POLITICS AMONG NATIONS The Struggle for Power and Peace

Brief Edition

Hans J. Morgenthau
Late Albert A. Michelson Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and Modem History at the University of Chicago and Late Director of the Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy at the University of Chicago Revised by

Kenneth W. Thompson
Director Miller Center of Public Affairs !. Milson "e#man Professor of $overnance University of %irginia McGraw-Hill, nc! "ew #or$ St! %ouis San &rancisco 'uc$land Bogota (aracas %isbon %ondon Madrid Me)ico (ity Milan Montreal "ew *elhi San +uan Singa,ore Sydney To$yo Toronto POLITICS AMONG NATIONS The Struggle for Power and Peace (o,yright - .//0, ./12, ./10, ./31, ./34, ./56, ./62 by McGraw-Hill, nc! 'll rights reserved! (o,yright - ./25 by 7enneth 8! Tho9,son, Susanna Morgenthau, and Matthew Morgenthau! 'll rights reserved! Printed in the :nited States of '9erica! E)ce,t as ,er9itted under the :nited States (o,yright 'ct of ./13, no ,art of this ,ublication 9ay be re,roduced or distributed in any for9 or by any 9eans, or stored in a data base or retrieval syste9, without the ,rior written ,er9ission of the ,ublisher! 312/4 *;(<*;( //2135 SB" 4-41-460043-= This boo$ was set in (aledonia by (o9(o9, nc! The editors were Peter %abella and +ohn M! Morriss> the ,roduction su,ervisor was Richard '! 'usburn! R! R! *onnelley ? Sons (o9,any was ,rinter and binder! Librar o! Congress Cata"oging#in#Pub"i$ation %ata Morgenthau, Hans +oachi9, @dateA! Politics a9ong nationsB the struggle for ,ower and ,eace < Hans +! MorgenthauB revised by 7enneth 8! Tho9,son C Brief ed! ,! c9! ncludes bibliogra,hical references and inde)! SB" 4-41-460043-= .! nternational relations! ! Tho9,son, 7enneth 8!, @dateA! ! Title! +D.0/.!M3 .//0 0=1 C dc=4 /=-00/2 This boo$ is ,rinted on acid-free ,a,er!

About the Authors

Hans +! Morgenthau was born in Ger9any in ./46! Educated at the :niversities of Berlin, &ran$fort, and Munich, he taught and ,racticed law in &ran$fort, where he was acting President of the %abor %aw (ourt! ' year before Hitler ca9e to ,ower, Professor Morgenthau went to teach at the :niversity of Geneva> he taught in Madrid before going to the :nited States in ./01! He taught at Broo$lyn (ollege and the :niversity of 7ansas (ity before his a,,oint9ent in ./60 to the :niversity of (hicago! He was also :niversity Professor of Political Science at The "ew School for Social Research, 'lbert '! Michelson *istinguished Service Professor of Political Science and Modern History at the :niversity of (hicago, and %eonard *avis *istinguished Professor of Political Science at (ity (ollege of the (ity :niversity of "ew #or$! He was also Eisiting Professor at (olu9bia, Harvard, "orthwestern, #ale, and the :niversity of (alifornia! Professor Morgenthau served as a consultant to the *e,art9ents of State and *efense and was *irector of the (enter for the Study of '9erican &oreign Policy at the :niversity of (hicago, a 9e9ber of the nstitute for 'dvanced Study at Princeton, 'ssociate of the 8ashington (enter for &oreign Policy Research, and a Senior Research &ellow of the (ouncil on &oreign Relations! '9ong his 9any ,ublications are n *efense of the "ational nterest @./5.A, The Pur,ose of '9erican Politics @./34A, Politics in the Twentieth (entury @./3=A, ' "ew &oreign Policy for the :nited States @./3/A, and ScienceB Servant or MasterF @./1=A! Professor Morgenthau died in "ew #or$ (ity on +uly ./, ./24! 7enneth 8! Tho9,son was born in *es Moines, owa, in ./=.! He was educated at the :niversity of (hicago, 'ugustana (ollege, and St! ;laf (ollege and taught at "orthwestern :niversity and the :niversity of (hicago! He served as an infantry officer and 9ilitary intelligence<counter intelligence officer in 8orld 8ar ! &ro9 ./55 to ./10, he held ,ositions in the Roc$efeller &oundation beginning as assistant director of the social sciences and concluding as vice ,resident fro9 ./3.-./10! He directed a twelve donor agencies review of higher education and develo,9ent in 'frica, 'sia, and %atin '9erica fro9 ./10 - ./13! n ./15, he was a,,ointed (o99onwealth Professor of Govern9ent and &oreign 'ffairs at the :niversity of Eirginia! n ./1/, he beca9e *irector of the 8hite Bur$ett Miller (enter of Public 'ffairs at the :niversity of Eirginia and 8hite Bur$ett Miller Professor of Govern9ent and &oreign 'ffairs! He has held 9aGor lectureshi,s such as the Riverside Me9orial, %illy, Sto$es, Roc$well, (ecil, and Stuber %ectures! He was na9ed Eirginia %aureate in ./2. and received the Eirginia Phi Beta 7a,,a PriHe and the (ollege Stores PriHe for his (hurchill boo$ in ./26! '9ong his 9any ,ublications are Political Realis9 and the (risis of 8orld Politics @./34A, '9erican *i,lo9acy and E9ergent Patterns @./3=A, The Moral ssue in Statecraft @./33A, &oreign 'ssistance @./1=A, :nderstanding 8orld Politics @./15A, Ethics, &unctionalis9 and Power @./1/A, Morality and &oreign Policy @./24A, Masters of nternational Thought @./24A, The President and the Public Philoso,hy @./2.A, (old 8ar Theories @./2.A, and 8inston S! (hurchillIs 8orld Eiew @./20A! ;ne of his 9ost recent efforts was to edit and bring to ,ublication ,osthu9ously Hans +! MorgenthauIs Essays on %incolnIs &aith and Politics @./20A!

Contents Pre!a$e to the &rie! '(ition Pre!a$e to the Si)th '(ition PART ONE Theory and Practice of International Politics * A +ea"ist Theor o! Internationa" Po"iti$s S D PR "( P%ES ;& P;% T ('% RE'% SM , The S$ien$e o! Internationa" Po"iti$s :"*ERST'"* "G "TER"'T ;"'% P;% T (S *ifferent ',,roaches %i9itations to :nderstanding :"*ERST'"* "G THE PR;B%EM ;& "TER"'T ;"'% PE'(E PA+T TWO Internationa" Po"iti$s as a Strugg"e !or Po-er . Po"iti$a" Po-er. 8H'T S P;% T ('% P;8ERF 's Means to the "ationIs Ends ts "atureB &our *istinctions THE *EPRE( 'T ;" ;& P;% T ('% P;8ER T8; R;;TS ;& THE *EPRE( 'T ;" ;& P;% T ('% P;8ER "ineteenth-(entury Philoso,hy The '9erican E),erience THE S( E"(E ;& PE'(EB (;"TEMP;R'R# :T;P '" SM / The Strugg"e !or Po-er0 Po"i$ o! the Status 1uo &iii &v ' ( ) '* '* '* '+ ,) ,* ,+ ,+ ,+ ((. (/ (+ (+ )' ..0 .0 .+ .+ 0' 0. 0. 0. 00 0* 0* 0* 0+ 0+ 0+ ***, *. *. //) /. ++' +)

2 The Strugg"e !or Po-er0 Imperia"ism 8H'T MPER '% SM S ";T E(;";M ( THE;R ES ;& MPER '% SM The Mar)ist, %iberal, and J*evilJ Theories of 9,erialis9 (riticis9 of These Theories * &&ERE"T T#PES ;& MPER '% SM Three nduce9ents to 9,erialis9 Eictorious 8ar %ost 8ar 8ea$ness Three Goals of 9,erialis9 8orld E9,ire (ontinental E9,ire %ocal Pre,onderance Three Methods of 9,erialis9 Military 9,erialis9 Econo9ic 9,erialis9 (ultural 9,erialis9 H;8 T; *ETE(T '"* (;:"TER '" MPER '% ST ( P;% (# The Proble9 of PolicyB (ontain9ent, ',,ease9ent, &ear The Proble9 of *etection 3 The Strugg"e !or Po-er0 Po"i$ o! Prestige * P%;M'T ( (EREM;" '% * SP%'# ;& M % T'R# &;R(E T8; ;B+E(T EES ;& THE P;% (# ;& PREST GE THREE (;RR:PT ;"S ;& THE P;% (# ;& PREST GE

4 The I(eo"ogi$a" '"ement in Internationa" Po"i$ies THE "'T:RE ;& P;% T ('% *E;%;G ES T#P ('% *E;%;G ES ;& &;RE G" P;% ( ES deologies of the Status Kuo deologies of 9,erialis9 '9biguous deologies THE PR;R%EM ;& RE(;G" T ;" PART THREE National Power 5 The 'ssen$e o! Nationa" Po-er 8H'T S "'T ;"'% P;8ERF R;;TS ;& M;*ER" "'T ;"'% SM Retreat fro9 "ationalis9B ',,arent and Real Personal nsecurity and Social *isintegration 6 '"ements o! Nationa" Po-er GE;GR'PH# "'T:R'% RES;:R(ES &ood Raw Materials The Power of ;il "*:STR '% ('P'( T# M % T'R# PREP'RE*"ESS Technology %eadershi, Kuantity and Kuality of 'r9ed &orces P;P:%'T ;" *istribution Trends "'T ;"'% (H'R'(TER ts E)istence The Russian "ational (haracter "ational (haracter and "ational Power "'T ;"'% M;R'%E ts nstability The Kuality of Society and Govern9ent as *ecisive &actors THE K:'% T# ;& * P%;M'(# THE K:'% T# ;& G;EER"ME"T The Proble9 of Balance between Resources and Policy The Proble9 of Balance a9ong Resources The Proble9 of Po,ular Su,,ort *o9estic Govern9ent and &oreign Policy *7 '8a"uation o! Nationa" Po-er THE T'S7 ;& EE'%:'T ;" T#P ('% ERR;RS ;& EE'%:'T ;" The 'bsolute (haracter of Power The Per9anent (haracter of Power The &allacy of the Single &actor Geo,olitics "ationalis9 Militaris9 PART FOUR Li itations of National Power! The "alance of Power ** The &a"an$e o! Po-er S;( '% EK: % BR :M Balance of Power as :niversal (once,t

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Balance of Power in *o9estic Politics T8; M' " P'TTER"S ;& THE B'%'"(E ;& P;8ER The Pattern of *irect ;,,osition The Pattern of (o9,etition 7orea and the Balance of Power *, %i!!erent Metho(s o! the &a"an$e o! Po-er * E *E '"* R:%E (;MPE"S'T ;"S 'RM'ME"TS '%% '"(ES The General "ature of 'lliances 'lliances vs! 8orld *o9ination 'lliances vs! (ounteralliances THE JH;%*ERJ ;& THE B'%'"(E *. The Stru$ture o! the &a"an$e o! Po-er *;M "'"T '"* *EPE"*E"T S#STEMS STR:(T:R'% (H'"GES " THE B'%'"(E ;& P;8ER PART FI#E Li itations of National Power! International $orality and %orld Public O&inion */ Mora"it 9 Mores9 an( La- as +estraints on Po-er

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*2 Internationa" Mora"it THE PR;TE(T ;" ;& H:M'" % &E Protection of Hu9an %ife in Peace Protection of Hu9an %ife in 8ar Moral (onde9nation of 8ar nternational Morality and Total 8ar :" EERS'% M;R'% T# ES! "'T ;"'% ST ( :" EERS'% SM Personal Ethics of the 'ristocratic nternational *estruction of nternational Morality *estruction of nternational Society Eictory of "ationalis9 over nternationalis9 Transfor9ation of "ationalis9 Hu9an Rights and nternational Morality PART 'I( Li itations of National Power! International Law *3 The Main Prob"ems o! Internationa" LaTHE GE"ER'% "'T:RE ;& "TER"'T ;"'% %'8 THE %EG S%'T EE &:"(T ;" " "TER"'T ;"'% %'8 ts *ecentraliHed (haracter nter,retation and Binding &orce nternational (ourts The Effect of +udicial *ecisions THE E"&;R(EME"T ;& "TER"'T ;"'% %'8 ts *ecentraliHed (haracter PART 'E#EN International Politics in the Conte &orary %orld *4 The Ne- Mora" :or$e o! Nationa"isti$ ;ni8ersa"ism "'T ;"'% SM, ;%* '"* "E8 PART EI)HT The Proble of Peace! Peace throu*h Li itation

*5 %isarmament THE PR;B%EM ;& PE'(E " ;:R T ME H ST;R# ;& * S'RM'ME"T 'RMS (;"TR;% " THE ":(%E'R 'GE *6 Se$urit (;%%E(T EE SE(:R T# The talo-Ethio,ian 8ar The 7orean 8ar '" "TER"'T ;"'% P;% (E &;R(E ,7 Internationa" Go8ernment THE H;%# '%% '"(E History Govern9ent by the Great Powers *ual Meaning of the Status Kuo Peace, ;rder, and the "ational nterest The (oncert of Euro,e THE %E'G:E ;& "'T ;"S ;rganiHation *ual Meaning of the Status KuoB &rance vs! Great Britain Three 8ea$nesses of the %eague of "ations (onstitutional 8ea$ness Structural 8ea$ness Political 8ea$ness ,* Internationa" Go8ernment0 The ;nite( Nations THE :" TE* "'T ;"S '((;R* "G T; THE (H'RTER Govern9ent by Su,er,owers :ndefined Princi,les of +ustice THE :" TE* "'T ;"S C P;% T ('% RE'% T# "ew Procedures PART NINE The Proble of Peace! Peace throu*h Transfor ation ,, The Wor"( State (;"* T ;"S ;& *;MEST ( PE'(E Su,rasectional %oyalties E),ectation of +ustice ;verwhel9ing Power The Role of the State The Tri,le Test of Po,ular Su,,ort T8; &'%SE S;%:T ;"S 8orld (onLuest The E)a9,les of SwitHerland and the :nited States ,. The Wor"( Communit THE (:%T:R'% 'PPR;'(HB :"ES(; (ultural *evelo,9ent and Peace (ultural :nity and Peace nternational :nderstanding and Peace THE &:"(T ;"'% 'PPR;'(H The S,ecialiHed 'gencies of the :nited "ations PART TEN The Proble of Peace! Peace throu*h Acco ,/ %ip"oma$ &;:R T'S7S ;& * P%;M'(# "STR:ME"TS ;& * P%;M'(# Sy9bolic Re,resentation %egal Re,resentation odation

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((' ((( (() (() ((0 ((* ((/ ()' ()( ()( ()) ()/ ()/ (.(.(.' (.( (.( (.+ (0' (0' (0( (0) (0. (0.

Political Re,resentation THE *E(% "E ;& * P%;M'(# *evelo,9ent of (o99unications *e,reciation of *i,lo9acy *i,lo9acy by Parlia9entary Procedures The Su,er,owersB "ewco9ers to *i,lo9acy ,2 The :uture o! %ip"oma$ H;8 ('" * P%;M'(# BE REE EE*F The Eice of Publicity The Eice of MaGority *ecision The Eice of &rag9entation THE PR;M SE ;& * P%;M'(#B TS " "E R:%ES &our &unda9ental Rules &ive PrereLuisites of (o9,ro9ise (;"(%:S ;" Histori$a" G"ossar

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Preface to the "rief Edition &or over four decades, Politics '9ong "ations has been considered by 9any the ,re9iere te)t in international ,olitics! "ow in its si)th edition its 9ain the9es, including national interest and ,ower, are co99on,lace a9ong ,ractitioners of foreign ,olicy! 't the sa9e ti9e its value for a wider ,ublic is beginning to be felt! The ,ublication of Politics in ,a,erbac$ is ins,ired by at least four considerations! &irst, its use in the f//4s has been rendered 9ore difficult by the 9ounting costs of higher education! 8hile boo$s constitute a relatively s9all ,art of educational e),enses, the tri,ling of ,rices for hardbac$ te)ts so9eti9es ,ushes student budgets to o,,ressive li9its! Second, todayIs students have grown accusto9ed to ,a,erbac$s in every field fro9 agrono9y to Hoology! t see9s a,,ro,riate, therefore, that Politics in ,a,erbac$ should be available to citiHens and students ali$e! Third, discussion of Professor MorgenthauIs wor$ has, if anything, intensified in the ,ast twenty years! *erivative schools of thought such as neorealis9 have 9ade their a,,earance! Ma$ing his 9agnu9 o,us accessible to a broad s,ectru9 of the '9erican ,ublic has unLuestioned 9erit! n this way, critics and sy9,athiHers will be able to read his wor$ first-hand, not as filtered through other 9inds! &ourth, faculties at res,ected institutions who have large and diverse classes in international relations have called for an edited edition available in an ine),ensive for9at! The ,ast twenty years have witnessed ,ublication ,rogra9s through which the 9aGority of ,o,ular te)ts in the social sciences have beco9e available in ,a,erbac$ for9! have followed three wor$ing ,rinci,les in ,re,aring this edition! &irst, have ,reserved intact the first ten cha,ters of the si)th edition! Professor Morgenthau considered these cha,ters as containing 9any of the basic ,rinci,les of his ,hiloso,hy of international relationsB a realist theory, ,olitics as a struggle for ,ower, foreign ,olicies, nationalis9, and national ,ower! Second, have included substantial seg9ents of those cha,ters that 9a$e a,,lication of the afore9entioned ,rinci,les! These cha,ters include the balance of ,ower, 9orality, and international law! Ta$en together, they ,rovide a discussion, rich in historical e)a9,les, of the li9itations of national ,ower! &ro9 this section and those that follow have eli9inated so9e of the 9ore technical and co9,le) 9aterial whenever it was discussed later in the te)t or was dealt with in a 9anner 9ore a,,ro,riate for advanced graduate and ,rofessional se9inars! Third, have 9ade selections fro9 those cha,ters that are concentrated on conte9,orary ,roble9s and the three funda9ental a,,roaches to ,eaceB li9itation of national ,ower as with disar9a9ent, collective security, and international govern9ent> transfor9ation with the world state and world co99unity> and acco99odation through di,lo9acy! 8ith the 9aGority of cha,ters in this section, have felt Gustified in eli9inating historical details not essential to the analysis and deleting cha,ters, such as Gudicial settle9ent, considered in earlier sections on international law! would urge students willing and able to e)a9ine these issues in de,th to have recourse to the full si)th edition! &or 9ost students of international relations, Politics reLuires no introduction! t has beco9e a sta,le intellectual diet for faculty and graduate students and for thousands of undergraduate students! The ,resent edition should serve to broaden its audience even further! n a word, we would e),ect that Politics in ,a,erbac$ would reach new readers! The new for9at is designed to serve the needs of a new era in higher education and ,ublic affairs! Two e),lanatory notes are indicated! Throughout the 9anuscri,t the 9ale ,ronoun ,redo9inates, as was custo9ary at the ti9e the boo$ was first ,ublished! 's is true on such 9atters throughout the te)t, we have chosen not to change the original! 8e would ho,e that we 9ight be understood as referring to 9en and wo9en wherever a,,ro,riate in our use of the 9ale ,ronoun! Second, we have actively underta$en to correct te9,oral usage as with such references as Jfifty years ago,J referring to the turn of the century! f we should overloo$ such ite9s at any ,oint in the te)t, we as$ the reader to re9e9ber that the author was writing at the 9id,oint of the twentieth century! 7enneth 8! Tho9,son

Preface to the 'i+th Edition 's a graduate student at the :niversity of (hicago following 8orld 8ar , had the ,rivilege of serving as Professor MorgenthauIs research assistant! %ater we Goined in the ,re,aration of a boo$ of te)t and readings entitled Princi,les and Proble9s of nternational Politics! He was ,ri9arily res,onsible for 9y returning to the university in the early ./54s as a 9e9ber of the *e,art9ent of Political Science! 8hen it was agreed should edit ? festschrift in his honor, we wor$ed together in identifying for9er students, colleagues, and friends es,ecially fa9iliar with his writings! n later years when our ,rofessional res,onsibilities brought us together in "ew #or$, we had freLuent contacts and long discussions! 's a 9e9ber of several advisory co99ittees, he contributed significantly to the ,rogra9s of the Roc$efeller &oundation for which wor$ed! ' few wee$s before he died he ,resented a ,a,er on the ,residency and foreign ,olicy at a Miller (enter conference at the :niversity of Eirginia! ;n a ,ersonal as well as a ,rofessional level, our friendshi, and intellectual collaboration continued until his last days! ;ur close association has 9ade the ,re,aration of a si)th edition of his classic wor$, Politics '9ong "ations, both si9,ler and 9ore difficult! ;n the one hand, have $e,t 9yself reasonably fa9iliar with the evolution of his thought fro9 the ,ublication of Scientific Man vs! Power Politics to the review after his death of certain un,ublished essays! 8hen Bertrand 8! %u99us, Senior Editor of the (ollege *e,art9ent of Rando9 House, invited 9e to ,re,are a new edition of Politics, felt confident that ,ossessed the necessary $nowledge for the tas$! ;n the other hand, u,on underta$ing the revision and reviewing Professor MorgenthauIs last writings, discovered i9,ortant new develo,9ents in the final stages of his wor$ of which had not $nown! t would have been sur,rising if this had not been true, for he too$ as his guiding ,rinci,le not the defense of an intellectual ,osition but Jthe Luest for truth!J n $ee,ing with 9y discovery of the continuous unfolding of his thought, have atte9,ted in this edition to let Morgenthau s,ea$ for hi9self whenever ,ossible! Than$s to the coo,eration of his children, Susanna and Matthew, 9y assistant and have had access to his ,a,ers on de,osit at 'lder9an %ibrary at the :niversity of Eirginia! Mr! Peter Gell9an has been tireless in Goining 9e in the search for further writings, whether ,ublished or un,ublished, that touched on the 9ost urgent ,roble9s confronting 9an$ind in the late ./14s and ./24s! n his ,reface to the fifth edition, revised, Morgenthau wrote of that editionIs continuing Jin an organic and al9ost inevitable fashion the wor$ of the ,receding editions!J Ever 9indful of the fact that his great wor$ has had an integrity throughout successive editions, have underta$en to ,reserve it in ways that would have been i9,ossible without the use of his own writings! have also consulted his draft 9anuscri,ts, letters to editors, and ,rofessional corres,ondence! 't the sa9e ti9e, the fifth edition has had to be u,dated and revised to reflect changes that have occurred since Professor MorgenthauIs death! Mr! Gell9an and have sought to substitute factual infor9ation and data wherever reLuired while recogniHing that even as we wor$ed, the tides of history were 9a$ing obsolete so9e of our evidence on to,ics li$e ,o,ulation, industrial ,roduction, decisions of the nternational (ourt of +ustice, and actions by the :nited "ations! ;n subGects such as hu9an rights, detente, and the nuclear ,roble9, have 9ade substantial revisions C introducing wherever ,ossible frag9ents of MorgenthauIs own writings! Because his 9ind was so creative and subtle, no would-be literary e)ecutor can declare with certainty that Morgenthau would have for9ulated his views and ,resented the9 in ,recisely the conte)t in which they are ,ut forward here! can only affir9 that have tried to be faithful to his ,hiloso,hy and to his views on ,roble9s and ,olicies as understood the9!

7enneth 8! Tho9,son

POLITIC' A$ON) NATION' The 'tru**le for Power and Peace PART ONE Theor an( Pra$ti$e o! Internationa" Po"iti$s , A Realist Theory of International Politics

This boo$ ,ur,orts to ,resent a theory of international ,olitics! The test by which such a theory 9ust be Gudged is not a ,riori and abstract but e9,irical and ,rag9atic! The theory, in other words, 9ust be Gudged not by so9e ,reconceived abstract ,rinci,le or conce,t unrelated to reality, but by its ,ur,oseB to bring order and 9eaning to a 9ass of ,heno9ena which without it would re9ain disconnected and unintelligible! t 9ust 9eet a dual test, an e9,irical and a logical oneB *o the facts as they actually are lend the9selves to the inter,retation the theory has ,ut u,on the9, and do the conclusions at which the theory arrives follow with logical necessity fro9 its ,re9isesF n short, is the theory consistent with the facts and within itselfF The issue this theory raises concerns the nature of all ,olitics! The history of 9odern ,olitical thought is the story of a contest between two schools that differ funda9entally in their conce,tions of the nature of 9an, society, and ,olitics! ;ne believes that a rational and 9oral ,olitical order, derived fro9 universally valid abstract ,rinci,les, can be achieved here and now! t assu9es the essential goodness and infinite 9alleability of hu9an nature, and bla9es the failure of the social order to 9easure u, to the rational standards on lac$ of $nowledge and understanding, obsolescent social institutions, or the de,ravity of certain isolated individuals or grou,s! t trusts in education, refor9, and the s,oradic use of force to re9edy these defects! The other school believes that the world i9,erfect as it is fro9 the rational ,oint of view, is the result of forces inherent in hu9an nature! To i9,rove the world one 9ust wor$ with those forces, not against the9! This being inherently a world of o,,osing interests and of conflict a9ong the9, 9oral ,rinci,les can never be fully realiHed, but 9ust at best be a,,ro)i9ated through the ever te9,orary balancing of interests and the ever ,recarious settle9ent of conflicts! This school, then, sees in a syste9 of chec$s and balances a universal ,rinci,le for all ,luralist societies! t a,,eals to historic ,recedent rather than to abstract ,rinci,les, and ai9s at the realiHation of the lesser evil rather than of the absolute good! This theoretical concern with hu9an nature as it actually is, and with the historic ,rocesses as they actually ta$e ,lace, has earned for the theory ,resented here the na9e of realis9! 8hat are the tenets of ,olitical realis9F "o syste9atic e),osition of the ,hiloso,hy of ,olitical realis9 can be atte9,ted here> it will suffice to single out si) funda9ental ,rinci,les, which have freLuently been 9isunderstood! 'I( PRINCIPLE' OF POLITICAL REALI'$ l! Political realis9 believes that ,olitics, li$e society in general, is governed by obGective laws that have their roots in hu9an nature! n order to i9,rove society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives! The o,eration of these laws being i9,ervious to our ,references, 9en will challenge the9 only at the ris$ of failure! Realis9, believing as it does in the obGectivity of the laws of ,olitics, 9ust also believe in the ,ossibility of develo,ing a rational theory that reflects, however i9,erfectly and one-sidedly, these obGective laws! t believes also, then, in the ,ossibility of distinguishing in ,olitics between truth and o,inion C between what is true obGectively and rationally, su,,orted by evidence and illu9inated by reason, and what is only a subGective Gudg9ent, divorced fro9 the facts as they are and infor9ed by ,reGudice and wishful thin$ing! Hu9an nature, in which the laws of ,olitics have their roots, has not changed since the classical ,hiloso,hies of (hina, ndia, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws! Hence, novelty is not necessarily a virtue in ,olitical theory, nor is old age a defect! The fact that a theory of ,olitics, if there be such a theory, has never been heard of before tends to create a ,resu9,tion against, rather than in favor of, its soundness! (onversely, the fact that a theory of ,olitics was develo,ed hundreds or even thousands of years ago C as was the theory of the balance of ,ower C does not create a ,resu9,tion that it 9ust be out9oded and obsolete! ' theory of ,olitics 9ust be subGected to the dual test-of reason and e),erience! To dis9iss such a theory because it had its flowering in centuries ,ast is to ,resent not a rational argu9ent but a 9odernistic ,reGudice that ta$es for granted the su,eriority of the ,resent over the ,ast! To dis,ose of the

revival of such a theory as a JfashionJ or JfadJ is tanta9ount to assu9ing that in 9atters ,olitical we can have o,inions but no truths! &or realis9, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving the9 9eaning through reason! t assu9es that the character of a foreign ,olicy can be ascertained only through the e)a9ination of the ,olitical acts ,erfor9ed and of the foreseeable conseLuences of these acts! Thus we can find out what states9en have actually done, and fro9 the foreseeable conseLuences of their acts we can sur9ise what their obGectives 9ight have been! #et e)a9ination of the facts is not enough! To give 9eaning to the factual raw 9aterial of foreign ,olicy, we 9ust a,,roach ,olitical reality with a $ind of rational outline, a 9a, that suggests to us the ,ossible 9eanings of foreign ,olicy! n other words, we ,ut ourselves in the ,osition of a states9an who 9ust 9eet a certain ,roble9 of foreign ,olicy under certain circu9stances, and we as$ ourselves what the rational alternatives are fro9 which a states9an 9ay choose who 9ust 9eet this ,roble9 under these circu9stances @,resu9ing always that he acts in a rational 9annerA, and which of these rational alternatives this ,articular states9an, acting under these circu9stances, is li$ely to choose! t is the testing of this rational hy,othesis against the actual facts and their conseLuences that gives theoretical 9eaning to the facts of international ,olitics! =! The 9ain sign,ost that hel,s ,olitical realis9 to find its way through the landsca,e of international ,olitics is the conce,t of interest defined in ter9s of ,ower! This conce,t ,rovides the lin$ between reason trying to understand international ,olitics and the facts to be understood! t sets ,olitics as an autono9ous s,here of action and understanding a,art fro9 other s,heres, such as econo9ics @understood in ter9s of interest defined as wealthA, ethics, aesthetics, or religion! 8ithout such a conce,t a theory of ,olitics, international or do9estic, would be altogether i9,ossible, for without it we could not distinguish between ,olitical and non,olitical facts, nor could we bring at least a 9easure of syste9ic order to the ,olitical s,here! 8e assu9e that states9en thin$ and act in ter9s of interest defined as ,ower, and the evidence of history bears that assu9,tion out! That assu9,tion allows us to retrace and antici,ate, as it were, the ste,s a states9an C ,ast, ,resent, or future C has ta$en or will ta$e on the ,olitical scene! 8e loo$ over his shoulder when he writes his dis,atches> we listen in on his conversation with other states9en> we read and antici,ate his very thoughts! Thin$ing in ter9s of interest defined as ,ower, we thin$ as he does, and as disinterested observers we understand his thoughts and actions ,erha,s better than he, the actor on the ,olitical scene, docs hi9self! The conce,t of interest defined as ,ower i9,oses intellectual disci,line u,on the observer, infuses rational order into the subGect 9atter of ,olitics, and thus 9a$es the theoretical understanding of ,olitics ,ossible! ;n the side of the actor, it ,rovides for rational disci,line in action and creates that astounding continuity in foreign ,olicy which 9a$es '9erican, British, or Russian foreign ,olicy a,,ear as an intelligible, rational continuu9, by and large consistent within itself, regardless of the different 9otives, ,references, and intellectual and 9oral Lualities of successive states9en! ' realist theory of international ,olitics, then, will guard against two ,o,ular fallaciesB the concern with 9otives and the concern with ideological ,references! To search for the clue to foreign ,olicy e)clusively in the 9otives of states9en is both futile and dece,tive! t is futile because 9otives are the 9ost illusive of ,sychological data, distorted as they are, freLuently beyond recognition, by the interests and e9otions of actor and observer ali$e! *o we really $now what our own 9otives areF 'nd what do we $now of the 9otives of othersF #et even if we had access to the real 9otives of states9en, that $nowledge would hel, us little in understanding foreign ,olicies, and 9ight well lead us astray! t is true that the $nowledge of the states9anIs 9otives 9ay give us one a9ong 9any clues as to what the direction of his foreign ,olicy 9ight be! t cannot give us, however, the one clue by which to ,redict his foreign ,olicies! History shows no e)act and necessary correlation between the Luality of 9otives and the Luality of foreign ,olicy! This is true in both 9oral and ,olitical ter9s! 8e cannot conclude fro9 the good intentions of a states9an that his foreign ,olicies will be either 9orally ,raiseworthy or ,olitically successful! +udging his 9otives, we can say that he will not intentionally ,ursue ,olicies that are 9orally wrong, but we can say nothing about the ,robability of their success! f we want to $now the 9oral and ,olitical Lualities of his actions, we 9ust $now the9, not his 9otives! How often have states9en been 9otivated by the desire to i9,rove the world, and ended by 9a$ing it worseF 'nd how often have they sought one goal, and ended by achieving so9ething they neither e),ected nor desiredF "eville (ha9berlainIs ,olitics of a,,ease9ent were, as far as we can Gudge, ins,ired by good 9otives> he was ,robably less 9otivated by considerations of ,ersonal ,ower than were 9any other British ,ri9e 9inisters, and he sought to ,reserve ,eace and to assure the ha,,iness of all concerned! #et his ,olicies hel,ed to 9a$e the Second 8orld 8ar inevitable, and to bring untold 9iseries to 9illions of ,eo,le! Sir 8inston (hurchillIs 9otives, on the other hand, were 9uch less universal in sco,e and 9uch 9ore narrowly directed toward ,ersonal and national ,ower, yet the foreign ,olicies that s,rang fro9 these inferior 9otives were certainly su,erior in 9oral and ,olitical Luality to those ,ursued by his ,redecessor! +udged by his 9otives, Robes,ierre was one of the 9ost virtuous 9en who ever lived! #et it was the :to,ian radicalis9 of that very virtue that 9ade hi9 $ill those less virtuous than hi9self, brought hi9 to the scaffold, and destroyed the revolution of which he was a leader! Good 9otives give assurance against deliberately bad ,olicies> they do not guarantee the 9oral goodness and ,olitical success of the ,olicies they ins,ire! 8hat is i9,ortant to $now, if one wants to understand foreign ,olicy, is not ,ri9arily the 9otives of a states9an, but his intellectual ability to co9,rehend the essentials of foreign ,olicy, as well as his ,olitical ability to translate what he has co9,rehended into successful ,olitical action! t follows that while

ethics in the abstract Gudges the 9oral Lualities of 9otives, ,olitical theory 9ust Gudge the ,olitical Lualities of intellect, will, and action! ' realist theory of international ,olitics will also avoid the other ,o,ular fallacy of eLuating the foreign ,olicies of a states9an with his ,hiloso,hic or ,olitical sy9,athies, and of deducing the for9er fro9 the latter! States9en, es,ecially under conte9,orary conditions, 9ay well 9a$e a habit of ,resenting their foreign ,olicies in ter9s of their ,hiloso,hic and ,olitical sy9,athies in order to gain ,o,ular su,,ort for the9! #et they will distinguish with %incoln between their Jofficial duty,J which is to thin$ and act in ter9s of the national interest, and their J,ersonal wish,J which is to see their own 9oral values and ,olitical ,rinci,les realiHed throughout the world! Political realis9 does not reLuire, nor does it condone, indifference to ,olitical ideals and 9oral ,rinci,les, but it reLuires indeed a shar, distinction between the desirable and the ,ossible C between what is desirable everywhere and at all ti9es and what is ,ossible under the concrete circu9stances of ti9e and ,lace! t stands to reason that not all foreign ,olicies have always followed so rational, obGective, and une9otional a course! The contingent ele9ents of ,ersonality, ,reGudice, and subGective ,reference, and of all the wea$nesses of intellect and will which flesh is heir to, are bound to deflect foreign ,olicies fro9 their rational course! Es,ecially where foreign ,olicy is conducted under the conditions of de9ocratic control, the need to 9arshal ,o,ular e9otions to the su,,ort of foreign ,olicy cannot fail to i9,air the rationality of foreign ,olicy itself! #et a theory of foreign ,olicy which ai9s at rationality 9ust for the ti9e being, as it were, abstract fro9 these irrational ele9ents and see$ to ,aint a ,icture of foreign ,olicy which ,resents the rational essence to be found in e),erience, without the contingent deviations fro9 rationality which are also found in e),erience! *eviations fro9 rationality which are not the result of the ,ersonal whi9 or the ,ersonal ,sycho,athology of the ,olicy 9a$er 9ay a,,ear contingent only fro9 the vantage ,oint of rationality, but 9aM the9selves be ele9ents in a coherent syste9 of irrationality! The ,ossibility of constructing, as it were, a counter-theory of irrational ,olitics is worth e),loring! 8hen one reflects u,on the develo,9ent of '9erican thin$ing on foreign ,olicy, one is struc$ by the ,ersistence of 9ista$en attitudes that have survived C under whatever guises C both intellectual argu9ent and ,olitical e),erience! ;nce that wonder, in true 'ristotelian fashion, has been transfor9ed into the Luest for rational understanding, the Luest yields a conclusion both co9forting and disturbingB we are here in the ,resence of intellectual defects shared by all of us in different ways and degrees! Together they ,rovide the outline of a $ind of ,athology of international ,olitics! 8hen the hu9an 9ind a,,roaches reality with the ,ur,ose of ta$ing action, of which the ,olitical encounter is one of the outstanding instances, it is often led astray by any of four co99on 9ental ,heno9enaB residues of for9erly adeLuate 9odes of thought and action now rendered obsolete by a new social reality> de9onological inter,retations of reality which substitute a fictitious reality C ,eo,led by evil ,ersons rather than see9ingly intractable issues C for the actual one> refusal to co9e to ter9s with a threatening state of affairs by denying it through illusory verbaliHation> reliance u,on the infinite 9alleability of a see9ingly obstre,erous reality! Man res,onds to social situations with re,etitive ,atterns! The sa9e situation, recogniHed in its identity with ,revious situations, evo$es the sa9e res,onse! The 9ind, as it were, holds in readiness a nu9ber of ,atterns a,,ro,riate for different situations> it then reLuires only the identification of a ,articular case to a,,ly to it the ,refor9ed ,attern a,,ro,riate to it! Thus the hu9an 9ind follows the ,rinci,le of econo9y of effort, obviating an e)a9ination de novo of each individual situation and the ,attern of thought and action a,,ro,riate to it! #et when 9atters are subGect to dyna9ic change, traditional ,atterns are no longer a,,ro,riateB they 9ust be re,laced by new ones reflecting such change! ;therwise a ga, will o,en between traditional ,atterns and new realities, and thought and action will be 9isguided! ;n the international ,lane it is no e)aggeration to say that the very structure of international relations C as reflected in ,olitical institutions, di,lo9atic ,rocedures, and legal arrange9ents C has tended to beco9e at variance with, and in large 9easure irrelevant to, the reality of international ,olitics! 8hile the for9er assu9es the Jsovereign eLualityJ of all nations, the latter is do9inated by an e)tre9e ineLuality of nations, two of which are called su,er,owers because they hold in their hands the un,recedented ,ower of total destruction, and 9any of which are called J9inistatesJ because their ,ower is 9inuscule even co9,ared with that of the traditional nation states! t is this contrast and inco9,atibility between the reality of international ,olitics and the conce,ts, institutions, and ,rocedures designed to 9a$e intelligible and control the for9er, which has caused, at least below the great-,ower level, the un9anageability of international relations which borders on anarchy! nternational terroris9 and the different govern9ent reactions to it, the involve9ent of foreign govern9ents in the %ebanese civil war, the 9ilitary o,erations of the :nited States in Southeast 'sia, and the 9ilitary intervention of the Soviet :nion in Eastern Euro,e cannot be e),lained or Gustified by reference to traditional conce,ts, institutions, and ,rocedures! 'll these situations have one characteristic in co99on! The 9odern fact of interde,endence reLuires a ,olitical order which ta$es that fact into account, while in reality the legal and institutional su,erstructure, har$ing bac$ to the nineteenth century, assu9es the e)istence of a 9ulti,licity of self-sufficient, i9,enetrable, sovereign nation states! These residues of an obsolescent legal and institutional order not only stand in the way of a rational transfor9ation of international relations in light of the ineLuality of ,ower and the interde,endence of interests, but they also render ,recarious, if not i9,ossible, 9ore rational ,olicies within the defective fra9ewor$ of such a syste9! t is a characteristic of ,ri9itive thin$ing to ,ersonaliHe social ,roble9s! That tendency is ,articularly strong when the ,roble9 a,,ears not to be susce,tible to rational understanding and successful 9ani,ulation! 8hen a ,articular ,erson or grou, of ,ersons is identified with the recalcitrant difficulty, that 9ay see9 to render the ,roble9 both

intellectually accessible and susce,tible of solution! Thus belief in Satan as the source of evil 9a$es us JunderstandJ the nature of evil by focusing the search for its origin and control u,on a ,articular ,erson whose ,hysical e)istence we assu9e! The co9,le)ity of ,olitical conflict ,recludes such si9,le solutions! "atural catastro,hes will not be ,revented by burning witches> the threat of a ,owerful Ger9any to establish hege9ony over Euro,e will not be averted by getting rid of a succession of Ger9an leaders! But by identifying the issue with certain ,ersons over who9 we have C or ho,e to have C control we reduce the ,roble9, both intellectually and ,rag9atically, to 9anageable ,ro,ortions! ;nce we have identified certain individuals and grou,s of individuals as the source of evil, we a,,ear to have understood the causal ne)us that leads fro9 the individuals to the social ,roble9> that a,,arent understanding suggests the a,,arent solutionB Eli9inate the individuals Jres,onsibleJ for it, and you have solved the ,roble9! Su,erstition still holds sway over our relations within society! The de9onological ,attern of thought and action has now been transferred to other fields of hu9an action closed to the $ind of rational enLuiry and action that have driven su,erstition fro9 our relations with nature! 's 8illia9 Graha9 Su9ner ,ut it, JThe a9ount of su,erstition is not 9uch changed, but it now attaches to ,olitics, not to religion!J. The nu9erous failures of the :nited States to recogniHe and res,ond to the ,olycentric nature of (o99unis9 is a ,ri9e e)a9,le of this defect! The corollary of this indiscri9inate o,,osition to (o99unis9 is the indiscri9inate su,,ort of govern9ents and 9ove9ents that ,rofess and ,ractice anti(o99unis9! '9erican ,olicies in 'sia and %atin '9erica have derived fro9 this si9,listic ,osition! The Eietna9 8ar and our inability to co9e to ter9s with 9ainland (hina find here their rationale! So do the theory and ,ractice of counterinsurgency, including large-scale assassinations under the Phoeni) ,rogra9 in Eietna9 and the actual or atte9,ted assassinations of individual states9en! Signs of a si9ilar a,,roach have been evident 9ore recently in (entral '9erica! The de9onological a,,roach to foreign ,olicy strengthens another ,athological tendency, which is the refusal to ac$nowledge and co,e effectively with a threatening reality! The de9onological a,,roach has shifted our attention and concern towards the adherents of (o99unis9 C individuals at ho9e and abroad, ,olitical 9ove9ents, foreign govern9ents C and away fro9 the real threatB the ,ower of states, (o99unist or not! Mc(arthyis9 not only ,rovided the 9ost ,ervasive '9erican e)a9,le of the de9onological a,,roach but was also one of the 9ost e)tre9e e)a9,les of this $ind of 9isGudg9entB it substituted the largely illusory threat of do9estic subversion for the real threat of Russian ,ower! &inally, it is ,art of this a,,roach to ,olitics to believe that no ,roble9s C however ho,eless they 9ay a,,ear C are really insoluble, given well-9eaning, well-financed, and co9,etent efforts! have tried elsewhere to lay bare the intellectual and historical roots of this belief>= here li9it 9yself to ,ointing out its ,ersistent strength des,ite 9uch e),erience to the contrary, such as the Eietna9 8ar and the general decline of '9erican ,ower! This ,reference for econo9ic solutions to ,olitical and 9ilitary ,roble9s is ,owerfully reinforced by the interests of ,otential reci,ients of econo9ic su,,ort, who ,refer the obviously ,rofitable transfer of econo9ic advantages to ,ainful and ris$y di,lo9atic bargaining! The difference between international ,olitics as it actually is and a rational theory derived fro9 it is li$e the difference between a ,hotogra,h and a ,ainted ,ortrait! The ,hotogra,h shows everything that can be seen by the na$ed eye> the ,ainted ,ortrait docs not show everything that can be seen by the na$ed eye, but it shows, or at least see$s to show, one thing that the na$ed eye cannot seeB the hu9an essence of the ,erson ,ortrayed! Political realis9 contains not only a theoretical but also a nor9ative ele9ent! t $nows that ,olitical reality is re,lete with contingencies and syste9ic irrationalities and ,oints to the ty,ical influences they e)ert u,on foreign ,olicy! #et it shares with all social theory the need, for the sa$e of theoretical understanding, to stress the rational ele9ents of ,olitical reality> for it is these rational ele9ents that 9a$e reality intelligible for theory! Political realis9 ,resents the theoretical construct of a rational foreign ,olicy which e),erience can never co9,letely achieve! 't the sa9e ti9e ,olitical realis9 considers a rational foreign ,olicy to be good foreign ,olicy> for only a rational foreign ,olicy 9ini9iHes ris$s and 9a)i9iHes benefits and, hence, co9,lies both with the 9oral ,rece,t of ,rudence and the ,olitical reLuire9ent of success! Political realis9 wants the ,hotogra,hic ,icture of the ,olitical world to rese9ble as 9uch as ,ossible its ,ainted ,ortrait! 'ware of the inevitable ga, between good C that is, rationalC foreign ,olicy and foreign ,olicy as it actually is, ,olitical realis9 9aintains not only that theory 9ust focus u,on the rational ele9ents of ,olitical reality, but also that foreign ,olicy ought to be rational in view of its own 9oral and ,ractical ,ur,oses! Hence, it is no argu9ent against the theory here ,resented that actual foreign ,olicy does not or cannot live u, to it! That argu9ent 9isunderstands the intention of this boo$, which is to ,resent not an indiscri9inate descri,tion of ,olitical reality, but a rational theory of international ,olitics! &ar fro9 being invalidated by the fact that, for instance, a ,erfect balance of ,ower ,olicy will scarcely be found in reality, it assu9es that reality, being deficient in this res,ect, 9ust be understood and evaluated as an a,,ro)i9ation to an ideal syste9 of balance of ,ower! 0! Realis9 assu9es that its $ey conce,t of interest defined as ,ower is an obGective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that conce,t with a 9eaning that is fi)ed once and for all! The idea of interest is indeed of the essence of ,olitics and is unaffected by the circu9stances of ti9e and ,lace! Thucydides state9ent, born of the e),eriences of ancient Greece, that Jidentity of interests is the surest of bonds whether between states or individualsJ
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JMores of the Present and &uture,J in 8ar and ;ther Essays @"ew HavenB #ale :niversity Press, ./..A, ,! .5/! Scientific Man versus Power Politics @(hicagoB :niversity of (hicago Press, ./63A!

was ta$en u, in the nineteenth century by %ord SalisburyIs re9ar$ that Jthe only bond of union that enduresJ a9ong nations is Jthe absence of all clashing interests!J t was erected into a general ,rinci,le of govern9ent by George 8ashingtonB ' s9all $nowledge of hu9an nature will convince us, that, with far the greatest ,art of 9an$ind, interest is the governing ,rinci,le> and that al9ost every 9an is 9ore or less, under its influence! Motives of ,ublic virtue 9ay for a ti9e, or in ,articular instances, actuate 9en to the observance of a conduct ,urely disinterested> but they are not of the9selves sufficient to ,roduce ,ersevering confor9ity to the refined dictates and obligations of social duly! &ew 9en are ca,able of 9a$ing a continual sacrifice of all views of ,rivate interest, or advantage, to the co99on good! t is vain to e)clai9 against the de,ravity of hu9an nature on this account> the fact is so, the e),erience of every age and nation has ,roved it and we 9ust in a great 9easure, change the constitution of 9an, before we can 9a$e it otherwise! "o institution, not built on the ,resu9,tive truth of these 9a)i9s can succeed!0 t was echoed and enlarged u,on in our century by Ma) 8eberIs observationB nterests @9aterial and idealA, not ideas, do9inate directly the actions of 9en! #et the Ji9ages of the worldJ created by these ideas have very often served as switches deter9ining the trac$s on which the dyna9is9 of interests $e,t actions 9oving!6 #et the $ind of interest deter9ining ,olitical action in a ,articular ,eriod of history de,ends u,on the ,olitical and cultural conte)t within which foreign ,olicy is for9ulated! The goals that 9ight be ,ursued by nations in their foreign ,olicy can run the whole ga9ut of obGectives any nation has ever ,ursued or 9ight ,ossibly ,ursue! The sa9e observations a,,ly to the conce,t of ,ower! ts content and the 9anner of its use are deter9ined by the ,olitical and cultural environ9ent! Power 9ay co9,rise anything that establishes and 9aintains the control of 9an over 9an! Thus ,ower covers all social relationshi,s which serve that end, fro9 ,hysical violence to the 9ost subtle ,sychological ties by which one 9ind controls another! Power covers the do9ination of 9an by 9an, both when it is disci,lined by 9oral ends and controlled by constitutional safeguards, as in 8estern de9ocracies, and when it is that unta9ed and barbaric force which finds its laws in nothing but its own strength and its sole Gustification in its aggrandiHe9ent! Political realis9 does not assu9e that the conte9,orary conditions under which foreign ,olicy o,erates, with their e)tre9e instability and the ever ,resent threat of large-scale violence, cannot be changed! The balance of ,ower, for instance, is indeed a ,erennial ele9ent of all ,luralistic societies, as the authors of The &ederalist ,a,ers well $new> yet it is ca,able of o,erating, as it does in the :nited States, under the conditions of relative stability and ,eaceful conflict! f the factors that have given rise to these conditions can be du,licated on the international scene, si9ilar conditions of stability and ,eace will then ,revail there, as they have over long stretches of history a9ong certain nations! 8hat is true of the general character of international relations is also true of the nation state as the ulti9ate ,oint of reference of conte9,orary foreign ,olicy! 8hile the realist indeed believes that interest is the ,erennial standard by which ,olitical action 9ust be Gudged and directed, the conte9,orary connection between interest and the nation state is a ,roduct of history, and is therefore bound to disa,,ear in the course of history! "othing in the realist ,osition 9ilitates against the assu9,tion that the ,resent division of the ,olitical world into nation states will be re,laced by larger units of a Luite different character, 9ore in $ee,ing with the technical ,otentialities and the 9oral reLuire9ents of the conte9,orary world! The realist ,arts co9,any with other schools of thought before the all-i9,ortant Luestion of how the conte9,orary world is to be transfor9ed! The realist is ,ersuaded that this transfor9ation can be achieved only through the wor$9anli$e 9ani,ulation of the ,erennial forces that have sha,ed the ,ast as they will the future! The realist cannot be ,ersuaded that we can bring about that transfor9ation by confronting a ,olitical reality that has its own laws with an abstract ideal that refuses to ta$e those laws into account! 6! Political realis9 is aware of the 9oral significance of ,olitical action! t is also aware of the ineluctable tension between the 9oral co99and and the reLuire9ents of successful ,olitical action! 'nd it is unwilling to gloss over and obliterate that tension and thus to obfuscate both the 9oral and the ,olitical issue by 9a$ing it a,,ear as though the star$ facts of ,olitics were 9orally 9ore satisfying than they actually are, and the 9oral law less e)acting that it actually is! Realis9 9aintains that universal 9oral ,rinci,les cannot be a,,lied to the actions of states in their abstract universal for9ulation, but that they 9ust be filtered through the concrete circu9stances of ti9e and ,lace! The individual 9ay say for hi9selfB J&iat Gustitia, ,ereat 9undus @%et Gustice be done, even if the world ,erishA,J but the state has no right to say so in the na9e of those who are in its care! Both individual and state 9ust Gudge ,olitical action by universal 9oral ,rinci,les, such as that of liberty! #et while the individual has a 9oral right to sacrifice
0

The 8rifings of George 8ashington, edited by +ohn (! &itH,atric$ @8ashingtonB :nited States Printing ;ffice, ./0. - 66A, Eol! D, ,! 030! 6 Marianne 8eber! Ma) 8eber @TuebingenB +! N! O! Mohr, ./=3A, ,,! 061 - 2! See also Ma) 8eber, (esa99elte 'ufsatHe Hur ReligionssoHiologie @TuebingenB +! N! O! Mohr, ./=4A, ,! =5=!

hi9self in defense of such a 9oral ,rinci,le, the state has no right to let its 9oral disa,,robation of the infringe9ent of liberty get in the way of successful ,olitical action, itself ins,ired by the 9oral ,rinci,le of national survival! There can be no ,olitical 9orality without ,rudence> that is, without consideration of the ,olitical conseLuences of see9ingly 9oral action! Realis9, then, considers ,rudence C the weighing of the conseLuences of alternative ,olitical actions C to be the su,re9e virtue in ,olitics! Ethics in the abstract Gudges action by its confor9ity with the 9oral law> ,olitical ethics Gudges action by its ,olitical conseLuences! (lassical and 9edieval ,hiloso,hy $new this, and so did %incoln when he saidB do the very best $now how, the very best can, and 9ean to $ee, doing so until the end! f the end brings 9e out all right, what is said against 9e wonIt a9ount to anything! f the end brings 9e out wrong, ten angels swearing was right would 9a$e no difference! 5! Political realis9 refuses to identify the 9oral as,irations of a ,articular nation with the 9oral laws that govern the universe! 's it distinguishes between truth and o,inion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry! 'll nations are te9,ted C and few have been able to resist the te9,tation for long C to clothe their own ,articular as,irations and actions in the 9oral ,ur,oses of the universe! To $now that nations are subGect to the 9oral law is one thing, while to ,retend to $now with certainty what is good and evil in the relations a9ong nations is Luite another! There is a world of difference between the belief that all nations stand under the Gudg9ent of God, inscrutable to the hu9an 9ind, and the blas,he9ous conviction that God is always on oneIs side and that what one wills oneself cannot fail to be willed by God also! The lighthearted eLuation between a ,articular nationalis9 and the counsels of Providence is 9orally indefensible, for it is that very sin of ,ride against which the Gree$ tragedians and the Biblical ,ro,hets have warned rulers and ruled! That eLuation is also ,olitically ,ernicious, for it is liable to engender the distortion in Gudg9ent which, in the blindness of crusading frenHy, destroys nations and civiliHations C in the na9e of 9oral ,rinci,le, ideal, or God hi9self! ;n the other hand, it is e)actly the conce,t of interest defined in ter9s of ,ower that saves us fro9 both that 9oral e)cess and that ,olitical folly! &or if we loo$ at all nations, our own included, as ,olitical entities ,ursuing their res,ective interests defined in ter9s of ,ower, we are able to do Gustice to all of the9! 'nd we are able to do Gustice to all of the9 in a dual senseB 8e are able to Gudge other nations as we Gudge our own and, having Gudged the9 in this fashion, we are then ca,able of ,ursuing ,olicies that res,ect the interests of other nations, while ,rotecting and ,ro9oting those of our own! Moderation in ,olicy cannot fail to reflect the 9oderation of 9oral Gudg9ent! 3! The difference, then, between ,olitical realis9 and other schools of thought is real, and it is ,rofound! However 9uch of the theory of ,olitical realis9 9ay have been 9isunderstood and 9isinter,reted, there is no gain saying its distinctive intellectual and 9oral attitude to 9atters ,olitical! ntellectually, the ,olitical realist 9aintains the autono9y of the ,olitical s,here, as the econo9ist, the lawyer, the 9oralist 9aintain theirs! He thin$s in ter9s of interest defined as ,ower, as the econo9ist thin$s in ter9s of interest defined as wealth> the lawyer, of the confor9ity of action with legal rules> the 9oralist, of the confor9ity of action with 9oral ,rinci,les! The econo9ist as$sB JHow does this ,olicy affect the wealth of society, or a seg9ent of itFJ The lawyer as$sB J s this ,olicy in accord with the rules of lawFJ The 9oralist as$sB J s this ,olicy in accord with 9oral ,rinci,lesFJ 'nd the ,olitical realist as$sB JHow does this ,olicy affect the ,ower of the nationFJ @;r of the federal govern9ent, of (ongress, of the ,arty, of agriculture, as the case 9ay be!A The ,olitical realist is not unaware of the e)istence and relevance of standards of thought other than ,olitical ones! 's ,olitical realist, he cannot but subordinate these other standards to those of ,olitics! 'nd he ,arts co9,any with other schools when they i9,ose standards of thought a,,ro,riate to other s,heres u,on the ,olitical s,here! t is here that ,olitical realis9 ta$es issue with the Jlegalistic-9oralistic a,,roachJ to international ,olitics! That this issue is not, as has been contended, a 9ere fig9ent of the i9agination, but goes to the very core of the controversy, can be shown fro9 9any historical e)a9,les! Three will suffice to 9a$e the ,oint!5 n ./0/ the Soviet :nion attac$ed &inland! This action confronted &rance and Great Britain with two issues, one legal, the other ,olitical! *id that action violate the (ovenant of the %eague of "ations and, if it did, what counter9easures should &rance and Great Britain ta$eF The legal Luestion could easily be answered in the affir9ative, for obviously the Soviet :nion had done what was ,rohibited by the (ovenant! The answer to the ,olitical Luestion de,ends, first, u,on the 9anner in which the Russian action affected the interests of &rance and Great Britain> second u,on the e)isting distribution of ,ower between &rance and Great Britain, on the one hand, and the Soviet :nion and other ,otentially hostile nations, es,ecially Ger9any, on the other> and, third, u,on the influence that the counter9easures were li$ely to have u,on the interests of &rance and Great Britain and the future distribution of ,ower! &rance and Great Britain, as the leading 9e9bers of the %eague of "ations, saw to it that the Soviet :nion was e),elled fro9 the %eague, and they were ,revented fro9 Goining &inland in the war against the Soviet :nion only by SwedenIs refusal to allow their troo,s to ,ass through Swedish territory on their way to &inland! f this refusal by Sweden had not saved the9, &rance and Great Britain would shortly have found the9selves at war with the Soviet
5

See the other e)a9,les discussed in Hans +! Morgenthau, J'nother IGreat *ebateIB The "ational nterest of the :nited Slates,J The '9erican Political Science Review, Eol! D%E @*ece9ber ./5=A, ,,! /1/ ff! See also Hans +! Morgenthau, Politics in the =4th (entury, Eol! ., The *ecline of *e9ocratic Politics @(hicagoB :niversity of (hicago Press, ./3=A, ,,! 1/ ff> and abridged edition @(hicagoB :niversity of (hicago Press! ./1.A, ,,! =46 ff!

:nion and Ger9any at the sa9e ti9e! The ,olicy of &rance and Great Britain was a classic e)a9,le of legalis9 in that they allowed the answer to the legal Luestion, legiti9ate within its s,here, to deter9ine their ,olitical actions! nstead of as$ing both Luestions, that of law and that of ,ower, they as$ed only the Luestion of law> and the answer they received could have no bearing on the issue that their very e)istence 9ight have de,ended u,on! The second e)a9,le illustrates the J9oralistic a,,roachJ to international ,olitics! t concerns the international status of the (o99unist govern9ent of (hina! The rise of that govern9ent confronted the 8estern world with two issues, one 9oral, the other ,olitical! 8ere the nature and ,olicies of that govern9ent in accord with the 9oral ,rinci,les of the 8estern worldF Should the 8estern world deal with such a govern9entF The answer to the first Luestion could not fail to be in the negative! #et it did not follow with necessity that the answer to the second Luestion should also be in the negative! The standard of thought a,,lied to the first C the 9oral C Luestion was si9,ly to test the nature and the ,olicies of the (o99unist govern9ent of (hina by the ,rinci,les of 8estern 9orality! ;n the other hand, the second C the ,oliticalC Luestion had to be subGected to the co9,licated test of the interests involved and the ,ower available on either side, and of the bearing of one or the other course of action u,on these interests and ,ower! The a,,lication of this test could well have led to the conclusion that it would be wiser not to deal with the (o99unist govern9ent of (hina! To arrive at this conclusion by neglecting this test altogether and answering the ,olitical Luestion in ter9s of the 9oral issue was indeed a classic e)a9,le of the J9oralistic a,,roachJ to international ,olitics! The third case illustrates stri$ingly the contrast between realis9 and the legalistic-9oralistic a,,roach to foreign ,olicy! Great Britain, as one of the guarantors of the neutrality of Belgiu9, went to war with Ger9any in 'ugust ./.6 because Ger9any had violated the neutrality of Belgiu9! The British action could be Gustified either in realistic or legalistic-9oralistic ter9s! That is to say, one could argue realistically that for centuries it had been a)io9atic for British foreign ,olicy to ,revent the control of the %ow (ountries by a hostile ,ower! t was then not so 9uch the violation of Belgiu9Is neutrality ,er se as the hostile intentions of the violator which ,rovided the rationale for British intervention! f the violator had been another nation but Ger9any, Great Britain 9ight well have refrained fro9 intervening! This is the ,osition ta$en by Sir Edward Grey, British &oreign Secretary during that ,eriod! :nder Secretary for &oreign 'ffairs Hardinge re9ar$ed to hi9 in ./42B J f &rance violated Belgian neutrality in a war against Ger9any, it is doubtful whether England or Russia would 9ove a finger to 9aintain Belgian neutrality, while if the neutrality of Belgiu9 was violated by Ger9any, it is ,robable that the converse would be the case!J 8hereu,on Sir Edward Grey re,liedB JThis is to the ,oint!J #et one could also ta$e the legalistic and 9oralistic ,osition that the violation of Belgiu9Is neutrality ,er se, because of its legal and 9oral defects and regardless of the interests at sta$e and of the identity of the violator, Gustified British and, for that 9atter, '9erican intervention! This was the ,osition which Theodore Roosevelt too$ in his letter to Sir Edward Grey of +anuary ==, ./.5B To 9e the cru) of the situation has been Belgiu9! f England or &rance had acted toward Belgiu9 as Ger9any has acted should have o,,osed the9, e)actly as now o,,ose Ger9any! have e9,hatically a,,roved your action as a 9odel for what should be done by those who believe that treaties should be observed in good faith and that there is such a thing as international 9orality! ta$e this ,osition as an '9erican who is no 9ore an English9an than he is a Ger9an, who endeavors loyally to serve the interests of his own country, but who also endeavors to do what he can for Gustice and decency as regards 9an$ind at large, and who therefore feels obliged to Gudge all other nations by their conduct on any given occasion! This realist defense of the autono9y of the ,olitical s,here against its subversion by other 9odes of thought does not i9,ly disregard for the e)istence and i9,ortance of these other 9odes of thought! t rather i9,lies that each should be assigned its ,ro,er s,here and function! Political realis9 is based u,on a ,luralistic conce,tion of hu9an nature! Real 9an is a co9,osite of Jecono9ic 9an,J J,olitical 9an!J J9oral 9an!J Jreligious 9an,J etc! ' 9an who was nothing hut J,olitical 9anJ would be a beast, for he would be co9,letely lac$ing in 9oral restraints! ' 9an who was nothing but J9oral 9anJ would be a fool, for he would be co9,letely lac$ing in ,rudence! ' 9an who was nothing but Jreligious 9anJ would be a saint, for he would be co9,letely lac$ing in worldly desires! RecogniHing that these different facets of hu9an nature e)ist, ,olitical realis9 also recogniHes that in order to understand one of the9 one has to deal with it on its own ter9s! That is to say, if want to understand Jreligious 9an,J 9ust for the ti9e being abstract fro9 the other as,ects of hu9an nature and deal with its religious as,ect as if it were the only one! &urther9ore, 9ust a,,ly to the religious s,here the standards of thought a,,ro,riate to it, always re9aining aware of the e)istence of other standards and their actual influence u,on the religious Lualities of 9an! 8hat is true of this facet of hu9an nature is true of all the others! "o 9odern econo9ist, for instance would conceive of his science and its relations to other sciences of 9an in any other way! t is e)actly through such a ,rocess of e9anci,ation fro9 other standards of thought, and the develo,9ent of one a,,ro,riate to its subGect 9atter, that econo9ics has develo,ed as an autono9ous theory of the econo9ic activities of 9an! To contribute to a si9ilar develo,9ent in the field of ,olitics is indeed the ,ur,ose of ,olitical realis9! t is in the nature of things that a theory of ,olitics which is based u,on such ,rinci,les will not 9eet with unani9ous a,,roval C nor does, for that 9atter, such a foreign ,olicy! &or theory and ,olicy ali$e run counter to two trends in our culture which are not able to reconcile the9selves to the assu9,tions and results of a rational, obGective theory of ,olitics! ;ne of these trends dis,arages the role of ,ower in society on grounds that ste9 fro9 the e),erience

and ,hiloso,hy of the nineteenth century> we shall address ourselves to this tendency later in greater detail! 3 The other trend, o,,osed to the realist theory and ,ractice of ,olitics, ste9s fro9 the very relationshi, that e)ists, and 9ust e)ist, between the hu9an 9ind and the ,olitical s,here! &or reasons that we shall discuss later 1 the hu9an 9ind in its day-byday o,erations cannot bear to loo$ the truth of ,olitics straight in the face! t 9ust disguise, distort, belittle, and e9bellish the truth C the 9ore so, the 9ore the individual is actively involved in the ,rocesses of ,olitics, and ,articularly in those of international ,olitics! &or only by deceiving hi9self about the nature of ,olitics and the role he ,lays on the ,olitical scene is 9an able to live contentedly as a ,olitical ani9al with hi9self and his fellow 9en! Thus it is inevitable that a theory which tries to understand international ,olitics as it actually is and as it ought to be in view of its intrinsic nature, rather than as ,eo,le would li$e to see it, 9ust overco9e a ,sychological resistance that 9ost other branches of learning need not face! ' boo$ devoted to the theoretical understanding of international ,olitics therefore reLuires a s,ecial e),lanation and Gustification!

The 'cience of International Politics UN.ER'TAN.IN) INTERNATIONAL POLITIC' %i!!erent Approa$hes This boo$ has two ,ur,oses! The first is to detect and understand the forces that deter9ine ,olitical relations a9ong nations, and to co9,rehend the ways in which those forces act u,on each other and u,on international ,olitical relations and institutions! n 9ost other branches of the social sciences this ,ur,ose would be ta$en for granted, because the natural ai9 of all scientific underta$ings is to discover the forces underlying social ,heno9ena and the 9ode of their o,eration! n a,,roaching the study of international ,olitics, one cannot ta$e this ,ur,ose for granted> it therefore reLuires s,ecial e9,hasis! 's *r! Grayson 7ir$ has ,ut itB :ntil recent ti9es the study of international relations in the :nited States has been do9inated largely by ,ersons who have ta$en one of three a,,roaches! &irst there have been the historians who have considered international relations 9erely as recent history, in which the student is handica,,ed by the absence of an adeLuate a9ount of available data! ' second grou,, the international lawyers, have ,ro,erly concerned the9selves ,ri9arily with the legal as,ects of inter-state relations, but they have seldo9 9ade a serious effort to inLuire into the funda9ental reasons for the continuing inco9,leteness and inadeLuacy of this legal ne)us! &inally, there have been those who have been less concerned with international relations as they are than with the 9ore ,erfect syste9 which these idealists would li$e to build! ;nly recently C and belatedly C have students underta$en to e)a9ine the funda9ental and ,ersistent forces of world ,olitics, and the institutions which e9body the9, not with a view to ,raise or to conde9n, but 9erely in an effort to ,rovide a better understanding of these basic drives which deter9ine the foreign ,olicies of states! Thus the ,olitical scientist is 9oving into the international field at last!. Professor (harles E! Martin has ta$en u, *r! 7ir$Is the9e by ,ointing to !! ! the ,roble9 which faces the students and the teachers of international relations 9ore than any other, na9ely, that dualis9 we have to face in 9oving in two different and o,,osite areas! 9ean the area of institutions of ,eace which are related to the adGust9ent of dis,utes and the area of ,ower ,olitics and war! #et, it 9ust be so! There is no esca,e fro9 it! !!! thin$ ,robably one of the greatest indict9ents of our attitude in teaching in the last twenty years has been to write off glibly the institution of war and to write off the boo$s the influence of ,ower ,olitics! thin$ ,olitical scientists 9a$e a great 9ista$e in doing so! 8e should be the very ones who are studying ,ower ,olitics and its i9,lications and the situations growing out of it, and we should be the ones who study the institution of war!= *efined in such ter9s, international ,olitics as an acade9ic disci,line is distinct fro9 recent history and current events, international law, and ,olitical refor9! nternational ,olitics e9braces 9ore than recent history and current events! The observer is surrounded by the conte9,orary scene with its ever shifting e9,hasis and changing ,ers,ectives! He cannot find solid ground on which to
3

See ,ages 01 ff! See ,ages .4. ff!

