B-gl-351-001-Fp-001 Signals in Support of Land Operations Volume 1 Principles and Fundamental

B-GL-351-001/FP-001
SIGNALS IN SUPPORT OF LAND OPERATIONS

VOLUME 1
PRINCIPLES AND FUNDAMENTALS

(ENGLISH)
Supersedes B-GL-321-001/FT-001 dated 1991-07-26.
WARNING ALTHOUGH NOT CLASSIFIED, THIS PUBLICATION, OR ANY PART OF IT, MAY BE EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE TO THE PUBLIC UNDER THE ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT. ALL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN MUST BE CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLICATION OR ANY PART OF IT MAY BE RELEASED.
This publication is issued on the authority of the Chief of Land Staff.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001
SIGNALS IN SUPPORT OF LAND OPERATIONS VOLUME 1
PRINCIPLES AND FUNDAMENTALS

(ENGLISH)
Supersedes B-GL-321-001/FT-001 dated 1991-07-26
WARNING ALTHOUGH NOT CLASSIFIED, THIS PUBLICATION, OR ANY PART OF IT, MAY BE EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE TO THE PUBLIC UNDER THE ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT. ALL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN MUST BE CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLICATION OR ANY PART OF IT MAY BE RELEASED.
This publication is issued on the authority of the Chief of Land Staff.
OPI DAD 6
2008-05-01
SILO Principles and Fundamentals
PREFACE
APPLICATION 1. B-GL-351-001/FP-001, Signals in Support of Land Operations, Volume 1, Principles and Fundamentals is issued on the authority of the Chief of the Land Staff by the Army Publishing Office, Fort Frontenac, Kingston, Ontario. It is effective on receipt and supersedes B-GL-321001/FT-001 Signals in Battle, Volume 1, Principles and Employment, which shall be destroyed. 2. The French version of this publication is B-GL-351-001/FP-002, Les Transmissions au cours des oprations terrestres, volume 1, Principes et rudiments. 3. AIM 4. This publication states the Signals doctrine for Land Force field operations. It is commonly referred to as SILO. SCOPE 5. The doctrine is applicable to all scales of conflict and to all levels of command within an area of operation. The publication describes: a. the requirement for a command and control information system; b. the principles for the provision of this system; c. the characteristics of major system components; and d. the major tactical considerations that affect the provision of communications on the battlefield. CONTEXT 6. This manual in the B-GL-351 series highlights Signals support in the tactical land environment. The cut-off point between the various manuals is arbitrary and some overlap is inevitable. 7. The primary references were: a. B-GL-310-001/AG-001 Land Operations 2021: The Force Employment Concept for Canadas Army of Tomorrow; b. B-GL-300-003/FP-001 Command in Land Operations; c. B-GL-331-001/FP-001 Command Support in Land Operations; d. B-GL-358-001/FP-001 Land Forces Information Operations Electronic Warfare; e. B-GL-331-002/FP-001 Staff Duties for Land Operations; and Suggestions for amendments should be forwarded to LFDTS DAD 6.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001
f.
Capability Development RecordCommand Version 1.1, Draft-8 September 2006.
TERMINOLOGY 8. The terminology used in this manual is consistent with that of the Army Glossary and AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE ................................................................................................................................i
CHAPTER 1 SIGNALS IN THE LAND FORCE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT SECTION 1 SCOPE OF SIGNALS .......................................................................................1-1 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. Introduction .........................................................................................................1-1 Role of Signals....................................................................................................1-1 Signals Functions...............................................................................................1-1 Signals Components..........................................................................................1-1 Command and Control........................................................................................1-2 Command and Control System...........................................................................1-3 Army Operational Functions ...............................................................................1-4 Information Environment.....................................................................................1-4 Signals Command and Staff ..............................................................................1-5 General Principles of System Management (SM)...............................................1-6 Responsibilities of Signals in System Operations...............................................1-7 Tasks of Signals in CIS Planning........................................................................1-8 General ...............................................................................................................1-8 Continuum of Operations Framework.................................................................1-9 Spectrum of Combat.........................................................................................1-10 Full Spectrum Operations .................................................................................1-11 The Electromagentic Battlespace .....................................................................1-12 Joint, Interagency, Multi-national and Public ....................................................1-12 Land Operations ...............................................................................................1-14 Expeditionary Operations .................................................................................1-14 Domestic Operations ........................................................................................1-15 Joint, Inter-agency, Multi-national, and Public (JIMP) ......................................1-15 Collaborative Working.......................................................................................1-16 Effects Based Approach to Operations.............................................................1-17 General .............................................................................................................1-18 Command Support Components ......................................................................1-19
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SECTION 2 THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .............................................................1-8
SECTION 3 TYPES OF LAND FORCE OPERATIONS ......................................................1-14
SECTION 4 OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS/IMPERATIVES.................................................1-16
SECTION 5 COMMAND SUPPORT ...................................................................................1-18
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127. 128. 129.
Command Support Capability .......................................................................... 1-20 System Interoperability..................................................................................... 1-22 Security ............................................................................................................ 1-24
CHAPTER 2 THE TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL INFORMATION SYSTEM SECTION 1 GENERAL ......................................................................................................... 2-1 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 2-1 Background ........................................................................................................ 2-1 Role of the Tactical Command and Control Information System ....................... 2-2 Effectiveness Criteria for a Tactical Command and Control Information System2-3 General .............................................................................................................. 2-5 Elements of Computerized Information Processing ........................................... 2-6 Computer-based Communications..................................................................... 2-8 Networked Computing Environments............................................................... 2-10 General ............................................................................................................ 2-11 Business Information Systems ......................................................................... 2-13 Business Information Databases ..................................................................... 2-14 Transaction Processing Systems ..................................................................... 2-15 Management Information Systems .................................................................. 2-16 Decision Support Systems ............................................................................... 2-20 Executive Information Systems ........................................................................ 2-22 Office Automation Systems .............................................................................. 2-24 Hybrid Business Information Systems ............................................................. 2-25 Real-time Systems ........................................................................................... 2-25
SECTION 2 ELECTRONIC COMPUTERS AS AIDS TO INFORMATION PROCESSING... 2-5
SECTION 3 COMPUTER-BASED INFORMATION SYSTEMS.......................................... 2-11
SECTION 4 FUNCTIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF A LAND FORCE TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL INFORMATION SYSTEM................................ 2-30 219. 220. 221. General ............................................................................................................ 2-30 Tactical Command and Control Information System Responsibilities.............. 2-34 System Development of the Tactical Command and Control Information System.............................................................................. 2-35
CHAPTER 3 TACTICAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... 3-1 301. 302. General .............................................................................................................. 3-1 Terminology ....................................................................................................... 3-2
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SECTION 2 MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS .....................................................................3-2 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. General ...............................................................................................................3-2 Telecommunications...........................................................................................3-3 Physical Communications...................................................................................3-5 Transmission Capacity .......................................................................................3-6 Communication Links .........................................................................................3-7 Modulation Systems ...........................................................................................3-8 Multiplexing.......................................................................................................3-11 Characteristics of Radio Communications........................................................3-12 Frequency Spectrum ........................................................................................3-13 Radio Propagation ............................................................................................3-15 Radio Communication by Sky Wave ................................................................3-17 Radio Communications by Combat Net Radio Systems ..................................3-19 Radio Communications by Satellite ..................................................................3-22 Radio Communications Through Area Trunk Systems.....................................3-25 General .............................................................................................................3-28 Characteristics ..................................................................................................3-29 Application ........................................................................................................3-30 Modes of Operation ..........................................................................................3-30 General .............................................................................................................3-31 Characteristics ..................................................................................................3-31 Applications ......................................................................................................3-32 General .............................................................................................................3-32 Switched Networks ...........................................................................................3-33 Broadcast Networks..........................................................................................3-35 Computer Network Communications ................................................................3-36
SECTION 3 RADIO COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS...........................................................3-12
SECTION 4 LINE COMMUNICATIONS ..............................................................................3-28
SECTION 5 HAND CARRIAGE COMMUNICATIONS ........................................................3-31
SECTION 6 NETWORKING (MULTI-POINT COMMUNICATIONS) ...................................3-32
CHAPTER 4 ELECTRONIC WARFARE IN THE ELECTRO MAGNETIC BATTLESPACE SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................4-1 401. 402. 403. General ...............................................................................................................4-1 Electronic WarfareDefinition............................................................................4-1 The Role of Electronic Warfare...........................................................................4-3
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404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413.
Electronic Warfare Capabilities .......................................................................... 4-4 General .............................................................................................................. 4-8 Search and Intercept Function ........................................................................... 4-9 Direction Finding .............................................................................................. 4-12 Analysis............................................................................................................ 4-13 Electronic Jamming.......................................................................................... 4-17 Control of Jamming .......................................................................................... 4-17 Jammer Platforms ............................................................................................ 4-20 Expendable Jammers ...................................................................................... 4-20 Electronic Attack as Electronic Protection: Jamming in Non-electronic Warfare Units ................................................................................................... 4-21 Light Electronic Warfare................................................................................... 4-21 Medium Electronic Warfare.............................................................................. 4-21 Command of EW.............................................................................................. 4-22 Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell ............................................................... 4-23 Analysis and Control Element .......................................................................... 4-24 Electronic Warfare Liaison Officers .................................................................. 4-24 The Operational Planning Process .................................................................. 4-24 Electronic Warfare and the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Process ..................................................................................... 4-25 The ISTAR Planning Process .......................................................................... 4-27 Priority Intelligence Requirements ................................................................... 4-27 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield......................................................... 4-27 Operations Plan Development ......................................................................... 4-28 ISTAR Plan ...................................................................................................... 4-28 The EW Processes .......................................................................................... 4-29 Aim ................................................................................................................... 4-30 Planning ........................................................................................................... 4-30
SECTION 2 ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT.............................................................. 4-8
SECTION 3 ELECTRONIC ATTACK.................................................................................. 4-16
SECTION 4 ELECTRONIC PROTECTION ........................................................................ 4-20
SECTION 5 ORGANIZATION FOR EMPLOYMENT .......................................................... 4-21 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429.
SECTION 6 COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE......................... 4-22
SECTION 7 ELECTRONIC WARFARE PLANNING AND PROCESSES........................... 4-24
SECTION 8 ELECTRONIC DECEPTION ........................................................................... 4-30
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SECTION 9 ELECTRONIC NEUTRALIZATION .................................................................4-31 430. General .............................................................................................................4-31 CHAPTER 5 SIGNALS PLANNING SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................5-1 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. Responsibilities of the General Staff to Signals..................................................5-1 Responsibilities of Signals to the Staff................................................................5-2 Signals Command and Control...........................................................................5-3 Signals Planning Principles ................................................................................5-3 Signals Planning Process ...................................................................................5-6 General ...............................................................................................................5-7 Information Presentation.....................................................................................5-7 Methodology .......................................................................................................5-8 Determining the Requirement.............................................................................5-9 Consideration of External Factors (Signal Preparation of the Battlefield).........5-13 Service Delivery Assessment ...........................................................................5-15 Assessment of External Factors .......................................................................5-15 Analysis ............................................................................................................5-17 Developing and Assessing Courses of Action ..................................................5-18 The Decision Briefing........................................................................................5-19 Presenting the Plan ..........................................................................................5-19 Keys to Successful Planning ............................................................................5-20 Communications-Electronics Annexes .............................................................5-20 Communications-Electronics Operation Order .................................................5-20 Communications-Electronics Operating Instructions ........................................5-21 Communications-Electronics Technical Instructions ........................................5-21 Communications Electronics Standing Instructions..........................................5-22 Standing Operating Procedures .......................................................................5-22 Additional Publications......................................................................................5-23
SECTION 2 SIGNAL ESTIMATE ..........................................................................................5-7
ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 5 SIGNAL ESTIMATE FORMAL TEMPLATE .............................. 5A-1 CHAPTER 6 SIGNAL TACTICS IN SUPPORT OF LAND OPERATIONS SECTION 1............................................................................................................................6-1 601. 602. 603. Introduction .........................................................................................................6-1 Offensive Operations ..........................................................................................6-2 Signal Considerations for a Hasty Attack ...........................................................6-3
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604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630.
Signals Considerations for a Deliberate Attack .................................................. 6-3 Signals Considerations in an Exploitation or Pursuit.......................................... 6-3 Defensive Operations......................................................................................... 6-4 Signals Considerations for the Main Defensive Battle ....................................... 6-4 Signals Considerations for the Delay ................................................................. 6-5 Stability Operations ............................................................................................ 6-5 Signals Considerations for Stability Operations ................................................. 6-6 Enabling Activities .............................................................................................. 6-7 Signals Considerations for an Advance to Contact ............................................ 6-7 Signals Considerations for a Meeting Engagement ........................................... 6-8 Signals Considerations for Relief Operations..................................................... 6-8 Signals Considerations for a Withdrawal.......................................................... 6-10 Signals Considerations Obstacle Crossing and Breaching .............................. 6-11 Airmobile Operations........................................................................................ 6-13 Signals Considerations for Airmobile Operations............................................. 6-14 Airborne Operations ......................................................................................... 6-16 Signal Considerations for Airborne Operations ................................................ 6-16 Amphibious Operations.................................................................................... 6-18 Signals Considerations for Amphibious Operations ......................................... 6-18 Operations in Enemy Controlled Territory ........................................................ 6-20 Signals Considerations for Operations in Enemy Controlled Territory ............. 6-20 Chemical and Biological Weapons Effects on Signals ..................................... 6-22 Nuclear and Radiological Effects on Signals ................................................... 6-23 Operations in Mountains .................................................................................. 6-26 Operations in the Arctic and Cold Weather ...................................................... 6-27 Operations in the Jungle .................................................................................. 6-29 Operations in Desert and Extremely Hot Conditions........................................ 6-30
SECTION 2 UNIQUE OPERATIONS.................................................................................. 6-13
SECTION 3 TACTICAL OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS .......................... 6-22
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1-1: Figure 1-2: Figure 1-3: Figure 1-4: Figure 1-5: Figure 1-6: Figure 1-7: Figure 1-8: Figure 3-1: Figure 3-2: Figure 3-3: Figure 3-4: Figure 3-5: Figure 3-6: Figure 3-7: Figure 4-1: Figure 4-2: Figure 4-3: Figure 4-4: Figure 5-1: Figure 5-2: Figure 5-3: Figure 5-4: Figure 5-5: Figure 5-6: Figure 6-1: Signals Two Main Components CIS and EW ........................................................1-2 Signals System Management in Network Operations ...........................................1-6 The Spectrum of Conflict .....................................................................................1-10 The Continuum of Operations .............................................................................1-11 Land Operations and Tasks ................................................................................1-14 The Model Shows the Linkages Between IM and SM, and Responsibility Layers Between All-arms Command and Staff to Signals Command and Staff................................................................................1-20 Primary Functional Components of SM in Their Relation to Signals Functions and Tasks Within Command Support ..................................................................1-21 A Representative Structure Combining Military/Commercial and Allied Military Systems.........................................................................................1-23 Ground Wave Transmission Paths ......................................................................3-16 Transmission Paths .............................................................................................3-17 CNR Linking Formation Level HQ with Subordinate HQs, Forward Operating Bases (FOB) and Specialized Assets...................................3-21 Satellite Communications Linking Formation Level HQ with Subordinate HQs...3-23 LOS Linking a Formation Level HQ with Subordinate HQ and FOBs..................3-26 Local Area Network .............................................................................................3-37 Wide Area Network..............................................................................................3-37 The Electromagnetic Spectrum .............................................................................4-3 EW Vehicle Conducting Electronic Reconnaissance and Electronic Surveillance ........................................................................................4-10 EW Vehicles Conducting Direction Finding Tasks...............................................4-13 Electronic Attack on the Receiver........................................................................4-17 LCSS Planning Flowchart......................................................................................5-6 Connectivity Overlay............................................................................................5-11 IER Overlay .........................................................................................................5-12 Information Services Requirement Overlay .........................................................5-12 Table Describing Constraints and Restraints ......................................................5-13 Table Describing Comparison of Courses of Action ............................................5-19 Table Describing Land Tactical Operations and Constituent Activities .................6-2
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CHAPTER 1 SIGNALS IN THE LAND FORCE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT SECTION 1 SCOPE OF SIGNALS 101. INTRODUCTION
1. Since 1903, Signals has been assigned the responsibility for the provision of communication links and services required by army commanders for command and control (C2) of their forces during operations. As the world changes and technology continues to evolve exponentially, the fundamental principles of Signals have remained constant. Signal Doctrine, as it applies to supporting commanders engaged in Land Operations, is rooted, is proven principles that more so adapt to the demands expected of it and the processes it supports. This document will describe how Signals supports commanders and war fighters in the modern operational environment. 102. ROLE OF SIGNALS
1. The role of Signals is to provide the commanders and their staffs with the means to exercise command and control through the exploitation of the military and global information environments while denying and exploiting the enemy's use of the same. 103. SIGNALS FUNCTIONS
1. Signals has two major functions in support of Land Force (LF) within the operating environment: a. Signals must enable Commanders at all levels to command and control their forces in the successful completion of their assigned mission across the entire Spectrum of Conflict within the Continuum of Operations. Signals must be able to conduct offensive, defensive and stability operations as they pertain to the electromagnetic (EM) battle space.
b.
104.
SIGNALS COMPONENTS
1. To enable commanders to execute effective command and control and to enhance their decision making process within the Land Command Support System (LCSS), it is important to understand the two components of SignalsCommunication Information System (CIS) and Electronic Warfare (EW) see Figure 1-1. CIS has two sub-componentsTactical Command and Control, Information System (TacC2IS) and Tactical Communications (TacComms)and shares a relationship with the Electronic protection (EP) sub-component of EW. Chapters 2 and 3 of this volume cover in detail TacC2IS and TacComm. EW has three sub-componentsthe Electronic Attack (EA), the Electronic Support (ES) and the Electronic Protection (EP). Chapter 4 of this volume will cover EW in detail. This construct is duplicated at all levels of command and each signals component has a technical relationship with its counterpart at higher, lower and lateral levels.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 1-1
Figure 1-1: Signals Two Main Components CIS and EW
2.
The LCSS supports the Armys desired end-state of command superiority by: a. b. c. d. fully integrating with the Canadian Forces (CF) unified command and control (C2) systems to support future missions; operating across the full spectrum of conflict; interacting seamlessly with civil authorities and non-governmental organizations; and being user-friendly, effective, achievable, affordable and sustainable within both integrated garrison and deployed domains.
3. The primary purpose of the LCSS is to provide commanders with the information and information services required to make effective and timely C2 decisions about their forces deployed in domestic and expeditionary operations. The LCSS is a combination of systems that can be grouped into TacComms and TacC2IS and delivers major Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) systems to operational commanders and staffs. This includes EW, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), Weapon Locating Sensors (WLS), Ground-based Air Defence (GBAD) and Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) sensors. 105. COMMAND AND CONTROL
1. Command is defined as the authority vested in an individual for the direction and control of military forces.1 This involves the exerciseand delegation ofauthority, acceptance of responsibility and a demonstration of leadership and competence. Command is the purposeful exercise of authority over structures, resources, people and activities.2
1 2
B-GL-300-003/FP-001, Command in Land Operations. Canadian Defence Academy, Leadership in the Canadian Forces, Doctrine, 2005, p. 7
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Signals in the Land Force Operating Environment
2. NATO has defined control as the process through which a commander, assisted by his staff, organizes, directs and co-ordinates the activities of the forces allocated to him3. Control should be viewed, not just as top-down direction, but also as including the feedback from bottom-up as to the effect of the action taken. To achieve control, the commander and his staff employ a common doctrine and philosophy for command and use standardized procedures (including staff work) in conjunction with the communications information systems available. 106. COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
1. The exercise of command and control is accomplished through a combination of systems. A command and control system is an integrated system comprised of doctrine, procedures, organizational structures, personnel, equipment, facilities and communications that provides authorities at all levels with timely data to plan, direct and control their activities. The army command and control system is made up of the following major components: a. Chain of Command. A chain of command designates commanders at various levels and for designated functions. Their responsibilities are described in B-GL-300-003/FP-001, Command in Land Operations Chapter 3. This command and control component will not be discussed any further in this publication. Staff System. It is described in B-GL-331-001/FP-001, Command Support in Land Operations, Chapter 2. It will not be discussed any further in this publication. Headquarters Facilities. The functioning of headquarters will be discussed in detail in this series of publications. Communication and Information Systems. Communications and Information Systems (CIS) are the resources that bind all of the other components of the command and control system. To be more precise, it is an assembly of equipment, methods, procedures and, if necessary, personnel, organized to accomplish specific information conveyance and processing functions. CIS encompasses both communications and computer related resources including the associated low level software applications. (1) Communications System: Communication System (CS) provides communication between users and includes transmission systems and switching systems in support of information transfer. Information System: An Information System (IS) is used by individuals to store, retrieve, process and display information in support of job related tasks. It includes software, applications and processing devices such as computers, scanners, and printers, in other words the Local Area Network (LAN) itself.
b.
c. d.
(2)
NATO Definition AAP 6 (2005)
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107.
ARMY OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS
1. The Army defines five operational functions: command, sense, act, shield, and sustain. Commanders seek to integrate and apply these functions as overwhelming combat power when and where required. B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations defines combat power as the total means of destructive and/or disruptive force that a military unit or formation can apply against an opponent at a given time. The aim is to convert the potential of forces, resources and opportunity into actual capability that is greater than the sum of the parts. Signals provides a capability to integrate the activities of the operational functions to enhance or magnify the effect of friendly combat power and diminish that of the enemy: a. Command. Signals provide the means for commanders to exercise command and control (C2) over their forces and facilitate the timely execution of C2 processes. Commanders seek to achieve information superiority at the right place, at the right time, and under the right circumstances. Signals enable Commanders to enhance the decision making cycle by processing information, linking sensors, commanders and weapon platforms on the battlefield, as well as ensuring the availability of battle visualization. Shield. Signals role in this operational function is protection and security of the network from both CS and C2IS threats posed by hackers, viruses and enemy electronic warfare (EW) units. Sense. Signals role in this operational function is associated with information operation in support of the military forces activities in the Electromagnetic (EM) battlespace. It encompasses the search for, interception and identification of electromagnetic emissions. Act. Signals role in this operational function is associated with Electronic Attack (EA), which is a sub-component of EW. It is the employment of electromagnetic energy, including direct energy, to reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum and to ensure its effective use by friendly forces. Sustain. Signals role in this operational function is to maintain the operational network. This includes the CS and the C2IS equipment and software crucial in processing functions and information transmission in the operational environment.
b.
c.
d.
e.
108.
INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
1. The domain in which Signals will forever be intrinsically linked is the information environment. The term information environment brings with it an immensity and scope that is seemingly all encompassing. Of particular importance to Signals is the inherent understanding of the following two sub-sets of the information environment:
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a.
The Military Information Environment (MIE) is defined as the environment contained within the global information environment, consisting of the information systems and organizations, friendly and adversary, military and nonmilitary that support, enable, or significantly influence a specific military operation.4 The Global Information Environment (GIE) is defined as all individuals, organizations or systems, most of which are outside the control of the military or National Command Authorities, that collect, process and disseminate information to national and international audiences.5
b.
2. The information environments exist within the land operations environment, and in order for Signals to effectively enable information exploitation in support of commanders and their staffs, Signals must understand the land operational environment in which they operate. Therefore, the Army requires the infrastructure that allows the Land Forces to operate within the MIE and to interface with the GIE so as to use CIS to enable the integration of all Land Force activities as follows: a. b. c. d. e. 109. Support the decision-making process; Transmit information, including orders and reports; Link sensors, commanders and weapons platforms; Provide a multi-dimensional relevant common picture; and Enable efficient sustainment of the force.
SIGNALS COMMAND AND STAFF
1. To enable operational commanders to execute effective command and control and enhance the decision making processes in the operational environment in conjunction with CIS, a Signals command and staff organizational structure is required. This organizational structure includes personnel, equipment, facilities, processes and expertise which provide authorities at all levels to plan, direct and monitor network operations. For Signals` commanders and staff to plan, direct and monitor activities for network operations an information management plan (IMP) from the operational commander and staff is required. Without the IMP, Signals will not be able to anticipate and support the functions of situation awareness (SA), battle management, battle planning and sensor integration in the operational environment. The IMP identifies how relevant information (RI) is to be managed internally and externally. The IMP assigns information management (IM) responsibilities to specific staff, describes information requirements, provides guidance to system management organizations on requirements for voice and data communication links, as well as command guidance with respect to information currency requirements and information protection needs. Figure 1-2 shows the relationship between Signals planning, directing and monitoring network operations once the IMP has been issued.
Ibid Land Force Information Operations B-GL-300-005/FP-001
B-GL-351-001/FP-001
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Figure 1-2: Signals System Management in Network Operations
110.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SYSTEM MANAGEMENT (SM)
1. The general principles of system management (SM) include capacity, economy, flexibility, mobility, reliability, security, simplicity, survivability and timeliness. 2. Capacity. The SM capability should be built on a modular basis to permit it to cater to a variety of force structures across the entire spectrum of CF operations. System management tools and procedures should be scalable, allowing an increase in the size of the supported HQ without an equivalent increase in system workload. 3. Economy. The limited availability of highly qualified support personnel suggests that service desk functions should be centralized with the senior deploying HQ. System support capabilities should allow for remote management of distant devices. Best industry practices in information technology (IT), where this is possible and sensible, are used. These include a tiered structure with junior (i.e. less experienced) personnel acting as initial points of contact with access to more specialized resources provided when the situation warrants. This bottom up approach is harmonized with the fact that CIS plans are developed from the top down. That is, the SM concept is integrated with existing and developing staff and signals doctrine. 4. Flexibility. The mature SM concept addresses the entire spectrum of operations from war fighting through peace support operations (PSO) to domestic operations and through the five phases of operations; i.e. a single support concept for garrison and deployed forces is the goal. In addition, CIS must be robust such that the loss of any single workstation, server or communications means has the minimum operational impact.
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5. Mobility. Headquarters must possess a high degree of strategic and tactical mobility to facilitate flexible C2. System support capabilities must possess the same degree of mobility. Hardware repair (primarily through replacement of faulty communications or computer components) should be carried out as far forward as possible. Software repair6 (less data and quick-fix issues) is normally carried out as far back as possible. 6. Reliability. Users will become increasingly dependent on the availability of C2IS systems and associated information holdings. Untimely or lengthy failures in communications, software or hardware will pose significant operational risks. Software configurations should have maximum standardization, reliability and maintainability to improve operational availability. 7. Security. Communications and information security considerations must be an integral part of all systems management doctrine and training. 8. Simplicity. Open interfaces should exist to simplify management of networks, messaging and software applications. 9. Survivability. The system has to be capable of withstanding physical and electronic attacks by the enemy. 10. Timeliness. Restoration of service to the current baseline operational environment, including operational data, is the highest priority task for system management. Rapid fault identification and equipment replacement or software restoration is essential. 111. RESPONSIBILITIES OF SIGNALS IN SYSTEM OPERATIONS
1. Within Signals, there are functional responsibilities directly associated with providing the means of C2 to a commander and their staff. These responsibilities, as they pertain to the signal network, can be categorized as: a. System Establishment. Consists of the personnel, equipment and processes required to establish and extend the infrastructure and terminal equipment (static or mobile) required to facilitate signal system interaction for the purpose of communication, command and control, and/or exploitation. System Operation. Consists of the personnel, equipment and processes required to utilize the signal system and monitor its performance as an enabler to the support command or staff function. System Exploitation/Protection. Consists of the personnel, equipment and processes required to gain advantage of our adversarys use of the information environment while preserving and protecting our own use of the same information environment.
b.
c.
Software repair in this context refers to issues such as adjustments to computer code and development of software patches. Software problems that can be resolved through simple re-installation of applications are carried out on site.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001
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d.
System Maintenance. Consists of the personnel, equipment and processes required to conduct fault finding and signal system repair in order to ensure the continued operational capability of the supporting system.
2. It is important to note that the above categories are mutually supportive of each other and only by achieving synergy amongst the categories can effective signal system support be achieved. Also key to note is that the term system is not limited to only the physical personnel, equipment and networks, but encompasses the electromagnetic spectrum, tactical and technical processes, operational mission, and the entire compliment of information that is applicable to accomplishing that mission. 112. 1. TASKS OF SIGNALS IN CIS PLANNING The primary tasks assigned to Signals are: a. System Planning. Conducted in an iterative manner and integrated within the supported command and staff processes, to support the commander in achieving their intent. System Adaptation. The Signals command and staff needs to create the conditions for maintaining the operating integrity of the supporting information bearer capabilities. System Management. Tactical Situational Awareness (SA) and technical Situational Understanding (SU) must be maintained to ensure preservation of the information flow required to enable the commander to make timely and effective decisions. System Administration. Administer the assigned signal systems and networks, as well as providing close tactical, technical and administrative support to the headquarters. System Support. Provided through the employment of technical experts who understand the needs of the commander and are themselves warriors in the context of military operations. SECTION 2 THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 113. GENERAL
b.
c.
d.
e.
1. 21st century armies conducting land operations must remain flexible, adaptive, and capable of succeeding across the entire continuum of operations. No longer is the massing of armies along fixed lines, using the acquisition of physical territory as the indicator of success or failure, the norm; however, this must remain as a potential threat. The modern threat is asymmetrical and the battlefield of the future is often a non-linear, non-contiguous battlespace to be potentially fought in urban terrain and complex environments wherein the threat is not readily identifiable. Combatants may well be insurgent groups, organized military or possibly a combination of both.
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2. The rapid advances in technology and its application in weapons and communication networks have become relatively inexpensive to place in a nations arsenal or in the hands of insurgent organizations. The ease of acquisition has given an adversary the potential to be a lethal threat to the stability of not only states within their sphere of influence but also to global peace. 3. The operating environment is the overall operational and tactical circumstances in which the LF is expected to conduct operations. It exists on both the physical and psychological planes. It is a complex mix of the geographical, environmental and human factors that collectively and significantly complicate the conduct of operations. 4. The LF will operate in an increasingly complex, interdependent environment in which they must plan to conduct operations that will influence the physical and psychological aspects of the terrain, threats and hazards, the local populace and other systems, actors and entities. They must do so using a comprehensive approach, working within a Joint, Interagency and Multinational within the Public domain (JIMP) framework to achieve enduring success. This complex, complicated, asymmetric operating environment has a significant impact on how Signals must conduct operations as part of the Command Support team and increasingly as a part of the Act and Shield operational functions available to Commanders at all levels. 5. As a direct result of the complexity of the operating environment, the threats within it and the technology available both to us and our adversaries, Signals has two major functions in support of LF within the LF operating environment: a. Signals must enable Commanders at all levels to command and control their forces in the successful completion of their assigned mission across the entire Spectrum of Conflict within the Continuum of Operations; and Signals must be able to conduct offensive, defensive and stability operations as they pertain to the electromagnetic (EM) battlespace.
b.
114.
CONTINUUM OF OPERATIONS FRAMEWORK
1. Campaigns and subordinate operations often require military forces to operate effectively across the spectrum of conflict, conduct a wide range of military activities simultaneously, and transition quickly from one type of operation to another in rapidly changing operational environments. Commanders must be able to visualize how a campaign or operation will likely evolve over time in light of changing circumstances. 2. The concept of a continuum of operations identifies a number of campaign themes and provides a framework for commanders to understand the complexity of the operational environment and the manner in which missions contribute to a lasting peace, or at least to an environment in which conflict is diminished. The continuum of operations consists of four aspects: a. b. c. The spectrum of conflict; Predominant (operational level) campaign themes, including counterinsurgency; Types of tactical operations (offensive, defensive and stability); and B-GL-351-001/FP-001
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d. 115.
Simultaneous conduct of different types of tactical operations.
SPECTRUM OF COMBAT
1. The spectrum of conflict is a backdrop for all operations and describes the environment in which they occur. The main discriminator is the level of violence involved, which ranges from peaceful interaction amongst international players (states, corporations, non-government agencies (NGOs)), through low-level conflicts, to general war (see Figure 1-3). Military forces operate throughout this spectrum.
Figure 1-3: The Spectrum of Conflict
2. Military operations do not necessarily go through a progression along the spectrum in either direction. Operations typically start somewhere in the middle of the spectrum, not at either end. There may be different levels of conflict in different parts of a single theatre of operations, or even within a joint operations area. Indeed, levels of conflict may vary over time within a single area. In general, no specific operation exists at just one point of this spectrum. Reality is more complex: at any one time there may be a humanitarian crisis in one location, an insurgency in another, and intense fighting between forces nearby, all within the same area of operations. Similarly, at any one location there may be house-to-house fighting one day, collection of forensic evidence the next day, and restoration of electricity and water supplies the day after. In other words, full spectrum operations will be conducted simultaneously and sequentially. 3. The Continuum of Operations is a conceptual framework used to explain the relationship between campaigns and the various types of tactical activities that constitute their conduct (see Figure 1-4). It aids in understanding the complexity of the operational environment while planning, preparing for, conducting and assessing operations. It recognizes that campaigns are realized through a combination of tactical activities that reflect the level of violence and overall campaign theme. Commanders must maintain a long-range vision of where a campaign is going and consider the long-term effects of current operations. This framework should help commanders think beyond the specifically assigned mission to what may come next.
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Figure 1-4: The Continuum of Operations
4. Signals must made aware of and understand the requirements of all forces operating throughout the spectrum of conflict and provide Commanders at all levels, regardless of their place within that spectrum, with the Command Support and offensive, defensive and stability operations support (as they pertain to the EM battlespace) that best suit the demands of the supported LF at any given time or instance. Signals must ensure that the support provided is adaptive, responsive and simple enough to respond to the exigencies of the constantly evolving framework that is defined as the continuum of operations. 116. FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS
1. Full Spectrum Operations (FSO) is defined as The simultaneous conduct of operations by a force across the spectrum of conflict.7 In FSO, the psychological plane is as important, if not more important than the physical plane. An LF formation headquarters (HQ) will require the competencies and supporting systems to apply all physical and psychological means in a Joint, Interagency, Multi-national and Public (JIMP) framework in order to achieve the desired effects. Manoeuvre, firepower and more importantly, Information Operations (Info Ops) must be designed to achieve effects in time and space over the course of a campaign. They must disrupt and defeat adversaries to the campaign objectives, as well as enhance the efforts of the JIMP. The vast majority of operations in the land operating environment are likely to be nonkinetic. The threat is adaptable and asymmetric and will seldom attack our kinetic strength. Therefore, the Command system must also be responsive and include the necessary mobility and protection to counter asymmetric threats. Command systems must be balanced and adaptive in order to provide command in FSO or cater to the range of potential operations within the spectrum of conflict.
Army Terminology Panel
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117.
THE ELECTROMAGENTIC BATTLESPACE
1. The importance of the EM Battlespace to Command within a network-enabled land operations environment cannot be overstated. It is imperative that Commanders at all levels understand the existence of the EM battlespace and ensure that their operations include activities that enable their forces to dominate that EM battlespace. 2. The EM Battlespace is a unique environment that encompasses all devices (including people) that employ electrical or electronic means to transmit, receive, process, store, display, sense and analyse information. The EM battlespace is, therefore, not dissimilar from the Aerospace environment, in that it exists only due to our ability to exploit it through a specialized infrastructure to achieve both physical and psychological effects. The Shielding necessary to protect our own infrastructure and the Act of prosecuting our adversaries infrastructure within this EM battlespace are primarily Signals functions, but require activities from Commanders and soldiers at all levels to be successful. Although the philosophy, doctrine and tactics associated directly with military operations in the land environment have aspects that support a military forces activities in the EM battlespace, warfare in the EM battlespace requires its own set of doctrine and tactics. These activities, Electronic Attack (EA) and Electronic Protection (EP), are sub-divisions of Electronic Warfare (EW), the military action that describes the use of EM activity to control that EM battlespace 3. Volume 3 of Signals in Land Operations will contain a more comprehensive description of the doctrine and tactics associated with warfare within the EM battlespace. The basic principles of warfare in the EM battle space are discussed in Chapter 4 of this volume. 118. JOINT, INTERAGENCY, MULTI-NATIONAL AND PUBLIC
1. Adapting to the JIMP framework is instrumental to the success of the command function particularly in the Comprehensive Approach to Canadian operations. The LF can anticipate that few if any future operational deployments will be conducted outside of this framework. How one deals with events as one moves through the continuum of operations will differ as will those who have responsibility for response in a supporting or supported role to a given emergency or contingency. Under the JIMP framework, the military becomes just one of the many effects available to government in the context of domestic, continental or international operations. This applies equally to all elements of national security, including civilian security partners, in order to achieve unity of effort through Collaborative Working (CW), collective response and combined effects. In many campaigns, the military will be in a supporting role depending upon the cause of the crisis and the requirement to exercise that element of power. 2. This serves to reinforce the point: for the LF command systems to be effective within the JIMP framework, they must be applied in harmony with many other actors and commanders must be personally engaged in the process. Indeed, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) charges his strategic staff and operational level HQ to maintain such contact and liaison with all potential security partners.8 Commanders at section through formation levels must be cognizant of and be prepared to operate within the JIMP framework. All levels of HQ,
CDS, Concept of Operations: CF Strategic Command. NDHQ, 14 Nov 05
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particularly land formation and unit task force, must be organized to engage and interact with local authorities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), other government departments (OGDs), other security services, etc. This involves staff, liaison and communications personnel with the right training, education, skills and collaborative tools to engage actively with civilian agencies to achieve coherent mission planning and execution. 3. The interagency aspect, though not well understood, is key to mission success, in particular as it is at the heart of the strategy for the Comprehensive Approach. Mutual understanding, liaison, building trust, confidence and a sense of common purpose with other players (and even integrating them into campaign planning or sharing information) are at the heart of effective command and mission success. A network of liaison teams must be established to reinforce the concepts of CW, Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO), and Network Enabled Operations (NE Ops) with emphasis on psychological effects. The priority function of a formation HQ will be to plan and synchronize psychological effects, with the delivery of physical effects left to the tactical commanders, within the commanders intent and extant targeting rules. Command and Control Information Systems structures, processes, systems and security measures must allow for civilian integration within any operation. 4. Multi-National (MN) operations have broad implications for Canada particularly in a lead nation context. Our recent history suggests that Canada is likely to be asked by NATO, the UN or possibly other coalitions to command an MN force at the formation level. Commitments such as these bring real benefits to Canada in terms of influence and presence, and provide all elements of the LF with much needed operational experience in the LF operating environment. The most likely mission will involve a CF-led MN force at the land formation level. Implicit in this is the capacity to provide the core command and command support capabilities regardless of the staff composition and contribution from coalition partners. Within an MN staff there is a need to assemble the team early in the training and mounting stages in order to build trust and cohesion. Equally, clear operating procedures are essential, and the staff decision tools and CIS must impose limited training and be configured to cater to the appropriate security domain. Signals must be prepared to provide a core command support capability that can expand to accommodate an MN formation and/or units and operate concurrently with national command elements (NCEs). Command systems, processes and procedures must account for the technological awareness of the entire MN team and be designed with this in mind. 5. An inherent challenge in a MN formation will be the sharing of information and intelligence, both within an MN HQ and across the force. In an LF-led MN force, there will be a clear distinction between information and intelligence that is held nationally and that which is declared to the coalition. Notwithstanding the operational imperative and desire to share information, LF commanders may not have access to all intelligence sources from coalition nations and must retain access to national sources and capabilities. In an asymmetric environment most useful and actionable information comes through human intelligence (HUMINT) from the elements on the ground, with deployed and reach-back signals intelligence (SIGINT) and EW assets accounting for the majority of actionable and targeting information. Multi-national chains of command are a valuable source of national intelligence. Therefore, means must be found to tap into these sources. National command functions and supporting systems must complement and operate effectively within a coalition and JIMP environment. National staff will have to have access to support and CIS capability that is distinct from the coalition.
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SECTION 3 TYPES OF LAND FORCE OPERATIONS 119. LAND OPERATIONS
1. The broad range of tactical level operations, tasks and activities that are conducted to realise success in a campaign are divided into three groupings or categories as follows: a. b. c. offensive operations; defensive operations; and stability operations.
2. These types of tactical level operations, together with tactical tasks, describe the total tactical activity undertaken by a military force within a campaign. Each type is guided by a set of principles. These types of operations are further broken down into subordinate types of tactical operations (see Figure 1-5). Operations will be further discussed in Chapter 6 of this volume. Offensive Operations Attack Raid Exploitation Pursuit Ambush Feint Break-out Demonstration Defensive Operations Defence Delay Stability Operations Control and Security Support to Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR) Support to Infrastructure and Governance Assistance to Other Agencies Enabling Activities Reconnaissance Security Link-up Retirement Withdrawal Advance to Contact Relief of Troops in Combat Obstacle Breaching/Crossing Relief of Encircled Force
Meeting Engagement
Figure 1-5: Land Operations and Tasks
120.
EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS
1. The intent that Canada will deploy a CF expeditionary capability has been recognized in the recent establishment of an expeditionary command. The emphasis at the moment is on structure with doctrine, process, culture and equipment being considered in parallel. 2. The implications of creating a full spectrum expeditionary capability for the CF are not readily apparent. One can surmise that a joint C2 capability will be required along with a harmonization of the key command support elements. The challenge will be to identify the
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requirements, based on a solid joint doctrinal foundation, sufficiently early enough to allow the new capability to be fielded for maximum effectiveness from the outset. The LF plays a key role in CF expeditionary operations and will be an important participant in developmental aspects of a joint capability. Expeditionary forces are inherently joint and must have processes and systems in place that allow communications and collaboration without reliance on ad hoc solutions. This implies a set of core capabilities at high readiness and with the necessary mobility. Land HQs must be rapidly deployable domestically or internationally by a combination of air, sea and land (rail); therefore their design must facilitate strategic mobility. To improve responsiveness and agility, expeditionary forces must leverage the use of networks for collaborative working and reach-back communications. Split-base operations can be part of the design of forward Command elements. 121. DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
1. With the stand-up of Canada Command (CANCOM), there will soon be more clearly defined Command requirements for the surveillance of, and conduct of operations within, Canadas territory, airspace and coastal approaches. It is important to note that although the location of the operations is different than Expeditionary operations, the nature of the operations and the campaign themes associated with them remain unchanged. 2. Canada Command has moved to re-energize a regional command structure, with joint operation centres in each of the six regions, and as a consequence established a need for a supporting CIS infrastructure. This has implications for the manning and command support capabilities within each of the regional Joint Task Force (JTF) HQ, in particular the termination of national CIS at the protected, classified and caveat levels. Less clear are the respective command responsibilities for force employment (FE) and force generation (FG) between CANCOMostensibly as the force employerand the environmental chiefs of staffs. 3. The LF will need to ensure that its Tactical Command and Control Information System (TacC2IS) is integrated such that it supports deployments within Canada using both military and civil infrastructure. It is imperative that the C2 tools used both domestically and abroad are the same to ensure that the Command Support process is seamless to LF Commanders and their staffs. 122. JOINT, INTER-AGENCY, MULTI-NATIONAL, AND PUBLIC (JIMP)
1. To respond to the threats (real or potential), the Army must be prepared to conduct operations as part of a Joint, Inter-Agency/Inter-Departmental, Multi-National and Public (JIMP) effort. The application of military effects cannot succeed in isolation and the Army is but one element of a comprehensive approach to address the root causes of conflict across the continuum. This operational reality demands that todays army be one that understands the strategic imperatives to success and is able to coordinate within that JIMP environment to achieve it. This operational reality demands a Command and Control Information Systems architecture as its backbone to enable success. Signals must succeed at defining, implementing and evolving that C2IS architecture. 2. Adapting to the JIMP framework is instrumental to the success of the command function particularly within the national strategy of Diplomacy, Development and Defence (3D) context for Canadian operations. The LF can anticipate that few if any future operational deployments will be conducted outside of this framework. How one deals with events as one moves through B-GL-351-001/FP-001
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the continuum of operations will differ as will those who have responsibility for response in a supporting or supported role to a given emergency or contingency. Under the JIMP framework, the military becomes just one of the many effects available to government in the context of domestic, continental or international operations. This would apply equally to all elements of national security, including civilian security partners, in order to achieve unity of effort through CW, collective response and combined effects. 3. This serves to reinforce the point for the CF command systems to be effective within the JIMP framework, they must be applied in harmony with the many other actors and commanders must be personally engaged in the process. Indeed, the CDS charges his strategic staff and operational level HQ to maintain such contact and liaison with all potential security partners.9 Commanders at section through formation levels must be cognizant of and be prepared to operate within the JIMP framework. All levels of headquarters, particularly land formation and unit task force, must be organized to engage and interact with local authorities, NGOs, OGDs, other security services, etc. This involves staff, liaison and communications personnel with the right training, education, skills and collaborative tools to overcome a natural mistrust and engage actively with civilian agencies to achieve coherent mission planning and execution. SECTION 4 OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS/IMPERATIVES 123. COLLABORATIVE WORKING
1. Collaborative Working and its sub-set collaborative planning are concepts gaining wide acceptance within both the military and civilian environments. They have the potential to help overcome the intra-military and civil-military cultural gaps which hinder communications, common understanding and action, and the building of trust. Collaborative Working can create new synergies and multiply the net capacity of the spectrum of partners and can be defined as the process by which the collective intellectual power, experience and knowledge of command and staff teams are applied to achieve a common intent.10 2. Teams can be temporary or permanent, single or multi-functional, collocated or distributed, intra or interagency, mixed military and civilian, and include multi-layers of government, national or coalition elements. Distributed teams are second nature to military organizations and are prevalent in the LF operating environment with robust and versatile command support systems being critical to mission success. These systems are critical to mission success. They must be built on the premise that CW is central to the workings of all members of the military team and that they include the full spectrum of JIMP partners whether they be in a supporting or supported role. Collaborative processes and tools that allow for simultaneous rather than cascading planning and execution are essential if CW is to work in the LF operating environment. Collaborative Working enables mission command and is critical to building trust and establishing SA and Situational Understanding (SU) particularly in the JIMP environment.
CDS, Concept of Operations: CF Strategic Command. NDHQ, 14 Nov 05 DRDC Valcartier, Collaborative Working in a Domestic Operation (CW in DOMOPS) Study, p. 5
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3. The application of mission command through command led collaboration in the LF operating environment has the potential to generate benefits that include: a. b. c. d. Implicit or explicit sharing of SA and SU; Harnessing of knowledge, experience, intellect and capabilities of the JIMP team allowing for more efficient use of all human and material resources; Better identification of accepted and agreed outcomes leading to a common understanding of the end state and how it is best achieved; and Capitalization on emerging opportunities and to mitigate unintended or undesirable consequences.
4. Collaborative Working goes beyond the concept of teamwork and demands organizational and technological solutions that will allow the diverse and distributed teams to work in harmony to achieve the common end-state. Open processes and systems are essential to facilitate CW, thus the design of HQs and Command Support must leverage collaborative tools and technologies. Co-operative, compatible and inventive solutions to capitalize on the collective intellectual power, experience and knowledge of the broader JIMP team will be essential to future FSO missions success in generating shared common intent. 124. EFFECTS BASED APPROACH TO OPERATIONS
1. Effects Based Approach to Operations is defined as A planning philosophy combined with specific processes that enable firstly, the integration and effectiveness of the military contribution within a comprehensive approach with other elements of power, and secondly, the realization of operational objectives.11 Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) is also described as the synergistic application of the full range of the nations capabilities at the tactical, operational and strategic levels and on the physical and psychological planes.12 An EBAO approach is still a maturing concept, one that requires refinement and is not yet fully embodied in doctrine. It is understood that: a. effects Based Approach to Operations complements the manoeuvrist approach and enables commands to more effectively operate on both the physical and psychological planes; the exercise of command-led operational art and the sensible use of mission command will be critical to the success of EBAO; and by synchronizing resources through collaboration across all elements of the JIMP framework, commanders can produce the right combination of effects, on the lines of operation to achieve the desired end state.
b. c.
11
Army Terminology Panel Army FEC, pp. 24 and 25
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2. With information acquisition becoming more bottom-up, an understanding and application of EBAO down to the lowest level is critical. Signals must enable the chain of command to apply EBAO and measure the success of EBAO within the land operations environment. SECTION 5 COMMAND SUPPORT13 125. GENERAL
1. Within the context of command, control is seen as a single yet vital element that is exercised through command support, which is defined as the integrated system of resources necessary to enable command. If Control is viewed as the means by which command is exercised, this definition encompasses the idea that all resources (human, intellectual and physical) involved in enabling the control of military operations by the commander, when integrated as a system, are considered Command Support. 2. The most significant recent development in the armys C2 capability has been the increased application of information technologies to military operations. In the past, the staff collected, processed, stored, displayed and disseminated battlefield information using a variety of manual or analog systems. The signal and administrative communities supported these activities through the use of combat net radio (CNR), teletype, manual dispatch services and central registry systems. Battlefield information held by various commanders was often inaccurate and untimely and the subsequent sharing of this information through analog systems often led to very different views of the battlefield within a given command. This lack of shared and common awareness of the battle space presented a significant impediment and risk to our conduct of military operations. 3. The introduction of networked sensors and information systems within the military and the digitization of battlefield information have blurred the clear dividing line between yesterdays staff and signal systems organizations. Communication and Information Systems networks now link human operators to essential battlefield information through the provision of advanced software applications. The human, intellectual and physical resources employed by the two domains are now becoming part of a single integrated system. 4. The capability generated through the subsequent integration of the staff and signal systems is now referred to as Command Support. The purpose of Command Support is to enable the commander to exercise effective control of assigned military forces and operations through the exploitation of battlefield information and CIS. 5. It is important to note that the information required by todays military commander has changed little over the years. The real change has occurred in our ability to effectively manage that information and present it to commanders in a form useful for decision-making. To fully exploit the technology now available to our forces, we must be prepared to rethink our existing command support system from the ground up.
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126. 1.
COMMAND SUPPORT COMPONENTS Command Support is made up of the following components: a. Chain of Command. The basis of the command framework, in peace, conflict and war, is the chain of commandthe structure by which command is exercised through a series of superior and subordinate commanders. For a chain of command to be effective, it must be flexible and accurately reflect the path of decision-making and authority within a military force. Two contributing factorsthe first human, the second technologyenhance a chain of commands effectiveness. Each link in the chain must be connected via communication and information systems and by standard operating procedures. Where these systems and procedures are not guaranteed or standardized, liaison is essential. The most important prerequisite of the chain of command is that each commander knows where he or she fits into the chain, from whom he or she receives orders and whom he or she commands. Normally, observance of a clear chain of command will be the most efficient case. The movement of information, however, must not be constrained exclusively along hierarchical lines. There will be times when the imperative of timely decision-making is best met by information reaching different levels of command simultaneously rather than sequentially. This model will become the norm as technology improves. Staff. This is explained in detail in B-GL-331-001/FP-001 Command Support in Land Operations and therefore will not be expanded upon in this manual. Headquarters Facilities. The types and functions of HQs are discussed in detail in B-GL-331-001/FP-001 Command Support in Land Operations and for this reason will not be expanded upon in this manual. The siting of HQs, layouts and deployments will be discussed in Signals in Land Operations Volume 2(LCSS Architecture and Organizations). Land Command Support System. The Land Command Support System (LCSS) is the interconnected network of digital CIS by which the data needed to plan, direct and control tactical land operations is communicated, stored, processed and displayed. The LCSS is divided into two sub-systems: (1) Tactical Communications. Tactical communications (TacComms) is the transparent integration of CIS in support of the LF in operations. Tactical communications enable commanders at all levels to have access to a fully integrated, secure communications system that gives them the ability to command and control LF through voice and/or data communications across the spectrum of conflict. Chapter 3 will further discuss in detail the LCSS sub-system. Tactical Communications Command and Control Information Systems. Tactical communications command and control information systems (TacC2IS) is comprised of a series of software and applications that are resident on TacComms and specifically provide automated decision support to Commanders at all levels to enable them to affect command and control of LF across the spectrum of conflict. Chapter 2 will further discuss in more details TacC2IS. B-GL-351-001/FP-001
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b. c.
d.
(2)
Figure 1-6: The Model Shows the Linkages Between IM and SM, and Responsibility Layers Between All-arms Command and Staff to Signals Command and Staff
127. 1.
COMMAND SUPPORT CAPABILITY Command Support capability is provided through two primary activities: a. Information Management. Information Management (IM) is the planning, coordination and control of the acquisition, analysis, processing, integration, distribution, use, safeguarding and disposal of information, and associated technology and supporting resources. Information Management ensures that the value of that information is identified and fully exploited. In a military context, IM includes five major processes: collecting, processing14, storing, displaying and disseminating relevant information. Information Management is covered in more detail in B-GL-331-001/FP-001 Command Support in Land Operations and therefore will not be expanded upon in this manual. Systems Management. Systems Management (SM) combines the policies, procedures, tools, personnel and structures that ensure a consistent and robust land force CIS environment is provided to all users. SM and control of CIS is achieved through several levels and layers of control. The primary functional components of SM are known as the following:
b.
14 In the purest sense, tactical information will answer who, what, when and where type questions. This information must still be exploited by human beings, perhaps assisted by technology, to answer why and how type questions. While type of information processing would more properly be classified as Knowledge management, this manual will assume information processing to include all of these questions.
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(1)
System Executive and Planning (SEP). The SEP functions occur at the highest level of the formation. The SEP function includes planning, issuing orders and instructions, and monitoring the execution of the plan. The functions will depend on the nature and size of the deployment. Operational System Control (OSC). This is the next echelon of system management and exists in all HQ above unit level and at formation resources. The OSC responsibilities include performing technical supervision of the system and issuing detailed directives to subordinate system management facilities, in accordance with SEP orders and instructions, concerning, move timings, times for opening and closing links and nets, communication resources, Communication security (COMSEC). Facility Control (FC). The FC is the control level, which is responsible for the technical control of all CIS equipment and implementation of respective OSC directives and orders at each communication facility. The FC is responsible for the details real-time technical control of the system equipment. Detachment Members. Signals Operator (Sig Op) detachment members deal with local hardware and software problems within their local area network (LAN). They provide technical feedback to their FCs.
(2)
(3)
(4)
Figure 1-7: Primary Functional Components of SM in Their Relation to Signals Functions and Tasks Within Command Support
2.
System Management in network operations includes some of the following key tasks: B-GL-351-001/FP-001
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a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. k. l. m. n. o. 128.
planning (participate in the operational planning process, conduct signals estimate, prepare the signals plan); directing (issue the signals plan) initialization of network segments, crypto-logic segments, cross domain interfaces (automated and procedural); monitor and control the network; operating a Help Desk; maintaining status of equipment and facilities; fault finding and system restoration; installing and upgrading software and hardware; conducting performance management and optimization; conducting configuration management; supporting transfer of control between HQ elements; operating international IS gateways; managing connectivity with all HQ IS; managing information systems security; and employing HQ IS to perform system management tasks.
SYSTEM INTEROPERABILITY
1. Global connectivity is essential for linking strategic, operational, and tactical aspects of command and control and the ability to project forces worldwide. CIS support operations globally with space-based and terrain-based systems. CIS must be configured to provide the required information support with a minimum of physical repositioning, whether in a strategic deployment phase or moving for a tactical attack. Both military and commercial CIS play important roles in todays Land Force operations. 2. The Army uses information technologies on the battlefield to provide an integrated Command and Control structure. The Army has migrated to a tiered common user core with associated specialist applications, which will function in a seamlessly fashion in garrison and in the field. This common user core concept uses Commercial Communication Services, Multinational Military Satellite Communications and the LCSS as an information bearer. This common user core is supplemented as required by specialist applications to deal with specific information requirements or processing. The integration of modern CIS with our tactical units will continue to enhance their connectivity, decision-making, and, ultimately, lethality, survivability, and the ability to control the tempo of operations.15
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3. Much of the Land Force information traffic flows over commercial systems. This is quite true domestically and like most nations the Land Force relies on elements of an information environment it does not control (see Figure 1-8). Some examples of non-military networks are: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN); postal and telegraph systems; wireless networks; computer networks; commercial communication satellites; the Internet; and public-accessed databases and bulletin boards.
Figure 1-8: A Representative Structure Combining Military/Commercial and Allied Military Systems
4. While the availability of non-military IS can often offer commanders an alternative means to satisfy requirements there is a need to carefully assess the security risks of this option. Using non-military IS may also reduce the requirement for deployed military IS, and allow planners to compensate for shortages and or meet surge requirements in this area. Additionally, by using non-military IS, there may be savings in support and maintenance. Signals have a responsibility
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for standardisation of non-military equipment and software used throughout the area of operation (AO). Planners who deploy modular IS will need to ensure that these systems ideally are open, non-proprietary, and have commonly accepted standards and protocols in order to simplify the interface requirements. 129. SECURITY
1. The increasing dependence on CIS has created both increased capability but also increased vulnerability. Computer systems and networks are vulnerable to attack at any time. The Rand Corporation of the United States has stated that the anonymity of cyberspace has blurred the distinction between crime and warfare and between accident and attack. A wide range of methods and techniques can accomplish gaining access to someones computer or communications network. Cyber attacks provide the opportunity for individuals or small groups to wreak havoc on networked services and information that may have impact on a local, regional, and global scale. These intrusions may be initiated at any time or any point in operation. Accordingly, security measures and procedures must actively, as well as passively preserve the confidentiality, integrity, and functionality of our networks.16 2. Communication systems such as microwave and satellite links between sites are vulnerable as well to monitoring and tapping. A microwave system may emit a signal the diameter of a nickel. That same signal will have a diameter of one mile when it reaches a receiving dish approximately 20 miles away. Anyone with the right equipment can monitor the signal if they are within the beam path. A communication satellite has a footprint that is as big as North America. Once again, the signal is easy to monitor, and Signals must take all necessary steps to preserve the integrity and functionality of the network by implementing good security policies, installing cryptographic equipment and building a robust and redundant network.
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CHAPTER 2 THE TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL INFORMATION SYSTEM SECTION 1 GENERAL 201. INTRODUCTION
1. This chapter presents the principles and general characteristics of a tactical command and control information system (TacC2IS) for the Canadian Land Forces in the early twenty-first century. These principles and characteristics are not specific to any particular equipment or system, but rather provide the conceptual foundations upon which such equipment and systems are to be designed, constructed, operated, managed and employed. While this chapter lays out the general requirements for information storage, retrieval, processing and display at various Land Force (LF) organizational levels, it does not prescribe the technical implementation of a TacC2IS by which to achieve them. Operations and engineering staffs must continually work together to define and develop specifications for hardware and software that make maximum use of evolving technologies to improve the physical implementation of the LF TacC2IS. 202. BACKGROUND
1. Command and control (C2) has always been a vital aspect of military operations, but only recently has it used such an extensive amount of sophisticated technology. The increasing range, speed and accuracy of modern weapons systems are continually shortening the time available for the tactical decision-action cycle, while at the same time, improvements in intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance capabilities are producing more and more information over greatly increased distances. Consequently, the real size of the tactical battlespace is continually increasing. Advancements in technology are also enhancing the mobility and the night-fighting capabilities of the worlds military forces, resulting in an increased tempo of tactical operations. 2. Apart from the changes in the conduct of traditional tactical operations against opposing military forces brought about by improvements in warfighting technology, the complex nature of contemporary conflict sees Canadian Land Forces increasingly engaged in protracted battles against forces employing asymmetric capabilities and tactics. Defeating such forces requires the identification and tracking of trends in the behaviour of many groups and individuals operating across a large geographic area, the timely dissemination of actionable intelligence to the lowest echelons of our own forces, the rapid recognition and evaluation of innovations or changes in the adversarys capabilities or tactics and the constant sharing of information throughout the force and with the forces joint, interagency, multinational and public partners (JIMP) in order to maintain the accurate shared situational awareness necessary to ensure unity of purpose and co-ordination of action. Consequently, command and control of land tactical forces in contemporary operations depends to an unprecedented degree on communications and the ability to process information fast enough for decisions to be relevant. 3. The ongoing improvements in military warfighting technology, the considerable increase in the tempo of tactical operations, the expanding volume of information available at all headquarters (HQ) throughout the force and the complex nature of contemporary conflict demand the use of a computer-based system to aid in the management, processing and display
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of C2 information. The TacC2IS is the component of the overall command support capability responsible to provide computer-based information handling support to LF tactical commanders and their staffs. As such, it constitutes the land operations extension of the CF integrated command and control information system (C2IS). 203. ROLE OF THE TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL INFORMATION SYSTEM
