rbagagnan Article 10 The Local Government Cases on Sections 5-14 Manila Electric v.

. Province of Laguna Manila Electric Railway Co., commonly called Meralco, is the distributor of electric supply in the NCR and other adjacent regions. Laguna is represented in this case by its Provincial Treasurer, Enito Balazo. Facts: On various dates, certain municipalities of the Laguna, by virtue of existing laws then in effect, issued resolutions granting franchise in favor of petitioner Meralco for the supply of electric light, heat and power within their concerned areas. On January 1983, Meralco was likewise granted a franchise by the National Electrification Administration to operate an electric light and power service in the Municipality of Calamba, Laguna. On January 1992, the Local Government Code took effect, enjoining local government units to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees and charges, subject to the limitations expressed therein, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Pursuant to the provisions of the Code, Laguna enacted a Provincial Ordinance providing a tax for business enjoying a franchise. Provincial Treasurer sent a demand letter to Meralco for the corresponding tax payment. Meralco paid the tax, which then amounted approx. 19 million, under protest. Meralco subsequently claimed refund, claiming that the franchise tax it had paid and continued to pay to the National Government pursuant to PD 551 already included the franchise tax imposed by the ordinance. Meralco contended that the imposition of a franchise tax under the tax ordinance, insofar as it concerned Meralco, contravened the provisions of Section 1 of PD 551 which provides that any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding, the franchise tax payable by all grantees of franchises to generate, distribute and sell electric current for light, heat and power shall be (2%) of their gross receipts received from the sale of electric current and from transactions incident to the generation, distribution and sale of electric current. Then Governor Jose Lina denied the refund claim, relying on the Local Government Code. The case went to court, and the trial court ruled in favor of Laguna. Meralco wasnt done and elevated the case to the Supreme Court. Issues: Whether the imposition of a franchise tax under the assailed tax ordinance, insofar as petitioner is concerned, is violative of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution and of PD 551. Whether The Local Government Code has repealed, amended or modified PD 551. Held: First of all, Laguna does not have the inherent power to tax, but under Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution, a general delegation of that power has been given in favor of local government units. Therefore, Laguna can enact whatever tax ordinance they can enact provided it is in accord with the law. Secondly, The Local Government Code explicitly authorizes provincial governments, notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law to impose a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise. Thirdly, The Local Government Code has provided a repealing clause which provides that all general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Therefore, Laguna was authorized to enact such law, and that law is enforceable. Meralco cannot do anything but to pay up. NAPOCOR v. Cabanatuan City National Power Corporation is a government owned and controlled corporation tasked to undertake the development of hydroelectric generations of power and the production of electricity from nuclear, geothermal, and other sources, as well as, the transmission of electric power on a nationwide basis. Cabanatuan is the largest city in Nueva Ecija. Facts: For many years then, NAPOCOR has been selling electric power to the residents of Cabanatuan City. After some time, Cabanatuan enacted a tax ordinance and ordered NAPOCOR to pay up taxes. Of course, NAPOCOR refused, arguing that Cabanatuan has no authority to impose tax on government entities. NAPOCOR also contended that as a non-profit organization, it is exempted from the payment of all forms of taxes, charges, duties or fees. Cabanatuan filed collection suit in the RTC of Cabanatuan City, demanding that NAPOCOR pay the assessed tax due, plus a surcharge equivalent to

