Merchandising:

Retail Merchandising is the process of developing, securing, pricing, supporting and

communicating the retailers merchandise offering. It means offering the right product at
the right time at the right price with the right appeal.
Steps in the Retail Merchandising Process:
1. Develop the merchandise mix and establish the merchandise budget.
2. uild the logistic s!stem for procuring the merchandise mix.
". #rice the merchandise offering.
$. %rgani&e the customer support service and manage the personal selling effort.
'. (reate the retailers advertising, sales incentive and publicit! programs.
Merchandise Mix:
)he breadth and depth of the products carried b! retailers is called as merchandise mix.
)his is also *nown as #roduct +ssortment. It includes the competing brands within a
categor!.
Depth of Assortment, this is the variet! in an! one categor! of goods and-or services
with which a retailer is involved. It refers to the average number of ./0s 1stoc* *eeping
units2 within each brand of the merchandise line. 3or eg, if a retailer decides to stoc* 14
design of shirts in ' different si&es and $ different colors, it ma*es for the depth of
assortment. + range of womens wear , in another example can be bro*en down into the
following categories,
Indian wear
5estern blouse
+ccessories
) shirts
3ormal trousers
(asual bottom wear
Indian wear can again be bro*en down into salwar *amee&, mix and match suits, ethnic
blouses, and formal evening wear. )he fabric color, si&e, 6uantit! per si&e and the total
6uantit! would then comprise the depth of each st!le
Consistency, this is an important element of the assortment dimension of a retailer.
)he 2 dimension of breadth and depth describe the si&e of the assortment. (onsistenc!,
in turn, can be defined as a degree to which different t!pes of products that comprise
the merchandise assortment are related.
Merchandise hierarchy, this is an indicator of the manner in which product
classification is done at the level of the retailer. It is a logical classification based on the
wa! in which customers are li*el! to bu! the products.
)he first level of classification is the compan! or the retail store itself.
)he next level of classification is the department followed b! the various categories of
products that the retailer offers in each department.
)hen comes in the sub7categories, the st!le, the price points and finall! the ./0 itself.
+n assortment plan is a list of merchandise that indicates in general terms what the
retailer wants to carr! in a particular merchandise categor!. 3or instance, an assortment
plan for girls 8eans would include the average number and percentage of each
st!le-fabric-colour-si&e combination that the retailer would have in inventor!.
Retail merchandising re6uires management of the merchandise mix including,
1. #lanning Merchandise 9ariet!
2. (ontrolling Merchandise 9ariet!
". #lanning Merchandise +ssortment-.upport
$. (ontrolling Merchandise +ssortment-.upport
'. Merchandise Mix .trategies
Developing the merchandise mix allows the retailer to segment the mar*et and appeal
to a select group of consumers.
The components of the merchandise mix,
Merchandise 9ariet! ,1number of product lines2
Merchandise +ssortment, 1number of product items2

Company

Department
Merchandse


cassfcaton
Merchandse

category
Stye/ prce
pont
Merchandse


subcategory
SKU
Merchandise .upport,1number of product units2
ZARA: Introduction
Zara is a .panish clothing and accessories retailer based in +rteixo, :alicia. It was
founded in 1;<' b! +mancio %rtega and Rosal=a Mera. It is a flagship chain store of
the Inditex group.
It is claimed that >ara needs 8ust two wee*s to develop a new product and get it to
stores, compared to the six7month industr! average. )he compan! also launches
around 14,444 new designs each !ear. >ara has resisted the industr!7wide trend
towards transferring fast fashion production to low7cost countries. #erhaps its most
unusual strateg! was its polic! of &ero advertising? the compan! preferred to invest a
percentage of revenues in opening new stores instead. )his has increased the idea of
>ara as a @fashion imitator@ compan!. Its lac* of advertisement is also in contrast to
direct competitors such as 0nited (olors of enetton.