1. The purpose of the TacC2IS is to support the information storage, retrieval, processing and display requirements of LF commanders in the field. It supports tactical commanders at all echelons and for all arms and services. In order to ensure that command support processes remain focused on the commanders, and not their staffs, any special requirements of the staff are subordinate to the direct needs of the commanders themselves. This does not mean that the TacC2IS ties commanders to their HQ, only that TacC2IS resources are assigned to ensure that the information requirements of commanders are met first, whether directly or through their HQ staff. 2. The TacC2IS is built solely for the purpose of assisting in the tactical command and control of land forces in operations. It is not designed to be used for the general administration of resources such as maintaining the personnel records on each soldier. Those activities are supported by CF enterprise information systems with connections to the TacC2IS as necessary. At the other extreme, the TacC2IS is not intended to directly control the actions of specific resources on the battlefield. For example, it will not be used to calculate the charge and elevation for a gun and will not be used to tell a gun when to fire. These platform level C2 activities are supported by the single combat function information systems developed and used by each arm and service, and/or by on-board fire control systems embedded within the weapons platforms themselves. 3. The tasks performed in a given tactical HQ or command post (CP) may be considered to be divided between common C2 tasks and specialized single combat function tasks. TacC2IS provides the so-called Common User Core (CUC) of computer-based information storage, retrieval, processing and display capabilities required for effective, efficient command and control of land operations. This includes such things as office automation tools, messaging capabilities, common database management facilities, electronic maps and other common geospatial information. While the single combat function tasks performed within a specific command post are, by definition, not common C2 tasks, some of them are so closely related to C2 activities that including support for them in the TacC2IS is easily accomplished and, furthermore, not including them in the TacC2IS reduces the overall effectiveness of the command post. This loss in effectiveness is due to the need for personnel working in the command post to frequently switch contexts between C2 tasks performed on TacC2IS workstations and single combat function tasks performed manually or on different workstations. In other words, where it makes sense to do so, certain single combat function information storage, retrieval, processing and display requirements may be implemented directly in the TacC2IS. Regardless, all single combat function information systems must interoperate with the TacC2IS in such a manner as to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of the overall command and control of tactical land operations.
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The Tactical Command and Control Information System
204. EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA FOR A TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL INFORMATION SYSTEM 1. The effectiveness of any C2IS, whether computer-based or manual, depends primarily upon the quality of the information it makes available to commanders at all levels. The quality of command and control information is determined by five criteria: a. Timeliness. Information is timely if it is available to a commander in time to influence his or her decision. As information becomes older its value generally decreases; however, timeliness is measured relative to the decision at hand. Lower-level tactical decisions must have more current and timely information, and as we move up the ladder to higher-level tactical and operational decisions the information can be somewhat older. Accuracy. Information is accurate if it is free of error. The amount of error that can be tolerated is related to other factors, especially timeliness and the consequences of the decision to be made. If a commander must make a decision quickly, a greater degree of error can be tolerated than if he or she has considerable time and resources available to reduce the data error. Relevance. Information is relevant if it has significant bearing on the matter at hand and, more specifically, the decision(s) to be made. In other words, any information that can improve a commanders decision is relevant. Verifiability. Information is verifiable if its accuracy can be confirmed. Information can be verified through comparison with other information that is known to be accurate. Quite often, though, verification is achieved by tracing information to its original source. The term audit trail is often used to describe the means by which summarized information can be traced back to its original source. Without this trail it is usually impossible to determine the accuracy of information, therefore bringing into question the usefulness of such information. Usability. Information is usable if a commander can grasp its significance to his or her situation and, accordingly, use the information to improve the quality of his or her decision making.
b.
c.
d.
e.
The TacC2IS must provide commanders at all levels timely access to accurate, relevant, verifiable information in forms that make that information directly usable as an aid to command decision making. 2. In addition to providing commanders at all levels with high quality information in support of command decision making, an effective LF TacC2IS must exhibit the following general system characteristics: a. Flexibility: the adaptability of the TacC2IS to changing user requirements, and its versatility for use in any operational scenario. This includes the ease with which the in-service system can be expanded and reconfigured to satisfy evolving user requirements and/or to fulfill changing operational roles. Maintainability: the ease with which the TacC2IS can be operationally maintained in order to minimize downtime. This includes the ease with which logistic support and field upgrades can be provided for the in-service system under operational conditions.
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b.
c.
Mobility: the ease with which the TacC2IS can move around on the battlefield in response to changing operational needs and priorities. This includes such considerations as software portability and the packaging and transportability of installations and major system components. Reliability: the ability of the TacC2IS to operate consistently for sustained periods of time. This includes the provision of appropriate redundancy in the system as well as its ability to enable graceful reversion to manual methods in the event of technology failure. Survivability: the ability of the TacC2IS to continue to exist as a useful system connecting various HQ and CPs in the harsh and hostile environment of the battlefield. This includes appropriate protection against enemy interference and/or direct physical action, reduction in the targetability of installations and major system components, as well as provisions for change of location of command and succession of command.
d.
e.
The TacC2IS must be sufficiently flexible, maintainable, mobile, reliable and survivable to enable continuous, effective command of full spectrum land operations conducted within the prevailing operational environment anywhere in the world. 3. Two final, but vitally important, characteristics essential to the effectiveness of the LF TacC2IS are the protection of command integrity and the safeguarding of command authority: a. Command Integrity. In order to protect the philosophy of mission command, the TacC2IS must not encourage or necessitate the encroachment upon a given commanders authority by a senior commander through the provision of imbalanced or inappropriate access to information and tools across the established echelons of command. In other words, higher level commanders must not have higher quality information regarding the situation on the ground than those lower level commanders directly responsible for carrying out the actions intended to influence that situation. To do so leads inevitably to socalled micro-management and the gradual centralization of planning and decision making at the higher levels of command. This, in turn, reduces the flexibility, freedom of action and responsiveness of the lower echelon forces. The TacC2IS must support, not stymie, the effective exercise of mission command. Command Authority. The computer-based automation of specific procedures within the C2 process must not abrogate a commanders authority. While command is defined as the authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces, it is understood that to exercise this authority effectively a commander must be a leader. Leadership is, in part, a personal quality. It may be learned, but it is not learned in the same way one learns to prepare a defensive position or a movement order. Therefore, it cannot be programmed into a computer. Furthermore, leadership is best expressed through face-to-face contact. An individual may be appointed leader but will have a great deal of difficulty influencing people to help manifest his or her will if subordinates never meet their leader or if the leader does not express his or her will by making decisions. For example, one can easily
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imagine what would happen to the authority of a commander if a TacC2IS were fielded that was capable of stating the aim of an operation, of developing and analysing a set of options, and of selecting the best one. Even though orders would be issued under the commanders authority, subordinates would know that those orders were not really expressions of the commanders will, but rather that of some nameless and faceless system designer who had, at best, an idealized and abstract understanding of military operations. A commander would no longer be the person whose experience, skill and determination could be relied upon to defeat the enemy. However, if this scenario were changed slightly to leave the aim of the operation with a commander, to have the TacC2IS assist in the development and analysis of options and to continue to have a commander decide which is the best option, then when subordinates receive orders there would be no doubt that they have come from their commander and are an expression of his or her will. The commander has merely used the TacC2IS to help prepare those orders. The TacC2IS must facilitate, not hinder, a commanders ability to express his will and exercise his leadership influence over those he commands. The TacC2IS must not intrude upon, and should wherever possible enhance, command integrity and command authority, thereby reinforcing and facilitating the Canadian Land Force philosophy of mission command. SECTION 2 ELECTRONIC COMPUTERS AS AIDS TO INFORMATION PROCESSING 205. GENERAL
1. The term data processing has traditionally been defined as the capture, storage, and processing of data necessary to turn it into information upon which management and control decisions can be based. There is an important difference between data and information. Data are collected facts, which generally are not useful for decision making without further processing. Information, on the other hand, is directly useful in decision making. Information is based on processed data and is, therefore, the output of a data processing system. In practice, however, the distinction between data and information is often difficult to make. One individuals data may be anothers information. For example, the ammunition held by individual soldiers is certainly information to a frontline non-commissioned officer. However, when the decision maker is the commander of a brigade, the ammunition holdings of individual soldiers are simply data that must be further processed and summarized to be of use in his or her decision making. Because electronic digital computers are being used increasingly at all levels of decision making, the term information processing is used rather than data processing. 2. Each of the individual steps of information processing done by a computer can also be done by the human mind. What makes the electronic digital computer so powerful is the speed (orders of magnitude faster than human thought) and accuracy with which simple calculations and/or logic operations can be processed. This makes it possible for the computer to perform computational tasks that would otherwise be impossible because of time limitations. This, in turn, allows the creation of information that would have been impossible to obtain with manual systems simply because the amount of calculation necessary to produce the information would have been prohibitive. Consequently, the use of electronic digital computers has substantially increased the quantity of information available to decision makers in business, government and
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military organizations. However, the vast quantities of information made available by computers are not always helpful to decision makers. So much information is now available that decision makers sometimes have difficulty sorting it out in order to identify and use what is truly relevant. Luckily, the processing power of the electronic digital computer, if properly applied, can aid this as well. 3. Computers do not actually perform tasks. To say that they do is to anthropomorphize the computer, leaving the impression that electronic digital computers possess some sort of intelligence. They do not. Computers behave as directed by human intelligence; they can only carry out computations in accordance with the instructions programmed into them. Thus, the computer is not a tool that thinks for us; it is one that extends human intelligence by combining into a single machine the computing capability of a digital electronic calculator and the information storage capability of printed or written records. Computers can assist people in their performance of information processing tasks in one of the following three ways: mechanization of procedures, enhancement of procedures and automation of procedures: a. Mechanization: the replacement of a manual procedure by one that is done by a machine under the control of a person performing the task. The use of a hand calculator as an aid to solving mathematical equations is a simple example of the mechanization of certain information processing procedures. Computerbased word processing programs also mechanize a number of information processing procedures. If, for example, a person were employing a word processing package to prepare a letter, when he or she finished typing it he or she would instruct the machine to file the results. Because the user is still in control of the execution of the task and must issue the instruction for any computerized action to occur, this is an example of mechanization of an information processing procedure. Enhancement: the introduction of new capabilities that were not possible in previous technologies. These computerized capabilities are still under the control of a person performing the information processing task. For example, most computer-based word processing packages have a command that allows the user to undo the previous command he or she gave to the computer. Since this ability was not possible in previous document preparation technologies, it is an enhancement derived from the adoption of electronic digital computers as aids to information processing. Automation: the execution of a programmed procedure by the machine without any intervention by a person being required. For instance, when the user of a computer-based word processing package inserts text into a document, the word processor can automatically repaginate the text, renumber the pages and update the Table of Contents. Since no instructions from the user are required to initiate the execution of these computerized actions, this is an example of automation of an information processing procedure.
b.
c.
206.
ELEMENTS OF COMPUTERIZED INFORMATION PROCESSING
1. The electronic digital computers capabilities as an aid to information processing can be described in terms of four basic elements: input, database, models and output.
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a.
Input. To be of any use as an aid to information processing, there must be some way for users to provide the electronic computer with information for processing, as well as some way to tell the computer what is to be done with that information. Input, therefore, encompasses all the information and user instructions that enter the computer while it is operating. Input schemes must allow the user maximum flexibility to interact with the computer and the information within it, through a combination of questions and answers, commands, menus, dialogue boxes and the like, using natural languages (both written and spoken), touch panels, joysticks and so on. Database. The database is where user information of enduring value is stored as persistent data. Apart from organizing and storing user information as data for later use, the computers database provides the means to search for, associate and retrieve that data such that it meets the specific information needs of its various users. In fact, electronic digital computers have transformed the storage and retrieval of information. A computer is able to store extremely large quantities of data. While this is also true of a library filled with books, the essential difference is that, because of its powerful data processing capabilities, the computer can access specific information very quickly. The computer-based search for and retrieval of previously stored information represents a quantum leap over traditional methods of searching information stored on paper. In fact, the computers ability to locate and link information has allowed entirely new forms of information processing and organization to emerge such as the electronic spreadsheet, the relational database and word processing (as distinct from mere typing or even traditional typesetting). Because information that has been stored in a digital electronic database can be retrieved, manipulated and updated directly by a computer executing programmed instructions, a wide range of information handling procedures can be completely automated by the use of electronic digital computers as aids to information processing. Models. These are the procedural, logical and mathematical representations used to guide the processing of information. The models are coupled to the database so that they can store and retrieve information as needed. For instance, a procedural model might take an input and update the appropriate file(s) in the database. A logical model might combine certain data elements within the database to provide an appropriate response to a users query for information. A mathematical model might express an arithmetic relationship between individual pieces of information (i.e., variables) to provide the result of a user-directed calculation. Models are encoded and stored in computers as application programs. Users employ models by providing the appropriate inputs while a computer is executing the programme containing the desired models. One of the great strengths of the electronic digital computer is that it allows the integration of a number of information processing tools whenever the output from one software package (i.e., set of models) can be provided as input into another software package for further processing. This ability to move information directly from one set of models to another allows people who use electronic digital computers to process information more efficiently than would otherwise be possible. Moreover, the proper combination of procedural, logical and mathematical models within one or more application programs can result in the complete automation of a variety of relatively complex information processing tasks.
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b.
c.
d.
Output. Sooner or later, to be of use in a management and control system, at least some of the processed information generated by an electronic digital computer has to flow through a human brain for use in managerial decision making. Thus, output is the ultimate product of the electronic digital computer employed as an aid to information processingit is the processed information as it is presented to users. To a large extent, output is the element that must guide and influence the other three elements. If the output does not meet the users actual need for accurate, timely, relevant and usable information, then the input, database and models are of little consequence. Quality of output depends upon the quality of both the input and models used in its analysis. Output schemes must allow the user maximum flexibility to have processed information displayed in the forms best suited to assist human understanding and the use of that information in decision making.
207.
COMPUTER-BASED COMMUNICATIONS
1. In addition to the storage, retrieval, processing and display of information, computers have also transformed the way people communicate. The electronic digital computer has five basic forms of output by which it can facilitate the dissemination of information. First, it can use of a variety of printers to produce traditional print format outputs that can be distributed in the same way as any other printed material. Second, it can portray information to more than one person at a time in a variety of video display formats using large display screens or projectors. Third, a computer can drive loudspeakers in order to present information in the form of sound. Fourth, a computer can store data files electronically on a portable medium that can be transported to another computer, which can then access the information for local storage, processing, display or printing. Fifth, an electronic digital computer can encode information as electrical/electromagnetic signals that can be transmitted over a telecommunications system to another computer, where the information can be locally stored, processed, displayed or printed. 2. The speed of electrical/electromagnetic communications allows information to be conveyed to a computer halfway around the world (almost) as quickly as to a computer in the next room. The integration of electrical/electromagnetic communications capabilities into an electronic digital computer can be beneficial in two ways: the computer can add power to the communications or the communications can add power to the computer. Often, these two benefits co-exist in the same setting. In the first instance, suitably equipped computers can replace various telecommunication devices, and do their jobs much better. An appropriately programmed computer can play the role of a teletypewriter, a data terminal, an answering machine, a television, a telephone or even a combination of such devices. The general purpose computers versatility as a communications device does not derive from processing power alonealmost any standard telecommunication device can have a microprocessor added to it at little cost, but this usually only helps the device do what it already does a bit faster and/or more accurately. It is the computers balance of programmability, disk-storage capacity and user interface, coupled with the availability of specialized plug-in hardware that makes it such a capable and versatile instrument for communication. Combining electronic mail with a chat program and a web camera on a computer connected to the Internet is an increasingly common
The functions, capabilities and characteristics of telecommunications systems are presented in Chapter 2 of this manual.
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example of the versatility of the electronic digital computer as a communications device. It allows the user to communicate with people around the world in a variety of ways through a single terminal device. 3. Apart from allowing the use of computers as highly effective replacements for traditional communications devices, the availability of computer-to-computer communications systems also facilitates the storage, retrieval, processing and display of information by making the data, software and hardware that reside on many different computers available to a single user. The use of microcomputers, sometimes called personal computers (PCs) or workstations, as desktop aids to information processing puts the power of the electronic digital computer as an aid to information processing directly into the hands of the people who process an organizations information. This allows individuals to select, configure and execute computer programs at times and in ways, that are most useful to them in the performance of their jobs. They are able to interact directly with the computer to provide input, apply models and create output that meets their specific requirements for accurate, timely, relevant and usable information. The proliferation of computer programs designed to provide microcomputer users with electronic office tools such as word processors, electronic spread sheets and even database management systems has helped to establish the microcomputer as the principal aid to the individuals engaged in information processing in many businesses and government organizations. 4. On the other hand, for all its information processing power, the desktop computing environment is fraught with hazards to the most important element of managerial effectiveness: communication among members of the organization. If left unregulated, the diversity of hardware, software and data file formats available to microcomputer users can reduce an organizations electronic information processing capability to a Tower of Babel, wherein every individual can employ his or her computer to store, retrieve, process and display information quickly and accurately, but nobody can use anyone elses electronic outputs as input to his or her own computer. Under such conditions, users resort to obtaining printed copies of the information produced by other people that they must then manually re-enter into their own computer for electronic storage, processing or display. Even in situations where microcomputer hardware, software and data file configurations are well-regulated so that data files copied onto portable media such as diskettes, CD-ROMs, DVDs and flash drives can be readily retrieved and used by any other computer user in the organization, this method of transferring information between computers may be too slow to be of real use for organizational information processing, especially in organizations with geographically dispersed elements. Additionally, it is often very difficult to know for sure that the copy of the information received on a portable medium is the most current version of the informationthe other person might have updated the information on his or her computer after the copy on the portable medium was made. The obvious solution to these problems is to link the desktop computers together and create a shared central repository of information. This creates a networked computing environment in which the data, software and hardware resident on each of the computers connected to the network can be made available to any user on the network. 5. The principal benefits of a networked computing environment as an aid to information processing are: a. Access to Reliable and Up-to-date Information. A well-managed, centralized data storage system allows multiple users, perhaps at different locations, to store and retrieve data from the same repository and to limit access to data while it is being processed or manipulated. This ensures that all users have
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timely access to information that is accurate (i.e., up-to-date), consistent and verifiable. b. Speedy Sharing of Data Between Computers. Transferring data files between computers across a network is almost always faster than other nonnetwork means of sharing data files. More Efficient Communication Within Work Groups. Electronic mail is a staple of most networked computer environments, as are scheduling systems, project monitoring software, online conferencing and groupware. All of these applications help work teams be more productive by facilitating communication. More Efficient Management of Computer Resources. For example, multiple users can share a single top-quality printer, rather than putting duplicate, possibly lesser quality, printers on every desktop. Network software licenses can also be less costly than separate, stand-alone licenses for the same number of users.
c.
d.
208.
NETWORKED COMPUTING ENVIRONMENTS
1. A local area network (LAN) is simply two or more electronic digital computers connected to each other in a single location, usually within a single building or facility. Some peripheral electronic devices such as printers, plotters, scanners, projectors and the like can also be connected directly to a LAN so that they can be used by anyone on the network. Individual LANs at different locations can be interconnected by so-called wide area networks (WAN) that make use of telecommunication systems to convey information between computers on geographically separated LANs. There are three roles for computers in a network: a. b. c. Clients: computers that use but do not provide network resources. Peers: computers that both use and provide network resources. Servers: computers that provide network services.
2. The type of operating system a computer uses determines which role it plays. Servers run network operating systems. Clients run client operating systems. Peers run peer network operating systems. However, since many commercially available operating systems support more than one of these roles, the manner in which a computer is actually used on the network is often what determines its role. Based on the roles of the computers attached to them, networks are divided into three types: a. Client-Server (also called Server-based) Networks: are defined by the presence of dedicated servers on the network that provide security and resources to the network. Client-server networks divide information processing tasks between clients, which request services such as file storage or web page access, and servers, which provide the services. There are many types of servers, including file servers (often called shared drives), print servers, application servers (including database management systems [DBMS]), e-mail servers and web servers, among others. Server computers are typically more powerful than client computers, and are often optimised to function as servers. Client-server networks require users to login to the network before access to servers is provided. A user can work on a client as a stand-alone computer without logging in to the network, but without login authorization from the
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networks centralized security controller, no network services (i.e., servers) will be accessible from that client. Once a user provides the correct password to login to the network, that user may access any resource for which he or she has appropriate permissions. b. Peer-to-Peer (also called Peer) Networks: are defined by a lack of central control over the network. There are no servers in peer networks; users simply share disk space and resources, such as printers and scanners, as they see fit. However, peers are not optimised to share resources. Generally, when a number of users are accessing resources on a peer, the user of that peer will notice significantly degraded performance. Peer networks are organized into workgroups over which there is very little security control. There is no central login process; as soon as a user logs into one peer on the network, all resources on the network, except those protected by a specific password, become available to that user. This means that a computer user either has unrestricted access to network resources or must know the individual password for each controlled resource. Any user who knows the password for a resource can access that resource; the owner of the resource cannot specify which users on the network can access that resource. Hybrid Networks: are defined by the presence of all three types of computers operating simultaneously. This means that while most shared resources are located on servers, network users still have access to any resource being shared by peers in their workgroups. Users can work on a client and access peer resources without logging in to the network, but in order to access server resources, that user must login to the network through the centralized security controller.
c.
3. The Internet is the largest and most familiar WAN in the world; however, a great number of businesses, governments and private organizations operate private WANs, called intranets, to interconnect their internal computer users at different geographic locations. The Internet has had a profound effect on the storage and retrieval of information. It effectively pools all of the information that is stored on all of the servers linked to the Internet to create the largest collection of data and information ever assembled in human historyall accessible to anyone with an electronic digital computer connected to the Internet. Intranets allow the pooling of information within an organization so that information whose distribution must be restricted to those within the organization can be shared internally among all users connected to the intranet. SECTION 3 COMPUTER-BASED INFORMATION SYSTEMS 209. GENERAL
1. A computer-based information system is any computer-based system the primary purpose of which is information processing in support of decision making. Computer-based information systems can be broken into six parts: inputs, processes, data files, outputs, people and hardware. Processes transform inputs (data or information) into outputs (information useful for the decisions at hand). Data files store information for use within these processes. The processes within a computer-based information system can be subdivided into procedures, which are performed by the people within the system, and computer programs, which are
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executed by the computer hardware within the system. In other words, in a computer-based information system, the actual processes by which data and information are transformed into outputs for use by decision makers are a prudent combination of procedures, carried out by people, and programs, executed by electronic digital computers. 2. Generally speaking, the more complex and unstructured the decisions to be supported are, the more intertwined and interactive the human procedures and the computer programs must become. The goal within any computer-based information system is to design information processes so as to maximize the use of computer programs to mechanize, enhance and even automate the procedures associated with storing, retrieving, processing, displaying and communicating information, while still retaining the necessary degree of human insight, intuition and judgement throughout each process to ensure that decisions made with the help of the system are appropriate and effective. This implies that the application programs within a computer-based information system cannot be developed in isolation from the human procedures with which they must interact in order to provide the required quality of output to the decision makers. Conversely, the human procedures within a computer-based information system cannot be developed in isolation from the application programs intended to mechanize, enhance and even automate many of those procedures in order to improve the quality of output available to the decision makers. The design and implementation of the human procedures and the computer programs within any computer-based information system must result in processes that reflect the truly symbiotic relationship between people and computers in all such systems. 3. Beyond that, the ways in which these information handling processes are defined, shaped and interwoven with inputs, data files, outputs, people and hardware to form the overall computer-based information system by which decision makers are supported will be determined largely by the nature of the decisions to be made and the characteristics of the decision making environment. In other words, the true power of the computers used in such systems cannot be measured by the speed of their processors and the size of their memories; rather, it must be assessed by the degree to which they allow human thought, creativity and intuition to interact with the computational capabilities of electronic digital computers to create powerful new ways of formulating, understanding, analysing and, ultimately, solving the complex problems faced by decision makers at all levels of the organization. Thus, the value of the computers within an organization is determined by the ease with which users can understand, configure, manipulate and communicate with those computers in order to have the computers mechanize, enhance or automate procedures in ways that allow the users to achieve their information processing goals with effectiveness, productivity, safety and satisfaction under the intended operational conditions. Computer-based information systems are extensions of, not replacements for, human cognitive processes. 4. The need to support different types of decisions made under different operational conditions has led to the emergence of a number of more or less standard classes of computerbased information systems. Commonly encountered classes include business information systems, real-time (information processing) systems and modelling and simulation systems. These classes represent broad collections of systems unified by some dominant purpose, feature or characteristic. Within each class, there are a number of categories into which specific systems can be placed. Classifying and categorizing computer-based information systems is a
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slippery undertaking; the classes and categories tend to blend, separate and change over time in response to changes in technology, changes in the computing environment and changes in the tasks to which electronic digital computers are applied. However, despite the shortcomings of computer-based system classification schemes, they still do have a practical use. Even though the boundaries and definitions shift, often resulting in overlaps and inconsistencies, each system class and category emphasises certain features that may be relevant in any particular situation. Therefore, the most practical use of computer-based system classifications is in identifying a number of widely usable features that are typically associated with particular system types. 5. Army tactical C2 information systems form a distinct class of computer-based information systems that is unlike any other class of computer-based system presently found in the world. While they share individual functions and characteristics with a number of traditional types of computer-based systems, the total requirement creates a unique type of system that is neither simply a new category within an existing class nor a mere aggregation of categories of systems drawn from different existing classes. The best way to describe army TacC2IS as a class of system is first to describe some of the system categories found within the traditional classes of computer-based information systems, and then to synthesize the relevant functions and characteristics from each category into a coherent portrayal of an army TacC2IS. 210. BUSINESS INFORMATION SYSTEMS
1. The most obvious class of computer-based information systems with which to begin any consideration of army TacC2IS is business information systems. These give managers at all levels of a business or government organization the ability to collect, analyse and summarize the diverse types of information they need to perform effectively. Throughout business and government, management uses information for two purposes: planning and control. Planning occurs prior to the execution of any organizational activity. Objectives are established in the planning process. Planning depends to a large degree on predictive and external information. Historical information is useful in planning only in that it helps management predict the future. Control is the process of comparing actual results with the plans identified in the planning process. Feedback information about the performance of the business or governance system is used by management for control. When deviations from the plan are detected, management attempts to get the business or governance system back in control by making changes to the inputs. Thus, a large percentage of the information produced and used within businesses and government is feedback. Business information systems monitor the business or government operation being controlled, compare the operations outputs to plans, and provide the feedback information necessary for management control. The use of computer-based information systems to support management planning and control within both business and government has always been directed at making operations more effective and efficient; however, since the mid1980s the emphasis within the business community has shifted toward using those same systems to gain competitive advantage in the marketplace. 2. The computer-based information systems used in business and government have traditionally been more successful in providing information for control decisions than for planning decisions. In other words, their success has tended to decrease the higher the level of decision making. However, advances in a wide-range of electronic digital computer technologies have made the use of computer-based information systems increasingly applicable to planning, as well as to decision making at the higher levels of organizational control. Consequently, over the years, a hierarchy of system categories has emerged within the business information system domain to account for the stratification of information processing
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activities generally performed within business and government organizations to transform mere data about an organizations interactions with its environment into the sort of information needed by decision makers at various levels of management and control within the organization. The standard model consists of a hierarchy of four categories of computer-based business information systems, supported by a fifth category that spans all four levels. 3. At the base of the business information system hierarchy are the transaction processing systems (TPS), which give workers and their first-line supervisors ready access to information that ensures the effective conduct of the organizations minute-to-minute activities. These systems also populate the database(s) used by the systems at the other levels of the hierarchy. The second level of the business information system hierarchy consists of the management information systems (MIS) that help lower and middle-level managers implement the organizations policies and plans by providing information that helps maintain and, whenever possible, increase employee performance, product quality and customer service. The third level of the business information system hierarchy comprises the various decision support systems (DSS) that are used to analyse alternatives and answer what-if questions in order to inform management decisions regarding future actions. Finally, at the pinnacle of the business information system hierarchy, are the executive information systems (EIS) that support top-level managers in formulating strategy and policies. All four levels of the hierarchy are supported by office automation systems (OAS) that provide computerized support to routine office work in the form of word processing, presentation packages, electronic spread sheets, electronic calendars and so on. 211. BUSINESS INFORMATION DATABASES
1. The shared database is the key building block in the design and implementation of any business information system. The shared database is the prime integrating force that provides coherence to the overall information system. If a good fit is not achieved between the processing and decision-making needs of the organization and the database, in terms of the accuracy, timeliness, relevance, verifiability and usability of the information supplied, the design and implementation efforts expended on the other elements of the system will have been in vain. A database consists of data elements organized into records and files in a way intended to most efficiently meet users information requirements. The data stored in an organizations database provide meaningful representations of the real-world entities that influence and are influenced by the decisions made within the organization. For example, sales clerks may often need to know how many pieces of angle iron are in stock in order to fulfill a customers desire to purchase some angle iron. It would be impractical to have to go to the warehouse and count the number of items every time to know the quantity on hand. Instead, a clerk accesses the data within the information system that represents the actual angle iron inventory. Clearly, to be of use to a sales clerk, the data retrieved from the database must be accurate and up to date, reflecting the precise quantities of angle iron presently stored in the warehouse. It must also be displayed to a sales clerk, in a usable form, in less time than it would take the clerk to go to the warehouse and count the angle iron. 2. The warehouse manager, on the other hand, probably does not care about the minuteto-minute tally of angle iron on hand; however, he or she probably does want to know when the amount of angle iron in the warehouse reaches a certain level, so that more can be ordered before the warehouse runs out of stock. The same database that was used to tell the sales clerks precisely how many of each type of angle iron was on hand can inform the warehouse manager when a certain threshold level of angle iron is reached, triggering a decision to order more angle iron. At still higher levels within the organization, an executive might wish to know whether angle iron will continue to be a profitable item to stock in the coming year. The
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database can provide historical data to support the analysis of sales trends, the impact of certain market factors on profits from angle iron and so on in order to inform the executive of the likely outcomes of various plausible alternative situations. In this way, a well-designed database integrates all of the information that is important to the organization so that it can be efficiently and effectively stored, retrieved, processed, displayed and communicated as needed by decision makers at all levels. 212. TRANSACTION PROCESSING SYSTEMS
1. A transaction processing system (TPS) is a computer-based information system that coordinates and assists with the storage, retrieval, processing and display of information derived directly from individual business transactions. A transaction is a unit of business activity, a fundamental business event that affects the organization in some way. Selling a book, taking a room reservation, transferring money from a savings account to a checking account, and hiring a new employee are examples of business transactions. A transaction, such as transferring money from one account to another, may actually consist of several discrete events, such as changing the savings account balance, changing the checking account balance and issuing a receipt. However, these individual events are not considered transactions because they exist only in the context of the larger logical unit of activity and do not normally take place on their ownsuch events have no inherent value of their own. 2. Transaction processing systems control the collection of specific data in specific formats and in accordance with rules, policies and goals of the organization. They generally include components to collect, retrieve, and report data on each individual transaction, as well as to make these data available for processing as part of other transactions, for use in management decision making or for some strategic purpose. Certain TPS such as airline reservation systems may automate some decision-making functions within a transaction, such as finding the flight that best meets the customers needs. Examples of TPS are point-of-sale systems, orderentry systems, distribution and logistics systems and general accounting systems. Transaction processing systems were the first type of computer-based business information systems, but now TPS applications are usually just components of a more comprehensive business information system. 3. Organizations keep detailed records of individual transactions for four primary reasons: a. b. c. d. to provide information needed by employees to transact business and perform their job functions; to collect information that managers need to make informed decisions; to provide information for customers, suppliers, business partners and others who participate in the transactions; and to create records called audit trails that auditors can use to verify corporate information reported by the company.
4. Transaction records provide employees the up-to-date information they need to do their jobs, e.g., seats remaining on a particular flight, current price per seat, etc. This allows multiple employees to co-ordinate their work efficiently and effectively by working from common, up-todate information. Even a single employee might need records of transactions. For example, a lawyer records the time spent and content of work done for each task performed for a client so that he or she can accurately bill the client for the services provided. At levels above the
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organizations front-line employees, managers use both detailed and summarized records of business transactions to make decisions. They need to follow trends, identify problems and verify that their decisions have the impact they expect. By recording detailed transaction data directly in the organizations database, the TPS makes that data available to the organizations managerial decision-making processes. Audit trails based on the transaction data stored by TPS can be used both externally, as in independent audit of financial reporting, and internally, as in troubleshooting a business problem. 5. The primary design objectives for a TPS are (a) to provide employees and first-level supervisors with timely access to accurate, up-to-date information in formats that allow that information to be used directly in the performance of specific business transactions and (b) to get the correct data entered into the system with the least amount of time and effort. Since the goal is to correctly carry out and record all business transactions with minimum time and effort, TPS are based on detailed models of how each particular transaction should be processed. Most contain enough structure to enforce rules and procedures for work done by clerks or customer service agents. A well-designed TPS can minimize data entry effort and reduce errors by automatically filling in data such as a customer address or unit price once the user has entered the customer number or product identification. Some TPS bypass clerks entirely and totally automate certain business transactions, such as the way automated teller machines (ATMs) automate deposits and cash withdrawals. Either way, a well-designed TPS checks each transaction for easily detectable errors such as missing data, data values that are obviously too high or too low, data values that are inconsistent with other data in the database and data in the wrong format. It may also check for required authorizations for the transaction. Finally, when all the data for the transaction have been collected and validated, the TPS stores the data in a standard format for later access by others. The key attribute of any TPS is throughput, the volume of transactions that can be correctly processed in a given time. The design and implementation of the overall computer-based transaction processing system (i.e., input, data files, processes, outputs, people and hardware) must satisfy the throughput requirements of the employees and frontline supervisors within the supported organization, when used under operational conditions. 213. MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS
1. A management information system (MIS) is a computer-based information system that can integrate and summarize data from various sources to provide the information necessary for management decision making. The idea of MIS predates the computer age. For example, as long ago as the mid-1500s, the Fugger family in Augsberg, Germany had business interests throughout Europe and even in China and Peru. To keep in touch, they set up a worldwide news reporting service through which their agents wrote letters about critical political and economic events in their areas of responsibility. These letters were collected, interpreted, analysed and summarized in Augsberg and answered through instructions sent to the familys agents. This paper-based system encompassing planning, execution and control helped the family move more rapidly in the mercantile world than their rivals. 2. Computerized MIS generate information for monitoring performance, maintaining coordination and providing background information about an organizations operations. Typically, they extract and summarize data from TPS to allow managers to monitor and direct the organization and to provide employees with accurate feedback about easily measured aspects of their work. Thus, MIS users can include both managers and employees who receive
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feedback about performance indicators such as productivity, product quality and customer service. A typical MIS report provides summary information rather than the details of individual transactions; however, much of the information that the MIS uses is initially captured and stored by one or more TPS. The key difference is that transaction processing is oriented toward capturing, processing and storing data, whereas an MIS is oriented toward using the data to produce management information. For example, a list of every sale that occurred during a day or week would be extremely difficult for a manager to use in monitoring a retail stores performance. However, the same data could be summarized in measures of performance such as total sales for each type of item, for each salesperson, and for each hour of the day. In this example, the computerized inventory and price assistance provided to transaction processing remains essential, but the MIS then summarizes and organizes the data collected by the TPS to present information for use by management. As the data are collected through various TPS, they also become available to produce the reports required by an MIS. Historically, most organizations implemented TPS first, since efficient processing and tracking of transactions with customers was (and is) a necessity in both business and government. The concept of MIS emerged partly as a response to the shortcomings of these first computerized TPS, which often improved transaction processing but provided little information useful for management decision making. 3. An MIS is focused on aiding managers in making sound control decisions. It helps structure the comparatively unstructured task of managing by focusing attention on important measures of performance. How to fix performance problems remains the human managers decision. Hence, the MIS within any large organization is typically a federation of functional information systems. Specialists within each functional area (such as finance, production, accounting and engineering) are much more familiar with the management information requirements of that function than anyone else in the firm. These specialists are best positioned to oversee the design of functional information systems to assist with the management of their functional area within the organization. The functional information systems throughout an organization must be integrated through the use of a common database. Database management systems (DBMS) greatly enhance the ability of functional information systems to share data. The important point is that the integrated functional information systems are the MIS. Each functional information system is made up of application systems. The accounting information system, for example, includes several applications. Each application is typically made up of one or more computer programs. Data are the central resource of any MIS. Managing this resource is crucial to effective decision making for the management and control of business or government operations. A DBMS is a collection of programs that serve as an interface between the many application programs that together make up the MIS and the common set of co-ordinated and integrated data files called a database. Prior to the advent of DBMS there was little, if any, integration or data sharing among functional information systems within organizations. 4. One of the most important components of an MIS is the management reporting system (MRS) that retrieves data from the database and presents it to users in the form of reports. A report is simply a printing or display of items of information in a form that is useful to managers. The representation of information in a report can be textual, graphical, pictorial or whatever other format is best suited to aiding the manager in understanding the significance of the information and then using it in his or her decision making. The MRS used by managers within the individual functional areas of an organization is often simply the reporting component of the respective TPS. At higher levels of management, MRS can combine data from two or more TPS (through the DBMS) to provide information that managers could not obtain from the individual systems. Managers generally use some combination of detail reports, summary
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reports, exception reports and predictive reports to monitor organizational performance and identify problems: a. Detail Reports: provide managers with information useful in overseeing day-today operations of a department or working group. Used primarily by lower-level managers, detail reports provide information about individual transactions, such as payments made by customers, parts manufactured and debits and credits to the general ledger. An MIS should provide detail reports often enough for managers to readily use the information they contain. Different detail reports contain information from the same transaction data arranged in different orders or containing different parts of the transaction. This helps managers in verifying relationships and trends in business activities. Summary or Statistical Reports: show totals, averages, maximums, minimums or other statistical data aggregated over time, personnel, products or some other quantity. Each line of a statistical report summarizes large amounts of transaction data that a manager can examine in a detail report. As managers move up the organizational ladder, they deal with reports that have data aggregated to increasing degrees. Exception Reports: notify management when an activity or system is out of control so that corrective action can be taken. This supports management by exception, one of the most efficient approaches to management. It allows managers to spend their time dealing with exceptions, or those situations that are out of control. Activities that are proceeding as planned are in control and, therefore, do not need the managers attention. A listing that identifies customers having overdue account balances is an exception report. An error report is another type of exception report. Exception reports can show information at either a transaction or a summary level; however, unlike detail and summary reports, they do not show all available information. As a result, they allow managers to quickly target problems without wading through a morass of extraneous information to find what is relevant. Predictive Reports: are useful in developing plans for future activities. They often make use of statistical and modelling techniques such as regression, timeseries analysis and simulation. These reports help management personnel answer what-if questions about their part of the business. The statistical and modelling techniques that produce predictive reports depend largely on historical data. Such data must be readily accessible by the MIS in a form that can be used by the models; otherwise, these models will be of little use to management.
b.
c.
d.
5. Management reporting systems must produce management reports such that managers are provided with the information they need at the appropriate time without overloading them. To achieve this, MRS typically employ three report generation strategies: periodic, eventinitiated and on-demand: a. Periodic or Scheduled Reports: are produced on a regular basis, such as daily, weekly or monthly, and are delivered to a specified list of managers and employees. Periodic reports are usually summary reports intended to assist with routine control decisions. They are the traditional source of feedback within
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the organization; however, as microcomputers have become more widespread, periodic reports have diminished in importance. Managers no longer feel compelled to ask for information on a scheduled basis just in case they may need it in the futureby having their own microcomputers connected to the business information system, managers can retrieve the information they need on demand. b. Event-initiated Reports: are generated on the occurrence of a specified event, typically either a milestone or an expected problem. A pre-specified list of recipients generally receives such event-initiated reports. These can be detail, summary, exception or, in rare cases, predictive reports. The aim of eventinitiated reports is to draw managerial attention to a specific circumstance that requires a decision or action. Notification systems are a particular type of eventinitiated reporting system that use alerts instead of reports to draw the attention of managers to situations requiring some decision or action. An alert is generated by the notification system in response to the occurrence of a specific event in the real-world. Alerts can replace exception reports in some situations, thereby reducing the number of reports managers need to review. They can also increase the value of a single report by honing in on particular information, rather than requiring the manager to scan the entire report to find the relevant information. On-demand Reports: are provided to authorized managers when they request specific information. These reports fill irregular needs for information. In the earlier days of computing, the contents of an on-demand report had to be previously anticipated or there would be a delay of often weeks or months in receiving the data. It simply took time to modify programs to produce information that filled unanticipated demands. Today, the widespread use of microcomputers with user application programs connected directly to powerful DBMS means that MRS can fulfill unanticipated demands for information very quickly, often within minutes. This is possible because users and managers themselves can use the query languages of the DBMS to produce their own reports.
c.
6. The primary design objective for an MIS is to provide managers with timely access to accurate, relevant, verifiable information about the organizations current performance in formats that allow that information to be used directly in their decision making. Management Information Systems are used to allow managers to recognize when current performance is deviating significantly from planned or expected performance, in terms of some agreed upon set of performance measures, so that they may initiate appropriate corrective action within their portions of the organization. Most contain enough structure to enforce organizational policies and procedures for work done by managers and front-line supervisors. A well-designed MIS can minimize the time and effort required to recognize and diagnose problems and to initiate appropriate corrective action by presenting information in consistently structured, easily understandable formats that allow users to grasp the significance of the information straight away, and by automatically transferring information generated during monitoring and diagnosis into the formats used to communicate instructions and other control information to the elements being managed. Some MIS bypass managers entirely and totally automate certain routine monitoring and control functions. Either way, a well-designed MIS allows managers to identify deviations from planned performance and assists them with the selection and initiation of appropriate corrective actions to prevent those deviations from causing adverse consequences
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for the organization. The key attribute of any MIS is data integration, the degree to which the disparate pieces of data important to decision making throughout the organization can be maintained, aggregated and manipulated to provide individual decision makers with timely, accurate and relevant information in a form they find useful. The design and implementation of the overall computer-based management information system (i.e., input, data files, processes, outputs, people and hardware) must satisfy the data integration requirements of the managers within the supported organization, when used under operational conditions. 214. DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
1. A decision support system (DSS) is a computer-based information system that helps middle and upper-level managers to reach decisions in ambiguous and complex environments. Traditional business information systems such as TPS and MIS have been most successful in acquiring and storing large quantities of detailed data concerning transaction processing and, from that data, providing information for routine, structured and anticipated types of decisions. They have been less successful in providing information for semi-structured or unstructured decisions, particularly unanticipated ones. A DSS provides a set of integrated computer tools that allow the user to apply a variety of models and analytical techniques to the available data in order to create information useful for semi-structured and unstructured decision making under conditions of uncertainty. Unlike an MIS, which provides managers primarily with information on current conditions to guide short-term control decisions, a DSS offers forecasts of future conditions for use in analyses conducted primarily in support of planning. It typically gives managers the ability to quantitatively analyse decision alternatives. 2. The common thread through a wide range of DSS applications is that they emphasize analytical work rather than transaction processing, general management work or general office work. Decision Support System software helps with tasks such as figuring out the best way to load and ship a product on trucks and trains or determining how running one customers order affects another order in the pipeline. Essentially, a DSS is used to model a complex set of circumstances and then allow the user to manipulate various parameters of the model to assess the impact of diverse conditions. A DSS supports this work by providing flexible, usercontrollable methods for displaying and analysing data and formulating and evaluating decision alternatives. The users of the various application software packages and computer programs within a DSS might include managers themselves for certain general types of analysis, functional specialists within a managers staff for more elaborate analyses within a particular field of activity and highly skilled analytical specialists (e.g., operations researchers and/or management scientists, economists, behavioural scientists, etc.) for the application of rigorous analytical methods and techniques to complex managerial problems. 3. As with all computer-based information systems, a DSS comprises the input, data files, processes, outputs, people and hardware needed to store, retrieve, process, display and communicate information in ways that are both relevant and useful. Many DSS users do a lot of analytical work and feel comfortable working with models, data analysis and statistics. To be of benefit to the planning and control of an organizations activities, however, the DSS must provide effective, efficient mechanisms by which managers can present problems to the system for analysis, and by which the results of those analyses can be communicated to managers in ways that support, not supplant, their decision making processes. In cases where the managers themselves conduct the analyses, aided only by the software applications available
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directly to them, the need is for appropriate user interfaces to the software. In cases where the analyses are conducted by people other than the managers who must make the actual decisions, the need is for well-articulated procedures, techniques and tools for (a) accurately translating managerial questions into problems to be solved by analysts employing specialized methods and techniques and (b) presenting the results of the analyses back to managers in forms they can understand and use effectively within their overall decision making processes. 4. The principal benefits of a well-implemented DSS include: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. improved decision making through better understanding of the business; an increased number of decision alternatives examined; the ability to implement ad hoc analysis; faster response to expected situations; improved communication; more effective teamwork; better control; and time and cost savings.
5. Decision Support Systems originally relied on improved user interfaces, graphical and statistical methods and simulation and optimization models to support better decision making. Many once-innovative DSS concepts are now common across many types of business information systems. For instance, predictive reports generated by an MIS might well be based on simple simulations and elementary statistical techniques originally implemented only in highly specialized DSS. Nonetheless, there are still many applications with a distinct DSS flavour. An insurance agent showing a customer costs and benefits of various alternatives computed from the details of the customers actual situation is an example of a DSS supporting repetitive decision making by first structuring the customers decision and then providing information, models and analytical tools to help the customer in making that decision. A production manager using a process simulation package to determine the likely increase in productivity that would result from the acquisition and use of an expensive new piece of equipment is an example of a DSS supporting non-repetitive decision making by providing a detailed statistical analysis in response to a simple what-if question. 6. The database provides access to internal or external data relevant to the decision making being supported by the system. A business information system DSS normally retrieves data from the same corporate database that is updated by the organizations various TPS and used by its MIS. These data form a baseline that mathematical models can use in extrapolating from past to future conditions. Within the DSS, they are employed to analyse trends, make forecasts and model various alternative situations. The knowledge base provides information about highly complex relationships among data that an ordinary database has problems representing. It consists of rules of thumb, known as heuristics, which define acceptable solutions and methods for evaluating them. For instance, a knowledge base could incorporate some heuristics about an appropriate ratio of staff to sales volume in order to signal if the forecasted volume resulting from some proposed change exceeds the volume that the projected
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staff can handle. The model base typically includes an array of spreadsheets, simulation packages, forecasting tools and statistical packages that allow DSS users to create what are essentially sophisticated ad hoc queries of the data and knowledge bases, based on what-if questions, that incorporate into their reports the uncertainty associated with forecasting future events. 7. The user interface for a DSS must allow its users to control the data and models to be included in their analyses. The flexibility of the DSS user interface contrasts with that typically found in MIS and TPS where the user is more passive, receiving data in limited formats or entering data into carefully crafted screens or forms. Because DSS support complex decision making under conditions of uncertainty, users typically analyse many alternatives and extensive data about each alternative. This means a high quality DSS should compare, contrast and aggregate data in a wide range of graphical and tabular formats. This often requires the application of statistical techniques to the data available within the database and/or the use of simulations to conduct experiments relevant to the impending decisions. The computer-based simulations in DSS range from simple Monte Carlo simulations run in an electronic spread sheet to full-blown interactive process simulations of an entire business activity run in a sophisticated modelling and simulation package. Because DSS users are usually not computer programmers, a DSS must provide users with a language for manipulating the systems models that they find easy to understand and use. However, whereas an MIS simplifies user access to data by employing carefully predefined formats that impose structure for the purpose of supporting timely control decisions, a DSS allows users to construct previously undefined formats based on innovative queries that generate novel combinations of data elements to answer what-if questions for the purposes of exploring decision alternatives in support of planning. Essentially, these ad hoc queries are the managers what-if questions, along with descriptions of the relevant factors and conditions of interest for the decision to be made, reformulated to match the DSS users choice of models and analytical techniques. 8. The primary design objective for a DSS is to provide managers with timely access to accurate, relevant, verifiable information about the likely effects of various alternative courses of action in formats that allow that information to be used directly in their decision making. Decision Support Systems are used to allow managers to explore and, if possible, quantitatively compare decision alternatives in terms of some agreed upon set of performance measures. Most contain enough structure to support rigorous analysis of the alternatives. A well-designed DSS allows managers to understand (a) which course of action is preferable in terms of the criteria applied during the analysis, (b) which factors relevant to the decision those criteria represent and (c) the degree of uncertainty associated with the preference for one alternative over all others. The key attribute of any DSS is validity, the degree to which the models within the system, including those created by users, provide a useful representation of the real world problem confronting the decision maker. The design and implementation of the overall computer-based decision support system (i.e., input, data files, processes, outputs, people and hardware) must satisfy the validity requirements of the decision makers within the supported organization when used under operational conditions. 215. EXECUTIVE INFORMATION SYSTEMS
1. An executive information system (EIS) is a highly interactive computer-based information system that provides top-level managers and executives flexible access to information for
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monitoring operating results and general business conditions. Sometimes called executive support systems, these systems attempt to take over where the traditional approach to MIS falls short. Although sometimes acceptable for monitoring the same indicators over time, the conventional MIS practice of providing pre-specified reports, either on a scheduled basis or ondemand, is too inflexible for many questions executives really care about, such as understanding problems and new situations. In order to address this deficiency, EIS provide executives with the status and performance information they need, as well as helping them understand the causes of exceptions and surprises. 2. The point of any EIS is to provide executives timely access to the accurate, relevant, verifiable information they need, whenever they need it and in whatever form they find to be most useful. A well-designed EIS is an upward extension of the various MIS and DSS within an organization. For an EIS to operate effectively, line managers, functional staff members and analysts throughout the organization must ensure that the information available to executive decision makers from various other systems through the EIS is timely and accurate. The essential purpose of the EIS is to allow the executive to determine, interactively with the system, which information is relevant and in what form it is most usable. For example, an EIS might allow its users to isolate and interactively re-organize information from a standard financial report generated by an MIS to combine, aggregate and represent the information contained in the report in a variety of ways that allow their experience and intuition to see the information from many different perspectives. It may also allow users to combine the information from a number of different MIS reports to create entirely new aggregations and perspectives that cross the functional, departmental and geographical lines of management within the organization. This type of semi-structured, interactive dialogue with the information available within the organization is a key to sparking the sort of creative insights necessary for understanding novel situations, making new connections between potential causes and effects and generating innovative solutions to problems. Thus, an EIS aims to support the creative and intuitive aspects of running a business or government organization, rather than the more structured and analytical aspects associated with the routine planning, direction and control of standard or ongoing activities. 3. An EIS typically provides a set of integrated computer tools that allows a decision maker to interact directly with the data and models available within the organizations computers in order to retrieve information useful for understanding novel or complex situations and for supporting unstructured decisions. Such decisions might involve plant expansion, mergers, acquisitions or new products. Executive information system users can interactively choose among numerous tabular or graphical formats for the display of outputs. They can also control the level of detail, the triggers for exception conditions, and other aspects of the information displayed. To facilitate this, an EIS provides user-friendly languages and interfaces to give decision makers direct control over the information retrieval, processing and display capabilities of the system. An EIS is intended for use by people with high levels of knowledge and insight into the business activities they plan and direct, but perhaps very limited computer-related knowledge and formal analytical skills. 4. Executives who use EIS often receive the results of analyses done by others, but rarely spend time doing analytical work themselves. Consequently, EIS are much more concerned with providing information in an easy-to-use format than providing sophisticated analytical capabilities such as statistical tests or model building. Although they sometimes resemble DSS, EIS respond to the particular requirements of top-level managers. They focus less on modelling and more on assembling and displaying data, recognizing trends, determining underlying causes and communicating knowledge. Executives generally use EIS to answer specific
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questions or monitor performance; however, some executives scan information in an EIS without specific questions in mind. For them, EIS help broaden their outlook, challenge their assumptions and provide greater insight into their business. 5. The primary design objective of an EIS is to provide executives with timely access to accurate, relevant, verifiable information about the organizations overall performance, including its position in the business market or public opinion, in formats that allow that information to be used directly in their (strategic) decision making. Executive Information Systems are used to aid executives in exploring the deeper significance of the organizations information by allowing them to shape and study the available information in imaginative and original ways based on their experience and insight. Most impose very little structure, leaving users free to organize and re-organize information in as many ways, and in as many formats, as possible. A welldesigned EIS allows executives to find novel or innovative relationships within the organizations information in order to (a) grasp the underlying causes of problems with the organizations performance, (b) recognize important new opportunities for the organization and (c) identify emerging threats to the organizations success. The key attribute of any EIS is intuitiveness, the degree to which the system not only behaves in ways that appear intuitive to users (making it easy to use), but actually stimulates the users intuition and supports creative problem solving in the domain of interest. The design and implementation of the overall computer-based executive information system (i.e., input, data files, processes, outputs, people and hardware) must satisfy the intuitiveness requirements of the executives within the supported organization, when used under operational conditions. 216. OFFICE AUTOMATION SYSTEMS
1. Office automation systems (OAS) facilitate everyday information processing tasks in offices and business organizations. These systems include a wide range of tools, including spread sheets, word processors and presentation packages. Although telephones, electronic mail, voice mail and facsimile are sometimes included in this category, Canadian Signal doctrine treats communication systems separately from information systems. Office automation systems help people perform personal record keeping, writing and calculation chores efficiently. Of all the computer-based information system categories, OAS is the most widely familiar to people. Tools generally grouped within the OAS category include: a. Electronic Spreadsheets: provide an efficient method of performing calculations that can be visualized in terms of the cells on a spreadsheet. These systems started with simple arithmetic spreadsheets but have evolved to include support for complex mathematical computations and statistical analysis as well as the organization and manipulation of tables containing text rather than numbers. Text and Image Processing Systems: store, revise and print documents containing text or image data. These systems started with simple word processors but have evolved to include desktop publishing systems for creating complex documents ranging from brochures to book chapters. Presentation Packages: help users develop presentations independently instead of working with typists and technical artists. These systems started with simple slide shows as visual aids to oral presentations but have evolved to include systems that support full-blown multi-media presentations.
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Personal Database Systems and Note-taking Systems: help people keep track of their own personal data (rather than the organizations shared data). In addition to relational database management systems, typical applications include a calendar and appointment book, a to-do list and a notepad.
2. Originally conceived as an aid to individual productivity, OAS are typically applied when work is unstructured and the users can use the tools however they like. In these situations, some individuals use them extensively and enjoy major efficiency benefits, whereas others do not use them at all. However, the same tools can also be used for broader purposes in which they form part of a larger system that an organization uses to structure and standardize tasks. Originally sold as separate products, most are now bundled together as suites including a spreadsheet, word processor, presentation package, electronic mail and possibly a personal organizer or database management system. 217. HYBRID BUSINESS INFORMATION SYSTEMS
1. Hybrid systems contain characteristics of several categories of business information system. For example, a given business information system might, at one level, be a TPS that collects and uses information about individual transactions. At another level, that same system might be a DSS that provides information for analysing the market. At yet another level, it might be an EIS providing information for executives. While unquestionably part of a single hybrid business information system, each of these individual systems is most likely a separate software package. As a case in point, almost all business information systems incorporate an OAS that serves both as a personal productivity tool for individuals and as an aid to the storage, retrieval, processing, display and communication of information within TPS, MIS, DSS and/or EIS. For example, many MIS and DSS have functions that allow the user to export a standard report or the response to a query directly to an electronic spreadsheet or a presentation slide. 218. REAL-TIME SYSTEMS
1. Alongside business information systems, the other important class of computer-based information systems with characteristics particularly relevant to army TacC2IS is that of realtime (information processing) systems. There are many interpretations of what constitutes a real-time system; however, they all have in common the notion of response timethe time taken for the system to generate output from some associated input. The basic feature of a real-time information processing system is its ability to operate continuously, or whenever necessary, so as to receive data and produce related output within a time that is normally short compared with the overall system of which the information processing apparatus is but one part. In other words, a real-time information processing system is any information processing activity or system which has to respond to externally generated input stimuli within a finite and specified period. 2. Computer-based real-time information processing systems monitor, respond to or control an external environment. That is to say, they interact with the outside world. Taken in the most general sense, this appears to cover a very wide range of computer-based activities. There is, however, a distinction between computer-based real-time systems and merely interactive computer systems. For example, a word processing package might seem to qualify as a realtime information processing system because while it is running, it monitors the keyboard and the mouse, waiting for a command to be entered by the user; when the user does enter a command, he or she expects an appropriate response from the computer within a few seconds. Clearly, word processors interact with their environment, and as such require a certain level of
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responsiveness to external events; however, it is usually not a disaster if the response to a user command entered into a word processor is not forthcoming. The user may become annoyed at having to wait for responses to individual commands, but if the overall word processing job can be done faster, more effectively and/or more economically with the aid of an electronic digital computer to mechanize, enhance and automate the many procedures involved (including those associated with communicating and/or subsequently modifying the text), then the user will simply adapt to the lack of responsiveness and use the computer anyway. Similarly, a computer-aided procedure that takes anywhere from several minutes to a few hours to produce an output from some associated input is perfectly acceptable if the business decision it informs only has to be made within a day or two of the time the information is available for processing. 3. A real-time system, on the other hand, interacts with its environment with the explicit aim of affecting, usually by controlling or alerting someone who can control the current state of some part of that environment. It is this aspect of directly controlling the current state of some portion of its environment that distinguishes a real-time system, where response time is critical to mission success, from an interactive system, where response time is important but not crucial. The consequences of a computer word processor taking too long to respond to a user input are generally limited to adversely altering the current emotional state of the human operator (e.g., it can result in impatience and frustration on the part of the user). On the other hand, the consequences of a jet fighters computer-based avionics system taking too long to produce an output in response to an input from its environment generally include loss of control of the flight behaviour of the aircraft, a situation that can lead directly to the failure of the operational mission and, quite possibly, the loss of the aircraft and the pilot. In a real-time information processing system, the consequences of not providing an output in time are just as bad as those resulting from the provision of an output that is logically incorrect. Most business information systems are interactive, but are not real-time systems. In terms of response time, a. Interactive Systems: are those where response times are important to the perceived usability of the system, but not to the correctness of its operation. The successful performance of the overall mission does not depend on the computer-based information system meeting finite and specified deadlines for the provision of output in response to some associated input. Real-time Systems: are those in which the correctness of the system depends not only on the logical result of the computation, but also on the time within which the results are produced. The successful performance of the overall mission depends on the computer-based information system meeting finite and specified deadlines for the provision of output in response to some associated input.
b.
The correctness of a real-time system depends not only on the logical result of the computation, but also on the time at which the results are produced. 4. A qualitative distinction is made between hard and soft real-time systems: a. Hard Real-time Systems: are those in which it is absolutely imperative that responses occur within the specified deadline. In other words, these systems must, without exception, meet their timing constraintsif a constraint is violated, the system fails. Hard real-time systems are characterized by the fact that severe consequences will result if logical or timing correctness properties of the system are not satisfied.
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b.
Soft Real-time Systems: are those in which response times are central to the correct behaviour of the system, but the system will still function properly, that is, perform its mission successfully, if deadlines are occasionally missed. Soft realtime systems are characterized by the fact that the system can tolerate some violations of timing constraints without severe consequence.
5. There is a continuum between the extremes of hardness and softness and most systems fit somewhere in between. For example, the flight control system of a combat aircraft is a hard real-time system because a missed deadline could lead to a catastrophe, whereas a data acquisition system for a process control application is soft as it may be defined to sample an input sensor at regular intervals, but also to tolerate intermittent delays. In many real-time applications, activities that have to occur in a timely fashion coexist with those that are not time critical. An accounting application or a long-term planning activity running on an automated factorys computer is an example of the latter. Both types of activities consist of one or more tasks, and a task with a finite and specified time constraint is known as a real-time task. Ideally, the computer should execute real-time tasks so that each task will meet its deadline, whereas it should execute the remaining tasks so that the average response time of these tasks is minimized. 6. Most real-time information processing systems are complex, special-purpose systems embedded within some larger technological system. In the majority of real-time applications, an electronic digital computer is interfaced directly to some physical equipment and is dedicated to monitoring or controlling the operation of that equipment. This equipment generally comprises real-time input and output devices consisting of sensors, which monitor the current state of some specified part of the overall systems physical environment, and actuators, which act on that same part of the systems environment in order to change it in ways desired by the operators of the system. Thus, in real-time applications, the computer-based information system acts as the regulating element in the feedback loop by which the operation of the overall system is controlled. The primary difference between real-time information processing systems and business information systems is the time scale for responsiveness to inputs. Real-time systems generally seek to control physical processes with control loops that must provide responses in seconds, or even milliseconds, to be effective; whereas business management systems generally seek to control social processes with control loops whose periods extend over hours, days, weeks, months, quarters and years. 7. A real-time system can be divided into two partsthe controlled system and the controlling system. The controlled system within a real-time system consists of the hardware devices, e.g., sensors and actuators that form the systems interface with the physical environment it seeks to affect. For example, in a telecommunications system the controlled system might consist of multiplexers, switches and printers, whereas in a process control system it might include valves, relays or hoppers. The controlling system within a real-time system comprises the computer-based information processing system that directs the behaviour of the controlled system. For example, in an automated factory, the controlled system is the factory floor with its robots, assembling stations and assembled parts, while the controlling system is the computer and the human interfaces that manage and coordinate the activities on the factory floor. As with all other computer-based information systems, the controlling system within a real-time application consists of inputs, processes, data files, outputs, people and hardware. For highly structured situations, such as an automated assembly line, the controlling system might rely exclusively on automated procedures, in which case the human operators only role is to initiate system operation and then monitor the systems performance in order to stop or over-ride the computer in the event of a system error or failure. In less structured