. =

'9erican +ournal of nternational %aw, Eol! 0/ @./65A, ,,! 03/ - 14! Proceedings of the Eighth (onference of Teachers of nternational %aw and Related SubGects @8ashingtonB (arnegie Endow9ent for nternational Peace, ./63A, ,! 33!

stand, or obGective standards of evaluation, without getting down to funda9entals that are revealed only by the correlation of recent events with the 9ore distant ,ast and the ,erennial Lualities of hu9an nature underlying both! nternational ,olitics cannot be reduced to legal rules and institutions! nternational ,olitics o,erates within the fra9ewor$ of such rules and through the instru9entality of such institutions! But it is no 9ore identical with the9 than '9erican ,olitics on the national level is identical with the '9erican (onstitution, the federal laws, and the agencies of the federal govern9ent! (oncerning atte9,ts to refor9 international ,olitics before 9a$ing an effort to understand what international ,olitics is about, we share 8illia9 Graha9 Su9nerIs viewB The worst vice in ,olitical discussions is that dog9atis9 which ta$es its stand on great ,rinci,les or assu9,tions, instead of standing on an e)act e)a9ination of things as they are and hu9an nature as it is! !!! 'n ideal is for9ed of so9e higher or better state of things than now e)ists, and al9ost unconsciously the ideal is assu9ed as already e)isting and 9ade the basis of s,eculations which have no root! ! ! ! The whole 9ethod of abstract s,eculation on ,olitical to,ics is vicious! t is ,o,ular because it is easy> it is easier to i9agine a new world than to learn to $now this one> it is easier to e9bar$ on s,eculations based on a few broad assu9,tions than it is to study the history of states and institutions> it is easier to catch u, a ,o,ular dog9a than it is to analyHe it to see whether it is true or not! 'll this leads to confusion, to the ad9ission of ,hrases and ,latitudes, to 9uch dis,uting but little gain in the ,ros,erity of nations!0 Limitations to ;n(erstan(ing The 9ost for9idable difficulty facing a theoretical inLuiry into the nature and ways of international ,olitics is the a9biguity of the 9aterial with which the observer has to deal! The events he 9ust try to understand are, on the one hand, uniLue occurrences! They ha,,ened in this way only once and never before or since! ;n the other hand, they are si9ilar, for they are 9anifestations of social forces! Social forces are the ,roduct of hu9an nature in action! Therefore, under si9ilar conditions, they will 9anifest the9selves in a si9ilar 9anner! But where is the line to be drawn between the si9ilar and the uniLueF This a9biguity of the events to be understood by a theory of international ,olitics C it 9ay be ,ointed out in ,assing C is but a s,ecial instance of a general i9,edi9ent to hu9an understanding! J's no event and no sha,e,J observes Montaigne, Jis entirely li$e another, so also is there none entirely different fro9 anotherB an ingenious 9i)ture on the ,art of "ature! f there were no si9ilarity in our faces, we could not distinguish 9an fro9 beast> if there were no dissi9ilarity, we could not distinguish one 9an fro9 another! 'll things hold together by so9e si9ilarity> every e)a9,le is halting, and the co9,arison that is derived fro9 e),erience is always defective and i9,erfect! 'nd yet one lin$s u, the co9,arisons at so9e corner! 'nd so do laws beco9e serviceable and ada,t the9selves to every one of our affairs by so9e wrested, forced, and biased inter,retation!J6 t is against such Jwrested, forced, and biased inter,retationJ of ,olitical events that a theory of international ,olitics 9ust be continuously on guard! 8e learn what the ,rinci,les of international ,olitics are fro9 co9,arisons between such events! ' certain ,olitical situation evo$es the for9ulation and e)ecution of a certain foreign ,olicy! *ealing with a different ,olitical situation, we as$ ourselvesB How does this situation differ fro9 the ,receding one, and how is it si9ilarF *o the si9ilarities reaffir9 the ,olicy develo,ed ,reviouslyF ;r does the blending of si9ilarities and differences allow the essence of that ,olicy to be retained while, in so9e as,ects, it is to be 9odifiedF ;r do the differences vitiate the analogy altogether and 9a$e the ,revious ,olicy ina,,licableF f one wants to understand international ,olitics, gras, the 9eaning of conte9,orary events, and foresee and influence the future, one 9ust be able to ,erfor9 the dual intellectual tas$ i9,licit in these Luestions! ;ne 9ust be able to distinguish between the si9ilarities and differences in two ,olitical situations! &urther9ore, one 9ust be able to assess the i9,ort of these si9ilarities and differences for alternative foreign ,olicies! Three series of events, ta$en at rando9, will illustrate the ,roble9 and its difficulties! ;n Se,te9ber .1, .1/3, George 8ashington 9ade a s,eech in which he bade farewell to the nation, outlining the ,rinci,les of '9erican foreign ,olicy in ter9s of abstention fro9 Euro,ean affairs! ;n *ece9ber =, .2=0, President Monroe sent a 9essage to (ongress in which he for9ulated the ,rinci,les of '9erican foreign ,olicy in si9ilar ter9s! n ./.1, the :nited States Goined &rance and Great Britain against Ger9any, which threatened the inde,endence of both! n ./6., the :nited States followed a si9ilar course of action! ;n March .=, ./61, President Tru9an, in a 9essage to (ongress, refor9ulated the ,rinci,les of '9erican foreign ,olicy in ter9s of the worldwide contain9ent of (o99unis9! n .5.=, Henry E of England 9ade an alliance with the Ha,sburgs against &rance! n .5.5, he 9ade an alliance with &rance against the Ha,sburgs! n .5== and .56=, he Goined the Ha,sburgs against &rance! n .153, Great Britain allied itself with Prussia against the Ha,sburgs and &rance! n .1/0, Great Britain, Prussia, and the Ha,sburgs were allied against "a,oleon! n ./.6, Great Britain Goined with &rance and Russia against 'ustria and Ger9any, and in ./0/ with &rance and Poland against Ger9any! "a,oleon, 8illia9 , and Hitler tried to conLuer the continent of Euro,e and failed!
0

J*e9ocracy and Res,onsible Govern9ent,J The (hallenge of &acts and ;ther Essays @"ew HavenB #ale :niversity Press! ./.6A, ,,! =65 - 3! 6 The Essays of Michel de Montaigne, edited and translated by +acob Peitlin @"ew #or$B 'lfred '! 7no,f, ./!03A! Eol! , ,! =14! MontaigneIs italics!

're there within each of these three series of events si9ilarities that allow us to for9ulate a ,rinci,le of foreign ,olicy for each seriesF ;r is each event so different fro9 the others in the series that each would reLuire a different ,olicyF The difficulty in 9a$ing this decision is the 9easure of the difficulty in 9a$ing correct Gudg9ents in foreign ,olicy, in charting the future wisely, and in doing the right thing in the right way and at the right ti9e! Should the foreign ,olicy in 8ashingtonIs &arewell 'ddress be considered a general ,rinci,le of '9erican foreign ,olicy, or did it ste9 fro9 te9,orary conditions and was its validity therefore li9ited to the9F 're the foreign ,olicies of 8ashingtonIs and MonroeIs 9essages co9,atible with the Tru9an *octrineF To state the ,roble9 another way, is the Tru9an *octrine a 9ere 9odification of a general ,rinci,le underlying 8ashingtonIs and MonroeIs conce,tion of foreign affairs, or does the Tru9an *octrine constitute a radical de,arture fro9 the traditions of '9erican foreign ,olicyF f its does, is it Gustified in the light of changed conditionsF Generally s,ea$ing, do the differences in the international ,osition of the :nited States in .1/3, .2=0, ./.1, ./6., and ./61 Gustify the different foreign ,olicies for9ulated and e)ecuted with regard to these different ,olitical situationsF 8hat are the si9ilarities and differences in the situation with which Euro,e confronted the :nited States in ./.1, ./6., and ./61, and to what e)tent do they reLuire si9ilar or different foreign ,olicies on the ,art of the :nited StatesF 8hat is the 9eaning of those shifts in British foreign ,olicyF Have they grown fro9 the whi9 and ,erfidy of ,rinces and states9enF ;r are they ins,ired by the accu9ulated wisdo9 of a ,eo,le 9indful of the ,er9anent forces, transcending any ,articular align9ent, that deter9ine their relations to the continent of Euro,eF 're the disasters that followed in the wa$e of the three atte9,ts at continental conLuest so 9any accidents due to dis,arate causesF ;r does the si9ilarity in results ,oint to si9ilarities in the over-all ,olitical situation, si9ilarities that convey a lesson to be ,ondered by those who 9ight want to try againF More ,articularly, were the ,olicies the Soviet :nion ,ursued in the after9ath of the Second 8orld 8ar si9ilar to those of "a,oleon, 8illia9 , and HitlerF f they were did they call for ,olicies on the ,art of the :nited States si9ilar to those ,ursued in ./.1 and ./6.F So9eti9es, as in the case of the changes in British foreign ,olicy, the answer see9s to be clearB that ,olicy ,roceeded fro9 wisdo9 rather than fro9 whi9! Most of the ti9e, however, and es,ecially when we deal with the ,resent and the future, the answer is bound to be tentative and subGect to Lualifications! The facts fro9 which the answer 9ust derive are essentially a9biguous and subGect to continuous change! To those 9en who would have it otherwise, history has taught nothing but false analogies! 8hen such 9en have been res,onsible for the foreign ,olicies of their countries, they have achieved only disaster! 8illia9 and Hitler learned nothing fro9 "a,oleanIs fate, for they thought it could teach the9 nothing! Those who have erected 8ashingtonIs advice into a dog9a to be followed slavishly have erred no less than those who would dis9iss it altogether! The Munich settle9ent of ./02 is another case in ,oint! n retros,ect, of course, we all $now fro9 ,ractical e),erience that it was a failure, and fro9 that e),erience we have develo,ed the theoretical categories which de9onstrate that it was bound to be a failure! But re9e9ber very well the consensus with which the Munich settle9ent was a,,roved at the ti9e of its conclusion by theoreticians and ,ractitioners of foreign ,olicy and by the 9an in the street as well! The Munich settle9ent was then generally regarded as a great act of states9anshi,, a concession 9ade to a would-be conLueror for the sa$e of ,eace! E! H! (arr so regarded it then, and '! +! P! Taylor so regards it now! The flaw in that reasoning, which few ,eo,le were C and ,erha,s could be C aware of at the ti9e, was again the neglect of the contingencies inherent in ,olitical ,rediction! That which reveals itself as a si9,le truth in retros,ect was either co9,letely un$nown in ,ros,ect or else could not be deter9ined by anything but an uncertain hunch! Ta$e finally the conte9,orary issue of nuclear war! &ro9 ti9e to ti9e '9erican ,olicy9a$ers s,ea$ o,enly about J,revailingJ in a nuclear war! n this they 9irror co99ents 9ade by Russian 9ilitary leaders C although not by Soviet ,olitical leaders such as BreHhnev, who 9ore than once warned that a ther9onuclear war would be suicidal for both su,er,owers! Particularly in the ./24s, as cold-war tensions 9ounted again, voices in both countries echoed the belief that victory in a nuclear war was not unthin$able, ,rovided aug9ented strategic forces were for9ed through vastly increased defense e),enditures! t is ,ossible to develo, a theory of nuclear war which assu9es nuclear war to be Gust another $ind of violence, greater in 9agnitude but not different in $ind fro9 the ty,es of violence with which history has acLuainted us! t follows fro9 this assu9,tion that nuclear war is going to be 9uch 9ore terrible than conventional war, but not necessarily intolerable, ,rovided we ta$e the 9easures which will enable at least so9e of us to survive it! n other words, once one starts with this theoretical assu9,tion of the nature and the conseLuences of nuclear war, one can logically arrive at the conclusion that the foreign ,olicy of the :nited States does not need to li9it itself to trying to avoid nuclear war, but that the :nited States 9ust also ,re,are to survive it! 'nd then it beco9es ,erfectly legiti9ate to raise the Luestion, ,rovided .44 9illion '9ericans were to be $illed in a nuclear war and nine-tenths of the econo9ic ca,acity of the :nited States were to be destroyed, of how we enable the surviving '9ericans to rebuild the :nited States with the re9aining one-tenth of econo9ic ca,acity! The contingent ele9ent in this theory of nuclear war is its utter uncertainty, and this uncertainty is ty,ical of all levels of theoretical analysis and ,rediction in the field of ,olitics, do9estic and international! Even if one were to acce,t all its esti9ates of deaths and 9aterial destruction and of the rate of 9aterial recovery, this theory would have to be uncertain about the hu9an reactions to the $ind of hu9an and 9aterial devastation which nuclear war is li$ely to bring about! ;bviously, if a highly co9,le) hu9an society could be visualiHed to o,erate li$e a ,ri9itive ant society, its recu,erative ability could be ta$en for granted! f one-half of the ants of one ant hill have been destroyed together with nine-tenths of the 9aterial of the ant hill, it is safe to conclude that the re9aining ants will start all over again, building u, the ant hill and re,roducing until the ne)t catastro,he will force the9 to start all over again!

But a hu9an society does not have this ty,e of 9echanical recu,erative ability! Societies have a brea$ing ,oint as do individuals, and there is a ,oint beyond which hu9an endurance does not carry hu9an initiative in the face of such un,recedented 9assive devastation! ;nce that ,oint is reached, civiliHation itself will colla,se! The e)act location of that ,oint in the scale of hu9an reactions is beyond theoretical understanding! 8hat we are left with are hunches which 9ay or 9ay not be confir9ed by e),erience! The first lesson the student of international ,olitics 9ust learn and never forget is that the co9,le)ities of international affairs 9a$e si9,le solutions and trustworthy ,ro,hecies i9,ossible! Here the scholar and the charlatan ,art co9,any! 7nowledge of the forces that deter9ine ,olitics a9ong nations, and of the ways by which their ,olitical relations unfold, reveals the a9biguity of the facts of international ,olitics! n every ,olitical situation contradictory tendencies are at ,lay! ;ne of these tendencies is 9ore li$ely to ,revail under certain conditions! But which tendency actually will ,revail is anybodyIs guess! The best the scholar can do, then, is to trace the different tendencies that, as ,otentialities, are inherent in a certain international situation! He can ,oint out the different conditions that 9a$e it 9ore li$ely for one tendency to ,revail than for another and, finally, assess the ,robabilities for the different conditions and tendencies to ,revail in actuality! Thus world affairs have sur,rises in store for whoever tries to read the future fro9 his $nowledge of the ,ast and fro9 the signs of the ,resent! n .113, 8ashington declared that Jthe &ate of our (ountry de,ends in all hu9an ,robability, on the E)ertion of a &ew 8ee$s!J #et it was not until seven years later that the 8ar of nde,endence ca9e to an end! n &ebruary .1/=, British Pri9e Minister Pitt Gustified the reduction of 9ilitary e),enditures @,articularly a drastic decrease in the ,ersonnel of the British navyA and held out ho,e for 9ore reductions to co9e by declaringB J:nLuestionably there never was a ti9e in the history of this country when fro9 the situation of Euro,e we 9ight 9ore reasonably e),ect fifteen years of ,eace than at the ,resent 9o9ent!J ;nly two 9onths later the continent of Euro,e was engulfed in war! %ess than a year later Great Britain was involved! Thus was initiated a ,eriod of al9ost continuous warfare which lasted nearly a Luarter of a century! 8hen %ord Granville beca9e British &oreign Secretary in .214, he was infor9ed by the Per9anent :ndersecretary that Jhe had never, during his long e),erience, $nown so great a lull in foreign affairs, and that he was not aware of any i9,ortant Luestion that he Q%ord GranvilleR should have to deal with!J ;n that sa9e day Prince %eo,old of HohenHollern-Sig9aringen acce,ted the (rown of S,ain, an event that three wee$s later led to the outbrea$ of the &ranco-Prussian 8ar! Si) wee$s before the Russian Revolution of March ./.1, %enin told a grou, of young socialists in PurichB J8e old ,eo,le will ,robably not live to see the decisive battles of the co9ing revolution!J %ess than a year later, the decisive battles of the Russian Revolution began under his leadershi,! 8hen the ,ro,hecies of great states9en fare so ill, what can we e),ect fro9 the ,redictions of lesser 9indsF n how 9any boo$s written on international affairs before the &irst 8orld 8ar, when co99on o,inion held great wars to be i9,ossible or at least of short duration, was there even an in$ling of what was to co9eF 8as any boo$ written in the ,eriod between the two world wars which could have hel,ed one antici,ate what international ,olitics would be li$e in the ninth decade of the centuryF 8ho could have guessed at the beginning of the Second 8orld 8ar what the ,olitical world would be li$e at its endF 8ho could have $nown in ./65 what the world would be li$e in ./55, or in ./34 what it would be li$e in ./14 or ./24F 8hat trust then shall we ,lace in those who today would tell us what to9orrow and the day after will bring or what the year =444 will be li$eF5 n ./1/ the intelligence co99unity, and 9ore ,articularly the (entral ntelligence 'gency, were criticiHed for their failure to warn '9erican ,olicy9a$ers of the u,heavals that cul9inated in the Shah of ranIs ouster! President (arter hi9self too$ the un,recedented ste, of ,ublicly re,ri9anding the highest authorities in the intelligence field for their lac$ of foresight! 8hat accounts for this failure of foresight on the ,art of otherwise intelligent and res,onsible ,eo,leF The answer lies in the nature of the e9,irical 9aterial with which these individuals had to deal! The observer is confronted with a 9ultitude of factors, the totality of which sha,e the future! n order to foresee the future, the observer would have to $now all these factors, their dyna9ics, their 9utual actions and reactions, and so forth! 8hat he actually $nows and can $now is but a s9all frag9ent of the total! He 9ust guess C and only the future will show who chose rightly a9ong the 9any ,ossible guesses! Thus, with regard to ran the intelligence co99unity guessed wrong! nstead of bla9ing it indiscri9inately, one ought to as$ oneself two LuestionsB (ould one have ,in,ointed in ti9e the outbrea$ of ,o,ular discontentF f the answer is in the affir9ative, 8hat could the :nited States have done about itF The answer to the second Luestion is, at bestB very little! This is ,robably why the intelligence co99unity ,aid less attention to ran than it 9ight have done in the first ,lace! t is sobering to note that the science of econo9ics, ,resu9ed to be the 9ost ,recise of the social sciences because its central conce,t, wealth, is Luantitative by definition, is si9ilarly inca,able of reliable ,rediction! 'n e)a9ination of a large nu9ber of forecasts of year-to-year changes in the '9erican G"P for the years ./50 - 30 established an average error of about 64 ,er cent!3 n ;ctober ./33, the Prudential %ife nsurance (o9,any ,redicted that in ./31 consu9er
5

The fallibility of ,ro,hecies in international affairs is stri$ingly de9onstrated by the fantastic errors co99itted by the e),erts who have tried to forecast the nature of the ne)t war! The history of these forecasts, fro9 Machiavelli to General +! &! (! &uller, is the story of logical deductions, ,lausible in the9selves, which had no connection with the contingencies of the actual historic develo,9ent! General &uller, for instance, foresaw in ./=0 that the decisive wea,on of the Second 8orld 8ar would be gasS See The Refor9ation of 8ar @"ew #or$B E! P! *utton and (o9,any, ./=0A! 3 Ei$tor ParnowitH, 'n ',,raisal of Short-Ter9 Econo9ic &orecasts @"ew #or$B "ational Bureau of Econo9ic Research, ./31A!

e),enditures would rise by 0. billion dollars and inventory invest9ents would a9ount to 1!5 billion dollars! n ;ctober ./31, it scaled its esti9ate of consu9er e),enditures down to =1 billion dollars, an error of al9ost .5 ,er cent, assu9ing the correctness of the revised esti9ate> it reduced its esti9ate of inventory invest9ents to 1 billion dollars! The (ouncil of Econo9ic 'dvisors overesti9ated the growth of the G"P for the sa9e year by about .= ,er cent! ;N%'+STAN%ING TH' P+O&L'M O: INT'+NATIONAL P'AC' These Luestions lead us to the secondary ,ur,ose of this boo$! "o study of ,olitics, and certainly no study of international ,olitics in the final decades of the twentieth century, can be disinterested in the sense that it is able to divorce $nowledge fro9 action and to ,ursue $nowledge for its own sa$e! nternational ,olitics is no longer, as it was for the :nited States during 9ost of its history, a series of incidents, costly or rewarding, but hardly calling into Luestion the nationIs very e)istence and destiny! The e)istence and destiny of the :nited States were 9ore dee,ly affected by the do9estic events of the (ivil 8ar than by the international ,olicies leading u, to, and evolving fro9, the Me)ican 8ar, the S,anish-'9erican 8ar, and the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe *octrine!1 Two facts ,eculiar to our ti9e have co9,letely reversed the relative i9,ortance of do9estic and international ,olicies for the :nited States! &irst of all, the :nited States is at the 9o9ent of this writing one of the two 9ost ,owerful nations on earth! #et, in co9,arison with its actual and ,otential co9,etitors, it is not so ,owerful that it can afford to ignore the effect of its ,olicies u,on its ,osition a9ong the nations! &ro9 the end of the (ivil 8ar to the beginning of the Second 8orld 8ar it 9attered little what ,olicies the :nited States ,ursued with regard to its %atin'9erican neighbors, (hina, or S,ain! The self-sufficiency of its own strength, in conGunction with the o,eration of the balance of ,ower, 9ade the :nited States i99une to the boundless a9bition born of success and the fear and frustration which goes with failure! The :nited States could ta$e success and failure in stride without being unduly te9,ted or afraid! "ow it stands outside the enclosures of its continental citadel, ta$ing on the whole of the ,olitical world as friend or foe! t has beco9e dangerous and vulnerable, feared and afraid! The ris$ of being very ,owerful, but not o9ni,otent, is aggravated by the second factB a threefold revolution in the ,olitical structure of the world! &irst, the 9ulti,le-state syste9 of the ,ast, whose center was in Euro,e, has been re,laced by a world-wide, bi,olar syste9, whose centers lie outside Euro,e! &urther9ore, the 9oral unity of the ,olitical world, which has distinguished 8estern civiliHation during 9ost of its history, has been s,lit into two inco9,atible syste9s of thought and action, co9,eting everywhere for the allegiance of 9en! More recently, the revolutions of eastern and central Euro,e and within the Soviet :nion have reinstated a 9ulti,olar world whose final outline is yet to be deter9ined! &inally, 9odern technology has 9ade ,ossible total war resulting in universal destruction! The ,re,onderance of these three new ele9ents in conte9,orary international ,olitics has not only 9ade the ,reservation of world ,eace e)tre9ely difficult, but has also increased the ris$s inherent in war to the ,oint where all-out nuclear war beco9es a self-defeating absurdity! Since in this world situation the :nited States holds a ,osition of ,redo9inant ,ower, and hence of fore9ost res,onsibility, the understanding of the forces that 9old international ,olitics and of the factors that deter9ine its course has beco9e for the :nited States 9ore than an interesting intellectual occu,ation! t has beco9e a vital necessity! To reflect on international ,olitics fro9 the vantage ,oint of the conte9,orary :nited States, then, is to reflect u,on the vital ,roble9s that confront '9erican foreign ,olicy in our ti9e! 8hile at all ti9es the ,ro9otion of the national interests of the :nited States as a ,ower a9ong ,owers has been the 9ain concern of '9erican foreign ,olicy, in an age that has seen two world wars and has learned how to wage total war with nuclear wea,ons the ,reservation of ,eace has beco9e the ,ri9e concern of all nations! t is for this reason that this boo$ is ,lanned around the two conce,ts of ,ower and ,eace! These two conce,ts are central to a discussion of world ,olitics in the final decade of the twentieth century, when an un,recedented accu9ulation of destructive ,ower gives to the ,roble9 of ,eace an urgency it has never had before! n a world whose 9oving force is the as,iration of sovereign nations for ,ower, ,eace can be 9aintained only by two devices! ;ne is the self-regulatory 9echanis9 of the social forces, which 9anifests itself in the struggle for ,ower on the international scene, that is, the balance of ,ower! The other consists of nor9ative li9itations u,on that struggle, in the for9 of international law, international 9orality, and world ,ublic o,inion! Since neither of these devices, as they o,erate today, is li$ely to $ee, the struggle for ,ower indefinitely within ,eaceful bounds, three further Luestions 9ust be as$ed and answeredB 8hat is the value of the 9ain current ,ro,osals for the 9aintenance of international ,eaceF More ,articularly, what is the value of the ,ro,osal for transfor9ing the international society of sovereign nations into a su,ranational organiHation, such as a world stateF 'nd, finally, what 9ust a ,rogra9 for action be li$e that is 9indful of the lessons of the ,ast and endeavors to ada,t the9 to the ,roble9s of the ,resentF

This corollary is found in the 9essage of Theodore Roosevelt to (ongress on *ece9ber 3, ./46! n that 9essage he ,roclai9ed the right of the :nited States to intervene in the do9estic affairs of the %atin-'9erican countries! &or the te)t, see Ruhl +! Bartlett, editor, The Record of '9erican *i,lo9acyB *ocu9ents and Readings in the History of '9erican &oreign Relations, 6th ed! @"ew #or$B 'lfred '! 7no,f, ./36A, ,! 50/!

PART T%O International Politics as a 'tru**le for Power / Political Power

WHAT IS POLITICAL POW'+<. As Means to the Nation=s 'n(s nternational ,olitics, li$e all ,olitics, is a struggle for ,ower! 8hatever the ulti9ate ai9s of international ,olitics, ,ower is always the i99ediate ai9! States9en and ,eo,les 9ay ulti9ately see$ freedo9, security, ,ros,erity, or ,ower itself! They 9ay define their goals in ter9s of a religious, ,hiloso,hic, econo9ic, or social ideal! They 9ay ho,e that this ideal will 9aterialiHe through its own inner force, through divine intervention, or through the natural develo,9ent of hu9an affairs! They 9ay also try to further its realiHation through non,olitical 9eans, such as technical co-o,eration with other nations or international organiHations! But whenever they strive to realiHe their goal by 9eans of international ,olitics, they do so by striving for ,ower! The (rusaders wanted to free the holy ,laces fro9 do9ination by the nfidelsB 8oodrow 8ilson wanted to 9a$e the world safe for de9ocracy> the "aHis wanted to o,en Eastern Euro,e to Ger9an coloniHation, to do9inate Euro,e, and to conLuer the world! Since they all chose ,ower to achieve these ends, they were actors on the scene of international ,olitics!= Two conclusions follow fro9 this conce,t of international ,olitics! &irst, not every action that a nation ,erfor9s with res,ect to another nation is of a ,olitical nature! Many such activities are nor9ally underta$en without any consideration of ,ower, nor do they nor9ally affect the ,ower of the nation underta$ing the9! Many legal, econo9ic, hu9anitarian, and cultural activities are of this $ind! Thus a nation is not nor9ally engaged in international ,olitics when it concludes an e)tradition treaty with another nation, when it e)changes goods and services with other nations, when it co-o,erates with other nations in ,roviding relief fro9 natural catastro,hes, and when it ,ro9otes the distribution of cultural achieve9ents throughout the world! n other words, the involve9ent of a nation in international ,olitics is but one a9ong 9any ty,es of activities in which a nation can ,artici,ate on the international scene! Second, not all nations are at all ti9es to the sa9e e)tent involved in international ,olitics! The degree of their involve9ent 9ay run all the way fro9 the 9a)i9u9 at ,resent attained by the :nited States and the Soviet :nion, through the 9ini9u9 involve9ent of such countries as SwitHerland! %u)e9bourg, or EeneHuela, to the co9,lete noninvolve9ent of %iechtenstein and Monaco! Si9ilar e)tre9es can be noticed in the history of ,articular countries! S,a9 in the si)teenth and seventeenth centuries was one of the 9ain active ,artici,ants in the struggle for ,ower on the international scene, but ,lays today only a 9arginal role in it! The sa9e is true of such countries as 'ustria, Sweden, and SwitHerland! ;n the other hand, nations li$e the :nited States, the Soviet :nion, and (hina are today 9uch 9ore dee,ly involved in international ,olitics than they were fifty or even twenty years ago! n short, the relation of nations to international ,olitics has a dyna9ic Luality! t changes with the vicissitudes of ,ower, which 9ay ,ush a nation into the forefront of the ,ower struggle, or 9ay de,rive a nation of the ability to ,artici,ate actively in it! t 9ay also change under the i9,act of cultural transfor9ations, which 9ay 9a$e a nation ,refer other ,ursuits, for instance co99erce, to those of ,ower! The tendency of countries to be involved to a greater or lesser e)tent in the struggle for ,ower ,ro9,ted 'rnold 8olfers to observe that they occu,ied ,ositions at o,,osite e)tre9es of a s,ectru9 e)tending fro9 what he called the ,ole of ,ower to the ,ole of indifference!
.

The conce,t of ,olitical ,ower ,oses one of the 9ost difficult and controversial ,roble9s of ,olitical science! The value of any conce,t used in ,olitical science is deter9ined by its ability to e),lain a 9a)i9u9 of the ,heno9ena that are conventionally considered to belong to a certain s,here of ,olitical activity! Thus the coverage of a conce,t of ,olitical ,ower, to be useful for the understanding of international ,olitics, 9ust be broader than the coverage of one ado,ted to o,erate in the field of 9unici,al ,olitics! The ,olitical 9eans e9,loyed in the latter are 9uch 9ore narrowly circu9scribed than are those e9,loyed in international ,olitics! = &or so9e significant re9ar$s on ,ower in relation to international ,olitics, see %ionel Bobbins, The Econo9ic (auses of 8ar @%ondonB +onathan (a,e, ./0/A, ,,! 30 ff!

Its Nature0 :our %istin$tions 8hen we s,ea$ of ,ower in the conte)t of this boo$, we have in 9ind not 9anIs ,ower over nature, or over an artistic 9ediu9, such as language, s,eech, sound, or color, or over the 9eans of ,roduction or consu9,tion, or over hi9self in the sense of self-control! 8hen we s,ea$ of ,ower, we 9ean 9anIs control over the 9inds and actions of other 9en! By ,olitical ,ower we refer to the 9utual relations of control a9ong the holders of ,ublic authority and between the latter and the ,eo,le at large! Political ,ower is a ,sychological relation between those who e)ercise it and those over who9 it is e)ercised! t gives the for9er control over certain actions of the latter through the i9,act which the for9er e)ert on the latterIs 9inds! That i9,act derives fro9 three sourcesB the e),ectation of benefits, the fear of disadvantages, the res,ect or love for 9en or institutions! t 9ay be e)erted through orders, threats, the authority or charis9a of a 9an or of an office, or a co9bination of any of these! n view of this definition, four distinctions 9ust be 9adeB between ,ower and influence, between ,ower and force, between usable and unusable ,ower, between legiti9ate and illegiti9ate ,ower! The Secretary of State who advises the President of the :nited States on the conduct of '9erican foreign ,olicy has influence it the President follows his advice! But he has no ,ower over the PresidentB for he has none of the 9eans at his dis,osal with which to i9,ose his will u,on that of the President! He can ,ersuade but he cannot co9,el! The President, on the other hand, has ,ower over the Secretary of StateB for he can i9,ose his will u,on the latter by virtue of the authority of his office, the ,ro9ise of benefits, and the threat of disadvantages! Political ,ower 9ust be distinguished fro9 force in the sense of the actual e)ercise of ,hysical violence! The threat of ,hysical violence in the for9 of ,olice action, i9,rison9ent, ca,ital ,unish9ent, or war is an intrinsic ele9ent of ,olitics! 8hen violence beco9es an actuality, it signifies the abdication of ,olitical ,ower in favor of 9ilitary or ,seudo-9ilitary ,ower! n international ,olitics in ,articular, ar9ed strength as a threat or a ,otentiality is the 9ost i9,ortant 9aterial factor 9a$ing for the ,olitical ,ower of a nation! f it beco9es an actuality in war, it signifies the substitution of 9ilitary for ,olitical ,ower! The actual e)ercise of ,hysical violence substitutes for the ,sychological relation between two 9inds, which is of the essence of ,olitical ,ower, the ,hysical relation between two bodies, one of which is strong enough to do9inate the otherIs 9ove9ents! t is for this reason that in the e)ercise of ,hysical violence the ,sychological ele9ent of the ,olitical relationshi, is lost, and that we 9ust distinguish between 9ilitary and ,olitical ,ower! The availability of nuclear wea,ons 9a$es it necessary to distinguish between usable and unusable ,ower! t is one of the ,arado)es of the nuclear age that, in contrast to the e),erience of all of ,renuclear history, an increase in 9ilitary ,ower is no longer necessarily conducive to an increase in ,olitical ,ower! The threat of all-out nuclear violence i9,lies the threat of total destruction! 's such, it can still be a suitable instru9ent of foreign ,olicy when addressed to a nation which cannot re,ly in $ind! The nation ar9ed with nuclear wea,ons can assert ,ower over the other nation by sayingB Either you do as say, or will destroy you! The situation is different if the nation so threatened can res,ond by sayingB f you destroy 9e with nuclear wea,ons, you will be destroyed in turn! Here the 9utual threats cancel each other out! Since the nuclear destruction of one nation would call forth the nuclear destruction of the other, both nations can afford to disregard the threat on the assu9,tion that both will act rationally! t is only on the assu9,tion that the nations concerned 9ight act irrationally by destroying each other in an all-out nuclear war that the threat of nuclear war is credible and has indeed been used by the :nited States and the Soviet :nion against each other, for instance by the Soviet :nion during the SueH (risis of ./53, by the :nited States during the Berlin (risis of ./3., and by both during the 'rab- sraeli 8ar of ./10! #et while here the threat of force can be used as a rational instru9ent of foreign ,olicy, the actual use of that force re9ains irrationalB for the threatened force would be used not for the ,olitical ,ur,ose of influencing the will of the other side but for the irrational ,ur,ose of destroying the other side with the attendant assurance of oneIs own destruction! Thus the 9agnitude of its destructiveness, as co9,ared with the li9ited character of the ,olitical ,ur,oses which are the ,ro,er obGect of foreign ,olicy, renders nuclear force unusable as an instru9ent of foreign ,olicy! t can be rational under certain conditions to threaten the other side with destruction through the use of nuclear force in order to change the other sideIs will> it would be irrational to actually destroy the other side, thereby inviting oneIs own destruction! n contrast, conventional force is usable as an instru9ent of foreign ,olicyB for by inflicting li9ited da9age with co99ensurate ris$s to oneself, one can use it indeed as a suitable instru9ent for changing the other sideIs will! &inally, legiti9ate ,ower, that is, ,ower whose e)ercise is 9orally or legally Gustified, 9ust be distinguished fro9 illegiti9ate ,ower! Power e)ercised with 9oral or legal authority 9ust be distinguished fro9 na$ed ,ower! The ,ower of the ,olice officer who searches 9e by virtue of a search warrant is Lualitatively different fro9 the ,ower of a robber who ,erfor9s the sa9e action by virtue of his holding a gun! The distinction is not only ,hiloso,hically valid but also relevant for the conduct of foreign ,olicy! %egiti9ate ,ower, which can invo$e a 9oral or legal Gustification for its e)ercise, is li$ely to be 9ore effective than eLuivalent illegiti9ate ,ower, which cannot be so Gustified! That is to say, legiti9ate ,ower has a better chance to influence the will of its obGects than eLuivalent illegiti9ate ,ower! Power e)ercised in self-defense or in the na9e of the :nited "ations has a better chance to succeed than eLuivalent ,ower e)ercised by an JaggressorJ nation or in violation of international law! Political ideologies, as we shall see, serve the ,ur,ose of endowing foreign ,olicies with the a,,earance of legiti9acy!

8hile it is generally recogniHed that the inter,lay of the e),ectation of benefits, the fear of disadvantages, and the res,ect or love for 9en or institutions, in ever changing co9binations, for9s the basis of all do9estic ,olitics, the i9,ortance of these factors for international ,olitics is less obvious, but no less real! There has been a tendency to reduce ,olitical ,ower to the actual a,,lication of force or at least to eLuate it with successful threats of force and with ,ersuasion, to the neglect of charis9a! That neglect, as we shall see,0 accounts in good 9easure for the neglect of ,restige as an inde,endent ele9ent in international ,olitics! #et without ta$ing into account the charis9a of a 9an! such as "a,oleon or Hitler, or of an institution, such as the :nited States govern9ent or (onstitution, evo$ing trust and love through which the wills of 9en sub9it the9selves to the will of such a 9an or institution, it is i9,ossible to understand certain ,heno9ena of international ,olitics which have been ,articularly ,ro9inent in 9odern ti9es! The i9,ortance which charis9atic leadershi, and the res,onse to it as love of the subGect for the leader has for international ,olitics is clearly revealed in a letter which +ohn *urie, Scotch Presbyterian and wor$er for Protestant unity! wrote in .30= to the British '9bassador Tho9as Roe! e),laining the decline of the ,ower of Gustavus 'dol,hus of Sweden, then fighting for the Protestant cause in Ger9anyB
The increase of his authority is the ground of his abodeB and love is the ground of his authority> it 9ust be through love> for it cannot be through ,owerB for his ,ower is not in his own subGects but in strangers> not in his 9oney, but in theirs> not in their good will, but in 9ere necessity as things stand now betwi)t hi9 and the9B therefore if the necessity be not so urgent as it is> or if any other 9eans be shown by God @who is able to do as 9uch by another 9an as by hi9A to avoid this necessity> the 9oney and the ,ower and the assistance which it yieldeth unto hi9 will fall fro9 hi9 and so his authority is lost, and his abode will be no longerB lor the %ove which was at first is gone ! ! !6

The President of the :nited States e)erts ,olitical ,ower over the e)ecutive branch of the govern9ent so long as his orders are obeyed by the 9e9bers of that branch! The leader of the ,arty has ,olitical ,ower so long as he is able to 9old the actions of the 9e9bers of the ,arty according to his will! 8e refer to the ,olitical ,ower of an industrialist, labor leader, or lobbyist in so far as his ,references influence the actions of ,ublic officials! The :nited States e)erts ,olitical ,ower over Puerto Rico so long as the laws of the :nited States are observed by the citiHens of that island! 8hen we s,ea$ of the ,olitical ,ower of the :nited States in (entral '9erica, we have in 9ind the confor9ity of the actions of (entral '9erican govern9ents with the wishes of the govern9ent of the :nited States!5 Thus the state9ent that ' has or wants ,olitical ,ower over O signifies always that ' is able, or wants to be able, to control certain E actions of O through influencing BIs 9ind! 8hatever the 9aterial obGectives of a foreign ,olicy, such as the acLuisition of sources of raw 9aterials, the control of sea lanes, or territorial changes, they always entail control of the actions of others through influence over their 9inds! The Rhine frontier as a century-old obGective of &rench foreign ,olicy ,oints to the ,olitical obGective to destroy the desire of Ger9any to attac$ &rance by 9a$ing it ,hysically difficult or i9,ossible for Ger9any to do so! Great Britain owed its ,redo9inant ,osition in world ,olitics throughout the nineteenth century to the calculated ,olicy of 9a$ing it either too dangerous @because Great Britain was too strongA or unnecessary @because its strength was used with 9oderation for other nations to o,,ose it! The ,olitical obGective of 9ilitary ,re,arations of any $ind is to deter other nations fro9 using 9ilitary force by 9a$ing it too ris$y for the9 to do so! The ,olitical ai9 of 9ilitary ,re,arations is! in other words, to 9a$e the actual a,,lication of 9ilitary force unnecessary by inducing the ,ros,ective ene9y to desist fro9 the use of 9ilitary force! The ,olitical obGective of war itself is not ,er se the conLuest of territory and the annihilation of ene9y ar9ies, but a change in the 9ind of the ene9y, which will 9a$e hi9 yield to the will of the victor! Therefore, whenever econo9ic, financial, territorial, or 9ilitary ,olicies are under discussion in international affairs, it is necessary to distinguish between, say, econo9ic ,olicies that are underta$en for their own sa$e and econo9ic ,olicies that are the instru9ents of a ,olitical ,olicy C a ,olicy, that is, whose econo9ic ,ur,ose is but the 9eans to the end of controlling the ,olicies of another nation! The e),ort ,olicy of SwitHerland with regard to the :nited States falls into the first category! The econo9ic ,olicies of the Soviet :nion with regard to the nations of Eastern Euro,e fall into the latter category! So do 9any econo9ic ,olicies of the :nited States in %atin '9erica! 'sia, and Euro,e! The distinction is of great ,ractical i9,ortance, and the failure to 9a$e it has led to 9uch confusion in ,olicy and ,ublic o,inion! 'n econo9ic, financial, territorial, or 9ilitary ,olicy underta$en for its own sa$e is subGect to evaluation in its own ter9s! s it econo9ically or financially advantageousF 8hat effects has acLuisition of territory u,on the ,o,ulation and econo9y of the nation acLuiring itF 8hat are the conseLuences of a change in a 9ilitary ,olicy for education, ,o,ulation, and the do9estic ,olitical syste9F The decisions with res,ect to these ,olicies are 9ade e)clusively in ter9s of such intrinsic considerations!
0

See (ha,ter 3! 6 Gunnar 8estin, "egotiations 'bout (hurch :nity! .3=2 -.306 @:,salaB 'l9Luist and 8i$sells, ./0=A, ,! =42! The s,elling has been 9oderniHed! 5 The e)a9,les in the te)t illustrate also the distinction between ,olitical ,ower as 9ere social fact, as in the case of the lobbyist, and ,olitical ,ower in the sense of legiti9ate authority, i!e!, of the President of the :nited States! Both the President of the :nited States and the lobbyist e)ercise ,olitical ,ower, however different its source and nature 9ay be!

8hen, however, the obGectives of these ,olicies serve to increase the ,ower of the nation ,ursuing the9 with regard to other nations, these ,olicies and their obGectives 9ust be Gudged ,ri9arily fro9 the ,oint of view of their contribution to national ,ower! 'n econo9ic ,olicy that cannot be Gustified in ,urely econo9ic ter9s 9ight nevertheless be underta$en in view of the ,olitical ,olicy ,ursued! The insecure and un,rofitable character of a loan to a foreign nation 9ay be a valid argu9ent against it on ,urely financial grounds! But the argu9ent is irrelevant if the loan, however unwise it 9ay be fro9 a ban$erIs ,oint of view, serves the ,olitical ,olicies of the nation! t 9ay of course be that the econo9ic or financial losses involved in such ,olicies will wea$en the nation in its international ,osition to such an e)tent as to outweigh the ,olitical advantages to be e),ected! ;n these grounds such ,olicies 9ight be reGected! n such a case, what decides the issue is not ,urely econo9ic and financial considerations but a co9,arison of the ,olitical chances and ris$s involvedB that is, the ,robable effect of these ,olicies u,on the ,ower of the nation! 8hen the :nited States has ,rovided loans or assistance to countries such as Poland which lav in the shadow of the Red 'r9y, the ,ur,ose was not ,ri9arily econo9ic or financial! t was rather to enable such countries to 9ove towards a degree of inde,endence of the influence and ,ower of the Soviet :nion! f the re,ay9ent of loans to '9erican agencies or financial institutions was ,ost,oned with :!S! govern9ent a,,roval, this was not for hu9anitarian or charitable reasons alone! Rather, it has been '9erican ,olicy to $ee, o,en certain o,tions for the govern9ent of Poland, o,tions which ,revent its total de,endence on the Soviet :nion! Such actions in the econo9ic s,here are based on ,olitical obGectives which in the long run would assure the survival of Poland as a sovereign state however 9uch its geogra,hic and ,olitical ,osition forced it to acce,t the ,osition of a satellite within the s,here of the Soviet :nion at least for the short run! n a word, the ai9 of '9erican econo9ic ,olicy toward Poland was to li9it Soviet influence and ,ower in (entral and Eastern Euro,e while increasing the leverage of the :nited States in the area! TH' %'P+'CIATION O: POLITICAL POW'+ The as,iration for ,ower being the distinguishing ele9ent of international ,olitics, as of all ,olitics, international ,olitics is of necessity ,ower ,olitics! 8hile this fact is generally recogniHed in the ,ractice of international affairs, it is freLuently denied in the ,ronounce9ents of scholars, ,ublicists, and even states9en! Since the end of the "a,oleonic 8ars, ever larger grou,s in the 8estern world have been ,ersuaded that the struggle for ,ower on the international scene is a te9,orary ,heno9enon, a historical accident that is bound to disa,,ear once the ,eculiar historic conditions that have given rise to it have been eli9inated! Thus +ere9y Bentha9 believed that the co9,etition for colonies was at the root of all international conflicts! JE9anci,ate your coloniesSJ was his advice to the govern9ents, and international conflict and war would of necessity disa,,ear!3 'dherents of free trade, such as (obden 1and Proudhon 2, were convinced that the re9oval of trade barriers was the only condition for the establish9ent of ,er9anent har9ony a9ong nations, and 9ight even lead to the disa,,earance of international ,olitics altogether! J't so9e future election!J said (obden! Jwe 9ay ,robably see the test no foreign ,olitiesI a,,lied to those who offer to beco9e the re,resentatives of free constituencies!J /&or Mar) and his followers, ca,italis9 is at the root of international discord and war! They 9aintain that international socialis9 will do away with the struggle for ,ower on the international scene and will bring about ,er9anent ,eace! *uring the nineteenth century, liberals everywhere shared the conviction that ,ower ,olitics and war were residues of an obsolete syste9 of govern9ent, and that the victory of de9ocracy and constitutional govern9ent over absolutis9 and autocracy would assure the victory of international har9ony and ,er9anent ,eace over ,ower ,olitics and war! ;f this liberal school of thought! 8oodrow 8ilson was the 9ost eloLuent and 9ost influential s,o$es9an! n recent ti9es, the conviction that the struggle for ,ower can be eli9inated fro9 the international scene has been connected with the great atte9,ts at organiHing the world, such as the %eague of "ations and the :nited "ations! Thus (ordell Hull, then :!S! Secretary of State, declared in ./60 on his return fro9 the Moscow (onference, which laid the groundwor$ for the :nited "ations, that the new international organiHation would 9ean the end of ,ower ,olitics and usher in a new era of international collaboration!.4 Mr! Phili, "oel-Ba$er, then British Minister of State, declared in ./63 in the House of (o99ons that the British govern9ent was Jdeter9ined to use the institutions of the :nited "ations to $ill ,ower ,olitics, in order that, by the 9ethods of de9ocracy, the will of the ,eo,le shall ,revail!J..
3 1

E9anci,ate #our (olonies @%ondonB Robert Heward, .204A! &ree TradeS 8hat is itF 8hy, brea$ing down the barriers that se,arate nationsB those barriers, behind which nestle the feelings of ,ride, revenge, hatred, and Gealousy, which every now and then burst their bounds, and deluge whole countries with blood!J J&ree trade is the international law of the 'l9ighty,J and free trade and ,eace see9 to be Jone and the sa9e cause!J See S,eeches by Richard (obden @%ondonB Mac9illan ? (o9,any, .214A, Eol! , ,! 1/B Political 8ritings @"ew #or$B *! ',,leton and (o9,any, .231A, Eol! , ,! ..4> letter of ',ril .=, .26=, to Henry 'shworth, Luoted in +ohn Morley! %ife of Richard (obden @BostonB Roberts Brothers, .22.A, T! .56! 2 U%et us su,,ress the tariffs, and the alliance of the ,eo,les will thus be declared, their solidarity recogniHed, their eLuality ,roclai9ed!J ;euvres co9,letes @Paris, .231A, Eol! , ,! =62! / Kuoted in '! (! &! Beales, ' Short History of English %iberalis9, ,! ./5! .4 "ew #or$ Ti9es, "ove9ber ./, ./60, ,! .! .. House of (o99ons *ebates @&ifth Series, ./63A, Eol! 6./, ,! .=3=!

8hile we shall have 9ore to say later about these theories and the e),ectations derived fro9 the9,.= it is sufficient to state that the struggle for ,ower is universal in ti9e and s,ace and is an undeniable fact of e),erience! t cannot be denied that throughout historic ti9e, regardless of social, econo9ic, and ,olitical conditions, states have 9et each other in contests for ,ower! Even though anthro,ologists have shown that certain ,ri9itive ,eo,les see9 to be free fro9 the desire for ,ower, nobody has yet shown how their state of 9ind and the conditions under which they live can be recreated on a worldwide scale so as to eli9inate the struggle for ,ower fro9 the international scene! .0 t would be useless and even self-destructive to free one or the other of the ,eo,les of the earth fro9 the desire for ,ower while leaving it e)tant in others! f the desire for ,ower cannot be abolished everywhere in the world, those who 9ight be cured would si9,ly fall victi9s to the ,ower of others! The ,osition ta$en here 9ight be criticiHed on the ground that conclusions drawn fro9 the ,ast are unconvincing, and that to draw such conclusions has always been the 9ain stoc$ in trade of the ene9ies of ,rogress and refor9! Though it is true that certain social arrange9ents and institutions have always e)isted in the ,ast, it does not necessarily follow that they 9ust always e)ist in the future! The situation is, however, different when we deal not with social arrange9ents and institutions created by 9an, but with those ele9ental bio-,sychological drives by which in turn society is created! The drives to live, to ,ro,agate, and to do9inate are co99on to all 9en!.6 Their relative strength is de,endent u,on social conditions that 9ay favor one drive and tend to re,ress another, or that 9ay withhold social a,,roval fro9 certain 9anifestations of these drives while they encourage others! Thus, to ta$e e)a9,les only fro9 the s,here of ,ower, 9ost societies conde9n $illing as a 9eans of attaining ,ower within society, but all societies encourage the $illing of ene9ies in that struggle for ,ower which is called war! *ictators loo$ as$ance at the as,irations for ,olitical ,ower a9ong their fellow citiHens, but de9ocracies consider active ,artici,ation in the co9,etition for ,olitical ,ower a civic duty! 8here a 9ono,olistic organiHation of econo9ic activities e)ists, co9,etition for econo9ic ,ower is absent, and in co9,etitive econo9ic syste9s certain 9anifestations of the struggle for econo9ic ,ower are outlawed, while others are encouraged! ;strogors$y, invo$ing the authority of TocLueville, states that Jthe ,assions of the '9erican ,eo,le are not of a ,olitical, but of a co99ercial, nature! n that world awaiting cultivation, the love of ,ower ai9s less at 9en than at things!J.5 Regardless of ,articular social conditions, the decisive argu9ent against the o,inion that the struggle for ,ower on the international scene is a 9ere historic accident 9ust be derived fro9 the nature of do9estic ,olitics! The essence of international ,olitics is identical with its do9estic counter,art! Both do9estic and international ,olitics are a struggle for ,ower, 9odified only by the different conditions under which this struggle ta$es ,lace in the do9estic and in the international s,heres! The tendency to do9inate, in ,articular, is an ele9ent of all hu9an associations, fro9 the fa9ily through fraternal and ,rofessional associations and local ,olitical organiHations, to the state! ;n the fa9ily level, the ty,ical conflict between the 9other-in-law and her childIs s,ouse is in its essence a struggle for ,ower, the defense of an established ,ower ,osition against the atte9,t to establish a new one! 's such it foreshadows the conflict on the international scene between the ,olicies of the status Luo and the ,olicies of i9,erialis9! Social clubs, fraternities, faculties, and business organiHations are scenes of continuous struggles for ,ower between grou,s that either want to $ee, what ,ower they already have or see$ to attain greater ,ower! (o9,etitive contests between business enter,rises as well as labor dis,utes between e9,loyers and e9,loyees are freLuently fought not only, and so9eti9es not even ,ri9arily, for econo9ic advantages, but for control over each other and over others> that is, for ,ower! &inally, the whole ,olitical life of a nation, ,articularly of a de9ocratic nation, fro9 the local to the national level, is a continuous struggle for ,ower! n ,eriodic elections, in voting in legislative asse9blies, in lawsuits before courts, in ad9inistrative decisions and e)ecutive 9easures C in all these activities 9en try to 9aintain or to establish their ,ower over other 9en! The ,rocesses by which legislative, Gudicial, e)ecutive, and ad9inistrative decisions are reached are subGect to ,ressures and counter,ressures by J,ressure grou,sJ trying to defend and e),and their ,ositions of ,ower! 's one of the *ead Sea scrolls ,uts itB 8hat nation li$es to he o,,ressed by a stronger ,owerF ;r who wants his ,ro,erty ,lundered unGustlyF #et! is there a single nation that has not o,,ressed its neighborF ;r where in the world will you find a ,eo,le that has not ,lundered the ,ro,erty of anotherF 8here indeedF J;f the gods we $now,J to Luote Thucydides, Jand of 9en we believe! that it is a necessary law of their nature that they rule wherever they can!J.3 ;r, as Tolstoy ,ut itB J!!! the very ,rocess of do9inating anotherIs will was in itself a

.= .0

See Part Eight! &or an illu9inating discussion of this ,roble9, see Malcol9 Shar,, J'ggressionB ' Study of Ealues and %aw,J Ethics, Eol! 51, "o! 6, Part @+uly ./61A! .6 Poologists have tried to show that the drive to do9inate is found even in ani9als, such as chic$ens and 9on$eys, who create social hierarchies on the basis of will and the ability to do9inate! See e!g!, 8arder 'llee, 'ni9al %ife and Social Growth @Balti9oreB The 8illia9s and 8il$ens (o9,any, ./0=A, and The Social %ife of 'ni9als @"ew #or$B 8! 8! "orton and (o9,any, nc!, ./02A! (f! also the theories of 7onrad %orenH and the controversies concerning the9! .5 M! ;strogors$y, *e9ocracy and the ;rganiHation of Political Parties @"ew #or$B The Mac-9illan (o9,any, ./4=A, Eol! , ,! 5/=! .3 Thucydides, Boo$ E, V .45!

,leasure, a habit, and a necessity to *olo$hov!J.1 'nd in the words of +ohn of SalisburyB Though it is not given to all 9en to seiHe ,rincely or royal ,ower, yet the 9an who is wholly untainted by tyranny is rare or none)istent! n co99on s,eech the tyrant is one who o,,resses a whole ,eo,le by a rulershi, based on force> and yet it is not over a ,eo,le as a whole that a 9an can ,lay the tyrant, but he can do so if he will even in the 9eanest station! &or if not over the whole body of the ,eo,le! still each 9an will lord it as far as his ,ower e)tends!.2 n view of this ubiLuity of the struggle for ,ower in all social relations and on all levels of social organiHation, is it sur,rising that international ,olitics is of necessity ,ower ,oliticsF 'nd would it not be rather sur,rising if the struggle for ,ower were but an accidental and e,he9eral attribute of international ,olitics when it is a ,er9anent and necessary ele9ent of all branches of do9estic ,oliticsF TWO +OOTS O: TH' %'P+'CIATION O: POLITICAL POW'+ The de,reciation of the role ,ower ,lays on the international scene grows fro9 two roots! ;ne is the ,hiloso,hy of international relations which do9inated the better ,art of the nineteenth century and still holds sway over 9uch of our thin$ing on international affairs! The other is the ,articular ,olitical and intellectual circu9stances that have deter9ined the relations of the :nited States of '9erica to the rest of the world! Nineteenth#Centur Phi"osoph The nineteenth century was led to its de,reciation of ,ower ,olitics by its do9estic e),erience! The distinctive characteristic of this e),erience was the do9ination of the 9iddle classes by the aristocracy! By identifying this do9ination with ,olitical do9ination of any $ind, the ,olitical ,hiloso,hy of the nineteenth century ca9e to identify the o,,osition to aristocratic ,olitics with hostility to any $ind of ,olitics! 'fter the defeat of aristocratic govern9ent, the 9iddle classes develo,ed a syste9 of indirect do9ination! They re,laced the traditional division into the governing and governed classes, and the 9ilitary 9ethod of o,en violence, characteristic of aristocratic rule, with the invisible chains of econo9ic de,endence! This econo9ic syste9 o,erated through a networ$ of see9ingly egalitarian legal rules which concealed the very e)istence of ,ower relations! The nineteenth century was unable to see the ,olitical nature of these legaliHed relations! They see9ed to be essentially different fro9 what had gone, so far, under the na9e of ,olitics! Therefore, ,olitics in its aristocratic C that is, o,en and violent C for9 was identified with ,olitics as such! The struggle, then, for ,olitical ,ower C in do9estic as well as in international affairs C a,,eared to be only a historic accident, coincident with autocratic govern9ent and bound to disa,,ear with the disa,,earance of autocratic govern9ent! The Ameri$an ')perien$e This identification of ,ower ,olitics with aristocratic govern9ent found su,,ort in the '9erican e),erience! t can be traced to three ele9ents in that e),erienceB the uniLueness of the '9erican e),eri9ent, the actual isolation of the '9erican continent fro9 centers of the world conflict during the nineteenth century, and the hu9anitarian ,acifis9 and anti-i9,erialis9 of '9erican ,olitical ideology! That the severance of constitutional ties with the British (rown was 9eant to signify the initiation of an '9erican foreign ,olicy distinct fro9 what went under the na9e of foreign ,olicy in Euro,e is clearly stated in 8ashingtonIs &arewell 'ddress! JEuro,e has a set of ,ri9ary interests, which to us have none, or a very re9ote relation! Hence she 9ust be engaged in freLuent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns! Hence, therefore, it 9ust be unwise in us to i9,licate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her ,olitics, or the ordinary co9binations and collisions of her friendshi,s or en9ities!J n .1/3, Euro,ean ,olitics and ,ower ,olitics were identical> there was no other ,ower ,olitics but the one engaged in by the ,rinces of Euro,e! JThe toils of Euro,ean a9bition, rival-shi,, interest, hu9or or ca,riceJ were the only 9anifestations of the international struggle for ,ower before the eyes of '9erica! The retreat fro9 Euro,ean ,olitics, as ,roclai9ed by 8ashington, could, therefore, be ta$en to 9ean retreat fro9 ,ower ,olitics as such! #et '9erican aloofness fro9 the Euro,ean tradition of ,ower ,olitics was 9ore than a ,olitical ,rogra9! (ertain s,oradic e)ce,tions notwithstanding, it was an established ,olitical fact until the end of the nineteenth century! This fact was a result of deliberate choice as well as of the obGective conditions of geogra,hy! Po,ular writers 9ight see in the uniLueness of '9ericaIs geogra,hic ,osition the hand of (od which had unalterably ,rescribed the course of '9erican e),ansion as well as isolation! But 9ore res,onsible observers, fro9 8ashington on! have been careful to
.1

%ev Tolstoy! 8ar and Peace, Boo$ Eight, (ha,ter D !

.2

+ohn of Salisbury! Poticraticus, translated by +ohn *ic$inson @"ew #or$B 'lfred '! 7no,f! ./=1A, Eol! E , ,! .1!

e9,hasiHe the conGunction of geogra,hic conditions and a foreign ,olicy choosing its ends in the light of geogra,hy, using geogra,hic conditions to attain those ends! 8ashington referred to Jour detached and distant situationJ and as$edB J8hy forego the advantages of so ,eculiar a situationFJ 8hen this ,eriod of '9erican foreign ,olicy drew to a close! +ohn Bright wrote to 'lfred %oveB J;n your continent we 9ay ho,e your growing 9illions 9ay henceforth $now nothing of war! "one can assail youB and you are an)ious to abstain fro9 9ingling with the Luarrels of other nations!J./ &ro9 the shores of the "orth '9erican continent, the citiHens of the new world watched the strange s,ectacle of the international struggle for ,ower unfolding on the distant shores of Euro,e, 'frica, and 'sia! Since for the better ,art of the nineteenth century their foreign ,olicy enabled the9 to retain the role of s,ectators, what was actually the result of a ,assing historic constellation a,,eared to '9ericans as a ,er9anent condition, self-chosen as well as naturally ordained! 't worst they would continue to watch the ga9e of ,ower ,olitics ,layed by others! 't best the ti9e was close at hand when, with de9ocracy established everywhere, the final curtain would fall and the ga9e of ,ower ,olitics would no longer be ,layed! To aid in the achieve9ent of this goal was conceived to be ,art of '9ericaIs 9ission! Throughout the nationIs history, the national destiny of the :nited States has been understood in anti9ilitaristic, libertarian ter9s! 8here that national 9ission finds a nonaggressive, abstentionist for9ulation, as in the ,olitical ,hiloso,hy of +ohn (! (alhoun, it is conceived as the ,ro9otion of do9estic liberty! Thus we 9ay Jdo 9ore to e)tend liberty by our e)a9,le over this continent and the world generally, than would be done by a thousand victories!J 8hen the :nited States, in the wa$e of the S,anish-'9erican 8ar, see9ed to desert this anti-i9,erialist and de9ocratic ideal, 8illia9 Graha9 Su9ner restated its essenceB JE),ansion and i9,erialis9 are a grand onslaught on de9ocracy !!! e),ansion and i9,erialis9 are at war with the best traditions, ,rinci,les, and interests of the '9erican ,eo,le!J=4 (o9,aring the tendencies of Euro,ean ,ower ,olitics with the ideals of the '9erican tradition, Su9ner thought with George 8ashington that they were inco9,atible! #et, as a ,ro,het of things to co9e, he saw that the settle9ent of the S,anish-'9erican 8ar irrevocably co99itted '9erica to the sa9e course that was engulfing Euro,e in revolution and war! Thus the general conce,tion the nineteenth century had for9ed of the nature of foreign affairs co9bined with s,ecific ele9ents in the '9erican e),erience to create the belief that involve9ent in ,ower ,olitics is not inevitable, but only a historic accident, and that nations have a choice between ,ower ,olitics and other $inds of foreign ,olicy not tainted by the desire for ,ower!

TH' SCI'NC' O: P'AC'0 CONT'MPO+A+> ;TOPIANISM ' word should be said about a school of thought C still influential in ,olitical and intellectual circles today C which ,roffers a JscientificJ alternative to the J,erennial wisdo9J of a rationalist a,,roach to international ,olitics! This school of thought we 9ay call Jscientific uto,ianis9J for lac$ of a better ter9> li$e the sources of self-dece,tion as to the ,ersistence of ,olitical ,ower discussed above, the scientific inter,retation has strong roots in nineteenth-century e),erience, both in Euro,e and in '9erica! n this case, however, neither the relations of class do9ination nor geogra,hical accident gave rise to :to,ian ho,es for a Jscience of ,eace!J nstead, the fantastic ,rogress of the natural sciences led various thin$ers to assu9e that the sa9e $inds of 9ethods, a,,lied to individual and collective hu9an behavior, could yield ,rogress toward what Herbert Marcuse and others have called Jthe ,acification of hu9an e)istence!J The 9odern science of ,eace starts fro9 the assu9,tion that the world is thoroughly accessible to science and reason and that it contains in itself all the ele9ents necessary for the har9onious co-o,eration of all 9an$ind! t is for science to detect those ele9ents, variously defined as har9ony of interests, laws of econo9ics, free trade, and 9odern co99unicationsB it is for law to a,,ly the9 where they do not ,revail s,ontaneously> and it is for negotiation and co9,ro9ise to discover the9 under the surface of a,,arent conflict! &or such rationalis9, it is the atavis9 of ,ower ,olitics that conceals and distorts the har9ony of interests which is the true nature of international relations! 'da9 S9ith, a founding father of classical liberalis9 as well as of classical econo9ics, discovered such a funda9ental har9ony of interests lying beneath the surface 9anifestations of selfregarding, co9,etitive econo9ic behavior! Selfish ,ursuits led to greater wealth for all through the wor$ings of an Jinvisible hand!J Governed by an inner logic, the free 9ar$et o,erates to dis,ose all for the best! "ineteenth-century liberalis9 had no use for even such residual traces of the 9iraculous in its search for a 9eans to establish har9onious relations a9ong states! ;nly strictly rational ,rinci,les would doB all international conflicts were considered ca,able of satisfactory solutions, either through co9,ro9ise or arbitration! Since all 9en ,arta$e of reason, they 9ust sooner or later 9eet on that co99on ground, discovering that their conflicts are a,,arent rather than real and can all be solved by a rational for9ula acce,table to all! 8ere all nations at all ti9es fully aware of their real interests, they would realiHe that a,,arently o,,osing interests are actually identical, that what is good for one country is of necessity good for all other countries, and that conflict is 9erely the ,roduct of ignorance and error!
./

Kuoted in Merle (urti! Peace and 8arB The '9erican Struggle .303 -./03 @"ew #or$B 8! 8! "orton and (o9,any, ./03A, ,! .==! =4 JThe (onLuest of the :nited States by S,ain!J Essays of 8illia9 Graha9 Su9ner @"ew HavenB #ale :niversity Press, ./64A, Eol! , ,! =/5!