Zaras !usiness System
>ara is the largest and most internationali&ed of Inditexs chains. >ara began to move
overseas in 1;;4. It also began to ma*e ma8or investments in manufacturing logistics
and I), including establishment of a 8ust7in7time manufacturing s!stem, a 1"4,4447
s6uare7meter warehouse close to corporate head6uarters in +rteixo, outside Aa (oruBa,
and an advanced telecommunications s!stem to connect head6uarters and suppl!,
production, and sales locations. )he business s!stem that had resulted was particularl!
distinctive in that >ara manufactured its most fashion7sensitive products internall!.
>aras designers continuousl! trac*ed customer preferences and placed orders with
internal and external suppliers. #roduction too* place in small batches, with vertical
integration into the manufacture of the most time7sensitive items. oth internal and
external production flowed into >aras central distribution center. #roducts were shipped
directl! from the central distribution center to well7located, attractive stores twice a
wee*, eliminating the need for warehouses and *eeping inventories low. 9ertical
integration helped reduce the Cbullwhip effectDEthe tendenc! for fluctuations in final
demand to get amplified as the! were transmitted bac* up the suppl! chain
Fven more importantl!, >ara was able to originate a design and have finished goods in
stores within four to five wee*s in the case of entirel! new designs, and two wee*s for
modifications 1or restoc*ing2 of existing products. In contrast, the traditional industr!
model might involve c!cles of up to six months for design and three months for
manufacturing. )he short c!cle time reduced wor*ing capital intensit! and facilitated
continuous manufacture of new merchandise, even during the biannual sales periods,
letting >ara commit to the bul* of its product line for a season much later than its *e!
competitors. )hus, >ara undertoo* "'G of product design and purchases of raw
material, $4GH'4G of the purchases of finished products from external suppliers, and
I'G of the in7house production after the season had started, compared with onl! 4GH
24G in the case of traditional retailers.
Design:
Fach of >aras three product linesEfor women, men, and childrenEhad a creative team
consisting of designers, sourcing specialists, and product development personnel. )he
creative teams simultaneousl! wor*ed on products for the current season b! creating
constant variation, expanding on successful product items and continuing in7season
development, and on the following season and !ear b! selecting the fabrics and product
mix that would be the basis for an initial collection. )op management stressed that
instead of being run b! maestros, the design organi&ation was ver! flat and focused on
careful interpretation of catwal* trends suitable for the mass mar*et. >ara created two
basic collections each !ear that were phased in through the fall-winter and
spring-summer seasons, starting in Jul! and Januar!, respectivel!. >aras designers
attended trade fairs and read!7to7wear fashion shows in #aris, Kew Lor*, Aondon, and
Milan, referred to catalogs of luxur! brand collections, and wor*ed with store managers
to begin to develop the initial s*etches for a collection close to nine months before the
start of a season. Designers then selected fabrics and other complements.
.imultaneousl!, the relative price at which a product would be sold was determined,
guiding further development of samples. .amples were prepared and presented to the
sourcing and product development personnel, and the selection process began. +s the
collection came together, the sourcing personnel identified production re6uirements,
decided whether an item would be insourced or outsourced, and set a timeline to
ensure that the initial collection arrived in stores at the start of the selling season.
)he process of adapting to trends and differences across mar*ets was more
evolutionar!, ran through most of the selling season, and placed greater reliance on
high7fre6uenc! information.
3re6uent conversations with store managers were as important in this regard as the
sales data captured b! >aras I) s!stem. %ther sources of information included industr!
publications, )9, Internet, and film content? trend spotters who focused on venues such
as universit! campuses and discothe6ues? and even >aras !oung, fashion7conscious
staff. #roduct development personnel pla!ed a *e! role in lin*ing the designers and the
stores, and were often from the countr! in which the stores the! dealt with were located.