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situations, such as flying a high performance aircraft, the control processes might involve human operators carrying out procedures that guide the controlling systems computers in the execution of their programs. Either way, time and reliability constraints are imposed on the entire system by the ongoing physical behaviour of the external world that it seeks to affect. Unless the computer-based information processing system can provide the correct instructions to the appropriate components of the controlled system, e.g., the control surfaces of an airplane, in a timely and reliable manner, the computers role will be meaningless. 8. Although the nature of the equipment that constitutes the controlled system varies widely with the purpose of the system, the design of the controlling system can be generalized. It is, in fact, this commonality across a wide range of controlling systems that makes real-time systems a class of computer-based information systems. The minor idiosyncrasies required by the various types of controlled systems simply result in distinguishable categories within the realtime systems class: (real-time) communications systems, (real-time) flight control systems, (real-time) process control systems and so on. The primary characteristics of any real-time information processing systems are: a. Responsiveness: in order to control its environment successfully, a real-time system must be responsive to changes in its environment. It is this responsiveness that forms the fundamental property of a real-time system. Unless the system reacts sufficiently rapidly to influence ongoing events in the external environment, it cannot be considered to be operating in real-time. This property is quantified by the systems response time. The response time is the time that the system will take to react to a change in, or a stimulus from, its environment. The response time must be such that the system reacts in time to produce the desired effect in the external environment. What constitutes reacting in time will vary with the controlled device. For a power-station boiler, in time may mean reaction to a temperature change within thirty minutes. For the system controlling a missile, the reaction to a course change must occur within a few milliseconds. Correctness and Completeness: in order to control its environment successfully, a real-time system must correctly and completely handle all changes in its environment. The system must be correct in that suitable decisions are made when the different situations arise (even if the decision is to do nothing at all). The system must be complete in the sense that it has catered for all possible eventualities and situations that may arise in the environment or in the controlling software itself. Concurrency: in order to control its environment successfully, a real-time system must be able to handle the fact that the external world is a mass of concurrent activities, so signals may arrive at the same time. This requires knowing when each signalled event occurred and how to respond within the applicable response time. Interacting simultaneous tasks can arise in systems in which several processes are running concurrently, perhaps to handle tasks arising from quite independent external events. If simultaneous tasks refer to the same data and one or more of them can modify this data, then, if there are variable time relationships between the tasks, it cannot be reliably predicted whether one task will read data which have or have not yet been modified by another. Worse still, some data may have been modified and other data not, so a task might act on inconsistent information. In other words, real-time systems
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must have safeguards to ensure that their responses are based on information that properly represents the current state of the controlled environment. d. Reliability: in order to control its environment successfully, a real-time system must be able to perform its function dependably, giving consistent results on successive processes. Operators must be able to trust real-time systems to perform as intended. In essence, reliability is a measure of how often a system will fail. Although real-time systems are designed to maximize the time between failures, fault tolerance is concerned with the recognition and handling of failures when they do occur. A real-time system must fail gracefullyit must provide a useful degraded service in the face of failure. Economy: in order to control its environment successfully, a real-time system must be affordable and economically sustainable. The cost of in time response, completeness, total correctness and absolute reliability must be taken into account when considering these ideals. As with any product, the performance of an actual real-time system is constrained by economic considerations. An on-line system that guarantees a maximum response time of half a second may not be able to compete with a system that only offers a response time of two seconds, but sells at half the price. In order to maintain its commercial viability, a real-time system must be as inexpensive to produce, run and maintain as possible.
e.
9. The primary design objective for a real-time information processing system (i.e., the controlling system within a real-time system) is to reliably compute the correct responses to inputs representing the current state of a controlled system and provide outputs in the form of instructions to the actuators within the controlled system in time to produce the desired effect(s) in the external environment. Since the goal is to affect the external environment by directing the behaviour of the controlled system, real-time information processing systems typically have substantial amounts of knowledge concerning the characteristics of the application domain and the controlled system built into the system. The more structured the application domain is, the more automated the control processes can be. A well-designed real-time information processing system can improve the effectiveness, efficiency and economy of a real-time system by incorporating appropriate computer programming and, if need be, operator procedures for dealing with about-to-be-missed deadlines, and by allowing for the graceful degradation of capability in the event of major component failure. The key attribute of any real-time information processing system is timeliness, the speed with which an undesired condition in the controlled system can be recognised and correctly diagnosed, appropriate decisions made and corrective action initiated. The design and implementation of the overall computer-based real-time information processing system (i.e., input, data files, processes, outputs, people and hardware) must satisfy the timeliness requirements for the initiation of appropriate corrective action, when used under operational conditions.
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SECTION 4 FUNCTIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF A LAND FORCE TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL INFORMATION SYSTEM 219. GENERAL
1. The LF TacC2IS is a network of microcomputer clients supported by dedicated servers and interconnected through the TacComms system to provide an integrated information system that allows the mechanization, enhancement and automation of information handling procedures in support of army tactical command and control. This includes information storage, retrieval, processing and display, and communication procedures across the full range of C2 activities associated with planning, directing and monitoring land operations. Commanders and their supporting staff officers must be able to store, retrieve, process, display and communicate timely, accurate, verifiable information for use in support of both battle management and battle planning. To this end, they receive information from a variety of sources, such as formations, units and individuals, sensors and surveillance devices and other allied forces. In order to organize and integrate all of this information so that it can be efficiently and effectively stored, retrieved, processed, displayed and communicated as needed by commanders and staff at all levels, the TacC2IS employs computer databases managed by powerful database management systems. Apart from organizing and storing tactical information, the TacC2IS operational database provides the means to search for, associate and retrieve that data such that it meets the specific information needs of its various users throughout the land operations chain of command. This shared database is the key building block in the design and implementation of the TacC2IS; it is the prime integrating force that provides coherence to the overall information system. 2. The data stored in the operational database provide meaningful representations of the real-world entities that influence and are influenced by the decisions made by LF tactical commanders. In order to keep those representations up to date in the rapidly changing environment of land operations, the TacC2IS must provide a highly efficient transaction processing capability. Specifically, it must provide duty officers and current operations staff at all levels with a well-designed system for getting data regarding tactical transactions (e.g., contact reports, situation reports, repair and recovery requests, etc.) entered into the system correctly with the least amount of time and effort. This requires carefully defined user interfaces based on detailed models of how each particular transaction should be processed. The interfaces should contain enough structure to enforce the information management procedures associated with the processing of these transactions by duty officers and current operations staff. A well-designed tactical transaction processing capability within the TacC2IS can minimize data entry effort and reduce errors by automatically filling in information items that are already available and verified within the database. Some transaction processing within the TacC2IS can be totally automated, as is the case with automatic position determination and reporting systems such as the Canadian LF Situation Awareness System. Either way, a welldesigned tactical transaction processing capability checks each transaction for easily detectable errors such as missing data, data values that are obviously too high or too low, data values that are inconsistent with other data in the database and data in the wrong format. However, the key attribute of the tactical transaction processing capability is throughput, the volume of transactions that can be correctly processed in a given time.
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The design and implementation of the overall computer-based transaction processing capability (i.e., input, data files, processes, outputs, people and hardware) within the TacC2IS must meet the throughput requirements of the various command posts and duty centres throughout the land operations chain of command, when used under operational conditions. 3. Beyond mere transaction processing, staff officers throughout the land operations chain of command must be able to retrieve and process all of the information relevant to a particular situation in order to evaluate, interpret and analyse it in preparation for presentation to their respective commanders. For current operations staff, this calls for the ability to integrate and summarize transaction information from various sources to provide the information necessary for control decision making. This equates to a tactical management information system capability within the TacC2IS to provide current operations staff with timely access to accurate, relevant, verifiable information about the organizations current performance in formats that allow that information to be used directly in their execution-monitoring decisions. The tactical MIS capability within the TacC2IS is used to allow current operations staff to recognise when execution is deviating significantly from planned or expected activities, in terms of some agreed upon set of performance measures, so that they may initiate appropriate corrective action on behalf of the commander or provide the commander with the information needed to make the appropriate decision(s). This capability should contain enough structure to enforce the applicable tactics, techniques and procedures, including information management procedures. 4. A well-designed tactical MIS capability can minimize the time and effort required to recognise and diagnose problems encountered during mission execution and to initiate appropriate corrective action by presenting information in consistently structured, easily understandable formats (e.g., standardized reports presented textually, graphically, pictorially and/or acoustically) that allow current operations staff to grasp the significance of the information straight away, and by automatically transferring information generated during monitoring and diagnosis into the formats used to communicate instructions and other control information to the subordinate elements being controlled by the headquarters. Some tactical MIS capabilities within the TacC2IS can bypass current operations staff entirely and totally automate certain routine monitoring and control functions. Either way, a well-designed tactical MIS capability allows current operations staff to quickly identify deviations from planned or expected performance and assists them with the selection and initiation of appropriate corrective actions to prevent those deviations from causing adverse consequences for the organization. The key attribute of the tactical MIS capability within the TacC2IS is data integration, the degree to which the disparate pieces of data important to execution phase decision making throughout the land operations chain of command can be maintained, aggregated and manipulated to provide individual current operations staff officers with timely, accurate, verifiable information relevant to the situation at hand and in a form they find useful. The design and implementation of the overall computer-based tactical management information system capability (i.e., input, data files, processes, outputs, people and hardware) within the TacC2IS must meet the data integration requirements of the current operations staff officers within the land operations chain of command, when used under operational conditions. 5. The plans staff at the various headquarters within the land operations chain of command also need to retrieve and process all of the information relevant to a particular situation in order to evaluate, interpret and analyse it in preparation for presentation to their commanders. In their case, however, the requirement is for timely access to accurate, relevant, verifiable information
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about the likely effects of various alternative courses of action in formats that allow that information to be used directly in their decision making. This calls for a tactical planning support capability within the TacC2IS that will allow plans staffs to explore and, if possible, quantitatively compare decision alternatives in terms of some agreed upon set of performance measures. Much like the DSS found in the business information system domain, the tactical planning support capability should contain enough structure to support rigorous analysis of the tactical alternatives. One significant difference between the traditional DSS and a tactical planning support capability is the absence of a knowledge base of heuristic information. The heuristic planning information associated with tactical land operations requires more judgement and insight than can presently be represented in computer data files. The staff officers from the various staff branches, arms and services must apply this knowledge to select the inputs, guide the execution of the computer programs and to interpret the output produced by the computer models. Therefore, the processes by which planning information is produced and used must consist of a tight interaction between human procedures and computer programs; the two must be developed together if the computer-based planning support capability within the TacC2IS is to be effective. A well-designed tactical planning support capability allows plans staff to understand (a) which course of action is preferable in terms of the criteria applied during the analysis, (b) which factors relevant to the decision those criteria represent and (c) the degree of uncertainty associated with the preference for one alternative over all others. The key attribute of the tactical planning support capability within the TacC2IS is validity, the degree to which the models within the system, including those created by users, provide a useful representation of the real world problem confronting the supported commander(s). The design and implementation of the overall computer-based tactical planning support capability (i.e., input, data files, processes, outputs, people and hardware) must satisfy the validity requirements of the plans staffs and commanders within land operations chain of command, when used under operational conditions. 6. Finally, commanders throughout the land operations chain of command must be able to use the accurate, up-to-date information available to them through the TacC2IS operational database effectively and efficiently in order to quickly and accurately assess the situation, make sound decisions and issue appropriate directions. Because command involves the creative expression of human will, commanders need a capability within the TacC2IS that will provide them with timely access to the accurate, relevant, verifiable information they need, whenever they need it and in whatever form they find to be most useful. Such a commanders information system capability is patterned on the executive information systems found in the business information system domain. A well-designed commanders information system is at once an upward extension of the various tactical MIS capabilities and tactical planning support capabilities within the TacC2IS and the driving force behind the design and implementation of those staff support capabilities. In the Canadian LF, commanders are the central focus of the command function and, hence, of the command support capability. Therefore, the primary purpose of the tactical transaction processing capability, the tactical MIS capability and the tactical planning support capability within the TacC2IS is to provide commanders at all levels of the land operations chain of command with timely access to the accurate, verifiable information they require to make sound tactical decisions. Where these capabilities provide staff officers with the tools to make decisions and issue direction, it is because they do so on behalf of the commander in order to relieve him of direct responsibility for the myriad minor details involved in the planning and execution of land operations.
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7. For the commanders information system to operate effectively, subordinate commanders, HQ staff officers and analysts throughout the land operations chain of command must ensure that the information available to commanders from various other systems through the commanders information system is timely and accurate. The essential purpose of the commanders information system capability within the TacC2IS is to allow commanders at all levels to determine, interactively with the system, which information is relevant to their current situation and in what formats that information is most usable to them. It is aimed at aiding tactical commanders in exploring the deeper significance of the information available to them by allowing them to shape and study that information in imaginative and original ways based on their experience and insight. For example, the commanders information system might allow a commander to isolate and interactively re-organize information from a series of standard contact reports generated by the tactical transaction processing capability within the TacC2IS. By combining, aggregating and representing the information contained in those reports in a variety of ways, the commander can allow his or her personal experience and intuition to see the information from many different perspectives. A commanders information system may also allow a commander to create entirely new aggregations of information and perspectives from which to study them that cross the functional, organizational and geographical lines within the land operations chain of command by combining the information from a number of different summary reports generated by staff officers at various headquarters using the tactical MIS capability. 8. The commanders information system imposes very little structure, leaving commanders free to organize and re-organize information in as many ways, and in as many formats, as possible. This type of semi-structured, interactive dialogue with the information available within the TacC2IS is a key to sparking the sort of creative insights necessary for understanding novel situations, making new connections between potential causes and effects and generating innovative solutions to problems. Thus, the commanders information system aims to support the creative and intuitive aspects of planning and executing land operations, rather than the more structured and analytical aspects associated with the routine staff work involved in the planning, direction and control of standardized activities. A well-designed commanders information system capability allows commanders at all levels to find novel or innovative relationships within the available information in order to (a) grasp the underlying causes of problems with the organizations tactical performance, (b) recognize important new tactical opportunities for the organization and (c) identify emerging threats to the organizations tactical success. The key attribute of the commanders information system capability within the TacC2IS is intuitiveness, the degree to which the system not only behaves in ways that appear intuitive to commanders (making it easy to use), but actually stimulates the commanders intuition and supports creative problem solving in the planning and execution of land operations. The design and implementation of the overall computer-based commanders information system capability (i.e., input, data files, processes, outputs, people and hardware) within the TacC2IS must meet the intuitiveness requirements of commanders throughout the land operations chain of command, when used under operational conditions. 9. Notwithstanding the fact that much of the structure and functional capability of the TacC2IS is drawn from the business information system domain, the tactical command and control of land operations is a real-time system. The controlled system is the actual combat power of the fighting units and formations, i.e., the sensors are the reconnaissance and surveillance vehicles, the unmanned aerial vehicles, the electronic intercept and direction finding systems, the foot patrols and so on, while the actuators are the tanks, guns, armoured
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personnel carriers and so on that deliver the effects that alter the external environment to fit Canadas political and diplomatic will. In other words, these are the assets that monitor the current state of the battle space and, when so directed, act to change that state in ways beneficial to the achievement of the forces tactical, operational and strategic objectives. The controlling system is the chain of command, the unbroken sequence of commanders, supported by their staffs, that connects each individual soldier to Canadas national objectives. The chain of command acts as the regulating element in the feedback loop by which the operation of the overall system, in this case a LF field organization conducting tactical operations, is controlled. 10. As United States Air Force Colonel John Boyd famously explained, war is a timecompetitive struggle. The side that can correctly understand the situation first and, therefore, initiate an appropriate action first has a decided advantage over the adversary who must now try to understand the new situation created by the side that acted first. This means that response times to events in the battlespace have finite and specified deadlines. These deadlines are determined by the enemys capacity to actin order to win, one must operate with a shorter observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA) cycle than ones adversary. These deadlines are real, and so are the consequences of missing them. Tactical land operations must be categorized as soft real-time systems, because deadlines can occasionally be missed without causing disastrous consequences. However, if a single major deadline or a series of minor deadlines is missed, the system will fail to achieve its mission. Thus, the controlling system must operate in real-time, subject to strict timing and reliability constraints. 11. This all means that the TacC2IS is a real-time information processing system, the correctness of which depends not only on the logical results of the information processing activities carried on within it, but also on the time at which those results are produced. Each and every process, from transaction processing through aggregation and summary reporting to support control of ongoing operations through analyses conducted in support of planning, all the way to command decision making as a creative act of human will, is subject to the rigours of timing and reliability constraints derived from the need to interact with the external world as events occur. It is this combination of the need to capture, organize and manipulate vast amounts of information in order to understand and reason about what is in essence a very complex, unstructured situation with the need for real-time response times on the order of seconds, minutes and hours that makes army TacC2IS a unique class of computer-based information systems. The design and implementation of the overall computer-based tactical command and control information system (i.e., input, data files, processes, outputs, people and hardware) must meet the timeliness requirements for the initiation of appropriate tactical actions, when used under operational conditions. 220. TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL INFORMATION SYSTEM RESPONSIBILITIES 1. The staff decides access authorizations, authentication procedures, data retention and release criteria, and basic operating procedures. In order to ensure that the TacC2IS functions effectively and efficiently as part of the overall command support capability, Signals: a. executes the staff directives through hardware distribution, software management, and network management;
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b. c. d.
maintains technical control of the LF TacC2IS, including ensuring interoperability with other systems as necessary; operates and provides first line maintenance of TacC2IS software and hardware at headquarters; and operates TacC2IS facility control centres (FCC), which give real time fault control of the system.
221. SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT OF THE TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL INFORMATION SYSTEM 1. The unique nature of army Tac2CIS presents a significant challenge to those who must specify, design, construct, operate, manage and employ such systems because the knowledge, methods, techniques and tools available to support the performance of these activities have generally been developed to meet the needs of one or more of the traditional classes of computer-based information system. Almost since the introduction of electronic digital computing, the computer-based systems realm has been divided into two distinct domains: business information systems (often referred to generically as management information systems) and real-time control systems (sometimes referred to as embedded systems). Each domain enjoys a very large community of practice, and is well supported by academic institutions, industry standards bodies and professional journals. However, because each domain comprehensively addresses the particular needs of an entire sphere of uses for computer-based information processing, and because there is as yet very little overlap between those spheres of use, little in the way of models, methods, techniques and tools are shared between the two domains. On the other hand, one of the things that makes army Tac2CIS so unique is that the most fundamental functions and characteristics that define any computerbased system as being part of either one domain or the other are of equal importance in army Tac2CIS. This is perhaps the principal reason for the extreme difficulty military forces around the world seem to be encountering in developing and employing these systems. 2. An army TacC2IS is a complex computer-based information processing system that seeks to utilize the most current technology for its hardware and software platforms as well as the latest techniques for software definition, development and life-cycle maintenance. In addition, its implementation involves the co-ordination, interface and, eventually, integration of several information systems, some of which are more advanced than the Tac2CIS in their lifecycle and others of which have not yet been initiated. Furthermore, experience has shown that information systems interact very strongly with their environment and the requirements of these systems evolve not only with time but also with use. With time and experience, the users needs and expectations will evolve and require more sophistication and performance. In such an environment, the risks associated with using a linear approach to life-cycle management are unacceptable; therefore, an evolutionary approach will be applied. The development and implementation of new system versions must be carefully planned and managed to avoid damage to the current operational system and discrepancies between the identified requirements and the implemented versions. However, the users of army Tac2CIS cannot rely upon system developers and technical experts to produce the systems they need based simply on past experience and the use of industry standard practices; they must take ownership of their requirements and remain active participants throughout the entire process of developing systems by which to satisfy them. The developers, for their part, must constantly work to find better ways of specifying, designing and constructing systems that will meet the needs and expectations of army Tac2CIS users.
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3. The method traditionally used to define the requirements for a Tac2CIS rests upon two fundamental principles. The first is primacy of data and the second is the progressive decomposition of the problem into its constituent parts in a coherent manner. The reason for the primacy of data is that experience in the information systems field has shown an organizations data is relatively stable when compared with the functions that are performed. The data usually only changes when the mission of the organization changes, whereas the functions performed adapt to changes in the environment in which the organization operates. Therefore, an information system based upon the data will be more stable and will likely require fewer resources to maintain during its lifecycle than one based upon functions. Moreover, in complex environments a shared database is the prime integrating force that provides coherence to the overall information system. 4. The progressive decomposition of the problem starts at the overall or purpose of the system and then analyses the constituent components at successive levels of detail until sufficient detail has been exposed to permit the solution design phase to begin. This is the tried and true engineering approach of breaking a large, complex problem down into a coherent set of manageable problems that can then each be solved and the solutions subsequently integrated to solve the original problem. This decomposition can take the form of data flow diagrams, object interaction diagrams, use cases or any other method for describing the functional information processing behaviour of the system. Because different parts of the system emphasize different functions and characteristics, the methods and tools must be selected in order to match the particular problem being addressed. Proper selection and use of techniques and tools drawn from these methods can ensure the logical correctness of the resulting computer-based system. 5. It is important to remember, however, that the correctness of an army Tac2CIS depends not only on the logical results of its computations, but also on the time at which the results are produced. Therefore, whatever methods, techniques and tools are used to decompose and describe the functional behaviour of the system must incorporate (i.e., explicitly model) the time constraints on the information processing tasks within that behaviour, as well as the need to perform the tasks in some alternative way in the event of system failure. This presents a significant challenge to existing methods, techniques and tools for the development of computer-based information systems. Lacking adequate models with which to analyse and define the impact of timing constraints on system design and implementation, more reliance must be placed on prototyping and experimentation. In fact, under the contemporary circumstances it is impossible to separate development of the system from use of the system. Just as the human procedures and computer programs must evolve together in a symbiotic relationship, so too must the users and developers come together in a way that blurs, if not eradicates, the line between development and use.
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CHAPTER 3 TACTICAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION 301. GENERAL
1. Operational success will continue to be more and more dependent upon knowledge based, network-enabled Command. Increasingly, the Army will be a digitized force to the lowest level possible, incorporating the application of current and evolving technologies. Interconnectivity and interoperability must be maintained between headquarters (HQ) that are linked to an array of sensors, surveillance, reconnaissance and strike platforms. Units and individual soldiers will provide commanders and staffs at all levels and echelons with an increasingly near real-time, relevant and multi-dimensional common operating picture (COP). Communications and Information Systems (CIS) provide the underlying infrastructure for a network-enabled command capability that supports operations by providing the integrated information network necessary to achieve the Commanders goal of information superiority in the battlespace. Communications and Information Systems encompasses two distinct but closely related systems, the communications systems (CS) that are used to relay information between locations, and the information systems (IS) that are used by individuals to store, retrieve, process and display information in support of their job-related tasks. Information systems specifically designed and employed to support the exercise of command and control over military forces are referred to as command and control information systems (C2IS). 2. In order for the Army to successfully operate in a Joint, Interagency, Multi-national and Public (JIMP) context the CIS must possess a high degree of interoperability. Communications and Information Systems must provide reliable connectivity within and between the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Communications and Information Systems must include interfaces with coalition forces and national and international infrastructure to enable the acquisition, processing and distribution of the information necessary to ensure the successful execution of the commanders mission. 3. This chapter presents the principles and general characteristics of a tactical communications (TacComms) system for the Canadian Land Forces in the early twenty-first century. These principles and characteristics are not specific to any particular equipment or system, but rather are the conceptual foundations upon which such equipment and systems are to be designed, constructed, operated, managed and employed. While this chapter lays out the general communications requirements at various Land Force (LF) organizational levels, it does not prescribe the technical implementation of a tactical communications system by which to satisfy them. Operations and engineering staffs must continually define and develop specifications for communications hardware and software that make maximum use of evolving technologies to improve the capabilities of the LF TacComms. 4. Any form of communication involves patterns: for example, patterns of ink on a printed page, electrical current variations on a wire or vibrating air molecules. In order to communicate information, we must first agree on assigned meanings for particular patterns, and then find a way to transmit sequences of such patterns. The paths between communication parties are called communication channels or communications links, and might involve electrical cable, telephone lines, microwave channels or some combination of these. The devices employed to
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send and receive information across a channel or link are usually called stations; when we need to distinguish their respective roles in the communications process, we refer to them as transmitters and receivers. We can simplify matters for now by concentrating on communications channels that merely connect one station to another. Of course, more than two stations may be linked together on a single channel, but this is an example of networking, which will be addressed later on. 5. A communication channel between stations requires a medium over which to transmit (convey) the signal. This transmission medium is the physical path between the transmitter and the receiver in a communication system. Information is transferred by creating patterns in the energy flow (electricity, radio waves, light and sound) through the medium. Such a pattern is called signalling. Different forms of signalling are appropriate for different media. A communications system requires a means by which to get information, in the form of signals, onto and off of the particular transmission medium being used. The speed of information transfer refers to the rate at which symbols can be passed across a link. Distance, the overall length of the link, is an important consideration since it may affect the degree of signal loss. Most of the limitations on information transfer speed and distance can be lifted through the use of more sophisticated technology, but this raises questions about the cost of communications. The installation, maintenance, operation and management of signalling devices are some of the primary responsibilities of Signals. 302. TERMINOLOGY
1. Line of Sight Communications. Although Line of Sight Communications (LOS) systems are heavily terrain-dependent, LOS TacComms are systems whose operational ranges are typically limited to 30 to 40 kilometres due to the curvature of the earth (optical LOS is limited directly by the curvature whereas radio LOS can extend slightly beyond due to the behaviour of radio waves). 2. Beyond Line of Sight Communications. Beyond Line of Sight Communications (BLOS) systems provide the links needed for communications between stations when they are deployed at greater than LOS distances from each other. These TacComms are becoming the norm rather than the exception on the nonlinear, non-contiguous battlefield. SECTION 2 MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS 303. 1. GENERAL The means of communication are defined as follows: a. Telecommunications. The conveyance of information between individuals or locations by sending agreed upon signals over a transmission medium, composed of the following methods: (1) Electrical/Electronic. Signals is responsible for the planning, installation, operation, maintenance and management of electrical/electronic telecommunications systems and facilities integral to the Canadian LF. Signals is also responsible for the planning, coordination and management of the Canadian Land Forces use of nonB-GL-351-001/FP-001
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integral electrical/electronic telecommunications systems and facilities, including those provided by other CF organizations, allied military forces, public infrastructures and commercial interests. (2) (3) b. Visual. Signals no longer has any responsibilities associated with the employment of visual means of communication. Aural. Signals has no responsibilities associated with the employment of aural means of communications.
Physical Communications. The conveyance of information between individuals or locations by a person or persons entrusted to carry a physical copy of the information from origin to destination which include: (1) (2) postal; and messenger/courier (i.e. hand carriage).
304.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
1. Telecommunications is the traditional term for wide-area communications handling all types of traffic, including voice, data and video. Convergence is becoming more important in telecommunications networks. Convergence is defined as the techniques used to format, transport, or interpret voice, data and video traffic, using the same network facilities. Convergence can be implemented at three levels in communications: a. b. c. at the transmission level, voice, data and video are carried by the same transmission medium, but they are independent; at the network level, voice, data and video are carried by a single network that is aware of the differences between them; and at the application level, there is a logical connection among voice, data and video which is understood by the communication equipment.
2. Electrical/Electronic Means. Electrical/Electronic transmission media may be classified as either guided or unguided. In both cases, communication is in the form of electromagnetic waves. With guided media, the waves are guided along a solid conductor that physically interconnects the transmitter and the receiver; examples of guided media are twisted pair, coaxial cable, and optical fibre. Traditional Signals terminology refers to all such guided transmission media as line. 3. Unguided media provide a means for transmitting electromagnetic waves but do not guide them; examples are propagation through air, vacuum and seawater. Traditional Signals terminology refers to all such unguided transmission media as radio or wireless. 4. Electrical/electronic communication modes include telephony, computer based information systems, imagery, video and database technology which furnish rapid, multicapacity communications needed for the conduct of operations. They are described as follows:
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a.
Telephony (Voice). This is the transmission and reception of speech and as an operational mode can be half-duplex, full duplex, point to point or broadcastall informed in nature. It is still the most common method available to tactical LF. Telephony uses a multitude of TacComms including Combat Net Radio (CNR), area trunk systems using radio or line, cellular based phone system, Canadian and host nation public switched networks and military and commercial communications satellite systems. Where required, all voice transmissions are encrypted and classed as secure in keeping with current communications security policies. Computer Based Systems. Command and Control systems utilized today and into the future rely on secure networks based on current and evolving technology. Using battlefield automation systems and communications allows users to share resources and pass information by maximizing the available information networks through near seamless connectivity and interoperability. This means allows for managing, transporting via messaging, processing and presenting data as usable information. This information can take the form of imagery, video, colour graphics, digital overlays, geospatial and database related information. Information can be passed, then printed as hardcopy or stored on a magnetic or optical medium for future reference. Documents and images sent throughout the network can be restricted by limitations present in the CIS infrastructure. Facsimile (Imagery). Facsimile is the transmission of fixed images with subsequent reproduction in permanent form. It supports the transmission and reception of written text, pictures, maps, traces or other similar graphic material. This has largely been superseded as a tactical means by C2IS computer based multimedia technology but through its use of a simplified universal protocol a capacity may be retained for communicating with allied or coalition members who may not have a compatible CS. Video. This is the transmission and reception of transient images of fixed or moving objects. This can be video teleconferencing, whiteboard, chat exchanges or actual closed circuit television in format. While some specialized equipment is required to implement the respective modes, the main cost to communications is the considerable bandwidth consumption, which varies with the format choice. Database Technologies. This is the transmission and reception of information in digital format and is the responsibility of the digitized TacComms. It should be noted that the storage and processing of this digital information is the domain of the IS, which will be addressed later. Analog information, such as voice communication, may be transmitted by this method but must first be converted into digital form. This conversion process is inherent in the design of the TacComms used. Data or digital systems in the form of networks have the ability to handle large amounts of warehoused data information, graphics and digital voice. Data may be transmitted in fully automated modes and at high speeds. The use of image compression, multimedia and evolving transmission technologies will allow for the transfer and viewing of three-dimensional imagery and graphics along with video from various sensors and platforms.
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c.
d.
e.
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5. Visual Means. Visual means are those methods of transmission that can be received by optical systems. Visual means are available to everyone and are useful to send simple, prearranged signals over short distances. Visual codes are insecure and can be imitated by the enemy to deceive and confuse. In the absence of other electronically based TacComms, visual means is an extremely useful form of LOS short-range communications and may be less vulnerable to enemy actions. Some of the visual LOS means of communicating are: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. arm and hand signals; aircraft manoeuvres; directional and non-directional flashing and coloured lights; flags; infra-red (IR); pyrotechnics, including coloured smoke (as authorized in ACP 168 current Canadian approved edition); and panels.
6. Aural. This means of communication utilizes sound signals for the transmission of information over audible ranges such as whistles, horns, sirens or voice amplifiers. Sound signals are vulnerable to interception and can be imitated by the enemy, thus their usefulness may be impaired by local and battle noises. 305. PHYSICAL COMMUNICATIONS
1. Postal Services. This means of communication involves the use of general-purpose mail handling systems to convey information recorded on a physical storage medium, such as paper, magnetic tape, computer disk(ette), CD, DVD, etc., from a source to a destination. It is the primary means by which personal and welfare-related letters and packages are communicated between deployed military personnel and civilians anywhere in the world. Postal services are not normally used for military operational or administrative traffic because ordinary mail handling systems do not generally provide the speed, flexibility and security necessary for such communications. The provision of postal services to the Canadian Land Forces is a logistics function for which Signals has no responsibility. 2. Hand Carriage. This means of communication involves one or more designated individuals hand carrying operational or administrative information recorded on a physical storage medium, such as paper, plastic talc, magnetic tape, computer disk(ette), CD, DVD, etc., from a source to a destination. It differs from postal services in that hand carriage is planned, operated and managed specifically to satisfy the speed, flexibility and security requirements of military operational and administrative communication. All arms and services employ hand carriage in the form of liaison officers, messengers and runners. Signals provides common user hand carriage services as an adjunct to its electrical/electronic telecommunications systems and facilities when necessary to ensure the timely, secure conveyance of operational and administrative information for which Signals is responsible.
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306.
TRANSMISSION CAPACITY
1. It is evident that the electrical/electronic means best satisfy the tactical requirements for rapid, high capacity communications. The ability to use these means will depend on the characteristics of the information to be transmitted, the distances to be covered and the operational environment. The amount of information that can be transmitted by electrical/electronic means depends on a number of technical factors. The three most important factors are: a. b. c. signalling speed; redundancy; and bandwidth.
2. Signalling Speed. The amount of information that can be passed will vary directly with the rate at which it can be transmitted and received. However, this by itself may be misleading, as it gives no indication of response time. Speech rates over voice circuits average less than 100 words per minute; however, the response time for person-to-person conversation is fast. Data transmission is very fast, enabling users at different levels of command at different locations to access information concurrently in a near real-time or real-time manner. 3. Redundancy. Redundancy is the proportion of non-essential information that the system passes while conveying the essential information. Visual modes of transmission possess more inherent redundancy than speech modes while the latter are more redundant than data modes: a. Visual. The amount of redundancy inherent in facsimile and television depends on the picture to be transmitted. In both cases, it is considerably greater than speech. Speech. Normal conversation is not formalized and it is usually spontaneous as opposed to deliberate and condensed. Speech transmissions include all unproductive pauses and noises made in order to create a sense of intimacy between speakers. Data. This is the least redundant mode of transmission but the length, number and spacing of the code elements introduces some redundancy to gain readability and accuracy. High-speed electronic techniques such as Cyclical Redundancy Checks (CRC) exist to ensure that data is successfully exchanged between subscribers to a system.
b.
c.
4. Bandwidth. Bandwidth is the frequency range (i.e. the band of frequencies or wavelengths) over which a transmission circuit is allowed to operate. Bandwidth also refers to the amount of data that can be transmitted in a fixed amount of time. For digital devices, bandwidth is expressed in bits per second (bps) or bytes (8 bits) per second (Bps). For analog devices, bandwidth is expressed in cycles per second, or Hertz (Hz). Transmission capacity is proportional to the allowed bandwidth of the circuit. The necessary bandwidth is the minimum value of bandwidth sufficient to ensure the successful transmission of information at the rate and with the quality required for the system employed. Some of the effects of transmission modes on bandwidth are as follow:
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a.
Data. The transmission requirements for coded data such as used in automated systems require higher speeds and the acceptable error rates are normally lower. This leads to wider bandwidths being utilized. Current (at time of publication) systems carry 100 MB LANs within vehicles, 10 MB connection vehicle-to-vehicle, from 256 kbps to 2 MB bandwidth on LOS radios and 16 kbps over CNR. The bandwidth capabilities will increase with new technologies as they emerge and system updates are applied. Voice. Voice may be transmitted in analog formfor example, over a simple telephone circuit, over a 3 kHz bandwidthbecause the electrical signal is a direct analog of the voice signal. When voice is converted to a type of digital code, for example, for encryption, it can be transmitted over difficult paths but at the expense of a greatly increased bandwidth (30 to 40 kHz). Facsimile. A still picture can be transmitted slowly over a voice circuit or more rapidly over a data circuit of greater bandwidth. Largely superseded by C2 Message Handling Systems supporting attachments, facsimile transmission is retained for legacy purposes and for basic communications with non-digitized allies and coalition members. Video. The reproduction of moving or transient imagery requires an increased bandwidth with, as an example, closed circuit television being some five hundred or more times larger than that required for a single voice circuit (up to 3 MHz). However, digitized video and video teleconferencing operate on much reduced bandwidths by slowing the scan and refresh rates of the individual pictures that together constitute the video.
b.
c.
d.
307.
COMMUNICATION LINKS
1. Communication link is the general term used to describe the connection over which signals are passed between two directly communicating stations. The term includes both the physical transmission medium and the devices that use that medium to provide one or more communication channels between the stations. Communication links are categorized by the degree to which signals can be passed in both directions over the physical transmission medium between communicating stations. There are four types of communication links: simplex, half-duplex, duplex and multiplex. 2. Simplex. A simplex communication link can pass signals in only one direction between stations. One of the stations is equipped with a transmitter; the other station is equipped with a receiver. This provides one-way communication from the source station to the destination station over the single physical transmission path by which they are connected. The most common examples of simplex communication links are commercial radio and television broadcasts. 3. Half-Duplex. A half-duplex communication link can pass signals in both directions between stations, but only in one direction at a time. Each station is equipped with a dualpurpose receiver/transmitter to permit two-way communication over the single physical transmission path by which they are connected; however, only one station at a time may transmit a signal over the shared path. Common examples of half-duplex communication links include walkie-talkies, citizen band (CB) radio and combat net radio.
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4. Duplex. A duplex communication link can pass signals between stations in both directions at the same time. In order to send and receive signals simultaneously, each station is equipped with a both a transmitter and a receiver. This simultaneous two-way communication requires the establishment of two physical transmission paths between the communicating stations so that each transmitter has a dedicated connection to the receiver at the other station. Thus, a duplex link is really two simplex links passing signals in opposite directions between the communicating stations. Duplex links are sometimes called full-duplex links, but this term is considered redundant and its use is to be discouraged. The term four-wire circuit is a traditional term used in line networks to indicate a duplex link consisting of two pairs of wires, each providing a simplex link between the communicating stations. In radio networks, a duplex link consists of two different carrier frequencies, each providing a simplex link between the communicating stations. A familiar example of a duplex communication link is a telephone. 5. Multiplex. A multiplex link can pass more than one signal between stations at the same time. This allows more than one source to convey information simultaneously over the same physical transmission path. In addition to transmit and/or receive device(s), each station is equipped with a multiplexer that divides the overall bandwidth of the physical transmission path into a number of separately accessible lower-bandwidth paths. Each of these lower-bandwidth paths provides an independent communication channel capable of carrying its own signal between the communicating stations. In other words, a multiplex link uses a single physical transmission path to provide a number of communication channels between stations. This allows each of a number of sources at one station (up to the number of channels multiplexed onto the transmission path) to communicate independently with a selected destination at the other station as if each source-destination pair had its own physical transmission path between the communicating stations. Common examples of multiplex links are cable television distribution systems that use a single cable to simultaneously deliver a number of television channels to a cable subscriber, telephone trunks that use a single microwave link to simultaneously carry a number of separate subscriber calls between telephone exchanges and satellite links that use a single physical transmission path to simultaneously carry a variety of telephone and data services to CF personnel deployed on a mission somewhere in the world. 308. MODULATION SYSTEMS
1. Modulation. Modulation is the process by which the intelligence to be transmitted, e.g., the voice signal, is superimposed on the radio or carrier wave. Common terms associated with modulation systems used with tactical radio are: a. b. c. d. e. Amplitude Modulation; Frequency Modulation; Phase Modulation; Pulse Modulation; and Spread Spectrum Techniques.
2. Amplitude Modulation (AM). The amplitude of the carrier wave is varied in accordance with the signal carrying the intelligence. A complex wave form results consisting of the original carrier wave plus two bands of frequencies called sidebands, one above and one below the carrier frequency. The system is simple but not very efficient since both sidebands contain the
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same intelligence and the carrier wave contains none. This modulation technique is also prone to carrying both man-made and natural electrical disturbances. All older, high frequency (HF) radios employ AM. 3. Single Sideband (SSB). This is a form of AM in which only one of the sidebands is transmitted; the second sideband and the carrier may be suppressed. Compared with double sideband AM, SSB increases by about 50% the ground wave range for a given weight of radio and battery, and occupies a much narrower bandwidth. SSB adds to the complexity of the radio set and requires a high standard of frequency stability. Independent sideband (ISB) is a variation on this system in which both sidebands are transmitted but each one is modulated with a different intelligence signal. 4. Frequency Modulation (FM). In this method of modulation, the frequency of the carrier wave is varied by the intelligence signal. The resulting radio system is more complex than in AM but is considerably more efficient: it provides higher quality circuits with better signal-to-noise ratios and weak interfering signals are suppressed. On the other hand, the transmitted signal occupies a wide bandwith, a result which precludes its use below very high frequency (VHF) and limits its range. FM is the standard method for combat net radio (CNR). 5. Phase Modulation (PM). In this method, the phase of the carrier wave is modulated by the intelligence signal. This technique is used either as a preliminary stage to FM to avoid the need for extensive frequency stabilization or alone. In this latter case, it requires a wide bandwidth. 6. Pulse Modulation. An alternative method to the transmission of intelligence by a continuous wave is the transmission by a series of short carrier-wave pulses. The most frequently used variants of this technique are: a. Pulse Amplitude Modulation (PAM). The mixing of the intelligence wave and the carrier wave is done as for normal AM except that the transmitter is turned on and off. The pulses are equally spaced and of equal duration (1 to 3 microseconds) but vary in amplitude. This technique produces very low average power in relation to peak power and allows the driving of the transmitting circuits far above their normal power ratings for continuous operation. A second advantage is increased signal-to-noise ratio if the receiver is silenced during the pulse intervals. Pulse Frequency Modulation (PFM). The mixing of the intelligence wave and the carrier wave is done as for normal FM except that the transmitter is turned on and off. In this case, the amplitude of the pulses remains constant and the frequency of the carrier is made to vary from pulse to pulse by the modulator. This technique provides the same advantages as PAM under the same conditions. PAM and PFM techniques can be combined to achieve diplexing. Pulse Width Modulation (PWM). In this method, the transmitter produces carrier pulses of constant amplitude and frequency but of varying duration. The duration or width of the pulses is varied in accordance with the amplitude of the modulating signal while the frequency of the pulse variations is made equal to the modulating frequency. This technique is readily adaptable to multiplexing in telephony.
b.
c.
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d.
Pulse Time Modulation (PTM). Contrary to previous pulse modulation variants where at least one characteristic of the pulse is altered in accordance with the audio modulating signal, in this technique, a series of pulses are transmitted, which are of constant amplitude, duration and frequency but with variable timing. The time interval between successive pulses is made to vary in accordance with the instantaneous amplitude of the modulating signal. The frequency of the pulses is governed by the frequency of the modulating voltage. This technique has the following advantages: the signals are very simple; noise can be considerably reduced to achieve higher signal-to-noise ratio than AM or FM systems; the total bandwidth requirement of a PTM system is independent of the number of channels used. This technique is widely used in multi-channel radio and cable telephone communications, ultra high frequency (UHF) broadcasting and TV sound channels. Pulse Code Modulation (PCM). In this form of modulation the amplitude of the modulating signal is sampled at regular intervals and transmitted as a binary code group of pulses. The size of the group of pulses increases with the requirement for higher fidelity with an attendant increase in bandwith. Digital techniques are advantageous in that much more intelligence can be transmitted at a faster rate compared to the other forms of modulation. Also, the encryption of voice signals is much simpler to accomplish when the intelligence is converted into digital form from its initial analogue form. These systems require a wide bandwidth for more efficient operation and are, therefore, suitable for high capacity trunk circuits. Delta Modulation (DM). This modulation uses the same technique as PCM; however, instead of the absolute signal amplitude being transmitted, at each sample, only the changes in signal amplitude from sampling instant to sampling instant are transmitted.
e.
f.
7. Spread Spectrum Techniques. Spread spectrum is a generic term applied to a signal whose bandwidth is much larger than that necessary to pass the information. These techniques, through the properties of coded modulation, can provide systems which produce low interference to other systems, have high interference rejection capability and provide multiple access capability. Although their efficiency is lower than that of frequency division or time division systems, these systems are of special interest in military communication systems because of their resistance to enemy jamming and low probability of intercept. There are three main methods employed in these systems and a particular system may employ one or more depending on the design of the system: a. Direct Sequence Modulation. The digital information signal is combined with a pseudo-random binary sequence signal which has a much higher bit rate (1000 times or more) and the resultant signal is used to change either the frequency or the phase of the carrier. The bandwidth of the transmitted signal is, therefore, broadened far beyond what is needed to accommodate the information and has all the appearances of noise. At the receiver, the identical pseudo-random binary sequence signal must be used to demodulate the carrier in order to recover the original information.
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b.
Frequency Hopping. The digital information is used to modulate the radio frequency carrier in the normal manner, however, a pseudo-random code is then used to pulse the carrier frequency over a large bandwidth. A typical system might employ over 250 different frequencies with the carrier changing frequencies at a rate of 100 times per second. The receiver must employ the identical pseudorandom code in order to tune to the correct frequency at the correct instant and recover the signal. Linear Frequency Modulation (also known as "Chirp"). A long transmitted pulse is suitably modulated and its frequency is linearly increased from F1 to F2 during the pulse duration. Only a matched receiver can demodulate the signal. This technique is often applied to radar systems but is not generally used for communications. It is, however, used in the HF band to scan the ionosphere to determine the optimum traffic frequency (called a "Chirp Sounder").
c.
309.
MULTIPLEXING
1. Multiplexing is the transmission of two or more signals using a common carrier wave. It enables a number of voice or other channels to be sent over a single circuit. Multiplexing systems are generally described in terms of the numbers and types of channels which they are designed to accept. Common methods of multiplexing are: a. Frequency Division Multiplex (FDM). Prior to transmission, each communication channel is translated onto a unique band of frequencies within the bandwidth of the transmitted radio frequency carrier. This method is economical in bandwidth because it maximizes the number of channels which can be obtained from a radio link; it is the least complex and the most economical in frequency requirements. It is commonly used with FM or PCM. The most serious disadvantage of FDM is that the noise and signal distortion introduced in each path link of a radio system, e.g., radio relay, limits the number of links that can be employed in a single system. Time Division Multiplex (TDM). Each communications channel is allotted a discrete time slot within the basic sampling frame and each communication is then transmitted in turn, in the allotted time slot. It is normally used with PCM. A TDM/PCM system occupies a far greater bandwidth than an FDM system of the same channel capacity but it can give better results over inferior transmission paths. It also has some advantage when two or three radio relay links are connected in series, because the pulses can be reconstituted (i.e., cleaned up) after each link. The digital form of the signal is convenient for high speed automatic switching. TDM multiplexers use complex circuitry but are simple to set up and operate.
b.
2. Sub-multiplexing is the process of combining a telegraph or data circuit with a speech circuit or utilizing a speech width channel to carry a number of telegraph or data circuits. Most sub-multiplexing equipment use FDM techniques and can be transmitted over voice channel by either FDM or TDM systems. Some TDM equipment combines both the multiplexing and submultiplexing functions at one terminal.
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3. Multiplex and sub-multiplex transmissions employing voice frequency or radio frequency carrier may be operated over line. This is termed carrier telephony or telegraphy depending on the modes being operated. Multiplexed radio and line systems are referred to collectively as multi-channel systems. SECTION 3 RADIO COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 310. CHARACTERISTICS OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS
1. Radio communication or wireless communication is the transmission of information through space by means of electromagnetic waves. No physical transmission path is required. This fact gives radio its specific advantages: a. Flexibility. Communication can be established quickly and rearranged readily. Radio can carry all modes of communications as well and is capable of integration with other systems. Mobility. Terminals are not tied to a fixed transmission path and are free to move. Economy. No physical transmission path has to be constructed. Line-of-sight, such as area trunk and cellular systems, and BLOS, such as commercial and military satellite communications, require alignment between transmit and receive terminals. Adaptability. Communications can be provided across ground that is inaccessible and impassable. Security. While the terminals need physical protection online encryption of the transmitted signals provides the appropriate level of information protection.
b. c.
d. e. 2.
The major disadvantages of radio are: a. Vulnerability. Radio communication can be exploited and disrupted by enemy Electronic Attack (EA)17, such as jamming and/or deception to deny use of electronic emitters. To obviate this liability, special communication security (COMSEC) measures and Electronic Protection (EP)18 such as emission control (EMCON) and facility siting must be adopted. Interference. Radio communications are subject to natural and man-made interference. Natural interference can restrict the usefulness of radio in certain physical environments and in certain parts of the frequency spectrum; manmade interference can originate from other electrical or electronic equipment operated in the vicinity or on the same and adjacent frequencies. With the large number of electronic, electrical, surveillance, data, radar and radio systems,
b.
17 18
Formally known as electronic counter measures (ECM). Formally known as electronic protective measures (EPM).
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problems of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) are becoming ever more complex within the battlespace. c. Range. The power rating of radios, the nature of the ground, the propagation conditions, the propagation characteristics of the frequency band in use, all tend to limit the range over which reliable radio communication can be provided. Capacity. The traffic capacity of any link is limited by the type, power and bandwidth of the radio set.
d.
311.
FREQUENCY SPECTRUM
1. All users of electromagnetic radiations must share one single frequency spectrum. This sharing is regulated world wide by a UN agency, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). By international agreement the spectrum is divided into bands, sub-bands and frequencies designated for specific purposes. From these bands, allocations and assignments are made by national authorities who are responsible for ensuring their proper use. Frequencies which are likely to be received beyond national boundaries must be co-ordinated internationally. 2. Within these bands, allocations are made for civilian and military purposes. In addition to frequencies for radio communications, allocation must be made for radio location, navigation systems, surveillance equipments, fire control systems and various industrial processes. 3. Despite improvements in equipment design, the ever increasing civilian and military demand for frequencies makes the task of allocating frequencies ever more complex. The difficulty is increased by the fact that certain frequency bands are more effective than others for certain purposes. In war, the enemy will also be sharing the same frequency spectrum for his own purposes. 4. The frequency spectrum is divided into the following bands: a. Very Low Frequency (VLF) 3-30 kHz. This band offers few frequencies and this all but precludes its use for general communications. Parts of the band are used for long range radio navigation signalling (Omega), for frequency calibration and for sub-marine communications. The ground wave component has great penetration power and can travel in excess of 1600km. The sky wave component is perfectly reflected by the ionosphere and can encircle the globe. Power requirements are high. Low Frequencies (LF) 30-300 kHz. As for VLF, the ground wave component can reach relatively great distances. The sky wave component is subject to increasing attenuation as the frequency increases but it is not affected by ionospheric disturbances like HF and is a better transmission medium in the auroral zone. Ranges from 800 to 12000 km are possible. Medium Frequency (MF) 300-3000 kHz. This band is used intensively by civilian broadcast stations. The range of ground wave can vary from 80 km at 3000 kHz to 300 km at the lower limit of the band. Sky wave communication is unreliable during the day but at night distances of up to 5000 km can be achieved. Attenuation reaches its maximum at about 1800 kHz and varies with the season. At all times, fading is severe.
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c.
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d.
High Frequency (HF) 3-30 MHz. The range of the ground wave decreases to little more than line of sight distances. Long range sky wave communication is possible but is subject to ionospheric conditions: range will vary with frequency, day and night and solar activities. This band is used by the military for long-range communication and back up tactical radio nets. Civilian use includes radio amateurs, short wave broadcast, citizen's band and various industrial, scientific and medical users. Very High Frequency (VHF) 30-300 MHz. There is no usable surface wave and sky wave reflection in the lower part of the VHF band. This can only be achieved through sophisticated scatter techniques over ranges of 600 to 2000 km. Transmission in this band is done mostly through a direct wave which travels above the surface of the earth. The range is generally limited to line of sight, and the best results are obtained when antennas are elevated above the ground. Longer range can be obtained through a technique called automatic radio rebroadcast (RRB) in which a received signal is automatically retransmitted on a different frequency by the second radio of a rebroadcast station specially sited for this purpose. This band is used by the military for CNR and by civilians for FM radio and TV broadcast and air traffic control. Radio communication in this band is free from noise and interference, provides good speech quality and is reliable 24 hours a day over suitable terrain. Ultra High Frequency (UHF) 300-3000 MHz. Except for the lower part of this band where troposcatter reflection can achieve moderate ranges, communication is near line of sight. Lack of interference and fading generally affords high quality reception. Compact and directive antennas can concentrate the radiated energy in a narrow beam resulting in much greater transmission efficiency. The military use this band for air to ground communication, for radio relay transmission and for some satellite links. Civilian use includes TV broadcast, some industrial usage and satellite navigation. Super High Frequency (SHF) (3-30 GHz). This band offers many times the information carrying capacity of all lower bands put together. Throughout this band, wide band communications are obtained over line of sight paths with very low power. The reduced size of the antenna permits this form of transmission from aircraft or satellite, enabling global ranges to be achieved by retransmission. Transmissions in this band are subject to atmospheric absorption and will be affected by weather; i.e., rain, fog, etc. Extremely High Frequency (EHF) (30300 GHz). This band is also known as millimetric waves. Tropospheric, ionospheric and atmospheric absorption is severe in this band and circuits must be carefully engineered. Once established, these circuits offer high reliability and very wide bandwidths capable of large volumes of traffic. Ground range is normally limited to a few kilometres making enemy interception or jamming difficult, except when satellite or aircraft platforms are used. This band permits use of small dish antennas. The full capability of this band is still not fully exploited. In addition to satellite communication, the army could use this band for intra-HQ communications. Decimillimetric waves (300-3000 GHz). Imagery, target acquisition, surveillance devices and thermal sensors operate in this band. Atmospheric absorption is most severe in a humid or moist environment and ranges are reduced in fog and rain.
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f.
g.
h.
i.
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j.
Optical (400-800 tHz). Fibre optics transmission is done in this band. Attenuation is proportional to the degree of impurities found in the core of the transmission cable. Interference and interception is easily detectable. Laser devices can also be used to transmit light signals. Developments in laser technology may result in range finding, telecommunication and weapon control equipments for the military.
312.
RADIO PROPAGATION
1. Propagation Paths. There are two principal paths by which radio waves can travel from a transmitter to a receiver: by ground wave or sky wave. All radio transmissions use one or both of these paths or various associated phenomena. 2. Ground Wave. Ground waves travel more or less directly from the transmitter to the receiver (see Figure 3-1). This form of propagation is affected by the electrical characteristics of the ground and by the amount of diffraction, or bending, of the wave around the curvature of the earth. The components of the ground wave are: a. Direct Wave. This component travels directly through space from the transmitting to the receiving antenna. On the ground, range is limited to the line-of-sight distance plus the small distance added by atmospheric refraction diffraction of the wave around the curvature of the earth. The range can be extended by raising the height of the antenna above the ground. Range is also affected by antenna gain, the power of the transmitter and the sensitivity of the receiver. Ground Reflected Wave. The ground reflected wave is the portion of the direct wave that reaches the receiving antenna after being reflected from the surface of the earth. When both the transmitting and receiving antennas are on, or close to the ground, the direct and ground reflected components tend to cancel each other; Surface Wave. This component travels in contact with the ground and follows the curvature of the earth. The surface wave predominates at frequencies below 30 MHz and relatively long ranges can be expected over areas of high conductivity. Wave dissipation or attenuation is greatest over jungle and desert and is least over sea water. Although surface waves tend to follow the contours of the ground, obstacles such as hills gradually attenuate these waves by reflection, scattering, and absorption. Sky Wave. The second path over which radio waves can travel is through ionospheric reflection (see Figure 3-2). These waves travel up to the ionosphere and are reflected back to earth. Long distance transmission is achieved principally by the use of sky waves at HF. For very long ranges, (beyond 4000 km) transmission may take place by successive skips from the ionosphere and the earth's surface (multi-hop transmission). There are, however, some special considerations in achieving a sky wave path. Above 30 MHz, sky wave working is generally impossible. Furthermore, for any given path there are critical limits to the frequency and to the angle at which the wave must strike the reflecting medium (angle of incidence). The optimum frequency depends on the
b.
c.
d.
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geographic location of, and the distance between the transmitter and receiver, the time of day, and the season of the year. The path and angle of propagation determine to a large extent the type of antenna that must be employed. Depending on its frequency and the angle of attack, the reflected sky wave may return to a point lying within the range of the ground wave, or beyond it. In the former case, severe distortion of the received signal may result from the alternating reinforcement and cancellation of the two incoming waves. In the latter case, no signal will be received between the limit of ground wave reception and the point at which the sky wave returns to earth. The area in which no signal is received is termed the skip zone. Despite these limitations and except for periods of severe ionospheric disturbances, sky wave working can be a useful method of communication.
Figure 3-1: Ground Wave Transmission Paths
3. Forward Scatter Reflection. In addition to the relatively efficient reflection that can be achieved by a sky wave at HF, a much weaker reflection and scattering phenomenon occurs at considerably higher frequencies. Unlike sky wave reflection, which takes place only in the ionosphere, scattering takes place throughout a large volume of the atmosphere and at some depth causing the propagated wave to diffuse widely. The signal arriving at the receiver, therefore, is the sum of a large number of very small signals. As a result the signal strength is constantly varying with rapid short term seasonal and daily variations. Communications employing this path require high power transmitters, complex receivers, and high gain directional antennas. There are two forms of scatter transmission in wide use: a. Ionospheric Scatter. Ionospheric scatter operates in the frequency range of 25 to 60 MHz. It is a relatively narrow band method used to provide communications over ranges extending to 2500 km. The range, coupled with the size of the transmitters and antennas used in this mode of transmission, preclude mobility; it is therefore reserved for strategic links or for links between the rear of the combat zone and the communication zone.
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b.
Tropospheric Scatter. This mode of transmission operates over frequencies from 300 MHz to 8 GHz and can give ranges of several hundred km. Like ionospheric scatter, it requires high power transmitters and high gain antennas, but the shorter range stations can be made mobile. Used as a mixed voice and data wideband system, it can be used to extend the area trunk system in the rear combat zone, for example from corps to army group HQ. Siting of the antennas is critical and a danger zone exists around this high power radiator.
Figure 3-2: Transmission Paths
313.
RADIO COMMUNICATION BY SKY WAVE
1. Links. A link is a communication path of specified character between two points. Link communication for passage of voice or data signals can be achieved through sky wave High Frequency (HF) radio, scatter radio or satellite. Only HF sky wave radio will be dealt with in the following paragraphs. 2. Characteristics. Sky wave radio generally shows the characteristics of all radio communication however some specific aspects deserve mention: a. Capacity. A link is operated in the duplex mode whenever possible so as to provide enhanced traffic carrying capability as compared with net radio; however, this may not always be possible. In the HF band, capacity is mainly improved by increasing transmission speed. Automatic Link Establishment. Systems with Automatic Link Establishment (ALE) can react adaptively to changes in link conditions, e.g. by changing the traffic frequency, the transmitter power and/or the modulation format.
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b.
Manufacturers develop their own specific systems, therefore, the capability to interoperate with systems from other manufacturers may be limited. c. Mobility. The need for a number of elaborate and large antennas seriously limits the mobility of this type of station. Once installed, the station cannot be moved without an interruption in its communications. Signal Security. Because of the often-unpredictable range of sky wave transmission, considerable attention must be paid to security. High-grade encryption is required to adequately protect the information passing over such links. Vulnerability. Sky wave radio is vulnerable in the following ways: (1) The extensive antenna parks generally required for this type of operation are readily distinguishable by aerial or ground reconnaissance and present inviting targets. The requirement to operate these links within narrow and predictable frequency limits renders these systems very vulnerable to detection, and thus to jamming or direction finding. Electromagnetic Pulse. Electromagnetic pulses (EMP) or post nuclear atmospheric disturbances would black out these links for some time.
d.
e.
(2)
(3) 3.
Application. Sky wave radio is normally used for the following BLOS applications: a. b. c. d. Rear links from the area of operations (AO) to national HQ. Operational and administrative links within the AO and at the joint and coalition level. Communications to distant formation logistics installations such as a Sea Port of Debarkation (SPOD) and an Air Port of Debarkation (APOD). Communications to long-range patrols and to forces engaged in special operations.
4.
Choice of Frequency Bands: a. HF is the normal method of providing these communications although low frequency (LF) or medium frequency (MF) may be employed. The frequency selected depends on the availability of suitable radios and frequencies, the geographic location, path length and ionospheric conditions. Frequencies chosen for this form of transmission are based on estimates of path performance provided by prediction tables or computer calculations. Although generally dependable, these estimates are no guarantee of continuous and reliable operation. Several frequencies are normally required for long term day and night or all season operation. The application of ALE capable radios enhances link stability.
b.
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c.
In Arctic latitudes, LF is a preferred frequency band.
5. Operating Modes. Operating modes may include voice and data. Facilities afforded the user are mostly a function of the bandwidth available, the speed of transmission possible and the mobility required. 6. Facilities: a. Remote Installation. Terminal equipment may be located away from the radio station in which case mobility is further restricted. Costs in operating personnel are higher as both the radio and the remote sites must be manned. On-Line Encryption. Normally data and voice signals will be automatically encrypted and decrypted by use of on-line cryptographic equipment to provide security of information.
b.
314.
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS BY COMBAT NET RADIO SYSTEMS
1. General. Combat Net Radio (CNR) systems are categorized into three distinct groupings based on inherent characteristics acquired with their respective use of the frequency spectrum, engineering design and technical capabilities. The three groupings are Combat Net Radio Primary (CNR(P)), Combat Net Radio High Frequency (CNR(HF)) and Combat Net Radio Air-Ground-Air (CNR(A/G/A)). Characteristics specific to the current CNR radio family are detailed under their separate headings in Volume 2 while common characteristics to these groups are: a. Radio Nets. A combat radio net consists of a net control station and a number of sub-stations. Radio Rebroadcast (RRB) stations may also be employed to extend the operating range. The net control station, normally found at the senior HQ, controls the traffic (voice or data) and enforces circuit discipline. Substations on the net are provided by a subordinate unit HQ or attached to an adjacent HQ see (Figure 3-3). Key personnel when moving away from the HQ may be required to join this net during the period of absence. Radio Detachments. A radio detachment or station consists of the CNR, the crew and the ancillary equipment including vehicles, tents, generators, etc. Stations may be manpack, vehicle-borne or mounted in aircraft. Depending on their tasks, detachments may be equipped with one or more radios to operate on one or more nets; some key detachments may have radios to operate on guard nets on alternate frequency bands. All transmissions on CNR are simplex; that is, no more than one station can transmit at any one time. In principle, all stations hear all messages passed on the radio net, thus making the network all informed. The great flexibility of CNR systems and their instantaneous responsiveness is counterbalanced by their limited traffic bearing capacity. There is also a practical limit to the number of stations on a net. CNR transmitted information can be either in a secure (encrypted) mode or a non-secure (non-encrypted) mode. In the secure mode, only the information is
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b.
c.
d.
e.
protected; while use of the frequency spectrum (even in the frequency hopping mode) is still evident to the enemy, the information being passed is not. Secure is the normal operating mode for CNR. f. CNR nets, although their information is protected by encryption, are vulnerable to enemy electronic warfare (EW) operations as follows: (1) Enemy Electronic Support.19 Enemy Electronic Support (ES) can often determine, by traffic volume and electromagnetic signature, the types of formations/units within the battlespace and may even determine by analysis of the various CNR nets friendly intentions or possible operations. The presence of a cluster of stations at a particular location, located through the use of direction finding equipment, that are operating on several different nets can facilitate the identification of that unit just by analyzing the different modes and bands that the CNR are operating in and the number of distinct nets that are operating. Enemy Electronic Attack. Enemy Electronic Attack (EA) refers to jamming and deception in the UHF, VHF and HF bands. CNR net discipline must be strict with electronic protection (EP) drills well rehearsed and communication security procedures continually enforced.
(2)
2. Common Application. Because of their characteristics, CNR nets are particularly suited to the operations of tactical groups at brigade level and below where instantaneous acknowledgement and reaction is essential. The distribution of CNR equipment facilitates regrouping as tactics require and passage of information between nets is made possible by the provision of multiple radio stations at a specific HQ. 3. Frequency Coverage. The most suitable frequencies for CNR systems are in the HF, VHF and UHF radio frequency bands. Current radios used by the Army operate in the bands from 1.5 MHz to 400 MHz. Certain CNR radios are designed to operate in fixed frequency mode as well as various forms of spread spectrum transmission such as frequency hopping. Net radios with wide frequency coverage tend to be expensive; however, technological advances in radio design and production are reducing costs. Individual radios that cover only one or part of a radio frequency band are normally used; therefore, a radio detachment often requires two or more radio sets, usually an HF and VHF combination, with a consequent weight and size penalty. Radios with much broader frequency coverage and the capability for more than one form of modulation are justifiable however for special roles (e.g. long range patrols).
19
Formally known as electron support measures (ESM).
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COMBAT NET RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

