vested right and the AO restricts the harbor pilots from enjoying their profession before their compulsory retirement, despite going through a rigid process before acquiring a license

-ARMY AND NAVY CLUB V. COURT OF APPEALS = Historical landmark? The City of Manila ordered the eviction of the Army & Navy Club for its failure to comply with contractual obligations The Army & Navy Club asserts that it is a historical landmark for being so declared by the NATIONAL HISTORICAL COMMISSION and, thus, its existence cannot be undermined by a simple ejectment suit The SC held that when properties are classified into historical treasures, it imposes limits on ownership and, hence, it must be done in accordance with due process both procedural and substantive The governing laws on the matter are RA 4846 and PD 374, providing the process by which properties are to be classified The SC also held that under the relevant law, it is the NATIONAL MUSEUM, which is given authority on the matter The SC further held that the prescribed procedure has not been complied with and nationalistic endorsements of classification will not transform a piece of property into a legally recognized historical landmark -SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD V. TORCITA = Conduct unbecoming an officer (the finding of guilt must have the proper charge) Torcita was charged with several counts of conduct unbecoming an officer, but the charges were dismissed due to lack of evidence and he was convicted instead for simple irregularity in the performance of duty Torcita insists that his right to due process of law was impaired The Summary Dismissal Board submits that the offense of "Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer" is broad enough to include any act of an officer that tends to bring dishonor and disgrace to the PNP organization, and Simple Irregularity in the Performance of Duty is one act that brings such disgrace and dishonor as contemplated by law The SC held that the administrative disciplinary machinery for dealing with complaints or charges against any member of the PNP is laid down in DILG Act of 1990 o Memorandum Circular 92-006 defines conduct unbecoming of a police officer" as any behavior or action of a PNP member done in his official capacity that seriously compromises his character and standing as a gentleman in such a manner as to indicate his vitiated or corrupt state of moral character; it may also refer to acts or behavior of any PNP member in an unofficial or private capacity that seriously compromises his position as a PNP member and exhibits himself as morally unworthy to remain as a member of the organization. o Memorandum Circular 91-002 defines "simple irregularity in the performance of duty" as a light offense, incurred by a member of the PNP who shall, among others,

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be found to have the odor or smell of alcohol on his breath while on duty, or possess alcoholic beverages on his person, police vehicle, post or office. The SC also held that while the definition of the more serious offense is broad, a finding of guilt for an offense, no matter how light, for which one is not properly charged and tried cannot be countenanced without violating the rudimentary requirements of due process o In this case, none of the charges or offenses mentioned or made reference to the specific act of being drunk while in the performance of official duty for which Torcita was convicted, which is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty for the offense for which he was not notified or charged

-ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN = Plunder law vague? Estrada was prosecuted under the Plunder Law o He challenged the constitutionality of the said law for being vague claiming that the words combination and series in the phrase combination or series of obvert and criminal acts are vague o As a result, his fundamental right to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated. The SC held that a statute is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application o But a doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice, as to doubt is to sustain The SC also held that the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters that would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation The SC further held that it can very easily be understood that what the law punishes is the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P50 million through the series or combination of criminal acts A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used or because of the employment of terms without defining them because the legislature is not mandated to define each and every word in an enactment o In this case, the words series and combination can be understood in their ordinary sense Finally, the SC held that the void for vagueness doctrine and overbreadth doctrine, which are peculiar to free expression cases, is not applicable to the case at bar o Void for vagueness states that a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the essential of due process of law o Overbreadth states that a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms Last but not least, the Plunder Law uses the reasonable doubt test, which further strengthens the case that it gives life to the due process clause -GONZALES V. NLRC AND ATENEO DE DAVAO = Removal of teacher because of corporal punishment (lack of due process) Gonzales, a teacher, was investigated pursuant to complaints from 2 parents alleging that she resorted to corporal punishment to discipline students She called for the amendment of some school rules, particularly that which limited the participation of her counsel to advice only without direct participation She was terminated upon notice and the NLRC sustained the termination. The SC held that upon being notified of her termination, Gonzales had the right to demand compliance with the basic requirements of due process: o Opportunity must be afforded the accused to defend herself either personally or through counsel, o To be informed of the nature and causes of the accusations against her o To confront and cross-examine the witnesses In this case, the adamant refusal of the committee to accede to the demand to amend the rules and allow her counsel to participate has led to her failure to successfully confront and cross-examine the accusers, which ultimately vitiated the investigation due to the denial of her right to due process -----SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS-----UNITED STATES V. TORIBIO = Slaughtering fit carabao (valid restraint on property use) Appellant was prosecuted for slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered a carabao, without a permit from the municipal treasurer against the provisions of Act 1147 Appellant assails the act either as an invalid exercise of eminent domain or police power because the permit will never be granted if the carabao is fit for agricultural work or for draft purposes, which was what happened in the instant case The SC held that there is a distinction between the power of eminent domain and police power

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Eminent domain is the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to public use, whenever public exigency requires it, and which can be done only on condition of providing for a reasonable compensation o Police power is power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth and of the subjects of the same The SC held that in this case, the power exercised was police power, particularly a restriction upon a private use, which the legislature deemed detrimental to public welfare o In other words, the legislature may regulate and restrain the use of property that would be inconsistent or injurious to the rights of the public The SC also held that to justify State interposition in behalf of the public: o The interests of the public in general require such interference o The means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive o The determination of a proper exercise is subject to review by the courts The SC finally held that in this case, there was a reasonably necessary limitation on private ownership to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by slaughter by improvident owners o

-YNOT V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT = Transfer of carabao (unreasonable law) Ynot transported 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo and was caught and penalized under EO No. 66-A, prohibiting the inter-provincial transport of carabaos and carabeef and authorizing the immediate confiscation of the said carabaos and distribution of the same to deserving farmers (charitable institutions in the case of carabeef) as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit. The purpose of the law was to protect carabaos as a national energy resource given the prevailing energy crisis, as the carabao was said to be the poor mans tractor Ynot claims that the penalty is invalid because it was imposed without according him a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court, as guaranteed by due process The government justifies the EO as an exercise of police power, which extends to all the great public needs and has the end goal of promoting general welfare The SC held that there was an absence of lawful method as the EO imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter, but on the movement of carabaos o In other words, the reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved was missing The SC also held that the sanction, outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef, is unreasonable because no trial is prescribed and the property being transported is immediately impounded and declared forfeited to the measure o Thus, there was an invalid exercise of police power because the method employed was not reasonably necessary and unduly oppressive -CHURCHILL V. RAFFERTY = Billboards regulation (constitutional) Act 2339 allows the COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, after due investigation, to decide that any sign or billboard exposed to the public view is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance and empowers him to summarily order the its removal; and if not complied with within 10 days, he may cause the removal himself The plaintiffs, whose billboards are upon private lands in Rizal, contend that it constitutes deprivation of property without due process of law The SC held that the regulation of billboards falls squarely within the police power of the State The SC also held that things offensive to the senses, such as sight, smell, or hearing, may be suppressed by the State, especially those situated in thickly populated districts o In other words, the people are entitled to protest against the indiscriminate and wholesale use of the landscape by advertisers, especially if they are offensive to the senses under certain conditions The SC further held that the State has the duty to promote a healthy social and economic condition and the comfort and convenience of the people fall squarely within its coverage o The prevailing public sentiment likewise militates against the erection of billboards that are offensive to the sight -PEOPLE V. FAJARDO = Constructing a building without permit (unlawful deprivation of property) Fajardo was convicted for having constructed a building, without permit from the Municipal Mayor, which obstructs the view of the Plaza from the Highway, contrary to a Camarines Sur Ordinance enacted for that matter The SC held that the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive because although the purpose of the law may be valid; however, the means employed is arbitrary Although property may be regulated in the interest of general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight, the State may not permanently divest owners of beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve the aesthetic appearance of the community

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In this case, every structure built by Fajardo, no matter how beautiful, would be a violation because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway o The appellant is then constrained to let his land remain idle The SC also held that an ordinance that permanently restricts the use of property, such that it can no longer be used for any reasonable purpose, is beyond regulation and constitutes taking of property o In other words, it clearly oversteps the boundaries of the exercise of police power and amounts to confiscation and deprivation of property without just compensation o The use and enjoyment of the property is an element of ownership o

-ACEBEDO OPTICAL CO. V. COURT OF APPEALS = Too many conditions for business permit (business permit v. license to practice) ACEBEDO OPTICAL applied with the City Mayor of ILIGAN for a business permit, which was granted, anent opposition from local optometrists, but subject to various burdensome conditions to the point that it is limited to being a commercial store: o It cannot examine or prescribe reading glasses o It cannot sell the same without prescription of independent optometrists o It can only advertise Ray Ban and similar frames The SC held that police power is vested in the legislature and the same is delegated to LGUs, including the power to issue permits However, the SC also held that there is a distinction between a business permit and a license to practice a profession o Business permit cannot be equated with a license to practice a profession the issuance of which is lodged in a Board of Commissioners tasked specifically to regulate the said profession, which is, in this case, the Board of Examiners in Optometry o Business permits are obtained in order to engage in business or some form of commercial activity The SC further held that ACEBEDO applied for a business permit and the LGU does not have authority to regulate the profession or practice of Optometry Last but not least, a corporation, such as ACEBEDO, has all the contractual rights of a person and may employ qualified optometrists it is not against public policy or the law. -LAWRENCE V. TEXAS = Homosexuals caught in the act (violation of due process) Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another adult man, Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct The State Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction The US SC held that the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause The Court reasoned that the case turned on whether Lawrence and Garner were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause The US SC also held that their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government The US SC further held that the Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual -ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS V. CITY OF MANILA = Motel regulation (constitutional and not violative of due process) To address the increase of prostitution, fornication, adultery, and other activities offensive to the public morals, the City of Manila enacted an Ordinance burdening hotel and motel operators with certain regulations, such as: o Lessees are to be required to fill up registration forms o Imposing a prohibition against the lease of rooms to minors o Imposing a prohibition against lease of rooms for more than twice within 24 hours o That the said establishments must be open for inspection by the Mayor of Chief of Police o Classifying said establishments into 2 classifications (1st class & 2nd class) and imposing certain minimum requirements therefor Petitioners assail the Ordinance for invading their right to privacy The SC held that police power is the power of the State to enact regulations to promote the health, morals, peace and order, and welfare of the society o The said ordinance is enacted precisely for that purpose: to prevent the deterioration of the public morals ! In other words, to curb immorality, which the SC found to be a valid and proper exercise of police power

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The SC also held that there was no violation of due process because the standard is the responsiveness to the supremacy of reason and obedience to the dictates of justice o In other words, it must not be arbitrary and oppressive o Due process is the embodiment of the idea of fair play In this case, the Ordinance was not arbitrary or oppressive because there was a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction Last but not least, the SC also held that the Ordinance is valid due to the absence of evidence adduced by the petitioners to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a statute or ordinance

-CITY OF MANILA V. JUDGE LAGUIO = Karaoke, sauna, illegal? (unconstitutional and unreasonable) Mayor Lim signed into law Ordinance 7783, which basically prohibited establishments such as sauna parlors, karaoke bars, motels, and inns from operating in the Malate District, which was notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers The MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION avers that the ordinance is invalid as it includes inns and motels in the enumeration of prohibited establishments Judge Laguio issued a Decision assailing the Ordinance, which prompted petitioners to file a case with the SC The SC held the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an ordinance to be valid, there are several requirements: o It must be within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact o It must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law o And it must conform to the following substantive requirements: ! Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; ! Must not be unfair or oppressive; ! Must not be partial or discriminatory; ! Must not prohibit, but may regulate trade; ! Must be general and consistent with public policy; and ! Must not be unreasonable The SC also held that the Ordinance violates the Due Process clause, which is a guarantee against arbitrary regulation o Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property o Substantive due process asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a persons life, liberty, or property o Police power must always be exercised in accordance with due process and to be valid: ! The interests of the public in general require an interference with private rights ! The means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose The SC recognized that the end goal of Manila City was to promote the social and moral values of the community, but the purpose could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by absolute prohibition o In other words, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se achieve the said goal o Coupled with the fact that the enumerated establishments per se are lawful pursuits -WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION V. CITY OF MANILA = no wash rates and renting of rooms twice within 24 hours (unconstitutional) Mayor Lim signed into law Ordinance 7774, which prohibited short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila WHITE LIGHT is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons The City of Manila maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power o Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports The SC held that the Ordinance is null and void as the exercise of police power violates, among others, the Due Process clause, which is supposed to serve as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure The SC held that it violated substantive due process, particularly when tested against the rational basis examination, which is used to review economic legislation, is a test to see if laws or ordinances rationally further a legitimate governmental interest o Strict scrutiny test, which is used to review laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, focuses on the presence of compelling governmental interest and on the absence of less restricting means for achieving such interest

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Immediate scrutiny test, which is used to review classifications based on gender and legitimacy, extensively examines governmental interest and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered The SC noted that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rates are really there for obscene purposes only o Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people o As held in jurisprudence, a valid exercise of police power has two requirements: ! The interests of the public in general require the interference of the State ! The means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose o

-BALACUIT V. CFI = Half price for children (unconstitutional and no public interest is served) The City Board of BUTUAN enacted Ordinance 640, mandating that admission seats for children between 7-12 years old should be sold for half the price o The Ordinance aims to lessen the economic burden of parents whose kids are lured by the so-called attractive nuisances Petitioners, who are owners of theaters, assail the Ordinance as unconstitutional for violating the due process clause for being unfair and oppressive The SC held that police power legislation must a) be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and b) a reasonable relation between end and means must exist o In other words, the method or means used to protect public health, morals, safety, or welfare must have some relation to the end in view o Lawful subject and lawful method The SC found that in this case, no public interest at all is served by the ordinance, save for the parents who will be able to save money o In fact, the SC also held that the ordinance is unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners Last but not least, ascertaining the ages of children for the purpose of the discount is likewise difficult o It is not at all practicable, as the Council asserts, to require children to present birth certificates while purchasing theater tickets -MATAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES = Gambling is not illegal per se PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation Inc., renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile It enacted Ordinance 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and canceling existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of casinos It then adopted a sterner Ordinance 3375-93, prohibiting altogether the operation of Casino and providing penalty for violation therefor Pryce assailed the ordinances before the CA, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner The CA found the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement, which prompted Cagayan de Oro to file elevate the case to the SC The SC held that the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue and gambling is not illegal per se. The SC also held that the test of a valid Ordinance requires: o That it must be within the power of the LGU to enact o That it must be passed according to proper procedure o That it does not contravene the Constitution or any statute o That it is not unfair or oppressive o That it is not partial or discriminatory o That it does not prohibit but may regulate o That it must be general and consistent with public policy o That it must not be unreasonable The SC further held that there are two kinds of gambling the illegal and those authorized by law o PD 1869 authorizes Casino gambling and has the status of a statute, which cannot be amended by a mere Ordinance Last but not least, Ordinances should not contravene a statute, as municipal governments are only agents of the national government -BENNIS V. MICHIGAN = Husband and prostitute had sex in the car (forfeiture was not a violation of due process) The car jointly owned by the Bennis spouses was confiscated by the Michigan Court as a public nuisance because the husband, John, used it to engage in sexual activity with a prostitute along a Detroit City street

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o John was convicted of gross indecency The wife, Tina, claims that, being the co-owner and innocent spouse without knowledge or consent to her husbands illegal activity, she has been deprived of her property without due process of law The US SC held that it is a well-settled rule in jurisprudence that the acts of the possessor bind the interests of the owner, whether he is innocent or not o The US SC also held that it is a defense of the State against forbidden use and the evasion from liability by dispensing with the necessity of conducting judicial inquiry regarding possible collusion o Thus, the innocent-owner defense does not hold sway The US SC noted held that Tina claims that she was denied notice and an opportunity to contest the abatement of her car, but she was actually accorded both The US SC further held that the government is not required to compensate the owner of the property it has lawfully taken, unless the taking was done in the exercise the power of eminent domain o In this case, the forfeiture was exercised through the police power of the State The purpose of the law is to deter illegal activities leading to the deterioration of the neighborhood and to unsafe streets o Forfeiture of property prevents illegal uses by: ! Preventing further illicit use of the property ! Imposing an economic penalty

-CRUZAN V. DIRECTOR, MISOURI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH = No euthanasia (Missouri States interest to protect life is valid) Nancy Cruzan, due to an automobile accident, is in a persistent vegetative state The Missouri State trial court authorized the termination of death-delaying procedures at the instance of her family, but the State Supreme Court reversed the decision The US SC held that generally, a competent person has the constitutionally-protected right to refuse life-saving hydration and nutrition o However, it does not follow that the same applies to an incompetent person The US SC also held that the State has a general interest in the protection and preservation of human life. o It must guard against potential abuses by surrogates who may not act according to the interests of the patient o For this reason, the State of Missouri can apply a clear and convincing evidence standard to determine whether or not the proposed termination of the deathdelaying mechanisms is in accordance with the will of the patient In this case, the evidence adduced in trial, based on the testimony of her friend that she once remotely expressed not wanting to live further in a vegetative state, does not suffice to meet the said standard The US SC further held that the Due Process Clause does not require the State to accept the substituted judgment of close family members in the absence of clear proof that they reflect the same views of the patient -BELTRAN V. SECRETARY OF HEALTH = Phasing out of commercial blood banks (equal protection clause and valid exercise of police power) The National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law and it sought to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country AO 9, constituting the IRR of said Act was promulgated by respondent DOH Section 7 of the Act provides that all commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a period of 2 years after the effectivity of the Act, extendable to a maximum period of 2 years by the Secretary Section 23 of the Act provides that the phasing out is extendible for a maximum period of 2 years after the effectivity of the Act and the decision to extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety Years prior to the passage of the said Act, petitioners have already been operating commercial blood banks under an old law, which allowed the establishment and operation by licensed physicians of blood banks and blood processing laboratories Thus, petitioners, operating under the name of Our Lady of Fatima Blood Bank, filed a petition with the SC The SC held that the Act does not violate the equal protection clause because: o It was based on substantial distinctions, which made real differences ! Non-profit blood banks operate for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical service while commercial blood banks are motivated by profit o The classification is germane to the purpose of the law ! The purpose was to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity, which necessarily involves the phase out of commercial blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a business enterprise, and they source their blood

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supply from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as shown by the USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine blood banking system. o It was not limited to existing conditions only ! Congress intended for the general application of the law o It applied equally to each member of the class ! The law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception The SC also held that the Act was a valid exercise of police power, as the promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State o Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the States police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety o In other words, it is valid because it is for the interest of the public generally and the means employed are reasonably necessary o Yes, the action may seriously affect the owners of commercial blood banks, but their interests must give way to serve a higher purpose

-MANALO V. PNP CHIEF = Restrictive custody and monitored movements (constitutional and not unlawful deprivation of liberty) Several police officers were detailed in Camp Vicente Lim under a restrictive custody status after being implicated in the burning of an elementary school in Batangas during the May 2007 elections Said police officers contend that the restrictive custody status is, in effect, an unlawful deprivation of their liberty because their physical movements are limited only within Camp Vicente Lim Petitioners filed a case for habeas corpus The SC held that for the writ of habeas corpus to issue, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action o It cannot be a mere nominal or moral restraint of liberty o In this case, the SC also held that petitioners are not actually detained or restrained of their liberties as what was ordered was only that their movements be monitored and they are, in fact, free to go in and out of Camp Vicente Lim The SC further held that placing police officers facing administrative cases under restrictive custody is a disciplinary measure authorized under the PNP law -LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. V. JAC LINER, INC. = Only one terminal in Lucena (invalid exercise of police power) Lucena City enacted an ordinance which provides, among others, that: all buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city and are hereby directed to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers; and (b) all temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of the ordinance It also provides that all jeepneys, mini-buses, and buses shall use the Grand Central Terminal of the city Last but not least, it granted a franchise to Lucena Grand Central Terminal as the sole operator of a terminal in the city JAC Liner, Inc. assailed the city ordinance as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise of police power The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, which ruled in favor of JAC Liner, prompting Lucena Grand Central Terminal to elevate the case to the SC The SC held that LGUs may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met: o The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and o The means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals o Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, which involve public interest warranting the interference of the State, making the first requisite for the proper exercise of police power present However, the means employed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Lucena to attain its professed objective were not reasonably necessary and unduly oppressive The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. o They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem o The common carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are, thus, compelled to close down their existing terminals and use the facilities of petitioner o Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive o Moreover, bus terminals per se do not impede or help impede the flow of traffic. The SC did not see how the outright proscription against the existence of all

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terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem -----EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW-----PEOPLE V. CAYAT = non-Christian drinker (valid and reasonable classification) Cayat was a member of the non-Christian tribes of Benguet He was charged and sentenced under RA 1639 for possession of intoxicating liquors other than the so-called native wines He challenged the constitutionality of the said act because it allegedly discriminatory and makes an arbitrary distinction based on birth The SC held that the following requisites must be complied with to satisfy equal protection: o It must rest on substantial distinctions o It must be germane to the purpose of the law o It must not be limited to existing conditions only o It must apply equally to all members of a class The SC held that the guarantee of equal protection is not violated by legislation based on a reasonable classification. o First, the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in non-Christian tribes, satisfying that it rests on substantial distinctions o Second, the prohibition is germane to the purpose of the law ! In the past, the free use of the said liquors by the natives has resulted in lawlessness and crimes, hampering the efforts of the government to prepare them for integration with the mainstream community o Third, the Act is not limited to present conditions at the time of its enactment ! It was intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist o Fourth, the Act applies equally to all members of the class ! The argument that some members of the non-Christian tribes have become civilized is untenable The SC also recognized that principle of salus populi suprema est lex. o When the public safety so requires, the hand of the legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance despite inconveniences that some members of a particular class may suffer o In other words, the private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation -DUMLAO V. COMELEC = If you retire from that position, you cannot run for it again (valid and reasonable classification) Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya and he has retired from his office, as well as been receiving retirement benefits therefrom He filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local elections However, BP 52 was passed and it provided a disqualification for candidates likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional, violating the equal protection of the law o He assails the validity of a provision of BP No. 52 that prohibits retired elected officials over 65 years old from seeking re-election for the same position from which he retired Igot and Salapantan also assailed BP 52, as it has a provision that prohibits persons charged with crimes from seeking public office The SC held that the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification o In other words, if the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class o In this case, for purposes of public service, employees 65 years old have been validly classified differently from younger employees. ! Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, as the purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments The SC also held that laws shall not be declared unconstitutional, unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear and beyond reasonable doubt However, as regards the case of Igot and Salapantan, the SC held that the assailed provision contravenes the constitutional provision on presumption of innocence and in effect classifies those merely charged with those already convicted o In other words, a person merely charged for a crime cannot be put in the same level as a person already convicted for the purpose of disqualifying him from office and it is an invalid classification ! An accusation is not synonymous to guilt The SC further held that a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination -GOESART V. CLEARY = No female bartenders unless wife or daughter of bar owner (probably unwise,

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but still constitutional) Michigan State, in line with its system of controlling the sale of liquor, passed a law, which stated that no female may be licensed to be a bartender, unless she is the wife or daughter of the male owner. Petitioner asserts that Michigan cannot forbid females generally, but, at the same time, making an exception in favor of the wives and daughters of owners The US SC held that Michigan could, if it so desired, to forbid all women from working behind a bar The US SC also held that while Michigan may deny to all women the opportunity for bartending, it cannot play favorites with women without rhyme or reason o In other words, the equal protection of the laws precludes irrational discrimination as between persons or groups in the incidence of a law o However, in this case, the US SC recognized that the legislature apparently believes that it did not need to go to the full length of the prohibition, as the wives or daughters of male bar owners are less susceptible to the general hazards to women of the said job due to the oversight afforded by the owner of the bar The US SC further held that although the law may be questionable insofar as its wisdom, the court cannot gainsay the belief of the legislature, especially where the line drawn is not without a basis in reason o In other words, it is not the province of the Judiciary to rule upon the wisdom of legislation only its legality may be ruled upon o This is in keeping with the principle of the separation of powers -ORMOC SUGAR CENTRAL V. ORMOC CITY = Tax imposed on one company only (invalid classification and violative of equal protection) The Municipal Board of Ormoc imposed a tax on all centrifugal sugar productions milled at the Ormoc Sugar Central Company, which was, at the time of the Ordinance, the only sugar central existing in Ormoc City during that time, at 1% per export sale o In other words, it taxes only the sugar produced in the said company and none other Ormoc Sugar Central paid the taxes in protest and until in finally filed a case in court, assailing that the Ordinance was, among others, violative of the equal protection of the laws The SC held that Section 2 of RA 2264 gave chartered cities, municipalities, and municipal districts the authority to levy, for public purposes, just and uniform taxes, licenses, or fees. The SC also held that the equal protection clause does not bar a reasonable classification and the classification, in order to be reasonable: o Must be based on substantial distinctions, which make real differences o Must be germane to the purpose of the law o Must apply not only present conditions, but also to future conditions, which are substantially identical o Must apply equally to those who belong to the same class The SC further held that, in this case, the requirement that the classification be applicable to future conditions was absent o While Ormoc Sugar Central is the only sugar central in the City of Ormoc during that time, the Ordinance, as worded, will not affect other sugar centrals established thereafter o Taxing ordinances should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar centrals, which was what happened in this case -SISON V. ANCHETA = Taxing professionals differently (valid and reasonable classification) BP 135 imposed a higher tax rate for net income of professionals and businessmen as opposed to the gross income tax at a lower rate applied to compensation or fixed-wage earners Petitioner assails the law as class legislation, which is oppressive and capricious in character, transgressing the equal protection clause The SC held that the equal protection clause, like the due process clause, are not fixed rules, but broad standards The SC also held that the standard to avoid the charge that there is a denial of equal protection is that the governmental act assailed was not prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason Equal protection of the law means that those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions case on some in the group should be equally binding on the rest o It does not prohibit reasonable classifications The SC further held that taxpayers may be classified into different classes or categories and such classification must rest upon substantial distinctions o In this case, there is a significant distinction between compensation earners and professionals or businessmen ! Wage earners have no overhead expenses and are not entitled to make deductions for taxing purposes ! Businessmen and professionals, on the other hand, are not uniform as to

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their expenses necessary to produce their income There is thus ample justification for the classification

-HIMAGAN V. PEOPLE = Preventive suspension for more than 90 days for PNP (valid and reasonable classification) Himagan, a member of the PNP, was implicated for the killing of Benjamin Machitar Jr. and the attempted murder of Barnabe Machitar and informations were filed with the RTC Himagan was preventively suspended on the basis of the DILG Act for such period until the termination of his case. Himagan contends that the 90-day maximum period for preventive suspension under the Civil Service Law should apply to him since the PNP is under the Civil Service The SC held that there is ample distinction between members of the PNP and other ordinary people charged with offenses o In this case, policemen carry weapons and a badge that can be used to harass or threaten witnesses The SC also held that the legislative intent, based on the record of deliberations of the BCC, is clear o The 90-day preventive suspension period was not meant to apply to members of the PNP charged with crimes o Their suspension is valid for such period prior to the termination of their case The SC finally held that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality, as it merely requires that all persons in the same class shall be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced o A distinction based on reasonable considerations and related to a proper legislative purpose is neither unreasonable, capricious, and unfounded -PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION V. PRADO= Removal of franking privileges for the judiciary (unconstitutional and violative of the equal protection clause) RA 7354, through its repealing clause, withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary but retained it for the other branches of the government, such as the executive and the legislative, even in favor of former first ladies and the AFP Ladies Steering Committee The SC held that the equal protection clause is embraced in the concept of due process and arbitrariness in general may be challenged based on the due process clause. o But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down with is the equal protection clause The SC also held that the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege is the need for the smoother flow of communication between the government and the people o In this case, it was agreed upon, even by the respondents, that it is the Judiciary that needs the franking privilege the most and this is the reason why it is being cut off from the privilege The SC further held that the equal protection clause is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirement of justice and fair play o Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause, but if the particular act assailed partakes of un unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down with is the equal protection clause But the SC held that if the problem is loss of revenue for the Philippine Postal Corporation, then the remedy is to withdraw the privilege from all branches of government, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored and oppressed o In this case, the distinction between the grantees of the privilege and the Judiciary was simply superficial -TIU V. COURT OF APPEALS = SSEZ businesses enjoy certain privileges (valid and reasonable classification) RA No. 7227 and EO 97-A grant several forms of tax incentives in favor of businesses and residents within the secured area of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), but denies the same to those businesses located outside the said zone Petitioner assails the law as being violative of the equal protection clause, as it unduly favors one particular class over another The SC held that the policy of the law is to develop the SSEZ into a self-sustaining commercial and financial investment center from an abandoned naval facility o For this reason, the SC recognized that the reason for the incentives was to attract big local and foreign investors, as they can pour huge investments to spur the economic growth of the country o In this case, there is clearly a substantial difference between the big investors being lured in to establish their business within the SSEZ and the present small merchants doing trade outside the area o The establishments outside of the said zone, aside from making only a local economic impact as opposed to the desired national impact, do not have any impact on the purpose of the law to turn the former military base into an industrial and commercial hub ! Thus, there is hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits

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under RA 7227 -DE GUZMAN, JR. ET AL. V. COMELEC = Reassignment of election officers (valid and reasonable classification) The Voters Registration Act declared that election officers who have served for more than 4 years within a certain municipality or city are to be re-assigned to a different area. This has resulted to the re-assignment of De Guzman and the other herein petitioners and they aver that they have been singled out as municipal and city election officers from other COMELEC officers, which is violative of the equal protection clause The SC held that in this case, the policy of the law in singling out the said election officers is to ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place assignment. o There was a valid classification in this case and, thus, it does not violate the equal protection clause -PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY V. NLRC = Youre married, youre fired (discriminatory against married women and unconstitutional) Herein private respondent de Guzman, a married woman, was dismissed from her work at PT&T due to concealment of civil status and defalcation of company funds De Guzman wrote that she was single when she was initially hired by PT&T, but she contracted marriage months after The record, however, discloses that her termination was, in reality, primarily caused by the companys policy against married women as opposed to her allegedly dishonesty The SC held that the companys policy is highly discriminatory o The policy against accepting women workers who contract marriage runs afoul to the right against discrimination of women protected by labor laws and the Constitution It is the policy of the State to protect labor, as well as the fundamental right to equality before the law of women and men The SC also held that although it is recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law o Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee -INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE V. QUISUMBING = Foreign-hires get more than local-hires (invalid classification and unconstitutional) Respondent International School, Inc. employs both foreign and locally-hired teachers, but grants the foreign-hires additional salary of 25% on top of other benefits such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, travel allowances, and the like. o According to the school, incentives are granted to foreign-hires because of the dislocation factor and limited tenure they undergo, as well as to attract them to exercise their profession here The local-hires cry discrimination The SC held that discrimination, especially in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Employees should be given equal pay for equal value of work. o Local-hires perform basically the same functions and services as foreign-hires and, thus, are entitled to the same compensation o Salary is defined as a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or industry in another mans business or basically, rendering services The SC also held that the principle to be followed is equal pay for equal work o Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort, and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries The SC further held that the dislocation factor is not a valid basis for distinction in salary rates o However, it may be adequately compensated by the other benefits granted by the school to which it is more directly related -PARRENO V. COA = No more retirement benefits after losing citizenship for AFP (valid and reasonable classification) Parreno served in the AFP for 32 years before his retirement, after which he received pension benefits Parreno migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized US citizen, which prompted the AFP to stop petitioners pension based on PD 1638, which provides that a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall have his retirement benefits terminated The Judge Advocate General of the AFP denied the motion for reconsideration and the money claim filed by Parreno with COA was denied for lack of jurisdiction Parreno filed a case with the SC, alleging that the law constitutes an unlawful deprivation of property the pension to which Parreno has a vested right to and it unreasonably discriminates against AFP retirees who have lost their citizenship

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The SC held that the retirement benefits of military personnel are purely gratuitous in nature The SC also held that Parrenos loss of citizenship constitutes a substantial distinction that distinguishes him from other retirees who retain their Filipino citizenship o A retiree who had lost his Filipino citizenship had already renounced his allegiance to the State and the latter may not call upon him to defend it when the need arises, as the State may require not only private citizens, but also those who have retired The SC further held that if groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, then one class may be treated and regulated differently from another

-CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V. CENTRAL BANK = Relative constitutionality (valid, but its continued operation would render it unconstitutional) In 1993, RA 7653 or the New Central Bank Act took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP. On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of the RA, petitioner Central Bank Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against the BSP to restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of RA 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional Petitioners contend that the proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between 2 classes of employees in the BSP a) those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization law (Salary Grade 20 and above) and b) the rank-and-file employees (Salary Grade 20 and below), which amounts to class legislation, as it is not based on substantial distinctions The SC held that under present standards of equal protection, the assailed proviso is valid o The equal protection clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate, provided that the long as the classification is not unreasonable ! It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. o The Constitution does not require that things that are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same o One of the requirements for a reasonable classification is that the same must be made on substantial distinctions, which make for real differences ! In this case, it was found that based on the legislative deliberations, the exemption of some officers from the SSL was intended to address the BSPs lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file However, the SC also held that the although initially valid, the continued operation of the law would be unconstitutional and violative of equal protection o The SC considered this to be a case of relative constitutionality ! A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions o In this case, subsequent laws having been enacted exempting all other rank-and-file employees of 7 other government financial institutions from the SSL, save for those from the BSP, constitutes discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of the BSP ! While the charter of the BSP was enacted in 1993, the subsequent laws and changes within the charters of other government financial institutions took place between 1994 to 2004 -SERRANO V. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. = Illegally discharged OFW (whichever is less violates the equal protection clause) Petitioner Serrano was hired by respondents GALLANT MARITIME and MARLOW NAVIGATION under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months as CHIEF OFFICER (Salary of US$1,400) In March 1998, the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of SECOND OFFICER (Salary of US$1,000) upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be CHIEF OFFICER by the end of April 1998 Respondents did not deliver on their promise. Hence, Serrano refused to stay on and was repatriated to the Philippines serving only 2 months and 7 days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of 9 months and 23 days Serrano filed a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims. The NLRC awarded a sum representing 3 months salary. This decision was based on the provision of RA 8042. Serano questioned the constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042, which provided that in case of invalid termination, the employee shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of 12% per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three 3 months for every

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year of the unexpired term, whichever is less. The SC held that apart from the equal protection clause in the BoR, the Constitution also accords in Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII all members of the labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare. o That means that workers of similar category should equally enjoy all monetary benefits, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them also in equal degree. The SC also held that such rights are not absolute, but subject to the power of Congress to incorporate a system of classification into its legislation There are 3 levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law: o Rational basis scrutiny ! In which the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest o Intermediate scrutiny ! In which the government must show that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest o Strict judicial scrutiny ! In which a legislative classification which interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest In this case, the SC held that the standard of strict judicial scrutiny is called for, instead of simply a rational basis scrutiny, and it found no compelling state interest The SC further held that prior to RA 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike, as they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts o But with the enactment the RA, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract have been differently treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment o It imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment ! In other words, the subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage

-BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACO V. CAMACHO = Different taxes for different kinds of cigarettes (valid and reasonable classification) British American Tobacco, the company behind Lucky Strike cigarettes, assailed the validity of RA 8240 and 8424, amending the National Internal Revenue Code, insofar as new brands of cigarettes shall be taxed according to their current net retail price while existing or old brands shall be taxed based on their net retail price as of October 1996 o Moreover, the taxing scheme based on the current net retail price of new cigarettes will be as such until revised by Congress After having introduced the brand in 2001, British American Tobacco was taxed for P13.44/pack because its current net retail price was above P10.00 Petitioner insisted that the provisions classification freeze provision violate the equal protection clause, as it accords a special or privileged status to other brands, based on the different taxing scheme The SC held that the petition is without merit and legislative classification may be tolerated so long as it is reasonable: o It rests on substantial distinctions o It is germane to the purpose of the law o It applies to both present and future conditions o It applies equally to all those belonging to the same class o In this case, since a new brand was not yet in existence at the time of the passage of RA 8240, Congress needed a uniform mechanism to fix the tax bracket of a new brand. The current net retail price, similar to what was used to classify the brands as of October 1996, was thus the logical and practical choice The SC also held that Congress sought to simplify the whole tax system for sin products to remove these potential areas of abuse and corruption from both the side of the taxpayer and the government o This is in line with one of the objectives of the RA "to simplify the tax administration and compliance with the tax laws that are about to unfold in order to minimize losses arising from inefficiencies and tax avoidance scheme, if not outright tax evasion." o Previously classified cigarette brands would be prevented from moving either

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upward or downward their tax brackets despite the changes in the net retail prices in the future and, as a result, the amount of taxes due from them would remain predictable ! The classification freeze provision would, thus, aid in the revenue planning of the government The SC further held that uniformity of taxation is not violated when classification is present, as long as: o The standards used are substantial and not arbitrary o The classification is germane to achieve the legislative purpose o The law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions o The classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class

-QUINTO AND TOLENTINO V. COMELEC = Appointive officials v. elective officials (valid and reasonable classification) Petitioners Quinto and Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. Petitioners assail the law as being violative of the equal protection clause for making an arbitrary distinction between elective and appointive officials o Elective officials are not ipso facto resigned from their office upon the filing of a certificate of candidacy The SC held that the issue in this case has already been laid to rest in Farinas v. Executive Secretary and that the legal dichotomy created by the legislature was a reasonable classification o In other words, if the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated from the other ! In this case, the SC also held that elective officials occupy their positions via the will of the electorate and are elected to an office for a definite term, removable therefrom only upon stringent conditions and are allowed to partake in political and electoral activities, whereas appointed officials hold office by virtue of designation by an appointing authority and who may or may not have security of tenure and are prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity, except to vote The SC also held that as long as the classification is made on reasonable grounds, then the Courts have no power to inquire into legislative wisdom o Under the Constitution, it is the legislature that is given authority to balance competing interests and thereafter make policy choices responsive to the exigencies of the times

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ART III SEC 2 -----WHEN INTRUSTION IS A SEARCH-----VALMONTE V. GENERAL DE VILLA = Checkpoints are not illegal per se (coup detats uphold the continuing validity of checkpoints) Due to the alarming lawlessness prevalent in urban areas and the threat of the NPA, particularly coup detats, an LOI was issued creating the NCR DISTRICT COMMAND to establish an effective territorial defense and to provide an atmosphere of peace and order It mandated the creation of checkpoints placed in various strategic locations manned by military personnel and it conducted regular searches and check-ups of vehicles without a warrant or court order o There was once an instance when a one person, Benjamin Parpon, was fired at and killed for speeding off and refusing to submit to the search Petitioner assailed the measure, as it serves as a vehicle for abuse, constituting warrantless searches and seizures, while his, along with the residents of Valenzuelas, safety is being placed at the arbitrary, capricious, and whimsical disposition of the military The SC held that checkpoints are not illegal per se, especially under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of the organized government is on the balance or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril o In this case, recent and ongoing events have pointed to the continuing validity and need for checkpoints, which have been regarded by authorities as a security measure o Moreover, the brief questioning and visual search that constitutes the routine check cannot be regarded as violative of the right against unreasonable searches ! No body search was conducted! The SC also held that one must concede to the States basic right to defend itself from its enemies and to pursue its program of government intended for public welfare The SC further held that practice of routine checkpoints has been sanctioned by jurisprudence because it is founded on public interest, safety, and necessity Last but not least, the Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right capable of being invoked only by those whose rights have been infringed o In this case, the petitioner cannot invoke it for other persons o Also, the citizen is not helpless and may avail of legal remedies in case of abuse -PEOPLE V. ESCANO = Checkpoints thanks to COMELEC (checkpoints need not be announced in advance) During a routine vehicle search in a checkpoint en route to Pasay City, police officers saw a long firearm on the lap of a person seated on the passenger seat, Usana o They were asked to park the car and the subsequent search yielded a 45-caliber pistol Usana, along with Escano, the driver, was brought to the precinct and the latter was directed to open the trunk of the car, to which he readily and freely agreed o Hashish was found in the trunk The trial court convicted them of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, among others Petitioners assailed the Decision, as they contended that the checkpoints should have been announced and that the warrantless search was conducted in an arbitrary manner The SC not only held that checkpoints are not illegal, but they also need not be announced o In this case, the checkpoints are pursuant to COMELECs gun ban during election period The SC also held that to limit the search to visual searches would defeat the aim of the COMELEC to effect the gun ban o In this case, the method employed by authorities consisted of merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such as those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were carrying guns o At best they merely directed their flashlights inside the cars they would stop, without opening the cars doors or subjecting its passengers to a body search ! There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is what the situation demands The SC further held that there are indications that Escano consented to the search because he did not refuse and freely accompanied the police to the trunk of his car o Thus, there is nothing arbitrary in the conduct of the search Finally, the SC held that the following warrantless searches are valid: o Search incidental to a lawful arrest o Search of moving vehicles o Evidence in plain view o Customs searches o Consented warrantless searches o Stop-and-frisk situations

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-----REQUISITES OF VALID WARRANT-----ALVAREZ V. CFI = Search for accounting books, documents, and papers (hearsay; defective search warrant) Suspected for being a loan shark, a search warrant was issued against Alvarez based solely on the affidavit of Agent Almeda, stating that he acquired information from a reliable source or, in other words, that he had no personal knowledge of the information o The order was for the search of Alvarez house and seizure, at any time, of certain accounting books, documents, and papers belonging to him The SC held that a search warrant must be based, not only upon probable cause, but also upon an application under oath of the applicant or the witnesses he may produce o The purpose of the oath is to convince the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause o Two possible situations may arise: ! When the affidavit of the applicant or complaint contains sufficient facts within the personal and direct knowledge of the applicant, it is sufficient, if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause ! When the applicants knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary In other words, personal knowledge is necessary ! In this case, the warrant was issued only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts, making it void However, the SC held that although a particular description of the things to be seized is necessary, an exception would be if by the nature of the goods to be seized, the description must be rather general, then it is not required that a technical description be given o Taking into consideration the nature of the articles sought (books, receipts, lists, etc. in connection with money-lending activities), no better and more accurate description is possible ! In this respect, the warrant was valid Last but not least, the SC invalidated the warrant because it was found that it was applied for in order to gain evidence against Alvarez for a more proper conviction under the Anti-Usury Law -PEOPLE V. VELOSO = John Doe search warrant (particular descriptions are necessary for a valid warrant) Veloso, a member of the HoR and manager of the Parliamentary Club (a gambling den), was arrested pursuant to a JOHN DOE WARRANT issued based on an affidavit executed by SecretAgent Geronimo o The warrant alleged that illegal gambling is being conducted in 124 Calle Arzobispo, Manila and that certain effects used in violation of the Anti-Gambling Law will be found there Veloso violently resisted the arrest, alleging that the John Doe warrant is void. In other words, that he is not John Doe. The SC held that, as a general rule, a warrant must specifically describe the persons or things to be seized o Aside, of course, from a finding of probable cause and supported by oath of affirmation However, if the name of the person to be seized is unknown, a John Doe warrant may still be valid, provided that there is a descriptio personae sufficient to enable the arresting authority to identify the person is present therein o The description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person upon whom the warrant is to be served o For example: ! Occupation ! Personal appearance ! Peculiarities ! Place of residence ! Other circumstances by which he can be identified o In this case, the description of the place to be searched was explicitly provided and once inside, the officers could arrest those who were presumably engaged in illegal acts The SC also held that there was no justification for excessive violence in resisting arrest because upon a lawful arrest, the officers may take from the arrested things or effects used to perpetrate the crime or the fruits thereof search incidental to lawful arrest -SOLIVEN V. MAKASIAR = Libel against Cory Aquino (personal examination vs. personal determination) President Aquino sued Beltran for libel for having written that the she hid under her bed during an attempted coup detat Warrants for his arrest were issued pursuant thereto by the judge without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses

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Petitioners contend that probable cause was not properly determined due to the absence of a personal examination by the issuing judge The SC held that the Constitution does not require the judge to personally examine the complainant and the witnesses. o What the Constitution underscores is personal determination of the existence of probable cause, which is simply the exclusive and personal duty of the judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause o The sanctioned procedure is as follows: ! The judge must personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause And on the basis thereof, issue a warrant; or ! The judge may require the submission of supporting affidavits should he find the fiscals report to be insufficient The SC also held that the rationale behind the rule is that to require the judges to personally examine the complainants, judges would be unduly laden with preliminary investigation instead of concentrating on deciding cases

-PLACER V. VILLANUEVA = Fiscals initial report is not binding (judge has to personally satisfy himself) Petitioners, Fiscal and Assistant City Fiscal of Butuan City, submitted 10 informations in the court of respondent Judge Villanueva, providing certification that probable cause exists and that there is a reasonable ground to believe that crimes were committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof and, therefore, should be subjected to litigation Upon receipt of said informations, Villanueva issued an Order, setting a hearing for the purpose of determining the propriety of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest After said hearing, Villanueva issued Orders, which required petitioners to submit to the court the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of the informations to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners Petitioners contend that under PD 77 and 911, they are authorized to determine the existence of a probable cause in a preliminary investigation and that their findings as to the existence thereof constitute sufficient basis for the issuance of warrants of arrest by the court The SC held that it is true that the judge may rely upon the fiscals report to determine the existence of probable cause o However, the judge is not obligated to issue a warrant on the basis thereof o If, on the face of the information, the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals certification and require the submission of supporting affidavits from witnesses The SC also held that the issuance by a judge of a warrant is discretionary and not ministerial o In other words, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest -STONEHILL V. DIOKNO = General warrants (particular descriptions are necessary in search or arrest warrants) A total of 42 search warrants were issued against the petitioners and corporations of which they are officers for violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff & Customs Laws, the Internal Revenue Code, and the Revised Penal Code The warrants mandated the seizure of all papers and documents pertaining to the said businesses, regardless of the legality of the transactions, in the offices and residences of petitioners o There was no specific offense charged and no reference to any particular provision of the law that was violated. Petitioners assailed the lack of particularity in the search warrants The SC held that the warrants were general, and general warrants are outlawed by the Bill of Rights o In other words, particular acts must be alleged o The thing to be seized must also be particularly described o Also, a search warrant shall only issue upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense ! No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense o In fact, the SC found that it should have been impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause o What was committed was, in fact a fishing expedition, making the evidence obtained from the said search inadmissible However, the SC held that petitioners cannot assail the legality of the warrants as regards the corporations because the same have their own respective personalities The SC further held that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby o The objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by 3rd parties

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-CENTRAL BANK V. MORFE = Unauthorized banking (General pattern of business vs. specific transactions) Judge Morfe of the CFI nullified a search warrant issued against the FIRST MUTUAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ORGANIZATION, which allegedly engaged in banking practices without authority from the Monetary Board, in violation of the CENTRAL BANK ACT The search warrant issued by the Municipal Court authorized the search and seizure of books of original and final entries, accounting records, financial statements, and other effects Morfe stated that, assuming that the deponent has personal knowledge on the matter, he should have stated the specific illegal acts and transactions and their respective perpetrators and victims, so that only books and records pertaining thereto are to be seized from the said FIRST MUTUAL The SC held that the failure of the witness to mention the particular individuals does not disprove his knowledge of the specific acts of the FIRST MUTUAL o That is because the records clearly suggested that the illegal transactions constituted the general pattern of business of the organization o The case would have been different had information alleged an isolated transaction, in which identification of the parties involved would be necessary o Thus, that no victims were named is immaterial The SC also held that the law sought to protect the public not only from actual but also potential injury that may be caused by the illegal banking practices of the corporation. -COLUMBIA PICTURES V. COURT OF APPEALS = Pirated video cassettes (comparison of original and pirated version not necessary) Petitioners, foreign corporations, lodged a formal complaint with the NBI for violation of PD 49, DECREE ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, and sought its assistance in their anti-film piracy drive Surveillance operations of various video establishments in Metro Manila were made, including that of SUNSHINE HOME VIDEO in Makati In 1987, NBI Agent Reyes applied for a search warrant against SUNSHINE Agent Reyes and other witnesses provided affidavits and depositions during the hearing of the application for the warrant A search warrant for violation of Section 56 of PD 49 was issued and was served upon Pelindario, registered owner-proprietor of SUNSHINE After the seizure, private respondents moved for the quashal of the search warrant on the ground of lack of probable cause Both the trial court and the CA upheld the quashal on the ground that the master tapes of copyrighted films were never presented in the proceedings for the issuance of the search warrants, which was the doctrine laid down in 20th Century Fox v. CA, which was decided in 1988 Petitioners assail the retroactive application of the 20 Century Fox case Based on the 20th Century Fox case, in order to determine the existence of probable cause in video piracy cases, the original or master tape must be presented in court and compared with the counterfeit in order to determine the existence of probable cause o It was held that in that case that court will not give credence to mere testimony, alleging the supposed similarity without the presentation of the originals and the counterfeit copies for the purpose of comparison. However, the SC held that the said rule is no longer applicable o The master tapes are no longer absolutely necessary to determine the existence of probable cause o A comparison is needed only if there is doubt as to the true nexus of the infringed material in comparison with the original The SC also held that the directive was not intended to be a sweeping and inflexible requirement in copyright infringement cases o The requirement laid down in 20th Century Fox was due to the circumstances prevailing during that time o In this case, the witnesses testified within their personal knowledge based on their investigation and surveillance -BURGOS, SR. V. CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP = We Forum search (general warrant void) 2 offices of the WE FORUM PUBLICATION were searched, pursuant to 2 separate warrants, alleging SUBVERSION o Printing machines, paraphernalia, motor vehicles, and other effects were seized Petitioner alleged that the 2 search warrants, however, pointed to one and the same place, making the search and seizure void The SC held that the error was typographical in nature and it was clear that 2 search warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search 2 distinct places o Moreover, in this case, the executing officer, Col. Abadilla, was also the one who filed an application for the warrants, which set forth the correct addresses The SC also held that in determining whether or not a search warrant describes the premises to be search with sufficient particularity, the executing officers prior knowledge of the

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premises to be searched is relevant, especially when the executing officer is the affiant and he knew the intention of the judge who issued the search warrant However, the SC held that the warrants were general in nature, lacking probable cause o Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched The SC further held that when addressed to a newspaper publisher or editor, the application for a warrant must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive materials he has published or intending to publish o Broad statements in the application do not satisfy the requirement of probable cause o In this case, the SC invalidated the general statement in Col. Abadillas application that petitioner is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other effects, which were used and are being used to commit subversion punishable under PD 885, as amended

-PEOPLE V. TEE = Undetermined amount of marijuana (the nature of the goods require a general description) Tee was convicted for illegal possession of marijuana The accused challenged the validity of a search warrant that specified an undetermined amount of marijuana for failing to satisfy the requirement of particularity, making the evidence inadmissible The SC held that the requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized is primarily to enable the executing officers to: o Readily identify the properties to be seized in order to prevent incorrect seizure o Leave executing officers with no discretion as to the articles to be seized in order to prevent unreasonable searches and seizures What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad or general characterization, which will authorize police officers to undertake a fishing expedition However, the SC held that it is not required that technical precision of description be applied, especially when, by the nature of the things to be seized, the description must be general o For example: ! Narcotics and paraphernalia ! Any and all narcotics -PEOPLE V. DEL NORTE = Wrong name on the warrant (irregular search warrant) Priscilla Del Norte was convicted by the RTC of the crime of illegal possession of drugs Del Norte argued that the marijuana seized as a result of the search is inadmissible evidence due to the irregularity of the search warrant o The search warrant issued contained the name Ising Diwa instead of Priscilla Del Norte The SC held that the Constitution requires search warrants to particularly describe both the place to be searched and the persons to be arrested o However, in rare instances, mistakes in the name of the persons subject of the search warrant do not invalidate the same, provided that the place to be searched is properly described ! It is upheld in cases where the authorities have personal knowledge of the identity of the person and the place to be searched, but they did not specifically know the name o In this case, the authorities did not have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the search and merely relied on hearsay that Diwa and Del Norte are one and the same person -----BANK SECRECY-----MARQUEZ V. DESIERTO = Bank Secrecy Law (requirements for exception) Ombudsman Desierto issued an Order to UNION BANK Julia Vargas Branch Manager Marquez, ordering the production of several bank documents relative to its investigation of Amado Lagdameo at al. Marquez failed to submit the documents requested and is being charged with contempt. The SC held that generally, bank deposits are strictly confidential except for the following instances: o Upon authority of the Monetary Board, if there is reasonable ground to believe that fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being committed o Regular audit of an independent auditor, provided that the examination is for audit purposes only o Upon written consent of the depositor o Impeachment cases o Upon order of competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials o When the deposited money is the subject matter of litigation

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The SC o o o o

also held that in order for an in camera inspection to be allowed, there must be: A pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction The account must be clearly identified The inspection must be limited to the subject matter of the pending case The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection o The inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case In this case, there was no pending litigation and what the Ombudsman wished to do was to conduct a fishing expedition, which is in violation of the privacy rights of the depositor -----WARRANTLESS SEARCHES-----

-PEOPLE V. ARUTA = Arrested and searched after alighting from bus (warrantless searches still require probable cause) Law enforcement officers received information from an informant named Benjie that a certain Aling Rosa would be leaving for Baguio City and would be back in the afternoon of the same day, carrying with her a large volume of marijuana In the evening of the same day, Aruta alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag and as she was about to cross the street, Benjie pointed her out to NARCOM officers NARCOM officers approached Aruta and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents o When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her travelling bag, she gave the same to him o When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves and Aruta was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation The defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence, alleging the illegality of the search and seizure, which constitutes a violation of constitutional rights The SC held that there are situations wherein warrantless searches are valid: o Search incidental to a lawful arrest o Search of moving vehicles o Evidence in plain view ! There must be prior valid intrusion ! Evidence was inadvertently discovered ! Evidence must be immediately apparent ! Mere seizure of evidence without any further search o Customs searches o Consented warrantless searches o Stop-and-frisk situations o Exigent circumstances However, the SC held that even so, the essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied o In this case, Aruta cannot be said to have committed, is committing or will commit a crime o Aruta was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she a crime was being committed o It was only when Benjie pointed to Aruta and identified her to the agents that she was singled out as the suspect ! To put it briefly, there was no probable cause The SC also held that it could neither sanction nor tolerate the situation, as it was a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure o Consequently, the arrest being illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest The SC further held that pursuant to the exclusionary rule, the evidence is inadmissible -NOLASCO V. PANO = Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest (limited only to the person of the arrested) o Mila Roque was arrested on board a public vehicle for alleged rebellion. o The military officers, however, were armed with a void general search warrant, and at the instance of the arrest, searched not only her person, but also her residence for the recovery of various subversive documents. o The military officers allege that the search was made incident to a lawful arrest o The SC held that warrantless searches incidental to a lawful arrest can only be made upon the person lawfully arrested and in the place where the arrest was made, and not elsewhere o Moreover, the search must be for dangerous (hidden) weapons or anything that may be used as proof of the commission of the offense o But the search cannot be used a means to fish for evidence o In this case, Roque was not even in her house during the time when the arrest and the search were made o The SC also held that given the fact that the evidence was obtained clearly in violation of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the same is deemed inadmissible o The exclusionary rule is the only practical means of preventing violations of the

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constitutional mandate -PAPA V. MAGO = Deputized PNP Chief (warrantless customs search valid) o Responding to a reliable information, the PNP, through Chief Papa, duly deputized by the COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS for the purposes of the enforcement of the TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE, intercepted trucks containing allegedly contraband goods o The private respondents alleged that the trucks were intercepted without any search warrant, violating the constitutional guarantee o The SC held that the TARRIF AND CUSTOMS CODE explicitly does not require warrants for customs officers to board and search vessels, beasts, or persons suspected of introducing contraband merchandise into the Philippines o In this case, the PNP Chief, having been deputized by the Commissioner of Customs, is, thus, authorized to carry out such searches o However, the SC held that the search of dwelling houses, even for the enforcement of Customs Laws, requires a warrant o The SC recognized that jurisprudence has held that there is a difference between a) a search of a dwelling house and b) a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can quickly escape o Thus, search of motor vehicles is likewise valid without a search warrant o The SC further held that vehicles are, after all, not actively used in within the home, where the sanctity of privacy is more safeguarded, but instead is used in public places such as roads and may facilitate commission of crimes -PEOPLE V. CFI = Dodge car chase (valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle) Relying upon an intelligence report, the REGIONAL ANTI-SMUGGLING ACTION CENTER (RASAC), without a search warrant, intercepted and chased a blue Dodge car allegedly containing contraband goods from Angeles to be brought to Manila In the car were Sgt. Hope and Medina and RASAC Agents found 4 boxes in the rear seat and 7 more in the compartment, which contained untaxed wristwatches Hope and Medina claimed to be unaware of the contents of the boxes. The RASAC proceeded to the drop-off spot, but aborted the mission given the fact that the suspected receivers never came The prosecution found the existence of a prima facie case against them, but the trial court declared the evidence inadmissible on the ground that they were seized without a warrant The SC held that it is a settled rule that Customs searches do not require a warrant for the enforcement of customs laws, except for those conducted in the dwelling of persons o The SC also noted US jurisprudence, which recognized the distinctive feature of a warrantless search of a vehicle where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction The SC also held that the RASAC could not have possibly secured a warrant based on their intelligence reports, which are not fully certain o But in this case, the information was more than just hearsay as the informer even went with them to the rendezvous point The SC further held that when officials see the existence of probable cause, coupled with the fact that the case involves motor vehicles, searches need not be justified by a warrant Dissent of Justice Teehankee: o In the absence of exigent circumstances, a warrant must be procured ! Given that they had the information one week in advance, there was ample time to procure a warrant and not simply rely on bare information given by an unidentified source ! Moreover, they could have delayed actual seizure until the warrant has been secured because they already had actual possession of the vehicle ! In this case, the search was remote to the arrest and, hence, a search warrant must have been secured ! What was committed was a typical shortcut in enforcing the law -PEOPLE V. LO HO WING = Undercover agent (warrantless search of a moving vehicle valid; search of a taxi) The PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY received a tip from one of its informers regarding importation of illegal drugs Tia was employed to be an undercover agent and he spied on respondents Lim and Peter Lo from China all the way until arriving in Manila, with the supposed drugs stashed in tea can Upon their arrival in NAIA, the PC took strategic positions, followed and cut the taxis respondents rode, arrested them, and took custody over the suspected illegal drugs. However, the PC did not have a valid warrant. Respondents contend that the warrantless search and seizure violates the Constitution and that the PC should have procured a valid search warrant, since they were informed of the arrival 2 days before The SC held that the rule that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not absolute