%n average, several do&en items were designed each da!, but onl! slightl! more than
one7third of them actuall! went into production. )ime permitting, ver! limited volumes of
new items were prepared and presented in certain *e! stores and produced on a larger
scale onl! if consumer reactions were unambiguousl! positive. +s a result, failure rates
on new products were supposed to be onl! 1G, compared with an average of 14G for
the sector. Aearning b! doing was considered ver! important in achieving such
favorable outcomes. %verall, then, the responsibilities of >aras design teams
transcended design, narrowl! defined. )he teams also continuousl! trac*ed customer
preferences and used information about sales potential based, among other things, on a
consumption information s!stem that supported detailed anal!sis of product life c!cles,
to transmit repeat orders and new designs to internal and external suppliers. )he design
teams thereb! bridged merchandising and the bac* end of the production process.
)hese functions were generall! organi&ed under separate management teams at other
apparel retailers.
Sourcing " Manufacturing
>ara sourced fabric, other inputs, and finished products from external suppliers with the
help of purchasing offices in arcelona and Mong /ong, as well as the sourcing
personnel at head6uarters. 5hile Furope had historicall! dominated >aras sourcing
patterns, the recent establishment of three companies in Mong /ong for purposes of
purchasing as well as trend7spotting suggested that sourcing from the 3ar Fast,
particularl! (hina, might expand substantiall!.
+bout one7half of the fabric purchased was Cgra!D 1und!ed2 to facilitate in7season
updating with maximum flexibilit!. Much of this volume was funneled through (omditel,
a 144G7owned subsidiar! of Inditex, which dealt with more than 244 external suppliers
of fabric and other raw materials. (omditel managed the d!eing, patterning, and
finishing of gra! fabric for all of Inditexs chains, not 8ust >ara, and supplied finished
fabric to external as well as in7house manufacturers. )his process, reminiscent of
enettons, meant that it too* onl! one wee* to finish fabric. 3urther down the value
chain, about $4G of finished garments were manufactured internall!, and of the
remainder, approximatel! two7thirds of the items were sourced from Furope and Korth
+frica and one7third from +sia. )he most fashionable items tended to be the ris*iest and
therefore were the ones that were produced in small lots internall! or under contract b!
suppliers who were located close b!, and reordered if the! sold well. More basic items
that were more price7sensitive than time sensitive were particularl! li*el! to be
outsourced to +sia, since production in Furope was t!picall! 1'GH24G more expensive
for >ara. +bout 24 suppliers accounted for <4G of all external purchases. 5hile >ara
had long7term ties with man! of these suppliers, it minimi&ed formal contractual
commitments to them.
Internal manufacture was the primar! responsibilit! of 24 full! owned factories, 1I of
them located in and around >aras head6uarters in +rteixo. >aras factories were
heavil! automated, speciali&ed b! garment t!pe, and focused on the capital7intensive
parts of the production processEpattern design and cuttingEas well as on final
finishing and inspection. Fven for the garments that were manufactured in7house, cut
garments were sent out to about $'4 wor*shops, located primaril! in :alicia and across
the border in northern #ortugal, which performed the labor7intensive, scale7insensitive
activit! of sewing. )hese wor*shops were generall! small operations, averaging about
24H"4 emplo!ees 1although a few emplo!ed more than 144 people a piece2, which
speciali&ed b! product t!pe. +s subcontractors, the! generall! had long7term relations
with >ara. >ara accounted for most if not all of their production? provided them with
technolog!, logistics, and financial support? paid them prearranged rates per finished
garment? carried out inspections onsite? and insisted that the! compl! with local tax and
labor legislation. )he sewn garments were sent bac* from the wor*shops to >aras
manufacturing complex, where the! were inspected, ironed, folded, bagged, and
tic*eted before being sent on to the ad8oining distribution center.
Distri#ution
>ara had its own centrali&ed distribution s!stem. >aras s!stem consisted of an
approximatel! $44,4447s6uare7meter facilit! located in +rteixo and much smaller
satellite centers in +rgentina, ra&il, and Mexico that consolidated shipments from
+rteixo.