(onflicts a9ong nations are due, then, to 9aladGust9ents arising fro9 lac$ of understanding and to the influence of ,olitical ,assions! E)ce,t for ignorance and e9otion, reason would solve international conflicts as easily and as rationally as it has solved so 9any ,roble9s in the natural sciences! Proudhon was a9ong the first to glorify the blessings of science in the international field! Truth is everywhere identical with itselfB science re,resents the unity of 9an$ind! f therefore science, instead of religion or authority, is ta$en in each country as social nor9, the sovereign arbiter of interests, with the govern9ent a9ounting to nothing, all the laws of the universe will be in har9ony! "ationality or fatherland will no longer e)ist in the ,olitical 9eaning of the ter9> there will only be birth,laces! Man, of whatever race or colour he 9ay be, will actually be a native of the :niverse> the right of citiHenshi, he will acLuire everywhere! n the sa9e way in which in a certain district of the national territory the 9unici,ality re,resents the nation and e)ercises its authority, each nation of the globe will re,resent hu9anity and in its natural boundaries act for it! Har9ony will reign a9ong the nations, without di,lo9acy nor councilB nothing shall fro9 now on disturb it!=. JThe duty of the ,acifist,J according to (!E! M! +oad, Jis above all things to be reasonable! He should, that is to say, rely on the use of his own reason in 9a$ing his a,,eal and he should assu9e that other 9en 9ay be brought to use theirs! ! ! ! Truth, in fact, will win out, if ,eo,le are only given a sufficient chance to find it!J == t was with the sa9e confidence in the ,ower of reason that (larence Streit asserted in ./6. that Jthe really big 9en in the :nited States Senate and British Parlia9ent will cha9,ion the :nion Qof the two countriesR, once they understand it!J =0 Political history, then, beco9es a succession of scientific ,roble9s ca,able of scientific solution C but 9ost unreasonably handled by an ignorant and i9,assioned hu9anity! Even for so realistic an observer as Ho9er %ea, the ,roble9 of international affairs resolved itself into a ,roble9 of $nowledge> if the Jvalour of ignoranceJ is re,laced by the $nowledge of the ,ertinent facts, 9an will be able to act successfully on the international scene! JThe ti9e can and will co9e!J wrote the fa9ous ,acifist Bertha von Suttner, Jwhen the science of ,olitics will have re,laced ,resent day statecraft, when only those will have legislative and ,olitical ,ower ! ! ! who sincerely see$ only the truth and through the truth strive to attain only the good C the universal good co9,rehending all civiliHed nations!J The ti9e Suttner s,o$e of has already arrived as far as the 9ere ,ossession of $nowledge is concerned, according to Robert S! %ynd! JThe diagnosis,J he wrote, is already fairly co9,lete, than$s to a long list of co9,etent studies of nationalis9, i9,erialis9, international finance and trade, and other factors within our culture that encourage war! The ,roble9 of war! 9ore than 9ost others, has engaged the attention of scientists fro9 several disci,lines, and the dissection has ,roceeded to the ,oint where fairly uneLuivocal $nowledge e)ists! The causes of war are $nown and acce,ted by a wide grou, of thoughtful students! But the state9ent of what is to be done languishes because social science shrin$s fro9 resolving the austere findings of scholarly 9onogra,hs into a bold ,rogra99e for action! !!! n the case of an issue li$e this, where the ,roble9 does not arise fro9 lac$ of $nowledge, what social science a,,ears to need is the will to 9ass its findings so that the truth they hold will not continue to tric$le away as dis,arate bits of scholarshi,! 8e $now enough about war and its causes to ,resent these findings, ,oint their 9eanings, and ,ro,ose action in a way that will hold this da9aging evidence steadily and authoritatively before the eyes of the hu9blest citiHen! =6 t was for this age of reason to re,lace the old 9ethods of ,ower ,olitics, secret di,lo9acy and war by a new, scientific a,,roach! Territorial clai9s, sovereignty over national 9inorities, the distribution of raw 9aterials, the struggle for 9ar$ets, disar9a9ent, the relation between the JhavesJ and the have-nots,J ,eaceful change, and the ,eaceful organiHation of the world in general C these are not J,oliticalJ ,roble9s, to be solved te9,orarily and always ,recariously according to the distribution of ,ower a9ong Luarrelling nations and its ,ossible balance! They are JtechnicalJ ,roble9s for which reason will find the one correct solution in each case! Thus the nineteenth century develo,ed a Jscience of ,eaceJ as a se,arate branch of scientific $nowledge! Scores of boo$s were ,ublished bearing this title! ;ne even received first ,riHe in a scholarly co9,etition! =5The conce,t of natural frontierJ C which had had a strategical and ,olitical, but not a scientific, connotation in the si)teenth and seventeenth centuries C was con-rued by the &rench revolutionaries and "a,oleon in the sense of a geogra,hically correctJ frontier! n the seventies and eighties of the nineteenth century, ,ublic o,inion in Great Britain discussed seriously the ,roble9 of the scientific frontier,J that is, a frontier which corres,onds to reason, and which, conseLuently, 9a$es all other frontiers in this geogra,hical region scientifically incorrect! n his s,eech at Mansion House on "ove9ber /, .212, *israeli Gustified the Second 'fghan 8ar by saying that the frontier of ndia was Ja ha,haHard and not a scientific one!J The search for such a JscientificJ frontier started in the second half of the eighteenth century when, on the occasion
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J dee generale de la revolution au di)-neuvie9e siecle!J ;euvres co9,letes, D @.232A, ,! 044B see also Proudhon, %a Guerre et la ,ai) @ParisB E! *entu, .23.A! == JPacifis9B ts PersonaR and Social 9,lications,J in G! P! Gooch, n Pursuit of Peace @%on-donB Methuen ? (o9,any, %td!, ./00A, ,,! 3., 30! =0 :nion "ow 8ith Britain @"ew #or$B Har,er ? Brothers, ./6.A, ,! ./1! =6 7nowledge for 8hatF @PrincetonB Princeton :niversity Press, ./0/A, ,! =6.! =5 %ouis Bara! %a Science de la ,ai) @.21=A!

of ,artitions and anne)ations of territory, the relative value of the ,ieces of territory to be distributed was deter9ined on the basis of certain JobGectiveJ standards, such as fertility, nu9ber and Luality of ,o,ulation, and the li$e! &ollowing this trend, the (ongress of Eienna, u,on the suggestion of Metternich, a,,ointed a s,ecial statistical co99ission> it was charged with evaluating the territories under discussion by the JobGectiveJ standard of nu9ber, Luality, and ty,e of ,o,ulations!=3 The deli9itation of territory thus beca9e a $ind of 9athe9atical e)ercise! The idea of the Jgood frontier!J develo,ed in the last decades of the nineteenth century in Ger9any with regard to RussiaIs territorial as,irations! had a so9ewhat si9ilar connotation! The idea of the Jscientific tariffJ atte9,ted to introduce science into foreign trade, building in ,art u,on ideas ,ut forth in the early nineteenth century by &riedrich %ist! The theory and ,ractice of international ,lebiscites are also ty,ical 9anifestations of the rationalist a,,roach to international ,roble9s> here the will of the 9aGority is the scientific test according to which sovereignty over territory is to be deter9ined! n the thirties, MaGor %efebure advanced his theories on Jscientific disar9a9ent!J JGeo,oliticsJ endeavoured to ,ut foreign ,olicy as a whole on a scientific basis! t was only after the &irst 8orld 8ar that this tendency to reduce ,olitical ,roble9s to scientific ,ro,ositions won general acce,tance! JReason is at last beco9ing an inde,endent agency,J wrote %ord 'llen of Hartwood, Jinfluencing the conduct of 9en! This is due to the co9ing of science! ! ! ! &eeling hi9self now to be the 9aster of nature, his 9ind is beginning to wor$ rationally instead of su,erstitiously! 8hen for9ing an o,inion he observes the ,heno9ena around hi9 and draws his conclusions! &ro9 that 9o9ent 9ind begins to be an inde,endent agency of influence! t can now therefore be considered as a ,olitical force, whereas that has never ,reviously been ,ossible in the history of civiliHation! *uring the last thirty years this has begun to influence ,ublic o,inion!J =1 Thus began what can ,ro,erly be called the age of the scientific a,,roach to international affairs, and the end is not yet in sight! Preceded by the Hague (onferences and hundreds of s9aller ,eace congresses, govern9ents the9selves e9bar$ed on a ,rogra9 of feverish activity un,recedented in recorded history, with the ,ur,ose of solving all international ,roble9s through scientific 9ethods! The govern9ents, the %eague of "ations, and ,rivate grou,s vied with each other in organiHing international conferences, in encouraging teaching and research, and in ,ublishing hundreds of volu9es to cure the ills of hu9anity in a scientific way! 8e have recently witnessed wides,read efforts to find a scientific solution for the ,roble9s of the ,ostwar world! These are the latest, but ,robably not the last, 9anifestation of this 9odern intellectual trend! =2 ;ur age is forever searching for the ,hiloso,hersI stone, the 9agic for9ula, which, 9echanically a,,lied, will ,roduce the desired result and thus substitute for the uncertainties and ris$s of ,olitical action the certitude of rational calculation! However, what the see$ers after the 9agic for9ula want is si9,le, rational, 9echanical> what they have to deal with is co9,licated, irrational, incalculable! 's a conseLuence they are co9,elled, in order to ,resent at least the se9blance of scientific solutions, to si9,lify the reality of international ,olitics and to rely u,on what one 9ight call the J9ethod of the single cause!J The abolition of war is obviously the funda9ental ,roble9 confronting international thought! To solve the ,roble9 one 9ust clearly first deter9ine its cause or causes! 8hat 9a$es a solution a,,ear so difficult for the nonrationalist 9ind is the variety of causes involved C causes which have their roots in the inner9ost recesses of the hu9an heart! 8ere it ,ossible to reduce all those 9ulti,le, co9,le) factors to a single cause C one ca,able of rational for9ulation C the solution of the ,roble9 of war would no longer see9 i9,ossible! This is what liberal foreign ,olicy has been trying to do since its very ince,tionB and since the heyday of the %eague of "ations 9ost ,eo,le would ta$e it for lac$ of creative thought if a states9an or ,olitical thin$er did not have a JconstructiveJ ,lan as a re9edy for the Jsingle cause!J 're not the re9nants of feudalis9 the great single cause 9a$ing for war in this worldF %et us do away with aristocratic govern9ent everywhere, the classical liberals would say, and we will have ,eace! n ,ractical ,olitics this general ,ro,osition was freLuently narrowed down to 9ore s,ecial re9edies intended to 9eet ,articular situations! Thus, as we have seen! Bentha9 and the Bentha9ites ,ointed to the struggle for colonies as the 9ain cause for war> they advocated abstention fro9 colonial ,olicy as a re9edy for war! &or others, tariffs were the source of all evils in the international s,here> to the9, free trade was the source of all good! ;thers would abolish secret treaties and secret di,lo9acy in general and, through ,o,ular control of international ,olicies, secure ,eace! s not 9odern war an outgrowth of i9,erialis9 which, in turn, is a result of the contradictions of 9ono,oly ca,italis9F Hence, let us do away with ca,italis9, the Mar)ists would say, and we will no longer have warB socialis9 is ,eace! The sa9e one - trac$ 9ode of thought is found also in do9estic ,olitics! 'll social evils ste9 fro9 our ignorance of the laws of econo9icsB the Jsingle ta)J ta$es account of those laws and will solve all social ,roble9s! ;ur econo9ic
=3 =1

&or details see (harles *u,uis, %e Princi,e dIeLuilibre et le (oncert Euro,een @ParisB Perrin et (ie, ./4/A! ,,! 02ff, 34 ff! JPacifis9B ts Meaning and ts Tas$,J in Gooch! o,! cit!, ,,! ==, =0! =2 (f! (harles '! Beard! ' &oreign Policy for '9erica @"ew #or$B 'lfred '! 7no,f! ./64A! ,,! /2 - //B J n line with the new interests, the study of international law and di,lo9acy was encouraged in institutions of learning! ;ld - fashioned courses on di,lo9acy C cold, scholarly ,erfor9ances C were su,,le9ented by courses on international relations, in which e9,hasis was laid on world ,eace and the 9eans of ,ro9oting it! Boo$s, ,a9,hlets, and articles on ,acification were written, ,ublished and widely circulated, often with the aid of subventions fro9 ,eace funds! nternational ,eace conferences were organiHed and ,rovided o,,ortunities for travel and e)tended discourses! Seldo9 had college ,residents, ,rofessors, clergy9en, and leaders a9ong wo9en enGoyed such ,rivileges and received such 9ar$ed consideration at the hands of the general ,ublic! t loo$ed as if a new era of usefulness and distinction had been o,ened for the9 in the field of great affairs, and they 9ade the 9ost of its o,,ortunities!J

syste9 is out of Goint because the govern9ent s,ends 9ore than it collectsB balance the budget and our econo9ic ,roble9s will be solved! Bad linguistic habits are at the root of our social evilsB with the acLuisition of good linguistic habits our social ,roble9s will be solved! E9erson, in J"ew England Refor9ers,J thus described this $ind of thin$ingB ;ne a,ostle thought all 9en should go to far9ing> and another, that no 9an should buy or sell> that the use of 9oney was the cardinal evilB another, that the 9ischief was in our diet, that we eat and drin$ da9nation! These 9ade unleavened bread, and were foes to the death to fer9entation! ! ! ! ;thers attac$ed the syste9 of agriculture> the use of ani9al 9anures in &ar9ing> and the tyranny of 9an over brute nature> these abuses ,olluted his food! ! ! ! Even the insect world was to be defended! C that had been too long neglected, and a society for the ,rotection of ground wor9s, slugs, and 9osLuitoes was to be incor,orated without delay! 8ith these a,,eared the ade,ts of ho9eo,athy> of hydro,athy, of 9es9eris9, of ,hrenology, and their wonderful theories of the (hristian 9iraclesS ;thers assailed ,articular vocations, as that of the lawyer, that of the 9erchant, of the 9anufacturer, of the clergy9an, of the scholar! ;thers attac$ed the institution of 9arriage as the fountain of social evils! ;thers devoted the9selves to the worrying of churches and 9eetings for ,ublic worshi,B and the fertile for9s of antino9ianis9 a9ong the elder ,uritans, see9ed to have their 9atch in the ,lenty of the new harvest of refor9! =/ n the do9estic field, however, the J9ethod of the single causeJ has been of rather li9ited theoretical and ,ractical i9,ortance> for here, e)ce,t in ,eriods of collective insanity, i99ediate ,ersonal e),erience reveals the absurdity of the a,,roachB and the ,ressure of the affected interests ,revents the Luac$ fro9 being 9ista$en for the saviour! The :to,ian internationalist, on the other hand, has no direct contact with the international scene! His thought, if it is sufficiently general, can roa9 over the globe without ever ris$ing collision with the star$ facts of ,olitics! He who would ,roclai9 the &our &reedo9s for the :nited States itself would soon learn fro9 ,ersonal e),erience the enor9ity of the social and ,olitical ,roble9s entailed by any atte9,t at realiHing those great ,rinci,les! By contrast, ,rocla9ation of the &our &reedo9s Jeverywhere in the worldJ is sufficiently general to avoid contact with historic realities and ,olitical facts! The refor9er without res,onsibility finds in the ar9ory of 9odern international thought what he is loo$ing for! That one ,anacea is freLuently inconsistent with another need not trouble hi9! &or since the Jsingle causeJ is an arbitrary abstraction fro9 a 9ultitude of actual causes, one abstraction and, hence, one Jsingle causeJ is as good as the ne)t one! Since, further9ore, the hunt for the Jsingle causeJ derives fro9 a vague desire to contribute so9ething to the better9ent of hu9an affairs rather than fro9 a fi)ed resolve to intervene in a definite ,olitical situation in a definite way, virtually any general e),lanation of the ills of the world and any general ,lan to re9edy the9 will satisfy the ,sychic need involved! Hence, the great hunting ground for the Jsingle causeJ and the Jscientific for9ulaJ to re9edy it has been the international scene, while their great season was the two decades between the world wars!04 nternational society is not organiHed> thus Jinternational organiHationJC in its abstract rationality a $ind of legal counter,art to the :to,ian syste9s of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century ,hiloso,hy C beca9e the scientific for9ula which, since the leading ,acifist and "obel PriHe winner, '! H! &ried, ,ro,ounded it at the beginning of the century, has been the credo of a whole school of thought! ;thers would loo$ to 9aterial re9edies! 're not wars being fought with ar9sF %et us ,rohibit or at least reduce ar9a9ents, and war will no longer be ,ossible or at least will be less li$ely! ;thers, again, would co9bine different re9edies, defending the co9bination CJon scientific groundsJC as the only a,,ro,riate one! Thus the &rench Radical-Socialist ,arty advocated Jsecurity, arbitration, disar9a9entJ as logical successive ste,s for the establish9ent of ,er9anent ,eace> whereas the &rench Socialists reversed the seLuence and swore to the e)clusive scientific value of the for9ula Jsecurity through arbitration and disar9a9ent!J &rench foreign ,olicy has been es,ecially ,roductive in abstract sche9es which, li$e the J,lan Briand,J the J,lan %aval!J the J,lan Tardieu)!J the J,lan Herriot,J or the J,lan Paul-Boncour,J ,retended to give in one legal for9ula a scientific solution to the ,roble9s of Euro,ean security! n other Luarters, es,ecially since the crisis of ./=/, the Jsingle causeJ of international unrest has been found in the econo9ic field! Restrictions on international trade, the lac$ of raw 9aterials, and insufficient international ,urchasing ,ower drive nations to war, so the argu9ent ran! Then let us find a scientific for9ula for reci,rocal trade agree9ents, for the redistribution of raw 9aterials, and for the floating of international loans C and there will be ,eace! &aced by the i9,erialistic as,irations of the thirties, it was reasoned that whenever nations cannot change the status Luo ,eacefully, they will try to change it by war> thus ,eaceful change, scientifically defined, would 9a$e war unnecessary! Since ban$ersI fears for their invest9ents was res,onsible for our involve9ent in the &irst 8orld 8ar, let us outlaw loans to belligerentsB we shall thus esca,e ,artici,ation in the ne)t one! More recently, it has been discoveredJ that national sovereignty is res,onsible for war> it follows that the ,ooling of national sovereignties in a world federation or at least in a federation of the de9ocracies is a scientific solution to the ,roble9 of war and ,eace! Thus our era is always in search of the scientific for9ula, but an obstinate reality again and again 9a$es the solution of today the fallacy of to9orrow! The JscientificJ era of international relations resulted in the substitution of su,,osedly scientific standards for
=/ 04

Ral,h 8aldo E9erson! EssaysB Second Series @BostonB Houghton Mifflin! .2//A! ,,! =46 - =45! SWW 7enneth 8! Tho9,son, Ethics, &unctionalis9 and Power in nternational PoliticsB (risis in Ealues @Baton Rouge, %ouisianaB %ouisiana :niversity Press, ./1/A, ,,! 05 - 65!

genuine ,olitical evaluations> in so9e cases this went so far as to i9,ede, if not entirely destroy, the ability to 9a$e any intelligent ,olitical decisions at all! Power, however li9ited and Lualified, is the value which international ,olitics recogniHes as su,re9e! The test to which international ,olitical decisions 9ust be subGect refers, therefore, to the 9easure in which those decisions affect the distribution of ,ower! The Luestion which Richelieu, Ha9ilton @no less than +efferson, for that 9atterA, or *israeli would as$ before they acted on the international scene wasB *oes this decision increase or decrease the ,ower of this and other nationsF The Luestion of the international JscientistJ is different! Since for hi9 the history of international affairs a9ounts to a succession of scientific ,roble9s, correctly or incorrectly handled by infor9ed or 9isinfor9ed officials, the su,re9e value is not ,ower but truth! The Luest for and the defense of ,ower then beco9e aberrations fro9 the scientific attitude, which loo$s for causes and re9edies! f we do not li$e the way things are, let us loo$ for its cause and change things by changing the cause! There is essentially nothing to fight for> there is always so9ething to analyHe, to understand, and to refor9! How was it ,ossible for the 9odern 9ind to 9a$e the belief in the all-e9bracing ,owers of science the controlling force of its foreign ,olicyF Here again, the answer is to be found in the general ,re9ises of rationalistic ,hiloso,hy, see9ingly verified in its universal assu9,tions by do9estic e),erience! The victory of liberalis9 in the do9estic field led to a ,eculiar narrowing of the ,olitical, and a corres,onding widening of the non,olitical, s,here> and thus the latter was o,en to detached rational e)a9ination! ;bGectives which for9erly had beer, seen as the ,riHe in the struggle for ,olitical ,ower were now a,,roached in a dis,assionate, 9atter-of-fact way and 9astered in accordance with the s,ecific techniLues of econo9ics, ad9inistration, or law! &irst the natural sciences and religion had freed the9selves fro9 ,olitical do9ination and had established their autono9y! Then liberalis9, by conLuering the state, freed an ever increasing do9ain fro9 direct ,olitical do9ination> finally, liberalis9 see9ed to e),el even ,olitics fro9 the real9 of the state and to 9a$e statecraft itself a science! (o99erce and industry were the first to win their autono9y under reason! That which for the ,hysiocrats was still a ,olitical ,rogra9, unsuccessfully suggested to the ,olitical ,owers of the day, was for 'da9 S9ith already a syste9 of scientific truths verified by e),erience, the ,ractical i9,lications of which no reasonable 9an could esca,e! Political tribunals were re,laced by inde,endent courts co9,osed of Gudges trained to render Gustice according to the ,rinci,les of legal science! 'ntiLuated and arbitrary election syste9s favoring certain ,olitical grou,s 9ade way for scientific devices which would secure full and eLual re,resentation for all citiHens! The civil service syste9 ,ut the selection of govern9ent ,ersonnel on an obGective, non,olitical basis! Today, legislative refor9s are increasingly ,re,ared by co99ittees of e),erts who see9 to be influenced largely by scientific instead of ,olitical considerations! Ta)ation, ad9inistration, and insurance beco9e JscientificJ in a,,roach> and, finally, there is no field of govern9ental activity which would not be regarded as a ,ro,er area for the a,,lication of J,olitical science!J The use of the scientific 9ethod in ,olitics, to which the 9odern 9ind was led by its ,erce,tion of the liberal e),erience, was and is a ,olitical fallacy in do9estic affairs! There, however, the refined 9echanis9 of ,olitical ,ressure and self-interest serves as an auto9atic chec$ on doctrinaire e)cess! n the international field such a 9echanis9, acting directly u,on the individual, does not e)ist, it is here, therefore, that the belief in the li9itless ,ower of the scientific for9ula has beco9e ,articularly ,rolific C and ,articularly ineffective! &or it is here that the ,anaceas engendered by this belief have no connection whatsoever with the forces which deter9ine the actual course of events! Events will, therefore, either follow their course as though all those ,ro,osals by international co99issions of e),erts and other rationalist-:to,ian devices had never been invented! ;r those devices will be a,,lied in an e)ce,tional instance and will then ,roduce effects unforeseen by their ,ro9oters and freLuently disastrous to the9 C such as the sanctions against taly during the talo - Ethio,ian war! #et! as a su,re9e irony, this school of thought atte9,ts to 9ono,oliHe for itself the virtue of being J,racticalJ> it treats with disdain the rare atte9,ts to base international action on a genuine understanding of the forces deter9ining ,olitical reality rather than on the ideal ,ostulates of abstract reason!0. 0 The 'tru**le for Power! Policy of the 'tatus 1uo

0.

's far bac$ as .211 +a9es %ori9er could write in J%e ,roble9e final du droit international!J Revue du droit international et de legislation co9,aree, D @.211A, ,! .26B JStrangely enough, however, these s,eculations of English utilitarianis9, ta$en as a whole, are of all the dissertations on the subGect $now the least useful fro9 the ,ractical ,oint of view!J (f! also Beard, o,! cit!, ,! .=/B J"early every evil that was inconceivable in internationalist ideology in ././ ca9e to ,ass within the s,an of twenty years! t would see9 then that this sche9e of thought had been based u,on so9e 9isconce,tions res,ecting the nature and ,ro,ensities of 9en and nations or, if this e),lanation is invalid, that internationalists had not ado,ted the correct Ia,,roachI to the goal they had set before the9selves! Their i9age of the world had not corres,onded with sufficient e)actness to its realities or their 9ethods had been deficient in ,oints of techniLue! They could, and so9e of the9 did, ascribe their defeats to the 9adness of 9en and nations but this was a confession that their for9er ,re9ises and actions had been founded u,on errors of calculation! n any event the verdict was the sa9e, unless all the bla9e was to be laid on '9ericans as the worldIs greatest sca,egoats!J

*o9estic and international ,olitics arc but two different 9anifestations of the sa9e ,heno9enonB the struggle for ,ower! ts 9anifestations differ in the two different s,heres because different 9oral, ,olitical, and social conditions ,revail in each! 8estern national societies show a 9uch greater degree of social cohesion within the9selves than a9ong the9selves! (ultural unifor9ity, technological unification, e)ternal ,ressure, and, above all! a hierarchic ,olitical organiHation co9bine to 9a$e the national society an integrated whole set a,art fro9 other national societies! n conseLuence, the do9estic ,olitical order is for instance, 9ore stable and less subGect to violent change than is the international order! 'll history shows that nations active in international ,olitics are continuously ,re,aring for! actively involved in, or recovering fro9 organiHed violence in the for9 of war! n the do9estic ,olitics of 8estern de9ocracies, on the other hand, organiHed violence as an instru9ent of ,olitical action on an e)tensive scale has beco9e a rare e)ce,tion! #et as a ,otentiality it e)ists here, too, and at ti9es the fear of it in the for9 of revolution and internal disorders has e)erted an i9,ortant influence u,on ,olitical thought and action!. The difference between do9estic and international ,olitics in this res,ect is one of degree and not of $ind! 'll ,olitics, do9estic and international, reveals three basic ,atterns> that is all ,olitical ,heno9ena can be reduced to one of three basic ty,es! ' ,olitical ,olicy see$s either to $ee, ,ower, to increase ,ower, or to de9onstrate ,ower! To these three ty,ical ,atterns of ,olitics, three ty,ical international ,olicies corres,ond! ' nation whose foreign ,olicy tends toward $ee,ing ,ower and not toward changing the distribution of ,ower in its favor ,ursues a ,olicy of the status Luo! ' nation whose foreign ,olicy ai9s at acLuiring 9ore ,ower than it actually has, through a reversal of e)isting ,ower relations C whose foreign ,olicy, in other words, see$s a favorable change in ,ower status C ,ursues a ,olicy of i9,erialis9! ' nation whose foreign ,olicy see$s to de9onstrate the ,ower it has! cither for the ,ur,ose of 9aintaining or increasing it! ,ursues a ,olicy of ,restige! = t should be noted that these for9ulations are of a ,rovisional nature and are subGect to further refine9ent! 0 The conce,t Jstatus LuoJ is derived fro9 status Luo ante hellu9, a di,lo9atic ter9 referring to the usual clauses in ,eace treaties which ,rovide for the evacuation of territory by ene9y troo,s and its restoration to the ,rewar sovereignty! Thus the ,eace treaties with taly 6 and Bulgaria 5 ter9inating the Second 8orld 8ar ,rovide that Jall ar9ed forces of the 'llied and 'ssociated Powers shall be withdrawnJ fro9 the territory of the ,articular nation Jas soon as ,ossible and in any case not later than ninety days fro9 the co9ing into force of the ,resent Treaty!J That is! within this ti9e li9it the status Luo ante bellu9 shall be reestablished with regard to this territory!3 The ,olicy of the status Luo ai9s at the 9aintenance of the distribution of ,ower which e)ists at a ,articular 9o9ent in history! ;ne 9ight say that the ,olicy of the status Luo fulfills the sa9e function for international ,olitics that a conservative ,olicy ,erfor9s for do9estic affairs! The ,articular 9o9ent in history which serves as ,oint of reference for a ,olicy of the status Luo is freLuently the end of a war, when the distribution of ,ower has been codified in a treaty of ,eace! This is so because the 9ain ,ur,ose of ,eace treaties is to for9ulate in legal ter9s the shift in ,ower which victory and defeat in the ,receding war have brought about, and to insure the stability of the new distribution of ,ower by 9eans of legal sti,ulations! Thus it is ty,ical for a status Luo ,olicy to a,,ear as defense of the ,eace settle9ent that ter9inated the last general war! The Euro,ean govern9ents and ,olitical ,arties that ,ursued a ,olicy of the status Luo fro9 .2.5 to .262 did so in defense of the ,eace settle9ent of .2.5, which ter9inated the "a,oleonic 8ars! The 9ain ,ur,ose of the Holy 'lliance, which these govern9ents concluded in .2.5, was the 9aintenance of the status Luo as it e)isted at the conclusion of the "a,oleonic 8ars! n conseLuence it functioned 9ainly as a guarantor of the ,eace treaty, that is, the Treaty of Paris of .2.5! n this res,ect, the relation between the ,olicy in defense of the status Luo of .2.5! the Treaty of Paris, and the Holy 'lliance is si9ilar to the relation between the ,olicy in favor of the status Luo of ./.2, the ,eace treaties of ././,
.

This is true es,ecially of the nineteenth century, as Gugliel9o &errero has ,ointed out in The Princi,les of Power> "ew #or$B G! P! Putna9Is Sons, ./6=A! = t is not a de,arture fro9 this threefold ,attern of international ,olitics when so9eti9es a nation gives u, ,ower without being ,hysically co9,elled to do so! as Great Britain did with regard to ndia in ./61 and as the :nited States has done on several occasions with regard to %atin-'9erican countries! n such cases a nation acts li$e a 9ilitary co99ander who 9ay retreat under certain circu9stances, because his front is overe)tended or his lines of co99unication are threatened or because he wants to concentrate his forces for an attac$! Si9ilarly, a nation 9ay retreat fro9 an e),osed ,ower ,osition it cannot ho,e to hold very long! ;r it 9ay e)change one $ind of control for another $ind, e!g!! 9ilitary for ,olitical control, ,olitical for econo9ic control, or vice versa @the substitution of the Good "eighbor ,olicy for the ,olicy of the Jbio stic$J is a case in ,ointA! ;r a change in the obGectives of its foreign ,olicy 9ay reLuire concentration of effort at another ,oint! n any case, the fact that it gives u, ,ower voluntarily cannot be ta$en to 9ean that it is not interested in ,ower, any 9ore than the retreat of a 9ilitary co99ander ,roves that he is not interested in 9ilitary victory! 0 t 9ust es,ecially be ,ointed out that these different ,atterns of international ,olicies do not of necessity corres,ond to conscious 9otivations in the 9ind of states9en or su,,orters of the res,ective foreign ,olicies! States9en and su,,orters 9ay not even be aware of the actual characters of the ,olicies they ,ursue and su,,ort! More ,articularly, a nation 9ay intend to ,ursue a ,olicy of the status Luo, while actually, without being aware of it, it is e9bar$ing u,on a ,olicy of i9,erialis9! Thus it has been said of the British that they acLuired their e9,ire in a Jlit of absent-9indedness!J n what follows on this ,oint in the te)t we are e)clusively concerned with actual character of the ,olicies ,ursued and not with the 9otives of those who ,ursue the9! 6 See 'rticle 10! "ew #or$ Ti9es, +anuary .2, ./61, ,! =3! 5 See 'rticle =4, bid!, ,! 0=! 3 &or a great nu9ber of older e)a9,les, see (ole9an Philli,son, Ter9ination of 8ar and Treaties of Peace @"ew #or$B E! P! *utton and (o9,any, ./.3A, ,,! ==0 ff!

and the %eague of "ations! The distribution of ,ower as it e)isted at the end of the &irst 8orld 8ar found its legal e),ression in the ,eace treaties of ././! t beca9e the 9ain ,ur,ose of the %eague of "ations to 9aintain ,eace by ,reserving the status Luo of ./.2 as it had been for9ulated in the ,eace treaties of ././! 'rticle .4 of the (ovenant of the %eague, obligating its 9e9bers Jto res,ect and ,reserve as against e)ternal aggression the territorial integrity and e)isting ,olitical inde,endence of all 9e9bers of the %eague,J recogniHed as one of the ,ur,oses of the %eague the 9aintenance of the territorial status Luo as established by the ,eace treaties of ././! (onseLuently, in the ,eriod between the two world wars the struggle for and against the status Luo was in the 9ain fought either by defending or o,,osing the territorial ,rovisions of the Treaty of Eersailles and their guarantee in 'rticle .4 of the (ovenant of the %eague! t was! therefore, only consistent fro9 their ,oint of view that the nations chiefly o,,osed to the status Luo established in ././ should sever their connections with the %eague of "ations C +a,an in ./0=, Ger9any in ./00, taly in ./01! t is not only in ,eace treaties and international organiHations su,,orting the9 that the ,olicy of the status Luo 9anifests itself! "ations desiring to 9aintain a certain distribution of ,ower 9ay use as their instru9ent s,ecial treaties, such as JThe "ine Power Treaty relating to Princi,les and Policies to be followed in Matters concerning (hina,J signed at 8ashington, &ebruary 3, ./==,1 and the JTreaty of Mutual Guarantee between Ger9any, Belgiu9, &rance, Great Britain, and taly,J signed at %ocarno, ;ctober .3, ./=5!2 The "ine Power Treaty transfor9ed the '9erican ,olicy of the Jo,en doorJ in (hina into a 9ultilateral ,olicy that the nations 9ostly interested in trade with (hina, as well as (hina itself, ,ledged the9selves to u,hold! ts 9ain ,ur,ose was to stabiliHe the distribution of ,ower with regard to (hina which e)isted at the ti9e between the contracting nations! This 9eant that the s,ecial rights which certain nations, es,ecially Great Britain and +a,an, had acLuired in certain ,arts of (hinese territory, such as Manchuria and various ,orts, should not only re9ain intact but that no new s,ecial rights should be ceded by (hina to any of the contracting ,arties! The %ocarno Treaty of 9utual guarantee endeavored to su,,le9ent the general guarantee of the territorial status Luo of ./.2, contained in 'rticle .4 of the (ovenant of the %eague, with a s,ecial one with res,ect to the western frontiers of Ger9any! 'rticle of the Treaty e),ressly referred to the guarantee of Jthe 9aintenance of the territorial status Luo resulting fro9 the frontiers between Ger9any and Belgiu9 and between Ger9any and &rance!J 'lliance treaties, in ,articular, freLuently have the function of ,reserving the status Luo in certain res,ects! Thus, after the victorious conclusion of the war against &rance, and the foundation of the Ger9an E9,ire in .21., Bis9arc$ tried to ,rotect the newly won do9inant ,osition of Ger9any in Euro,e by alliances intended to ,revent a war of revenge on the ,art of &rance! n .21/, Ger9any and 'ustria concluded an alliance for 9utual defense against Russia, and, in .2/6, &rance and Russia entered into a defensive alliance against the Ger9an-'ustrian co9bination! The 9utual fear lest the other alliance be intent u,on changing the status Luo while ,rofessing to 9aintain it was one of the 9ain factors in bringing about the general conflagration of the &irst 8orld 8ar! The alliance treaties that &rance concluded with the Soviet :nion, Poland, (Hechoslova$ia, and Ru9ania in the ,eriod between the two world wars were intended to 9aintain the status Luo, 9ainly in view of ,ossible Ger9an atte9,ts to change it! Si9ilar treaties between (Hechoslova$ia! #ugoslavia, and Ru9ania, and the treaty between (Hechoslova$ia and the Soviet :nion, had the sa9e ,ur,ose! The ineffectiveness of these alliances when they were ,ut to the test fro9 ./05 to ./0/ was one of the reasons for Ger9anyIs attac$ on Poland in ./0/! The British-Polish 'lliance of ',ril 5, ./0/, was the last atte9,t, before the outbrea$ of hostilities, to ,reserve at least the territorial status Luo on the eastern Ger9an frontier! Today the alliances that the Soviet :nion has concluded with the countries of Eastern Euro,e and those that the countries of 8estern Euro,e have concluded a9ong the9selves and with the :nited States ai9 si9ilarly at the 9aintenance of the status Luo as it was established in these res,ective Euro,ean regions by the distribution of ,ower at the end of the Second 8orld 8ar! The 9anifestation of the ,olicy of the status Luo which has had the greatest i9,ortance for the :nited States and has been the cornerstone of its foreign relations is the Monroe *octrine! ' unilateral declaration 9ade by President Monroe in his annual 9essage to (ongress on *ece9ber =, .2=0, the *octrine lays down the two essential ,rinci,les of any status Luo ,olicy! ;n the one hand, it sti,ulates res,ect on the ,art of the :nited States for the e)isting distribution of ,ower in the 8estern He9is,hereB J8ith the e)isting colonies or de,endencies of any Euro,ean ,ower we have not interfered and shall not interfere!J ;n the other hand, it ,roclai9s resistance on the ,art of the :nited States to any change of the e)isting distribution of ,ower by any non-'9erican nationB JBut with the govern9ents who have declared their inde,endence, and 9aintain it !!! we could not view any inter,osition for the ,ur,ose of o,,ressing the9, or controlling in any other 9anner their destiny, by any Euro,ean ,ower, in any other light than as the 9anifestation of an unfriendly dis,osition towards the :nited States!J 's President &ran$lin *! Roosevelt e),ressed it in an address before the Governing Body of the Pan-'9erican :nion on ',ril .=, ./00B J t Qthe Monroe *octrineR was ai9ed and is ai9ed against the acLuisition in any 9anner of the control of additional territory in this he9is,here by any non-'9erican ,ower! / 8e have said that the ,olicy of the status Luo ai9s at the 9aintenance of the distribution of ,ower as it e)ists at a ,articular 9o9ent in history! This does not 9ean that the ,olicy of the status Luo is necessarily o,,osed to any change
1 2

:nited States Treaty Series, "o! 31. @8ashington! ./=0.! '9erican +ournal of nternational %aw, Eol! =4 @./=3A! Su,,le9ent, ,! ==! / RooseveltIs &oreign Policy, ./00-6.! &!*!R!Is :nedited S,eeches and Messages @"ew #or$B 8ilfred &un$, nc!, ./6=A, ,! 6!

whatsoever! 8hile it is not o,,osed to change as such, it is o,,osed to any change that would a9ount to a reversal of the ,ower relations a9ong two or 9ore nations, reducing, for instance, ' fro9 a first-rate to a second-rate ,ower and raising O to the e9inent ,osition ' for9erly held! Minor adGust9ents in the distribution of ,ower, however, which leave intact the relative ,ower ,ositions of the nations concerned, are fully co9,atible with a ,olicy of the status Luo! &or instance, the ,urchase of the territory of 'las$a by the :nited States in .231 did not then affect the status Luo between the :nited States and Russia, since, in view of the technology of co99unications and warfare at the ti9e, the acLuisition by the :nited States of this then-inaccessible territory did not affect to any a,,reciable e)tent the distribution of ,ower between the :nited States and Russia! Si9ilarly, by acLuiring the Eirgin slands fro9 *en9ar$ in ./.1, the :nited States did not e9bar$ u,on a ,olicy ai9ing at a change of the status Luo with regard to the (entral '9erican re,ublics! 8hile the acLuisition of the Eirgin slands greatly i9,roved the strategic ,osition of the :nited States in so far as the defense of the a,,roaches to the Pana9a (anal was concerned, it did not change the relative ,ower ,ositions of the :nited States and the (entral '9erican re,ublics! The acLuisition of the Eirgin slands 9ay have strengthened the already do9inant ,osition of the :nited States in the (aribbean, yet it did not create it and, therefore, was co9,atible with a ,olicy of the status Luo! ;ne 9ight even say that, by strengthening the ,re,onderance of the :nited States over the (entral '9erican re,ublics, it actually reinforced the e)isting distribution of ,ower and thus served the ,ur,oses of a ,olicy of the status Luo! Beginning in ./3=, the Soviet :nion undertoo$ to e)tend its influence significantly through the e9,lace9ent of 9issiles on (uba! The 7ennedy ad9inistration weighed the ,ossible alternative courses of action it 9ight ta$e to re9ove the 9issiles, including an air stri$e> eventually it chose a ,olicy of bloc$ade and Luarantine! The Soviets withdrew their 9issiles as the result of a 7ennedy-7hrushchev agree9ent but continued to su,,ort the (astro regi9e with 9assive econo9ic and 9ilitary assistance! Meanwhile (uba sought to increase its own ideological influence in the (aribbean and in (entral '9erica! By the ./24s, (uban and Soviet 9ilitary assistance and 9ilitary ,ersonnel were identified in countries such as Grenada and "icaragua! %eaving aside the Luestion of ,o,ular su,,ort for (uban intervention in these countries, the Luestion which confronted '9erican ,olicy9a$ers was the e)tent to which the status Luo was threatened! *id inde,endent (uban intervention threaten the status LuoF 8as (uban action as a surrogate for the Soviets the real threatF 8as Soviet involve9ent a violation of the Monroe *octrine and the 7ennedy7hrushchev agree9ent and itself a threat to the status LuoF Successive ad9inistrations, beginning with that of +ohn &! 7ennedy, were forced to address this Luestion! ;n ;ctober =5, ./20, the Reagan ad9inistration invaded Grenada ostensibly to ,rotect the lives of about .,444 '9ericans on the island, but actually because Grenada was seen as an arsenal for 9ilitary action 9aster9inded by the (ubans and by Soviet advisors there and elsewhere in the (aribbean! ;bservers continued to as$ whether (uban and Soviet activities had constituted a true threat to the status Luo in the region> conflicting answers were ,ut forth in Euro,e and the :nited States as President ReaganIs ,olicy ca9e under critical scrutiny! The standard for Gudging (uban-Soviet involve9ent and for deter9ining the res,onse of '9erican ,olicy9a$ers was whether an i9,ortant shift in the distribution of ,ower, and hence of the status Luo, was ta$ing ,lace! 2 The 'tru**le for Power! I &erialis %HAT I$PERIALI'$ I' NOT 'n obGective analysis of the acLuisition of the Eirgin slands by the :nited States 9ight show that it was ,art of a ,olicy of the status Luo in that region! "evertheless, these and si9ilar 9oves toward strengthening the ,osition of the :nited States in the (aribbean have been decried as i9,erialistic by 9any observers! Such observers have used the ter9 Ji9,erialisticJ not for the ,ur,ose of characteriHing obGectively a ,articular ty,e of foreign ,olicy, but as a ter9 of o,,robriu9 by which a ,olicy to which the observer is o,,osed can be discredited! This arbitrary use of the ter9 for ,ole9ical ,ur,oses has beco9e so wides,read that today Ji9,erialis9J and Ji9,erialisticJ are indiscri9inately a,,lied to any foreign ,olicy, regardless of its actual character, to which the user ha,,ens to be o,,osed! 'nglo,hobes will refer to British i9,erialis9 as an actuality in ./24, as they did in ./64 or in ./.6! Russo,hobes will call i9,erialistic whatever the Russians do in foreign affairs! The Soviet :nion considered all ,artici,ants in the Second 8orld 8ar as waging an i9,erialistic war until it was attac$ed by Ger9any in ./6.> the war it then had to fight beca9e anti-i9,erialistic by definition! To ene9ies and critics of the :nited States everywhere, J'9erican i9,erialis9J is a standard ter9! To add to the confusion, certain econo9ic and ,olitical syste9s and econo9ic grou,s, such as ban$ers and industrialists, are indiscri9inately identified with i9,erialistic foreign ,olicies! n this ,rocess of indiscri9inate usage the ter9 Ji9,erialis9J has lost all concrete 9eaning! Everybody is an i9,erialist to so9eone who ha,,ens to ta$e e)ce,tion to his foreign ,olicies! :nder such circu9stances it beco9es the tas$ of theoretical analysis to brea$ with ,o,ular usage in order to give the ter9 an ethically neutral, obGective, and definable 9eaning that at the sa9e ti9e is useful for the theory and ,ractice of international ,olitics! 2
2

The ter9 is freLuently used as synony9ous with any $ind of colonial e),ansion, as, for instance, in Par$er Tho9as Moon, 9,erialis9 and 8orld Politics @"ew #or$B The Mac9illan (o9,any, ./=3A! Such use is unobGectionable fro9 a theoretical ,oint of view, so long as it i9,lies no general theory of the nature of e),ansionist ,olicies as such! Since in the te)t we are concerned with

Before we as$ what i9,erialis9 actually is, let us as$ first what i9,erialis9 is not but is 9ost often su,,osed to be! The three 9ost ,o,ular 9isconce,tions reLuire our attention! .! "ot every foreign ,olicy ai9ing at an increase in the ,ower of a nation is necessarily a 9anifestation of i9,erialis9! 8e have already dis,osed of this 9isconce,tion in our discussion of the ,olicy of the status Luo! = 8e defined i9,erialis9 as a ,olicy that ai9s at the overthrow of the status Luo, at a reversal of the ,ower relations between two or 9ore nations! ' ,olicy see$ing only adGust9ent, leaving the essence of these ,ower relations intact, still o,erates within the general fra9ewor$ of a ,olicy of the status Luo! The view that i9,erialis9 and any ,ur,oseful increase in ,ower are identical is held 9ainly by two distinct grou,s! Those who are o,,osed on ,rinci,le to a ,articular nation and its ,olicies, such as 'nglo,hobes, Russo,hobes, and anti-'9ericans, regard the very e)istence of the obGect of their ,hobia as a threat to the world! 8henever a country thus feared sets out to increase its ,ower, those who fear it 9ust view the increase in ,ower as a ste,,ing-stone to world conLuest> that is, as 9anifestation of an i9,erialistic ,olicy! ;n the other hand, those who, as heirs of the ,olitical ,hiloso,hy of the nineteenth century, consider any active foreign ,olicy an evil bound to disa,,ear in the foreseeable future, will conde9n a foreign ,olicy that see$s an increase in ,ower! They will identify that foreign ,olicy with what is for the9 the ,aradig9 of evil C i9,erialis9! =! "ot every foreign ,olicy ai9ing at the ,reservation of an e9,ire that already e)ists is i9,erialis9! t is widely believed that whatever a nation, such as Great Britain, (hina, the Soviet :nion, or the :nited States, does in order to 9aintain its ,re,onderant ,osition in certain regions is i9,erialistic! Thus i9,erialis9 beco9es identified with the 9aintenance, defense, and stabiliHation of an e9,ire already in e)istence rather than with the dyna9ic ,rocess of acLuiring one! #et, while it 9ay 9a$e sense to a,,ly the ter9 Ji9,erialis9J to the do9estic ,olicies of an e)isting e9,ire, it is confusing and 9isleading to a,,ly the ter9 to international ,olicies of an essentially static and conservative character> for in international ,olitics i9,erialis9 is contrasted with the ,olicy of the status Luo and, hence, has a dyna9ic connotation! The history of what is co99only called JBritish i9,erialis9J is instructive in this regard! The idea of British i9,erialis9 had its origin in Great Britain itself! t was used for the first ti9e by the (onservatives under *israeli in the ca9,aign for the elections of .216! The idea of British i9,erialis9, as conceived by *israeli and develo,ed later by +ose,h (ha9berlain and 8inston (hurchill, was o,,osed to what the (onservatives called the cos9o,olitanis9 and internationalis9 of the %iberals! t found its concrete e),ression in the ,olitical ,rogra9 of Ji9,erial federation!J The 9ost i9,ortant ,oints of this ,rogra9 wereB @.A the unification and integration of Great Britain and its ,ossessions into a unified e9,ire with the aid of ,rotective tariffs, @=A the reservation of free colonial land to English9en, @0A unified ar9ed forces, and @6A a central re,resentative organ in %ondon! 8hen this Ji9,erialisticJ ,rogra9 was ,ostulated and ,ut into effect, the territorial e),ansion of Great Britain had in the 9ain co9e to an end! The ,rogra9 of British Ji9,erialis9J was, therefore, essentially a ,rogra9 of consolidation, not of e),ansion! t sought to secure and e),loit what had already been a,,ro,riated! t endeavored to stabiliHe the distribution of ,ower which had been brought about by the creation of the British E9,ire! 8hen 7i,ling Gustified British i9,erialis9 as Jthe white 9anIs burden,J the burden was already shouldered! Since the .214s, British Ji9,erialis9J C that is, British foreign ,olicy with regard to BritainIs overseas ,ossessions C was in the 9ain a ,olicy of the status Luo and not i9,erialistic at all in the e)act 9eaning of the ter9! #et the antii9,erialists in Great Britain and elsewhere, acce,ting the i9,erialistic slogans of *israeli and (ha9berlain at face value and 9ista$ing the effects of i9,erialis9 for i9,erialis9 itself, o,,osed the British ,olicy of e),loitation and consolidation, es,ecially in 'frica and ndia, as Ji9,erialistic!J n fact, when (hurchill refused in ./6= Jto ,reside over the liLuidation of the British E9,ire,J he was s,ea$ing not as an i9,erialist but as a conservative in foreign affairs, a defender of the status Luo of e9,ire! British Ji9,erialis9J and its o,,onents are the outstanding e)a9,les of the confusion between the consolidation and defense of e9,ire, on the one hand, and i9,erialis9, on the other! But they are not the only e)a9,les! 8hen we s,ea$ of the Ro9an E9,ire and of Ro9an i9,erialis9, we thin$ naturally of the ,eriod of Ro9an history which starts with 'ugustus, the first e9,eror governing what was then called for the first ti9e i9,eriu9 Ro9anu9! #et, when 'ugustus gave Ro9e and its ,ossessions the constitution of an e9,ire! the e),ansion of Ro9e had essentially co9e to an end! The foreign ,olicy of the Re,ublic, fro9 the Punic 8ars to its overthrow by +ulius (aesar, had indeed been i9,erialistic in the e)act 9eaning of the ter9! n that ,eriod, the ,olitical face of the earth had been changed and 9ade Ro9an! The foreign ,olicy of the e9,erors and their ,er,etual wars served the 9ain ,ur,ose of securing and ,rotecting what had been conLuered before! "ot unli$e the Ji9,erialisticJ ,olicies of Great Britain fro9 the ti9e of *israeli to (hurchill, Ro9an foreign ,olicy was one of conservation, of the status Luo! 8hen there were conLuests, as under TraGan for instance, these ,olicies served to 9a$e the e9,ire and Ro9an su,re9acy secure! The sa9e is essentially true of the territorial as,ects of '9erican Ji9,erialis9J fro9 the beginning of the twentieth century to the Second 8orld 8ar! The great debate for and against '9erican i9,erialis9 which raged during the first decades of the century followed the great i9,erialistic e),ansion of the nineteenth century! The ,olicy which was the subGect of that debate was essentially a ,olicy of consolidation, of ,rotection, of e),loration> that is, a ,olicy of the status Luo! 8hen 8illia9 Graha9 Su9ner, in .2/2! referred to the '9erican ,olicy of territorial e),ansion as Jthe
the general characteristics of international ,olicies of e),ansion, it is obvious that a conce,t li9ited to the ,heno9ena of colonial e),ansion is too narrow for our ,ur,oses! = ;n this ,oint see the discussion in (ha,ter 6!

conLuest of the :nited States by S,ain,J0 he referred to a ,olicy that was already consu99ated! 8hen Senator 'lbert +! Beveridge declared that JGod has 9ade us ade,ts in govern9ent that we 9ay ad9inister govern9ent a9ong savage and senile ,eo,les,J6 he endeavored to Gustify do9inion already established rather than to su,,ort e),ansion ,lanned for the future! Thus, in both Great Britain and the :nited States, 9uch of the 9odern debate on i9,erialis9 follows after the ,rocess of i9,erialistic e),ansion, conde9ning or Gustifying it in retros,ect! n ter9s of actual ,olicies to be ,ursued in the future, the debate is concerned ,ri9arily with the result of i9,erialistic ,oliciesB that is, the ad9inistration and safeguarding of e9,ire! The e),lanation is not hard to find! The great debate started in Great Britain with the (onservative e)altation of the British E9,ire, a $ind of British counter,art to the nationalis9 of the continent! The British E9,ire was a colonial e9,ire and! as such, it beca9e the ,rototy,e of 9odern e9,ire! n conseLuence, the acLuisition and e),loitation of colonies beca9e synony9ous with e9,ire, which thus received ,ri9arily, if not e)clusively, an econo9ic connotation! This econo9ic connotation gave rise to the 9ost e)tensive, 9ost syste9atic, and also 9ost ,o,ular body of thought which has sought to e),lain i9,erialis9 in 9odern ti9esB the econo9ic theories of i9,erialis9! Here we find the third of the 9isconce,tions that have obscured the true nature of i9,erialis9! ECONO$IC THEORIE' OF I$PERIALI'$ The Mar)ist9 Libera"9 an( ?%e8i"? Theories o! Imperia"ism The econo9ic theories of i9,erialis9 have been develo,ed in three different schools of thoughtB the Mar)ist, the liberal, and one that has a,tly been called the devilJ theory 5 of i9,erialis9! The Mar)ist theory of i9,erialis9 rests u,on the conviction, which is the foundation of all Mar)ist thought, that all ,olitical ,heno9ena are the reflection of econo9ic forces! (onseLuently, the ,olitical ,heno9enon of i9,erialis9 is the ,roduct of the econo9ic syste9 in which it originates C that is, ca,italis9! (a,italist societies, according to the Mar)ist theory, are unable to find within the9selves sufficient 9ar$ets for their ,roducts and sufficient invest9ents for their ca,ital! They hive, therefore, a tendency to enslave even larger nonca,italist and, ulti9ately, even ca,italist areas in order to transfor9 the9 into 9ar$ets for their sur,lus ,roducts and to give their sur,lus ca,ital o,,ortunities for invest9ent! The 9oderate Mar)ists, such as 7auts$y and Hilferding, believed that i9,erialis9 was a ,olicy of ca,italis9 and that, therefore, an i9,erialistic ,olicy was a 9atter of choice toward which ca,italis9 9ight be 9ore or less inclined according to circu9stances! %enin 3 and his followers, es,ecially Bu$-harin,1 on the other hand, identified i9,erialis9 and ca,italis9 outright! 9,erialis9 is identical with ca,italis9 in its last C that is, 9ono,oly C stage of develo,9ent! 'ccording to %enin! J 9,erialis9 is ca,italis9 in that ,hase of its develo,9ent in which the do9ination of 9ono,olies and finance-ca,ital has established itself> in which the e),ort of ca,ital has acLuired very great i9,ortance> in which the division of the world a9ong the big international trusts has begun> in which the ,artition of all the territory of the earth a9ongst the great ca,italist ,owers has been co9,leted!J 2 n the eyes of the Mar)ists, ca,italis9 is the 9ain evil and i9,erialis9 only its necessary or ,robable 9anifestation! The liberal school, of which +ohn '! Hobson / is the chief re,resentative, is 9ainly concerned with i9,erialis9 in which it finds the result, not of ca,italis9 as such, but of certain 9aladGust9ents within the ca,italist syste9! n confor9ity with Mar)is9, the liberal school diagnoses as the root of i9,erialis9 the sur,lus of goods and ca,ital which see$ outlets in foreign 9ar$ets! #et, according to Hobson and his school, i9,erialist e),ansion is not the inevitable and not even the 9ost rational 9ethod of dis,osing of these sur,luses! Since the sur,luses are the result of the 9aldistribution of ,urchasing ,ower, the re9edy lies in the e),ansion of the ho9e 9ar$et through econo9ic refor9s, such as increase in ,urchasing ,ower and eli9ination of oversavings! t is this belief in a do9estic alternative to i9,erialis9 which in the 9ain distinguishes the liberal school fro9 Mar)is9! The JdevilJ theory of i9,erialis9 o,erates on a 9uch lower intellectual level than do its two co9,anion theories! t is widely held by ,acifists and has beco9e a stoc$-in-trade of (o99unist ,ro,aganda! t 9ay be said to have been the official ,hiloso,hy of the "ye (o99ittee, which in ./06 - 03 investigated on behalf of the :nited States Senate the influence of financial and industrial interests on the intervention of the :nited States in the &irst 8orld 8ar! The ,ublicity which the ,roceedings of this co99ittee received 9ade the JdevilJ theory of i9,erialis9 for a ti9e the 9ost
0 6

See ,revious Luotation, ,age 6., note =!

S,eech in the Senate, +anuary /, ./44, re,rinted in Ruhl +! Bartlett, The Record of '9erican *i,lo9acy, 6th ed! @"ew #or$B 'lfred '! 7no,f! ./36A, ,! 025! 5 (harles '! Beard, The *evil Theory of 8ar @"ew #or$B The Eanguard Press, ./03A> see also The "ew Re,ublic, Eol! 23 @March 6, .., .2, ./03A! 3 (ollected 8or$s @"ew #or$B nternational Publishers, ./=1A, Eol! DE > Selected 8or$s @"ew #or$B nternational Publishers! ./05A, Eol! E! 1 9,erialis9 and 8orld Econo9y @"ew #or$B nternational Publishers! ./=/A! ;f the writers who! aside fro9 those 9entioned in the te)t, have ,articularly influenced the develo,9ent of the Mar)ist theory of i9,erialis9! Rosa %u)e9burg and &ritH Sternberg ought to be 9entionedB cf! the latterIs The (o9ing (risis @"ew #or$B The +ohn *ay (o9,any, ./63A! 2 9,erialis9, the Highest Stage of (a,italis9 @"ew #or$B nternational Publishers, ./00A, ,! 1=! / 9,erialis9 @%ondonB G! 'llen ? :nwin, ./02A!

,o,ular e),lanation of foreign affairs in the :nited States! The si9,licity of the theory contributed 9uch to its ,o,ularity! t identified certain grou,s that obviously ,rofited fro9 war, such as 9anufacturers of war 9ateriel @the socalled 9unitions 9a$ersA, international ban$ers @J8all StreetJA, and the li$e! Since they ,rofited fro9 war, they 9ust be interested in having war! Thus the war ,rofiteers transfor9 the9selves into the Jwar 9ongers,J the JdevilsJ who ,lan wars in order to enrich the9selves! 8hile the e)tre9e Mar)ists eLuate ca,italis9 and i9,erialis9, and while the 9oderate Mar)ists and the disci,les of Hobson see in i9,erialis9 the result of 9aladGust9ents within the ca,italist syste9, for the adherents of the JdevilJ theory i9,erialis9 and war in general a9ount to nothing but a cons,iracy of evil ca,italists for the ,ur,ose of ,rivate gain! Criti$ism o! These Theories 'll econo9ic e),lanations of i9,erialis9, the refined as well as the ,ri9itive! fail the test of historic e),erience! The econo9ic inter,retation of i9,erialis9 erects a li9ited historic e),erience, based on a few isolated cases, into a universal law of history! t is indeed true that in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries a s9all nu9ber of wars were waged ,ri9arily, if not e)clusively, for econo9ic obGectives! The classic e)a9,les are the Boer 8ar of .2// - ./4= and the (haco 8ar between Bolivia and Paraguay fro9 ./0=-05! The 9ain res,onsibility of British gold 9ining interests for the Boer 8ar can hardly be doubted! The (haco 8ar is considered by so9e to have been ,ri9arily a war between two oil co9,anies for the control of oil fields! Even in the Persian Gulf war in .//., the war was fought for 9ulti,le obGectives, not econo9ics alone! But during the entire ,eriod of 9ature ca,italis9, no war, with the e)ce,tion of the Boer 8ar, was waged by 9aGor ,owers e)clusively or even ,redo9inately for econo9ic obGectives! The 'ustro - Prussian 8ar of .233 and the &rancoGer9an 8ar of .214, for instance, had no econo9ic obGectives of any i9,ortance! They were ,olitical wars, indeed i9,erialistic wars, fought for the ,ur,ose of establishing a new distribution of ,ower, first in favor of Prussia within Ger9any and then in favor of Ger9any within the Euro,ean state syste9! The (ri9ean 8ar of .256 X 53, the S,anish - '9erican 8ar of .2/2, the Russo - +a,anese 8ar of ./46 - 45, the Tur$o - talian 8ar of ./..-.=, and the several Bal$an 8ars show econo9ic obGectives only in a subordinate role, if they show the9 at all! The two world wars were certainly ,olitical wars, whose sta$e was the do9ination of Euro,e, if not of the world! "aturally, victory in these wars brought econo9ic advantages and, 9ore ,articularly, defeat brought in its wa$e econo9ic losses! But these effects were not the real issue> they were only by-,roducts of the ,olitical conseLuences of victory and defeat! Still less were these econo9ic effects the 9otives that deter9ined in the 9inds of the res,onsible states9en the issue of war and ,eace! The econo9ic theories of i9,erialis9 are thus not su,,orted by the e),erience of that historic ,eriod which they su,,ose to be inti9ately connected, if not identical, with i9,erialis9> that is, the ,eriod of ca,italis9! &urther9ore, the 9ain ,eriod of colonial e),ansion which the econo9ic theories tend to identify with i9,erialis9 ,recedes the age of 9ature ca,italis9 and cannot be attributed to the inner contradictions, of the decaying ca,italist syste9! n co9,arison with those of the si)teenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, the colonial acLuisitions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are s9all! The latest ,hase of ca,italis9 even witnesses the liLuidation of e9,ire on a large scale in the for9 of the retreat fro9 'sia and 'frica of Great Britain! &rance, Portugal, and The "etherlands! The evidence of history is still 9ore unfavorable to the contentions of the econo9ic theories if one tests the theories against the evidence ,resented by the ,reca,italist ,rocesses of e9,ire building! The ,olicies that in ancient ti9es led to the foundation of the Egy,tian, 'ssyrian, and Persian e9,ires were i9,erialistic in the ,olitical sense! So were the conLuests of 'le)ander the Great and the ,olicies of Ro9e in the last century before the (hristian era! The 'rabian e),ansion in the seventh and eighth centuries showed all the ear9ar$s of i9,erialis9! Po,e :rban used the ty,ical ideological argu9ents in su,,ort of an i9,erialistic ,olicy when, in .4/5, he e),ressed to the (ouncil of (ler9ont the reasons for the &irst (rusade in these wordsB J&or this land which you inhabit, shut in on all sides by the seas and surrounded by the 9ountain ,ea$s, is too narrow for your large ,o,ulation> nor does it abound in wealth, and it furnishes scarcely food enough for its cultivators! Hence it is that you 9urder and devour one another, that you wage war and that very 9any a9ong you ,erish in civil strife!J .4 %ouis D E, Peter the Great, and "a,oleon were the great i9,erialists of the 9odern ,reca,italist age! 'll these i9,erialis9s of ,reca,italist ti9es share with those of the ca,italist ,eriod the tendency to overthrow the established ,ower relations and ,ut in their stead the do9inance of the i9,erialistic ,ower! #et those two ,eriods of i9,erialis9 share also the subordination of econo9ic obGectives to ,olitical considerations! 'le)ander the Great and "a,oleon did not e9bar$, any 9ore than did 'dol,h Hitler, on i9,erialistic ,olicies for the ,ur,ose of ,ersonal gain or in order to esca,e the 9aladGust9ent of their econo9ic syste9s! 8hat they ai9ed at was e)actly the sa9e thing the ca,tain of industry is ai9ing at when he tries to establish an industrial Je9,ireJ by adding enter,rise to enter,rise until he do9inates his industry in a 9ono,olistic or Luasi9ono,olistic 9anner! 8hat the ,reca,italist i9,erialist, the ca,italist i9,erialist, and the Ji9,erialisticJ ca,italist want is ,ower, not econo9ic gain! The ca,tain of industry is no 9ore driven toward his Ji9,erialisticJ goal by econo9ic necessity or ,ersonal greed than was "a,oleon ! Personal gain and the solution of econo9ic ,roble9s through i9,erialistic e),ansion are for all
.4

&!'! ;gg, editor, ' Source Boo$ of Medieval History @"ew #or$B '9erican Boo$ (o9,any, ./41A, ,! =23!

of the9 a ,leasant afterthought, a welco9e by-,roduct, but not the goal by which the i9,erialistic urge is attracted! 8e have seen that i9,erialis9 is not deter9ined by econo9ics, ca,italist or otherwise! 8e shall see now that ca,italists ,er se are not i9,erialists! 'ccording to the econo9ic theories and, 9ore ,articularly, the JdevilJ theory, ca,italists use govern9ents as their tools in instigating i9,erialistic ,olicies! #et the investigation of historic instances cited in su,,ort of the econo9ic inter,retation shows that in 9ost cases the reverse relationshi, actually e)isted between states9en and ca,italists! 9,erialistic ,olicies were generally conceived by the govern9ents who su99oned the ca,italists to su,,ort these ,olicies! Thus historic evidence ,oints to the ,ri9acy of ,olitics over econo9ics, and Jthe rule of the financier ! ! ! over international ,oliticsJ is indeed, in the words of Professor Schu9,eter, Ja news,a,er fairytale, al9ost ludicrously at variance with facts!J.. #et, far fro9 being the instigators, ca,italists as a grou, C aside fro9 certain individual ca,italists C were not even enthusiastic su,,orters of i9,erialistic ,olicies! The literature and ,olicies of the grou,s and ,olitical ,arties re,resenting the ca,italist ele9ent in 9odern societies are a testi9ony to the traditional o,,osition of the 9erchant and 9anufacturing classes to any foreign ,olicy that, li$e i9,erialis9, 9ight lead to war! 's Professor Einer has statedB t was for the 9ost ,art the 9iddle classes who were the su,,orters of ,acifis9, of internationalis9, of international conciliation and co9,ro9ise of dis,utes, of disar9a9ent C in so far as these had su,,orters! t was for the 9ost ,art aristocrats, agrarians, often the urban wor$ing classes, who were the e),ansionists, the i9,erialists, the Gingoes! n the British Parlia9ent it was s,o$es9en for the J9oneyed interests,J for the e9erging 9iddle classes in the northern 9anufacturing districts and for the J(ityJ in %ondon, who were the a,,easers during the "a,oleonic 8ars, during the (ri9ean 8ar, during the Boer 8ar, and during the ,eriod fro9 the rise of Hitler to the Ger9an invasion of Poland! n our own country it was largely fro9 business circles that the i9,ortant o,,osition ca9e to the '9erican Revolution, to the 8ar of .2.=, to the i9,erialis9 of .2/2, and to the anti-"aHi ,olicy of the Roosevelt ad9inistration ,rior to Pearl Harbor! .= &ro9 Sir 'ndrew &ree,ort in the S,ectator at the beginning of the eighteenth century to "or9an 'ngellIs The Great llusion in our ti9e, it has been the conviction of the ca,italists as a class and of 9ost ca,italists as individuals that Jwar does not ,ay,J that war is inco9,atible with an industrial society! that the interests of ca,italis9 reLuire ,eace and not war! &or only ,eace ,er9its those rational calculations u,on which ca,italist actions are based! 8ar carries with it an ele9ent of irrationality and chaos which is alien to the very s,irit of ca,italis9! 9,erialis9, however, as the atte9,t to overthrow the e)isting ,ower relations, carries with it the inevitable ris$ of war! 's a grou, then, ca,italists were o,,osed to warB they did not initiate, and only su,,orted with 9isgivings and under ,ressure, i9,erialistic ,olicies that 9ight lead, and 9any ti9es actually did lead, to war! How was it ,ossible that a body of doctrine, such as the econo9ic theories of i9,erialis9, which is so co9,letely at variance with the facts of e),erience, could hold sway over the ,ublic 9indF Two factors are res,onsible for the success of that doctrineB the cli9ate of o,inion in the 8estern world and the character of the doctrine itself! 8e have already ,ointed to the general tendency of the age to reduce ,olitical ,roble9s to econo9ic ones! .0 The ca,italists and their critics are eLually guilty of this funda9ental error! The for9er e),ected fro9 the develo,9ent of ca,italis9, freed fro9 the atavistic fetters of the ,reca,italist age and following only its own inherent +aws, general ,ros,erity and ,eace! The latter were convinced that these ai9s could be achieved only through refor9 or the abolition of the ca,italist syste9! Both ca9,s loo$ed to econo9ic re9edies for ,olitical ,roble9s! Bentha9 advocated the e9anci,ation of the colonies as the 9eans of doing away with the i9,erialistic conflicts that lead to war! Proudhon, (obden, and their disci,les saw in tariffs the sole source of international conflicts and reasoned that ,eace lay in e)tending free trade! .6 n our own ti9e we have heard it said that since Ger9an, talian, and +a,anese i9,erialis9 was born of econo9ic needs, these countries would have refrained fro9 i9,erialistic ,olicies had they received loans, colonies, and access to raw 9aterials! Poor nations will go to war, so the argu9ent runs, in order to esca,e econo9ic distressB if the rich nations alleviate their econo9ic afflictions, they will have no reason to go to war! n the classic age of ca,italis9 both the adherents and the o,,onents of the ca,italist syste9 believed that the econo9ic 9otives which see9ed to deter9ine the actions of business9en were guiding the actions of all 9en! The other reason for the ready acce,tance of the econo9ic inter,retation of i9,erialis9 lies in its ,lausibility! 8hat Professor Schu9,eter has said of the Mar)ist theory of i9,erialis9 holds generally trueB J' series of vital facts of our ti9e see9s to be ,erfectly accounted for! The whole 9aHe of international ,olitics see9s to be cleared u, by a
.. .=

+ose,h Schu9,eter, Business (ycles @"ew #or$ and %ondonB McGraw-Hill Boo$ (o9,any! ./0/A, Eol! ., ,! 6/5, n! l! +acob Einer, JPeace as an Econo9ic Proble9!J nternational Econo9ics @GlencoeB The &ree Press! ./5.A, ,! =55! (f! Phili, S! &oner, Business and SlaveryB the "ew #or$ Merchants and the rre,ressible (onflict @(ha,el HillB :niversity of "orth (arolina Press! ./6.A, on the o,,osition of "ew #or$ and "ew England 9erchants to the (ivil 8ar! and *israeliIs state9ent to %ord Salisbury of Se,te9ber =3, .213B J'll the 9onied and co99ercial classes in all countries are against war! !!!J 'lso significant in this res,ect is the re,ort that the British '9bassador to Ger9any sent on the eve of the &irst 8orld 8ar, +une 04!./.6! to his &oreign ;fficeB J hear in fact fro9 all sides that the financial and industrial classes are dead against a war in any sha,e!!!!J British *ocu9ents on the ;rigin of the 8ar, .2/2 - ./.6 @%ondonB His MaGestyIs Stationery ;ffice, ./=3A, Eol! D , ,! 03.! .0 See ,ages 03 ff! See also Hans +! Morgenthau, Scientific Man,s! Power Politics @(hicagoB :niversity of (hicago Press, ./63> Phoeni) Edition, ./35A, ,,! 15 ff! .6 See ,age 05 - 03!

single ,owerful stro$e of analysis!J.5 The 9ystery of so threatening, inhu9an, and often 9urderous a historic force as i9,erialis9, the theoretical ,roble9 of defining it as a distinctive ty,e of international ,olitics, the ,ractical difficulty, above all, of recogniHing it in a concrete situation and of counteracting it with adeLuate 9eans C all this is reduced to either the inherent tendencies or the abuses of the ca,italist syste9! 8henever the ,heno9enon of i9,erialis9 ,resents itself for either theoretical understanding or ,ractical action, the si9,le sche9e will ,rovide an al9ost auto9atic answer that ,uts the 9ind at ease! .IFFERENT T3PE' OF I$PERIALI'$ The true nature of i9,erialis9 as a ,olicy devised to overthrow the status Luo can best be e),lained by a consideration of certain ty,ical situations that favor i9,erialistic ,olicies and that, given the subGective and obGective conditions necessary for an active foreign ,olicy, will al9ost inevitably ,roduce a ,olicy of i9,erialis9! Three In(u$ements to Imperia"ism %ictorious 1ar 8hen a nation is engaged in war with another nation, it is very li$ely that the nation which antici,ates victory will ,ursue a ,olicy that see$s a ,er9anent change of the ,ower relations with the defeated ene9y! The nation will ,ursue this ,olicy regardless of what the obGectives were at the outbrea$ of the war! t is the obGective of this ,olicy of change to transfor9 the relation between victor and vanLuished which ha,,ens to e)ist at the end of the war into the new status Luo of the ,eace settle9ent! Thus a war that was started by the victor as a defensive war C for the 9aintenance of the ,rewar status Luo C transfor9s itself with the a,,roaching victory into an i9,erialistic warB that is, for a ,er9anent change in the status Luo! The J(arthaginian Peace,J by which the Ro9ans changed their ,ower relations with the (arthaginians ,er9anently in their favor, has beco9e the byword for the $ind of ,eace settle9ent which tends to ,er,etuate the relation between victor and vanLuished as it e)ists at the conclusion of hostilities! The Treaty of Eersailles and its co9,anion treaties, ter9inating the &irst 8orld 8ar, had in the eyes of 9any observers a si9ilar character! The e),ansion of the Soviet s,here of influence into Eastern Euro,e after 8orld 8ar , es,ecially as recogniHed in the Helsin$i 'ccords, is a further e)a9,le! ' ,olicy that ai9s at a ,eace settle9ent of this $ind 9ust, according to our definition, be called i9,erialistic! t is i9,erialistic because it tries to re,lace the ,rewar status Luo, when a,,ro)i9ately eLual or at least not thoroughly uneLual ,owers o,,ose each other, with a ,ostwar status Luo where the victor beco9es the ,er9anent 9aster of the vanLuished! Lost %2r This very status of subordination, intended for ,er9anency, 9ay easily engender n the vanLuished a desire to turn the scales on the victor, to overthrow the status Luo created by his victory, and to change ,laces with hi9 in the hierardy of ,ower! n other words, the ,olicy of i9,erialis9 ,ursued by the victory is li$ely to call forth a ,olicy of i9,erialis9 on the ,art of the vanLuished! f he is not forever ruined or else won over to the cause of the victor, the vanLuished will want to regain what he has lost and, it ,ossible, gain 9ore! The to,ical e)a9,le of i9,erialis9 conceived as a reaction against the successful i9,erialis9 of others is Ger9an i9,erialis9 fro9 ./05 to the end of the Second 8orld 8ar! The Euro,ean status Luo of ./.6 was characteriHed by a concert of great ,owers, consisting of 'ustria, &rance, Ger9any, Great Britain, taly, and Russia! The victory of the 'llies and the subseLuent ,eace treaties created a new status Luo that was the fruition of the i9,erialistic ,olicies of &ranYW! This new status Luo established the hege9ony of &rance, e)ercised in alliance with 9ost of the newly created nations of Eastern and (entral Euro,e! Ger9an foreign ,olicy fro9 ././ to ./05 o,erated see9ingly within the fra9ewor$ of that status Luo, while secretly ,re,aring for its overthrow! t tried to win concessions for Ger9any, but it nevertheless acce,ted, at least for the tine being and with 9ental reservations, the ,ower relations established by fie Treaty of Eersailles! t did not o,enly challenge these ,ower relationsB other, it ai9ed at adGust9ents that left their essence intact! Such was ,articularly the character of the J,olicy of fulfill9entJ C that is, fulfill9ent of the Treaty of Eersailles C which the Re,ublic of 8ei9ar ,ursued! t was this atte9,t to i9,rove the international ,osition of Ger9any while acce,ting at east te9,orarily the status Luo of Eersailles that aroused the violent o,,osition of nationalists and "ational Socialists! 'fter the "ational Socialists had co9e to ,ower in ./00 and stabiliHed their regi9e do9estically, they abrogited in ./05 the disar9a9ent ,rovisions of the Treaty of Eersailles! n ..03, in violation of the sa9e treaty, they occu,ied the Rhineland and declared void the de9ilitariHation of the Ger9an territory adGacent to the Ger9an - &rench frontier! 8ith these 9oves the foreign ,olicy of "ational Socialist Ger9any beca9e o,enly i9,erialistic> for these were the first in a series of 9oves that e),ressed Ger9anyIs resolution no longer to acce,t the status Luo of Eersailles as basis for its foreign ,olicy, but to wor$ for the overthrow of that status Luo! 1ea3ness
.5

+ose,h Schu9,eter, (a,italis9, Socialis9, and *e9ocracy @"ew #or$ and %ondonB Har,er and Brothers, ./61A, ,! 5.!