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o One of the exceptions to the rule is a search of a moving vehicle The SC also held that although there are exceptions that allow warrantless searches, the indispensable requirement is that it still must be conducted upon probable cause o In this case, the SC held that the authorities had reasonable grounds to suspect the importation of illegal drugs based on intelligence reports gathered and surveillance activities ! In other words, probable cause was present

-CABALLES V. COURT OF APPEALS = Jeep covered in kakawati leaves (mere suspicion is not probable cause; intrusion) While on a routine patrol, 2 officers flagged a jeep suspiciously covered by kakawati leaves and found that it contained 700 kilos of conductor wires owned by the NAPOCOR The wires were stolen and the officers arrested the driver, taking custody of the said wires for evidence. However, they did not have a search warrant. Petitioner contends that the flagging down of his vehicle based on mere suspicion does not amount to probable cause, violating the Constitutional guarantee and making the evidence obtained inadmissible The SC held that in exceptional events where a valid warrant is not necessary to effect a search and seizure, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure becomes a purely judicial question, determinable from: o Uniqueness of the circumstances involved o The purpose of the search and seizure o The presence or absence of probable cause o The manner how the search and seizure was made o The place searched o The character of the articles produced The SC also held that although one of the exceptions to the rule is the search of a moving vehicle, the mere mobility of the same does not give police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches in the absence of probable cause The SC held that, generally, mere routine checks of vehicles, such as checkpoints, do not violate the right against unreasonable searches, especially when it is conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists However, in an extensive search, as when the officer goes beyond the portion of the vehicle viewable from the outside, such already constitutes an intrusion into the domain protected by the Constitution and, hence, must be justified by the existence of probable cause o In this case, the SC held that mere suspicion because some vehicle appears to be uncommon does not amount to probable cause, which was absolutely necessary because the police officers did not conduct a simply routine check. o In other words, routine traffic checks must be limited to visual searches ! An extensive search cannot be conducted, unless there is probable cause -OBRA V. COURT OF APPEALS = Truck moving into mining area (warrantless search of moving vehicles must be based on probable cause) Obra was the Regional Director of the BUREAU OF MINES AND GEO SCIENCES in Baguio City and he received a letter, complaining that the spouses Brett had been conducting illegal mining activities in an area in Bgy. Palasa-an, Mankayan, Benguet, which belonged to Gillies family Obra enlisted the help of the Philippine Constabulary to apprehend a truck allegedly used by the Bretts in shipping illegally mined ores The authorities seized an ISUZU Elf Truck belonging to the Bretts, as it entered the mining area in Mankayan. The truck was impounded in the military camp and was prevented from leaving its premises The Trial Court ruled in favor of the Bretts, as it found that no investigation has been made by Obra to verify the complaint, and, as a result, the Bretts have been deprived of their property without due process of law Petitioners invoked the moving vehicle doctrine The SC held that officers do not have unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of vehicles in the absence of probable cause o In fact, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid so long as there was probable cause o In this case, not only was the seizure solely based on a letter-complaint, the truck was also apprehended as it was entering the mining area and not transporting allegedly illegally mined ores outside of the area, which further militates against the existence of probable cause -PEOPLE V. MALMSTEDT = Caucasian with marijuana in a bus (warrantless search pursuant to lawful arrest is valid) Responding to certain intelligence reports, the NARCOM set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region Without any warrant, they stopped the bus that Malmstedt was riding on and conducted a search therein

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One of the soldiers noticed a bulge in Malmstedts waist. Their suspicion was further aroused by his failure to present valid IDs. They found hashish in his pouch and there were also some that were stashed inside teddy bears in his luggage. Malmstedt was arrested and prosecuted for violation of the DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT Malmdstedt contended that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant and, therefore, the evidence obtained from the same was inadmissible The SC held that a lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person when: o In his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense o An offense had just been committed and he has personal knowledge of the facts, indicating that the person to be arrested has committed the offense o The person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or where he is serving final judgment or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another ! In this case, Malmstedt was transporting prohibited drugs, which led to his arrest ! In other words, he was caught in flagrante delicto, making the search made upon his personal effects afterwards justified as warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest The SC also held that the officers were only making a routine search, not an extensive search, but Malmstedts own suspicious behavior, aside from intelligence reports, gave him away o The SC noted that in this case, not only was there probable cause, but there was also no time to obtain a search warrant Dissent of Justice Narvasa: o There was no probable cause in this case and, hence, there is no valid arrest; and when there is no valid arrest, any search made incidental thereto is void o Malmstedt has not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a crime in the soldiers presence when he was searched. ! There is no probable cause yet! o The mere bulge in his waist does not suffice. Upon searching and finding the hashish, that is the only time that they arrested Malmstedt a typical fishing expedition The arrest must first be made; and then the incidental search follows. o The process cannot be reversed because, otherwise, it amounts to a fishing expedition

-ROAN V. GONZALES = Wrong guns were found (exhaustive examination is necessary before establishing probable cause to cause the issuance of search warrant) Respondent Judge issued a search warrant based on the mere affidavit of Capt. Quillosa and some witnesses Capt. Quillosa himself did not have personal knowledge of the facts of the offense, but simply relied upon the statements of the witnesses The witnesses stated that they saw 8 men deliver arms to Roans house Upon search pursuant to the warrant, the officers did not find any of the articles mentioned in the warrant, but instead found a Colt Magnum Revolver and 18 live bullets, which became the bases of the charges against Roan Roan contended that the procedure in issuing a search warrant was not properly observed The SC held that a search warrant must not be issued based on mere hearsay The SC also held that the judge must not merely rehash the statements in the affidavits, but must examine them closely and ascertain the existence of probable cause o Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are insufficient o The examining judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record The SC further held that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary, if the claimed probable cause is to be established o In this case, not only did the respondent judge not take Capt. Quillosas depositions at all, the depositions taken from the witnesses were restatements of their own allegations, except that they were made in the form of questions-and-answers Last but not least, prohibited articles may be seized, but only as long as the search is valid o In this case, that the said guns are illegally possessed by Roan is of no moment o In other words, just because items are illegal items does not mean that the same can be summarily seized without due process ! But pending resolution of the case, the items must remain in custodia legis -PEOPLE V. TABAR = Aunt and nephew busted for selling marijuana (evidence in plain view) Police officers conducted a buy-bust operation, involving the sale of marijuana

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The boy, Rommel, who sold the marijuana to the agent entered a shanty where his aunt was after receiving money from the agent Acting nervously and suspiciously, the aunt, Carmelina, came out of the shanty with a white pair of pants that were rolled up which she, upon order of the officers, spread out revealing packs of marijuana Tabar argued that the marijuana seized from her are inadmissible evidence because they were obtained in violation of her right against unreasonable search and seizure The SC held that the crime was committed in the presence of the officers o When a crime is committed in the presence of policemen, the person may be lawfully arrested and, after, searched for anything that may be used as proof of the commission of the offense without the corresponding arrest and search warrants o In this case, Tabar hurriedly left the shanty after seeing the arrest of Rommel and she voluntarily spread out the pants, which revealed the marijuana ! Even assuming that there was no warrant, there was a waiver of the right when Tabar submitted to the search and seizure voluntarily

-ANIAG, JR. V. COMELEC = Driver caught in Batasan checkpoint during a gun ban (no act that could give rise to probable cause) Pursuant to a COMELEC gun ban, petitioner ordered his driver to return his 2 issued firearms to the HoR But his driver, Arellano, was flagged and searched in a checkpoint 20m away from the Batasan entrance and was detained and charged accordingly o The PNP found the guns neatly packed in the trunk of the car Petitioner protested against the manner by which the search and seizure was conducted without a warrant and without informing the driver of his rights as the PNP search the car o Moreover, the firearms were not tucked in the waist of the driver nor within his immediate reach The SC held that as a general rule, a valid search must be authorized by a valid search warrant, and the only exceptions are: o Search incidental to lawful arrest o Search of a moving vehicle o Seizure of evidence in plain view o Search conducted at police or military checkpoints ! As held in jurisprudence, checkpoints are not illegal per se, so long as the occupant is not subject to a body search and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search The SC also held that an extensive search of a vehicle without a warrant could only be justified if the officers conducting the search had reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that: o The motorist was a law offender o They would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched In this case, the SC held that, in the absence of probable cause, the PNP could not extensively search the car without violating the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures o The driver was not, in any way, acting suspiciously, and the guns were neatly wrapped and placed in their cases and kept in the trunk of the car he did not have instant access to the guns ! In other words, nothing could have triggered their suspicion and instead, there was intrusion into privacy -PEOPLE V. TUDTUD = Marijuana in King Flakes boxes (lawful arrest must precede warrantless search) On the basis of reports made by a civilian asset, Solier, the police suspected Tudtud for being responsible for the proliferation of marijuana o They conducted a surveillance in Soliers neighborhood in Davao, but the same merely consisted of a gathering of information The police received a report that Tudtud will arrive from Cotabato with a supply of marijuana and, thus, they posed undercover o They saw 2 persons, one matching the reported looks of Tudtud helping each other unloading boxes from a bus o They approached and introduced themselves as police and asked if they may look into the boxes to which Tudtud agreed o Marijuana was found among the contents of the boxes and Tudtud was charged and convicted by the trial court accordingly Tudtud questioned the validity of their arrest and seizure of the evidence against them, as the same were done in violation of his right against unreasonable searches The RTC justified the warrantless search as incidental to a lawful arrest The SC held that the exception of warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest means that the arrest must come before the search, and not the other way around However, the SC held that the search may precede the arrest if: o There is probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search

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The search is substantially contemporaneous to the arrest, then the search may precede the arrest In this case, there was absolutely no hint that Tudtud was committing a crime, as he was merely unloading some boxes o In other words, there was no probable cause to arrest Tudtud at the outset and what happened was that the arrest came after the unlawful search The SC also held that reliable information alone cannot justify a warrantless arrest o The rule requires that the accused perform an overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense o In other words, mere reliable information will not establish probable cause Moreover, the SC held that in his presence connotes personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officer The SC also held that the following are requisites for a valid waiver of right: o That the right exists o That the person had actual or constructive knowledge of the right o That there is actual intention to relinquish the right In this case, the SC held that the mere fact that Tudtud did not oppose the search is not tantamount to a waiver of his rights o

-VERONIA SCHOOL DISTRICT V. ACTON = Drug tests for athletes (compelling state interest) o Motivated by the discovery that athletes were leaders in the student drug culture, the VERONIA SCHOOL DISTRICT imposed a STUDENT ATHLETE DRUG POLICY, authorizing random urinalysis testing for those engaged in athletic programs o Acton was denied admission to the football program for refusing to submit to the procedure o Acton assailed the validity of the measure, claiming that it amounts to an intrusion upon privacy o The US SC held that in their jurisdiction, a search unsupported by probable cause can be constitutional when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirements impracticable o Such special needs exist in the public school context o In this case, there are special needs attendant to the school setting that justify the measure, namely, the interest to prevent drug use among students and athletes ! The warrant requirement would interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary measures needed ! The probable cause requirement would undercut the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in schools The US SC also held that in this case, the subjects of the policy are: o Children o Children who have been committed to the temporary custody of the State as schoolmaster o The schools act in loco parentis to the children and have such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he was employed The SC further held that urinalysis test intrudes upon a person's privacy in two ways: o First, the subject is monitored while providing the actual sample ! The US SC considered this a "negligible" intrusion on the subject's privacy interest o Second, the test discloses personal information concerning the state of the subject's body and the materials he has ingested ! The school was testing only for the use of drugs, not whether the student was diabetic or pregnant ! The results of the test were disclosed only to a small group of school officials and not to law enforcement officers The US SC concluded that the invasion of privacy was "not significant By contrast, the schools' interest in deterring drug use among students was truly important -PEOPLE V. CAMPACION = Marijuana plant used for migraine (no valid waiver of rights; intrusion into home) Compacion was put under surveillance by NARCOM agents for maintaining marijuana plants in his backyard NARCOM tried to procure a warrant but was unable to and nevertheless proceeded to Compacions house to make the arrest and search o The marijuana plants were allegedly for the use of Campacions wife, who was suffering from migraine o It was alleged that Campacion did not contest the entry given they were heavily armed and intimidating Campacion was subsequently charged for violating the DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT

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Campacion contended that none of the NARCOM Agents asked for his permission to search his house and its premises, which violates his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures The SC held that the right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures may be waived, expressly or impliedly, so long as it is made voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly o Mere passive conformity and failure to object to unlawful entry cannot be construed as a waiver of the right against unreasonable search and seizures o In this case, the implied acquiescence, if any, of Campacion was a product of passive conformity due to coercive or intimidating circumstances The requisites of a valid waiver are: o That the right must exist o That the person involved had actual or constructive knowledge of the right o That the person had an actual intention to relinquish the right The SC also discussed the evidence in plain view doctrine, which is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but, nonetheless, inadvertently comes across an incriminating object o The following requisites must concur for evidence in plain view: ! A prior valid intrusion ! Evidence was inadvertently discovered, as the police had the right to be where they are ! Evidence must be immediately apparent ! Seizure without further search o In this case, the plain view doctrine cannot apply because the NARCOM had no authority to enter the dwelling without a valid warrant

-PEOPLE V. VALDEZ = Marijuana plants (requisites of evidence in plain view; invalid warrantless search) Based on a tip from an informer, police officers went to the place of Valdez, where they found marijuana plants being cultivated approximately twenty-five meters from Valdez house o The police officers inquired as to who owned the marijuana plants and Valdez claimed ownership The police officers uprooted the plants, arrested the accused, and the prosecution then offered the plants and Valdez admission as evidence Valdez claimed that the warrantless search was illegal On the other hand, the police officers claimed that the plants were found in plain view The SC held that the marijuana plants were not in plain view For the plain view doctrine to apply, the following must be present: o There was a valid prior intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties ! In this case, the police officers first located the plants before they arrested the accused without a warrant o The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they were ! In this case, the police officers were dispatched precisely to look for the marijuana plants, making the discovery not inadvertent o The evidence must be immediately apparent o Plain view justified seizure of the evidence without further search The SC also held that the confession is also inadmissible o In trying to elicit information from the accused, the police was investigating him as a suspect o Therefore, he was already under custodial investigation and had a right to counsel -PEOPLE V. DE GRACIA = Eurocar building as rebel stronghold (warrantless search justified by exigent circumstances) In the event of a coup detat conducted by the REFORM THE ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT SOLDIERS OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE, the EUROCAR BUILDING was put under surveillance pursuant to an intelligence report that it housed large quantities of ammunition One time, the car of the surveillance team was fired upon by 5 persons from a crowd within the vicinity of the EUROCAR BUILDING The team raided the building without a warrant and was able to seize de Gracia and plenty of explosives and ammunition De Gracia contended that there was no warrant for the raid The SC held that the arrests were impelled by the exigencies of the situation, which concerned the very survival of society and the government o In this case, the military operatives had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed o The team had no opportunity to apply for a search warrant from the courts, as the court with jurisdiction, at that time, was closed due to disorder The SC also held that arrest of persons involved in rebellion were in the nature of capturing enemies of the State

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And if the authorities are justified in killing them given the dangerous situation, then all the more are they justified in depriving them temporarily of their liberty

-BOARD OF EDUCATION V. EARLS, ET AL. = Urine test for extra-curricular activities (negligible intrusion valid) The TECUMSEH SCHOOL DISTRICT implemented mandatory urinalysis testing for students engaged in extra-curricular activities in order to test whether the students are engaged in drug use Certain high school students and their parents opposed the policy, claiming that it violates their right to privacy The US SC held that while reasonableness is the touchstone of the constitutionality of a governmental search, the reasonable inquiry cannot disregard the schools custodial and tutelary responsibility As in the Veronia case, central is the fact that subjects of the policy: o Children o Children who have been committed to the temporary custody of the State as schoolmaster The US SC also held that a students privacy interest is limited in a public school environment where the State is responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and safety The US SC further held that the degree of intrusion is minimal and the uses of the urine sample are very limited, as: o The test results are kept in confidential files separate from the students other educational records o The test results are released to school personnel only on a need to know basis o The test results are not turned over to any law enforcement authority o The test results do not lead to the imposition of discipline or academic consequences ! In other words, not only is the measure is pursuant to a legitimate policy, but it is also reasonable and the intrusion brought about by the testing is pretty much negligible -SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY V. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD = Mandatory drug testing The COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT of 2002 was implemented and Section 36 requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses Petitions alleged that the Act was unconstitutional for it infringes upon a persons right against unreasonable searches, among others The SC held that the right to privacy has been accorded as a facet of the right to unreasonable searches and seizures As regards candidates for public office, the Act was unconstitutional, as it enlarges the qualification requirements under the Constitution As regards persons who were accused of crimes, the Act was unconstitutional, as the mandatory drug testing of said persons are not random and without suspicion o In other words, said persons are singled out and are impleaded against their will, making a medical test a tool for criminal prosecution ! There is no valid waiver of their right to privacy As regards students, the Act was held to be constitutional because it is within the prerogative of schools to require compliance with reasonable school regulations, as a condition for admission or enrollment o The SC also recognized that: ! Schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students ! Minor students have contextually fewer rights than adults, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools ! Schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty ! Schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory As regards employees of public and private offices, the Act was held to be constitutional because the privacy interest in an office is circumscribed by the companys work policies, CBAs, and the right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace The SC further held that whether a search adheres to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government-mandated intrusion against the promotion of compelling state interests -----SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF WHATEVER NATURE AND PURPOSE-----MATERIAL DISTRIBUTORS AND LYONS V. JUDGE NATIVIDAD, CFI MANILA = Court order to produce papers and evidence valid Sarreal filed a complaint, seeking a money judgment against petitioners

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Sarreal also filed a Motion for the Production and Inspection of books, papers, letters of and between Material Distributors and Lyons Judge Natividad granted Sarreals Motion, despite the objection of petitioners because, according to them, there was no good cause and that Sarreal was simply fishing for evidence Petitioners contend that Judge Natividad violated their right to unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as their constitutional rights against self-incrimination The SC held that the Order was issued by virtue of the provisions of Section 1, Rule 21, which pertains to a civil procedure that cannot be identified with unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution o Section 1, Rule 21 allows a court where an action is pending to either a) order a party to produce items, not privileged, which contain material evidence to any matter involved in the action, or b) order a party to permit entry upon designated areas in his control for the same purpose ! The Order shall specify the time, place, and manner of the inspection and shall prescribe just conditions o In this case, the SC said that justice will be better served if all the facts pertinent to the controversy are before the court The SC also held that the guarantee of privacy of communication and correspondence will not be violated because the court has power and jurisdiction to issue the Order o In this case, it was an express exception in favor of the disclosure of communication and correspondence upon lawful order

-CAMARA V. MUNICIPAL COURT = Inspector for HOUSING CODE An Inspector of the SAN FRANCISCO PUBLIC HEALTH DEPARTMENT entered an apartment building to make a routine annual inspection for violations of the citys HOUSING CODE The inspector was informed that the Camara was using part of his leasehold as a personal residence The inspector confronted Camara and demanded to inspect the premises as residential use was prohibited on the ground floor of the building Camara did not allow the inspector to enter because there was no search warrant. Camara also received a Summons, ordering him to appear at the District Attorneys Office, but he did not comply 2 other inspectors attempted to gain access to his apartment a few weeks later and were again refused because there was no search warrant A Complaint was filed against Camara for violation of Section 503 of the HOUSING CODE or the right of authorized inspectors to enter buildings Camara contended that the HOUSING CODE violated his rights, as it allowed Inspectors to enter his private dwelling without a warrant and probable cause The US SC held that the effect of such a regulatory scheme is to leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the field, which is precisely the discretion to invade private property o In this case, when the inspector demanded entry, the occupant has no way of knowing: ! Whether enforcement of the municipal code requires inspection of his premises ! The lawful limits of the inspectors power to search ! Whether the inspector is acting under proper authorization The US SC also held that the decision to inspect an area was based upon a legislative or administrative assessment of broad factors, which is not a suitable substitute for individualized review by a Judge The US SC further held that fire, health, and housing code programs could still achieve their goals within the confines of a valid search warrant o In other words, obtaining a valid warrant will not frustrate the legitimate governmental purpose -IN RE: UMIL, ET AL. V. RAMOS = Arrested while confined in hospital (valid warrantless arrest; rebellion is a continuing crime) Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA, shot and killed 2 policemen in furtherance of rebellion He was confined in ST. AGNES HOSPITAL when he was arrested without a warrant Dural assailed a) the validity of the arrest, as it violated his constitutional rights and b) the doctrine that rebellion is a continuing crime The SC held that mere membership with the NPA is a continuing crime, making the warrantless arrest lawful because the arrestee would be committing an offense at that time of his arrest o In this case, Dural did not cease to be or became less subversive just because he was confined in a hospital The SC also held that subversion and rebellion are different from common offense, which generally end upon their commission, because the former are anchored on an ideological base, which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness until the objective of overthrowing the government is attained

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In other words, a rebel will not stop until the overthrow of the government is achieved, making him always in flagrante delicto

-PEOPLE V. DE LA CRUZ = Buy-bust operation (valid warrantless arrest; entrapment is not illegal) De la Cruz was apprehended through a buy-bust operation and was charged for violation of the DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT De la Cruz challenged the constitutionality of such operation because it is prone to abuse and akin to a seizure without a valid warrant The SC conceded that that buy-bust operations are prone to abuse, but recognized that they have proven to be the most effective means of addressing drug trafficking The SC held that in buy-bust operations, the arresting officers catch the malefactor in flagrante delicto o But the arresting officers neither instigate nor induce the arrestee to commit a crime o Entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of capturing a lawbreaker from whose mind the criminal intent originated The SC also held that a search warrant is not necessary because a search pursuant to a buybust operation is one made incidental to a lawful arrest the arrestee is flagrante delicto -PEOPLE V. AMINUDIN = Arrested after alighting from bus (unlawful arrest and seizure; no crime committed) Based on a tip from an informant, the PC waited for Aminudin to disembark from the M/V Wilcon 9, accosted him, searched his belongings, and found what was later confirmed to be marijuana The PC were not armed with any warrant The SC held that mere information does not amount to probable cause o In this case, Aminundin was not in flagrante delicto when he was arrested and searched he was merely disembarking from a and the informant pointed him out o Also, the PC had 2 days to obtain a warrant, but no effort was exerted to comply with the law, despite having knowledge of Aminudins name, the vehicle he was on, and his date of arrival The SC also held that since the arrest was invalid, the search made incidental thereto was likewise invalid -HARVEY V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO = Pedophiles (valid; deportation is not a criminal procedure) Harvey, Sherman, and Elshout were aliens arrested upon Order by the COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION for having engaged in pedophilia They were under surveillance for months and upon their apprehension, various effects, such as videotapes and photographs were seized Afterwards, deportation proceedings were then instituted against the said aliens and they were detained pendente lite The aliens filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus and assailed the arrest and seizure for being a violation of the Constitution The SC held that a warrantless arrest may be effected when an offense has, in fact, been committed and the police officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it o In this case, the arrest was based on probable cause after 3-months worth of surveillance o Moreover, the seizure of the photographs were incidental to a lawful arrest The SC also held that because deportation proceedings have been instituted, then their detention has become legal, even assuming arguendo that it was illegal at the outset o Thus, habeas corpus can no longer apply o Moreover, the filing of a petition to be released on bail should be considered as a waiver of any irregularity in the arrest The SC further held that the COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION is authorized by the REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE to issue warrants, but it is essential that: o There is a specific charge against the alien o A fair hearing be conducted o The charged be sustained by competent evidence Last but not least, the rule that only a judge may issue valid warrants does not apply to deportation proceedings, as the same is not a criminal procedure, but a preventive measure that is administrative in character -PEOPLE V. SUCRO = Selling marijuana in chapel (valid warrantless arrest; police officer had personal knowledge) Fulgencio, a police officer, monitored the activities of Sucro, who was allegedly selling marijuana Under surveillance, Sucro sold marijuana along a chapel to 3 different buyers On the 3rd sale, the police zeroed in on Sucro and the buyer, who, while trying to escape, threw a tea bag to the ground, which was found to contain marijuana Sucro contended that there was sufficient time for the police officers to apply for a search and arrest warrant

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The SC held that when the illegal act was committed in the presence of the arresting officers, a warrantless arrest may be effected o An offense is committed in the presence of an officer when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene of the crime The SC also held that according to jurisprudence, police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when they had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused o In this case, Fulgencio was 2 meters away from Sucro when he sold marijuana, making the latter in flagrante delicto

-PEOPLE V. RODRIGUEZA = Mistake in buy-bust procedure (unlawful arrest and seizure; arrest should be immediate) Responding to intelligence reports regarding the on-going trafficking of drugs in Albay, the police conducted a buy-bust operation Officer Taduran posed as the buyer and purchased 100g of marijuana from a certain Don, but instead of arresting Don on the spot, Taduran returned to headquarters and reported the incident Thereafter, a team was formed and, without a warrant, stormed through Rodriguezas house, confiscated various effects of marijuana, and arrested both Rodrigueza and his father The SC held that a buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto, which requires that the arrestee be caught red-handed o In this case, Taduran should have arrested him on the spot, which would have been a valid warrantless arrest o Moreover, the raid of the house without a search warrant was likewise illegal The SC also held that while the rights of a person under custodial investigation may be waived, such waiver must be made a) voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently and b) in the presence and with the assistance of counsel o In this case, Rodriguezas alleged admission during custodial investigation was invalid, as he was without assistance of counsel -PEOPLE V. BAGISTA = Arrested on bus like Malmstedt (valid warrantless arrest and seizure) Responding to reliable information stating that there is a woman with curly hair around 52 who will be transporting drugs from up north, the NARCOM established a temporary checkpoint in Benguet They flagged a bus, boarded the same, noticed a woman of the same description, and inspected her bags, which revealed marijuana Bagista denied the charges and presented her own version of the story The SC held that extensive searches of moving vehicles are allowed without a warrant provided that there is probable cause to believe, before the search, that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched o In this case, NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search the vehicles given the information report that they received o The accused also fitted the description made by the informant Dissent of Justice Padilla o The information received by NARCOM agents, without other suspicious circumstances surrounding the accused, did not give rise to probable cause -PEOPLE V. MENGOTE = Looking from side to side (unlawful arrest and seizure; no probable cause) Based on a phone call regarding suspicious persons in Manila, the police stationed a surveillance team who noticed 2 men, Mengote and Morellos, looking from side to side and one of them holding his abdomen The police approached them and introduced themselves as such, but the 2 men tried to run away Mengote and Morellos were caught and the search thereafter yielded a .38 caliber gun. Respondents assailed the admissibility of the evidence obtained from them because it was illegally seized The SC held that a warrantless may be effected when: o In his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is committing, or is attempting to commit an offense ! In this case, the accused were merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen, which both do not constitute any offense under the law o When an offense has just been committed and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it ! In this case, there was no personal knowledge because all the authorities knew was hearsay information from a phone call about a crime yet to be committed o When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment

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-PEOPLE V. GO = Murder on a one-way street (unlawful arrest 6 days after the fact) While driving, Go nearly collided with Maguan, who was driving in the opposite direction on a one-way street Go shot Maguan and sped away, but his plate number was identified by a security guard who, upon being shown a sketch of the perpetrator, confirmed that it matched the appearance of Go The police launched a manhunt and 6 days after the shooting, Go showed up at the station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, and inquired as to what was going on Go was arrested on the spot Go assailed his warrantless arrest on the ground that the crime had not been just committed The SC held that to fall under the exception that an offense had just been committed and the officer has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it, the arrest must immediately follow the commission of the crime o In other words, there is no valid warrantless arrest if the crime had not just been committed ! In this case, it was 6 days ago ! Moreover, there was no personal knowledge, as what the police had was a statement from an alleged eyewitness The SC also held that unlike the case of Umil v. Ramos, where the accused was arrested 14 days after the commission of the offense of subversion, murder is not a continuing crime and is completed after the act -PEOPLE V. MANLULU = 1AM killing, 7PM arrest (unlawful arrest; personal knowledge vs. personal gathering of information) Manlulu was arrested without a warrant for allegedly having killed another person at around 1:00AM in the morning The warrantless arrest was made around 7:00PM or about 19 hours later Manlulu assailed the warrantless arrest as a violation of his rights The SC held that for there to be a lawful warrantless arrest, the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of the offense, which has in fact just been committed o In other words, the arrest has to immediately follow the commission of the offense o If a sufficient amount of time lapses as to allow him to procure a warrant, then the police officer must do so o In this case, not only was the arrest 19 hours after the alleged crime, but the arresting officer also did not have any personal knowledge of the facts The SC also held that personal gathering of information is different from personal knowledge o The law requires personal knowledge -PEOPLE V. BOLASA = Policemen peeping through window (unlawful arrest and search; no probable cause; no personal knowledge) Tipped by an anonymous caller that a man and woman were repacking prohibited drugs, police officers Salonga and Carizon parked their car 300 meters from the alleged den The police officers then proceeded to peep through the window, where they saw a man and woman packing marijuana Police officers entered the premises, seized the various effects therein, and arrested the 2 persons Bolasa and delos Reyes Both respondents appealed and assailed the arrest and seizure conducted The SC held that the State cannot, in a cavalier fashion, intrude into the persons of its citizens, as well as into their houses, papers, and effects In this case, the arrest was illegal because: o Prior to the arrest, the officers had no personal knowledge that respondents had just committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime o Prior to the arrest, the officers had no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did they have any reasonable ground to believe that the respondents committed it o The respondents were not escapees from a penal establishment o What happened was that the officers intentionally peeped first through the window and ascertained the activities The SC also held that the officers should have first conducted surveillance, then determined if probable cause exists, and finally proceeded to secure a proper warrant before making the intrusion. -PEOPLE V. ESCORDIAL = Arrest in the basketball court (unlawful arrest; no personal knowledge) Escordial allegedly committed a crime, but was arrested without a warrant while watching a game in the local basketball court 1 week after the commission of the crime The SC held that personal knowledge must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion o Reasonable suspicion means when, in the absence of actual belief, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts that are supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves

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A reasonable suspicion must be founded on: ! Probable cause ! Good faith In this case, the arresting officers were not present when the crime was committed and, thus, they could not have personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the commission of the crime The SC also held that since the warrantless arrest was effected 1 week after the crime, the arresting officers have no reason for not securing a warrant first However, the SC noted that that because Escordial pleaded not guilty without questioning the arrest, he waived the right to object to the legality of his arrest o

-PEOPLE V. JAYSON = Ihaw-ihaw club (valid warrantless arrest; personal knowledge of a crime that was just committed) Jayson was a bouncer of the Ihaw-Ihaw Nightclub who allegedly shot Nelson Jordan The police officers arrived at the scene a few moments after, responding to a radioed order pertaining to the said crime Bystanders pointed to Jayson, who was seen running from scene Jayson was apprehended, searched, and a .38 caliber pistol was seized The SC held that warrantless arrests are lawful when an offense had just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it o In this case, the respondent was pointed out to the officers only moments after the shooting, who had not gone very far away, although he was fleeing -PEOPLE V. SALVATIERRA = Estopped from questioning arrest (submission to courts jurisdiction is tantamount to waiver) Salvatierra was charged for the murder of Fernandez The Trial Court convicted him and charged him with the penalty of reclusion perpetua plus damages Salvatierra appeals to the SC that his arrest was done illegally The SC held that an accused is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest, if he does not raise it before entering his plea o Any irregularity attendant to the arrest will be cured by voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court upon the entry of plea and participation in the trial o In this case, Salvatierra never raised the legality of his arrest in his initial pleadings ! He entered a plea of not guilty and participated in the trial -PEOPLE V. HERNANDEZ = Failure to file for Motion to Quash before arraignment (waiver of the right to question legality of arrest) Hernandez was arrested without the benefit of a warrant, but he did not file for a Motion to Quash prior to arraignment Hernandez entered a plea of not guilty and participated in the trial The SC held that failure to file a Motion to Quash prior to arraignment amounts to a waiver of the right to question the validity of the arrest. o In other words, Hernandez waived his right to challenge the legality of his arrest -PEOPLE V. DORIA = Entrapment (entrapment is legal) The informant initially contracted Doria to deal him marijuana PO3 Manlangit posed as a buyer of marijuana Doria was apprehended as he handed a brick of marijuana to Manlangit Doria assailed the validity of the arrest The SC held that entrapment in US jurisprudence is equivalent to instigation in our jurisdiction o Under Philippine law, instigation is prohibited while entrapment is generally allowed ! In entrapment, the criminal impulse originates from the mind of the accused, who has the intention to commit the crime with or without the decoy Entrapment is not a good defense in criminal proceedings ! In instigation, the criminal intent originates in the mind of the entrapping person and the accused is lured into the commission of the crime In other words, it is the arresting officer who encourages the perpetrator to commit the crime Instigation is a good defense in criminal proceedings The SC also held that generally, we apply the objective test, where what is examined is the conduct of the apprehending officers o However, adopting the objective test is not a bar to the application of the subjective test, where the predisposition of the accused to commit the crime is examined ! Objective did the arresting officers conduct themselves within permissible bounds? ! Subjective what are the circumstances of the accused?

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In this case, Doria was not induced into committing the crime, as he would have sold marijuana to anyone who wanted The SC also held that the testimony of the informant may be dispensed with, except when: o The appellant vehemently denies the alleged crime o There are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers o There are reasons to believe that the arresting officers had motives to testify falsely against the accused o Only the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the transaction o -----STOP AND FRISK-----

-TERRY V. OHIO = Stop and frisk (valid under the 4th Amendment) Detective McFadden was observing 2 persons who were suspiciously walking back and forth, pausing to stare at the same store, and conversing suspiciously amongst themselves The 2 persons converged with a 3rd person and it was at this time that McFadden approached them and introduced himself as a policeman They mumbled something and McFadden spun them around, frisked them, and found concealed pistols within their outer clothing The respondents assailed the admissibility of the evidence obtained The US SC held that when a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in the circumstances of a given case in believing that his safety or that of others is endangered, he may make a reasonable search for weapons of the person he believes to be armed and dangerous, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the person or the absolute certainty that the individual is armed The US SC also held that while, as a general rule, a warrant should first be secured, the said procedure cannot be followed where swift action based upon on-the-spot observations of the officer is required The US SC further held that the reasonableness of the stop-and-frisk is determined based on the circumstances of the case o In this case, the actions of the accused reasonably corroborate the McFaddens theory that they were planning a daylight armed robbery o Moreover, the search was limited to what was reasonably required by the circumstances ascertaining whether or not the accused were carrying dangerous weapons -MALACAT V. COURT OF APPEALS = Muslim fast eyes (invalid stop-and-frisk; no suspicious behavior) In response to a bomb threat, Yu of the WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT and other officers stationed themselves near the Mercury Drugstore in Plaza Miranda where they observed 2 groups of Muslim-looking men, who were acting suspiciously and with eyes moving very fast As the officers approached the said groups, they ran, but were apprehended, and a search of their persons yielded a hand grenade and a .38 caliber pistol Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade They were charged with illegal possession of explosives and the Trial Court sustained the search Respondents argued that the warrantless arrest was invalid due to the absence of any of the conditions for valid warrantless arrests The SC held that in a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search and the law requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a search o Assuming a valid arrest, the officer may search a) the person of the arrestee and b) the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy o Personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officer and an overt physical act on the part of the arrestee is necessary In a stop-and-frisk, a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons is conducted o Although probable cause is not required, mere suspicion or hunch will not validate a stop-and-frisk In this case, the respondents were not in flagrante delicto when they were arrested and searched because the allegation that they had eyes moving very fast was very doubtful and could not have justified the existence of probable cause Stop-and-frisk would also not hold sway as nothing in the accuseds behavior then would warrant any suspicion, all the more that he was hiding a grenade -PEOPLE V. CHUA = Shabu in Zest-O box (invalid stop-and-frisk; invalid in flagrante delicto) Chua had been under surveillance for years for alleged drug trafficking As Chua arrived within the vicinity of Thunder Inn Hotel carrying a Zest-O box, he was hurriedly accosted by the police, searched, and arrested for possession of drugs shabu Chua assailed the validity of the search and arrest made, as well as the admissibility of the evidence obtained The SC held that in in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing, attempting to commit, or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer

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Two requisites: ! The person to be arrested must execute an overt act, indicating that he had just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime ! The overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer o Also, in in flagrante delicto arrests, mere reliable information alone, absent any overt act in the presence of the arresting officer, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause ! In this case, Chua simply arrived at the vicinity of the hotel, parked his car, and alighted from it casually there was nothing suspicious about his actions ! In other words, there was no overt manifestation that Chua was committing a crime The SC also held that in stop-and-frisk situations, the police officer stops a citizen in the street, interrogates him, and pats him for weapons or contraband o An introduction by the police officer, as well as initial inquiries are first warranted o Genuine reasons must exist in light of the officers experience ! In this case, the accused did not manifest any unusual conduct to yield a reasonable suspicion that he was committing a crime or that he possessed a weapon Last but not least, given the fact that the accused had been under surveillance for 2 years, there was no excuse for not obtaining a valid warrant of arrest o

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ART III SEC 3 -----PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION-----PEOPLE V. MARTI = Package of marijuana (admissible evidence; intrusion by private person) Marti and Reyes employed the services of MANILA PACKAGING AND EXPORT FORWARDERS for the purpose of sending a package to a friend in Switzerland Shirley Reyes refused to have the box inspected and claimed that it contained merely cigars and books, to which Anita Reyes agreed But Job Reyes, a co-proprietor, as a standard operating procedure, opened the boxes during a routine inspection and suspected that the contents were illegal drugs Job Reyes forwarded the contents to the NBI, which confirmed that they were marijuana The NBI proceeded to the exporters and supervised the complete opening of the package Marti assailed the admissibility of the drugs as evidence against him, which, according to him, is in violation of his constitutional rights The SC held that in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties granted by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State o In other words, the BoR embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals o In cases where the exclusionary rule was upheld, the evidence obtained were procured by the State, acting through its law officers o In this case, the evidence was obtained via the act of a private person, Reyes, without prompting from the State The constitutional prescription against unreasonable searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government The SC also held that to merely observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search o In this case, mere presence of the NBI when Reyes opened the rest of the packages does not invalidate the evidence obtained Jech: When a private individual violates another persons right to privacy, the evidence obtained therefrom is admissible; however the violator could be held civilly liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code -RAMIREZ V. COURT OF APPEALS = Recording conversation (no ambiguity exists in the Anti-Wire Tapping Law) According to Ramirez, Garcia vexed, insulted, and humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood in an altercation that ensued between them During the confrontation, Ramirez tape-recorded the altercation without the knowledge and consent of Garcia Garcia sued for violation of the ANTI-WIRE TAPPING LAW Ramirez contended that a) what is prohibited is the taping of the private conversation by a party other than those involved The SC held that RA 4200 was clear and unambiguous o Section 1 unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by the parties to a private conversation, to secretly record such communication using a tape recorder ! In other words, the law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication But the SC pointed out that the use of a telephone extension does not violate RA 4200 because its use is not expressly enumerated therein and penal laws are strictly construed against the State o Dictaphone o Dictagraph o Detectaphone o Walkie-talkie o Tape recorder -SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL V. SOLUTA = Marijuana in Union Office (Private persons civilly liable under Article 32, New Civil Code) Loida, a laundrywoman of the SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, stayed overnight at the basement of the hotel At dawn, she heard pounding sounds and she saw 5 men, whom she failed to recognize, but was sure were not employees of the hotel, forcibly opening the door of the UNION OFFICE Soluta came afterwards and was trying to open the door when Loida narrated to him what she had witnessed Soluta immediately lodged a complaint before the SECURITY OFFICER and fetched a locksmith. At that instant, the men arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions Panlilio, VP for Finance, instructed to force the door open

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Once inside, Panlilio and his companions began searching the office, over the objection of Babay, who asked them if they had a search warrant A plastic bag containing marijuana was found As a result of the discovery a complaint against the 13 Union Officers was filed, but they were acquitted by the RTC The Union Officers then filed a case against Panlilio and the Hotel for damages and the RTC granted the same via Article 32 of the CC Petitioners argued that because they are private persons, they are not covered by the Constitutional prohibition The SC held that under the New Civil Code, private individuals can be held civilly liable for violation of constitutional rights o And it is not necessary that the defendant should have acted with malice or bad faith Under the New Civil Code, the injured citizen will always have adequate civil remedies because of the independent civil action, even in instances where the act or omission complained of does not constitute a criminal offense The SC pointed out that in People v. Marti, the issue was whether or the evidence obtained was admissible, but in this case, the issue is whether or not damages can be recovered for violation of constitutional rights

-PEOPLE V. DAMASO = Maid allowed entry (unlawful search and seizure; the right to unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right) The group of Lt. Quijardo entered the dwelling of Damaso without a valid warrant when the latter was absent Only Tancianco and Morados were there, the latter being a mere helper, who, according to Lt. Quijardo, allowed them entry The authorities saw copier machines, an M-14 rifle, ammunition, and other items used for the purpose of committing subversion Damaso was charged with violation of PD 1866 The SC held that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures may be waived only by a) the person whose rights are injured or b) the one who is expressly authorized to make the waiver in his behalf o In this case, Morados, being a mere helper, does not qualify as a person authorized to waive such right in representation of her employer o Thus, the search being invalid for lack of warrant, it follows that evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible -SPOUSES VEROY V. LAYAGUE = Qualified consent The Veroy Spouses moved to QC and left their Davao City house to a caretaker who had keys only up to the kitchen thereof The Veroys maintained possession of the keys to the bedrooms Capt. Obrero raided the said house based on a report that rebel soldiers are allegedly hiding therein The authorities only entered up to the yard since they did not have a warrant and, so, they contacted Mrs. Veroy, who allowed entry to their house subject to the condition that Major Macasaet monitor the search The consent was only for the purpose of finding out if rebel soldiers were indeed hiding there Despite the qualified consent, the officers entered various rooms, including the childrens room, and confiscated various subversive items, such as guns, printed materials with subversive indicia, ammunition, etc. The Spouses Veroy assailed the admissibility of the evidence The SC held that in this case, the permission granted was only for the purpose of ascertaining the presence of rebel soldiers o In order for them to be allowed to conduct a full search of the house, the authorities should have obtained a warrant because the circumstances of the case at bar do not fall under any of the exceptions that allow warrantless searches The SC also held that just because the items were allegedly subject to an offense mala prohibita, it does not mean that the same can be summarily seized without a valid warrant -PEOPLE V. EVARISTO = Heard gunshots (valid search and seizure; evidence in plain view) Officers Vallarta and Romeroso were on routine patrol when they heard bursts of gunfire They proceeded to where the sound came from and saw Rosillo who ran to the house of Evaristo, where the latter and Carillo were drinking Vallarta noticed the bulge on Carillos waist and frisked him revealing a .38 caliber revolver Romeroso sought the consent of Evaristo for the entry into the latters house to search for Rosillo, to which consent was given Upon entry they found various firearms, paraphernalia, and other effects Evaristo and Carillo were charged for violation of PD 1866 The SC held that under the doctrine of seizure of evidence in plain view, objects inadvertently falling in the plain view of an officer, who has a the right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be introduced as evidence

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In this case, the plain view doctrine will apply to the seizure of the firearms and effects because their discovery was inadvertent o The purpose for the entry was to search for Rosillo, making the discovery of the firearms was accidental The SC also held that an offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof o In this case, the gunfire, the bulge in Carillos waist, and the peace officers professional instinct more than sufficed to grant him personal knowledge of the facts of the crime that has just been committed, allowing a warrantless arrest o

-OKABE V. JUDGE DE LEON = Bail not a bar to question illegal arrest Maruyama filed a case against Okabe for estafa, alleging that Okabe was engaged in the business of door-to-door delivery from Japan to the Philippines, but she failed to delivery the money as agreed upon The Trial Court issued a warrant for Okabes arrest Okabe posted a bail bond and the court recalled the warrant Okabe alleged that the documents submitted by the prosecutor were not sufficient to determine the existence of probable cause against her The Court of Appeals denied the appeal and ruled that the posting of bail and participation in court proceedings is a waiver of her right to question the respondent Judges finding of probable cause The SC held that under Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, provided that he raises them before entering his plea an application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging: o The validity of his arrest o The legality of the warrant issued therefor o The regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him The SC also held that the rule is a new one, intended to modify previous rulings that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities thereon o In this case, based on Okabes conduct after posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be said that she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her by the respondent judge The SC further held that there must be clear and convincing proof that the accused had an actual intention to relinquish his right to question the existence of probable cause o When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible ! In this case, the records show that a warrant was issued by the respondent judge in Pasay City for the arrest of the petitioner, a resident of Guiguinto, Bulacan ! When the petitioner learned of the issuance of the said warrant, she posted a personal bail bond to avert arrest and secure provisional liberty ! Thus, the posting of a personal bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to avert her incarceration and should not be deemed as a waiver of her right to assail her arrest

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ART III SEC 4 -----PRIOR RESTRAINT-----NEAR V. MINNESOTA = Session Laws ban scandalous criticism of public officials (invalid prior restraint) The SESSION LAW OF MINNESOTA mandated the abatement, as public nuisances, of malicious, scandalous, and defamatory publications After publishing articles that criticized certain local public officials and personalities, THE SATURDAY PRESS, owned by the petitioner Near, was enjoined from further publication The articles alleged that the said officials are not energetically performing their duties in preventing gambling, racketeering, bootlegging, and other crimes allegedly controlled by a certain Jewish gangster Near invoked the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution The US SC held that the statute does not aim to provide remedies for any wrong that may be committed through publication, but rather it is aimed towards prevention o In other words, its object is not punishment, but suppression o Moreover, although no penalty is provided, continued publication would make the publisher liable for contempt ! In this case, authority to resume publication is discretionary upon the court and would require presentation of evidence to substantiate whatever allegations are contained therein and to prove that it was done in good faith ! In other words, there is also a restraint on future speech o To put it simply, under the statute, public authorities may bring the owner or publisher of a newspaper or periodical before a judge upon a charge of conducting a business of publishing charges or criticisms against public officials o The US SC held that such a statute amounts to prior restraint ! It is a form of censorship The US SC also held that the security of the freedom of the press requires that it should be exempt both from Executive and Legislative prior restraint The US SC further held that there are exceptions to prior restraint: o When a nation is at war o Obstruction to governments recruiting service o Publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops o Incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of the organized government o Obscenity and indecency -NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. UNITED STATES = Pentagon Vietnam files (presumption of unconstitutionality for prior restraint) The US Government sought to enjoin the NY Times and the Washington Post from publishing the HISTORY OF US DECISION-MAKING ON VIETNAM POLICY based on national security considerations The US Government argued that in spite of the 1st Amendment, the Executive Department has the authority to protect the nation against publication of information whose disclosure would endanger national security An injunction was issued, prompting New York Times to file a case The US SC held that any prior restraint upon the freedom of the press bears a heavy presumption against its constitutionality o In other words, the government must clearly make out a case to overcome this presumption, which it failed to do in this case o The word security is so broad that it should not be used to abrogate the fundamental law o The publication would not cause an inevitable, immediate, and direct event that would imperil the safety of the American forces, such that there was no grave and irreparable danger The US SC also held that the 1st Amendment does not tolerate prior restraints predicated upon beliefs that untoward consequences may result therefrom In the jurisdiction of the US, the press must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship or restraint o That is because only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose government deception to the people The US SC further held that since the Executive possessed sole power to regulate national defense and conduct foreign relations, it is likewise its responsibility to protect the confidentiality of its own records Dissenting opinion: o The Executive possesses the wisdom to determine up to what extent publication of info will prejudice the national interest, which is in keeping with the principle of the separation of powers -FREEDMAN V. MARYLAND = Maryland State Board of Censors (unlawful prior restraint; delay)

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Freedman, a theatre owner, was convicted for having shown REVENGE AT DAYBREAK without having submitted the same to the BOARD OF CENSORS for prior review, as required by the MARYLAND MOTION PICTURE CENSORSHIP STATUTE Freedman contended that the statute unconstitutionally impaired freedom of expression, particularly the initial decision by a censorship board without any judicial participation The US SC held that in the area of freedom of expression, one has standing to challenge a statute on the ground that it delegates overly broad licensing discretion to an administrative office The US SC also held that there has to be adequate safeguards to obviate dangers of censorship: o The burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor ! In this case, the exhibitor assumes the burden of proof o The censors determination cannot be final, as the same must be in the hands of the judiciary ! In this case, pending approval of the judiciary, the film cannot be exhibited o The procedure must assure a prompt final decision ! In this case, a time-consuming appeal to the courts is required once the Board denies exhibition of a proposed film ! Also, no time limit is imposed upon the Board to decide whether or not to allow the showing of a film submitted to it for review The procedural scheme put together paints a clear picture of prior restraint on the part of exhibitors

-AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. V. JUDGE CAPULONG = EDSA documentary AYER PRODUCTIONS produced the FOUR DAY REVOLUTION, a documentary depicting the events that transpired during the people power revolution for television viewing It combined fictitious characters with real-life ones in order to portray the Filipino culture and the historic events that transpired Fidel Ramos gave his consent to the showing of the film, but Juan Ponce Enrile objected and invoked his, as well as his familys right to privacy Enrile filed a writ of preliminary injunction, which the RTC granted AYER contended that the production would not involve the private life of Enrile and that the preliminary injunction amounted to a prior restraint of their right to free expression The SC held that the freedom of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit the same in theaters or to diffuse them through TV o The freedom is granted both to locally-owned and foreign-owned production companies The SC also held that a limited intrusion into a persons privacy is permissible when a) the person is a public figure and b) the information sought to be elicited constitute matters of a public character o Public figure is defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, mode of living, or profession, which gives the public a legitimate interest in his affairs, has become a public personage o In other words, the right of privacy cannot be invoked to resist publication and dissemination of matters of public interest o In this case, Enrile is a public figure given the role he has played in EDSA and the fact that he is a Senator The SC further held that the tests of clear and present danger as well as balancing of interest may be applied o In this case, there was no clear and present danger since there was no knowledge yet of the actual contents of the film o As regards the balancing of interest test, the intrusion is fairly reasonable because the EDSA revolution is a matter of national and international interest, coupled with the fact that the revolution itself does not relate to the individual and private life of Enrile alone the participation of Enriles character were all public facts -EASTERN BROADCASTING V. DANS, JR. = DYRE radio station (radio stations and TV are different from print media) Radio station DYRE was summarily closed for national security reasons because it allegedly aired subversive programs Petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed down based on mere allegation and that it was deprived freedom of speech However, the case has become moot and academic because DYRE was sold and the new owner did not want to pursue the case Nevertheless, the SC held that all forms of media are entitled to the protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause The SC also held that the clear and present danger test may be applied to test the limits of free speech

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That the words are used in such circumstances and are of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent o The SC recognized that the government also has a right to be protected against broadcasts that incite the listeners to violently overthrow it However, the clear and present danger test is not an all embracing interpretation that is applicable to all utterances in all forums o Freedom of television and radio broadcasting is lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media o Radio broadcasting receives the most limited protection from the free expression clause o Broadcast media have a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens it reaches even the privacy of the home o Broadcast media is uniquely accessible to all, even children selectivity is more difficult in radio and TV o In other words, the audiences of radio and TV have lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze, and reject the utterance o

-ALEXANDER V. UNITED STATES = Selling porn (lawful foreclosure; no prior restraint on future expression) Alexander was engaged in the adult entertainment industry for several years He was convicted for obscenity, as well as for violation of the RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS LAW (RICO) As a result, several of his assets amounting to millions of dollars, including his porn and adult stores and enterprises were foreclosed He alleged that the foreclosure amounted to prior restraint against his freedom of speech, particularly his future expression The US SC held that prior restraint is used to described the administrative and judicial orders forbidding communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur o For example: ! Temporary restraining orders ! Permanent injunctions In this case, the US SC held that the foreclosure imposed upon him is a punishment for criminal conduct under RICO, not a prior restraint against his freedom of expression o In other words, the foreclosure does not impose a ban on any future expression he might make; it only deprived him of specific assets, which were related to his previous racketeering violations o In fact, Alexander may return to his porno businesses anytime, without being cited for contempt, but he cannot finance those activities using assets derived from racketeering -NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING V. DY = Mayors permit as a tool for prior restraint NEWSOUNDS and CBS were corporations that operated radio stations In 1996, they relocated their offices to Isabela and they were issued building permits for the construction of a commercial establishment on one of their properties The said area was classified as commercial by the Office of the MUNICIPAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT COORDINATOR In 2002, petitioners applied for renewal of the permit, but they were required to submit papers of reclassification of their area from agricultural to commercial either from the DAR or the City Council They obtained a formal recognition of conversion, but it was not accepted, as it was allegedly spurious and void In 2004, petitioners missed the deadline for the application for the permit and, as a result, their radio stations were to be closed The SC held that prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination o The Constitution guarantees that there is to be no previous restraint on the communication of views nor subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings, unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent The SC also held that any system of prior restraint comes to court bearing a heavy burden against its constitutionality The SC further held that although LGUs are capacitated to enact ordinances requiring licenses or business permits, the same should be content-neutral, which means that it should only regulate the incidents of speech, such as the time, place, or manner, and under welldefined standards On the other hand, content-based laws are those in which the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech o In this case, the steps utilized by respondents to ultimately shut down the radio stations were content-based

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Last but not least, the strict scrutiny test is applicable because it is used to assess contentbased regulations on free speech, freedom of the mind, the political process and other fundamental rights o In the strict scrutiny test, the burden falls upon the government to prove that its actions do not infringe upon constitutional rights o In other words, the burden is on the government to establish such compelling reason to infringe the right to free expression o In this case, the respondents actions were tainted with ill-motives because while they were still in operation, the radio stations were aggressive in exposing widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appeared to favor the respondents

-----SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT-----GONZALES V. COMELEC = Standards to test the validity of a rule curtailing the freedom of speech (clear and present danger rule not absolute) Responding to the undesired reality of prolonged political campaigns, RA 4880 was enacted containing 2 assailed provisions: o Section 50-A, which prohibited the early nomination of candidates by parties o Section 50-B, which limited the period of campaign and partisan political activity But the RA did not prohibit the common expression of thoughts or the mention of names relating to the elections Gonzales assailed the RA as being violative of the freedom of speech The SC held that the freedom of expression and the right to freely associate are not absolute o In this case, the curtailment is not such as to render meaningless the said rights, as the scope of legitimate activities is not unduly narrowed The SC also discussed standards to test the validity of regulations that curtail the freedom of speech, of the press, and of peaceful assembly: o Dangerous tendency doctrine, which permitted the application of restrictions when a) there is a rational connection between the speech and the danger apprehended and b) the tendency of one to create the other is shown ! It may be implied in from this case that said doctrine has been abandoned o Clear and present danger rule, where the question is whether the words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent In other words, it must be present and inevitable It is question of proximity and degree Clear connotes a causal connection with the danger of the substantive evil arising from the utterance questioned Present refers to the time element that is identified with imminent and immediate danger o Balancing of interest test, where there is a judicial balancing of the conflicting social values and individual interests competing for ascendancy in legislation that restricts expression ! In other words, which one deserves greater protection based on the circumstances? ! The interference with the freedom of speech and assembly is in a more generalized way ! The effects of speech in terms of the probability of realizing a specific danger is not readily apparent The SC held that the dangerous tendency doctrine and the clear and present danger rule were fashioned in the course of testing legislation that limited speech expected to have deleterious consequences on the security and public order of the community o The clear and present danger rule is not one of universal applicability and validity o In this case, the balancing of interest test was applied in determining the validity of Sections 50-A and 50-B of RA 4880 o Sections 50-A and 50-B recognize that such speech and assembly are lawful, but sought to limit the same for a certain point in time ! But while the Court expressed doubt as to the constitutionality of the provisions, the required 2/3 votes to declare it unconstitutional were not attained -PEOPLE V. PEREZ = Lets cut off Woods head with bolos! (lawful punishment of seditious speech) Perez, the MUNICIPAL SECRETARY of SORSOGON, was charged for inciting to sedition on the ground of having uttered seditious words while engaged in a discussion

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He said that the Filipinos should get bolos and cut of Governor-General Woods head for recommending bad things for the Filipinos and for killing the independence Perez contended that he did not commit a crime because the utterance was during a discussion done in a peaceful manner and what he simply meant was that Governor-General Wood should be replaced with another The SC held that criticism is allowed to penetrate even the foundations of government o In other words, criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, except when the intention and effect would be seditious o When the intention and effect of the speech is seditious, the guarantee of freedom of speech must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the supremacy of law and order o In this case, there was a seditious tendency in the words used and the same could easily cause disaffection among the people ! It was made to stir the people up to rise against the lawful authorities The SC defined sedition as the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State and its ultimate object is a violation of the public peace o