UHF UHF JTF HQ VHF VHF VHF BG HQ Coy FOB #2 VHF HF HF
RRB
RRB VHF
Coy FOB #1
Long Range Patrol
ISTAR Sensor
VHF Patrol
Figure 3-3: CNR Linking Formation Level HQ with Subordinate HQs, Forward Operating Bases (FOB) and Specialized Assets
4. Operating Modes. CNR can be used to provide voice and data as modes, but secure voice is the priority mode of operation. 5. Facilities: a. Remote Operations. Ancillary equipment can allow operators or users to be located a distance from the radio itself. The distance is limited by the design specifications of the radio. An operator may still be needed at the radio to tune or adjust the set. Antenna. CNR antennas are distinct to the radio type as well as related engineering design specifications such as using cosite antenna designs on vehicles where more than one transceiver is fed to the same antenna. The employment of tactical radios also has a bearing on the type and size of antenna used, for example, manpack or vehicle borne. VHF radios typically use omni-directional antennae in a whip or elevated ground configuration with direct wave propagation as the communication path. HF radios tend to use omnidirectional, long wire or specific tuned-to-frequency constructed antennae. HF radios utilize both direct and skywave to achieve desired transmission path results. Distance, terrain, power output, mobility and electronic protective measures (EPM) all have a bearing on antenna performance and use. Normally the antenna used in CNR cannot be sited at any great distance from the transceiver.
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c.
Rebroadcast. Radio Rebroadcast (RRB) is a method of extending the range of a radio net by using an intermediate station. Rebroadcast may be automatic, in which case two transceivers are employed back-to-back, each operating on a different frequency (retransmission) or hop set in the frequency hopping mode; or it may be manual during voice operations, in which case retransmission is performed by an operator on the common or net frequency (relay) or hop set. On-line Encryption. Signals will be automatically encrypted and decrypted by the use of on-line security equipment. On-line cryptographic equipment, either integral to the radio itself or a separately installed peripheral to the radio, will provide security of information. The keying of cryptographic material must be done locally or remotely according to formation communications electronics standing instructions (CESI).
d.
315.
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS BY SATELLITE
1. Satellite transmission provides radio communications between two or more terrestrial points via a repeater located on a spacecraft. It is primarily used for BLOS rear link or strategic gateway services communications or where relatively short ranges cannot be accomplished because of terrain. The use of tactical level satellite communications (TacSAT) between mobile forces that are beyond the range of current CNR systems, are becoming more prevalent. The use of TacSAT is also a result of the ever-increasing complex environment encountered on current operations see (Figure 3-4). 2. A spacecraft based repeater in geosynchronous orbit (36,000 km above the earth) will appear to be stationary with respect to the terrestrial terminals and can be accessed from anywhere in an area of one-third of the earth's surface depending on the footprint of the satellite. The terminal can be fixed or mobile and the transmission path extends from the earth's surface to the spacecraft and back. The quality of transmission to the ground terminals is not affected by intervening terrain or distance within the earth bound footprint. 3. Communication between satellites and terrestrial terminals20 is accomplished through the transmission signal between earth based station and the satellite known as an uplink and the transmission signal between the satellite and earth based station known as downlink. The downlink signal is characterized by the satellite receiving the uplinked signal, amplifying it, shifting it to a lower frequency and re-transmitting it to an earth(s) stations. As an example C-band uplink frequencies are from 5.925 to 6.425 GHz with downlink frequencies from 3.7 to 4.2 GHz while Ku signals are uplinked at the 14.0 to 14.5 GHz range and downlinked in the 10.7 to 12.2 GHz for the Fixed Satellite Service in North America. The frequency and power output of a satellite signal determine the size of the earth station antenna (dish) in relationship to wavelength (frequency). The shorter the wavelength (higher the frequency) the smaller the dish. C-band requires a dish size minimum of 1.8 m to 3.7 m using a lower frequency than Ka and Ku bands requiring 0.66 m to 1.2 m respectively (assuming the bandwidth is constant).
20
http://broadband.gc.ca/pub/technologies/tech_factsheets/satellite/index.html
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SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
JTF HQ
BG HQ
Coy HQ Pl Coy HQ Coy HQ Pl Pl Pl
Figure 3-4: Satellite Communications Linking Formation Level HQ with Subordinate HQs
4.
Satellite Types: a. Equatorial. Geosynchronous satellites are parked above the equator at an orbital height of 35,700 km which causes rotation once every 24 hours. Most civilian satellite communications use geosynchronous satellites which have long delays and fixed antennas. Three equatorial spaced satellites can provide nearglobal coverage. With equatorial satellites there is little atmospheric drag, potentially longer satellite lifetime and minimal station-keeping. However, there is no polar visibility and there is a large propagation delay. First generation satellites use C-band (406 GHz) window and second generation satellites are being deployed as Ku-band (11-14 GHz) or dual band. Equatorial satellites provide high quality video and high speed data. Both military and commercial communication satellites in geosynchronous orbit, are used to provide BLOS communications links for deployed forces to access gateways linking strategic National, Joint and Combined operation centres. Non-equatorial. Low earth orbit (LEO) satellites orbits are non-equatorial with orbital heights less than 1500 km above the earth. This type of satellite has shorter delay and requires the ground terminal to switch between satellites as they pass overhead. LEO limits visibility of satellites in terms of earth coverage area and times of coverage. With LEO Doppler effects are present continuously but vary with orbit, satellite orbital position, and location of earth station. LEO vehicles have higher atmospheric drag, orbits are not as secure as high-orbit satellites and satellites require additional fuel for orbit maintenance.
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5. Satellite communication systems can provide high quality speech, data and television channels. Tactical communications systems utilize satellites to obtain wide bandwidth transmission at extended ranges over terrain not otherwise accessible. 6. Characteristics: a. Flexibility. Satellite communication is a flexible method for providing all types of communication requirements found within the battlespace. Flexibility is limited only by the number of terminal equipment and satellite stations available. Mobility. Forward area satellite terminals are highly mobile and can be either man portable or installed in tactical vehicles. Economy. Satellite communication terminals are just as economical to operate as other communication terminals of equivalent capability. However, the space segment is very expensive and very few nations can afford to have satellite communication systems for military purposes despite their undoubted efficiency; Vulnerability. Satellite communication is vulnerable because of the following: (1) (2) There is a danger of losing satellites and thus of suffering irreparable damage to operational communications systems. Rain is the main factor that negatively effects satellite communications while clouds, snow and fog can contribute to poor propagation. Atmospheric particles can affect communications particularly higher satellite frequency bands such as Ku and Ka. It is susceptible to damages caused by EMP and direct attack by antisatellite weapons. It is susceptible to intercept and jamming, unless hardened to military specifications. Satellite control is capable of being seized by enemy forces unless specific countermeasures are used.
b. c.
d.
(3) (4) (5)
7. Signal Security. Traffic over all channels can best be encrypted by using on-line bulk encryption devices. These may be located at ground terminal stations and at switching facilities as required to ensure security of transmission between subscribers. The satellite simply acts as a repeater and there is no requirement to decrypt and re-encrypt the signal at the satellite. All classified traffic passed by this form of transmission is protected by cryptographic equipment. Unclassified services such as Internet access can use clear channels. 8. Application: a. Low capacity, man portable terminals, capable of speech as well as data transmission in a secure mode, is available. These enhance communications within the battlespace especially in the forward area and over difficult terrain.
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b.
Medium capacity tactical satellite terminals can be advantageously used in all types of conditions. High ground is not a requirement if direct line of sight paths to the satellite can be established and maintained. Terminal stations are easily transportable by rotary wing and vertical take-off and landing aircraft. Satellite communication systems can form part of the area trunk system. Interconnecting links are required to permit integration of systems and/or to provide communications to the supported HQ or local signal facility.
c.
9. The present and ever expanding use of intelligence gathering systems in the form of battlespace sensors and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), as an example, finds satellite communications systems ideal as an intelligence gathering and forwarding platform. Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) is a prime user of this system. 316. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH AREA TRUNK SYSTEMS
1. Area Trunk Systems. Trunk systems are often referred to as Area Systems. The Area Trunk System is a microwave system which provides trunk telephone and data communications delivered by SHF and UHF line-of-sight (LOS) Radio Relay (LOS-RR) as well as fibre optic cabling and equipment. The Trunk System could also provide access to strategic communications, allied or commercial networks. The system is comprised of high capacity long-range communications (static and limited mobility). LOS radio can establish links up to 40 km and can be used to link subordinate HQs of a formation or with a coalition HQ (see Figure 3-5). A Radio relay describes a form of wide band radio transmission employing LOS paths for point-to-point or link communications: a. Radio relay consists of two terminal stations communicating with each other directly or through one or more repeater stations. Repeater stations possess duplicate radio equipment to enable tandem operation. Combinations of these basic installations allow a variety of system and circuit interconnections. Depending on the type of equipment, radio relay systems can provide a set number of high quality speech and data channels, or a lesser number of video channels.
b.
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Director Land Command & Information
LINE OF SITE (LOS) COMMUNICATIONS
JTF HQ
Allied HQ
Coy FOB #3 BG HQ
Coy FOB #2
Coy FOB #1
FOB Forward Operating Base Directeur Commandement et Information Terrestre
Figure 3-5: LOS Linking a Formation Level HQ with Subordinate HQ and FOBs
2.
Characteristics: a. Flexibility. Radio relay is a much more flexible method of providing multichannel communications than tactical line and cable or scatter systems. However, its flexibility depends greatly on the number of stations that are available to step up and relay. When available, radio relay can be readily relocated, extended and rearranged to conform to changing tactical requirements. Mobility. Radio relay cannot currently be operated on the move. It is, however, readily transportable by vehicle. Helicopters may be used to move stations over impassable terrain or to otherwise inaccessible sites. Once on site, it can be set up and torn down relatively quickly. Economy. For average path ranges, radio relay is much more economical in resource use than the other methods of providing multi-channel communications. However, its greatest advantage is that, provided suitable sites are available, additional links can be interconnected with the deployment of few additional stations. It is thus possible to provide a communication grid economically. Reliability. Radio relay is virtually immune to atmospheric interruption and enjoys a drastically reduced susceptibility to interference from other emitters. The relative ease with which a grid can be established greatly enhances the opportunities for alternate routing. Equipment is easy to operate and maintain,
b.
c.
d.
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circuit paths can be predicted with a high degree of assurance and, once engineered, circuits are extremely stable. However, this method is quite susceptible to weather conditions. For example, the range might be degraded by as much as 50% in a severe rain or snowstorm. e. Vulnerability: (1) It is necessary to site stations within LOS either on high ground or in isolated positions; radio relay stations are thus relatively easy to target. This can be reduced by proper tactical siting of detachments, to include the remote placement of antennas, and careful shielding of paths from enemy observation. Radio relay is less susceptible to interception, direction finding and jamming than other forms of radio because it employs highly directional antennas in a ground-to-ground mode. There is, however, a risk that the detection of a number of signals from a single radio relay node in a narrow arc will disclose not only the communications grid but also possibly the formation axis during high intensity conflict. In order to minimize the risk of detection and interception, the radio relay shot should be as parallel as possible to the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). During low to mid intensity conflict within a non-contiguous battlespace, protection of these isolated communications stations is a consideration and planning must include for protection of these assets from any enemy ground threat. It is susceptible to EMP.
(2)
(3)
3. Signal Security. Although the low power of equipment and the effects of screening by terrain greatly reduce the range of useful intercept, interception is still possible and traffic must be protected. Traffic over all channels is encrypted with the use of on-line, bulk encryption devices. 4. Application: a. Low capacity radio relay sets generally have the associated multiplexing equipment as an integral feature of the installation. In higher capacity stations, installation of the radio relay set and the associated multiplexing equipment may be separate depending on size and capacity. Because of its characteristics, radio relay is the main transmission system for tactical area trunk CS (voice and data) used at Brigade Group to Battalion/Battle Group HQ level in the area of operations (AO).
b.
5.
Frequency Band: a. The wide bandwidth employed in radio relay necessitates operation in the VHF, UHF, or SHF bands:
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(1)
At VHF, it is still possible to work beyond the optical path and with relatively narrow margins of path clearance. In this frequency range, the methods of predicting usable circuits are well established and comparatively simple. Because of the less demanding characteristics, VHF is much more suited to tactical use, particularly for maintaining communications with mobile forces within the AO. Unfortunately, the congestion in this band does not always afford the large number of frequencies needed for a wide area radio relay system. At the upper VHF (225 to 300 MHz), and within the UHF and SHF bands, the path is virtually true LOS and transmission quality is excellent in clear weather and with an unobstructed path (i.e. clear of deciduous and coniferous trees) provided Fresnel zone clearance is accounted for. Severe degradation may be experienced in heavy precipitation.
(2)
b.
A radio relay system requires a large number of frequencies over a broad band. Circuits are normally duplex and adjacent links must be established with broad frequency separation. At junctions, links of adjoining systems require a similar separation of frequencies. Because of the zigzag course usually followed by radio relay links, dissimilar frequency lists may be needed for nearby parallel links if interference is to be avoided. It is normal to use computer software for frequency assignment, path loss calculation and siting of stations. SECTION 4 LINE COMMUNICATIONS
317.
GENERAL
1. Line communications is a form of communication where there is a physical connection between the transmitter and the receiver. The most usual means of connection is the metallic wire, the coaxial cable or the wave-guide. Metallic wires may be single or grouped in pairs or pair multiples to form multi-core cable. Coaxial cables are especially designed for transmission at radio frequencies. Line can be used for multiple voice and/or data channels. 2. Fibre optic cables or fibre optic cable assemblies (FOCA) are also used for line communications. In this case, the connection is a clear plastic or glass fibre and the information is passed by modulating a light beam, as it is transmitted over the fibre. The major advantages of fibre optic cables over metallic cables are: a. b. c. d. the cable is lighter and smaller; it is immune to electromagnetic interference including EMP; it is very difficult to tap into by the enemy and unauthorized intrusions can easily be detected by monitoring the signal strength; and it has a bandwidth up to 1000 times greater than that of a metallic cable of the same size. Multiple strands of fibre in the cable exponentially increase the bandwidth available.
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3. Fibre optic cable has developed into the pre-eminent means of tactical line communications at HQs, primarily because of its massive bandwidth. Fibre optic cables are used exclusively in connecting large capacity data systems to their backbone radio relay carriers. Fibre is also used to connect a HQ node to its radio emitters up to 5 km away from the HQ site. 4. Line systems are classified according to the degree of permanence inherent in the installation as either field or permanent line systems. Field line systems are characterized by ruggedness, simplicity, ease and speed of installation and removal. Permanent line systems tend to be more complicated, must be individually planned and built and take time and heavy equipment for construction. 5. Line communication systems can be laid over the ground, suspended on poles or towers, buried or submerged, or structure wired into buildings. 318. 1. CHARACTERISTICS Line has the following characteristics: a. Flexibility. Line communications are relatively inflexible in the context of military operations. Once laid to support a specific configuration of forces, they require a lot of work to adjust to a change in troop disposition or requirements. The construction of line takes time, considerable manpower and considerable amount of stores, which increase with distance. Therefore, distance, frequency of moves and response time are critical factors to be considered before deciding on line as a means of communications. On the other hand, it can be used during electronic or radio silence and is not constrained by radio frequency allocation. Capacity. Line communications can provide a very high traffic capacity. They provide a stable and high quality transmission path, which can be built up as required. The operating range of line communications varies according to the characteristics of the cable and terminating equipment and the method of construction. Field cable is affected by wet weather conditions and wear and tear (damaged insulation and excessive splicing). Range may be extended by the use of line repeaters. Economy. Line construction is expensive in time, manpower and material. Once installed, line communications are relatively easy to maintain; they are also operated with relatively few personnel. Unlike radio communications, subsequent increases in capacity result in very modest increase in personnel and equipment. Vulnerability. Line communications are vulnerable to deliberate or accidental damage throughout their length. This is an even greater risk within unprotected areas of the AO because of enemy action, friendly troop movements and the method used for line construction. Artillery bombardments, for example, can badly damage field line in the impact zone. Line construction or maintenance crews must work along exposed routes, at times without cover or concealment and are subject to shelling, strafing and ambush. Line routes must be patrolled and line crews must be capable of fighting in self-defence. Metallic wire and cable lines are also subject to EMP.
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b.
c.
d.
e.
Signal Security. Line is immune to most forms of EA and signals emanating from it can only be detected at close proximity. It is thus a valuable alternative to radio in the preparation stages of an operation or under conditions of electronic or radio silence. Provided line routes are regularly patrolled, its use in friendly areas provides a relatively secure means of communication.
319. 1.
APPLICATION Line has the following applications: a. b. Line communications are best used where mobility is not a paramount requirement but where high capacity and signal security are essential. Field line communications will be used in periods of radio and electronic silence, in the preparatory stages of offensive operations, as long as possible during defensive operations and at all times within unit or formation HQ. Specific usage will be to provide combat information exchange, voice and data, within staff cells of an HQ, to connect an HQ to the area trunk CS, to provide remote facilities for CNR and to provide an inter-unit line grid in the absence of radio communication. Fibre optic cable assemblies are also used as CIS backbone cabling connecting radio parks to HQ facilities at distances up to 5 km. Line communications will gradually become the mainstay of communications as distance from the enemy increases, as communication requirements become more permanent, more complex and denser and as mobility of users become a less important factor. In many cases, line communication will be integrated into area trunk communication links to form hybrid radio and line systems where the advantages of both techniques will be exploited fully.
c.
320. 1.
MODES OF OPERATION Line has the following mode of operations: a. Multiplex signals may be transmitted at radio frequency over line (coaxial cable) or at light frequencies over FOCA. A higher grade of field cable, e.g., carrier quad or a fixed line system is required for this form of transmission. Such a line requires repeaters and equalizers inserted at regular intervals throughout its length. This type of line system normally forms part of an area multi-channel trunk system. Television and high-speed data circuits, which occupy a very wide band, are transmitted over coaxial or fibre optic cable. Coaxial cable is subject to line loss and problems inherent in amplifying this type of signal limit the length of these lines for field applications. However, fibre optics (field grade) cable does not have the same restrictions and is the preferred transmission medium for highspeed data circuits with lengths up to 5 km.
b.
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SECTION 5 HAND CARRIAGE COMMUNICATIONS 321. GENERAL
1. Hand carriage describes a physical means of communication in which signal traffic is manually taken between HQs, and in certain cases between originators and addressees. 2. The common methods of carriage consist of runners on foot (within HQ only) and dispatch riders on motorcycles or wheeled vehicles (Signals dispatch service (SDS) and/or Liaison Officers (LO). When available, aircraft, boats, trains or any other form of transport may be used for this purpose. Formations and units provide these communications to subordinate and lateral headquarters. 3. In addition, a courier is a person appointed in accordance with security orders to accompany or carry CRYPTO-caveated, COMSEC and other controlled material, from or within an AO. Within an area, couriers are detailed to travel directly between originators and addressees. Couriers are employed when the security classification precludes it being sent through the normal scheduled SDS. 322. 1. CHARACTERISTICS Hand carriage communications has the following characteristics: a. Flexibility. This is a very flexible means of communication, which can be readily adjusted in terms of timings, destination and frequency according to the needs of the moment. It requires little specialized training other than map reading and driving. Capacity. Carriers can transport a sizable amount of information depending on their mode of transport. This is offset, however, by their relative slowness and the fact that each carrier must reach each addressee in turn. Speed is a function of the mode of transport, distance, terrain, weather, routes available and the tactical situation. Economy. This method may be relatively costly in personnel but under difficult warfare conditions, it is an effective method of passing critical messages/information. Vulnerability. Carriers are not subject to EW but are as subject to physical destruction as other combatants at the same tactical echelon. In the forward combat zone, there is danger of ambush by enemy infiltrated parties. Signal Security. This is probably the most secure means of communication available to commander and staff.
b.
c.
d.
e.
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323.
APPLICATIONS
1. Hand carriage serves to complement the other means of communications. It can be used for: a. Transmission of message traffic that cannot be passed by electronic/electrical means due to its security classification or its format. The latter includes lengthy messages, bulky documents, large charts or maps. Communications within sub-units or for minor elements or installations within sub-units or for minor elements or installations within an area which lack other means of communication. Collection of traffic within a HQ or between components of a HQ. Message traffic when the other means of communication are inoperative or are reserved for higher priority traffic. Transmission of data in the form of removable high capacity computer storage peripherals such as tapes, hard drives removable memory devices or discs.
b.
c. d. e.
2. Common user hand carriage may be scheduled or unscheduled. When it is scheduled, it is called SDS. It is provided when the quantity of traffic between HQ and units warrants it. When it is unscheduled, it is called Special Dispatch Rider (SDR) service and is provided when unforeseen requirements arise. On the high intensity battlefield, in the face of heavy enemy electronic warfare interference, this means of communications may well be critically important in AO. SECTION 6 NETWORKING (MULTI-POINT COMMUNICATIONS) 324. GENERAL
1. A communication network is created any time more than two stations are connected by a single communication system. When a communication system connects only two stations, it is obvious that every signal transmitted by one station is intended to convey information that is both meaningful and relevant to the destination served by the other station. This is not always the case for a communication system that connects three or more stations. In such a system, not every signal transmitted by a given station will necessarily be meaningful and relevant to all other stations on the network. Moreover, many transmissions may convey information intended exclusively for some identifiable subset of all the stations connected to the network. Telephone calls and e-mails are examples of communications of the latter nature. On the other hand, some communication systems are specifically intended to allow a single source to convey information that is assumed to be meaningful and relevant to all destinations served by the system. Television programmes and earthquake or tsunami warnings are examples of communications of this nature. The diverse nature of communications between various sources and destinations has led to the development of a number of different architectures and techniques for conveying information between stations on a communication network. At the most general level, communication networks may be divided into two architectural groups: switched networks and broadcast networks.
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325.
SWITCHED NETWORKS
1. Many modern communication systems connect tens, hundreds or even thousands of stations that, at any given time, must be able to send information to and/or receive information from any other selected station or stations on the network. In other words, each station on the network must be able to convey information exclusively to any other selected station, or possibly group of stations, whenever the need arises. However, it is usually quite impractical for each station on such a network to maintain a direct point-to-point communication link to every other station on the network to convey information only when required. Switching is one solution to this problem. In a switched communication network, the stations, also known as terminal nodes, are interconnected through one or more intermediate nodes, called switches. 2. The intermediate nodes in a switched network are not concerned with the content of the transmitted signal; their purpose is simply to provide a facility that will route the signal from node to node (i.e., switch to switch) through the network until it reaches the selected destination station(s). This requires the source station to provide the system with the address(es) for the destination station(s). The switches then use this address to determine which series of communication links to use to convey the signal to the selected destination station(s). The use of switches substantially reduces the number of communication links required to interconnect all the stations. This is especially important when new stations are added to the network; a new station requires only the installation of a single link to the nearest switch rather than the installation of a separate link to each existing station on the network. Many of the electrical/electronic telecommunication systems for which Signals is responsible employ switched networks. There are three types of switched networks: circuit-switched, messageswitched and packet-switched. 3. Circuit-switched Networks. In a circuit-switched network, the intermediate nodes are used to establish a temporary direct physical transmission channel (i.e., a dedicated circuit) between the communicating stations. Because an intermediate node (i.e., circuit switch) maintains an actual physical connection between the incoming channel and the selected outgoing channel for the duration of a communication session, signals transmitted by the source station pass straight through the switch as if it were not there. Thus, circuit-switched networks are able to provide real-time communication by allowing signals to propagate directly along a continuous end-to-end physical transmission path between the communicating stations. 4. Circuit-switching is designed to provide an efficient infrastructure for real-time interactive voice communications (i.e., telephony) between a source and one or more selected destinations. However, circuit-switched networks can be a very inefficient way of conveying record information such as narrative (i.e., written text) messages or computer data files. First, it takes a considerable amount of time to set-up and tear-down the end-to-end connection between stations, sometimes longer than it takes to transmit a short message or data file across the resulting circuit. Second, the requirement for an end-to-end physical connection between communicating stations can lead to under-utilisation of some communication links within the network while other links are overloaded. This problem can be particularly difficult (and expensive) to rectify in situations where the traffic patterns among stations change frequently. The most common example of a circuit-switched network is the global telephone network. 5. Message-switched Networks. Message switching is designed specifically for routing large volumes of record information, such as narrative (i.e., written text) messages or computer data files, efficiently from source stations to destination stations. As in all switched networks, stations are connected to intermediate nodes known as switches, but, unlike circuit-switched
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networks, no direct end-to-end physical transmission path is ever established between communicating stations in a message-switched network. Instead, each message is transmitted from the source station to an intermediate node, where it is temporarily stored on a queue for processing and subsequent onward transmission (i.e., forwarding) towards the selected destination station(s). Thus, the term store-and-forward is associated with message-switched networks. Each intermediate node (i.e., store-and-forward message switch) generally has communication links to two or more other store-and-forward message switches, allowing each message to be routed through the network via the most efficient path between its source station and the selected destination station(s), taking into account such dynamic considerations as traffic congestion, circuit outages and so on. A message is stored at a node until a communication channel to the next node in the chosen path to the destination station becomes available. The entire message is then forwarded along that channel to the next node, where it is once again stored, processed and subsequently forwarded. This process of storing and forwarding the message continues until it is delivered to the selected destination station(s). 6. Clearly, the queuing nature of message switching does not support real-time communication between stations. However, the combination of store-and-forward switching with multiple path routing allows message-switched networks to make efficient use of a relatively modest number of transmission channels to convey large volumes of record information between three or more stations in a timely, reliable manner. 7. Packet-switched Networks. Packet switching is so named because the source stations information is broken up and sent across the network as a sequence of small chunks, called packets. Each packet contains both user information and network control data, all of which are switched as a composite whole. A packet-switched network is constructed such that each node in the network has communication links to two or more other nodes, creating a large number of possible paths between source and destination stations. Because each packet contains its own control and identification data, individual packets can be independently routed through the network from the source station to the destination station. As in message-switching, a source stations packets are sent to an intermediate node (i.e., packet switch) that receives the packet, stores it until a communication channel to the next node on the way to the packets destination station is available and then forwards the packet along that channel. Each packet is routed through the network along the most efficient end-to-end path from source to destination, taking into account such dynamic considerations as traffic congestion, outages, error conditions, and other network performance criteria. Because packets are small and packet switches are electronic computers, it takes only a very short time to transmit a packet between nodes. This means that the channel used to transmit a packet from one node to the next is available to transmit another packet, perhaps from a different source en route to a different destination, after only a very brief delay. 8. The combination of small packet size and powerful routing over multiple paths allows a packet-switched network to efficiently convey large volumes of information between many stations, in what can often appear to be real-time, over a relatively modest number of transmission channels. Packet-switched networks are commonly used for computer-tocomputer data communications over so-called wide area networks, often utilizing existing transmission infrastructures such as telephone networks.
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326.
BROADCAST NETWORKS
1. Broadcasting is an alternative way of connecting three or more stations by a single communication system. In a broadcast communication network, there are no intermediate nodes. All stations are directly connected to each other by a single, common physical transmission channel. Broadcasting, like switching, alleviates the need for separate point-topoint communication links between each pair of stations connected to the network. In a broadcast network, however, all signals transmitted over the single shared transmission channel are received by all stations on the network. This makes broadcast networks ideal for situations where the intent is to disseminate the same information to all stations as quickly and efficiently as possible. A simple example of this is a combat net radio system, in which all users tuned to the same communication channel (i.e., frequency) receive all transmissions sent over that channel. There are three types of broadcast network: simplex, half-duplex and addressable. 2. Simplex Broadcast Networks. In a simplex broadcast network, one station is the source of all information conveyed over the network. The source station is the only one equipped with a transmitter, usually one of high power output. All other stations on the network are passive receivers with no ability to transmit signals of their own on the network. In most cases, the receivers are anonymous to the source station. The most common examples of simplex broadcast networks are television and commercial radio stations that transmit signals through the air as electromagnetic waves that can be received and enjoyed by anyone with a suitable television or radio receiver. Military applications of simplex broadcast networks include warning networks intended to disseminate information about imminent threats and hazards to everyone within a given geographic area without requiring any sort of acknowledgement that they received it. 3. Half-Duplex Broadcast Networks. The purpose of half-duplex broadcast networks is to allow any station connected to the network to convey information to all other stations simultaneously. Each station is equipped with a dual-purpose receiver/transmitter to permit twoway communication over the shared transmission channel to which all stations are connected. The result is an all-informed network in which information from any source connected to the network is automatically conveyed to all destinations in real-time. Because all stations share the same physical transmission channel, only one station at a time may transmit a signal across the network. However, the ability of any station to transmit a signal over the network means that, unlike simplex networks, destinations can acknowledge or respond to the information they receive, and that all such acknowledgements and responses will also be received by all other stations connected to the network. The all-informed nature of such communications is a valuable characteristic in any situation in which a number of individuals or organizations must co-ordinate their efforts in pursuit of a common goal, especially under dynamic operational conditions. Combat net radio is a familiar military example of a half-duplex broadcast network. 4. Addressable Broadcast Networks. Digital information processing technology has made it possible to combine the features of a broadcast network with those of a switched network. As in any broadcast network, all stations are directly connected to each other by a single, common physical transmission channel. In other words, there are no intermediate nodes or switches between the terminal stations. However, each device connected to the shared transmission channel is assigned an address. As in a standard packet switched network, each packet transmitted across the network contains both user information and network control data, including the address of the destination station. Instead of having intermediate nodes route each packet to its destination, every station on the network receives all packets transmitted over the single shared transmission channel. Each receiving station simply checks the destination
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address of the packet to determine whether it should process the packet in order to convert the user information within it into a suitable form for presentation to the intended recipient or simply ignore it. Normal all-informed broadcasts are possible on an addressable broadcast network simply by assigning one address as the broadcast address. Every receiving station will process packets addressed to the broadcast address. An even more sophisticated enhancement is the use of multi-cast addresses which specified groups of receiving stations will process. Local area networks (LANs) that interconnect computers within a small geographic area are the most common example of addressable broadcast networks. 5. The Internetworking Protocol. The Internet Protocol (IP) was created as a way to hide the complexity of physical addressing by creating a virtual addressing scheme that is independent of the underlying network. The Internetworking Protocol does not ensure that data is delivered to the application in the appropriate order; that responsibility is left to upper-layer protocols such as transmission control protocol (TCP) and user datagram protocol (UDP). (Note: IP is a connectionless, network-layer protocol in that it does not require a reply but assumes the data was received, this is why it is used along with TCP which requires a recipient reply before continuing with data transmission). 327. COMPUTER NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS
1. Computer network communications are very analogous when compared to telephone system communications. This type of network is categorized in several different ways but one of the more common methods is by classifying the network in accordance with the geographical area it spans. A local area network (LAN) is a computer network covering a small local area, like an office environment of a unit or a formation HQ (Figure 3-6). Current LANs are most likely to be based on switched Ethernet or wireless (WiFi) technology running at from 10 to 1000 Mbps. LANs can be segmented into smaller groups for ease of administration and maintenance yet still share a common server through switching or routing devices. The defining characteristics of LANs in contrast to other area networks are: a. b. c. much higher data rates; smaller geographic range; and they do not as a rule involve leased telecommunication lines.
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Figure 3-6: Local Area Network
2. A wide area network (WAN) is a computer network covering a wide geographical area, involving a vast array of computers see (Figure 3-7). This is different from LANs that are usually limited to a room, building or a deployed HQ complex. The best example of a WAN is the Internet. WANs are used to connect distant LANs together, so that users and computers in one location can communicate with users and computers in other locations. Many WANs are built for one particular organization and are private. Others, built by Internet service providers, provide connections from an organization's LAN to the Internet. WANs are most often built using leased lines. At each end of the leased line, a router connects to the LAN on one side and a hub within the WAN on the other.
Figure 3-7: Wide Area Network
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CHAPTER 4 ELECTRONIC WARFARE IN THE ELECTRO MAGNETIC BATTLESPACE SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION 401. GENERAL
1. Electronic warfare (EW) has been practiced in every conflict since World War I. Fundamentally the practice of EW has not changed. However, the context in which EW must operate has. The Canadian Land Force (LF) has placed a greater emphasis on joint and coalition operations. As well, closer relationships with national and strategic agencies have had significant impacts on the conduct of EW. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of EW and the role it plays to conduct offensive, defensive and stability operations as they pertain to the electromagnetic (EM) battlespace. 2. The EM Battlespace is a unique environment encompassing all devices including people that employ electrical or electronic means to transmit, receive, process, store, display, sense and analyse information. The EM battlespace is, therefore, not dissimilar from the Aerospace environment, in that it exists only due to our ability to exploit it through a specialized infrastructure to achieve both physical and psychological effects. The Shielding necessary to protect our own infrastructure and the Act of prosecuting our adversaries infrastructure within this EM battlespace are primarily Signals functions, but require activities from Commanders and soldiers at all levels to be successful. 3. EW may be conducted by a broad range of assets, ranging from a single soldier with man-portable equipment to a full squadron operating under armour. In order to maximize the capabilities of the Canadian Forces (CF) signal intelligence system and LF EW assets, EW operations will, wherever possible, be integrated with coalition and CF EW and signal intelligence agencies. 402. ELECTRONIC WARFAREDEFINITION
1. The concept and doctrine of EW are derived from a series of definitions that, in general terms, explain the boundaries of the activity. The central definition for EW, from which subordinate definitions are derived, is as follows: Military action to exploit the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum which encompasses the interception and identification of EM emissions, the employment of EM energy, including directed energy, to reduce or prevent hostile use of the EM spectrum and actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces.21
NATO Military Committee (MC) 64 NATO EW Policy, NATO ATP 51(A) EW in the Land Battle and AAP-6 (U) NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.
21
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4-1
2. As previously stated in Chapter 1, Signals has a communication and information systems (CIS) component and an EW component. The EW component is further divided into three sub-components: a. Electronic Support (ES). It encompasses the search for, interception and identification of electromagnetic emissions in the EM battlespace. ES products include: (1) Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). The generic term used to describe COMINT and ELINT when there is no requirement to differentiate between these two types of intelligence, or to represent fusion of the two. Electronic Intelligence (ELINT). Technical material and intelligence information derived from EM non-communications transmission (i.e. radar, navigational aids, jamming transmissions) by other than intended recipients. Communication Intelligence (COMINT). Technical material and intelligence information derived from EM communications and communication systems (i.e. morse, voice, facsimile) by other than intended recipients.
(2)
(3)
b.
Electronic Attack (EA). It is the employment of electromagnetic energy, including direct energy, to reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum and to ensure its effective use by friendly forces. Electronic Protection (EP). The action taken to ensure friendly effective use of the EM spectrum despite the adversary's use of EM energy.
c.
3. Electromagnetic (EM) Spectrum. Visible light is a form of energy. When it travels through the atmosphere it is partly absorbed and reflected by all objects in its path. This action creates a pattern of light, shade and color that enables the human eye to recognize objects. This form of energy is related to radio, radar and X-rays. All of these forms of energy have similarities and, collectively, are known as electromagnetic energy. The main similarity is that all electromagnetic energy travels in waveform. The wavelength of the energy (the distance between the wave crests) determines the form of energy, and there are an infinite variety of wavelengths. The whole range of wavelengths is known as the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum see (Figure 4-1). All electromagnetic waves, regardless of their position in the EM spectrum, travel at the speed of light, which is approximately 300,000,000 meters per second. The EM spectrum is the domain of operations for LF EW.
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Electronic Warfare in the Electro Magnetic Battlespace
Figure 4-1: The Electromagnetic Spectrum
403.
THE ROLE OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE
1. The role of EW is to conduct operations in the EM spectrum in support of the commanders objectives. These operations include actions to exploit the EM spectrum which encompasses the interception and identification of EM emissions, the employment of EM energy (including directed energy) to deduce or prevent hostile use of the EM spectrum and actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces. 2. They also support defensive EW carried out by all arms/services. Specifically, the following tasks can be carried out by EW organizations: a. Provide EM support to the commander in the following three operational functional areas: (1) (2) (3) Sense (ES), Act (EA), and Shield (EP).
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b.
Work in the Global Information Environment (GIE)/ Military Information Environment (MIE), which means that the commanders area of interest has significantly expanded. With the expanded area of interest, national assets are now deployed and work closely with tactical EW elements to support LF operations. Provide single source tactical signals intelligence (SIGINT) in the form of EW summaries (EWSUMs) or tactical reports (TACREPs), which supports current operations and future planning. Provide target acquisition of adversary electromagnetic emitters. Provide immediate threat warning to commanders. Provide EP advice to protect the Land Command Support System (LCSS).
c. d.
e. f. g. 404.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE CAPABILITIES
1. General Capabilities. To perform the roles/tasks assigned to them, EW elements must have the following basic capabilities: a. b. c. d. A 24/7, all weather ES coverage of the commander's area of interest. A capability to conduct EAthe range of a commanders EA capabilities contributes to his overall area of influence along with other combat systems. The capability to process and secure highly classified information and special materials based on national policies and security orders. A secure and reliable communication means within the EW organization, to the supported formation headquarters (HQ), to the higher EW organization and to the national level organizations. A capability to operate in an EW and/or nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) environment. The ability to operate either under armour (medium EW) and using highly mobile platforms or man-packs (light EW) in order to effectively compliment the supported formation. Enough redundancy to sustain operations.
e. f.
g.
2. Equipment and System Capabilities. Electronic Warfare equipment tends to be highly specialized and is required to adapt quickly to an ever-changing EM target presented by various adversaries. Electronic Warfare equipment forms modular components that can be integrated to allow multi-tasking and highly responsive, adaptable operations by ES detachments. In brief, each ES detachment has the technical capability to perform intercept and direction finding (DF) across the spectrum, including both communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) targets. These capabilities are organized and deployed depending on mission specifics and the target environment. They are as follows:
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a.
Electronic SupportSearch/Intercept Capability. These ES capabilities consist of the personnel and equipment whose purpose is to search, intercept and conduct direction finding (DF) in the EM spectrum for targets and gather detailed information on detected targets. A search/intercept component requires the following capabilities: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) Broad band coverage search. Interoperability with national strategic systems. The ability to be used in vehicle (platform independent) and/or dismounted operations. The ability to integrate with the DF capability to provide a single package capability. The ability to detect and track low probability of intercept (LPI) signals (e.g., frequency hopping (FH)). The ability to exploit targets throughout the threat spectrum. Conduct first line analysis on collection and reflected in the TACREP. The ability to have an integral linguistic capability. Recording and storage capabilities. The ability to interface directly with the EW analysis component.
b.
Electronic SupportCommunications Direction-Finding Capability. This ES component consists of a number of detachments with modular equipment that form baselines to provide location information of target communication emitters. The DF components require the following capabilities: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Sufficient accuracy to allow cueing of other sensor systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Broad band coverage to the greatest extent possible and in step with intercept capabilities. The ability to integrate with search and intercept capability to provide a single package capability. The ability to locate LPI emitters. The ability to be used in mounted (platform independent) and/or dismounted operations. The ability to interface directly with the EW analysis component.
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c.
Electronic SupportElectronic Intelligence Capability. This ES component is deployed in detachments with modular equipment that forms a baseline. The ELINT components provide search, intercept, DF and analysis of target noncommunications emitters. The equipment conducts analysis by comparing emitter data to a database that determines the radar type and associated equipment. An ELINT component must be capable of the following: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Broadband coverage of the radar frequency band. Interoperability with national and other service systems. Flexible, platform independent deployment. Rapid reprogramming of new signals by field operators. Interfacing with the land integrated support station (LISS) to enable 2nd level collation of new signals. Interaction with standard electronic parameter databases such as the Canadian Forces EW Database (CFEWDB) and the NATO Emitter Database (NEDB). Recording. Interfacing directly with the EW analysis component.
(7) (8) d.
Electronic Attack Capability. The EA component consists of a number of dedicated detachments and modular equipment, which may be integrated with ES detachments for attacking both communication and non-communications targets, either in a deliberate or a surgical fashion. Electronic Attack detachments require the following capabilities: (1) (2) (3) (4) Platform independence to the greatest extent possible. The ability to attack both communications and radar frequency bands. Upgradeability. Ability to perform a range of EA tasks, including but not limited to electronic masking, spoofing, deception and jamming.
e.
Analysis Capability. The analysis component of an EW unit converts the data and information collected by the EW sensors into a single source product, EWSUMs or TACREPs. This component consists of specially trained personnel and specialized equipment. It can be as simple as an analyst working along side a search/intercept operator. Analysis is usually conducted in a distributed fashion, with various baseline detachments, the SIGINT EW operations centre (SEWOC) and the EW coordination cell (EWCC) each adding layers of analytical refinement to the end product. The component has the following capabilities:
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) f.
The capability to receive sensor data. Tools to assist the analyst to process the data. Electronic Warfare trained analytical personnel. The ability to create, hold and secure highly classified materials and databases. Access to other intelligence databases. The ability to be mobile in both light and medium armoured vehicles. The ability to interface directly with ES and EA components. The ability to interface directly with national-level SIGINT databases.
Electronic Warfare Command and Control Intelligence System Capability. Electronic Warfare coordination cell (EWCC) and/or the EW liaison officer (EWLO) at the supported formation HQ (as required) provide for the command and control of EW assets. The EWCC is the command and control element which is attached to the supported HQ. The EWCC can also attach elements to the ISTAR all source cell (ASC) or to the all source intelligence centre (ASIC). This component is supported by an integral signal organization of appropriate size. The EW C2IS capability must support the following: (1) (2) (3) (4) Dispersed deployment of EW assets throughout the area of operations (AO). Interoperability with the Tactical Command and Control Information System (TacC2IS). The capability of handling highly classified information. The capability of supporting timely transmission of data from the sensor to the end-product customer without requiring either hard-copy or air gapping.
g.
Combat Service Support Capability. The combat service support (CSS) component provides the CSS necessary for EW operations. Electronic warfare organization are supported as other units of a formation are and in accordance with sustainment doctrine22. Electronic warfare organizations have specialist maintenance capabilities to support specialized fleets of EW equipment. Some equipment provided by the national/strategic level authorities will be maintained by those agencies and not through the integral LF EW unit CSS component.
22
For more information see B-GL-300-004/FP-000 Sustainment and supporting sustainment system manuals.
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SECTION 2 ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT 405. GENERAL
1. In order to provide the best support to operational commanders, deployed EW units must take advantage of national and international capabilities to augment limited resources. A deployed LF commander will receive EW support from three areas: a. b. c. organic EW resources; resources from other nations in theatre (force level EW capabilities); and Canadian national/strategic resources.
2. Organic EW Resources. Organic EW resources provide the access to the national signal intelligence system. It is unlikely that LF organic resources will be able to provide all the EW information necessary for operations, therefore national and international assets need to be leveraged to augment capability. Electronic Warfare units cannot provide their full potential combat effect without access to national signal intelligence systems. 3. Other Nations in Theatre. Theatre EW units, depending on their tasks, may be able to provide both ES and EA support. This support will be coordinated by the EWCC. There may be national limitations on the provision of this support. 4. Canadian National Resources. Canadian Forces Information Operations Group (CFIOG) is to provide a CF level signal intelligence capability for the provision of databases, analysts, force generate a deployable SIGINT support team (DSST) as part of the EW Troop and sanctuary operations.23 Also, CFIOG will provide access, through the Canadian Security Establishment (CSE), to resources and information from allied nations and, via the LISS, to the CFEWDB. Lastly, CFIOG will force generate a signals intelligence satellite support element (SSE) to augment deployed LF EW assets on an as required basis. 5. It is important to note that augmentation of an SSE results in the creation of either a SEWOC and/or a SEWCC capability as an SSE will locate with either the EWCC or EWOC. In tasked tailored operations, the DSST could be located with the EWCC and the functions traditionally done by the EWOC could be integrated into the EWCC. 6. At the LF level, the LISS provides a Land EW operational support (LEWOS) capability to deployed LF EW systems. An example of this is the provision of a start state radar database for ELINT ES ops during pre-deployment preparations. 7. Electronic Support is defined as that division of EW involving actions taken to locate, intercept and identify EM emissions and locate their sources for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. It provides a source of information required for immediate decisions involving EA, EP and taking other tactical actions.24 It provides information that contributes to production of SIGINT.
Sanctuary (or split based) operations is a term used to describe operations that are being conducted from a safe area (normally out of theatre in Canada) to directly support operations in theatre.
24
23
MC 64 NATO EW Policy.
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8. Electronic Support systems collect data and/or produce information or intelligence, which can be used to: a. Contribute as a source of information for the production of Red situational awareness (SA) within the intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) system. Provide targeting information for EA operations. Initiate self-protection measures. Support EP efforts. Pull data from SIGINT databases populated from the collection done by EW/SIGINT assets. Provide warning to the COMINT supported commander.
b. c. d. e. f.
9. Essentially, ES is the exploitation of adversary transmissions for the purpose of providing immediate threat warning, force protection, and SIGINT about the area of interest as well as targeting information for EA. Electronic Support is composed of search and intercept, DF and analysis functions applied against communications and non-communications targets. The ES process is described below and mirrors the intelligence cycle. Electronic Support can be carried out from ground-based equipment in the forward area and at greatly extended ranges from airborne platforms. All EM radiation has a distinct characteristic or signature, ranging from a single radio frequency to the unique signature of an air defence radar/weapon system. Electronic Warfare units deploy electronic sensors so they can listen to, locate and identify adversary transmissions. 10. Electronic Support (except for organic communications systems) employs passive sensing. In general, ES can collect information throughout a commanders area of interest and is an all weather capability. Direction finding ranges and accuracy of ES are greatly increased with the use of elevated platforms. Electronic Support equipment needs to be modular and compatible to allow for deployment in fixed-wing, rotary-wing or UAV type platforms. Electronic Support requires special equipment, well trained soldiers and clear direction from the ISTAR process on priorities, the types of targets sought and the kind of information desired so wasted effort is prevented. 11. To exploit the adversary's transmissions, EW elements search the spectrum to find which frequencies the adversary is using. When they find a target frequency, or set of frequencies in the case of frequency agile systems, they then intercept the transmissions, use DF equipment to locate the transmitters and then analyse the message content or emission types to gain information and disseminate the information to anyone who requires it. 406. SEARCH AND INTERCEPT FUNCTION
1. Search and intercept should be considered electronic reconnaissance and electronic surveillance (see Figure 4-2). In general, these two functions cannot be separated as the same equipment and operators do both functions. In the past, search was viewed as the start of the EW process; however, it is unlikely that deployed land forces will arrive in a theatre without some national SIGINT database support allowing for immediate commencement of intercept tasks.
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Figure 4-2: EW Vehicle Conducting Electronic Reconnaissance and Electronic Surveillance
2. Search. The search function based on SIGINT already available conducts a reconnaissance of the EM spectrum for exploitable activity. Search must be conducted continuously, and some resources will always need to be dedicated to it. Analysis of the results of the search function is very useful in determining adversary activity even if the internal information of the communications cannot be immediately exploited. 3. In the early stages of an operation, search operations are vital to providing the information necessary for development of the overall ES capability. The results of search provide detailed information on the portions of the EM spectrum employed by an adversary and from this allow the ES package to be task-tailored to exploit the particular theatre. This is particularly important where the size of the EW force will be limited by the overall contingent size. 4. Search and intercept operators are required to exploit as much of the EM spectrum as possible. This will include high frequency (HF), very high frequency (VHF), ultra high frequency (UHF), super high frequency (SHF) and extremely high frequency (EHF) bands for communications and radar activity. In tasked tailored operations, the requirement might exist to have one team focused on search and the other on intercept and cross queuing each other for direction finding. The team focused on search has some knowledge of the target language, and will record all voice transmissions heard. The team notes the frequency, the type of modulation and the mode of transmission. If the net is operating in plain language, the operator can log the call signs, the type of net and an outline of the traffic. If the operator recognizes it as an important net, the operator calls for another operator to look specifically at that particular frequency. In the case of non-communication transmissions, general operators are looking for emissions with unique signal characteristics before conducting follow on direction finding and analysis.
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5. The team involved in a specific search will be assigned to specific frequencies and looks for specified nets. Following a frequency change, the team will be busy trying to rediscover the net on its new frequency. Details of priority nets and those which show promise of providing useful information are then passed to an intercept operator. Modern search equipment incorporates microprocessors, which can be programmed to automatically scan a portion of the band, ignoring friendly or restricted frequencies. 6. Intercept. While the search function conducts a reconnaissance of the EM spectrum, the intercept function conducts surveillance of specific target frequencies. The aim of intercept is to exploit the specifics of adversary transmissions, primarily by transcribing unencrypted voice transmissions, facsimile and data. 7. These activities require very specialized operator skills such as linguistics. Once an important radio net is identified by search, it is handed off to an intercept operator who records the information passed on that net. The intercept operator exploits the information on the net to the extent possible and then passes the results to analysts for further exploitation, fusion and reporting. The intercept operator passes the data files to the analyst for further exploitation. The same process is conducted with regard to intercept of non-communication emitters. 8. Many signals will not be immediately exploitable. These signals will be recorded, logged, databases updated and passed to other EW assets for exploitation. In certain instances, the support of coalition national agencies will be necessary to exploit these signals. The process of exploitation in this case must be as fast as possible to ensure the commander is supported with timely strategic SIGINT. 9. However, when an immediate threat is identified, a warning in the form of a TACREP is reported directly to the EWCC/All Source Intelligence Centre (ASIC) for furtherance to the targeted unit. 10. Intercept can be conducted against secure and insecure nets, but the information obtained will vary. Secure targets yield valuable information in the form of emission characteristics (e.g., frequency and modulation), and some inference can be drawn about the relative importance of the net based on traffic patterns and location of stations. Secure stations are still subject to DF, as are stations working insecure. 11. From intercept the analysts receive information about frequency, message content, traffic flow, activity patterns and transmission types. This information is enhanced by locations and movement provided by DF. In conjunction with other sources of intelligence, the analyst will try to determine the adversary order of battle, strengths, intentions, unit identities and deployment. 12. Search and Intercept Equipment. The fundamental equipment in any search and intercept system is the receiver and associated antenna or antenna system. Intercept receivers are very sensitive with high degrees of both of frequency accuracy and stability. With a high gain antenna and good siting, receivers are capable of exploiting signals at a greater range than normal communication receivers. Intercept receivers usually incorporate a digital frequency meter, which gives the operator a precise frequency read-out for use by direction-finding stations. They also have a panoramic display that can detect all transmissions within a certain range even if these transmissions are infrequent or short.
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407.
DIRECTION FINDING
1. Direction finding (DF) is an ES function that provides location information on target emitters. This information when fused with other search and intercept information is invaluable. Direction-finding equipment is a receiver with a specialized antenna system that is capable of providing a line of bearing (LOB) to where the emitter is located. The quality of the DF system, terrain, signal strength, reflection, and equipment determines the accuracy of the LOB. DF determines the location of an emitter by triangulation. Three or more direction-finding stations are used by taking a simultaneous LOB on the target station transmission (see Figure 4-3). DF can also be used to give guidance to other sensors and supplement intelligence products. In other words, ES data including DF provides excellent cueing for other sensors to detect targets with sufficient accuracy to target. Increasing the number of bearings obtained and using elevated DF platforms can improve DF accuracy. Air based intercept and DF systems can provide this fidelity. Additionally, DF accuracy tends to improve when targeting higher frequencies. As technology advances, we can expect in the future that locating emitters will improve significantly. 2. Emitter Density Location. A number of secure and insecure transmissions on different frequencies all emanating from the same area may indicate the location of an important HQ. In any formation, each type of unit or level of HQ will have its own distinctive electronic signature, which, if identified and located, will obviously provide vital intelligence. The interrelationship between stations on a net and their locations is an important element in establishing the adversary's electronic order of battle. 3. In tasked tailored operations, Search, intercept and DF functions could be combined on the same platform. Integration of intercept and DF information greatly improves the analytical effort to fuse information. Therefore this will result in combined ES detachments for search, intercept and DF. Current ELINT systems already have an integrated search, intercept and DF capability. 4. In the HF frequency band, single station location can be performed. In effect, the target emitter is located by a single ground station rather than by triangulation with a deployed baseline. Again, it is expected that in the near future, this type of locating capability will be available in other bands a well. In essence, the need to deploy a baseline to obtain accurate DF information will be reduced. This will have particular application in operations other than war (OOTW), where a limited number of EW systems can be deployed and in situations where it is not practical to deploy baselines. 5. Ground-based detachments must be sited to obtain a good electronic view of the adversary emitters [usually line of sight (LOS)]. They can locate forward with reconnaissance (recce) to allow for cross-queuing of information if the communications systems do not allow the EW asset to locate further to the rear. If those systems are available, then the EW asset can locate further to the rear, for example, with an artillery detachment or battery, and still provide real time assistance to the recce detachment. As with search and intercept equipment, DF equipment benefits from elevated platforms via UAV and aviation assets. This greatly improves the accuracy and range over ground-mounted systems but is limited by the availability of platforms and weather. Direction finding via elevated platforms should augment a groundbased capability.
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Figure 4-3: EW Vehicles Conducting Direction Finding Tasks
408.
ANALYSIS
1. Analysis is a process of taking sensor data and converting it into information that is useful. It is important to understand that analysis occurs throughout the ES process and not just as a final step. The key principles in analysis that apply to ES are accuracy and speed. The outputs from analysis are SIGINT, immediate threat warnings, force protection, EA targets and assessments of the effectiveness of EA and other IO measures such as psychological operations (PSYOPS) or deception. 2. Specially trained SIGINT analysts primarily carry out the analysis function. The analyst takes directionPriority Intelligence Requirements (PIR)from the EWCC and converts this into tasks for the ES sensors. The ES sensors then collect the necessary data and information and provide them to the analysts. The analysts then take the sensor results, use various databases and produce their products. The analyst must integrate information from search, intercept, and DF of communication and non-communication emitters and produce a SIGINT view of the battle. From an all-source cell perspective, SIGINT is considered a single source that must be integrated with other sensor information [recce, UAV, human intelligence (HUMINT)] to produce Red Situational Awareness (SA) for the commander. 3. Accuracy of the products is critical. The ES process must produce reliable information and be able to indicate to the ASIC how accurate the information is. Inaccurate information can have a detrimental effect on the entire process of producing Red SA. Speed of reporting requires the ES process to produce accurate results as quickly as possible. This allows the commander to have Red SA faster and hence enables him to quicken his decision-action cycle relative to the adversarys.
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4. With software and databases being part of ES systems, software can compare ES results to known databases and provide instantaneous analysis of a signal. This is particularly true in ELINT. Radars are detected, characterized, located, identified and reported without necessarily having a human interface. This level of analysis converts signal data into useful information. Search and intercept operators conduct analysis based on knowledge of the adversary systems. In principle, the analysis should be done as quickly as possible using integral software and operator knowledge. As analysis and data fusion software develops, ES equipment and operators will conduct more analysis. Analysis is a time consuming process. The adversary uses many means to ensure that it takes considerable time to produce results. 5. From intercept, the analysts receive information about frequencies, call signs, types of net, message content, traffic flow, activity patterns and transmission types. For both radio and radar, intercept can identify the equipment by its technical characteristics (electronic fingerprinting). When fused with locations and tracks from DF, this information enables the EW analyst to build up the adversary electronic order of battle. The result of their efforts will be intelligence concerning the adversary order of battle, strengths, intentions, unit identities and equipment developments. Some information cannot be held by the analyst while developing SIGINT since it is time perishable and therefore must be passed immediately to the EWCC/ASIC for action. The analyst is a detective and quickly seizes upon any errors or breaches of security. The building up of an overall SIGINT picture by analysis is a lengthy process. If the adversary EP is effective, SIGINT obtained by intercept is fragmentary at first and gains coherence only as a result of close observation over a period of time. 6. The tactical SIGINT picture is optimally complemented by National systems and their access to first and second party databases. In theatre, SIGINT analysts can work with the National system to provide a SIGINT picture of the area of operation. This in turn provides a detailed communications picture for the EW analysts, the EWCC and the ASIC to aid in their intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and subsequent tasking of the commanders EW assets. 7. Location of Analysis. Many factors dictate the location of the analysts. Factors that would determine the location of the analysis function are: a. Continuity. Electronic Support analysis needs to be continuous. When there is a period of time that analysis is not being conducted, gaps in knowledge are created that will directly affect the accuracy and speed of reporting. The analysis function needs to be as stationary as possible, have redundant capabilities or a split based capability. Access to Databases. The analysis function requires access to databases both for SIGINT and other intelligence information. The databases provide quick references to previously conducted activities and greatly speed the analysis process. Communications. Limitations in the size of communications links may require analysts to deploy directly with the sensors. In other cases, the communication may allow for the analyst to be physically separated from the sensors but in virtual contact. The analysis function must have reliable communication with the ES sensors. The commander must always have some analysis capability in theatre to allow for time of communications disruptions.