+ll of >aras merchandise, from internal and external suppliers, passed through the
distribution center in +rteixo, which operated on a dual7shift basis and featured a mobile
trac*ing s!stem that doc*ed hanging garments in the appropriate bar7coded area on
carousels capable of handling $',444 folded garments per hour. +s orders were
received from hand7held computers in the stores 1twice a wee* during regular periods,
and thrice wee*l! during the sales season2, the! were chec*ed in the distribution center
and, if a particular item was in short suppl!, allocation decisions were made on the
basis of historical sales levels and other considerations. %nce an order had been
approved, the warehouse issued the lists that were used to organi&e deliveries.
Aorena +lba, Inditexs director of logistics, regarded the warehouse as a place to move
merchandise rather than to store it. +ccording to her, C)he vast ma8orit! of clothes are in
here onl! a few hours,D and none ever sta!ed at the distribution center for more than
three da!s. %f course, the rapidl! expanding store networ* demanded constant
ad8ustment to the se6uencing and si&e of deliveries as well as their routing. )he most
recent revamp had been in Januar! 2442, when >ara had started to schedule
shipments b! time &one. In the earl! morning while Furopean store managers were still
stoc*ta*ing, the distribution center pac*ed and shipped orders to the +mericas, the
Middle Fast, and +sia? in the afternoon, it focused on the Furopean stores. )he
distribution center generall! ran at half its rated capacit!, but surges in demand,
particularl! during the start of the two selling seasons in Januar! and Jul!, boosted
utili&ation rates and re6uired the hiring of several hundred temporar! wor*ers to
complement close to 1,444 permanent emplo!ees.
.hipments from the warehouse were made twice a wee* to each store via third7part!
deliver! services, with shipments two da!s a wee* to one part of the store networ* and
two da!s a wee* to the other. +pproximatel! <'G of >aras merchandise b! weight was
shipped b! truc* b! a third part! deliver! service to stores in .pain, #ortugal, 3rance,
elgium, the 0nited /ingdom, and parts of :erman!. )he remaining 2'G was shipped
mainl! b! air via /AM and DMA from airports in .antiago de (ompostela 1a ma8or
pilgrimage center in :alicia2 and #orto in #ortugal. #roducts were t!picall! delivered
within 2$H"N hours to stores located in Furope and within 2$H$I hours to stores
located outside Furope. +ir shipment was more expensive, but not prohibitivel! so.
)hus, one industr! participant suggested that air freight from .pain to the Middle Fast
might cost "GH'G of 3% price 1compared with 1.'G for sea freight2 and, along with a
1.'G landing charge, a 1G finance charge, miscellaneous expenses, and 1generall!2 a
$G customs dut!, bring the landed mar*up on 3% price to 12G or so. In the case of
the 0nited .tates, a 24GH2'G landed mar*up seemed a better approximation because
of tariffs of up to 12G as well as other added cost elements.
Despite >aras historical success at scaling up its distribution s!stem, observers
speculated that the centrali&ed logistics model might ultimatel! be sub8ect to
diseconomies of scaleEthat what wor*ed well with 1,444 stores might not wor* with
2,444 stores. In an attempt to increase capacit!, >ara was beginning construction of a
second distribution center, at >arago&a, northeast of Madrid.
)his second ma8or distribution facilit!, to be started up in summer 244", would add
124,444 s6uare meters of warehouse space at a cost of OII million close to the local
airport and with direct access to the railwa! and road networ* as well.
Retailing
>ara aimed to offer fresh assortments of designer7st!le garments and accessoriesE
shoes, bags, scarves, 8ewelr! and, more recentl!, toiletries and cosmeticsEfor relativel!
low prices in sophisticated stores in prime locations in order to draw masses of fashion7
conscious repeat customers. Despite its tapered integration into manufacturing, >ara
placed more emphasis on using bac*ward vertical integration to be a ver! 6uic* fashion
follower than to achieve manufacturing efficiencies b! building up significant forward
order boo*s for the upstream operations. #roduction runs were limited and inventories
strictl! controlled even if that meant leaving demand unsatisfied.
oth >aras merchandising and store operations helped to reinforce these upstream
policies.