-DENNIS V. UNITED STATES = Communist Party of the US (free discussion vs. violent and unlawful advocacy) Dennis and the other petitioners were convicted for conspiring to organize the COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE US, which advocated the destruction of the organized government Dennis et al. transformed the COMMUNIST POLITICAL ASSOCIATION into the COMMUNIST PARTY and changed its policy from peaceful cooperation to that overthrow by force and violence Petitioners contended that they were simply discussing the MARXIST-LENNIST DOCTRINE and the statute impairs their right to free discussion The US SC held that there is no doubt that it is within the power of Congress to enact measures to protect the security of the State from armed rebellion o In fact, the government need not wait until the putsch is about to be executed or the plans have been laid down and only the signal is awaited before it may act o An attempt to overthrow the government by force, even if doomed from the outset, is a sufficient evil that Congress has a right to prevent o In this case, the mere fact that from 1945 to 1948, petitioners activities did not result in an attempt to overthrow the government is immaterial because the fact was that there was a group that was ready to make an attempt come the right time o In other words, the probability of success is of no moment and what is important is that the requisite danger exists The US SC also held that the freedom of speech is not an unlimited and unqualified right, but may be subordinated to other values and considerations on certain occasions o But because the crime sought to be prevented contained in this case contained elements of free speech, the same deserves special and careful consideration o The clear and present danger rule must be applied in order to sustain a conviction if the evidence of the violation takes the form of speech and expression o In this case, the prohibition is directed against advocacy, not discussion -UNITED STATES V. OBRIEN = Destroying Selective Service registration certificate (valid incidental restriction on the freedom of speech) OBrien and 3 others burned their SELECTIVE SERVICE CERTIFICATES in front of a crowd outside a Boston Courthouse, in order to influence them to accept their anti-war beliefs He was charged with violation of the UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING and SERVICE ACT, penalizing the intentional destruction of the said certificates OBrien assailed the validity of the said law for violating his right to symbolic speech, which was within the protection of the 1st Amendment The US SC held that the right to free speech cannot be used as an excuse to justify apparently limitless varieties of conduct for the purpose of expressing an idea o In other words, not every conduct can be labeled speech when the person engaging in the conduct intends to express an idea o In this case, it does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a registration certificate is a constitutionally protected activity The US SC also held that when speech and non-speech elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important government interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on the 1st Amendment freedoms: o If it is within the constitutional power of the government o If it furthers an important and legitimate governmental interest o If the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free speech o If the incidental restriction on free speech is no greater than what is essential to the furtherance of the governmental interest ! In this case, the law targeted the knowing destruction of certificates issued, not free (symbolic) speech, making the alleged impairment on free speech incidental

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-BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE V. JUDGE MAJADUCON = Gross ignorance of the law (unlawful charge of indirect contempt; no malicious intent) Pursuant to Senate Resolutions filed by Senators Ople and Sotto, the BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE conducted inquiries, in aid of legislation, regarding a) a possible coup dtat and b) alleged mismanagement of military retirement and benefit funds The Committee probed the purchase of a lot from Atty. Flaviano for a price of P10,500/square meter, but the Registry of Deeds disclosed that under the deed of sale filed, the purchase price was only P3,000/square meter Flaviano refused to appear during the inquiries after having been summoned and he filed for a TRO with Judge Majaducon, which the latter granted The Committee, through Senator Pimentel, countered with a petition for certiorari, which alleged gross ignorance of the law on the part of Majaducon The case was published in the Philippine Star and, as a result, Majaducon, motu propio, charged Pimentel of indirect contempt Pimentel alleged that the term gross ignorance of the law was normally used in petitions and that it was used without malice. He also contended that he did not cause the publication of the case nor could he stop the same lest he violate the right to freedom of the press The SC held that the gross ignorance of the law is a description of normal usage in law to describe acts of lower courts that are challenged before higher tribunals o It is used when the law is so elementary that not to know it or to act as if a judge does not know it constitutes gross ignorance o In other words, there is no malignant intention behind its usage and it does not constitute improper conduct that tends to obstruct or degrade the administration of justice o In this case, the TRO issued by Judge Majaducon against the appearance of Atty. Flaviano during the Senate inquiries led Pimentel to believe that there was gross ignorance of the law because under the principle of separation of powers, the judiciary cannot interfere with the exercise by the legislature of its authority to conduct investigations in aid of legislation The SC also held that publications exercise discretion as to what materials would be published, provided that the same are relevant to public interest o In this case, there was no evidence that Pimentel caused the release of the articles, nor could they be faulted for its publication -----SPEECH AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS-----GONZALES V. COMELEC RA 4880 a) prohibited the too early nomination of candidates and b) limited the period of election campaign or partisan political activity Petitioners invoked the basic liberties of free speech and free press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association to nullify the act Petitioner Cabigao was the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila and Gonzales is a private individual, a registered voter Respondents justified the enactment under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections, being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship, and undue concentration in politics with the loss of efficiency in society and the government, not to mention the huge expenditure of funds The SC held that at the very least, free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment The SC also held that the BoR extends the same protection to the right of the people peaceably to assemble, which is a necessary consequence of our republican government and complements the right of free speech o However, the association must not be contrary to law, which means that if an association could be shown to create an imminent danger to public safety, then there is justification for abridging its right to form associations or societies The SC further held that the RA could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation o In other words, it suffers from the infirmity of vagueness The prohibition of any speech, announcement, or commentary; the holding of interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office; the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials; the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly; the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or against any candidate or party are repugnant to the constitutional guarantee o However, the required 2/3 vote to declare a law unconstitutional was not attained -SANIDAD V. COMELEC = Restraint on discussing plebiscite matters (no legal basis for plebiscite regulation; plebiscite vs. election)

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COMELEC promulgated Resolution 2167 to govern the conduct of the plebiscite for the approval of the CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION ORGANIC ACT The Resolution prohibits the use of columns or commentaries from campaigning for or against plebiscite issues during campaign period COMELEC used both Article 9-C of the 1987 Constitution and BP 881 as basis: o The Constitution provides that COMELEC may, during election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of media communication or information, among others o BP 881 prohibits the sale or granting of and space or airtime to candidates during election period and requires leave of absence of candidates engaged in the broadcast or print media business Sanidad, a columnist, assailed the Resolution on the ground that it constitutes a prior restraint on his freedom of the press and imposes a subsequent punishment for those who violate the same The SC held that the power granted to COMELEC was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits, or other grants to media to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply among candidates are ensured o The evil sought to be prevented is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space of radio or television time o But COMELEC does not have the right to regulate or supervise the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their rights during plebiscite periods because the same are neither candidates or franchise holders o In a plebiscite, there are no candidates for a specific office, as only issues are voted upon ! Plebiscite issues are also matters of public concern and importance o In this case, while the restriction does not absolutely bar the freedom of expression, there is still a restriction upon choice of where to express his views and no sufficient justification has been advanced in support of the prohibition The SC also held that free discussion of the issues pertaining to a plebiscite must, in fact, be encouraged rather than curtailed so as to allow the voters to cast enlightened and wellinformed votes

-NATIONAL PRESS CLUB V. COMELEC = Banning of political ads COMELEC promulgated a Resolution, banning political ads, except for those dedicated to COMELEC time or COMELEC hour o It prevented the sale or donation of space and time for political advertisements Petitioners contended that the prohibition amounts to censorship, as it suppresses a particular content and only that content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda Petitioners also maintained that the prohibition abridges the freedom of speech of candidates and that the suppression of media-based campaign would bring about a substantial reduction in the volume of information concerning candidates, limiting the right of voters to information and opinion The SC held that the freedom of speech and of the press have to be taken in conjunction with Article 9-C, which is a special provision applicable during a specific limited period, i.e., during the election period The SC also held that equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is an important value The essential question is whether or not the assailed prohibition constitutes a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and information enterprises during an election period or whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press o In this case, the prohibition is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability only during election period o In fact, it does not prohibit reports or commentaries that, in responsible media, are not paid for by candidates for office ! In other words, it is designed to cover only paid political advertisements of political candidates The SC also held that the effect of Article 9-C of the Constitution is that no presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or regulatory authority by COMELEC for the purpose of securing equal opportunity among candidates for political office, even if the same may result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and of the press o In other words, the burden of proof is on the party asserting the unconstitutionality of the statute of COMELEC, which is presumed to be constitutional at the outset The SC further held that the regulation of election campaign activity will not pass the test of validity: o If it is too general in its terms or not limited in time and scope in its application

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o o

If it restricts ones expression of belief in a candidate or ones opinion of his or her qualifications If the regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective

-ADIONG V. COMELEC = Banning of stickers on vehicles (unlawful restriction on freedom of speech and right to property; no legitimate government interest) COMELEC promulgated Resolution 2347, which provides that decals and posters may only be posted on authorized posting areas, such as campaign headquarters, candidates residences, common posted areas, etc. o The Resolution also prohibited the exhibition of stickers and decals in mobile places, such as vehicles Adiong, being a neophyte, assailed the Resolution on the ground that it would have been the last medium he can use to inform the public of his candidacy The SC held that all the protections expressed in the BoR are important, but the right to free speech has been accorded a preferred status o That is because the freedom of expression is the indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom The SC also held that COMELEC is recognized, during election period, to regulate the conduct and manner of elections, but the regulation of election activity has its limits o When faced with borderline situations where freedom to speak by a candidate and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections, COMELEC should lean in favor of freedom o In this case, there is no adequate governmental interest endangered that would justify the curtailment o Moreover, the regulation unduly infringed upon free speech ! It strikes at the freedom of the individual to express his preference and support The SC further held that a statute is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the are of protected freedoms o In other words, governmental purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved ! In this case, the regulation too loosely worded such that even posting in ones residence or car is illegal, infringing even upon the lawful use of private property -ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC = Exit polls (unlawful restraint on freedom of speech; speculative danger) COMELEC promulgated a Resolution to enjoin ABS-CBN from conducting and reporting the results of exit polls, on the ground that it has a tendency to sow confusion and could prejudice the results of the election, promote bandwagon mentality, and impair the secrecy of the ballot ABS-CBN contended that the holding of exit polls is a valid exercise of the freedom of speech and of the press The SC defined an exit poll as a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals to determine the probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their ballots The SC held that the freedom of expression is accorded a preferred right and stands on a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties because the same is the indispensable condition for nearly every other form of freedom The SC also held that to justify a restriction of the freedom of speech, a substantial governmental interest musty be clearly shown: o It is within the constitutional power of the government o It furthers an important governmental interest o The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression o The incidental restriction on the freedom of speech is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the governmental interest o In other words, even if the governments purpose is legitimate, it cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental liberties, where the end may be more narrowly achieved ! In this case, the interviewees are selected at random, the survey is not meant to replace the official COMELEC count, and the credibility and integrity of the election is not at stake because it is an exercise separate and independent of the same ! Moreover, the contents of the official ballots are not actually exposed and the participation in exit polls is voluntary ! In other words, COMELECs concern does not justify a ban The SC further held that there must be a substantial government interest involved to justify restrictions upon free expression and not mere speculations

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In this case, no evidence was presented to prove that the presence of exit poll reports will lead to the danger envisioned by COMELEC Thus, the interest of the state in reducing disruption is outweighed by the drastic abridgement of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the media and the electorate o

-SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS V. COMELEC = Banning of election surveys (unlawful restraint on freedom of the press) The FAIR ELECTION ACT prohibited the publication of election surveys, 15 days before the national elections and 7 days before local elections to prevent the manipulation of the electoral process by the publication of erroneous and unscrupulous surveys The SWS and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING (Manila Standard) assailed the validity of the said provision because there is no clear and present danger to justify the restraint COMELEC argued that it has a duty to prevent the debasement of the electoral process and that impairment on freedom of expression is only for a limited period The SC held that the power of COMELEC under Article 9-C of the Constitution is limited to ensuring equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply, as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of media facilities for public information campaigns and forums among candidates o That is why the SC upheld the validity of the ban on media advertising in National Press Club case The SC also held that even if a law furthers an important governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is related to the suppression of freedom of expression o And even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental interest o In this case, the argument that the prohibition is for a limited time only is immaterial because, it is, nevertheless, direct, absolute and constitutes the total suppression of only one category of speech, i.e., publication of surveys o Moreover, the suppression is clearly greater than that which is necessary to further the government interest ! THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987 provides ways by which the purpose may be more narrowly pursued, such as by punishing unlawful acts, instead of punishing or prohibiting free expression itself ! COMELEC has the power to stop any illegal activity, or confiscate, tear down, and stop any unlawful, libelous, misleading, or false election propaganda, after due notice and hearing -----COMMERCIAL SPEECH-----CENTRAL HUDSON GAS & ELECTRIC CORPORATION V. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION = Ban on advertisement promoting the use of electricity (unlawful restraint on commercial speech) The New York PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION completely banned an electric utility from advertising to promote the use of electricity o The aim of the ban was to promote energy conservation The US SC held that while it is true that commercial expression is afforded a lesser degree of protection, it is, nevertheless, still protected against unwarranted government regulation For commercial speech to come within the Constitutional protection: o The commercial speech must concern a lawful activity and must not be misleading ! In this case, it was not claimed that the expression was inaccurate or unlawful o The asserted governmental interest to be served by restricting said commercial speech is substantial ! In this case, the States interest in energy conservation is clearly substantial o The regulation must directly advance the governmental interest o The regulation must not be more extensive than necessary to serve the interest ! In this case, the regulation, which reaches all promotional advertising, regardless of the impact of the touted service on overall energy use, is more than necessary ! In other words, although there is a legitimate government interest in this case, the government went overboard by employing means that are too sweeping and curtail fundamental liberties -PHARMACEUTICAL V. SECRETARY OF HEALTH = Ban on advertisement promoting breast milk substitutes (unlawful restraint on commercial speech) President Aquino issued EO 51, which sought to give effect to Article II of the INTERNATIONAL CODE OF MARKETING OF BREASTMILK SUBSTITUTES, a code also adopted by the WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY

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EO 51 or the MILK CODE is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICBMS, except that it did not adopt the provision on the absolute prohibition on the advertising of breast milk substitutes Instead, the MILK CODE provides that advertising may be allowed if the same are duly authorized by the INTER-AGENCY COMMITTEE However, the DOH issued an IRR, which absolutely prohibits the advertising of infant formula, breast milk substitutes, and other related products The SC held that the DOHs power under the MILK CODE to control information regarding breast milk vis--vis breast milk substitutes is not absolute as the power to control does not encompass the power to absolutely prohibit the advertising and promotion of the latter Concurring opinion of Chief Justice Puno: o In this case, the advertising of breast milk substitutes properly falls within the ambit of commercial speech o Commercial speech is speech that proposes an economic transaction o Commercial speech is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression, but is nonetheless entitled to protection In this case, the absolute ban on advertising prescribed under the IRR is unduly restrictive and is more than necessary to further the governmental interest of promoting the health of infants

-CITY OF LADUE V. GILLEO = Banning of signs in residence (unlawful restraint on freedom of speech) Gilleo, a citizen of Ladue, Missouri, placed a sign outside her home, calling for an end to the PERSIAN GULF WAR The city informed her that her sign was banned under a local ordinance, which prohibited signs in residential areas o The purpose of the ordinance is to minimize the visual clutter associated with such signs Gilleo fought to keep her sign where it was and won a case in the District Court, which stopped the city from enforcing its ordinance Gilleo then placed another sign, reading "FOR PEACE IN THE GULF," in her front window The Ladue City Council responded by passing a new law that banned all signs over a certain size that were not covered by ten specific exemptions (such as "For Sale" and "Beware of Dog" signs) Gilleo alleged that it violated her right to free speech and filed a new action in District Court challenging the revised ordinance The US SC held that although cities have a right to regulate the placement of signs, they cannot enforce an Ordinance selectively based on the messages contained in the signs o In this case, although the US SC accepted that Ordinance did not discriminate on the basis of content, it found that Ladues interest in regulating clutter was outweighed by Gilleo's right to express herself The US SC also held Ladue had "almost completely foreclosed" on a vital means of expression by its citizens o Even if not content-based, the banning of an entire media, i.e., signs, poses too much of a threat to the free speech of citizens to be allowed Last but not least, the US SC rejected the claim that there are other means of expressing Gilleos viewpoint, such as pamphlets or newspaper advertisements o Personal signs are a unique way of expressing one's opinion and cannot be equated with other methods of expression, not to mention cheap and convenient -----SPEECH AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS-----RE: REQUEST FOR RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF PLUNDER CASES OF ERAP = Rights of the accused prevails when in conflict with freedom of speech A request for possible TV coverage of the Estrada plunder trial in the Sandiganbayan was filed, but it was rejected by the same court The SC held that based on US jurisprudence, TV coverage of judicial proceedings involves an inherent denial of the due process rights of a criminal defendant o The jury, witnesses, trial judge, and defendant will all be affected The SC admits that the press is a mighty catalyst in awakening public consciousness and has become an instrument in the quest for truth, but the case must be weighed out with the freedom of the press and the right to public information on the one hand and on the other, the fundamental rights of the accused, along with the power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial The SC further held that with the possibility of losing the life and liberty of the accused, he must receive a verdict solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment o In this case, the SC ruled that live video coverage should be prohibited in order to protect the right of the parties to due process, prevent the distraction of proceedings, avoid the miscarriage of justice, and to avoid prejudice and pressure during the trial

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Thus, in case of seeming conflict, the rights of the accused under criminal trial prevail over the rights of others to free expression or information on matters of public concern

-IN RE: PETITION TO ANNUL 98-7-02 SC = Prohibition on demonstrations in the vicinity of courts (valid rule of procedure by the judiciary) The said Resolution prohibited demonstrations along premises and within a 200 meter radius of the outer boundary of the Supreme Court or other courts because such activities interrupt and hamper the working conditions in the said courts The Resolution was assailed as being violative of the freedom of expression The Resolution was upheld on the ground that its purpose is to assure the impartial and orderly administration of justice o The judiciary is empowered by the Constitution to promulgate rules of procedure for the purpose of protecting rights -UNITED STATES V. GRACE = Unlawful ban on display of flags or banners outside the US SC (only content-neutral regulations public places) Title 40 of the USC prohibits the display of any flag, banner or device designed to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement within the vicinity of the US SC or any of its grounds, including sidewalks constituting the outer bounds of the premises Persons bearing picket signs or distributing leaflets were threatened with arrest on the basis of the said law The US SC held that peaceful picketing and leaflet distribution are covered by protected speech The US SC also held that public places are considered public forums, where the government may enforce reasonable time, place, and manner regulations, but not an absolute prohibition of a type of expression o In this case, the Court grounds are not transformed into public forum property merely because the public is permitted to freely enter and leave the grounds anytime The US SC further held that an absolute prohibition of a particular type of expression will be upheld only on compelling governmental interests o In this case, the prohibition does not substantially serve its purpose of protecting the SC from outside influence or preventing the appearance that the SC is influenced by such -IN RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TV COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASE AGAINST ZALDY AMPATUAN ET AL. = (partially granted; pro hac vice) Members of the press, along with members of the academe and the relatives of the victims filed a petition with the SC, praying that live TV and radio coverage of the Ampatuan criminal cases be permitted Petitioners contended that the absolute ban laid down in Aquinos libel case and Estradas plunder case, is violative of constitutional rights because restrictions on the same are to be narrowly construed and outright prohibition cannot stand when regulation is a viable alternative The SC admitted that the indication of serious risks posed by live media coverage to the accuseds right to due process in Aquino and Estrada was left unexplained, leaving a blow to the exercise of press freedom and the right to public information o It is high time to craft a win-win situation that shall not: ! Compromise rights in the criminal administration of justice ! Sacrifice press freedom and allied rights ! Interfere with the integrity, dignity and solemnity of judicial proceedings o In other words, the solution is compliance with regulation and not curtailment of rights The doctrine in Aquino is that trials of any kind are matters of utmost importance and should not be treated as means of entertainment; and to do so would deprive the courts of the dignity that they hold and departs from the solemn quest for truth The doctrine in Estrada is that the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information must be weighed out with the fundamental rights of the accused and the constitutional power of the courts to control their proceedings in ensuring fair and impartial trials The SC held that a public trial is not synonymous to a publicized trial o An accused has a right to a public trial, but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty is critically held in balance o A public trial aims to ensure that the accused is fairly dealt with o A public trial implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process ! In this case, due to the massive character of the case, it would be impossible to hold the trial in a courtroom that can accommodate all the interested parties, as well as the general public

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Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open, and public trial The SC held that technology per se has always been neutral and it is the use and regulation thereof that need fine-tuning for the same to work in furtherance of various rights and, thus, the SC resolved to grant coverage, subject to several guidelines ! -----LIBEL-----

-POLICARPIO V. MANILA TIMES = Inaccurate information made it sound worse (sensationalized news; standards for defamatory articles) Policarpio, the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY of the LOCAL UNESCO NATIONAL COMMISSION, terminated Reyes from the service and the latter countered by filing a case for estafa thru falsification and malversation of public funds against the former The case was published in the MANILA TIMES and the DAILY MIRROR, but the articles reported that the case was filed by the PRESIDENTIAL COMPLAINT and ACTION COMMISSION pursuant to an ongoing administrative investigation Neither did the articles indicate that the alleged stencils Policarpio used for private purposes amounted to only P54.00 and that the reimbursements she made were for certain trips Policarpio filed for damages, claiming that the articles are libelous per se Respondents argued that little details do not affect the truthfulness of the articles as a whole The SC held that newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion in determining the manner in which a given event should be presented to the public as a news item o Presentation in a sensational manner is not illegal per se However, in order to enjoy immunity, a publication containing derogatory information must be: o True and fair ! In this case, besides being false, the articles were unfair, as the sensationalizing of the issue made it appear to be far more serious than what it actually was, putting Policarpio in an unfavorable light o Made in good faith ! In this case, even if respondents acted in good faith under a misapprehension of facts, they are still guilty of negligence o Made without comments or remarks ! PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON FRAUD is a comment Under Article 354 of the RPC, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, if there is no good intention or justifying motive, except for the following: o Private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty o A fair and true report, made in good faith, without comments and remarks, of governmental proceedings that are not of confidential nature or of any speech delivered in such proceedings, or of any act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions The SC also held that even if a subsequent article were to be published to rectify an error, the same does not erase the responsibility arising from the publication of the prior article and, at best, the rectification would only serve to mitigate liability -LOPEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS = Hoax of the year (reasonable care absent from publication; no pressure of deadline) Cruz was a SANITARY OFFICER assigned in BABUYAN ISLANDS, who made a distress signal to a passing USAF plane, which dropped an emergency kit with a radio Cruz used the radio to contact Manila, concocting a story that a mad killer was on the loose, prompting the authorities to send a rescue squad But the story was a hoax as Cruz was simply looking for a way back to Manila An article was published by the MANILA CHRONICLE, but it erroneously used the picture of another Cruz, a businessman from Bulacan, who sued for libel The CHRONICLE published a subsequent article, expressing their sincere regrets and apologies for the mistake The SC held that no liability would be incurred if it could be demonstrated that an article comes within the freedom of the press o The press is given wide latitude of choice as to what items should see the light of day, so long as they are relevant to public interest o In fact, the insistence on truth would sometimes yield to unavoidable inaccuracies of publications subject to deadlines The SC held that jurisprudence generally recognizes that a newspaper should not be held to account for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words to the point of suppressing the newspaper o But in this case, there was no pressure of a daily deadline, as the article was published in a weekly magazine o Reasonable care that is required of the CHRONICLE was absent

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Moreover, subsequent rectification does not erase the liability for the prior article, but only mitigates the same Dissent of Justice Dizon: o Respondents should not be liable as there was no evidence of actual malice and the case falls within the ambit of excusable negligence o

-NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY V. SULLIVAN = Defamatory article against public official (actual malice standard for public officials/figures) The NY TIMES carried a full-page ad entitled "HEED THEIR RISING VOICES", which solicited funds to defend Martin Luther King, Jr. against an Alabama perjury indictment The ad described actions against civil rights protesters, some of which involved the Alabama police force Referring to the Alabama State Police, the advertisement inaccurately stated that "they have arrested King 7 times", but at that point he had only been arrested 4 times The PUBLIC SAFETY COMMISSIONER, Sullivan, was not named, but he considered the inaccurate criticism on the police force as defamation against him due to his position and his duty to supervise the police department Pursuant to Alabama law, Sullivan sent a letter for public retraction, which the Times did not respond to, prompting the former to file a suit for recovery of punitive damages in a libel action Sullivan won in the Alabama court due to an Alabama statute, declaring that a published material is libelous per se, if it brings the public official in contempt or tends to injure his reputation The US SC held that factual errors or the effect of injuring official reputation do not suffice to justify the repression of free speech o Compelling critics of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all their factual assertions would amount to self-censorship o Critics would be deterred due to doubt as to whether they can prove their assertions in court or fear of the expense of having to do so The US also held that public officials may not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to their official conduct, unless they can prove that the statement was made with actual malice o Actual malice means either: ! Intentionally publishing the material with the knowledge that it was false, or ! Publishing the material with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not o In this case, what was made was effective criticism, which the US SC recognized as protected speech -BORJAL V. COURT OF APPEALS = Wenceslao defensive of a blind item (doctrine of qualified privileged communication) Borjal, in his column with the PHILIPPINE STAR called THE JAYWALKER, wrote about anomalous activities of a certain conference organizer, alleging that he engaged in dubious ways, shady deals, and is thick faced Wenceslao, the organizer of the FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LAND TRANSPORT, thinking that the article is about him, filed a complaint before the NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, as well as a criminal complaint for libel The libel case was dismissed but he later filed a civil case for damages, which the lower courts granted in his favor Petitioners maintained that the CA erred because, among other, it refused to recognize that the articles are qualifiedly privileged communication The SC held that in order to maintain a libel suit, it is necessary that the victim be identifiable, but it is not necessary that he be named o It must be shown that at least a 3rd person could identify the victim as the object of the libelous publication o In this case, it is not sufficient that Wenceslao identified himself o Also, the articles did not name him and there are, in fact, several other organizers of the said event, aside from him The SC also held that privileged communication may be either: o Absolutely privileged, which are those that are not actionable, even if the author has acted in bad faith o Qualifiedly privileged, which are those that contain defamatory information, but are not actionable, unless found to have been made without good intention or justifiable motive ! Private communication ! Fair and true report without any comments or remarks The SC further held that the enumeration under Article 354 of the RPC is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications o Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander

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Fair comment means that while generally every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable, unless there is actual malice ! Mere error, inaccuracy, or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice Thus, if it is an expression of opinion based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts In this case, Wenceslao is a public figure as organizer of the FNCLT, which is an entity imbued with public interest and, thus, he cannot dissociate himself from media scrutiny

-VASQUEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS = Denounced Barangay Chairman (elements of libel; actual malice standard for public officials) A citizen denounced a barangay chairman of the TONDO FORESHORE AREA for alleged misconduct in office The barangay official sued for libel The SC held that the following are the elements of libel: o Allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another o Publication of the said allegation or charge o Identity of the person defamed, where at least a 3rd person or stranger can identify the person as the object of the publication o Malice The SC also held that even if a defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach, if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned can prove that the statement was made with actual malice o Actual malice means knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not The SC further held that a rule that would place on the accused the burden of showing the truth of the allegations of official conduct would infringe on the guaranteed freedom of expression o In this case, the person defamed was a public official -TIME, INC. V. FIRESTONE = Divorce (misapplication of actual malice doctrine; private persons entitled to greater protection) Respondent sought separate maintenance from her husband, who countered with a divorce suit due to adultery and extreme cruelty TIME reported that the divorce was in fact granted based on the said grounds (adultery and extreme cruelty) After TIME had declined to retract, respondent brought an action for libel The US SC held that holding in New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, which bars media liability for defamation of a public figure, unless there is actual malice, has strict application: o It only applies to public officials or public figures o It does not automatically apply to all reports of judicial proceedings because there is no reason why one involved in litigation should forfeit that degree of protection afforded by the law of defamation simply by being drawn into a court room ! In this case, respondent was neither public official nor figure, as she did not occupy any role of special prominence in the society The US SC also gave 2 criteria, which must be followed in determining civil liability in libel cases: o Compensatory awards must be supported by competent evidence concerning the injury o Liability cannot be imposed without actual fault ! In this case, since the court did not find actual fault on the part TIME, no damages are due -HUSTLER MAGAZINE V. FALWELL = Jerry Falwell talks about his first time (parody; cannot be interpreted as stating actual facts) HUSTLER MAGAZINE featured an ad parody, portraying Falwell, a known minister and commentator in politics and other public affairs, engaged in a drunken sexual and incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse The ad was modeled after actual CAMPARI ads, featuring celebrities interviewed about their first time drinking CAMPARI Falwell filed a libel claim, alleging outrageous and intentional infliction of emotional distress The US SC held that in the absence of a false statement of facts made with actual malice, public officials or public figures cannot recover damages for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of the publication of a caricature o In other words, the interest in protecting public figures from emotional distress is not sufficient to deny the freedom of speech that is patently offensive and intended to cause emotional injury, when the speech could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figures involved

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In this case, Falwell was a public figure and the caricature was not reasonably believable and, hence, it cannot be interpreted as having stated actual facts

-JAL V. SIMANGAN = JAL wrongly bumped passenger off (privileged commentary on a matter of public interest) Respondent purchased a round trip plane ticket from JAPAN AIR LINES JALs crew suspected respondent of carrying falsified travel documents The plane took off and respondent was left behind It was later confirmed that respondents travel documents were in order Respondent filed for breach of contract of carriage The issue became publicized and JAL filed an action for libel The SC held that pursuant to Borjal v. CA, there must be actual malice in order that a discreditable imputation to a public person in his public capacity or to a public official in his official capacity may be actionable o To be considered malicious, the libelous statements must be shown to have been written or published with the knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of whether they are false or not o In this case, even though JAL is not a public official, the rule on privileged commentaries on matters of public interest applies ! In this case, JAL deals with the public and its bumping off of respondent without a valid reason naturally drew public attention and generated a public issue ! Also, the published articles involved matters of public interest and that its expressed opinion is not malicious, but based on established facts, which makes the imputation against JAL not actionable The SC also held that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press includes fair commentaries on matters of public interest o In this case, the publication involved a matter about which the public has the right to be informed because they relate to a public issue o Even assuming that respondent, indeed, caused the publication of his complaint, he may not be held liable for damages for it -----OBSCENITY AND INDECENCY-----MILLER V. CALIFORNIA = Test to determine obscenity (utterly vs. serious without value) Miller conducted a mailing campaign for the promotion of adult materials Some brochures were unwillingly received by a restaurant owner and his mother in Newport Beach, prompting them to file a complaint The US SC held that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionality protected speech or press The US SC also decided to abandon the Memoirs Doctrine, requiring the material to be utterly without any redeeming social value in order to be obscene, as the same was a burden that was impossible to discharge o Thus, in order to benefit from the protection conferred by the 1st Amendment, the prurient and patent display of sexual conduct must have some serious literary, political, or scientific value The US SC further held that forms of expression may be considered obscene if the following characteristics attend: o The average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find the work, taken as a whole, to appeal to the prurient interests o The work depicts or describes patently offensive sexual conduct, specifically defined by the applicable state law o The work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, political, artistic, or scientific value Thus, no one may be punished for the sale or exposure of obscene materials, unless they depict patently hardcore sexual conduct, specifically defined by the regulating state law, as written or construed o In this case, the case was remanded to the lower courts for further proceedings based on the new standard Finally, the SC held that what the 1st Amendment protects is the commerce of ideas, which must be distinguished from the commercial exploitation of obscene materials -GONZALES V. KALAW KATIGBAK = Kapit sa Patalim classified as for adults only (artist entitled to respect, unless work is obscene) The BOARD OF REVIEW classified the movie, KAPIT SA PATALIM, as being for adults only, as it contained sexually explicit scenes, such as naked women dancing, lesbian action, etc. The Board ordered the deletion of the said scenes and delayed the issuance of permit to exhibit, but, in the end, it resolved to grant the exhibition of the movie without any deletion But petitioners still brought an action against respondents, contending that the classification of had no legal basis and it restrained artistic expression

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The SC held that the test to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is the clear and present danger rule o Censorship of movies, theatrical productions, radio scripts, TV programs, and the like is allowed not allowed, except under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public safety, morals, health, or any legitimate public interest ! In this case, the power of the Board is limited to that of classification, which is to determine what films are for general patronage and are suitable for adults only But even with the clear and present danger rule, the law still frowns upon obscenity The SC also held that to determine what is obscene, the test is whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interests o Obscene materials are those that deal with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interests o Thus, what is seen or perceived by an artist is entitled to respect, unless there is a showing that his work is obscene ! In this case, the standard applied by the Board is unduly restrictive, but the Court failed to muster the required number of votes to find grave abuse of discretion on their part

-SORIANO V. LAGUARDIA = Ang Dating Daan (valid suspension against vulgar language in general patronage program; relative obscenity) Soriano, as the host of ANG DATING DAAN, aired on UNTV 37, made derogatory and obscene remarks against the Iglesia ni Cristo Ang DATING DAAN has a G rating, which means that the show does not contain anything unsuitable for children and minors and may be viewed without adult guidance or supervision Members of the INC filed complaints against Soriano with the MTRCB The MTRCB imposed a preventive suspension order and in its final decision, imposed a 3month suspension on the show Petitioner sought reconsideration as the suspension constituted prior restraint and that the utterance was an exercise of the freedom of religion The SC held that it has been established in our jurisdiction that unprotected speech or lowvalue expression refers to: o Libelous statements o Obscenity or pornography o False or misleading advertisements o Insulting or fighting words, i.e., those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering national security ! In this case, the statement can be treated as obscene with respect to the average child and not for the average adult because with a G rating, the concern was how the average child would view or understand the words uttered The SC also held that the State, as parens patriae, is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young o In this case, Soriano used vulgar language on primetime TV o Moreover, there is nothing in the statement that expresses any particular religious belief or a furtherance of an avowed mission As held in jurisprudence, the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil that the State has a duty to prevent The SC further held that there is no law in our jurisdiction, unlike the US, that sets a period when indecent material may be broadcasted o Our jurisdiction uses the system of classification of TV programs Dissent of Justice Abad: o The test of obscenity is whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find the speech, taken as a whole, as appealing to the prurient interests o A thing is prurient when it arouses lascivious thoughts or desires or tends to arouse sexual desire ! In this case, there was no such interest aroused -BARNES V. GLEN THEATER = Nude dancing (valid incidental limitation on the freedom of expression; nude dancing per se v. public nudity) The KITTY KAT LOUNGE and GLEN THEATER are 2 establishments that sought to exhibit totally-nude-dancing, and thus assailed an INDIANA statute that requires dancers to wear pasties and a G-string, at the very least Petitioners claimed that the statute violates the freedom of expression The US SC held that nude dancing is not without its 1st Amendment protections from official regulation, even if the protection may involve only the barest minimum

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But in this case, it was public nudity that was proscribed and not necessarily nude dancing The US SC applied the O Brien Test and ruled that the objective of the law is to protect the societal order and morality against public nudity o In other words, the statute is not specifically targeted against erotic dancing per se and the restriction is merely an incidental limit upon the said expressive activity o In this case, the requirement of wearing pasties and G-strings does not deprive the performers of whatever expressive or erotic messages they wish convey Dissent of Justice White: o The statute is targeted, not towards public nudity in general with an incidental effect upon expression, but against a particular form of expression, namely the communicative aspect of erotic dance o Where government prohibits conduct precisely because of its communicative attributes, the same should be unconstitutional o The statute does not punish nudity in stage plays, or ballets, or operas, but only those committed within said go-go bars o The States interest, allegedly, is to prevent offense to the public, but all of the customers of such go-go bars are consenting adults who are there precisely for the enjoyment of the said performances o

-F.C.C. V. PACIFICA FOUNDATION = Filthy words monologue aired on radio (indecent language during daytime; context) PACIFICA aired a 12-minute monologue by GEORGE CARLIN, where he uttered extremely vulgar language, depicting sexual and excretory activities, during daytime when children could have been listening A letter of complaint was sent to the COMMISSION and the latter warned that further acts would result to the non-renewal of PACIFICAs license PACIFICA contended that the broadcast was not indecent due to the absence of prurient appeal The US SC held that although the law does not confer upon the COMMISSION the power to censor the material prior to broadcast, it is not precluded from reviewing the same and imposing sanctions should there be a need to o The Commission also has power to regulate the broadcast of obscene, indecent, or profane language The US SC also held that obscenity is different from indecency o Prurient appeal is an essential element of obscene language ! But prurient appeal is a not a necessary component of indecent language o Indecency is nonconformance with accepted standards of society o In fact, the law provides, obscene, indecent, or profane with the disjunctive, which implies that each has a separate meaning The US SC further held that given the intrusive nature of broadcasting, which could a) reach into the privacy of the home and b) easily tap into the youth, the broadcaster may be deprived of his license, if doing so would serve public interest, convenience, and necessity o In this case, given the context, the monologue was just as harmful to children as an obscene material is -RENTON V. PLAYTIME THEATERS = Zoning of porn theaters (valid content-neutral regulation; adult theaters not absolutely banned) The RENTON CITY planned to enact a zoning ordinance for the purpose of regulating adultoriented establishments The COUNCIL issued a Moratorium on licensing and a issued a Regulation that no adult theater shall be situated within 1,000 feet from a school, residential dwelling, church, or park PLAYTIME THEATERS acquired property and intended to open adult movie houses within the prohibited area and, thus, challenged the said enactments as being violative the 1st Amendment The US SC held that regulations enacted for the purpose of restraining speech on the basis of its content presumptively violate the constitution o But regulations on time, place, and manner are acceptable, if: ! The regulation serves a substantial governmental interest ! The regulation does not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication In this case, the ordinance does not ban adult theaters altogether, but merely regulates the time, manner, and place of their operations o In other words, it was a content-neutral regulation as it was without reference to the content of the regulated speech o Moreover, the proximity of such adult theaters to wholesome areas has produced various ill effects and the city must be given reasonable opportunities to formulate solutions to such problems -BETHEL SCHOOL DISTRICT V. FRASER = Sexual innuendo in campaign speech (school board may determine inappropriate speech)

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Fraser, during a speech to support his candidate for the school elections, and before a crowd of some 600 14-years-olds, made use of lewd and sexual innuendo in his campaign speech As a result, he was suspended for 2 days and disqualified from being the graduation speaker Represented by his father as guardian ad litem, Fraser sued the school for violating his freedom of speech The US SC held that while it is true that students do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression in school, the constitutional rights of students in school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings o In this case, Fraser should have taken into account the sensibilities of his fellow students The US SC also held that the determination of what manner of speech s inappropriate in school properly rests with the school board o In other words, the right to free speech does not prevent the school from determining the extent of allowable conduct within school premises The US SC further held that school authorities, acting in loco parentis, have the right and duty to protect students from sexually explicit and indecent speeches Darvin: o It is also part of the academic freedom of the school to determine what disciplinary measures to impose and what policies to implement pursuant to its mission and vision o Unlike public forums that enjoy greater constitutional protection, expression in schools may be regulated according to the principles and policies of the institution.

-HAZELWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT V. KUHLMEIER = Deleting articles in school paper (school paper not public forum; part of curriculum) Principal Reynolds of HAZELWOOD SCHOOL deleted 2 pages from the proposed issue of the school paper, SPECTRUM: o One of which deals with teenage pregnancy o The other deals with the effects of divorce upon the students Reynolds alleged that the identities of the students were not adequately protected and the parents must be afforded the right to be heard The authors sued the school for violating their right to speech The US SC held that students cannot be punished for merely expressing their personal views on the school premises, unless school authorities have reason to believe that such expression will: o Substantially interfere with the work of the school o Impinge upon the rights of other students The US SC also held that a public school students right to free speech is not coextensive with an adults rights in other settings o In other words, the students rights must be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment The US SC further held that a school need not tolerate speech not consistent with its basic educational policy or mission, even though the State could not censor similar speech outside the school Last but not least, the US SC held that school facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have, by policy or by practice, opened the same for indiscriminate use by the general public o In this case, SPECTRUM was but a part of the Journalism class curriculum, giving the school discretion as to its content ! In other words, it was not a public forum o Thus, unlike speech in public forums that enjoys greater protection, expression of ideas in schools may be regulated according to the principles and policies of the institution -RENO V. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION = Internet regulation (unconstitutional for being vague; adults also have rights) The COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT (CDA) sought to protect minors from the harmful effects of patently offensive and indecent communications on the Internet by criminalizing the knowing: o Transmission of obscene or indecent messages to any person below 18 years old o Sending to any person under 18 of anything that, in context, depicts in terms patently offensive, as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs The US SC held that the Act is void for being vague and it differs from other laws in that it: o Failed to define what is indecent and patently offensive o Does not allow parental consent to use the restricted material o Does not limit the regulation to particular times or individuals o Omits the standard of lack of socially redeeming value o A content-based blanket restriction on free speech o In this case, the vague content-based regulation, coupled with its deterrent as a criminal statute, has a chilling effect on free speech

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Thus, the CDA lacked the precision that the 1st Amendment requires when a statute regulates the content of speech The US SC also held that the special factors recognized as justifying the regulation of broadcast media are not present in cyberspace o Internet forums are open to all comers, making the applicability of the CDA very difficult, especially given the growing complexity and diversity of the internet The US SC further held that although the government has an interest in protecting children from potentially harmful materials, the CDA pursues that interest by suppressing a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to send and receive o

-ASHCROFT V. FREE SPEECH COALITION = Child pornography (invalid for being overly broad; no actual victims of child porn) The CHILD PORNOGRAPHY PREVENTION ACT (CPPA) penalized any visual depiction of what appears to be or in any way depicts, minors engaged in explicit sexual conduct, including virtual computer-generated renderings Petitioners challenged the Act for being overbroad and vague The US SC held that pornography in general can be banned only if it is obscene under the standards laid down in Miller v. California, but pornography depicting actual children can be proscribed whether or not the images are obscene due to the States interest in protecting the children exploited by the production process o But in this case, the CPPA was substantially overbroad because it banned materials that are neither a) obscene under Miller nor b) produced by the exploitation of actual and real children o Under the CPPA, materials need not appeal to the prurient interest and it is not necessary that the image be patently offensive, as long as it depicts what is proscribed by the CPPA The US SC also held that a works artistic merit does not depend on the presence of a single explicit scene, as the redeeming value is judge by considering the work as a whole o In this case, many legitimate and artistic films and works would fall within the CPPA prohibition and would be penalized o The CPPA prohibits the visual depiction of teenagers engaged in sexual activity, which is a fact of modern society and has been a theme in art and literature throughout the ages. The US SC further held that the mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for banning it o In this case, the US SC held that virtual porn is not intrinsically related to the abuse of children o Even assuming that watching virtual porn will whet the appetites of pedophiles and encourage them to commit such acts, that reason alone is insufficient to justify the prohibition Last but not least, the overbreadth doctrine disallows the government from banning a certain unprotected speech if, as a result, certain protected speech will likewise be proscribed Darvin: o Regulation of free expression on the internet is a problematic issue considering the rapid development of cyberspace o There is a very easy tendency for regulations to go overboard considering that access is available to both minors and adults -UNITED STATES ET AL. V. AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL. = Regulating the surfing of porn in public libraries Due to the fact that free Internet services in the public libraries have been used for searching for porn, the US Congress enacted the CHILDRENS INTERNET PROTECTION ACT, requiring libraries to install software to filter or block obscene or pornographic websites Petitioners contended that the Act was facially unconstitutional and that the filtering system could block constitutionally protected speech The US SC held that Congress may impose certain conditions when it appropriates funds for public benefit The US SC also held that a public forum is created when the government makes an affirmative choice to open up an area for use as a public forum o But Internet access in public libraries is neither a traditional nor a designated public forum because libraries do not acquire Internet terminals in order to "create a public forum for Web publishers to express themselves o The Internet is merely a method for making info available in a library and is no more than a technological extension of the book shelves o In other words, the US SC viewed that Internet access in libraries should be for educational or research purposes Last but not least, the US SC recognized that there was a substantial government interest at stake that of protecting young internet users from inappropriate material Darvin: o The library computers are public property made available to the people and, thus, the government may impose reasonable regulations for their utilization

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-----ASSEMBLY AND PETITION-----NAVARRO V. VILLEGAS = Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda (valid exercise of discretion; no denial of right) Navarro applied for a permit to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda on 26 February 1970 from 4PM to 11PM Mayor Villegas granted the permit to hold the rally at the Sunken Gardens instead and at an earlier time Navarro filed a petition for mandamus to compel Villegas to release a permit for the desired rally and alleged that his right to assembly has been violated The SC held that the Mayor, as the licensing authority, possesses reasonable discretion to specify the streets or public places to be use for the assembly: o To secure convenient use thereof by others o To provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety o In other words, another place may be designated by the licensing authority should there be a clear and present danger of a substantive evil Concurring opinion of Justice Villamor: o The right to freedom of assembly is neither unlimited nor absolute ! In this case, the Mayor did not refuse to grant the permit applied for, but simply offered an alternative Dissenting opinion of Justice Castro and Fernando: o The offering of the alternative constitutes a prior restraint to a constitutional right o Also, the Ordinance empowering the Mayor lacks a narrow, objective, and definite standard, making it unconstitutional -PBM EMPLOYEES V. PBM = Strike against Pasig Police (unlawful termination of employment; denial of right to assembly) Petitioner is a labor union composed of employees of the PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS and it decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacanang to protest against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police The Union informed the respondent company of the intended demonstration But the company warned the union that the workers, especially those part of the first shift, without leave of absence who fail to report for work, shall be dismissed for violation of the NO LOCKOUT, NO STRIKE in the CBA The company then filed charges against petitioner for violation of the CBA The COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ruled in favor of the company and found the Union guilty for having bargained in bad faith The SC held that the rights of free expression, assembly, and petition are civil and political rights and, thru the said freedoms, the citizen can participate: o In the periodic establishment of the government o In the administration of public affairs o In the discipline of abusive public officers

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The SC also held that a valid infringement of human rights requires a stringent criterion, namely the existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil that the State has the right to prevent o There was no grave and immediate danger in the case at bar o In fact, the Company should have stepped in and rally to the defense of its employees, so that the latter can report to work free from harassment or vexation and perform their work more efficiently o The pretension of the Company that it would suffer loss by reason of the absence of its employees from 6AM to 2PM is a plea for the preservation merely of its property rights The SC further held that the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly, and of petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been sustained in jurisprudence o In this case, to regard the demonstration as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and, hence, a violation of the CBA and a cause for termination would unduly stretch the compass of the CBA and turn it into a potent means of inhibiting free speech o Thus, it was the company that was guilty of unfair labor practices for restraining its employees from exercising their basic rights

-JBL REYES V. MAYOR BAGATSING = Anti-Bases Coalition rally (unlawful denial and modification of permit; no clear and present danger) Retired Justice Reyes, in behalf of the members of the ANTI- BASES COALITION, sought a permit to rally from LUNETA PARK until the front gate of the US EMBASSY, which is less than two blocks apart The permit was denied by Manila Mayor Bagatsing, but the latter offered the RIZAL COLISEUM instead The Mayor claimed that there were intelligence reports, which indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless elements He also issued City Ordinance 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies within the 500-meter radius of the US embassy Bagatsing pointed out that it was his intention to provide protection to the US embassy from such lawless elements in pursuant to Art 22 of the VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS Reyes filed a suit for mandamus The SC held that free speech is identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully matters of public concern without censorship or punishment o Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern o Thus, the general rule is that a permit should recognize the right of the applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of their choice, but another place may be designated by the licensing authority, if it be shown that there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil ! In this case, there was no compelling justification to deny the exercise of peaceful assembly ! Fear of disorder or injury alone cannot justify a denial The SC also held that the freedom of speech is to ensure a true ferment of ideas, but one may not advocate disorder in the name of protest or preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent o However, utmost calm is not required The SC further held that there is freedom of access to public places, especially parks and streets, which have immemorially been held in trust for the use for purposes of assembly to communicate thoughts between citizens Finally, the SC held in applications to hold an assembly: o The applicant must inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where, and the time when the rally will take place o The application should be filed well ahead in time o The standard or indispensable condition to a refusal or modification is the test of clear and present danger o If the licensing authority is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger, the applicants must be heard on the matter o The decision of the licensing authority must be transmitted to the applicants at the earliest opportunity o The applicants may have recourse to the proper judicial authorities o But if it were a private place, only the consent of the one entitled to its legal possession is required -MALABANAN V. RAMENTO = Rally in school premises (yes, there was a violation, but the punishment was too severe) Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of the GREGORIO ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION

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They were granted a permit to hold a meeting to protest the merger of two units of the university On the scheduled date, the students continued the rally beyond the allowed time and held it in a different place from that indicated in the permit They expressed their opposition in a vehement language and, as a result, classes and office work were disturbed Petitioners were eventually found guilty of holding an illegal assembly and oral defamation, meriting a 1-year suspension as punishment Petitioners maintained that the University failed to accord respect to their constitutional rights The SC held that the invocation of the freedom of peaceable assembly implies that the right to free speech has been disregarded o Right to peaceably assembly and free speech are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression, which is identified with the liberty to discuss any matter of public interest publicly and truthfully without censorship or punishment and that is not to be limited, much less denied, except upon a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent The SC also held that while educational institutions have authority over the conduct of students, it cannot go so far as to violate constitutional safeguards o Except when conduct by the student, in class or out of it: ! Materially disrupts classwork ! Involves substantial disorder ! Invades the rights of others The SC further held that the rights to peaceably assemble and free speech are guaranteed for students and their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest cannot be subject to prior restraint or subsequent punishment, unless there is a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil o But even so, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made o If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from the school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request unreasonably or arbitrarily ! In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel ! But should there be a violation of the terms, the penalty incurred should be proportionate to the offense In this case, it was conceded that there was a violation of the permit, but the penalty of 1-year suspension was too harsh, so the SC lowered it to 1-week instead

-BAYAN V. ERMITA = BP 880 (public assembly act valid; calibrated preemptive response invalid) Petitioners assailed the PUBLIC ASSEMBLY ACT of 1985, which requires: o A permit to be issued by the Mayor, who must be informed of the date, time, and place of the rally ! The mayor may deny the issuance of the same if, to his judgment, there exists a clear and present danger o It also mandates the designation of freedom parks where protesters may organize peaceful actions without the need of a permit The CALIBRATED PREEMPTIVE RESPONSE was also implemented by the Executive Department to strictly enforce the provisions of BP 880, particularly the no permit-no rally policy o But it resulted to the violent dispersal of various protest actions and assemblies, which led to the assault upon its constitutionality To begin with, the SC held that petitioners standing cannot be seriously challenged because their rights as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and petition is directly affected by BP 880 The SC also held that jurisprudence has upheld the primacy of freedom of speech over comfort and convenience in the use of streets and parks o However, the right is not absolute and it may be regulated so that it shall not be injurious to a) the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights and b) the rights of the community or society The SC further held that it has been recognized that a statute requiring persons using the public streets for assemblies to procure a special license from local authorities is valid when: o The licensing authorities are strictly limited to a consideration of the time, place, and manner of the assembly ! With a view to conserve public convenience ! With a view to provide proper policing o The licensing authority is not vested with arbitrary discretion

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In this case, BP No. 880 is not an absolute ban on public assemblies, but is merely a contentneutral restriction that regulates the time, place, and manner of assemblies to avoid clear and present danger o Its reference to lawful cause is not content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be entitled to constitutional protection o There is no prior restraint because the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation o The clear and present danger stated in Section 6(a) is substantially the same as imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil in Section 6(c) and is consistent standard o BP 880 requires maximum tolerance, which is the highest degree of restraint that the peacekeeping authorities must observe during assemblies ! Dispersal should be the last resort and all peaceful means of conciliation between the police and the protesters must first be pursued ! Thus, the CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and it is illegal if it means something else because what is to be followed is that which is mandated by BP 880 itself Last but not least, the SC also required the designation of freedom parks from the various LGUs, as provided for in BP 880, otherwise all public parks within the said LGUs will be deemed freedom parks

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ART III SEC 5 -----NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION-----AGLIPAY V. RUIZ = Sale of Eucharistic stamps = (valid legislative purpose; incidental benefit to Church immaterial) RA 4052 authorized the DIRECTOR OF POSTS to issue postage stamps commemorating the Eucharistic Congress celebrated in Manila and organized by the Roman Catholic Church Congress appropriated money for it and the same expected to generate around P 1.6 million from the sale of such stamps Aglipay of the Philippine Independent Church sought to prohibit the issuance and sale of such stamps for violating the separation of Church and State and the Constitutional command that no public money should be appropriated to support any system of religion The SC held that the principle of separation of Church and State has been recognized starting from the Malolos Constitution until its embodiment in the 1935 Constitution o In this case, RA 4052 contemplates no religious purpose, but simply gives the DIRECTOR the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be advantageous to the Government o The stamps were not sold for the benefit of the Catholic Church, but merely to advertise the Philippines as the seat of the Eucharistic Congress o Thus, the resulting propaganda possibly in favor of the Catholic Church is merely incidental and should not frustrate the main purpose of the law, which is to generate profit and boost tourism -TARUC V. BISHOP = Excommunication (civil courts cannot intrude upon discretionary and official functions of religious institutions) Petitioners were lay members of the PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENT CHURCH in SURIGAO DEL NORTE They requested the transfer of Father Florano to another parish because Floranos wife belonged to a political party opposed to Taruc Bishop de la Cruz denied the request, but hostility worsened as Taruc tried to organized an open mass to be celebrated by Father Ambong, not Florano After being unable to dissuade Taruc, Bishop de la Cruz excommunicated petitioners from the PIC Petitioners filed a case and claimed that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial and, thus, violating their right to due process The SC held that in a form of government where the complete separation of civil and ecclesiastical authority is insisted upon, the civil courts must not unduly intrude in matters of an ecclesiastical nature o In this case, the excommunication of members of a religious organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, laws, and canons of the said organization o In other words, it is not for the courts to exercise control over Church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions The SC also held that in disputes involving religious institutions, one area that courts should not touch is doctrinal and disciplinary differences o The power of excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership is unquestionably an ecclesiastical matter that is outside the province of civil courts -GARCES V. ESTENZO = Wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer (valid acquisition; no public money spent; private property) In preparation for the town fiesta, the BARANGAY COUNCIL of ORMOC CITY enacted Resolutions, authorizing the purchase of a wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia, Ormoc The image was to be acquired through solicitation, sale of tickets, and donations and was to be placed in the custody of the hermana mayor It was temporarily placed at the altar of the church for the mass, but the parish priest, Osmea, refused to return the image to the barangay, claiming that it was property of the church The Council filed a replevin suit Osmea alleged that the Resolutions violate the non-establishment clause and the prohibition of public funds being appropriate in support of any religion The SC held that in this case, the Resolutions were not enacted for the purpose of favoring any religion, nor did it authorize the allocation of public funds for religious purposes o In fact, the image was purchased using private funds and not using tax money o Thus, the image is private property of the Council and the same has the right to determine who shall exercise custody over it -SCHOOL DISTRICT V. SCHEMPP = Bible before class starts (violation of the non-establishment clause; government should be neutral) Various States required the reading of certain verses from the Bible, as well as the recitation of The Lords Prayer to begin each school day

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Some students, represented by their parents, assailed the constitutionality of the said policies for being a violation of the non-establishment clause The US SC held that the government should be neutral when it comes to religion; it cannot favor any in particular o In other words, the State cannot forbid the exercise of religious functions and aid in the performance of the same o In this case, ceremoniously reading from the Bible and reciting The Lords Prayer are clearly exercises of religion and to require the same would violate the rights of the students But the US SC held that objective study of the Bible for academic purposes, such as for its historic or literary qualities, may be part of the curriculum as a secular activity o But in this case, the said activities clearly partook of a religious exercise not in connection with any academic purpose

-LEMON V. KURTZMAN = Subsidy for teachers (violation of non-establishment clause; direct financial aid; excessive entanglement) RHODE ISLAND statutes provided a salary subsidy of 15% of the annual wage of teachers in favor of non-public elementary and secondary schools, including parochial schools Likewise, PENNSYLVANIA statutes provided financial support for instructional materials in secular subjects and reimbursement for the salaries of school teachers Petitioners challenged the statutes as violative of the non-establishment and free exercises clauses The US SC held that the non-establishment clause was intended to afford protection from sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity The US SC also held that although a given law might not establish a state religion, it may, nevertheless, be one respecting that end in the sense of being a step that could lead to such establishment o Thus, US jurisprudence has developed 3 requisites for statutes to be consistent with the non-establishment clause: ! The statute must have a secular legislative purpose In this case, there is compliance as the statutes intended to enhance the quality of the secular education in all schools covered by it ! The principal effect of the statute must neither advance nor inhibit religion ! The statute must not foster excessive entanglement of the government with religion In this case, the parochial schools have a significant religious mission and they foster an atmosphere of religious instruction and vocation, not to mention that they are under church control and supervision Thus, it will be difficult for the subsidized teachers to be religiously neutral; the teachers cannot inculcate religion in their classes, but ensuring compliance with the same would cause excessive entanglement between the government and the church The US SC further held that in cases where States were permitted to provide church-related schools with secular, neutral, or non-ideological facilities, the same were supplied in common to all students and the services were provided for them and their parents o The facilities were not for the parochial schools per se o In this case, the Statutes provided financial aid directly to church-related schools and a government post-audit to ascertain if the proceeds are dedicated to secular purposes would entail excessive entanglement -TILTON V. RICHARDSON = Construction grants (facilities were religiously neutral, but possible religious use after grace period) The HIGHER EDUCATION FACILITIES ACT authorized federal grants and loans to colleges and universities for the construction of buildings and facilities, such as libraries, laboratories, theaters, and science buildings subject to the condition that they must be used for secular purposes only for the period of 20 years after construction And should this condition be violated, the State is entitled to recover the amount proportionate to its grant based on its present value Petitioners contended that the federal aid extends to church-related institutions, which is a violation of the non-establishment clause The US SC held that 4 questions must be considered to determine if a statute violates the non-establishment clause: o Does the Act reflect a secular legislative purpose? ! In this case, there is compliance as the Act intended to give ample opportunity for the fullest development of students who aspire for higher education o Is the primary effect of the Act to advance or inhibit religion?