b.
c.
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8. Traditionally, the analysis function has been co-located with the search and intercept functions. Tactical communications has normally been conducted with low bandwidth tactical radios. The analyst had to reduce the amount of information passed to a size that could be routinely transmitted by that means. The arrangement also allowed for a close relationship between intercept and analysis. Current communications technology allows for a far more flexible deployment of the analysis function. In recent operations, both sensor and analysis functions have been conducted in separate locations over strategic distances. Additionally, the analysis function has been integrated with ES sensors into a single vehicle detachment. This demonstrates that the location of the analysis function is flexible and mission dependant. 9. Within the ISTAR CC there will likely be a need to have SIGINT analysis capabilities. This will create a synergy with the ASIC and the other sensors. As well, national level communications links will be readily available to the analysts. 10. Analysis Security. Many SIGINT databases and analytical methods are highly classified and specially protected. This creates a requirement for a Special Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). Access to the information and many SIGINT products require special security clearances. Commanders, designated staff and the ISTAR CC will require regular access to this information and will need to be cleared appropriately. 11. Dissemination of Analysis Products. Analysis derived products will be disseminated on a need to know basis. In general, the products will be sanitized to allow them to be passed on the LF command and C2IS. The sanitation procedure will be in accordance with nationally set guidelines and the source protection necessary. The normal products of the EW process are: a. Tactical Reports and Summaries. These reports are produced in an approved text format that allows for quick dissemination, database updates and display on maps as necessary. Overlays. Overlays allow for a pictorial representation of various ES results. For example, all air defence radars, communications towers and all or selected DF results.
b.
12. Enemy Electronic Deception versus Analysis. Analysts must be aware that an adversary may attempt deception. A properly conceived deception plan is aimed at the commander not the ES system. An electronic deception is normally planned as part of an overall deception plan. In some instances, however, it is possible for only an electronic deception to be attempted. In this case, the aim is to deceive the ES system into reporting false information that will be reported to our commander. Analysts must be aware that deception is possible and question results that appear unusual. When this occurs, the ISTAR system may be able to confirm or deny the adversaries use of deception with other sensors. Analysts should not be over cautious and not report for fear of deception. 13. Conclusion. As discussed earlier, automated tools will significantly speed up the analysis process, but analysts must still be highly skilled in order to quickly make sense of a myriad of data. Although progress in the areas of artificial intelligence and automated tools is constantly being made, the main tool remains a highly skilled analyst.
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SECTION 3 ELECTRONIC ATTACK 1. Electronic Attack is defined as: That division of EW involving actions taken to prevent or reduce an adversary's effective use of the EM spectrum through the use of EM energy. There are three subdivisions of EAelectronic jamming, electronic deception and electronic neutralization25: a. Electronic Jamming. Electronic Jamming is the deliberate radiation, reradiation or reflection of EM energy with the object of impairing the effectiveness of electronic devices, equipment or systems being used by an adversary.26 In jamming, EW is not able to stop the transmitter from sending out its signal, therefore the receiver is targeted by EW by putting out a stronger signal thus suppressing the command signal from the receiver see (Figure 4-4). Electronic Deception. Electronic deception is the deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration, absorption or reflection of EM energy in a manner intended to confuse, distract or seduce an adversary or his electronic systems27 . Electronic Neutralization. Electronic neutralization is the deliberate use of EM energy to either temporarily or permanently damage adversary devices, which rely exclusively on the EM spectrum.28
b.
c.
2. Electronic Attack is the offensive arm of EW. Electronic countermeasures are coordinated through the targeting process as described in Chapter 3. The electronic warfare support measures process is the target acquisition (TA) system for EA. Electronic countermeasures are subdivided into three categories: electronic jamming, electronic deception and electronic neutralization.
25
MC 64 NATO EW Policy. MC 64 NATO EW Policy. MC 64 NATO EW Policy. MC 64 NATO EW Policy.
26
27
28
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Figure 4-4: Electronic Attack on the Receiver
409.
ELECTRONIC JAMMING
1. Electronic jamming is the deliberate radiation, re-radiation or reflection of EM energy with the object of impairing the effectiveness of electronic devices, equipment or systems being used by an adversary. Jamming used at the right time on the right targets (e.g., on command links during an assault) can greatly reduce the adversarys effectiveness by denying him critical information and communications. If jamming is poorly coordinated, it will alert the adversary and can compromise our own capability and intentions. If jamming is conducted too early, it will allow the adversary time to react and restore communications and therefore have limited effect. A jamming signal can affect both friend and foe, and its effects can be widespread. Adversary transmissions are often a source of intelligence, and if they are jammed, the information they provide is lost. Jamming, therefore, is an activity that must be closely directed and coordinated by the G3 staff. 2. Within the LF, EW units conduct electronic jamming. The responsibility for jamming rests with the G3 /Chief of Staff (COS), and jamming is coordinated by the FSCC and electronic EWCC. The EWCC is responsible for the execution of jamming based on targets determined by the targeting process. Coordination with other staffs, in particular the G2 and G6, is critical. 410. CONTROL OF JAMMING
1. Jamming operations are most successful when they are permitted the greatest possible latitude to attack both planned and opportunity targets. Coordination of jamming operations should commence early in the planning cycle and continue through all operational phases. The measures for controlling jamming are normally contained in the operations order. Control is exercised in one of four ways:
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a.
Positive Control. Positive control is the issuance of specific orders to jam and/or deceive a given target or blanket authority to neutralize by jamming and/or deception a category of target (for example, an adversary fire control net or ground surveillance radars). Frequencies and times are not specified. Negative Control. Negative control is the denial of permission to conduct jamming (for example, no jamming before H-hour). On/Off Control. On/off control is the direct control of a jamming operation from moment to moment. Restricted Frequency Control. Restricted frequency lists (RFLs) are a mechanism to prevent jamming from affecting friendly operations. Annex A to this chapter provides a process and procedures for developing and maintaining RFLs. There are three categories of frequencies: (1) (2) (3) Taboo. A friendly frequency on which jamming or other intentional interference is prohibited.29 Guarded. An adversary frequency used as a source of information.30 Protected. A friendly frequency on which interference must be minimized.31
b. c. d.
2. These four methods of controlling jamming are applied in a manner that permits maximum flexibility and minimum delay in obtaining authority to conduct jamming operations without compromising limitations imposed by superior headquarters. Unless forbidden by a higher commander or established rules of engagement, any formation commander can authorize jamming. Commanders at all levels must be fully conversant with the orders governing the use of jamming and be aware of the possible adverse effects on intelligence collection, command and control and weapon systems. 3. Jamming is a technique that is used to capture an adversarys communication device (radio) by radiating enough energy that the intended receiver only receives the jamming signal and only the intended one. Jamming effectiveness is determined by several factors: a. b. Jammer Power. In general, the higher the power the more effective the jamming. Range to the Target Receiver. The closer the target, the more effective the jamming.
29 30 31
ATP 51(A) Chapter 4. ATP 51(A) Chapter 4. ATP 51(A) Chapter 4.
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c.
The Link Distance. The link distance is the distance between the transmitter and receiver. The longer this distance, the more effective the jamming is (less jamming power is required). Ground. For ground-based jammers, the ground itself can mask the target or necessitate greater power to produce effective jamming. Power of the Adversary Transmitter. Depending on the power output of the adversary transmitter, more jammer power may be required to effect jamming. Normally, the power output is known and can be factored into the equation to determine the required jammer power output.
d. e.
4. Jammers can use a variety of modulations. It is important to tailor the jamming modulation to the target. The most successful jammer is one that is perceived as anything but a jammer. For example, the jammer can use a random Morse signal against a net operating on Morse code or use a random data signal against a data net. 5. Types of Jamming. The types of jamming that may be employed are as follows: a. Spot Jamming. Spot jamming occurs when a jammer attacks one frequency or narrow band of frequencies in specific use by the victim. It is normally tuneable over a range of frequencies. Spot jamming causes minimum interference with friendly systems and permits maximum use of available jamming power. A spot jammer requires very accurate knowledge of adversary frequencies. Barrage Jamming. Barrage jamming occurs when a jammer attacks over a wide band of frequencies simultaneously. The power available will be spread over the entire bandwidth; this results in less power on any particular frequency than occurs with spot jamming. Barrage jamming is likely to harass the victim over a number of frequency options rather than totally deprive the victim of using any particular frequency. Less detailed steerage is necessary for barrage jamming. Also, the chance of interference with friendly nets is greater than with spot jamming. Sweep Jamming. Sweep jamming attempts to compromise between the advantages of spot jamming and barrage jamming. The frequency of the jamming signal is continuously varied within a specific bandwidth. All available power is used for one frequency or a narrow band at any instant, but the tuning is swept back and forth across a whole band of frequencies. Higher sweep rates can achieve more effective results. Automatic Search Jamming. More sophisticated jammers use advanced technology to maximize their effectiveness yet reduce their vulnerability. The automatic search jammer (also known as a responsive jammer) incorporates an intercept receiver, which automatically searches a selected band of frequencies to find frequencies of interest for which the system has been programmed. The jamming transmitter is then automatically tuned and activated on the target frequency. For the victim station, the jamming appears to be continuous. Sometimes a capability is incorporated into the system to look through the jamming transmissions and follow any changes in frequency made by the victim. Complex systems will include a computer management function, which allocates power resources to simultaneous targets.
b.
c.
d.
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JAMMER PLATFORMS
1. To be effective, a ground-based jammer has to be sited close to the forward line of own troops (FLOT) so it can take advantage of the high power output (which is typically between 1 kW and 2 kW). This siting allows the jammer to be effective against targets that are in depth (for example, artillery nets), but it makes the jammer vulnerable. Thus the jammer should be mounted in an armoured vehicle. Mounting the jammer on an elevated platform such as an UAV can eliminate the loss of power of a jamming signal caused by intervening terrain (attenuation). This technique provides a line of sight path from the jammer to the target receiver, thus enabling a lower power jammer to be used. An airborne jammer of as little as 200 watts output at a distance of 40 km can be as effective as a ground-based jammer of 2 kW output at 15 km. 412. EXPENDABLE JAMMERS
1. Expendable jamming involves placing a low power jammer within a few hundred metres of a target receiver. This can have the same disruptive effect as a high power jammer 15 to 20 km away. Expendable jammers can be hand-placed, airdropped or artillery delivered. They can be programmed to lock on to strong local signals, or they can be programmed to switch on to a certain frequency at a predetermined time. If expendable jammers are delivered as a mix with explosive ordnance, they could seriously degrade the adversary's efforts to restore order out of chaos. Special Forces, reconnaissance and forward troops may be tasked to place expendable jammers. Their use would be coordinated, as with other jamming, through the targeting process. SECTION 4 ELECTRONIC PROTECTION 1. Electronic protective measures are defined as: That division of EW involving actions taken to ensure friendly effective use of the EM spectrum despite the adversary's use of EM energy. There are two sub-divisions of EP: a. Active Electronic Protection. Detectable measures, such as altering transmitter parameters as necessary, to ensure friendly effective use of the EM spectrum. Passive Electronic Protection. Undetectable measures, such as operating procedures and technical features of equipment, which are meant to ensure friendly effective use of the EM spectrum.32
b.
32
MC 64 NATO EW Policy.
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413. ELECTRONIC ATTACK AS ELECTRONIC PROTECTION: JAMMING IN NONELECTRONIC WARFARE UNITS 1. Systems are now available that can provide protection for LF by using jammers against electronic artillery fuses such as variable-time or proximity fuses. The jammer causes the artillery round to detonate prematurely. The system detects the signal from the artillery round and automatically sends a signal, which detonates the round. The system is, in fact, a combination of ES and EA that provides EP. SECTION 5 ORGANIZATION FOR EMPLOYMENT 1. There are two broad organizational paradigms for EW employment: a. b. 414. Light EW; and Medium EW.
LIGHT ELECTRONIC WARFARE
1. Light Electronic Warfare (EW) assets have the full spectrum of operational capability and are mounted in wheeled soft-skinned vehicles thus having the ability to operate dismounted to a limited degree. Logistical limitations of the platforms employed may dictate a slightly degraded capability that is offset by increased mobility and reduced logistical support requirements. 2. Light EW can also be man-pack or man-portable systems that can be used in conjunction with patrols, reconnaissance, light infantry work and work in complex terrain against low-powered communications. 415. MEDIUM ELECTRONIC WARFARE
1. Medium Electronic Warfare (EW) assets are equipped with wheeled armoured sensor platforms. Medium EW may have an increased technical capability due to the increased loadcarrying capacity of the platform and provide increased operator protection. Medium EW has increased logistic support requirements. 2. For all deployments, subject to resource constraints and based on the assigned mission, the EW team/detachment/troop/squadron will be formed on a grouping of the following building block functions/entities tailored to the operation: a. b. c. d. e. f. Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell or Signals Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell; Electronic Warfare Liaison Officer; Electronic Warfare Operation Centre or Signals Electronic Warfare Operation Centre; Mobile Electronic Warfare Team; Electronic Attack; and Combat Service Support.
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3. Mobile Electronic Warfare Teams. A Mobile Electronic Warfare Team (MEWT) is a grouping of EW capability, usually ES, at the lowest level, formed to meet a mission requirement. It can be an existing ES detachment, an ES detachment augmented with intelligence analysis capability or a grouping of both an ES and EA detachment together. A MEWT grouping is mission dependant. 4. Electronic Warfare Liaison Officers. Small-scale short-term deployments, such as a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO), might be provided with a single vehicle (or manpack) detachment, which is capable of providing EW liaison, advice, connectivity to national or allied assets and a limited capability to perform ES33. 5. Electronic Warfare Coordination Centre/Mobile Electronic Warfare Teams. A twoor three-vehicle grouping capable of providing EW liaison, advice and connectivity to national or allied assets, a full-time presence at the ISTAR table, and a team capable of mobile ES operations, either vehicle mounted or foot borne, to carry out EM spectrum reconnaissance and provide target situational awareness and threat warning to the supported commander. 6. Rapid Deployment Troop. Electronic Support Team, Analysis Team, one EWLO team, a wheeled vehicle baseline capable of full spectrum ES and limited EA and integral specialist technical support. SECTION 6 COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1. When speaking of command and control of EW, this normally refers to specialist EW units/detachments within formations. Electronic warfare units provide formation commanders with capabilities to conduct ES and EA operations. All units and formations conduct EP with EW units providing specialist advice. Electronic Warfare must be coordinated centrally at each level of command. This does not prevent the allocation of EW capabilities to subordinate formations and units. Internal to an EW unit, command and control is exercised via the EWCC, which exercises command on behalf of the EW unit and the EWOC exercises operational control of the EW assets. However during specific tasked tailored operations the EWCC could be augmented with an analyst team to take over the control function from the EWOC. 416. COMMAND OF EW
1. Electronic Warfare unit commanders exercise command over their organic EW assets and, depending on the command relationship,34 exercise control (on behalf of the commander) of additional EW assets assigned. The EW commander is also the arms adviser to the commander on EW matters. Because of this, it is imperative that the EW commander be involved in the supported units operational planning process (OPP) to allow for proper usage of the assets available or to allow for the EW commander to request additional support from higher HQs EW.
33 The level of ES that can be provided by a single detachment is limited to essential force protection and short-term warning. 34 B-GL-300-003/FP-001 Command in Land Operations provides details of various command relationship under which forces can be assigned.
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2. For the purposes of this document, the EWCC will be the central capability referred to for the operational control of the supported units EW capabilities. As the EW unit becomes smaller, for example, a Troop at the battle Group level, the EWCC may simply be the EW commander and his or her senior EW non-commissioned officer (NCO). 3. The EWCC is located at the tactical headquarters and acts as the EW unit commanders operations (Ops) staff. This coordination is primarily in the form of direction with regard to movement and allocation of EW assets in support of specific units during different phases of formation operations. The EWCC should be considered the same as any other CC located at the unit HQ. 417. ELECTRONIC WARFARE COORDINATION CELL
1. The EWCC is the focal point for all EW activities within a given level of command. The supporting EW unit normally provides the EWCC. Each level of command that has EW assets allocated will have an EWCC. The EWCC performs the following functions: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. Develop the EW plans to support the commanders operation and ISTAR plan. Coordinate ES and EA activities with other combat capabilities within the formation. Coordinate ES and EA activities with higher and flanking formations. Provide specialist EW advice to the commander and other staff, including EP. Direct ES and EA activities on behalf of the EW commander. Control EA operations on behalf of the EW commander. Conduct analysis during tasked tailored operations (the EWOC function is replaced with an analyst team located in the EWCC). Provide ES results in support of the ISTAR system.
2. Coordination of EW activities across various levels of command is critical. This prevents the duplication of effort and enhances the sharing of EW information. The chain of command takes precedence over any EW technical control. The senior formation EWCC has technical control of all EW activities. 3. In the context of joint and multinational operations, the same technical control relationship would occur. The joint EWCC would exercise technical control over the Land component EWCC (as well as those of the Air and Maritime elements). Canadian LF formations will normally be allocated to an allied formation for operations. The allied formation SEWCC is responsible for the coordination of all EW activities within the formation. Technical control and passage for EW information to other nations will be based on national agreements and policies.
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418.
ANALYSIS AND CONTROL ELEMENT
1. The EWOC exercises operational real time control of the formation EW capability specifically with regard to ES in accordance with the EW unit commanders direction. The primary function of the EWOC is to control the ES system as it executes search, intercept and direction-finding tasks. However during tasked tailored operations, the EWOC function could be replaced with an analyst team located in the EWCC carrying-out the ES control functions. 419. ELECTRONIC WARFARE LIAISON OFFICERS
1. Electronic warfare liaison officers (EWLOs) are normally allocated from the formation EW unit to subordinate formations that do not have an organic EW unit. The purpose is to allow subordinate formations and units access to the capabilities of the EW system, in particular, ES information and EA. If a subordinate formation or sub-unit is allocated EW resources, an EWCC, depending on the size, organization and mission of the supported sub-unit or formation, is provided for its support. 2. An EWLO at the EW squadron (Sqn) level will normally be a Captain. At the Brigade (BG) level, an EWLO will be a Sergeant or a Warrant Officer. SECTION 7 ELECTRONIC WARFARE PLANNING AND PROCESSES 420. THE OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS
1. Formation HQs use the OPP to produce a plan based on the mission, concept and intent of the higher commander. The IPB process and the targeting process support the OPP. The SIGINT IPB creates a picture of the EM spectrum for the EW commander to be able to better advise the G2, G# and the supported commander with respect to how best to employ the EW assets available. 2. The OPP is a six-step process: a. Receipt of Tasks. The formation HQ normally receives its tasks as a warning order, operations order or fragmentary order from the higher formation. The receipt of the tasks initiates a new planning cycle; Orientation. In this step the commander conducts mission analysis and prepares guidance. The commander's guidance will include commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs). Priority intelligence requirements are the component of CCIRs that provide guidance to the overall ISTAR effort and by extension, the ES effort; Develop Courses of Action. The staff develops courses of action (COA) based on the information. The IPB process develops possible adversary COA and questions for the ISTAR system. The staff then compares COA by means of a war game. The EWCC would support the ISTAR system in helping to answer questions from IPB by directing ES activities and obtaining any available SIGINT from other sources including information provided through a SIGINT IPB;
b.
c.
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d. e.
Decision. The staff presents the results of COA war game to the commander for a decision on which COA to develop into a plan. Plan Development. Another war game is conducted to refine the selected COA and develop the decision support template (DST), the synchronization matrix and high payoff target list (HPTL). The targeting process produces the attack guidance matrix (AGM). The EWCC supports the targeting process with coordination of EA. The result of this step is the production of an order with an EW annex; and Plan Review. The coordination of the details of the plan with subordinate units is conducted during this step. The EWCC coordinates the EW plan with higher and lower formations as necessary.
f.
421. ELECTRONIC WARFARE AND THE INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD PROCESS 1. The IPB process provides a continuous analysis of the adversary, weather and terrain. The result of the process is the information collection plan (ICP). The process has four steps: a. Define the Battlefield. The staff refines the AO and defines the area of intelligence responsibility (AIR) based on the higher formation orders and the commander's initial planning guidance. Describe the Battlefield Effects. The G2 collects information about the battlefield or updates information provided by other sources. The effects of terrain and weather on the AO are also evaluated. Evaluate the Threat. The G2 assembles all available information on the adversary and prepares doctrinal and event templates. Determine Threat Courses of Action. The G2 prepares threat COA based upon the available information.
b.
c. d.
2. The EWCC must participate in IPB. In fact, in conjunction with National Assets, it is responsible to prepare the SIGINT IPB. This will allow the G2 to more fully understand the electronic battlefield when preparing the ICP. This in turn will provide direction to the EWCC for ES through the ISTAR CC. The IPB process is a useful tool for the EWCC in preparation for ES operations. 3. Targeting is defined as the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities.35 The targeting process assists the commander by determining which targets are to be acquired and attacked, when they are to be attacked and what is required to defeat the target. A target is an adversary function, formation or equipment, facility or terrain planned for destruction, neutralization or
35
AAP 6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.
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suppression in order to delay, disrupt, divert, limit or destroy the adversary.36 Targeting links the commander, the sensors and the engagement systems. The targeting process has four functions: a. Decide. Decide is the cornerstone of the targeting process and requires close coordination between the commander and the intelligence, plans, operations and targeting team elements. The process begins with receipt of a mission, whether assigned by higher HQ or deduced by the commander. The commander, with input from his staff, analyses the mission and considers the tasks that must be performed. Targeting priorities must be addressed for each phase or critical event of an operation. Detect. Detect is the next critical step in the targeting process. The G2 is the main figure in this step as he coordinates the effort to detect high payoff targets (HPTs) identified in the decide function. To ensure there is no duplication of effort, specific direction is given to target acquisition systems capable of detecting high priority targets. Information needs are expressed as priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and information requirements (IRs). The detect function is carried out through the execution of the ICP. Deliver. The deliver function of the targeting process executes the AGM and supports the commanders battle plan once the HPTs have been located and identified. During the detect function, it is the TA assets that have to be managed. The deliver function provides the framework for the efficient employment of firing assets. The attack of targets must satisfy the attack guidance developed during the decide function. Assess. Combat assessment is the determination of the effectiveness of force employment (FE) during military operations. It is composed of three elements as follows: (1) Battlefield Damage Assessment. Battlefield Damage Assessment (BDA) is the timely and accurate assessment of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a target. It provides commanders with an estimate of the adversarys combat effectiveness, capabilities and intentions. Munitions Effect Assessment. Munitions Effect Assessment (MEA) is used as the basis for recommendations for changes to increase the effectiveness of tactics, methodology, weapon system selection, munitions and weapon delivery patterns. Recommendations for Re-attack. This aspect considers the requirement for another attack if the desired effect on the target has not been achieved.
b.
c.
d.
(2)
(3)
36
B-GL-300-007/FP-001 Firepower Chapter 3.
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4. The EW system is involved in the targeting process in two ways. Firstly, EA is integrated as an engagement system with all of the other engagement systems at the commanders disposal. The EWCC, which is a member of the targeting team, is responsible for the integration, tasking and control of EA based on the targeting priorities. The second way that the EW system is involved in the targeting process is that the entire EW system is required to conduct its own targeting process for effective EA support. 5. The EWCC with the targeting team conducts the decide function for EA. The targeting team will recommend the use of EA and the control measure37 to be in effect. The ES provides the detection function for EA. This involves the collection of information (in effect target acquisition) in sufficient detail to allow for effective EA. For example, determination that a specific frequency is an artillery net and its general direction is sufficient information to allow the EWCC to target that particular net. The deliver function is conducted by the EA detachments as directed and coordinated by the EWCC. The ES then provides the assess function by determining if the EA has been effective and recommends new targets to the EWCC to ensure the EA remains effective. 422. THE ISTAR PLANNING PROCESS
1. The ISTAR planning process within the formation is a continuous process much like IPB and targeting. A cycle begins with the receipt of the commanders guidance on completion of his or her mission analysis. The guidance contains the PIRs that are of concern to ISTAR. 423. PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
1. At this stage in the process, PIRs should be considered to be of two types. Some PIRs are things that the commander will need to know for the execution of the mission. For example, the commander may want to know if the adversary will delay or defend. As a result, during execution, ISTAR will look for indications that the adversary is thinning out in preparation for a withdrawal. Other PIRs will be for planning. For example, the commander may want to know the extent to which the adversarys defences have been prepared. These latter PIRs are immediately translated into tasks in the ISTAR coordination centre (ISTAR CC) and issued out to sensors. The EWCC converts tasks from the ISTAR CC into ES tasks. 424. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
1. Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance provides the terrain and environment information that allows the G2 to describe the battlefield effects. The ISTAR CC also contributes to the evaluation of the threat by providing intelligence from existing databases and from the results of the collection efforts resulting from the PIRs issued for planning. The EWCC will work with the ISTAR CC and the G2 to add the electronic battlefield to the G2s IPB. This will in turn keep the EW commander as part of the planning process and overall IPB so that the supported commander, the G2 and the G3 have an understanding and appreciation for what electronic targets are available and prosecutable in support of the operation.
37
See chapter 6 of B-GL-358-001/FP-001 for EA control measure measures.
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425.
OPERATIONS PLAN DEVELOPMENT
1. As the formation operations staff develops the COA, EW planners contribute to the development by advising on the EW contribution to each COA. The EW planners participate in the COA war game and the plan war game in order to ensure that EW tasks are fully synchronized with the remainder of the plan. 2. During plan development, the EWCC continues to contribute to the common operational picture, as it collects information based upon the PIRs issued for planning. The updated common operational picture allows the COA to be adjusted to a change in adversary disposition or in increase in our knowledge of the adversary disposition. 426. ISTAR PLAN
1. The ISTAR plan is included as an annex to the formation operation order. Like the Fire Support annex, the ISTAR plan is prepared by the ISTAR CC and is issued as part of the formation operation order. The ISTAR plan describes how the assets of the ISTAR system will be used to collect the information required in the ICP. 2. The ISTAR CC will coordinate unit ISTAR plans on behalf of the G3 ISTAR. This will identify gaps in the ISTAR coverage and allow action to be taken to cover the gaps if possible. It will also identify to the ISTAR CC, the ISTAR priorities of subordinate commanders, so that information that is collected that is particularly relevant to their battles can be processed on their behalf. The EWCC will assist in this coordination by evaluating the ES coverage of a subordinate formation in conjunction with the SIGINT IPB. 3. ISTAR Overlay. The ISTAR overlay links the ISTAR plan, IPB and the targeting process. The overlay details the named area of interest (NAI) and target area of interest (TAI) that are developed during the formation OPP. Collection tasks within these NAI and TAI will be detailed in the ISTAR annex and the ISTAR matrix. 4. ISTAR Matrix. The ISTAR matrix is an appendix to the ISTAR annex. It is based upon the ICP produced by the G2. The ISTAR matrix relates the ICP to the ISTAR system sources and agencies. It identifies collection tasks to ISTAR sensors and is prepared by the ISTAR CC. The EWCC will be represented on the ISTAR matrix and is the main tasking document for ES. It also allocates tasks to other formation units since it forms part of the formation operation order. 5. Information Collection Plan.38 The ICP identifies the PIRs, the IRs and the combat indicators necessary to evaluate the adversarys COA and to predict the adversarys future activities. It is an appendix to the Intelligence annex to the formation operation order. It allows all units to understand the information required to draw the appropriate conclusions about the adversary. This is a very important document for the EWCC and the EW analyst. It allows the EWCC to focus its analytical efforts. Conclusions drawn by the analysts must support PIRs and IRs.
38
Examples of the ISTAR overlay, ISTAR matrix and the ICP can be found in B-GL-352-001/FP-001 Land Force Information OperationsIntelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance Chapter 3.
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427.
THE EW PROCESSES
1. There is not one EW Process. The EW system conducts two processes: ES and EA processes. The EWCC is the focal point of both of these processes. 2. The Electronic Support Process. The ES process is a sub-process of the ISTAR and intelligence processes. The ES process mirrors the intelligence cycle in that it consists of direction, collection, processing and dissemination. The process begins with direction from collection management on the areas to be covered. This consists of the ICP, ISTAR overlay and ISTAR matrix. The EWCC converts these documents into specific targets such as networks (C2, artillery, reconnaissance nets), critical nodes (command posts, communication centres) and activities (radar, movements) that will satisfy the collection tasks. The targets are passed to the EWOC or the analyst team for additional analysis, refinement and tasking to the sensor systems. The sensors, both COMINT and ELINT, conduct the collection phase of search, intercept and. The search systems continuously look for targets and pass those of interest to intercept for further detailed collection. Direction finding is conducted to determine locations, and this information is fused with the intercept information. 3. The EWOC or the analyst team then processes the information into a single source intelligence product (SIGINT) disseminated in the form of TACREPs or EWSUMs. The EWOC can also re-task the sensors as necessary. The products are then disseminated to the EWCC who provides the results to the ASIC. The ASIC may ask for additional information from the EWCC or request additional ES tasks through the collection managers to the EWCC. 4. The Electronic Attack Process. The EA process is a sub-process of the targeting process. The EWCC receives EA tasks through the AGM which is developed by the targeting team and approved by the commander. This process also provides additional ES collection tasks that the EWCC must direct to the EW system. The ES provides the detection (target acquisition) system for EA. The ES system must provide detailed information to allow EA to be effective. The results of detection are provided to the EWCC to allow for the integration of EA into the fire support plan. The G3, through the fire support coordination centre (FSCC), then authorizes EA. The EWCC then tasks EA elements to conducts attacks. The ES then monitors and provides an assessment of EA effectiveness to the EWCC. This EA assessment is provided to the targeting team who start the process again. 5. The conduct of EA will have a direct effect on the ES collection. The ES resources normally dedicated to ES tasks will be required to monitor the effects of EA and will thus cause some degradation of the ES effort. Normally, many of the EA targets have been well developed and, therefore, the ES effort will not be completely degraded to support EA. ES should continue during EA activities. If necessary, the G3 ISTAR will make the decision on the priority of effort based on advice from the EWCC, the G6 and the G2. The G6 must be involved in the planning process regarding EA assets to ensure the RFL is being obeyed, on behalf of the G3, and to ensure there is a limitation of any signals fratricide. This is a risk assessment that must be presented to the supported commander.
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SECTION 8 ELECTRONIC DECEPTION All warfare is based on deception. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, c. 500 BC, tr. Griffith. 1. Electronic deception (ED) is the deliberate radiation, re-radiation, alteration, absorption or reflection of EM energy in a manner intended to confuse, distract or seduce an adversary or his electronic systems. Electronic deception is a component of the commanders overall deception plan39, which, in turn, is part of the commanders overall information operation plan. 428. AIM
1. The aim of deception is to mislead the adversary commander and induce him into doing something counter to his interests. The EM spectrum is an ideal medium to employ deceptive techniques because it is shared with the adversary. His ES system is a means to provide him false information. Electronic deception is employed as part of an overall tactical deception plan and cannot be practiced indiscriminately. Careful scripting and control at the highest possible level are required as well as highly skilled operators who must be well briefed. On the other hand, low-level imitative deception can be attempted by EW elements if the aim is limited to delaying adversary traffic from a few minutes to a few hours or if there is an opportunity to temporarily confuse adversary commanders at formation or unit level. Electronic deception is a potent weapon with few of the disadvantages of jamming, but it can be very expensive in manpower and equipment. 429. PLANNING
1. Electronic deception must be considered during the planning phase of any deception plan. The G3 has responsibility for developing the overall deception plan. The planning of ED is the responsibility of the EWCC on behalf of the G3 (via a designated G3 IO). Many other staffs are involved with the development of deception plans. Annex B to this chapter provides a guide for the EWCC to plan and coordinate ED. Electronic deception is particularly effective in the following circumstances: a. When the adversary relies heavily on a communications and information systems (CIS) using the EM spectrum. Electronic deception may cause the adversaryby the manipulation, distortion or falsification of electronic transmissionsto react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. When the adversary ISTAR system is dependent on the ES (tactical and national level).
b.
39
More information on deception can be found in B-GL-354-003/FP 001
Land Force Deception.
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c. d.
When it is skilfully conducted and fully integrated into the overall deception plan. At a critical time in the adversarys operations.
2. All units in a formation could be involved in ED. Electronic deception is divided into three categories: a. Manipulative Electronic Deception. This type of ED puts out false information over our own emitters so it can be intercepted by the adversary and treated as real information (for example, dummy radio traffic). Simulative Electronic Deception. This type of ED is the creation of electronic signatures (for example, false radio net). Imitative Electronic Deception. This type of ED emits signals designed to convince the adversary these signals belong to the adversary (for example, intruding on an adversary net). SECTION 9 ELECTRONIC NEUTRALIZATION 430. GENERAL
b. c.
1. Electronic neutralization (EN) is the deliberate use of EM energy to either temporarily or permanently damage adversary devices that rely exclusively on the EM spectrum. Electronic neutralization is usually brought about as a result of a directed energy (DE) or particle beam (PB) weapon depositing sufficient EM energy on a target so as to render useless the target, its electronics or both. The use of lasers to destroy sensitive optical viewing devices is one such example. Electronic neutralization is characterized by the requirement for LOS and the near instantaneous time of flight (approaching or at the speed of light). 2. Electronic neutralization carries with it a risk to our own troops. As a consequence, great care and safety must be used when employing certain types of DE weapons. Directed energy weapons will have applications in close combat, LOS engagements. The doctrine for employing these weapons will be contained in the manuals of those arms that employ the weapons. EW units are not involved directly with EN. Land EW operational support may be involved in the reprogramming of systems to detect the use of EN.
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CHAPTER 5 SIGNALS PLANNING SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION 1. Signals and staff have a symbiotic relationship that demands that both entities fully understand the requirements of the other to achieve mission success. In order for Signals to successfully provide the Command Support necessary for the staff to support the Commanders decision-action cycle, Signals needs to understand the information exchange requirements of all involved in that cycle in the context of the Land Operating environment (LOE). Further, Signals must be able to provide the most suitable environment within that LOE from which to execute that decision-action cycle efficiently and effectively. There are a significant number of factors that affect Signals ability to achieve that aim. The goal of this chapter is to outline the process and the factors that affect Signals in their provision of Command Support services. By understanding the process and the requirements that drive it, Commanders and staff will understand what is required of them to ensure that the Command Support provided by Signals is the best possible, given the operational requirements. 2. A formation's Signal element is responsible for providing the Commander and staff with the personnel, equipment and vehicles required to exercise command over subordinate formations and units, for electronic warfare (EW) support and for the administrative support and security of the headquarters (HQ). These responsibilities cannot be met properly unless the efforts of the general staff and Signals are complementary. Each has to know and accept its responsibilities towards the other. 501. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE GENERAL STAFF TO SIGNALS
1. Training. The general staff assists in the preparation of training plans. The staff must ensure that these plans direct and facilitate training of all elements of the formation in communication procedures, equipment and facilities. 2. General responsibilities of the staff are to: a. Inform Signals as to planned operations at the earliest possible time. This includes information on tactical plans, e.g., groupings, movement of headquarters and special communication requirements and specific Information Exchange Requirements (IERs). Issue orders for the opening, closing and joining of communication nets. Allocate sites and routes for deployment of communications and electronic warfare elements. Enforce communication procedures, including discipline on voice nets, use of precedence, security classifications, special handling procedures and measures to reduce traffic. Enforce policy concerning the distribution and use of codes and encryption devices.
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b. c. d.
e.
f. g. h. i.
Establish priorities for, and authorize issue of, communication equipment. Establish priority of means to be used in communications and the order of priority for establishing communications to units Authorize the use of special dispatch service. The G3 staff, with G2 and Signals advice, develops a Commanders EW policy and provides staff direction to the Electronic Warfare Coordination Centre (EWCC). The G3 staff carries out the following specific tasks in this area: (1) Planning the employment of interception and direction-finding (DF) assets based on the priority of intelligence requirements. The G3 also provides assistance to these elements through the provision of advice on enemy organizations, locations, capabilities and intentions. Establishing formation policy on the use of jamming. Preparing electronic deception (ED) plans for the formation. Establishing communications security policy, namely the application of electronic protection measures (EPM), including policies for emission control, such as rules for the imposition, breaking and lifting of radio or electronic silence.
(2) (3) (4)
j.
Through the EWCC, the general staff: (1) (2) (3) Establishes lists of guarded, protected and prohibited frequencies. Adjusts tasking to intercept and DF elements and disseminates intelligence received. Controls the employment of jammers.
502. 1.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF SIGNALS TO THE STAFF General Responsibilities. The formation Signal unit has the following responsibilities: a. Providing advice on the following communications matters: (1) (2) (3) b. training; priority of use of communications means; and siting and moving the HQ.
Operation, engineering and technical control of tactical communications (TacComms) and tactical command and control information systems (TacC2IS) in support of the identified IERs. Performance of communications and electronics equipment maintenance.
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d. e. f. g. h. i.
Provision of administrative support and local defence of formation HQ. Managing and allocating the frequency spectrum, including maintaining and disseminating lists of guarded, protected and prohibited frequencies. Recommending sites and routes for the deployment of communications and EW elements. Advising on the state of communications, including information about delays in handling traffic. Monitoring communications security and reports security breaches. Drafting the Command and Signals paragraphs and the Communications and Electronics Annex to Operation Orders and the preparation of Communications and Electronics Operating Instructions (CEOIs). Maintaining and disseminating the correct time. Providing advice on the policy and planning of EW activities and the allocation of EW elements. Adjusting the employment of intercept, DF and jamming as directed. Controlling the execution of ED tasks.
j. k. l. m. 503.
SIGNALS COMMAND AND CONTROL
1. To work efficiently, the tactical Signal systems must be co-ordinated as one entity; therefore, a control system must be established at all levels of command. Control aims at the best utilization of all systems in order to meet operational requirements. A considerable degree of centralized planning and overall control is necessary to eliminate undesirable duplication or, alternatively, to exploit available systems to their full potential. However, substantial delegation of authority is required in the execution of the Signal plan. 2. Controlling agencies are fielded as part of Signal units; they exist to assist key Signal officers in discharging their responsibilities towards Commanders and staffs. Control and coordination of tactical systems is exercised from the highest to the lowest levels of command; thus, at any level, a Signal officer (Sig O) is operationally responsible to his or her Commander and subject to technical control instructions issued by the senior Sig O at the next higher level of command. 504. SIGNALS PLANNING PRINCIPLES
1. To be effective and meet the requirements of Commanders at all levels, Signals must provide the Command Support necessary to sustain the Land Command Support System (LCSS) in accordance with certain principles. All of these principles are interrelated although they may not be mutually compatible in all circumstances. Their application and their relative importance in planning and in operations must therefore be weighed against the specific needs in every situation.
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2. Capacity. The system must be capable of handling the traffic generated by the users within the specified time frame, in the required mode and without inhibiting the tempo of operations. Constant monitoring of the LCSS must be carried out to ensure that operated systems are engineered to meet the capacity needed for peak loads. These peak load periods can be anticipated with the co-operation of users. 3. Economy. The increasing complexity of warfare means that more and more of the effort has to be diverted from the primary function of fighting to tasks that, although essential, are ancillary. One of these tasks is the provision of an LCSS. It must therefore be as economical as possible and demand the least amount of human and material resources for its operation and maintenance. It is important that LCSS facilities be allocated in accordance with operational priorities and that their use be strictly controlled to ensure they serve the intended purpose. 4. Economy is realized by ensuring that: a. b. c. demands for facilities are kept to a minimum; signal plans are based on the minimum scale needed to accomplish the tactical mission; and signal spares and reserve holdings are properly planned to promote reliability and flexibility.
5. Flexibility. This is the ability to react to changing situations and unexpected developments. Changes in requirements may result from alterations to operational plans or from enemy action. 6. Flexibility also implies the ability to provide systems which are interoperable and can be adapted to diverse operations and/or combat functions. 7. Flexibility is gained by: a. b. c. d. e. forethought in planning and anticipation of contingencies; standing operating procedures (SOPs) and drills to reduce the time needed to plan and redeploy LCSS components; high standard of efficiency in establishing and maintaining LCSS components; close co-ordination between the user and the Signal planner; and systems that are user-oriented and can be used for a variety of combat functions.
8. Mobility. This is the ability to deploy everywhere on the battlefield and to meet the needs of the user without restricting freedom of action and ability to manoeuvre. LCSS components must have the same tactical mobility as the forces being supported. 9. Mobility is also enhanced by the design of communication systems that allow for separate movement of user HQs and Signal facilities (e.g., an area trunk system).
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10. Reliability. Reliability is the capability of a system to operate efficiently within the specified performance standards, for a planned period of time and under the conditions likely to be encountered. The system must remain available to the user for traffic despite damages and technical failures. Its maintenance and restoration requirements must be satisfied within allowed and available resources. 11. Reliability is mainly achieved by providing: a. b. Diversity. The provision of multiple means for a particular combat function lessens the probability of total failure. Alternative Routing. Communication systems must be designed to provide alternative paths between points in the system so that the loss of a single facility or link does not result in the failure of the system. Reserve. To replace a disrupted portion of the system, a reserve of personnel and equipment must be available. To be effective, this reserve must be located and placed on an appropriate stand-by status so as to be able to intervene quickly. Training. A high standard of individual and collective competence among all personnel assigned to LCSS must be maintained in order to meet the challenges of the land force (LF) operating environment. Maintenance. The system must be engineered so as to be easy to maintain with few resources. In the combat zone, the maintenance system must be capable of immediate restoration of key elements.
c.
d.
e.
12.
Security. Security measures must be applied strictly in order to: a. b. deny unauthorized persons information of value which might be derived from monitoring LCSS components; and prevent intrusion and imitative deception.
13. To achieve security it is essential that every LCSS user know and observe the Signal security procedures established to ensure the protection of classified traffic, documents and equipment. Security should be applied in balance with the requirement to ensure that critical information remains available to Commanders when and where they require it. 14. Simplicity. The simpler the system, the more likely it is to withstand the stresses of war. Simple systems are easily operated, readily adaptable and easy to deploy and maintain. 15. Land Command Support System components must be designed as much as possible to be operated by users with minimum training. Any design that increases the level of technical complexity must produce equivalent improvements in operational effectiveness. 16. Survivability. The system has to be capable of withstanding physical and electronic attacks by the enemy. In particular, equipments must be designed to operate effectively in an environment with a severe electromagnetic pulse (EMP) threat. Equipment has to be hardened, facilities protected and alternate facilities provided. Personnel are to be well trained in defensive measures, EPM procedures and restoration drills.
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17. Timeliness. Combat information has a short useful life span. In order to be successful, Commanders must complete their command and control (C2) process in a shorter time frame than their opponents. The LCSS components must therefore be engineered, organized and operated so as to allow the processing and transmission of combat information within the required time frame. Staff and Signal personnel are to be imbued with a sense of urgency. 505. SIGNALS PLANNING PROCESS
1. To promulgate the direction required to execute Signal plans, a system of orders and instructions is used. These may be issued through either staff or Signal channels, according to their nature. In general, Signal matters which are part of the Commander's plan or that touch on the authority or resources of subordinate Commanders are covered by orders issued by the Commander or in his name by the formation Sig O. Detailed technical instructions necessary to provide Signal support to further the Commander's plan are issued directly by Signals. The major part of this chapter deals directly with the Signal Estimate by design, as it is the foundation process used in generating the subsequent Signals orders and instructions. 2. The Figure 5-1 represents a Signals Planning Process model as applied to the current LCSS, which may be adapted to cover any integrated information system/communications system (IS/CS).
Figure 5-1: LCSS Planning Flowchart
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SECTION 2 SIGNAL ESTIMATE 506. GENERAL
1. This section describes a Signal Estimate, which outlines the planning considerations and process that is required to determine the requisite Signal support to the LF. The process of Signal planning starts with a Signal estimate, which generates the plan used to formulate any subsequent Signal orders and instructions. The estimate of the situation is a time-honoured process, which is used by Commanders at various levels to ensure that complex problems are considered thoroughly in a logical process of reasoning. The Signal estimate process can be quickly stated as an activity by which a Sig O follows a logical process of reasoning to consider all the circumstances and factors affecting the military situation and decide on the course of action to be taken in order to accomplish the assigned tactical mission. 2. The mental process used is the same for both the tactical and the Signal estimate. It is important to keep the following differences clearly in mind when considering the Signal estimate vis--vis its tactical counterpart: a. Relative Importance of Terrain. Tactical estimates tend to be terrain-centric. For a manoeuvre Commander, the terrain is one of the most important factors to be considered. The Sig O must, however, always bear in mind that the terrain is seldom as important to his plan as it is to those of his combat arms colleagues. The major concern for the Sig O will be the effects of terrain upon Signal propagation, since issues such as routes (of great concern to the tactical Commander) will normally be mandated in the operation order given him. Consequently, Signal estimates seldom consider the terrain to the degree of detail that the tactical estimate will; and Relative Importance of Mission Analysis. Mission analysis, particularly at the lower levels of command (combat team and battle group) tends to be relatively simple for the tactical Commander. Most tactical tasks are well understood and clearly articulated in our doctrine. Furthermore, the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for accomplishing them are, in theory, standardized across the Army. The supporting Signal Commander does not enjoy the same luxury. Signal tasks are generally not well understood outside of the Signal community. As a result, the Signal Commander will likely find the assigned task to be vague and almost always open-ended (e.g. Provide Signal support to throughout Op .). The Signal estimate must, therefore, spend considerable time and effort on mission analysis to ensure that the full scope and implications of the assigned task(s) are understood.
b.
507.
INFORMATION PRESENTATION
1. Prior to the advent of modern information technology, it was nearly impossible to quickly produce and mass-distribute information in any other way than text based documents. However, the text-based approach to a Signal estimate is inefficient. Large quantities of text are required to communicate Signal concepts clearly, which can lead to fatigue, if not outright confusion for the reader. In addition, a text-based estimate can take an inordinate amount of time to produce.
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2. The following presents a methodology for conducting and presenting a Signal estimate using a largely graphical format. It is a guide, not a template. Used intelligently it can make the Signal estimate easier to conduct and to present. Used blindly, it will hinder, rather than help the process. Remember, the estimate is a tool whose effectiveness will be dictated by the skill with which it is applied. 508. 1. METHODOLOGY The Signal estimate can be effectively divided into the following stages: a. Mission Analysis, in which we: (1) (2) (3) b. determine the user requirement; translate the user requirement into Signal terms using a service-centric approach; and determine the restrictions on our freedom of action in meeting the user requirement.
Evaluation of Factors, in which we identify the internal and external factors that will affect the operational situation and analyze the potential effects of each. For ease of review, these factors are normally considered in the following standard order: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) friendly forces (including the communications information systems (CIS) capabilities of attached elements); enemy/opposing forces; environment; surprise; security; time and space; technical; and other.
c.
Development of Potential Courses of Action, in which we: (1) (2) (3) (4) brainstorm options; assess the suitability of each potential option; prepare a shortlist of Courses of Action (COA) which are deemed to be the best candidates for meeting the user requirement in this situation; and prepare a Decision Briefing.
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d. e.
Deliver the Decision Briefing, in which the Commander is presented with the shortlist of options developed above. Developing a Detailed Plan based upon the COA selected by the Commander.
2. On operations, assumptions will be inevitable throughout the estimate process, since perfect situational awareness is virtually unachievable. When considering assumptions, three things must be borne in mind throughout: a. Realism. An assumption must be an extrapolation from known facts, not simply a wild guess. An assumption must not be unduly optimistic (assuming away the problem) and as a general rule should reflect the worst-case scenario. Documentation. Assumptions must always be documented. For ease of reference, assumptions should be listed in one place, whether at the beginning of the estimate or in an annex to it. Approval. Any assumption used in your estimate must be approved by a higher authority. The approving authority may vary; however, one will always exist. If you dont know identity of the approving authority, find out before you start the estimate.
b.
c.
3. Commanders, Operations Officers (Ops O) and Chiefs of Staff (COS) have a vested interest in the success of the Signals Plan and are a valuable source of information to provide clarification to any questions that may arise while completing your estimate. Seek out advice when you do not understand something. 509. DETERMINING THE REQUIREMENT
1. During operations adequate preparation time is not the norm. At best, you may be handed a draft operations order, given a few minutes in which to ask questions and then be expected to produce a draft Signal plan in a matter of hours. At worst, you may find that you are expected to develop your Signal plan concurrent with, if not in advance of, the development of the tactical plan. To aid in production of the estimate the following points must be governing factors: a. Speak the Users Language. Know your tactical doctrine at the level at which you are employed. Be familiar with any modifications of meaning or terminology that your supported tactical Commander uses; Understand the Higher Signal Plan. Signals Officers frequently find themselves in the situation of having to please two masters: their supported tactical Commander and their higher Signal Commander. Consequently, you would be well advised to conduct a mission analysis of both the tactical plan, which must be supported, and the higher Signal plan, which you are expected to integrate into; Dont Try to Do it All Yourself. Our mtier is so complex that no one individual, regardless of rank or appointment, can know everything. Engage your experts at the very beginning of the estimate process. This will ensure that your plan will not require a waiver to the laws of nature to be executed; and
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b.
c.
d.
Use Assumptions Judiciously. Avoid assuming away the problem with a plan founded upon significant assumptions that are unlikely to be proven correct. As further information becomes available throughout the planning process the number of assumptions in your estimate should gradually be reduced as they are replaced by constraints, restrictions or additional support requirement.
2. Mission Analysis. Within the Estimate of the Situation, the accepted tool for determining the user requirement is Mission Analysis. A detailed exposition of Mission Analysis is found in B-GL-300-003/FP-001 Command in Land Operations. It should be read in detail and pondered at length. In summary, Mission Analysis consists of the following steps: a. Determine the Superior Commanders Intent. The Superior Commander is the Commander two levels above you. (E.g. if you are the Sig O of 2 RCHA, your Superior Commander will normally be the Commander of 2 CMBG). Determine your Commanders Intent and Concept of Operations. Your Commanders Intent tells you what the comd is going to do. The Concept of Operations articulates how the comd intends to accomplish it. Determine your Higher Formation Signal Commanders Intent and Concept of Communications. Assess the higher formation Signal plan to evaluate the impact on your Mission Analysis. Determine Assigned and Implied Tasks. An assigned task is obvious. An implied task is one that, although you have not been specifically told to do it, you must carry out to accomplish an assigned task. For example, frequency deconfliction and clearance is an implied task within the assigned task coordinate Signal support for Joint Task Force . As stated earlier, determining your implied tasks is critical. Your subject matter experts can provide you with invaluable assistance here. Determine your Constraints and Restraints. It is recommended that at this point one focus only on the constraints and restraints handed down by higher authority (operational and procedural) and ignore technological issues until later. Constraints and restraints from higher authority will include such issues as radio silence, timings to be met and routes to be used. Depending upon the nature or scope of the operation, you may also find implied constraints expressed as timings or milestones for the availability of certain services (e.g. TITAN will be used as the primary command and control system at JTFHQ beginning D+2). Regularly Review the Results. No plan survives contact and neither should any Mission Analysis. As the situation changes or new factors come to light, review the Mission Analysis to ensure that the results are still valid. If they are not, then redo the Mission Analysis.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
3. Define the Requirement in Signal Terms. Once the Mission Analysis is complete, you should have a clear understanding of what is required. Producing a network diagram at this point is a useful and efficient way of translating this into Signal terms. If supporting a multiphased operation with regroupings between phases, it will be useful to produce a separate network diagram for each phase. A useful and logical methodology for determining the Signal support requirement is to:
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Figure 5-2: Connectivity Overlay
a.
Determine the Connectivity Requirement. Using a diagram similar to that shown above, show each organization that you are responsible for providing communications to, and indicate who needs to communicate with whom. Include the relative priority of each link (This will be given to you. If it is not, use standing operating procedures (SOPs) or common sense: e.g. a command net always takes priority over an administration net.) For reasons that will become obvious in a moment, it will be helpful to do this in the form of an overlay, scaled to the map. Determine the Information Exchange Requirements. Having determined the connectivity requirements, the next step is to determine the nature, quantity and classification of the information that must be shared between each station as well as how often it must be shared. (A diagram similar to that shown below for each element of your supported organization is useful) You will likely find that for doctrinal organizations and operations determining IERs is straightforward, since they are implicit in the tactical and Signal doctrines that describe how the organization(s) conduct the operation. For non-doctrinal organizations and operations you will have to take considerable pains to ensure that your mission analysis has captured all the IERs of your supported organizations(s).
b.
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Figure 5-3: IER Overlay
c.
Determine the Information Services Requirement. Having determined the connectivity requirement and the IERs, the next step is to translate these into the information services required to support them. Information Services generally fall into one of three categories (voice, fax and data) delivered in either secure or non-secure form. Voice and fax services are largely standardized, but care must be taken when considering data services since the technical requirements for delivery vary markedly between services. As with IERs, it will be found that doctrinally standard situations are far simpler than non-doctrinal ones.
Figure 5-4: Information Services Requirement Overlay
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d.
Determine the Restrictions on Your Freedom of Action. Having determined the operational requirement and expressed it in Signal terms, it is imperative that you fully understand those constraints and restraints that will limit the options available in meeting them. Simply put, a constraint is a requirement to do something (e.g. maintain a reserve) while a restraint is a prohibition (e.g. no recce before last light). Constraints and restraints may be operational (e.g. radio silence will be in effect on all VHF nets from D 1 until first contact) procedural (e.g. frequency clearance requests must be submitted to Directorate Telecommunications and Spectrum Engineering and Support (DTSES) at least 90 days in advance of the requirement) or technical (e.g. a very high frequency (VHF) link has more intrinsic bandwidth available than a high frequency (HF) link.) A useful approach is to list these as shown in the table in figure 5-5 below (Note: CIS equipment and systems listed in the table in figure 5-5 are current as of the year 2006). Note that while operational and procedural requirements may be relaxed, technical restrictions are notoriously inflexible. CONSTRAINT/RESTRAINT
Rad si in eff on all VHF nets from D 1 until first contact Wh veh tfc limited to HEART rte for Ph 2 Line may only be laid at ni fwd of BIG DOG DAG to be completed by D-4 to allow time for pre-depl leave
CATEGORY
Operational
EFFECTS
Alt comms means reqr. SAS unaval. Impact upon SDS rtes May impact sequencing of line tasks Time aval for other pre-depl prep reduced. Possible scheduling conflicts. LOs from other nations cannot have access to TITAN or TITAN products. Must determine Comds concept for empl of recv LOs and ensure segregation of TITAN is achieved. Att UK Recce Sqn cannot be on Cdn secur nets until approval recv. Advise G3. Develop contingency plan for use in the interim and in the event that the req is denied. Only two terminals will be able to browse DWAN or pass large files. Remaining will be limited to 9.6 kBps dial-up. Advise COS and get pri of empl for HSD terminals.
Procedural
TITAN is an CANUS-eyes-only system.
Cdn crypto may not be provided to non-Cdn units without approval from NDHQ. Min 5 working days reqr to process req. Technical Cdn INMARSAT HSD lease limited to two licenses for Theatre Activation.
North American standard STU-III incompatible Only two European-compatible STU-III aval. with European eqpt. Seek loan from G6 of 1 (UK) Armd Div. Get pri of empl of existing terminals from COS.
Figure 5-5: Table Describing Constraints and Restraints
510. CONSIDERATION OF EXTERNAL FACTORS (SIGNAL PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD) 1. Having determined what Information Services are required, the next step is to determine the best means of delivering them. In some situations the answer will be straightforward and simple: usually because only one delivery means is available. Other situations may be more complex. A thorough, logical analysis of the external environment and how it will affect your delivery of information services (this process is sometimes referred to as the Signal Preparation of the Battlefield) will give you a high degree of confidence that your resulting plan will not be held up in future years as a good example of how not to do things.
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2. Signal Preparation of the Battlefield is best done link-by-link, rather than the terraincentric approach of ground left/centre/right used in the tactical estimate. Begin by considering technical requirements and friendly force capabilities. While this will likely shock your manoeuvre arm colleagues, it makes sense to eliminate alternatives that cannot support the required Information Services as early as possible. Furthermore, this will enable you to identify at the outset if you have Information Service Delivery requirements that your current equipment cannot support due to technical limitations. Consider the remaining Information Service Delivery options against, as a minimum, the following external factors: a. Enemy/Opposing Forces/Local Population. The presence, location, strength and intentions of the enemy/opposing forces/local population may affect such things as physical security for your personnel. Environment. Environment includes such things as distance, topography and climate (with respect to their effects upon Signal propagation) as well as routes, roads and existing CIS infrastructure. Surprise. Surprise, in this case, refers to the effects upon the enemy. Security. Consider all aspects of the security problem including, but not limited to, physical security, cryptography, information security and emission security. Time and Space (Scheduling). Manoeuvre estimates tend to treat time and space as a relatively simple speed and distance problem (e.g. how long will it take a tank squadron to move from BIG DOG to MANGY CAT during an advance to contact). While the deployment of CIS equipment is limited by the same constraints, which govern all army vehicles, this is not always the limiting factor in determining how quickly Signal support can be provided. Network configuration, database population/updating, Signal mapping (for satellite systems) and the testing of cable plants can all impact on the speed with which services can be provided or restored. Careful consideration here will enable you to manage your supported Commanders expectations early. Sustainment and Support. Consider the requirements for resupply of consumables (water, rations and fuel) spare parts, medical support etc. This is of particular importance in countries where the existing CIS infrastructure is limited. Technical Issues. Consider any technical issues affecting the link which have not already come to light elsewhere. Examples include interoperability with allies and partners, user training, cost etc.
b.
c. d. e.
f.
g.
3. Presentation. Signal Preparation of the Battlefield presents its results in the form of a graphical and tabular product: the Service Delivery Assessment (SDA). A separate SDA is prepared for each required service identified to this point in the Signal estimate, identifying the factors and deductions pertinent to each. If the SDA is large, it may be helpful to break it into a number of smaller SDAs each of which considers a subset of the applicable factors. A sample SDA for a single link (C/S 1 to C/S 0) is shown below. Note that this is an indicative example only. An actual SDA would contain considerably more facts and deductions!
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SERVICE DELIVERY ASSESSMENT
INFORMATION SERVICE REQUIRED Secur Vox
POTENTIAL DELIVERY MEANS AVAILABLE Tac rad INMARSAT/STU-III Civ Telecom
Secur Fax DEMS/DIN (high speed)
INMARSAT/STU-III Civ Telecom Mil Wide Area System (WAS) Civ Telecom INMARSAT HSD MMSGT
TITAN (high speed)
Mil Wide Area System (WAS) Civ Telecom INMARSAT HSD MMSGT
512.
ASSESSMENT OF EXTERNAL FACTORS

