CASE DIGESTS ON SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

REMEDIAL LAW CASE DIGESTS

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

INTERPLEADER Wack Wack Golf and Country Club v. Won and Tan G.R. No. L-23851 March 26, 1976 Castro, C.J. Facts: Claiming to be the owner of a membership fee certificate, Lee Won filed a complaint against Wack Wack Golf and Country Club. Wack Wack, however, knows that another person, Tan, was also claiming the ownership of the same membership fee certificate 201. Hence, Wack Wack defended the case against Won. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of Won and the decision became final and executor. Subsequently, however, Wack Wack filed a complaint of interpleader against Won and Tan. Wack Wack alleged that Won claims ownership of the certificate by virtue of the decision rendered in the civil case while Tan claims ownership of the said certificate by virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199 issued to him on July 24, 1950 pursuant to an assignment made in his favor by the original owner and holder of membership fee certificate 201. Defendants however moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata and prescription. Issues: Whether the complaint of interpleader was barred by res judicata and prescription? Held: Yes, the complaint of interpleader is barred by res judicata and prescription. A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to have the contending claimants to court. He need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill of interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or undue delay. But where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the environmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred. In this case, Wack Wack was aware of the conflicting claims of the defendants with respect to the membership fee certificate 201 long before it filed the present interpleader suit. It had been recognizing Tan as the lawful owner thereof. It was sued by Won who also claimed the same membership fee
1|P a g e

certificate. Yet it did not interplead Tan. It preferred to proceed with the litigation and to defend itself therein. Therefore, it is too late for it to invoke the remedy of interpleader. RULE 63: DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES Tolentino v. The Board of Accountancy G.R. No. L-3062 September 28, 1951 Bautista, J. Facts: Commonwealth Act No. 3105 was enacted. Section 16-A thereof, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 342, authorized accountants to practice their profession under a trade name. Assailing the constitutionality of the aforementioned provision, plaintiff, an accountant, filed an action for declaratory relief in the CFI of Manila on the ground advanced that the assailed provision is a class legislation since by its terms it excludes persons engaged in other callings or professions from adopting, acquiring or using a trade name in connection with the practice of such callings or professions. Inclluded as defendants are Robert Orr Ferguson, and Hans Hausamann, foreign accountants practicing their profession in the Philippines under the trade name Fleming and Williamson. Issue: Whether plaintiff has sufficient cause of action to question the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 342? Held: No, plaintiff has no sufficient cause of action. Plaintiffs main objection centers on the exclusive character of the law which extends its benefits only to those engaged in the profession of accountancy. It is obvious that he seeks the declaratory relief not for his own personal benefit, or because his rights or prerogatives as an accountant, or as an individual, are adversely affected, but rather for the benefit of persons belonging to other professions or callings, who are not parties to this case. He does not claim having suffered any prejudice or damage to him or to his rights or prerogatives as an accountant by the use of the disputed name by the defendants. His complaint is rather addressed against the propriety of the use of said trade name by the defendants because it is misleading and is liable to defraud the public. Plaintiff, therefore, has no

CASE DIGESTS ON SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

REMEDIAL LAW CASE DIGESTS

actual justiciable controversy against the herein defendants which may give him the right to secure relief by asserting the unconstitutionality of the law in question. In order that an action for declaratory relief may be entertained, it must be predicated on the following requisite facts or conditions: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination. These requisite facts are wanting and, therefore, the complaint must fail for lack of sufficient cause of action. Tadeo v. The Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan G.R. No. L-16474 January 31, 1962 Padilla, J. Facts: Spouses Maicong and Acosta filed a complaint for damages against petitioner for allegedly allegedly preparing a deed of sale in favor of one Bongato of their parcel of land and fraudulently inducing them to sign the deed of sale which they did sign under the belief that it was a partition of their conjugal partnership property that the spouses had asked petitioner, a lawyer and notary public, to prepare and ratify. Thereafter, the spouses filed a complaint for estafa against petitioner. The civil case was however dismissed. Later, the court dismissed the criminal case on the ground that the dismissal of the civil case which was prejudicial precluded the continuation of the criminal case which arose from the same transaction alleged in the civil case. Petitioner, then, filed a complaint for declaratory relief against the spouses praying that the deed of quitclaim executed by them in favor of Bongato be declared the genuine document representing the true intention of the spouses and that petitioner be relieved from civil and criminal liability arising from the part he had taken as lawyer and notary public in the drafting and execution thereof. After petitioner instituted the complaint for declaratory judgment, the spouses again filed a complaint for estafa against petitioner. Issue: Whether petitioner has the right to bring an action for declaratory relief against the spouses? Held: No, petitioner is not entitled to the relief prayed for. Petitioner is not one of the contracting parties to the deed
2|P a g e