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But in this case, the statutes 20-year restriction opens the door for religious use after the grace period and, hence, will likely violate the nonestablishment clause o Does the administration of the Act foster an excessive government entailment with religion? ! In this case, as opposed to that of Lemon vs. Kutzman, where teachers were directly subsidized, the facilities to be granted are, in themselves, religiously neutral and, hence, there is lesser tendency for entanglement, as inspection and surveillance would not be as pervasive and stringent ! Also, evidence disclosed that the colleges and universities are more inclined to providing the students with secular education and have made no attempts to indoctrinate students, unlike primary and secondary parochial schools that require participation with religious activities o Does the implementation of the Act inhibit the free exercise of religion? ! In this case, petitioners claimed that they are compelled to pay taxes and the part of the proceeds of which will finance the said grants, but there was no coercion directed at the practice or exercise of their religious beliefs The US SC found that, except for the 20-year limitation, the Act does not violate the religion clauses of the 1st Amendment and, thus, remanded the case to the District Court !

-ZOBREST, ET AL. V. CATALINA FOOTHILLS SCHOOL DISTRICT = Interpreter (general government program; aid neutrally distributed) The CATALINA FOOTHILLS SCHOOL DISTRICT refused to provide an interpreter for a deaf student, which was allowed under the INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT, because he attends a Roman Catholic school The CATALINA FOOTHILLS claimed that providing an interpreter would promote the students religious development and benefit the parochial school at the expense of the government and the non-establishment clause The US SC held that government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens and without reference to religion do not violate the non-establishment clause o In this case, the Constitution does not prevent respondent from furnishing a disabled child enrolled in a sectarian school with a sign language interpreter to facilitate his education because the service is part of a general government program that neutrally distributes benefits to any child qualifying as disabled under the IDEA, without regard to the sectarian or non-sectarian or public or non-public nature of the school the child attends o Neither does the IDEA create a financial incentive for parents to choose a sectarian school The US SC also held that the in cases where governmental aids were struck down, the challenged programs gave direct grants of government aid, relieving sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would have borne o In this case, the child is the primary beneficiary and whatever benefits that may accrue to the school is merely incidental -AGOSTINI, ET AL. V. FELTON ET AL. = Public school teachers for remedial classes (presence of public employees in sectarian schools not necessarily governmental indoctrination; valid aid based on neutral and secular criteria) NEW YORKs TITLE I PROGRAM sent public school teachers to parochial schools to provide remedial education to disadvantaged children It was declared unconstitutional in Aguilar vs. Felton and the petitioners prayed that the court re-examine the ruling The US SC held that placing government employees in parochial schools do not, as a matter of law, have the impermissible effect of advancing religion through indoctrination o In this regard, US jurisprudence has abandoned 2 presumptions: ! That public employees placed in parochial schools will inculcate religion or that their presence constitutes a symbolic union between the government and religion ! That all government aids that directly aid the educational function of religious schools are invalid The US SC also held that government aid is allowed if based on a neutral, secular criteria that neither favors nor disfavors religion and, more importantly, is made available to both religious and non-religious beneficiaries on a non-discriminatory basis o In this case, the service is available to all children who meet the eligibility requirement, no matter what their religious beliefs or where they go to school o Thus, there is no governmental indoctrination and the recipients are not defined by reference to their belies The US SC also held that to determine excessive entanglement, the following must be taken into consideration: o The character and purposes of the benefitted institutions o The nature of the aid that the State provides o The resulting relationship between the government and religion

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In this case, due to the abandonment of the presumption that public employees will inculcate religion by virtue of being in a sectarian environment, pervasive monitoring of their activities is no longer required, lessening the chances for entanglment

-MITCHELL, ET AL. V. HELMS, ET AL. = Materials and educational aids (valid neutral aid; principle of private choice) The EDUCATION CONSOLIDATION AND IMPROVEMENT ACT channels federal funds to schools lending educational, media, and library materials including software and computers to implement secular, neutral, and non-ideological programs Since 30% of the funds spent have benefited religiously-affiliated schools, the program was challenged for violating the non-establishment clause The US SC held that 3 primary criteria are considered to determine if governmental aid has the effect of advancing religion: o If the aid results in governmental indoctrination ! Whether or not any indoctrination that occurs could reasonably be attributed to governmental action ! In other words, whether or not the governmental aid program subsidizes religion o If the aid defines its recipients by reference to religion o If the aid creates an excessive entanglement The US SC further held that under the neutrality principle, aid that is offered to a broad range of groups or persons without regard to religion are valid o And one way to assure the said neutrality is through the principle of private choice, wherein the government is not considered to have provided any support of religion when aid to schools, even if direct, is a) neutrally available and b) before reaching or benefitting any religious school, first passes through the hands of numerous private citizens who are free to direct the aid elsewhere ! In this case, there is no basis to conclude that the ECIA advances religion because the aid is allocated on the basis of neutral criteria and is made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a non-discriminatory basis ! Under the ECIA, eligibility for aid is based on school enrollment and the private choices of parents as to which schools to send their children to ! Thus, just because some beneficiaries of governmental aid are religiouslyaffiliated does not automatically mean that the said program respects an establishment of religion -ZELMAN, SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF OHIO, ET AL. V. SIMMONS-HARRIS, ET AL. = Tuition aid for pilots (valid neutral aid; incidental benefit to parochial schools immaterial) OHIO CITYs PILOT PROJECT SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM provided tuition aid for students to attend participating public or private schools of their own choosing and even tutorial aid for those chose to remain enrolled in public schools Both religious and secular schools were participants in the program, but 82% of the participating private schools were religiously-affiliated OHIO taxpayers sought to enjoin the program on the ground that it violated the nonestablishment clause The US SC held that a governmental aid program is not readily subject to challenge under the non-establishment clause, if it is neutral with respect to religion and it provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens, who, in turn, direct the said aid to religious schools wholly due to their own genuine and independent private choice o In other words, there is no violation if governmental aid reaches religious institutions only by way of the deliberate choices of the individual recipients of the aid ! In this case, the law intended to provide educational assistance to poor students and it permitted participation of all district schools, whether religious or non-religious ! Thus, the incidental advancement of the religious missions of the parochial schools cannot be attributed to the government, as its sole aim was to distribute benefits among students The US SC also held that the constitutionality of a neutral educational aid program simply does not turn on whether and why, in a particular area, at a particular time, most private schools are religious or most recipients choose to use the aid at a religious school o In this case, the fact that a substantial majority of the participating private schools are religiously-affiliated is of no moment -COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY V. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION = Christmas and Chanukah (crche unconstitutional; menorah constitutional) The COUNTY COURTHOUSE displayed a nativity scene crche donated by HOLY NAME SOCIETY, which bore the words Glory to God in Latin, while the CITY-COUNTY BUILDING

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displayed an 18-foot Chanukah menorah beside a Christmas tree and a sign bearing the Mayors name The AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION sought to enjoin the display of the said symbols and invoked the non-establishment clause The US SC held that the non-establishment clause prohibits government: o From appearing to take positions regarding religious belief o From making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a persons standing in the political community In other words, the government must remain secular in order to avoid discriminating against citizens on the basis of their religious faith o In this case, the government may recognize the holidays secular aspects, but it cannot suggest that the people praise the Christian God for the birth of Jesus, which the crche endorses ! When viewed in its overall context, the crche display had the primary effect of advancing religion, as it sat on the Grand Staircase, which is the main and most beautiful part of the building that is the seat of county government o As regards the menorah, its display was held as constitutionally legitimate given its particular physical setting, as its inclusion broadened the display to refer not only to Christmas, but also to Chanukah, which shows that the city has demonstrated no preference for the religious celebration of the holiday season Consolidated Dissents: o The symbols merely recognize that both Christmas and Chanukah are part of the winter season and have attained a secular status in the society and, at best, merely recognizes cultural diversity o The Christmas Tree is widely viewed today as a secular symbol of the Christmas Holiday and, as such, cannot be interpreted as an endorsement of Christianity or Judaism o If opening prayers are allowed before convening Congress, there should be no obstacle to displaying the said symbols

-CAPITOL SQUARE REVIEW AND ADVISORY BOARD, ET AL. V. PINETTE, ET AL. = Ku Klux Klan (public forum; private religious speech is protected) The KKK applied for a permit to display an unattended cross in CAPITOL SQUARE, a forum for public questions and discussions and the use of which was regulated by the BOARD pursuant to OHIO STATE law The KKK were denied based on the theory that, given the proximity of the square to the seat of government, the symbol could be interpreted to mean that the government was endorsing a particular religion The US SC held that forbidden government speech endorsing religion is different from protected private speech that does the same o Private religious speech is fully protected under the free speech clause as secular private expression ! In this case, the display sought by the KKK belonged to the category of private secular expression The US SC also held that when purely private sponsorship of religious expression occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced, and open to all, the same does not count as endorsement The US SC defined the reasonable observer as the personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the collective social judgment, whose knowledge is not limited to information gleaned from viewing the challenged display, but also extends to the general history of the place in which the display appears o In this case, the reasonable observer may be held not only to know that the cross is a religious symbol, but also that the SQUARE is a public place where citizens may engage in expressive conduct -ISLAMIC DAWAH COUNCIL V. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY = Halal food (invalid EO; no clear and present danger) EO 46 created the PHILIPPINE HALAL CERTIFICATION SCHEME, which designated the OFFICE OF MUSLIM AFFAIRS to oversee its implementation, granting it exclusive authority to issue halal certificates to guarantee that food products do not contain pork or any of its derivatives Thus, all other halal certificates not issued by the OMA were deemed illegal The ISLAMIC DAWAH COUNCIL is a NGO engaged in the issuance of such certifications, among other social functions, and manufacturers stopped seeking their certifications, resulting to loss of income ISLAMIC contended that EO 46 violated the separation of Church and State The SC held that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom o Thus, if the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is unacceptable

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! !

In this case, classifying food products as halal is a religious function drawn from the Koran and other Islamic beliefs Thus, in granting the OMA exclusive authority to perform the said act, the government encroached upon religious freedom in the absence a compelling justification

-SORIANO V. LAGUARDIA = Ang Dating Daan (plain and simple insults are not religious speech) Soriano, as the host of ANG DATING DAAN, aired on UNTV 37, made derogatory and obscene remarks against the Iglesia ni Cristo Ang DATING DAAN has a G rating, which means that the show does not contain anything unsuitable for children and minors and may be viewed without adult guidance or supervision Members of the INC filed complaints against Soriano with the MTRCB The MTRCB imposed a preventive suspension order and in its final decision, imposed a 3month suspension on the show Petitioner sought reconsideration as the utterance was an exercise of the freedom of religion The SC held that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil that the State has a duty to prevent The SC also held that plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech o In this case, there is nothing in the statement that expresses any particular religious belief or a furtherance of an avowed mission o The fact that Soriano uttered the statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse, as they simply illustrate that he descended to the level of name-calling and foul-language -----FREE EXERCISE-----CANTWELL V. CONNECTICUT = Jehovahs Witnesses (deprivation of free exercise and prior restraint; no clear and present danger) Cantwell, a Jehovahs Witness minister, walked from house-to-house in CONNECTICUT, solicited, and carried pamphlets and a phonograph record, which he played upon the permission of their interviewees The record was entitled Enemies and the content attacked other religions, especially Catholicism, but, since around 90% of the residents of the neighborhood were Catholics, Cantwell annoyed many people along the way Cantwell was charged for inciting breach of the peace under the City Statute, which prohibited solicitation for religious or charitable purposes without the approval of the PUBLIC WELFARE COUNCIL o The purpose of the statute was to protect the citizens against solicitation from bogus religious or charitable purposes Cantwell claimed that the Act violated his freedom to exercise religion and was not a mere regulation, but an outright prohibition The US SC held that although the State may not, by statute, wholly deny the right to preach or disseminate religious views, it may, by non-discriminatory legislation, regulate the times, the places, and the manner of soliciting upon its streets o But in this case, the statute sweeps though a vast array of conduct and gives the COUNCIL too much discretion in its application to the point that it suppresses the free exercise of religion and even constitutes prior restraint o Also, the function of the COUNCIL in approving or denying authorization was discretionary and not merely ministerial ! Thus, the right to solicit depends upon their decision The US SC also held that the State must ensure both the free exercise of religion and the freedom to communicate information and opinion The US SC further held that when there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public safety, peace, or order, the power of the State to prevent or to punish appears o In other words, the State has a right to prevent and punish activities that would incite violence and breach the peace in order to protect others of their equal right to exercise their liberties ! In this case, there was no threat to the public peace, as there was only an attempt to persuade willing listeners to embrace, or at least, contribute to the religious cause -UNITED STATES V. BALLARD = I am St. Germain (the law knows no heresy and cannot condemn religious belief) Ballard organized the I Am Movement and claimed to be some sort of divinity or the medium through which St. Germain would transmit his message to mankind Ballard claimed to have cured various persons with ailments and performed such other supernatural deeds

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He was convicted for conspiring to use the mails to commit fraud by making 18 different misrepresentations of the I Am movement and the Trial Court ruled that the said claims were false and were concocted mainly to defraud other persons The US SC held that what is true or not is not the concern of the courts and the only question that must be resolved is whether or not the religious belief is made honestly and in good faith o In this case, the religious beliefs of the defendants cannot be raised as an issue in court o Thus, it is not for the jury, as a trier of facts, to test the veracity of Ballards claims, but merely to determine if he acted in good faith The US SC held that freedom of religion has a dual aspect: o It forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship o It safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion In other words, religious freedom embraces 2 concepts: o Freedom to believe, which is absolute o Freedom to act, which may be regulated The US SC also held that the law knows no heresy and is not committed to the support of any dogma or sect o Thus, no one may be put to the proof of his religious beliefs o If one could be sent to jail because a jury found certain religious teachings false, then religious freedom would be illusory ! In this case, the District Court properly withheld from the jury all questions about the truth of defendants religious belief

-AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY V. CITY OF MANILA = Bibles for sale (invalid prohibition on non-profit religious sale; prior restraint) The ACTING TREASURER OF MANILA informed the AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY, which was selling bibles and pamphlets for 25 and 5 respectively, that it was engaging in the business of general merchandise without the proper municipal license and mayors permit and assessed certain taxes against the Society Plaintiff contended that the Ordinances are illegal because they provide for religious censorship and restrain the free exercise clause The SC held that the guarantee of the free exercise clause carries with it the right to disseminate religious information o Any restraint of the said rights can only be justified on the clear and present danger test o In this case, the sale of bibles and pamphlets was not for business or commercial purposes, even if the prices were a bit higher, but rather for the purpose of dissemination and, thus, the same cannot be subject to the procurement of a license or permit The US also held that the power to impose a license tax on the exercise of freedoms is as potent as the power of censorship -ANG LADLAD V. COMELEC = LGBT (invalid denial based on religious grounds;) LADLAD filed a petition for party-list registration with COMELEC and argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector, particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity and that it has complied with the 8point guideline laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC COMELEC dismissed the petition on moral grounds that petitioner tolerates immorality, offends religious beliefs, and advocates sexual immorality, not to mention that it would expose the youth to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith LADLAD argued that the denial of accreditation via religious dogma violates the guarantee against the non-establishment of religion Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society, the Philippine Constitutions religion clauses prescribe a benevolent neutrality and not a strict one o Benevolent neutrality recognizes that the government must pursue its secular goals and interests, but at the same time, strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits o Law-based morality is secular, but benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of religion-based morality, provided that doing so would not offend compelling state interests The SC held that the non-establishment clause calls for government neutrality in all religious matters and governmental reliance on religious justification is prohibited o In this case, it was a grave violation for COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of LADLAD The SC also held that the government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects o In other words, the government must proscribe a certain conduct because it is detrimental to the conditions upon which the existence and progress of human

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society depend and not because the same is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or another The SC further held that the Philippines has not seen it fit to criminalize homosexual conduct o In this case, the generally accepted public morals, on which COMELEC argued, have not reached the realm of law o Also, COMELEC has not identified any specific overt immoral act by LADLAD nor has it explained what societal ills are sought to be prevented or why special protection is required for the youth o Thus, moral disapproval alone is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system

-EBRALINAG V. SUPERINTENDENT = Jehovahs Witnesses and the flag (invalid expulsion from school; no clear and present danger) Members of the Jehovahs Witness were expelled from school for refusing to participate in the flag ceremony, where they were supposed to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge The students claimed that the same contradicts with their religious beliefs They were expelled on the basis of RA 1265 and Order 8 of the DECS, which made the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions Petitioners contended that there is no warrant for their expulsion for they did not engage in any disruptive behavior The SC held that the only justification for a restraint or limitation upon religious freedom is the presence of a clear and present danger o In this case, the students did not manifest any disrespect and merely stood silently and in attention during the ceremony The SC also recognized US jurisprudence, which holds that coerced unity and loyalty to the country is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty o In this case, forcing the children to salute the flag is hardly conducive to fostering love of country o Also, expelling them on the basis of such conduct will likewise violate their right to receive education The SC further held that when general laws conflict with the scruples of conscience, certain exceptions may be granted, unless a compelling state interest intervenes o In this case, an exception may be accorded to the Jehovahs Witnesses out of respect for their religious beliefs however bizarre they may be -EMPLOYMENT DIVISION V. SMITH = Peyote drug (religious followers must still follow general laws; balancing test not applicable to criminal prohibitions) Smith and Black were both fired by the PRIVATE DRUG REHABILITATION ORGANIZATION for ingesting a drug, peyote, for sacramental purposes during a ceremony at the Native American Church They were likewise denied unemployment compensation Petitioners maintained that their expulsion and denial to compensation violated their right to religious freedom The US SC held that the free exercise clause does not relieve one of the obligation to comply with a law that incidentally forbids (or requires) the performance of an act that his religious belief requires (or forbids): o If the law is not specifically directed to religious practice o If the law is constitutional as applied to those who engage in the specified act for non-religious purposes o In this case, the law is not specifically directed to religious practice and is applied equally to all, regardless of whether they do the act for religious or non-religious purposes o Thus, the law does not offend the free exercise clause The US SC further held that the balancing test, whereby government actions that substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by a compelling governmental interest, is inapplicable to an across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct o That is because to hold otherwise would create an extraordinary right to ignore general laws in the name of religion for as long as no compelling state interest intervenes -LONG AND ALMERIA V. BASA, ET AL. = Expulsion from the church (decisions of church tribunals are conclusive upon the civil courts) Petitioners were expelled from their Church and, hence, they sought reprieve in the civil courts Under the by-laws of the Church, proper expulsion merely required that the BOARD OF DIRECTORS be informed that a member has failed to observe any of the regulations and bylaws or has conducted himself in any manner dishonorable to the Church and, after which, the BOARD shall issue the corresponding Resolution for his expulsion, even without prior notice

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The SC held that the nature of religious corporations are different from ordinary corporations organized for profit o In this case, although the provision on expulsion may sound unusual to petitioners, they have expressly adhered to the same when they became members of the Church and, thus, are subject to its by-laws o Generally, there is no room for dissent in a religious corporation The SC also held that in matters purely ecclesiastical, the decision of the proper church tribunals are conclusive upon the civil courts Darvin: o Admission to or excommunication from churches is a matter left entirely upon their discretion and the State has no business in it

-AUSTRIA V. NLRC = Pastor terminated from service (employer-employee relationship not a purely ecclesiastical affair) Austria was a pastor for the SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH He was terminated after 28 years of service for misappropriation of funds, breach of trust, gross misconduct, and habitual neglect of duties He sued the ADVENTIST CHURCH before the NLRC for reinstatement and back wages plus damages The Church invoked the separation of church and state and claimed that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case of Austria The SC held that under the separation of Church and State, the State is prohibited from interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs and the Church is barred from meddling in purely secular affairs The SC defined an ecclesiastical affair as one that concerns: o Doctrine, creed, form, or worship of the Church o The adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of membership o The power of excluding those deemed unworthy of membership o Thus, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the Church and its members and relates to matters of faith, religious doctrine, worship, and governance of congregations: ! Excommunication ! Ordinations of religious ministers ! Administration of sacraments ! In this case, the principle of separation of Church and State does not apply because the matter is not purely ecclesiastical, but one that concerns an employer-employee relationship, which is governed by labor laws The matter of terminating an employee, which is an exercise of management prerogatives, is different from expelling a member of a religious institution, which involves religious prerogatives The SC further held that the provisions of the Labor Code apply to all establishments, whether religious or not -CENTENO V. VILLALON-PORNILLOS = Charitable vs. Religious (religious purposes not contemplated under the solicitation permit law) The SAMAHANG KANTANDAAN NG NAYON NG TIKAY is an organization composed of elderly men who engaged in solicitation for the renovation of their barrio chapel without the necessary permit from the DSWD They tried to solicit from Judge Angeles who sued them for violating the SOLICITATION PERMIT LAW But the said law mentioned only solicitations for charitable or public welfare purposes without making any reference to religious purposes The SC held that under the Constitution, the words charitable and religious are treated separately and independently o While there is no religious purpose that is not also charitable, there may be a charitable purpose that is not religious o In this case, the old men cannot be punished under the said law because the law does not include solicitation for religious purposes But the SC also held that even the exercise of religion may be regulated in order that the State may protect its citizens from injury o A state may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitations by requiring a stranger to first establish his identity and authority to act for the cause that he purports to represent o A state may regulate the time and manner of solicitations The SC further held that a law advancing a legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily invalid as one interfering with the free exercise of religion merely because it also has an incidental and detrimental effect on the same o Thus, the general regulation of solicitation that does not involve any religious test nor unreasonably obstructs the collection of funds is valid, even if the same is for a religious purpose

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But in this case, religious purpose are not covered by PD 1564

-WISCONSIN V. YODER = Amish (invalid compulsion; only interests of the highest order may override fundamental liberties) Members of the AMISH CHURCH were charged under a WISCONSIN LAW on compulsory school attendance for refusing to send their children to school after graduating from the 8th grade Petitioners claimed that doing so would violate their beliefs and endanger their salvation, as the Amish believe in seclusion from the modern life and recourse to the simple country life as; and they have sufficiently established their sincerity towards such beliefs over the years Petitioners contended that the COMPULSORY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE LAW violates their right to free religious exercise The US SC held that the States interest in universal education is not free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights o In this case, the States claim of parens patriae cannot prevail over the free exercise claim of the Amish Community in the absence of a compelling state interest o Also, the Amish have established that there is no apparent danger to the welfare of their children, even if they are deprived of the 2 years of additional education contemplated under the law Darvin: o The States duty to raise and educate the youth is only subsidiary to the primary right and duty of their parents to do the same -PAMIL V. TELERON = Priest as municipal mayor (law amounting to religious test, but not enough votes to render it unconstitutional) Father Gonzaga was elected to the position of municipal mayor of ALBUQUERQUE, BOHOL A suit for quo warranto was filed against him for violating the separation of church and the state The REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE expressly disallowed ecclesiastics, soldiers, and contractors engaged with the government, among others, from holding public office Majority Opinion: o The ban imposed by the Code is incompatible with the Constitution as the same amounts to a religious test for the exercise of a political right ! In this case, Gonzaga is disqualified from public office by virtue merely of his religious profession o But the required majority to nullify the assailed provision was not attained and Gonzaga was forced to vacate his office Dissenting Opinion of Justice Teehankee: o It is conceded that the religious test clause bars the State from disqualifying a nonbeliever from voting or being voted for because the same would be tantamount to a religious test and a compulsion to profess a belief in a religion o By the same token, the same clause is equally applicable to those who believe and have taken up a religious profession o To disqualify them from being voted for and elected to public office is to exact a religious test for the exercise of their political rights as it amounts to compelling them to shed off their religious ministry in order to be able to run for office ! The ecclesiastic should be free to seek public office and place his personal merits and qualifications for public service before the electorate Darvin: o The 1973 Constitution requires a majority of all members of the SC to declare a law unconstitutional; under the 1987 Constitution, only a majority vote of all members who took part in the deliberations and voted thereon is sufficient -MCDANIEL V. PATY = Minister in constitutional commission (invalid religious test for the exercise of political right) Paty, a candidate for the TENNESSEE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, sought the disqualification of McDaniel, a Baptist minister and a rival candidate, for the same position Paty invoked a TENNESSEE Statute, which established the qualifications of constitutional convention delegates to be the same as those for members of the HoR and, thus, disqualifying McDaniel The TENNESSEE SC HELD that clergy disqualification imposed no burden on religious belief The US SC held that although the Tennessee disqualification does not target religious belief, but rather the status of the clergy, it nevertheless violates the free exercise clause o In this case, the statute had the effect of conditioning McDaniels exercise of his right to free exercise of his religion upon the surrender of his right to seek public office o Thus, the statute establishes a religious classification, which inhibits religion in violation of the free exercise clause The US SC also held that freedom of belief includes freedom to profess or practice that belief, even as a means of livelihood

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-GOLDMAN V. WEINBURGER = Yarmulke (valid evenhanded military regulation) Goldman was an ORTHODOX JEW and member of the US AIR FORCE He was prohibited from wearing his YARMULKE indoors in accordance with AIR FORCE REGULATIONS However, according to Jewish beliefs, the yarmulke serves to cover the head before an omnipresent God Goldman claimed that the regulation infringed upon his freedom to exercise his religious beliefs The US SC held that the free exercise clause does not require the military to accommodate religious practices at the expense of its policy to evenhandedly regulate dress in the interest of military uniformity o In this case, the US Air Force does not have to accede to Goldmans request of wearing his yarmulke Dissenting Opinion of Justice Brennan: o Goldman should be allowed to wear his yarmulke because to uphold the regulation would be to suggest that the desirability of certain dress regulations would prevail over a basic right o The rules of the Air Force itself allow expressions of individuality, excluding only those that are extreme, unusual, or faddish ! It cannot be contended that a serviceman in a yarmulke present an extreme image that will destroy public confidence in his ability to perform ! Moreover, the regulation tolerates manifestations of religious diversity, such as wearing of crosses or rings ! Thus, there is no reasonable and striking basis for prohibiting the wearing of yarmulkes -LEE, ET AL. V. WEISMAN = Prayer by clergy during graduation (violation of the non-establishment clause; act attributable to the State) Lee, a middle school principal, invited a JEWISH RABBI to offer a prayer during the graduation ceremony of his public middle school Weisman, a father of one of the students, sought to enjoin the practice, which the District Court granted in his favor The US SC held that the principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the non-establishment clause The non-establishment clause guarantees that government may not a) coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise or b) act in a way that establishes a state religion or tends to do so o In this case, including clergy who offer prayers as part of an official public school graduation ceremony is a violation, as prayer exercises in elementary schools carry a particular risk of indirect coercion o Also, the actions of the public school principal are attributable to the State The US SC also held that there is a difference between the public school system and the sessions of Congress, where jurisprudence has condoned prayer exercises o In Congress, adults are free to enter and leave, but in this case, a graduation ceremony, which is a personal milestone, highly calls for attendance Dissenting Opinion of Justice Scalia: o Prayer has been a prominent and accepted part of ceremonies and proclamations ! It has been a long established practice in public events o Also, there is no reasonable and discernible trace of coercion in the absence of any threat of penalty -CHURCH OF THE LUKUMI BABALU AYE, INC., ET AL. V. CITY OF HIALEAH = Animal sacrifices (invalid nonneutral and non-general law) The LUKUMI CHURCH practices the Santeria religion, which employs animal sacrifices After leasing some property in the HIALEAH CITY and signifying their intent to establish a chapel therein, the City suddenly enacted ordinances prohibiting animal sacrifices or the unnecessary and cruel slaughter of animals during rituals or for purposes other than for food Petitioners filed suit, alleging a violation of their free religious exercise The US SC held that under the free exercise clause, a law that burdens religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest, if it is a) neutral and b) of general applicability o But when the law is not neutral or not of general application, the same must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny: ! It must be justified by a compelling governmental interest ! It must be narrowly tailored to advance the said interest o In this case, the Ordinances, though seemingly neutral, were actually targeted towards repressing the Santeria practices and worship and, hence, they violate the free exercise clause o Also, animal killings for non-religious purposes are allowed

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-LAMBS CHAPEL, ET AL. V. CENTER MORICHES UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL. = Film viewing after school (violation of free exercise clause; non-neutral regulation) NEW YORK law authorizes SCHOOL BOARDS to regulate the use of school facilities after school hours and for purposes other than religious purposes LAMBS CHAPEL EVANGELICAL CHURCH made requests for the use of the said premises for the purpose of showing a film about family values and child rearing, but the Board denied them access based on the statute The US SC held that access to a non-public forum can be based on subject matter or speaker identity, provided that the distinctions drawn are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral o In this case, that the rule treats all religions alike for purposes of the prohibition does not make it neutral because it discriminates on the basis of religious viewpoint o In other words, access to non-public forums, when permitted, can be based on subject matter, but the distinction must be religiously neutral Moreover, rule would pass the 3-part test in Lemon v. Kurtzman o The film was to be shown after school hours and would not have been sponsored by the school o The film would have been open to the public, hence, there is nothing there to indicate that the State endorses or benefits any religion -IGLESIA NI KRISTO V. COURT OF APPEALS = X-rating for Ang Iglesia ni Cristo (MTRCB empowered to regulate, but no basis for rating) Certain episodes of ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO, the bible TV program of the IGLESIA, was given a X-rating by the MTRCB for attacking the dogmas of other religions and, thus, were prevented from being aired IGLESIA alleged GADALEJ on the part of MTRCB The Trial Court ruled in favor of IGLESIA, but the Court of Appeals reversed and ruled that MTRCB has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program and that the Board validly denied the episodes that attacked other religions The SC held that PD 1986 gave the MTRCB: o The power to screen, review, and examine all TV programs o The power to approve, delete, and/or prohibit TV programs o To determine TV programs that are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law, and/or good customs, injurious to the Republic of the Philippines and its people The SC also held that the right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect: o Freedom to believe ! One may not be required to prove his beliefs and he may not be punished for his inability to do so o Freedom to act ! Religious freedom can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of others Thus, the Constitution gave religious liberty, but not civil immunity, or freedom from conformity to religious dogma, but not freedom from conformity to law o In this case, IGLESIAs contention that its bible TV program is beyond the MTRCBs review power is untenable, as the same externalizes its internal belief, which may be regulated by the State, especially as TV is a very pervasive medium But the SC further held that it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion o The non-establishment clause prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion, as it must be neutral o In this case, MTRCB erred when it squelched the speech of IGLESIA simply because it attacked other religions o Although the speech may be regarded as one that provokes a hostile audience reaction, it did not pass the test of clear and present danger o Also, the MTRCB had no basis for censorship as attack of other religions is not one of the standards set by the law Darvin: o Mudslinging is common to the free market of religious dogmas ! Said expressions, no matter how odious, cannot be curtailed, unless they begin to pose a clear and present danger -ESTRADA V. ESCRITOR = Clerk of Court concubine (benevolent neutrality; burden on state; least restrictive means) Escritor was the Clerk of Court for the Las Pias RTC, who was charged administratively for immoral conduct for co-habiting with Quilapio without the benefit of marriage over the last 20 years At the time they started co-habiting, Escritor was still married, but at the time she entered the judiciary, she was already a widow Escritor and Quilapio were members of the Jehovahs Witness They secured a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness, signifying their churchs approval of their union in accordance with their religious beliefs

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The SC held that jurisprudence has held that not every moral wrong is foreseen and punished by law, criminal or otherwise and that is why the New Civil Code has provided for a remedy with Articles 19 and 21 The SC also held that using the compelling state interest test from a benevolent neutrality stance: o Whether or not the right to religious freedom has been burdened ! In this case, she has undoubtedly been burdened because she has to give up either her religious beliefs or her employment o Whether or not respondent is sincere in his religious belief ! In this case, she has procured the certificate 10 years after the union began, which is years before she entered the judiciary The SC further held that under compelling state interest test: o The State undertakes the burden of presenting evidence of its compelling interest to override respondents religious belief o The State has to show that the means it has adopted in pursuing the said interest is the least restrictive to respondents freedom ! The case was remanded to the Office of the Court Administrator to determine the case based on the above considerations Consolidated Dissents: o Escritors conduct constitutes the felony of concubinage, which is clearly within the provisions of the Revised Penal Code o Religious beliefs, no matter how sincere, cannot exempt one from liability for criminal acts under the RPC

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ART III SEC 6 -----LIBERTIES OF ABODE AND TRAVEL-----Marcos v. Manglapus = Marcos (right to travel different from right to return to ones own country; residual powers of the President) In his deathbed, the deposed President Marcos signified his intention to return from exile and die in his native country But at that time, the local situation was rather volatile, given the repeated coup attempts, the secessionist movement in Mindanao, communist insurgency, accumulated foreign debt, and the devastated economy Thus, President Aquino refused to allow Marcos to re-enter the country Marcos invoked the constitutional guarantee of liberty of abode and freedom to travel, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, which both provide for the right against being arbitrarily deprived of right to enter his own country. On the other hand, Aquino invoked her residual powers as well as her duty to maintain peace and order and the protection of the people. The SC held that under International Law, the right to return to ones own country is separate and distinct from the right of liberty of abode and the right to travel and, therefore, it would be inappropriate to construe limitations of the said rights in the same context o Moreover, the Bill of Rights guarantees only the liberty of abode and the right to travel and makes no mention of the right to return to ones own country The SC also held constitutional guarantees are not inflexible and may be subject to limitation should the paramount national interest so require The SC further held that the President possesses residual powers inherent in her duty to safeguard protect the general welfare of the people o In other words, as protector of the peace, the President may exercise powers short of calling out the AFP, suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or declaring martial law in order to maintain public order and safety o The extent of the Presidents powers is not limited to those expressly conferred by the Constitution. ! In this case, the President balanced the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of Marcos individual rights Dissenting Opinion of Justice Gutierrez: o Interpreting the Constitution for only one person smacks of unequal protection, as this case treated Marcos as sui generis o The liberty of abode and of changing the same cannot be impaired except upon lawful order of the Court ! This provision speaks of the Judiciary and not the Executive o The right to travel cannot be impaired except in the interest of the national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law ! This speaks of the Legislature and there has been no law passed for this particular purpose. ! The right to travel obviously includes the right to travel out of or back into the Philippines o Moreover, the deposed President is on life-support. There may be local disturbances present, but not to such an extent as to compel the SC to ignore a plea under the Bill of Rights o Last but not least, the Legislature, although recognizing the Presidents residual powers, proposed, through a Resolution, for the President to allow entry in the spirit of reconciliation and goodwill Darvin: o Restrictions on the liberty of abode or of changing the same require court order o The right to travel may be impaired or regulated even by administrative agencies ! As long as the regulation is provided for or allowed by the law ! And is in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health

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ART III SEC 7 -----RIGHT TO INFORMATION-----Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission = Civil service eligibilities (invalid denial to access; right to information is a public right) Legaspi requested information from the CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION regarding the civil service eligibilities of certain government sanitarians The CSC refused to divulge the information, prompting Legaspi to file a case for mandamus and claiming his right to information The SC held that the constitutional guarantee of the right of information is self-executing and Congress may provide only reasonable conditions and limitations that must be consistent with the State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest The SC also held that the right of information on matters of public concern is a public right to which every citizen is entitled to as the same is part of the general public that possess the said right o In this case, the petition for mandamus is proper The SC further held that government agencies are without discretion in refusing to disclose information of public concern, as they may only impose reasonable regulations on the manner by which the right may be exercised o Only Congress, by law, has the power to impose an outright refusal to disclose particular information Last but not least, the SC held that access to particular public records must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought: o It must be of public concern or one that involves public interest o It must not be exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee ! In this case, public office being a public trust, it is the citizens concern to ensure that public positions requiring civil service eligibilities are occupied only by those who are eligible -Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr. = GSIS loans (invalid denial to access; requisite to enforce right to information; no right to request list) Valmonte was a member of the press who requested from the GSIS a list of Batasang Pambansa members who were able to avail of loans through the intervention of Imelda Marcos, as well as for certified true copies of documents evidencing the said loans The GSIS refused to prepare the list and denied access thereto, invoking the right to privacy and privileged confidentiality between customers The SC held that the right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional polices of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service, not to mention that it is an essential premise of any meaningful right to speech and expression o The right to information is meant to enhance the role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making, as well as in checking abuse in government The SC also held that for the right to information may be enforced: o The information sought is of public interest or concern ! In this case, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the borrowers make the info sought a matter of public interest o The information is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee ! In this case, there is no law granting the GSIS confidentiality with regard to its documents The SC recognized the intent of the framers of the Constitution that government transactions cover both a) the steps leading to a contract and b) an already consummated contract, subject to safeguards on the national interest and that the policy of full public disclosure applies to: o Individual public officers o Agencies o Departments o Ministries o Instrumentalities o GOCCs However, the right to information does not confer upon the citizens the right to compel agencies to prepare lists, summaries, and the like o In other words, only access to official records is permitted because otherwise, citizens can unduly burden the agencies with the preparation of their requested lists or summaries -Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato = MTRCB voting slips (invalid denial to access; acts done in official capacity are not private) Sarmiento is an employee of the MTRCB, who requested for permission to examine the voting slips made by the BOARD in rating the films submitted for review

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Chairman Morato denied her request claiming that the manner of voting is kept confidential, as they are conscience votes, which are personal Sarmiento contended that the records she wished to examine are public in character and that Morato may only regulate the exercise of the same The SC held that private means belonging to or concerning an individual person, company, or interest Public means pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or community at large o In this case, the MTRCB is public in character, as it is an office created to serve public interest The SC also held that the right of privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to governmental agencies or officers tasked with and acting in the discharge of public duties o In this case, the decisions of the BOARD and the individual voting slips are made pursuant to its official functions The SC further held that the exercise of the right to information, being a public right, cannot be made contingent on the discretion of the agency charged with the custody of the official records sought

-GONZALES V. NARVASA = PCCR (invalid denial of access) Gonzales wrote Executive Secretary Zamora, inquiring as to officials who hold multiple positions in government and requested for copies of their appointments and receipts of luxury cars seized by the Bureau of Customs But Zamora did not answer the letter, prompting Gonzales to file a petition for mandamus, invoking his right to information on public matters The SC held that the right to information is self-executing and may be invoked by any citizen in court The SC also held that under the CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, subject to reasonable claims of confidentialities, public officials are required: o To respond to letters sent by the public within 15 working days from receipt thereof o To ensure the accessibility of all public documents for inspection by the public within reasonable working hours ! In this case, the matters, appointments made to public offices and the utilization of public property, Zamora has the responsibility and the duty to answer the letter and to allow inspection of official records and documents -CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY AND AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT = Public bidding (exploratory stage vs. definite proposition; right to information covers on-going negotiations) The petition sought to compel the PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY to disclose all facts regarding its then on-going renegotiation with AMARI COASTAL BAY to reclaim portions of Manila Bay PEA sought to transfer ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands and 290.156 hectares of the submerged areas of Manila Bay PEA then entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI to develop the Freedom Islands without public bidding Chavez sought information regarding the negotiations even prior to final agreement, invoking his right to matters of public concern The PEA refused to disclose the information, claiming that the constitutional right to information does not include intra-agency communications and recommendations during the exploratory stage the time when assertions are still in the process of being formulated The SC held that information on on-going evaluations of bids or proposals by a review committee is not accessible under the right to information because there is no official act, transaction, or decision o But the moment the review committee makes its official recommendation, there emerges a definite proposition and the right to information begins to attach, which can cover even information leading to the definite proposition The SC also held that the right to information does not require that the contracts be first consummated before the right may be invoked, as the same also contemplates negotiations leading to the consummation o Thus, the right to information includes official information regarding on-going negotiations before final contract, provided there is a definite proposition by the government o In this case, petitioner may access the renegotiation of the JVA, which includes evaluation reports, legal opinions, minutes of meetings, etc., but he must copy the information at his own expense and PEA may not compelled to may a list or summary The right to information covers 3 categories of information: o Official records ! Refers to any document that is part of the public records in the custody of the government agencies or officials o Documents pertaining to official acts, transactions, and decisions

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Refers to documents recording, evidencing, supporting, or explaining official acts of the government o Research data used in formulating policies ! Refers to data, whether raw, collated, or processed, owned by the government and used in formulating policies But the right to information does not cover the following: o Privileged information under the separation of powers o Military and diplomatic secrets o Information affecting national security o Information on investigation of crimes by law enforcement agencies prior to the actual prosecution of the accused o Presidential communications and correspondences during closed-door Cabinet meetings o Internal deliberations of the courts o Executive sessions of Congress o Other limitations that Congress may impose by law !

-HILADO V. JUDGE REYES = Access to court records (access to official records vs. good cause; purpose of access and prejudice to parties) Julita, the surviving spouse of the deceased Roberto Benedicto, was appointed administratrix of the latters estate Petitioners filed 2 complaints for damages against Roberto In the initial inventory, Julita listed the petitioners claims as part of the liabilities for her husbands estate For a while, the RTC allowed petitioners to regularly examine the records of the case and to secure certified true copies, but the associate of petitioners counsel was denied access to the last folder-record of the case, which was inside Judge Reyes chambers for safekeeping Petitioners requested Reyes for access to each and every document forming part of the records of the case, but the latter would not accede to the same, prompting petitioners to filed a petition for mandamus with the SC The SC held that in determining whether a particular information is of public concern, there is no specific test because, ultimately, it is for the courts to determine on a case to case basis The SC also held that decisions and opinions of a court are matters of public concern because the same are the authorized expositions and interpretations of the laws o But pleadings and other documents filed by parties need not be matters of public interest, as the same are filed for the purpose of establishing the basis upon which judgment may be rendered o Thus, not all judicial records are matters of public interest The SC further held that the right to access public or official records may be restricted on a showing of good cause o To determine good cause, the judge must balance the rights of parties based on the particular facts of each case o In other words, access to judicial records may be permitted at the discretion and subject to the supervisory power of the court after considering: ! The actual use or purpose for which access is sought ! The obvious prejudice to any of the affected parties o In this case, the petitioners are interested parties who have a legitimate purpose for accessing the said records, which was to monitor prompt compliance with the Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition estates assets -BA-RA 7941 V. COMELEC= Party-list nominees A handful of organized parties were accredited by COMELEC to participate in the May 2007 elections BA-RA 7941 filed with COMELEC an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations Likewise, petitioner Rosales addressed letters to COMELECs LAW DEPARTMENT, requesting for the names of the party-list nominees But COMELEC issued Resolution 07-0724, declaring the names of the said nominees as confidential and, in effect, denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure request According to COMELEC, Section 7 of RA 7941 prohibits the appearance of the names of the party-list nominees on the certified list, not to mention that party-list elections must not be personality-oriented The SC held that the right to information and the right to access to official records are not absolute and are limited to: o Matters of public concern o Matters that are not regarded by law as confidential The SC also held that the policy of full public disclosure is limited to: o State transactions involving public interest o Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law In this case, no national security concern or the like is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups

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Also, the prohibition under RA 7941 extends only to the certified list and there is absolutely nothing to prevent COMELEC from disclosing the names through another medium

-GUINGONA, JR V. COMELEC = May 2010 elections (invalid denial to access; mandamus of public right) Several media reports divulged that the preparations for the May 2010 elections were fraught with controversies, among others: o SMARTMATIC supplied the wrong ultraviolet ink, but COMELEC still shouldered the replacement o 2 million ballot secrecy folders were bought at an overpriced rate and without public bidding o The indelible ink of TEXAS RESOURCES was immediately washable, but COMELEC still awarded the contract to the same o Certain PCOS machines in HK for the overseas absentee voting failed to accept the ballots Petitioners filed for mandamus, praying that COMELEC fully explain the complete details of its preparations for the said elections On the other hand, COMELEC assailed the petitioners legal standing and the fact that petitioners have never requested for any documents The SC held that, as a general rule, a petition for mandamus must be instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, board, corporation, or person that unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right o But if the petition is anchored on the peoples right to information, any citizen is a real party in interest, as the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact of citizenship, making the citizen part of the general public that possesses the said right o In other words, there is no need to show any special interest in the result, as it is sufficient that petitioners are citizens ! In this case, petitioners were all Filipino citizens The SC also held that for mandamus to be successful: o The information must be a matter of public concern ! In this case, the May 2010 elections, as well as the alleged wastage of public funds brought about by bungled contracts attendant therein, is a matter of public concern o The information must not be among those exempted by law ! In this case, COMELEC failed to cite any law exempting the info sought from the Constitutional command ! Thus, due to the Constitutional provisions, relevant jurisprudence, and various Election Laws, COMELEC must accede to petitioners requests -----EXCEPTIONS-----Recognized limitations to the exercise of the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure: (1) National Security Matters At the very least, this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters. But where there is no need to protect such state secrets, the privilege may not be invoked to withhold documents and other information, provided that they are examined in strict confidence and given scrupulous protection. Likewise, information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest. (2) Trade Secrets and Banking Transactions The drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national security matters and intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other related laws), as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act) are also exempted from compulsory disclosure (3) Criminal Matters Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as those relating to the apprehension, prosecution and, detention of criminals, which courts may not inquire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution. Efforts at effective law enforcement would be seriously jeopardized by free public access to, for example, police information regarding rescue operations, the whereabouts of fugitives, or leads on

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covert criminal activities. (4) Other Confidential Information The Ethical Standards Act further prohibits public officials and employees from using or divulging confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public. Other acknowledged limitations to information access include diplomatic correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meetings, and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.

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ART III SEC 8 A certification election is the most democratic and expeditious method by which the laborers can freely determine the UNION that shall act as their representative in their dealings with the establishment where they are working. It is the appropriate means whereby controversies and disputes on representation may be laid to rest, by the unequivocal vote of the employees themselves. -----RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATIONS-----UNITED PEPSI COLA SUPERVISORY UNION V. LAGUESMA = Route managers (managerial employees; no right to form union; conflict of interest) UNITED PEPSI is a Union of supervisory employees filing for Certification Election on behalf of the route managers of Pepsi-Cola LABOR SECRETARY denied the petition due to Article 245 of the LABOR CODE, which states, managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist, or form labor organizations; supervisory employees are not allowed to join rank-and-file organizations, but may form their own unions. Petitioners contended that Article 245, with respect to managerial employees, contravenes the right to form associations and unions The SC held that managerial employees are classified into 3 groups: o Top Managers who are policy-determining and are in charge of overall management o Middle Managers who direct the conduct of other managers and balance the demands of superiors and workers o First-line Managers who directly supervise the workers and are considered and often called supervisory employees or supervisors ! In this case, route managers are managerial employees, as they are responsible for the success of the companys main line of business through management of their respective sales teams, which entails planning, direction, operation, and evaluation ! On the other hand, supervisors merely direct operating employees in line with set tasks assigned to the latter ! Thus, route managers belong to the category of middle managers The SC also held that with the enactment of the LABOR CODE, even supervisors were denied the right to self-organize, as the CODE prohibited all types of managers from forming unions o But the ratification of the 1987 Constitution brought with it the restoration of the right of supervisory employees to form unions, as evidenced by Delegate LERUMs repeated reference to the same when discussing the right to associate o However, the said right was not conferred to managerial employees, as they act in a confidential capacity and, thus, may lead to a conflict of interest, not to mention that Unions might become company-dominated o In other words, government workers, supervisory employees, and security guards have a constitutionally guaranteed right to organize, but no similar or absolute right to organize for labor purposes are given to top-level and middle managers ! In this case, the route managers, being managerial employees, are not eligible to join, assist, or form unions and the assailed LABOR CODE provision remains valid Dissent of Justice Davide: o Delegate LERUM expressly stated that he intended Articles 245 (assailed provision) and 246 of the Labor Code to be automatically abolished o The intent was clearly to grant to all persons, whether rank-and-file or managerial, the right to associate and form unions o There is no ambiguity or vagueness whatsoever in Lerums statements that would warrant implying anything else and there is no room for interpretation where the intent is clear o However, due to the obvious conflict of interest, managerial employees should be eligible to join or assist only unions of their own rank and not those of supervisory or rank-and-file employees -----GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES-----TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES V. NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION = Government employees have a right to form unions The NHC is a GOCC without an original charter and its workers applied for a Certification Election for the purpose of forming a Union, but the application was denied The SC held that the right to unionize or to form associations is explicitly recognized under the Constitution and granted to employees in both the governmental and private sectors o In this case, there is no question that the NHC workers have a right to form unions or employees organizations The SC also held that the guarantee of the right to unionize is reiterated:

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Section 3, Article 13, which provides that the State shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law o Section 2, Article 9-B, which provides that the right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees The SC recognized that the government is the biggest employer in the Philippines, except that the terms and conditions of employees are set forth through a CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION o Thus, government employees generally do not bargain for wages because the same are fixed in the budget, but in unionizing, they acquire a forum to promote professional and self-development, as well as serve as watchdogs of their own bosses o

-SSS EMPLOYEES V. COURT OF APPEALS = Strike (public employees have the right to form unions, but do not have the right to strike) The employees of the SSS staged a strike and the RTC enjoined the said employees from further striking and ordered them to return to work The employees filed a case with the SC, alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction to hear the case, as it involved a labor dispute On the other hand, the SSS contended that the employees are covered by CIVIL SERVICE LAWS, not the LABOR CODE The SC held that while there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, but the same is silent as to whether such recognition includes the right to strike o According to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Lerum expressly pointed out that the self-organization right of government employees does not include the right to strike o Under RA 875, government workers, including those of GOCCs, are prohibited from striking The SC also held that EO 180 provided guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government employees, but as regards the matter of strikes, the same made reference to Memorandum Circular 6 of the CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, which prohibits the staging of strikes o Presently, there is no law allowing government employees to strike, much less recognizing their right to do so The SC further held that the CIVIL SERVICE embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including GOCCs with original charters o In this case, the SSS is a GOCC with an original charter and, thus, its employees do not have the right to strike Last but not least, the terms and conditions of private employment are settled through collective bargaining agreements, but the terms and conditions of public employment are fixed by law o Although EO 180 allows public employees to negotiate the terms and conditions of employment, the same are limited to those not already fixed by law o If the negotiations fail, the Unions may bring the matter before the PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR MANAGEMENT COUNCIL or petition Congress for the betterment of the said terms and conditions Jech: o It may be well to note that Section 3, Article 13 guarantees the rights of workers to self-organizationincluding the right to strike in accordance with law o According to Bernas, the current prohibition on the right to strike is only statutory and may be lifted by law -MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS V. LAGUIO, JR. = Public school Teachers on strike (dissent: not right to strike, but freedom of expression) A strike was staged by public school teachers, praying for decent wages and protesting against the general lack of concern of the government for their pressing grievances Due to the alleged illegal strike, DECS summarily dismissed 20 teachers, while 40 were suspended for 1 year, 33 for 9 months, and 122 for 6 months o The teachers were also placed on preventive suspension beyond the 90-day statutory limit The majority of the court applied the doctrine laid down in SSS Employees vs. Court of Appeals in enjoining the strike and declaring the same to be not accorded by law to the said teachers o The decision was met by a barrage of dissenting opinions Dissent of Justice Gutierrez: o The suspensions meted against the teachers were cruel, arbitrary, and punitive, being beyond the allowable 90-day period, which amounts to denial of substantive due process

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o Dissent o

o o o Dissent o

o Dissent o

o Dissent o o

Although the SSS Ruling remains good law, what was involved here was not the right to strike, but the right of the teachers to peaceful assembly, to free speech, and to petition the government for redress of grievances of Justice Cruz: The teachers should be ordered reinstated in the meantime pending their administrative investigations. ! In other words, they should not be indefinitely suspended The SSS Ruling should not be used as an excuse by the government to ignore the legitimate complaints of its employees Just because teachers are governed by CIVIL SERVICE LAWS, it does not mean that they should be deprived of their rights to free speech and to peaceably assemble Last but not least, the prohibition against strikes made by government employees must be re-examined of Justice Feliciano: The prohibition on strikes is not statutory in nature, but is only administrative and regulatory in character ! The Constitution itself is silent on the matter and, thus, it could not and should not be made an absolute rule In this case, the court failed to balance the rights and legitimate interests of the teachers on the one side and the effective maintenance of government on the other of Justice Padilla: There is a violation of procedural due process ! The dismissals and suspensions were handed out in rapid succession characterized by arbitrariness and undue haste Also, the Court dismissed the case because it supposedly involved a question of fact, but proceeded to declare that the strike was illegal, which could be done only if the facts were duly considered of Justice Sarmiento: There was clearly grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DECS and the court should not shirk based on the handy excuse that it is not a trier of facts The issue of whether or not there was due process or arbitrariness in handing out the suspensions and dismissals of the teachers must be resolved before the court

-Doctrine of People v. Ferrer as regards Subversive Organizations: In the case of subversive organizations other than the COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES: o That the purpose of the organization is to overthrow the present government and to establish in this country a totalitarian regime o That the accused joined such organization o That the accused joined such organization knowingly, willfully, and by overt acts In case of the COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES: o That the CPP continues to pursue the objectives with led Congress to declare it to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the government by illegal means in 1957 o That the accused joined the CPP o That the accused joined the CPP willfully, knowingly, and by overt acts Since the ANTI-SUBVERSION ACT is a conspiracy statute and the gist is the agreement itself, there is no need of proof of direct participation in the substantive offenses constituting the act of conspiracy, such that that overt act requirement may be satisfied by proof of noncriminal and relatively minor acts o Signing membership papers o Paying dues o Attending meetings

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ART III SEC 9 -----POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN-----BARDILLON V. BARANGAY MASILI = RTC (expropriation suits are incapable of pecuniary estimation and RTC has jurisdiction) BARANGAY MASILI filed 2 complaints for eminent domain for the purpose of expropriating a 144-square meter parcel of land, Lot 4381-D The expropriation was being pursued in view of providing the BARANGAY with a multipurpose hall for the use and benefit of its constituents The 1st complaint was filed with the MTC of LAGUNA, following the failure of the BARANGAY to reach an agreement with BARDILLON on the purchase price, but the same was dismissed The 2nd complaint was filed with the RTC of LAGUNA and BARDILLON filed a motion to dismiss, alleging res judicata, but the RTC denied the said motion on the ground that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the said expropriation proceeding and eventually issued a writ of possession over the lot Petitioner claimed that the MTC had jurisdiction over the case because the value of the land is only about 11,000 The SC held that an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money, but deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take property for public use and, as such, the same are: o Incapable of pecuniary estimation o Should be filed with the RTC, regardless of the value of the property The SC also held that the question that must be resolved in such cases is the propriety of the expropriation, that is, whether or not it complies with the requisites for the valid taking of private property o In this case, it is true that the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms for the court to determine the just compensation for it, but the same is merely incidental to the suit The requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation case are expressly governed by: o Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court o Section 19 of the LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE In expropriation proceedings, the requisites for authorizing immediate entry are as follows: o Filing of a complaint for expropriation that is sufficient in form and substance o Deposit of the amount equivalent to 15% of the fair market value of the property based on its current tax declaration ! In this case, the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the BARANGAY was proper as the same complied with the requisites The SC finally held that the RTC has authority to inquire about: o The legality of the exercise of the right to eminent domain o The genuine necessity for expropriation ! Thus, the amount of just compensation is determined only after the RTC is satisfied with the validity and legality of the expropriation -ESTATE OF JBL REYES V. CITY OF MANILA = (statutory requirements for exercise of eminent domain; order of priorities; exhaustion) HEIRS of JBL Reyes filed a case for unlawful detainer against ABIOG and MAGLONSO and the former obtained a writ of execution But during the pendency of the case, the CITY OF MANILA sought to expropriate the same properties The CA issued protective orders, requiring the parties to maintain the status quo until the expropriation is resolved The HEIRS questioned the legality and validity of the expropriation and the CAs Order, enjoining the execution of the judgment in the ejectment case The SC held that the issue in expropriation cases is whether or not the government deprived citizens of their private property without due process of law and the same depends on whether or not the government complied with the legal requirements for expropriation o In this case, before the CITY may exercise its power of eminent domain, the same must be sanctioned by and must not violate any law o Also, although Section 19 of the LGC and its CHARTER, empower the CITY to expropriate property for its urban land reform and housing program, it must still comply with the standards of RA 7279 (URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING ACT of 1992) the law governing the expropriation of property for urban land reform and housing Under Section 9 of RA 7279, there is an order of priority in the acquisition of land for socialized housing: o Those owned by the Government o Alienable lands of the public domain o Unregistered, idle, or abandoned lands o Those within declared Areas of Priority Development, Zonal Improvement, Slum Improvement, and Resettlement Program sites

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Bagong Lipinan Improvement Sites and Services (BLISS) that have not yet been acquired o Privately owned lands (last in priority) Under Section 10 of RA 7279, it is provided that expropriation is to be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition (community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation, joint venture agreement, negotiated purchase) have already been exhausted The SC also held that compliance with these conditions is mandatory as they are the only safeguards of owners of private property against violation of due process when their property is forcibly taken from them for public use o In this case, the CITY failed to comply with both requirements, which is violation of petitioners right to due process The SC further held that the State has a paramount interest in exercising its power of eminent domain for the general welfare and that the superior right of the State to expropriate private property always takes precedence over the interest of private owners, provided that: o The expropriation is for public use o The exercise of the right to eminent domain complies with the guarantees of due process o -----MUNICIPAL PROPERTY-----