rbagagnan 25% of the amount of tax, and 2% monthly interest. Cabanatuan alleged that petitioner's exemption from local taxes has been repealed by section 193 of RA 7160 (The Local Government Code). The RTC dismissed the case in favor of NAPOCOR. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and ordered NAPOCOR to pay the city government the tax assessment. Issues: Whether the NAPOCOR is excluded from the coverage of the franchise tax simply because its stocks are wholly owned by the national government and its charter characterized is as a non-profit organization? Whether the NAPOCORs exemption from all forms of taxes is repealed by the provisions of the Local Government Code. Held: No. A franchise tax is imposed based not on the ownership but on the exercise by the corporation of a privilege to do business. The taxable entity is the corporation which exercises the franchise, and not the individual stockholders. By virtue of its charter, NAPOCOR was created as a separate and distinct entity from the national government. It can sue and be sued under its own name, and can exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Code. To be sure, the ownership by the national government of its entire capital stock does not necessarily imply that petitioner is not engaged in business. Since the tax is imposed on entities engaged in business, NAPOCOR is not exempt. Yes. One of the most significant provisions of the LGC is the removal of the blanket exclusion of instrumentalities and agencies of the national government from the coverage of local taxation. Although as a general rule, LGUs cannot impose taxes, fees, or charges of any kind on the national government, its agencies and instrumentalities, this rule now admits an exception when specific provisions of the LGC authorize the LGUs to impose taxes, fees, or charges on the aforementioned entities. This is in accordance with the legislative purpose of the LGC. Since it would be impractical to attempt to enumerate all the existing statutes providing for special tax exemptions or privileges, the LGC provided for an express and general withdrawal of such exemptions or privileges. Therefore, NAPOCOR, with its contentions thwarted, must pay up. Petron Corporation v. Mayor Tiangco Petron Corporation is the largest oil refining and marketing company in the Philippines, supplying more than a third of the countrys oil requirements. Tobias Tiangco was then the mayor of Navotas. Facts: In accordance to the New Navotas Revenue Code, Petron was assessed a total tax of approx. 6 million. Petron, of course, filed a protest arguing that they are exempt from paying local business taxes as provided by Article 232 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code. This protest was denied. Petron, unfazed, took the case to the RTC of Malabon, which subsequently dismissed the case in favor of Navotas, requiring Petron to pay the assessed tax. Petron, with a lot of guts, filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied. Petron, like they know something everyone else dont, elevated the case to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether a local government unit is empowered under the Local Government Code to impose business taxes on persons or entities engaged in the sale of petroleum and petroleum products. Held: Navotas cannot tax Petron. Section 133 of the LGC provides that unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of taxing powers of LGUs shall not extend to the levy of excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Revenue Code, as amended, and taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products. The power of a municipality to impose business taxes is provided for in Section 143 of the Local Government Code. Under the provision, a municipality is authorized to impose business taxes on a whole host of business activities. Suffice it to say, unless there is another provision of aw which states otherwise, Section 143, broad in scope as it is, would undoubtedly cover the business of selling diesel fuels, or any other petroleum products for that matter. However, Section 133(h) provides two kinds of taxes which cannot be imposed by LGUs, and those levied on petroleum products are included. Note: A tax on business is distinct from a tax on the article itself. A business tax is different from an excise tax. However, such distinction is immaterial insofar as Section 133(h) is concerned, for the phrase taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products does not qualify the kind of taxes, fees or charges that could withstand the absolute prohibition imposed by the provision. It would have been a different matter had

rbagagnan Congress, in crafting Section 133(h), barred excise taxes or direct taxes, or any category of taxes only, for then it would be understood that only such specified taxes on petroleum products could not be imposed under the prohibition. The absence of such qualification leads to the conclusion that all sorts of taxes on petroleum products, including business taxes, are prohibited by Section 133(h). Where the law does not distinguish, the Court should not distinguish. Pimentel v. Aguirre Aquilino Pimentel was then a Senator. Alexander Aguirre was then the Executive Secretary. Facts: On December 1997, then President Fidel Ramos issued AO 372, which directed, among others, all local government units to reduce their total expenditures by at least 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services (Section 1). Further, the AO also effectively withheld 10% of their internal revenue allotments (Section 4). The purported purpose of this AO was to alleviate the financial crunch that the country was experiencing then. As an analogy, the mother (President) told her son (LGU) to be frugal and subsequently decreased his sons allowance. Pimentel wasnt thrilled by this. He contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising the power of control over LGUs. The Constitution vests in the President, however, only the power of general supervision over LGUs, consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Pimentel further argues that the directive to withhold 10% of their IRA is in contravention of Section 6, Article 10 of the Constitution, providing for the automatic release to each of these units its share in the national internal revenue. Issues: Whether the President committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering all LGUs to adopt a 25% cost reduction program as such violates the LGUs fiscal autonomy. Whether the President committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the withholding of 10% of the LGUs internal revenue allotment. Held: AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his power of supervision over local governments. It is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country, which is facing economic difficulties. Besides, it does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five days after every quarter of the year and shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose. As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore, imperative. This order is not under supervision, but rather under control, and is therefore, invalid.

Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections Benjamin Borja, Jr. was the son of Cesar Borja, the incumbent mayor of Pateros who died while in office. Go slash your wrist if you dont know Comelec. Facts: Jose Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 1988 for a term ending June 1992. On September 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 1995. On May 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June 1998. In the May 1998 elections, Benjamin Borja was a candidate for mayor of Pateros. He was very happy because he would presumably follow in the steps of his late father. However, Capco spoiled his party and filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor, going directly against Borja. Borja obviously wasnt very happy with this. He sought Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that. (Comelec ruled in favor of Borja and Capco was disqualified. However, the ruling came late and the elections pushed through, in which Capco won by a landslide.)

rbagagnan Issue: Whether the candidacy of Capco was valid. Held: Article 10, Section 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of the term of office of elective local officials and bars such officials from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. The term served must therefore be one for which he was elected. The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term now withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration. To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office; he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. David v. Commission on Elections Alex David was then the Barangay Chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Caloocan City as well as the president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas. Comelec is the constitutional commission tasked with the enforcement of election laws. Facts: Alex David was elected as the Barangay Chairman of Barangay 77 of Caloocan City. He started to serve on May 1994. According to the Local Government Code, he would serve for 3 years, and would therefore step down on June 1997. However, he enjoyed so much that he wouldnt step down. Before the scheduled barangay elections on May 1997, David filed a case wanting to prohibit the holding of the barangay election scheduled on May 1997. David insists that according to RA 6653 and RA 6679, approved on May 1988, the term of office of barangay officials shall be for 5 years. Therefore, according to this bonehead, he should serve until June 1999. Issue: Whether the term of barangay officials is 5 years (according to RA 6653 and 6679) or 3 years (according to the LGC). Held: RA 7160, the Local Government Code, was enacted later than RA 6653 and 6679. It is basic that in case of an irreconcilable conflict between two laws of different vintages, the later enactment prevails. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. The rationale is simple: a later law repeals an earlier one because it is the later legislative will. It is to be presumed that the lawmakers knew the older law and intended to change it. In enacting the older law, the legislators could not have known the newer one and hence could not have intended to change what they did not know. Under the Civil Code, laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and not the other way around. Under the LGC, the term of office of barangay officials was fixed at 3 years which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on May 1994. This provision is clearly inconsistent with and repugnant to RA 6679 which states that such term shall be for five years. Note: RA 6679 requires the barangay voters to elect seven kagawads and the candidate obtaining the highest number of votes shall automatically be the punong barangay. RA 6653 empowers the seven elected barangay kagawads to select the punong barangay from among themselves. On the other hand, the Local Autonomy Code mandates a direct vote on the barangay chairman by the entire barangay electorate, separately from the seven kagawads. Hence, under the Code, voters elect eight barangay officials, namely, the punong barangay plus the seven kagawads. Under both RA 6679 and 6653, they vote for only seven kagawads, and not for the barangay chairman. During the barangay elections held on May 1994 (2nd Monday), the voters actually and directly elected one punong barangay and seven kagawads. If we agree with the thesis of petitioners, it follows that all the punong barangays were elected illegally and thus, Petitioner Alex David cannot claim to be a validly elected barangay chairman, much less president of the national league of barangays which he purports to represent in this petition. It then necessarily follows also that he is not the real party-in-interest and on that ground, his petition should be summarily dismissed.