'nother ty,ical situation that favors i9,erialistic ,olicies is the e)istence of wea$ states or of ,olitically e9,ty s,aces, that are attractive and accessible to a strong state! This is the situation out of which colonial i9,erialis9 grew! t is also the situation that 9ade ,ossible the transfor9ation of the original federation of thirteen '9erican states into a continental ,ower! "a,oleonIs as well as HitlerIs i9,erialis9 had ,artly this character, the latterIs ,articularly in the ,eriod of the JblitH$riegJ of ./64! *uring the closing ,hase of the Second 8orld 8ar and the decade following it, i9,erialis9 growing out of the relations between strong and wea$ nations was e)e9,lified by the relations between the Soviet :nion and the nations of Eastern Euro,e! The attractiveness of ,ower vacuu9s as an incentive to i9,erialis9 is at least a ,otential threat to the survival of 9any of the new nations of 'sia and 'frica, deficient as they are in the 9ost i9,ortant ele9ents of ,ower! 4hree $oals of 5m6erialism 's i9,erialis9 grows out of three ty,ical situations, so i9,erialis9 9oves toward three ty,ical obGectives! The obGective of i9,erialis9 can be the do9ination of the whole ,olitically organiHed globeB that is a world e9,ire! ;r it can be an e9,ire or hege9ony of a,,ro)i9ately continental di9ensions! ;r it can be a strictly localiHed ,re,onderance of ,ower! n other words, the i9,erialistic ,olicy 9ay have no li9its but those set by the ,ower of resistance of the ,ros,ective victi9s, or it 9ay have geogra,hically deter9ined li9its, such as the geogra,hical boundaries of a continent, or it 9ay be li9ited by the localiHed ai9s of the i9,erialistic ,ower itself! 1orld 7m6ire The outstanding historic e)a9,les of unli9ited i9,erialis9 are the e),ansionist ,olicies of 'le)ander the Great, Ro9e, the 'rabs in the seventh and eighth centuries, "a,oleon , and Hitler! They all have in co99on an urge toward e),ansion which $nows no rational li9its, feeds on its own successes and! if not sto,,ed by a su,erior force, will go on to the confines of the ,olitical world!.3 This urge will not be satisfied so long as there re9ains anywhere a ,ossible obGect of do9ination C a ,olitically organiHed grou, of 9en which by its very inde,endence challenges the conLuerorIs lust for ,ower! t is, as we shall see, e)actly the lac$ of 9oderation, the as,iration to conLuer all that lends itself to conLuest, characteristic of unli9ited i9,erialis9, which in the ,ast has been the undoing of the i9,erialistic ,olicies of this $ind! The only e)ce,tion is Ro9e, for reasons that will be discussed later! .1 Continental 7m6ire The ty,e of geogra,hically deter9ined i9,erialis9 is 9ost clearly ,resented in the ,olicies of Euro,ean ,owers to gain a ,redo9inant ,osition on the Euro,ean continent! %ouis D E, "a,oleon , and 8illia9 are cases in ,oint! The $ingdo9 of Pied9ont under (avour see$ing the do9ination of the talian ,eninsula in the .254s, the different ,artici,ants in the Bal$an 8ars of ./.= and ./.0 as,iring to hege9ony in the Bal$ans, Mussolini trying to 9a$e the Mediterranean an talian la$e C these are e)a9,les of geogra,hically deter9ined i9,erialis9 on a less than continental basis! The '9erican ,olicy of the nineteenth century, consisting in the gradual e),ansion of '9erican rule over the better ,art of the "orth '9erican continent is ,ri9arily, but not e)clusively, deter9ined by the geogra,hic li9its of a continent> for the :nited States has not atte9,ted to bring (anada and Me)ico under its do9ination, although it would have been able to do so! (ontinental i9,erialis9 is here 9odified by its li9itation to a localiHed section of the continent! The sa9e 9i)ed ty,e of i9,erialis9 constitutes the essence of '9erican foreign ,olicy toward the 8estern He9is,here as a whole! The Monroe *octrine, by ,ostulating for the 8estern He9is,here a ,olicy of the status Luo with regard to non-'9erican ,owers, erected a ,rotective shield behind which the :nited States could establish its ,redo9inance within that geogra,hic region! 8ithin these geogra,hic li9its, however, '9erican ,olicy was not always unifor9ly i9,erialistic! Toward the (entral '9erican re,ublics and certain countries of South '9erica it was at ti9es fran$ly i9,erialistic, but in its dealings with so9e other countries, such as 'rgentina and BraHil, it sought only to 9aintain the e)isting su,eriority of the :nited States, which was the result of a $ind of natural ,rocess rather than of a deliberate '9erican ,olicy! Even though the :nited States has had the ,ower to i9,ose its su,eriority u,on these countries in the for9 of actual hege9ony, it chose not to do so! Here again we find a localiHed i9,erialis9 within the general fra9ewor$ of a geogra,hically li9ited ,olicy! Local Pre6onderance The ,rototy,e of localiHed i9,erialis9 is to be found in the 9onarchical ,olicies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries! n the eighteenth century, &rederic$ the Great, %ouis DE, Maria Theresa, Peter the Great, and (atherine
.3

Hobhes has given the classical analysis of this unli9ited desire for ,ower in the %eviathan, (ha,ter D @Every9anIs %ibraryA, ,,! 6/ ff! JSo that in the first ,lace, ,ut for a generall inclination of all 9an$ind, a ,er,etuall and restlesse desire of Power after ,ower, that ceaseth only in *eath! 'nd the cause of this, is not alwayes that a 9an ho,es for a 9ore intensive delight, that he has already attained to> or that he cannot be content with a 9oderate ,owerB but because he cannot assure the ,ower and 9eans to live well, which he hath ,resent, without the acLuisition of 9ore! 'nd fro9 hence it is, that 7ings, whose ,ower is greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring it at ho9e by %awes, or abroad by 8arsB and when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire> in so9e, of &a9e fro9 new conLuestB in others, of ease and sensuall ,leasure> in others, of ad9iration, or being flattered fro9 e)cellence in so9e art, or other ability of the 9ind!J .1 See ,age 060 ff!

were the 9oving forces of this $ind of foreign ,olicy! n the nineteenth century, Bis9arc$ was the 9aster of this i9,erialistic ,olicy, which see$s to overthrow the status Luo and to establish ,olitical ,re,onderance within selfchosen li9its! The difference between such a localiHed i9,erialistic ,olicy, continental i9,erialis9, and unli9ited i9,erialis9 is the difference between the foreign ,olicies of Bis9arc$, 8illia9 , and Hitler! Bis9arc$ wanted to establish Ger9anyIs ,re,onderance in (entral Euro,e> 8illia9 , in all of Euro,e> Hitler, in the whole world! The traditional obGectives of Russian i9,erialis9, such as control of &inland! Eastern Euro,e, the Bal$ans, the *ardanelles, and ran, are also of a localiHed nature! The li9its of this ty,e of i9,erialis9 are not, as in the case of the geogra,hically li9ited ty,e, ,ri9arily a ,roduct of the obGective facts of nature beyond which it would be either technically difficult or ,olitically unwise to go! ;n the contrary, they are ,ri9arily the result of a free choice a9ong several alternatives, one of which 9ight be a ,olicy of the status Luo, another continental i9,erialis9, a third localiHed i9,erialis9! n the eighteenth century the third alternative reco99ended itself because the e)isting concert of ,owers, each of about the sa9e strength, discouraged any atte9,t at continental i9,erialis9! The e),erience of %ouis D E showed how haHardous such an atte9,t could be! &urther9ore, eighteenth - century i9,erialis9 was 9otivated 9ainly by considerations of 9onarchical ,ower and glory, not by the 9ass e9otions of 9odern nationalis9! These considerations o,erated within a co99on fra9ewor$ of 9onarchical traditions and Euro,ean civiliHation which i9,osed u,on the actors on the ,olitical scene a 9oral restraint necessarily absent in ,eriods of religious or nationalistic crusades! !n the nineteenth century, the ele9ent of choice characteristic of the ,olicy of localiHed i9,erialis9 is ,ara9ount in the history of Bis9arc$Is foreign ,olicy! &irst, he had to overco9e the o,,osition of the Prussian conservatives who favored a ,olicy of the status Luo for Prussia over Bis9arc$Is ,olicy of localiHed i9,erialis9 ai9ing at hege9ony within Ger9any! 8hen victorious wars had 9ade Bis9arc$Is ,olicy feasible, it had to be defended against those who now wanted to go beyond the li9its Bis9arc$ had set for Prussian and later Ger9an hege9ony! The dis9issal of Bis9arc$ by 8illia9 in .2/4 9ar$ed the end of localiHed and the beginning of at least a tendency toward continental i9,erialis9 as the foreign ,olicy of Ger9any! 4hree Methods of 5m6erialism +ust as there are three ty,es of i9,erialis9 with res,ect to the situations fro9 which i9,erialis9 ty,ically arises, and three ty,es of i9,erialis9 in view of its obGectives, so a tri,le distinction is to be 9ade regarding the ty,ical 9eans e9,loyed by i9,erialistic ,olicies! 'ccordingly, we 9ust distinguish between 9ilitary, econo9ic, and cultural i9,erialis9! ' wides,read ,o,ular 9isconce,tion confuses these three 9ethods with the obGectives of i9,erialis9, as though econo9ic i9,erialis9, for instance, ai9ed at nothing but econo9ic e),loitation of other ,eo,les! This 9isconce,tion has its origin in the econo9ic theories of i9,erialis9 as well as in the neglect of the ,ower ele9ent in international relations, referred to above!.2 n truth, 9ilitary i9,erialis9 see$s 9ilitary conLuest> econo9ic i9,erialis9, econo9ic e),loitation of other ,eo,les> cultural i9,erialis9, the dis,lace9ent of one culture by another C but always as 9eans to the sa9e i9,erialistic end! That end is always the overthrow of the status LuoB that is, the reversal of the ,ower relations between the i9,erialist nation and its ,ros,ective victi9s! This i99utable end is served by 9ilitary, econo9ic, and cultural 9eans, cither alone or in co9bination! t is with these 9eans that we are here concerned! Military 9,erialis9 The 9ost obvious, the 9ost ancient, and also the crudest for9 of i9,erialis9 is 9ilitary conLuest! The great conLuerors of all ti9es have also been the great i9,erialists! The advantage of this 9ethod, fro9 the ,oint of view of the i9,erialistic nation, lies in the fact that the new ,ower relations resulting fro9 9ilitary conLuest can as a rule be changed only by another war instigated by the vanLuished nation, with the odds nor9ally against the latter! "a,oleon 9ight have relied u,on the sole ,ower of the ideas of the &rench Revolution to establish the hege9ony of &rance in Euro,e and in the world> that is, he 9ight have chosen cultural i9,erialis9 instead of 9ilitary conLuest! ;n the other hand, if he could 9a$e and hold 9ilitary conLuests, he would reach his i9,erialistic goal 9ore Luic$ly and derive fro9 the ,rocess of conLuering that 9a)i9u9 of ,ersonal satisfaction which victory in co9bat gives to the victor! #et the very condition under which this state9ent is alone correct indicates the great drawbac$ of 9ilitary conLuest as a 9ethod of i9,erialis9B war is a ga9bleB it 9ay be lost as well as won! The nation that starts war for i9,erialistic ends 9ay gain an e9,ire and $ee, it, as Ro9e did! ;r it 9ay gain it and, in the ,rocess of trying to gain still 9ore, lose it, as in "a,oleonIs case! ;r it 9ay gain it! lose it, and fall victi9 to the i9,erialis9 of others, as in the case of "ational Socialist Ger9any and of +a,an! Military i9,erialis9 is a ga9ble ,layed for the highest sta$es! 7conomic 5m6erialism Econo9ic i9,erialis9 is less obtrusive and also generally less effective than the 9ilitary variety and is, as a rational 9ethod of gaining ,ower, a ,roduct of 9odern ti9es! 's such, it is a conco9itant of the age of 9ercantilist and ca,italist e),ansion! ts outstanding 9odern e)a9,le is what is called Jdollar di,lo9acy!J t has also ,layed an i9,ortant role in the history of British and &rench i9,erialis9! British influence in Portugal since the beginning of the eighteenth century has been ,owerfully su,,orted by econo9ic control! British su,re9acy in the 'rab world was the
.2

See ,ages 04 ff!

result of econo9ic ,olicies for which the ter9 Joil di,lo9acyJ is not 9is,laced! Si9ilarly, the 'rab discovery of the ,olitical uses of oil has given the oil-,roducing 'rab nations un,recedented ,ower over the industrial nations i9,orting 'rab oil! The ,redo9inant influence &rance e)ercised in countries such as Ru9ania in the ,eriod between the two world wars was to a considerable e)tent based u,on econo9ic factors! The co99on characteristic of the ,olicies we call econo9ic i9,erialis9 is their tendency, on the one hand, to overthrow the status Luo by changing the ,ower relations between the i9,erialist nation and others and, on the other hand, to do so not through the conLuest of territory but by way of econo9ic control! f a nation cannot or will not conLuer territory for the ,ur,ose of establishing its 9astery over other nations, it can try to achieve the sa9e end by establishing its control over those who control the territory! The (entral '9erican re,ublics, for instance, are all sovereign states> they ,ossess all the attributes of sovereignty and dis,lay the ,ara,hernalia of sovereignty! But, their econo9ic life being al9ost co9,letely de,endent u,on e),orts to the :nited States, these nations, unless they receive significant su,,ort fro9 another source, are unable to ,ursue for any length of ti9e ,olicies of any $ind, do9estic or foreign, to which the :nited States would obGect! The nature of econo9ic i9,erialis9 as an unobtrusive, indirect, but fairly effective 9ethod of gaining and 9aintaining do9ination over other nations is ,articularly stri$ing where two rival i9,erialis9s co9,ete with econo9ic 9eans for control over the sa9e govern9ent! The century - old co9,etition between Great Britain and Russia for control of ran, though carried on for a long ti9e ,redo9inantly by 9ilitary 9eans, 9ay serve as an e)a9,le! Professor P! E! Roberts described this situation in ran, then called Persia, before the &irst 8orld 8arB Russia ,resses on her fro9 the north, Great Britain fro9 the south, though the influence of the two ,owers is very different! Great Britain holds in her hands the bul$ of the foreign trade of southern Persia, and clai9s a general control of the whole 'siatic coastline fro9 'den eastwards to Baluchistan! ! ! ! Great Britain has never coveted territorial ,ossessions! ! ! ! The develo,9ent of navigation of the Eolga and the construction of the Transcas,ian railway have given to Russia the bul$ of the trade with northern Persia! But the co99ercial wea,ons of Russia are a 9ono,oly and ,rohibition! She has laid an interdict u,on the 9a$ing of railroads in Persian territory, and has often o,,osed 9easures which 9ight regenerate the country! ./ ;nly Jthe co99ercial and ,olitical rivalry of Great BritainJ see9ed to bar the way to the co9,lete absor,tion of ran into the Russian orbit! *uring the ,eriod of econo9ic and ,olitical rivalry between Great Britain and Russia in that region, the foreign ,olicies, and freLuently also the do9estic ,olicies, of the ranian govern9ent faithfully reflected the intensity of the econo9ic, and so9eti9es 9ilitary, ,ressures that the rival ,owers brought to bear! 8hen Russia ,ro9ised or granted econo9ic advantages that Great Britain failed to 9atch, or when Russia threatened to withdraw advantages it had granted, Russian influence increased, and vice versa! Russia did not dare realiHe its territorial a9bitions with regard to ran! Great Britain had none! But both tried to control the ranian govern9ent, which in turn controls oil fields as well as the road to ndia! Cultural 5m6erialism =4 8hat we suggest calling cultural i9,erialis9 is the 9ost subtle and, if it were ever to succeed by itself alone, the 9ost successful of i9,erialistic ,olicies! t ai9s not at the conLuest of territory or at the control of econo9ic life, but at the conLuest and control of the 9inds of 9en as an instru9ent for changing the ,ower relations between two nations! f one could i9agine the culture and, 9ore ,articularly, the ,olitical ideology, with all its concrete i9,erialistic obGectives, of State ' conLuering the 9inds of all the citiHens deter9ining the ,olicies of State B! State ' would have won a 9ore co9,lete victory and would have founded its su,re9acy on 9ore stable grounds than any 9ilitary conLueror or econo9ic 9aster! State ' would not need to threaten or e9,loy 9ilitary force or use econo9ic ,ressure in order to achieve its ends> for that end the subservience of State O to its will, would have already been realiHed by the ,ersuasiveness of a su,erior culture and a 9ore attractive ,olitical ,hiloso,hy! This is, however, a hy,othetical case! (ultural i9,erialis9 generally falls short of a victory so co9,lete as to 9a$e other 9ethods of i9,erialis9 su,erfluous! The ty,ical role cultural i9,erialis9 ,lays in 9odern ti9es is subsidiary to the other 9ethods! t softens u, the ene9y, it ,re,ares the ground for 9ilitary conLuest or econo9ic ,enetration! ts ty,ical 9odern 9anifestation is the fifth colu9n, and one of its two outstanding 9odern successes is to be found in the o,erations of the "ational Socialist fifth colu9ns in Euro,e before the outbrea$ and at the beginning of the Second 8orld 8ar! ts success was 9ost s,ectacular in 'ustria, where in ./02 a ,ro-"ational Socialist govern9ent invited the Ger9an troo,s to occu,y the country! ts success was considerable in &rance, where a nu9ber of influential citiHens, inside and outside the govern9ent, had been converted to the "ational Socialist ,hiloso,hy and its international obGectives! t is hardly an e)aggeration to say that these countries were already ,artly conLuered by 9eans of cultural i9,erialis9 before 9ilitary conLuest finished the tas$! Great Britain, by interning at the outbrea$ of
./ =4

(a9bridge Modern History @"ew #or$B The Mac9illan (o9,any, ./.4A, Eol! D , ,! 6/.! 8hat is described under this heading goes freLuently by the na9e of ideological i9,erialis9, the ter9 JideologicalJ referring ,articularly to the contest of ,olitical ,hiloso,hies! Two reasons, however, see9 to 9a$e it advisable to use the ter9 JculturalJ instead! ;n the one hand, the ter9 JculturalJ co9,rises all $inds of intellectual influences, ,olitical and otherwise, that serve as 9eans for i9,erialistic ends! ;n the other hand, we are using the ter9 JideologicalJ in (ha,ter 1 in its s,ecific sociological sense, and it would only 9a$e for confusion if we used the sa9e ter9 here in its general ,o,ular 9eaning!

the Second 8orld 8ar all $nown "ational Socialists and their sy9,athiHers within its borders, ,aid tribute to the danger that cultural ,enetration ,resented for the ,ros,ective victi9s of Ger9an i9,erialis9! The other outstanding e)a9,le of cultural i9,erialis9 in our ti9e, antedating and surviving the "ational Socialist fifth colu9n, is the (o99unist nternational! n its heyday, directed fro9 Moscow, it guided and controlled the (o99unist ,arties in all countries and saw to it that the ,olicies ,ursued by the national (o99unist ,arties were in accord with the foreign ,olicy of the Soviet :nion! To the e)tent that (o99unist ,arties gained influence in ,articular nations, the influence of the Soviet :nion over these nations increased, and where (o99unist ,arties gained control of national govern9ents, the Russian govern9ent, controlling the (o99unist ,arties, controlled these national govern9ents! The techniLue used by the Soviet :nion for establishing its control over the countries of Eastern Euro,e ,rovides a classic e)a9,le of the organic interconnectedness between cultural i9,erialis9 and the other for9s of i9,erialistic conLuest! n those countries the ,ro9otion of (o99unis9 through (o99unist ,arties, directed fro9 Moscow, was a 9ere 9eans to the end of Russian do9ination and was coordinated with other 9eans serving the sa9e end! Thus 9ilitary conLuest was the foundation for the Russian do9ination of Eastern Euro,e! Su,,orting and in ,art su,,lanting it was Russian control over the econo9ic life of Eastern Euro,e, and the conseLuent econo9ic de,endence of Eastern Euro,e u,on the Soviet :nion! &inally, the Soviet :nion endeavored to substitute loyalty to (o99unis9 and! in conseLuence, to the SovietJ :nion for the loyalties the ,eo,les of Eastern Euro,e have traditionally felt to their res,ective nations, religions, and ,arries, endeavoring thus to 9a$e the9 willing tools of Russian ,olicies! The co9,etition between the Soviet :nion and (hina for the do9ination of the world (o99unist 9ove9ent and for ,redo9inant influence in the unco99itted nations, too, uses ,ri9arily the instru9ents of cultural i9,erialis9! The two 9aGor (o99unist nations derive their clai9 to do9inant influence fro9 the assertion that each of the9 is the true heir of Mar) and %enin, while the other is a heretic su,,orting the ene9ies of (o99unis9! 8herever govern9ents and ,olitical 9ove9ents adhere to (o99unist doctrine, this argu9ent is a source of ,ower for the one of the two 9aGor (o99unist nations that can 9a$e the argu9ent credible! The cultural i9,erialis9 of totalitarian govern9ents is well disci,lined and highly organiHedB for these govern9ents are able, because of their totalitarian character, to e)ert strict control and guiding influence over the thoughts and actions of their citiHens and foreign sy9,athiHers! 8hile the techniLue of cultural i9,erialis9 has been ,erfected by the totalitarians and has been forged into the effective ,olitical wea,on of the fifth colu9n, the use of cultural sy9,athy and ,olitical affinities as wea,ons of i9,erialis9 is al9ost as old as i9,erialis9 itself! The histories of ancient Greece and Renaissance taly are re,lete with e,isodes in which i9,erialistic ,olicies were e)ecuted through association with ,olitical sy9,athiHers in the ene9y ran$s rather than through 9ilitary conLuests! n 9odern ti9es religious organiHations, associated or identified with govern9ents, have ,layed an i9,ortant role in i9,erialistic ,olicies of a cultural character! Ty,ical in this res,ect are the i9,erialistic ,olicies of (Harist Russia, which used the dual ,osition of the (Har as head of the Russian govern9ent and of the ;rthodo) (hurch for the ,ur,ose of e)tending the ,ower of Russia to the followers of the ;rthodo) faith in foreign countries! That Russia was able in the nineteenth century to succeed Tur$ey as the ,re,onderant ,ower in the Bal$ans is largely due to the cultural i9,erialis9 that used the ;rthodo) (hurch as a wea,on of Russian foreign ,olicy! n the secular field, la 9ission civilisatrice of &rance has been a ,otent wea,on of &rench i9,erialis9! The deliberate use of the attractive Lualities of &rench civiliHation for the ,ur,oses of &rench foreign ,olicy was one of the cornerstones of &rench i9,erialis9 in the countries adGacent to the eastern Mediterranean before the &irst 8orld 8ar! The wave of ,ublic sy9,athy throughout the world, which ca9e to the aid of &rance in both world wars, was the fruit of cultural i9,erialis9, which in turn strengthened the &rench 9ilitary i9,erialis9 of the later, victorious years of both world wars! (ultural i9,erialis9 n the for9 of the diffusion of a national culture is inco9,arably less 9echanical and disci,linary, but not necessarily less effective, than the totalitarian $ind! 8hile the latter 9a$es use ,ri9arily of the affinities of ,olitical ,hiloso,hy, the for9er i9,resses the intellectually influential grou,s of a foreign country with the attractive Lualities of a civiliHation until these grou,s tend to find the ,olitical obGectives and 9ethods of that civiliHation eLually attractive! 8e have already ,ointed out that cultural i9,erialis9 generally ,lays a role subsidiary to the 9ilitary and econo9ic varieties! Si9ilarly, while econo9ic i9,erialis9 so9eti9es stands by itself, it freLuently su,,orts 9ilitary ,olicies! ;n the other hand, while 9ilitary i9,erialis9 is able to conLuer without the su,,ort of non9ilitary 9ethods, no do9inion can last that is founded u,on nothing but 9ilitary force! Thus the conLueror will not only ,re,are for 9ilitary conLuests by econo9ic and cultural ,enetration! He will also found his e9,ire not u,on 9ilitary force alone, but ,ri9arily u,on the control of the livelihood of the conLuered and u,on the do9ination of their 9inds! 'nd it is in that 9ost subtle yet 9ost i9,ortant tas$ that, with the e)ce,tion of Ro9e, all the great i9,erialists, fro9 'le)ander to "a,oleon and Hitler, have failed! Their failure to conLuer the 9inds of those who9 they had conLuered otherwise ,roved to be the undoing of their e9,ires! The ever-renewed coalitions against "a,oleon, the revolts atJ the Poles against the Russians throughout the nineteenth century, the struggle of the underground against Hitler, and the fights of reland and ndia for freedo9 fro9 British rule are the classic e)a9,les in 9odern ti9es of that ulti9ate ,roble9 which few i9,erialistic ,olicies have been able to solve! The share of econo9ic and cultural i9,erialis9 in the over-all international activities of govern9ents has greatly increased since the Second 8orld 8ar! t has done so for two reasons! ;n the one hand, 9ilitary i9,erialis9 ,ursued o,enly and on a large scale is no longer a rational instru9ent of foreign ,olicy since it carries within itself the ris$ of escalation into a self-destructive nuclear war! Thus a nation bent u,on the i9,erialistic e),ansion of its ,ower will

often substitute econo9ic and cultural 9ethods for 9ilitary ones! ;n the other hand, the disintegration of the colonial e9,ires into a great nu9ber of wea$ states, 9any of which 9ust rely for their very survival u,on outside assistance, o,ens u, new o,,ortunities for i9,erialistic nations to e),and their ,ower by econo9ic and cultural 9eans! Thus (hina, the Soviet :nion, and the :nited States use their econo9ic and cultural resources in order to co9,ete with each other for the e),ansion of their res,ective ,ower into the so-called unco99itted third of the world or at least for ,reventing the other nations to e),and theirs! The wea$ness of the new nations offers the9 the o,,ortunity, and the unacce,table ris$ of nuclear war has transfor9ed that o,,ortunity into a rational necessity! HO% TO .ETECT AN. COUNTER AN I$PERIALI'TIC POLIC3 The ,receding considerations lead to the funda9ental Luestion that confronts the ,ublic officials res,onsible for the conduct of foreign ,olicy as well as citiHens trying to for9 an intelligent o,inion on international issues! This Luestion concerns the character of the foreign ,olicy ,ursued by another nation and! in conseLuence, the $ind of foreign ,olicy that ought to be ado,ted with regard to it! s the foreign ,olicy of the other nation i9,erialistic, or is it notF n other words, does it see$ to overthrow the e)isting distribution of ,ower, or does it only conte9,late adGust9ents within the general fra9ewor$ of the e)isting status LuoF The answer to that Luestion has deter9ined the fate of nations, and the wrong answer has often 9eant deadly ,eril or actual destruction> for u,on the correctness of that answer de,ends the success of the foreign ,olicy derived fro9 it! 8hile it would be fatal to counter i9,erialistic designs with 9easures a,,ro,riate to a ,olicy of the status Luo, it would be only a little less ris$y to deal with a ,olicy see$ing adGust9ents within the status Luo as though it were i9,erialistic! The classic e)a9,le of the for9er error is the a,,ease9ent of Ger9any in the late thirties! The other error had a decisive influence u,on the foreign ,olicies of the great Euro,ean ,owers in the decades before the outbrea$ of the &irst 8orld 8ar! The Prob"em o! Po"i$ 0 Containment9 Appeasement9 :ear 's the ,olicies of i9,erialis9 and the status Luo are funda9entally different in nature, so 9ust the ,olicies designed to counter the9 be funda9entally different! ' ,olicy adeLuate to counter a ,olicy of the status Luo cannot be sufficient to 9eet a ,olicy of i9,erialis9! ' ,olicy of the status Luo which see$s adGust9ents within the e)isting over-all distribution of ,ower can be dealt with by a ,olicy of give and ta$e, of balance, of co9,ro9iseB a ,olicy, in short, that 9a$es use of the techniLues of adGust9ent within a given overall distribution of ,ower in order to gain a 9a)i9u9 of advantage and to get by with a 9ini9u9 of loss! 9,erialis9, which see$s to overthrow the e)isting distribution of ,ower, 9ust at the very least be countered by a ,olicy of contain9ent which, in defense of the e)isting distribution of ,ower, calls a halt to further aggression, e),ansion, or other disturbances of the status Luo on the ,art of the i9,erialistic nation! The ,olicy of contain9ent erects a wall, either a real one, such as the Great 8all of (hina or the &rench Maginot %ine, or an i9aginary one, such as the line of 9ilitary de9arcation drawn in ./65 between the Soviet orbit and the 8estern world! t says in effect to the i9,erialistic nationB JThus far and no farther!J warning it that a ste, beyond the line entails the virtual certainty of war! ',,ease9ent is a foreign ,olicy that atte9,ts to 9eet the threat of i9,erialis9 with 9ethods a,,ro,riate to a ,olicy of the status Luo! ',,ease9ent tries to deal with i9,erialis9 as though it were a ,olicy of the status Luo! t errs in transferring a ,olicy of co9,ro9ise fro9 a ,olitical environ9ent favorable to the ,reservation of the status Luo, where it belongs, to an environ9ent e),osed to i9,erialistic attac$, where it does not belong! ;ne 9ight say that a,,ease9ent is a corru,ted ,olicy of co9,ro9ise, 9ade erroneous by 9ista$ing a ,olicy of i9,erialis9 for a ,olicy of the status Luo! t is i9,ortant to note, in view of the conte9,orary tendency to use the ter9 Ja,,ease9entJ indiscri9inately as a ter9 of o,,robriu9, that a,,ease9ent and i9,erialis9 are logically correlated! n other words, a ,olicy of a,,ease9ent on the one side ,resu,,oses a ,olicy of i9,erialis9 on the other side! f we say that State ' ,ursues with res,ect to State O a ,olicy of a,,ease9ent, we are at the sa9e ti9e saying that State O ,ursues with res,ect to State ' a ,olicy of i9,erialis9! f the latter state9ent is incorrect, the for9er is 9eaningless! The a,,easer sees in the successive de9ands of the i9,erialistic ,ower rationally li9ited obGectives which in the9selves are co9,atible with the 9aintenance of the status Luo and 9ust be dis,osed of either on their intrinsic 9erits or by way of co9,ro9ise! His error lies in not seeing that the successive de9ands, far fro9 being self-contained and growing fro9 s,ecific grievances, are but the lin$s of a chain at the end of which stands the overthrow of the status Luo! The conciliation of antagonistic ,olicies on the basis of legal or 9oral ,rinci,les or through a di,lo9atic bargain is indeed the great tas$ of a di,lo9acy that o,erates on both sides within the recogniHed li9its of the status Luo! Since both sides acce,t the e)isting distribution of ,ower, both sides can afford to settle their differences either on the basis of ,rinci,le or through co9,ro9ise> for whatever the settle9ent 9ay be, it will not affect the basic distribution of ,ower between the9! The situation is, however, different when one or both sides have i9,erialistic designs> that is, when they see$ a funda9ental change in the e)isting distribution of ,ower! Then the settle9ent of the res,ective de9ands on the basis of legal or 9oral ,rinci,les or through bargaining 9ethods, in disregard of the influence the settle9ent 9ight have u,on the distribution of ,ower, a9ounts to a ,iece9eal change in the ,ower relations in favor of the i9,erialistic nation! &or the latter will always be favored by co9,ro9ise and will be careful in choosing the grounds for its de9ands so that

,rinci,le will favor it, too! :lti9ately, these ,iece9eal changes will add u, to the reversal of the ,ower relations in favor of the i9,erialistic nation! The i9,erialistic nation will have won a bloodless, yet decisive, victory over an o,,onent who did not $now the difference between co9,ro9ise and a,,ease9ent! Ger9any started its i9,erialistic ,olicies o,enly in ./05 with the re,udiation of the disar9a9ent ,rovisions of the Treaty of Eersailles, ,ointing to the failure of the other nations to disar9 and to the increase in &rench and Russian ar9a9ents! Ta$en by itself and in disregard of an ulterior obGective, the argu9ent was not without 9erit in the light of the legal ,rinci,le of eLuality! ',art fro9 ,a,er ,rotests and ,a,er alliances, the only tangible reaction to this first Ger9an ste, on the road to e9,ire was the conclusion three 9onths later of the 'nglo-Ger9an "aval 'gree9ent, in which Great Britain conceded to Ger9any a naval force of not 9ore than 05 ,er cent that of Great Britain! Both the reoccu,ation of the Rhineland by Ger9any in ./03 and its denunciation of the international control of its waterways later in the sa9e year found su,,ort in the legal ,rinci,le of eLuality, if one acce,ted the ,rofessed rational li9its of the de9ands as the actual ones! The anne)ation of 'ustria in ./02 could easily be defended by the ,rinci,le of national self-deter9ination, which had also been one of the ,rofessed war ai9s of the 'llied ,owers in the &irst 8orld 8ar! %ater in ./02 Ger9any de9anded the Ger9an ,arts of (Hechoslova$ia! The Munich settle9ent granted the Ger9an de9ands! 8hen Hitler, shortly before the settle9ent of Munich, declared that the Ger9an ,arts of (Hechoslova$ia were the last territorial de9ands Ger9any had to 9a$e in Euro,e, he was really saying that the anne)ation of these territories was an end in itself, self-contained within its own rational li9its! He ,retended that Ger9an ,olicy o,erated within the general fra9ewor$ of the Euro,ean status Luo and was not intent u,on overthrowing it, and that the other Euro,ean ,owers ought to view Ger9an foreign ,olicy in that light and deal with it corres,ondingly! t was only by the end of March ./0/! five 9onths before the outbrea$ of the Second 8orld 8ar, that the anne)ation of the whole of (Hechoslova$ia and the territorial de9ands on Poland convinced the 8estern ,owers that what had a,,eared to be a ,olicy of the status Luo had really been fro9 the beginning a ,olicy of i9,erialis9, of continental, if not world, di9ensions! 't that 9o9ent, the distribution of ,ower in Euro,e was already changed in favor of Ger9any! t was changed to such an e)tent that a further increase in Ger9an ,ower could not be ,revented short of war! Ger9any had beco9e strong enough to challenge o,enly the status Luo of Eersailles, and the ,restige C that is, the re,utation for ,ower C of the nations identified with the order of Eersailles had sun$ so low that they were unable to defend what was left of the status Luo by 9ere di,lo9atic 9eans! They could either surrender or go to war! Thus the a,,easers of ./02 beca9e either the Luislings @if they dee9ed resistance to Ger9an i9,erialis9 ho,elessA or the heroes of ./0/ - 65 @if they thought that resistance was 9orally reLuired regardless of the outco9e or that it had even a chance to succeedA! The final catastro,he, and the tragic choices with which the catastro,he confronted the actors on the international scene, were ,redeter9ined by that initial error which res,onded to a ,olicy of i9,erialis9 as though it were a ,olicy of the status Luo! ;nce a ,olicy of contain9ent has succeeded in chec$ing a ,olicy of i9,erialis9, or the latter has run its course either because it has reached its obGective or has e)hausted itself, contain9ent @a ,olicy of unco9,ro9ising resistanceA 9ight well 9a$e way to co9,ro9ise @a ,olicy of give and ta$eA! Such a ,olicy, nefarious when it see$s to a,,ease i9,erialis9, beco9es a virtue when it ai9s at acco99odating a ,olicy of the status Luo which has left its i9,erialistic as,iration behind! t was this distinction to which Sir 8inston (hurchill referred when he said on *ece9ber .6! ./54, in the House of (o99onsB The declaration of the Pri9e Minister that there will he no a,,ease9ent also co99ands al9ost universal su,,ort! t is a good slogan for the country! t see9s to 9e, however, that in this House it reLuires to be 9ore ,recisely defined! 8hat we really 9ean, thin$, is no a,,ease9ent through wea$ness or fear! ',,ease9ent in itself 9ay be good or bad according to the circu9stances! ',,ease9ent fro9 wea$ness and fear is ali$e futile and fatal! ',,ease9ent fro9 strength is 9agnani9ous and noble and 9ight be the surest and ,erha,s the only ,ath to world ,eace! The other funda9ental error into which those res,onsible for the conduct of foreign affairs are 9ost li$ely to fall is the reverse of the one thus far discussed! t 9ista$es a ,olicy of the status Luo for a ,olicy of i9,erialis9! By doing so! State ' resorts to certain 9easures defensive in intent, such as ar9a9ents, bases, alliances, with res,ect to State B! The latter, in turn, resorts to counter9easures, for it now sees State ' e9bar$ing u,on a ,olicy of i9,erialis9! These counter9easures strengthen the initial 9isa,,rehension, on the ,artZ of State ', of State BIs ,olicies, and so forth! :lti9ately, either both countries correct their errors with regard to their res,ective ,olicies or else the ever increasing 9utual sus,icions, feeding u,on each other, end in war! ;ut of an initial error there develo,s a vicious circle! Two or 9ore nations, each only see$ing to ,reserve the status Luo, but each convinced of the i9,erialistic designs of the others, find su,,ort for their own errors of Gudg9ent and action in the errors of the others! n such a situation nothing but an al9ost su,erhu9an effort will deflect the trend of events fro9 a catastro,hic denoue9ent! The history of Euro,ean di,lo9acy between the &ranco-Ger9an 8ar of .214 and the outbrea$ of the &irst 8orld 8ar in ./.6 illustrates this situation! 'fter the victorious conclusion of the 8ar of .214 and the foundation of the Ger9an E9,ire, Ger9an foreign ,olicy was 9ainly defensive! t was concerned with the 9aintenance of the ,osition Ger9any had acLuired in Euro,e and with the danger, Bis9arc$Is fa9ous cauche9ar des coalitions, that a hostile coalition, es,ecially between &rance and Russia, 9ight challenge that ,osition! The Tri,le 'lliance between Ger9any, 'ustria, and taly was the instru9ent of that defensive ,olicy! t was served also by the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia

in which Russia and Ger9any ,ledged each other neutrality if either beca9e involved in war with a third ,ower! 'fter the dis9issal of Bis9arc$ in .2/4, 8illia9 decided to let the Reinsurance Treaty la,se, ,ri9arily because of the fear that its continuation 9ight alienate 'ustria and thus destroy the Tri,le 'lliance! Russia then @in .2/. and .2/6A entered into agree9ents with &rance which were defensive in character and obviously ins,ired by fear of the intentions of the Tri,le 'lliance! The ,rovisions of the Military (onvention of .2/6! in ,articular, antici,ated the ,ossible transfor9ation of the Tri,le 'lliance fro9 a defensive into an i9,erialistic instru9ent! Thus the (onvention was to re9ain a force as long as the Tri,le 'lliance! The 9ain ,rovisions of the (onvention 9ade the following sti,ulationsB f &rance were attac$ed by Ger9any or by taly su,,orted by Ger9any, Russia would give 9ilitary aid to &rance! &rance would do the sa9e in res,ect to Russia if the latter were attac$ed by Ger9any or by 'ustria su,,orted by Ger9any! n case of the 9obiliHation of the forces of the Tri,le 'lliance! &rance and Russia would 9obiliHe their forces without delay! &irst, the fear of hostile alliances led to the for9ation of the Tri,le 'lliance! Then, the fear of the latterIs dissolution led to the severance by Ger9any of the friendly relations with Russia! &inally, the fear of the intentions, of the Tri,le 'lliance brought about the &ranco-Russian 'lliance! t was the 9utual fears of these two defensive alliances, and the general insecurity created by the erratic character of the i9,erialistic utterances of 8illia9 , that ins,ired the di,lo9atic 9aneuvers during the two decades before the &irst 8orld 8ar! These 9aneuvers sought either new co9binations destructive of e)isting align9ents or the su,,ort of ,owers, thus far aloof, for the e)isting alliances! n the end, the general conflagration in ./.6 was 9ade inevitable by the fear that the other side would change the ,ower relations decisively in its favor if not forestalled by such a change in oneIs own favor! n the two antagonistic blocs, Russia and 'ustria es,ecially were ani9ated by this fear! The fear of the otherIs sus,ected i9,erialis9 bred i9,erialis9 in reaction, which, in turn, gave substance to the original fear! The distorting effects of 9utual fear are ,articularly ,ronounced when antagonistic foreign ,olicies are overlaid with world-e9bracing ideologies=. to which the foreign ,olicies actually ,ursued 9ay or 9ay not corres,ond! Thus the (o99unist ideology of world revolution and of the (o99uniHation of the world creates in non-(o99unist nations the fear that the foreign ,olicies of (o99unist nations are of necessity at the service of a world-wide i9,erialis9! n conseLuence, every 9ove a country such as the Soviet :nion or (hina 9a$es on the chessboard of international ,olitics is not Gudged on its own 9erits but in ter9s of i9,erialistic ideology! ;n the other hand, since (o99unist ,hiloso,hy assu9es that ca,italistic nations are by nature warli$e and Ji9,erialistic,J 8estern ,rofessions of dedication to law and order and o,,osition to aggression and subversion are inter,reted by (o99unist nations as 9ere ideological disguises of i9,erialistic ,olicies! This 9ythological ,erce,tion of reality on both sides calls forth ,olicies see$ing to contain the i9,erialis9 of the other side, and these ,olicies confir9 in the 9inds of all concerned the original 9ythological inter,retation! The great ,owers are thus tra,,ed in a vicious circle! &irst, fear 9a$es the9 inter,ret reality in ter9s of an ideology on which that fear can feed! Then, the 9easures they ta$e to ,rotect the9selves fro9 what 9ay be an i9aginary danger confir9 the other side in its fears and 9isinter,retation of reality! Then, counter9easures are ta$en against these 9easures, carrying a si9ilar confir9ation, and so forth! Thus the fear of one side sustains the fear of the other, and vice versa! En9eshed in 9utual fear and engaged in an ar9s race which see$s to still those fears, neither side is ca,able of ,utting the original assu9,tion of i9,erialis9 to the test of actual e),erience! 8hat was originally a 9ythological ,erce,tion of reality has now beco9e a self-fulfilling ,ro,hecyB the ,olicies engendered by 9utual fear a,,ear to ,rovide e9,irical evidence for the correctness of the original assu9,tion!== The Prob"em o! %ete$tion ',,ease9ent, which is the atte9,t to co9,ro9ise with an i9,erialis9 not recogniHed as such, and the fear that creates i9,erialis9 where there is none C these are the two wrong answers, the two fatal 9ista$es an intelligent foreign ,olicy 9ust try to avoid! Such an intelligent foreign ,olicy, which recogniHes i9,erialis9 where it e)ists and deter9ines its s,ecific nature, is confronted with five difficulties, and they are all of a for9idable character! The first and 9ost funda9ental difficulty was ,ointed out by Bu$harin, the fore9ost e),onent of the (o99unist doctrine fro9 %eninIs death to the great ,urges in the 9id-thirties! 'rguing against the non-econo9ic e),lanation of i9,erialis9, he su99ariHed it thusB J 9,erialis9 is a ,olicy of conLuest! But not every ,olicy of conLuest is i9,erialis9!J=0 The state9ent is indeed correct and sLuares with what we have said ,reviously about the distinction between a ,olicy of conLuest o,erating within the e)isting status Luo and one see$ing to overthrow it! =6 To 9a$e this distinction in a concrete situation ,resents a for9idable difficulty! How was one to $now with any degree of certainty what HitlerIs ulti9ate obGectives wereF &ro9 ./05 on, he 9ade de9and after de9and, each of which in itself could be fully reconciled with a ,olicy of the status Luo, yet each of which 9ight be a ste,,ing-stone on the road to e9,ire! The individual ste,s in the9selves were a9biguous and, therefore, did not reveal the actual nature of the ,olicy of which they for9ed the ele9ents! 8here could one, then, have found an answer to our LuestionF
=. ==

&or the e),lanation of the conce,t, see (ha,ter 1! (f! +ohn H! 7auts$y! JMyth! Self - fulfilling Pro,hecy, and Sy9bolic Reassurance in the East - 8est (onflict,J The +ournal of (onflict Resolution, Eol! D! "o! . @March ./35A, ,,! . ff! =0 "! ! Bu$harin! 9,erialis9 and 8orld Econo9y @"ew #or$B international Publishers, ./=/A, ,! ..6 =6 See ,ages 55 ff!

;ne 9ight have found it, however tentative and o,en to doubt, in two of the three ty,ical situations that we ,ointed out as favoring i9,erialistic ,olicies! The desire to overthrow the status Luo of the Treaty of Eersailles had been fro9 the very beginning one of the 9ain ,oints of the "ational Socialist ,rogra9, which in ./00 beca9e the official ,rogra9 of the Ger9an govern9ent! n view of this obGective, one 9ight have been able to foresee that the Ger9an govern9ent would ,ursue a foreign ,olicy see$ing its realiHation as soon as it had a chance to do so> that is, as soon as the nations identified with the status Luo of the Treaty of Eersailles were no longer able or willing to defend that status Luo effectively! This initial and funda9ental difficulty is aggravated by the tact that a ,olicy which starts out see$ing adGust9ents within the e)isting distribution of ,ower 9ay change its character either in the course of its success or in the ,rocess of its frustration! n other words, the ease with which the original obGectives are reached within the established distribution of ,ower 9ay suggest to the e),anding nation that it is dealing with wea$ or irresolute antagonists and that a change in the e)isting ,ower relations can be achieved without great effort or ris$! Thus the a,,etite 9ay co9e with the eating, and a successful ,olicy of e),ansion within the status Luo 9ay overnight transfor9 itself into a ,olicy of i9,erialis9! The sa9e 9ay be true of an unsuccessful ,olicy of e),ansion within the status-Luo! ' nation frustrated in its li9ited obGectives, which do not see9 to be atta$ bie within the e)isting ,ower relations, concludes that it 9ust change these ,ower relations if it is to 9a$e sure that it gets what it wants! 8here a ,olicy is couched in ,urely territorial ter9s, the nature of the territorial obGectives will so9eti9es indicate the nature of the ,olicy ,ursued! The obGective 9ay, for instance, be a strategic ,oint, the acLuisition of which 9ay in itself change the ,ower relations in that ,articular region! "o such hel, can be e),ected and, therefore, an additional difficulty 9ust be 9et where a foreign ,olicy uses 9ainly the vehicles of econo9ic or cultural ,enetration! These 9ethods, too, are a9biguous in view of the character of the ,olicy they serve, but their a9biguity is 9uch greater than that of the 9ilitary 9ethod, which has defined territorial obGectives! Econo9ic and cultural e),ansion are generally without a clearly defined locale! They address the9selves to a wide variety of ill-defined ,ersons! 'nd, further9ore, they are ,racticed on a wide scale by an indefinite nu9ber of nations! To identify econo9ic or cultural e),ansion as instru9ents of i9,erialis9 in contrast to identical ,olicies that have no hidden ,ower obGective beyond the e),licit cultural and econo9ic ones and, hence, are not i9,erialistic, is indeed a difficult tas$! Here again reference to the ty,ical situations favorable to i9,erialistic ,olicies will be of hel,! The active econo9ic ,olicies SwitHerland has been ,ursuing in the international s,here have never had an i9,erialistic tinge! British foreign-trade ,olicies at ti9es have had an i9,erialistic character with res,ect to certain countries! Today their end is in the 9ain ,urely econo9ic> that is, they try to obtain for the inhabitants of the British sles the necessities of life! They ai9 at econo9ic survival through favorable trade balances, not at the 9aintenance or acLuisition of ,olitical ,ower over foreign nations! t is only with regard to certain strategic regions, such as Egy,t and ran, that since the end of the Second 8orld 8ar British econo9ic ,olicies have at ti9es been subordinated to ,olitical considerations! So9e of these considerations 9ight have acLuired, or under certain conditions will acLuire, an i9,erialistic character! The cultural ,enetration of %atin '9erica by S,ain was generally bound to be without i9,erialistic significance, for the 9ilitary wea$ness of S,ain in relation to the (rated States forbade any thought of changing the ,ower relations in %atin '9erica in S,ainIs favor! The cultural 9ission of &rance has been in certain countries and at certain ti9es an end in itself! :nder different circu9stances and in other countries it has been subordinated to i9,erialistic ai9s! Here, too, the character of econo9ic and cultural e),ansion 9ay change with a change in the ,olitical situation! 8hen the o,,ortunity bec$ons, the Jreservoir of good willJ or a ,re,onderant ,osition in the foreign trade of another country, which a nation has acLuired as ends in the9selves, 9ay suddenly beco9e sources of ,olitical ,ower and ,otent instru9ents in the struggle for ,ower! But when circu9stances change again, they 9ay lose that Luality Gust as suddenly! 8hen all these difficulties have been overco9e and a foreign ,olicy has been correctly identified as i9,erialistic, yet another difficulty ,resents itself! t concerns the $ind of i9,erialis9 with which one has to deal! ' successful localiHed i9,erialis9 9ay find in its success an incentive to s,read wider and wider until it beco9es continental or worldwide! More ,articularly, a country 9ay find it necessary, in order to stabiliHe and secure a local ,re,onderance, to acLuire ,re,onderance of ,ower on an even greater scale, and it 9ay feel fully secure only in a worldwide e9,ire! There is freLuently in i9,erialis9 a dyna9ic force, rationaliHed in aggressive or defensive ter9s, that ,roceeds fro9 a li9ited region to a continent and fro9 there to the world! The Macedonian E9,ire under Phili, and 'le)ander and "a,oleonic i9,erialis9 were of this $ind! ;n the other hand, a ,olicy of worldwide i9,erialis9, o,,osed by su,erior force, 9ay retreat to a geogra,hically deter9ined region or be satisfied with local ,re,onderance! ;r it 9ay lose its i9,erialistic tendencies altogether and transfor9 itself into a ,olicy of the status Luo! The develo,9ent fro9 geogra,hically deter9ined to localiHed i9,erialis9 and fro9 there to the ,er9anent loss of i9,erialistic tendencies altogether can be traced in the history of Swedish i9,erialis9 in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries! Thus the evaluation of i9,erialistic tendencies and, conseLuently, of the ,olicies countering the9 is never definitive! Both ,olicies and counter,olicies are ever subGect o re-evaluation and refor9ulation! But the fra9ers of foreign ,olicy are always e),osed to the te9,tation to ta$e a ,articular ,attern of i9,erialistic e),ansion or of any other ty,e of foreign ,olicy as ,er9anent and to ,ursue a foreign ,olicy ada,ted to that ,attern even when the ,attern has changed! ' worldwide i9,erialis9 reLuires counter9easures different fro9 those which are adeLuate for one that is localiHed, and a nation that counters the latter with 9easures a,,ro,riate to the for9er will bring on the very dangers

it tries to avoid! n this necessity to recogniHe Luic$ly a change in the i9,erialistic ,olicy of another nation lies another difficulty and, in the failure to ada,t oneIs own foreign ,olicy Luic$ly to such change, another source of error! &inally, i9,erialis9 ,oses a ,roble9 that it shares with all foreign ,olicy-,resenting it, however, in a ,articularly acute 9anner! This is the ,roble9 of detecting the true nature of a foreign ,olicy behind its ideological disguises! The actors on the international scene rarely ,resent the foreign ,olicy they are ,ursuing for what it is, and a ,olicy of i9,erialis9 al9ost never reveals its true face in the ,ronounce9ents of those who ,ursue it! The true nature of the ,olicies ,ursued disa,,ears behind a veil of ideological disguises! The reasons why this 9ust be so and the ty,ical sha,es these ideologies ta$e will be discussed in (ha,ter 1 of this boo$! How difficult it is to distinguish between the a,,earance of a foreign ,olicy and its essence will beco9e a,,arent in the course of that discussion! 3 The 'tru**le for Power! Policy of Presti*e The ,olicy of ,restige has rarely been recogniHed in 9odern ,olitical literature for what it isB the third of the basic 9anifestations of the struggle for ,ower on the international scene! The reasons for this neglect are threefold! The ,olicy of ,restige shares this neglect with the subtle and intangible relationshi,s the understanding of which, as we have seen,. has suffered fro9 the ,redo9inant theoretical and ,ractical concern with the 9aterial as,ect of ,ower in the for9 of force, actual or threatened! &urther9ore, the ,olicy of ,restige has used as one of its 9ain vehicles the aristocratic for9s of social intercourse ,racticed in the di,lo9atic world! That world, with its cere9onial rules, its Luarrels about ran$ and ,recedence, and its e9,ty for9alis9s, is the very antithesis of the de9ocratic way of life! Even those not fully ,ersuaded that ,ower ,olitics is nothing but an elitist atavis9 have been inclined to see in the ,olicy of ,restige as ,racticed by di,lo9ats an anachronistic ga9e, frivolous and farcical and devoid of any organic connection with the business of international ,olitics! &inally, ,restige, in contrast to the 9aintenance and acLuisition of ,ower, is but rarely an end in itself! More freLuently, the ,olicy of ,restige is one of the instru9entalities through which the ,olicies of the status Luo and of i9,erialis9 try to achieve their ends! This 9a$es it easy to conclude that the ,olicy of ,restige is not i9,ortant and does not deserve syste9atic discussion! 'ctually, the ,olicy of ,restige, however e)aggerated and absurd its uses 9ay have been at ti9es, is as intrinsic an ele9ent of the relations between nations as the desire for ,restige is of the relations between individuals! Here again it beco9es obvious that international and do9estic ,olitics are but different 9anifestations of one and the sa9e social fact! n both s,heres, the desire for social recognition is a ,otent dyna9ic force deter9ining social relations and creating social institutions! The individual see$s confir9ation, on the ,art of his fellows, of the evaluation he ,uts u,on hi9self! t is only in the tribute others ,ay to his goodness, intelligence, and ,ower that he beco9es fully aware of, and can fully enGoy, what he dee9s to be his su,erior Lualities! t is only through his re,utation for e)cellence that he can gain the 9easure of security, wealth, and ,ower he regards to be his due! Thus, in the struggle for e)istence and ,ower C which is, as it were, the raw 9aterial of the social world C what others thin$ about us is as i9,ortant as what we actually are! The i9age in the 9irror of our fellows 9inds @that is, our ,restigeA, rather than the original, of which the i9age in the 9irror 9ay be but the distorted reflection, deter9ines what we are as 9e9bers of society! t is, then, a necessary and i9,ortant tas$ to see to it that the 9ental ,icture other ,eo,le for9 of oneIs ,osition in society at least re,resents faithfully the actual situation, if it does not e)cel it! This is e)actly what the ,olicy of ,restige is about! ts ,ur,ose is to i9,ress other nations with the ,ower oneIs own nation actually ,ossesses, or with the ,ower it believes, or wants the other nations to believe, it ,ossesses! Two s,ecific instru9entalities serve this ,ur,oseB di,lo9atic cere9onial in the widest 9eaning of the ter9, and the dis,lay of 9ilitary force! %IPLOMATIC C'+'MONIAL Two e,isodes fro9 the life of "a,oleon show clearly the sy9bols through which the ,ower ,osition of a ruler, re,resenting a nation, e),resses itself in cere9onial for9s! ;ne shows "a,oleon at the su99it of his ,ower, the other indicates that he had left that su99it behind! n .246, when "a,oleon was about to be crowned E9,eror by the Po,e, each of the two rulers had a vital interest in de9onstrating his su,eriority over the other! "a,oleon was successful in asserting his su,eriority, not only by ,utting the crown on his head with his own hands instead of letting the Po,e do it, but also by a cere9onial device that the *u$e of Rovigo, one of "a,oleonIs generals and 9inister of ,olice, re,orts in his 9e9oirsB He went to 9eet the Po,e on the road to "e9ours! To avoid cere9ony, the ,rete)t of a hunting-,arty was assu9ed> the attendants, with his eLui,ages, were in the forest! The E9,eror ca9e on horsebac$ and in a hunting-dress, with his retinue! t was at the half-9oon on the to, of the hill that the 9eeting too$ ,lace! There the Po,eIs carriage drew u,B he got out at the left door in his white costu9eB the ground was dirty> he did not li$e to ste, u,on it with his
.