FACT DEDUCTION COMMENTS
FACTOR
Enemy/Opposing Forces/Local Population
Environment
Stations separated by 150 km. Terrain consists largely of undulating savannah with dominating ground around GR UT 7897
Tac Rad: VHF only viable with RRB. HF a possible option. INMARSAT/STU-III: no issues Civ Telecom: no issues if Civ Telecom aval MMSGT: No issues Recce task to determine if Civ Telecom svc aval between these two stns.
Surprise
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SILO Principles and Fundamentals FACTOR FACT DEDUCTION Tac Rad: only op secure. Coloc RRB with other elms for protection INMARSAT/STU-III: no issues Civ Telecom: Only op secure Do not make civ telecom single pt of failure. MMSGT: Bulk encryption reqr. COMMENTS
Security
Opposing Forces have advanced EW/SIGINT capability and are expected to tgt Cdn Contingent. Physical atk of Cdn Contingent possible.
Tac Rad: VHF assets will likely reqr a wk to depl to loc and set up. Nets should open by D-1 if no delays encountered with RSOMI Sig Tp Main Body will not arr in theatre until D-10 INMARSAT/STU-III: no issues Civ Telecom: unknown if civ telecom exists or is aval for lease. MMSGT: MMSGT will reqr a min of 7 days after arr to be OPRED. Alternate Rear Link comms reqr during that pd.
See att GANTT chart for tac rad depl timelines
Time and Space
See att GANTT chart for INMARSAT depl timelines Cfm with NDHQ J6 Ops on state and aval of Civ Telecom in theatre.
See att GANTT chart for MMSGT depl timelines
Sustainment and Support Technical Issues
1.
Only deductions that meet the following rules of thumb should be recorded: a. Is This a Change to Normal Practice? If the deduction is an SOP activity, then there is no point in including it, unless your non-commissioned officers (NCOs) really like being told how to do their jobs. A deduction along the line of vehicles must be fuelled prior to the road move is a waste of time. A deduction that vehicles must be issued two extra jerry cans of diesel prior to the road move is worth recording.
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b.
Is this my responsibility? If the deduction relates to somebody elses job, it is worth noting only as a potential restriction upon your own freedom of action. For example, the medical and administrative preparation of you and your personnel prior to a deployment (a DAG) will be done for you. There is no point noting lengthy deductions about immunization requirements and rules of engagement (ROE) briefings unless you are going to be mounting yourself. What you should note in this case is that the time required for administrative preparations for deployment will be a constraint upon the other pre-deployment activities which you will be responsible for carrying out. Is This Going to Affect My Plan? If the deduction is not going to affect how you do business, dont bother recording it. However, before you cast the deduction aside be very certain that it will not, under any circumstance, affect what you do. Not many deductions will fall into this category, but a few may. A good example is a nationally mandated procedure where you have no flexibility in its application (e.g. cryptographic storage and accounting).
c.
513.
ANALYSIS
1. Analysis, the application of expert judgment to facts to determine their significance, has been referred to as the dark mystery of the estimate process simply because it is by nature a subjective activity. While the expertise of ones judgment is certainly a function of experience (among other things) it is possible to conduct analysis in a structured and coherent way. The following process is suggested as a starting point: a. Summary of Requirements and Deductions. For each service, summarize your requirements and key deductions in one place. This could be done in tabular form, on a separate overlay or a link diagram. Identify Options. For each service, eliminate those options that are precluded by the laws of nature and/or other factors (e.g. if a high speed, large bandwidth data capability is a requirement, you can safely eliminate HF as a means of delivery). Further analyze the remaining service delivery options as follows: (1) Augmentation Requirements. Identify any augmentation you would require to your existing resources to make each option workable (e.g. additional radio rebroadcast (RRBs)). Sustainment and Support Requirements. Identify any special logistical requirements associated with each option. (E.g. a manned RRB Detachment (Det) has sustainment and support requirements that an unmanned Det does not have.) Furthermore, if cost is an issue, identify the indicative cost associated with each option (i.e. this can be a planning factor for such services as morale calls). Security. Identify the overall security risk (and the resources required to mitigate it) associated with each option. A thorough understanding of this will be essential if (when) changes are required to the plan and you are required to provide rapid assessments of the security risks inherent in a proposed change.
b.
(2)
(3)
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(4)
Flexibility. For each option consider the following: (a) (b) How easily can the scale of service provided be expanded? How easily can the delivery option be reconfigured to meet changing requirements?
514.
DEVELOPING AND ASSESSING COURSES OF ACTION
1. The penultimate step in the estimate process is the development and assessment of COA that will enable you to achieve your operational tasks within the existing operational environment. This is often done in a two-phase process: a brainstorming session, in which concepts of operations are generated, followed by an assessment of the merits and shortcomings of each COA in relation to the operational situation. Regardless of the approach taken it is essential that COA be: a. Distinctive. To merit consideration as a distinct course of action, a concept of operations must differ in some substantial way from all others under consideration. If it does not, then it is not a truly unique option, but simply a variation upon a theme. The distinctiveness (or lack thereof) of a concept of operations from its fellows can be assessed by asking the following questions: (1) Communications Means. Do the primary and alternate means of communications differ for the operation or for any phase of the operation? If they do not, then you are likely looking at a mere variation on another concept of operations. Sequencing of Activities. Does the sequencing of activities differ from other COA sufficiently to affect my subordinates tasks and priorities of work? A major change to the sequence and priority of cable-plant installation would qualify as distinctive, whereas a variation on a Signals Dispatch Service (SDS) route would likely not. Support Concepts. Does the support concept differ significantly? For example, a COA that envisioned all second-line support being provided by allies would be distinct from one in which all second-line support was provided by an in-theatre contractor. Two COA that both envisioned contractor support (from different agencies) would be variations on a theme.
(2)
(3)
b.
Realistic. Courses of Action must not make unwarranted assumptions. As discussed earlier, the estimate is no place for wishful thinking. Furthermore, resist the temptation to produce a throwaway COA whose only purpose is to demonstrate your creativity or to make an alternate COA look better by comparison. One must be prepared to execute any of the proposed COA if directed to do so.
2. Assessing the relative merits of COA is a largely subjective activity. However, it is essential that one be able to readily present the merits and risks of each COA proposed. A table similar to that shown in the table in figure 5-6 (Note: CIS equipment is current as of the year 2006) below is an excellent way of doing this and, when considered in relation to the Commanders known priorities and concerns, should make it relatively easy to select the optimal COA from the options under consideration.
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Signals Planning COURSE OF ACTION
ADVANTAGES
RISKS
REMARKS
1. INMARSATs with each patrol 1. Strategic link Strategic Comms give high reliability comms in high- redundancy reduced since assets att TACOM auth threat areas. INMARSATS det to ptls. 2. Reliance upon our own cable 2. Line stores arrival date reqr from CF J6 to det INMARSATs. RABID GERBIL assets in planning reduces risk in theatre cannot be Alternatively, add since theatre recce not yet guaranteed, possible delays in full OPRED date INMARSAT terms completed. and leases may of JTF HQ be reqr. 1. Use of IRIS VHF in ptls reduces trg burden on Sig Ops, since Coy signalers fully trg on IRIS OPCAP 1. 1. Mountainous terrain means that VHF comms will reqr RRB depl to be reliable. Additional RRBs 2. Contracting cable plant constr in may be reqr. theatre reduces work load on own 2. Unknown if cable stores and expertise aval locally, tps. TAVs may still be reqr. Guaranteed comms with ptls essential since force protection is Comds primary concern.
DRUNKEN DUCK
Figure 5-6: Table Describing Comparison of Courses of Action
515.
THE DECISION BRIEFING
1. Once the COA has been developed and assessed, it will be time to present them to the supported Commander, who will decide what they really want to do. A full discussion of Decision Briefings is outside of the scope of this publication; however, the following guidelines should be respected in all cases: a. b. Clarity. Make the advantages and disadvantages of each potential COA obvious. Make it clear which COA you are recommending and why. Accuracy. Ensure that your briefing draws a clear distinction between facts, inferences and speculation. There is a world of difference between knowing something to be true and hoping that it is true. Simplicity. Keep the structure of the briefing clean and easy to follow.
c. 516.
PRESENTING THE PLAN
1. Once the supported Commander has selected a COA for implementation, the estimate will then have to be turned it into a clear, concise plan that subordinates can execute. There are multiple ways of doing this: a. b. c. d. a written operation order; a Communications and Electronics (C&E) Annex to an operation order; an overlay order with a Communications Electronics Operating Instructions (CEOI) attached; or a combination of the above.
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2. The primary difficulty in conducting the Signal estimate has not been the estimate process itself, but rather the difficulty inherent in clearly and efficiently communicating the reasoning process used. A more formatted formal method for drafting a Signal estimate will be published in the Army Communications-Electronics Standard Instructions (CESI). 517. KEYS TO SUCCESSFUL PLANNING
1. The ability of Sig Os to plan successfully the Signal support of operations depends to a great extent on: a. b. c. d. e. f. the receipt of the accurate, complete, up-to-date and early information needed; the ability to think through the Signal problem in a logical but expeditious manner; a thorough knowledge of Signal personnel and CIS equipment capabilities including those of cooperating forces; a thorough understanding of tactical concepts and plans; streamlined battle procedure, aided by C2IS software programs, to speed up the planning process and to enhance the ability to react to unforeseen events; and good communication capability to be able to impart one's intention quickly and accurately whilst gaining the cooperation of subordinates and allies.
2. Liaison and Visits. Visits are essential to confirm the adequacy of communications services, to assess the situation and to obtain advance information. A Sig O makes frequent visits to the various staff centres and to subordinate Sig Os periodically to gain early warning of impending moves or operations visits. Also, the inspection of deployed detachments to ensure that systems are functioning properly and to detect emerging problems is essential. 518. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS ANNEXES
1. Orders detailing the tasks and grouping of several Signal elements and giving the essential coordination details required to ensure the execution of the Signal plan in support of an operation are issued by formation Commanders or in their name by formation Sig Os. Depending on the formation SOPs or the complexity of the tasks, formation Sig Os will normally choose to issue simple orders in the appropriate paragraph of the Op O; further detailed orders will be issued as an EW annex and a CE annex to the Op O. These annexes may be issued simultaneously with or separately from the main body of the Op O when Signal deployment timings preclude coordination of the issue. In all cases, the main body of the Op O makes reference to the annexes. Supplemental instructions may be issued as Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs) to the main Op O at any time. 519. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS OPERATION ORDER
1. The Communications-Electronics Operation Order (CE Op O) is normally issued by the Commander or Commanding Officer (CO) of a Signal formation or unit to those elements under his command. Thus a CE Op O could be issued by the CO of a Bde HQ and Sig Sqn to his troop Commanders. In a Joint Interagency Multinational Public (JIMP) operation a CE Op O
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may be issued by the formation Sig O to other elements under command of the multinational Signal organization or those elements not under his command when detailing tasks for a duly authorized Signal operation. 520. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS
1. The CEOIs are issued by formation and unit Sig Os at all levels of command to coordinate the operation of CIS systems and subsystems. If CE Op Os and CE Annexes to Op Os are concerned with the who and what, CEOIs deal with the "how" of CIS operations. They contain the essential details needed for the operation and integration of CIS. They are issued along Signal channels and are intended for CIS operators and supervisors. Topics covered under the CEOI include: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. k. l. 521. Callsign and Net Diagrams; Net Identifiers, Validity Period, Frequencies and Loadgroups; Communications management system (CMS)-produced CEOI; Telephony Network Directory; Wide Area system; Signals Dispatch Service/Air Defence System Schedule; Situational Awareness System (SAS) Settings; In Theatre BLOS; Codewords; Nicknames; National command element (NCE); and Unique Equipment Table.
COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS
1. The Communications-Electronics Technical Instructions (CETIs) are issued by formations to unit Sig O where applicable to facilitate a central point of TacC2IS information. This document is normally generated when mounting new operations and is of particular relevance to system managers. Topics covered under the CETI include: a. b. c. network configuration; naming and numbering schemes; Internet Protocol (IP) addressing scheme;
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d. e. f. g. h. i. j. 522.
server configurations; client configurations; operational data bases (ODB) including order of battle (ORBAT); SAS Network Plan; Unique Equipment Table; Exchange (messaging) Organization and Account structure; and User Accounts and Folder Structure.
COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS STANDING INSTRUCTIONS
1. The Army Communications-Electronics Standing Instructions (CESI) should be issued by the Army G6 on behalf of the Army Commander for all Army level communications issues. A formation Sig O may also issue standing instructions on a variety of technical subjects. Communications-Electronics Standing Instructions at all levels are semi-permanent and normally deal with technical matters and procedures of interest to Signals only. They are not connected directly with current or planned operations but are intended to facilitate CIS operation, coordination or maintenance. 2. Subjects suitable for such instructions are: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. 523. method of dealing with a defect in widely used equipment; details of enemy Signal equipment which may have to be used; the use of local civilian communications; system and circuit numbering; method of operating CIS which cross unit/formation boundaries; command and control information system management; distribution and holding of CEOIs; and distribution and holding of communications security (COMSEC) material.
STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES
1. Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) deal with a broad range of tactical, Signal and administrative activities intended to become routine. These drills form the basis of all recurring activities and promote efficiency by eliminating or reducing the need to detail these steps in every plan. For Signal units they may cover Signal C2 measures, activities affecting staff and other users as well as those pertaining to the administration, protection and movement of headquarters.
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524.
ADDITIONAL PUBLICATIONS
1. Many publications are available to Signals that can be used to pass or to gain information on personnel and equipment. Some of these are listed below: a. b. Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) provide information on specific equipment and the step-by-step procedures used to perform certain tasks; Tactical Aides Memoire (TAMs) provide refresher information highlighting key points required to perform a certain function, for example, setting up defensive perimeter arcs of fire; and Life Cycle Materiel Manager (LCMM) publications deals with equipment and covers the following areas that are of interest to Signals technical staff: (1) (2) (3) Investigating and staffing Materiel Authorization Change Requests (MACRs); Unsatisfactory Condition Reports (UCRs): and Technical Failure Reports (TFRs).
c.
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ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 5 SIGNAL ESTIMATE FORMAL TEMPLATE Copy No __ of ___ SIGNAL ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION By I. C.A.N. Write Major CO 20 CMBG HQ & Sig Sqn at (place) at (hours) on (date) References: A. MCE 6100/6/94/649413 Republique Rwandaise, Jun 94, 1:250,000 B. UN Security Council Resolution xxx/xx Aug 55 Time Zone: CHARLIE (ZULU plus three hours) Assumptions: (1) List any relevant assumptions made in the preparation of the estimate (i.e. this is filled out as you go through the estimate). Question/factor (a)
STEP 1 MISSION ANALYSIS (Why?) 1. a. Superior Commanders (1) Two levels up (Intent). (2) One level up (Intent and concept of Ops). b. Superior Signal Commanders (1) Intent and concept of Ops. (2) Analysis of en RECS/EW and tactical objectives in your area of responsibility. c. My Role in his Plan (What?) 2. Tasks a Assigned. b. Implied. (What not? When?) 3. Constraints (if any) a. Time incl fixed timings. b. Space. c. Resources. How must my action directly support my immediate superior, taking into account his intent and concept of operations, and the intent two levels up? How does this effect the higher Signal Plan, and will it effect my immediate superiors intent and concept of operations?
Consideration/deduction (b)
Tasks/constraints (c)
MISSION The task(s) given, and the purpose, against which all factors are considered.
What task(s) must I complete to accomplish my Mission?
What constraints have been placed These constraints must be clearly on me by both the Superior Tactical stated in your Aim. and Signal Commanders What limitations are there on my freedom of action? By when do I need to decide?
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Question/factor (a)
4. Changes to the Tactical Situation a. Mission no change. b. Changed mission.
Situation changed since orders were received or the estimate completed? Nothing changed. Minor change. Significant change. Major change.
No change. Mission confirmed. Same Mission, same Plan. Possibly new Mission and new Plan. Refer to Superior Comd, or if not possible, act in support of his Main Effort, taking into account his Intent.
5. Commanders Direction a. Critical Information Requirements (to focus staff effort). b. Planning Guidance (Down). c. Clarification (Up).
What has to be decided? Who is to For the purpose of the Estimate check what, if I am not going to the word Aim has the same complete this estimate by myself? meaning as given to the word How long will it take to complete the Mission. estimate and prepare orders? AIM: (Aim of the Estimate, for example)To provide CIS to UNEFIR with the following limitations: Adv party to be deployed NLT 222000R Aug 99; and Must provide UNHQ with infrastructure CIS.
STEP 2EVALUATE FACTORS 6. Environment a. Terrain/Ground General Signal characteristics of the ground advantages and disadvantages If the theatre of operations or of CNR, trunk, line, SDS, ADS, area of responsibility is large SAT comm.; enough, you may have to cover hydrograpghy, vegetation, and possible communications soil conditions as separate priorities; factors under environment. effects on propagation; FLOCARK, GO/NO GO, suitability of communications vegetation and hydrography means; maps can be useful tools to requirements for RRBs and assist with the ground analysis repeaters; process, and are useful tools to support your estimate graphically. possible HQ locations; movement scheduling; coordination requirements; protection of communication resources; key terrain features to assist communications; vital terrain for the employment of communications resources; resources available to support mission pers, i.e. Sources of water. Identify possible tasks that fall out of deductions.
General description of the topographic features including soil conditions, hydrography, flora (vegetation), availability of key and vital terrain for communications, high spots, obstacles, axis of movement, boundaries.
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Annex A to Chapter 5
Question/factor (a)
b. Axis of Manoeuvre Signal characteristics of the axis described from LEFT to RIGHT. Each axis should be assigned a letter starting with A.
c. Transportation (can be displayed graphically) Road networks and routes, aircraft available, clear bridges, airstrips and Landing Zones. d. Climate Arctic, Tropical, Temperate, Desert, Jungle, Seasons, Temperature, light data (day & night).
key terrain for RRBs, repeaters, Identify possible tasks that fall as facing the en and in the HQ out of deductions. and trunk nodes. Direction of movement; propagation requirements (need for RRBs, repeaters); obstacles to signal movement and channelling of resources; screening from en RECS/EW; vulnerability to en RECS/EW and/or physical attack; advantages and disadvantages of lateral communications movement; movement and possible HQ locations; site accessibility; priority of deployment/sequencing; civilian facilities available; coordination of requirements with subordinate signal elements for the use of key terrain; ground clearance requirements/ coord with G3; logistic support; line and SDS routes; control measures; harbours and hides. effects on signal mobility; Identify possible tasks that fall out of deductions. possible routes; effects on signal logistic support; use o f line/ SDS/ ADS; protection requirements for signal assets. effect on equipment and related Identify possible tasks that fall support requirements, i.e. - air- out of deductions. conditioning and ventilation; effect on personnel; medical and immunization requirements for personnel; pre-arrival and in-theatre acclimatization requirements; effect on mobility; effect on propagation.
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Question/factor (a)
e. Infrastructure Availability of infrastructure communications systems.
f.
Demography
Local population, including religion, culture including political culture, education, languages, relative wealth of populations, employability and local attitudes towards force in-place (friendly & enemy).
7 Force Capabilities a. Enemy
What infrastructure systems are Identify possible tasks that fall available? out of deductions. What systems must I upgrade? What systems must I install to support the mission? What firmware, hardware and software must/should I bring? What will my technical support requirements be for both equipment and personnel? Effects on signal logistic support, what can I purchase in-theatre and what must I bring to the theatre or operation? requirement to observe local Identify possible tasks that fall regulations, customs and out of deductions. religions; working language and need for interpreters; medical concerns; possible CIMIC tasks in support of mission objectives; driving customs and regulations deployments in populated areas; effects on signal manoeuvre; RECS/EW; resources available; availability of accn, rations, POL, etc; threat assessment, requirements to protect communications assets; close protection requirements. security of dets and local defence of HQs; special arrangements for defence of isolated installations or protection of transient individuals or groups in area where clandestine or penetration forces are active; routing of communications through areas where physical security cannot be assured; Knowledge of enemy resources and tactics is essential to foresee possible contingencies. Identify possible tasks that fall out of deductions. EMCON policy will normally be tied to a specific phase of an operation or mission.
(1) Threat Evaluation (Doctrinal Overlays); Organization, Equipment, Support Services, Tactical Doctrine. (2) Threat Integration (as to how it will effect the communications plan); possible aims and intentions, dispositions, strengths and weaknesses, Enemy COA Overlays.
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Question/factor (a)
(3) Dominance of manoeuvre area, NBCW threat, organisation, air superiority, and use of special/ unconventional troops in forward areas. Defensive or protective measures with respect to RECS/EW capability infiltration and attack.
emission control (EMCON) policy, and ECCM measures is case of RECS/EW attack; COMSEC, protection of information and action in the event of compromise; priority of communication systems; advantages and disadvantages of each friendly C2 means; movement restrictions; measures to reduce the risk of disclosure to enemy reconnaissance, search, and intercept; deception programs and alternative means of communications when either electronic or radio silence is imposed; en vulnerabilities which might be exploited.; EW (EA/ES) activity and possible tasks/priorities in support an operation. channel allocations as required requirement to support additional callsigns; reserves and spares; signal security; D & S resources; interoperability requirements (Joint, Combined Ops, C2IS, radio, IM/IT, etc); what are the Commanders Critial Information Requirements; air support (ADS); restrictions on employment; sustainment constraints; Identify possible tasks that fall out of deductions.
b. Friendly Forces. (1) Consider higher/lower resources that are allocated, and the comms requirements for flanking formations, and lower formations not normally affiliated. c. Air and Maritime Situation. (1) In OOTW, joint and combined operations there may be a requirement to support and coordinate National level, Maritime and Air forces, as well as Allied forces. (2) Own force capabilities must include not only the signal order of battle but all other formations and units in the command. The analysis should include restrictions of pers and eqpt, lines of communications, en action, re-supply, and maintenance. disposition and availability of own resources (committed /available);
Possible EW tasks in support of Operation/Mission. Includes any limitations imposed by the command and administrative relationship of the forces involved (see B-GL-300-003/FP-001 Command in Land Operations, Figures 4A-1 and 4B-1.
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Question/factor (a)
additional communications resources available; availability to use/deploy own communications and EW resources; coordination of Joint Information Operations liaison requirements and support. (3) What comms support will be required to support air and maritime ops. national level communications coordination, national circuits, nonforecasted national requirements, ITSEC, COMSEC, frequency management; command relationships; frequencies management within formation coordination and support. d. Communication Assets.
What assets are available to support the plan? What additional assets to I need to support the plan?
8. Surprise and Security. Involves deception planning and possible Information Operations task. 9. Time and Space a. Time. Time in which communication systems must be in and operating. Prepare a time matrix of locations. b. Space. Prepare a distance matrix of locations.
communications deception plan and sub-unit tasks; EA, EP, ES tasks in support of the plan; possible OPSEC tasks. time for signal elements to deploy; time available for preparation; do restrictive timings preclude the use of certain systems; battle procedure sequence; recce times; lead time required for request of commercial services; phasing of the tactical manoeuvre; move timings for various elements; suitability of communications means; The Time and Distance Matrix can be done as one matrix. Distance to be covered in units of time. Timings may include time by Air as well as by road. Loc Dis Ref Point Time Comm Sys Op
Bde Main HQ
55 km Bde 0400 Release D-3 Point Bde Main HQ Last Lt D-1
BP 122 4 km
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Question/factor (a)
10. Other Relevant Factors
distance over which signal Line of sight (LOS) is important elements may deploy (by LOS for all relay and long distance and by land); communications facility planning. ECM threat to friendly elements; requirement for RRB or relay facilities. Anything that may effect or assist the communications plan in support of the mission and assigned tasks.
(P Aff, Host Nation Support, legal constraints, CIMIC tasks, media, population areas, ROE. Etc.)
11. Assessment of Tasks a. Summary of Possible Tasks b. Essential Tasks c. Optional Tasks d. Requirements (1) analysis of the type of traffic to be passed (capacity, voice, data, admin, ops, etc); decide on the list of tasks to be A Matrix of the systems to tasks considered in order of priority; will best illustrate this point. suitability of communications means; capacities of various systems; security of transmission; requirements for specialty equipment; possible allocation of resources; coordination requirements for timings/ line/; procurement of equipment; allocation of resources; critical timings for priority communications; taskings required to establish priority; communications; requirement for additional resources; reallocation or reassignment of resources; redundancy of systems; requirement for controlled stores; feasibility of options. (NOTE: for electronic users - this matrix is done in Excel and inserted here - it may be edited by double clicking on the table) Gp Reqr Time Reqr
(2) analysis of specific link requirements (additional nets, line communications, res dml nets, UN nets, A/G/A, etc). e. Priorities f. System Availability g. Surpluses and Deficiencies h. Suitability of Communications Systems to Tasks 12. Summary of Major Deductions
Task a. Lay cable to BP221, 224
Pri
Line Sect
6 hrs
2 1
b. est Bn HQ CP Sect 2hrs c. recce Altn HQ loc
Sig O
2hrs
As required, may disperse summary at various point in the estimate if the estimate is long.
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Question/factor (a)
Use principles of Communication to assist in the process of assessing the advantages and disadvantages. Principles of Communications Capacity, Economy, Flexibility, Mobility, Reliability, Security, Simplicity, Survivability, and Timeliness.
STEP 3CONSIDERATION OF COURSES OF ACTION (COA) 13. What is common to all COA? Advantages Disadvantages
14. COA 1. Concept Including Main Effort and Schematic. 15. COA 2. Concept Including Main Effort and Schematic. 16. COA 3. Concept Including Main Effort and Schematic. 17. Comparison of Courses of Action. a. Compare advantages and disadvantages of the COA based on the Mission Analysis and Evaluation of Factors.
Advantages Disadvantages Advantages Disadvantages Advantages Disadvantages
Assess flexibility of each course vis a vis possible (2) en actions and the development of your own commanders manoeuvre. Identify critical areas and possible adjustments in the planning or execution phase.
Use principles of Communication to assist in the process of assessing the advantages and disadvantages. Principles of Communications Capacity, Economy, Flexibility, Mobility, Reliability, Security, Simplicity, Survivability, and Timeliness.
STEP 4COMMANDERS DECISION 18. Decision a. Selection of COA; b. States outline Concept of Operations (including What? Where? When? How?). Choose best COA. Briefly describe chosen COA and state reason for choosing it. Also include any adjustments to the COA made during the selection process. Does this choice accomplish the aim within the limitations imposed? Will this choice be able to meet the challenge of the enemy reactions? Does it provide the best support to friendly tactical manoeuvre at a minimal or acceptable degree of risk? STEP 5DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN 19. Plan This is not your C&E Op O but it must include sufficient details to allow a staff officer to write complete orders.
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Question/factor (a)
20. Task Org 21. MISSION 22. EXECUTION a. Concept of Operation b. Unit/Sub-Unit #1 (1) Grouping (2) Tasks c. Unit/Sub-Unit #2 (1) Grouping (2) Tasks d. Unit/Sub-Unit #3 (1) Grouping (2) Tasks e Unit/Sub-Unit #4 (1) Grouping (2) Tasks f. Coord Instructions (1) Timings (2) Deception Plan (if any) (3) Recce priorities (if appropriate) (4) Physical protection (5) EMCON (6) CBRN (7) Orders and instructions, CEOIs, CESI, etc (8) Radio. (9) Nets (changes to SOPs) (10) Voice and Data (Changes to SOPs) i.e. CEOI 3/99 (11) Trunk System Access Node Repeaters Trunk Fibre Data Directory (12) Line Priority of work Allocation of tasks (13) SDS Routes
Concept of Operation to include Commanders intent and is based on your Selection of COA.
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Question/factor (a)
Schedules DRs (14) SIGSEC Codes and crypto keys Changeover Compromise (15) EW (16) TacC2IS (17) Time Standard 23. SERVICE SUPPORT a. General Outline b. Material and Services c. Medical d. Personnel e. Maintenance 24. COMMAND AND SIGNAL a. Locations b. Codewords, Nicknames, and Passwords 25. SIGNATURE BLOCK
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CHAPTER 6 SIGNAL TACTICS IN SUPPORT OF LAND OPERATIONS SECTION 1 601. INTRODUCTION
1. Land Force (LF) operations are conducted in the face of a myriad of threats, on varied terrain and environments and across the complete spectrum of conflict. Signal tactics must continue to include the support for traditional force-on-force peer conflict while remaining adaptable to support full spectrum LF operations fought in complex or urban terrain within an asymmetrical, non-linear, and non-contiguous battlespace. 2. This chapter explains the implications on Signals of the tactical doctrine for various types of operations. It looks at tactical communications (TacComms) and tactical communications information systems (TacC2IS) planning considerations and provides guidance for Signal Officers (Sig Os) with regards to the three main categories of tactical operations: offensive operations, defensive operations and stability operations. It also addresses considerations for enabling activities and underlying tactical tasks or activities associated with these tactical operations. Signal support to unique operations (airborne, airmobile and amphibious) along with the Signal support to operations undertaken in specific environments such as Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear (CBRN), mountain; desert; artic and jungle will also be described. 3. Guidance provided in this chapter does not relieve Sig Os from the obligation of making a proper Signal estimate. These are general observations derived from the types of TacComms available to the LF as they are applied using the operational tactics and principles of Signals. Signal Officers are still required to adapt this general guidance to the tactical situation at hand.
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Tactical Operations Tactical Activities
Offensive Operations Attack Raid Ambush Exploitation Pursuit Break-Out Feint and Demonstration Reconnaissance in Force
Defensive Operations Defence Delay
Stability Operations Security and Control Support to Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR) Support to Civilian Infrastructure and Governance Assistance to Other Agencies
Enabling Operations Reconnaissance Security Advance to Contact Meeting Engagement Link-up Withdrawal Retirement Relief of Troops in Combat and Encircled Forces
NOTES 1. Security and control refers to the establishment of a safe and secure environment, in which other non-military agencies may operate and assist in the operational and strategic objectives. 2. Support to Civilian Infrastructure and Governance will see military forces, at least initially, conducting tasks that (re)build civilian infrastructure and conduct or assist with certain aspects of governance such as provision of health care, rule of enforcement and humanitarian aid. 3. Assistance to other agencies refers to military assistance to specific agencies, helping them to reach operational objectives. For example, military forces may be allocated to assist election organizers with security and logistical support. 4. Enabling operations link or lead to other tactical operations and their effects. For example, an advance to contact leads to an attack (and eventual effects such as seize) and a withdrawal leads from one defence to another defence. 5. Each of the tactical activities is realized through tactical tasks and effects that normally comprise of a mission statement (see text on following pages). Enabling operations consist of activities, as given above, and these will be issued in mission statements in terms of conduct In order to prosecute them, enabling activities will be broken down into supporting or constituent tasks for subordinates. For example, security will be assigned as a covering force or guard force and supporting tasks assigned. See B-GL-331-002/FP-001 Staff Duties in the Field for further details. Figure 6-1: Table Describing Land Tactical Operations and Constituent Activities
602.
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
1. The purpose of offensive operations is to impose the commanders will upon the enemy by the focused application of force, when and where required to achieve military objectives. Successful offensive operations are often decisive. 2. An explanation and description of the characteristics of the aforementioned tactical tasks of offensive operations can be found in B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations or B-GL-321006/FP-001 Combat Team Operations. 3. Offensive operations are not limited to high intensity peer conflict and could be undertaken at any point within the spectrum of conflict. The Signals considerations discussed below are equally applicable to any of the tactical tasks or activities associated with offensive operations; however, a few select tactical tasks will be described.
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603.
SIGNAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR A HASTY ATTACK
1. In a hasty attack, the major command and control (C2) consideration is the ability to pass orders quickly, maintain situation awareness (SA) and to effectively direct and control the manoeuvre of forces. To do so, all major Signal systems must be used but most often combat net radio (CNR) will be the primary means, both line of sight (LOS) and beyond line of sight (BLOS). As a result, it is imperative that effective measures be taken to counter enemy electronic warfare (EW) action. 604. SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS FOR A DELIBERATE ATTACK
1. In a deliberate attack, security is paramount at least until H-hour. Use of electronic systems must be strictly regulated to prevent tipping the enemy on the attack's time, location and objectives. In the mounting stage, maximum use must be made of Liaison Officers (LOs), Signals Dispatch Service (SDS) and line in preference to CNR and radio relay (RR). Emission control (EMCON) directives must be strictly enforced. 2. Once the assault is launched, all means can be used, but Sig Os must be wary of enemy EW action and must take measures to ensure the effective operations of electronic systems despite enemy electronic deception and jamming. Physical security will remain a major concern for all forward elements until mopping up has been completed during the consolidation stage. 3. Sig Os must foresee the requirement for communications during an eventual exploitation phase and ensure that the TacComms can be extended with little or no notice. Further, Signallers must be prepared to support Commanders as they move forward in their rovers and tactical armoured command post vehicles (Tac CPs). The Main Headquarters (HQ) must also be ready to move forward quickly to keep pace with the progress of forward elements during high intensity mobile warfare. 605. SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS IN AN EXPLOITATION OR PURSUIT
1. During an exploitation and or pursuit, the major tactical considerations affecting Signals are the speed of movement, the fluidity of the front and the extended distances that are required to be supported. Electronic means of communications will be stretched to the limit and a premium will be placed on timeliness, quick reconnaissance and short set-up and tear down times of any mobile HQ or TacComms detachments. 2. The fluidity of the front will demand that calculated risks be taken in regard to the physical security of isolated elements. Extended distances will probably require the use of BLOS TacComms such as high frequency (HF) CNR, satellite telephone, cellular phone or helicopters for radio rebroadcast (RRB) purposes. The area trunk system may have to be deployed in a linear configuration along the major axis of the pursuit rather than in the full grid configuration. The insertion of cut-off forces deep in enemy territory will further complicate the task of Signal planners. Finally, the need for Combat Service Support (CSS) units to follow the lead elements may well require extensive traffic control communications.
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606.
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
1. Defensive operations are usually undertaken when the enemy has the initiative in order to prevent him from seizing terrain or breaking through a defended area. Doctrinally, defensive operations are considered to consist of two specific tactical tasks: the delay and the defence. Although considered to be separate tasks these activities may overlap in part and are described as follows: a. b. The main defensive battle, including countermoves (reinforcing, blocking and counter-attacking); and The delaying battle is fought during the covering force stage of defensive operations to determine the enemy's main axis of advance, to gain time for the preparation of the main defensive position and to weaken the enemy by inflicting casualties.
607.
SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE MAIN DEFENSIVE BATTLE
1. A Sig O must reconcile the high capacity and resilient communications needed to allow the extensive coordination required during the defensive battle with the need for extreme discretion until the main battle is joined. During the preparation stage and whilst the covering force battle is going on, radio silence should be enforced in the main defensive area. This is particularly important for earmarked reserves and countermoves forces. Liaison Officers, line and SDS should be the mainstay of communications. Extensive reconnaissance should allow the positioning of Signal emitters so as to shield them from enemy EW elements. 2. Once radio silence is lifted and the main battle is joined, close co-ordination of electronic support (ES) and fire support elements is required to ensure the neutralization or destruction of enemy EW jammers and to preserve our ability to affect the C2 of our own forces. Communication discipline and skilfully conducted electronic protection (EP) drills will also be paramount. 3. Signals Officers within the main defensive area must also take measures to coordinate with the covering force Sig O for the rearward passage of lines by the returning covering force troops. 4. Laying of communications cables and lines in the main defensive area will require care and a lot of time if the line grid is to have maximum resilience once the battle is joined. Line reinforcements should be sought from higher formation and line crews should be deployed very early in the preparation stage of the main defensive area. Whenever possible, the area trunk system should use lines including civilian telephone lines, in preference to RRB, especially in the forward part of the main defensive area. Current CIS trunk nodes permit data access to the Public Switch Telephone Network (PSTN) through a modem at restricted bandwidth. 5. During the countermove battle, Signals difficulty must ensure the coordination and the compatibility of signal systems among the rapidly regrouping troops. For example, resubordination of units to the proper domain in C2 will be difficult. Troop density will become very high for short periods and at the same time; there will be an extensive need for coordination amongst reinforcing, blocking and counter-attacking troops. Signals Officers must ensure they fully understand the details of all regrouping orders, the manner in which command will be exercised, the critical timings and the adjustments made to the various control measures (axis, boundaries, etc.).
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6. Physical security will become problematic until mopping up is completed if the enemy has achieved infiltration or widespread penetration. Additional protective measures may be warranted at this stage. 608. SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE DELAY
1. During the covering force battle, the covering force Sig O must have a thorough understanding of the Commander's concept of operations. A Sig O must be aware of the delay to be imposed, the manoeuvre to be adopted, the various delaying positions and the handover arrangements back at the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). Because of the difficult psychological conditions of the delaying battle, the Signal Officers will have to ensure his or her Signal troops are briefed in detail to ensure they understand the battle plan they must support and the risks that must be accepted. 2. Prudent Sig Os will carry out extensive reconnaissance of the covering force area (CFA) before the delaying battle is joined so as to be in a position to move signal elements quickly and effectively once contact is made and time is critical. In particular, withdrawal routes must be reconnoitred in detail and reserved demolition timings must be known. 3. Liaison must be affected with the main defensive area Sig O through whose area the final withdrawal must occur so as to coordinate Signal control measures at the handover line and for the subsequent passage of lines. A covering force role will be extended in depth and frontage. In the initial stage and until physical contact is made with the enemy, the emphasis will be on information gathering. Signals Officers will therefore plan for the forward deployment of EW assets especially ES resources and for a discreet C2 posture. Line, LO and SDS should be used in preference to other TacComms to prevent tipping the enemy prematurely. Extensive use should be made of the civilian telephone system employing on-line encryption. 4. Once the delaying battle is joined, the emphasis must switch to providing Commanders with timely and mobile Signal support. All TacComms will be necessary to support the rapid deployment of tactical forces from one delay position to the next. Physical security will also become a problem for isolated signal components. Electronic protection activities such as jamming support may be required to neutralize the action of forward enemy. The extension of the area trunk system into the forward battlespace must be carefully weighed against the risk of destruction or the impossibility of withdrawal and the need for its full exploitation during the main defensive battle. 5. Covering forces normally carry out extensive grouping and regrouping from one delay position to the next and affect multiple rearward passages of lines. Signal Officers must ensure the compatibility of the various systems during these critical stages. 609. STABILITY OPERATIONS
1. A tactical activity conducted by military and security forces, often in conjunction with other agencies, to maintain, restore or establish a climate of order, stability operations have a basis in both cooperative and coercive activities. They can occur at almost any portion along the spectrum of conflict and may happen prior to, during, or following offensive and defensive operations, or as the primary objective of a campaign. Stability operations are a contributing factor to creating an environment conducive to allowing diplomatic, informational and economical instruments of power to predominate in cooperation with a lawful government. Doctrinally, the tactical tasks and activities considered to fall within stability operations are the following:
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a. b. c.
Control and Security to establish a framework of security in which other agencies and a civil populace may function. Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) operations such as reconstruction and humanitarian aid activities. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and Security Sector Reform (SSR) which could involve multi-agency lines of operation within a campaign all of which will include their own specific military tactical tasks. Assistance to Other Agencies in which the military is directly supporting civilian and other government agencies.
d.
2. Stability operations are most often conducted within an asymmetric warfare environment, which is non-linear in concept within a non-contiguous battlespace with a threat from all points external and internal to the area of own forces control. There are similarities to encircled operations described later in this chapter with the exception that it is a planned state rather than one that is temporary awaiting the linear battle geometry to be regained. These types of operations are most prevalent in the conduct of peace support missions or peacemaking counter insurgency operations (COIN) although not restricted to them. Brigade Group (Bde Gp) level HQ and higher tend to be large while remaining in static positions for extended periods rather than highly mobile and lightweight as with conventional linear high intensity mobile warfare. In addition, the assigned area of operations (AO) tends to be complex and quite large where the communications distances often stretch the capability of the vehicle mounted TacComms where reliance on the primary means of communications is generally on CNR. 610. SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS
1. Formation sub-units are often dispersed at distances throughout the AO where planning for the extension of CNR nets is the norm and the adoption of satellite based tactical communications, as a primary means or as a way to extend CNR enclaves, becomes a necessity. Signals must plan within the same constraints and restraints described in normal offensive and defensive operations, but with the knowledge that terrorists, insurgents, guerrilla forces, conventional enemy military forces and unfriendly indigenous members of the population pose a significant threat to isolated TacComms resources inside and outside the area of control. Depending upon the nature of the deployment and the timeline associated with it, a decision must be made with regards to the type of communications infrastructure best suited to it: a. Mounted. Mounted TacComms and TacC2IS are normally found in a more fluid operation and can be established within urban areas as well as open terrain. Signals must consider the extreme vulnerability and consequential protection required for mounted, isolated TacComms such as RRB detachments, area trunk system resources as well as line and SDS routes. Dismounted. Tactical Communications and TacC2IS within this scenario are normally considered for more long-standing/semi-permanent scenarios that involve base camp establishments or buildings within built-up areas. Special considerations to Signals are as follows:
b.
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(1)
use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) systems to permit extension of TacComms and TacC2IS into building configurations and its effect on overall accreditation; increased protection requirements of isolated TacComms resources; added physical security requirements of building based HQ complexes; and increased protection requirements in built-up areas, as there is the inherent provision of areas of isolation and resulting vulnerability to key communications facilities.
(2) (3) (4)
611.
ENABLING ACTIVITIES
1. Enabling Activities are those tactical tasks and activities that are considered as linking actions between decisive tactical operations. The types of tactical tasks or activities currently considered to doctrinally be categorized as enabling activities are listed in Figure 6-1. 2. This section will not discuss all the aforementioned tactical tasks associated with enabling activities but will focus on a few. However, the Signals considerations discussed below can be easily extrapolated to be applicable to many of the aforementioned tactical task or activities associated with enabling activities. Further details on Signals considerations for linkup and relief of encircled forces activities is described under operations in enemy controlled territory in section 6 of this chapter. 612. SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS FOR AN ADVANCE TO CONTACT
1. Signal Officers must consider the following when planning support for an advance to contact: a. b. Advance to contact may well be extended in depth and frontage. Distances to be covered will be greater than in most other operations. Physical security of isolated TacComms elements will be at risk because of the necessity to bypass certain enemy elements. Losses may be higher and more reserves should be planned and maintained. It may be necessary to assign additional protection elements or to collocate with other troops. Passage of information is a vital task of forward elements; yet Signal security is critical if friendly intentions are not to be revealed prematurely to enemy EW troops. Depending on the enemy EW threat and the commander's EMCON policy, means of communication that do not emit in free space (SDS, LOS, line) may have to be used extensively. If freely emitting means are allowed, close coordination with ES elements will be required for threat identification and destruction. Area trunk system access through nodes may be limited by the tempo of an advance and distances covered. Use of CNR will be the primary communications means forward of the FEBA.
c.
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d.
Unless friendly forces are advancing on well charted and known territory, siting of TacComms installations and HQs may have to be done with inadequate knowledge of the ground unless Signal reconnaissance parties follow closely behind lead combat elements. Commanders will want to move forward either in their rovers or Tac CPs. This will further complicate the task of Signal support for the various HQ components. Movement of Main HQ using Step-Up procedures will require careful planning to keep up with a rapid advance.
e.
613.
SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS FOR A MEETING ENGAGEMENT
1. In a meeting engagement, the major C2 consideration is the ability to pass orders quickly, maintain SA and to effectively direct and control the manoeuvre of forces. To do so, all major TacComms must be used, but effective measures must be taken to counter enemy EW action. 614. SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS FOR RELIEF OPERATIONS
1. Relief of troops includes operations whereby combat activities are taken over by one force from another. There are two types of tactical activities considered to be relief operations: a. Relief in Place. This includes both relief of encircled forces and relief of troops in contact wherein all or part of a force is replaced in a sector by an incoming unit that takes over operations at this point. Passage of Lines. Passage of Lines is an operation in which one force moves through another forces area. This is conducted either to come into (forward passage), or out of (rearward passage) contact with the enemy.
b.
2. Relief operations are delicate operations because of the inherent danger of congestion, confusion and the coexistence of two parallel TacC2IS within one area. To ensure success, liaison at all levels between forces must be established and deception, including electronic deception and Signal security, must prevent enemy interference. The incoming and outgoing Sig Os must start planning early and ensure the closest coordination between their two elements. 3. Relief in Place. In a relief in place, the outgoing Sig O is concerned with the following: a. b. c. ensuring Signal security by maintaining the right patterns of traffic; making provisions for the reception and briefing of incoming Signal troops; maintaining the in-place CIS for as long as possible, this is especially critical for CNR, other systems (C2, trunk, line, SDS) can be taken over gradually by the incoming Sig O until only the CNR is left; extricating his or her Signal personnel and equipment after handover has been done; and coordinating with the higher Sig O the Signal plan for his next position.
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d. e.
6-8
4.
Also in a relief in place the incoming Sig O is concerned with the following: a. b. c. d. ensuring Signal security by remaining electronically passive until as late as possible in the relief procedurethis is especially true of CNR operations; making provision for the early reconnaissance and coordinating take over with the outgoing Sig O; introducing Signal personnel and equipment gradually into service starting with SDS, line, C2 trunk and CNR; and taking over as late as possible during the relief operations.
5. Forward Passage of Lines. During a forward passage of lines the moving force Sig O is concerned with the following: a. b. c. d. ensuring Signal security by remaining electronically passive until H hour; planning early reconnaissance and coordinating with the in-place Sig O; collocating key Signal personnel with the in-place key Signal personnel early in the passage of lines so as to ensure a smooth passage; and extending the higher formation CIS beyond the line of departure as coordinated with the higher Sig O.
6. Also during a forward passage of lines, the in-place Sig O is concerned with the following: a. b. c. d. e. ensuring Signal security by maintaining the right pattern of traffic on electronic systems; making provisions for the reception and briefing of the moving force key Signal personnel; making provisions for traffic control communications during the passage of lines; maintaining the in-place CIS until the passage is complete; and initiating Signal planning for the commander's next mission after the passage of lines.
7. Rearward Passage of Lines. During the rearward passage of lines the moving force Sig O is concerned with the following: a. b. c. ensuring Signal security behind the handover line where the moving force should become electronically silent as soon as disengagement is achieved; making provision for early reconnaissance and liaison with the in-place Sig O; co-locating key Signal personnel with the in-place CP early in the passage of lines so as to ensure a smooth passage; and
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d.
coordinating with the higher Sig O for the Signal plan in the new rearward position.
8. Also during the rearward passage of lines, the in-place Sig O is concerned with the following: a. b. c. 615. ensuring Signal security by maintaining radio silence until contact is established at the handover line; making provisions for the reception and briefing of the moving force Signal personnel; and making provisions for traffic control communications during the passage of lines.
SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS FOR A WITHDRAWAL
1. A withdrawal is a tactical activity that occurs when a force disengages from an enemy in accordance with the will of its commander. A withdrawal takes place in the following four stages, which overlap in part: a. b. c. d. thinning out of the position to be evacuated; preparation of intermediate and new positions; disengagement of the main body; and protective and delaying action by the covering force.