rbagagnan Supangan v. Santos Johnny Supangan was then a member of the Kabataang Barangay of Mabini, Pangasinan. There are a multitude of petitioners in this case. Luis Santos was then the Secretary of the Department of Local Government. Facts: Then Local Government Secretary Luis Santos appointed several persons in respective local units, among them Supangan, as sectoral representatives of local legislative bodies. However, Supangan and a whole lot of people contested this, arguing that the President (or in this case, the Local Government Secretary) cannot make the assailed appointments without an enabling law. They also argue that assuming that the Local Government Secretary is possessed with the power and authority to designate such sectoral representatives, the designations made by the Secretary are null and void as they were not made in the manner required by the same law, which provides that before the President may appoint members of the local legislative bodies to represent the Industrial and Agricultural Labor Sectors, there must be a determination to be made by the Sanggunian itself that said sectors are of sufficient number in the city or municipality to warrant representation after consultation with associations and persons belonging to the sector concerned. Issues: Whether the assailed designations were valid. Held: The designations were valid. Two pertinent provisions of BP 337 (LGC under the 1973 Constitution) are worth looking at. These are Sections 173 and 146, which provides as follows: The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city shall be composed of the vice-mayor, as presiding officer, the elected sangguniang panlungsod members, and the members who may be appointed by the President of the Philippines consisting of the presidents of the katipunang panlungsod ng mga barangay and the kabataang barangay city federation. In addition thereto, there shall be one representative each from the agricultural and industrial labor sectors who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, whenever as determined by the sangguniang panlungsod, said sectors are of sufficient number in the city to warrant representation, after consultation with associations and persons belonging to the sector concerned. The Sangguniang Bayan shall be the legislative body of the municipality and shall be composed of the municipal mayor, who shall be the presiding judge pro tempore, eight members elected at large, and the members appointed by the President consisting of the president of the katipunang bayan and the president of the kabataang barangay municipal federation. In addition thereto, there shall be one representative each from the agricultural and industrial labor sectors who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines whenever, as determined by the Sangguniang Bayan, said sectors are of sufficient number in the municipality to warrant representation, after consultation with associations and persons belonging to the sector concerned. Section 9, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution commands that all legislative bodies of local governments must have sectoral representatives among its members, and the appointment or designation of individuals thereto must be done in accordance with provisions of law, whether that law exists or has still to be passed. But in this case that law already exists in BP 337 particularly Sections 146 and 173 quoted above. Further, BP 337 was still operative, even after the ratification of the new Constitution, because the transitory provisions provide for the continued operation of all existing laws not inconsistent with it. Since there was, as of the time of this case, no law repealing BP 337, such would continue to have effect as it was not inconsistent with the Constitution. In effect, these laws are the bases for the designations made. In some of the cases in this consolidated petition, the Sanggunian concerned has not yet determined that the Industrial and Agricultural Labor Sectors in their particular city or municipality are of sufficient number to warrant representation. In this case, there will absolutely be no basis for the designations. These designations would therefore be invalid. The Constitution does not prescribe the qualifications for the position of sectoral representatives to the local legislative bodies. However, the use of the term "sectoral representation" implies that the person to be appointed must possess the necessary qualifications to represent that particular sector. At the very least, the appointee must actually belong to the sector which he purports to represent; otherwise there can be no true representation. Again, in some of the cases herein, the appointees do not belong to the concerned sectors. Therefore, their appointments are likewise invalid. Tan v. Comelec

rbagagnan I couldnt find the original text of the case. We can only assume that Tan was an interested party in this case. Maybe he was the congressman of Negros Occidental and, therefore, didnt want his constituency to shrink. Batas Pambansa 885created a new province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte. The cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto were included in the new province. Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the Comelec scheduled a plebiscite for January 1986. Petitioners opposed, contending that the BP 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because: The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite. The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2800 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute. Whether the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites under Article 11, Section 3 of the Constitution (which is now Article 10, Section 10), which states that no province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. Held: Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental, the parent province. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte. Note: Paredes vs. Executive Secretary should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, which says when the Constitution speaks of the unit or units affected it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. Following this school of thought, for the plebiscite to be valid, everyone in Negros Occidental, even those who would not fall under the new province, must take part. Such was not the case here. Therefore, the plebiscite is null and, therefore, has no legal effect. Food for Thought: When the boundaries of a LGU is substantially altered, there are necessarily more than one unit affected -- the parent LGU and the new LGU that was created as a result of the alteration. Therefore, the votes of all the members of the two units must be obtained. Padilla, Jr. v. Commission on Elections Roy Padilla Jr. was then the governor of Camarines Norte. Comelec is the constitutional commission tasked with the enforcement of election laws. Facts: RA 7155 created the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines Norte to be composed of barangays in the Municipality of Labo in the same province. Comelec subsequently ordered a plebiscite throughout Labo, but only 2,890 votes favored its creation while 3,439 voters voted against. Consequently, the day after the political exercise, the independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa was declared rejected by a majority of votes. Padilla was saddened. He filed a case which seeks to set aside the concluded plebiscite conducted throughout Labo and prays that a new plebiscite be undertaken as provided by RA 7155. Further, he says that the plebiscite was a complete failure and that the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite should have been conducted only in the