Merchandising
>aras product merchandising policies emphasi&ed broad, rapidl! changing
product lines, relativel! high fashion content, and reasonable but not excessive ph!sical
6ualit!, Cclothes to be worn 14 times,D some said. #roduct lines were segmented into
womens, mens, and childrens, with further segmentation of the womens line,
considered the strongest, into three sets of offerings that varied in terms of their prices,
fashion content, and age targets. #rices, which were determined centrall!, were
supposed to be lower than competitors for comparable products in
>aras ma8or mar*ets, but percentage margins were expected to hold up not onl!
because of the direct efficiencies associated with a shortened, verticall! integrated
suppl! chain but also because of significant reductions in advertising and mar*down
re6uirements.
>ara spent onl! 4."G of its revenue on media advertising, compared with "GH$G for
most specialt! retailers. Its advertising was generall! limited to the start of the sales
period at the end of the season, and the little that was underta*en did not create too
strong a presence for the >ara brand or too specific an image of the C>ara 5omanD or
the C>ara :irlD 1unli*e the CMango :irlD of .panish competitor Mango2. )hese choices
reflected concerns about overexposure and loc*7in as well as limits on spending. Kor
did >ara exhibit its merchandise at the read!7to7wear fashion shows, its new items
were first displa!ed in its stores. )he >ara name had nevertheless developed
considerable drawing power in its ma8or mar*ets. )hus b! the mid71;;4s, it had alread!
become one of the three clothing brands of which customers were most aware in its
home mar*et of .pain, with particular strengths among women between ages of 1I and
"$ from households with middle to middle7high income.
>aras drawing power reflected the freshness of its offerings, the creation of a sense of
scarcit! and an attractive ambience around them, and the positive word of mouth that
resulted. 3reshness was rooted in rapid product turnover, with new designs arriving in
each twice7wee*l! shipment. Devout >ara shoppers even *new which da!s of the wee*
deliver! truc*s came into stores, and shopped accordingl!. +bout three76uarters of the
merchandise on displa! was changed ever! three to four wee*s, which also
corresponded to the average time between visits given estimates that the average
>ara shopper visited the chain 1< times a !ear, compared with an average figure of
three to four times a !ear for competing chains and their customers. +ttractive stores,
outside and inside, also helped. Auis lanc, one of Inditexs international directors,
summari&ed some of these additional influences,
C5e invest in prime locations. 5e place great care in the presentation of our storefronts.
)hat is how we pro8ect our image. 5e want our clients to enter a beautiful store, where
the! are offered the latest fashions. ut most important, we want our customers to
understand that if the! li*e something, the! must bu! it now, because it wont be in the
shops the following wee*D.
It is all about creating a climate of scarcit! and opportunit!.
3or the customers who did wal* in through the door, the rapid turnover obviousl!
created a sense of Cbu! now because !ou wont see this item later.D In addition, the
sense of scarcit! was reinforced b! small shipments, displa! shelves that were sparsel!
stoc*ed, limits of one month on how long individual items could be sold in the stores,
and a degree of deliberate undersuppl!.
Items that were slow to sell were immediatel! apparent and were ruthlessl! weeded out
b! store managers with incentives to do so. Returns to the distribution center were
either shipped to and sold at other >ara stores or disposed of through a small, separate
chain of close7out stores near the distribution center. )he target was to minimi&e the
inventories that had to be sold at mar*ed7down prices in >ara stores during the sales
period that ended each season.
.uch mar*downs had a significant impact on apparel retailers revenue bases, in the
0nited .tates, for example, womens apparel stores averaged mar*downs of "4G7plus
of 1potential2 revenues in the mid71;;4s.1< 9er! rough estimates for 5estern Furope
indicated mar*downs that were smaller but still ver! significant. >ara was estimated to
generate 1'GH24G of its sales at mar*ed7down prices, compared with "4GH$4G for
most of its Furopean peers.