See ,ageB0=, 26

white sil$ shoes, but was obliged to do so at last! "a,oleon alighted to receive hi9! They e9braced> and the E9,erorIs carriage, which had been ,ur,osely driven u,, was advanced a few ,aces, as if fro9 the carelessness of the driver> but 9en were ,osted to hold the two doors o,enB at the 9o9ent of getting in, the E9,eror too$ the right door, and an officer of the court handed the Po,e to the left, so that they entered the carriage by the two doors at the sa9e ti9e! The E9,eror naturally seated hi9self on the right> and this first ste, decided without negotiation u,on the etiLuette to he observed during the whole ti9e that the Po,e was to re9ain at Paris! = The other e,isode occurred in .2.0 in *resden, after the defeat in Russia, when "a,oleon was threatened by a coalition of all of Euro,e, a coalition that shortly afterward would inflict u,on hi9 the disastrous defeat of %ei,Hig! n an interview lasting nine hours, "a,oleon tried to restrain the 'ustrian (hancellor, Metternich, fro9 Goining the coalition against hi9! Metternich treated "a,oleon as a doo9ed 9an, while "a,oleon acted li$e the 9aster of Euro,e, which he had been for a decade! 'fter a ,articularly stor9y e)change, "a,oleon, as if to test his su,eriority, dro,,ed his hat, e),ecting the s,o$es9an of the hostile coalition to ,ic$ it u,! 8hen Metternich feigned not to see it, it 9ust have beco9e clear to both 9en that a decisive change had occurred in the ,restige and ,ower of the victor of 'usterlitH and 8agra9! Metternich su99ed u, the situation when he told "a,oleon at the end of the discussion that he was sure "a,oleon was lost! The relations between di,lo9ats lend the9selves naturally as instru9ents for a ,olicy of ,restige, for di,lo9ats are the sy9bolic re,resentatives of their res,ective countries! 0The res,ect shown the9 is really shown their countries> the res,ect shown by the9 is really shown by their countries> the insult they give or receive is really given or received by their countries! History abounds with e)a9,les illustrating these ,oints and the i9,ortance attributed to the9 in international ,olitics! n 9ost courts it was the custo9 to have foreign a9bassadors introduced to the sovereign by ordinary officials while royal a9bassadors were introduced by ,rinces! 8hen in .3/2 %ouis D E had the '9bassador of the Re,ublic of Eenice introduced by the Prince of %orraine, the Grand (ouncil of Eenice as$ed the &rench '9bassador to assure the 7ing that the Re,ublic of Eenice would be forever grateful for that honor and the (ouncil sent a s,ecial letter of than$s to %ouis D E! Through that gesture &rance indicated that it regarded the Re,ublic of Eenice to be as ,owerful as a $ingdo9, and it was for that new ,restige that Eenice showed its gratitude! 't the ,a,al court the Po,e used to receive the di,lo9atic re,resentatives of different ty,es of states in different halls! '9bassadors of crowned heads and of Eenice were received in the Sala Reggia, the re,resentatives of other ,rinces and of re,ublics in the Sala *ucale! The Re,ublic of Genoa is said to have offered the Po,e 9illions in order to have its re,resentatives received in the Sala Reggia instead of in the Sala *ucale! The Po,e, however, refused to grant the reLuest because, of the o,,osition of Eenice, which did not want Genoa to be treated on eLual ter9s with herself! ELuality of treat9ent would have 9eant eLuality of ,restige C that is, re,utation for ,ower C and to this the state su,erior in ,restige could not consent! 't the end of the eighteenth century, it was still the custo9 at the court of (onstantino,le that a9bassadors and 9e9bers of their suites who ,resented the9selves to the Sultan were grabbed by the ar9s by court officials and their heads bent down! 'fter the custo9ary e)change of s,eeches between a9bassador and Pri9e Minister, the court officials e)clai9edB JPraise be to the Eternal that the infidels 9ust co9e and give ho9age to our gloriously brilliant sce,tre!J The hu9iliation of the re,resentatives of foreign countries was intended to sy9boliHe the inferiority in ,ower of the countries they re,resented! :nder President Theodore Roosevelt, all di,lo9atic re,resentatives were received together on the first of +anuary in order to ,resent their congratulations to the President! President Taft changed the arrange9ent and ordered that a9bassadors and 9inisters be received se,arately! 8hen the S,anish Minister, who had not been infor9ed of this change, a,,eared on +anuary ., ./.4, at the 8hite House for the rece,tion of the a9bassadors he was refused ad9ission! 8hereu,on the S,anish govern9ent recalled the 9inister and ,rotested to the govern9ent of the :nited States! ' nation that had Gust lost its e9,ire and ,assed to the ran$ of a third-rate ,ower insisted at least u,on the ,restige co99ensurate with its for9er greatness! n ./63, when the &oreign Minister of the Soviet :nion was seated at a victory celebration in Paris in the second row! while the re,resentatives of other great ,owers sat in the first, he left the 9eeting in ,rotest! ' nation that for long had been a ,ariah in the international co99unity had attained the unLuestioned ,osition of a great ,ower and insisted u,on the ,restige due to its new status! 't the Potsda9 (onference of ./65, (hurchill, Stalin, and Tru9an were unable to agree on who9 should enter the conference roo9 firstB finally they entered through three different doors at the sa9e ti9e! These three ,olitical leaders sy9boliHed the res,ective ,ower of their nations! (onseLuently, the ,recedence accorded to one of the9 would have given his nation a ,restige of su,eriority over the other two which the latter were not willing to concede! Since they clai9ed eLuality of ,ower, they were bound to be concerned with u,holding the ,restige in which that eLuality found its sy9bolic e),ression! To cite two e)a9,lesB &rance, since *eGaulle o,,osed the su,ranational tendencies of the Euro,ean (o99unities, obGected to the traditional style C stri,ed ,ants, 9orning coat and cha9,agne C in which *r! 8alter Hallstein, ,resident
= 0

Me9oirs of the *u$e of Rovigo @%ondon, .2=2A, Eol! ., Part ! ,! 10 &or the different functions of di,lo9ats, see (ha,ter =6!

of the (o99on Mar$et (o99ission, has been receiving a9bassadors ,resenting their credentials! Paris feels that such a cere9ony creates the i9,ression that *r! Hallstein is eLual in ran$, for the ,ur,ose of receiving a9bassadorsI credentials, to a chief of state, such as President deGaulle! The &rench contend that the co99ission is not a govern9ent and the cere9ony should be toned down! This is one as,ect of &rench o,,osition to the so-called su,ra-national features of the Euro,ean co99unities, &rance views the9 as grou,s of sovereign states! 6 The ,eace negotiations a9ong the :nited States, the South and "orth Eietna9 govern9ents, and the "ational %iberation &ront @Eiet (ongA which were su,,osed to have started in "ove9ber ./32 were delayed for ten wee$s because of a dis,ute over the sha,e of the conference table! "orth Eietna9 ,ro,osed a sLuare table, or four tables arranged in a circular or dia9ond ,attern, or a ,lain round table for9ing a co9,lete unbro$en circle! The :nited States, on the other hand, ,ro,osed two half oval tables ,laced against each other to for9 a bro$en oval, or two half-circular tables to for9 a bro$en circle, or two half-circular tables, se,arated so9ewhat fro9 each other, with two rectangular tables for secretaries between the9! 's concerns the last ,ro,osal, the :nited States 9ade the concession that the two half-circular tables could be ,ushed together to adGoin the secretarial tables between the9! However, the secretarial tables would have to Gut out a few inches on either side fro9 the curved tables!5 &inally, a circular table without na9e,lates, flags or 9ar$ings was agreed u,on! Two rectangular tables, 9easuring about 0 feet by 6 .<= feet, were to be ,laced .2 inches fro9 the circular table at o,,osite sides! 8hat lay behind these see9ingly absurd ,roceedingsF "orth Eietna9 insisted u,on the recognition of the Eiet (ong as an inde,endent negotiating ,arty! The :nited States wanted the recognition of its assu9,tion, basic to its longheld conce,tion of the war! that the Eiet (ong were a 9ere e)tension of the "orth Eietna9ese regi9e! Thus the controversy over the sha,e of the table was a sy9bolic 9anifestation of the substance of the conflict! 8as the Eietna9 8ar the result of the aggression of the "orth Eietna9ese, using the Eiet (ong as its instru9ent, or was the Eiet (ong a genuine ,o,ular force, aided and abetted but not created by the "orth Eietna9eseF The sha,e of the table, one way or other, would have ,reGudged that substantive issue! The sha,e finally agreed u,on a,,eared to leave that issue in abeyance! The ,olitical i9,ortance of the entertain9ent in which all di,lo9ats vie with each other is well illustrated by these e)cer,ts fro9 an article dealing with the 8ashington social sceneB "ow the Luestion of whether foreign e9bassies actually buy anything for their countries with all this entertain9ent is naturally 9oot! There is no chec$ on it! But 9ost a9bassadors ,ursue their social rounds with dead seriousness and regard it as one of the 9ost i9,ortant and ,roductive as,ects of their Gob! They are ,robably-right! 'fter all, ,ro,riety severely constricts the activities of an a9bassador in the ca,ital to which he is accredited! (ertainly an a9bassador doesnIt want to be seen on the Hill, 9ingling with (ongress9en or ,ublicly registering reaction to the tone and tenor of legislative debates! #et he 9ust get about enough to receive accurate i9,ressions of '9erican affairs and officials, and in turn leave so9e i9,ress of his own and his countryIs character on the ,ublic 9ind! &or this, the social avenue is al9ost his only a,,roach, and unless he is attractive and ade,t in the salon, he will not be of 9uch use to his country in the chancery! ! ! ! Because the %atin '9ericans throw the biggest and 9ost e),ensive ,arties in 8ashington, and a,,ear to ,rofit the least thereby, there is a tendency to write the9 off as 9ere ,layboys! That is a 9ista$e! 8hat the %atinos are striving for, above all, is ,restige, a ,lace of eLuality in the fa9ily of '9erican nations> and who can say that by ,arading not only their wealth but their good 9anners and bright, Hestful 9inds in a series of unrivaled entertain9ents they are not acco9,lishing so9ething toward that endF3 The ,olicy of ,restige as the ,olicy of de9onstrating the ,ower a nation has or thin$s it has, or wants other nations to believe it has, finds a ,articularly fruitful field in the choice of a locality for international 9eetings! 8hen 9any antagonistic clai9s co9,ete with each other and cannot be reconciled through co9,ro9ise, the 9eeting-,lace is freLuently chosen in a country that does not ,artici,ate in the co9,etition for ,restige! &or this reason, The Hague in the "etherlands and Geneva in SwitHerland have been favored 9eeting-,laces for international conferences! &reLuently, the shift fro9 one favorite 9eeting-,lace to another sy9boliHes a shift in the ,re,onderance of ,ower! *uring the better ,art of the nineteenth century, 9ost international conferences were held in Paris! But the (ongress of Berlin of .212! held in the ca,ital of the reestablished Ger9an E9,ire after its victory over &rance, de9onstrated to all the world Ger9anyIs new ,restige of being the ,re,onderant ,ower on the Euro,ean continent! ;riginally, the Soviet :nion o,,osed the choice of Geneva as headLuarters of the :nited "ations> for Geneva, the for9er headLuarters of the %eague of "ations, was sy9bolic of the low ,oint in Russian ,restige in the ,eriod between the two world wars! 8hen the distribution of ,ower within the :nited "ations, 9eeting in "ew #or$ in the after9ath of the Second 8orld 8ar, showed the Soviet :nion in what a,,eared to be a ,er9anent 9inority, confronted with a 9aGority under '9erican leadershi,, it advocated the transfer of the headLuarters of the :nited "ations to Geneva, which carried no sy9bolic reference to '9erican su,re9acy! That in ./1= President "i)on 9et the (hinese Pri9e Minister, (hou En-lai, in Pe$ing and not in 8ashington or at so9e neutral ,lace has a sy9bolic significance for the shifts that the nations
6 5

The "ew #or$ Ti9es, May 6, ./33! ,! .3! The "ew #or$ Ti9es, *ece9ber .6, ./32, ,! =! 3 JR!S!E! Politics,J &ortune, &ebruary ./5=, ,! .=4! @:sed by ,er9ission of &ortune! (o,yright Ti9e nc!, ./5=!A

concerned believe to have occurred in the distribution of ,ower in 'sia and in the world! "or9ally a nation that has a ,re,onderance of ,ower in a ,articular field or region insists that international conferences dealing with 9atters concerning that field or region 9eet within, or at least close to, its territory! Thus 9ost international conferences dealing with 9ariti9e Luestions have been held in %ondon! nternational conferences concerned with +a,an have 9et either in 8ashington or in To$yo! Most international conferences concerned with the future of Euro,e after the Second 8orld 8ar have been held either on Russian territory, such as Moscow and #alta, or in territory occu,ied by the Soviet :nion, such as Potsda9, or in the ,ro)i9ity of Russian territory, such as Teheran! #et, by the end of ./61, the ,olitical situation had changed to such an e)tent that President Tru9an could declare with considerable e9,hasis that he would 9eet Stalin nowhere but in 8ashington! 1

%ISPLA> O: MILITA+> :O+C' Besides the ,ractices of di,lo9acy, the ,olicy of ,restige uses 9ilitary de9onstrations as 9eans to achieve its ,ur,ose! Since 9ilitary strength is the obvious 9easure of a nationIs ,ower, its de9onstration serves to i9,ress the others with that nationIs ,ower! Military re,resentatives of foreign nations are! tor instance, invited to ,eaceti9e ar9y and navy 9aneuvers, not in order to let the9 in on 9ilitary secrets, but to i9,ress the9 and their govern9ents with the 9ilitary ,re,aredness of the ,articular nation! The invitation of foreign observers to the two ato9ic bo9b tests in the! Pacific in ./63 was intended to fulfill a si9ilar ,ur,ose! The foreign observer was, on the one hand, to be i9,ressed by the naval 9ight of the :nited StatesB and with '9erican technological achieve9ents! JTwenty-one observers fro9 the :nited "ations 'to9ic Energy (ontrol (o99ission!J re,orted the "ew #or$ Ti9es! J! ! ! agreed today that the :nited States was bo9bing a grou, of shi,s larger than 9any of the worldIs navies!J 2;n the other hand, the foreign observer was to see for hi9self what the ato9ic bo9b could do above and under water and how su,erior in 9ilitary strength a nation that had the 9ono,oly of the ato9ic bo9b was bound to be in co9,arison with nations that did not have it! Because of the high 9obility of navies, which are able to bring the flag and the ,ower of a nation to the four corners of the globe and because of the great i9,ressiveness of their a,,earance, naval de9onstrations have in the ,ast been a favorite instru9ent of the ,olicy of ,restige! The visit in .2/. of the &rench fleet to the Russian ,ort of 7ronstadt and the return visit in .2/0 of the Russian fleet to the &rench ,ort of Toulon 9ar$ a turning ,oint in the ,olitical history of the world> for these 9utual visits de9onstrated to the world a ,olitical and 9ilitary solidarity between &rance and Russia which was not long in crystalliHing into a ,olitical and 9ilitary alliance! The ,eriodical dis,atch, on the ,art of the great 9ariti9e ,owers, of naval sLuadrons to the ,orts of the &ar East de9onstrated to the ,eo,les of that region the su,eriority of 8estern ,ower! The :nited States has fro9 ti9e to ti9e sent warshi,s to %atin'9erican ,orts in order to re9ind the nations concerned that in the 8estern He9is,here '9erican naval ,ower is su,re9e! 8henever the clai9s of a 9ariti9e ,ower were challenged in colonial or se9icolonial regions either by the natives or by co9,eting ,owers, these nations would dis,atch warshi,s to the region as sy9bolic re,resentatives of the ,ower of the country! ' fa9ous e)a9,le of this $ind of ,olicy of ,restige is the visit 8illia9 ,aid in ./45 on board a Ger9an warshi, to Tangier, a ,ort of Morocco, for the ,ur,ose of counteracting &rench clai9s on that state! The Mediterranean cruises '9erican naval sLuadrons have been 9a$ing since the Second 8orld 8ar to talian, Gree$, and Tur$ish ,orts are the un9ista$able re,ly to Russian as,irations in that region! The selection of the 9ost e),osed regions of 8estern Euro,e for 9aneuvers by the co9bined forces of the 8estern allies is intended to de9onstrate to the Soviet :nion and to the allies the9selves the 9ilitary ,ower of the 'tlantic 'lliance and the resolution to use this ,ower in defense of the status Luo in 8estern Euro,e! The 9ost drastic for9 of the 9ilitary ty,e of the ,olicy of ,restige is ,artial or total 9obiliHation! MobiliHation as an instru9ent of the ,olicy of ,restige 9ay be obsolete today, since the war of the &uture will in all ,robability reLuire total ,re,aredness at all ti9es! n the ,ast, however, and as late as ./02 and ./0/, the calling to the colors either of certain classes of the reserves or of all those subGect to 9ilitary service has been a ,otent instru9ent of the ,olicy of ,restige! 8hen, for instance, in +uly ./.6 Russia 9obiliHed its ar9y, followed by the 9obiliHation of the 'ustrian, Ger9an, and &rench forces, and when &rance and (Hechoslova$ia 9obiliHed their ar9ies in Se,te9ber ./02 and &rance its ar9y again in March and Se,te9ber ./0/, the ,ur,ose was always to de9onstrate to friend and foe ali$e oneIs own 9ilitary strength and oneIs resolution to use that strength in su,,ort of oneIs ,olitical ends! President Bush did this with the "ational Guard and reserves in *esert Shield! Here ,restige C re,utation for ,ower C is e9,loyed both as a deterrent to and as ,re,aration for war! t is ho,ed that the ,restige of oneIs own nation will be great enough to deter the other nations fro9 going to war! 't the sa9e ti9e it is ho,ed that, if this ,olicy of ,restige should fail, the 9obiliHation of the ar9ed forces before the actual outbrea$ of war will ,ut oneIs own nation in the 9ost advantageous 9ilitary ,osition ,ossible under the circu9stances! 't that ,oint, ,olitical and 9ilitary ,olicy tend to 9erge and beco9e two different as,ects of one and the sa9e ,olicy! 8e shall have further occasion to ,oint to the inti9ate relations between foreign and 9ilitary ,olicy in ti9es of ,eace as well as of war! /
1 2

"ew #or$ Ti9es, *ece9ber ./, ./61, ,! .B +uly =1, ./62! ,! .> &ebruary 6, ./6/, ,! .! bid!, +uly ., ./63, ,! 0! / See (ha,ters /, .2, =5!

TWO O&J'CTI@'S O: TH' POLIC> O: P+'STIG' The ,olicy of ,restige has two ,ossible ulti9ate obGectivesB ,restige for its own sa$e, or 9uch 9ore freLuently, ,restige in su,,ort of a ,olicy of the status Luo or of i9,erialis9! 8hile in national societies ,restige is freLuently sought for its own sa$e, it is rarely the ,ri9ary obGective of foreign ,olicy! Prestige is at 9ost the ,leasant by - ,roduct of foreign ,olicies whose ulti9ate obGectives are not the re,utation for ,ower but the substance of ,ower! The individual 9e9bers of a national society, ,rotected as they are in their e)istence and social ,osition by an integrated syste9 of social institutions and rules of conduct, can afford to indulge in the co9,etition for ,restige as a $ind of har9less social ga9e! But nations, which as 9e9bers of the international society 9ust in the 9ain rely u,on their own ,ower for the ,rotection of their e)istence and ,ower ,osition, can hardly neglect the effect that a gain or loss of ,restige will have u,on their ,ower ,osition on the international scene! t is therefore not by accident that, as we have already ,ointed out, observers of international affairs who underrate the i9,ortance of ,ower tend to ta$e Luestions of ,restige lightly! 'nd it is li$ewise not by accident that only foolhardy egocentrics are inclined to ,ursue a ,olicy of ,restige for its own sa$e! n 9odern ti9es, 8illia9 and Mussolini are cases in ,oint! nto)icated with newly acLuired do9estic ,ower, they regarded international ,olitics as a $ind of ,ersonal s,ort where in the e)altation of oneIs own nation and in the hu9iliation of others one enGoyed oneIs own ,ersonal su,eriority! By doing so, however, they confused the international with the do9estic scene! 't ho9e, the de9onstration of their ,ower, or at least of its a,,earance, would be at worst nothing 9ore than har9less foolishness! 'broad, such a de9onstration is a ,lay with fire that will consu9e the ,layer who does not have the ,ower co99ensurate with his belief or his ,retense! ;ne-9an govern9ents C that is, absolute 9onarchies or dictatorshi,s C tend to identify the ,ersonal glory of the ruler with the ,olitical interests of the nation! n view of the successful conduct of foreign ,olicy, this identification is a serious wea$ness, for it leads to a ,olicy of ,restige for its own sa$e, neglectful of the national interests at sta$e and of the ,ower available to su,,ort the9! '9erican ,olicy in ndochina fro9 ./35 to ./15 could well be seen in the light of this analysis! The function the ,olicy of ,restige fulfills for the ,olicies of the status Luo and of i9,erialis9 grows out of the very nature of international ,olitics! The foreign ,olicy of a nation is always the result of an esti9ate of the ,ower relations as they e)ist a9ong different nations at a certain 9o9ent of history and as they are li$ely to develo, in the i99ediate and distant future! The foreign ,olicy of the :nited States, for instance, is based u,on an evaluation of the ,ower of the :nited States in relation to, let us say, the ,ower of Great Britain, the Soviet :nion, and 'rgentina, and of the ,robable future develo,9ent of the ,ower of these different nations! %i$ewise, the foreign ,olicies of Great Britain, the Soviet :nion, and 'rgentina are based u,on si9ilar evaluations, which are constantly subGected to review for the ,ur,ose of bringing the9 u, to date! t is the ,ri9ary function of the ,olicy of ,restige to influence these evaluations! f, for instance, the :nited States could i9,ress its ,ower u,on the %atin - '9erican nations to such an e)tent as to convince the9 that its ,redo9i nance in the 8estern He9is,here was unchallengeable, its ,olicy of the status Luo in the 8estern He9is,here would not be li$ely to be challenged, and its success would thus be assured! The relative ,olitical stability Euro,e enGoyed during the twenties and in the beginning of the thirties was due 9ainly to the ,restige of &rance as the strongest 9ilitary ,ower in the world! Ger9an i9,erialis9 owes its triu9,hs in the late thirties 9ainly to a successful ,olicy of ,restige! This ,olicy was able to convince the nations interested in the 9aintenance of the status Luo of Ger9anyIs su,eriority, if not invincibility! &or instance, the showing of docu9entary fil9s of the JblitH$riegJ in Poland and &rance to foreign audiences co9,osed ,referably of 9ilitary and ,olitical leaders clearly served this ,ur,ose! 8hatever the ulti9ate obGectives of a nationIs foreign ,olicy, its ,restige C its re,utation for ,ower C is always an i9,ortant and so9eti9es a decisive factor in deter9ining success or failure of its foreign ,olicy! ' ,olicy of ,restige is, therefore, an indis,ensable ele9ent of a rational foreign ,olicy! The (old 8ar, which do9inated the relations of the 8estern world and the Soviet bloc during the two decades following the Second 8orld 8ar! was fought ,ri9arily with the wea,ons of ,restige! The :nited States and the Soviet :nion endeavored to i9,ress each other with their 9ilitary 9ight, technological achieve9ents, econo9ic ,otential and ,olitical ,rinci,les in order to wea$en each otherIs 9orale and deter each other fro9 ta$ing an irrevocable ste, toward war! Si9ilarly, they tried to i9,ress their allies, the 9e9bers of the hostile alliance, and the unco99itted nations with these sa9e Lualities! Their ai9 was to $ee, the allegiance of their own allies, wea$en the unity of the hostile coalition, and win the su,,ort of the unco99itted nations! Prestige has beco9e ,articularly i9,ortant as a ,olitical wea,on in an age in which the struggle for ,ower is fought not only with the traditional 9ethods of ,olitical ,ressure and 9ilitary force, but in large 9easure as a struggle for the 9inds of 9en! n wide areas of 'sia, the Middle East, 'frica, and %atin '9erica, the (old 8ar was fought ,ri9arily in ter9s of co9,etition between two rival ,olitical ,hiloso,hies, econo9ic syste9s, and ways of life! This is another way of saying that in these regions ,restige C re,utation for ,erfor9ance and ,ower C has beco9e the 9ain sta$e for which ,olitical warfare is waged! The chief instru9ents of this struggle are ,ro,aganda, which see$s to increase the ,restige of oneIs own side and deflate that of the ene9y, and foreign aid, which intends to i9,ress the reci,ient nation with the econo9ic and technological ,roficiency of the aidIs ,rovider! ' ,olicy of ,restige attains its very triu9,h when it gives the nation ,ursuing it such a re,utation for ,ower as to enable it to forgo the actual e9,loy9ent of the instru9ent of ,ower! Two factors 9a$e that triu9,h ,ossibleB re,utation for unchallengeable ,ower and re,utation for self-restraint in using it! ;f this rare co9bination the Ro9an and the British e9,ires and the Good "eighbor ,olicy of the :nited States, when it ,revailed, are the classic e)a9,les!

The longevity of the Ro9an E9,ire, in contrast to the fate of Luic$ dissolution which generally befalls i9,erial structures of si9ilar di9ensions, was due ,ri9arily to the ,rofound res,ect in which the na9e of a Ro9an was held within its confines! Ro9e was Jsu,erior in ,olitical acu9en and 9ilitary strength to any one of the co9,onent ,arts of the E9,ire! By 9a$ing the burden of su,eriority as easy as ,ossible to bear, it de,rived its subGect ,eo,les of the incentive to rid the9selves of Ro9an do9ination! 't worst one or the other of the subGect ,eo,les 9ight revolt, but there was never incentive enough for the for9ation of a coalition sufficiently strong to challenge Ro9e! solated revolts would be dealt with swiftly and efficiently by ,re,onderant Ro9an ,ower, thus increasing Ro9eIs ,restige for ,ower! The contrast between the dis9al fate of those who dared to challenge Ro9e, and the ,eaceful and ,ros,erous e)istence, under the ,rotection of the Ro9an law, of those who re9ained loyal, increased Ro9eIs re,utation for 9oderation in the e)ercise of its ,ower! The sa9e re,utation for ,ower te9,ered by self-restraint was one of the foundation stones of the British E9,ire! ;bservers have 9arveled at the ability of a few thousand British officials to do9inate hundreds of 9illions of ndians, not to s,ea$ of the voluntary ties of loyalty which $e,t the self-governing do9inions united in the E9,ire! But the igno9inious defeats Great Britain suffered in the Second 8orld 8ar at the hands of +a,an shattered forever its re,utation for unchallengeable ,ower! 'nd the cry for national liberation, raised by the subGect races throughout 'sia, drowned out the 9e9ory of a tolerant rule 9ellowed by age and wisdo9! 8hen that twofold ,restige was gone and the resources to 9aintain the E9,ire by sheer force had beco9e unavailable, the 'siatic ,art of the British E9,ire did not for long survive the ,restige of Britain! *uring the era of the Good "eighbor ,olicy, the hege9ony of the :nited States in the 8estern He9is,here re,osed li$ewise u,on the re,utation for unchallengeable ,ower rather than u,on its actual e)ercise! The su,eriority of the :nited States in the 8estern He9is,here was so obvious and overwhel9ing that ,restige alone was sufficient to assure the :nited States the ,osition a9ong the '9erican re,ublics co99ensurate with its ,ower! The :nited States even at ti9es could afford to forgo insistence u,on the ,restige that was its due, because the self-restraint thus 9anifested 9ade its hege9ony 9ore tolerable to its neighbors to the south! Thus the :nited States 9ade a ,oint, fro9 the inauguration of the Good "eighbor ,olicy, to have Pan-'9erican conferences 9eet in %atin-'9erican countries rather than in the :nited States! Since in the 8estern He9is,here the :nited States had the substance of unchallengeable ,ower, it dee9ed it the better ,art of wisdo9 not to insist u,on all the 9anifestations of the ,restige that go with such overwhel9ing ,ower, and to allow so9e other country in the 8estern He9is,here to enGoy at least the a,,earances of ,ower in the for9 of ,restige! ;nly with the decline of the ;rganiHation of '9erican States and a shift in '9erican ,olicy did this outloo$ begin to change! TH+'' CO++;PTIONS O: TH' POLIC> O: P+'STIG' &or a nation to ,ursue a ,olicy of ,restige is, however, not enough! t can do too 9uch or too little in this res,ect, and in either case it will run the ris$ of failure! t does too 9uch when, insecure in the awareness of its ,ower, it invests a ,articular 9ove with a 9easure of ,restige out of all ,ro,ortion to its actual i9,ortance! The ,restige of a nation is not deter9ined by the success or failure of a ,articular 9ove at a ,articular 9o9ent in history! Kuite to the contrary, it reflects the su9 total of a nationIs Lualities and actions, of its successes and failures, of its historic 9e9ories and as,irations! The ,restige of a nation is very 9uch li$e the credit of a ban$! ' ban$ with large, ,roven resources and a record of successes can afford what a s9all and freLuently unsuccessful co9,etitor cannotB to 9a$e a 9ista$e or suffer a setbac$! ts $nown ,ower is big enough for its ,restige to survive such reverses! The sa9e is true of nations! The ,ages of history are full of instances of nations which, secure in their ,ossession of great ,ower and recogniHed as such by their ,eers, have suffered defeat or retreated fro9 e),osed ,ositions without suffering a loss in ,restige! 8hen was the ,restige of &rance higherB when it fought wars in ndochina and 'lgeria which it could neither win nor thought it could afford to lose, or after it had liLuidated these losing enter,risesF 'nd how 9uch, in the long run! did '9erican ,restige suffer fro9 the debacle of the Bay of Pigs in ./3=F 8hen &rance de9onstrated the wisdo9 and courage to liLuidate two losing enter,rises on which it had sta$ed its Jhonor,J its ,restige rose to heights it had not attained since the beginning of the Second 8orld 8ar! and the Bay of Pigs has weighed little in the scales of '9erican ,restige, heavy as they are with ,ower and successes! "ations 9ust ta$e care not to confound e,he9eral fluctuations of ,ublic o,inion with the lasting foundations of national ,ower and ,restige! Prestige in a ,articular instance, then, li$e the ,ower it 9irrors, 9ust be seen in the conte)t of a nationIs over-all ,ower and ,restige! The greatness of the latter is reflected in the for9er, and the deficiencies of the for9er are co9,ensated for by the latter! ' nation also does too 9uch when it ,aints an e)aggerated ,icture of its ,ower and thus atte9,ts to gain a re,utation for ,ower which e)ceeds the ,ower it actually ,ossesses! n that case, it builds its ,restige u,on the a,,earances of ,ower rather than u,on its substance! Here the ,olicy of ,restige transfor9s itself into a ,olicy of bluff! ts outstanding e)a9,le in recent history is the ,olicy of taly fro9 the Ethio,ian 8ar of ./05 to the 'frican ca9,aign of ./6=! E9bar$ing u,on a ,olicy of i9,erialistic e),ansion with the ,ur,ose of 9a$ing the Mediterranean an talian la$e, taly during the Ethio,ian 8ar and the S,anish (ivil 8ar of ./03 - 0/ dared defy Great Britain, then the fore9ost naval ,ower on earth and the ,redo9inant ,ower in the Mediterranean! t did so by creating the i9,ression that it was a 9ilitary ,ower of the first order! taly was successful in this ,olicy so long as no other nation dared to ,ut its ,retense of ,ower to the actual test! 8hen this test ca9e, it revealed the contrast between talyIs re,utation for ,ower, deliberately created by a nu9ber of ,ro,agandistic devices, and its actual ,ower! t un9as$ed its ,olicy of ,restige as a

,olicy of bluff! The essence of a ,olicy of bluff is well illustrated in the theater device of letting a score of e)tras, dressed as soldiers, wal$ about the stage, disa,,ear behind the scenery, and co9e bac$ again and again, thus creating the illusion of a great nu9ber of 9arching 9en! 8hile the ignorant and the gullible will easily be deceived by this a,,earance of ar9ed 9ight, the infor9ed and detached observer will not fall victi9 to the dece,tion! 'nd if the stage directions reLuire that the Jar9yJ give battle to another Jar9yJ the bluff beco9es ,atent to anyone! Here the ,olicy of bluff is reduced to its essentials, and its 9echanics are de9onstrated in ele9ental for9! t is easy for the ,olicy of bluff to succeed in the short run! but in the long run it can succeed only if it is able to ,ost,one forever the test of actual ,erfor9ance, and this even the highest Luality of statecraft cannot assure! The best that luc$ and ,olitical wisdo9 can do is to use the initial success of a ,olicy of bluff for the ,ur,ose of bringing the actual ,ower of oneIs nation u, to its re,uted Luality! 8hile the other nations are bluffed into giving that ,ower undeserved consideration, ti9e is gained for bringing ,restige and actual ,ower into har9ony! ' nation, therefore, that has fallen behind in the co9,etition for ,ower, es,ecially in the field of ar9a9ents, 9ight try to conceal its wea$ness behind a ,olicy of bluff while at the sa9e ti9e endeavoring to overco9e its handica,! 8hen Great Britain, in the autu9n and winter of ./64 - 6., was actually o,en to invasion, its ,restige, far e)ceeding at that ti9e its actual 9ilitary strength, was ,robably the 9ost i9,ortant single factor deterring the Ger9ans fro9 the atte9,t to invade its territory! SubseLuently, while 9aintaining the a,,earance of its defensive strength, it was able to acLuire actual defensive strength! t 9ust, however, be noted that luc$ ca9e to the assistance of that ,olicy of bluff in the for9 of HitlerIs 9ilitary 9ista$es, and that this ,olicy was not so 9uch freely chosen by Great Britain as forced u,on it as a des,erate last resort by an al9ost irresistible necessity! .4 8hile it thus re9ains true that it is generally a 9ista$e in international ,olitics to engage in a ,olicy of bluff, it is no less a 9ista$e to go to the other e)tre9e and be satisfied with a re,utation for ,ower which is inferior to the actual ,ower ,ossessed! The outstanding e)a9,les of this Jnegative ,olicy of ,restigeJ are the :nited States and the Soviet :nion in the ,eriod between the two world wars and, 9ore ,articularly, in the first years of the Second 8orld 8ar! 't the outbrea$ of the Second 8orld 8ar, the :nited States was already ,otentially the 9ost ,owerful nation on earth, and it had o,enly declared its o,,osition to the i9,erialis9 of Ger9any and +a,an! "evertheless, Ger9any and +a,an ,roceeded very 9uch as though the :nited States as a first-rate ,ower did not e)ist at all! The significance of the attac$ on Pearl Harbor in view of this discussion lies in the i9,lied e),ression of conte9,t for the 9ilitary strength of the :nited States! The re,utation for ,ower of the :nited States C that is, its ,restige C was so low that +a,an could base its war ,lans u,on the assu9,tion that '9erican 9ilitary strength would not recover fro9 the blow of Pearl Harbor in ti9e to influence the outco9e of the war! '9erican ,restige was so low that Ger9any and taly, instead of trying to $ee, the :nited States out of the Euro,ean war, see9ed al9ost eager to bring it in by declaring war against it on *ece9ber .4, ./6.! Hitler is Luoted as having declared in ./06B JThe '9erican is no soldier! The inferiority and decadence of this allegedly "ew 8orld is evident in its 9ilitary inefficiency!J .. So enor9ous a de,reciation was ,ri9arily due to what can al9ost be called the absence of an '9erican ,olicy of ,restige in so far as re,utation for 9ilitary ,ower is concerned! &ar fro9 de9onstrating to the other nations what the hu9an and 9aterial ,otentialities of the :nited States could 9ean in ter9s of 9ilitary ,ower, the :nited States see9ed al9ost an)ious to ,rove to the world its unwillingness, if not inability, to transfor9 those enor9ous ,otentialities into actual instru9ents of war! Thus the :nited States invited neglect and attac$ fro9 its ene9ies, failure for its ,olicies, 9ortal danger to its vital interests! The Soviet :nion had to co,e with si9ilar results not because it neglected, but because it failed in, its ,olicy of ,restige! Throughout the ,eriod between the two world wars, the re,utation of the Soviet :nion for ,ower was low! 8hile Ger9any, &rance, and Great Britain at ti9es tried to secure Russian su,,ort for their foreign ,olicies, no nation had a sufficiently high o,inion of the ,ower of the Soviet :nion to overco9e the aversion to Russian ,olitical ideology and the fear of its s,reading through the rest of Euro,e! 8hen, for instance, during the (Hechoslova$ian crisis of ./02 &rance and Great Britain were confronted with the alternative of either a,,roving the i9,erialistic e),ansion of Ger9any or trying to chec$ it with the aid of the Soviet :nion, the latterIs ,restige was so low that the 8estern Euro,ean ,owers reGected its ,roffered co-o,eration without 9uch hesitation! The 9ilitary ,restige of the Soviet :nion reached its lowest ,oint during the ca9,aign against &inland in ./0/ - 64, when little &inland see9ed able to hold its own against the Russian giant! That lac$ of ,restige was one of the factors that convinced the Ger9an general staff as well as the general staffs of the allied nations that the Soviet :nion would be unable to withstand a Ger9an attac$! &or a wise foreign ,olicy, however, such discre,ancy between ,restige and actual ,ower ought not to be a 9atter of indifference! &or if the Soviet :nion had a,,eared to be as ,owerful in ./02 or ./0/ or ./6. as it actually was C that is, if its ,restige had then been co99ensurate with its ,ower C the ,olicies of the other nations with res,ect to the Soviet :nion 9ight easily have been different, and the destiny of the Soviet :nion and of the world 9ight have been
.4

;ne can safely say that in the two 9ost critical ,eriods of its history Great Britain owed its salvation, at least in ,art, to its ,restige! 8hen in .1/1 all of Euro,e was at "a,oleonIs feet and &rance concentrated all its efforts u,on the destruction of Great Britain, a 9utiny bro$e out in the British fleet! &or a ti9e two loyal shi,s were all that stood between the continent and the British sles! n the winter of ./64C6., Great Britain was, for however different reasons, si9ilarly hel,less! n both situations, the awe in which the British na9e was held was one of the factors deterring its ene9ies fro9 an attac$ that the distribution of 9aterial ,ower greatly favored! .. Her9ann Rauschning! The Eoice of *estruction @"ew #or$B G! P! Putna9Is Sons, ./64A, ,! 1.

different as well! 8hether today the Soviet :nion is as strong as it see9s to be, or stronger, or wea$er, is a Luestion of funda9ental i9,ortance for both the Soviet :nion and the rest of the world! The sa9e is true of the :nited States and of any other nation ,laying an active role in international ,olitics! To de9onstrate to the rest of the world the ,ower oneIs own nation ,ossesses, revealing neither too 9uch nor too little, is the tas$ of a wisely conceived ,olicy of ,restige! 4 The Ideolo*ical Ele ent in International Policies THE NATURE OF POLITICAL I.EOLO)IE', t is a characteristic as,ect of all ,olitics, do9estic as well as international, that freLuently its basic 9anifestations do not a,,ear as what they actually are C 9anifestations of a struggle for ,ower! Rather, the ele9ent of ,ower as the i99ediate goal of the ,olicy ,ursued is e),lained and Gustified in ethical, legal, or biological ter9s! That is to sayB the true nature of the ,olicy is concealed by ideological Gustifications and rationaliHations! The dee,er the individual is involved in the ,ower struggle, the less li$ely he is to see the ,ower struggle for what it is! The words which Ha9let addresses to his 9other 9ight be addressed with eLual lac$ of success to all hungry for ,owerB ! ! ! Mother, for love of grace, %ay not that flattering unction to your soul, That not your tres,ass, but 9y 9adness s,ea$s! ;r, as Tolstoy ,uts it in 8ar and PeaceB 8hen a 9an acts alone, he always carries within hi9 a certain series of considerations, that have, as he su,,oses, directed his ,ast conduct, and that serve to Gustify to hi9 his ,resent action, and to lead hi9 to 9a$e ,roGects for his future activity! 'sse9blies of 9en act in the sa9e way, only leaving to those who do not ta$e direct ,art in the action to invent consideration, Gustifications, and ,roGects concerning their co9bined activity! &or causes, $nown or un$nown to us, the &rench began to cho, and hac$ at each other! 'nd to 9atch the event, it is acco9,anied by its Gustification in the e),ressed wills of certain 9en, who declare it essential for the good of &rance, for the cause of freedo9, of eLuality! Men cease slaughtering one another, and that event is acco9,anied by the Gustification of the necessity of centralisation of ,ower, of resistance to Euro,e, and so on! Men 9arch fro9 west to east, $illing their fellow-creatures, and this event is acco9,anied by ,hrases about the glory of &rance, the baseness of England, and so on! History teaches us that those Gustifications for the event are devoid of all co99on sense, that they are inconsistent with one another, as, for instance, the 9urder of a 9an as a result of the declaration of his rights, and the 9urder of 9illions in Russia for the abase9ent of England! But those Gustifications have an incontestable value in their own day! They re9ove 9oral res,onsibility fro9 those 9en who ,roduce the events! 't the ti9e they do the wor$ of broo9s, that go in front to clear the rails for the trainB they clear the ,ath of 9enIs 9oral res,onsibility! ',art fro9 those Gustifications, no solution could be found for the 9ost obvious Luestion that occurs to one at once on e)a9ining any historical event> that is, How did 9illions of 9en co9e to co9bine to co99it cri9es, 9urders, wars, and so onF = The actor on the ,olitical scene cannot hel, J,laying an actJ by concealing the true nature of his ,olitical actions behind the 9as$ of a ,olitical ideology! The 9ore re9oved the individual is fro9 a ,articular ,ower struggle, the 9ore li$ely he is to understand its true nature! So it is not by accident that foreigners have often a better understanding of the ,olitics of a ,articular country than have the natives, and that scholars are better eLui,,ed than ,oliticians to understand what ,olitics is all about! ;n the other hand, ,oliticians have an ineradicable tendency to deceive the9selves about
.

The conce,t of ideology is freLuently used in the general sense of ,hiloso,hic, ,olitical, and 9oral convictionsB we are dealing with the subGect 9atter referred to by this general conce,t of ideology in later ,arts of this boo$! The conce,t of ideology used in this cha,ter corres,onds to what 7arl Mannhei9 has called J,articular ideology!J See 7arl Mannhei9, deology and :to,ia @"ew #or$B Harcourt, Brace and (o9,any, ./03A, ,! 6/B JThe ,articular conce,tion of ideology is i9,lied when the ter9 denotes that we are sce,tical of the ideas and re,resentations advanced by our o,,onent! They are regarded as 9ore or less conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation, the true recognition of which would not be in accord with his interests! These distortions range ail the way fro9 conscious lies to half - conscious and unwitting disguises> fro9 calculated atte9,ts to du,e others to self - dece,tion!J See also ,! =02B JThe study of ideologies has 9ade it its tas$ to un9as$ the 9ore or less conscious dece,tions and disguises of hu9an interest grou,s, ,articularly those of ,olitical ,arties!J = E,ilogue, Part , (ha,ter E !

what they are doing by referring to their ,olicies not in ter9s of ,ower but in ter9s of either ethical and legal ,rinci,les or biological necessities! n other words, while all ,olitics is necessarily ,ursuit of ,ower, ideologies render involve9ent in that contest for ,ower ,sychologically and 9orally acce,table to the actors and their audience! These legal and ethical ,rinci,les and biological necessities fulfill a dual function in the s,here of international ,olitics! They are either the ulti9ate goals of ,olitical action, of which we have s,o$en before 0 C that is, those ulti9ate obGectives for the realiHation of which ,olitical ,ower is sought C or they are the ,rete)ts and false fronts behind which the ele9ent of ,ower, inherent in all ,olitics, is concealed! These ,rinci,les and necessities 9ay fulfill one or the other function, or they 9ay fulfill the9 both at the sa9e ti9e! ' legal and ethical ,rinci,le, such as Gustice, for e)a9,le, or a biological necessity, such as an adeLuate standard of living, 9ay be the goal of a foreign ,olicy, or it 9ay be an ideology, or it 9ay be both at the sa9e ti9e! Since we are not concerned here with the ulti9ate goals of international ,olitics, we shall deal with ethical and legal ,rinci,les and biological necessities only in so far as they ,erfor9 the function of ideologies! These ideologies are not the accidental outgrowth of the hy,ocrisy of certain individuals who need only to be re,laced by other, 9ore honest individuals in order to 9a$e the conduct of foreign affairs 9ore decent! *isa,,oint9ent always follows such e),ectations! The 9e9bers of the o,,osition who were 9ost vocal in e),osing the deviousness of &ran$lin *! RooseveltIs or (hurchillIs foreign ,olicies shoc$ed their followers, once they had beco9e res,onsible for the conduct of foreign affairs, by their own use of ideological disguises! t is the very nature of ,olitics to co9,el the actor on the ,olitical scene to use ideologies in order to disguise the i99ediate goal of his action! The i99ediate goal of ,olitical action is ,ower, and ,olitical ,ower is ,ower over the 9inds and actions of 9en! #et those who have been chosen as the ,ros,ective obGect of the ,ower of others are the9selves intent u,on gaining ,ower over others! Thus the actor on the ,olitical scene is always at the sa9e ti9e a ,ros,ective 9aster and a ,ros,ective subGect! 8hile he see$s ,ower over others, others see$ ,ower over hi9! To this a9bivalence of 9an as a ,olitical being corres,onds the a9bivalence of his 9oral evaluation of this condition! He will consider his own desire for ,ower as Gust and will conde9n as unGust the desire of others to gain ,ower over hi9! Since the end of the Second 8orld 8ar, the Russians have found their own designs for ,ower Gustified by considerations of their own security! But they have conde9ned as Ji9,erialisticJ and ,re,aratory to world conLuest the e),ansion of '9erican ,ower! The :nited States has ,ut a si9ilar stig9a on Russian as,irations, while it views its own international obGectives as necessities of national defense! 's +ohn 'da9s ,ut itB Power always thin$s it has a great soul and vast views beyond the co9,rehension of the wea$ and that it is doing GodIs service when it is violating all His laws! ;ur ,assions, a9bitions, avarice, love and resent9ent, etc!, ,ossess so 9uch 9eta,hysical subtlety and so 9uch over,owering eloLuence that they insinuate the9selves into the understanding and the conscience and convert both to their ,arty! The a9bivalence of this evaluation, characteristic of the a,,roach of all nations to the ,roble9 of ,ower, is again inherent in the very nature of international ,olitics! The nation that dis,ensed with ideologies and fran$ly stated that it wanted ,ower and would, therefore, o,,ose si9ilar as,irations of other nations, would at once find itself at a great and ,erha,s decisive disadvantage in the struggle for ,ower! That fran$ ad9ission would, on the one hand, unite the other nations in fierce resistance to a foreign ,olicy so uneLuivocally stated and would thereby co9,el the nation ,ursuing it to e9,loy 9ore ,ower than would otherwise be necessary! ;n the other hand, that ad9ission is tanta9ount to flouting o,enly the universally acce,ted 9oral standards of the international co99unity and would thereby ,ut the ,articular nation in a ,osition where it would be li$ely to ,ursue its foreign ,olicy halfheartedly and with a bad conscience! To rally a ,eo,le behind the govern9entIs foreign ,olicy and to 9arshal all the national energies and resources to its su,,ort, the s,o$es9an of the nation 9ust a,,eal to biological necessities, such as national e)istence, and to 9oral ,rinci,les, such as Gustice, rather than to ,ower! This is the only way a nation can attain the enthusias9 and willingness to sacrifice without which no foreign ,olicy can ,ass the ulti9ate-test of strength! Such are the ,sychological forces that inevitably engender the ideologies of international ,olicies and 9a$e the9 wea,ons in the struggle for ,ower on the international scene! ' govern9ent whose foreign ,olicy a,,eals to the intellectual convictions and 9oral valuations of its own ,eo,le has gained an incalculable advantage over an o,,onent who has not succeeded in choosing goals that have such a,,eal or in 9a$ing the chosen goals a,,ear to have it! deologies, li$e all ideas, are wea,ons that 9ay raise the national 9orale and, with it, the ,ower of one nation and, in the very act of doing so, 9ay lower the 9orale of the o,,onent! The enor9ous contribution 8oodrow 8ilsonIs &ourteen Points 9ade to the victory of the 'llies in the &irst 8orld 8ar by strengthening the 9orale of the 'llies and wea$ening the 9orale of the (entral Powers is the classic e)a9,le of the i9,ortance of the 9oral factor for international ,olitics! 6 T3PICAL I.EOLO)IE' OF FOREI)N POLICIE' t follows fro9 the nature of international ,olitics that i9,erialistic ,olicies resort ,ractically always to ideological disguises, whereas status Luo ,olicies 9ore freLuently can be ,resented as what they actually are! t also follows fro9
0 6

See ,ages 04 ff! ;n the ,roble9 of national 9orale in general, see ,ages .6/ ff!

this nature that certain ty,es of ideologies are coordinated with certain ty,es of international ,olicies! I(eo"ogies o! the Status 1uo ' ,olicy of the status Luo can often afford to reveal its true nature and dis,ense with ideological disguises, because the status Luo has already, by virtue of its very e)istence, acLuired a certain 9oral legiti9acy! 8hat e)ists 9ust have so9ething in its favor> otherwise it would not e)ist! 's *e9osthenes ,ut itB &or no one would go to war as readily for aggrandiHe9ent as for the defense of his own ,ossessions> but while all 9en fight des,erately to $ee, what they are in danger of losing, it is not so with aggrandiHe9ent> 9en 9a$e it, indeed, their ai9, but if ,revented, they do not feel they have suffered any inGustice fro9 their o,,onents!5 Since a nation that ,ursues a ,olicy of the status Luo see$s the ,reservation of the ,ower it already has, it 9ay avoid the need to allay the resent9ent of other nations and its own scru,les! This is es,ecially so when the ,reservation of the territorial status Luo is not o,en to 9oral or legal attac$ and when national ,ower has by tradition been e)clusively used for the ,reservation of this status Luo! Such nations as SwitHerland, *en9ar$, "orway, and Sweden do not need to hesitate to define their foreign ,olicies in ter9s of the 9aintenance of the status Luo! since this status Luo is generally recogniHed as legiti9ate! ;ther nations, such as Great Britain, &rance! #ugoslavia, (Hechoslova$ia, and Ru9ania, which in the ,eriod between the two world wars in the 9ain ,ursued a ,olicy of the status Luo! could not afford si9,ly to declare that their foreign ,olicies ai9ed at the defense of their ,ossessions! Since the legiti9acy of the status Luo of ././ was itself being challenged within and without these nations, they had to invo$e 9oral ,rinci,les able to 9eet that challenge! Peace and international law fulfilled that ,ur,ose! Peace and international law are e9inently Lualified to serve as ideologies for a ,olicy of the status Luo! Since i9,erialistic ,olicies, by disturbing the status Luo, freLuently lead to war and 9ust always ta$e the ,ossibility of war into account, a foreign ,olicy that ,roclai9s ,acifis9 as its guiding ,rinci,le is by the sa9e to$en anti-i9,erialistic and su,,orts the 9aintenance of the status Luo! By e),ressing in ,acifist ter9s the obGectives of the ,olicy of the status Luo! a states9an ,uts the stig9a of war - 9ongering u,on his i9,erialistic o,,onents, clears his and his country9enIs conscience of 9oral scru,les, and can ho,e to win the su,,ort of all countries interested in the 9aintenance of the status Luo!3 nternational law fulfills a si9ilar ideological function for ,olicies of the status Luo! 'ny legal order tends to be ,ri9arily a static social force! t defines a certain distribution of ,ower and offers standards and ,rocesses to ascertain and 9aintain it in concrete situations! *o9estic law, through a highly develo,ed syste9 of legislation, Gudicial decisions, and law enforce9ent, allows for ada,tations and so9eti9es even considerable changes within the general distribution of ,ower! nternational law, in the absence of such a syste9 9a$ing for lawful change, is, not only ,ri9arily but essentially, by dint of its very nature, a static force! The invocation of international law, of Jorder under law,J of Jordinary legal ,rocessesJ in su,,ort of a ,articular foreign ,olicy, therefore, always indicates the ideological disguise of a ,olicy of the status Luo! More ,articularly, when an international organiHation, such as the %eague of "ations, has been established for the ,ur,ose of 9aintaining a ,articular status Luo, su,,ort of that organiHation beco9es tanta9ount to su,,ort of that ,articular status Luo! Since the end of the &irst 8orld 8ar, it has beco9e rather co99on to 9a$e use of such legalistic ideologies in Gustification of a ,olicy of the status Luo! 8hile the alliances of for9er ,eriods of history have not disa,,eared, they tend to beco9e Jregional arrange9entsJ within an over-all legal organiHation! The J9aintenance of the status LuoJ yields to the J9aintenance of international ,eace and security!J ' nu9ber of states that have the sa9e interest in the 9aintenance of the status Luo will be li$ely to ,rotect their co99on interests against a threat fro9 a ,articular source not by a JHoly 'llianceJ but by a Jsyste9 of collective securityJ or a Jtreaty of 9utual assistance!J Since changes in the status Luo are freLuently brought about at the e),ense of s9all nations, defense of the rights of s9all nations, such as of Belgiu9 in ./.6 and &inland and Poland in ./0/, beco9es under a,,ro,riate conditions another ideology of the ,olicy of the status Luo! I(eo"ogies o! Imperia"ism ' ,olicy of i9,erialis9 is always in need of an ideology> for in contrast to a ,olicy of the status Luo i9,erialis9 always has the burden of ,roof! t 9ust ,rove that the status Luo it see$s to overthrow deserves to be overthrown and that the 9oral legiti9acy which in the 9inds of 9any attaches to things as they are ought to yield to a higher ,rinci,le of 9orality calling for a new distribution of ,ower! Thus, in the words of GibbonB J&or every war a 9otive of safety or revenge, of honor or Heal, of right or convenience, 9ay be readily found in the Guris,rudence of conLuerors!J 1 n so far as the ty,ical ideologies of i9,erialis9 9a$e use of legal conce,ts, they cannot well refer to ,ositive international lawB that is, to international law as it actually is! 's we have seen, the static character of international law 9a$es it the natural ideological ally of the status Luo! The dyna9ic Luality of i9,erialis9 reLuires dyna9ic ideologies! n the do9ain of law it is the doctrine of natural law C that is, of the law as it ought to be C that fits the
5 3

*e9osthenes, &or the %iberty of the Rhodians! sections .4 - ..! See ,age ..=, on the recent transfor9ation of the ideology of ,eace> see also ,ages =0. ff! 1 The *ecline and &all of the Ro9an E9,ire @The Modern %ibrary EditionA, Eol! , ,! .=05!

ideological needs of i9,erialis9! 'gainst the inGustices of international law as it e)ists, sy9boliHing the status Luo, the i9,erialistic nation will invo$e a higher law that corres,onds to the reLuire9ents of Gustice! Thus "ational Socialist Ger9any based its de9ands for the revision of the status Luo of Eersailles ,ri9arily u,on the ,rinci,le of eLuality which the Treaty of Eersailles was said to have violated! The de9and for colonies, for instance, of which the Treaty of Eersailles had de,rived Ger9any co9,letely, and the de9and for the revision of that treatyIs ,rovisions for unilateral disar9a9ent, were derived fro9 the sa9e ,rinci,le! 8hen the i9,erialistic ,olicy is not directed against a ,articular status Luo resulting fro9 a lost war, but grows fro9 a ,ower vacuu9 inviting con- Luest, 9oral ideologies that 9a$e it an unavoidable duty to conLuer ta$e theJ ,lace of the a,,eal to a Gust natural law against an unGust ,ositive law! Then to conLuer wea$ ,eo,les a,,ears as Jthe white 9anIs burden,J the Jnational 9ission,J J9anifest destiny,J a Jsacred trust,J a J(hristian duty!J (olonial i9,erialis9, in ,articular, has freLuently been disguised by ideological slogans of this $ind, such as the Jblessings of 8estern civiliHation,J which it was the 9ission of the conLueror to bring to the colored races of the earth! The +a,anese ideology of the East 'siatic Jco - ,ros,erity HoneJ carries the si9ilar connotation of a hu9anitarian 9ission! 8henever a ,olitical ,hiloso,hy, held with the fervor of a religious faith, coincides with an i9,erialistic ,olicy, it beco9es a ready instru9ent of ideological disguise! 'rab i9,erialis9 during the ,eriod of 'rab e),ansion Gustified itself as the fulfill9ent of religious duty! "a,oleonic i9,erialis9 swe,t over Euro,e under the banner of J%iberty, ELuality, &raternity!J Russian i9,erialis9, es,ecially in its as,irations for (onstantino,le and the *ardanelles, has successively or si9ultaneously 9ade use of the ;rthodo) faith, Pan-Slavis9, world revolution, and defense fro9 ca,italist encircle9ent! n 9odern ti9es, es,ecially under the influence of the social ,hiloso,hies of *arwin and S,encer, the ideologies of i9,erialis9 have ,referred biological argu9ents! Transferred to international ,olitics, the ,hiloso,hy of the survival of the fittest sees in the 9ilitary su,eriority of a strong nation over a wea$ one a natural ,heno9enon that 9a$es the latter the ,reordained obGect of the for9erIs ,ower! 'ccording to this ,hiloso,hy, it would be contrary to nature if the strong did not do9inate the wea$ and if the wea$ tried to be the eLual of the strong! The strong nation has a right to a J,lace in the sunJ> it is the Jsalt of the earth!J 's the fa9ous Ger9an sociologist 8erner So9bart discovered in the &irst 8orld 8ar, the Ger9anic JheroJ 9ust necessarily win out over the British Jsho,$ee,er!J That the inferior races should serve the 9aster race is a law of nature that only villains and fools will o,,oseB slavery and e)ter9ination are the latterIs Gust dessert! (o99unis9, fascis9, and "aHis9, as well as +a,anese i9,erialis9, have given these biological ideologies a revolutionary turn! The nations that nature has a,,ointed to be the 9asters of the earth are $e,t in inferiority by the tric$ery and violence of the naturally inferior nations! The vigorous but ,oor Jhave-notsJ are cut off fro9 the riches of the earth by the wealthy but decadent Jhaves!J The ,roletarian nations, ins,ired by ideals, 9ust fight the ca,italist nations defending their 9oneybags! The ideology of over,o,ulation found ,articular favor with Ger9any, taly, and +a,an before the Second 8orld 8ar! The Ger9ans are a J,eo,le without s,aceJ who, if they cannot obtain Jliving s,ace,J 9ust JsuffocateJ and, if they cannot obtain sources of raw 9aterials, 9ust Jstarve!J 8ith different variations, this ideology was used in the thirties also by taly and +a,an to Gustify their e),ansionist ,olicies and to disguise their i9,erialistic goals!2 The 9ost widely ,racticed disguise and Gustification of i9,erialis9 has, however, always been the ideology of anti- i9,erialis9! / t is so widely used because it is the 9ost effective of all ideologies of i9,erialis9! 's, according to Huey %ong, fascis9 will co9e to the :nited States in the guise of antifascis9, so i9,erialis9 has co9e to 9any a country in the guise of anti-i9,erialis9! n ./.6 as well as in ./0/, both sides went to war in order to defend the9selves against the i9,erialis9 of the other side! Ger9any attac$ed the Soviet :nion, in ./6. in order to forestall the latterIs i9,erialistic designs! Since the end of the Second 8orld 8ar, '9erican and British as well as Russian and (hinese foreign ,olicy has been Gustified by the i9,erialistic obGectives of other nations! By thus ,resenting oneIs own foreign ,olicy, regardless of its actual character! as anti - i9,erialistic C that is, defensive and ,rotective of the status Luo C one gives oneIs own ,eo,le that good conscience and confidence in the Gustice of their own cause without which no ,eo,le can su,,ort its foreign ,olicy wholeheartedly and fight successfully for it! 't the sa9e ti9e one 9ay confound the ene9y who, ideologically less well ,re,ared, 9ay no longer be certain on which side Gustice is to be
2

The ,urely ideological character of the clai9 for colonies, Gustified in the ,eriod between the two world wars by Ger9any, taly, and +a,an with ,o,ulation ,ressure and econo9ic distress, is clearly de9onstrated by the relevant ,o,ulation and econo9ic statistics! The four 'frican colonies of Ger9any covered /04,444 sLuare 9iles and had, in ./.6! a ,o,ulation of al9ost twelve 9illion, of which only =4!444 were white! t was ,ointed out at that ti9e that 9ore Ger9ans were living in the city of Paris than in all of Ger9anyIs colonies co9bined! 'fter Eritrea had been an talian colony for fifty years, the =,444 sLuare 9iles of territory 9ost suitable for settle9ent contained about .44 talian inhabitants! The +a,anese colonies of 7orea and &or9osa absorbed within a ,eriod of forty years less than one yearIs increase of the +a,anese ,o,ulation! 's for the econo9ic i9,ortance of colonies to their 9other countries, the figures are eloLuent in the case of Ger9any and taly! The i9,orts fro9, and the e),orts to, the Ger9an colonies a9ounted in ./.0 to 4!5 ,er cent of the total Ger9an i9,orts and e),orts! n ./00! the i9,orts fro9 the talian colonies were .!3 ,er cent of the total i9,orts, and the e),orts to the9 were 1!= ,er cent of all the e),orts fro9 taly> a considerable ,ortion of the latter 9ust have consisted of war 9aterial! ;nly for +a,an were its colonies of ,ara9ount econo9ic i9,ortance, its trade with the9 in ./06 a9ounting to al9ost =5 ,er cent of its total trade @=0!. ,er cent of the total i9,orts! == ,er cent of the total e),ortsA! See Royal nstitute of nternational 'ffairs, The (olonial Proble9 @%ondon, "ew #or$, TorontoB ;)ford :niversity Press, ./01A, es,ecially ,! =21! / ' variant of the ideology of anti - i9,erialis9 is the ideology of anti-,ower ,olitics! 'ccording to this ideology, other nations are 9otivated in their ,olicies by as,irations for ,ower, while oneI s own nation, free fro9 such base 9otives, ,ursues ,urely ideal obGectives!

found! The econo9ic de9ands that the nations of the JThird 8orldJ have ,resented contain a strong ideological ele9ent! The res,onsibility for the econo9ic distress of 9any of these nations, which 9ust be attributed to a variety of reasons, such as natural ,overty, irrational econo9ic ,olicies, corru,tion, and inco9,etence, is ty,ically laid at the door of the develo,ed rich and industrial nations! ;ne star$ and disLuieting fact gives the conce,t of "orth-South confrontation a se9blance of ,lausibilityB the e)tre9e differences in the standard of living between the industrial nations and those of the Third 8orld! &ro9 that su,,osed causal res,onsibility follows the 9oral res,onsibility to 9a$e a9ends for the evils ,reviously wrought and to contribute to a 9ore eLual future distribution of the worldIs wealth! The 9ost salient case in ,oint is the uneLual distribution of food, causing e)cess and gluttony in the industrial nations and chronic undernourish9ent and even fa9ine in 9any countries of the Third 8orld! However, both the causal and the 9oral ne)us between abundance in the industrial world and want in the Third 8orld are o,en to serious Luestion! Throughout history 9an$ind has been divided by drastic differences in standards of living! 8hat sets the ,resent situation a,art is the awareness of these differences by the advantaged and disadvantaged 9e9bers of 9an$ind owing to the 9odern technologies of co99unication! That awareness coincides with the ascendancy of the ,rinci,le of eLuality, both of o,,ortunity and condition, throughout the world! Hence the as,irations of the disadvantaged to a narrowing of the ga, between the rich and the ,oor C and the 9oral e9barrass9ent of the rich in the face of these as,irations! t goes without saying that these as,irations and the attendant 9oral e9barrass9ent C both inca,able of satisfaction or relief on a worldwide scale C are e)tensively used as ideological Gustifications and rationaliHations for s,ecific ,olitical ai9s in the service of concrete national interests! These ai9s are naturally directed toward changes in the status Luo at the e),ense of the rich and in favor of the ,oor! The for9er, aware of the e)isting e)tre9e ineLuality, and ,ersuaded by the 9oral ,rinci,le which conde9ns it! are at an obvious disadvantage in defining and ,ro9oting their own interests> they 9ust do so, as it were, with a bad conscience, no longer fully convinced of the rightness of their case! &aced with the clai9 to econo9ic eLuality, they are in a 9orally hel,less ,osition, one si9ilar to that in which the 8estern de9ocracies found the9selves in ./02 when confronted with the Ger9an clai9 to a ,art of (Hechoslova$ia, advanced in the na9e of the 9oral ,rinci,le of national self-deter9ination! The 9oral argu9ent in favor of the eLualiHation of the standard of living throughout the world a,,ears as a s,ecial a,,lication of the general argu9ent in su,,ort of hu9anitarian aid to nations in distress! The :nited States has acce,ted this obligation in theory and ,ractice! However, the situation ,roviding a 9oral Gustification for hu9anitarian aid differs funda9entally fro9 the one calling for eLualiHation of the standard of living throughout the world! Hu9anitarian aid is Gustified by a sudden natural catastro,he, the conseLuences of which the affected country finds hard to re9edy with its own resources alone! The worldwide differences in the standard of living are the result of a co9,le) of natural, cultural, econo9ic, and ,olitical factors! ;utside intervention 9ay be able to 9odify such differences in s,ecific instances, but it cannot e),ect to eli9inate the9 throughout the world! t is this i9,ossibility to achieve C even with the best of intentions and the 9ost e)tensive co99it9ent of resources C what is ,resu9ed to be 9orally reLuired that negates the 9oral obligation! The ,rinci,le of Ro9an law ultra vires ne9o obligatur @beyond his ability nobody is obligatedA a,,lies also to ,resu9ed 9oral obligations! The su,,osed 9oral obligation for the industrialiHed, rich nations to raise the standard of living of the nonindustrialiHed, ,oor nations throughout the world is grounded in the causal relationshi, which is ,resu9ed to e)ist between the ,olicies and the high standard of living of the for9er and the low standard of living of the latter! However, the assu9,tion of a si9,le causal relationshi, of this $ind is a 9yth! The colonialists, i9,erialists, and ca,italists ,erfor9 here the function of the devil to who9 the evils of underdevelo,9ent can be traced! n truth, these evils have 9ulti,le causes, of which colonialis9, i9,erialis9, and ca,italis9 are, at best, only one! The eli9ination of ineLualities in food su,,ly is, then, not only C and not even ,ri9arily C a 9atter of agricultural technology and collective generosity, but of ,olitical interest and will! n 9any societies the ,er,etuation of ,overty, of which the scarcity of food is a stri$ing 9anifestation, is not Gust another unfortunate accident to be re9edied by technological refor9, but the result of deliberate social, econo9ic, and ,olitical choices! f one wants to rid the world of hunger, one has to rid these societies of the arrange9ents that have caused it! More li$ely than not, that 9eans radical refor9 C if not revolution! 8hether the ,olitical elites of Third 8orld nations are willing to follow their own rhetoric is a 9atter of controversy! Thus the ter9s in which the so-called "orth-South conflict is fought out between the have and the have-not nations of the world in good 9easure conceal and at the sa9e ti9e Gustify a conflict between the traditionally ,owerful and the new ,olitically wea$ nations whose 9ain real obGect is e)actly a new distribution of ,ower! Ambiguous I(eo"ogies The ideology of anti-i9,erialis9 draws its effectiveness fro9 its a9biguity! t confounds the observer, who cannot always be sure whether he is dealing with an ideology of i9,erialis9 or with the true e),ression of a ,olicy of the status Luo! This confounding effect is ,resent whenever an ideology is not 9ade to order, as it were, for a ,articular ty,e of ,olicy, but can be worn by the defenders of the status Luo as well as by the ,ro9oters of i9,erialis9! Traditionally, and 9ore ,articularly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the balance of ,ower has been used as an ideological wea,on by the defenders of the status Luo and the ,ro9oters of i9,erialis9! n our ti9e, the ideologies of national self-deter9ination and of the :nited "ations have ,erfor9ed a si9ilar function! Since the beginning of the

(old 8ar, they have been Goined to an ever increasing e)tent by the ideologies of ,eace, rela)ation of tensions, detente! The ,rinci,le of national self-deter9ination, as conceived by 8oodrow 8ilson, Gustified the liberation of the (entral and Eastern Euro,ean nationalities fro9 foreign do9ination! Theoretically it was o,,osed not only to the status Luo of e9,ire, but also to i9,erialis9 of any $ind, either on the ,art of the old i9,erial ,owers C Ger9any, 'ustria, and Russia C or on the ,art of the liberated s9all nations! #et the destruction of the old i9,erial order at once called forth, still in the na9e of self-deter9ination, new i9,erialis9s! Those of Poland, (Hechoslova$ia, Ru9ania, and #ugoslavia are as outstanding as they were inevitable> for the ,ower vacuu9 left by the brea$down of the old i9,erial order had to be filled and the newly liberated nations were there to fill it! 's soon as they had installed the9selves in ,ower, they invo$ed the selfsa9e ,rinci,le of national self-deter9ination in defense of the new status Luo! This ,rinci,le was their 9ost ,otent ideological wea,on fro9 the end of the &irst to the end of the Second 8orld 8ar! t was by a stro$e of ,ro,agandistic genius that Hitler hit u,on the ,rinci,le of national self-deter9ination in order to disguise and Gustify his ,olicies of territorial e),ansion! The Ger9an 9inorities of (Hechoslova$ia and Poland, under the banner of national self-deter9ination, were now to ,lay the sa9e role in under9ining the national e)istence of (Hechoslova$ia and Poland which the (Hech, Slova$, and Polish nationalities, under the sa9e ideological banner, had ,layed in under9ining the national e)istence of the 'ustrian-Hungarian E9,ire! 8ith their own ideological wea,on turned against the9, the benefactors of the status Luo of Eersailles had no ideology, e)ce,t the one of law and order, with which to defend that status Luo! Thus 'ustria and (Hechoslova$ia were surrendered, and Poland was e),osed to 9ortal danger! 'fter the settle9ent of Munich granted the Ger9an de9ands with regard to (Hechoslova$ia, the %ondon Ti9es, 9a$ing the Ger9an ideology its own, declaredB JSelf-deter9ination, the ,rofessed ,rinci,le of the Treaty of Eersailles, has been invo$ed by Herr Hitler against its written te)t, and his a,,eal has been allowed!J.4 Rarely, if ever, has 9odern history offered a 9ore stri$ing e)a9,le of the i9,ortance of ideologies in international ,olitics and of the confounding effect of an a9biguous ideology a,tly e9,loyed! The ideology of national self-deter9ination also ,lays a crucial ,art in the conflict between srael and the 'rab states! The 'rab clai9s of national self-deter9ination, in order to do the9 Gustice, 9ust be ,ut in the ,olitical conte)t fro9 which they have risen and within which theM are su,,osed to o,erate! 'rab clai9s for Palestinian selfdeter9ination 9ust be seen in the conte)t of the continuous o,,osition of 9ost 'rabs to the e)istence not only of the state of srael but of +ewish settle9ents within the territory of Palestine! n other words, recognition of srael as a state is inco9,atible with the clai9 to national self-deter9ination of the Palestinian 'rabs! &or their clai9 is based not only u,on the 8est Ban$ of the +ordan but C as innu9erable ,ronounce9ents of the Palestine %iberation ;rganiHation @P%;A clai9 C u,on the whole territory on which the state of srael has been erected! Thus the ,rinci,le of national self-deter9ination on behalf of the Palestinian 'rabs reveals itself as an ideological disguise for the unchanging as,iration of 'rabs to destroy the state of srael and establish an 'rab state in its ,lace! 8hen &rancis of &rance was as$ed why he always 9ade war against (harles E of Ha,sburg, he re,liedB Because both of us want the sa9e thing, taly!J The sa9e re,ly, substituting Palestine for taly, could be given by the leaders of srael and the P%;! The :nited "ations was intended at its ince,tion to serve as an instru9ent of (hina! &rance! Great Britain, the Soviet :nion, and the :nited States, and of their allies, for 9aintaining the status Luo as established by the victory of these nations in the Second 8orld 8ar! But in the years i99ediately following the conclusion of the Second 8orld 8ar! this status Luo ,roved to be only ,rovisional and subGect to contradictory inter,retations and clai9s by the different nations! The ideology of the :nited "ations is therefore, used by these different nations for the ,ur,ose of Gustifying their ,articular inter,retations and disguising their ,articular clai9s! 'll nations a,,ear as the cha9,ions of the :nited "ations, and Luote its (harter in su,,ort of the ,articular ,olicies they are ,ursuing! These ,olicies being contradictory, the reference to the :nited "ations and its (harter beco9es an ideological device Gustifying oneIs own ,olicy in the light of generally acce,ted ,rinci,les and at the sa9e ti9e concealing its true character! ts a9biguity 9a$es this ideology a wea,on with which to confound oneIs ene9ies and strengthen oneIs friends! Since the end of the Second 8orld 8ar! the ideologies of ,eace, rela)ation of tensions, and detente have to an ever increasing e)tent co9e to ,erfor9 a si9ilar function! n view of the general fear of a third world war, fought with the 9odern wea,ons of 9ass destruction, no govern9ent can e),ect to gain su,,ort for its foreign ,olicies fro9 its own and other ,eo,les if it cannot convince the9 of its ,eaceful intentions! Thus J,eace congresses,J J,eace offensives!J and J,eace crusadesJ have beco9e standard wea,ons of ,ro,aganda in the (old 8ar! These well-nigh universal ,rofessions of ,eaceful intentions are 9eaningless as references to the actual foreign ,olicies ,ursued, since it can well be ta$en for granted that, in view of the incalculable destructiveness of 9odern war, all nations would rather ,ursue their ai9s by ,eaceful 9eans than by war! #et by the sa9e to$en these ,rofessions ,erfor9 two i9,ortant ,olitical functions! They tend to conceal the actual ,olicies ,ursued behind a veil of ,rofessed ,eaceful ,ur,oses! They also tend to attract su,,ort of 9en of good will everywhere for these ,olicies, whatever they 9ay actually be since they are ,resented as ai9ing at the ,reservation of ,eace, a goal that 9en of good will everywhere ardently desire! Si9ilar considerations a,,ly to the well-nigh universal co99it9ent to disar9a9ent, es,ecially in its Jgeneral and co9,leteJ for9! 'n end to the ar9a9ents race is widely considered desirable on hu9anitarian, ,olitical, and econo9ic grounds! But it is obvious fro9 the e),erience of the last two decades that the ,olitical conditions of the world 9a$e disar9a9ent i9,ossible!.. 8hen, in view of this co9,lete failure of all atte9,ts at disar9a9ent of any $ind, govern9ents declare as their ,olicy Jgeneral and co9,leteJ disar9a9ent, they are actually 9a$ing an ideological
.4 ..

%ondon Ti9es! Se,te9ber =2! ./02! See for an e)tensive discussion of the reasons for the failure of disar9a9ent below! (ha,ter .2!

a,,eal to the nations of the world yearning for ,eace and relief fro9 the burdens of co9,etitive ar9a9ents! This a,,eal serves the ,ur,ose of 9a$ing the foreign ,olicies actually ,ursued 9ore acce,table to the other nations than they 9ight otherwise be! THE PRO"LE$ OF RECO)NITION To see through these ideological disguises and gras, behind the9 the actual ,olitical forces and ,heno9ena is, then, one of the 9ost i9,ortant and 9ost difficult tas$s for the student of international ,olitics! This tas$ is i9,ortant because, unless it is done, it is i9,ossible to deter9ine correctly the character of the foreign ,olicy with which one ha,,ens to deal! The recognition of i9,erialistic tendencies and of their ,articular character de,ends u,on a clear distinction between the ideological ,retense that generally disavows i9,erialistic as,irations altogether and the actual obGectives of the ,olicies ,ursued! To 9a$e this distinction correctly is difficult because of the general difficulty of detecting the true 9eaning of any hu9an action a,art fro9 what the actor believes or feigns it to 9ean! This general ,roble9 is aggravated by two other difficulties ,eculiar, at least in their generality, to international ,olitics! ;ne is to distinguish a boast or bluff indicative of a ,olicy of ,restige fro9 an ideological disguise of actual i9,erialis9! The other is to discover behind an ideology of the status Luo or of localiHed i9,erialis9 the true 9eaning of the ,olicy actually ,ursued! 8e have already had occasion to refer to the foreign ,olicy of 8illia9 , which conveyed through its language and 9anifestations the i9,ression of being o,enly i9,erialistic while it was actually a strange 9i)ture of i9,erialistic designs and neurotic boastfulness! (onversely, the true i9,erialistic essence of the foreign ,olicies of Hitler and Mussolini was not generally recogniHed u, to the late thirties, being e),lained away as 9ere bluff and boastfulness for ho9e consu9,tion! To deter9ine the true character of a foreign ,olicy behind its deliberate or unconscious ideological disguise beco9es ,articularly difficult when the ideologies of the status Luo are used as a disguise! The ,eriod following the Second 8orld 8ar offers stri$ing e)a9,les of this difficulty in the foreign ,olicies of the :nited States and the Soviet :nion! Both nations have e),ressed the obGectives of their foreign ,olicies in the al9ost identical ter9s of status-Luo ideologies! Both the Soviet :nion and the :nited States have ,roclai9ed that they have no territorial a9bitions beyond the line of 9ilitary de9arcation which was established by the agree9ents of Teheran, #alta, and Potsda9 and through understandings a9ong the 9ilitary co99anders at the end of the war> that they want to see free and de9ocratic govern9ents established everywhereB that they are guided by considerations of security and national defense> and that it is the ca,italist or (o99unist i9,erialis9 of the other side against which they are co9,elled, in s,ite of their own wishes, to defend the9selves! Most '9ericans and 9ost Russians are obviously convinced that these state9ents are a faithful e),ression of the true character of their countriesI foreign ,olicy! #et they cannot both be right, while one or the other or both 9ay be wrong! &or it 9ay be that the Soviet :nion 9isunderstands the foreign ,olicy of the :nited States or that the :nited States 9isunderstands the foreign ,olicy of the Soviet :nion, or that both 9isunderstand each other! The solution of this riddle u,on which the fate of the world 9ay well de,end is not to be sought in the character of the ideologies alone, but in the su9 total of the factors deter9ining the foreign ,olicy of a nation! ;f this, 9ore will be said later! .=

PA+T TH+'' Nationa" Po-er

5
.=

See Part Ten!