of sale executed by the spouses but took part only as notary public before whom the spouses acknowledged the execution thereof. Not being a party to the deed, petitioner is not entitled to file an action for declaratory judgment. None of his rights or duties thereunder need be declared. In addition, petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the appropriate case and at the opportune time, he may set up all defenses available to him and may appeal from an adverse judgment G.R. No. L-1897 De Borja v. Villadolid November 28, 1949 Torres, J.

Facts: De Borja is a license fee fish peddler having paid the required license fee to the office of Manila City Treasurer. As a fish peddler, he is the owner of two motor boats with coastwise license issued by the Bureau of Customs and used by him solely and exclusively in connection with his business of buying and selling fish and not for catching them. Villadolid, the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries, required De Borja to procure a commercial fishing boat license as owner and operator of said motor boats. De Borja refused on the ground that he is not so required by section 18 of Act No. 4003, as amended by section 1 of C.A. No. 471 as he is not operating his motor boats for the purpose of catching fish. Because of the refusal, Villadolid turned over the case to the Office of the Fiscal of the City of Manila for appropriate action. De Borja however filed a complaint for declaratory relief. Issue: Whether the complaint for declaratory relief was proper? Held: No, De Borja is not entitled to the relief prayed for. An action for declaratory relief must be brought before there has been a breach of a contract or statute the construction of which is sought. In the case at bar, if petitioner is prosecuted and found criminally liable, then the punishment prescribed by the law will be imposed upon him; otherwise the charge will be dismissed. In either case, the action is terminated with finality. It might be argued that no criminal action has as yet been presented. But the law does not require that there shall be an actual pending case. It is sufficient that there is a breach of the law, an actionable violation to bar a complaint for declaratory

CASE DIGESTS ON SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

REMEDIAL LAW CASE DIGESTS

judgment. Evidently, appellant would have the courts to prejudice the impending criminal action against him, without necessarily terminating the same. Commissioner of Customs v. Cloribel G.R. No. L-21036 June 30, 1977 Barredo, J. Facts: There was pending before respondent court a special civil action for declaratory relief entitled Macario M. Ofilada vs. Reparations Commission, Jose Cochingyan and Susana Cochingyan, wherein Ofilada, as the Second Receiver of the World War II Veterans Enterprises, Inc. (Warvets) in another civil case, likewise pending in another Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, sought a judicial declaration as to whether, under the allocation granted to said Warvets to purchase reparations goods, the conversion into pesos of the dollar prices of said goods should be at the rate of two pesos to one dollar or at the prevailing market rate at the time for payment, which would be much higher. Spouses Cochingyan filed a third-party complaint for mandamus against petitioner. Respondent judge ruled in their favor and ordered petitioners to deliver the goods subject to the third-paty complaint of Cochingyan. Issue: Whether the third-party complaint can be granted in declaratory relief actions Held: No. When the origin of the case is for declaratory relief, a third-party complaint is inconceivable. In this case, the relief cannot be granted because in declaratory relief action, the court is merely interpreting the terms of the contract. Adlawan v. Intermediate Appellate Court G.R. No. 73022 February 9, 1989 Regalado, J.: Facts: P.D. No. 449, otherwise known as the Cockfighting Law of 1974, was later promulgated. P.D. No. 449 provided for the one cockpit for every municipality rule. In the Municipality of Minglanilla, there were two cockpits operating even before the declaration of Martial Law. These are the Minglanilla Junior Coliseum and the Gallera Bagong Lipunan. Thus, the question arose as to which
3|P a g e