The Supreme Court was in recess at the time so the petition was not timely considered. Consequently, petitioners filed a supplemental pleading on January 1986, after the plebiscite sought to be restrained was held earlier. Issue:

rbagagnan political unit or units affected, not in the whole of Labo. Issue: Whether the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-NaLupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo is valid. Practically, whether the plebiscite should include the whole of Labo or just the areas which would be included in the proposed new municipality. Held: It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite.10 Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, we conclude that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2312. Note: In the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, then Commissioner Davide expressly stated that in the plebiscites to be conducted, it must involve all the units affected. This established the intent of the 1987 Constitution framers. Food for Thought: In Paredes, the Court said that only those who would be included in the new unit should participate in a plebiscite. Justice Abad Santos strongly dissented. In Tan, the dissent was substantially used. In this 1986 case, the Court reversed itself and said that everyone should participate in a plebiscite. Both the new unit and the parent unit are affected and, therefore, must be included. In Padilla, the Court said that the 1987 Constitution did not junk the ruling in Tan, in accordance with its legislative intent manifested in the deliberations. The ruling and doctrine established in Tan should be maintained. Everyone should be included in a plebiscite. League of Cities v. Comelec League of Cities is a formal organization of all the cities in the Philippines. Presently, 122 cities are part of this organization. Comelec is the constitutional commission tasked with the enforcement of election laws. This is reconsideration, so I will provide the background. Facts: During the 11th Congress, Congress passed 33 laws converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009, which amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate, were too busy sleeping together and again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009. On December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the Presidents signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the Comelec to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. LCP (League of Cities of the Philippines) was not very merry with this. They filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article 10 of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of

rbagagnan internal revenue set aside for all cities under the Local Government Code. Issue: Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article 10 of the Constitution. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause. Held: The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article 10 of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional. Applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later. Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article 10 of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. Fourth, the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction. Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained intent and was never written into the Local Government Code. Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. In short, in the November 2008 decision, the Court en banc, by a 6-5 vote, nullified the 16 cityhood laws for being violative of the Constitution, specifically its Section 10, Article 6 and the equal protection clause. League of Cities v. Comelec (Reconsideration) Facts: By a decision dated November 2008, the Supreme Court, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and nullified the sixteen (16) cityhood laws for being violative of the Constitution, specifically its Section 10, Article 10 and the equal protection clause. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed, but the same was denied in a 6-6 vote. Note that this was a resolution, so a majority is not needed. If the Court ended in a tie, which is the case in this one, the reconsideration would lose and such would be denied. However, Section 4 of Article 7 of the Constitution mandates that all cases involving the constitutionality of a law shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc and shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations of the issues in the case. Therefore, the Court accepted this second Motion for Reconsideration, considering that the 1st decision never attained finality with the deadlock vote on its reconsideration. Issues: Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article 10 of the Constitution. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause. Held: The legislative intent underlying the enactment of RA 9009 to exclude would-be-cities from the Php 100 million criterion would hold sway, as long as the corresponding cityhood bill has been filed before the effectivity of RA 9009 and the concerned municipality qualifies for conversion into a city under the original version of the LGC. In short, Congress did not intend the increased income requirement in RA 9009 to apply to the cityhood bills which became the cityhood laws in question. In other words, Congress intended the subject cityhood laws to be exempted from the income requirement of Php 100 million prescribed by RA 9009. The cityhood laws merely carry out the intent of RA 9009, now Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, to exempt respondent LGUs from the Php 100 million income requirement. The deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. It is really immaterial if Congress is not a continuing body. The hearings and deliberations during the 11th and 12th Congress may still be used as extrinsic reference inasmuch as the same cityhood bills which were filed before the passage of RA 9009 were being considered during the 13th Congress. Courts may fall back on the history of a law, as here, as extrinsic aid of statutory construction if the literal application of the law results in absurdity or injustice. The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact that each had pending cityhood bills long before the enactment of RA 9009 that substantially distinguish them from other

rbagagnan municipalities aiming for cityhood. On top of this, each of the 16 also met the Php 20 million income level exacted under the original Sec. 450 of the 1991 LGC. Therefore, the 16 laws are declared valid and constitutional. MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in BelAir Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village. Facts: On December 1995, Bel-Air Village Assoc. received from MMDA, through its Chairman, a notice requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 1996. BAVA was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. On January 1996, BAVA, obviously furious, instituted a civil case for injunction. MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public. It is alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court. From the premise that it has police power, it is now urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune Street to the public. Issue: Whether the MMDA has authority to open Neptune Road to the public. Held: Police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the local government units. Once delegated, the LGUs can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the legislature. Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. There is nothing in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a development authority. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature. Clearly then, the MMC is not the same entity as the MMDA. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal. Abella v. Comelec Adelina Larrazabal was the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes in the local elections of February 1988 and was proclaimed as the duly elected governor of Leyte but who was later declared by the Comelec to lack both residence and registration qualifications for the said position as provided by Section 12, Article 10 of the Constitution and is hereby disqualified as such Governor. Benjamin Abella was the one who obtained the second highest number of votes for the position of governor but was not allowed by the Comelec to be proclaimed as governor after the disqualification of Larrazabal. Comelec is the constitutional commission tasked with the enforcement of election laws. Facts: Larrazabal wanted to run for the position of Leyte Governor. However, a certain person wanted to disqualify Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the same office. In its questioned decision and resolution, the COMELEC found that Larrazabal was neither a resident nor a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte as she claimed but a resident and registered voter of Ormoc City, a component city of the province of Leyte but independent of the province pursuant to Section 12,