The Essence of National Power %HAT I' NATIONAL PO%ER4 8e have said that by ,ower we 9ean the ,ower of 9an over the 9inds and actions of other 9en, a ,heno9enon to be found whenever hu9an beings live in social contact with one another! 8e have s,o$en of the J,ower of a nationJ or of Jnational ,owerJ as though the conce,t, were self-evident and sufficiently e),lained by what we have said about ,ower in general! #et, while it can be easily understood that individuals see$ ,ower, how are we to e),lain the as,irations for ,ower in the collectives called nationsF 8hat is a nationF 8hat do we 9ean when we attribute to a nation as,irations and actionsF ' nation as such is obviously not an e9,irical thing! ' nation as such cannot be seen! 8hat can be e9,irically observed are only the individuals who belong to a nation! Hence, a nation is an abstraction fro9 a nu9ber of individuals who have certain characteristics in co99on, and it is these characteristics that 9a$e the9 9e9bers of the sa9e nation! Besides being a 9e9ber of a nation and thin$ing, feeling, and acting in that ca,acity, the individual 9ay belong to a church, a social or econo9ic class, a ,olitical ,arty, a fa9ily, and 9ay thin$, feel, and act in these ca,acities! ',art fro9 being a 9e9ber of all these social grou,s, he is also a hu9an being ,ure and si9,le, and thin$s, feels, and acts in that ca,acity! Therefore, when we s,ea$ in e9,irical ter9s of the ,ower or of the foreign ,olicy of a certain nation, we can only 9ean the ,ower or the foreign ,olicy of certain individuals who belong to the sa9e nation! 's Marcel Proust ,ut itB JThe life of nations 9erely re,eats, on a larger scale, the lives of their co9,onent cells> and he who is inca,able of understanding the 9ystery, the reactions, the laws that deter9ine the 9ove9ents of the individual, can never ho,e to say anything worth listening to about the struggles of nations!J #et this ,oses another difficulty! The ,ower or the foreign ,olicy of the :nited States is obviously not the ,ower or the foreign ,olicy of all the individuals who belong to the nation called the :nited States of '9erica! The fact that the :nited States e9erged fro9 the Second 8orld 8ar as the 9ost ,owerful nation on earth has not affected the ,ower of the great 9ass of individual '9ericans! t has, however, affected the ,ower of all those individuals who ad9inister the foreign affairs of the :nited States and, 9ore ,articularly, s,ea$ for and re,resent the :nited States on the international scene! &or a nation ,ursues foreign ,olicies as a legal organiHation called a state, whose agents act as the re,resentatives of the nation in international affairs! They s,ea$ for it, negotiate treaties in its na9e, define its obGectives, choose the 9eans for achieving the9, and try to 9aintain, increase, and de9onstrate its ,ower! They are the individuals who, when they a,,ear as re,resentatives of their nation on the international scene, wield the ,ower and ,ursue the ,olicies of their nation! t is to the9 that we refer when we s,ea$ in e9,irical ter9s of the ,ower and of the foreign ,olicy of a nation! How, then, does it co9e about that the great 9ass of the individual 9e9bers of a nation, whose individual ,ower is not affected by the vicissitudes of national ,ower, identify the9selves with the ,ower and the foreign ,olicies of their nation, e),erience this ,ower and these ,olicies as their own, and do so with an e9otional intensity often sur,assing the e9otional attach9ent to their individual as,irations for ,owerF By as$ing this Luestion, we are ,osing the ,roble9 of 9odern nationalis9! n ,receding ,eriods of history, the collectivity with whose ,ower and as,irations for ,ower the individual identified hi9self was deter9ined by ties of blood, of religion, or of co99on loyalty to a feudal lord or ,rince! n our ti9e the identification with the ,ower and ,olicies of the nation has largely su,erseded or, in any case, overshadows those older identifications! How is this ,heno9enon of 9odern nationalis9 to be e),lainedF 8e have learned fro9 our discussion of the ideologies of foreign ,olicies that in the 9ind of the individual the ,ower as,irations of others bear the stig9a of i99orality! 8hile this attitude has one of its roots in the desire of the ,ros,ective victi9 of the ,ower of others to defend his freedo9 against this threat, the other root grows fro9 the atte9,t of society as a whole to su,,ress and $ee, in bounds individual as,irations for ,ower! Society has established a networ$ of rules of conduct and institutional devices for controlling individual ,ower drives! These rules and devices either divert individual ,ower drives into channels where they cannot endanger society, or else they wea$en the9 or su,,ress the9 altogether! %aw, ethics, and 9ores, innu9erable social institutions and arrange9ents, such as co9,etitive e)a9inations, election contests, s,orts, social clubs, and fraternal organiHations C all serve that ,ur,ose! n conseLuence, 9ost ,eo,le are unable to satisfy their desire for ,ower within the national co99unity! 8ithin that co99unity, only a relatively s9all grou, ,er9anently wields ,ower over great nu9bers of ,eo,le without being subGect to e)tensive li9itations by others! The great 9ass of the ,o,ulation is to a 9uch greater e)tent the obGect of ,ower than it is its wielder! "ot being able to find full satisfaction of their desire for ,ower within the national boundaries, the ,eo,le ,roGect those unsatisfied as,irations onto the international scene! There they find vicarious satisfaction in identification with the ,ower drives of the nation! 8hen the citiHen of the :nited States thin$s of the ,ower of his country, he e),eriences the sa9e $ind of e)altation the citiHen of Ro9e 9ust have felt when, identifying hi9self with Ro9e and its ,ower and by the sa9e to$en contrasting hi9self with the stranger, he would sayB J(ivis Ro9anus su9!J 8hen we are conscious of being 9e9bers of a very ,owerful nation, the nation whose industrial ca,acity and 9aterial wealth are unsur,assed, we flatter ourselves and feel a great ,ride! t is as though we all, not as individuals but collectively, as 9e9bers of the sa9e nation, owned and controlled so 9agnificent a ,ower! The ,ower our re,resentatives wield on the international scene beco9es our own and the frustrations we e),erience within the national co99unity are co9,ensated for by the vicarious enGoy9ent of the ,ower of the nation! These ,sychological trends, o,erating within the individual 9e9bers of a nation, find su,,ort in the rules of

conduct and in the institutions of society itself! Society restrains as,irations for individual ,ower within the national co99unity and ,uts the 9ar$ of o,,robriu9 u,on certain ,ower drives ,ointing toward individual aggrandiHe9ent! But it encourages and glorifies the tendencies of the great 9ass of the ,o,ulation, frustrated in its individual ,ower drives, to identify itself with the nationIs struggle for ,ower on the international scene! Power ,ursued by the individual for his own sa$e is considered an evil to be tolerated only within certain bounds and in certain 9anifestations! Power disguised by ideologies and ,ursued in the na9e and for the sa$e of the nation beco9es a good for which all citiHens 9ust strive! The national sy9bols, es,ecially in so far as they have reference to the ar9ed forces and the relations with other nations, are instru9ents of that identification of the individual with the ,ower of the nation! The ethics and 9ores of society tend to 9a$e that identification attractive by holding out rewards and threatening ,unish9ents! Thus it is not by accident that certain grou,s of the ,o,ulation are either the 9ost 9ilitant su,,orters of the national as,irations for ,ower in the international field, or else refuse to have anything to do with the9 at all! These are the grou,s which are ,ri9arily the obGect of the ,ower of others and are 9ost thoroughly de,rived of outlets for their own ,ower drives or are 9ost insecure in the ,ossession of whatever ,ower they 9ay have within the national co99unity! The lower 9iddle classes es,ecially, such as the white-collar wor$ers, but also the 9ain bul$ of the laboring 9asses, . identify the9selves co9,letely with the national as,irations for ,ower! ;r else C and here the 9ain e)a9,le is the revolutionary ,roletariat in the heyday of Mar)is9, ,articularly in Euro,e C they do not identify the9selves with national as,irations at all! 8hile the latter grou, has thus far been of s9all concern for the foreign ,olicies of the :nited States, the for9er has ta$en on ever greater i9,ortance! t is here, then, that one 9ust see$ the roots of 9odern nationalis9 and the e),lanation for the increasing ferocity with which foreign ,olicies are ,ursued in 9odern ti9es! The growing insecurity of the individual in 8estern societies, es,ecially in the lower strata, and the ato9iHation of 8estern society in general have 9agnified enor9ously the frustration of individual ,ower drives! This, in turn, has given rise to an increased desire for co9,ensatory identification with the collective national as,irations for ,ower! These increases have been Luantitative as well as Lualitative! ROOT' OF $O.ERN NATIONALI'$ :ntil the ti9e of the "a,oleonic 8ars, only very s9all grou,s of the ,o,ulation identified the9selves with the foreign ,olicies of their nation! &oreign ,olicies were truly not national but dynastic ,olicies, and the identification was with the ,ower and the ,olicies of the individual 9onarch rather than with the ,ower and the ,olicies of a collectivity, such as the nation! 's Goethe ,ut it in a significant ,assage of his autobiogra,hyB J8e all felt for &redric$ Qthe GreatR, but what did we care for PrussiaFJ JThese QscientificR societies,J wrote Tho9as +efferson to +ohn Hollins on &ebruary ./, .24/, Jare always at ,eace, however their nations 9ay be at war! %i$e the re,ublic of letters, they for9 a great fraternity s,reading over the whole earth, and their corres,ondence is never interru,ted by any civiliHed nation!J 8ith the "a,oleonic 8ars began the ,eriod of national foreign ,olicies and wars> that is, the identification of the great 9asses of the citiHens of a nation with national ,ower and national ,olicies, re,lacing identification with dynastic interests! Talleyrand ,ointed to that change when he said to (Har 'le)ander in .242B JThe Rhine, the 'l,s, and the Pyrenees are the conLuests of &rance> the rest, of the E9,eror> they 9ean nothing to &rance!J :, to the &irst 8orld 8ar it was doubtful to what degree the 9e9bers of the Euro,ean socialist ,arties identified the9selves with the ,ower and ,olicies of their res,ective nations! #et the full ,artici,ation in that war of the 9ain bul$ of the wor$ers in all belligerent countries de9onstrated the identification of ,ractically the whole ,o,ulation with the ,ower and ,olicies of their res,ective nations! +etreat !rom Nationa"ism0 Apparent an( +ea" The Second 8orld 8ar has, however, brought about a certain retrogression fro9 that 9a)i9u9 of identification which the &irst 8orld 8ar witnessed! That retrogression too$ ,lace on the to, and at the base of the social ,yra9id! ;n the one hand, s9all yet ,owerful ,rofascist grou,s of intellectual, ,olitical, and 9ilitary leaders in Great Britain and &rance either refused to identify the9selves with their countries or even ,referred to identify the9selves with the national ene9y! The leaders who felt this way were insecure in their ,ower ,ositions, es,ecially in view of the initial ,olitical and 9ilitary wea$ness of their countries, and the ene9y alone see9ed to be able to assure the9 their ,ositions on to, of the social ,yra9id! ;n the other hand, the &rench (o99unists, owing allegiance to both &rance and the Soviet :nion, were able to identify the9selves fully with their nation only after the Ger9an attac$ on the Soviet :nion in ./6. had brought both allegiances into ,lay! The Ger9an attac$ on &rance alone was unable to rouse the9 to active o,,osition to the invader! But the Ger9an attac$ on the Soviet :nion 9ade &rance and the Soviet :nion allies in a co99on cause and allowed the &rench (o99unists to o,,ose in the Ger9an invaders of &rance the co99on ene9y of &rance and the Soviet :nion ali$e! The identification of the &rench (o99unists with &rench national ,olicies was ,redicated u,on the identity of those ,olicies with Russian interests and ,olicies! This (o99unist allegiance to foreign interests and
.

They have, in ter9s of ,ower, less to lose and 9ore to gain fro9 nationalistic foreign ,olicies than any other grou, of the ,o,ulation, with the e)ce,tion of the 9ilitary!

,olicies, to ta$e ,recedence over the national ones, was a universal ,heno9enon that, as such, was a challenge to the cohesion of the nation state and to its very e)istence!= This disintegration of national solidarity can hardly be called a retreat fro9 nationalis9, for it e)changes loyalty to a foreign nation for loyalty to oneIs own! The (o99unist &rench9an, as it were, transfor9ed hi9self into a Russian nationalist who su,,orts the ,olicies of the Soviet :nion! 8hat is new in this nationalis9 is its inconsistency in de9anding identification with one C foreign C nation while denying the clai9s of other nations to the loyalty of their citiHens! t testifies to the strength of national solidarity that even this transfer of loyalty fro9 oneIs own nation to another one! which is the fountainhead of a worldwide ,olitical 9ove9ent, has ,roven to be an e,he9eral interlude! &or we are witnessing the revival of national solidarity in (o99unist govern9ents and 9ove9ents, which have begun in differing degrees to ,ut their res,ective national interests ahead of the interests of the Soviet :nion! The 9onolithic world(o99unist 9ove9ent, directed by, and at the service of, the Soviet :nion, has been re,laced by J,olycentris9,J in which national loyalties and interests ta$e ,recedence over the affinities of ,olitical ,hiloso,hy! 8ith the revolutions of ./2/, this trend reached fulfill9ent! However, the after9ath of the Second 8orld 8ar has brought into being a genuine retrogression fro9 nationalis9 in the for9 of a 9ove9ent toward the unification of 8estern Euro,e! This 9ove9ent has thus far to its credit several concrete achieve9ents in ter9s of wor$ing su,ranational organiHations, including the Euro,ean (oal and Steel (o99unity, the (o99on Mar$et @Euro,ean Econo9ic (o99unityA, and the develo,9ent of a Euro,ean (o99unity! Two e),eriences have given birth to the 9ove9ent toward Euro,ean unificationB the destructiveness of the Second 8orld 8ar and the ,olitical, 9ilitary, and econo9ic decline of Euro,e in its after9ath! The su,,orters of this 9ove9ent cannot hel, concluding fro9 these e),eriences that, in 8estern Euro,e at least, the nation state is an obsolescent ,rinci,le of ,olitical organiHation which, far fro9 assuring the security and ,ower of its 9e9bers, conde9ns the9 to i9,otence and ulti9ate e)tinction either by each other or by their 9ore ,owerful neighbors! ;nly the future will show whether this acute sense of insecurity, not only of the individuals but also of the national societies to which they belong, will lead to ,olitical creativity in the for9 of the ,olitical, 9ilitary, and econo9ic unification of Euro,e, or to ,olitical i9,otence in the for9 of a retreat into Jneutralis9J C that is, the renunciation of an active foreign ,olicy altogether C or to ,olitical des,eration in the for9 of a 9ore intense identification with the individual nations! ' force that runs counter to the revival of nationalis9 is the growing recognition by states9en, intellectuals, and technical e),erts that certain funda9ental ,roble9s ,osed by the 9odern technologies of trans,ortation, co99unications, and warfare transcend the interests and the ability to solve of any single nation, however ,owerful! The control of nuclear energy, the ,rotection and restoration of the natural environ9ent, the su,,ly of food and raw 9aterials are ,roble9s of this $ind! They cannot be solved by an individual nation co9,eting with other nations for national advantage! 'll nations, or a considerable nu9ber of the9, have a co99on interest in the solution of these ,roble9s, which interest ought to be reflected in co99on ,olicies transcending ,articular national interests! 8hile so9e s9all elites have beco9e aware of this novel ele9ent in world ,olitics and are trying to co9e intellectually to ter9s with it! the actual conduct of national foreign ,olicies has hardly been affected by it! To the contrary, it testifies to the undi9inished strength of nationalis9 that organiHations, such as the :nited "ations and its s,ecialiHed agencies, created for the ,ur,ose of realiHing the co99on interests of the nations of the world, have been seiHed by co9,eting nationalis9s for the ,ur,ose of serving co9,eting national interests! Persona" Inse$urit an( So$ia" %isintegration Kualitatively, the e9otional intensity of the identification of the individual with his nation stands in inverse ,ro,ortion to the stability of the ,articular society as reflected in the sense of security of its 9e9bers! The greater the stability of society and the sense of security of its 9e9bers, the s9aller are the chances for collective e9otions to see$ an outlet in aggressive nationalis9, and vice versa!0 The revolutionary wars of &rance in the last decade of the eighteenth century and the wars of liberation against "a,oleon fro9 .2.= -.5 are the first e)a9,les in 9odern ti9es of 9ass insecurity, induced by the instability of do9estic societies and leading to e9otional outbursts in the for9 of fervent 9ass identifications with aggressive foreign ,olicies and wars! Social instability beca9e acute in 8estern civiliHation during the nineteenth century! t beca9e ,er9anent in the twentieth century as a result of the e9anci,ation of the individual fro9 the ties of tradition, es,ecially in the for9 of religion, of the increased rationaliHation of life and wor$, and of cyclical econo9ic crises! The insecurity of the grou,s affected by these factors found an e9otional outlet in fi)ed and e9otionally accentuated nationalistic identifications! 's 8estern society beca9e ever 9ore unstable, the sense of insecurity dee,ened and the e9otional attach9ent to the nation as the sy9bolic substitute for the individual beca9e ever stronger! :nder the i9,act of the world wars, revolutions, concentration of econo9ic, ,olitical, and 9ilitary ,ower, and the econo9ic crises of the twentieth century it reached the fervor of a secular religion! (ontests for ,ower now too$ on the ideological as,ects of struggles between good and evil! &oreign ,olicies transfor9ed the9selves into sacred 9issions! 8ars were fought as crusades, for the ,ur,ose of bringing the true ,olitical religion to the rest of the
= 0

See also (ha,ter =0! These collective e9otions 9ay, of course, see$ an outlet in aggressiveness within the nation as well> that is, in the for9 of class struggle, revolution, urban violence, and civil war!

world! This relation between social disintegration, ,ersonal insecurity, and the ferocity of 9odern nationalistic ,ower drives can be studied to ,articular advantage in Ger9an fascis9, where these three ele9ents were 9ore highly develo,ed than anywhere else! The general tendencies of the 9odern age toward social disintegration were driven to e)tre9es in Ger9any by a conGunction of certain ele9ents in the national character favoring the e)tre9es rather than 9ediating and co9,ro9ising ,ositions, and by three events that wea$ened the social fabric of Ger9any to such an e)tent as to 9a$e it an easy ,rey for the consu9ing fire of "ational Socialis9! The first of these events was the defeat in the &irst 8orld 8ar, coinciding with a revolution that was held res,onsible not only for the destruction of traditional ,olitical values and institutions, but for the loss of the war itself! The revolution naturally brought loss of ,ower and insecurity in social status to those who had been at or near the to, of the social hierarchy under the 9onarchy! #et the social situation of large 9asses of the ,o,ulation was si9ilarly affected by the i9,act of the idea that defeat and revolution were both the result of treacherous 9achinations of do9estic and foreign ene9ies wor$ing for the destruction of Ger9any! Thus it was widely held that Ger9any was not only JencircledJ by foreign ene9ies, but that its own body ,olitic was shot through with invisible hostile organis9s, sa,,ing its strength and bent u,on destroying it! The second event was the inflation of the early twenties which ,roletariHed econo9ically large sectors of the 9iddle classes and wea$ened, if not destroyed, in the ,eo,le at large the traditional 9oral ,rinci,les of honesty and fair dealing! The 9iddle classes, in ,rotest against their econo9ic ,roletariHation, e9braced the 9ost anti,roletarian and nationalistic ideologies available! The lower strata of the 9iddle classes es,ecially had always derived at least a li9ited satisfaction fro9 their su,eriority to the ,roletariat! 8hen they viewed the social ,yra9id as a whole, they had always to loo$ u, 9uch farther than they were able to loo$ down! #et, while they were not actually at the botto9 of the social ,yra9id, they were unco9fortably close to it! Hence their frustrations and insecurity and their ,redis,osition for the nationalistic identification! "ow inflation ,ushed the9 down to the botto9, and in the des,erate struggle to esca,e social and ,olitical identification with the a9or,hous 9ass of the ,roletariat they found succor in the theory and ,ractice of "ational Socialis9! &or "ational Socialis9 offered the9 lower races to loo$ down u,on and foreign ene9ies to feel su,erior to and conLuer! &inally, the econo9ic crisis of ./=/ brought all the different grou,s of the Ger9an ,eo,le in different ways face to face with the actual or threatened loss of social status and intellectual, 9oral, and econo9ic insecurity! The wor$ers were faced with actual or threatened ,er9anent une9,loy9ent! Those grou,s of the 9iddle classes who had recovered fro9 the econo9ic devastation of inflation were losing what they had regained! The industrialists had to co,e with increased social obligations and were haunted by the fear of revolution! "ational Socialis9 focused all those fears, insecurities, and frustrations u,on two foreign ene9iesB The Treaty of Eersailles and bolshevis9, and their alleged do9estic su,,orters! t channeled all those thwarted e9otions into one 9ighty strea9 of nationalistic fanaticis9! Thus "ational Socialis9 was able to identify in a truly totalitarian fashion the as,irations of the individual Ger9an with the ,ower obGectives of the Ger9an nation! "owhere in 9odern history has that identification been 9ore co9,lete! "owhere has that s,here in which the individual ,ursues his as,irations for ,ower for their own sa$e been s9aller! "or has the face of the e9otional i9,etus with which that identification transfor9ed itself into aggressiveness on the international scene been eLualed in 9odern civiliHation! 8hile the transfor9ation of individual frustrations into collective identification with the nation has never in 9odern history been 9ore co9,rehensive and intensive than it was in "ational Socialist Ger9any, nevertheless the Ger9an variety of 9odern nationalis9 differs in degree rather than in $ind fro9 the nationalis9 a other great ,owers, such as that of the Soviet :nion or of the :nited States! n the Soviet :nion the great 9ass of the ,o,ulation has no o,,ortunity to satisfy its ,ower drives within the do9estic society! The average Russian wor$er and ,easant has nobody to loo$ down u,on, and his insecurity is intensified by the ,ractices of the ,olice state as well as by a low standard of living, Here, too, a totalitarian regi9e ,roGects these frustrations, insecurities, and fears onto the international scene where the individual Russian finds in the identification with Jthe 9ost ,rogressive country in the world,J Jthe fatherland of socialis9!J vicarious satisfaction for his as,irations for ,ower! The conviction see9ingly su,,orted by historic e),erience, that the nation with which he identifies hi9self is constantly 9enaced by ca,italist ene9ies serves to elevate his ,ersonal fears and insecurities onto the collective ,lane! His ,ersonal fears are thus transfor9ed into an)iety for the nation! dentification with the nation thus serves the dual function of satisfying individual ,ower drives and alleviating individual fears by ,roGecting both onto the international scene! n the :nited States, the ,rocess by which national ,ower is a,,ro,riated by the individual and e),erienced as his own rese9bles by and large the ty,ical ,attern as it develo,ed in 8estern civiliHation during the nineteenth century! This is to say! the identification of the individual with the ,ower and the foreign ,olicies of the nation ,roceeds largely in ter9s of the ty,ical frustrations and insecurities of the 9iddle class! #et '9erican society is to a 9uch greater e)tent a 9iddle-class society than any other society in 8estern civiliHation! More i9,ortantly, whatever class distinctions there 9ay be tend to be 9itigated, if not resolved, in '9erican society by the co99on deno9inator of 9iddle-class values and as,irations! The identification of the individual with the nation in ter9s of 9iddle - class frustrations and as,irations is therefore, al9ost as ,redo9inant and ty,ical in '9erican society as the ,roletarian identification is in the Soviet :nion! ;n the other hand, the relatively great 9obility of '9erican society o,ens to the great 9asses of the ,o,ulation avenues for social and econo9ic i9,rove9ent! These o,,ortunities have in the ,ast, at least in nor9al ti9es, tended to $ee, rather low the e9otional intensity of that identification as co9,ared with the corres,onding situations in

the Soviet :nion and in "ational Socialist Ger9any! 6 "ew factors have, however, arisen in recent ti9es with the increasing ato9iHation of society, the threat of world revolution as sy9boliHed by international (o99unis9, the relative disa,,earance of geogra,hical isolation, and the danger of nuclear war! Thus, in the last Luarter of the twentieth century, intensified individual frustrations and an)ieties have called forth a 9ore intensive identification, on the ,art of the individual, with the ,ower and the foreign ,olicies of the nation! f therefore, the ,resent trend toward ever-increasing do9estic frustration and international instability is not reversed, the :nited States is li$ely to ,arta$e to a growing e)tent in those tendencies in 9odern culture which have found their 9ost e)tre9e 9anifestations in Soviet Russia and "ational Socialist Ger9any, tendencies that 9a$e for an ever 9ore co9,lete and intensive identification of the individual with the nation! n this co9,leteness and intensity of identification we have one of the roots of the ferocity and ruthlessness of 9odern foreign ,olicies where national as,irations for ,ower clash with each other, su,,orted by virtually total ,o,ulations with an unLualified dedication and intensity of feeling which in for9er ,eriods of history only the issues of religion could co99and! 6 Ele ents 5f Power

8hat are the factors that 9a$e for the ,ower of a nation vis-a-vis other nationsF 8hat are the co9,onents of what we call national ,owerF f we want to deter9ine the ,ower of a nation, what factors are we to ta$e into considerationF Two grou,s of ele9ents have to be distinguishedB those which are relatively stable, and those which are subGect to constant change!

)EO)RAPH3 The 9ost stable factor u,on which the ,ower of a nation de,ends is obviously geogra,hy! &or instance, the fact that the continental territory of the :nited States is se,arated fro9 other continents by bodies of water three thousand 9iles wide to the east and 9ore than si) thousand 9iles wide to the west is a ,er9anent factor that deter9ines the ,osition of the :nited States in the world! t is a truis9 to say that the i9,ortance of this factor today is not what it was in the ti9es of George 8ashington or President Mc7inley! But it is fallacious to assu9e, as is freLuently done, that the technical develo,9ent of trans,ortation, co99unications, and warfare has eli9inated altogether the isolating factor of the oceans! This factor is certainly 9uch less i9,ortant today than it was fifty or a hundred years ago, but fro9 the ,oint of view of the ,ower ,osition of the :nited States it still 9a$es a great deal of difference that the :nited States is se,arated fro9 the continents of Euro,e and 'sia by wide e),anses of water instead of bordering directly on, let us say, &rance, (hina, or Russia! n other words, the geogra,hical location of the :nited States re9ains a funda9ental factor of ,er9anent i9,ortance which the foreign ,olicies of all nations 9ust ta$e into account, however different its bearing u,on ,olitical decisions 9ight be today fro9 what it was in other ,eriods of history! Si9ilarly, the se,aration of Great Britain fro9 the Euro,ean continent by a s9all body of water, the English (hannel, is a factor that +ulius (aesar could no 9ore afford to overloo$ than could 8illia9 the (onLueror, Phili, , "a,oleon, or Hitler! However 9uch other factors 9ay have altered its i9,ortance throughout the course of history, what was i9,ortant two thousand years ago is still i9,ortant today, and all those concerned with the conduct of foreign affairs 9ust ta$e it into account! 8hat is true of the insular location of Great Britain is true of the geogra,hic ,osition of taly! The talian ,eninsula is se,arated fro9 the rest of Euro,e by the high 9ountain 9assif of the 'l,s, and while the valleys of the 'l,s descend gradually southward toward the north talian ,lain, they ,reci,itate abru,tly toward the north! This geogra,hical situation has been an i9,ortant ele9ent in the ,olitical and 9ilitary considerations of taly and of other nations with regard to taly! &or, under all conditions of warfare of which we $now, this geogra,hical situation has 9ade it e)tre9ely difficult to invade (entral Euro,e fro9 taly, while it has 9ade it 9uch less difficult to invade taly fro9 the north! n conseLuence, invasions of taly have been 9uch 9ore freLuent than invasions by taly! &ro9 Hannibal in the Punic 8ars to General (lar$ in the Second 8orld 8ar! this ,er9anent geogra,hical factor has deter9ined ,olitical and 9ilitary strategy! The Pyrenees have fulfilled for the international ,osition of S,ain a so9ewhat different, but no less ,er9anent, function! t has been said that Euro,e ends at the Pyrenees! The Pyrenees, by 9a$ing S,ain difficult of access to the outside world, have indeed functioned as a barrier shutting S,ain off fro9 the 9ain strea9 of the intellectual, social, econo9ic, and ,olitical develo,9ents that transfor9ed the rest of Euro,e! S,ain has also been by-,assed by 9ost of the great ,olitical and 9ilitary conflagrations of continental Euro,e! This ,osition on the sidelines of continental ,olitics is at least ,artially the result of that geogra,hical seclusion ,rovided by the 9ountain barrier of the Pyrenees! &inally, let us consider the geogra,hical situation of the Soviet :nion! The Soviet :nion constitutes an enor9ous land 9ass that e)tends over one seventh of the land area of the earth and is two and one-half ti9es as large as the
6

ntense nationalistic identification in the :nited States has been associated in the ,ast 9ainly with antagonis9, on the ,art of the 9ost insecure sector of the 9iddle class, against certain ethnic grou,s, such as the "egro or the latest wave of ,roletarian i99igrants!

territory of the :nited States! 8hile it is about five thousand 9iles by air fro9 the Bering Straits to 7oenigsberg, the ca,ital of what was for9erly East Prussia, now called 7aliningrad, it is half that distance fro9 Mur9ans$ at the Barents Sea to 'sh$habad at the northern frontier of ran! This territorial e)tension is a ,er9anent source of great strength which has thus far frustrated all atte9,ts at 9ilitary conLuest fro9 the outside! This enor9ous land 9ass dwarfed the territory conLuered by foreign invaders in co9,arison with what still re9ained to be conLuered! (onLuest of a considerable ,ortion of a country without ,ros,ects for s,eedy recovery usually brea$s the will to resist of the conLuered ,eo,le! This is as we have seen, the ,olitical ,ur,ose of 9ilitary conLuests! Si9ilar conLuests C es,ecially if, as under "a,oleon and Hitler, they did not have a li9ited obGective, but ai9ed at the very e)istence of Russia as a nation C had a rather sti9ulating effect u,on Russian resistance! &or not only were the conLuered ,arts of Russia s9all in co9,arison with those which were left in Russian hands, but the tas$ of the invader beca9e 9ore difficult with every ste, he advanced! He had to $ee, an ever greater nu9ber of troo,s su,,lied over ever lengthening lines of co99unication dee, in a hostile country! Thus geogra,hy has 9ade the conLuest of Russian territory, as soon as the obGectives of such conLuest beca9e ill defined and tended to beco9e unli9ited, a liability for the conLueror rather than an asset! nstead of the conLuerorIs swallowing the territory and gaining strength fro9 it, it is rather the territory that swallows the conLueror, sa,,ing his strength! The ,ossibility of nuclear war has enhanced the i9,ortance of the siHe of territory as a source of national ,ower! n order to 9a$e a nuclear threat credible, a nation reLuires a territory large enough to dis,erse its industrial and ,o,ulation centers as well as its nuclear installations! The conGunction between the large radius of nuclear destruction and the relatively s9all siHe of their territories i9,oses a severe handica, u,on the ability of the traditional nation states, such as Great Britain and &rance, to 9a$e a nuclear threat credible! Thus it is the Luasi-continental siHe of their territory which allows nations, such as the :nited States, the Soviet :nion, and (hina, to ,lay the role of 9aGor nuclear ,owers! 'nother geogra,hical factor, however, constitutes at the sa9e ti9e a wea$ness and an asset for the international ,osition of the Soviet :nion! 8e are referring to the fact that neither high 9ountains nor broad strea9s se,arate the Soviet :nion fro9 its western neighbors and that the ,lains of Poland and Eastern Ger9any for9 a natural continuation of the Russian ,lain! There e)ists, then, no natural obstacle to invasion on the western frontier of Russia, either on the ,art of the Soviet :nion or on the ,art of the Soviet :nionIs western neighbors! Thus, fro9 the fourteenth century to the ,resent! 8hite Russia and the western9ost ,art of Russia ,ro,er have been the scene of continuous thrusts and counterthrusts and a field of battle where Russia and its western neighbors 9et! The lac$ of a natural frontier C that is of a frontier ,redeter9ined, li$e the talian or the S,anish, by geogra,hical factors C has been a ,er9anent source of conflict between Russia and the 8est! Si9ilarly, yet for the o,,osite reason, the ,ossibility of such a frontier between &rance and Ger9any in the for9 of the Rhine, to which &rance always as,ired and which it had rarely the strength to attain, has been a ,er9anent source of conflict between those two countries since the ti9es of the Ro9ans! 's concerns Russia, the bolshevist foreign 9inister Eishins$y su99ed u, the transcendent i9,ortance of geogra,hy when he said, u,on being re,roached for following a (Harist ,olicy on the *ardanellesB J f a warshi, has to sail fro9 the Mediterranean to the Blac$ Sea, it 9ust ,ass through the *ardanelles whether the govern9ent in Moscow is (Harist or (o99unist!J. NATURAL RE'OURCE' 'nother relatively stable factor that e)erts an i9,ortant influence u,on the ,ower of a nation with res,ect to other nations is natural resources! :oo( To start with the 9ost ele9ental of these resources, foodB a country that is self-sufficient, or nearly self- sufficient, has a great advantage over a nation that is not and 9ust be able to i9,ort the foodstuffs it does not grow, or else starve! t is for this reason that the ,ower and! in ti9es of war! the very e)istence of Great Britain, which before the Second 8orld 8ar grew only 04 ,ercent of the food consu9ed in the British sles, has always been de,endent u,on its ability to $ee, the sea lanes o,en over which the vital food su,,lies had to be shi,,ed in! 8henever its ability to i9,ort food was challenged, as in the two world wars through sub9arine warfare and air attac$s, the very ,ower of Great Britain was challenged, and its survival as a nation ,ut in Geo,ardy! &or the sa9e reason, Ger9any, though to a 9uch s9aller e)tent deficient in foodstuffs than Great Britain, in order to survive a war was bound to ,ursue three ,rinci,al goals, either severally or in co9binationB first, the avoidance of a long war through a s,eedy victory before its food reserves were e)haustedB second, the conLuest of the great food,roducing areas of eastern Euro,e> and third, the destruction of British sea,ower, which cut Ger9any off fro9 access to overseas sources of food! n both world wars, Ger9any was unable to attain the first and third obGectives! t reached the second goal in the &irst 8orld 8ar too late to be of decisive effect! Thus the 'llied bloc$ade, by i9,osing u,on the Ger9an ,eo,le ,rivations that sa,,ed their will to resist, was one of the essential factors in the victory of the 'llies! n the Second 8orld 8ar! Ger9any beca9e virtually self-sufficient with regard to food, not ,ri9arily through conLuest, but through the deliberate starvation and the outright $illing of 9illions of ,eo,le in conLuered territories!
.

Kuoted after *enis Healey, "eutrality @%ondonB '9,ersand %td!, ./55A, ,! 03!

' deficiency in ho9e-grown food has thus been a ,er9anent source of wea$ness for Great Britain and Ger9any which they 9ust so9ehow overco9e, or face the loss of their status as great ,owers! ' country enGoying selfsufficiency, such as the :nited States, need not divert its national energies and foreign ,olicies fro9 its ,ri9ary obGectives in order to 9a$e sure that its ,o,ulations will not starve in war! Since such countries are reasonably free fro9 worry on that count, they have been able to ,ursue 9uch 9ore forceful and single-9inded ,olicies than otherwise would have been ,ossible! Self-sufficiency in food has thus always been a source of great strength! (onversely, ,er9anent scarcity of food is a source of ,er9anent wea$ness in international ,olitics! ;f the truth of this observation, ndia was the ,ri9e e)a9,le before the so-called green revolution drastically increased its food su,,ly! The scarcity of food fro9 which ndia suffered was the result of two factorsB the increase in ,o,ulation, outstri,,ing the su,,ly of food, and the insufficiency of e),orts to ,ay for the i9,ort of the food necessary to 9a$e u, the deficit! This dual i9balance, which 9ade the ever-,resent threat of 9ass starvation one of the 9ain concerns of govern9ent, ,ut an insu,erable handica, u,on any active foreign ,olicy ndia 9ight have wanted to ,ursue! Regardless of the other assets of national ,ower which were at its dis,osal, the deficiencies in food co9,elled it to act in its foreign ,olicy fro9 wea$ness rather than fro9 strength! The sa9e observation a,,lies with ,articular force to the nations of the Third 8orld that continuously live under the threat of fa9ine and the actuality of undernourish9ent without 9ost of any of the other assets which g[ into the 9a$ing of national ,ower! These are the so-called Jbas$et casesJ that are li9ited to ho,ing that international generosity will hel, the9 to survive the ne)t fa9ine! Self-sufficiency in food, or lac$ of it is a relatively stable factor in national ,ower, but it is so9eti9es, as the e)a9,le of conte9,orary ndia shows, subGect to decisive changes! There 9ay be changes in the consu9,tion of food brought about by changing conce,tions of nutrition! There 9ay be changes in the techniLue of agriculture which 9ay increase or decrease the out,ut of agricultural ,roducts! The outstanding e)a9,les of the influence of changes in the agricultural out,ut u,on national ,ower are, however, to be found in the disa,,earance of the "ear East and of "orth 'frica as ,ower centers and in the descent of S,ain fro9 a world ,ower to a third-rate ,ower! The agricultural syste9s of the "ear East and "orth 'frica were all founded u,on irrigation! Even though it can hardly be ,roved that the decline in the national ,ower of Babylon, of Egy,t, and of the 'rabs was conco9itant with the disorganiHation of their irrigation syste9s, this 9uch is certain C the decay of their syste9s of agriculture 9ade irre,arable the decline of their national ,ower! &or the disa,,earance of regulated irrigation transfor9ed the better ,art of the arable land of these regions into deserts! t was only in Egy,t that the natural irrigation of the "ile ,reserved a certain 9easure of fertility even after artificial irrigation had bro$en down! 's for S,ain, while one dates the decline of its ,ower fro9 the destruction of the 'r9ada by Great Britain in .522, its ,olitical downfall beca9e definite only after 9isrule in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had destroyed considerable sections of its arable land through large-scale deforestation! n conseLuence, wide regions of northern and central S,ain were transfor9ed into virtual deserts! +a- Materia"s 8hat holds true of food is of course also true of those natural resources which are i9,ortant for industrial ,roduction and, 9ore ,articularly, for the waging of war! The absolute and relative i9,ortance natural resources in the for9 of raw 9aterials have for the ,ower of a nation de,ends necessarily u,on the technology of the warfare ,racticed in a ,articular ,eriod of history! Before the large-scale 9echaniHation of warfare, when hand-to-hand fighting was the ,revalent 9ilitary techniLue, other factors, such as the ,ersonal Lualities of the individual soldier, were 9ore i9,ortant than the availability of the raw 9aterials with which his wea,ons were 9ade! n that ,eriod of history which e)tends fro9 the beginning of historic ti9e well into the nineteenth century, natural resources ,layed a subordinate role in deter9ining the ,ower of a nation! 8ith the increasing 9echaniHation of warfare, which since the industrial revolution has ,roceeded at a faster ,ace than in all ,receding history, national ,ower has beco9e 9ore and 9ore de,endent u,on the control of raw 9aterials in ,eace and war! t is not by accident that the two 9ost ,owerful nations today, the :nited States and the Soviet :nion, co9e closest to being self- sufficient in the raw 9aterials necessary for 9odern industrial ,roduction, and control at least the access to the sources of those raw 9aterials which they do not the9selves ,roduce! 's the absolute i9,ortance of the control of raw 9aterials for national ,ower has increased in ,ro,ortion to the 9echaniHation of warfare, so certain raw 9aterials have ga9ed in i9,ortance over others! This has ha,,ened whenever funda9ental changes in technology have called for the use of new 9aterials or the increased use of old ones! n ./03 a statistician rated the share of a nu9ber of basic 9inerals in industrial ,roduction for 9ilitary ,ur,oses and assigned the9 the following valuesB coal! 64B oil, =4B iron! .5B co,,er, lead, 9anganese, sul,hur, 6 eachB Hinc, alu9inu9, nic$el, = each! =Half a century before, the share of coal would certainly have been considerably greater, since as a source of energy it had at that ti9e only s9all co9,etition fro9 water and wood and none fro9 oil! The sa9e would have been true of iron which then had no co9,etition fro9 light 9etals and such substitutes as ,lastics! Great Britain, which was self-sufficient in coal and iron, was the one great world ,ower of the nineteenth century! The influence the control of raw 9aterials can e)ert u,on national ,ower and the shifts in the distribution of ,ower which it can bring about are de9onstrated in our own day 9ost stri$ingly by the case of uraniu9! ;nly a few years ago the control or lac$ of control of uraniu9 de,osits was entirely irrelevant for the ,ower of a nation! The author we have
=

&erdinand &riedensburg, *ie 9ineralischen BodenschatHe als welt,olitische and 9ilitarische Machtfa$toren @StuttgartB &! En$e, ./03A! ,! .15!

Luoted above,0 writing in ./03, did not even 9ention this 9ineral in his evaluation of the relative 9ilitary i9,ortance of 9inerals! The release of ato9ic energy fro9 the uraniu9 ato9 and the use of that energy for warfare have at once 9odified the actual and ,otential hierarchy of nations in view of their relative ,ower! "ations that control de,osits of uraniu9, such as (anada, (Hechoslova$ia, the Soviet :nion, the :nion of South 'frica, and the :nited States, have risen in the ,ower calculations! ;thers that neither ,ossess nor have access to de,osits of that 9ineral have fallen in ter9s of relative ,ower! 4he Po#er of 8il Since the &irst 8orld 8ar, oil as a source of energy has beco9e 9ore and 9ore i9,ortant for industry and war! Most 9echaniHed wea,ons and vehicles are driven by oilB conseLuently, countries that ,ossess considerable de,osits of oil have acLuired an influence in international affairs which in so9e cases can be attributed ,ri9arily, if not e)clusively, to that ,ossession! J;ne dro, of oil,J said (le9enceau during the &irst 8orld 8arB Jis worth one dro, of blood of our soldiers!J The e9ergence of oil as an indis,ensable raw 9aterial has brought about a shift in the relative ,ower of the ,olitically leading nations! The Soviet :nion has beco9e 9ore ,owerful since it is self-sufficient in this res,ect, while +a,an has grown considerably wea$er, since it is co9,letely lac$ing in oil de,osits! 'side fro9 its location as the land bridge of three continent, the "ear East is strategically i9,ortant because of the oil de,osits of the 'rabian ,eninsula! (ontrol over the9 traditionally has been an i9,ortant factor in the distribution of ,ower, in the sense that whoever is able to add the9 to his other sources of raw 9aterials adds that 9uch strength to his own resources and de,rives his co9,etitors ,ro,ortionately! t is for this reason that Great Britain, the :nited States and, for a ti9e, &rance e9bar$ed in the "ear East u,on what has a,tly been called Joil di,lo9acyJB that is, the establish9ent of s,heres of influence giving the9 e)clusive access to the oil de,osits in certain regions! #et oil is no longer one of 9any raw 9aterials i9,ortant in the 9easure9ent of a nationIs ,ower! t is now a 9aterial factor whose very ,ossession threatens to overturn centuries-old ,atterns of international ,olitics! The e9bargo on oil by the oil-,roducing states in the winter of ./10 - 16, together with the drastic rise in the ,rice of oil, suddenly clarified certain basic as,ects of world ,olitics which we 9ight have understood theoretically, but which were brought ho9e in earnest by the drastic change in ,ower relations brought on by the new ,olitics of oil! Traditionally a functional relationshi, has e)isted between ,olitical, 9ilitary, and econo9ic ,ower! That is to say, ,olitical ,ower has been throughout history a function of 9ilitary and C in recent ti9es 9ore ,articularly C of econo9ic ,ower! Ta$e for instance the e),ansion of Euro,e into what later beca9e the colonial areas of the 8estern He9is,here, 'frica, and 'sia! That e),ansion was ,ri9arily due to a technological ga, between the colonial ,owers and the coloniHed nations! n other words, the conLuest of ndia by Great Britain @9uch inferior in 9an,ower and in 9any other as,ects of national ,owerA was largely 9ade ,ossible by Great BritainIs ,ossession of a higher technology which, when transfor9ed into 9ilitary ,ower, the ndian states could not resist! Those relationshi,s of a functional nature between technology and econo9ic ,ower, on the one hand, and ,olitical and 9ilitary ,ower, on the other, have been disturbed C one 9ight even say destroyed C by the recent use of oil as a ,olitical wea,on! Many of those oil-,roducing states are states only by way of what 9ight be called se9antic courtesy! Measured in ter9s of natural resources, they have nothing but sand and oil! But it is the oil which see9ingly overnight has 9ade those s9all ,lots on the 9a, which we call states i9,ortant and even ,owerful factors in world ,olitics! n other words, a state which has nothing to go on by way of ,ower, which is lac$ing in all the ele9ents which traditionally have gone into the 9a$ing of national ,ower, suddenly beco9es a ,owerful factor in world ,olitics because it has one i9,ortant asset C oil! This is indeed an event which is of revolutionary i9,ortance for world ,olitics! Two basic factors in our ,eriod of history have 9ade ,ossible this divorce of ,olitical ,ower fro9 9ilitary and industrial-technological ,ower! @.A &ree trade between the ,rivate ,roducers and consu9ers of certain raw 9aterials and 9ono,olistically controlled trade through colonial and se9icolonial arrange9ents by the consu9er govern9ents has been re,laced by 9ono,olistic or Luasi-9ono,olistic controls on the ,art of the ,roducer govern9ents acting in concert! &or9erly the consu9ers could $ee, the ,rice low through colonial arrange9ents and the control of consu9,tion> now the ,roducers can $ee, the ,rice high by controlling ,roduction! @=A &or9erly ,roducers and consu9ers of raw 9aterials were tied together by co9,le9entary interests, the balance of which favored the consu9er! The latterIs needs were li9ited as co9,ared with I the nu9ber of ,otential ,roducers and the Luantity of raw 9aterials available! The consu9er had, accordingly, a choice a9ong several ,roducers to buy fro9, and also of the Luantity to buy fro9 the several ,roducers chosen! Today, what was once a buyerIs 9ar$et has beco9e a sellerIs 9ar$et! The consu9,tion of raw 9aterials has enor9ously increased, not only in absolute ter9s C between .134 and ./.0 i9,orts of food and raw 9aterials to Great Britain increased seventy-fold C but also relative to available resources! Thus oil has beco9e the lifeblood of industrially advanced nations, 9any of which are co9,letely @e!g!, +a,anA or in considerable 9easure @e!g! the nations of 8estern Euro,eA de,endent u,on i9,orts fro9 other nations! The ,ower which oil bestows is, first of all, the result of the technological develo,9ent of 9odern industrial nations! Twenty or fifty years ago oil did not bestow such ,ower u,on ,roducing nations because the use of oil as the lifeblood of 9odern industry was li9ited! 8hen nations which have large de,osits of oil are able to co-o,erate and co-ordinate ,olicies, as the oil-e),orting states were during the fall of ./10, they can a,,ly a stranglehold to the consu9ing nations> they can i9,ose ,olitical conditions which the consu9ing nations can refuse to 9eet only at the
0

See ,receding note!

ris$ of enor9ous ,olitical, econo9ic, and social dislocations! ' state which is ,owerless in all other res,ects, which is not a 9aGor force in ter9s of traditional ,ower, can e)ert enor9ous C and under certain conditions even decisive C ,ower over nations which have all the i9,le9ents of ,ower at their dis,osal e)ce,t one C de,osits of oil! Thus a nation li$e +a,an, one of the fore9ost industrial nations of the world and ,otentially a great ,ower, is co9,letely de,endent u,on the su,,ly of oil fro9 abroad! f for so9e reason the oil-,roducing nations were to i9,ose a total e9bargo u,on +a,an, they could destroy her ,olitical, econo9ic, and social fabric, and if they were to connect that threat of a total e9bargo with ,olitical conditions, they could i9,ose their will u,on +a,an! They could reduce +a,an to the status of satellite, a de,endency of the oil,roducing nations! To a certain e)tent those nations have already tasted that ,ower! *uring the Middle Eastern war of ;ctober, ./10, they forced +a,an and the nations of 8estern Euro,e @which are only ,artially de,endent on the i9,ort of oilA to ta$e certain ,olitical ste,s which they would not have ta$en on their own initiative, but which they felt they had to ta$e under the circu9stances because otherwise they would have ris$ed ,olitical, social, and econo9ic ruin! t is not only the Luasi- 9ono,oly which the oil-,roducing nations acting in concert have on the su,,ly of oil which has caused such dislocation! t is ,articularly, and in the long run 9ore i9,ortantly, the control @whether actual or ,otentialA they e)ert over the ,rice of oil that has beco9e one of the 9ain factors of instability in the world econo9y and one of the 9ain sources of inflation! The inflationary tendencies which were already at wor$ in the industrial nations of the world were greatly aggravated by the fourfold increase in the ,rice of oil in ./10 and the further doubling of the wellhead ,rice in ./12! t is i9,ortant to note that this situation is ,otentially of a ,er9anent nature! 's long as the oil-,roducing nations co-o,erate against the consu9ing nations, as long as there is no co9,etition a9ong the9 for 9ar$ets or for econo9ic or ,olitical advantages, they will be able to i9,ose virtually any conditions on the oil-consu9ing nations, Gust as they did in the wa$e of the ./10 war! n the case of a country li$e +a,an it would be suicide to refuse such conditions! n the case of other nations, such as the :nited States, whose 9ain sources of energy are do9estic, it would 9ean severe disco9fort of the $ind already e),erienced in ./10! The nations of 8estern Euro,e, for e)a9,le 8est Ger9any, whose 9ain sources of ,etroleu9 co9e fro9 abroad, would face catastro,he if they atte9,ted to defy those nations u,on who9 they de,end for oil! 8hile there is no way of destroying this stranglehold short of war, there is a way of 9itigating its results! t lies in wea$ening the 9ono,olistic or Luasi-9ono,olistic ,osition of the oil- ,roducing nations by strengthening the ,osition of the oil-consu9ing ones! The latter fall into two categoriesB those li$e +a,an, who are utterly de,endent u,on the i9,ortation of oil, and for who9 therefore the access to foreign oil is a 9atter of life and death> and those li$e the :nited States, who, by virtue of do9estic sources of energy, can be inconvenienced and har9ed, but not 9ortally wounded, by the ,olitical 9ani,ulation of oil! The latter are able to ,rotect the9selves fro9 the 9ore severe conseLuences of such 9ani,ulation by li9iting the i9,ortation of oil, by restricting its do9estic use, by stoc$,iling reserves, and by e9bar$ing u,on a crash ,rogra9, after the 9odel of the Manhattan ProGect for the discovery of nuclear fission, to develo, alternative sources of energy! The very e)istence of such a four-,ronged ,olicy would have a salutary effect u,on all concerned! t would strengthen the 9orale of the oil consu9ers and give ,ause to the ,roduces! Such a ,olicy would also lay the ,sychological and 9aterial groundwor$ for a ,olicy of sharing between those consu9ers who ,ossess considerable do9estic sources of energy and those who lac$ the9! &or the oil ,roducers are able to stri$e at a consu9er, such as the :nited States, not only directly by cutting off its su,,ly, but also indirectly by bringing its ,rinci,al allies, such as the &ederal Re,ublic of Ger9any and +a,an, to their $nees! Thus the :nited States is doubly vulnerable to the ,olitical 9ani,ulation of oil, and it 9ust 9eet that dual threat by 9a$ing itself as Luic$ly and as 9uch as ,ossible inde,endent of foreign oil su,,lies and by 9a$ing a fraction of its do9estic resources available to its 9ost endangered allies! &inally, if one loo$s at this situation created by the ,olitical use of oil fro9 an over-all ,oint of view, one realiHes that it is the s,ecific result of what we identified earlier as the 9ain characteristic of conte9,orary world ,oliticsB the disGunction between the organiHational structures and ,olitical ,rocesses through which we act on the world scene, on the one hand, and the obGective conditions under which hu9anity lives, on the other! Thus one is struc$ by the utter irrationality of leaving the control of nuclear ,ower which can destroy 9an$ind to sovereign nation states! The sa9e a,,lies to entrusting the control of oil C which can destroy in a different way @less dra9atically but al9ost as thoroughlyA the civiliHation of the highly develo,ed industrial nations C to so-called nation states which are sovereign only in a very li9ited sense! The states belonging to the Jnuclear clubJ are no longer, and the oil-,roducing states have never been, ca,able of ,erfor9ing the functions for which govern9ent is established in the first ,lace, that is to ,rotect and ,ro9ote the life, liberty, and ha,,iness of its citiHens! Their ,ower is essentially destructive! IN.U'TRIAL CAPACIT3 The e)a9,le of uraniu9 illustrates, however, the i9,ortance of another factor for the ,ower of a nation C industrial ca,acity! The (ongo has vast de,osits of high-grade uraniu9! #et, while this fact has increased the value of that country as a ,riHe of war and! therefore, its i9,ortance fro9 the ,oint of view of 9ilitary strategy, it has not affected the ,ower of the (ongo in relation to other nations! &or the (ongo does not have the industrial ,lant to ,ut the uraniu9 de,osits to industrial and 9ilitary use! ;n the other hand, for Great Britain, (anada, and the :nited States, as for

(Hechoslova$ia and the Soviet :nion, the ,ossession of uraniu9 signifies an enor9ous increase in ,ower! n these countries the industrial ,lants e)ist or can be built, or they can easily be used in a neighboring country, where uraniu9 can be transfor9ed into energy to be e9,loyed in ,eace and war! The sa9e situation can be e)e9,lified by coal and iron! The :nited States and the Soviet :nion have drawn a good deal of their national strength fro9 the ,ossession of vast a9ounts of these two raw 9aterials because they ,ossess also industrial ,lants that can transfor9 the9 into industrial ,roducts! The Soviet :nion has built its ,lant, and is still in the ,rocess of building it, at enor9ous hu9an and 9aterial sacrifices! t is willing to 9a$e the sacrifices because it recogniHes that without the industrial ,lant it cannot build and 9aintain a 9ilitary establish9ent co99ensurate with its foreign ,olicy! 8ithout this ,lant the Soviet :nion cannot ,lay the i9,ortant ,art in international ,olitics which it intends to ,lay! ndia follows the :nited States and the Soviet :nion closely as a de,ository of coal and iron! ts reserves of iron ore in the two ,rovinces of Bihar and ;rissa alone are esti9ated at =!1 billion tons! &urther9ore, ndiaIs out,ut of 9anganese, which is indis,ensable for the ,roduction of steel, was a 9illion tons as early as ./0/, to,,ed only by the out,ut of the Soviet :nion! But des,ite these riches in raw 9aterials, without which no nation can attain first ran$ in 9odern ti9es, ndia cannot be classified today as a first-rate ,ower even faintly co9,arable to the :nited States and the Soviet :nion! The reason for this lag between the ,otentialities and actualities of ,ower, which concerns us in the conte)t of this discussion @others will be 9entioned laterA, is the lac$ of an industrial establish9ent co99ensurate with the abundance of raw 9aterials! 8hile ndia can boast of a nu9ber of steel 9ills, such as the Tata ron 8or$s, which are a9ong the 9ost 9odern in e)istence, it has no ,er ca,ita ,roductive ca,acity, es,ecially for finished ,roducts, that can be co9,ared with even one of the second-rate industrial nations! n ./24! fewer than si) 9illion ndians C less than one ,er cent of the total ,o,ulation C were e9,loyed in industry! So we see that ndia ,ossesses, in the abundance of so9e of the $ey raw 9aterials, one of the ele9ents that go into the 9a$ing of national ,ower, and to that e)tent it 9ay be regarded as a ,otentially great ,ower! 'ctually, however, it will not beco9e a great ,ower as long as it is lac$ing in other factors without which no nation in 9odern ti9es can attain the status of a great ,ower! ;f these factors industrial ca,acity is one of the 9ost i9,ortant! The technology of 9odern warfare trans,ortation and co99unications has 9ade the over-all develo,9ent of heavy industries an indis,ensable ele9ent of national ,ower! Since victory in 9odern war de,ends u,on the nu9ber and Luality of highways, railroads, truc$s, shi,s, air,lanes, tan$s, and eLui,9ent and wea,ons of all $inds, fro9 9osLuito nets and auto9atic rifles to o)ygen 9as$s and guided 9issiles, the co9,etition a9ong nations for ,ower transfor9s itself largely into co9,etition for the ,roduction of bigger, better, and 9ore i9,le9ents of war! The Luality and ,roductive ca,acity of the industrial ,lant, the $now-how of the wor$ing 9an, the s$ill of the engineer, the inventive genius of the scientist, the 9anagerial organiHation C all these are factors u,on which the industrial ca,acity of a nation and, hence, its ,ower de,end! Thus it is inevitable that the leading industrial nations should be identical with the great ,owers, and a change in industrial ran$, for better or for worse, should be acco9,anied or followed by a corres,onding change in the hierarchy of ,ower! So long as Great Britain as an industrial nation had no eLual, it was the 9ost ,owerful nation on earth, the only one that deserved to be called a world ,ower! The decline of &rance as a ,ower in co9,arison with Ger9any, which was un9ista$able after .214 and was only see9ingly and te9,orarily arrested during the decade following the &irst 8orld 8ar, was in ,art but the ,olitical and 9ilitary 9anifestation of the industrial bac$wardness of &rance and of the industrial ,redo9inance of Ger9any on the Euro,ean continent! The Soviet :nion, while having been ,otentially always a great ,ower, beca9e one in fact only when it entered the ran$s of the fore9ost industrial ,owers in the thirties, and it beca9e the rival of the :nited States as the other su,er,ower only when it acLuired in the fifties the industrial ca,acity for waging nuclear war! Si9ilarly, the ,otential of (hina as a great ,ower will only be realiHed if and when it acLuires a si9ilar industrial ca,acity! 8hen the :nited States was at the height of its ,ower in the forties, the Econo9ist of %ondon related that ,ower to '9erican econo9ic strength by sayingB n any co9,arison of ,otential resources of the Great Powers the :nited States, even before HitlerIs war, far outstri,,ed every other nation in the world in 9aterial strength, in scale of industrialiHation, in weight of resources, in standards of living, by every inde) of out,ut and consu9,tion! 'nd the war! which all but doubled the '9erican national inco9e while it either ruined or severely wea$ened every other Great Power, has enor9ously increased the scale u,on which the :nited States now towers above its fellows! %i$e 9ice in the cage of an ele,hant, they follow with a,,rehension the 9ove9ents of the 9a99oth! 8hat chance would they stand it were to begin to throw its weight about, they who are in so9e danger even if it only decides to sit downF6 This drastic increase in the i9,ortance of industrial ca,acity for national ,ower has also accentuated the traditional distinction between great and s9all ,owers! The very ter9 Jsu,er,owerJ ,oints to an un,recedented accu9ulation of ,ower in the hands of a few nations, which sets these nations a,art not only fro9 the s9all ones but fro9 the traditional great ,owers as well! 8hat distinguishes the su,er,owers fro9 all other nations, aside fro9 their ability to wage all-out nuclear war and absorb a less than all-out nuclear attac$, is their virtual industrial self-sufficiency and their technological ca,acity to stay abreast of the other nations! By the sa9e to$en, the de,endence of the nations of the third and fourth ran$ u,on the nations of the first ran$, which we can call su,er,owers, has also drastically increased! The
6

Econo9ist, May =6! ./61, ,! 125! @Re,rinted by ,er9ission!A

9ilitary ,ower of the for9er de,ends to a so9eti9es decisive e)tent u,on the willingness of the latter to su,,ly the9 with 9odern wea,ons and the i9,le9ents of 9odern co99unications and trans,ortation! 8ithout this su,,ly 9any of the9 would be hel,less in confrontation with an ene9y thus su,,lied! $ILITAR3 PREPARE.NE'' 8hat gives the factors of geogra,hy, natural resources, and industrial ca,acity their actual i9,ortance for the ,ower of a nation is 9ilitary ,re,aredness! The @de,endence of national ,ower u,on 9ilitary ,re,aredness is too obvious to need 9uch elaboration! Military ,re,aredness reLuires a 9ilitary establish9ent ca,able of su,,orting the foreign ,olicies ,ursued! Such ability derives fro9 a nu9ber of factors of which the 9ost significant, fro9 the ,oint of view of our discussion, are technological innovations, leadershi,, and the Luantity and Luality of the ar9ed forces! Te$hno"og The fate of nations and of civiliHations has often been deter9ined by a differential in the tec5hnology of warfare for which the inferior side was unable to co9,ensate in other ways! Euro,e, in the ,eriod of its e),ansion fro9 the fifteenth through the nineteenth century, carried its ,ower on the vehicle of a technology of warfare su,erior to that of the 8estern He9is,here, 'frica, and the "ear and &ar East! The addition of infantry, firear9s, and artillery to the traditional wea,ons in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries s,elled a 9o9entous shift in the distribution of ,ower in favor of those who used those wea,ons before their ene9ies did! The feudal lords and inde,endent cities, who in the face of these new wea,ons continued to rely u,on cavalry and the castles which until then had been ,ractically i99une against direct attac$, now found the9selves suddenly dislodged fro9 their ,osition of ,re,onderance! Two events illustrate dra9atically this shift in ,ower which ,olitically and 9ilitarily 9ar$s the end of the Middle 'ges and the beginning of the 9odern era of history! &irst, in the battles of Morgarten in .0.5 and of %au,en in .00/, ar9ies co9,osed of Swiss infantry inflicted disastrous defeats u,on feudal cavalry, de9onstrating that foot soldiers recruited fro9 the co99on ,eo,le were su,erior to an aristocratic and e),ensive ar9y of eLuestrians! The second is the invasion of taly in .6/6 by (harles E of &rance! 8ith infantry and artillery, (harles E bro$e the ,ower of the ,roud talian city-states, until then secure behind their walls! The see9ingly irresistible destructiveness of these new techniLues of warfare 9ade an indelible i9,ression u,on conte9,oraries, so9e of which is reflected in the writings of Machiavelli and other &lorentine writers of the ti9e! The twentieth century has thus far witnessed four 9aGor innovations in the techniLue of warfare! They gave at least a te9,orary advantage to the side that used the9 before the o,,onent did, or before he was able to ,rotect hi9self against the9! &irst, the sub9arine was used in the &irst 8orld 8ar by Ger9any ,ri9arily against British shi,,ing and see9ed to be ca,able of deciding the war in favor of Ger9any until Great Britain found in the convoy an answer so that 9enace! Second, the tan$ was used in considerable and concentrated nu9bers by the British, but not by the Ger9ans, in the closing ,hase of the &irst 8orld 8ar, giving the 'llies one of their assets for victory! Third, strategic and tactical co-ordination of the air force with the land and naval forces contributed greatly to the Ger9an and +a,anese su,eriority in the initial stages of the Second 8orld 8ar! Pearl Harbor and the disastrous defeats that the British and the *utch suffered at the hands of the +a,anese on land and at sea in ./6. and ./6= were the ,enalties to be ,aid for technological bac$wardness in the face of a 9ore ,rogressive ene9y! f one reads the so9ber review of British defeats which (hurchill gave in the secret session of Parlia9ent on ',ril =0, ./6=, 3 one is struc$ by the fact that all these defeats on land, on the sea, and in the air have one co99on deno9inatorB the disregard or 9isunderstanding of the change in the technology of warfare brought about by air ,ower! &inally, nations which ,ossess nuclear wea,ons and the 9eans to deliver the9 have an enor9ous technological advantage over their co9,etitors! However, the availability of nuclear wea,ons also results in two e)traordinary ,arado)es, referred to above, as concerns its bearing u,on national ,ower! Both ,arado)es ste9 fro9 the enor9ous destructiveness of nuclear wea,ons! t is by virtue of that destructiveness that a Luantitative increase in nuclear wea,ons, in contrast to conventional ones, does not of necessity signify a corres,onding increase in national ,ower! ;nce a nation ,ossesses all the nuclear wea,ons necessary to destroy all the ene9y targets it has chosen for destruction, ta$ing all ,ossible contingencies, such as a first stri$e by the ene9y, into consideration, additional nuclear wea,ons will not increase that nationIs ,ower! 1 The other ,arado) lies in the inverse relationshi, between the degree of destructiveness of nuclear wea,ons and their rational usability! High-yield nuclear wea,ons are instru9ents of indiscri9inate 9ass destruction and can therefore not be used for rational 9ilitary ,ur,oses! They can be used to deter a war by threatening total destruction> but they cannot be used to fight a war in a rational 9anner! ' nation ar9ed with nothing but high-yield nuclear wea,ons could draw very little ,olitical ,ower fro9 its 9ilitary ,osture> for it would have no 9ilitary 9eans by which to i9,ose its will u,on another nation, aside fro9 threatening it with total destruction! f such a nation has a second-stri$e nuclear ca,ability, it will threaten total destruction in return and then the two
5

See the account by &eli) Gilbert, UMachiavelliB The Renaissance of the 'rt of 8ar,\ in Ma$ers of Modern Strategy, edited by Edward Mead Earle @Princeton] Princeton :niversity Press, ./66A, ,,! 2,/! 3 8inston (hurchillIs Secret Session S,eeches @"ew #or$B Si9on and Schuster, ./63A, ,,! 50 ff! 1 (f! below, ,ages =24 ff!

threats either will cancel each other out or will lead to the 9utual destruction of the belligerents! f the threatened nation has no nuclear 9eans of retaliation, it will either suffer total destruction or surrender unconditionally as did +a,an in ./65 after Hiroshi9a and "agasa$i had been destroyed by nuclear bo9bs! n other words, the threatening nation could wi,e the nonnuclear nation off the face of the earth, either ,iece9eal, city by city, or in one devastating blow, but it could not subtly ada,t the degree of 9ilitary ,ressure to be used to the degree of ,sychological resistance to be overco9e! The absence of conventional wea,ons, susce,tible to such subtle ada,tations, and the sole reliance u,on high-yield nuclear wea,ons would 9a$e a nation less ,owerful 9an it would be if it ,ossessed a co9bination of high-yield nuclear wea,ons for the ,ur,ose of deterrence and an ar9ory of conventional wea,ons usable for the ordinary ,ur,oses of warfare! Hence the ,arado) that in order to 9a$e nuclear wea,ons usable one 9ust reduce their yield to a,,ro)i9ate that of conventional wea,ons! Lea(ership 'side fro9 the ti9ely use of technological innovations, the Luality of 9ilitary leadershi, has always e)erted a decisive influence u,on national ,ower! The ,ower of Prussia in the eighteenth century was ,ri9arily a reflection of the 9ilitary genius of &rederic$ the Great and of the strategic and tactical innovations introduced by hi9! The art of warfare had changed between the death of &rederic$ the Great in .123 and the battle of +ena in .243 when "a,oleon destroyed the Prussian ar9y, which in itself was then as good and strong as it had been twenty years before! But, what was 9ore i9,ortant, 9ilitary genius was lac$ing in its leaders who were fighting the battles of &rederic$ the Great all over again! ;n the other side 9ilitary genius was in co99and, e9,loying new ideas in strategy and tactics! This factor decided the issue in favor of &rance! The Maginot %ine ,sychology of the &rench general staff in the ,eriod between the two world wars has beco9e a byword for faulty strategic thin$ing! 8hile the tendencies of 9odern technology, es,ecially its trend toward 9echaniHation of trans,ortation and of co99unications, ,ointed toward the ,robability of a war of 9ove9ent, the &rench general staff continued to thin$ in ter9s of the trench warfare of the &irst 8orld 8ar! The Ger9an general staff, on the other hand, fully alive to the strategic ,otentialities of 9echaniHed warfare, ,lanned its ca9,aigns in ter9s of un,recedented 9obility! The conflagration of these two conce,tions, not only in &rance but also in Poland and the Soviet :nion, ,roduced in the JblitH$riegJ a su,eriority of Ger9an ,ower which brought Ger9any close to final victory! The intellectual shoc$ and the 9ilitary and ,olitical devastation caused by the onslaught of HitlerIs ,anHers and dive bo9bers u,on the Polish cavalry in ./0/ and u,on the i99obile &rench ar9y in ./64 ushered in a new ,eriod of 9ilitary history, si9ilar to the one initiated by (harles E Is invasion of taly in .6/6! But, while the talian states had nobody to fall bac$ on in order to recover their strength, in the Second 8orld 8ar the su,erior technology of the :nited States and the su,erior 9an,ower of the Soviet :nion turned HitlerIs innovations to his destruction! 1uantit an( 1ua"it o! Arme( :or$es The ,ower of a nation in 9ilitary ter9s is also de,endent u,on the Luantity of 9en and ar9s and their distribution a9ong the different branches of the 9ilitary establish9ent! ' nation 9ay have a good gras, of technological innovations in warfare! ts 9ilitary leaders 9ay e)cel in the strategy and tactics a,,ro,riate to the new techniLues of war! #et such a nation 9ay be 9ilitarily and, in conseLuence, also ,olitically wea$ if it does not ,ossess a 9ilitary establish9ent that in its over-all strength and in the strength of its co9,onent ,arts is neither too large nor too s9all in view of the tas$s it 9ay be called u,on to ,erfor9! Must a nation, in order to be strong, ,ossess a large ar9y or is its ,ower not i9,aired by having, at least in ,eaceti9e, only s9all land forces, co9,osed of highly trained, heavily ar9ed s,ecialiHed unitsF Have battle-ready forces - in - being beco9e 9ore i9,ortant than trained reservesF Have large surface navies beco9e obsolete, or do aircraft earners still fulfill a useful ,ur,oseF How large a 9ilitary establish9ent can a nation afford in view of its resources and co99it9entsF *oes concern for national ,ower reLuire large-scale ,eaceti9e ,roduction of aircraft and other 9echaniHed wea,ons, or should a nation, in view of ra,id changes in technology, s,end its resources on research and on the ,roduction of li9ited Luantities of i9,roved ty,es of wea,onsF 8hether a nation gives the right or the wrong answer to such Luestions of a Luantitative character has obviously a direct bearing u,on national ,ower! (an decision in war be forced by one new wea,on, such as artillery, as was thought at the turn of the fifteenth century, or the sub9arine, as the Ger9ans thought in the &irst 8orld 8ar, or the air,lane, as was widely believed in the ,eriod between the two world wars, or the inter-continental guided 9issiles, as 9any believe todayF The wrong answers given to so9e of these Luestions by Great Britain and &rance in the ,eriod between the two world wars ,reserved for the9 the se9blance of ,ower in ter9s of the traditional 9ilitary conce,tions! But those errors brought the9 to the brin$ of final defeat in the course of the Second 8orld 8ar, whose 9ilitary techniLue reLuired different answers to these Luestions! :,on the Luality of the answers we give to these and si9ilar Luestions today will de,end the future ,ower of the :nited States in relation to other nations! POPULATION 8hen we turn fro9 9aterial factors and those co9,ounded of 9aterial and hu9an ele9ents to the ,urely hu9an factors that deter9ine the ,ower of a nation, we have to distinguish Luantitative and Lualitative co9,onents! 8hile a9ong the latter we count national character, national 9orale, and the Luality ^ of di,lo9acy and of govern9ent in general, the for9er needs to be discussed in ter9s of siHe of ,o,ulation!