cockpit shall remain to operate and which shall be closed, the final determination whereof was held in abeyance, with the municipal council of Minglanilla instead referring the matter to the Philippine Constabulary unit which had jurisdiction over the same. Thereafter, the Provincial Command rendered a decision upholding the Coliseum. The operator of the Gallera appealed the decision to the Zone Commander who in turn referred the matter back to said municipal council. The Municipal Council submitted a report recommending the retention and certification of the Gallera as the municipal cockpit of Minglanilla. Aggrieved, the operators of the Coliseum filed an action for declaratory relief with injunction praying for a judicial interpretation of their rights under all pertinent laws governing cockpits. Issue: Whether the action for declaratory relief should be allowed? Held: Yes. This action was initiated on a petition for declaratory relief, ostensibly for a declaration of the rights and obligations of the parties under the laws and ordinances involved therein or invoked by them. Consequently, in such special civil action the judgment does not essentially entail an executory process since generally, other than a declaration of such rights and duties, other affirmative reliefs, as these are understood in ordinary civil actions, are not sought by the proponent. However, the Court has held that although the action is for a declaratory judgment but the allegations in the complaints are sufficient to make out a case for specific performance or recovery of property with claims for damages, and the defendants did not raise an issue in the trial court to challenge the remedy or form of the action availed of, the court can grant such affirmative relief as may be warranted by the evidence. This decisional rule applies to the case at bar. The Visayan Packing Corporation v. The Reparations Commission and Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-29673 November 12, 1987 Narvasa, J. Facts: Petitioner and respondent entered into a contract of sale. Under the contract, petitioner bound itself to pay the purchase price in ten (10) equal yearly installments with interest. Prior to the due date of the first installment,

CASE DIGESTS ON SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

REMEDIAL LAW CASE DIGESTS

respondent sent petitioner a written reminder thereof. Petitioner, however, responded by filing in the CFI of Manila two (2) special civil actions for declaratory relief, alleging ambiguity in the contract between it and respondent consisting in the agreements failure to clearly state the precise time when the obligation to pay the first installment of the price would arise. Respondent filed a civil action for collection based on what it deemed to be the due date. Petitioner moved to dismiss the collection suit alleging that because of the pendency of the declaratory relief actions, no cause of action could be deemed to exist in favor of respondent for collection. The Motion was however denied and petitioner was later ordered to pay respondent the sum claimed. Petitioner appealed the decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in the collection suit. Petitioner assailed the decision contending that the money claim should have been set up as a compulsory counterclaim in the declaratory relief action, and since respondent had not done this, but had instead set it up in a separate suit, the claim had thereby become barred. Issue: Whether the failure to set up the money claim in the declaratory relief actions barred its collection in a separate civil case? Held: No. There is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory relief that proscribes the filing of a counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed or contract subject of the complaint. Ideally, in the case at bar, the separate action for collection should have been dismissed and set up as a compulsory counterclaim in the declaratory relief suits, by way of an amended answer. This was not done. The actions proceeded separately and were decided on the merits. The final verdict was that the declaratory relief suits instituted by petitioner were unmeritorious, quite without foundation and, in the light of all the relevant facts, appear to have been initiated by petitioner merely to obstruct and delay the payment of the installments clearly due from it, payment of which was decreed in the collection suit. Under the circumstances, and taking into account the not inconsiderable length of time that the case at bar has been pending, it would be to do violence to substantial justice to pronounce the proceedings fatally defective for breach of the rule on
4|P a g e

compulsory counterclaims. Rules of procedure are after all laid down in order to attain justice. RULE 64: REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS OR RESOLUTION OF COMELEC AND COA Chua Giok Ong v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-41689-90 April 8, 1987 Narvasa, J. Facts: Two checks which were sent by mail to their respective payees were never received by the said payees. The checks found their way into the hands of Ng Bun Seng. After the checks had been mailed, Ng Bun Seng brought the said checks to Chua Giok Ong, and asked him to deposit them in his current account with the China Banking Corporation. It would appear that alterations were made on the faces of the check by changing the names of the respective payees thereof and the amounts. Chua looked at the checks and asked from whom they came. Ng said they came from a friend whom Chua did not know. Chua then signed the backs of the checks and filled up a deposit slip for them. The following day, the checks were deposited by Ng at the China Bank to Chuas current account, and were in due course sent out for clearing but were returned because of the alterations. Later, Ng told Chua he wanted to withdraw the amount of the two checks. Chua forthwith issued two checks with amounts exactly corresponding to those first deposited. When Ng tried to encash Chuas checks at the China Bank, he was arrested by NBI agents. Thereafter, Ng and Chua, and others were charged with the crime of attempted estafa and were adjudged guilty thereof. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction when the accused appealed. Thereafter, petitioners invoked the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by Supreme Court is a matter of discretion? Held: Yes. As will at once be observed, the assailed findings are factual in nature and this circumstance justifies outright rejection by the Supreme Court of petitioners invocation of its appellate jurisdiction since it is axiomatic that such findings are not reviewable by the Supreme Court unless the case falls within any recognized exception to the