+dditionall!, since >ara had to move less of its merchandise during such periods, the
percentage mar*downs on the items affected did not have to be as largeEperhaps onl!
half as much as the "4G average for other Furopean apparel retailers, according to
>aras management.
Retailing Aspects:
>aras stores functioned as both the compan!s face to the world and as information
sources. )he stores were t!picall! located in highl! visible locations, often including the
premier shopping streets in a local mar*et 1e.g., the (hamps Fl!sPes in #aris, Regent
.treet in Aondon, and 3ifth +venue in Kew Lor*2 and upscale shopping centers. >ara
had initiall! purchased man! of its store sites, particularl! in .pain, but had preferred
long7term leases 1for 14 to 24 !ears2 since the mid71;;4s, except when purchase was
necessar! to secure access to a ver! attractive site.
>ara activel! managed its portfolio of stores. .tores were occasionall! relocated in
response to the evolution of shopping districts and traffic patterns. More fre6uentl!,
older, smaller stores might be relocated as well as updated 1and t!picall! expanded2 in
new, more suitable sites. )he average si&e of the stores had graduall! increased as
>ara improved the breadth and strength of its customer pull.
)hus, while the average si&e of >ara stores at the beginning of fiscal !ear 2441 was ;14
s6uare meters, the average si&e of the stores opened during the !ear was 1,"<N s6uare
meters. In addition, >ara invested more heavil! and more fre6uentl! than *e!
competitors in refurbishing its store base, with older stores getting ma*eovers ever!
three to four !ears.
>ara also relied on significant centrali&ation of store window displa!s and interior
presentations in using the stores to promote its mar*et image. +s the season
progressed and product offerings evolved, ideas about consistent loo*s for windows
and for interiors in terms of themes, color schemes, and product presentation were
protot!ped in model window and store areas in the head6uarters building in +rteixo.
)hese ideas were principall! carried to the stores b! regional teams of window dressers
and interior coordinators who visited each store ever! three wee*s. ut some
adaptation was permitted and even planned for in the loo* of a store
zara
appare
accessor
es
footwear
bottomwe
ar
topwear
|eans skrts trousers
topwear bottomwe
ar
|eans skrts trousers
Sknny ft Loose ft
Two
toned
patched rpped
Faded
bue
Dark
bue
Sze range:XS:26 ,S:28,
M:30, L:32
Prce: Rs.3990
Indgo
UNITED COLORS OF BENETTON: an introduction
United Colors of Benetton:
A goba brand, and one of the most we known n the word, Unted Coors of
Benetton
has an nternatona stye that combnes coor, quaty and fashon. Each
season the womens wear,mens wear, chdrens wear and underwear
coectons offer a tota ook for everyday, for work and for esure, n the cty
and outdoors. The Benetton Baby abe s a new product ne dedcated to the
prenata and the under-fves word.
The brand s present n many other sectors, from the eegant accessores to
the eyewear nes and perfumes, from the home coecton to baby products.
The above products are avaabe n seected specazed shops wordwde.
HISTORY:
Benetton Grou s a goba fashon brand, based n Trevso, Itay. The name
comes from the Benetton famy who founded the company n 1965.
Benetton Group s sted n Man. Benetton has a network of around 6,000
stores n 120 countres. The stores are managed by ndependent partners
and generate a tota turnover of over 2 bon euro. In 1965, Lucano
Benetton, the edest of four chdren, was a 30-year-od saesman n Trevso.
He saw a market for coourfu cothes, and sod a younger brother's bcyce n
order to buy hs frst second-hand knttng machne. Hs nta sma
coecton of sweaters receved a postve response n oca stores n the
Veneto regon, and soon after he asked hs sster and two younger brothers,
Gberto and Caro, to |on hm. In 1965, the entty known as the "Benetton
Group" s formed.