%istribution t would, of course, not be correct to say that the larger the ,o,ulation of a country the greater the ,ower of that country! &or if such an unLualified correlation e)isted between siHe of ,o,ulation and national ,ower, (hina, whose ,o,ulation is esti9ated as being over . billion ,eo,le, 2would be the 9ost ,owerful nation on earth, followed by ndia with about 104 9illion! The Soviet :nion with about =1= 9illion and the :nited States with =06 9illion would run third and fourth, res,ectively! Though one is not Gustified in considering a country to be very ,owerful because its ,o,ulation is greater than that of 9ost other countries, it is still true that no country can re9ain or beco9e a first-rate ,ower which floes not belong to the 9ore ,o,ulous nations of the earth! 8ithout a large ,o,ulation it is i9,ossible to establish and $ee, going the industrial ,lant necessary for the successful conduct of 9odern warB to ,ut into the field the large nu9ber of co9bat grou,s to fight on land, on the sea! and in the air> and, finally, to fill the cadres of the troo,s, considerably 9ore nu9erous than the co9bat troo,s, which 9ust su,,ly the latter with food, 9eans of trans,ortation and co99unication, a99unition, and wea,ons! t is for this reason that i9,erialistic countries sti9ulate ,o,ulation growth with all $inds of incentives, as did "aHi Ger9any and &ascist taly, and then use that growth as an ideological ,rete)t for i9,erialistic e),ansion! ' co9,arison between the ,o,ulation of the :nited States and that of 'ustralia and (anada will 9a$e clear the relation between siHe of ,o,ulation and national ,ower! 'ustralia has today, in an area of so9ewhat less than three 9illion sLuare 9iles, a ,o,ulation of about fifteen 9illion, while the (anadian ,o,ulation, in an area of close to three and one-half 9illion sLuare 9iles, a9ounts to twenty-four and one-half 9illion! The :nited States, on the other hand, in an area between that of 'ustralia and (anada, has a ,o,ulation of =06 9illion, 9ore than fifteen ti9es larger than 'ustraliaIs and nearly ten ti9es larger than (anadaIs! 8ith the ,o,ulation of either 'ustralia or (anada, the :nited States could never have beco9e the 9ost ,owerful nation on earth! The waves of 9ass i99igration in the nineteenth and the first two decades of the twentieth centuries brought to the :nited States this ele9ent of national ,ower! Had the 99igration %aw of ./=6! li9iting i99igration to the :nited States to .54,444 ,ersons a year, been enacted a hundred or even fifty years earlier, thirty-si) or twenty-seven 9illion ,eo,le, res,ectively, would have been ,revented fro9 settling in the :nited States, and they and their descendants would have been lost to the :nited States! n .2=6, the ,o,ulation of the :nited States a9ounted to close to eleven 9illion! By .216, it had risen to fortyfour 9illion> by ./=6, to ..6 9illion! *uring that century the share of i99igration in the growth of the '9erican ,o,ulation was on the average close to 04 ,er cent, a,,roaching 64 ,er cent in the ,eriod fro9 .224 to ./.4! n other words, the 9ost s,ectacular rise in '9erican ,o,ulation coincides with the absolute and relative ,ea$s of i99igration! &ree i99igration fro9 .2=6 and, 9ore ,articularly, fro9 .216 to ./=6 is 9ainly res,onsible for the abundance of 9an,ower which has 9eant so 9uch for the national ,ower of the :nited States in war and ,eace! 8ithout this i99igration, it is unli$ely that the ,o,ulation of the :nited States would a9ount to 9ore than half of what it actually is today! n conseLuence, the national ,ower of the :nited States would be inferior to what =06 9illion ,eo,le 9a$e it today! Since siHe of ,o,ulation is one of the factors u,on which national ,ower rests, and since the ,ower of one nation is always relative to the ,ower of others, the relative siHe of the ,o,ulation of countries co9,eting for ,ower and! es,ecially, the relative rate of their growth deserve careful attention! ' country inferior in siHe of ,o,ulation to its co9,etitor will view with alar9 a declining rate of growth if the ,o,ulation of its co9,etitor tends to increase 9ore ra,idly! Such has been the situation of &rance with regard to Ger9any between .214 and ./64! *uring that ,eriod, the ,o,ulation of &rance increased by four 9illion, whereas Ger9any registered a gain of twenty-seven 9illion! 8hile in .244 every seventh Euro,ean was a &rench9an, in ./04 only every thirteenth was a &rench9an! n ./64! Ger9any had at its dis,osal about fifteen 9illion 9en fit for 9ilitary service, whereas &rance had only five 9illion! ;n the other hand, ever since the unification in .214, Ger9any has viewed so9eti9es with alar9, and always with res,ect, the Russian ,o,ulation figures, which show a greater rate of increase than Ger9anyIs! %oo$ing at the situation as it e)isted at the outbrea$ of the &irst 8orld 8ar solely fro9 the ,oint of view of ,o,ulation trends, Ger9any could feel that ti9e was on RussiaIs side, and &rance could feel that ti9e was on the side of Ger9any, while both 'ustria and Russia, for other reasons already alluded to, / could believe that ,ost,one9ent of the conflict would favor the o,,onent! Thus all the ,rotagonists, with the e)ce,tion of Great Britain, had reasons of their own to ,refer a war in ./.6 to a ,eaceful settle9ent which they could not regard as definite, but only as a breathing s,ell before the unavoidable settling of accounts! 's the shifts in the distribution of ,ower within Euro,e in recent history have been roughly du,licated by the changes in ,o,ulation trends, so the e9ergence of the :nited States as the great ,ower center of the 8est, ta$ing the ,lace of 8estern and (entral Euro,e, can be read in the ,o,ulation figures of the res,ective countries! n .214, the ,o,ulation of &rance as well as of Ger9any e)ceeded that of the :nited States! #et, in ./64, the ,o,ulation of the :nited States had increased by .44 9illion while the co9bined increase in the ,o,ulations of &rance and Ger9any in the sa9e ,eriod a9ounted to only thirty-one 9illion! t is thus obvious that a nation cannot be the first ran$ without a ,o,ulation sufficiently large to create and a,,ly the 9aterial i9,le9ents of national ,ower! ;n the other hand, it has beco9e obvious only in recent ti9es that a large ,o,ulation can also e)ert a drastically negative influence u,on national ,ower! This has ha,,ened in so-called
2

'll ,o,ulation figures, unless indicated otherwise, are derived fro9 the infor9ation re,orted in the :!S! (ensus Bureau Re,ort for 9id-+une ./20, !"ew #or$ Ti9es, Se,te9ber 6, ./20! ,! '/! / See ,ages 24 and 2.!

underdevelo,ed nations, such as ndia and Egy,t, whose ,o,ulations have greatly increased, by virtue of a decrease in the 9ortality rates, while their food su,,ly did not $ee, ,ace with the increase in ,o,ulation! These countries were continually faced with the threat of fa9ine and with the need to ta$e care of large 9asses of undernourished and diseased ,eo,le! They had to divert scarce resources fro9 the develo,9ent of their national ,ower to the feeding and care of their ,o,ulations! The largeness of their ,o,ulation, far fro9 being an asset for their national ,ower, is an obstacle to its develo,9ent! &or such nations, to bring the nu9ber of their ,o,ulation into har9ony with their resources is a necessity, and if resources cannot be increased, ,o,ulation control is a ,recondition of national ,ower! .4 Tren(s t is obvious fro9 what has been said thus far that in trying to assess the future distribution of ,ower the ,rediction of ,o,ulation trends ,lays an i9,ortant role! 'll other factors re9aining a,,ro)i9ately eLual, a considerable decline in the 9an,ower of a nation in co9,arison with its co9,etitors on the international scene s,ells a decline in national ,ower, and a considerable increase, under si9ilar conditions, a9ounts to a gain in national strength! 8hen, toward the end of the nineteenth century, the British E9,ire was the only world ,ower in e)istence, its ,o,ulation a9ounted to about 644 9illionB that is, a,,ro)i9ately one fourth of the total ,o,ulation of the world! n ./63! it ca9e close to 554 9illion! Since ndiaIs ,o,ulation was then esti9ated at 644 9illion, these figures illustrate the enor9ous loss in national ,ower, in ter9s of siHe of ,o,ulation alone, which Great Britain suffered in the loss of ndia! &ro9 the ,oint of view of ,o,ulation, the ,osition of the :nited States will continue to show considerable strength in co9,arison with 8estern Euro,e because of the latterIs antici,ated s9all increases! But co9,ared with the ,o,ulation trend in %atin '9erica, the ,osition of the :nited States is well on its way to deterioration! %atin '9erica shows the greatest rate of increase of any 9aGor region in the world! n ./44, %atin '9erica had an esti9ated si)tythree 9illion inhabitants to seventy-five 9illion for the :nited States! The ,o,ulation of 'rgentina alone 9ore than doubled between ./.6 and ./35 and is now al9ost twenty - eight 9illion! n the sa9e ,eriod the ,o,ulation of the :nited States has only risen fro9 // to =06 9illion! t is, however, not sufficient to $now the over-all ,o,ulation figures of different countries in order to assess correctly the influence of the ,o,ulation factor u,on national ,ower! The age distribution within a given ,o,ulation is an i9,ortant ele9ent in ,ower calculations! 'll other things being eLual, a nation with a relatively large ,o,ulation of 9a)i9u9 ,otential usefulness for 9ilitary and ,roductive ,ur,oses @roughly between twenty and forty years of ageA will have an edge in ,ower over a nation in whose ,o,ulation the older age grou,s ,redo9inate! t 9ust be ,ointed out! however, that the ,roGection of ,o,ulation trends is haHardous even without the interference of war or natural catastro,hes! The esti9ates of ,o,ulation trends which were 9ade in the forties ,ainted a rather ,essi9istic ,icture of the increase of the '9erican ,o,ulation as co9,ared with that of the Soviet :nion! #et today the ,o,ulation of the :nited States e)ceeds by a wide 9argin the nu9ber that so9e ,o,ulation e),erts of great re,ute e),ected it to reach by ./15! Even in a field whose scientific accuracy a,,ears to be relatively high, the ,rediction of national ,ower is beset with uncertainties! But these uncertainties do not affect the i9,ortance of ,o,ulation trends for the develo,9ent of national ,ower! "or can they di9inish the active concern of states9en with the ,o,ulation trends of their own nations! Echoing 'ugustus and his successors on the throne of the Ro9an E9,ire, Sir 8inston (hurchill, as British Pri9e Minister, e),ressed this concern when he said in his radio address of March ==, ./60B ;ne of the 9ost so9ber an)ieties which beset those who loo$ thirty, or forty, or fifty years ahead, and in this field one can see ahead only too clearly, is the dwindling birth - rate! n thirty years, unless ,resent trends alter, a s9aller wor$ing and fighting ,o,ulation will have to su,,ort and ,rotect nearly twice as 9any old ,eo,leB in fifty years the ,osition will be worse still! f this country is to $ee, its high ,lace in the leadershi, of the world, and to survive as a great ,ower that can hold its own against e)ternal ,ressures, our ,eo,le 9ust be encouraged by every 9eans to have larger fa9ilies!

NATIONAL CHARACTER Its ')isten$e ;f the three hu9an factors of a Lualitative nature which have a bearing on national ,ower, national character and national 9orale stand out both for their elusiveness fro9 the ,oint of view of rational ,rognosis and for their ,er9anent and often decisive influence u,on the weight a nation is able to ,ut into the scales of international ,olitics! 8e are not concerned here with the Luestion of what factors are res,onsible for the develo,9ent of a national character! 8e are only interested in the fact C contested but @it see9s to usA incontestable, es,ecially in view of the anthro,ological conce,t of the Jculture ,atternJ C that certain Lualities of intellect and character occur 9ore freLuently and are 9ore highly valued in one nation than in another! To Luote (oleridgeB ! ! ! But that there is an invisible s,irit that breathes through a whole ,eo,le, and is ,artici,ated by all, though not
.4

(f! above ,age .=1!

by all ali$e> a s,irit which gives a color and character both to their virtues and vices, so that the sa9e action, such . 9ean as are e),ressed by the sa9e words, are yet not the sa9e in a S,aniard as they would be in a &rench9an, hold for an undeniable truth, without the ad9ission of which all history would be a riddle! hold li$ewise that the difference of nations, their relative grandeur and 9eanness, all, in short, which they are or do, C @not indeed at one ,articular ti9e, under the accidental influence of a single great 9an, as the (arthaginians under the great Danti,,us, and afterwards under their own Hannibal!A but all in which they ,ersevere, as a nation, through successions of changing individuals, are the result of this s,irit> ! ! !.. These Lualities set one nation a,art fro9 others, and they show a high degree of resiliency to change! ' few e)a9,les, ta$en at rando9, will illustrate the ,oint! s it not an incontestable fact that, as +ohn *ewey .= and 9any others have ,ointed out, 7ant and Hegel are as ty,ical of the ,hiloso,hic tradition of Ger9any as *escartes and Eoltaire are of the &rench 9ind, as %oc$e and Bur$e are of the ,olitical thought of Great Britain, as 8illia9 +a9es and +ohn *ewey are of the '9erican a,,roach to intellectual ,roble9sF 'nd can it be denied that these ,hiloso,hic differences are but e),ressions, on the highest level of abstraction and syste9atiHation, of funda9ental intellectual and 9oral traits that reveal the9selves on all levels of thought and action and that give each nation its un9ista$able distinctivenessF The 9echanistic rationality and the syste9atic ,erfection of *escartesI ,hiloso,hy rea,,ear in the tragedies of (orneille and Racine no less than in the rationalistic fury of +acobin refor9! They rea,,ear in the sterility of the acade9ic for9alis9 that characteriHes 9uch of the conte9,orary intellectual life of &rance! They rea,,ear in the stores of ,eace ,lans, logically ,erfect but i9,racticable, in which &rench statecraft e)celled in the ,eriod between the two world wars! ;n the other hand, the trait of intellectual curiosity which +ulius (aesar detected in the Gauls has re9ained throughout the ages a distinctive characteristic of the &rench 9ind! %oc$eIs ,hiloso,hy is as 9uch a 9anifestation of British individualis9 as Magna (arta, due ,rocess of law, or Protestant sectarianis9! n Ed9und Bur$e, with his undog9atic co9bination of 9oral ,rinci,le and ,olitical e),ediency, the ,olitical genius of the British ,eo,le reveals itself as 9uch as in the Refor9 'cts of the nineteenth century or the balance - of - ,ower ,olicies of (ardinal 8olsey and (anning! 8hat Tacitus said of the destructive ,olitical and 9ilitary ,ro,ensities of the Ger9anic tribes fitted the ar9ies of &rederic$ Barbarossa no less than those of 8illia9 and of Hitler! t fits, too, the traditional rudeness and clu9sy deviousness of Ger9an di,lo9acy! The authoritarianis9, collectivis9, and state worshi, of Ger9an ,hiloso,hy have their counter,art in the tradition of autocratic govern9ent, in servile acce,tance of any authority so long as it see9s to have the will and force to ,revail, and, conco9itant with it, the lac$ of civil courage, the disregard of individual rights, and the absence of a tradition of ,olitical liberty! The descri,tion of the '9erican national character, as it e9erges fro9 TocLuevilleIs *e9ocracy in '9erica, has not been de,rived of its ti9eliness by the intervention of 9ore than a century! The indecision of '9erican ,rag9atis9 between an i9,licit dog9atic idealis9 and reliance u,on success as a 9easure of truth is reflected in the vacillations of '9erican di,lo9acy between the &our &reedo9s and the 'tlantic (harter, on the one hand, and Jdollar di,lo9acy,J on the other! The +ussian Nationa" Chara$ter 's for Russia, the Gu)ta,osition of two e),eriences, al9ost a century a,art, will ,rovide stri$ing ,roof of the ,ersistence of certain intellectual and 9oral Lualities! Bis9arc$ wrote in his 9e9oirsB 't the ti9e of 9y first stay in St! Petersburg, in .25/, had an e)a9,le of another Russian ,eculiarity! *uring the first s,ring days it was then the custo9 for everyone connected with the court to ,ro9enade in the Su99er Garden between PaulIs Palace and the "eva! There the E9,eror had noticed a sentry standing in the 9iddle of a grass ,lot> in re,ly to the Luestion why he was standing there, the soldier could only answer, JThose are 9y orders!J The E9,eror therefore sent one of his adGutants to the guard-roo9 to 9a$e inLuiries> but no e),lanation was forthco9ing e)ce,t that a sentry had to stand there winter and su99er! The source of the original order could no longer be discovered! The 9atter was tal$ed of at court, and reached the ears of the servants! ;ne of the9, an older ,ensioner, ca9e forward and stated that his father had once said to hi9 as they ,assed the sentry in the Su99er GardenB JThere he is, still standing to guard the flower, on that s,ot the E9,ress (atherine once noticed a snowdro, in bloo9 unusually early, and gave orders that it was not to he ,luc$ed!J This co99and had been carried out by ,lacing a sentry on the s,ot, and ever since then one had stood there all the year round! Stories of this sort e)cite our a9use9ent and criticis9, but they are an e),ression of the ele9entary force and ,ersistence on which the strength of the Russian nature de,ends in its attitude towards the rest of Euro,e! t re9inds us of the sentinels in the flood at St! Petersburg in .2=5, and in the Shi,$a Pass in .211> not being relieved, the for9er were drowned, the latter froHen to death at their ,osts! .0
.. .=

Sa9uel Taylor (oleridge, Essays on his own Ti9es @%ondonB 8illia9 Pic$ering, .254A, Eol! , ,,! 332-/! Ger9an Philoso,hy and Politics @"ew #or$B G! P! Puntna9_s Sons, ./6=A, ,assi9! .0 Bis9arc$, the Man and States9an, being the Reflections and Re9iniscences of ;tto, Prince von Bis9arc$, translated under the su,ervision of '! +! Butler @"ew #or$ and %ondonB Har,er and Brothers, .2//A, Eol! , ,! =54!

4ime 9agaHine of ',ril =., ./61, contains the following re,ortB *own Potsda9Is slushy Berlinerstrasse stu9bled twelve haggard 9en! ! ! ! Their faces had the ,ale, creased loo$ of ,risoners! Behind the9 trudged a stubby, broad-faced Russian soldier, To99y gun croo$ed in his right ar9, the wide :$rainian ste,,e in his blue eyes! ',,roaching the Stadtbahn station, the grou, 9et a strea9 of 9en and wo9en hurrying ho9e fro9 wor$! 'n angular, 9iddle-aged wo9an suddenly sighted the twelve 9en! She sto,,ed in her trac$s, stared wide-eyed at the9 for a full 9inute! Then she dro,,ed her threadbare 9ar$et bag, flew across the street in front of a lu9bering charcoal-burning truc$ and threw herself with a gas,ing cry u,on the third ,risoner! Prisoners and ,assers-by ,aused and ga,ed du9bly at the two RodinesLue figures fingering the bac$s of each otherIs rough coats and 9u9bling hystericallyB J8ohinFJ J! ! ! weiss nicht!J J8aru9FJ J! ! ! weiss nicht!J Slowly the Russian wal$ed around his charges and a,,roached the cou,le! Slowly a grin covered his face! He ta,,ed the wo9an on the bac$! She shuddered! Rigid a,,rehension s,read over the faces of the onloo$ers, but the Russian ru9bled soothinglyB J7eine 'ngst! 7eine 'ngst!J @"o fear! "o fear!A Then he waved the 9uHHle of his To99y gun toward the ,risoner, who instinctively recoiled a ste,, and as$edB J*ein MannFJ J+a,J re,lied the wo9an, tears strea9ing down her chee$s! JGu - ut,J grunted the Russian, wrin$ling his nose, J"i99 9it,J and he gave the bewildered ,risoner a gentle shove toward the sidewal$! The s,ectators e)haled a 9ass sigh of relief as the cou,le stu9bled off deliriously, hand in hand! Eleven ,risoners, 9uttering to each other, ,ushed on down the street ,ast the 9uttering crowdB J:n,redictable Russians ! ! ! incredible !!! canIt understand !!! donIt understand the Russians!J The Russian shuffled along stoically, gri,,ing a long ,a,irosa between yellow stained teeth as he fished in a ,oc$et for 9atches! Suddenly his face clouded! He hitched the To99y gun higher under his ar9, too$ a dirty ,iece of ,a,er fro9 the wide, ragged sleeve of his shinel, and scowled at it! 'fter a few ste,s he stuffed the ,a,er bac$ carefully, stared for a 9o9ent at the bent bac$s of the ,risoners, then searched the strained faces of a new load of co99uters Gust leaving the station! 8ith no fuss, the Russian ste,,ed u, to a youngish 9an with a briefcase under his ar9 and a dirty brown felt hat ,ulled over his ears, and co99andedB JEeh, *uS 7o99SJ The Ger9an froHe, casting a terrified glance over his shoulder at the frightened strea9 of 9en and wo9en who were trying not to see or hear! The Russian waved his To99y gun and curled his li,! J7o99SJ He ,ushed his ,etrified recruit roughly into the gutter! 'gain the ,risoners were twelve! The RussianIs face rela)ed! 8ith a third s,uttering 9atch he lighted his ,a,irosa and ,lacidly blew s9o$e toward the tense Ger9ans scurrying ho9e through the gathering dus$! .6 Between these two e,isodes a great revolution intervened, interru,ting the historic continuity on ,ractically all levels of national life! #et the traits of the Russian "ational character e9erged intact fro9 the holocaust of that revolution! Even so thorough a change in the social and econo9ic structure, in ,olitical leadershi, and institutions, in the ways of life and thought has not been able to affect the Jele9entary force and ,ersistenceJ of the Russian character which Bis9arc$ found revealed in his e),erience and which reveal the9selves in the Russian soldier of Potsda9 as well! To illustrate the sa9e continuity of the national character, let us consider the following e)cer,ts fro9 di,lo9atic dis,atches sent by an '9erican di,lo9at fro9 Russia to the *e,art9ent of StateB *uring the last year it has been evident that the ,olicy of Russia toward foreigners and their entrance into the e9,ire was beco9ing 9ore and 9ore stringent! heard of several '9ericans last su99er who were unable to ,rocure visas! ! ! ! This arises 9ainly fro9 ,olitical considerations and a fear of foreign influence u,on the ,o,ular 9ind! To this it 9ay be added that there is a strong anti-foreign ,arty in Russia whose ,olicy would e)clude all foreigners e)ce,t for 9ere ,ur,oses of transient co99erce! ! ! ! The ,osition of a 9inister here is far fro9 being ,leasant! The o,inion ,revails that no co99unication, at least of a ,ublic nature, is sale in the ,ost office but is o,ened and ins,ected as a 9atter of course! ! ! ! The o,inion also ,revails that 9inisters are constantly subGected to a syste9 of es,ionage and that even their servants are 9ade to disclose what ,assed in their households, their conversations, associations, etc! ! ! ! Secrecy and 9ystery characteriHe everything! "othing is 9ade ,ublic that is worth $nowing! ' strange su,erstition ,revails a9ong the Russians that they arc destined to conLuer the world! ',,eals to the soldiery founded on this idea of fatality and its glorious rewards are seldo9 9ade in vain! To a feeling of this sort has been attributed that re9ar$able ,atience and endurance which distinguish the Russian soldier in the 9idst of the greatest ,rivations! ! ! ! "othing is 9ore stri$ing to an '9erican on his first arrival here than the rigor of the ,olice! These i9,ressions were gathered, not, as one 9ight e),ect, in recent years by '9bassadors 7ennan, Bohlen, or Tho9,son, but in .25.-5= by "eill S! Brown, then :nited States Minister to Russia!
.6

Ti9e, ',ril =., ./61, ,! 0=! @:sed by ,er9ission of Ti9e! (o,yright Ti9e, nc!, ./61!A

Nationa" Chara$ter an( Nationa" Po-er "ational character cannot fail to influence national ,ower> for those who act @or the nation in ,eace and war, for9ulate, e)ecute, and su,,ort its ,olicies, eleet and are elected, 9old ,ublic o,inion, ,roduce and consu9e C all bear to a greater or lesser degree the i9,rint of those intellectual and 9oral Lualities which 9a$e u, the national character! The Jele9entary force and ,ersistenceJ of the Russians, the individual initiative and inventiveness of the '9ericans, the undog9atic co99on sense of the British, the disci,line and thoroughness of the Ger9ans are so9e of the Lualities which will 9anifest the9selves, for better or for worse, in all the individual and collective activities in which the 9e9bers of a nation 9ay engage! n conseLuence of the differences in national character, the Ger9an and Russian govern9ents, for instance, have been able to e9bar$ u,on foreign ,olicies that the '9erican and British govern9ents would have been inca,able of ,ursuing, and vice versa! 'nti9ilitaris9, aversion to standing ar9ies and to co9,ulsory 9ilitary service are ,er9anent traits of the '9erican and British national character! #et the sa9e institutions and activities have for centuries stood high in the hierarchy of values of Prussia, fro9 where their ,restige s,read over all of Ger9any! n Russia the tradition of obedience to the authority of the govern9ent and the traditional fear of the foreigner have 9ade large ,er9anent 9ilitary establish9ents acce,table to the ,o,ulation! Thus the national character has given Ger9any and Russia an initial advantage in the struggle for ,ower, since they could transfor9 in ,eaceti9e a greater ,ortion of their national resources into instru9ents of war! ;n the other hand, the reluctance of the '9erican and British ,eo,les to consider such a transfor9ation, es,ecially on a large scale and with res,ect to 9an,ower, e)ce,t in an obvious national e9ergency, has i9,osed a severe handica, u,on '9erican and British foreign ,olicy! Govern9ents of 9ilitaristic nations are able to ,lan, ,re,are, and wage war at the 9o9ent of their choosing! They can, 9ore ,articularly, start a ,reventive war whenever it see9s to be 9ost ,ro,itious for their cause! Govern9ents of ,acifist nations, of which the :nited States was the outstanding e)a9,le until the end of the Second 8orld 8ar, are in this res,ect in a 9uch 9ore difficult situation and have 9uch less freedo9 of action! Restrained as they are by the innate anti9ilitaris9 of their ,eo,les, they 9ust ,ursue a 9ore cautious course in foreign affairs! &reLuently the 9ilitary strength actually at their dis,osal will not be co99ensurate with the ,olitical co99it9ents that their concern for the national interest i9,oses u,on the9! n other words, they will not have the ar9ed 9ight sufficient to bac$ u, their ,olicies! 8hen they go to war, they 9ay well do so on the ter9s of their ene9ies! n the ,ast they have had to rely u,on other traits in the national character and u,on other co9,ensating factors, such as geogra,hical location and industrial ,otential, to carry the9 over the initial ,eriod of wea$ness and inferiority to ulti9ate victory! Such can be the effects, for good or evil, of the character of a nation! The observer of the international scene who atte9,ts to assess the relative strength of different nations 9ust ta$e national character into account, however difficult it 9ay be to assess correctly so elusive and intangible a factor! &ailure to do so will lead to errors in Gudg9ent and ,olicies, such as the de,reciation of the recu,erative force of Ger9any after the &irst 8orld 8ar and the underesti9ation of Russian staying ,ower in ./6. - 6=! The Treaty of Eersailles could restrict Ger9any in all the other i9,le9ents of national ,ower, such as territory, sources of raw 9aterials, industrial ca,acity, and 9ilitary establish9ent! But it could not de,rive Ger9any of all those Lualities of intellect and character which enabled it within a ,eriod of two decades to rebuild what it had lost and to e9erge as the strongest single 9ilitary ,ower in the world! The virtually unani9ous o,inion of the 9ilitary e),erts who in ./6= gave the Russian ar9y only a few 9ore 9onths of resistance 9ay have been correct in ,urely 9ilitary ter9s, such as 9ilitary strategy, 9obility, industrial resources, and the li$e! #et this e),ert o,inion was obviously 9ista$en in underrating that factor of Jele9entary force and ,ersistenceJ which better Gudg9ent has recogniHed as the great source of Russian strength in its dealings with Euro,e! The ,essi9is9 that in ./64 denied Great Britain a chance for survival had its roots in a si9ilar neglect or 9isreading of the national character of the British ,eo,le! 8e have already 9entioned in another conte)t the conte9,t in which '9erican ,ower was held by the Ger9an leaders before the Second 8orld 8ar! .5 t is interesting to note that e)actly the sa9e 9ista$e, and for the sa9e reason, was 9ade by the Ger9an leaders during the &irst 8orld 8ar! Thus, in ;ctober ./.3, the Ger9an Secretary of the "avy esti9ated the significance of the :nited States Goining the 'llies to be JHero,J and another Ger9an 9inister of that ,eriod declared in a ,arlia9entary s,eech, after the :nited States had actually entered the war on the side of the 'lliesB JThe '9ericans cannot swi9 and they cannot fly, the '9ericans will never co9e!J n both cases, the Ger9an leaders underesti9ated '9erican ,ower by ,aying attention e)clusively to the Luality of the 9ilitary establish9ent at a ,articular 9o9ent, to the anti9ilitaris9 of the '9erican character, and to the factor of geogra,hical distance! They disregarded co9,letely the Lualities of the '9erican character, such as individual initiative, gift for i9,rovisation, and technical s$ill, which, together with the other 9aterial factor and under favorable conditions, 9ight 9ore than outweigh the disadvantages of geogra,hical re9oteness and of a dila,idated 9ilitary establish9ent! ;n the other hand, the belief of 9any e),erts, at least until the battle of Stalingrad in ./60, in the invincibility of Ger9any drew its strength fro9 the 9aterial factors as well as fro9 certain as,ects of the Ger9an national character which see9ed to favor total victory! These e),erts neglected other as,ects of the national character of the Ger9an ,eo,le, in ,articular their lac$ of 9oderation! &ro9 the e9,erors of the Middle 'ges and the ,rinces fighting the Thirty #earsI 8ar to 8illia9 and Hitler, this lac$ of 9oderation has ,roved to be the one fatal wea$ness of the Ger9an national character! :nable to restrain goals and action within the li9its of the ,ossible, the Ger9ans have ti9e and again sLuandered and ulti9ately destroyed the national ,ower of Ger9any built u,on other 9aterial and hu9an factors!
.5

See ,age //!

NATIONAL $ORALE More elusive and less stable, but no less i9,ortant than all the other factors in its bearing u,on national ,ower, is what we ,ro,ose to call national 9orale! "ational 9orale is the degree of deter9ination with which a nation su,,orts the foreign ,olicies of its govern9ent in ,eace or war! t ,er9eates all activities of a nation, its agricultural and industrial ,roduction as well as its 9ilitary establish9ent and di,lo9atic service! n the for9 of ,ublic o,inion, it ,rovides an intangible factor without whose su,,ort no govern9ent, de9ocratic or autocratic, is able to ,ursue its ,olicies with full effectiveness, if it is able to ,ursue the9 at all! ts ,resence or absence and its Lualities reveal the9selves ,articularly in ti9es of national crisis, when either the e)istence of the nation is at sta$e or else a decision of funda9ental i9,ortance 9ust be ta$en u,on which the survival of the nation 9ight well de,end! ItAs Instabi"it 8hile certain traits of the national character 9ay easily 9anifest the9selves in the national 9orale of the ,eo,le at a certain 9o9ent of history, such as the co99on sense of the British, the individualis9 of the &rench, the tenacity of the Russians, no conclusion can he drawn fro9 the character of a nation as to what the 9orale of that nation 9ight be under certain contingencies! Their national character see9s to Lualify the '9erican ,eo,le to a ,articular degree for ,laying the role of a first-rate ,ower under the conditions of the twentieth century! #et nobody can foresee with any degree of certainty what the national 9orale of the '9erican ,eo,le would be li$e under the conditions of hardshi, and disintegration which ,revailed in the different belligerent countries of Euro,e and 'sia during certain ,hases of the Second 8orld 8ar and of the ,ostwar years! "or is there a way of antici,ating the reactions of the British ,eo,le to a re,etition of the e),eriences of the Second 8orld 8ar! They stood u, under the JblitHJ and E - wea,ons once! (ould they stand u, under the9 a second ti9eF 'nd what about nuclear wea,onsF Si9ilar Luestions can be as$ed of all nations, and no rational answers are forthco9ing! '9erican national 9orale, in ,articular, has been in recent years the obGect of searching s,eculation at ho9e and abroad> for '9erican foreign ,olicy and, through it, the weight of '9erican ,ower in international affairs is to a ,eculiar degree de,endent u,on the 9oods of '9erican ,ublic o,inion, as they e),ress the9selves in the votes of (ongress, election results, ,olls, and the li$e! 8ould the :nited States Goin the :nited "ations and stay with it des,ite disa,,oint9entsF 8ould (ongress su,,ort the econo9ic and 9ilitary assistance ,rogra9 for Euro,e, and for how long would it vote billions for foreign aid throughout the worldF How far were the '9erican ,eo,le willing to go in su,,orting South 7orea, and under what conditions would they continue to do soF 8ould they be willing to co,e indefinitely with the liabilities, ris$s, and frustrations attributed to the Soviet :nion, without either rela)ing their efforts or trying to end it all by drastic actionF The 9ain factor u,on which the answers to these Luestions de,ended or de,end is the state of national 9orale at the decisive 9o9ent! The national 9orale of any ,eo,le will obviously brea$ at a certain ,oint! The brea$ing ,oint is different for different ,eo,le and under different circu9stances! So9e ,eo,les will be brought close to the brea$ing ,oint by tre9endous and useless losses in war, such as the &rench after the "ivelle offensive in ./.1 in the (ha9,agne! ;ne great defeat will suffice to under9ine the national 9orale of others, such as the defeat the talians suffered in ./.1 at (a,oretto, which cost the9 three hundred thousand 9en in ,risoners and the sa9e nu9ber in deserters! The 9orale of others, such as the Russians in ./.1, will brea$ under the i9,act of a co9bination of tre9endous war losses in 9en and territory and the 9is9anage9ent of an autocratic govern9ent! The 9orale of others will only slowly decline and, as it were, corrode at the edges C not brea$ at all in one sudden colla,se, even when e),osed to a rare co9bination of govern9ental 9is9anage9ent, devastation, invasion, and a ho,eless war situation! Such was the case of the Ger9ans in the last stage of the Second 8orld 8ar, when a nu9ber of 9ilitary leaders and for9er high officials gave u, the lost cause while the 9asses of the ,eo,le fought on until ,ractically the 9o9ent of HitlerIs suicide! The ,ersistence of Ger9an 9orale in ./65 under 9ost unfavorable circu9stances illustrates dra9atically the un,redictability of such collective reactions! :nder 9uch less severe circu9stances the national 9orale of Ger9any colla,sed in "ove9ber ./.2, a ,recedent that should have ,resaged a si9ilar colla,se of Ger9an 9orale so9e ti9e in the su99er of ./66, after the 'llied invasion of &rance! Tolstoy gives in 8ar and Peace a vivid analysis of the inde,endent i9,ortance of 9orale for 9ilitary successB Military science assu9es that the relative strength of forces is identical with their nu9erical ,ro,ortions! Military science 9aintains that the greater the nu9ber of soldiers, the greater their strength! %es gros bataillons ont touGour) ratson! To say this is as though one were in 9echanics to say that forces were eLual or uneLual si9,ly because the 9asses of the 9oving bodies were eLual or uneLual! &orce @the volu9e of 9otionA is the ,roduct of the 9ass into the velocity! n warfare the force of ar9ies is the ,roduct of the 9ass 9ulti,lied by so9ething else, an un$nown )! Military science, seeing in history an i99ense nu9ber of e)a9,les in which the 9ass of an ar9y does not corres,ond with its force, and which s9all nu9bers conLuer large ones, vaguely recogniHes the e)istence of this un$nown factor, and tries to find it so9eti9es in so9e geo9etrical dis,osition of the troo,s, so9eti9es in the su,eriority of the wea,ons, and 9ost often in the genius of the leaders! But none of those factors yield results that agree with the historical facts!

;ne has but to renounce the false view that glorifies the effect of the activity of the heroes of history in warfare in order to discover this un$nown Luantity, )! D is the s,irit of the ar9y, the greater or less desire to fight and to face dangers on the ,art of all 9en co9,osing the ar9y, which is Luite a,art fro9 the Luestion whether they are fighting under leaders of genius or not, with cudgels or with guns that fire thirty ti9es a 9inute! The 9en who have the greater desire to fight always ,ut the9selves, too, in the 9ore advantageous ,osition for fighting! The s,irit of the ar9y is the factor which 9ulti,lied by the 9ass gives the ,roduct of the force! To define and e),ress the significance of this un$nown factor, the s,irit of the ar9y, is the ,roble9 of science! This ,roble9 can only be solved when we cease arbitrarily substituting for that un$nown factor ) the conditions under which the force is 9anifested, such as the ,lans of the general, the ar9ing of the 9en and so on, and recogniHe this un$nown factor in its entirety as the greater or less desire to fight and face danger! Then only by e),ressing $nown historical facts in eLuations can one ho,e fro9 co9,arison of the relative value of this un$nown factor to a,,roach its definition! Ten 9en, or battalions or divisions arc victorious fighting with fifteen 9en or battalions or divisions, that is, they $ill or la$e ,risoner all of the9 while losing four of their own side, so that the loss has been four on one side and fifteen on the other! (onseLuently, four on one side have been eLuivalent to fifteen on the other, and conseLuently 6) ` .5y! (onseLuently )<y ` .5<6! This eLuation does not give us the value of the un$nown factors, but it docs give us the ratio between their values! 'nd fro9 the reduction to such eLuations of various historical units @battles, ca9,aigns, ,eriods of warfareA a series of nu9bers are obtained, in which there 9ust be and 9ay be discovered historical laws! .3 The 1ua"it o! So$iet an( Go8ernment as %e$isi8e :a$tors 8hile national 9orale is subGected to its ulti9ate test in war, it is i9,ortant whenever a nationIs ,ower is brought to bear on an international ,roble9! t is i9,ortant ,artly because of the antici,ated effects of national 9orale u,on 9ilitary strength, ,artly because national 9orale influences the deter9ination with which the govern9ent ,ursues its foreign ,olicies! 'ny seg9ent of the ,o,ulation which feels itself ,er9anently de,rived of its rights and of full ,artici,ation in the life of the nation will tend to have a lower national 9orale, to be less J,atrioticJ than those who do not suffer fro9 such disabilities! The sa9e is li$ely to be true of those whose vital as,irations diverge fro9 the ,er9anent ,olicies ,ursued by the 9aGority or by the govern9ent! 8henever dee, dissensions tear a ,eo,le a,art, the ,o,ular su,,ort that can be 9ustered for a foreign ,olicy will always be ,recarious and will be actually s9all if the success or failure of the foreign ,olicy has a direct bearing u,on the issue of the do9estic struggle! 'utocratic govern9ents, which in the for9ulation of their ,olicies do not ta$e the wishes of the ,eo,le into account, cannot rely u,on 9uch ,o,ular su,,ort for their foreign ,olicies! Such was the case in countries li$e (Harist Russia and the 'ustrian 9onarchy! The e)a9,le of 'ustria is ,articularly instructive! Many of the foreign ,olicies of that country, es,ecially with res,ect to the Slavic nations, ai9ed at wea$ening the latter in order better to be able to $ee, in chec$ the Slavic nationalities living under 'ustrian rule! n conseLuence, these Slavic nationalities tended to be at best indifferent to the foreign ,olicies of their own govern9ent and at worst to su,,ort actively the ,olicies of Slavic govern9ents directed against their own! Thus it is not sur,rising that during the &irst 8orld 8ar whole Slavic units of the 'ustro - Hungarian ar9y went over to the Russians! The govern9ent dared to use other such units only against nonSlavic ene9ies, such as the talians! &or si9ilar reasons, during the &irst 8orld 8ar the Ger9an ar9y used 'lsatian units against the Russians, and Polish units against the &rench! The Soviet :nion had a si9ilar e),erience of lac$ of 9orale during the Second 8orld 8ar when large contingents co9,osed in the 9ain of :$rainians and Tartars deserted to the Ger9ans! Great Britain had the sa9e e),erience with ndia, whose national energies su,,orted but unwillingly and with reservations the foreign ,olicies of its alien 9aster C if they did not, li$e Bose and his followers during the Second 8orld 8ar, co9e to the assistance of the alien 9asterIs ene9y! "a,oleon and Hitler had to learn to their dis9ay that a9ong the s,oils of foreign conLuest ,o,ular su,,ort of the conLuerorIs ,olicies is not necessarily to be found! The a9ount and strength of the su,,ort Hitler, for instance, found a9ong the conLuered ,eo,les of Euro,e was in inverse ratio to the Luality of the national 9orale of the ,articular ,eo,le! 'ny country with dee, and unbridgeable class divisions will find its national 9orale in a ,recarious state! &rench ,ower ever since the thirties has suffered fro9 this wea$ness! &ro9 the ti9e of HitlerIs ascent to ,ower, the vacillating foreign ,olicies of the &rench govern9ents, following each other in ra,id succession and concealing their i9,otence behind the ideologies of a status Luo they were unwilling and inca,able of defending, has already wea$ened the national 9orale of the &rench ,eo,le as a whole! The crises of ./02 - 0/, with the ever renewed threat of war and general 9obiliHations to 9eet it, followed by HitlerIs successes, de9obiliHations, and an increasingly ,recarious ,eace, had contributed ,owerfully to the general decay of &rench 9orale! 8hile there was decay everywhere, there was actual colla,se only in two i9,ortant sectors of &rench society! ;n the one hand, faced with social legislation li9iting their ,owers, considerable grou,s of the &rench u,,er classes rallied to the cryB JRather Hitler @the ene9y dictatorA then Blu9 @the &rench SocialistASJ 'lthough Hitler threatened the ,osition or &rance in Euro,e and its very e)istence as a nation, these grou,s were unable to give wholehearted su,,ort to the &rench foreign ,olicy o,,osing Hitler! 'fter the
.3

%ev Tolstoy, 8ar and Peace, Part D E, (ha,ter !

conLuest of &rance they favored the do9ination of &rance by Hitler rather than its liberation fro9 the foreign dictator! ;n the other hand, the (o99unists, for different reasons, under9ined the national 9orale of &rance so long as Hitler fought only the ca,italists of the 8est! t was only after he had attac$ed the Soviet :nion that they contributed new strength to &rench national 9orale by fighting in the forefront of the resistance against the invader! However un,redictable the Luality of national 9orale, es,ecially at a 9o9ent of great crisis, there are obvious situations where national 9orale is li$ely to be high, while under certain different conditions the odds are in favor of a low state of national 9orale! ;ne can say, in general, that the 9ore closely identified a ,eo,le are with the actions and obGectives of their govern9ent C es,ecially, of course, in foreign affairs C the better are the chances for national 9orale to be high, and vice versa! Thus it can sur,rise only those who 9ista$enly thin$ of the 9odern totalitarian state in ter9s of the autocracies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that in "aHi Ger9any national 9orale was high al9ost to the last! t declined slowly rather than brea$ing in one sudden colla,se as it did in "ove9ber ./.2! The great bul$ of the Russian ,eo,le, des,ite the greatest hardshi,s in war and ,eace, have consistently shown a high degree of national 9orale! The 9odern totalitarian state has been able to fill the ga, between govern9ent and ,eo,le, a ga, that was ty,ical of the 9onarchies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, through the use of de9ocratic sy9bols, totalitarian control of ,ublic o,inion, and ,olicies actually or see9ingly benefiting the ,eo,le! Practically all national energies flow into the channels chosen by the govern9ent, and the identification of the individual with the state, which we have recogniHed as one of the characteristics of 9odern ,olitics, .1reaches under the sti9ulation of totalitarianis9 the intensity of religious fervor! Therefore, so long as totalitarian govern9ents are or see9 to be successful, or can at least hold out ho,e for success, they can count u,on the deter9ined su,,ort of their ,eo,les for the foreign ,olicies they ,ursue! 8hat totalitarianis9 can achieve only by force, fraud, and deification of the state, de9ocracy 9ust try to acco9,lish through the free inter,lay of ,o,ular forces, guided by a wise and res,onsible govern9ent! 8here the govern9ent is unable to ,revent the degeneration of this inter,lay into class, racial, or religious conflicts, tending to s,lit the national co99unity into warring grou,s, national 9orale is li$ely to be low, at least a9ong the victi9iHed grou,s if not a9ong the ,eo,le as a whole! The ,olicies of &rance before and during the Second 8orld 8ar illustrate this ,oint! So does the wea$ness of the foreign ,olicies in ,eace and war of countries where feudal aristocracies or autocratic dictators control the govern9ent and o,,ress the ,eo,le! The govern9ents of such nations can never choose and ,ursue their foreign obGectives with any degree of deter9ination, even at the ris$ of war, because they can a never be sure of the su,,ort of their ,eo,les! They constantly fear lest the do9estic o,,osition e),loit difficulties and reverses in the international field for the ,ur,ose of overthrowing the regi9e! 8here, however, a govern9ent s,ea$s as the 9outh,iece, and acts as the e)ecutor, of the ,o,ular will, national ^ 9orale is li$ely to reflect the real identity between ,o,ular as,irations and govern9ental actions! The national 9orale of *en9ar$ under the Ger9an occu,ation fro9 ./64 to the end of the Second 8orld 8ar and the bravery of the "orwegians against the invading Ger9ans illustrate this ,oint no less stri$ingly than did the national 9orale of Ger9any until the defeat at Stalingrad! n the last analysis, then, the ,ower of a nation, in view of its national 9orale, resides in the Luality of its govern9ent! ' govern9ent that is truly re,resentative, not only in the sense of ,arlia9entary 9aGorities, but above all in the sense of being able to translate the inarticulate convictions and as,irations of the ,eo,le into international obGectives and ,olicies, has the best chance to 9arshal the national energies in su,,ort of those obGectives and b ,olicies! The adage that free 9en fight better than slaves can be a9,lified into the ,ro,osition that nations well governed are li$ely to have a higher national 9orale than nations ,oorly governed! The Luality of govern9ent is ,atently a source of strength or wea$ness with res,ect to 9ost of the factors u,on which national ,ower de,ends, es,ecially in view of the influence the govern9ent e)erts u,on natural resources, industrial ca,acity, and 9ilitary ,re,aredness! &or the Luality of national 9orale, the Luality of govern9ent ta$es on a s,ecial i9,ortance! 8hereas it o,erates u,on the other ele9ents of national ,ower as one a9ong several influences, all 9ore or less 9anageable by hu9an action, it is the only tangible factor a9ong intangibles which accounts for the Luality of national 9orale! 8ithout national 9orale, national ,ower is either nothing but 9aterial force or else a ,otentiality that awaits its realiHation in vain! #et the only 9eans of deliberately i9,roving national 9orale lies in the i9,rove9ent of the Luality of govern9ent! 'H else is a 9atter of chance! THE 1UALIT3 OF .IPLO$AC3,6 ;f all the factors that 9a$e for the ,ower of a nation, the 9ost i9,ortant, b however unstable, is the Luality of di,lo9acy! 'll the other factors that deter9ine national ,ower are, as it were, the raw 9aterial out of which the ,ower of a nation is fashioned! The Luality of a nationIs di,lo9acy co9bines those different factors into an integrated whole, gives the9 direction and weight, and awa$ens their slu9bering ,otentialities by giving the9 the breath of actual ,ower! The conduct of a nationIs foreign affairs by its di,lo9ats is for national ,ower in ,eace what 9ilitary strategy and tactics by its 9ilitary leaders are for ^ national ,ower in war! t is the art of bringing the different ele9ents of the national ,ower to bear with 9a)i9u9 effect u,on those ,oints in the international situation which concern the national
.1 .2

See ,ages ..2 ff! By @he ter9 Jdi,lo9acy,J as used in the following ,ages, we refer to the for9ation and e)ecution of foreign ,olicy on all levels, the highest as well as the subordinate! ;n the subGect 9atter discussed here, see also Part Ten!

interest 9ost directly! *i,lo9acy, one 9ight say, is the brains of national ,ower, as national b 9orale is its soul! f its vision is blurred, its Gudg9ent defective, and its deter9ination feeble, all the advantages of geogra,hical location, of self-sufficiency in food, raw 9aterials, and industrial ,roduction, of 9ilitary ,re,aredness, of siHe and Luality of ,o,ulation will in the long run avail a nation little! ' nation that can boast of all these advantages, but not of a di,lo9acy co99ensurate with the9, 9ay achieve te9,orary successes through the sheer weight of its natural assets! n the long run, it is li$ely to sLuander the natural assets by activating the9 inco9,letely, haltingly, and wastefully for the nationIs international obGectives! n the long run, such a nation 9ust yield to one whose di,lo9acy is ,re,ared to 9a$e the 9ost of whatever other ele9ents of ,ower are at its dis,osal, thus 9a$ing u, through its own e)cellence for deficiencies in other fields! By using the ,ower ,otentialities of a nation to best advantage, a co9,etent di,lo9acy can increase the ,ower of a nation beyond what one would e),ect it to be in view of all the other factors co9bined! ;ften in history the Goliath without brains or soul has been s9itten and slain by the *avid who had both! *i,lo9acy of high Luality will bring the ends and 9eans of foreign ,olicy into har9ony with the available resources of national ,ower! t will ta, the hidden sources of national strength and transfor9 the9 fully and securely into ,olitical realities! By giving direction to the national effort, it will in turn increase the inde,endent weight of certain factors, such as industrial ,otential, 9ilitary ,re,aredness, national character, and 9orale! t is for this reason that national ,ower is a,t to rise to its height fulfilling all its ,otentialities, ,articularly in ti9es of war, when ends and 9eans of ,olicy are clearly laid out! The :nited States, in the ,eriod between the two world wars, furnishes a stri$ing e)a9,le of a ,otentially ,owerful nation ,laying a 9inor role in world affairs because its foreign ,olicy refused to bring the full weight of its ,otential strength to bear u,on international ,roble9s! 's far as the ,ower of the :nited States on the international scene was concerned, the advantages of geogra,hy natural resources, industrial ,otential, and siHe and Luality of ,o,ulation 9ight as well have not e)isted at all, for '9erican di,lo9acy ,roceeded as though they did not e)ist! The transfor9ation '9erican foreign ,olicy has undergone since the end of the Second 8orld 8ar see9ed to have answered definitively the Luestion whether, and to what e)tent, '9erican di,lo9acy is willing and able to transfor9 the ,otentialities of national ,ower into ,olitical actualities! #et at the beginning of that ,eriod, in an article significantly entitled, J 9,erialis9 or ndifference,J the %ondon Econo9ist still doubted the answer! 'fter enu9erating the factors that, ta$en by the9selves, would 9a$e the :nited States the 9ost ,owerful nation on earth, the Econo9ist continuedB But though these things are essential ingredients, they are not all that it ta$es to 9a$e a Great Power! There 9ust also be the willingness, and the ability, to use econo9ic resources in su,,ort of national ,olicy! The rulers of Soviet Russia !!! are not li$ely, at least for a generation to co9e, to have nearly as good cards in their hands as the '9ericans! But the nature of their syste9 of concentrated ,ower and iron censorshi, enables the9 to ,lay a forcing ga9e! The '9ericansI hand is all tru9,s> but will any of the9 ever be ,layedF 'nd for what ,ur,oseF ./ The classic e)a9,le of a country that, while in other res,ects ho,elessly outclassed, returned to the heights of ,ower chiefly by virtue of its brilliant di,lo9acy is &rance in the ,eriod fro9 .2/4 to ./.6! 'fter is defeat in .214 at the hands of Ger9any, &rance was a second-rate ,ower, and Bis9arc$Is statecraft, by isolating it, $e,t it in that ,osition! 8ith Bis9arc$Is dis9issal in .2/4, Ger9anyIs foreign ,olicy turned away fro9 Russia and was unwilling to alleviate Great BritainIs sus,icion! &rench di,lo9acy too$ full advantage of those 9ista$es of Ger9an foreign ,olicy! n .2/6, &rance added a 9ilitary alliance to the ,olitical understanding reached with Russia in .2/.> in ./46 and ./.=, it entered into infor9al agree9ents with Great Britain! The configuration of ./.6, which found &rance aided by ,otent allies and Ger9any deserted by one @ talyA and burdened with the wea$ness of the others @'ustria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Tur$eyA was in the 9ain the wor$ of a gala)y of brilliant &rench di,lo9atistsB (a9ille Barrere, '9bassador to taly, +ules (a9bon, '9bassador to Ger9any, Paul (a9bon, '9bassador to Great Britain, Maurice Paleologue, '9bassador to Russia! n the ,eriod between the two world wars, Ru9ania owed its ability to ,lay a role in international affairs 9uch su,erior to its actual resources chiefly to the ,ersonality of one 9an, its &oreign Minister Titulescu! Si9ilarly, so s9all and ,recariously located a country as Belgiu9 owed a great deal of the ,ower it was able to e)ercise during the nineteenth century to two shrewd and active $ings, %eo,old and %eo,old ! S,anish di,lo9acy in the seventeenth, and Ele9ents of Tur$ish di,lo9acy in the nineteenth century were able for a ti9e to co9,ensate for the decline of national ,ower in other res,ects! The u,s and downs of British ,ower are closely connected with changes in the Luality of British di,lo9acy! (ardinal 8olsey, (astlereagh, and (anning signify the su99its of British di,lo9acy as well as of British ,ower, while %ord "orth and "eville (ha9berlain stand for the decline of both! 8hat would the ,ower of &rance have been without the statecraft of Richelieu, MaHarin, and TalleyrandF 8hat would Ger9anyIs ,ower have been without Bis9arc$F talyIs without (avourF 'nd what did the ,ower of the young '9erican re,ublic not owe to &ran$lin, +efferson, Madison, +ay, the 'da9ses, its a9bassadors and secretaries of stateF "ations 9ust rely u,on the Luality of their di,lo9acy to act as a catalyst for the different factors that constitute their ,ower! n other words, these different factors, as they are brought to bear u,on an international ,roble9 by di,lo9acy, are what is called a nationIs ,ower! Therefore it is of the ut9ost i9,ortance that the good Luality of the
./

Econo9ist, May =6, ./61, ,! 125! @Re,rinted by ,er9ission!A

di,lo9atic service be constant! 'nd constant Luality is best assured by de,endence u,on tradition and institutions b rather than u,on the s,oradic a,,earance of outstanding individuals! t is to tradition that Great Britain owes the relative constancy of its ,ower fro9 Henry E to the &irst 8orld 8ar! 8hatever the whi9s and shortco9ings of its $ings and 9inisters 9ay have been, the traditions of its ruling class and, in recent ti9es, its ,rofessional foreign service were able, a few notable e)ce,tions notwithstanding, to 9old the ,rereLuisites of national ,ower, with which Great Britain was endowed, into the greatness of its actual ,ower! t is no accident that when, due to the di,lo9acy of Stanley Baldwin and "eville (ha9berlain, British ,ower reached its lowest ,oint in centuries, the ,rofessionals of the &oreign ;ffice had little influence u,on the conduct of British foreign ,olicy, and that the two 9en 9ainly res,onsible for it were, in ter9s of fa9ily tradition, business9en and newco9ers to the aristocracy that for centuries had ruled Great Britain! n 8inston (hurchill, the scion of a ruling fa9ily, the aristocratic traditions were again brought to bear u,on the national ,ower of Great Britain! Today the institutional e)cellence of the British foreign service reveals itself in the s$ill with which Great Britain has brought its co99it9ents all over the world into har9ony with the reduced resources of its national ,ower! ;n the other hand, Ger9any owed its ,ower to the de9oniac genius of two 9en, Bis9arc$ and Hitler! Since Bis9arc$Is ,ersonality and ,olicies 9ade it i9,ossible for traditions and institutions to develo, that 9ight have been able to ,er,etuate the intelligent conduct of Ger9anyIs foreign ,olicy, his disa,,earance fro9 the ,olitical scene in .2/4 was the signal for a dee, and ,er9anent dro, in the Luality of Ger9an di,lo9acy! The conseLuent deterioration of Ger9anyIs international ,osition cul9inated in the 9ilitary ,redica9ent with which the &irst 8orld 8ar confronted it! n the case of Hitler, the strength and wea$ness of Ger9an di,lo9acy lay in the 9ind of the &uhrer hi9self! The victories Ger9an di,lo9acy won fro9 ./00 to ./64 were the victories of one 9anIs 9ind, and the deterioration of that 9ind was a direct cause of the disasters that 9ar$ed the last years of the "aHi regi9e! The national suicide of Ger9any in the last 9onths of the Second 8orld 8ar, when 9ilitary resistance had beco9e a futile gesture ,aid for in hundreds of thousands of lives and the ruin of cities, and HitlerIs suicide in the last stage of the war C the self - e)tinction, in other words, of Ger9anyIs national ,ower and of the life of its leader C were both the wor$ of one 9an! That 9an was unfettered by those traditions and institutional safeguards by which healthy ,olitical syste9s try to ,rovide for continuity in the Luality of di,lo9acy and thus tend to inhibit the s,ectacular successes of genius as well as the abys9al blunders of 9ad9en! So far as continuity in the Luality of the conduct of foreign affairs is concerned, the :nited States stands between the continuous high Luality of British di,lo9acy and the traditional low Luality, interru,ted by short-lived triu9,hs, of Ger9an foreign ,olicy! 8ith an unchallengeable su,eriority in 9aterial and hu9an resources at its dis,osal, '9erican di,lo9acy in the 8estern He9is,here could not fail to be successful in so9e 9easure, regardless of the Luality of its foreign ,olicy! The sa9e has been true to a lesser degree in the relations between the :nited States and the rest of the world! The Jbig stic$J in the for9 of the 9aterial su,eriority of the :nited States s,o$e its own language, regardless of whether '9erican di,lo9acy s,o$e in a soft or loud voice, in articulate or confused ter9s, with or without a clearly conceived ,ur,ose! The brilliance of the first decades of '9erican di,lo9acy was followed by a long ,eriod of 9ediocrity, if not ine,titude, interru,ted under the i9,act of great crises by three brief ,eriods of great achieve9ents under 8oodrow 8ilson, &ran$lin *! Roosevelt, and Harry Tru9an! 8hile '9erican di,lo9acy was thus lac$ing in the institutional e)cellence of the British, it had the benefit of 9aterial conditions that even ,oor statecraft could hardly dissi,ate! &urther9ore, it could draw u,on a national tradition, for9ulated in 8ashingtonIs &arewell 'ddress and, 9ore ,articularly, in the Monroe *octrine! The guidance of this tradition would ,rotect a ,oor di,lo9acy fro9 catastro,hic blunders and 9a$e a 9ediocre di,lo9acy loo$ better than it actually was! :nanswered is the Luestion whether such a tradition can save '9erican di,lo9acy fro9 a crusading ideological a,,roach!

THE 1UALIT3 OF )O#ERN$ENT The best conceived and 9ost e),ertly e)ecuted foreign ,olicy, drawing u,on an abundance of 9aterial and hu9an resources, 9ust co9e to naught if it cannot draw also u,on good govern9ent! Good govern9ent, viewed as an inde,endent reLuire9ent of national ,ower, =49eans three thingsB balance between, on the one hand, the 9aterial and hu9an resources that go into the 9a$ing of national ,ower and, on the other, the foreign ,olicy to be ,ursuedB balance a9ong those resources> and ,o,ular su,,ort for the foreign ,olicies to be ,ursued! The Prob"em o! &a"an$e &et-een +esour$es an( Po"i$ Good govern9ent, then, 9ust start by ,erfor9ing two different intellectual o,erations! &irst, it 9ust choose the obGectives and 9ethods of its foreign ,olicy in view of the ,ower available to su,,ort the9 with a 9a)i9u9 chance of success! ' nation that sets its sights too low, forgoing foreign ,olicies well within the reach of its ,ower, abdicates its rightful role in the council of nations> the :nited States fell into that error in the interwar ,eriod! ' nation 9ay also set its sights too high and ,ursue ,olicies that cannot be successfully e)ecuted with the available ,ower> this was the error which the :nited States co99itted during the ,eace negotiations in ././! 's %loyd George ,ut itB JThe '9ericans a,,eared to assu9e res,onsibility for the sole guardianshi, of the Ten (o99and9ents and for the
=4

8e have already s,o$en of @he Luality of govern9ent as a reLuire9ent of national 9oraleB see ,ages .5= ff!

Ser9on on the Mount> yet, when it ca9e to a ,ractical Luestion of assistance and res,onsibility, they absolutely refused to acce,t it!J ' nation 9ay try to ,lay the role of a great ,ower without having the ,rereLuisites for doing so, and will court disaster, as Poland did in the interwar ,eriod! ;r, being a great ,ower, it 9ay e9bar$ u,on a ,olicy of unli9ited conLuest, overta)ing its strength> the unsuccessful world-conLuerors, fro9 'le)ander to Hitler, illustrate that ,oint! Thus the national ,ower available deter9ines the li9its of foreign ,olicy! There is only one e)ce,tion to @hat rule, and that is when the very e)istence of the nation is at sta$e! Then the ,olicy of national survival overrides the rational considerations of national ,ower, and the e9ergency reverses the nor9al relationshi, between ,olicy and considerations of ,ower, establishing the ,ri9acy of the for9er! ' nation is then called u,on to subordinate all other interests to that of survival and to 9a$e a national effort that rationally could not have been e),ected of it! This is what Great Britain did in the fall and winter of ./64C6.! The Prob"em o! &a"an$e Among +esour$es ;nce a govern9ent has brought its foreign ,olicy into balance with the ,ower available to it, it 9ust bring the different ele9ents of national ,ower into balance with each other! ' nation does not necessarily attain the 9a)i9u9 of national ,ower because it is very rich in natural resources, ,ossesses a very large ,o,ulation, or has built an enor9ous industrial and 9ilitary establish9ent! t attains that 9a)i9u9 when it has at its dis,osal a sufficient Luantity and Luality, in the right ad9i)ture, of those resources of ,ower which will allow it to ,ursue a given foreign ,olicy with a 9a)i9u9 chance of success! Great Britain, when it was at the su99it of its ,ower, was deficient in 9any of the ele9ents of national ,ower, such as natural resources, siHe of ,o,ulation, and ground troo,s! #et it had develo,ed to unchallengeable su,re9acy that one ele9ent of national ,ower, the navy, which was a ,erfect instru9ent for the British ,olicy of overseas e),ansion, and at the sa9e ti9e assured the uninterru,ted flow fro9 abroad of those raw 9aterials and foodstuffs without which Great Britain could not have survived! n view of this ,olicy, of the available natural resources, and of the geogra,hic location, a large ,o,ulation and a standing ar9y would have been for Great Britain a handica, rather than an asset! ;n the other hand, had Great Britain continued to ,ursue a ,olicy of continental e),ansion, as it did during the better ,art of the Middle 'ges, it would have been in need of both! ' large ,o,ulation is a source of wea$ness rather than of strength, as the e)a9,le of ndia has shown us, =. if it cannot be adeLuately fed with the available resources! The hasty building of great industrial and 9ilitary establish9ents by totalitarian 9ethods creates certain ele9ents of national ,ower, but in its very ,rocess destroys others, such as national 9orale and the ,hysical resilience of the ,o,ulation> the develo,9ents in the Soviet satellites of Eastern Euro,e are a case in ,oint! To ,lan for a 9ilitary establish9ent that is too big to be su,,orted by the available industrial ca,acity, and hence can be built and 9aintained only at the ,rice of gallo,ing inflation, econo9ic crisis, and deterioration of 9orale, is to ,lan for national wea$ness rather than for ,ower! n a national e9ergency, when the very e)istence of the nation is at sta$e, the '9erican govern9ent, for instance, can and 9ust offer the ,eo,le guns instead of butter> if it cannot 9a$e a case for such an e9ergency, it 9ust stri$e a balance between 9ilitary and civilian reLuire9ents by allocating a fair share of the econo9ic ,roduct for civilian consu9,tion! 'nother govern9ent, such as the (hinese or 7orean, 9ight not need to ta$e such considerations of civilian welfare into account! n other words, a govern9ent in its building of national ,ower cannot be oblivious to the character of the nation it governs! ;ne nation will revolt against hardshi,s that another nation will ta$e ,atiently in its stride, and so9eti9es a nation will sur,rise the world and itself by the sacrifices it willingly 9a$es for the defense of its interests and its e)istence! The Prob"em o! Popu"ar Support ' conte9,orary govern9ent, es,ecially one subGect to de9ocratic control, has only ,erfor9ed ,art of its tas$ when it has established the two ty,es of balances which we have discussed above! 'nother tas$, ,erha,s the 9ost difficult of all, still lies ahead of it! t 9ust secure the a,,roval of its own ,eo,le for its foreign ,olicies and the do9estic ones designed to 9obiliHe the ele9ents of national ,ower in su,,ort of the9! That tas$ is difficult because the conditions under which ,o,ular su,,ort can be obtained for a foreign ,olicy are not necessarily identical with the conditions under which a foreign ,olicy can be successfully ,ursued! 's TocLueville ,ut it, with s,ecial reference to the :nited StatesB &oreign ,olitics de9and scarcely any of those Lualities which are ,eculiar to a de9ocracy> they reLuire, on the contrary, the ,erfect use of al9ost all those in which it is deficient! *e9ocracy is favorable to the increase of the internal resources of a state> it diffuses wealth and co9fort, ,ro9otes ,ublic s,irit, and fortifies the res,ect for law in all classes of societyB all these are advantages which have only an indirect influence over the relations which one ,eo,le bears to another! But a de9ocracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an i9,ortant underta$ing, ,ersevere in a fi)ed design, and wor$ out its e)ecution in s,ite of serious obstacles! t cannot co9bine its 9easures with secrecy or await their conseLuences with ,atience! ! ! ! The ,ro,ensity that induces de9ocracies to obey i9,ulse rather than ,rudence, and to abandon 9ature design for the gratification of a 9o9entary ,assion, was clearly seen in '9erica on the brea$ing out of the &rench Revolution! t was then as evident to the si9,lest ca,acity as it is at the ,resent ti9e that the interest of the '9ericans forbade the9 to ta$e any ,art in the contest which was about to deluge Euro,e with blood, but which
=.