rbagagnan Article 10 of the Constitution thereby disqualifying her for the position of governor of Leyte. With these findings, the COMELEC disqualified the petitioner as governor of the province of Leyte. Unfazed, Larrazabal poses an alternative position that her being a registered voter in Ormoc City was no impediment to her candidacy for the position of governor of the province of Leyte. Issue: Whether the fact that Larazzabal was of Ormoc City is not an impediment to her candidacy. Held: Section 12, Article 10 of the Constitution is explicit in that aside from highly-urbanized cities, component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are independent of the province. In the same provision, it provides for other component cities within a province whose charters do not provide a similar prohibition. Necessarily, component cities like Ormoc City whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are treated like highly urbanized cities which are outside the supervisory power of the province to which they are geographically attached. This independence from the province carries with it the prohibition or mandate directed to their registered voters not to vote and be voted for the provincial elective offices. Cordillera Broad Coalition v. Commission on Audit Cordillera Broad Coalition was one of the instrumentalities of CAR. COA is the auditor of the government. Facts: EO 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers under Section 6, Article 18 of the Constitution, created the CAR. It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Its main function is to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government units as well as with the executive departments of the National Government in the supervision of field offices and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the region. It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local government projects in the region. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm. The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the autonomous regional government is established and organized. In these cases, petitioners principally argue that by issuing EO 220 the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers prior to the convening of the 1st Congress under the 1987 Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Issue: Whether EO 220 was valid. Held: A reading of EO 220 will reveal that what it actually envisions is the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the national government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is, as petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, the interim autonomous region in the Cordilleras. The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in the autonomous region composed of an elective executive and legislature and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction. Using this as a guide, we find that EO 220 did not establish an autonomous regional government. It created a region, covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and services. To determine policy, it created a representative assembly, to convene yearly only for a five-day regular session, tasked with, among others, identifying priority projects and development programs. To serve as an implementing body, it created the Cordillera Executive Board. The bodies created by EO do not supplant the existing local governmental structure, nor are they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the national government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras. Abbas v. Comelec

rbagagnan Firdausi Abbas was a datu in the Mindanao area. Comelec is the constitutional commission tasked with the enforcement of election laws. The Tripoli Agreement, more specifically, the Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front with the participation of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission, Members of the Islamic Conference and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference. It provided for the establishment of autonomy in the southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and enumerated the thirteen provinces comprising the areas of autonomy. In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified which for the first time provided for regional autonomy. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, RA 6734 was enacted and signed into law. Petitioner Abbas argues that RA 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region which makes the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite. Issue: Whether or not the provisions of RA 6734 is in conflict with the Tripoli Agreement. Whether RA 6734 creates an autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution which make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite Held: First of all, the Tripoli Agreement is not a binding treaty or international agreement. Therefore, it is not part of the law of the land. If at all, RA 6734 would be amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement, being a subsequent law. RA 6734 hinges upon the Constitution itself, and so, if it conflicts with the Tripoli Agreement, the right action is to challenge the RAs constitutionality. Under the constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. If the Constitution is approved by majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region immediately takes effect. The questioned provisions in RA 6734 requiring an oversight Committee to supervise the transfer do not provide for a different date of effectivity. Much less would the organization of the Oversight Committee cause an impediment to the operation of the Constitution, for such is evidently aimed at effecting a smooth transition period for the regional government. The constitutional objection on this point thus cannot be sustained as there are no bases therefor. Note: As provided in the Constitution, the creation of the Autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao is made effective upon the approval "by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose." Further, what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the organic act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units. Cordillera Regional Assembly was one of the instrumentalities of CAR. Comelec is the constitutional commission tasked with the enforcement of election laws. Facts: A plebiscite was held for the creation of the Cordillera Administrative Region. Every province, of course with relation to such purpose, took part. However, only Ifugao Province voted favorably. Issue: Whether the fact that Ifugao Province favorably voted for the creation of CAR is enough to legally constitute such region. Held: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Section 15, Article 10 of the Constitution provides that there shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas. Therefore, the Constitution contemplates more than one geographical area to constitute an autonomous region. Leonor v. Cordillera Bodong Administration Leonor Badua was a native of the Cordilleras. The Cordillera Bodong Administration was an instrumentality of the CAR. Facts: Spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua allegedly own a farm land from which they were forcibly ejected through the decision of the Cordillera Bodong Administration, favoring a certain David Quema. The background of this case reveals that David Quema