2. Since the enemy will have the initiative during the withdrawal, it is extremely difficult to maintain security and achieve surprise. Signals Officers must participate in the planning of withdrawals as early as possible so as to take measures to put in place an effective signal security plan. In particular, transmission patterns must not betray the intentions of the commander and electronic deception must be used to achieve surprise and deceive enemy EW. 3. Maintenance of morale is critical, especially for isolated TacComms elements that may get the feeling of having been forgotten behind. Sound system management may well require the reinforcement of Signal leadership elements with forward isolated elements at the very time when leaders are required in the forward position as well as in the new position to the rear. 4. The Signal considerations during the thinning out stage of a withdrawal are as follows: a. Signal reconnaissance must start during this stage. Security requirements may force the reconnaissance to be conducted at night or under conditions of poor visibility, so additional resources may have to be devoted to this task to offset the slower pace of activity. Reconnaissance has to take into account the total distance to be covered, the going on the withdrawal routes, demolition timings, withdrawal timings, intermediate positions, defiles if any, and the possible sites for TacComms installations. Care should be taken to screen TacComms installations from enemy EW.
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b.
It may well be necessary to send the second-in-command of all Signal elements involved back for this task. This will place an additional burden on leadership elements in the forward area.
5. The Signal considerations during the preparation of intermediate and new positions are as follows: a. The TacComms infrastructure for the withdrawal is put in place during this stage. Radio silence should be enforced to the rear of the position to be evacuated. The area trunk system should be deployed axially along the withdrawal routes but line, rather than RR, should be the main transmission means if at all possible. An important traffic control TacComms will have to be established. It should be based on LOs and Military Police (MPs) at various checkpoints using secure telephone or SDS. CNR should only be a last recourse. In all likelihood, Signal support for a withdrawal will exceed the capability of the withdrawing force. Reinforcements by the higher formation Signal organization will be required. TacComms in the position to be evacuated must continue to be used in a normal pattern so as not to raise enemy suspicion. Dummy stations may have to be set up to deceive the enemy during the preparation stage. Deception activities must be carefully coordinated with G2/G3 and higher formation staffs.
b.
c.
d.
6.
Signals considerations during the disengagement stage of a withdrawal are as follows: a. b. In the early stage of the disengagement, the electronic part of the deception plan should move into full gear in conjunction with other elements of the plan. Electronic deception will not likely succeed very long and the Sig O must be ready to use all electronic TacComms to provide signal support once the withdrawal is uncovered and the delaying battle is joined. In particular, ES and EP resources will be required to neutralize enemy C2 and augment the delay imposed.
7. Protective and Delaying Action. During this stage, the Signal problem and considerations follow that of the covering force battle already explained above. 616. SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS OBSTACLE CROSSING AND BREACHING
1. A crossing or breaching task involves the crossing or breaching of a natural or artificial obstacle and can occur during offensive, defensive and delaying operations, during passages of lines, or anywhere in an AO. A crossing refers to the opening of a route over a water obstacle, while a breaching refers to the securing of a passage through a land obstacle. 2. The two types of obstacle crossing/breaching activities are described as follows: a. Hasty. This activity takes place from the line of march with little preparation.
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b.
Deliberate. This tactical task requires extensive preparation and is only undertaken if a hasty crossing cannot be achieved. The Signal considerations associated with this activity will be described in detail below.
3. Since an obstacle crossing or breaching activity is a subsidiary part of other types of operations, the tactical considerations for these types of tactical operations must also be taken into account; however, only those aspects peculiar to obstacle crossing and breaching activities will be discussed here. An obstacle crossing or breaching activity is done in four stages: a. b. c. d. 4. reconnaissance; assault to gain lodgement; build up of the bridgehead; and consolidation before the break out.
The Signals considerations during the reconnaissance stage are as follows: a. Signals Officers must reconnoitre carefully all areas where communications for the crossing force must be put in place. The enemy threat against the crossing and the terrain largely dictate the means of communications to be used. It is unlikely that complete surprise can be achieved. Line and SDS should be used for the traffic control and crossing area organizations so as not to tip off the enemy as to the exact crossing place and timing. The crossing force when possible should minimize radio emissions until the battle is joined. Thereafter, the area trunk system should be used in preference to CNR for the crossing and traffic control organizations. Electronic support resources will be useful at this stage to locate enemy forces on the far side. In cases where the force in place belongs to another formation, the Sig O must make the necessary coordination arrangements to ensure an efficient forward passage of lines. The TacComms infrastructure for the crossing should be put in place as soon as the force in place has been established on the near side of the obstacle and in time to control the advance of the assault force through the crossing area. Tactical communications resources required for this task are extensive and will have to be made available by regrouping the resources of various units in the formation, such as reconnaissance units, MP units, TacComms resources of the force in place, TacComms resources of the controlling HQ, etc. If sufficient TacComms resources are available, electronic emissions may be used to deceive the enemy as to the place and time of the crossing.
b.
c. d.
e.
f.
g.
5. The Signals considerations during the assault stage of the obstacle crossing are as follows:
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Signal support for the assault force relies mainly on its integral resources supplemented as required by the crossing formation area trunk system resources. Provision has to be made for the assault forces passage of lines through the force in place and for its cooperation with the traffic control organization that it will direct until the full crossing area is established, after a lodgement is seized on the far side of the obstacle; As in the deliberate attack, electronic emissions should be discreet before Hhour; thereafter radio silence can be lifted at the discretion of the assault force commander; and As soon as intermediate objectives are seized, the crossing area is established and the traffic control reverts from the assault force commander to the crossing force commander.
b.
c.
d.
6. The Signals considerations during the final two stages of the build up and the consolidation of the Bridgehead before the breakout are as follows: a. The major concern of the bridgehead force Sig O is to ensure that sufficient EW and TacComms resources cross the obstacle to permit the orderly support of the consolidation and break out. A balance must be kept between overcrowding the far bank with superfluous TacComms resources and keeping enough resources to offset equipment losses and casualties and to allow the support of subsequent stages of the crossing activity. The bridgehead force Sig O must also make the necessary preparations for a forward passage of lines by the break out force. The bridgehead is extremely vulnerable at this stage and maximum use of EW resources must be made to locate and neutralize or destroy enemy C2 elements. As soon as possible, alternate TacComms to CNR must be used on the far bank to lower the electronic profile of our own TacC2IS. Physical security will also be low until mopping up is complete during the consolidation phase, requiring further prudence and defensive measures to be practiced. SECTION 2 UNIQUE OPERATIONS 617. AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS
b.
c. d.
e.
1. General. An airmobile operation is the movement of combat forces and their equipment about the battlefield in air vehicles, usually helicopters or Vertical Take Off and Landing (VTOL) aircraft, under the control of an LF Commander, to engage in ground combat. It can be undertaken separately or as part of any type of ground operations. An airmobile force can be employed independently or in conjunction with other land forces. 2. Airmobile operations are planned in the reverse sequence of their execution as follows:
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a. b. c. d. e. 618.
a ground tactical plan to cover the employment in the objective area once the lifted force is landed; a landing plan, to place the lifted force in the objective area; an air movement plan to fly the lifted force to the objective area; the loading plan identifies the pick-up zone, provides guidance for its establishment and control; and the staging plan details the control area(s) and provides guidance on the repositioning of the units, supplies, and equipment required.
SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS FOR AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS
1. The Sig O must consider the following during the ground tactical stage of an airmobile operation: a. Signal support during this stage is the responsibility of the airmobile force Sig O. In order to carry out his or her task, the Sig O has to know the enemy EW threat en-route and in the objective area, the distance from the landing zone to the objective area, the quantity and size of TacComms resources allowed to be flown in (vehicular or manpack only), the arrangements made by the higher G6 staff for communications with supporting forces (link up forces, artillery, air forces) and the method of extraction of the airmobile force. Prior to the insertion of the main body of the airmobile force, it could be necessary to insert pathfinders for the reconnaissance of the objective area and marking of the landing zone (LZ). In such a case, special Signal arrangements must be made for the pathfinders to report back and for recognition signals in the LZ. As a matter of principle, radio silence should be maintained in the objective area as long as possible or at least until H-hour. If link-up of the airmobile force with a main ground force is planned, the higher formation Sig O will make the necessary coordination between the two elements during the mounting stage. Once the ground operation is on and radio silence has been lifted, an airborne command post (CP) could be used to coordinate the movement of all components and relay back to higher HQ reports and requests for support, if the air situation is favourable and the air defence (AD) threat from the ground is negligible.
b.
c. d.
e.
2.
Signals considerations during the landing stage of an airmobile operation are as follows: a. The TacComms for the ground tactical stage must be on stand-by, ready for use. Signallers in aircraft and disembarking should be on listening watch ready to receive orders. Dispatch riders (DRs) or runners should accompany selected commanders ready to transmit their orders to various points on the LZ or to another LZ. Arrangements for contact with the pathfinder group should be executed. This is particularly critical if routes are unmarked and guidance from the LZ to the objective area is required.
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b. c.
Enemy reaction on the LZ may require breaking radio silence either by the ground troops or by the aviation unit. TacComms resources in personnel and equipment should have been dispersed in various aircraft along with the various command elements to ensure adequate back up in case of destruction during the air move.
3. Signals considerations during the air movement stage of an airmobile operation are as follows: a. The airmobile force Sig O should help the aviation component Sig O prepare the Signal plan for this stage. Ideally, the flight to the objective should be conducted under electronic silence, but it may be necessary to coordinate with accompanying EW helicopters, armed helicopters and close support aircraft for air space control and suppression of enemy air defence en-route. It will also be necessary to decide on permissible active navigational aids. Planning for air movement also includes planning for the return of aircraft after the insertion and for the extraction sorties if a link-up is not planned. The decision to be electronically silent on the various flights in and out depends on the mission security requirement, on the enemy threat and, for the extraction flights, on the immediate tactical situation at the time of extraction. Signals must arrange for intercommunication between ground and aviation commanders so that the ground commander can be updated on SA developments as they occur.
b.
c.
4. Signals considerations during the mounting stage of an airmobile operation are as follows: a. As for any other type of operation, supporting Sig Os must have an intimate knowledge of their Commander's intentions and plans. But since three separate components (higher command, ground component and aviation component) are involved, it is of the utmost importance that complete coordination between these components' Signal plans be effected. The higher Commander's Sig O must take the lead in planning and coordinating. Before the higher Commander's orders are issued, the Sig O must put together the major elements of the Signal plan between the airmobile force and the outside world. Then, once the airmobile task force is formed, the higher Commanders Sig O should meet with the airmobile force Sig O and the aviation component Sig O to explain clearly how he or she intends to provide Signal support to the airmobile force and what are the constraints under which all must operate. The airmobile force Sig O is also the land component Sig O. He or she, therefore, has a dual responsibility for planning the Signal support internal to the ground component and also to coordinate the Signal support between the aviation component and the land component. The aviation component Sig O prepares the aviation Signal plan within the constraints imposed by the airmobile force Sig O.
b.
c.
d.
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e.
Once planning is complete and marshalling is done, the airmobile force Sig O must ensure that a complete Signal briefing is given to all signallers and key land and aviation commanders and staff officers. All TacComms equipment must also be inspected and tested for serviceability. The mounting stage should normally be conducted under complete electronic silence within the airmobile force, except for short (burst) pathfinder reports if necessary. However, communications of host land and air elements will have to be used to link the various commanders and the supporting elements during this stage.
f.
619.
AIRBORNE OPERATIONS
1. General. An airborne operation is a joint operation involving the air movement and parachute landing of ground forces to interdict an area or to conduct a raid. This section provides guidance only for additional aspects peculiar to airborne operations. Airborne operations can be conducted independently or in conjunction with other land forces. 2. Airborne operations like airmobile operations are planned in the reverse sequence of their execution as follows: a. b. c. d. 620. A ground tactical plan, to cover the employment once the forces have landed. A landing plan, to organize the manner in which the ground forces will arrive on the drop zones (DZ) in the objective area. An air movement plan, to fly the force to the objective area. A mounting plan, to assemble army and air force resources and load the aircraft at departure airfields.
SIGNAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR AIRBORNE OPERATIONS
1. In airborne operations, security and intelligence are imperative to success. Therefore, Sig Os have to take strict measures to ensure that Signal planners disseminate information on a strict need-to-know basis. Briefings to troops occur only once all elements are mustered and quarantined on the departure airfields. Equally important, higher formation EW resources must be fully exploited to gain maximum signal intelligence (SIGINT) for exploitation during the various stages of the operation. 2. The Signal considerations during the ground tactical stage of airborne operations are as follows: a. If one replaces the expressions airmobile and LZ by airborne and DZ, previous guidance given on airmobile operations is also applicable for airborne operations planning. The major difference between airmobile and airborne operations is probably the depth of insertion into enemy territory. Airborne forces will usually be inserted deeper than airmobile forces. Consequently, the communications back to higher HQ and to external supporting forces must be conducted over much longer distances and will require different means.
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c.
The airborne force Sig O must also be aware that immediately after landing, the airborne force is extremely vulnerable and that the ground commander will want to ensure that regrouping of forces into fighting formations is done as expeditiously as possible. Depending on the conditions after landing, the airborne force commander may wish to break radio silence in order to speed up regrouping. Cohesion of the tactical force would thus take precedence over security. Finally, the airborne force Sig O must plan for air-ground-air (A/G/A) communication and DZ control during follow-up resupply missions.
d.
3. The Signals considerations during the landing stage of an airborne operation are as follows: a. The same guidance as for airmobile operations applies. However, Sig Os must be ready to react to adverse conditions immediately after landing. The likelihood of destruction and casualties in flight and on landing and of unacceptable dispersal on and off DZ may jeopardize the Signal plan. In advising airborne commanders on EMCON policy on arrival in the objective area, Sig Os must carefully weigh the threat, the need for rapid direction if the plan must be changed and the overwhelming need for a rapid concentration of force immediately after landing. If the plan develops as expected and surprise is achieved, retaining radio silence as long as possible may be worthwhile. In this case, DRs could be used provided they are well briefed on the relative positions of the various DZs and have some means of transport (bicycles or motorcycles).
b.
4. The Signal considerations during the air movement stage of an airborne operation are identical to those for airmobile operations. During this stage, EW aircraft could accompany the transport aircraft to neutralize air defence and surveillance radar en route and in the objective area. The task force Sig O should be ready to advise the airlift commander on this aspect. 5. The Signal considerations during the mounting stage of an airborne operation are as follows: a. The same guidance as for airmobile operations applies only change the higher commander's Sig O for joint task force Sig O, the airmobile force Sig O for airborne force Sig O and the aviation Sig O for airlift force Sig O. Prior to airborne operations, not only briefings but also rehearsals must be conducted. The airborne force Sig O will ensure that the complete Signal plan is rehearsed and walked through. Inspection of platform rigged TacComms equipment must also be carried out in detail. Because of the higher rate of casualties at the outset, the airborne force Sig O will ensure that the plan includes the requirement for a small reserve of personnel and equipment in the initial assault as well as in the immediate followup resupply drops.
b.
c.
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621.
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
1. General. An amphibious operation is a joint operation involving the sea movement of naval, land and/or air forces into an objective area to conduct an amphibious assault/landing on a hostile shore; or, an amphibious raid or an amphibious demonstration. Alternately, it could also involve an amphibious withdrawal of a land force from a hostile shore by naval forces. Such an operation may be conducted independently or in conjunction with other land forces. 2. Amphibious operations are normally planned in five stages and in the reverse sequence of their execution, as follows: a. Assault. This stage starts with the arrival of the amphibious task force in the objective area and ends when the mission of the amphibious task force is accomplished. Movement. The components of the amphibious task force move from the points of embarkation to the amphibious objective area. Rehearsal. During this stage, the plans, including the Signal support plan, are tested and practiced. Embarkation. This covers the period during which troops and their equipment are embarked in assigned shipping. The Planning Stage. This covers the period from the issue of the initiating directive by a higher commander to the embarkation of forces.
b. c. d. e.
622. 1.
SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS General. Signal considerations for amphibious operations are as follows: a. b. An amphibious task force is a joint operation and it will usually be led by a naval officer. The key C2 appointments from a Signal point of view are: (1) (2) c. naval amphibious Task Force Commander and assigned naval communication officer, and Landing Force Commander and assigned Sig O.
Signal planning must encompass communications required for the command of the amphibious task force as a whole; for lateral communications between the naval, land and air components; and for communications internal to each component. Responsibilities are shared as follows: (1) the amphibious task force Sig O plans Signal support for the task force as a whole and coordinates requirements for communication between components and between the task force and external supporting forces,
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(2)
the landing force Sig O plans Signal support for the land component and coordinates all Signal requirements for operations once the force is landed, and the air force communications-electronics officer will plan the Signal support for air force elements integral to the task force.
(3) d.
The critical Signal planning element is in providing the amphibious Task Force Commander and the LF Commander the required Signal support afloat and ashore, and to effect an orderly transfer of the Landing Force Commander's CP from sea to shore without discontinuity. Signal planners must be aware of Joint Operations doctrine.
2. Signal considerations during the assault stage of an amphibious operation are as follows: a. The formulation of an assault concept of operations is the first step in the overall planning process. The landing force Sig O must participate in this process and cooperate closely with the task force communication officer to ascertain whether the concept can be supported by communications ashore and afloat. Signal support for operations ashore is conducted as for other offensive operations except that the Signal plan must: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) provide for an early build up of TacComms ashore, provide for an orderly transfer of C2 of the landing force from afloat to the beachhead, provide for the LF Commander to command initially from a joint CP afloat with the Task Force Commander, provide a communications capability between naval and land CIS on the initial stages of the assault when all systems are operated from ships, integrate the requirement to operate rear and lateral links from shore to the naval task force CP afloat and to supporting air force elements afloat or on land beyond the objective area, this includes complex landing ship and beach control communications, where link-up with other ground forces is planned, include the requirement for communication during link-up, where extraction by sea is planned, include the reverse of the process explained in (1) to (5) above, and when subsequent operations on land are planned, include the provisions for a forward passage of lines by follow-on forces.
b.
(6) (7) (8)
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3. During the movement stage of an amphibious landing the landing force TacComms should be silent. Naval force communications must be used when necessary if the naval EMCON policy allows. 4. Rehearsals are a necessity for amphibious operations due to their extreme complexity. Supporting Sig Os must ensure that all aspects of the Signal plan are rehearsed and adjustments made where necessary. This provides an opportunity to test the understanding of the plan by all concerned. Rehearsal requirements must be foreseen in the distribution of TacComms equipment and personnel among ships during embarkation. 5. Signals considerations during the embarkation stage of an amphibious operation are as follows: a. Sig Os should delegate embarkation control responsibility to ensure that all Signal personnel and TacComms equipment are embarked and distributed among shipping so as to allow the orderly transfer from ships to landing craft in the objective area. If an enemy threat is foreseen during the movement phase, cross loading of TacComms equipment and Signal personnel should be planned to overcome losses or destruction.
b.
6. Planning. Unlike other types of operations, the Landing Force Commander, one of the subordinate commanders, assumes a pre-eminent role during this phase. The amphibious Task Force Commander merely acts as a coordinator to ensure all other elements of the task force take effective measures to support the Landing Force Commander's concept of operations. This relationship ceases upon the start of embarkation when the Task Force Commander assumes overall command responsibility. It is the Sig Os responsibility to be intimately familiar with the overall concept of operations in order to effectively plan and coordinate the various aspects of CIS support to the amphibious operation. 623. 1. OPERATIONS IN ENEMY CONTROLLED TERRITORY Operations in enemy controlled territory include: a. b. c. Operations by Encircled Forces. These in turn include the defence of the encircled force and its break out. Link-up Operations. This occurs when a force joins another friendly force in enemy controlled territory. Special Operations. These are operations conducted by special troops in order to attack or disrupt vital points or to secure important information deep behind enemy lines.
624. SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS FOR OPERATIONS IN ENEMY CONTROLLED TERRITORY 1. The Signals considerations for operations by encircled forces in enemy controlled territory are as follows:
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a.
Encirclement is not normally a planned activity but one with which military commanders may have to cope. Once a force has been encircled, the first priority is to re-establish the integrity of the TacC2IS in the pocket including its Signal element in order to plan and direct the immediate defence of the forces encircled. Once the defence is organized, the Sig O must attempt to lower the electronic profile of the TacComms in order to avoid enemy EW attack and avoid DF of critical C2 elements. If at all possible, line and SDS should be used in preference to radio during the defensive stage of the encirclement. However, in the event of an attack, CNR may have to be used especially by the reserve/countermoves force. The Sig O must also try to re-establish communications with the higher commander outside the pocket so that relief, break out, combat support and combat service support may be coordinated. If it is not possible electronically, the use of a messenger, DR or LO should be considered. If a break out is planned, the Sig O must ensure that absolute Signal security is maintained until H-hour in order to achieve surprise; this may conflict with the need for coordination with external forces. A decision to coordinate by radio will depend on the relative importance of surprise and support from external forces, and on the quality of Signal security procedures (crypto systems and traffic patterns). Once the break out starts, all TacComms means available are used to ensure immediacy of control and maintenance of the momentum. If at all possible, the Sig O must coordinate frequencies, crypto and recognition signals between the encircled troop lead elements and the external friendly forces with which it is planned to establish contact.
b.
c.
d.
2. A link-up operation is planned much like a normal attack or advance to contact, but specific aspects of C2 between the two converging forces need explanation. The guiding principles for the planning and conduct of link-up operations are security to achieve surprise, speed to prevent timely enemy reaction and coordination of manoeuvre and control measures to prevent needless friendly casualties. The Signal considerations for link-up operations in enemy controlled territory are as follows: a. The higher commander's Sig O is responsible for coordinating Signal support between the two converging forces; once this is done, the link-up force Sig O must take the initiative to establish contact with the static force. In all likelihood, CNR will be the only means of communications with the force in enemy territory, so precautions must be taken not to tip the enemy about link-up plans. As for break out operations, coordination between converging forces must cover passwords, frequencies, crypto keys, contact location, timings, C2 contracts and visual signals.
b.
3. Signals considerations for special operations conducted in enemy controlled territory are as follows: a. Special operations teams operating behind enemy lines are equipped with special, long range, secure radio or satellite communications equipment to contact their controlling HQ.
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b.
Communications security (COMSEC) measures may include; (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) varied calling schedules; varied frequency plans; burst transmission and frequency hopping; use of low power transmitters in the operational area and highly sensitive receivers at the controlling HQ; and remote radio transmitters away from the operational base or CP. SECTION 3 TACTICAL OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS
1. Formations will conduct operations on what can be termed complex terrain most of the time. This is not to say that there will not be conflict on open terrain nor does it imply that all complex terrain is the same. Each type of terrain presents particular challenges and engenders specific Signal doctrinal methods for dealing with the characteristics of the terrain in question. This section provides guidance to Sig Os supporting forces operating in specific environments. The following specific environments will be discussed: a. b. c. d. e. 625. operations in a chemical, biological, radioactive, and/or nuclear (CBRN) environment; operations in mountains; operations in the arctic and cold weather; operations in jungles; and operations in deserts.
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS EFFECTS ON SIGNALS
1. Continuity of C2 is essential during periods of gas or chemical attacks. Signals will play a vital role in: a. b. rapid collection and dissemination of information related to enemy capabilities, location and use of biological and chemical resources; and warning of own troops and those of flanking formations of attacks, impending attacks (if possible), and contaminated areas.
2. Biological and chemical agents are primarily anti-personnel weapons. The survivability of TacComms and TacC2IS is therefore dependent on the ability of personnel to survive and to operate and maintain these systems in a reliable manner. Survival of personnel is dependent on: a. b. personal protection measures; and collective protection.
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3. Personal Protection. Personal protection is achieved mainly by wearing protective masks and protective clothing ensembles. The use of radio and telephone communications will be difficult even when aided by special types of ancillary equipment. Moreover, problems will also arise in the operation of keyboard equipment, handling of messages, maintenance and repair of systems, etc. Signal personnel, as well as users, must be highly trained in the use of protective clothing and equipment and be capable of effectively carrying out their responsibilities while wearing such clothing. 4. Collective Protection. Collective protective measures for CP personnel is possible through the provision of overpressure shelters in which personnel can continue to carry out all necessary actions needed for the operation of the TacC2IS. The shelters may be of permanent or field construction, depending on location and the tactical situation, but should contain special air filtration and circulation plants. Operators and users will require suitable airlock entrances and exit facilities for prolonged operations. 5. Decontamination. The need for decontamination significantly affects any operational plan. The Commander has to decide on the degree of decontamination to be achieved and on the control measures to be adopted. Priorities for decontamination must be laid down clearly; initial measures being limited to those essential for operations to continue. 6. Reserves. A reserve of personnel and equipment must be available to Signals to reestablish any part of the TacC2IS rendered inoperative by an enemy CBRN attack, either through destruction or contamination. 626. NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL EFFECTS ON SIGNALS
1. Aside from the devastating results of a nuclear explosion, there are other effects that could have an impact on TacComms equipment even at great distances away from ground zero. These are: a. b. c. electromagnetic pulse (EMP); nuclear blackout; and; Transient-Radiation Effects on Electronics (TREE).
2. Electromagnetic Pulse. Electromagnetic pulse originates with the release of massive charges of gamma rays, X-rays and neutrons in the atmosphere as the result of a nuclear explosion. This pulse of electromagnetic radiation is many times more powerful than that of lightning; as a result, it can enter CIS equipment through antenna systems, power connections and signal input connections. Integrated circuits and solid-state circuitry is particularly susceptible to damage; spares and spare parts should be kept in steel boxes or be shielded whenever possible. The following paragraphs describe the effects of EMP on different means of communications as well as the actions to be taken to minimize damage: a. Radio. The first protective measure is to disconnect the antenna if the threat is imminent. Further, equipment, power and antenna connectors should be disconnected when the radios are not in use or during periods of electronic silence. Equipments should be shielded from direct penetration of EMP whenever possible.
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b.
Multi-channel Radio. Electromagnetic pulse will likely damage the sensitive receivers. In order to minimize damage, all spare equipment should be disconnected from the antennae and from power and Signal cables. Planning should stress shielding equipment whenever possible, flexibility in routing and re-routing critical circuits and allow for spare equipment to minimize the likelihood of losing entire systems. Information Systems. Computer based systems (laptops, desktops, servers, displays and peripherals) are susceptible to EMP damage as is any other equipment containing integrated circuits. Shielding of these devices will reduce or prevent damage (related directly to the strength of the EMP) although damage to supporting medium (line, radio, radio-relay) will isolate the ability to provide a voice/data network. Line. Electromagnetic pulse does not affect fibre optic cables; however, the peripheral equipment (switches, hubs, routers, etc) on which they terminate is. Non-shielded line and cable is susceptible to arcing and insulation failure. Replacement and repair is required after EMP exposure. Shielded cable should be grounded at one end and cable shield connectors must be inspected frequently to ensure proper connection. Cables and lines between equipments can become unintentional antennas; this can be avoided by: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) keeping the lengths of cable and line as short as possible (the amount of energy collected is directly related to the length of the conductor), burying all cables and lines, including power cable, at least 1 m deep, never leaving line or cable coiled on a reel connected to equipment (the coil will pick-up more energy than a straight cable run); always using a common ground for all equipment, shelters and power sources, and ensuring that all antenna guy lines are properly insulated and grounded.
c.
d.
e.
Visual and Sound. Should EMP cause the loss of radio and line communications, the use of visual and sound signalling may be necessary for C2. Signals Dispatch System. Extensive use of SDS, courier and liaison may be necessary in a nuclear environment when and where EMP has damaged equipment. Shielding. Shielding prevents direct penetration of EMP into TacComms equipment. Shielding effectiveness is related to the type of shielding and its thickness. For effective electrical field shielding, any metal can be used. For magnetic shielding, iron or steel is required. Loss of otherwise good shielding is due to openings, such as doors, panels and vents in the shield enclosures. Other conductors, such as water pipes and cooling and heating ducts, also provide good access paths for EMP penetration. In order to minimize the effects of direct penetration of EMP, all access panels and other equipment apertures should be closed and sealed at all times, except when they absolutely must be removed or opened for operation or maintenance. Where feasible, TacComms equipment may be buried 1 m deep, in soil, to reduce the effects of EMP.
f.
g.
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3. Nuclear Blackout. A nuclear blast always produces large disturbances in the atmosphere. For airbursts, below an altitude of 25 km, the most significantly disturbed region is within a well-defined fireball varying from one km to tens of km. For underground blasts or at very low altitudes, large dust clouds are generated in addition to the fireball. When a radio transmission goes through a nuclear blast region, there will be degradation of the radio wave that results in the partial or total blackout of radio communications. 4. Nuclear Blackout Variables. The characteristics of this blackout, as well as actions to minimize its effects, are described below. The three variables of nuclear blackout that concern communications are: a. b. c. altitude and direction of the nuclear blast; yield of the weapon; and frequency of the radio waves.
5. Radio Waves Interactions. The basic interactions of radio waves with the nuclear fireball and the dust created by the blast are refraction, absorption and scattering. As a result, signals arriving at the receiver will vary rapidly in phase, strength and in direction of arrival. The three phenomena may occur singly or concurrently. In addition, the fireball will radiate thermal noise. In the case of tactical radio systems, HF to SHF may be catastrophically affected by these radio wave interactions. 6. Blackout Environment. The actual amount of blackout interference to be encountered will not be known unless a nuclear war occurs. Tests and simulations cannot confidently predict the results. However, in such an environment it can be expected that the following three main combinations would cause blackout for varying periods of time: a. b. c. High altitude blasts with the resulting disabling of all but the most rigorously hardened communications satellite relays. High altitude blasts with the resulting major disruption of HF communications systems (skywave). Dust clouds produced by low altitude blasts resulting in disruption to LOS, BLOS, in particular satellite and HF communications systems.
7. Remedial Actions. When blackout occurs, the following actions may reduce communication outage time: a. b. c. Line communications that have not been affected by EMP may be used. Alternative routing or relaying around the blackout region may be possible. Assigned alternative frequencies may be used. (If it is suspected that an ionised region is causing interference, higher frequencies should be tried first but when dust appears to be the problem, lower frequencies should be tried).
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8. Transient-Radiation Effects on Electronics. Transient-Radiation Effects on Electronics is another important electrical effect caused by the radiation emitted by a nuclear explosion that can interact with components of electronic circuits to produce ionization or atomic displacements in the semiconductor and insulating materials. The effect ranges from momentary changes in conductivity to permanent changes in crystal lattices. Semi-permanent effects, such as trapped charges in insulating materials, may also occur. Transient radiation effects on electronics may upset memories, produce spurious circuit responses (logic errors), drive circuits into abnormal states, or cause permanent damage. As with most other EMP forms, damage caused by TREE can also occur through secondary effects. Self-inflicted damage may be triggered by abnormal conductivity in a junction that allows stored energy to be released. In addition, one circuit may be caused to instruct another circuit or another part of the system to perform some forbidden act that destroys the circuit or even the system. 627. OPERATIONS IN MOUNTAINS
1. Mountainous terrain is characterized by a marked difference in elevation with steep slopes and valleys over an extended area. Weather conditions can also vary considerably over a small area. It may include built-up areas and plains between mountain ridges, plateaus, passes and the mountainsides themselves. Communications practices will differ in this environment from normal operations. 2. The communications means available to support operations in mountainous regions are the same as those to support operations in other regions of the world. However, rapid and reliable communications are especially difficult to achieve and maintain in mountainous areas. Mountainous environments require electronic equipment that is light, rugged, portable and able to exploit the advantages of higher terrain. The combined effects of irregular terrain patterns, magnetic and ionospheric disturbances, cold, ice, and dampness on TacComms equipment increases operating, maintenance and supply problems and requires precise planning and extensive coordination. 3. Since even a small unit may be spread over a large area, retransmission and rebroadcast sites may be needed to maintain radio communications and to increase range. These sites require extensive preparation and support to ensure the survival of personnel and the continued maintenance of TacComms equipment. Retransmission systems are often placed on the highest accessible terrain to afford them the best LOS; however, through simple analysis, these locations are often predictable and make them more vulnerable to enemy interdiction. 4. Physical range limitations, difficulties in establishing LOS paths due to intervening terrain, and limited retransmission capabilities often make it difficult to establish a brigade and larger-sized CNR net. However, commanders can, if within range, enter subordinate nets and establish a temporary net for various contingencies. In the mountains or if the network is not yet fully developed, commanders should consider the increased use of HF AM radios and singlechannel tactical satellite communications terminals, if available, for extended distances. 5. Directional antennae, both bi-directional and unidirectional, may be needed to increase range and maintain radio communications. Although easy to fabricate, directional antennae are less flexible and more time-consuming to set up. Positioning of all antennae is also crucial in the mountains because moving an antenna even a small distance can significantly affect reception and/or transmission.
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6. Antenna icing, a common occurrence at high elevations, significantly degrades communications. Ice may also make it difficult to extend or lower antennae and the weight of ice build-up, combined with increased brittleness caused by the cold, may cause them to break. Antennae should have extra guy wires, supports and anchor stakes to strengthen them to withstand heavy ice and wind loading. All large horizontal antennae should be equipped with a system of counterweights arranged to slacken the antenna wire before the wire or poles break from the excess weight of ice or pressures of wind. 7. Ground rods and guy wires are often difficult to drive into rocky and frozen earth. Mountain pitons are excellent anchors for antenna guys in this type of soil. Adequate grounding is also difficult to obtain on frozen or rocky surfaces due to high electrical resistance. Where it is possible to install a grounding rod, it should be driven into the earth as deeply as possible or through the ice on frozen lakes or rivers. Grounding in rocky soil may be improved by adding salt solutions to improve electrical flow. In many instances it will be impracticable to secure a ground and it will be necessary to install a counterpoise antenna. 8. Field cable is normally one of the most reliable means of communication. Unfortunately, in rugged mountains and particularly during the winter months, field cable is more difficult and time consuming to install, maintain and protect. 9. Snow-covered cables and line can cause the loss of many man-days in recovering or maintaining circuits. Allowances must be made for drifting snow when determining the height above ground at which to support the lines. If long-distance line communications are required, the integration of radio relay systems must be considered. 10. Computers and computer based systems, as well as the peripheral equipment, are sensitive to extreme cold or heat. Operating temperatures fall within the range of -40 to 70 C for TacComms and Tac C2IS equipment based on Military Standards but COTS items are significantly less. Consideration must be taken into account to ensure that the equipment environment meets the optimum temperature requirements. 628. OPERATIONS IN THE ARCTIC AND COLD WEATHER
1. Operations in arctic and cold weather conditions demand special techniques, training and equipment. This section concentrates on outlining the communications considerations for such operations during the winter season but also gives some guidance on operations conducted during arctic summer conditions. 2. Military operations in northern latitudes may be characterized by the employment of independent task forces, usually beyond mutual supporting distance of each other. The lack of major land lines of communication, the necessity of relying upon air lines of communication and the great dispersion between forces mean that primary reliance must be placed on radio as a means of communication. Operations over extended areas will require augmentation of radio equipment and personnel. When these factors are considered in conjunction with the extreme cold and deep snow, it can be seen that, under some circumstances, operations of isolated task forces will be practically impossible unless these forces are able to communicate. 3. Tactical radio (i.e. VHF/UHF) equipment operating in the LOS frequency band (30 MHz and upwards; the frequency modulated series of tactical radio sets are included in this band) is not affected adversely by auroral activity. In fact, the greater ionization of the upper atmosphere that takes place during auroral activity will, on occasion, increase the range of the tactical VHF radios. The use of VHF and microwave radio relay equipment will provide the greatest degree
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of reliability for multi-channel means of communications in northern areas. Tactical tropospheric scatter radio equipment, when available, is another reliable means of providing multi-channel communications for distances up to approximately 300 kilometres. 4. High frequency (HF) radio transmission and reception, while capable of spanning the extended distances dictated by tactical requirements, are subject to interference by magnetic storms, aurora borealis and ionospheric disturbances, which may completely black out reception for hours or even days. Transmission and reception under most conditions is possible providing proper installation and operation procedures are followed. 5. Line communication has the same capabilities and limitations in northern latitudes as in temperate zones. Due to the distances involved and the difficulty of overland movement, wire communications may be limited to serving local installations. If long distance wire communication trunks (telephone and data transmission) are required, radio relay systems that can be integrated into the wire system must be considered because of relative ease of installation, economy of transport and other logistical factors. 6. Batteries of all types show decreased power capacity at low temperatures; however, some (such as Lithium Ion) are better than others in cold weather. Batteries should be stored at supply facilities between temperature ranges of -12C to 2C. Upon removal from storage, and prior to use, the batteries should be heated slowly to a temperature of 20C. Warm batteries will give good results if used promptly upon exposure to cold. The conventional dry cell type battery loses efficiency rapidly at low temperatures and decreases in capacity as the temperature drops below 21 C. (The terminal voltage of the battery is not affected by cold, but its capacity, life, or effectiveness to supply operating voltage over a period of time is affected.) At -17C. it is 40 percent effective; at -23C., 20 percent; and at -34C., only 8 percent effective. 7. Similar to mountainous terrain operations, difficulties will be experienced in erecting antennae in the north. The frozen ground makes it difficult to drive the antenna base support, guy line stakes and ground rods. Vertical antennae are preferred for ground wave propagation in the HF band; but the use of fractional wavelength whip antennas is not recommended except for short distances. Suitable grounds are difficult to obtain under conditions of extreme cold since the frozen ground offers high electrical resistance. The permafrost which underlies much of the far north offers as much obstruction to ground rods as solid reinforced concrete. Where it is possible to install a ground rod, the rod should be driven as deeply as possible into the frozen earth or preferably through the ice of one of the lakes or rivers that abound in the north. In many instances, it will be impracticable to secure a ground and it will be necessary to install a counterpoise antenna. 8. Computers and computer based systems, as well as the peripheral equipment, are sensitive to extreme cold or heat. Operating temperatures fall within the range of -40C to 70C for equipment based on Military Standards but COTS items are significantly less. Consideration must be taken into account to ensure that the equipment environment meets the optimum temperature requirements. 9. Auroral effects are considered the reflecting properties of the ionosphere and are directly related to the position and radiation activity of the sun. The sun's bombardment of the earth's atmosphere coupled with strong magnetic activity concentrated near the poles causes a visual effect that is called the aurora borealis in northern latitudes. Ionization of atmospheric particles is increased and radio waves reaching distant receiving points by means of sky wave propagation are reduced in intensity by increased absorption. This absorption becomes more
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pronounced during violent eruptions of the sun's surface that is visible in the form of sunspots. During such a period, a radio blackout may occur on nets crossing or passing through the auroral zone. The greatest auroral activity occurs between 60C and 70C North latitude and occurs at intervals of 27 to 28 days. Signals from distant stations are usually much stronger prior to such periods. Monthly predictions of expected sunspot conditions are published by the National Bureau of Standards and are available to signal staff officers at all levels of command. It must be emphasized that blackouts occur throughout the HF spectrum and down to 26 KHz and may last several days. In addition, HF sky wave transmissions are subject to sporadic blackouts that are, at present, unpredictable and erratic as to duration and coverage. During such periods, alternate means of communications, such as satellite or line, possibly integrated with radio relay, must be available. 10. In the medium frequency band (300 to 3,000 KHz) very little continuous high level static is experienced in northern latitudes, but steady rushes of high level noise are common and signify an auroral blackout on the frequency being monitored. Flakes or pellets of highly charged snow are occasionally experienced in the north just as rain and sand static are encountered in many tropical and desert regions during periods of high winds. This phenomenon is commonly called precipitation static. Charged particles of snow driven against metal vehicles, antennas, and other objects usually discharge with a high pitched static roar that can blanket all frequencies for several hours at a time. While these phenomena are uncommon except in aircraft, they can take place just when communications are vital to some operations. 629. OPERATIONS IN THE JUNGLE
1. Rapid, reliable communications are essential in jungle operations. Command and control, fire support, resupply and evacuation are all dependent on effective communications. The importance of establishing and maintaining reliable communications cannot be overemphasized. For this reason, a commander must give Signals high priority in his planning and supervision. 2. Jungle operations place additional demands on the resources of Signal units and personnel. Signal units may require augmentation of Signal personnel and TacComms equipment to accomplish the C2 functions. Besides providing normal tactical communications networks, Signal units may have to operate long distance radio sets. Airborne platforms will have to be used in many instances to provide a radio rebroadcast capability as well as to assist line-laying operations. 3. Very High Frequency communications in a jungle environment are significantly reduced due to the dense undergrowth, heavy rains, and hilly terrain. All means of communications should be used in a manner that complements one another. For all operations, backup means of communications must be planned. 4. The usefulness of radio communications is reduced in jungle operations. Very High Frequency and UHF radios are particularly limited by the jungle growth and terrain that absorb and obstruct the transmissions. It is not unusual for the range of a set operated in the jungle to be reduced by 10 to 25 percent. 5. In order to overcome environmental conditions in the jungle, existing antennae must be used properly and field expedient antennae produced to extend the capacity of current equipment this is a must in jungle with dense overhead canopies of vegetation. The problems of LOS antenna locations are best solved by remoting the transmitter from the CP.
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6. Line based systems should be established whenever feasible. Field cable and line are more secure than radio, hard to jam and their use allows for normal telephone (as opposed to push-to-talk) conversations. The heavy rain and high humidity of the tropics reduces the range (about 20 percent) and reliability of line communications. Line laying in the jungle requires more time and suitable routes are limited. The increased cover and concealment make it easier for the enemy to intercept or interrupt line communications and to ambush maintenance crews. Wire laid by air on top of the jungle canopy is extremely difficult to maintain and recover; however, it is less likely to be damaged by vehicles or weather. 7. The speed of surface messengers (i.e. SDS and runners) is severely limited by jungle terrain and vegetation. The lack of roads restricts full use of motor vehicles. Foot messengers may have difficulties with land navigation and natural obstacles. The use of air messengers maybe a better alternative, but one that is limited by availability of aircraft, scarcity of good landing zones, weather conditions and the fact that air activity aids the enemy in locating friendly troop areas. When using a messenger, messages should be written or be transferred to magnetic media. Their text must be clear, concise and complete. 8. Jungle climates (i.e. high temperatures, high humidity, and heavy rain) can have serious effects on TacComms equipment. Frequent cleaning and more detailed inspection for mildew, moisture and rot of TacComms equipment will mitigate the effects of the climate. 9. Computers and computer based systems as well, as the peripheral equipment are sensitive to extreme cold or heat. Most TacComms equipments operating temperatures fall within the range of -40 to +70 C for equipment based on Military Standards although COTS items are significantly less. Requirements exist for consideration of air conditioning as a means to maintain the optimum equipment environment. Particular attention should be placed on ensuring equipment fans and airflow paths are not restricted. 630. OPERATIONS IN DESERT AND EXTREMELY HOT CONDITIONS
1. This section describes the effects that desert terrain and extremely hot conditions will have on communications in the conduct of land operations and considerations Sig Os must take into account. Operations in desert and extremely hot weather conditions demand special techniques. 2. High temperatures adversely affect communications support. The heat causes anomalies in radio and other electrical transmissions and radio battery life is reduced. Radio range is shorter during the day than at night. At night, range improves but static electricity may cause interference. VHF communications ranges can be reduced by as much as 50 percent because of high temperatures. HF ground wave propagation over the dry sandy soil is also reduced. Night communications make communications security a concern notwithstanding the fact that nets are encrypted, since the range of VHF radios is significantly increased, without RRB, and they could therefore be more readily subjected to enemy direction finding. 3. TacComms equipment, in particular radios and computers, regardless of type, must be kept cool and clean. They must be in the shade whenever possible and should be located in a ventilated area (air-conditioned shelter). Additional key TacComms equipment should be available in vital communications centres, such as tactical operations centres, to allow immediate replacement if the equipment in use shows signs of overheating. The interval between computer system back-ups should be decreased to reduce the effects of any catastrophic system failure and allow for a rapid reconstitution of the tactical operational picture.
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4. It is essential that antennae be cut or adjusted to the length of the operating frequency. Directional antennae must be faced exactly in the required direction; approximate azimuth produced by guesswork will not do. A basic whip antenna relies on the capacitor effect between itself and the ground for efficient propagation. The electrical ground may be very poor and the antenna performance alone may be degraded by as much as one-third if the surface soil lacks moisture, which is normally the case in the desert. If a ground-mounted antenna is not fitted with a counterpoise, the ground around it should be dampened using any fluid available. Vehicle-mounted antennae are more efficient if the mass of the vehicle is forward of the antennae and is oriented towards the distant station. 5. Desert operations require dispersion, yet the environment is likely to degrade the transmission range of radios, particularly VHF fitted with secure equipment. This degradation is most likely to recur in the hottest part of the day, approximately 1200 to 1700 hours. 6. If stations start to lose contact, especially if the hotter part of the day is approaching, alternative communication plans must be ready. Alternatives include the following: a. Using RRB stations, including airborne RRB (the aircraft must remain at least 4,000 meters behind the FEBA) and deploying RR repeater detachments if the area trunk system is in jeopardy. Deploying any vehicle with a radio as a manual relay between stations. Using alternative radio links such as HF satellite Single Side Band (SSB) voice or data. Using Line. Normally, line would not be used as operations will be fluid, but it may be of some value in some static situations. Using SDS or runners for hand messenger service to maintain communications.
b. c. d. e.
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B-gl-351-001-Fp-001 Signals in Support of Land Operations Volume 1 Principles and Fundamental