-Is there compensable taking when municipal property is taken by the State? If it is patrimonial property of the municipality, that is, property acquired by the municipality with its private funds in its corporate or private capacity, then compensation is required If it is any other property held by the municipality for the State in trust for the inhabitants, then the State is free to dispose of it at will -----ELEMENTS OF TAKING-----REPUBLIC V. VDA. DE CASTEVELLI = AFP Lease contract (elements of taking; just when just compensation is computed) In 1947, Castellvi leased real properties to the AFP on a year-to-year basis In 1959, the government sought to expropriate the properties and contended that actual taking commenced during 1947, when the property was first occupied and, thus, just compensation should be based on the value of the property in 1947 and not in 1959 The SC held that taking, under the power of eminent domain, is generally defined as entering upon private property for more than a momentary period and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof The following are the requisites of a valid taking of property: o The expropriator must enter a private property ! In this case, this is present as the AFP took possession of the property by virtue of a least agreement o The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period, such that it is for a permanent or indefinite period ! In this case, the lease contract was for a period of 1 year, renewable from year to year, which makes the entry on the property merely temporary, notwithstanding the construction of installations of a permanent nature ! Thus, possession was merely transitory and the SC rejected the Republics contention that a lease on a year-to-year basis can give rise to a permanent right to occupy o Entry should be under warrant or color of authority ! In this case, this is present as the AFP validly entered the property as a lessee o The property must be devoted to a public use, informally appropriated, or injuriously affected ! In this case, this is present as the property was used by the AFP o Utilization of the property for public use must be to such an extent as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof ! In this case, Castevelli was not ousted, but she remained as the owner of the property and was enjoying the benefits of the same, as the Republic was bound to pay and was paying rent ! Thus, in this case, the 2nd and 5th elements were missing The SC also held that the right of eminent domain may not be exercised by simply leasing the premises to be expropriated and may not be exercised under the guise of a lease when the real intention was to expropriate the property, which could have been done anytime o Such a practice would mean that to secure a low price for a land which the government intends to expropriate, it would first negotiate with the owner of the land for a lease, then expropriate the same when the lease is about to terminate,

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and then assert that the value of the property should be reckoned as of the start of the lease, in spite of the fact that its value had increased during the period of the lease The SC further held that under Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint for expropriation o In this case, the complaint was filed in 26 June 1959 and, thus, just compensation must be determined based on the said date

-CITY GOVERNMENT V. JUDGE ERICTA = 6% of memorial parks (police power vs. power of eminent domain) QUEZON CITY passed Ordinance 6118 and Sec. 9 thereof provides that at least 6% of memorial parks or cemeteries should be set aside for the burial of paupers who have been residents of QC for more than 5 years The CITY COUNCIL then issued a Resolution ordering the City Engineer to stop the selling of such memorial park lots for failure to donate the said 6% portion and among those ordered was HIMALAYANG PILIPINO INC., which assailed the constitutionality of the said Ordinance QUEZON CITY argued that the taking of HIMALAYANGs property is a valid exercise of police power and that the land is taken for public use The SC held that police power is defined as the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property o Police power is generally exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare o But police power does not involve the taking or confiscation of property, except when there is a necessity to confiscate the same in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order ! In such rare cases, the property is destroyed and the owner does not recover from the government for the injury sustained, but the same is never taken for public use The SC also held that the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit or confiscate o In this case, the Ordinance is not a mere police regulation, but outright confiscation without any just compensation o In other words, the Ordinance warrants deprivation of property without due process of law and without just compensation -UNITED STATES V. CAUSBY = Aircraft at low altitudes (direct and immediate cause of depreciation of beneficial use and value) CAUSBY owned 2.8 acres of land situated very near an airport used by the government and the path of glide of which passed directly over his property Various forms of aircraft used the airport, from bombers, to transport aircraft, to fighters These aircrafts flew low enough to barely miss the top of the trees or blow old leaves off, which made startling noises and disturbing glares CAUSBY was forced to close his chicken business because many of his chickens were killed in the process, aside from contending with lack of sleep and the fact that the value of the property has greatly depreciated The US argued that the flights were within the minimum safe altitudes of flights which have been prescribed by statute and the same are made without any physical invasion of the property of landowners The US also argued that the landowner does not own the superadjacent airspace that he has not subjected to possession by the erection of structures or other occupancy, as Congress has declared the air as a public highway However, the US itself conceded that if the flights over the property rendered it inhabitable, then there would be a taking compensable under the Constitution The SC held that, in this case, if by reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights, Causby could not use his land for any reasonable purpose, the loss would be complete and it is as if the government entered into the land and took possession of it altogether o In other words, it would be as if the lands were used as runways The SC also held that even if the airspace is deemed a public highway, it is still obvious that the landowner must have exclusive control over the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere to have full enjoyment of the land o Otherwise, buildings cannot be erected, trees cannot be planted, and even fences cannot be run o The fact that the landowner does not occupy the immediate enveloping atmosphere in a physical sense is immaterial, as he does use the same in somewhat the same sense that space left between buildings for the purpose of light and air is used The SC further held that the inconveniences caused by airplanes are normally not compensable under the 5th Amendment, except when the same fly so low and so frequent so as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land that are affected

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In this case, the fact that the planes do not touch the surface is immaterial because there was intrusion nonetheless, which was so immediate that Causby was deprived any beneficial use Also, the frequent low-level flights of the planes were the direct and immediate cause for depreciation of his properties

-PEOPLE V. FAJARDO = View of the plaza (unlawful deprivation of property without just compensation) Fajardo was convicted for having constructed a building, without permit from the Municipal Mayor, which obstructs the view of the Plaza from the Highway, contrary to a Camarines Sur Ordinance enacted for that matter The SC held that although property may be regulated in the interest of general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight, the State may not permanently divest owners of beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve the aesthetic appearance of the community o In this case, every structure built by Fajardo, no matter how beautiful, would be a violation because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway o Thus, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as although the purpose of the law may be valid; the means employed is arbitrary o The appellant is then constrained to let his land remain idle The SC also held that an Ordinance that permanently restricts the use of property, such that it can no longer be used for any reasonable purpose, is beyond regulation and constitutes taking of property o In other words, it clearly oversteps the boundaries of the exercise of police power and amounts to confiscation and deprivation of property without just compensation o The use and enjoyment of the property is an element of ownership Under US jurisprudence, a regulation that substantially deprives an owner of all beneficial use of his property is a deprivation within the meaning of the 14th Amendment Darvin: o In this case, if the LGU wished to deprive Fajardo of any beneficial use of his property to preserve the view of the plaza from the highway, then the city would have to expropriate the property o But according to the LGC, before an LGU may expropriate private property, an Ordinance for that matter is necessary and a mere Resolution would be insufficient -REPUBLIC V. PLDT = Trunk lines (power of eminent domain as burden or easement of right of way; no loss of title and possession) PLDT entered into a contract with RCA COMMUNICATIONS for the reception or transmission of telephone messages to and from the US The BUREAU OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS set up its own telephone system and rented the trunk lines of the PLDT for the benefit of government offices, on the condition that use of the same will not be dedicated for private use The BUREAU later contracted with RCA for a JOINT OVERSEASE SERVICE, but PLDT objected, contending that the BUREAU was using their own trunk lines to compete with them PLDT threatened that if the BUREAU refused to desist therefrom, in violation of their agreement, it would sever the telephone connections between them The BUREAU refused to comply and, thus, the PLDT severed the connections and, as a result, the Philippines was disconnected from the rest of the world, except from the US As the PLDT and the BUREAU failed to arrive at a compromise, the latter sought to compel the former to enter into a contract for the use of its telephone system facilities throughout the Philippines The SC held that parties cannot be compelled to enter into contracts where no agreement is had between them as to the principals terms and conditions of the same o Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the essence of our contractual system The SC also held that while, generally, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to and possession of the expropriated property, there is no cogent reason as to why the said power may not be availed of or impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of title and possession o In other words, real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way, provided that the property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit The SC further held that under Section 6, Article 13, the State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation o Thus, there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest, so long as just compensation is paid therefor o In this case, the REPUBLIC may, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, require PLDT to permit interconnection of its telephone system and that of the governments, as the needs of government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court

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-NPC. V. JOCSON = Procedure for deposit (discretionary value vs. assessed value; Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court v. PD 42) NPC filed 7 eminent domain cases in the acquisition of right of way easement over 7 parcels of land in relation to the necessity of building towers and transmission lines for the common good, with the offer of corresponding compensation to landowners affected with the expropriation process Respondent Judge found existing paramount public interest for the expropriation and thereby issued an Order determining the provisional market value of the subject areas based on tax declaration of the properties NPC, in compliance to the order of Respondent Judge, deposited the corresponding amount of the assessed value of said lands in the amount of about 23 million with the PNB Respondents land owners filed motion for reconsideration asserting that the assessed value is way too low and that just compensation due them is estimated as 29 million Respondent Judge then increased the provisional value 29 million and ordered NPC to deposit the differential amount within 24 hours from receipt of Order while holding in abeyance the writ of possession order pending compliance to the same Petitioner assailed such order to be in violation of due process and GADALEJ on the part of Respondent Judge The case enunciated the proper procedure for filing a complaint for expropriation and the corresponding deposit of the amount of just compensation Under the old rule, Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, for the purpose of expropriation, the court has authority to determine the provisional value, which must be deposited to the National or Provincial Treasurer before possession may be effected and notice to the parties is not indispensable, as failure to hear the owners and claimants of the land does not affect the validity of the Order o In other words, the Court decides how much is to be deposited Under the new rule, PD 42, the courts no longer have such discretion o What is to be deposited with the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK is the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for taxation purposes, as reflected in the tax declaration o No hearing is required for the purpose, but the owner of the property must be duly notified o Thus, upon the filing of the complaint for expropriation or at any time thereafter, the government has the right to take or enter upon the possession of the property involved, provided there is compliance with PD 42 -DIPIDIO EARTH SAVERS V. SECRETARY = Mining act (police power vs. power of eminent domain; kinds of taking; indirect benefit) President Ramos executed an FTAA with ARIMCO MINING CORPORATION One of the affected areas is BARANGAY DIPIDIO in Nueva Vizcaya Thus, DIPIDIO EARTH SAVERS, an organization of farmers and indigenous peoples representing the community affected by the mining activities, assailed the validity of the RA 7924 (MINING ACT) and the FTAA, as it allowed the unlawful taking of private property for private purposes Respondents, on the other hand, claim that the same is a valid exercise of police power The SC distinguished the taking in eminent domain from the regulation in police power, although both have the general welfare as their object o The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state and of those entities, to which the power has been lawfully delegated, to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation ! In other words, property interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose, such that there is compensable taking If in the regulation of the use of the property someone else acquires the use or interest thereof, such restriction constitutes compensable taking Taking may include: o Trespass without actual eviction of the owner o Material impairment of the value of the property o Prevention of the ordinary uses for which the property was intended o Establishment of an easement of right of way ! A regulation that substantially deprives the owner of his proprietary rights and restricts the beneficial use and enjoyment for public use amounts to compensable taking o Police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty or property ! Property condemned under police power is usually noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such that no compensation shall be paid

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Property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State ! In other words, property interest is merely restricted or is destroyed because the continued use or existence thereof would be injurious to the public welfare Use of the property by the owner is limited, but no aspect of the same is used by or for the public, whether or not the deprivation is total or partial o In this case, the SC held that Section 76 of RA 7924 is a taking provision, but the same is not unconstitutional, as it is done for a public purpose The SC held that for taking to be valid, the same must be for public use, which is synonymous to public interest, benefit, welfare, convenience and includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage (as opposed to actual use) o In this case, the contention that public use is negated by the fact that the State would be taking private properties for the benefit of private mining firms or contractors is incorrect, as the SC recognized that the mining industry plays a pivotal role in the economic development of the country The SC also held that once the object is within the authority of Congress, the means by which it will be attained is also for Congress to determine o In other words, once the public purpose has been established, the means of executing the project are for Congress and them alone to determine The SC further held that determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function o Even as the executive or legislative departments may make initial determinations, the same cannot prevail over the courts findings or is subject to review by the courts ! In this case, the provisions of RA 7924 do not exclude the courts from the determination of just compensation, despite the fact a PANEL OF ARBITRATORS makes a preliminary determination of the said amount The SC finally held that the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts to decide the determination of just compensation remains intact, despite the preliminary determination made by an administrative agency or body o Thus, the jurisdiction of the RTC is not less original and exclusive simply because the question is first passed upon by an administrative agency, as the ensuing judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the initial administrative determination !

-BENNIS V. MICHIGAN = Confiscated car after use for sex (confiscation as police power and penalty, not eminent domain) The car jointly owned by the Bennis spouses was confiscated by the MICHIGAN COURT as a public nuisance because the husband, John, used it to engage in sexual activity with a prostitute along a DETROIT CITY street John was convicted of gross indecency, but the wife, Tina, claimed that, being the co-owner and innocent spouse without knowledge or consent to her husbands illegal activity, she has been deprived of her property without due process of law The US SC held that it is a well-settled rule in jurisprudence that the acts of the possessor bind the interests of the owner, whether or not the latter is innocent o Such rule is a defense of the State against forbidden use and the evasion from liability by dispensing with the necessity of conducting judicial inquiry regarding possible collusion The US SC also held that the government is not required to compensate the owner of the property it has lawfully taken, unless the taking was done in the exercise the power of eminent domain o In this case, the forfeiture was exercised through the police power of the State o Also, the confiscation of the said property is in the nature of a penalty and, hence, no compensation is due ! The purpose of the law was to deter illegal activities leading to the deterioration of the neighborhood and to unsafe streets -PENN CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION COMPANY V. NEW YORK CITY = (no taking if it is only a regulation of property use) The LANDMARKS PRESERVATION LAW created a COMMISSION, which was empowered to designate a building as landmark on a particular landmark site or may designate an area to be a historic district Before alterations to such landmarks may be made, the owner must acquire approval from the COMMISSION PENN CENTRAL was the owner of GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, which was designated as a landmark and the area around it as a landmark site PENN sought to build a multi-story office building over the terminal but was denied permission by the COMMISSION and no judicial review was sought by PENN, despite the same being allowed

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PENN claimed that such law deprives them of the use of their property without due process of law The US SC held that there was no taking because the City did not take possession or control of the premises, but only regulated the exploitation of the same o In this case, the law simply prohibited PENN from occupying certain features of the airspace above the property, but allowed the use of its other portions The US SC also held that the government may execute laws or programs that adversely affect recognized economic values without the said action constituting a taking within the meaning of the 5th Amendment o In zoning laws where the courts have reasonably concluded that the health, safety, morals, or general welfare would be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land, land-use regulations that destroy or adversely affect real property interests were upheld o In many instances, use-restrictions that served substantial public purpose have been upheld against taking challenges The US SC further held that in deciding whether particular governmental action has effected a taking, what are focused upon are a) the character of the action and b) the nature and extent of the interference with property rights, rather than discrete segments thereof o In this case, PENN cannot establish taking simply by showing that it has been denied the ability to exploit the superadjacent airspace, irrespective of the remainder of the parcel The US SC finally held that diminution in property value alone cannot establish a taking and that the Law affects some landowners more severely than others does not, in itself, result in taking for that is often the case with general welfare and zoning legislations o In this case, the law does not interfere with the terminals use nor does it prevent PENN from any reasonable use and benefit therefrom, as opposed to US vs. Causby, where the owner was almost completely deprived of any reasonable benefit from his property o Also, there is no showing that a smaller and more harmonizing structure cannot be authorized -----PUBLIC USE-----

Definition of socialized housing from Section 1 of PD 1259: The construction and/or improvement of dwelling units for the middle and lower income groups of the society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities; Slum clearance, relocation and resettlement of squatters and slum dwellers as well as the provision of related facilities and services; Slum improvement which consists basically of allocating homelots to the dwellers in the area or property involved, rearrangemeant and re-alignment of existing houses and other dwelling structures and the construction and provision of basic community facilities and services, where there are none, such as roads, footpaths, drainage, sewerage, water and power system schools, barangay centers, community centers, clinics, open spaces, parks, playgrounds and other recreational facilities; The provision of economic opportunities, including the development of commercial and industrial estates and such other facilities to enhance the total community growth; and Such other activities undertaken in pursuance of the objective to provide and maintain housing for the greatest number of people under Presidential Decree No, 757 -SUMULONG V. GUERRERO = Socialized housing (new definition of public use; number of people to benefitted test; steward doctrine) The NHA sought to expropriate 25 hectares of land in ANTIPOLO, RIZAL and among those sought were the properties of SUMULONG and BALAOING Petitioners assailed the validity of the expropriation, alleging that it does not satisfy the public use requirement, as it would benefit only a handful The SC held that the public use requirement for the exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible, comprehensive, and evolving concept that is influenced by changing conditions o Presently, as long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play o Whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use, such that the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage is recognized ! In this case, socialized housing falls within the confines of public use economic opportunities linked with low-cost hosing, slum clearance, relocation, and resettlement The SC also held that the Constitution determines what is public use: o The expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals

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The transfer, through the power of eminent domain, of utilities and other private enterprises to the government The SC further held that urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as having a public purpose both under the expanded concept of public use and by specific provisions of the Constitution Section 9, Article 2 and Section 9, Article 13 o Housing is a basic human need and shortage of the same is a matter of State concern, as it affects public health, safety, the environment, and the general welfare ! In this case, the public character of the housing measure does not change simply because units in the same can be occupied only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications ! A beginning has to be made and it is not possible to provide housing for all those who need it, all at once Last but not least, the SC held that the propriety of exercising the power eminent domain cannot be determined on a purely quantitative or area basis, such that expropriation can cover both lands and landed estates o Jurisprudence adheres to the number of people to be benefited test and not the area of the land test Ultimately, the SC held that the property owner may not interpose objections merely because, in his judgment, some other property would have been more suitable or just as suitable for the purpose o In this case, the State, acting through the NHA, has discretion to designate the particular property to be taken for socialized hosing purposes and how much thereof may be expropriated o Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion, the courts will give due weight to and leave undisturbed NHAs choice and the size of the site for the project The Constitution emphasizes the stewardship concept, which means that private property is supposed to be held by the individual only as a trustee for the people in general, who are, in turn, its real owners o As a mere steward, the individual must exercise his rights to the property not for his own exclusive benefit, but for the good of the entire community or nation o

-PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR V. COURT OF APPEALS = DAR approval (concept of public use from literal to broad; LGC) CAMARINES SUR sought to expropriate certain parcels of land contiguous to the capitol site to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional crops and a housing project for government employees The Resolution was assailed on the basis of public use and the SOLICITOR GENERAL further opined that CAMARINES should first secure the approval of the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM to convert the subject land from agricultural to non-agricultural lands The SC held that, modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of public purpose or public use o Under the old concept of public use, the condemned property must actually be open to use by the general public o Under the new concept, public use simply means public advantage, convenience, or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and prosperity of the whole community ! In this case, the expropriation of the said properties for the pilot farm and housing project more than satisfy this requirement by enhancing the livelihood of farmers and fishermen and for benefiting government employees The SC also held that it is true the LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and can only exercise the same when expressly authorized by Congress, which may retain certain control of or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by LGUs o But the limitations, if any, should be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring power or in other legislations, such that statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to LGUs cannot be broadened or constrained by implication The SC further held that under Section 9 of the LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, LGUs may, through its head or acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain o In this case, there is nothing in the LGC that requires approval from the DAR before properties may be expropriated by LGUs o Also, to sustain the CA would mean that LGUs can no longer expropriate agricultural lands without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands, even for the construction of roads, bridges, and hospitals, as all of the them would involve a change in the land use -MASIKIP V. CITY OF PASIG = Sports and recreational facility (no genuine necessity) PASIG CITY sought to expropriate property of MASIKIP to construct a sports facility for the poor residents of BARANGAY CANIOGAN

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MASIKIP, although conceding that the same is for a public purpose, claimed that there is no genuine necessity to justify the condemnation of her property, as there is already an established sports development and recreational activity center in PASIG CITY The SC held that judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of concern: o The adequacy of the just compensation o The necessity of the taking o The public use character for the purpose of the taking The SC also held that the right to take private property for public purposes a) necessarily originates from the necessity and b) the taking must be limited to the said necessity o In other words, the very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, which must be of a public character, provided that the ascertainment of the necessity must precede the taking of the property and not following it The SC further held that necessity does not mean an absolute, but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the property owner consistent with such benefit o In this case, PASIG failed to establish that there is genuine necessity to expropriate MASIKIPs property, as there already an established facility and the intended beneficiary is the MELENDRES COMPOUND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION, not the residents of CANIOGAN, such that the purpose is not clearly and categorically public Last but not least, the SC held that the right to own and possess property is one of the most cherished rights of men and unless the requisite of genuine necessity for the expropriation of ones property is clearly established, then it shall be the duty of the courts to protect the rights of individuals to their private properties o The purpose of the taking of private property must be specified o The genuine necessity for the taking must be shown to exist

-MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT V. LOZADA, JR. = Lahug Airport ceased to exist (constructive trust; commit to the use) Subject of this case is a lot located in LAHUG, CEBU CITY Its original owner was DEIPARINE when the same was subject to expropriation proceedings, initiated by REPUBLIC for the expansion and improvement of LAHUG AIRPORT During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, LOZADA et al. acquired the lot The RTC ruled for the REPUBLIC and ordered the latter to pay the fair market value of the lot and subsequently, the REPUBLIC and the LANDOWNERS entered into a compromise settlement, whereby the properties would be resold to the latter in the event that the reconstruction of LAHUG AIRPORT would be abandoned The projected improvement and expansion plan of the old said Airport was not pursued and the landowners initiated a complaint for the recovery of possession and reconveyance of ownership the subject lot On the other hand, the petitioners denied that the Government had made assurances to reconvey the said lot if the property would no longer be needed for airport operations, such that the judgment of condemnation was unconditional, and respondents were, therefore, not entitled to recover the expropriated property notwithstanding non-use or abandonment thereof The SC held that under Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan: o If the land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then when the purpose is terminated, the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated o If the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator and the former owner retains no right in the land, such that the public use may be abandoned without any impairment of the title acquired or reversion to the former owner ! However, in this case, the SC declared that Fery was not decided pursuant to the presently sacredly-held Constitutional right that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation The SC also held that with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed o Should there be failure in committing to the same, the expropriator should either a) file another petition for the new purpose or b) return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same o Otherwise, the judgment for expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack an indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain the particular public purpose The SC further held that the taking of private property, consequent to the Governments exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken

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In other words, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or pursued and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received Last but not least, the SC held that the right of former owner to repurchase may be enforced based on a constructive trust constituted on the property and held by the Government in favor of the owner o Constructive trust is akin to the implied trust under the CIVIL CODE o Under Article 1454 of the CC, if an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee, a trust by virtue of law is established ! If the fulfillment of the obligation is offered by the grantor when it becomes due, he may demand the reconveyance of the property to him o In other words, failing to keep its bargain, the Government may be compelled to reconvey the land because, otherwise, the former owners would be denied the use of their properties upon a state of affairs that was not conceived nor contemplated when the expropriation was authorized, such that there is a wrongful holding of property and a unjust enrichment However, the SC pointed out that the former owners must return: o The amount received as just compensation for the expropriation o Legal interest to be computed from default, which is computed from the time the Government complies with its obligation to reconvey o Necessary expenses that the Government may have incurred in maintaining the property o The monetary value of Government services in managing the property to the extent that the former owners were benefitted thereby o -----SECTION 19, LGC (RA 7160)-----

-LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise the same only when expressly authorized by statute: Section 19 of the LGC prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of eminent domain to LGUs, subject to the following: o That the power may not be exercised, unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner and the same was not accepted o That the LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least 15% of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration o That the amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking

-----JUST COMPENSATION-----Market value: The price fixed by the buyer and seller in the open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal trade and competition The price and value of the article established or shown by sale, public or private, in the ordinary course of business The fair value of property as between one who desires to purchase and one who desires to sell The current price The general or ordinary price for which property may be sod in that locality -EPZA V. DULAY = Determination of amount of just compensation is a judicial function (Rules of Court > PD 76, 464, 794, 1533) The EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY sought to expropriate certain properties and presented tax assessments made by the city assessor during martial law as basis for computing just compensation The EPZA further claimed that the owners are estopped from questioning the said assessments because they had prior opportunities to do so EPZA invoked PDs 76, 464, 794, and 1533, claiming that the courts no longer have discretion to determine just compensation The SC held that just compensation is the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking, such that anything beyond that is more and anything short of that is less than just compensation o It is a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity and not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity

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In this case, due process demands that the owners should be given the chance to dispute the valuations made in the tax assessments, as to peg the value of the lots on the basis of documents that are out of date and at prices below the acquisition cost of present owners would be arbitrary and confiscatory The SC also held that in estimating the market value, all of the following are to be considered in reaching the same: o The capabilities of the property o The uses to which the property may be applied o The uses to which the property is adapted o The condition it is in at the time of the taking o The surroundings of the property o The improvements made on the property Under the RULES OF COURT, the estimation of just compensation is discretionary upon the courts, such that the same is not bound even by the Commissioners report o The courts may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation and to the defendant, just compensation for the property expropriated o Thus, the courts may substitute its own estimate of the value as gathered from the record ! In this case, the assailed PDs have taken away such discretion, stating that the basis for determining just compensation shall be the market value declared by the owner or determined by the assessor, whichever is lower ! Thus, the PDs are unconstitutional, as they encroach upon judicial prerogatives, tending to render the courts inutile in a matter, which, under the Constitution, is reserved to it for final determination o In other words, final determination of just compensation is incumbent upon the courts The SC further held that under the RoC, the need to satisfy due process in the taking of private property is fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking o In this case, the PDs deprive the courts of discretion to determine what is just and fair, as its choice is always limited only to two assessments, whichever is lower Last but not least, the SC held that the rules laid down by the PDs can serve only as a guideline at most, but it cannot bind the courts as to a) what amount should be awarded and b) how to arrive at such amount o

-CITY OF MANILA V. ESTRADA = (difficulty with computing for the market value; factors taken into consideration) MANILA CITY sought to expropriate an entire parcel of land with its improvements in connection with a new MARKET, at that time, being erected in PACO DISTRICT A complaint for expropriation was filed and commissioners were appointed, who, after viewing the premises and receiving evidence, and being unable to agree, submitted two reports to the court The court duly rendered its Decision, confirming the majority report as to the improvements, but reducing the price of the land from the one fixed by the majority report Motions for a new trial having been made by both parties and denied by the court, both parties appealed from that part of the decision fixing the value of the land at P15 per square meter, instead of P20 The record was elevated to the SC for a review of the evidence and assigned errors of the parties and it held that P10 per square meter was just compensation for the land The SC justified such action, first, upon the ground that preponderance of the evidence submitted to the commissioners showed that P10 per square meter was just compensation for the land taken, and, second, upon the power of the court to revise the report of the commissioners when the amount awarded is grossly inadequate or grossly excessive The SC held that, as a general rule, just compensation is the market value of the land taken, to which the owner of the condemned property is entitled to receive The SC also held that the difficulty is not with the rule, but with its application, which means that determining the amount of just compensation is a difficult task The SC further held that market value means the sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received o The market value is attained by a consideration of all those facts that make a property commercially valuable, such that it is not limited to what the market value of the condemned property is Under US jurisprudence, determining the market value of expropriated land entails that the same considerations are to be regarded as in a sale of property between private parties in the regular course of business o In other words, the compensation is to be estimated by reference to the uses for which the property is suitable, having regard to the existing business or wants of the community or such as may be reasonably excepted in the immediate future ! What are the uses to which it is applied at the time of the taking?

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What are the uses to which it is plainly adapted?

-MADDUMBA V. GSIS = Land Bank bonds A LAND BANK bondholder purchased a residential house from the GSIS using the said bond, which is acquired as just compensation He sought to compel the GSIS to accept the said bonds at their face value in payment for the residential house and lot pursuant to Section 85 of PD 3844, as amended by PD 251 o Section 85 provides that the bonds issued by the bank may be used by the holder and shall be accepted as payment for the purchase of shares of stocks or assets of GOCCs GSIS sought to negotiate and secure a discount therefrom The SC held that under PD 3844, a GOCC, like the GSIS, is compelled to accept LAND BANK bonds as payment for the purchase of its assets o Under jurisprudence, GSIS is recognized as a GOCC and, thus, it has the obligation to unequivocally support government programs and not introduce its own interpretative policies, which may thwart the same, especially as regards LAND REFORM o Agrarian reform cannot be fully realized without the intervention of the government, particularly in the payment of just compensation and it is only with the support and assistance of government financial institutions that the said payment to landowner may be realized The SC defined LAND BANK bonds as certificates of indebtedness, approved by the MONETARY BOARD of the CENTRAL BANK, fully tax-exempt both as to principal and income and bear interest at the rate of 6% per annum, redeemable at the option of the LAND BANK on or before maturity o The Land Bank bonds are fully negotiable and unconditionally guaranteed by the Government, such that their values cannot be diminished directly or indirectly o The said bonds are not ordinary commercial papers that are subject to discounting, as they are issued in the captive market of land owners and to facilitate the speedy transfer of lands to tenant-farmers in support of the land reform programs of the Government and not in the open market nor for the purpose of raising funds The SC also held that the mere acceptance of LAND BANK bonds, instead of money, as just compensation already entails some sacrifice on the part of the landowner and to reduce their value would impose yet another burden o In this case, the purpose of RA 3844 is precisely to cushion the impact of dispossession upon the landowner Darvin: o Generally, just compensation must be made in cash; but the SC made an exception in case the property is expropriated under the AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM ! In this case, the SC allowed compensation in the form of LAND BANK bonds, among other modes, which entails sacrifice on the part of the landowners To allow government to discount the value of the bonds would augment the sacrifice of the landowners and, as such, the said bonds must be accepted at face value -NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS = At what point in time should just compensation be computed? In 1978, NAPOCOR took possession of a land situated in MARAWI CITY, owned by MANGONDATO, under the mistaken belief that it is part of the public land reserved for use for hydroelectric power purposes and the CITY was paid P40.00 per square meter Eventually, MANGONDATO claimed that the subject land is his duly registered private property covered by a TCT in his name, and that he is not privy to any agreement between NAPOCOR and MARAWI, such that any payment made to said CITY cannot be considered as payment to him In 1990, NAPOCOR's BOARD passed a Resolution, resolving to pay Mangondato P100.00 per square meter plus 12% interest per annum from 1978, but passed another Resolution, which excluded the interests, despite NAPOCOR's regional legal counsel's findings, which state that the said property is actually worth P300.00 per square meter Mangondato submitted that the fair market value of his land is even more than the P300.00 per square meter, but he is willing to settle for P300.00 per square meter plus 12% interest per annum from 1978 The parties brought their own respective cases to court, which were consolidated, and the RTC ordered NAPOCOR to pay P500.00 per square meter, among other costs NAPOCOR averred that the taking of the property should not be reckoned as of the year 1992 when NAPOCOR filed its Complaint for eminent domain but as of the year 1978 when it took possession of the property, and that the just compensation, determined as it should be, on the basis of the value of the property as of 1978, as P40.00 per square meter The SC held that the general rule is that the value of the property for just compensation is determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 67 of the RoC

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The SC also held that generally, the time of taking coincides with the filing of the complaint for expropriation and, thus, the value of the property at the time of the filing of the complaint serves as basis o The same general rule applies even if the complaint is made prior to entry into the property However, the SC held that the exception to the rule is where the landowner would be given undue incremental advantages arising from the use to which government devotes the expropriated property o Such as when there is an extra-ordinary increase in the value of the owners land arising from the expropration o In such cases, just compensation is computed on the basis of the entry or the taking of the property and not from the filing of the complaint o Also, in such cases, it is the one claiming the exception to Rule 67 of the RoC who has the burden of proving that its occupancy and use was the direct cause of the increase in valuation and not ordinary inflation and increase in land values ! In this case, petitioner has failed to show why it should be granted an exemption from the general rule, as the records do not show any evidence that the valuation reached was due to increments directly caused by NPCs use of the land Darvin: o If the entry took place before the filing of the complaint, and as a result of whichthe value of the property increased, then the value of the property at the time of the taking shall be basis for computing just compensation, plus legal interest o In all other cases, the value of the property at the time of the filing of the complaint shall be basis o Under the present state of law, the State must make a down payment of 15% of the fair market value based on the tax declaration before entering the property ! Thus, full payment is not required before entry to the property can be effected

-MERALCO V. PINEDA = Board of Commissioners (not more than 3 commissioners indispensable to expropriation proceedings) Respondent Judge, during the expropriation proceedings, arrived at the valuation of P 40.00 per square meter based on a JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT submitted before him and without the reception of evidence before a BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS The SC held that under Section 5, Rule 67 of the RoC, it is provided that upon entry of the order of condemnation, the court shall appoint not more than 3 competent and disinterested persons as Commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken But under Section 8, Rule 67 of the RoC, the court may: o After hearing, accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith o For cause shown, recommit the same to the Commissioners for further report of facts o Set aside the report and appoint new Commissioners o Accept the report in part and reject it in part o Make such order or render judgment as shall secure the property for condemnation and just compensation for the same The SC also held that there are 2 stages in an expropriation proceeding: o The first is concerned with the determination of a) the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and b) the propriety of its exercise o The second is concerned with the determination, by the court, of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken, which is done with the assistance of not more than 3 Commissioners The SC further held that a trial before the BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases, such that it may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all o It is indispensable in order to allow the parties to present evidence regarding just compensation o Though it is true that the findings of the Commissioners are not necessarily binding and may be disregarded by the court, the latter may only do so for valid reasons: ! When the Commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted ! When the Commissioners have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence ! When the amount allowed by the Commissioners is either grossly inadequate or excessive Last but not least, the SC held that prior to the determination of just compensation, the property owners may rightfully demand to withdraw from the deposit made by the condemner o Upon an award of a smaller amount by the court, the property owners are subject to a judgment for the excess

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Upon an award of a larger sum, the property owners are entitled to a judgment for the amount awarded by the court

-LAND BANK V. SPOUSES ORILLA = Partial payment (compensation as correct determination and prompt payment in full) The spouses ORILLA were owners of a lot in BOHOL, which the DAR sought to expropriate and the latter offered compensation based on the valuation made by the LAND BANK ORILLA rejected the valuation and filed an action for the determination of just compensation The SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT agreed that the valuation was too low, increased the same, and granted the motion for execution with the objective of ensuring prompt payment, on account of the advanced age of ORILLA Petitioner asserted that prompt payment has been made, as it has deposited the provisional compensation with an accessible bank, which was subsequently released to ORILLA after complying with the requirements under RA 6657 The SC held that the expropriation of private property under the AGRARIAN REFORM LAW is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, as it is a means to obtain social justice by distributing land to the farmers, envisioning freedom from the bondage to the land they actually till Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator o The true measure of just compensation is the owners loss and not the takers gain o The concept of just compensation embraces: ! The correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land ! Payment within a reasonable time from its taking The SC also held that without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just, inasmuch as the property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land, while being made to wait for a long time before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss o In this case, while prompt payment of just compensation requires the immediate deposit and release to the landowner of the provisional compensation determined by the DAR, the same does not end there, as prompt payment also encompasses the payment in full to the landholders as finally determined by the courts o In other words, it cannot be said that there is already prompt payment of just compensation when there is only a partial payment thereof -----JUDICIAL REVIEW-----The following aspects of the exercise of the power of eminent domain are subject to judicial scrutiny: The adequacy of the compensation The necessity of the taking The public use character of the purpose of the taking -DE KNECHT V. BAUTISTA = EDSA extension into residential area (due process for landowners; arbitrariness is a judicial question) The government, through the DPWH, sought to extend EDSA to ROXAS BLVD. and the said extension was, originally, to pass through CUNETA AVENUE However, subsequently, the DPWH decided to change the course of the extension to make the same pass through FERNANDO REIN and DEL PAN STREETS, which are lined with old and substantial houses, among the owners was DE KNECHT, who sought to enjoin the government from proceeding with the expropriation DE KNECHT assailed the choice of the streets, stating that the condemner may not choose any property he wants and the question of necessity is rests in the discretion of the courts On the other hand, the REPUBLIC stated that it had complied with all the statutory requirements, which entitled it to have immediate possession of the properties The SC held that the government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose what private property should be taken o Jurisprudence has recognized that the failure to meet the exacting standard of due process would constitute a valid objection to the exercise of the power of eminent domain o A landowner is covered by the mantle of protection that due process affords, which is a mandate of reason and frowns upon arbitrariness, whim, or caprice the standard that must be met by governmental agencies in the exercise of whatever competence is entrusted to it o Thus, acts of Congress and the Executive can deny due process only under pain of nullity The SC also held that despite due recognition of the power of Congress to a) designate the particular property to be taken and b) how much thereof may be condemned in the exercise of eminent domain, it is still a judicial question, whether in the exercise of such competence, the party affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice

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In this case, it is odd why the DPWH decided to suddenly change the course of the extension when the previous course through CUNETA was subject to careful study and consideration Likewise, the report of HUMAN SETTLEMENTS COMMISSION showed that the choice of FERNANDO REIN and DEL PAN was indeed arbitrary and ill-advised

-REPUBLIC V. DE KNECHT = BP 340 (supervening events; no longer arbitrary; ways to expropriate property) A few years after the ruling in De Knecht vs. Bautista, the Legislature enacted BP 340, expropriating the same properties along the FERNANDO REIN-DEL PAN STREETS However, it should be pointed out that certain factual changes have taken place, as the government has already acquired, through negotiated sale, 80% to 85% of the said lands from their respective landowners and only a few landowners, including DE KNECHT vigorously opposed o The project was for alleviating traffic congestion, controlling floods, and completing drainage projects of the government DE KNECHT argued that with the decision of SC being final, her rights as determined therein should no longer be disturbed and that the same has become the law of the case between the parties involved The SC held that there was no question that in the De Knecht v. Bautista case, it found that the choice of the said streets was arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval o However, in this case, the social impact that persuaded the SC to consider the extension arbitrary under the previous ruling has already disappeared in this case and DE KNECHT remains as the sole obstacle to the project The SC also held that while it is true that said final judgment becomes the law of the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the REPUBLIC to take private property for public use upon payment of just compensation is provided in the Constitution and in other laws o As such, expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by Government through: ! Voluntary negotiation with the landowners ! Taking appropriate court action ! Passing legislation The SC further held that the De Knecht decision is not an obstacle to Congress in a) thereafter making its own independent assessment of the circumstances then prevailing as to the propriety of undertaking the expropriation of the said properties and b) thereafter enacting the corresponding legislation o In this case, BP 340 was passed based on supervening events that occurred after De Knecht v. Bautista and the SC found justification in proceeding with the expropriation of the FERNANDO REIN-DEL PAN STREETS from EDSA to ROXAS BLVD because if the said properties was not to be taken, traffic will continue to clog EDSA and TAFT intersections and the drainage and flood control programs would be paralyzed. o Thus, in this case, the Legislature no longer acts with arbitrariness in deciding to expropriate Concurring Opinion of Justice Cruz: o BP 340 is not a legislative reversal of the ruling in De Knecht v. Bautista because that case was tried under a different set of facts ! In sustaining BP 340, the SC did so not because it conceded that the lawmakers can nullify its findings in the exercise of its discretion, but it did so because Court itself found the expropriation necessary under the change situation -MANOTOK V. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY = PDs making expropriation automatic (no opportunity to question) LOI 555 and 557 declared the TAMBUNTING ESTATE and ESTERO DE SUNOG-APOG as blighted communities PD 1669 and 1670 declared the said properties expropriated and authorized the NHA to immediately possess and control them The said PDs decreed maximum compensation at P17 million and P8 million for the respective properties, payable in 5 annual installments The 1st annual installments were deposited with the PNB and notice was given to the owners of the said properties President MARCOS also declared that the actions of the NHA pursuant thereto are beyond review by the courts MANOTOK alleged that he has been deprived of his property without due process of law, as the PDs automatically expropriated the properties without giving him a chance to contest the just compensation to which he is entitled On the other hand, the REPUBLIC contended that when Congress or the President, through his law-making power, exercise the power of eminent domain, the public use, necessity, and fixing of just compensation become political questions and must respect the same, unless the decision is clearly and evidently arbitrary

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The SC held that the power of eminent domain is inherent in every State and the provisions of the Constitution pertaining to such power only serve to limit its exercise in order to protect the individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced o The following are the limitations on the exercise of eminent domain: ! The taking must be for a public purpose ! The payment of just compensation must be made ! Due process must be observed in the exercise o In this case, the properties are summarily proclaimed blighted areas and directly expropriated by decree without the slightest resemblance of a hearing or any proceeding whatsoever the expropriation is instant and automatic, which will take effect immediately upon the signing of the PDs o Also, the owners have no opportunity to contest the expropriation, plead their side, or question the amount of payments fixed by the PDs and the decisions of the NHA are expressly declared as beyond the reach of judicial review The SC also held that the due process clause cannot be rendered nugatory every time a specific decree or law orders the expropriation of somebodys property and provides its own peculiar manner of taking the same o Likewise, the courts should not adopt a hands-off policy just because the public use has been ordained as existing by the decree or the just compensation has been fixed and determined beforehand by law o Although due process does not always necessarily demand that a proceeding be had before a court of law, the same still mandates some form of proceeding wherein notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard are given to the owner to protect his property rights The SC further held that the basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain is necessity, which must be of a public character o Modern decisions no longer call for absolute necessity, as it is enough if the condemner can show a reasonable or practical necessity, which, of course, varies with the times and circumstances of each case o In this case, there is no showing as to why the properties involved were singled out for expropriation through PDs or what necessity impelled the particular choices o Also, in expropriations through legislation, the same are attended by debates and deliberations, but the PDs, in this case, were issued by the PRESIDENT without adequate justification o In fact, there is no showing that the said premises are blighted areas, were it not for the declaration of the PRESIDENT In addition, the SC held that private property may not be expropriated for private use, despite full compensation o The legislature may not take the property of one citizen and transfer it to another, when the public interest is not thereby promoted o In every action for expropriation, the Government must prove that the same would be for a public use under the Constitution Last but not least, the SC held that just compensation must be determined either a) at the time of the actual taking by the government or b) at the time of filing the complaint o When the government takes possession before the institution of the condemnation proceedings and, as a result, the value of the property increased, the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession o When the government takes possession that coincides with or is subsequent to the institution of the condemnation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the filing of the complaint ! In this case, the actual taking of the properties occurred in 1980, but the fixing of the maximum amounts of compensation were based on its 1978 valuation

ART III SEC 10 -----CONTRACT CLAUSE-----According to Clemons v. Nolting, a law that impairs the obligation of a contract is one that: Changes the terms of a legal contract between the parties Imposes new conditions Dispenses with the conditions expressed Authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that which is provided in its terms -US. v. Diaz Conde Any law that enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intention of the parties necessarily impairs the contract itself, even when the change in the contract is done by indirection -To come under the Constitutional prohibition:

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The law must effect a change on the rights of the parties with reference to each other and not with reference to non-parties Enactments must be passed by a governmental law-making body

-HOME BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION v. BLAISDELL = Mortgage Moratorium (contract clause not absolute; subject to police power) In order to address an economic crisis, the MINNESOTA MORTGAGE MORATORIUM LAW was passed, allowing parties to a contract to judicially avail of postponement of auction sales or extensions of periods of redemption, but effective only during the existence of the emergency The law was assailed for allegedly impairing the obligation of contracts The MINNESOTA COURT upheld the statute as an emergency measure The US SC held that the prohibition regarding the contract clause in the Constitution is not absolute and is not to be read with literal exactness The US SC defined the obligation of a contract as the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement Under US jurisprudence, the laws that subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract and where it is to be performed, enter into and form part of it as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in its forms o This principle embraces laws that affect contracts in areas of: ! Validity ! Construction ! Discharge ! Enforcement o The ideas of validity and remedy are inseparable and both are parts of the obligation that is guaranteed by the Constitution against invasion ! But under US jurisprudence, the remedy may certainly be modified as the wisdom of the nation shall direct, without impairing the obligation of the contract, such that the obligation of a contract and the remedy given by the legislature to enforce the same are different concepts The US SC also held that the contract clause is qualified by: o The measure of control that the State retains over remedial processes o Authority of the State to safeguard the vital interests of its people The US SC further held that not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of legal order Last but not least, The US held that the State retains adequate power to protect the public against the maintenance of nuisances, despite insistence upon existing contracts o The legislature cannot bargain away with the public health or the public morals o Thus, the economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant protective power, notwithstanding interference with contracts ! In this case, there was an economic emergency to be addressed and the law, which will be effective only for the said limited period, was enacted for the interest of the society. ! Also, the integrity of the mortgage was not impaired, as the conditions and terms attendant to mortgage are preserved, except to the extent that the remedies are slightly modified Darvin: o Since impairment of the obligation of contracts is necessarily an exercise of the police power, the standards of substantive due process are applicable ! Thus, the impairment must be for a valid and lawful purpose, and the means must be reasonable, not arbitrary or oppressive -RUTTER v. ESTEBAN = 8-year moratorium (limits on power; cannot alter substantive rights; propriety of remedy) RA 342 provides debtors in contracts entered into prior to World War 2, who have suffered from the ravages of the said war, a period of 8 years to settle their debts upon filing a claim before the PHILIPPINE WAR DAMAGE COMMISSION and, as a result, the debts cannot be enforced until after the lapse of the said period o The purpose was to enable the pre-war debtors to rehabilitate themselves and to keep them from being victimized by their creditors Based on Blaisdell, the SC held that laws altering existing contracts constitute an impairment within the meaning of the contract clause only if they are unreasonable in light of the circumstances occasioning their enactment o This rule of reason was justified on the theory that all contracts are made subject to an implied reservation of the protective power of the State and, thus, statutes that validly exercise the said reserved power are comprehended within them o However, the SC held that the said laws should be limited to their proper bounds and must be addressed to a legitimate purpose o Thus, the Blaisdell case postulates that the protective power of the State (police power): ! May only be invoked and justified by an emergency, temporary in nature

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Can only be exercised upon reasonable conditions in order that it may not infringe the Constitutional provision against impairment of contracts The SC also held that the limitations are: o The impairment should only refer to the remedy and not to a substantive right ! The State may postpone the enforcement of the obligation, but it cannot destroy it by making the remedy futile o The propriety of the remedy should be considered ! The change that the new legislation desires to write into an existing contract must not be burdened with restrictions and conditions that would make the remedy hardly pursuing The SC further held that changes in the remedies available for the enforcement of a mortgage may not be pressed so far as to cut down the security of the same without moderation or reason, even when the public welfare is invoked as an excuse o Thus, a State is free to regulate the procedure in its courts, even with reference to contracts already made, and moderate extensions of the time for pleading or for trial will ordinarily fall within the power so reserved, but a different situation is presented when extensions are so piled up as to make the remedy a shadow ! In this case, the 8-year period is unreasonable and oppressive ! Also, some of the investments were pending as early as 1941 and coupled with EOs 25 and 32, and the law would require the creditors to wait 12 years before they may claim what is due to them, on top of the fact that the debtor is not even required to pay legal interest ! Moreover, in the context of the prevailing circumstances, development has spurred after the war as evidenced by national economic developments, making the contemplated emergency non-existent !

-ORTIGAS & CO. v. FEATI BANK = EDSA lot (contract clause subject to police power; judicial review only for violation of due process and other constitutional guarantees) ORTIGAS & CO. was selling lots, particularly those of HIGHWAY SUBDIVISION HILLS, along EDSA It sold Lots 5 & 6 PADILLA, who transferred his rights to EMMA CHAVEZ, subject to the condition that the said lots were to be used exclusively for residential purposes and the same was annotated in the TCTs The lots were later acquired by FEATI BANK, which started to build a Bank ORTIGAS sought to enjoin the construction Feati alleged that Resolution 27 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declared the said area a commercial and industrial zone ORTIGAS asserted that the Resolution impairs the obligation of contracts The SC held that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, which expands as civilization advances o The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, property, and business and occupations o The exercise of police power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if its capricious, whimsical, unjust, or unreasonable: ! There being a denial of due process ! There being a violation of any other applicable Constitutional guarantee o In this case, the LOCAL AUTONOMY ACT empowered LGUs to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances and regulations o Also, the Resolution was enacted for a valid purpose, which was to promote the development of the area into a commercial district; and the means used to carry it out were neither arbitrary nor oppressive o Moreover, the lots front EDSA, where industrial and commercial complexes have already flourished as of the filing of the complaint -JUAREZ v. COURT OF APPEALS = Rental regulations (modern trend of private agreements affecting the public welfare) BP 877 was enacted regulating rental rates, especially in urban areas o It prevents the lessor from increasing the rentals arbitrarily, and, at the same time, prevents the lessee from insisting on paying inordinately low rentals The law covered all residential units with a monthly rental less than P480 and applied retroactively JUAREZ assailed its constitutionality on the basis of the contract clause The SC held that the contract clause was particularly useful before in protecting the integrity of private agreements from government meddling, but that was when the said agreements did not affect the community in general o However, as of the moment, more and more interests of the public have become involved in what are supposed to be still private agreements, which, as a result, have been removed from the protection of the contract clause o Instead, the said agreements have come within the embrace of police power

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Thus, as long as the contract affects the public welfare in one way or another so as to require the interference of the State, then police power must be asserted and the same will prevail over the contract clause, in the absence of arbitrariness ! In this case, the SC pointed out that housing is one of the most serious social problems of the country and the lease of residential units affects the public welfare, which calls for the exercise of police power -----REHABILITATION PLAN-----

-A rehabilitation plan approved by statute that merely suspends the actions for claims does not violate the contract clause -The contract clause is a limit on the exercise of legislative power and not of judicial or quasi-judicial power -The government cannot prejudice private rights without due process of law -----FOREST MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT-----Timber licenses, permits, and license agreements are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process clause The same are subject to the power of the State to protect the ecology -----ANNULMENT OF CONTRACTS-----Impairing the obligation of a contract vs. Invalidating a contract Impairing the obligation of a contract affects a valid contract Invalidating a contract declares a contract non-existent o The President can make the initial move of refusing to implement a valid contract, which he considers invalid, pursuant to the faithful execution clause under Section 17, Article 7 o However, the same is subject to judicial review -Contract rights vs. Power to tax With respect to private contracts, the question about the power to tax is irrelevant because a tax law does not alter the relation between the parties With respect to public contracts, the answer must be no because just as the State cannot contract away its police power, so also it cannot contract away its power to tax -Contract rights vs. Freedom of religion The free exercise of religion is superior to contract rights

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ART III SEC 12 -----ORIGIN and RATIONALE-----MIRANDA v. ARIZONA In this case, the US SC examined and discussed the common practice of ominously securing extra-judicial and incriminating confessions from persons under custodial investigation o The accused was placed in a secluded room with no access to the outside, in an obviously police-dominated atmosphere o Interrogators are often directed to use trickery or threat to extract confessions o The persons are misinformed that their refusal to talk may suggest guilt o The person is deprived of any outside support; his will is undermined and he is led into affirming a preconceived story concocted by the police o Many succumb to this tactic and render self-incriminating statements The US SC held that the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant, unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination Custodial investigation is defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way The US SC laid down the following rules to be observed during custodial investigation: o The person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent o That statements he make may be used as evidence against him o That he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed o That he may waiver effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, willingly, and intelligently o There can be no questioning, if he indicates, in any manner and at any stage of the process, that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking o The police may not question him, if the individual is alone and indicates, in any manner, that he does not wish to be interrogated o The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries, until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned The US SC also held that no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice, unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings The US SC further held that the practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with the principle that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself -MAGTOTO v. MANGUERA = Prospectivity not retroactivty Two persons under custodial investigation were not informed of their right to remain silent and to counsel o Extra-judicial admissions were obtained therefrom The SC held that the Constitutional provisions on the right to remain silent and to counsel, as well as the right to be informed of such, are to be applied prospectively because the same are granted for the first time through the 1973 Constitution o Confessions obtained before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, are still admissible as evidence, even if they were presented thereafter and even if there was no compliance with the said Constitutional command o However, if the admissions were obtained after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, the same would be inadmissible, if obtained from one who was not informed of his right to silence and to counsel ! In this case, the investigation took place before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution where no such right had yet existed -PEOPLE v. MAHINAY = Updated rules The following rules must be complied with while the accused is under custodial investigation: o The person arrested, detained, invited, or under custodial investigation must be informed, in a language known to and understood by him, of the reason for his arrest and must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any o He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him o He must be informed that he has a right to be assisted, at all times, and have the presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice o That if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, then one will be provided for him o He must be informed that, whether or not he has a lawyer, no custodial investigation can be conducted, except in the presence of counsel or after a valid waiver has been made

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o o o o

He must be informed that, at any time, he is allowed to confer with his lawyer, immediate family, priest or minister, or be visited or confer with duly accredit national or international NGOs He must be informed that he may waive the said rights voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently That should he waive his right to a lawyer, it must be made in writing and in the presence of counsel, otherwise, the waiver will be void He must be informed that he may refuse, at any time or stage of the process, to answer any question He must be informed that that any previous or initial waiver of such rights is not a bar to invoking them again at any time during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements He must be informed that any statement or evidence obtained in violation of such rules, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, is inadmissible in evidence against him -----WHEN THE RIGHTS BECOME AVAILABLE-----

-PEOPLE v. TAYLARAN = Grandma killer (confession upon voluntary surrender is not contemplated under Section 12) TAYLARAN surrendered to the police and admitted to Pat. Basilad that he killed a certain OFREMIA ATUP (an old woman) because of her alleged vow to kill him through witchcraft o The confession was made even before police investigation could be properly and formally initiated TAYLARAN questioned the admissibility of the said confession for not having complied with the Constitutionally mandated procedure The SC held that the applicability of the Constitutional procedure does not contemplate cases where no written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of a formal custodial investigation o In this case, the statement was not made while under custodial investigation and, hence, the same is admissible and Section 12 does not operate The SC also held that it is but natural for one who surrenders to the police to give reason or explanation for his act for his surrendering o Under such circumstances, the surrenderee is not yet under custodial investigation as within the meaning of Section 12 o Also, what was testified to is only what TAYLARAN told the police upon surrendering to them -PEOPLE v. MARCOS MARCOS maintained that his extra-judicial confession is inadmissible as evidence against him because the same was obtained from him without the assistance of counsel He also averred that although he waived his right to counsel, the same is without legal effect as it was made without the assistance of a lawyer The SC held that that Constitutional guarantee of Section 12 does not operate when the accused is not under police custody o In this case, MARCOS was merely invited for questioning so he can shed light on the kidnapping of Benedict o Also, MARCOS was even allowed to go home after the investigation -PEOPLE v. RAPEZA = Illiterate (requisites for extra-judicial confession to be admissible; RA 7438) An unidentified woman reported a killing that had taken place in SITIO CAWA-CAWA, PALAWAN An investigating team was sent to the victims house, where they saw the bloodied bodies of a man and a woman Upon information supplied by a certain DELA CRUZ that RAPEZA wanted to confess to the crime, the team set out to search for the latter SPO2 GAPAS found RAPEZA fishing and invited the latter for questioning RAPEZA expressed his willingness to confess in the presence of a lawyer, so he was brought to the house of ATTY. REYES, where SPO2 GAPAS conducted the custodial investigation o An INTERPRETER was also present because RAPEZA was not well-versed in Tagalog Also, because RAPEZA was illiterate, he affixed only his thumb mark on the statement above his printed name During trial, RAPEZA presented a different story and claims that he did not know the victims, as well as that his thumb mark was obtained through violence and intimidation RAPEZA claimed that he was not informed of his rights and that ATTY. REYES was not his personal choice The SC held that a confession is admissible in evidence if its satisfactorily shown to have been obtained within the limits imposed by Section 12 o Moreover, RA 7438 has reinforced the Constitutional mandate to protect the rights of persons under custodial investigation o Custodial investigation includes the practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have

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committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any violation of the law ! In this case, RAPEZA did not voluntarily surrender, but was invited by the police and at that moment, he should have been informed of his Constitutional rights, as he was already considered a suspect The SC also held that for an extra-judicial confession to be admissible: o The confession must be voluntary o The confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the confessants choice o The confession must be express o The confession must be in writing The SC further held that in order to comply with the Constitutional mandates, there should be meaningful communication to and understanding of his rights by the appellant, as opposed to a routine, peremptory, and meaningless recital thereof o Since comprehension is the objective, the degree of explanation required will necessarily depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing investigation ! In this case, even if SPO2 GAPAS did inform RAPEZA of his rights, there is no showing that the latter actually understood the same, as he was illiterate

-PEOPLE v. JUDGE AYSON = PAL investigation (custodial investigation) Felipe Ramos was a PAL TICKET FREIGHT CLERK and he was investigated for irregularities in the sale of plane tickets He executed a handwritten statement during the investigation saying that he is willing to settle the irregularities charged against him The statement was not executed in the presence of or with the assistance of a lawyer, nor was he informed of his right to remain silent and on the basis thereof, he was then charged for estafa RAMOS assailed the validity of the statements he made during the administrative investigation for violating his right against self-incrimination and his Miranda Rights The SC held that the right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceedings o The right is not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself ! It prescribes an option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry o It simply secures to a witness the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question, which is one where the answer to which as a tendency to incriminate him for some crime o However, the right cannot be claimed at any other time, except only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness o In fact, the Constitution does not impose any duty on the judge or any other officer presiding over a trial, hearing, or investigation, any obligation to advise a witness of his right against self-incrimination ! As such, the right against self-incrimination is not automatically operation and it must be claimed On the other hand, the rights under custodial investigation apply to persons under investigation for the commission of an offense, that is, persons who are suspects under investigation by police authorities o Custodial investigation is defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way o Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in a crime is within the scope of Constitutional protection, as if the same is not made under custodial interrogation or under investigation for the commission of an offense, the statement if not protected o With respect to a defendant in a criminal case already pending in court, there is no occasion to speak of his right under custodial investigation because the same no longer exists Thus, while the right against self-incrimination may be invoked during civil, administrative, or criminal proceedings, the Miranda Rights apply only to persons under custodial investigation for the commission of offenses o In this case, the statement was not made under custodial investigation; thus is not protected by the Miranda Doctrine o Also, RAMOS even voluntarily answered the said questions during the administrative investigation The SC also held that: o Before the case is filed in court, but after having been taking into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, the accused has the right: ! To remain silent

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To counsel To be informed of the said rights Not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means that vitiates free will ! To have evidence obtain in violation of these rights as inadmissible After the case is filed in court: ! To refuse to be a witness ! Not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal ! To testify on his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution While testifying: ! To refuse to answer a specific question that tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted ! ! !