In 1966, the Benettons opened ther frst store n Beuno and three years
after n Pars,
wth Lucano as charman, hs brother Gberto n charge of admnstraton,
ther younger brother Caro runnng producton, and Guana as a chef
desgner.
Today, the Benetton Group s present n 120 countres around the word. Its
core busness s fashon appare: a group wth a strong Itaan character
whose stye, quaty and passon are ceary seen n ts brands, the casua
Unted Coors of Benetton, the gamour orented Ssey, the esurewear
brand Payfe. The Group produces over 150 mon garments every year. Its
network of around 6,000 contemporary stores around the word, offers hgh
quaty customer servces and generates a tota turnover of over 2 bon
euro.
!round "#$$$ stores %orld%ide:
The deveopment of Benetton's commerca network, charactersed by
prestgous ocatons n hstorc and commerca centres and by the hgh eve
of customer servces offered, has been supported by a ma|or programme of
nvestment wordwde.
The Benetton stores carry compete coectons, as we as a wde seecton of
accessores, offerng a fu range of Benetton stye and quaty.
Desi&n:
A staff of 300 desgners from a over the word creates the coectons for the
casua Unted Coors of Benetton. The desgn team s aso engaged n
researchng new materas and creatng new nes for dfferent targets from
chdren, men and women to expectant mothers, offerng them not ony
practca and modern styes but aso maxmum comfort.
The resut s the atest trends n desgn and a rch output of many modes a
year whch are reazed wth computer asssted desgn systems fuy
ntegrated wth the rest of the company's producton phases.
'roduction:
Consstenty hgh quaty s one of the fundamenta characterstcs of the
Benetton producton process from the raw materas to the fnshed garment.
A constant commtment to nnovaton, a cruca factor for deveopment, has
aways
characterzed the Groups busness organzaton, from communcaton to IT,
from research nto new materas to ntegrated ogstcs. Speca attenton s
gven to nnovaton n producton, where a systems and equpment are
constanty renewed.
The Benetton producton system, co-ordnated by a hgh-tech facty at
Castrette (Itay)
s capabe of turnng out over 150 mon garments every year.
Lo&istics:
Benetton has drect contro of the ogstcs phase for both own manufactured
and sourced products, and has nvested n modeng, organzaton, and
automaton of ogstc processes n order to competey ntegrate the entre
producton cyce, from cent orders, to packng and devery.
!uto(ated Sortin& S)ste(
The state-of-the-art ogstcs operaton at Castrette (Itay) has a fuy
automated nnovatve sortng system, whose propuson s based on
eectromagnetc feds, capabe of handng ndvdua orders for around
6,000 Benetton shops wordwde.
Foded and hangng garments are automatcay sorted, packed nto boxes
and
sent through a one-kometer tunne to the Automated Dstrbuton Center.
!uto(ated Distri*ution Center
The Automated Dstrbuton Center covers an area of 30,000 square
meters,wth a tota capacty of 800,000 boxes, and s abe to hande 120,000
ncomng/outgong boxes day wth a workforce of ony 28. The fnshed
product s sent drecty to the Group's around 6,000 reta outets n 120
countres wordwde.
+erc,andise +i-:
The breadth and depth of the products carred by retaers s caed as
merchandse mx.
Ths s aso known as Product Assortment.
United Colors Of Benetton: +erc,andise !ssort(ent
.o(an !nd +an:
Unted Coors of Benetton chooses a keyword for the Autumn/Wnter 2010-11
coecton:
freedom, a cear and smpe word wth many meanngs. In ths case, the
freedom we aow ourseves when choosng our ook every-day.
Unted Coors of Benetton has aways foowed ths prncpe and offers even
greater freedom of choce for the new wnter season.
!ccessories:
The Autumn/Wnter 2010-11 Unted Coors of Benetton accessores and
footwear
coecton expores new fronters of n terms of shape, matera and coour.