Cordillera Regional Assembly v. Comelec

rbagagnan owns the parcels of land evidenced by Tax Declarations 4997 and 4998. The parcels of land were purchased from Dr. Erotida Valera. Twenty-two years later, he was able to redeem the parcels of land through payment of 10,000 to the vendor's heir, Jessie Macaraeg. Quema was prevented from tilling the land by Rosa Badua. Prompted by such turn of events, David Quema filed a case in the Barangay Council but failed to have the dispute settled. A judge advised Quema to file his case in the provincial courts. However, Quema did not, and filed it in the tribal court of the Maeng Tribe. Due to several warnings from the tribe, spouses Badua filed a petition for special relief, with the following to be settled: That the respondents be enjoined from enforcing the decision of the tribal court in the pending case. The respondents be prohibited from usurping judicial power. That the legal personality of the Cordillera Bodong Administration be clarified. Held: Tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the Supreme Court and the lower courts which have been established by law. They do not possess judicial power. Like the pangkats or conciliation panels in the barangays, they are advisory and conciliatory bodies whose principal objective is to bring together the parties to a dispute and persuade them to make peace, settle, and compromise. An amicable settlement, compromise, and arbitration award rendered by a pangkat, if not seasonably repudiated, has the force and effect of a final judgment of a court but it can be enforced only through the local city or municipal court to which the secretary of the Lupon transmits the compromise settlement or arbitration award upon expiration of the period to annul or repudiate it. Similarly, the decisions of a tribal court based on compromise or arbitration may be enforced or set aside, in and through the regular courts today. Pandi v. Court of Appeals Lampa Pandi was then designated as the Officer-inCharge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. Facts: On August 1993, Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director and as Secretary of the DOH of the ARMM designated Pandi, who was then DOH-ARMM Assistant Regional Secretary, as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. On September 1993, Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mahid Mutilan issued designated Saber also as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. On October 1993, then President Fidel Ramos issued EO 133 transferring the powers and functions of the DOH in the region to the Regional Government of the ARMM. On November 1993, Macacua, again in her capacity as DOH-ARMM Secretary-Designate, issued a Memorandum reiterating Pandis designation as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. Issue: Whether or not the designation of Pandi was valid. Held: Macacua, as Regional Director and Regional Secretary of Health, designated Pandi Officer-inCharge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, on August 1993 and again on November 1993. The designation dated August 1993 is void since the Regional Secretary at that time did not yet exercise supervision and control over the provincial health offices of the ARMM. However, the designation of Pandi on November 1993 is valid since at that time EO 133 had already been issued vesting in the Regional Secretary of Health supervision and control over all functions and activities of the DOH in the ARMM. The designation of Pandi, however, while valid is only temporary in nature, good until a new designation or a permanent appointment is made. Under the ARMM Local Code, the provincial health officer became for the first an official of the provincial government even though he is appointed by the Regional Governor and draws his salary from regional funds. The ARMM Local Code vests in the Provincial Governor the power to exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the provincial government. Upon the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the power of supervision and control over the provincial health

The Baduas also allege that they were denied due process (or hearing) and that the tribal court has no jurisdiction over the case, since neither they nor the respondent are members of the Maeng tribe. The respondents countered by saying that the SC has no jurisdiction over the case since the tribal court is not a part of the judicial system. Issue: Whether the tribal court has jurisdiction over the case.

rbagagnan officer passed from the Regional Secretary to the Provincial Governor. From then on the Provincial Governor began to exercise the administrative authority to designate an Officer-in-Charge in the provincial health office pending the appointment of a permanent provincial health officer. Notwithstanding this, the Governor did not make a valid designation because he did not have the power to do so. He made the designation on September, while the EO was issued on October.