-PEOPLE v. MARRA = Spontaneous statement SGT. DE VERA reported to the crime scene to conduct an investigation and was informed that a man wearing a security guards uniform perpetrated the incident He was directed to MARRA who was eating in a nearby carinderia MARRA informed DE VERA that his gun was at his house They proceeded to the house and DE VERA asked MARRA why he killed TANDOC, but the later initially denied Eventually, though, he admitted the same and claimed self-defense, but during which, he was not assisted by counsel nor was he informed of his Miranda Rights MARRA questioned he admissibility of the admission The SC defined custodial investigation as any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way o Section 12 operates only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, such that the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements ! In this case, MARRA was not under custodial investigation when he made the statement and, thus, they are admissible in evidence, even if MARRA has not been informed of his rights ! Also, MARRA was never subjected to any form of restraint and he could have refused to answer the questions at the outset ! Moreover, he made statement spontaneously when DE VERA was merely probing the possibilities The SC held that under jurisprudence, a spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary manner is admissible Darvin: o In this case, MARRA was not deprived of liberty and he made the confession spontaneously -PEOPLE v. MAQUEDA MAQUEDA was prosecuted for the commission of an offense and evidence adduced against him included (1) a Sinumpaang Salaysay as well as (2) extra-judicial admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor ZARATE for the purpose of negotiating his privileges as a possible state witness The SALAYSAY was not made in the presence of counsel and was executed after MAQUEDA had been arrested and prior to arraignment The SC held that there is a difference between admission and confession o In confession, there is an acknowledgement of guilt ! According to Wharton, a confession is an acknowledgement, in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilty of the crime charged o Admission is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused that do not directly involve an acknowledgement of his guilty or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he charged ! Wharton defines admission as statements by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt o In this case, the SALAYSAY was an extra-judicial admission The SC held that the exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel, as well as to be informed thereof, are not confined to the period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information, but are available even at that stage where a person is under investigation for the commission of an offense o In other words, Section 12 does not cease just because a criminal complaint or information has been filed o Thus, as opposed to People vs. Judge Ayson, that the Miranda Rights cover not only custodial investigations, but also apply to persons not in custody at any time prior to arraignment

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In this case, the Sinumpaang Salaysay, executed prior to arraignment, is inadmissible as evidence for not having been executed with assistance from counsel However, the admissions before the PROSECUTOR are admissible, as they were made freely and voluntarily and not during the course of an investigation, but merely for the purpose negotiating immunity as a state witness

-PEOPLE v. BALISTEROS = Miranda rights are personal GALVANTE executed a sworn statement under pressure categorically admitting guilt without the assistance of counsel and in the presence of the opposing counsel, the brothers of the deceased (whom he allegedly killed), and a stranger The appellants (also accused) assailed the validity of GALVANTEs confession as having been made in violation of the Miranda Rights The SC held that the objection can only be raised by the confessant or the person whose rights have been violated, and not by other persons o Thus, the right, as provided by Section 12, is a personal right Darvin: o An extra-judicial admission or confession made by the confessant in violation of the Miranda Rights is inadmissible as evidence against him (confessant), but is admissible against other persons

-----POLICE LINE-UPS-----GAMBOA v. JUDGE CRUZ = Vagrancy (police line-up) Gamboa was arrested and detained without warrant for vagrancy He was lined up together with 5 detainees and complainant BERNAL pointed to him saying, that ones a companion. He was then made to sit down in front of the complainant, while the latter was being interrogated The line-up was made without the presence of counsel and, thus, its validity is being assailed The SC held that the right to counsel attaches upon the start of investigation, which is the time when the officers start to interrogate and elicit information or confessions from the accused o At such point, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of exhorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense o In other words, any person under investigation, must be assisted by counsel and while the right may be waived, the same shall not be valid, unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel The SC also held that the police line-up is not a part of the custodial inquest, and, hence, no right to counsel yet attaches o In this case, GAMBOA did not have to give any statement to the police nor was he interrogated, as it was actually the complainant who was being interrogated by the police o Thus, the police did not, at that stage, exact a confession to be used against him Under US jurisprudence, the Constitutional rule requiring the exclusion of evidence derived from out-of-court identification procedures conducted in the absence of counsel did not apply to pre-indictment identifications o The exclusionary rule relating to out-of-court identifications in the absence of counsel did not apply to identification testimony based upon a police station showup, which took place before the accused had been indicted or otherwise formally charged with any criminal offense Darvin: o However, the moment that there is even a slight move to elicit information, as in an accusatory process, then the accused should then be assisted by counsel -PEOPLE v. LOVERIA = Hold-up (police line-up) Upon learning that certain hold-up men were being detained, MANZANERO proceeded to the detention facility and identified to PAT. BILL AYUN the perpetrator LOVERIA during a police line-up He made a sworn statement to that effect, which was presented in court Custodial investigation is defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way

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The SC held that the right to counsel of a person under custodial investigation cannot be invoked until such time that the police investigators start questioning, interrogating, or exacting a confession from the person under investigation o In this case, LOVERIA was not yet entitled to counsel when he was in the process of being identified, because at that time he was not being interrogated

-PEOPLE v. HATTON = Police line-up may be part of custodial investigation, but not in this case Hatton was subjected to a police line-up and invoked US vs. Wade in asserting that his Miranda Rights, particularly to counsel, were violated o In the case of US vs. Wade, a lawyer was present during the police line-up to be identified by the prosecution witness The SC held, based on Wade, that the presence of counsel is indispensable in a postindictment line-up, where the accused had already been arrested and a lawyer already appointed to represent him o In Wade, even if Wade was subjected to a police line-up, the same was already part of the custodial investigation because he was also being interrogated and, thus, his right to counsel accrued o Also, it was conducted 15 days after he had been arrested According to Escobedo v. Illinois of the US Federal SC, when the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory, as when police investigation does not elicit a confession, the accused may not yet avail of the services of his lawyers o In this case, HATTON was only brought for the purpose of identification by a witness for the killing of ALGARME -PEOPLE v. FRAGO FRAGO was identified by a certain JOCELYN during a police line-up composed of 10 men, most of them were mustachioed He invoked People vs. Hassan, asserting that he ought to have been assisted by counsel during the police line-up. The SC held that in the Hassan Case, there was a peculiar factual milieu, as HASSAN was the only person brought for identification, which was held in the funeral parlor, amidst the grieving relatives of the victim o The SC held it to be as tainted as an uncounselled confession because what purported to be a mere identification was actually a confrontation and, hence, HASSAN had the right to counsel o To put it briefly, the Hassan case was attended by exceptional and anomalous circumstance o In this case, there was nothing to show that during the police line-up, the police sought to extract any information from FRAGO and, hence, his right to counsel had yet to accrue Darvin: o From the foregoing we deduce the general rule that police line-ups are not part of custodial investigation because the accused is not asked questions nor is any information elicited from him ! Basically, he just has to be identified But from the moment he is interrogated or asked questions pertaining to the crime, the right to counsel attaches -PEOPLE v. GAMBOA = Paraffin test Gamboa was subjected to a paraffin test to determine if he indeed had fired a gun and the results turned out positive GAMBOA asserted that he should have been assisted by counsel and that it amounts to self-incrimination The SC held that the rights against self-incrimination, as well as the right to remain silent and to have counsel, extend only to testimonial compulsion, and not when the body of the accused is examined -PEOPLE v. LINSANGAN = Marked money vs. Marijuana sale LINSANGAN initialed the P10.00 bills found tucked in his waist without the presence of counsel He acquired the marked money from the sale of marijuana during a buy-bust operation The SC held that law enforcers are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary. o In this case, LINSANGANs possession of the marked bills did not constitute the crime, as what constituted the crime was his act of selling marijuana o Thus, his right against self-incrimination was not violated by his possession of the marked bills -PEOPLE v. DE LAS MARINAS = Receipt signed by the accused

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DE LAS MARINAS and TORRES were made to sign a RECEIPT FOR PROPERTY SEIZED, acknowledging that they are the owners of the things seized in connection with the commission of a felony The SC held that the act was a clever ruse and a clear violation of the right to remain silent because it had the effect of an extra-judicial confession of the commission of the offense, albeit not verbally expressed o In this case, by signing the receipt, the accused practically admitted possessing certain articles in connection with an offense o As such, the accused was made to admit the commission of the offense without informing him of his Constitutional rights o Also, it should be the police who should have signed the receipts and not the accused

-PEOPLE v. ENRIQUE = Signed marijuana sticks During investigation, ENRIQUE was made to sign his name on rolled marijuana cigarettes without the assistance of counsel On the other hand, the arresting officers argued that the gesture was done voluntarily by ENRIQUE However, the arresting officers did not exert any effort to inform him of his Miranda Rights The SC held that the appellants act amounted to an admission of his culpability in violation of the Constitution and such admission is, therefore, inadmissible as evidence -PEOPLE v. BANDIN = Booking sheet BANDIN was arrested for possession of drugs He signed the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report at the police station, as well as the Receipt of Property Seized without the assistance of counsel The SC held that when an arrested person signs a Booking Sheet and Arrest Report at a police station, he does not admit the commission of an offense nor confess to any incriminating circumstance o The Booking Sheet is merely a statement of the accuseds being booked as well as the date of his arrest. o It is a police report and may be useful in charges of arbitrary detention against the police themselves o The Booking Sheet is not an extra-judicial statement and cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction The SC also held that as regards the signature on the Receipt of Property Seized, the same was tantamount to an admission because mere possession of drugs is a crime in itself o The act was tantamount to an extra-judicial and uncounselled admission made in clear violation of the Bill of Rights -----RIGHT TO COUNSEL-----ESTACIO v. SANDIGANBAYAN = Last minute arrival of lawyer While ESTACIO was under investigation, he was briefed by the investigator of his rights under custodial investigation When asked if he wished to waive the said rights, he agreed, and proceeded to sign a waiver o He then proceeded to make certain extra-judicial statements Then, his lawyer, at the last minute, arrived, read the waiver, and confirmed with ESTACIO whether he indeed sought to waive his rights o ESTACIO confirmed the waiver The SC held that while the accused was validly informed of his rights, the waiver was initially invalid for having been made without the presence of counsel o However, in this case, when his counsel arrived at the last minute and he signed the waiver in his presence, the defect was cured o Thus, the statements were held admissible as evidence. Darvin: o This ruling no longer holds under the present state of law ! Counsel must be present at every stage of the investigation and not only during the closing stages -PEOPLE v. DE JESUS = When the right to counsel accrues TUPAZ and DE JESUS were turned over to the investigating officer by the CID for investigation They were interrogated without the presence of counsel for a certain robbery hold-up with homicide The facts and statements were reduced in writing and signed in the presence of a CLAO lawyer, ATTY. SALDIVAR The SC held that the right to counsel attaches upon the start of the custodial investigation, when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information or confessions from the accused.

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In this case, there was a violation of the right to counsel and thus, evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible

-PEOPLE v. BOLANOS = Confession on board police jeep While BOLANOS and MAGTIBAY were boarded in the police jeep and on their way to the station, BOLANOS was asked about the killing and he confessed killing the victim The same went on to be the only evidence relied upon to convict BOLANO The SC held that being under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional rights under Section 12 o In this case, while being on board the jeep, BOLANO was already considered to be under custodial investgation o Also, given that the extra-judicial confession is inadmissible, the accused must be acquitted. Darvin: o From the moment the accused is, in any way, significantly deprived of liberty, he cannot be asked questions, unless he is assisted by counsel and was well informed of his rights under Section 12. ! Otherwise, any confession or admission made by him is inadmissible -PEOPLE v. LUCERO = Laywer left during investigation While LUCERO was under custodial investigation, he was provided with a lawyer from the CIS Legal Department, ATTY. PERALTA PERALTA explained all his rights under custodial investigation and stated that even had he made certain statements therein, he could still refuse to sign the same o PERALTA gathered the impression that Lucero understood But when the investigation started, PERALTA left to attend a wake, but gave word that should he be needed, he could be reached at his residence The next day, LUCERO, accompanied by CIS agents arrived at PERALTAs residence, carrying a signed statement by LUCERO PERLATA explained the implications of such statements, but LUCERO nevertheless consented thereto Later, LUCERO claimed that he signed the statement under duress and in the absence of his lawyer, which is in violation of his constitutional rights The SC held that the Constitution requires a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be provided with counsel o The right to counsel has been constitutionalized because of hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect o Force and fraud tarnish confessions and render them inadmissible The SC also held that when the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it means effective and vigilant counsel and not just any kind of counsel o In this case, PERALTA left the accused during the most crucial point of the investigation, which resulted to an uncounselled confession The SC further held that the right to counsel attaches from the start of the investigation, which is the point in time when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions o In this case, Lucero was practically denied his right to competent legal counsel -PEOPLE v. PAROJINOG = Choice of lawyer (acquiescence) PAJORINOG, who was arrested for triple murder, claimed that the lawyer assigned to him, ATTY. FUENTES, was not of his choice and was only forced upon him The evidence, however, reveals that FUENTES was nevertheless with him throughout the investigation and PAJORINOG complained about the matter only during trial The SC held that a person under investigation for the commission of an offense may choose his own counsel, but if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one While the initial choice of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators when the accused cannot afford the services of counsel, the latter still has the final choice, as he may reject the counsel chosen and ask for a new lawyer o However, in this case, all throughout the proceedings, the accused never voiced any objection as to the choice of his counsel o Thus, he acquiesced to the choice of the investigators and raised the matter only during trial, which was too late. Darvin: o From the foregoing, it is clear that while, generally, the choice of counsel devolves upon the accused, investigators may provide him with counsel if he consents thereto o If he distrusts the counsel appointed, he has the right to refuse and may request counsel of his own choosing o However, if he acquiesces or does not object to the counsel appointed, and the latter performs his duties properly, the accused cannot, all of a sudden, aver that his right to choice of counsel was violated

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Definitely, the matter cannot be raised only during trial

-PEOPLE v. PAMON = Lawyer appointed by investigator PAMON asserted that ATTY. LIGORIO was not his choice of counsel and that he was forced to sign a paper, which turned out to be a letter to LIGORIO LIGORIO, however, was present during the time when PAMONs confession was made and sworn to and has participated during the investigation The SC held that the Constitutional mandate is that, as a general rule, the counsel present must not be just any counsel, but one who has been chosen by the accused o No in custody investigation shall be conducted, unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested ! By any person in his behalf ! Appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by someone in his behalf The SC also held that where investigators provide for counsel, the confession taken in the presence of such counsel is inadmissible as evidence because it fails to satisfy the Constitutional guarantee o However, there are exceptions to the said doctrine o Where the counsel has been appointed by the investigators with the conformity of the confessant, the latters confession is considered as valid and binding upon him o In other words, the rule is otherwise if the accused acquiesced to the choice of counsel ! In this case, PAMON never signified that he had a lawyer of choice and, hence, he was merely provided with one and he clearly acquiesced thereto -PEOPLE v. BAELLO While BAELLO was under custodial investigation, he stated that he could not afford the services of a lawyer and, hence, he was provided with one in ATTY. GENEROSO. No objection was voiced by BAELLO during the entire proceedings GENEROSO informed him in detail of his rights and the implications of his confessions He even advised against such, but Baello insisted in confessing to robbery BAELLO later on asserted that he was not fully and duly assisted by counsel engaged by him The SC held that every lawyer is presumed to have knowledge of the law, as well as the training in procedure o In this case, BAELLOs failure to request for new counsel during the proceedings negates his claim for denial of the right to choose his lawyer In People v. Pinzon, the SC held that by said acceptance, the Attorney became the appellants counsel of choice and the fact that appellant had no previous acquaintance with the said Attorney did not render null and void appellants confession -PEOPLE v. AGUSTIN = Lawyer foisted upon accused AGUSTIN, a farmer who understood only ILOCANO, was unlawfully arrested by military officers and was taken into custody for investigation He asserted that he wished to be assisted by counsel and, automatically, Atty. CAJUCOM was foisted upon him and was to represent him CAJUCOM was an associate of the prosecutor in charge of interrogating him, but, nevertheless, CAJUCOM informed him of his rights, but in English and Tagalog Also, AGUSTIN was interrogated in the presence of military officers An extra-judicial confession was extracted under threat where he attested that he knew a certain Jun and Sonny and had participated in the crime The SC held that when what is involved is the issue of admissibility of evidence under Section 12, the distinction between confession and admission is irrelevant because Section 12(3) refers to both The SC also held that under the 1987 Constitution: o The right to counsel means not just any counsel, but a competent and independent counsel, preferable of the accuseds own choice o The right to remain silent and to counsel can only be waived in writing and in the presence of counsel o The rule on inadmissibility expressly includes admissions and not just confessions The SC further held that in custodial investigations, the party to be investigated has the final choice of counsel and may reject the counsel chosen for him by the investigator and ask for another o However, in this case, AGUSTIN was not even asked if he had a lawyer of his own choice or whether or not he can afford to hire one, but the FISCAL clearly suggested the availability of CAJUCOM o Thus, CAJUCOM could not have possibly been voluntarily and intelligently accepted by the accused o Also, it is even doubtful if he understood CAJUCOMs briefings in English and Tagalog -PEOPLE v. GUILLERMO GUILLERMO was sentenced to death for the murder of a certain KEYSER

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Upon being arrested he was only made to read his rights posted in the wall and he was not provided counsel because it was a Sunday and there were no lawyers in touch Also, there was no showing of any waiver of the said rights other than the fact that he said, he regrets nothing. These facts are actually affirmed upon testimony by the arresting officer SPO1 REYES The SC held that for evidence to be admissible: o The confession must be made voluntarily o The confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel o The confession must be express o The confession must be in writing ! In this case, the arresting officers made no serious effort to comply with the constitutional requirements ! Also, there was no showing that Guillermo waived his rights, but even if he so intended, the waiver is still invalid because it was not made in the presence of counsel The SC also held that even if the admission or confession of an accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even it had been voluntarily given The SC further held that the right of a person under interrogation to be informed implies: o A correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain o An effective communication that results in an understanding of what is conveyed ! Absent such understanding, there is a denial of the right to be informed, as it cannot be said that the person has been truly informed of his rights ! Thus, ceremonial shortcuts in the communication of abstract Constitutional principles ought not be allowed for it diminishes the liberty of the person facing custodial investigation However, the SC recognized that the Constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation do not apply to: o Spontaneous statements o Those elicited through questioning by law enforcement authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the appellant verbally admits to having committed the offense ! Thus, Section 12 is meant to preclude the slightest use of the States coercive power that would lead an accused to admit something false, but it is not intended to prevent him from freely and voluntarily admitting the truth outside of the sphere of such power In this case, assuming that his extra-judicial admissions during custodial investigation are inadmissible, GUILLERMO spontaneously made confessions to private individuals and such evidence is admissible

-PEOPLE v. MOJELLO The SC held that when the accused is granted the right to counsel preferably of his own choice, it does not mean that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent lawyers from handling the defense o Otherwise, the tempo of custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused, who can impede or obstruct the progress of interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest The SC also held that while the initial choice is lodged with the investigators in the event that the accused cannot afford the services of counsel or where his preferred lawyer is not available, the final choice is still with the accused. o Thus, a lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection against the counsels appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer -PEOPLE v. SAYABOC SAYABOC was convicted for the murder of GALAM During the custodial investigation, he was represented by PAO lawyer ATTY. CORNEJO, who remained silent during the entire proceedings o As a result, SAYABOC made extra-judicial admissions that led to his conviction The SC held that extra-judicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary, provided that the prosecution is able to show that all the constitutional safeguards have been strictly complied with o Thus, even if the confession may appear to have been given voluntarily since the confessant did not file charges against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment, the failure to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation renders the confession valueless and inadmissible

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The SC also held that the right to be informed requires the transaction of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract Constitutional principle, such that it should allow the suspect to consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he might make of these rights The SC further held that the right to a competent and independent counsel means that the counsel should satisfy himself, during the conduct of the investigation, that the suspect understands the import and consequences of answering the questions propounded o According to People v. Deniega, the desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing questioning o If the advice given is so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired ! But that is not to say that a counsel should try to prevent an accused from making a confession ! However, counsel should be able, throughout the entire investigation, to explain the nature of the questions by conferring with his client and halting the investigation should the need arise ! The duty of a lawyer includes ensuring that the suspect under custodial investigation is aware that the right of an accused to remain silent may be invoked at any time o In this case, SAYABOC was not afforded his right to competent legal counsel o It is CORNEJOs task to make SAYABOC aware of the consequences of his actions at each stage of the proceeding o SAYABOC should be aware when his client ought to remain silent and advise the same, but, in this case, CORNEJO just remained silent

-PEOPLE v. MARLENE OLERMO OLERMO was first represented by ATTY. DOMINGO, since YUSECO, her counsel of choice, was in Cagayan During subsequent trials, she was represented de officio by PEREZ, because her preferred lawyers were likewise unavailable This prejudiced her case and she then asserted that she was deprived her right to competent legal counsel because her lawyers were not familiar with her case The SC held that the right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the appellant to admit something false However, preferably of his own choice does not preclude other equally competent lawyers from handling his case/defense o Otherwise, the accused could impede the judicial process by choosing lawyers who are unavailable -----INDEPENDENT COUNSEL-----Competent and independent counsel If counsel is a member of the Bar, then it can be presumed that he is competent For independence to be satisfied, the counsel must not have an interest that is adverse to that of the accused -----RIGHT TO BE INFORMED-----PEOPLE v. PINLAC The right to be informed is complied with not merely by mechanically and ceremonially reciting to the accused the Constitutional provisions, but the investigator must also explain the effects of the same in simple and practical terms o In other words, the accused must be made to understand the implications of his actions The rights of persons under custodial investigation are reiterated as follows: o The reason for his arrest and must be shown the warrant o His right to remain silent o His right to counsel, preferably of his own choice o That if he has no lawyer, one will be provided for him o That no custodial investigation can be conducted except in the presence of counsel o That at any time he is allowed to confer w/ his lawyer, immediate family, priest, etc. o His right to waive the said rights knowingly and intelligently o That should he waive such right, it must be made in writing and in the presence of counsel o That he may refuse, at any stage of the process, to answer interrogations o That any previous waiver of such rights is not a bar to invoking them again at any time o That any evidence obtained in violation of such rules is inadmissible

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The SC also held that the FISCAL has the duty to adduce evidence that there was compliance with the duties of an interrogating officer because it is the obligation of the investigating officer to inform a person under investigation of his right to remain silent and to counsel o Thus, it is the duty of the prosecution to affirmatively establish compliance by the investigating officer with his said obligation o Absent such affirmative showing, the admission or confession made by a person under investigation cannot be admitted in evidence o In People v. Ramos, the accused was appraised of his Constitutional rights, but for the reason that the prosecution failed to show that the same were explained to him, it could not be said that the appraisal was sufficiently manifested and intelligently understood -----WAIVER-----

-The rights under Section 12 cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel Thus, where there are no lawyers, the State must bring the accused to a place where there is one -The contention comes too late where an appellants contention that he was not appraised of his rights was raised only after: A valid information has been filed The accused arraigned Trial commenced and completed, and Judgment of conviction render

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ART III SEC 13 -----RIGHT TO BAIL-----PEOPLE v. NITCHA = A matter of right vs. a matter of discretion The SC held that the subsistence of a bail bone is no legal obstacle to immediate incarceration after promulgation of a Decision involving a felony punishable by reclusion perpetua o In other words, even if the accused has posted bail, once the Decision of conviction is promulgated, the accused is subject to re-incarceration Under Section 13, Article 3 of the Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules, as amended: o Before conviction, bail is either: ! A matter of right When the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua To this extent, the right is absolute ! A matter of discretion When the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a matter of right Discretion refers to the courts discretion to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong The SC also held that if an accused charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the RTC and sentenced to suffer a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor a matter of discretion on the part of the court o Because in such a situation, the RTC would already have determined: ! That the evidence of guilt it strong ! That the accuseds guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt o Thus, bail must not be granted during the pendency of appeal from the judgment of conviction Darvin: o Under the present state of law, when the case is on appeal, bail becomes a matter of discretion -CARDINES v. ROSETE = Old law regarding life imprisonment vs. ADM. CIR. 12-94 JUDGE ROSETE is being charged for misconduct and for ignorance of the law for granting bail to ERLIE AND EMILIO CLARO, both charged for illegal recruitment in large scale, constituting economic sabotage, punishable by life imprisonment under the LABOR CODE ROSETE, on the other hand, contended that under Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a person charged with an offense penalized by life imprisonment should be granted bail as a matter of right The applicable law then was the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that the only exceptions for denying the right to bail are a) offenses punishable by capital punishment or reclusion perpetua and b) evidence of guilt must be strong in both cases o The SC agreed that under the old rule, life imprisonment was not among one of the exceptions and, thus, in this case, the accused are entitled to bail The SC held that life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua are not synonymous o Life imprisonment is invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized by SPECIAL LAWS, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed under the RPC o Life imprisonment does not carry with it any accessory penalty, while reclusion perpetua carries accessory penalties o Life imprisonment does not appear to have any definite extent or duration, while reclusion perpetua entails incarceration for at least 30 years, after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon However, the SC held that under ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR 12-94, which took effect on 1 October 1994, amending Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, now provides that when the evidence of guilt is strong, the person is not entitled to bail as a matter of right if charged with an offense with the following penalties: ! Death ! Reclusion perpetua ! Life imprisonment o Thus, for a person charged therewith, admission to bail is addressed to the sound discretion of the court depending on whether the evidence of guilt is strong o The prosecution, in such cases, which has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong, must be accorded an opportunity to present such evidence that the court shall consider in its determination of whether or not the accused should be granted bail o Judicial discretion, in such cases, must be within the confines of procedural due process, i.e., after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution

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-PADERANGA v. COURT OF APPEALS = Under custody; constructive custody When ROXAS was implicated for multiple murder, his counsel was PADERNGA, his former employer Strangely, ROXAS implicated PADERANGA, alleging that he was the mastermind behind the Bucag Massacre An arrest warrant was issued for PADERANGA, but before the same can be served, he filed a Motion for Admission to Bail But he was then confined in a hospital, manifested that he was submitting himself to the custody of the law, and the prosecution offered no objection He managed to appear before the court to post bail as well as attend the hearings in connection therewith The CA, on the other hand, argued that at the time of PADERANGAs application for bail, he was not yet in the custody of law The SC held that under Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, bail is defined as the security given for the release of a person in the custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearing before any court as required under the conditions specified in the said Rule o The main purpose of bail is to: ! Relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction ! Secure his appearance at the trial o Thus, as bail is intended to secure ones provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody over him has been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by: ! Lawful arrest ! Voluntary surrender o Thus, only those who have been either arrested, detained, or otherwise deprived of their freedom, will ever have the occasion to seek the protective mantle extended by the right to bail ! But the person seeking provisional release need not wait for a formal complaint or information to be filed against him In this case, while it is true that PADERANGA posted bail before he was actually arrested, nevertheless, given the factual circumstances, he was constructively under custody He voluntarily submitted himself to the custody of the law and the jurisdiction of the RTC A person is considered to be in the custody of law when: o He is arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest or by warrantless arrest o He has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities The SC also held that under jurisprudence, when the person has actually posted a bail bond, which was accepted the court, he has effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court over his person The SC further held that the right to bail may be waived considering its personal nature Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the RTC of a criminal offense, an accused is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the exceptions thereto being the instances where the penalty is either capital punishment, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, where the evidence of guilt is strong o Under the general rule, upon proper application for admission to bail, the court having custody of the accused should grant the same after a hearing conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 114 o Under the exception, a hearing is mandatory in nature, whether summary or otherwise, required with the participation of both the defense and the prosecution to specifically ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of the applicant ! But the burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required quantum ! The prosecution is also entitled to due process and, thus, it must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable amount of time, all the evidence that it may want to introduce before the court may resolve the application ! When the court eventually issues its Order, whether favorable or adverse to the accused, the same should contain: A summary of evidence of the prosecution Conclusion as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong ! The court cannot rely on mere affidavits or recitals of their contents, as these represent only hearsay evidence and, thus, are insufficient to establish the quantum of evidence that the law requires -YAP v. COURT OF APPEALS = Excessive bail

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YAP was convicted by the RTC for estafa, but he appealed the Decision and prayed for provisional liberty pending appeal The CA required him to post bail amounting to P5.5 million corresponding to the amount he allegedly embezzled, as well as to secure a certification from the Mayor that he was a resident of the area in which he resides, and that should he transfer, he should inform the Court and the complainant YAP prayed that the amount be reduced to P40,000 according to the Bail Bond Guide, but the CA denied his petition o The apparent rationale of the CA is to prevent him from leaving the country during the pendency of the case considering that he himself admitted having gone out several times The SC held that the prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution and, according to jurisprudence, imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail, such that the SC will not hesitate to exercise its supervisory powers over the lower courts should the latter, after holding the accused entitled to bail, effectively deny the same by: o Imposing a prohibitory sum o Exacting unreasonable conditions ! In this case, although the SC conceded that an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, P5.5 million was unreasonable, and thus, the bail bond was reduced to 200k

-NARCISCO v. STA. ROMANA-CRUZ = Duties of the judge NARCISO was charged with parricide, punishable by reclusion perpetua He was granted bail by the RTC only ten minutes after he filed his motion to post bail, to which the prosecution objects The SC held that under jurisprudence, the judge has the duty to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong in such cases where the grant of bail is discretionary o The prosecution has the burden of showing the evidence of guilt against the accused, but the determination of whether or not the same is strong is a matter of judicial discretion and remains with the judge o The said discretion may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing, where the petitioner has the right to cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal o A hearing, whether summary or otherwise, is mandatory in order to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong o The course of inquiry in such hearing may be left to the discretion of the court, which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters and avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and crossexamination o The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases Summary hearing is defined as such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing, which is simply to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail o In this case, ten minutes could not have possibly been sufficient to receive or evaluate any evidence o Thus, the judge practically denied the complainant the opportunity to be heard, in violation of due process The SC also held that the following are the duties of the trial judge in an application for bail when the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, capital punishment, or life imprisonment: o To inform the prosecutor of the heading for the application for bail or require him to submit a recommendation o To conduct a hearing, regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses or fails to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong o Decide whether the evidence of guilt is strong based on the summary of evidence presented by the prosecution o Approve or deny provisional liberty based on the strength of the evidence -PEOPLE v. CABRAL = Evident proof; Presumption great CABRAL was charged with rape qualified with the use of deadly weapon, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death The grant of bail is, thus, discretionary upon the court depending on whether evidence of guilt is strong The SC held that when the grant of bail is discretionary, the same is dependent on whether the evidence of guilt is strong, which the lower court should called for the purpose o The test is not whether the evidence establishes proof beyond reasonable doubt, but rather whether the evidence shows evident guilt or great presumption of guilt depending on the facts, circumstances, and evidence presented

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Evident proof means clear and strong evidence, which leads a well-guarded and dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been committed, that the accused is the guilty agent, and that he will be punished capitally if the law is administered Presumption great exists when the circumstances testified to are such that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of any other conclusion The SC also held that the SC would not hesitate to reverse the RTCs findings regarding whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, if found to be done with GADALEJ

-SERAPIO v. SANDIGANBAYAN The SANDIGANBAYAN erred in ordering the arraignment of SERAPIO before proceeding with the hearing for bail The SC held that the arraignment of an accused is not a pre-requisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender An accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail The SC also held that an accused may apply for an be granted bail even prior to arraignment: o In cases where bail is a matter of right o In cases where the application for bail involves an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death ! If the court finds in such cases that the accused is entitled to bail because the evidence against the him is not strong -LEVISTE v. COURT OF APPEALS LEVISTE was charged with the murder of DE LAS ALAS and the RTC convicted him of the lesser crime of homicide, as well as sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum LEVISTE appealed his conviction to the CA and, pending appeal, he filed an application for bail, which the appellate court denied The SC held that under Section 5, Rule 114 of the RoC: o Pending appeal of a conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to be discretionary o The discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal is lodged either in the RTC or the CA depending on the circumstances: ! RTC if it has not transmitted the original record to the CA ! CA if the decision of the RTC convicting the accused changes the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable o If the penalty imposed by the RTC is imprisonment exceeding 6 years, the accused shall be denied bail or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances: ! Recidivism ! Quasi-recidivism ! Habitual delinquency ! Commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteracion ! Previous escape from legal confinement ! Evasion of sentence ! Violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid justification ! Commission of the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon ! Circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail ! Undue risk of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal ! Any other similar circumstance According to Justice Regalado: o After conviction by the RTC wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years, but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Section 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion o After conviction by the RTC wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years, but not more than 20 years is imposed, and any of the circumstances stated in Section 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be granted In this case, LEVISTE misunderstood the Rules, as he contended that if any of the circumstances enumerated under Section 5 are not present, then bail should be granted as a matter of right -GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES v. JUDGE PURUGANAN = Extradition cases vs. criminal cases

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While his case was pending in the US, JIMINEZ fled to the RP and, thus, the US sought to extradite him During the extradition proceedings, JIMENEZ applied for bail The SC held that extradition proceedings are sui generis o Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person o Extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature, which would call into operation the rights of the accused under the BoR o The extradition court is not called upon to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused, as the same will be adjudged in the court of the State where he will be extradited o The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine: ! Whether the extradition request complies with the EXTRADITION TREATY ! Whether the person sought is extraditable o Thus, as a general rule, Constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee ! An extradition proceeding is summary in nature, while a criminal proceeding involves a full-blown trial ! An extradition proceeding allows admission of evidence under less stringent standards, while a criminal proceeding requires strict standards ! An extradition proceeding may order a fugitive to be extradited upon a showing of the existence of a prima facie case, while a criminal proceeding requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction ! In an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him, while a criminal proceeding involves an executor judgment upon being rendered final o Under the TREATY, The demanding government, where it has done all that the treaty and the law requires it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant and the other government is under obligation to make the surrender o Section 13 of the Constitution uses the word conviction, which suggests that bail only applies when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine Criminal Laws The SC also held that the Constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings o Thus, the right to bail will not apply to extradition cases, where the presumption of innocence is not an issue and the extradition court does not render judgments of conviction or acquittal o The accused should apply for bail before the courts trying him in the criminal cases against him and not before the extradition court But, even if bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases, the SC held that after a potential extradite has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail me be applied for and granted as an exception when: o Once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community o There exists special humanitarian and compelling circumstances o In such cases, the applicant bears the burden of proof Dissenting Opinion of Justice Puno: o From the moment a person is arrested, the guarantees under the Bill of Rights operate, including his right to bail ! This is more in accord with the UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, as well as the COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

-RODRIGUEZ v. JUDGE The US GOVERNMENT, through the DOJ, filed a petition for extradition against petitioners After their arrest, petitioners applied for bail, which the RTC granted The bail was set for P1 million each and the petitioners posted cash bonds The US GOVERNMENT moved for reconsideration, but the Motion was denied The US GOVERNMENT filed a petition for certiorari with the SC and the latter directed the RTC to resolve the matter of bail according to the ruling of Government of the United States of America v. Purganan In compliance with the SCs directive, the RTC, without prior notice and hearing, cancelled the cash bond of petitioners and ordered their arrest The SC held in Purganan that prospective extradites are not entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest, because notifying him before his arrest only tips him of his pending arrest o However, in this case, the SC pointed out that the doctrine is only applicable to cases pending the issuance of a warrant of arrest and not in a cancellation of bail that had been issued after proper determination by the RTC

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The SC also held that the grant of bail in extradition proceedings presupposes that the prospective extradite already presented evidence to prove her right to be on bail, that he is no flight risk, and the RTC had already exercised its sound discretion and had already determined that under the Constitution and relevant laws, that the prospective extradite is entitled to provisional release o In this case, petitioner has duly proven that she is not a flight risk, among others, and, thus, her bail should not be cancelled without being given notice and opportunity to be heard why her temporary liberty should not be discontinued o In doing so, the RTC committed GADALEJ and deprived petitioner of due process of law The SC further held that bail may be granted to a possible extradite only upon a clear and convincing showing that: o He will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community o That the exists special, humanitarian, and compelling circumstances

-GOVERNMENT of HONG KONG v. JUDGE OLALIA = New trends in Public International Law MUNOZ was charged before the HK Court with three counts of the offense accepting an advantage as agent under HK Law The DOJ received from its HK counterpart a request for the provisional arrest of MUNOZ HK filed with the RTC a petition for the extradition of MUNOZ and the latter filed a petition for bail, which was denied The SC held that while it has ruled that bail is available only in criminal proceedings and does not apply in extradition proceedings, it cannot ignore the modern trend in PUBLIC INTERNATIONL LAW, which places primacy on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights o The Philippines has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable the latter to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified o The RP authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies that safeguard their fundamental right to liberty, which includes the right to bail The SC also held that: o The exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings ! Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained o To limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close its eyes to jurisprudential history ! The SC has already admitted the right to bail to those persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings ! If bail can be granted in deportation cases on the basis of the UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, then there is no justification as to why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases Both deportation and extradition cases are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not an issue The SC further held that the right of a prospective extradite to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in light of the various treaty obligations of the RP concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights o The presumption lies in favor of human liberty Moreover, the SC held that an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process: o It entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extradite ! The extradite is subjected to arrest, prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding State following the proceedings o The means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also the machinery of Criminal Law In addition, the SC held while our EXTRADITION LAW does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, there is no provision prohibiting him from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution Furthermore, the SC held that pacta sunt servanda does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the RP should diminish a potential extradites rights to life, liberty, and due process Last but not least the SC held that clear and convincing evidence should be the standard used in granting bail in extradition cases, which is: ! Lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt ! Higher than preponderance of evidence o The applicant must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court

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-Under PD 1069, THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW: Extradition is defined as the removal of an accused from the RP with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting State or Government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting State or Government Extradition is characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction and the correlative duty of the other State to surrender him to the demanding state The object of extradition is: o To prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and o To secure his return to the State from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment -----WAIVER OF THE RIGHT-----PEOPLE v. JUDGE DONATO and RODOLFO SALAS SALAS, along CRUZ and CONCEPCION were arrested and charged for robbery At that time, the applicable law prescribed a penalty of reclusion perpetua to death EO 187 was enacted, which reduced the penalty to prision mayor, thus making the same a bailable offense The SC held that under Section 3, Rule 114 of the RoC, all persons in custody, before final conviction, shall be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong The SC also held that in instances where bail is a matter of right, the prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of the same o But in cases where the grant of bail is discretionary, due process requires that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail o However, the guidelines for fixing the amount of bail are provided for in Section 10, Rule 114 of the RoC and, as such, the said amount is not a matter left entirely to the discretion of the court The SC further held that as a general rule, any right or privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by the Constitution may be waived, except when the same: o Is in derogation of a statutory right o Infringes on the rights of others o Would be against public policy, morals, and public interest According to Commonwealth v. Petrillo, rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall naturally into two classes: o Those in which the State, as well as the accused, is interested ! May not be waived o Those which are personal to the accused, which are in the nature of personal privileges ! May be waived Bail is defined as the security given for the release of a person in the custody of the law o Bail presupposes that the person applying for it should be in the custody of the law o Custody has been held to mean nothing less than actual imprisonment ! It is also defined as the detainer of a person by virtue of a lawful authority, or the care and possession of a thing or person o In this case, a compromise was entered into whereby the arrest warrants for CRUZ and CONCEPCION were to be lifted but Salas was to remain in legal custody Last but not least, the SC held that the right to bail is one Constitutional right, which can be waived o It is a right personal to the accused o The waiver of the right will not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law -----EXCESSIVE BAIL-----DE LA CAMARA v. ENAGE DE LA CAMARA was arrested for multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder He applied for bail claiming that there was no evidence to link him to the crime and the prosecution failed to present evidence but JUDGE ENAGE fixed the bail at some P1.2 million DE LA CAMARA assailed the Order of the ENAGE, but he later escaped from jail and, thus, his petition to nullify the said Order has become moot Nevertheless, the SC held that excessive bail shall not be required o The right to bail flows from the presumptions of innocence in favor of every accused The SC also held that where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive

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If there were no such prohibition on excessive bail, then the right ot bail becomes meaningless The SC further held that under Villasensor v. Abano, that the guidelines in the fixing of bail are as follows: o Ability of the accused to give bail o Nature of the offense o Penalty for the offense charged o Character and reputation of the accused o Health of the accused o Character and strength of evidence o Probability for the accused to appear on trial o Forfeiture of other bonds o Whether accused was a fugitive when arrested o If the accused is under bond for appearance in other cases o

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ART III SEC 14 -----DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL OFFENSES-----SECTION 14: The right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved The right to be heard by himself and counsel The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him The right to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial The right to meet the witness face-to-face The right to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf -OLAGUER v. MILITARY COMMISSION No. 34 = Military commissions OLAGUER and several others were arrested and charged for subversion and several other crimes before a MILITARY TRIBUNAL created under martial law The military tribunal found them guilty only after a 25-minute recess and sentenced them to death Petitioners filed a case for habeas corpus and sought to enjoin the military tribunal from trying their case The SC held that under old jurisprudence, it is recognized that martial law creates an exception to the general rule of exclusive subjection to the civil jurisdiction and renders offenses against the laws of war, as well as those of a civil character, triable by military tribunals, as public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process o However, in this case, the SC revisited the former doctrine and held that military commissions or tribunals have no jurisdiction to try civilians for alleged offenses, which are properly cognizable by the civil courts, when the civil courts are open and functioning o The same rule applies regardless of whether or not martial law has been proclaimed, provided that civil courts are functioning The SC also held that trial contemplated by the due process clause of the Constitution is a trial by judicial process and not be executive or military process o Military commissions or tribunals are not courts within the Philippine judicial system o Judicial power is vested by the Constitution exclusively in the SC and in such inferior courts as are duly established by law ! Judicial power exists only in the courts, which have the exclusive power to hear and determine those matters which affect the life, liberty, or property of a citizen Under US jurisprudence, it has been recognized that the presiding officer in a court martial is not a judge, but is a military law officer o Court martial is not yet an independent instrument of justice buy remains, to a significant degree, a specialized party of the over-all mechanism by which military discipline is preserved. The SC further held that military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department and are instrumentalities of Executive power for the President as CoC to aid him in properly commanding the army and enforcing discipline therein o Following the principle of separation of powers, the power and duty of interpreting the laws, as when an individual should be considered to have violated the same, is primarily a judicial function Last but not least, the SC held that the main premise in the Aquino, Jr. case is that military tribunals have the jurisdiction to try civilians as long as the period of national emergency lasts o In this case, PROCLAMATION 2045 is an acknowledgement on the part of the Executive that the emergency no longer lasts and, thus, all cases against civilians pending therein should be transferred to the civil courts for proper disposition o Also, there would be no violation of double jeopardy, as the military tribunals are devoid of the required jurisdiction in the first place -TAN v. BARRIOS = Prospectivity of Olaguer doctrine Pursuant to the rulings in Olaguer, as well as Cruz vs. Enrile, declaring the military tribunals functus officio and the proceedings therein null and void, several persons convicted by the military tribunals during martial law prayed for a re-trial of their case The courts directed the SECRETARY OF JUSTICE to file the necessary informations in the proper civil courts and pursuant thereto, FISCAL BARRIOS re-filed informations against Tan and other persons who have been acquitted by the military tribunals The lower courts then issued the warrants for their arrest The SC held that Olaguer should be applied prospectively and only to future cases, as well as those ongoing or not yet final when the said decision promulgated o There should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military tribunals against civilians before the promulgation of Olaguer

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The only exception would be in cases where the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of the Constitutional rights of the accused, such that nullity of the sentence and retrial may be ordered based on the Constitutional rights of the accused ! But If a retrial is no longer possible, the accused should be released since the judgment against him is null and void on the account of the violation of his Constitutional rights and denial of due process The SC also held that it would be a distortion of Olaguer, if the same would be used as an authority for re-prosecuting civilians, regardless of whether: ! They had been accorded a fair trial ! They had already been acquitted and released ! They had accepted the sentences imposed on them ! They had already commenced serving the sentences imposes o Why should one who has accepted the justness of the verdict of a military court, who is satisfied that he had a fair hearing, and who is willing to serve his sentence in full, be dragged through the harrow of another hearing in a civil court to risk being convicted a second time perchance to serve a heavier penalty? o -----PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE-----

-UNITED STATES v. LULING = Rights of the State LULING was a wharf watchman who was charged under ACT 335 for having solicited and received the sum of P100 from ELORD so that he may secure the delivery and importation of certain rolls of paper containing opium LULING assailed the validity of Section 316 of the said law for making the mere receiving of certain gifts from importers or exporters prima facie evidence of violation, alleging that it violates his right to presumption of innocence by transferring the burden of proof to the accused The SC held that no rule has been better established in criminal law than the every man is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt o In a criminal prosecution, the burden is upon the State to prove every fact and circumstance constituting the crime charged, for the purpose of showing the guilt of the accused However, the SC also held that in cases of statutory crimes, no constitutional provision is violated by the statute that provides: o Proof by the State of some material fact of facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt o In proving so, the burden is shifted to the defendant for the purpose of showing that such act is innocent and committed without unlawful intention The SC also held that in the RP, no act is a crime, unless it is made so by statute and the State has the right: o To declare what acts are criminal, within well-defined limitations o To specify what act/s shall constitute a crime o To specify what proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt o To put upon the defendant the burden of showing that such act/s are innocent and are not committed with any criminal intent -PEOPLE v. MINGOA MINGOA a public officer entrusted with funds, who failed to account for the same alleging that the said monies were lost o MINGOA was charged for malversation The RPC provides that mere failure to account for public funds or property amounts to prima facie evidence that he has put the said funds or property to personal use MINGOA assailed Art. 217 of the RPC for violating the constitutional guarantee of presumption of innocence The SC held the validity of statutes establishing presumptions in criminal cases is now a settled matter o There is no Constitutional objection to the passage of a law which provides that: ! The presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct ! Enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence o The legislature may enact: ! That when certain facts have been proved, they shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused ! The burden of proof is shifted to the accused ! Provided: that there is a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed, so that the inference of the one from proof of the others it not unreasonable because of lack of connection between the two in common experience

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In this case, the statute creates a presumption of guilt once certain facts are proved and the fact presumed is but a natural inference from the fact proved, so that it cannot be said that there is no rational connection between the two The SC also held that such statutes establish only a prima facie presumption and, thus, gives the accused an opportunity to present evidence to rebut it o

-DUMLAO v. COMELEC = Charged vs. convicted BP 52 disqualifies a candidate charged either before the civil or military tribunals for acts of disloyalty, subversion, insurrection, rebellion, and such other crimes The SC held that explicit is the Constitutional provision that, in all criminal proceedings: o The accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved o The accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel The SC also held that an accusation according to the Constitution, is not synonymous with guilt o In this case, the challenged proviso contravenes the presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him it condemns before proper hearing o Also, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and a person against whom charges have been filed for such acts The SC further held that a legislative or administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to substitute for a judicial determination of the same o In this case, evidence regarding such acts of disloyalty should be presented before the courts and not before administrative bodies, such as COMELEC. -MARQUEZ, JR. v COMELEC = Fugitive from justice Defeated candidate MARQUEZ sought the disqualification of RODRIGUEZ for the governorship of QUEZON province for being a fugitive from justice based on Section 40(e) of the LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE RODRIGUEZ was charged with 10 counts of insurance fraud and grand theft in a Municipal Court of LOS ANGELES, but he fled from the US to evade prosecution The SC held that the term fugitive from justice embraces: o Those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment o Those who flee to avoid prosecution after being charged o In this case, the SC held that although the deliberations regarding the IRR of the LGC held that fugitive from justice covered only those convicted by final judgment, the same is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law o An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law, but must remain congruent to it Concurring Opinion of Justice Davide o The said prohibition does not infringe upon the right to presumption of innocence because one is not being disqualified for his guilt or the lack of it, but rather for his act of fleeing from justice o As opposed to Dumlao vs. COMELEC, where the person was disqualified due to a presumption of guilt even when he was merely charged, the same rationale does not attend in this case -----EQUIPOISE RULE-----Equipoise rule Where the evidence of the parties in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the Constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused -----RIGHT TO COUNSEL-----PEOPLE v. HOLGADO = Duties of the judge HOLGADO was charged for slight illegal detention for kidnapping and detaining FABREAG for 8 hours without any justifiable reason During arraignment, he was asked, Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty? He did not have an attorney and pleaded guilty, saying that a certain OCAMPO had instructed him to do so The SC held that under Section 3, Rule 112 of the RoC, when the defendant appears without an attorney, the court has four duties to comply with: o Inform the defendant that it is his right to have an attorney before being arraigned o After giving the said information, ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney o If he chooses to avail but is unable to employ an attorney, the court must assign an attorney de oficio to defend him ! Such that it is not enough for the court to merely appraise an accused of his right to have an attorney o If the defendant chooses to procure an attorney of his own, the court must grant him reasonable time to do so

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! In this case, none of these duties have been complied with The SC also held that in criminal cases, there can be no fair hearing, unless the accused is given an opportunity to be heard by counsel o Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of evidence, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty, but because he does not know how to establish his innocence

-UNITED STATES v. ASH Under the old English Common Law Rule, the right to counsel was limited to trial, but this notion has been gradually disregarded o There is a growing recognition of the fact that an unaided layman, even if educated or learned, may not be able to defend himself intelligently given the intricate procedural system ! Thus, counsel was necessary as a guide through the complex legal technicalities o The Creation of the Office of the Prosecutor further necessitated the presence of counsel ! The prosecutor was dedicated primarily for the purpose of prosecuting defendants and is incomparably more familiar with procedures, idiosyncrasies of juries, and the personnel of the court, as compared to an average defendant who does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself ! Thus, there was a need to minimize the imbalance and this was done through counsel Moreover, the right to counsel has been extended even to pre-trial proceedings o These involve critical stages where the accused may make mistakes or his reasoning dimmed by emotional tension and, thus, he needs a spokesman or advisor in his lawyer o Todays law enforcement machinery involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecutor at pre-trial proceedings where the results might well settle the accuseds fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality o Counsel was further extended to police line-ups under the Wade Case to prevent the prosecution from taking advantage of the accused during such stages. The SC further held that the assistance of counsel refers to the right to have counsel acting as his assistant o Advising the accused on available defenses in order to allow him to plead intelligently o Advising the client on the benefits of the 5th Amendment o Examining the witnesses, probing for evidence, and making legal arguments -PEOPLE v. LIWANAG = Effective counsel vs. intelligent counsel LIWANAG was provided with counsel de oficio in ATTY. UY who assisted him during arraignment and trial and who cross-examined the prosecution witnesses LIWANAG contends that UY was not intelligent counsel for not being able to safeguard his right against unreasonable searches and seizures for not having contested his warrantless arrest and that UY failed to secure a reversal of his conviction He contended that this in fact amounts to a violation of his right to counsel The SC held that the right to be heard by counsel is the right to be assisted by counsel and it cannot be inferred that the said right presupposes the right to an intelligent counsel o The requirement is for counsel to be effective and not intelligent o The SC also held that the right to be heard by counsel refers to the right to be assisted by counsel for the purpose of ensuring that an accused is not denied the collateral right to due process, which is a fundamental right that cannot be waived by an accused o There can be no due process accorded an accused, if he is not given the right to be heard through counsel or assisted by counsel o Thus, under both the Constitution and US jurisprudence, the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel The SC also held that the assistance afforded by counsel to an accused in light of the Philippine Constitutional requirement need only be in accordance with the pertinent provisions of: ! The Rules of Court ! The Code of Professional Responsibility ! The Canons of Professional Ethics o A counsel assisting an accused is presumed to be providing all the necessary legal defenses, which are reasonable under the circumstances in accordance with the said norms -PEOPLE v. LARRANAGA, et al. During trial, LARRANAGAs counsel de parte unceremoniously withdrew

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Thus, LARRANAGA asked for a continuance of 3 weeks to 1 month wanting to procure counsel of his own choice In order to prevent any dilatory maneuvers on the part of the defense counsel, the court appointed counsel de oficio and refused to suspend the trial LARRANGA contested that he was denied the right to counsel The SC held that there is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio was appointed during the absence of the accuseds counsel de parte, pursuant to the courts desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system o The appointment of counsel de oficio under such circumstances is not proscribed by the Constitution The SC also held that the preference in the choice of counsel applies more aptly and specifically to a person under custodial investigation, rather than an accused in a criminal prosecution o But even if the application is extended, such preferential discretion is not absolute as would enable the accused to choose a particular counsel to the exclusion of others who are equally capable o The choice of counsel by the accused in a criminal prosecution is not a plenary one, because if the chosen counsel deliberately makes himself scarce, then the court is not precluded from appoint a de oficio counsel The SC further held that an application for a continuance in order to secure the services of counsel is ordinarily addressed to the discretion of the court and the denial thereof is not ordinarily an infringement of the accuseds right to counsel o The right of the accused to select his own counsel must be exercised in a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner Last but not least, the SC held that while the accused has the right to discharge or change his counsel at any time, the same is, to some extent, subject to supervision by the court, particularly after trial has commenced o The court may deny the application to discharge counsel, where it appears that such application is not made in good faith, but is made for the purposes of delay

-----RIGHT TO BE INFORMED-----PEOPLE v. REGALA REGALA and FLORES were charged for murder with assault upon an agent of a person in authority for having stabbed and killed SGT. DESILOS But the information failed to allege the crucial element of knowledge that the accused had knowledge of the fact that the victim was indeed an agent of a person in authority The SC held that, in this case, the accused cannot be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with the assault upon an agent of a person in authority because the information filed did not allege the essential elements of assault o In this case, the fact that the victim was engaged then in the exercise of his duties does not suffice and knowledge of his authority must be alleged in the information o Also, there are no other allegations in the information that would clearly point to the fact that the accused had knowledge The SC also held that, in this case, the fact that the crime of assault was established by the evidence of the prosecution without any objection on the part of the accused cannot cure the defect in the information and validly convict the accused thereof o To rule otherwise would be to convict the accused of a crime not properly alleged in the body of the information, which would violate his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him Darvin: o The facts must be alleged in the information so as to allow the defense to prepare evidence or arguments to contradict the same o The defense should not be surprised by the introduction of new averments during trial, especially those that they were not given the chance to prepare for -ENRILE v. SALAZAR SENATOR ENRILE was arrested and charged with the complex crime of rebellion with murder and multiple murder committed during the failed coup attempt ENRILE alleged that he is being charged for an offense that does not exist in the statute books The SC held, in this case, that the information filed against petitioner does not in fact charge an offense o In the case of People vs. Hernandez, it has been held that rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, homicide, or other common crimes that are allegedly committed as a means necessary for the perpetration of rebellion However, the SC held, in this case, that the information, read in the context of Hernandez, does charge a crime defined and punished by the RPC: simple rebellion

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Darvin: o Simply put, the facts averred in the information suffice to form the elements of simple rebellion. The information should contain statements of fact, not conclusions of law w/c are for the courts to decide.