LIFESTYLE:
Lfestye s a coecton of surprses created by Benetton to satsfy everyone's
tastes and
needs. It concudes excusve fragrances; sungasses and eyewear frames for
men, women and chdren; uggage sets for a trave needs; ots of statonery
deas for schoo; proposas of every knd for our home.
/erde0Rosso0Giallo0Blu0United 1fra&rances2 :
Benetton s coour: coour ceebratng the dversty of the word, coour
speakng to every
cuture, coour as a unversa means of communcaton. Coour as passon, as
nstnct, as somethng to whch we a share the same spontaneous human
response.
Lke coour, fragrance s a unversa anguage, communcatng through
ntuton, emoton
and evocaton. Now coour and fragrance come together n a coecton of
scents nspred by Benetton's egacy - a egacy of creatvty, unversaty and
youthfuness, wth coour at ts heart. A coecton of four perfumes
representng an homage to Benetton's hstory and presence, nspred by the
conc coours and the woo sttch - tmeess eements of the brand's DNA.
!dult E)e%ear:
Gamour and orgnaty dstngush Unted Coors of Benetton eyewear. A
wde range of
frames wth a the coour, energy and comfort you woud expect from
Benetton.
!dult Sun&lasses:
The Unted Coors of Benetton sungasses are cooured accordng to tradton:
trendy but wthout gong to extremes. It s a coecton wth wrap-around
frames and shaded enses for unque and unmstakeabe proposas.
+ERCH!NDISING 'OLICY OF UNITED COLORS OF
BENETTON:
Benetton Group (the "Parent Company") and ts subsdary companes
prmary
manufacture and market fashon appare n woo, cotton and woven fabrcs,
as we as
esurewear. The manufacture of fnshed artces from raw materas s
undertaken party wthn the Group and party usng subcontractors, whereas
seng s carred out through an extensve commerca network both n Itay
and abroad, consstng many of stores operated and owned by thrd partes.
Return 'olic):
Unworn, fu prced merchandse wth tags attached and accompaned by the
orgna
recept can be exchanged wthn 14 days at the store of purchase. There w
be no refunds or store credt. A sae merchandse s fna sae. For hygenc
reasons a sae of underwear and nner garment are fna, returns or
exchange of these tems w not be permtted. Payments made by Credt
Card, w receve the appcabe amount credted to the card account wthn
14 workng days .
Retailin& !sects:
Each coecton s characterzed by dfferent proposas wth severa themes,
offerng
products senstve to market trends and fashon moods and maxmsng
stores' attractveness, n order to satsfy the requrements of the most
demandng customers.
The structure aso nvoves a segment of products known as Casule,
capabe of
presentng fashon-forward garments and accessores at any tme durng the
season.
Moreover UCB offers addtona servce to the network wth Continuati3e
Ite(s# whch
ensure that coecton's core products are restocked as qucky as possbe.
Orders for these products are entered drecty, and as the nformaton
systems of the producton and ogstcs unts are nked, the system provdes
mmedate confrmaton and guaranteed devery tmes (frst n, frst out).
Latest 'ro(otional !cti3it) : LUC4Y YOU
From 30 October 2010, customers purchasng n a snge transacton three
tems from the
Unted Coors of Benetton "Todder" and "Kd" (from sze 74 to XXL) nes
among those
marked wth the speca LUCKY YOU stcker w receve the cheapest tem
free (sub|ect to
avaabty n-store at the moment of purchase).
The promoton w be vad at partcpatng "Unted Coors of Benetton"
stores,
dspayng the speca "Unted Coors of Benetton. Lucky you" advertsng
posters.
The UCBs product merchandsng pocy s aso mportant n ts success
because they
emphaszed a cmate of scarcty and opportunty. So, ts consumers know
that f they ke
somethng, they must buy t n ths moment and not ater. A these
characterstcs makes UCB a
busness mode dffcut to mtate and for ths reason ts compettve
advantages are more
sustanabe.
In concuson, Benetton uses knowedge management to baance structure
and creatvty.
They recognze that both creatvty and structure s cruca n ensurng the
success of the venture.