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B-gl-351-001-Fp-001 Signals in Support of Land Operations Volume 1 Principles and Fundamental

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B-GL-351-001/FP-001

SIGNALS IN SUPPORT OF LAND OPERATIONS

PRINCIPLES AND FUNDAMENTALS

This publication is issued on the authority of the Chief of Land Staff.

SIGNALS IN SUPPORT OF LAND OPERATIONS VOLUME 1

PRINCIPLES AND FUNDAMENTALS

This publication is issued on the authority of the Chief of Land Staff.

SILO Principles and Fundamentals

Capability Development RecordCommand Version 1.1, Draft-8 September 2006.

SILO Principles and Fundamentals

SECTION 2 THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .............................................................1-8

SECTION 3 TYPES OF LAND FORCE OPERATIONS ......................................................1-14

SECTION 4 OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS/IMPERATIVES.................................................1-16

SECTION 5 COMMAND SUPPORT ...................................................................................1-18

127. 128. 129.

SECTION 2 ELECTRONIC COMPUTERS AS AIDS TO INFORMATION PROCESSING... 2-5

SECTION 3 COMPUTER-BASED INFORMATION SYSTEMS.......................................... 2-11

SILO Principles and Fundamentals

SECTION 3 RADIO COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS...........................................................3-12

SECTION 4 LINE COMMUNICATIONS ..............................................................................3-28

SECTION 5 HAND CARRIAGE COMMUNICATIONS ........................................................3-31

SECTION 6 NETWORKING (MULTI-POINT COMMUNICATIONS) ...................................3-32

SECTION 2 ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT.............................................................. 4-8

SECTION 3 ELECTRONIC ATTACK.................................................................................. 4-16

SECTION 4 ELECTRONIC PROTECTION ........................................................................ 4-20

SECTION 6 COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE......................... 4-22

SECTION 7 ELECTRONIC WARFARE PLANNING AND PROCESSES........................... 4-24

SECTION 8 ELECTRONIC DECEPTION ........................................................................... 4-30

SILO Principles and Fundamentals

SECTION 2 SIGNAL ESTIMATE ..........................................................................................5-7

SECTION 2 UNIQUE OPERATIONS.................................................................................. 6-13

SECTION 3 TACTICAL OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS .......................... 6-22

SILO Principles and Fundamentals

SILO Principles and Fundamentals

SILO Principles and Fundamentals

Figure 1-1: Signals Two Main Components CIS and EW

Signals in the Land Force Operating Environment

NATO Definition AAP 6 (2005)

SILO Principles and Fundamentals

ARMY OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS

Signals in the Land Force Operating Environment

SIGNALS COMMAND AND STAFF

Ibid Land Force Information Operations B-GL-300-005/FP-001

SILO Principles and Fundamentals

Figure 1-2: Signals System Management in Network Operations

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SYSTEM MANAGEMENT (SM)

Signals in the Land Force Operating Environment

SILO Principles and Fundamentals

Signals in the Land Force Operating Environment

CONTINUUM OF OPERATIONS FRAMEWORK

SILO Principles and Fundamentals

Simultaneous conduct of different types of tactical operations.

Figure 1-3: The Spectrum of Conflict

Signals in the Land Force Operating Environment

Figure 1-4: The Continuum of Operations

Army Terminology Panel

SILO Principles and Fundamentals

THE ELECTROMAGENTIC BATTLESPACE

CDS, Concept of Operations: CF Strategic Command. NDHQ, 14 Nov 05

Signals in the Land Force Operating Environment

SILO Principles and Fundamentals

SECTION 3 TYPES OF LAND FORCE OPERATIONS 119. LAND OPERATIONS

Figure 1-5: Land Operations and Tasks

Signals in the Land Force Operating Environment