-PEOPLE v. LEGAZPI, et al. RESPONDENT was charged under 2 separate informations one for double murder and another for violation of RA 6539 ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT She was convicted of the complex crime of robbery with double homicide, combining and complexing the two crimes alleged in separate informations The SC held that conviction can only be limited to the crime alleged or necessarily included in the allegations in the separate informations o What controls is the description of the offense as alleged in the information The SC also held, in this case, that while the court can hold a joint trial of two or more cases and can render a consolidated decision, the court cannot convict the accused of a complex crime constitutive of the various crimes alleged in the two informations o In other words, the court cannot combine two crimes charged in two separate informations to form a complex crime o To do so would violates the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him -PEOPLE v. DE LA CRUZ DE LA CRUZ was charged for committing sexual abuse on his daughter, either by raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness on her The validity of the information was questioned The SC held that under Section 8, Rule 110 of the RoC, it is provided that the complaint or information shall state: o The designation of the offense given by the statute o Aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense o Specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances The SC also held, in this case, that what was alleged was not a sufficient averment of the acts constituting the offense o The information does not which provisions of RA 7610 were violated by DE LA CRUZ o The information does not state the acts or omissions constituting the offense o Thus, the information contained conclusions of law and not averments of facts Darvin: The information went ahead to conclude that he committed the felony of acts of lasciviousness without mentioning what particular acts he committed that constituted the same, as well as the applicable provisions of law violated. o Conclusions of law are for the judge to make -PEOPLE v. ESPERANZA NELSON was charged for the rape of his 13 year old niece Supposedly, minority (under 12 years of age) and relationship (within 3rd civil degree of consanguinity) are qualifying circumstances in the crime of rape But the information does not allege that he is related to her within the 3rd civil degree of consanguinity and he was charged under paragraph 1 of Art. 335 of the RPC (intimidation), not under paragraph 2 or 3 (minority/deprivation of reason) The SC held that under Article 335 of the RPC, as amended, the twin circumstances of minority and relationship are in the nature of qualifying circumstances because they alter the nature of the crime of rape and increase the penalty o Special qualifying circumstances must be: ! Specifically pleaded ! Alleged with certainty in the information o In this case, the specific relationship, that he is a relative by consanguinity or affinity within the 3rd civil degree, must have been aglleged The SC also held, in this case, that while the victim turned out to be 11 years old as proved during trial, still such proof cannot be appreciated against the accused o To appreciate said qualifying circumstances without having properly alleged the same in the information would violate the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him o In this case, NELSON cannot be charged with the crime of rape in its simple form and then be tried and convicted of rape in its qualified form Darvin: o Qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information and proved during trial -PEOPLE v. PURAZO PURAZO was charged and convicted of rape and he alleged that the information failed to state with particularity the time when the rape was committed and, thus, violating his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him o It provided merely sometime in the Month of March 1997

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The SC held that under Section 11, Rule 110 of the RoC, it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed, except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, provided it meets two criteria: o It is as near as to the actual date of commission of the offense as the complaint or information of the prosecuting officer will permit o The time ultimately proved should be as so alleged in the complaint or information The SC also held that under jurisprudence, date is not an essential element in the crime of rape, as the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman o Thus, the time or place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated The SC further held that where the time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime, provided that the specific crime charged was committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or information, even if: o It appears that the crime was not committed at the precise time or place alleged o The proof fails to sustain the existence of some immaterial fact set out in the complaint

-GARCIA v. PEOPLE GARCIA was charged for estafa under Art. 315, Section 2(a), which penalizes false manifestations or fraudulent machinations, but was convicted based on Art. 315 Section 2(d) for having issued post-dated checks that were not funded or insufficiently funded The SC held that the real nature of the crime is determined by the facts alleged in the information and not by the title or the designation of the offense contained in the caption of the Information The SC also held that it is fundamental that every element of which the offense is comprised must be alleged in the information -----RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL-----CONDE v. RIVERA CONDE had to respond to 5 separate informations and had to make court appearances for over a year already Even so, there has still yet to be any resolution of the case Thus, she came before the SC to seek redress The SC held that where the prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponement of the trial of a defendant against the latters protest beyond a reasonable period of time, the accused is entitled to relief by: o Proceeding in manadamus to compel a dismissal of the information o Proceeding in habeas corpus to obtain his freedom Darvin: o Dismissal of the case due to a violation of the right to speedy trial is also a bar to another prosecution for the same offense ! Thus, it is practically an acquittal -NEPOMUCENO v. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE NEPOMUCENO, along with several others, have yet to be arraigned for their respective offenses before the Military Tribunal This is due to the fact that they filed a Motion to Quash and then a Supplemental Motion questioning the constitutionality of the Military Commissions, and even asked for preliminary injunction to suspend the trials They later assert that their right to a speedy trial is violated and seek the dismissal of the case The SC held that it is true that criminal cases have been dismissed upon a showing of a violation of the right to speedy trial, but not one has been found to be where the accused have not yet been arraigned o In cases in which the denial of the right to speedy trial resulted in the dismissal of the case, the prosecution, after arraignment and in the trial set for the case: ! Failed to enter into trial without a valid excuse ! Otherwise present its evidence without a valid excuse ! Repeatedly asked for the postponement of the trial without a valid excuse o In this case, any delay in the disposition of NEPOMUCENOs case is attributable to his own actions. o Also, any delay in filing the charges was brought about by the exigencies of martial law and by the circumstances of the case The SC also held that a delay in the trial of the case must be vexatious, capricious, and oppressive to constitute a denial of the right to speedy trial The SC further held that speedy trial is necessarily relative and is consistent with reasonable delays o The Constitution prohibits only unreasonable delays Last but not least, the right to speedy trial may be waived, except when otherwise expressly so provided by law

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Thus, the right must be asserted ! In this case, petitioners themselves never moved for the setting of the case for trial in assertion of the rights -----RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL TRIAL-----

-MATEO, JR. v. VILLALUZ MATEO, among others, was tried before JUDGE VILLALUZ for robbery in a band w/ homicide Later, REYES executed an extra-judicial statement implicating MATEO and the statement was subscribed and sworn to before VILLALUZ But REYES later repudiated the said statement claiming that he made the statement under intimidation from a government agent In short, it is possible that VILLALUZ had something to do about it and, thus, MATEO prayed that the former disqualify himself from the case, to which the JUDGE refused The SC held that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the party of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being just o There is the legitimate expectation that the decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts, as found by a judge who does not play favorite and who considers the parties to stand on equal footing o Due process of law requires: ! A hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal ! That every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge o Thus, a judge has the duty: ! To render a just decision ! To render a just decision completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and integrity o Under jurisprudence, if it appears that the accused was not given a fair and impartial trial because of the trial judges bias or prejudice, then the SC will order a new trial, if it deems necessary, in the interest of justice The SC also held that under the RoC, a judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons (that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity) o In such cases, not only is the judges reputation for probity and objectivity preserved, but more importantly, that the ideal of an impartial administration of justice lived up to and, thus, due process is vindicated -----RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL-----In re: Oliver The SC held that the Constitution requires that all the criminal trials be open to the public o The guarantee has always been recognizes as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution o The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power The SC also held that all courts have held that an accused is at the very least entitled to have his friends, relatives, and counsel present, no matter what offense he may be charged Thus, secret trials are a menace to liberty o They are instruments for the repression of religious and political heresies and allow the government to act arbitrarily -GARCIA v. DOMINGO The trials in this case, on 14 separate instances, were held in the air-conditioned chambers of the trial court judge for the purpose of convenience The defendants offered no objection But later, they assert that their right to a public trial has been violated The SC held that as a general rule, the trial must be public and it poses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so o There is to be no ban on such attendance, whether or not the person is a stranger o The thought that lies behind this safeguard is that the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, such that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety o The right to a public trial is embraced in procedural due process o However, there is an exception that warrants the exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as offensive to decency or public morals The SC also held that it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could have his friends, relatives, and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged o In this case, there is nothing to show that other persons are prohibited from observing the proceeding and, hence, there is no violation of such right

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-FAJARDO v. GARCIA FAJARDO, along with other accused, were charged for murder Evidence of the prosecution disclosed that during the night of the murder, the accused were wounded They presented medical certificates issued by DR. ACADEMIA However, when the judge asked where the doctor was, it turned out that he left for the United States Counsel for the accused asked the judge to allow them to send interrogatories to ACADEMIA in the United States, invoking the expanded guarantee of compulsory process to produce evidence The judge refused, and thus, they appeal alleging grave abuse of discretion The SC held, in this case, that there was no grave abuse of discretion because evidence of their stay in the hospital could be easily obtained from the testimony of nurses or the records of the hospital without having to resort to sending the interrogatories all the way to the US -CARREDO v. PEOPLE CARREDO was charged for malicious mischief After arraignment, he posted bail and waived his right to appear during trial During trial, the prosecution witnesses were presented, but hearing was postponed because they could not identify the accused Thus, the trial judge summoned CARREDO and after his failure to appear during trial, the judge ordered his arrest and the forfeiture of his cash bond The SC held that accused may waive his right to be present during the criminal proceedings, except at the stages where identification of his person by the prosecution witnesses is necessary o Thus, his presence may be compelled when he is to be identified o Also, it is possible that a witness may not know the name of the accused, but can identify him if seen again o The accused may waive his right, but not his duty or obligation to the court The SC also held that trial in absentia is permitted, even of capital offenses, provided that, after arraignment: o The accused may be compelled to appear for the purpose of identification by the witnesses of the prosecution o The accused unqualifiedly admits, in open court, that he is the person named as the defendant in the case on trial ! In this case, petitioner only admits that he can be identified by the prosecution witnesses in his absence ! Thus, he did not admit that he is the very person name as defendant o If allowed to be absent in all the stages of the proceedings without giving the Peoples witnesses the opportunity to identify him in court, then he may, in his defense, say that he was never identified as the person charged in the information and, therefore, is entitled to an acquittal The SC further held that trial in absentia of the accused, in case of his non-appearance, means that he waives his right to meet the witnesses face-to-face, among others Darvin: o In the bail system under the Constitution, the accused is granted provisional liberty, subject to the condition that he appears during trial ! Thus, his failure to do so would make the previous warrant of arrest sufficient for his re-confinement

ART III -----SECTION 15-----Writ of habeas corpus A writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in the behalf. It requires deprivation of personal liberty: o Physical compulsion or coercion o Duress o External moral compulsion o Founded or groundless fear o Erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an imposter to cause harm if not blindly obeyed o Any psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will What is suspended by the Executive is the privilege of the writ and not the writ itself

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-Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus The President may suspend the privilege for a period not exceeding 60 days The grounds for the suspension of the privilege are: ! Actual invasion or actual rebellion ! When the public safety requires the suspension o The suspension shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion ! The criminal charge has to be filed in court within 3 days because, otherwise, the person shall be released ! Thus, the suspension of the privilege will not apply until such persons are placed in the custody of a judicial officer Congress is given the power to revoke the suspension and the President may not set aside such revocation Congress, upon the initiative of the President, may also extend the suspension The Supreme Court, upon the initiative of any citizen, may review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension and must promulgate its decision thereon within 30 days from filing The Supreme Court has the power: ! To determine arbitrariness in the manner of arriving at the suspension ! To determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension o The SC is empowered to determine whether, in fact, actual invasion and rebellion exists and whether public safety requires the suspension -Habeas corpus cannot be used when: To question the conditions of confinement Once charges have been filed in court

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ART III SEC 16LOPEZ v. OMBUDSMAN Certain complaints have been pending before the SANDIGANBAYAN for almost 4 years This interval prior to the Resolution finding the existence of probable cause came without any explanation Thus, the accused therein prayed for its dismissal invoking his right to speedy disposition of his case Eventually, after the prolonged delay, the appropriate Informations were filed The SC held that the Constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases: o Extends to all parties in all cases o Extends to all proceedings ! Criminal, civil, and administrative ! Judicial and quasi-judicial o Thus, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice The SC also held that the right to a speedy disposition of cases is violated: o When the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays

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ART III SEC 17 -UNITED STATES v. NAVARRO Subject for review in this case were 2 provisions of the Penal Code Art. 481 punishes unlawful deprivation of liberty, while Art. 483 provides that a person who detained another, who fails to give information as to his whereabouts or does not prove that the same has been set free shall be punished by a higher penalty o Therefore, in order for the accused to lessen the penalty he stands to incur, he is forced to divulge the whereabouts of the detainee or declare that the same has been set free, which is practically an admission that he in fact detained another o If he opts not to speak, then he incurs a more severe criminal liability The SC held that the right against self-incrimination was established on the grounds of both public policy and humanity ! Public policy because if the party were required to testify, then it would place the witness under the strongest temptation to commit the crime of perjury ! Humanity because it would prevent the extorting of confessions by duress o The very object of the provision is to wipe out the practice of requiring the accused to submit to judicial examinations and to give testimony regarding the offenses with which they were charged ! In this case, the evidence required to absolve him under Art. 483 has the effect of convicting him under Art. 481 ! Also, under Art. 483, the fact of guilt follows the mere silence of the accused, which cannot be permitted Under Emery, the principle was held to apply to any compulsory disclosure of the guilt of the offender himself, whether sought: ! Directly as the object of the inquiry ! Indirectly and incidentally for the purpose of establishing facts involved in an issue between the parties o The disclosure would be an accusation against himself, if it would be capable of being used against him: ! As a confession of a crime ! As an admission of facts tending to prove the commission of the crime o It is possible that a witness, by declaring a single fact, may complete the testimony against himself as entirely as he would by stating every circumstance which would be required for his conviction US jurisprudence has also held that a compulsory production of mans private papers to establish a criminal charge against himself is unconstitutional The SC also held that a law, while permitting a person accused to be a witness in his own behalf, should, at the same time, authorize a presumption of guilt from his omission to testify would be a law that adjudges without evidence and one that reverses the presumption of innocence The SC further held that it is the duty of the prosecution, in order to convict one of a crime, to produce evidence showing guilt beyond reasonable doubt o The accused cannot be called upon, either by express words or acts, to assist in the production of evidence o The silence of the accused should not be taken as proof against him o The accused has the right to rely on the presumption of innocence until the prosecution proves him guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged -UNITED STATES v. TAN TENG = Gonorrhea Prosecuted for rape, TAN TENG was physically examined after his arrest and a substance was taken from his body for the purpose of testing him for gonorrhea and he tested positive TAN TENG assailed the admissibility of the evidence claiming that it was obtained in violation of his right against self incrimination The SC held that the right against self-incrimination is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused ! The Constitutional guarantee does not include the body of the accused as evidence, when the same may be material ! Thus, the provision is against legal processes that extract from the defendants own lips, against his will, an admission of guilt ! The kernel of the privilege is testimonial compulsion and not any other compulsion ! As held in People v. Gardener, the purpose of the provision is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before or upon trial for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declaration, implicating them in the commission of a crime o In this case, the examination does not call upon the accused to be a witness, nor does it compel him to render testimony or answer questions

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o o o

Also, the evidence obtained from him is not testimonial in nature and is not covered by the right Moreover, Tan never objected to the extraction from his body of said substances By analogy, a physical examination for evidence is similar to introducing stolen property taken from the person of the thief

-VILLAFOR v. SUMMERS VILLAFLOR and SOUINGCO were charged for adultery The trial court ordered VILLAFLOR to be examined by physicians to determine if she was pregnant and the latter refused, which led her to be cited for contempt VILLAFLOR invoked her right against self-incrimination The SC held that the prohibition of compelling a man, in a criminal court, to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him ! It is not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material ! Thus, the Constitutional guarantee is limited to a prohibition against to compulsory testimonial self-incrimination ! On other other hand, upon a proper showing and under an order of the court, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible o In this case, while to compel a woman to submit to the examination of her private parts amounts to great embarrassment and shame, nevertheless, the SC applied the constitutional provision in accord with the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by sentimental influences o Thus, physical examinations are not covered by the right o But due care must be exerted at least not to embarrass the accused any more than necessary in carrying out the test -UNITED STATES v. ONG SIU HONG ONG was forced to discharge a certain amount of morphine from his mouth The substance was appreciated as evidence against him He assailed the admissibility of such evidence, invoking his right against self-incrimination The SC held that the main purpose of the Constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling confessions that would implicate the accused in the commission of a crime o It would be a forced construction to hold that any article, substance, or thing taken from a person accused of crime could not be given in evidence ! In this case, ONG was no different from TAN TENG, where the accused was subjected to a test to obtain substances from his body as evidence to prove his guilt Also, the evidence is admissible -BELTRAN v. SAMSON = Positive testimonial act vs. mechanical examination BELTRAN was ordered by the RESPODENT JUDGE to appear before the FISCAL for the purpose of taking a sample of his handwriting to determine if he was the one who wrote certain falsified documents There was yet no information filed against him and it was merely an investigation, not a prosecution Nevertheless, BELTRAN invoked his right against self-incrimination The SC held that the Constitutional guarantee is not limited to a declaration, but also to be a witness against oneself ! Testifying ! Furnishing evidence ! Being a witness o Thus, the privilege is not limited precisely to testimony or giving of oral testimony, but extends to all furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of mouth o It includes the divulging of any fact which the accused has a right to hold secret The SC also held that it is the duty of the courts to liberally construe the prohibition in favor of personal rights and to refuse to permit any steps tending toward their invasion o In this case, the SC held writing to be something more than a mechanical act, as it requires application of intelligence and attention o Also, the present case is more serious as the witness is compelled to write, create, make, or prepare, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not yet exist and will be later on used against him as falsifier o Simply put, what is required in the instant case is for the petitioner to perform a positive, testimonial act, to write and give a specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of comparison, which sets it apart from other cases, where the accused did not have to do anything but be examined o For the purpose of the Constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting because, in both cases, the person is required to furnish evidence against himself o Thus, the JUDGE and FISCAL are thus ordered to cease and desist therefrom

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-BERMUDEZ v. CASTILLO The right against self-incrimination has been expanded to cover other forms of proceedings or compulsion: o It extends to all proceedings sanctioned by law o It extends to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not o It extends to both the accused, as well as a mere witnesses in a prosecution o It protects equally in civil cases when incriminating questions are asked o It applies to all kinds of courts ! It covers litigious or non-litigious proceedings ! It covers proceedings ex parte or otherwise ! It covers all forms of interrogation before the courts o It extends to investigations conducted by legislative bodies o It now prohibits rendering incriminatory handwriting specimens (Beltran vs. Samson) -CHAVEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS CHAVEZ, along with several others, was charged for qualified theft of a motor vehicle During trial, the FISCAL called upon CHAVEZ to testify as an ordinary witness (not a state witness), to which the trial judge acceded, amid strong objection by the defense counsel and the refusal of CHAVEZ The judge said that the act of testifying, by itself, does not necessarily incriminate him and it is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness including the accused Thus, the accused was compelled to take the witness stand The SC held that the right against self-incrimination is mandatory, as it secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive right o It is not merely a formal technical rule and the enforcement of which is left to the discretion of the court ! The court may not extract from an admission of guilt from the defendants own lips and against will ! The court may not resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of the crime o Thus, the accused has: ! The right to forego testimony ! The right to remain silent o Unless he chooses to take the witness stand through the exercise of his own free will o The rule may apply even to a co-defendant in a joint trial The SC also held that the accused occupies a greater degree of protection than an ordinary witness ! An ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him ! An accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions o In reality, the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him and to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction ! In this case, the damaging facts forged in the decision of the lower court were drawn directly, by compulsion, from the lips of CHAVEZ and are, thus, inadmissible ! The objection made at the beginning is a continuing one ! Also, forcing the accused to testify violates his right to remain silent The SC also held that the courts indulge in every reasonable presumption against a waiver of Constitutional rights o A waiver must be unequivocal and certain and should be made willingly and intelligently ! In this case, CHAVEZ did not waive his rights to remain silent and against self-incrimination ! Also, actual violence need not be employed to amount to compulsion; moral coercion, as in this case, is sufficient Concurring Opinion of Justice Castro: o The Government must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured ! The Government cannot, by coercion, prove a charge against an accused out of his own mouth -CABAL v. KAPUNAN, JR. = Forfeiture is quasi-criminal COL. MARISTELA of the Army filed a letter-complaint to the Sec. of National Defense, charging Chief of Staff CABAL for graft and corruption, unexplained wealth, and other reprehensible acts

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MARISTELA did not seek the removal of CABAL, but rather the forfeiture of Cabals unexplained wealth The President ordered the formation of a COMMITTEE to investigate the matter The COMMITTEE then ordered CABAL to take the witness stand, but the latter refused to be sworn and invoked his right against self-incrimination The SC held that in a criminal case, the accused may refuse: ! To answer incriminatory questions ! To take the witness stand o Thus, in this case, the question is about the nature of the proceedings The SC also held that forfeiture has been held to partake of the nature of a penalty o Forfeiture is a divestiture of property, without compensation, in consequence of a default or an offense ! It is imposed by way of punishment, not by the mere conviction of the parties, but by the law-making power, to insure a prescribed course of conduct o Proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal and, thus, the right against self-incrimination is applicable ! A witness or party called as witness cannot be made to testify against himself to matters that would subject his property to forfeiture ! Forfeiture proceedings are criminal in nature to the extent that where there person using the res illegally is the owner or rightful possessor of it, the forfeiture proceedings is in the nature of a punishment ! Suits for penalties and forfeitures are of quasi-criminal nature and within the reason of criminal proceedings for the purposes of the Constitutional protection against self-incrimination ! Thus, the right against self-incrimination attends: o When the person is liable criminally to prosecution and punishment o When the answer of the person would tend to expose him to a forfeiture Criminal Quasi-criminal Penal proceedings Proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by reason of the commission of an offense o In this case, the proceeding for forfeiture, while administrative in character, possess a criminal or penal aspect However, the SC held that the privilege against self-incrimination is not infringed by merely asking the witness a question which he refuses to answer o The privilege is simply an option or refusal and not a prohibition of inquiry o A question is not improper merely because the answer may tend to incriminate o The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of requiring self-incrimination will not justify the refusal to answer the question ! But where a witness exercises his Constitutional right not to answer, a question by counsel as to whether the reason for refusing to answer is because the answer may tend to incriminate the witness is improper ! And where the witness is the accused, he may invoke the privilege for a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions The SC further held that a person may not be compelled: ! To testify in an action against him for a penalty ! To answer any question as a witness that would subject him to a penalty or forfeiture o Even though the action or proceedings for its enforcement is not brought in a criminal court, but is prosecuted through the modes of procedures applicable to ordinary civil remedy Last but not least, the right to self-incrimination extends to all cases in which the action prosecuted is to try and punish persons charged with the commission of public offense o It applies whenever the proceeding is not purely remedial or intended as a redress for a private grievance, but primarily: ! To punish a violation of duty or a public wrong ! To deter others from offending in a like manner o It applies when the proceeding is not to establish, recover, or redress private and civil rights

-PASCUAL, JR. v. BOARD OF EXAMINERS PASCUAL was being tried administratively before the BOARD for alleged immorality and malpractice The result could be the cancellation of his license to practice his medical profession He was then ordered by the BOARD to take the witness stand PASCUAL refused and invoked his right against self-incrimination

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On the other hand, the BOARD argued that the right is available only when a question calling for an incrimination answer is asked of a witness and that the same can simply object when such circumstance arises The SC held that the right against self-incrimination must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the person invoking it o Under US jurisprudence, the right extends even to lawyers as well as to other individuals The SC also held that the accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of guilt against him o The accused has the right to forego testimony and remain silent, unless he takes the witness stand out of his own free will The SC further held that the right against self-incrimination now comes within the right to privacy o The 5th Amendment in its self-incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender his detriment Last but not least, in this case, the SC held that the ruling in Cabal vs. Kapunan is applicable The BOARD, in an administrative proceeding that could result to the loss of the privilege to practice the medical profession, cannot compel PASCUAL to take the witness stand without his consent o Also, the cancellation of license to practice medicine, as a consequence, acquires the nature of a penalty and, thus, the right against self-incrimination and the right to refuse to take the witness stand accrue Darvin: o The right against self-incrimination extends to all proceedings sanctioned by law, which include investigations conducted by special boards or committees ! Thus, if the proceedings are criminal in nature and may result to the imposition of penalties, the accused may refuse to take the witness stand altogether

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ART III SEC 19 -----CRUEL, DEGRADING, OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT, EXCESSIVE FINES-----PEOPLE V. ESTOISTA As punishment for illegal possession of firearms, the term of imprisonment for 5 to 10 years is neither cruel nor unusual, especially considering the prevalent circumstances, such as rampant lawlessness and the promiscuous carrying of weapons The SC held that it takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution o The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual o To come under the ban, the punishment must be flagrantly and plainly oppressive, wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense so as to shock the moral sense of the community ! Cruel and unusual, barbarous or excessive to the extent of being shocking to public conscience The SC also held that if in a given case the imposition of the full extent of the penalty would be too harsh considering the intention and the degree of malice of the perpetrator, the courts are allowed to recommend to the Chief Executive for clemency -Guides in determining whether punishment is cruel and unusual (Furman vs. Georgia): US SC Justice Brennan: o The punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to human dignity o The punishment not be applied arbitrarily o The punishment not be unacceptable to contemporary society o The punishment must not be excessive ! A punishment or fine is excessive when, under any circumstance, it is disproportionate to the offense US SC Justice Marshall: o There are certain forms of punishment which involve too much pain and suffering that civilized people cannot tolerate them o There are unusual punishments in the sense of being previously unknown for a given offense o A penalty may be cruel and unusual because it is excessive and serves no legislative purpose o A punishment that is not excessive and serves a legislative purpose may still be invalid if popular sentiment abhors it -----EFFECT OF ABOLITION ON APPLICATION OF PENAL LAWS-----PEOPLE v. MUNOZ = Barring imposition vs. abolish The 1987 Constitution had the effect of barring the imposition of the death penalty, until the same is reactivated by the Congress The manner of computing penalties was discussed in this case when the range of the penalty adjudged includes death Advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death penalty, which limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, minimum and maximum, and these remaining periods should now be divided into three new periods in keeping with the 3grade scheme intended by Congress The SC held that since 2 February 1987, the SC has not imposed death penalty whenever it was called for, but instead reduced the same to reclusion perpetua The SC also held that a reading of the Constitution shows that there is nothing therein that expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty o The provision merely says: Death penalty shall not be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, which Congress hereafter will provide for If death penalty is already imposed, then it shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua ! The Constitution does not say that there is a requirement to adjust the two remaining periods by dividing them into three shorter periods ! According to Father Bernas: The only thing is, if there is a range, then the range cannot go so far as death. Certainly, the penalties lower than death remain. o Thus, the Constitution does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed in the RPC, such that that range of the medium and minimum penalties remain unchanged o A person originally subjected to the death penalty and another person who committed murder without the attendance of any modifying circumstance will now be both punishable with the same medium period, although the former is concededly more guilty than the latter

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The SC further held that the result of the amendment to the penalties is a question of wisdom o The problem, in any event, is addressed not to the courts, but to Congress because penalties are prescribed by statute, which fall under the province of the legislature -----RESTORATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY-----

-PEOPLE v. ECHEGARAY Under US Jurisprudence, punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death o But the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution o Cruel implies something inhuman and barbarous and something more than the mere extinguishment of life The SC held that courts are not the for a for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the death sentence, where the law itself provides therefor in specific and well-defined acts o It is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law, regardless of their private opinions: ! As long as that penalty remains in the statute books ! As long as criminal law provides for its imposition on certain cases The SC also held that the Constitution vests in Congress the power to re-impose the death penalty subject to certain requisites: o Congress must define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes o Congress must specify and penalize by death only those crime that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition set in the bill AND/OR designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, in which the latter can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition set in the bill o Congress, in enacting a death penalty bill, must be singularly motivated by compelling reasons involving heinous crimes Heinous crimes are those which are grievous, odious, and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity, and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized, and ordered society o Haineus means hateful and abominable (Sparta) o Haton denotes acts so hatefully or shockingly evil (Greek) The SC further held that the criterion is deliberately undetailed as to the circumstances of the: ! Victim ! Accused ! Time ! Place ! Manner of commission of the crime ! Proximate consequences and effects on the victim and society o In order to afford the sentencing authority sufficient leeway to exercise his discretion in imposing the appropriate penalty Moreover, the 1987 Constitution did not amend or repeal the provisions of the RPC relating to aggravating circumstance Likewise, RA 7659, while it specifies circumstances that generally qualify a crime provided therein to be punished by that maximum penalty of death, neither amends nor repeals the aggravating circumstances under the RPC o Thus, the provisions on the aggravating circumstances under the RPC subsist and affect criminal liability o In this case, rape, especially one perpetrated against ones own daughter, is an intrinsically evil act and is outrageous to dignity and decency and deserves to be punished by death Construing RA 7659 in pari materia with the RPC, death may be imposed when: o Aggravating circumstances attend the commission of the crime as to make operative the provision of the RPC regarding the imposition of the maximum penalty o Other circumstances attend the commission of the crime, which indubitably characterizes the same as heinous in contemplation of RA 7659 that justify the imposition of death, albeit the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death Last but not least, the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes: o Because the perpetrators have committed a) unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or b) criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry o Because the perpetrators have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government, such that they must be permanently prevented from doing so

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-PEOPLE v. PURAZO = First vote re: guilt, second vote re: compelling reasons Under US jurisprudence, it was not the presence of jury-discretion that made death penalty cruel and unusual, but the arbitrary, irrational, excessive, and discriminatory quality of its imposition o Mandatory sentences as a form of cruel and unusual punishment as it is a process that: ! Accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and the record of the individual offender or the circumstance of the particular offense ! Excludes from consideration, in fixing the ultimate punishment of death, the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors ! Treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the death penalty Section 22 of RA 7659, amending Article 47 of the RPC, recognizes that in death penalty cases, the Court: o First, puts to a vote the question of the guilt of an appellant, whether the same is beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous crime charged o Second, in the affirmative, puts to a vote the imposition of the death penalty ! The second voting is to consider the presence of compelling reasons ! If the majority of the members of the Court do not vote to affirm the death penalty, the penalty is automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua, even if the accused is guilty of a heinous crime for which death is the prescribed penalty ! If reclusion perpetua is imposed: A majority of the court voted that the accused is guilty of a heinous crime Less than a majority of the court voted to imposed the death penalty o The required majority vote is not obtained because no compelling reason exists Even if a person is charged and convicted of a heinous crime, the Constitution still requires that there must be compelling reasons for imposing the death penalty o If the Body decides in favor of the death penalty, then the same would still have to address two issues: ! Is the crime for which the death penalty is supposed to be imposed heinous pursuant to the Constitutional mandate? ! If so, is there a compelling reason to impose the death penalty for it? o In other words, the death penalty cannot be imposed simply because the crime is classified by law as heinous ! The SC is to apply statutory standards provided for in RA 7659, from the facts and circumstances of each case, whether or not there are compelling reasons to impose the death penalty In discharging his duty of imposing a proper sentence, the sentencing judge is authorized, if not required, to consider all of the mitigating circumstances involved in the crime o Thus, RA 7659 and its single mandatory penalty of death for certain offenses should not preclude the courts, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, from considering the facts and circumstances and determining whether the crime committed is heinous, and whether there are compelling reasons to impose the death penalty o Neither the legislative qualification of the crime as heinous nor the imposition of the death penalty per se should be conclusive on the judiciary o Notwithstanding RA 7659, the courts are not precluded, given mitigating factors or conditions duly established in evidence: From declaring the charged to be, in fact, non-heinous in character, or From concluding that no compelling reason exists to warrant the imposition of the death penalty ! Either of which would allow the courts to impose the penalty next lower in degree than death o When without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried Some factors to consider whether the right has been violated are: o The conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant o Length of the delay o Reason for such delay o Assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused o Prejudice cause by the delay However, the SC held that the concept of speedy disposition of cases is a relative term and, thus, is a flexible concept The SC further held that, in this case, the subsequent filing of the Informations does not cure or correct the unexplained delay in the Resolution of the criminal complaints

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Thus, there has been an unreasonable delay in the resolution of the case and the right accrues The case was ordered dismissed

-Notes for Section 16: The right covers all the periods before, during, and after trial The right is consistent with reasonable delay The remedy for the violation of the right to a speedy disposition of cases is dismissal of the same obtained through mandamus

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ART III SEC 20 -----IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT-----LORENZO v. MARTINEZ = Bad debt law vs. bad check law In this case, the constitutionality of BP 22, the BOUNCING CHECKS LAW, was assailed for violating the Constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for non-payment of debt o It is allegedly a bad debt law rather than a bad check law, as the offense under the BP is consummated only upon the dishonor or non-payment of the check when it is presented to the drawee bank The SC held that the debt, under Section 20, covers prison liabilities arising from actions ex contractu o The prohibition under Section 20 does not include: ! Damages arising in an action ex delicto Because damages recoverable therein a) are considered punishment and b) do not arise from any contract entered into between the parties, but are imposed for the wrong done ! Fines and penalties imposed by the courts in criminal proceedings as punishments for the commission of crime o In this case, what the law punishes with imprisonment is not the failure to pay the debt, but rather the act of making and issuing worthless checks o Also, the purpose of the law is to protect the public interest from the deleterious effects of the proliferation of bad checks by making the same and putting them in circulation, but not necessarily to coerce a debtor to pay his debt o Moreover, acceptance of checks is based on confidence, as they are not legal tender. If that confidence is shaken, then the usefulness of checks as substitutes for currency would be greatly diminished ! A check flasher injures not only the payee, but also the public interest. The SC also held that while it is Constitutionally impermissible for Congress to penalize a person for non-payment of a debt ex contractu, it is within the prerogative of the same to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare o In this case, BP 22 was enacted by Congress, as a valid exercise of the police power o Also, the enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by Congress that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions -IN RE: PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS = Civil debt; debt arising ex contractu The petitioners were tenants of a land They were Ordered by the court to pay their rentals to BOLANO, the ADMINISTRATRIX of the estate of ALLERS Petitioners failed to pay the necessary rentals because they were then uncertain as to the rightful person to whom they should pay Moreover, BOLANO sought to have them cited for contempt for their failure to comply with the Order of the judge to pay the appropriate rentals The SC held that debts covered by the Constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt pertains to civil debt o It means any liability to pay arising out of a contract, whether express or implied o In this case, the payment of rent is covered by the prohibition o Also, it is a contractual debt and not one arising from a crime o Thus, petitioners cannot be imprisoned for their failure to pay rent without violating their constitutional right against imprisonment for non-payment of debt

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ART III SEC 21 -----ATTACHMENT OF JEOPARDY-----To raise the defense of double jeopardy: o A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second o The first jeopardy must have terminated o The second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first Darvin: o To determine if the offenses charged are the same, it is important to observe if the offense alleged is merely: ! An ingredient or element of the other, or ! An attempt for frustration of the other -PEOPLE v. YLAGAN = When first jeopardy attaches For a defendant in a criminal prosecution to be placed in jeopardy, he must be placed on trial under the following conditions: o In a court of competent jurisdiction o Upon a valid complaint or information that is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction o After the defendant has been arraigned o After the defendant has pleaded to the complaint or the information, such that the issue is properly joined The SC held that the rule against double jeopardy protects the accused against being again tried for the second offense and not against the peril of second punishment o Without this safeguard, the fortune, safety, and peace of mind of the accused would be entirely a the mercy of the complaining witness, who might repeat his accusation as often as dismissed by the court and whenever he might see fit The SC also held that the accused, after being notified of the Order dismissing the complaint may either: o Rest assured that he will not be further molested o Prepare himself for the presentation of a new complaint -PEOPLE v. BALISACAN = Self defense (no valid plea) BALISACAN was charged for homicide for attacking and stabbing BULAOAT Upon being arraigned, he pleaded guilty Upon motion of his counsel de oficio, he was allowed to present evidence to mitigate liability Thereafter, he claimed that he merely acted in self-defense and alleged voluntary surrender On the basis thereof, the trial judge rendered a decision acquitting BALISACAN Thus, the prosecution appealed, which led BALISACAN to invoke his right against double jeopardy The SC held that a plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense charged o Forecloses the right to defend oneself from said charge o Leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the appropriate penalty fixed by law under the circumstances The SC also held that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy o In this case, BALISACAN was allowed to testify only to present evidence to mitigate liability and, thus, such testimony cannot be taken as a trial on the merits o What the trial judge should have done was to require him to plead anew on the charge or at least, direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him because his testimony of self-defense had the effect of vacating his pervious plea of guilty o There was, thus, no valid plea, which is one of the requisites for jeopardy to attach, at the time the court rendered its decision of acquittal The SC held that, in this case, with BALISACANs testimony of self-defense having the effect of vacating his previous plea of guilty, the court a quo should have: o Taken defendants plea anew o Then proceeded with the trial of the case in order under Section 3, Rule 119 of the RoC, which is the procedure to be followed when the accused enters a plea of not guilty Last but not least, the SC held that under Section 2, Rule 122 of the RoC, the People of the Philippines cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy o The rule applies even if the accused fails to file a brief and raise the question of double jeopardy o In this case, jeopardy did not attach the first time in the absence of a valid plea and, thus, appeal by the prosecution cannot violate the BALISACANs right against double jeopardy because there was no standing plea at that time -PEOPLE v. ESPINOSA = Conditional arraignment (valid plea; no valid waiver) ESPINOSA was charged before the SANDIGANBAYAN for estafa and attempted corruption of public officers

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ESPINOSA motioned to have his case re-investigated before the OMBUDSMAN and then later filed a motion for leave to travel abroad The SANDIGANBAYAN had the accused conditionally arraigned, where ESPINOSA pleaded not guilty o The condition was for ESPINOSA to waive his right against double jeopardy for him to be allowed to travel abroad pending re-investigation Later, the OMBUDSMAN moved to withdraw the charges ex parte Subsequently, the OMBUDSMAN filed with the same court Informations for malversation of public funds Thus, ESPINOSA argued double jeopardy The SC held that arraignment is an indispensable requirement of due process o Arraignment consists of the judges or the clerk of courts reading of the criminal complaint or information to the defendant ! At this stage, the accused is granted, for the first time, the opportunity to be officially informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation o In this case, ESPINOSA pleaded not guilty, simply and unconditionally o Also, conditionally arraigning an accused is a practice not recognized in regular rules of procedure o Moreover, there was no express or manifest intention on ESPINOSAs part to waive his right against double jeopardy and such waiver cannot be implied or assumed from the proceedings, as the same must be clear and categorical The SC also held that under Section 11(c), Rule 116 of RoC, the arraignment shall be suspended for a period not exceeding 60 days when a reinvestigation or review is being conducted o However, the court does not lose control of the proceedings by reason of such review o Once the court had assumed jurisdiction, it is not handcuffed by any Resolution of the reviewing authority o Once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, as to its dismissal or conviction, rests on the sound discretion of the court The SC further held that under Section 17, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure: o To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy: ! A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second ! The first jeopardy must have been validly terminated ! The second jeopardy must be a) for the same offense or b) the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, c) or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof o Legal jeopardy attaches only: ! Upon a valid indictment ! Before a competent court ! After arraignment ! When a valid plea has been entered ! The case was dismissed or otherwise terminate without the express consent of the accused o In this case, the dismissal of the case was secured by the OMB without the consent of ESPINOSA and the same bars a subsequent prosecution Last but not least, the SC held that the alleged conditions attached to an arraignment must be unmistakable, express, informed, and enlightened o The same must be expressly stated in the Order disposing of the arraignment o Otherwise, the plea should be deemed simple and unconditional -----TERMINATION OF JEOPARDY-----

-To satisfy the defense of double jeopardy, the first jeopardy must be terminated: By acquittal By final conviction By dismissal without express consent of the accused By dismissal on the merits -BULAONG v. PEOPLE = Rebellion and subversion (first jeopardy not yet terminated) BULAONG was charged for rebellion before the CFI of LAGUNA in 1956 o Trial did not proceed until 1958 because he remained at large The ANTI-SUBVERSION ACT took effect in 1957 o And in 1958, he was charged before the CFI of MANILA for the crime of subversion While his case for subversion was pending, he was convicted of the crime of rebellion BULAONG invoked his right against double jeopardy, alleging that the facts alleged in both charges were the same The SC held that under Section 9, Rule 113 of the RoC, the defense of double jeopardy is available to the accused only where:

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! He was convicted ! He was acquitted ! The case against him was dismissed on the merits ! The case against him was terminated without his consent It is the conviction, acquittal, dismissal, or termination of the case that bars further prosecution of: ! The same offense ! Any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof ! Any offense that necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information In this case, BULAONG was not convicted or acquitted of subversion and neither was the case terminated or dismissed without his consent Thus, double jeopardy does not attach Simply put, when BULAONG was convicted for rebellion, his jeopardy for subversion has yet to be terminated ! One of the requisites for invoking the right against double jeopardy is that the first jeopardy must have terminated

-BUSTAMANTE v. MACEREN = Sentence has been served (instances when case becomes final) GREGORIO was charged for serious physical injuries caused through reckless imprudence He was found guilty and was sentenced to 1 month and 1 day imprisonment That same day, he paid the necessary fines and he began serving his sentence Also on that same day, the trial judge rescinded the decision and re-assigned the case for a new trial, allegedly based on new findings of fraud on the part of the accused GREGORIO pleaded not guilty and raised the defense of double jeopardy The SC held that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense o This is a rule of finality for a single prosecution for any offense is all that the law allows o The SC also held that as a general rule, where the defendant has executed or entered upon the execution of a valid sentence, the court cannot, even during the 15-day period, set it aside and render a new sentence o To do so would be to punish the defendant twice for the same offense Under the RoC, a judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside by the court rendering it: ! Before the judgment has become final ! Before appeal has been perfected o After such time, the case can no longer be reopened with a view to the modification of the sentence o A judgment in a criminal case becomes final: ! After the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal ! When the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served ! When the defendant has expressly waived his right to appeal in writing o A final and executory judgment is not appealable and the appellate court has no jurisdiction to review, reverse, or modify the same o A sentence having become final, no court, not even the SC, can modify it, even if it is erroneous ! In this case, GREGORIO has already begun serving sentence and, thus, the Decision has become final ! Thus, the trial judge erred in not accepting the plea of double jeopardy ! Also, considering that GREGORIO has already served the full term, then he is entitled to release The SC also held that under Section 10, Rule 117 of the Revised RoC: ! The defense of double jeopardy is waivable ! If the defense of double jeopardy is not raised or set up at the proper time, then it is deemed waived o But if the defendant learns after he has pleaded or moved to quash that the offense for which he is now charged is an offense for which he has been pardoned, convicted, acquitted, or been in jeopardy, then the court may, in its discretion, entertain the said motion to quash -PEOPLE v. OBSANIA = Rice fields rape OBSANIA was charged for having raped a 14-year old girl while armed with a dagger and in the rice fields along the street The information failed to expressly allege the existence of lewd designs, which is inherent in all crimes against chastity OBSANIA was arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and moved for the dismissal of the case due to a defective information, averring that the subsequent information filed by the fiscal did not cure the defect in the first information The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the case The SC held that in a complaint for rape, it is not necessary to allege lewd design or unchaste motive for to require such averment is to demand a patent superfluity

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Lascivious intent inheres in rape and the unchaste design is manifest in the very act itself The SC also held that an appeal by the prosecution, in a criminal case, is not available, if the defendant would be placed in double jeopardy Under Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised RoC, when a defendant shall have been convicted, acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminate without his express consent, then the same shall be a bar to another prosecution: o For the offense charged o For any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof o For any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information The SC further held that in order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of the accused, the following requisites must have been obtained in the original (first) prosecution: o A valid complaint or information o A competent court o The defendant was arraigned o The defendant had pleaded to the charge o The defendant was acquitted, convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent Under jurisprudence, when a case is dismissed other than on the merits and upon a motion of the accused personally or through counsel, such dismissal is to be regarded as with the express consent of the accused: ! The accused is deemed to have waived his right to plead double jeopardy The act of the accused in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his right because he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him ! The accused is estopped from claiming the defense of double jeopardy on appeal by the Government or in another indictment for the same offense The dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense o The acts of counsel, in a criminal prosecution, bind his client and the only case in which the defendant cannot be represented by his counsel is in pleading guilty according to Section 3, Rule 114 of the RoC ! In such a case there is no trial on the merits ! The accused cannot question the jurisdiction of the court in moving for the dismissal of the case and then later invoke double jeopardy, which requires, among others, that the case be brought before a court of competent jurisdiction ! In this case, the accused motioned for the dismissal of the case and, thus, he cannot later raise the defense of double jeopardy because the dismissal of the case was with his consent in fact, at his instance Thus, an appeal of the prosecution from the Order of dismissal by the trial court will not constitute double jeopardy if: o The dismissal is made upon motion or with the express consent of the defendant o The dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case o The question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal, so that if the dismissal is found to be incorrect, then the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused The application of the doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two conditions: o First, the dismissal must be sought or induced by the defendant personally or through his counsel o Second, such dismissal must not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal Last but not least, under jurisprudence, if the dismissal was due to failure to prosecute or due to a violation of the right to a speedy trial, then the same amounts to an acquittal and, thus, double jeopardy can be invoked o Such a circumstance does not attend in this case o

-RIVERA, JR. v. PEOPLE RIVERA was arrested for allegedly attempting to transport marijuana to Manila and upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty During trial, no witnesses were available and neither was the confiscated marijuana presented CAPT. SARMIENTO, the FORENSIC CHEMIST, on repeated occasions, failed to appear during trial On the 3rd instance that SARMIENTO failed to appear, the Respondent JUDGE verbally granted the motion to dismiss and ordered RIVERAs immediate release

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Barely an hour later, SARMIENTO arrived, and upon satisfactory explanation, the judge set aside the verbal dismissal and ordered the case re-scheduled RIVERA invoked double jeopardy The SC held that under jurisprudence, where there is a valid information and the accused has been arraigned, an Order of dismissal issued by the court, in the course of a trial of a criminal case, whether based on the merits or for failure of a prosecution witness to appear, has the effect of a judgment of acquittal and the right against double jeopardy attaches o But the Order of dismissal must be: ! Written ! Personally and directly prepared by the judge ! Signed by the judge conformably with the provisions of Section 2, Rule 120 of the RoC o In this case, the verbal order did not yet attain the effect of a judgment of acquittal, so that it was still within the powers of the judge to set aside and enter another order, now in writing and duly signed by him, reinstating the case o In other words, double jeopardy has yet to attach

-PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN v. VELASCO = Insufficiency of evidence (demurrer to evidence as exception to the rule on dismissal at the instance of the accused) VELASCO was charged before the SANDIGANBAYAN After the prosecution had rested its case, VELASCO filed a Demurrer seeking to dismiss the case based on insufficiency of evidence, which was initially denied but eventually granted upon his Motion for Reconsideration Later, VELASCO invoked double jeopardy to bar subsequent prosecution The prosecution contends that the earlier Dismissal was void for failing to state a summary of facts The SC held that under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a Demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court o In resolving the accuseds demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt o Once the trial court grants the Demurrer, such Order amounts to an acquittal ! The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court ! The trial courts ruling as regards the same shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion o criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy -CONDRADA v. PEOPLE = Provisional dismissal vs. permanent dismissal CONDRADA was charged with rape Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty On two separate occasions, the complainant and the witnesses failed to appear during trial On the third instance the court ordered the sub poenae to be coursed through the NBI, but still the complainant and the witnesses failed to appear, which led the prosecution to again requested for postponement The court denied the accuseds motion to dismiss based on the right to a speedy trial, but allowed the temporary dismissal of the case, subject to revival within 30 days therefrom, otherwise, it shall be dismissed permanently Upon revival of the case, CONDRADA invoked double jeopardy The SC held that a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is a dismissal without prejudice to the reinstatement thereof: ! Before the Order of dismissal becomes final ! The subsequent filing of a new information for the offense within the periods allowed under the RPC or Revised Rules of Court o In other words, a provisional dismissal is not a permanent dismissal, which would bar a subsequent prosecution or revival of the case based on double jeopardy On the other hand, the SC also held that the a permanent dismissal of a criminal case may refer to: o The termination of the case on the merits, resulting in either conviction or acquittal of the accused o Dismissal due to the prosecutions failure to prosecute o Dismissal on the ground of unreasonable delay in the proceedings, which is in violation of the accuseds right to speedy disposition or trial of the case against him o Dismissal without the consent of the accused o Dismissal due to insufficiency of evidence (People v. Sandiganbayan and Velasco) -PEOPLE v. LACSON = Time bar LACSON was charged for multiple murder for the annihilation of the KURATONG BALELENG GANG particularly 11 members thereof

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The case was provisionally dismissed by JUDGE AGNIR on the basis of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure Thus, the People moved for reconsideration The prosecution sought to revive the case, despite the lapse of the 2 year period and prayed that the Resolution of Judge AGNIR dismissing the case be set aside, contending that the abovementioned requisites for provisional dismissal are not present and, hence, according to them, LACSON should not be entitled to the immunity granted after 2 years from the provisional dismissal, since the provisional dismissal was invalid at the outset Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a case shall not be provisionally dismissed, except: ! With the express consent of the accused, and ! With due notice to the offended parties In order to afford the victims or their heirs the chance to object to the motion on valid grounds o If the offense is punishable by imprisonment of more than 6 years, the provisional dismissal shall become permanent after 2 years if the case is not revived after the issuance of the Order o If the offense is punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 years or a fine of any amount, or both, the provisional dismissal shall become permanent after 1 year after the issuance of the Order without the case having been revived o In this case, LACSON did not pray for the provisional dismissal, as he never consented thereto and never sought it, either expressly nor impliedly o Rather, what LACSON sought in his motion was merely judicial determination of probable cause and examination of the witnesses, so that should the court find the absence of probable cause, then arrest warrants should then be cancelled ! Thus, the 1st element is missing o Also, no notice of the motions for provisional dismissal were ever served to the heirs of the victims at least 3 days before the said hearing as required by the rules of court ! Thus, the 2nd element is, likewise, missing The SC held that, in this case, having invoked the said Rule, respondent is burdened to establish its essential requisites: o (1) The prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused, or both, move for a provisional dismissal of the case ! The express consent of the accused is required in order to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy ! Express consent to provisional dismissal is given either: Viva voce In writing ! A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional dismissal ! If the criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, then the case may be revived only within the prescribed periods ! If the criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his objection, then the time bar would not apply and the case may be revived or refilled even beyond the prescribed period, subject to the right of the accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or prescription o (2) The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case o (3) The court issues an Order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally o (4) The public prosecutor is serve with a copy of the Order of provisional dismissal of the case ! An Order of provisional dismissal shall become permanent after the lapse of the time bar and after service of the same on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline, unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal The SC also held that the case may be revived by the State within the time bar by either: o The refilling of the information o The filing of a new information for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein o There is no need of a new preliminary investigation, except when:

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Darvin: I believe that even though the Rule on Provisional Dismissal does not apply, nevertheless, the accused should be entitled to the defense of double jeopardy o The case was dismissed clearly without his consent and by no stretch of the imagination can his motion for judicial determination of probable cause be taken as consent to the dismissal, which must be given unequivocally, positively, and clearly o If dismissal was made without the consent of the accused, then it acquires the status of permanence or finality, and such dismissal bars subsequent prosecution for the same offense in accord with the right against double jeopardy Dissenting Opinion of Justice Puno: The underlying reason why Section 8, Rule 117 was formulated, was to prevent the prosecution from arbitrarily reviving or re-animating an case that has become dormant due primarily to the prosecutions own failure or inaction without justification The time-bar rule confers new rights independent of, but, at the same time, related to the rights to a speedy trial and against double jeopardy o Thus, it would not be proper to require elements necessary in either speedy trial or double jeopardy in time-bar cases Thus, the prosecutors should be constrained to work within the prescribed timeline and not unduly burden the accused with the hassles of prolonged and protracted prosecutions o Otherwise, the lapse of the 1 or 2-year period, as the case may be, puts a finality to the provisional dismissal and amounts to an acquittal

After the provisional dismissal, the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them are no longer available and new witnesses have emerged Aside from the original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein The original charge has been upgraded under a new criminal complaint The criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal

-PEOPLE v. COURT OF APPEALS = Errors of judgment vs. errors of jurisdiction Respondents FRANCISCO and PACAO were acquitted by the Court of Appeals The People, through a writ of certiorari, alleged errors of judgment or misappreciation of evidence on the part of the CA, but not errors of law or jurisdiction The SC held that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari o Factual matters cannot normally be inquired into by the SC in a certiorari proceeding o The SC cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess, and weigh them again, in order to ascertain if the trial and the appellate courts were correct in according credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other o Even the mere fact that a court erroneously decides a case does not necessarily deprive the same of jurisdiction o In this case, there is an erroneous application of the certiorari because the SC cannot inquire into factual matters, unless there is a blatant abuse of authority on the part of the lower court Under jurisprudence, if the petitioner, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the right against double jeopardy would be violated o In this case, the petition is actually one for an ordinary review of the factual findings of the lower court o It was practically an appeal disguised as a petition for certiorari and for the SC to entertain such would violate the constitutional right against double jeopardy o Thus, unless there is a mistrial, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable pursuant to double jeopardy o This is regardless of whether it is decided by the trial court or the CA Darvin: o A decision of acquittal becomes final immediately and bars the re-opening of the case o The exception is when the prosecution was denied due process NOTES: When the dismissal of the case clearly constitutes GADALEJ, the dismissal, even if made on the merits, is invalid and is not a bar to a reinstatement of the case

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When the judgment of acquittal is void for having been given without jurisdiction, then the judgment cannot be a basis for a plea of double jeopardy The decision of a military tribunal is merely recommendatory and subject to review by the convening authority and, thus, for purposes of double jeopardy, it does not terminate a case An Order of dismissal in a preliminary investigation does not, in any way, terminate case The discharge of an accused in order to be a State witness, even if there is failure to comply with all the requirements of Section 9, Rule 111, is equivalent to an acquittal and is a bar to a reinstatement of the case against him, except when the accused so discharged fails or refuses to testify when the opportunity is given o -----SAME OFFENSE-----

-In order to determine whether the two charges are identical, the test is: o Whether one offense is identical with the other o Whether the offense is an attempt or frustration of the other o Whether one offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other The identity of offenses does not require one-to-one correspondence between the facts and the law involved in the two charges o But it is necessary that one of the offenses is complete included in the other offense -PEOPLE v. RELOVA = Different offense, but same act in violation of both an Ordinance and a National Statute (identity of offense vs. identity of act) OPULENCIA was charged for violating Ordinance No. 1 Series of 1974 of BATANGAS CITY for having made unauthorized installations and wirings in his ice plant to lower his power bill fraudulently (jumper) He pleaded not guilty, although he admitted to the presence of such unauthorized installations within his ice plant But given the fact that the case against him has prescribed, the trial court was constrained to dismiss the case against him on the ground of prescription Being a light felony, the offense prescribed 2 months after the discovery and the ASSISTANT FISCAL filed the case 9 months thereafter, which was way beyond the prescriptive period Eventually, the FISCAL again filed a case against OPULENCIA, this time for theft of electric power, punishable under the Revised Penal Code OPULENCIA answered with a Motion to Quash The SC held that the rule on double jeopardy in the Constitution: o As a general rule, the protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts o The exception to the general rule is that the protection against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an Ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a National Statute, such as the RPC, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts ! In other words, even if the offenses charged under the Ordinance and the Law are different, if the charges under both of them are based on the same act, then double jeopardy applies ! In this case, there is obviously only one act sought to be punished, although different offenses are alleged o Thus, the BoR deals with two kinds of double jeopardy: ! The first deals with that involving the same offense Prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense One may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided that he is charged with different offenses or the offense charged in one case is not included in or does not include the crime charged in the other case o So long as jeopardy has attached under one of the informations charging the said offense, the defense may be available in the other case involving the same offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case ! The second deals with the same act that is punishable by a law and an ordinance Contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act Applies even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute o If the two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal under either the ordinance or the law shall bar a prosecution under the other

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Where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of the offense charged ! The Constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged ! The question of identity of offense is addressed by examining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective definitions of the offenses involved o Where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance, while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts, which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses ! The Constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts that constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts that constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute ! The question of identity of acts which are claimed to have generated a liability both under an ordinance and a national statute is addressed by examining the location of such acts in time and space When the acts of the accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each other in time and space, as to be reasonably regarded as: o Having taken place on the same occasion o Have been moved by one and the same, or a continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence Such acts may be appropriately characterized as an integral whole capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under different legal enactments Under jurisprudence, it has been discussed that if the second sentence of the double jeopardy provision had not been written into the Constitution, then conviction or acquittal under a municipal ordinance would never constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act under a national statute o An offense penalized by an ordinance is, by definition, different from an offense under a statute and, thus, the two offenses would never constitute the same offense, having been promulgated by different rule-making authorities The SC also held that the while the rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for the same offense, the accused should also be shielded against being prosecuted for several offenses made out of a single act o Otherwise, an unlawful act or omission may give rise to several prosecutions depending upon the ability of the prosecuting officer to imagine or concoct as many offenses as can be justified by said act or omission, by simply adding or subtracting elements o The acts of a person that physically occur a) on the same occasion and b) are infused by a common intent or design or negligence and, thus, a moral unity should not be segmented and sliced But the SC held that the extinction of criminal liability, whether by prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy, does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged o -----SUPERVENING FACTS-----

-MELO v. PEOPLE = Change the character of the offense and constitute a new (distinct) offense MELO was charged for frustrated homicide for stabbing and inflicting fatal wounds on OBILLO MELO pleaded not guilty Subsequently, the victim died and, thus, the next day, an amended information was filed against MELO charging him, this time, with consummated homicide MELO invoked double jeopardy The SC held that under Section 13, Rule 106, if it appears at any time before judgment, that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court may: ! Discuss the original complaint or information, and ! Order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense ! Provided that the defendant would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy o Thus, it is proper for the court to dismiss a first information and order the filing of a new one for the reason that the proper offense was not charged in the former and the latter did not place the accused in a second jeopardy for the same or identical offense Double jeopardy generally means that when a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal, conviction, or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the person cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense

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The inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense The exception to the rule is when the same act is punished by a law and an ordinance because conviction or acquittal under one will be a bar to prosecution under another Same offense has been construed to mean: o The second offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information o The second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof o The second offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information An offense necessarily includes another when some of the essential ingredients of the former as alleged in the information constitute the latter An offense is necessarily included in another when all the ingredients of the former constitute a part of the elements constituting the latter An offense may be said to necessarily include or to be necessarily included in another offense when both offenses were in existence during the pendency of the first prosecution ! One who has been charged with an offense cannot be charged again with the same or identical offense, though the latter be lesser or greater than the former But the SCfor the new offense o In this case, the second offense was not in existence during the time of the first prosecution because the accused could not possibly have been convicted of an offense that was still inexistent o The victim then was still alive and, thus, no case for consummated homicide could prosper and it was, at most, frustrated homicide o Even assuming that the second offense is identical to the first, as the first being a mere frustration of the second, nevertheless, the right against double jeopardy is not violated by the filing of the amended complaint o Supervening events took place that changed the character of the offense, and, thus the accused cannot be said to be placed under double jeopardy for being prosecuted for the new offense o The amended complaint should, thus, be allowed to stand o But MELOs service of the first penalty however should be credited in case of conviction of the second offense The SC further held that when a person who has already suffered his penalty for an offense is charged with a new and greater offense, said penalty may be credited to him in case of conviction for the second offense Darvin: o Also take note that the first jeopardy has not yet terminated and, thus, no double jeopardy can attach o o