CASE DIGESTS ON SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

REMEDIAL LAW CASE DIGESTS

rule, which, however, is not the situation in the case at bar. It bears stressing that except in criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher, which may be appealed by writ of error, all appeals to the Supreme Court are not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and may be taken by filing a petition for review on certiorari which may raise only questions of law to be distinctly set forth in the petition. Final judgments and decrees of inferior or lower courts may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by appeal, writ of error, or certiorari. By appeal the appellate court reviews all the findings of law and of fact of the court a quo as in special proceedings (Rule 105, Rules of Court). By writ of error the appellate court reviews only the findings of law or of fact of the lower court assigned in the assignment of errors of the appellant, as in ordinary civil actions (section 19, Rule 48). And by certiorari the appellate or superior Court can only review questions or errors of law decided or committed by the lower court as provided in Rules 43, 44 and 46 of the Rules of Court. Padilla v. Commission on Elections G.R. Nos. L-68351-52 July 9, 1985 De la Fuente, J. Facts: Padilla and Perez were candidates for the position of Assemblyman for Nueva Vizcaya in the national elections, Pilotin, an independent candidate, filed a petition contesting the composition of the Board of Canvassers for Nueva Vizcaya, which led to the suspension of the canvass. Thereafter, Pilotin resquested COMELEC to transfer the canvass to Manila. Padilla filed a CounterPetition likewise contesting the said boards composition and praying for dismissal of Pilotins petition. Later, the Board submitted a manifestation asking for replacement of its members. Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition with a prayer for a restraining order to prevent the transfer of the venue of the canvass to Manila, which was granted by said Court. Petitioner also filed an urgent ex parte motion to direct the said Board to commence with the canvass of election returns and thereafter, to proclaim the winner. COMELEC thereafter issued a resolution denying Pilotins petition. It also replaced all the members of the Board. The new Board canvassed the returns as instructed. The Board resolved to exclude from the canvass of votes sixteen election returns from 6
5|P a g e

municipalities, and included seventy six election returns from 5 municipalities. It would appear that both Padilla and Perez objected to this resolution. Nevertheless, Perez, after getting the most votes was proclaimed as the duly elected Assemblyman to represent Nueva Vizcaya in the Batasang Pambansa. Both Padilla and Perez appealed to the COMELEC the adverse rulings of the respondent Board on their respective written objections. The COMELEC upheld the rulings of the Board. This prompted Padilla to file a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the appeal was proper? Held: No. The principal relief sought by Padilla is predicated on the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in Section 11, Article XII-C, 1973 Constitution. A petition for certiorari under said provision, however, should be confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process. Moreover, the legislative construction of the constitutional provision has narrowed down the scope and extent of the inquiry the Court is supposed to undertake to what is strictly the office of certiorari as distinguished from review. The Supreme Court cannot review rulings or findings of fact of the COMELEC. Factual matters were deemed not proper for consideration in proceedings brought either as an original action for certiorari or as an appeal by certiorari for the main issue in certiorari is one of jurisdiction lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction while petitions for review on certiorari are limited to the consideration of questions of law. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC G.R. No. 133486 January 28, 2000 Panganiban, J. Facts: COMELEC issued a resolution prohibiting the conduct of exit polls during elections. The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official COMELEC count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey. The Supreme Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. ABS-

CASE DIGESTS ON SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

REMEDIAL LAW CASE DIGESTS

CBN filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court raising the lone issue of whether COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining ABS-CBN or any other group, its agents or representatives from conducting exit polls. The Solicitor General contends that the Petition should be dismissed for ABS-CBNs failure to exhaust available remedies before the issuing forum, specifically the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Issue: Whether the direct resort to the Supreme Court through a special civil action for certiorari is proper in this case? Held: Yes. The Supreme Court has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available. The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998, only twenty (20) days before the election itself. Besides, the petitioner got hold of a copy thereof only on May 4, 1998. Under the circumstances, there was hardly enough opportunity to move for a reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in time or the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover, not only is time of the essence; the Petition involves transcendental constitutional issues (fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press). Direct resort to the Supreme Court through a special civil action for certiorari is therefore justified.

6|P a g e