-PEOPLE v. BULING BULING was charged for less serious physical injuries for having inflicted wounds upon BALABA The findings of the medical examination showed that the BALABA was to be incapacitated and would require medical attendance for some 10 to 15 days BULING pleaded guilty and served sentence that same day Prior to the filing of the subsequent amended complaint, BULING has fully served his sentence Later, BALABAs wounds did not heal A second medical exam was committed and, this time, an X-ray machine was used, where fractures were found in the victims hand, which would take him some 90 days to heal An amended information was filed against BULING, this time, for serious physical injuries The prosecution invoked supervening events to justify the filing of the new complaint The SC held that, in this case, there were no supervening events that would justify the filing of an amended complaint o The fractures already existed during the time of the first examination, but it was just that they were only discovered during the subsequent examination o Thus, an amended complaint cannot be validly filed against the accused without violating his constitutional right against double jeopardy The SC also warned that before filing appropriate informations in cases of physical injuries, thorough medical examinations must be conducted to avoid such circumstances, where the accused could not be held liable for the more severe but rightful liability, as he is shielded by the guarantee against double jeopardy Darvin: o Also, take note that the first jeopardy has already terminated because the accused had, in fact, fully served his sentence

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-----APPEALS-----The prosecution may not appeal a judgment of acquittal No error committed by the court against the State can be reserve by it for decision by the SC, when the defendant has once been placed in jeopardy and discharged, even though the same was the result of the error committed o But where the prosecution has not been given due process, acquittal or dismissal is no bar to a refilling of the case When an accused appeals a conviction, the reviewing court may impose on him a penalty higher than that imposed in the decision appealed by him o When an accused appeals his conviction, he waives his right to the plea of double jeopardy and whatever benefit he may have obtained from the prior judgment -----REMINDERS-----Darvin: Always take note of the elements of double jeopardy o If the first jeopardy has yet to attach due to the lack or defect of any of the elements (court of competent jurisdiction, valid information, arraignment, valid plea), then double jeopardy cannot yet be invoked Even if the first jeopardy has attached, the same would have to terminate, otherwise to invoke double jeopardy would be premature (Bulaong v. People) If the dismissal of the case is with the consent of the accused, the dismissal does not bar a subsequent prosecution, unless, the dismissal was based on the merits, such as failure to prosecute or lack of evidence If the dismissal of the case was due to a violation of the right to speedy trial, it amounts to an acquittal and bars a subsequent prosecution for the same offense

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ART III SEC 22 -----EX POST FACTO LAWS-----An ex post facto law is one that is defined as Which makes an action done, before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done, criminal and punishes such action Which aggravates a crime o Makes it greater than when it was committed Which changes the punishment o Inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed Which alters the legal rules of evidence o Receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant Assumes to regulate civil and remedies only, but, in effect, imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful Deprives a person accused of a crime some lawful protection to which he has become entitled -Ex post facto prohibition applies to: Criminal legislation that affects the substantial rights of an accused Criminal procedural law that is prejudicial to the accused o The test in procedural matters is whether particular statutes, by their operation, take from an accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution: ! As vital for the protection of life and liberty ! Which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him -LACSON v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY The accused, in this case, are being prosecuted as accessories for multiple murder with regard to the KURATONG BALELENG rubout Under the old law, the case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC However, RA 8249 was enacted expanding the jurisdiction of the SANDIGANBAYAN o Under the old law, only principals for offenses cognizable by the SB may be tried by it o Under the new law, accomplices and accessories may also be tried by the SB, not only principals RA 8249 was made to apply to cases pending in any court over which trial has not yet begun, such as the case of the accused where evidence has yet to be presented and, thus, their case was transferred to the SB The accused alleged that the law is an ex post facto law because the new law deprives him of the two-tiered appeal before recourse to the SC The SC held that generally, an ex post facto law prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws o In this case, RA 8249 is not a penal law, but a substantive law on jurisdiction, which is not penal in character The SC also held that penal laws are: o Those acts of the Legislature that prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations o Those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment The SC further held that the right to appeal is not a natural right, but only statutory in nature o Thus, the right to appeal can be regulated by law o The mode of procedure for the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws ! In this case, RA 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, does not mete out a penalty, and did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial ! Also, RA 8249 has preserved the right of the accused to appeal before the SC, which has the power to review the case in order to determine if the presumption of innocence has been overcome Darvin: o Cases decided by the SB may be appealed to the SC o Cased decided by the RTC may be reviewed first by the CA before being reviewed by the SC o But it must be noted that the CA may determine questions of fact, while the SC, generally, may only rule upon questions of law -----BILLS OF ATTAINDER-----PEOPLE v. FERRER The ANTI-SUBVERSION ACT outlaws the COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES and other subversive organizations and punishes any person who knowingly and by overt acts

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affiliates himself, becomes, or remains a member of the said Party or any similar subversive organization after the passage of the Act The Act is alleged to be a bill of attainder The SC held that a bill of attainder is a Legislative act that inflicts punishment without trial o Its essence is the substitution of a legislative act for a judicial determination of guilt o It suffices to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder: ! There is a singling out of a definitive class ! There is an imposition of a burden on the said class ! There is a legislative intent behind the said imposition The SC held, in this case, that the Act does not specify the COMMUNIST PARTY for the purpose of punishment, but merely uses the same for definitional purposes o The Act focuses on the conduct prohibited and not on the individuals o The issues are resolved as follows: o (1) The mere fact that the Act singles out the CPP and imposes a burden upon it is insufficient to deem it a BoA, as the said law does not apply solely to the CPP but to any other organization organized for the purpose of overthrowing the government ! Under the Act, the guilt of the accused must still be judicially determined ! In other words, the court must still prove that the accused joined the Party knowingly and with intent to attain its specific objective to overthrow the government o (2) The judgment expressed in the legislation regarding the criminal nature of the CPP is so universally acknowledged as to be certain and judicially noticeable The SC, on many occasions, has found the CPP to be an illegal organization, engaged in armed struggle for the purpose of overthrowing the government, etc. ! When the judgment express in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be certain as to be judicially noticeable, the legislature may apply its own rules and judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make such determination o (3) If a statute is a Bill of Attainder, it is necessarily also an ex post facto law o The said law, however, punishes acts committed after the enactment of the law o In other words, it applies prospectively, not retroactively o Also, members of the CPP have the opportunity to renounce their affiliation or discontinue their criminal acts and, hence, the penalties are not inescapable The SC further held that a statute becomes a bill of attainder only when it applies either to a) named individuals or b) easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them, amounting to a deprivation of any right, civil or political, without judicial trial Last but not least, a bill of attainder must apply retroactively and reach past conduct o A bill of attainder is doubly objectionable because of its ex post facto features o Thus, a bill of attainder is also an ex post facto law o If one objection to the bill of attainder is that Congress thereby assumes judicial magistracy, then it must be demonstrated that the statute claimed to be such: ! Reaches past conduct, and ! The penalties it imposes are inescapable So long as the incidence of legislation is such that the persons who engage in the regulated conduct can escape regulation merely by altering the course of their own present activities, there can be no complaint of an attainder Dissenting Opinion Justice Fernando: o A bill of pains and penalties is a bill of attainder, where the penalty imposed is less than death ! Within the meaning of the Constitution, bills of attainder include bills of pains and penalties o In cases of bills of attainders, the legislature: ! Exercises the powers and office of a judge, as the former assumes judiciary magistracy ! Pronounces upon the guilt of the party without any of the forms or safeguards of trial ! Determines the sufficiency of the proofs produces, whether conformable to the rules of evidence or otherwise ! Fixes the degree of punishment in accordance with its own notions of the enormity of the offense o In bills of attainders, there is a legislative enactment creating the deprivation, without any of the ordinary forms and guards provided for the security of the citizen in the administration of justice by the established tribunals

-PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN PAREDES committed a violation of the ANTI-GRAFT and CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT for which he was prosecuted PAREDES committed the said offense in the year 1976 The prescriptive period for the said Act, then, under existing law was 10 years

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Subsequently, BP 195 was enacted in 1982), which extended the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under RA 3019 from 10 years to 15 years Thus, PAREDES is now being prosecuted due to the extended prescriptive period, although under the old law, his liability therefrom must be extinguished The SC held, in this case, that the provisions of BP 195 regarding the longer prescriptive period for prosecution of offenses cannot be applied retroactively against PAREDES because it is not favorable to him as the accused o To do so would make it an ex post facto law, contrary to the Constitution, as it would punish PAREDES for a crime that should have already been extinguished through prescription

-CO v. COURT OF APPEALS In 1981, the MINISTRY OF JUSTICE issued a Circular declaring that the issuance of rubber checks was not covered by BP 22 (ANTI-BOUNCING CHECKS Law) o Hence, it was not prohibited by law In 1983, CO issued the rubber check subject of this prosecution upon reliance on the Circular In 1984, the said Circular was reversed by the MINISTRY OF JUSTICE declaring that the issuance of rubber checks was covered by BP 22 and, hence, is punishable under the said law In 1987, the SC ruled in the case of Que vs. People that the issuance of rubber checks was indeed prohibited by law and punishable under BP 22 Thus, Co is now being prosecuted for the issuance of the said rubber check in violation of BP 22 The SC held that the principle of prospectivity applies to: o Original or amendatory statutes o Administrative rulings and circulars o Judicial decisions The SC also held that the interpretation upon a law by the SC constitutes a part of the law as of the date that the law was originally passed o The Courts construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate The SC further held when a doctrine of the SC is overruled and a different view is adopted: ! The new doctrine should be applied prospectively ! The new doctrine should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof o Especially in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society o Thus, while it is true that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system, the same are also subject to the principle that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is proved o The retroactive application of a law usually: ! Divests rights that have already become vested ! Impairs the obligations of contracts Last but not least, there is an imperative necessity to take account of the actual existence of a statute, prior to its nullification, as an operative fact and may have consequences that cannot justly be ignored, which negates the acceptance of the principle of absolute retroactive invalidity ! Prior to the declaration of nullity, the challenged Act must have been in force and had to be complied with and, thus, it is entitled to obedience and respect as parties may have acted under it and changed their positions ! Thus, prior to its being nullified, the existence of a statute as a fact must be reckoned with ! It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice if there will be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such nullification o In this case, CO relied upon the initial interpretation of the MINISTER OF JUSTICE and the Que vs. People ruling was promulgated already after his act of issuing the rubber check o Thus, Que cannot retroact and apply to the case because it is not favorable to CO as an accused

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ART IV -----CITIZENSHIP-----The following are citizens of the Philippines: Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines Those born before 17 January 1973 (1973 Constitution), of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority Those who are naturalized in accordance with law -----CHILDREN OF FILIPINO FATHERS OR MOTHERS-----1935 Constitution Adopted the rule of jus sanguinis as an absolute rule and, hence, the child of a Filipino father was a Filipino citizen from the moment of birth, whether born in the Philippines or abroad -1973 Constitution Expanded the application of jus sanguinis by placing Filipino mothers on the same level as Filipino fathers in matters of citizenship o Thus, those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines are Filipino citizens, even if the father is an alien, provided that the mother must be Filipina at the time of the birth of the child, which must take place on or after 17 January 1973 (not during the 1935 Constitution) -VALLES v. COMELEC = Jus sanguinis; effect of Certificate of Candidacy ROSALIND LOPEZ was a candidate for public office and her eligibility was challenged on the basis of citizenship LOPEZ was born in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother She was born the year before the 1935 Constitution took effect and, thus, the PHILIPPINE BILL and PHILIPPINE AUTONOMY ACT were the applicable laws Under both Acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines, who were Spanish subjects on 11 April 1899 and who resided therein, including their children, are deemed Filipino Citizens o TELESFORO, LOPEZ father, qualifies as a citizen under the said laws The SC held that the signing into law of the 1935 Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of citizenship o Jus sanguinis is the principle that confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship o In this case, LOPEZ is a Filipino citizen having been born to a Filipino father and the fact that she was born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship o Also, if Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then, at most, LOPEZ can also claim Australian citizenship, resulting to her possession of dual citizenship The SC also held that in order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, the same must be express o Under jurisprudence, being a holder of a FOREIGN PASSPORT or an ALIEN CERTIFICATION OF REGISTRATION is not tantamount to a renunciation of Philippine citizenship o In this case, the documents were mere acts of LOPEZ assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same The SC further held that dual citizenship as used in the LGC as a mode of disqualification from holding public office, refers to dual allegiance o The LGC must be reconciled with the Constitution with the recognition that a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state Last but not least, the SC held that for public office candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship, upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, in order to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship o The filing of a certificate of candidacy suffices to renounce foreign citizenship, which effectively removes any disqualification as a dual citizen o In the certificate of candidacy, one declares, among others, that he is a Filipino citizen and such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship -TECSON v. COMELEC = FPJ FPJ filed his CoC for President in the 2004 election, where he represented himself to be a natural-born citizen FORNIER sought to disqualify FPJ on the ground that he is not a natural-born citizen because a) his parents were both foreigners, as his mother was an American and his father was Spanish and b) even assuming that his father was Filipino, the same could not transmit the citizenship to FPJ because he was an illegitimate child

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Under the history on citizenship, during the Spanish occupation, there was no such term as Philippine citizens, but only Spanish subjects and it was only upon the ratification of the TREATY OF PARIS that the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects, as the Philippine Bill of 1902 described the same as Citizens of the Philippine Islands Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship The SC held that, in this case, FPJ was born during the time when 1935 Constitution prevailed, which meant that the concept of jus sanguinis was the primary basis of citizenship o Thus, FPJs citizenship would depend on whether or not ALLAN, his father, was a Filipino citizen o In this case, the citizenship of LORENZO POU (grandfather) could be drawn from the presumption that, having died in 1954 in PAMPANGA, he wouldve have been born in 1870 when the RP was still under Spanish rule and, thus, LORENZO would have benefitted from the en masse Filipinization that the PHILIPPINE BILL enacted in 1902 o In turn, that citizenship, if acquired, would extend to his son, ALLAN, the father of FPJ The SC also held that the supposed doctrine that an illegitimate child follows the citizenship of the mother has not been duly established as a doctrine because the same is merely obiter dictum from past decisions o BERNAS, as amicus curiae, opined that such a doctrine would have no textual foundation in the Constitution and is violative of the equal protection clause, making an unreasonable distinction between a legitimate and illegitimate child o Thus, the 1935 Constitution confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino, regardless of whether they are born legitimate or illegitimate -----CITIZENS BY ELECTION-----

-1935 Constitution Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship For a child to benefit from this provision, the mother must be a citizen of the Philippines either by birth or by naturalization at the time of her marriage -1973 Constitution Allowed the Filipino who marries an alien to retain her original citizenship Allowed the child to follow the citizenship of his mother and, thus, a child born under the 1973 Constitution would not have to make the election in order to acquire Philippine citizenship o However, this provision is prospective The election provision is applicable only to children born under the 1935 Constitution who had not yet reached the age of majority when the 1973 Constitution took effect o Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the 1935 Constitution o Thus, the right of election referred to can only be one which was acquired under the 1935 Constitution o The 1973 Constitution does not grant, but merely preserves a right already acquired o There is no right of election for children born under the 1973 Constitution -1987 Constitution Since the right of election provided in the 1973 Constitution is in the nature of transitory provision, the same has been carried into the present Constitution for the benefit of those who will attain the age of majority sometime in 1994 -CO v. HRET JOSE ONG, JR. was proclaimed Representative of the 2nd District of NORTHERN SAMAR BALINQUIT and CO, his losing competitors, challenged ONGs natural-born citizenship before the HRET, which upheld the same and, hence, they filed petition for certiorari ONGs family history goes as follows: o ONG TE (grandfather) arrived from China in 1895, established residence in SAMAR and was able to obtain a CERTIFICATE OF RESIDENCE under the Spanish Colonial Administration ! ONG TE qualified as a Filipino citizen under the PHILIPPINE BILL of 1902 o JOSE ONG CHUAN (father) was brought to the Philippines in 1905 and married a natural born Filipina (mother) ! The CFI of Samar, after trial, declared JOSE ONG CHUAN a Filipino Citizen o JOSE ONG, JR. (respondent) was born in 1948, under the 1935 Constitution o EMIL ONG (brother) was a delegate of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, which affirmed his citizenship and other qualifications as a member of the said body

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The SC held that Section 1(3), Article IV, which provides that those born of Filipino mothers before the 1973 Constitution took effect, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, shall be Filipino citizens applies to: ! Those who elect Philippine citizenship after the 1987 Constitution took effect ! Those who have elected Philippine citizenship even before the 1987 Constitution took effect o Filipino citizenship would apply to anyone who elected the same by virtue of the 1935 provision (born before the 1973 Constitution), regardless of whether the election was done before or after the 1973 Constitution ! Moreover, persons who have exercised such right of election conferred by the 1935 Constitution shall be considered natural-born o In this case, JOSE was born of a Filipino father and mother and, thus, there is no question that he was a Filipino citizen The SC also held that the right of election is both a formal and informal process o The Court recognizes peculiar situations for those who cannot be expected to have elected citizenship through by the filing of a sworn statement or formal declaration, as they were already citizens and, thus, affirmed other acts of deliberate choice: Entering a profession open only to Filipinos Serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification Voting during election time Running for public office ! In this case, even assuming that he was born merely to a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution and that he would have to elect or choose to be a natural-born Filipino citizen, ONG still satisfied the requirement, albeit not expressly ! ONG exercised his right to vote, lived in the Philippines since birth and established a life here, held sensitive positions in the government (Central Bank), exercised a profession (CPA) reserved only to Filipinos, embraced the Philippine customs and values, and was overwhelmingly voted for by his constituents o The election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that a) the person electing is an alien or b) his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries ! In this case, there is no doubt that ONG was a Filipino when he turned 21 Last but not least, the SC held that an attack of a persons citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity o Thus, the attack on ONG TEs citizenship cannot stand Darvin: o The Constitution requires that a person must be natural-born in order to be eligible as a Representative in Congress o However, only the Constitution in specified cases can distinguish between naturalborn and naturalized citizens in conferring rights and privileges ! Thus, naturalized citizens are not second-class citizens and possess the same rights as a natural-born citizen -----NATURALIZATION-----

-Naturalization defined: The legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the rights that belong to a naturalborn citizen o Naturalization may be obtained either through: ! A general law of naturalization applied through a judicial process ! Administrative process, but, as that with judicial naturalization, the applicant must prove that he has the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for citizenship Nature: o Naturalization is not considered a matter of right, but is one of privilege, which regarded as the most discriminating, delicate, and exacting in nature o The right to determine rules on admission to citizenship is considered an aspect of sovereignty ! Generally, the questions on naturalization should be left to the National Legislature, whose power includes: Control over processes through which citizenship is acquired or lost Determination of substantive criteria for admission to citizenship Fixing the consequences of the grant of citizenship on the wife or minor children of the grantee o The grant of citizenship is never res judicata, as it can always be opened for valid reasons Effects:

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o o

The naturalization of a father of legitimate minors under parental authority also naturalizes the minors The naturalization of a husband also naturalizes the wife, provided the latter shows, in an administrative procedure, that she has none of the disqualifications

-Natural-born citizens: Those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship These who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with Section 1(3), Article IV, by virtue of the provisions of the 1935 Constitution -Natural-born vs. Naturalized There is no significant distinction between the natural-born and naturalized citizens, except where the Constitution itself provides otherwise ! Certain Constitutional offices only for NBCs ! Former NBCs who lost their Filipino citizenship may still be transferees of private linds o If it were not so, then there would be an infringement of the equal protection guarantee o Thus, both natural-born and naturalized citizens have equal rights -----LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP-----Ways to lose Filipino citizenship under CA 63, which applies to both natural-born and naturalized citizens: By naturalization in a foreign country By express renunciation of citizenship By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining 21 years of age or more By accepting commission in the military, naval, or air service of foreign country By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization By having been declare by competent authority as a deserter of the AFP in time of war, unless, subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted In case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husbands country, she acquires his nationality -Ways to lose Filipino citizenship under CA 473, which applies only to naturalized citizens: When the certificate of naturalized is found to have been fraudulently or illegally obtained By permanent residence in the country of origin within 5 years from naturalization When the petition is found to have been made on an invalid declaration of intent Upon failure to comply with the requirements for re education of minor children If the person allows himself to be a dummy for aliens -YU v. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO YU was originally issued a PORTUGESE PASSPORT in 1971 He was naturalized as a Filipino citizen in 1978, but in 1981, he once again applied for and was issued a PORTUGESE PASSPORT As a naturalized Filipino, YU even declared his nationality as PORTUGESE in public and commercial documents, despite his oath to maintain true allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines YU pleaded that he has never formally renounced his Filipino citizenship The SC held that, in this case, all the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of YUs Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization Under jurisprudence, express renunciation has been held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication o In this case petitioner, with full knowledge and legal capacity, while a naturalized Filipino citizen, represented himself as a PORTUGESE national in several official documents Darvin: o The decision in this case was summarily rendered by the EXECUTIVE BRANCH, most likely by the COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORATION, in an executive, not a judicial, proceeding Consolidated Dissents: o The pieces of documentary evidence, which consist primarily of photocopies of certain documents, are insufficient to indicate a categorical and unequivocal renunciation of citizenship

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It has been held in jurisprudence that if, in a deportation proceeding, the alleged alien claims citizenship and supports the claim by substantial evidence, then he is entitled to have his status finally determined by a judicial tribunal ! The determination that a person has ceased to be a Filipino should not be left to summary proceedings ! Thus, YU deserved to have his day in court ! A judicial proceeding must be held to afford him his right to due process ! In this case, a summary executive proceeding is not sufficient, as the proper procedures laid down by law must be observed

-FRIVALDO v. COMELEC = No automatic restoration of Filipino citizenship FRIVALDO was proclaimed governor-elect of SORSOGON His eligibility was challenged before COMELEC on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized as an AMERICAN in 1983 and that he has not re-acquired his Filipino citizenship on the day of the elections FRIVALDO claimed that he acquired American citizenship only to protect himself from the Marcos Regime and that the same was merely forced upon him to avoid persecution and, thus, his naturalization was not impressed with voluntariness Under the Constitution: o All public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution allegiance at all times o A candidate for a local elective office must be a citizen of the RP and a qualified voter of the constituency where is running o A qualified voter must be a citizen of the Philippines The SC held that, in this case, FRIVALDOs excuse must be rejected and that if he really wanted to disavow his US citizenship and re-acquire Philippine citizenship, then he should have done so in accordance with Philippine law, either by act of Congress, naturalization, or repatriation The SC also held that, in this case, even if FRIVALDO lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring the Philippine citizenship that he earlier renounced o At most, FRIVALDO would be a stateless individual The SC further held that qualifications for public office are continuing requirements, such that the same must be possessed not only at the time of appointment, election, or assumption of office, but also during the officers entire tenure o Once any of the required qualifications is lost, then his title may seasonably be challenged o Moreover, the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone o If a person seeks to serve in the RP, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only -LABO, JR. v. COMELEC LABO was proclaimed Mayor of BAGUIO CITY According to an unrefuted statement from the AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, it turns out that sometime prior to his election, LABO married an AUSTRALIAN woman and acquired Australian citizenship by naturalization He was required to swear an oath or to make an affirmation renouncing all other allegiance o Thus, LABO swore true allegiance to the Queen of Australia o Also, he categorically stated that he was an Australian in a number of sworn statements Subsequently, his marriage to his AUSTRALIAN wife was declared void for being bigamous He applied for IMMIGRANT CERTIFICATION OF REGISTRATION COMELEC affirmed his citizenship, stating that the said acts were all mistakes, while the CID declared that he was not a citizen LABO invoked res judicata The SC held that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship The SC also held that Philippine citizenship may be reacquired under CA 63, as amended by PD 725: ! By a direct act of Congress ! By naturalization ! By repatriation o In this case, the fact that LABOs marriage was declared void and arguably had the effect of divesting him of his AUSSIE citizenship is a matter between him and the State of Australia o It does not automatically restore him to his status as a Filipino citizen and, thus, he must first re-acquire his lost citizenship through the process required by Philippine law o Thus, LABO was ineligible according to the LGC and was ordered to vacate his position as Mayor

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-AZNAR v. OSMENA OSMENA was a candidate for governor for CEBU AZNAR sought to disqualify him as candidate alleging that he was an AMERICAN citizen based on a Statement issued by the CID affirming the existence of the following documents: (1) Application for Alien Registration, (2) Alien Certificate of Registration, (3) Permit to Re-enter the Philippines, and (4) Immigration Certification of Clearance, which were all under his name Despite such circumstances, OSMENA who was eventually proclaimed as winning candidate The SC held, in this case, that AZNAR failed to present direct proof that OSMENA had lost his Filipino citizenship, as the former merely presumed that the latter took an a oath of allegiance to the US based on the said documents o Moreover, by virtue of being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption is that OSMENA is a Filipino citizen and AZNAR failed to discharge the burden of proof o There was no proof that OSMENA lost his citizenship by (1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express renunciation, or (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to a foreign country The SC also held, in this case, that the CERTIFICATION OF ALIEN REGISTRATION, although stating that OSMENA is an AMERICAN, does not mean and follow that he is still not a Filipino or no longer Filipino o It is possible that he possesses both nationalities o Also, the statement under the Constitution against dual allegiance has no retroactive effect and is to be dealt with by law, but a law has yet to be enacted Consolidated Dissents: o When a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he is, in effect, affirming that he is not a citizen ! Simply put, how can a person claim to be both an alien and a citizen at the same time? ! Obtaining an ALIEN CERTIFICATE is a clear and unambiguous act of declaring that one is not a citizen ! It was a voluntary act for the purpose of insulating oneself from the jurisdiction of the State over its nationals o Express renunciation and naturalization are separate modes of losing citizenship ! One need not be naturalized to actually have to expressly renounce his citizenship ! All the documents that OSMENA requested from the CID are predicated upon the fact that he is an alien under Philippine laws, especially his PERMIT TO RE-ENTER ! Entry to the country is a right conferred to citizens; if he believed himself to be a citizen, then seeking permission would not be necessary ! Thus, treating OSMENA different from FRIVALDO and LABO smacks of unequal treatment -----REPATRIATION-----Repatriation is governed by RA 8171: Process: o Taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the RP o Registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration ! Registration is an essential element for the reacquisition to take effect o The effective date of a grant of repatriation is the date of application Effect: o Reacquisition of former original citizenship, whether natural-born or naturalized Application: o Women who have lost their citizenship through marriage to aliens o Natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship on account of economic or political necessity o Desertion of the AFP o Service in the armed forces of the allied forces in WWII o Serviced in the armed forces of the US at any other time -BENGZON v. CRUZ CRUZ was born in 1960 of Filipino parents and, thus, he was a natural-born Filipino citizen But in 1985, he enlisted in the US Marine Corps, as well as took an oath of allegiance to the US and, thus, he lost his Filipino citizenship He was subsequently naturalized as a US citizen in 1990 But in 1994, CRUZ reacquired his Filipino citizenship by virtue of REPATRIATION under RA 2630 Eventually, he ran for and was elected as Representative of 2nd District of PANGASINAN BENGZON, his losing competitor, assailed his citizenship qualification claiming that he is no longer a natural born-citizen because he had to perform an act to acquire or perfect his citizenship

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On other hand, CRUZ alleged that he simply reacquired his original status since the phrase from birth in reference to NBCs, refers to an innate, inherent, and inborn characteristic The SC held that there are two ways of acquiring citizenship: ! By birth ! By naturalization o Which corresponds to only two kinds/classes of citizens: ! Natural-born citizen Natural-born citizens are those citizens of the RP from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship ! Naturalized citizen Naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization Filipinos who have lost their citizenship may reacquire the same in the manner provided by law by naturalization, by repatriation, or by direct act of Congress o Naturalization, which is a mode for both the acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, requires a very tedious process o Repatriation simply consists of taking an oath of allegiance and registering the same The SC also held that the effect of repatriation is the recovery of the original nationality o A natural-born or naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a natural-born or naturalized citizen, as the case may be, by virtue of repatriation o In this case, CRUZ, through repatriation, acquired his status as a natural-born citizen, which is a status he acquired at birth by being the son of a Filipino father The SC further held that two requisites must concur for a person to be considered a naturalborn citizen: ! A person must be a Filipino citizen from birth, and ! The person does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship o Under the Constitution, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens ! A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino is one who did not have to go under the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship and is necessary a natural-born citizen Concurring Opinion of Justice Panganiban: o Repatriation is simply the recovery of original citizenship ! Repatriation is not a grant of anew citizenship, but a restoration of a former status Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez: o If citizenship is gained through naturalization, repatriation, or legislation, the citizenship cannot be considered natural-born o The person would still have to make an express and unequivocal act of formally rejecting his adopted state and reaffirming is allegiance to the Philippines o The patriotic intent of the Constitution is to impose a more stringent requirement for those aspiring to hold high offices in the government, particularly Congress. ! In this case, the majority has adopted a liberal and cavalier approach to the meaning and import of natural-born citizenship Darvin: o For repatriation to be effective, it must be registered with both: ! The Civil Registrar ! The Bureau of Immigration o Also, repatriation is not a right, but is simply a privilege granted by the State

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ART IX -----EDUCATION-----MEYER v. NEBRASKA A NEBRASKA Law prohibited the teaching of foreign languages to students, unless they have already passed the 8th grade and violation of the same amounts to a misdemeanor and is punishable by fine and imprisonment The intent of the law was to curb the baneful effects of the settlement of foreigners who rear their children in their native tongue and inculcate ideas inconsistent with American ideals MEYER, an instructor at the ZION PAROCHIAL SCHOOL, was convicted under the said law for teaching the GERMAN language to a 10-year old child The US SC held that liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action that is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect o In other words, even a desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means ! In this case, while the intent of the law is valid, the means employed is arbitrary, as it exceeded the limitations of State power and conflicted with the rights assured to MEYER ! Also, mere knowledge of the German language cannot be said to be harmful, as no emergency has arisen that would require such a drastic prohibition o Moreover, determination by Congress of what constitutes proper exercise of police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to supervision by the courts o Liberty includes: Freedom from bodily restraint The right to contract The right to engage in any of the common occupations of life The right to acquire useful knowledge The right to marry The right to establish a home and bring up children The right to worship God according to the dictates of conscience The right to enjoy privileges long recognizes at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men ! In this case, the right of MEYER to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children were recognized as within the liberty found under the Constitution ! Thus, via the NEBRASKA Law, the legislature has attempted to interfere with the calling of modern language teachers, the opportunities of students to acquire knowledge, and the power of parents to control the education of their children The US SC also held that though the State may do much in order to improve the qualify of its citizens, the individual has fundamental rights that must be respected o In this case, the protection of the Constitution extends to all, even to those who speak other languages -PIERCE v. SOCIETY OF SISTERS The COMPULSORY EDUCATION ACT required that every parent or guardian of a child between 8-16 years old to send their children to a public school for a certain period and violation thereof amounts to a misdemeanor The purpose of the law is to compel general attendance in public schools by normal children who have yet to complete the 8th grade SOCIETY OF SISTERS, a corporation that engages in the business of primary and secondary schooling and owns considerable educational facilities, assailed the validity of the law for violating the parents right to rear their children, not to mention that SOCIETY stands to lose considerable profits due to the enforcement of the law The US SC held there is no question concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools to inspect, supervise, and examine the same o But the rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation that has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State ! In this case, the law interfered with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control ! Also, there were no peculiar circumstances or present emergencies that demand extraordinary measures relative to primary education ! Thus, the theory of liberty excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public school teachers only The US SC also held that the child is not the mere creature of the State, as those who nurture the child and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations Darvin:

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The duty to educate and rear children is primarily vested in their parents and the State merely has the subsidiary duty to educate and rear the same ! Thus, the parents have the right to choose between public schools and private schools for their children

-WISCONSIN v. YODER YODER et al. were members of the AMISH Religion who, against a Wisconsin COMPULSORY ATTENDANCE LAW, refused to send their children to high school after finishing the 8th grade According to them and their expert witness, their religious dogmas mandate a return to the old Christian life, de-emphasizing competitiveness and success and requiring aloofness from the material world They allege that high school education goes against their dogmas favoring manual work and devotion to a life in harmony with nature, etc. Also, they point out that the Amish have demonstrated to be law abiding and productive members of the society The US SC held that there is no doubt as to the power of the State, having a high responsibility for the education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education o Likewise, the values of parental direction of the religious upbringing of their children in their early and formative years have acquired a high place in society o Thus, the States interest in universal education is not totally free from a balancing process when the same impinges on other fundamental rights and interests, such as those protected by the free exercise clause and the traditional interest of parents in the religious upbringing of their children ! In this case, in order for WISCONSIN to enforce the said law, it must appear either that the State does not deny the free exercise of religious beliefs or that there is a State interest of sufficient magnitude to override the protection of the free exercise clause the burden was not discharged, as there was indeed a restraint on free exercise and an absence of compelling State interests To let the State to enforce the law would allow it to influence, if not determine, the religious future of the said children, which is contrary to the fundamental and primary interest of parents in the upbringing of their children, which includes directing the religious future of the same o Therefore, only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion ! In other words, no matter how strong the States interest in universal compulsory education, it is by no means absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other interests ! In this case, there was no proof that the Amish alternative education causes any harm to the students and any argument that it deprives the children of choice as well as the chance to be competent is largely speculative ! Despite their strangeness, the Amish have proven that adherence to their beliefs has allowed the Amish to survive for the last 3 centuries as productive and self-reliant citizens ! Also, the State mistakenly assumed that the Amish do not provide any education for their children beyond the 8th grade, as the latter does provide for ideal vocational education -Pierce doctrine: Where only the general interest of the parent in the nurture and education of his child is involved, the same may be subject to regulation, provided that the State acts reasonably and Constitutionally When the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim, more than merely a reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state is required to sustain the validity of a statute regulating the same o But the power of the parent, even when linked to a fundamental right, may be subject to limitation, if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child or have a potential for significant social burdens -GINSBERG v. NEW YORK GINSBERG was operating Sams Stationery and Luncheonette, which also sold some magazines GINSBERG was charged and convicted for having sold girlie magazines on 2 separate occasions to children less than 17 years old, which is in violation of the NY Penal Law GINSBERG attacked the validity of the said law for impairing the right to liberty of the children under 17 years old The US SC held that obscenity is not within the are of protected speech or press

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Thus, obscenity may be suppressed even without a showing of the circumstances that lie behind the clear and present danger test applicable to protected speech The US SC also held that under jurisprudence, the concept of obscenity or unprotected matter may vary according to the group to whom the questionable material is directed or from whom it is quarantined o Material that is protected for distribution to adults is not necessarily constitutionally protected from restriction upon its dissemination to children o Since there is State interest in preventing distribution of objectionable material to children, the former can exercise its power to protect the morals of its community by barring the distribution to children of materials recognized to be suitable for adults ! In this case, the NY statute simply adjusted the definition of obscenity to social realities by permitting the appeal of the same to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests of those under 17 years old ! Also, the State has the power to make the said adjustment, even where there is an invasion of protected freedoms, as the power of the State to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults The US SC also held that the well-being of its children is a subject within the States Constitutional power to be regulated o Thus, while it is true that the custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, the knowledge that parental control or guidance cannot always be provided, coupled with State interest in the welfare of children, justify regulation with respect to the same o In other words, the State has an interest: To protect the welfare of children To see it to that the children are safeguarded from abuses ! To ensure their growth into free and independent well-developed citizens o In this case, there is nothing in the statute to prevent a parent from purchasing the magazine and allowing his child to read it, which is in recognition of the primary right of parents, but since the same cannot always be expected to monitor the children, reasonable regulation of the sale of such material by the State is justified o -----QUALITY and ACCESSIBILITY OF EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM-----

-The State must promote and protect: Quality education Affordable education Relevant education -DEPARTMENT of EDUCATION, CULTURE, and SPORTS v. SAN DIEGO SAN DIEGO, a graduate of Zoology from UE, times took the NMAT four times for entry to med school He flunked the exam as many times and, as a result, he was barred by the DECS from taking the NMAT the fifth time on the basis of the Three Flunk Rule laid down in MECS Order 12, which allows students to take the NMAT only 3 times SAN DIEGO challenged the constitutionality of the Three Flunk Rule for violating his right to academic freedom, quality education, and equal protection The SC held that under jurisprudence, it has been established that there is a reasonable relation between the prescribing of the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school and the securing of the health and safety of the general community o The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public o In turn, the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine ! In this case, the SC held that the issue raised is the academic preparation of the applicant, which may be gauged initially by the admission test and later on by the three-flunk rule ! Also, the said rule was laid down as a valid exercise of the police power, as it the right and the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their health ! In other words, the rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and, ultimately, the medical profession from the intrusion of unqualified doctors The SC also held that the right to quality education is not absolute because the Constitution also provides that every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements o In this case, while SAN DIEGOs persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love -NON v. JUDGE DAMES

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NON and 12 other students of the MABINI COLLEGED were denied re-enrollment for having participated in unruly mass actions without permits from the school authorities, resulting to the disruption of classes, which is in violation of school disciplinary rules The SC previously held in Alcuaz vs. PSBA that when a college student is admitted into an institution, the same is considered to be in contractual relations with the school only for one semester, which contract terminates by the end of the said semester o After which, the school cannot be compelled, through judicial proceedings, to readmit the student because the courts cannot make contracts for the parties NON sought a re-examination of the said ruling The SC held that the protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution is available to students and the same do not shed their Constitutional rights at the school-house gate o While the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, the schools cannot go so far as to be violative of Constitutional safeguards o Thus, the exercise of free expression and assembly cannot be used as a basis for denying re-enrollment to students o The right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized to discriminate against students who exercise their Constitutional rights ! But this is different from allowing non-enrollment of students who clearly incurred marked academic deficiency ! Academic freedom includes the right to set academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students and once the school has done so, that standard should be followed meticulously But the SC held that while the highest regard must be afforded the exercise of the rights to free speech and assembly, this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are virtually powerless to discipline students o Conduct that materially disrupts classwork, involves substantial disorder, invasion of the rights of others is not immunized by the Constitutional guarantee of free speech o Thus, under jurisprudence, students were not totally absolved for the events that transpired The SC also held that the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires the observance of procedural due process: o Students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of the accusations o They shall have the right to answer the charges, with counsel if desired o They shall be informed of the evidence against them o They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf o School authorities must decide based on duly considered evidence o The penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed ! If the concept of proportionality between the offense committed and sanction imposed is not followed, then an element of arbitrariness intrudes In this case, the penalty of refusing re-enrollment is disproportionate to the offenses committed Considering that 5 of the students did not have failing marks, they should be entitled to re-enrollment Furthermore, 2 students had only 1 or 2 failures, which cannot be sufficient deficiency Also, since the academic standards of the school were never pleaded, NON and the others who had several failures are to be re-admitted, without prejudice to any appropriate action, if it is shown that they have indeed failed to satisfy the schools academic requirements The SC further held that a contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract, as the same imbued with public interest, considering: o The high priority given by the Constitution to education o The grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions o In this case, Paragraph 137 on the MANUAL OF REGULATIONS FOR PRIVATE SCHOOLS as regards the termination of contract theory does not hold water because the same merely clarifies that a college student enrolls for the entire semester for the purpose of protecting schools wherein tuition fees are collected and pair on an installment basis, being under the section on TUITION AND OTHER FEES ! Thus, in no way may Paragraph 137 be construed to mean that the student shall be enrolled only for one semester and that after the same is over, his re-enrollment is dependent only on the sound discretion of the school o In contrast, Paragraph 107 recognizes the right of the student to be enrolled in his course for the entire period he is expected to complete it, except in the case of academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations

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BP 232 provides for the right of the student to freely choose his field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue his course therein up to graduation, except in cases of (1) academic deficiency or (2) violation of disciplinary regulations

-Note:

The academic freedom of schools gives them the right to exclude from the school students whom they consider academically unsuitable

-SUPERINTENDENT v. AZARCON Respondents AZARCON and ANONUEVO were public school teachers at GENERAL HIZON ELEMENTARY SCHOOL (GMHES), who joined an unauthorized mass action of public school teachers DECS SECRETARY CARINO filed charges against the participants and respondents were among those charged, placed under preventive suspension, and eventually dismissed Respondents elevated the case to the CSC, which modified the penalty to 6 months suspension without pay and on the basis of the said ruling, respondents requested the SUPERINTENDENT to reinstate them in GMHES But since there were no more vacancies in the said school, the respondents were assigned to other schools Respondents refused to accept their new assignments and moved for implementation of the CSC Decision The SC held that under Section 6 of the MAGNA CARTA for PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS, it is provided that no teacher shall be transferred without his consent from one station to another, except for cause and as otherwise provided in the MAGNA CARTA o For a transfer or reassignment of a public school teacher to be valid: ! The transfer or reassignment was undertaken pursuant to the exigencies of the service In this case, SUPERINTENDENT not only implemented the CSC decision by reinstating the teachers, but also addressed the lack of other teachers in other stations ! The school superintendent previously notified the teacher concerned of his transfer or reassignment In this case, the teachers were able to extensively and exhaustively question the legality of their transfers ! The teacher concerned was informed of the reason(s) for his transfer In this case, the teachers were apprised of their transfers and the reasons therefor ! That transfer was not made 3 months before a national or local election In this case, the teachers were effectively transferred more than 3 months before the proximate election The SC also held that the appointment of public school teachers does not refer to any particular school or station, as the same are not entitled to stay permanently in one station because their assignments are subject to the exigencies of their service o The exigencies of the service should be viewed in light of the Constitutional mandate of Section 1, Article 15, which provides that the State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all o Thus, the accessibility of quality education determines the exigencies of the service ! Assignments undertaken for purpose of improving the educational system and/or making education more accessible are valid -----TAX EXEMPTION-----COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. COURT OF APPEALS YMCA, a welfare, educational, charitable, and non-profit corporation, sought to remove from the coverage of the income tax its profits derived from the rentals of its real property YMCA invoked both Section 28(3), Article 6 and Section 4(3), Article 14 The SC held that under Section 28(3), Article 6 of the Constitution, what is exempted is not the institution itself, but real estate or property taxes of lands, buildings, and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes o Moreover, the exemption created by the said provision pertains only to property taxes The SC also held that laws allowing tax exemptions are construed strictissimi juris and to be granted a tax exemption for revenues and assets under Section 4(3), Article 14 of the Constitution: o The entity must fall under the classification of non-stock, non-profit educational institution ! Educational institution refers to schools that of a school system, which is normally associated with formal education ! Under the EDUCATION ACT of 1982, private auspices, such as foundations and civic-spirited organizations are ruled out

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Educational institution, when used in laws granting tax exemptions refer to school seminaries, colleges, or educational establishments It means a place where systematic instruction in any or all of the useful branches of learning is given by methods common to schools and institutions of learning o In this case, YMCA had not given any proof that it is an educational institution The income the entity seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes ! In this case, YMCA failed to prove that its rent income from the lease of its property is actually, directly, and exclusively used for education purposes, as it is not a school ! -----ACADEMIC FREEDOM-----

-Academic freedom: The Constitution speaks specifically only of institutional academic freedom and only of institutions of higher learning The academic freedom of the faculty or individual academic freedom is based on the right of free expression The academic freedom of students is based on the right to enjoy in the schools the guarantees of the Bill of Rights as adjusted to the context of a school community -BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION v. JUDGE ALFONSO The RIZAL COLLEGE OF MEDICINE was ordered by DECS to be closed down based on several findings of the COMMISSION ON MEDICAL EDUCATION The COMMISSION, through several tests and surveys, found that the school suffered from serious deficiencies and lack of facilities, as well as full-time faculty, among others The COLLEGE was able obtain an injunction from Respondent Judge, enjoining the DECS from closing down the school The SC held that it is not the function of the judiciary to review the decisions and orders of DECS on the issue of whether or not an educational institution meets the norms and standards required for a) permission to operate and b) to continue operating as such o In other words, the courts have no power or prerogative to substitute their opinion for that of the SECRETARY of DECS, as the former would not have the competency to do so in the said matter o The only authority reposed in the courts is to determine whether or not DECS acted within the scope of powers granted it by the law and the Constitution ! The court may rectify the action of DECS or its SECRETARY only when: Its powers were exercised whimsically, capriciously, or oppressively with grave abuse of discretion, or It had unlawfully neglected the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty It had excluded another from the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which the same is entitled ! But even in these extreme instances, the courts, absent any compelling reason to do otherwise, should still leave to the SECRETARY the ultimate determination of the issue of the fulfillment by an educational institution of the standards set own for its legitimate operation o In this case, it being a matter of law that the SECRETARY exercise the power to enjoin compliance with the requirements laid down for medical schools and to mete out sanctions where he finds violations thereof have been committed, it was GADALEJ on the part of Respondent Judge to set aside the SECERETARYs order and, in effect, substitute his judgment in place of that of the latter o Also, the records clearly indicate that there is nothing to support the idea that DECS committed grave abuse of discretion, as it was the respondent judge that was guilty thereof ! The evaluating teams came from different sectors of the medical field and have conducted several studies ! DECS also afforded the College ample opportunities to improve its facilities, but the latter repeatedly failed The SC also held that courts of justice should generally not interfere with purely administrative and discretionary functions o In other words, the courts have no supervisory power over the proceedings and actions of administrative departments involving a) the exercise of judgment and b) findings of facts because by reason of their special knowledge expertise over matters within their jurisdiction, the said departments are in a better position to pass judgment on such matters and their findings of facts in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality -CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER v. COURT OF APPEALS

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Teachers of the CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER OCLLEGE demanded from the latter vacation and sick leave privileges and upon being denied thereof, the former postponed the final semestral exam and influenced the students to boycott the school and conduct mass demonstrations The school, upon due notice to the DECS and DOLE, was forced to close down after the 1st semester Afterward, the students and teachers filed an action to compel the school to reopen and admit them for the 2nd semester, arguing that it the school had a contractual obligation to allow them enrollment for the next semester The lower courts granted a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, directing CMCC to reopen and admit the students and teachers The SC held that the sole object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard o The status quo is the last actual peaceable uncontested status, which preceded the controversy ! In this case, the lower courts committed GADALEJ because when it issued the writ, it did not restore the status quo, but the conditions preceding the status quo, as the same was the time when CMCC had already closed down its facilities The SC also held while it is true that the school, after accepting a student for enrollment in a given course, may not expel him or refuse to reenroll him until he completes his course (except when he is academically deficient or has violated the rules of discipline), there is no contract between the student and the school for the latter to remain open for the entire duration of the formers course o There is no law that obligates a) a school to remain open until its students have completed their courses and b) a student who has enrolled in a school to remain therein until he finishes his course o In this case, assuming there is such a contract, that same was terminated at the end of the 1st semester and as the school has already ceased to operate, the students and teachers have no legal right to reenroll and the school has no legal obligation to reopen o Also, a contract creates reciprocal rights and obligations, which, in this case, is for the school to educate the student and for the student to comply with the rules and standards of the school ! When the teachers and students breached the supposed contract, the school may cancel the contract and close its doors

-GARCIA v. FACULTY ADMISSION COMMITTEE GARCIA was admitted for a certain summer classes for credits in the LOYOLA SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY, a seminary When she applied for enrollment for the 1st semester, the Faculty decided to bar her admission and, thus, she filed a case for mandamus to compel the school to admit her It must be noted that the LST merely allows certain lay persons to attend its classes, but admission to the school rests upon the discretion of the Assistant Dean of the Graduate School of Ateneo The SC held that mandamus will not lie when there is no clear duty conferred by law against whom the writ is exercised o In this case, LST has no clear duty to admit GARCIA, as the school has the discretion to turn down even qualified applicants due to limitations of space, facilities, professors, etc. o Also, the LST is a seminary for priesthood and GARCIA was a woman The SC also held that institutions of higher learning enjoy academic freedom o Academic freedom means that the school decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain the same ! The school is free from outside coercion or interference, save when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint ! Thus, the school has a wide sphere of autonomy when it comes to the choice of students o The academic staff should have de facto control of the following functions: ! The admission and examination of students ! The curricula for courses of study ! The appointment and tenure of office of the academic staff ! The allocation of income among the different categories of expenditure o Basically, academic freedom means that school may determine, for itself, on academic grounds: ! Who may teach ! What may be taught ! How it shall be taught ! Who may be admitted to study o Moreover, academic freedom of the educational institution is distinguished from the academic freedom of the scholar, which is the freedom to discover, publish, and teach the truth as he sees fit in the field of his competence

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-LUPANGCO v. COURT OF APPEALS The PROFESSIONAL REGULARTORY COMMISSION issued Resolution 105, which prohibited examinees from attending review classes or from receiving handouts, tips, or review materials from their schools or review centers within 3 days before the licensure examinations The examinees sued to annul the said Resolution The SC held that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations o To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view o Thus, if the rules and regulations are shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purpose for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid ! In this case, that although the Resolution was for a commendable purpose, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its Constitutional infirmities ! Resolution 105 was unreasonable, arbitrary, and infringed on the right to liberty of the examinees The SC also held that liberty means more than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison o It means freedom to go where one may choose and to act in such a manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the promotion of his happiness, to pursue such callings and vocations as may be most suitable to develop his capacities and give them their highest enjoyment The SC further held, in this case, that the Resolution violated the academic freedom of the schools concerned o In this case, PRC had no authority to dictate upon the examinees how to prepare themselves for the exams, or to restrain them from taking lawful steps to fulfill their ambitions o Also, it cannot interfere with the conduct of reviews by the schools, unless the instructions are impractical or riddled with corruption -UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS v. COURT OF APPEALS LEE filed a case for mandamus to compel the UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS to confer upon her the Degree of BS Commerce major in Accounting with honors of cum laude However, she earned a grade of 5 (failure) in two of her subjects, which more than enough to disqualify her from honors Nevertheless, LEE was able to have her grade changed through manifold maneuvers The SC held it is an accepted principle that schools of learning are given ample discretion to formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation o Within the parameters of these rules and guidelines, it is within the competence of universities to determine who are entitled to the grant of honors among the graduating students and such discretion may not be disturbed or controlled by the courts, unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise o The same is part of academic freedom ! In this case, even assuming that she had her failing grades removed, it is still discretionary upon the school to determine whether or not LEE was entitled to graduate with honors -REYES v. COURT OF APPEALS UP COLLEGE OF MEDICINE (UPCM) prescribed a passing rate of 70% in the NMAT, as the cut-off score for admission to the COLLEGE OF MEDICINE and the same was approved by the UNIVERSITY COUNCIL (UC) Eventually, UPCM changed the passing score to 90% without the approval of UC Upon appeal to the BOARD OF REGENTS (BOR) by the Respondent-students, the latter reverted to the 70% NMAT cut-off score and the students who attained scores between 70% and 90% were, thus, ordered admitted However, the UPCM DEAN, as well as the Faculty, did not heed the directive for them to admit the students. Thus, the students filed a case for Injunction before the RTC, and while the same was pending, they were admitted and had, in fact, completed 3 years of their medical education The students then wrote to UPCM, manifesting that they never intended to question the Facultys right to academic freedom and left the case for the humanitarian consideration of the same, not to mention that they also sought the dismissal of the case before the RTC BOR, invoking its plenary power regarding matter affecting university affairs, approved the admission of the respondent-students in the interest of equity and justice However, the DEAN and the Secretary of UPCM, again, refused to follow the directive issued The SC held, in this case, that under the UP Charter, the power to fix the admission requirements to any college in UP belonged to the UNIVERSITY COUNCIL, while the BOR was given governance and general powers of administration in UP

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Also, the particular COLLEGE FACULTIES have the power to determine the entrance requirements of their respective colleges, subject to the approval of the autonomous UC o Thus, any entrance requirement that may be imposed by the COLLEGE FACULTY must bear the UCs approval ! In this case, UPCM fixed the cut-off grade to 90%, it did not have the approval of the UC and, thus, the same was inefficacious, which means that the students indeed had the right to stay in the said college ! Also, the UC has the final say in admission requirements provided the same conforms to the law, rules, and regulations of the university and in the event the power is abused or misused, it becomes the duty of the BOR, as the highest governing body, to step in and to correct the anomaly The SC also held that under the Constitution, the students have the right to select a profession or course of study, subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements o In this case, while it may bet rue that the UC could ratify the acts of the COLLEGE regarding admission requirements, to do so would be unfair to the students who have, in the meantime, proved their capabilities by surviving 3 years o Thus, any ratification of the act of the College must be done within a reasonable amount of time The SC further held that academic freedom is: o To the individual faculty member the freedom to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic establishments o To the university or school the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study ! As a corporate body, the University has entrusted to its academic staff the de facto control of its function of admission and examination of students In this case, the UC has the power to fix admission requirements and the College cannot impugn the BOR directives on the ground of academic freedom, as their rights as university teachers remain unaffected o

-MIRIAM COLLEGE v. COURT OF APPEALS Members of the editorial board of CHI-RHO, the school publication of MIRIAM COLLEGE, published the article Libog, which was described by the MC community as obscene, sexually explicit, vulgar, and the like Complaints against the students responsible for the article were filed and after due examination, they were expelled The students invoked Sec. 7 of the CAMPUS JOURNALISM ACT, which states that a student shall not be expelled or suspended solely on the basis of the article he/she has written. The students also contended that the investigation should be conducted by the DECS and not by MIRIAM COLLEGE The SC held that the essential freedoms subsumed in the term "academic freedom" encompasses the freedom of the institution to determine for itself on academic grounds: ! Who may teach, ! What may be taught, ! How it shall be taught, and ! Who may be admitted to study o The right of the school to discipline its students is included in the freedom, how it shall be taught, as a school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy ! Under jurisprudence, the establishment of an educational institution requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of an educational environment conducive to learning ! Such rules and regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty, and property o The right of the school to discipline also finds basis in the freedom of what may be taught ! In fact, under the Constitution, the school not only has the right, but also the duty to develop discipline in its students ! Under jurisprudence, discipline is a means for the school to carry out its responsibility to help its students "grow and develop into mature, responsible, effective and worthy citizens of the community o The right to discipline also finds itself in the freedom of who may be admitted to study ! If a school has the freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as

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upon whom to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of graduation privileges ! In fact, admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right Under jurisprudence, education must be religious, in the sense that it is an education that inculcates duty and reverence o Universities are established not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the student, but also to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes for the development of the total man The SC also held that under the Constitution, the State has the power to regulate educational institutions o But such power to regulate is subject to the requirement of reasonableness o Also, the Constitution allows merely the regulation and supervision of such institutions and not the deprivation of their rights The SC further held that the power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel o The power to investigate is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning o The power to investigate, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom ! In this case, MC had the right to hear and decide the case Last but not least, jurisprudence recognizes that private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the admission, discipline, and promotion of students o The establishment of the rules governing university-student relations may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival ! In this case, MC should be allowed to determine who among its students deserve sanction and to establish rules and regulations therefor ! Also, it is axiomatic that the right to free expression is not absolute, especially when exercised within school premises ! Thus, Sec. 7 of the Campus Journalism Act should be harmonized with the Constitution to mean that students should not be expelled or suspended solely on the basis of the articles they write, provided, they do not materially disrupt class work or provoke substantial disorder

-UP BOARD OF REGENTS v. COURT OF APPEALS CELINE was a candidate for Ph.D. from UP DEAN PAZ requested from the BOARD OF REGENTS the exclusion of her name from the list of graduating students pending clarifications about her dissertation, but her letter did not reach the BOR on time and, thus, CELINE was able to graduate Upon thorough investigation by the External Review Panel composed of senior faculty, it was found out that her dissertation contained at least 90 instances of plagiarism The COLLEGE ASSEMBLY AND UNIVERSITY COUNCIL unanimously approved the withdrawal of her Ph.D CELINE then filed a case for mandamus before the RTC of Quezon City to compel UP to restore her Ph.D The SC held that mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law o Under jurisprudence, mandamus is not available to restrain an educational institution from the exercise of its academic freedom o In this case, a writ of mandamus cannot issue against UP without violating its right to academic freedom The SC also held that in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply: ! The opportunity to explain ones side of a controversy ! A change to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of o A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process ! In this case, CELINE was afforded her right to be heard because she was present during the investigations. The SC further held that academic freedom has been present since the 1935 Constitution for the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning o If such institution can decide who can and who cannot study in it, the it certainly can also determine to whom it will confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates

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Thus, where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred Last but not least, the academic freedom of a university does not terminate upon the graduation of a student o An institution of higher learning cannot be powerless, if it discovers that an academic degree it has conferred is not rightfully deserved o It should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take measures to protect itself from serious threats to its integrity ! In this case, it is of no moment that CELINE has graduated as it is precisely her graduation that is in question o COURT OF APPEALS One of the parents spat in the face of the Vice Principal The school refused to admit the children of the adversarial parents The SC held, in this case, that where relations between parents and children on the one hand and school administrators and teachers on the other have deteriorated to the level exhibited, the private school may, in the interest of the faculty and entire student body, require that their students be enrolled elsewhere o To rule otherwise would unduly jeopardize the morally conducive and orderly educational environment, which would lead the detriment of the student body o The situation is comparable to certain labor disputes where relations have become strained due to pre-existing and supervening events, as to make reinstatement an unfeasible solution

-TAN v.

-PARENT TEACHERS ASSOCIATION v. METROBANK In 2001, the SPOUSES ILAGAN applied for and were granted a loan by the METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY, which was secured by a real estate mortgage and upon default thereof, the latter was allowed to foreclose on the said property The PARENT-TEACHERS ASSOCIATION assailed the foreclosure, alleging that the same violated the right of the students to quality education, as well as academic freedom The SC held that the Constitutional mandate to protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels is directed to the State and not to the schools o In this case, PTA cannot prevent MBTC from acquiring possession of the school premises by virtue of a valid writ of possession The SC also held that the academic freedom granted under the Constitution did not go beyond the concept of freedom of intellectual inquiry: ! The freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish, and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence, subject to no control or authority, except of rational methods by which truths and conclusions are sought and established in these disciplines ! The freedom of institutions of higher learning to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference, save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint o Under the Constitution, the recipients of the said academic freedom are institutions of higher learning, which means that the school or college is possessed of the said right ! In this case, PTA failed to show the relevance of the right to quality education and academic freedom and how the same were violated by the Order granting the writ of possession

Jech Tiu Block C