See ,ages .=1, .=2!

could not inGure their own country! But the sy9,athies of the ,eo,le declared the9selves with so 9uch violence in favor of &rance that nothing but the infle)ible character of 8ashington and the i99ense ,o,ularity which he enGoyed could have ,revented the '9ericans fro9 declaring war against England! 'nd even then, the e)ertions which the austere reason of that great 9an 9ade to re,ress the generous but i9,rudent ,assions of his fellow citiHens nearly de,rived hi9 of the sole reco9,ense which he ever clai9ed, that of his countryIs love! The 9aGority re,robated his ,olicy, but it was afterwards a,,roved by the whole nation! == Thin$ing reLuired for the successful conduct of foreign ,olicy can be dia9etrically o,,osed to the rhetoric and action by which the 9asses and their re,resentatives are li$ely to be 9oved! The ,eculiar Lualities of the states9anIs 9ind are not always li$ely to find a favorable res,onse in the ,o,ular 9ind! The states9an 9ust thin$ in ter9s of the national interest, conceived as ,ower a9ong other ,owers! The ,o,ular 9ind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the states9anIs thin$ing, reasons 9ore often than not in the si9,le 9oralistic and legalistic ter9s of absolute good and absolute evil! The states9an 9ust ta$e the long view, ,roceeding slowly and by detours, ,aying with s9all losses for great advantage> he 9ust be able to te9,oriHe, to co9,ro9ise, to bide his ti9e! The ,o,ular 9ind wants Luic$ results> it will sacrifice to9orrowIs real benefit for todayIs a,,arent advantage! f TocLuevilleIs ,oint is well ta$en, the $ind of thin$ing reLuired for the successful conduct of foreign ,olicy will at ti9es be o,,osed to considerations by which ,eo,le are 9oved! ' foreign ,olicy that is ,assionately and overwhel9ingly su,,orted by ,ublic o,inion cannot be assu9ed for that reason alone to be good foreign ,olicy! ;n the contrary, the har9ony between foreign ,olicy and ,ublic o,inion 9ay well have been achieved at the ,rice of surrendering the ,rinci,les of good foreign ,olicy to the unsound ,references of ,ublic o,inion! n the '9erican case these inherent difficulties are aggravated by the fact that the :nited States is al9ost continuously recovering fro9 the last elections or ,re,aring for the ne)t one! Es,ecially in the latter case, the te9,tation is overwhel9ing for an ad9inistration to see$ to gain electoral advantage by catering to the ,references of ,ublic o,inion, regardless of foreign ,olicy! Thus one reLuire9ent of the states9anIs art is to steer a 9iddle course between res,ect for the ,erennial ,rinci,les of sound foreign ,olicy and the fic$le ,references of ,ublic o,inion! These considerations shed an illu9inating light u,on the a,,arent ,arado) of President +i99y (arter, who e9erged fro9 the *e9ocratic ,ri9aries in ./24 as virtually unbeatable in his a,,eal to the electorate, yet under his leadershi, the :nited States had suffered a string of hu9iliating defeats in its relations with other nations! The 9ost s,ectacular of these defeats was the continuing ca,tivity of fifty hostages in ran! By foreswearing fro9 the outset any for9 of violence in res,onse to this outrage, (arter de,rived hi9self of any leverage against ran! The disadvantages he was able to threaten ran with, ,ri9arily econo9ic sanctions, were bound to be ineffective! The advantages he could offer @such as econo9ic and 9ilitary aidA did not outweigh, in the eyes of the ranians, the ris$s and liabilities '9erican largesse would entail! Thus the :nited States stood hel,less C in a situation which in 9ost other ,eriods of '9erican history would have called forth swift action to settle the issue, even at the ris$ of so9e '9erican lives! But the President, by ,utting the e9,hasis on saving '9erican lives by ,eaceful 9eans, hit u,on a sy9,athetic chord in '9erican ,ublic o,inion! (arter did what 8ilson had allegedly done beforeB JHe $e,t us out of war!J He did so without abandoning the 9ost visible and senti9ental '9erican obGectiveB saving those fifty '9erican lives! t a,,arently did not occur to ,ublic o,inion or to the President that the leader res,onsible for '9erican foreign ,olicy has a duty not only to ,reserve lives, but also to ,reserve the long-ter9 interests of the nation! The sa9e 9i)ture of rhetorical co99it9ent and ,olitical inaction has secured ,ublic su,,ort for our ,olicies toward the Soviet :nion and assured their ineffectiveness at the sa9e ti9e! Regardless of oneIs inter,retation of the significance of the Soviet 9ilitary ta$eover of 'fghanistan, the belligerent verbal reaction of the President was out of all ,ro,ortion to the actual 9easures ta$en in res,onse to that ta$eover! #et while that belligerence 9ay have sur,rised the Russians, the absence of action co99ensurate with that rhetoric did nothing to induce a change in their ,olicies! The Russians will go as far as they can without ,rovo$ing the :nited States into a nuclear confrontation! Positive cases in ,oint are the (uban 9issile crisis and the successive Berlin crises> a negative confir9ation of this thesis was the e)tended 9ilitary occu,ation of 'fghanistan! However, the PresidentIs belligerent stance a,,eared to be a great success in do9estic ,olitics! The President who had declared his intention to 9a$e the ,rotection and ,ro9otion of hu9an rights the cornerstone of his foreign ,olicy s,o$e to the Soviet :nion in the language of +ohn &oster *ulles! Public-o,inion ,olls registered overwhel9ing ,o,ular a,,rovalB once again, a futile foreign ,olicy was co9,ensated for by do9estic triu9,h! Here, however, Mr! (arter encountered another dile99a, su,eri9,osed u,on the one between foreign ,olicy and do9estic ,olitics! t evolved fro9 the rational unacce,tability of nuclear confrontation! The need of great ,owers to defend and ,ro9ote their interests by the use of force as a last resort i9,lies in the case of the :nited States and the Soviet :nion the ,ossibility of using nuclear wea,ons as an instru9ent of force! #et the use of nuclear wea,ons not as a single, isolated de9onstration, as at Hiroshi9a and "agasa$i, but as nor9al instru9ents of warfare would 9ean the destruction of all the belligerents as viable societies! "uclear wea,ons thus used C in contrast to conventional wea,ons C would not be a rational 9eans to the rational ends of foreign ,olicy, but instru9ents of des,eration denoting suicide and genocide! This was the second funda9ental dile99a (arter faced! The anarchic character of the international syste9 forced hi9, following a convention coter9inous with history, to conte9,late resort to ,hysical violence as the ulti9ate factor in the settle9ent of international issues! #et the
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'le)is de TocLueville, *e9ocracy in '9erica @"ew #or$B 'lfred '! 7no,f, ./65A, Eol! , ,,! =06 - 5!

irrationality of the all-out use of such violence 9ade hi9 shrin$ fro9 the use even of conventional violence lest it 9ight escalate into nuclear war! Thus in an international crisis today the President acts with ut9ost caution, if he acts at all, and he co9,ensates for the lac$ of effective action with belligerent tal$! n this tendency, President (arter did not stand alone! Po,ular su,,ort is the ,recondition of the PresidentIs stewardshi, of foreign ,olicy! The creation of a ,ublic o,inion su,,orting hi9, even at the sacrifice of so9e ele9ents of foreign ,olicy, is a tas$ which a President can only shun at the ris$ of losing office and, with it, his ability to ,ursue any foreign ,olicy at all! The Luestion to which (arterIs conduct gave rise concerned not the need of a co9,ro9ise between the reLuire9ents of a sound foreign ,olicy and the de9ands of ,ublic o,inion, but the ,oint at which the co9,ro9ise was to be 9ade! 'side fro9 faulting hi9 for ignorance and inco9,etence, the critics 9aintained that he surrendered too 9any ,rinci,les of a sound foreign ,olicy to the de9ands of ,ublic o,inion! The issue was not whether the President ought to ,ursue the national interest regardless of the ,ossibility of nuclear war, but where to draw the line between concern for the national interest and fear of nuclear war! The Luestion was whether (arter, in his an)iety to stay as far away as ,ossible fro9 nuclear war, had not needlessly sacrificed i9,ortant national interests! (onfronted with this dile99a between a good foreign ,olicy and a bad one that ,ublic o,inion de9ands, a govern9ent 9ust avoid two ,itfalls! t 9ust resist the te9,tation to sacrifice what it considers good ,olicy u,on the altar of ,ublic o,inion, abdicating leadershi, and e)changing short-lived ,olitical advantage for the ,er9anent interests of the country! t 9ust also avoid widening the unavoidable ga, between the reLuire9ents of good foreign ,olicy and the ,references of ,ublic o,inion! t widens that ga, if, shunning tolerable co9,ro9ise with the ,references of ,ublic o,inion, it stic$s in every detail to a foreign ,olicy it considers to be right, and sacrifices ,ublic su,,ort to the stubborn ,ursuit of that ,olicy! nstead, the govern9ent, to be successful in its foreign and do9estic ,olicies ali$e, 9ust co9,ly with three basic reLuire9ents! t 9ust recogniHe that the conflict between the reLuire9ents of good foreign ,olicy and the ,references of ,ublic o,inion is in the nature of things and, hence, unavoidable, and that it can ,erha,s be narrowed, but it can never be bridged, by concessions to the do9estic o,,osition! Second, the govern9ent 9ust realiHe that it is the leader and not the slave of ,ublic o,inion> that ,ublic o,inion is not a static thing to be discovered and classified by ,ublico,inion ,olls as ,lants are by botanists, but that it is a dyna9ic, ever changing entity to be continuously created and recreated by infor9ed and res,onsible leadershi,> that it is the historic 9ission of the govern9ent to assert that leadershi, lest it be the de9agogue who asserts it!=0 Third, it 9ust distinguish between what is desirable in its foreign ,olicy and what is essential, and while it 9ay be willing to co9,ro9ise with ,ublic o,inion on nonessentials, it 9ust fight, even at the ris$ of its own fortunes, for what it regards to be the irreducible 9ini9u9 of good foreign ,olicy! ' govern9ent 9ay have a correct understanding of the reLuire9ents of foreign ,olicy and of the do9estic ,olitics to su,,ort the9, but if it fails in 9arshaling ,ublic o,inion behind these ,olicies, its labors will be in vain, and all the other assets of national ,ower of which the nation can boast will not be used to best advantage! ;f this truth the ,olicies of conte9,orary de9ocratic govern9ents, including those of the :nited States, offer abundant ,roof! =6 %omesti$ Go8ernment an( :oreign Po"i$ t is not enough, however, for a govern9ent to 9arshal national ,ublic o,inion behind its foreign ,olicies! t 9ust also gain the su,,ort of the ,ublic o,inion of other nations for its foreign and do9estic ,olicies! This reLuire9ent is a reflection of the changes that have occurred in recent ti9es in the character of foreign ,olicy! &oreign ,olicy is being ,ursued in our ti9e not only with the traditional wea,ons of di,lo9acy and 9ilitary 9ight, but also with the novel wea,on of ,ro,aganda! &or the struggle for ,ower on the international scene is today not only a struggle for 9ilitary su,re9acy and ,olitical do9ination, but in a s,ecific sense a struggle for the 9inds of 9en! The ,ower of a nation, then, de,ends not only u,on the s$ill of its di,lo9acy and the strength of its ar9ed forces but also u,on the attractiveness for other nations of its ,olitical ,hiloso,hy, ,olitical institutions, and ,olitical ,olicies! This is true in ,articular of the :nited States and the Soviet :nion, who co9,ete with each other not only as the two ,olitical and 9ilitary su,er,owers but also as the fore9ost re,resentatives of two different ,olitical ,hiloso,hies, syste9s of govern9ent, and ways of life! Thus whatever these su,er,owers C and this is true also, in a lesser degree, of other nations C do or do not do, achieve or fail to achieve, in their do9estic and foreign ,olicies has a direct bearing u,on their standing as these re,resentatives and, hence, u,on their ,ower! ' nation, for instance, that e9bar$ed u,on a ,olicy of racial discri9ination could not hel, losing the struggle for the 9inds of the colored nations of the earth! 'n underdevelo,ed nation that could increase in a s,ectacular fashion the health, literacy, and standard of living of its ,eo,le would thereby
=0

%ord "orwich, who as Mr! *uff (oo,er occu,ied in the interwar ,eriod i9,ortant cabinet ,osts and other govern9ent ,ositions, ,uts his finger on the co99on 9isunderstanding of ,ublic o,inion and the govern9entIs relation to it when he says in his 9e9oirs @;ld Men &orget Q%ondonB Hart-*avis, ./50+A of "eville (ha9berlainB JThe Pri9e MinisterIs 9ain 9ista$e see9s to 9e to be two! He believes ,ublic o,inion is what the JTi9esJ tells hi9 it is C and he believes (onservative o,inion is what the (hief 8hi, says it is!J :nfortunately, this ,assive acce,tance of what so9ebody says ,ublic o,inion wants has beco9e C and not only in the England of the interwar ,eriod C one of the 9a9 obstacles to good foreign ,olicy! =6 This the9e has been elaborated in Hans +! Morgenthau, JThe (onduct of &oreign Policy,J 's,ects of '9erican Govern9ent, Sydney Bailey, editor @%ondonB The Hansard Society, ./54A, ,,! // ff!> and n *efense of the "ational nterest @"ew #or$B 'lfred '! 7no,f, ./5.> 8ashington, *!(!B :niversity Press of '9erica, ./2=A, ,,! ==. ff!

have achieved a considerable increase in its ,ower in other underdevelo,ed regions of the world! 't this ,oint, then, as at others to be 9entioned later,J the traditional distinction between foreign and do9estic ,olicies tends to brea$ down! ;ne 9ight al9ost be te9,ted to say that there are no longer any ,urely do9estic affairs, for whatever a nation does or does not do is held for or against it as a reflection of its ,olitical ,hiloso,hy, syste9 of govern9ent, and way of life! ' do9estic achieve9ent that is intelligible to other nations in ter9s of their as,irations cannot fail to increase the ,ower of the nation> a do9estic failure, eLually intelligible, is bound to decrease it!

*7 E7aluation of National Power THE TA'8 OF E#ALUATION t is the tas$ of those res,onsible for the foreign ,olicy of a nation and of those who 9old ,ublic o,inion with regard to international affairs to evaluate correctly the bearing of these factors u,on the ,ower of their own nation and of other nations as well, and this tas$ 9ust be ,erfor9ed for both the ,resent and the future! 8hat is the influence of the unification of the ar9ed services u,on the Luality of the 9ilitary establish9ent of the :nited StatesF 8hat effect will the use of nuclear energy have u,on the industrial ca,acity of the :nited States and of other nationsF How will the industrial ca,acity, 9ilitary strength, and national 9orale of (hina develo, after *engIs deathF How has the hostility of (hina and Pa$istan influenced the national 9orale of ndiaF 8hat is the significance of the revival of a Ger9an ar9y for the national ,ower of Ger9anyF Has reeducation changed the national character of Ger9any and +a,anF How has the national character of the ,eo,le of 'rgentina reacted u,on the ,olitical ,hiloso,hies, 9ethods, and obGectives of successive 9ilitary and civilian regi9esF n what ways does the advance9ent of the Russian s,here of influence to the Elbe River affect the geogra,hical ,osition of the Soviet :nionF 8ill this or that reorganiHation or change in the ,ersonnel of the State *e,art9ent strengthen or wea$en the Luality of '9erican di,lo9acyF 8hat about a reunified Ger9anyF These are so9e of the Luestions which 9ust be answered correctly if a nationIs foreign ,olicy is to be successful! #et these Luestions referring to changes in one ,articular factor are not the 9ost difficult to answer! There are others which concern the influence of changes in one factor u,on other factors, and here the difficulties increase and the ,itfalls 9ulti,ly! 8hat is, for instance, the i9,ort of the 9odern technology of warfare for the geogra,hical ,osition of the :nited StatesF How, in other words, do guided 9issiles and su,ersonic ,lanes affect the geogra,hical isolation of the :nited States fro9 other countriesF To what degree will the :nited States lose, and to what degree will it retain, its traditional inviolability to overseas attac$F 8hat do the sa9e technological develo,9ents 9ean in view of the geogra,hy of Russian territoryF To what e)tent have these factors reduced the ,rotective function of the wide e),anses of the Russian ,lainsF 'nd what, in this conte)t, of the ,rotection the (hannel has afforded Great Britain since the beginning of British historyF 8hat will the industrialiHation of BraHil, (hina, and ndia signify for the 9ilitary strength of these countriesF 8hat is the relative i9,ortance of the '9erican ar9y, navy, and air force in view of changes in the technology of warfareF 8hat does the antici,ated rate of increase of the '9erican ,o,ulation in the ne)t two decades and the 9ore ra,id increase of the ,o,ulations of %atin '9erica, ndia, and (hina ,ortend for the industrial ca,acity and 9ilitary strength of the res,ective nationsF How will fluctuations in industrial ,roduction affect the national 9orale of the :nited States, the Soviet :nion, Ger9any, Great Britain, and &ranceF 8ill the British national character ,reserve its traditional Lualities under the i9,act of the funda9ental changes which the industrial ca,acity, 9ilitary strength, and the geogra,hical isolation of Great Britain are undergoingF 8ill inde,endence for the countries of eastern Euro,e strengthen national 9oraleF The tas$ of the analyst of national ,ower does not, however, sto, here! He 9ust yet try to answer another grou, of Luestions of a still higher order of difficulty! These Luestions concern the co9,arison of one ,ower factor in one nation with the sa9e or another ,ower factor in another nation! n other words, they concern the relative weight of changes in the individual co9,onents of the ,ower of different nations for the over-all ,ower relations of these different nations! f one considers, for instance, the relative ,ower of the :nited States and the Soviet :nion at a ,articular 9o9ent, let us say in .//., the Luestion arises of how the different ,ower factors on either side add u, and to which side, and in what res,ects, they give a su,eriority in ,ower! To what e)tent does the Luantitatively and Lualitatively su,erior industrial ca,acity of the :nited States co9,ensate for the ,robable inferiority of its land forcesF 8hat are the res,ective strengths and wea$nesses of the highly concentrated '9erican industrial and ,o,ulation centers, with their great vulnerability to air attac$ and their great ease of co99unication, and of the dis,ersed Russian centers, ,artly secret in location and character, yet faced with great difficulties in trans,ortationF 8hat ,ower did the Soviet :nion derive fro9 the e),osure of 8estern Euro,e to ideological and 9ilitary ,enetration fro9 the EastF 8hat wea$ness does it suffer fro9 its e),osure to air and naval attac$ fro9 the PacificF 8hat is the significance, in ter9s of the res,ective ,ower ,ositions, of the ,luralistic o,eration in the :nited States of grou,s subservient to Soviet foreign ,olicy, and of the changing character of Soviet ,ublic o,inionF 8hat is the i9,act u,on the national ,ower of the :nited States of a de9ocratic for9 of govern9ent and of a nontotalitarian econo9ic syste9 in co9,arison with the ,olitical and econo9ic organiHation of the Soviet :nionF

These and si9ilar Luestions 9ust be as$ed and answered with regard to all nations that ,lay an active role on the international scene! The relative influence of the different factors u,on national ,ower 9ust be deter9ined with regard to all nations that co9,ete with each other in the field of international ,olitics! Thus one ought to $now whether &rance is stronger than taly and in what res,ects! ;ne ought to $now what the assets and liabilities in ter9s of the different ,ower factors of ndia or (hina are with res,ect to the Soviet :nion, of +a,an with regard to the :nited States, of 'rgentina with regard to (hile, and so on! The tas$ of ,ower co9,utation is still not co9,leted! n order to gain at least an a,,ro)i9ately true ,icture of the distribution of ,ower a9ong several nations, the ,ower relations, as they see9 to e)ist at a ,articular 9o9ent in history, 9ust be ,roGected into the future! To achieve this it is not enough to as$ oneselfB 8hat are the ,ower relations between the :nited States and the Soviet :nion at this 9o9ent, and what are they li$ely to be two years henceF *ecisions on international 9atters based u,on, and referring to, the ,ower relations between the :nited States and the Soviet :nion cannot wait for 9easure9ents of ,ower every two years! They 9ust be 9ade every day! 'nd everyday changes, however s9all and i9,erce,tible at first, in the factors 9a$ing for national ,ower add an ounce of strength to this side and ta$e a grain of 9ight away fro9 the other! ;n the relatively stable foundation of geogra,hy the ,yra9id of national ,ower rises through different gradations of instability to its ,ea$ in the fleeting ele9ent of national 9orale! 'll the factors we have 9entioned, with the e)ce,tion of geogra,hy, are in constant flu), influencing each other and influenced in turn by the unforeseeable intervention of nature and 9an! Together they for9 the strea9 of national ,ower, rising slowly and then flowing on a high level for centuries, as in Great Britain, or rising stee,ly and falling shar,ly fro9 its crest, as was the case in Ger9any> or, as in the :nited States and the Soviet :nion, rising stee,ly and facing the uncertainties of the future! To chart the course of the strea9 and of the different currents that co9,ose it, and to antici,ate the changes in their direction and s,eed, is the ideal tas$ of the observer of international ,olitics! t is an ideal tas$ and, hence, inca,able of achieve9ent! Even if those res,onsible for the foreign ,olicy of a nation were endowed with su,erior wisdo9 and unfailing Gudg9ent, and could draw u,on the 9ost co9,lete and reliable sources of infor9ation, there would be un$nown factors to s,oil their calculations! They could not foresee such natural catastro,hes as fa9ines and e,ide9ics, such 9an-9ade catastro,hes as wars and revolutions, as well as inventions and discoveries, the rise and disa,,earance of intellectual, 9ilitary, and ,olitical leaders, the thoughts and actions of such leaders, not to s,ea$ of the i9,onderables of national 9orale! n short, even the wisest and best infor9ed of 9en would still have to face all the contingencies of history and of nature! 'ctually, however, the assu9ed ,erfection in intellect and infor9ation is never available! "ot all the 9en who infor9 those who 9a$e decisions in foreign affairs are well infor9ed, and not all the 9en who 9a$e decisions are wise! Thus the tas$ of assessing the relative ,ower of nations for the ,resent and for the future resolves itself into a series of hunches, of which so9e will certainly turn out to be wrong while others 9ay be ,roved by subseLuent events to have been correct! The success or failure of a foreign ,olicy, in so far as it de,ends u,on such ,ower calculations, is deter9ined by the relative Z i9,ortance of the right and wrong hunches 9ade by those res,onsible for a ,articular foreign ,olicy of a ,articular nation, as well as by those who conduct the foreign affairs of other nations! So9eti9es the 9ista$es in the assess9ent of ,ower relations co99itted by one nation are co9,ensated for by the 9ista$es co99itted by another! Thus the success of the foreign ,olicy of a nation 9ay be due less to the accuracy of its own calculations than to the greater errors of the other side! T>PICAL '++O+S O: '@AL;ATION ;f all the errors that nations can co99it in evaluating their own ,ower and the ,ower of other nations, three ty,es are so freLuent and illustrate so well the intellectual ,itfalls and ,ractical ris$s inherent in such evaluations that they deserve so9e further discussion! The first disregards the relativity of ,ower by erecting the ,ower of one ,articular nation into an absolute! The second ta$es for granted the ,er9anency of a certain factor that has in the ,ast ,layed a decisive role, thus overloo$ing the dyna9ic change to which 9ost ,ower factors are subGect! The third attributes to one single factor a decisive i9,ortance, to the neglect of all the others! n other words, the first error consists in not correlating the ,ower of one nation to the ,ower of other nations, the second consists in not correlating actual ,ower at one ti9e to ,ossible ,ower at so9e future ti9e, and the third consists in not correlating one ,ower factor to others of the sa9e nation!

The Abso"ute Chara$ter o! Po-er 8hen we refer to the ,ower of a nation by saying that this nation is very ,owerful and that nation is wea$, we always i9,ly a co9,arison! n other words, the conce,t of ,ower is always a relative one! 8hen we say that the :nited States is at ,resent one of the two 9ost ,owerful nations on earth, what we are actually saying is that if we co9,are the ,ower of the :nited States with the ,ower of all other nations, as they e)ist at ,resent, we find that the :nited States is 9ore ,owerful than all others save one! t is one of the 9ost ele9ental and freLuent errors in international ,olitics to neglect this relative character of ,ower and to deal instead with the ,ower of a nation as though it were an absolute! The evaluation of the ,ower of &rance in the ,eriod between the two world wars is a case in ,oint! 't the conclusion of the &irst 8orld 8ar, &rance was the 9ost ,owerful nation on earth fro9 a 9ilitary ,oint of view! &rance was so regarded u, to the very 9o9ent in ./64 when its actual 9ilitary wea$ness beca9e obvious in a crushing defeat! The news,a,er headlines fro9 the beginning of the Second 8orld 8ar in Se,te9ber ./0/ to the defeat of &rance in the su99er of ./64 tell 9ost eloLuently the story of that 9isGudg9ent of &rench 9ilitary ,ower! *uring that ,eriod of the so-called ,hony war the Ger9an ar9ies were su,,osed not to dare to attac$ the &rench because of the latterIs su,erior strength, and on nu9erous occasions the &rench were re,orted to have bro$en through the Ger9an lines! 't the root of that

9isGudg9ent there was the 9isconce,tion that the 9ilitary ,ower of &rance was not relative to the 9ilitary ,ower of other nations, but so9ething absolute! &rench 9ilitary strength, ta$en by itself, was at least as great in ./0/ as it was in ././> &rance was therefore believed to be as strong a nation in ./0/ as it had been in ././! The fatal error of that evaluation lies in the unawareness of the fact that in ././ &rance was the strongest 9ilitary ,ower on earth only in co9,arison with other nations, of which its closest co9,etitor, Ger9any, was defeated and disar9ed! The su,re9acy of &rance as a 9ilitary ,ower was, in other words, not an intrinsic Luality of the &rench nation which 9ight be ascertained in the sa9e way in which one 9ight detect the national characteristics of the &rench ,eo,le, their geogra,hic location, and natural resources! That su,re9acy was, on the contrary, the result of a ,eculiar ,ower configuration> that is, of the co9,arative su,eriority of &rance as a 9ilitary ,ower over the other nations! The Luality of the &rench ar9y as such had indeed not decreased between ././ and ./0/! Measured in nu9bers and Luality of troo,s, artillery, air,lanes, and staff wor$, &rench 9ilitary ,ower had not deteriorated! Thus even so $een an e),ert on international affairs as Sir 8inston (hurchill, co9,aring the &rench ar9y of the late thirties with the &rench ar9y of ././, could declare in ./01 that the &rench ar9y was the only guarantee of international ,eace! He and 9ost of his conte9,oraries co9,ared the &rench ar9y of ./01 with the &rench ar9y of ././, which had gained its re,utation fro9 co9,arison with the Ger9an ar9y of the sa9e year, instead of co9,aring the &rench ar9y of ./01 with the Ger9an ar9y of the sa9e year! Such a co9,arison would have shown that the ,ower configuration of ././ was reversed in the late thirties! 8hile the &rench 9ilitary establish9ent still was essentially as good as it had been in ././, Ger9anyIs ar9ed forces were now vastly su,erior to the &rench! 8hat e)clusive concern with &rench ar9ed 9ight C as if it were an absolute Luality C could not reveal, a co9,arison of the relative 9ilitary strength of &rance and Ger9any 9ight have indicated, and grave errors in ,olitical and 9ilitary Gudg9ent 9ight thus have been avoided! ' nation that at a ,articular 9o9ent in history finds itself at the ,ea$ of its ,ower is ,articularly e),osed to the te9,tation to forget that all ,ower is relative! t is li$ely to believe that the su,eriority it has achieved is an absolute Luality to be lost only through stu,idity or neglect of duty! ' foreign ,olicy based on such assu9,tions runs grave ris$s, for it overloo$s the fact that the su,erior ,ower of that nation is only in ,art the outgrowth of its own Lualities, while it is in ,art the result of the Lualities of other nations co9,ared with its own! The ,redo9inance of Great Britain fro9 the end of the "a,oleonic 8ars to the beginning of the Second 8orld 8ar was due 9ainly to its insular ,rotection fro9 attac$ and its Luasi-9ono,olistic control of the 9ain sea lanes of the world! n other words, Great Britain during that ,eriod of history had in co9,arison with other nations two advantages no other nation ,ossessed! Great BritainIs insular location has not changed and its navy is still one of the 9ost ,owerful in the world! But other nations have acLuired wea,ons, such as nuclear bo9bs and guided 9issiles, that obviate to a considerable e)tent the two advantages fro9 which the ,ower of Great Britain grew! This change in the ,ower ,osition of Great Britain sheds light u,on the tragic dile99a that confronted "eville Gha9berlain in the years before the Second 8orld 8ar! (ha9berlain understood the relativity of BritainIs ,ower! He $new that not even victory in war could sto, its decline! t was Gha9berlainIs ironic fate that his atte9,ts to avoid war at any ,rice 9ade war inevitable, and that he was forced to declare the war he dreaded as the destroyer of British ,ower! t is, however, a testi9ony to the wisdo9 of British statecraft that since the end of the Second 8orld 8ar, British foreign ,olicy has by and large been conscious of the decline of British ,ower relative to the ,ower of other nations! British states9en have been aware of the fact that while the British navy, ta$en by itself, 9ay be as strong as it was ten years ago and the channel is as broad and unruly as it always was, other nations have increased their ,ower to such an e)tent as to de,rive those two British assets of 9uch of their effectiveness! The Permanent Chara$ter o! Po-er The second ty,ical error i9,airing the evaluation of national ,ower is related to the first one, but ,roceeds fro9 a different intellectual o,eration! 8hile it 9ay be well aware of the relativity of ,ower, it singles out a ,articular ,ower factor or ,ower relation, basing the esti9ate u,on the assu9,tion that this factor or relation is i99une to change! 8e have already had occasion to refer to the 9iscalculation that u, to ./64 saw in &rance the first 9ilitary ,ower on earth! Those who held this view erected &rench ,ower as they had e),erienced it at the end of the &irst 8orld 8ar into a ,er9anent Luality of &rance which see9ed i9,ervious to historic change, forgetting that the e9inence of that ,ower in the twenties was the result of co9,arison and that it would have to be tested by co9,arison in order to ascertain its Luality in ./64! (onversely, when the actual wea$ness of &rance revealed itself in 9ilitary defeat, there develo,ed a tendency in &rance and elsewhere to e),ect that wea$ness to endure! &rance was treated with neglect and disdain as though it were bound to be wea$ forever! The evaluation of Russian ,ower has followed a si9ilar ,attern, but in reverse historical order! &ro9 ./.1 to the battle of Stalingrad in ./60, the Soviet :nion was treated as if its wea$ness at the beginning of the twenties was bound to ,ersist whatever change 9ight occur in other fields! Thus the British 9ilitary 9ission that was sent to Moscow in the su99er of ./0/ to conclude a 9ilitary alliance with the Soviet :nion, in antici,ation of the a,,roaching war with Ger9any, conceived its tas$ with a view of Russian ,ower which 9ight have been Gustified ten or twenty years before! This 9iscalculation was an i9,ortant ele9ent in the 9issionIs failure! ;n the other hand, i99ediately after the victory of Stalingrad and under the i9,act of the Soviet :nionIs aggressive foreign ,olicy, the belief in the ,er9anent invincibility of the Soviet :nion and in the ,er9anency of its ,redo9inance in Euro,e was widely held as a dog9a! There is a see9ingly ineradicable inclination in our attitude toward the %atin-'9erican countries to assu9e that the

unchallengeable su,eriority of the colossus of the "orth, which has e)isted since the nations of the 8estern He9is,here won their inde,endence, was al9ost a law of nature which ,o,ulation trends, industrialiHation, ,olitical and 9ilitary develo,9ents 9ight 9odify but could not basically alter! Si9ilarly, since for centuries the ,olitical history of the world has been deter9ined by 9e9bers of the white races, while the colored races were in the 9ain the obGects of that history, it is difficult for 9e9bers of all races ali$e to visualiHe a situation where the ,olitical su,re9acy of the white races 9ight no longer e)ist> where, indeed, the relation between the races 9ight even be reversed! t is es,ecially the de9onstration of see9ingly irresistible 9ilitary ,ower which e)erts a strange fascination over the 9inds of those who are given to hasty ,ro,hecies rather than to cautious analysis! t 9a$es the9 believe that history has co9e to a standstill, as it were, and that todayIs holders of unchallengeable ,ower cannot fail to enGoy this ,ower to9orrow and the day after! Thus, when in ./64 and ./6. the ,ower of Ger9any was at its ,ea$, it was widely believed that Ger9an do9ination of Euro,e was established forever! 8hen the hidden strength of the Soviet :nion startled the world in ./60, Stalin was saluted as the future 9aster of Euro,e and 'sia! n the ,ostwar years the '9erican 9ono,oly of the ato9ic bo9b gave rise to the conce,tion of the J'9erican (entury,J a world do9inion based u,on unchallengeable '9erican ,ower! . The root of all those tendencies to believe in the absolute character of ,ower or to ta$e the ,er9anency of a ,articular ,ower configuration for granted lies in the contrast between the dyna9ic, ever changing character of the ,ower relations between nations, on the one hand, and the hu9an intellectIs thirst for certainty and security in the for9 of definite answers, on the other! (onfronted with the contingencies, a9biguities, and uncertainties of the international situation, we search for a definite co9,rehension of the ,ower factors u,on which our foreign ,olicy is based! 8e all find ourselves in the ,osition of Kueen Eictoria, who after dis9issing Pal9erston, whose un,redictable 9oves on the international scene had e)as,erated her, as$ed her new Pri9e Minister, +ohn Russell, for Ja regular ,rogra99e e9bracing these different relations with other ,owers!J The answers we receive are not always so wise as the one +ohn Russell gave Kueen Eictoria! J t is very difficult,J he re,lied, Jto lay down any ,rinci,les fro9 which deviations 9ay not freLuently be 9ade!J= #et a 9isguided ,ublic o,inion is only too ,rone to bla9e states9en for such deviations, dee9ing co9,liance with ,rinci,les, without regard for the distribution of ,ower, to be a virtue rather than a vice! 8hat the observer of international ,olitics needs in order to reduce to a 9ini9u9 the unavoidable errors in the calculations of ,ower is a creative i9agination, i99une fro9 the fascination that the ,re,onderant ,ower of the 9o9ent so easily i9,arts, able to detach itself fro9 the su,erstition of an inevitable trend in history, o,en to the ,ossibilities for change which the dyna9ics of history entail! ' creative i9agination of this $ind would be ca,able of that su,re9e intellectual achieve9ent of detecting under the surface of ,resent ,ower relations the ger9inal develo,9ents of the future, co9bining the $nowledge of what is with the hunch as to what 9ight be, and condensing all these facts, sy9,to9s, and un$nowns into a chart of ,robable future trends which is not too 9uch at variance with what actually will ha,,en! The :a""a$ o! the Sing"e :a$tor The third ty,ical error in assessing the ,ower of different nations C attributing to a single factor an overriding i9,ortance, to the detri9ent of all the others C can best be illustrated in three of its 9anifestations 9ost conseLuential in 9odern ti9esB geo,olitics, nationalis9, and 9ilitaris9! $eo6olitics Geo,olitics is a ,seudoscience erecting the factor of geogra,hy into an absolute that is su,,osed to deter9ine the ,ower, and hence the fate, of nations! ts basic conce,tion is s,ace! #et, while s,ace is static, the ,eo,les living within the s,aces of the earth are dyna9ic! 'ccording to geo,olitics, it is a law of history that ,eo,les 9ust e),and by JconLuering s,ace,J or ,erish, and that 9i relative ,ower of nations is deter9ined by the 9utual relation of the conLuered s,aces! This basic conce,tion of geo,olitics was first e),ressed in a ,a,er by Sir Halford Mac$inder, JThe Geogra,hical Pivot of History,J read before the Royal Geogra,hical Society in %ondon in ./46! J's we consider this ra,id review of the broader currents of history, does not a certain ,ersistence of geogra,hical relationshi, beco9e evidentF s not the ,ivot region of the worldIs ,olitics that vast area of Euro - 'sia which is inaccessible to shi,s, but in antiLuity lay o,en to the horse-riding no9ads, and is today to be covered with a networ$ of railwaysFJ This is the JHeartlandJ of the world which stretches fro9 the Eolga to the #angtHe and fro9 the Hi9alayas to the 'rctic ;cean! J;utside the ,ivot area, in a great inner crescent, are Ger9any, 'ustria, Tur$ey, ndia and (hina, and in an outer crescent, Britain, South 'frica, 'ustralia, the :nited States, (anada and +a,an!J The J8orld- slandJ is co9,osed of the continents of Euro,e, 'sia, and 'frica, around which the lesser land areas of the world are grou,ed! &ro9 this geogra,hical structure of the world geo,olitics draws the conclusion that J8ho rules east Euro,e co99ands the Heartland> who rules the Heartland co99ands the 8orld- sland> who rules the 8orld- sland co99ands the 8orld!J 0 Mac$inder, on the basis of this analysis, foresaw the e9ergence of Russia, or whatever nation would control the
.

The 9ost s,ectacular conte9,orary victi9 of the fallacy of the ,er9anent character of ,ower is +a9es Burnha9! See George ;rwell, JSecond Thoughts on +a9es Burnha9,J Pole9ic, "o! 0, May ./63, ,,! .0 ff!> J+a9es Burnha9 Rides 'gain,J 'ntioch Review, Eol! 1, "o! =, Su99er ./61, ,,! 0.5 ff! = Robert 8! Seton 8atson, Britain in Euro,e, .12/ - ./.6 @"ew #or$B The Mac9illan (o9,any, ./01A, ,! 50! 0 Sir Halford +! Mac$inder, *e9ocratic deals and Reality @"ew #or$B Henry Holt and (o9,any, ././A, ,! .54!

territory described above, as the do9inating world ,ower! The Ger9an geo,oliticians, under the leadershi, of General Haushofer, who e)erted an i9,ortant influence u,on the ,ower calculations and foreign ,olicies of the "aHi regi9e, were 9ore s,ecific! They ,ostulated an alliance with the Soviet :nion or else the conLuest of Eastern Euro,e by Ger9any in order to 9a$e Ger9any the ,redo9inant ,ower on earth! t is obvious that this ,ostulate cannot be directly inferred fro9 the geo,olitical ,re9ise! Geo,olitics only tells us what s,ace is destined, because of its location relative to other s,aces, to harbor the 9aster of the world! t does not tell us to what ,articular nation that 9astery will fall! Thus the Ger9an school of geo,olitics, eager to de9onstrate that it was the 9ission of the Ger9an ,eo,le to conLuer the JHeartland,J the geogra,hical seat of world do9inion, co9bined the geo,olitical doctrine with the argu9ent of ,o,ulation ,ressure! The Ger9ans were a J,eo,le without s,ace,J and the Jliving s,aceJ that they 9ust have in order to live bec$oned to be conLuered in the e9,ty ,lains of Eastern Euro,e! Geo,olitics, as ,resented in the writings of Mac$inder and &airgrieve, had given a valid ,icture of one as,ect of the reality of national ,ower, a ,icture seen fro9 the e)clusive, and therefore distorting, angle of geogra,hy! n the hands of Haushofer and his disci,les, geo,olitics was transfor9ed into a $ind of ,olitical 9eta,hysics to be used as an ideological wea,on in the service of the national as,irations of Ger9any! 6 "ationalism Geo,olitics is the atte9,t to understand the ,roble9 of national ,ower e)clusively in ter9s of geogra,hy, and degenerates in the ,rocess into a ,olitical 9eta,hysics couched in a ,seudoscientific Gargon! "ationalis9 tries to e),lain national ,ower e)clusively or at least ,redo9inantly in ter9s of national I character, and degenerates in the ,rocess into the ,olitical 9eta,hysics of racis9! 's geogra,hical location is for geo,olitics the one deter9inant of national ,ower, so 9e9bershi, in a nation is for nationalis9 a si9ilar deter9inant! Me9bershi, in a nation 9ay be defined in ter9s of language, culture, I co99on origin, race, or in the decision of the individual to belong to the nation! But no 9atter how it is defined, the 9e9bershi, always entails as its essence ,arta$ing in certain Lualities, called the national character, which the 9e9bers of a ,articular nation have in co99on and by which they are differentiated fro9 the 9e9bers of other nations! The ,reservation of the national character and, 9ore ,articularly, the develo,9ent of its creative faculties is the su,re9e tas$ of the nation! n order to fulfill this tas$, the nation needs ,ower that will ,rotect it against other nations and will sti9ulate its own develo,9ent! n other words, the nation needs a state! J;ne nation C one stateJ is thus the ,olitical ,ostulate of nationalis9> the nation state is its ideal! But though the nation needs the ,ower of the state for the sa$e of its ,reservation and develo,9ent, the state needs the national co99unity in order to 9aintain and increase its ,ower! Particularly in the nationalistic ,hiloso,hy of Ger9any C in the writings of &ichte and Hegel, for instance C the national character or s,irit a,,ears as the soul, and the ,olitical organiHation of the state as the body, of the national co99unity, which needs both in order to fulfill its 9ission a9ong the other national co99unities! The feeling of affinity, the ,artici,ation in a co99on culture and tradition, the awareness of a co99on destiny, which are of the essence of national senti9ent and ,atriotis9, are transfor9ed by nationalis9 into a ,olitical 9ysticis9 in which the national co99unity and the state beco9e su,erhu9an entities, a,art fro9 and su,erior to their individual 9e9bers, entitled to absolute loyalty and, li$e the idols of old, deserving of the sacrifice of 9en and goods! This 9ysticis9 reaches its a,ogee in the racist worshi, of the national character! The nation is here identified with a biological entity, the race, which, so long as it re9ains ,ure, ,roduces the national character in all its strength and s,lendor! The dilution of the race through the ad9i)ture of alien ele9ents corru,ts the character of the nation and thus wea$ens the ,ower of the state! The ho9ogeneity of the nation and the ,urity of the race thus a,,ear as the very essence of national ,ower, and for the latterIs sa$e national 9inorities 9ust either be absorbed or eGected! n the end, the national character of oneIs own nation co9es to be regarded as the re,ository of all those Lualities C courage, loyalty, disci,line, industry, endurance, intelligence, and faculty for leadershi, C the ,ossession of which Gustifies the e)ercise of su,re9e ,ower over other nations and at the sa9e ti9e 9a$es the e)ercise of such ,ower ,ossible! The overesti9ation of the Lualities of oneIs own nation, which is characteristic of all nationalis9, leads in the conce,t of the 9aster race to the very idolatry of the national character! The 9aster race is, by virtue of the su,erior Luality of its national character, destined to rule the world! t has by virtue of these Lualities the ,otential ,ower to e)ercise world wide do9inion, and it is the tas$ of states9anshi, and of 9ilitary conLuest to transfor9 those slu9bering ,otentialities into the actualities of world e9,ire! The intellectual and ,olitical e)cesses of nationalis9 and of its degenerate offs,ring, racis9, have shoc$ed and re,elled the non-nationalistic 9ind to a 9uch greater degree than have the e)cesses of geo,olitics! The latter have in the 9ain been li9ited to Ger9any, and were ,er,etrated in an esoteric language! The e)cesses of nationalis9, on the other hand, are the logical outgrowth of a secular religion that has engulfed in the fanaticis9 of holy wars of e)ter9ination, enslave9ent, and world conLuest only certain countries, yet has left its 9ar$ on 9any everywhere! Since nationalis9 has singled out the national character as the ,ivot of its ,olitical ,hiloso,hy, ,rogra9, and action, critical observers have freLuently tended to go to the other e)tre9e and have denied the e)istence of a national character altogether! ntent
6

The ideological connotations of isolationis9 and the solidarity of the 8estern He9is,here are a$in to geo,olitics in that they derive a conce,tion of foreign ,olicy fro9 distorted or fictional geogra,hical factors! The distortion of isolationis9 has already been ,ointed out in the te)t> as to the fictional character of the geogra,hical unity of the 8estern He9is,here, see Eugene Staley, The Myth of the (ontinents,J in (o9,ass of the 8orld, edited by Hans 8! 8eigert and EilhGal9ur Stefansson @"ew #or$B The Mac9illan (o9,any, ./66A, ,,! 2/ - .42!

u,on de9onstrating the 9ythical and subGective essence of nationalis9, they have been an)ious to show that its alleged e9,irical basis, the national character, is also nothing but a 9yth! ;ne can readily agree with the critics of nationalis9 and racis9 that the allegedly inevitable deter9ination of the national character by the JbloodJ-that is, the co99on biological characteristics of the 9e9bers of a certain grou, C is a ,olitical fabrication without any basis in fact! ;ne can also agree that the absolute constancy of the national character, deriving fro9 the i99utability of the Lualities of a ,ure race, belongs in the real9 of ,olitical 9ythology! The e)istence of the :nited States as a nation and its assi9ilative ,owers offer convincing ,roof of the fallacy of both assertions! ;n the other hand, to deny altogether the e)istence of the national character and its bearing u,on national ,ower runs counter to the facts of e),erience, of which we have given a few sa9,les above! 5 Such denial would be an error no less detri9ental to a correct assess9ent of the ,ower of a nation in relation to others than the nationalistic deification of the national character has ,roved to be! Militarism Militaris9 co99its the sa9e ty,e of error with res,ect to 9ilitary ,re,aredness which geo,olitics and nationalis9 co99it with regard to geogra,hy and national character! Militaris9 is the conce,tion that the ,ower of a nation consists ,ri9arily, if not e)clusively, in its 9ilitary strength, conceived es,ecially in Luantitative ter9s! The largest ar9y, the biggest navy, the biggest and fastest air force in the world, su,eriority in nu9bers of nuclear wea,ons beco9e the ,redo9inant, if not the e)clusive, sy9bols of national ,ower! "ations whose 9ilitary strength lies in navies rather than in large standing ar9ies are wont to ,oint with abhorrence to the 9ilitaris9 of Ger9any, &rance, or the Soviet :nion without recogniHing that they have develo,ed their ,eculiar brand of 9ilitaris9! nfluenced by writers such as Mahan, they have e9,hasiHed out of all ,ro,ortion the i9,ortance of the siHe and Luality of their navies for national ,ower! n the :nited States there is a wides,read tendency to overe9,hasiHe the technological as,ects of 9ilitary ,re,aredness, such as the s,eed and the range of air,lanes and the uniLueness of nuclear wea,ons! The average Ger9an was 9isled by 9asses of goose-ste,,ing soldiers! The average Russian e),eriences the su,re9acy of Soviet ,ower, derived fro9 s,ace and ,o,ulation, in the throngs filling the vastness of Red SLuare on May *ay! The ty,ical English9an used to lose his sense of ,ro,ortion in the ,resence of the gigantic for9 of a dreadnought! Many '9ericans succu9bed to the fascination that e9anated fro9 the JsecretJ of the ato9ic bo9b! 'll these attitudes toward 9ilitary ,re,aredness have in co99on the 9ista$en belief that all that counts, or at least what counts 9ost for the ,ower of a nation, is the 9ilitary factor conceived in ter9s of nu9bers and Luality of 9en and wea,ons! 3 &ro9 the 9ilitaristic error follows inevitably the eLuation of national ,ower with 9aterial force! To s,ea$ loudly and carry a big stic$, to re,hrase Theodore RooseveltIs fa9ous dictu9, is indeed the ,referred 9ethod of 9ilitaristic di,lo9acy! The ,ro,onents of this 9ethod are unaware that it is so9eti9es wise to s,ea$ softly and carry a big stic$> that it is so9eti9es even wise to leave the big stic$ at ho9e where it is available when needed! n its e)clusive concern with 9ilitary strength, 9ilitaris9 is conte9,tuous of the intangibles of ,ower! 8ithout the9 a ,owerful nation 9ay frighten other nations into sub9ission or it 9ay conLuer by sheer overwhel9ing force, but it cannot rule what it has conLuered> for it cannot gain voluntary acce,tance for its rule! n the end, the ,ower of 9ilitaris9 9ust yield to a ,ower te9,ered with self-restraint which see$s the effectiveness of national ,ower in the infreLuency of its 9ilitary use! The failures of S,artan, Ger9an, and +a,anese 9ilitaris9, co9,ared with the triu9,hs of the Ro9an and British ,olicies of e9,ire-building, show the disastrous ,ractical results of that intellectual error which we call 9ilitaris9! Thus the error of 9ilitaris9 gives new shar,ness to the structure and contours of national ,ower! Militaris9 C and here is the essence of its error C is unable to understand the ,arado) that a 9a)i9u9 of 9aterial ,ower does not necessarily 9ean a 9a)i9u9 of over - all national ,ower! ' nation that throws into the scale of international ,olitics the 9a)i9u9 of 9aterial ,ower it is ca,able of 9ustering will find itself confronted with the 9a)i9u9 effort of all its co9,etitors to eLual or sur,ass its ,ower! t will find that it has no friends, but only vassals and ene9ies! Since the e9ergence of the 9odern state syste9 in the fifteenth century, no single nation has succeeded in i9,osing its will for any length of ti9e u,on the rest of the world by sheer 9aterial force alone! "o nation that has tried the ways of 9ilitaris9 has been strong enough to withstand the other nationsI co9bined resistance, which the fear of its su,erior 9aterial ,ower had called into being! The only nation that in 9odern ti9es could 9aintain a continuous ,osition of ,re,onderance owed that ,osition to a rare co9bination of ,otential su,erior ,ower, a re,utation for su,erior ,ower, and the infreLuent use of that su,erior
5 3

See ,ages .60 ff! This as,ect of 9ilitaris9 is i9,ressively described by R! H! Tawney, The 'cLuisitive Society @"ew #or$B Harcourt, Brace and (o9,any, ./=4A, ,! 66B JMilitaris9 is the characteristic, not of an ar9y, but of a society! ts essence is not any ,articular Luality or scale of 9ilitary ,re,aration, but a state of 9ind, which, in its concentration on one ,articular ele9ent in social life, ends finally by e)alting it until it beco9es the arbiter of all the rest! The ,ur,ose for which 9ilitary forces e)ist is forgotten! They are thought to stand by their own right and to need no Gustification! nstead of being regarded as an instru9ent which is necessary in an i9,erfect world, they are elevated into an obGect of su,erstitious veneration, as though the world would be a ,oor insi,id ,lace without the9, so that ,olitical institutions and social arrange9ents and intellect and 9orality and religion are crushed into a 9old 9ade to fit one activity, which in a sane society is a subordinate activity, li$e the ,olice, or the 9aintenance of ,risons, or the cleansing of sewers, but which in a 9ilitarist state is a $ind of 9ystical e,ito9e of society itself! JMilitaris9 !!! is fetish worshi,! t is the ,rostration of 9enIs souls before, and the laceration of their bodies to a,,ease an idol!J @Re,rinted by ,er9ission of the ,ublisher!A

,ower! Thus Great Britain was able, on the one hand, to overco9e all serious challenges to its su,eriority because its self-restraint gained ,owerful allies and, hence, 9ade it actually su,erior! ;n the other hand, it could 9ini9iHe the incentive to challenge it because its su,eriority did not threaten the e)istence of other nations! 8hen Great Britain stood at the threshold of its greatest ,ower, it heeded the warning of its greatest ,olitical thin$er C a warning as ti9ely today as when first uttered in .1/0B '9ong ,recautions against a9bition, it 9ay not be a9iss to ta$e one ,recaution against our own! 9ust fairly Say, dread our own ,ower and our own a9bition> dread our being too 9uch dreaded! t is ridiculous to say we are not 9en, and that, as 9en, we shall never wish to aggrandiHe ourselves in so9e way or other! (an we say that even at this very hour we are not invidiously aggrandiHedF 8e are already in ,ossession of al9ost all the co99erce of the world! ;ur e9,ire in ndia is an awful thing! f we should co9e to be in a condition not only to have all this ascendant in co99erce, but to be absolutely able, without the least control, to hold the co99erce of all other nations totally de,endent u,on our good ,leasure, we 9ay say that we shall not abuse this astonishing and hitherto unheard - of ,ower! But every other nation will thin$ we shall abuse it! t is i9,ossible but that, sooner or later, this state of things 9ust ,roduce a co9bination against us which 9ay end in our ruin!1

PART FOUR

Li itations of National Power! The "alance of Power

** BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB The "alance of Power

The as,iration for ,ower on the ,art of several nations, each trying either to 9aintain or overthrow the status Luo, leads of necessity to a configuration that is called the balance of ,ower . and to ,olicies that ai9 at ,reserving it! 8e say Jof necessityJ advisedly! &or here again we are confronted with the basic 9isconce,tion that has i9,eded the understanding of international ,olitics and has 9ade us the ,rey of illusions! This 9isconce,tion asserts that 9en have a choice between ,ower ,olitics and its necessary outgrowth, the balance of ,ower, on the one hand, and a different, better $ind of international relations on the other! t insists that a foreign ,olicy based on the balance of ,ower is one a9ong several ,ossible foreign ,olicies and that only stu,id and evil 9en will choose the for9er and reGect the latter! t will be shown in the following ,ages that the international balance of ,ower is only a ,articular 9anifestation of a general social ,rinci,le to which all societies co9,osed of a nu9ber of autono9ous units owe the autono9y of their co9,onent ,arts> that the balance of ,ower and ,olicies ai9ing at its ,reservation are not only inevitable but are an essential stabiliHing factor in a society of sovereign nations> and that the instability of the international balance of ,ower is due not to the faultiness of the ,rinci,le but to the ,articular conditions under which the ,rinci,le 9ust o,erate in a society of sovereign nations! 'OCIAL E1UILI"RIU$ &a"an$e o! Po-er as ;ni8ersa" Con$ept The conce,t of JeLuilibriu9J as a synony9 for JbalanceJ is co99only e9,loyed in 9any sciences C ,hysics, biology, econo9ics, sociology, and ,olitical science! t signifies stability within a syste9 co9,osed of a nu9ber of autono9ous forces! 8henever the eLuilibriu9 is disturbed either by an outside force or by a change in one or the other ele9ents co9,osing the syste9, the syste9 shows a tendency to re-establish either the original or a new eLuilibriu9! Thus eLuilibriu9 e)ists in the hu9an body! 8hile the hu9an body changes in the ,rocess of growth, the eLuilibriu9 ,ersists as long as the changes occurring in the different organs of the body do not disturb the bodyIs stability! This is es,ecially so if the Luantitative and Lualitative changes in the different organs are ,ro,ortionate to each other! 8hen, however, the
1

Ed9und Bur$e,JRe9ar$s on the Policy of the 'llies with Res,ect to &rance,J 8or$s, Eol! E @BostonB %ittle, Brown, and (o9,any, .2//A, ,! 651! . The ter9 Jbalance of ,owerJ is used in the te)t with four different 9eaningsB @.A as a ,olicy ai9ed at a certain slate of affairs, @=A as an actual state of affairs, @0A as an a,,ro)i9ately eLual distribution of ,ower, @6A as any distribution of ,ower! 8henever the ter9 is used without Lualification, it refers to an actual slate of affairs in which ,ower is distributed a9ong several nations with a,,ro)i9ale eLuality!

body suffers a wound or loss of one of its organs through outside interference, or e),eriences a 9alignant growth or a ,athological transfor9ation of one of its organs, the eLuilibriu9 is disturbed, and the body tries to overco9e the disturbance by reestablishing the eLuilibriu9 either on the sa9e or a different level fro9 the one that obtained before the disturbance occurred! = The sa9e conce,t of eLuilibriu9 is used in a social science, such as econo9ics, with reference to the relations between the different ele9ents of the econo9ic syste9, e!g!, between savings and invest9ents, e),orts and i9,orts, su,,ly and de9and, costs and ,rices! (onte9,orary ca,italis9 itself has been described as a syste9 of Jcountervailing ,ower!J 0 t also a,,lies to society as a whole! Thus we search for a ,ro,er balance between different geogra,hical regions, such as the East and the 8est, the "orth and the South> between different $inds of activities, such as agriculture and industry, heavy and light industries, big and s9all businesses, ,roducers and consu9ers, 9anage9ent and labor> between different functional grou,s, such as city and country, the old, the 9iddle-aged, and the young, the econo9ic and the ,olitical s,here, the 9iddle classes and the u,,er and lower classes! Two assu9,tions are at the foundation of all such eLuilibriu9sB first, that the ele9ents to be balanced are necessary for society or are entitled to e)ist and, second, that without a state of eLuilibriu9 a9ong the9 one ele9ent will gain ascendancy over the others, encroach u,on their interests and rights, and 9ay ulti9ately destroy the9! (onseLuently, it is the ,ur,ose of all such eLuilibriu9s to 9aintain the stability of the syste9 without destroying the 9ulti,licity of the ele9ents co9,osing it! f the goal were stability alone, it could be achieved by allowing one ele9ent to destroy or overwhel9 the others and ta$e their ,lace! Since the goal is stability ,lus the ,reservation of all the ele9ents of the syste9, the eLuilibriu9 9ust ai9 at ,reventing any ele9ent fro9 gaining ascendancy over the others! The 9eans e9,loyed to 9aintain the eLuilibriu9 consist in allowing the different ele9ents to ,ursue their o,,osing tendencies u, to the ,oint where the tendency of one is not so strong as to overco9e the tendency of the others, but strong enough to ,revent the others fro9 overco9ing its own! n the words of Robert BridgesB ;ur stability is but balance> and wisdo9 lies n 9asterful ad9inistration of the unforeseen! "owhere have the 9echanics of social eLuilibriu9 been described 9ore brilliantly and at the sa9e ti9e 9ore si9,ly than in The &ederalist! (oncerning the syste9 of chec$s and balances of the '9erican govern9ent, "o! 5. of The &ederalist saysB This ,olicy of su,,lying, by o,,osite and rival interests, the defect of better 9otives, 9ight be traced to the whole syste9 of hu9an affairs, ,rivate as well as ,ublic! 8e see it ,articularly dis,layed in all the subordinate distributions of ,ower, where the constant ai9 is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a 9anner as that each 9ay be a chec$ on the other C that the ,rivate interests of every individual 9ay be a sentinel over the ,ublic rights! These inventions of ,rudence cannot be less reLuisite in the distribution of the su,re9e ,owers of the state! n the words of +ohn Randol,h, J#ou 9ay cover whole s$ins of ,arch9ent with li9itations, but ,ower alone can li9it ,ower!J6 &a"an$e o! Po-er in %omesti$ Po"iti$s The conce,t of eLuilibriu9 or balance has indeed found its 9ost i9,ortant a,,lication, outside the international field, in the s,here of do9estic govern9ent and ,olitics!5 Parlia9entary bodies have freLuently develo,ed within the9selves
=

(f!, for instance, the i9,ressive analogy between the eLuilibriu9 in the hu9an body and in society in 8alter B! (annon, The 8isdo9 of the Body @"ew #or$B 8! 8! "orton and (o9,any, ./0=A, ,,! =/0, =/6B J't the outset it is noteworthy that the body ,olitic itself e)hibits so9e indications of crude auto9atic stabiliHing ,rocesses! n the ,revious cha,ter e),ressed the ,ostulate that a certain degree of constancy in a co9,le) syste9 is itself evidence that agencies are acting or are ready to act to 9aintain that constancy! 'nd 9oreover, that when a syste9 re9ains steady it does so because any tendency towards change is 9et by increased effectiveness of the factor or factors which resist the change! Many fa9iliar facts ,rove that these state9ents are to so9e degree true for society even in its ,resent unstabiliHed condition! ' dis,lay of conservatis9 e)cites a radical revolt and that in turn is followed by a return to conservatis9! %oose govern9ent and its conseLuences bring the refor9ers into ,ower, but their tight reins soon ,rovo$e restiveness and the desire for release! The noble enthusias9s and sacrifices of war are succeeded by 9oral a,athy and orgies of selfindulgence! Hardly any strong tendency in a nation continues to the stage of disaster> before that e)tre9e is reached corrective forces arise which chec$ the tendency and they co99only ,revail to such an e)cessive degree as the9selves to cause a reaction! ' study of the nature of these social swings and their reversal 9ight lead to valuable understanding and ,ossibly to 9eans of 9ore narrowly li9iting the disturbances! 't this ,oint, however, we 9erely note that the disturbances are roughly li9ited, and that this li9itation suggests, ,erha,s, the early stages of social ho9eosta-sis!J @Re,rinted by ,er9ission of the ,ublisher! (o,yright ./0=, ./0/, by 8alter B! (annon!A 0 +ohn 7! Galbraith, '9erican (a,italis9, the (once,t of (ountervailing Power @BostonB Houghton Mifflin, ./5=A! 6 Kuoted after 8illia9 (abell Bruce, +ohn Randol,h of Roano$e @"ew #or$ and %ondonB (! P! Putna9, ./==A, Eol! , ,! =..!
5

lt hardly needs to be ,ointed out that, while the balance of ,ower is a universal social ,heno9enon, its functions and results are different in do9estic and international ,olitics! The balance of ,ower o,erates in do9estic ,olitics within a relatively stable fra9ewor$ of an integrated society, $e,t together by a strong consensus and the nor9ally unchallengeable ,ower of a central govern9ent! ;n the international scene, where consensus is wea$ and a central authority does not e)ist, the stability of society and the freedo9 of its co9,onent ,arts de,end to a 9uch greater e)tent u,on the o,erations of the balance of ,ower!

a balance of ,ower! ' 9ulti,arty syste9 lends itself ,articularly to such a develo,9ent! Here two grou,s, each re,resenting a 9inority of the legislative body, often o,,ose each other, and the for9ation of a 9aGority de,ends u,on the votes of a third grou,! The third grou, will tend to Goin the ,otentially or actually wea$er of the two, thus i9,osing a chec$ u,on the stronger one! Even the two-,arty syste9 of the :nited States (ongress dis,layed the ty,ical configuration of this chec$ing and balancing ,rocess when, in the last years of &ran$lin *! RooseveltIs ad9inistration and during 9ost of Tru9anIs, the Southern *e9ocrats constituted the9selves a third ,arty, voting on 9any issues with the Re,ublican 9inority! They thus chec$ed not only the *e9ocratic 9aGority in (ongress, but also the e)ecutive branch, which was also controlled by the *e9ocratic ,arty! 3 The '9erican govern9ent is the outstanding 9odern e)a9,le of a govern9ental syste9 whose stability is 9aintained by an eLuilibriu9 a9ong its co9,onent ,arts! n the words of %ord BryceB The (onstitution was avowedly created as an instru9ent of chec$s and balances! Each branch of the govern9ent was to restrain the others, and 9aintain the eLui,oise of the whole! The legislature was to balance the e)ecutive, and the Gudiciary both! The two houses of the legislature were to balance one another! The national govern9ent, ta$ing all its branches together, was balanced against the State govern9ents! 's the eLuilibriu9 was ,laced under the ,rotection of a docu9ent, unchangeable save by the ,eo,le the9selves, no one of the branches of the national govern9ent has been able to absorb or override the others ! ! each branch 9aintains its inde,endence and can, within certain li9its, defy the others! But there is a9ong ,olitical bodies and offices @i!e! the ,ersons who fro9 ti9e to ti9e fill the sa9e officeA of necessity a constant strife, a struggle for e)istence si9ilar to that which Mr! *arwin has shown to e)ist a9ong ,lants and ani9als> and as in the case of ,lants and ani9als so also in the ,olitical s,here this struggle sti9ulates each body or office to e)ert its ut9ost force for its own ,reservation, and to develo, its a,titudes in any direction where develo,9ent is ,ossible! Each branch of the '9erican govern9ent has striven to e)tend its range and its ,owers> each has advanced in certain directions, but in others has been restrained by the eLual or stronger ,ressure of other branches! 1 "o! 5. of The &ederalist has laid bare the ,ower structure of this Jdyna9ic eLuilibriu9J or J9oving ,arallelogra9 of force,J as it was called by (harles '! BeardB2 J!!! the defect 9ust be su,,lied, by so contriving the interior structure of the govern9ent as that its several constitutional ,arts 9ay, by their 9utual relations, be the 9eans of $ee,ing each other in their ,ro,er ,laces! ! ! ! But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several ,owers in the sa9e de,art9ent, consists in giving to those who ad9inister each de,art9ent the necessary constitutional 9eans and ,ersonal 9otives to resist the encroach9ent of others! ! ! ! The ,rovision for defense 9ust in this, as in all other cases, be 9ade co99ensurate to the danger of attac$! '9bition 9ust be 9ade to counteract a9bition! The interest of the 9an 9ust be connected with the constitutional rights of the ,lace! !!!J The ai9 of these constitutional arrange9ents is Jto guard one ,art of the society against the inGustices of the other ,art! *ifferent interests necessarily e)ist in different classes of citiHens! f a 9aGority be reunited by a co99on interest, the rights of the 9inority will be insecure!J The author, Madison, e),ected to safeguard the rights of the 9inority Jby co9,rehending in the society so 9any se,arate descri,tions of citiHens as will render an unGust co9bination of a 9aGority of the whole very i9,robable, if not i9,racticable! ! ! ! The society itself will be bro$en into so 9any ,arts, interests, and classes of citiHens, that the rights
(f! also +! 'llen S9ith, The Growth and *ecadence of (onstitutional Govern9ent @"ew #or$B Henry Holt and (o9,any, ./04A, ,,! =6., =6=B J n the absence of any co99on and i9,artial agency to inter,ret international law and su,ervise international relations, every state is an)ious not only to increase its own authority but to ,revent, if ,ossible, any increase in the authority of rival states! The instinct of self-,reservation, in a world 9ade u, of inde,endent nations, o,erates to 9a$e each desire ,ower in order to secure itself against the danger of e)ternal aggression! The fact that no country alone is sufficiently strong to feel secure against any ,ossible co9bination of o,,osing states 9a$es necessary the for9ation of alliances and counteralliances through which each state see$s to ensure the needed su,,ort in case its safety is rnenaced fro9 without! This is usually referred to as the struggle to 9aintain the balance of ,ower! t is 9erely an a,,lication of the chec$ and balance theory of the state to international ,olitics! t is assu9ed, and rightly so, that if any state should acLuire a ,redo9inant ,osition in international affairs, it would be a distinct 9enace to the interests and well-being of the rest of the world! Power, even though it 9ay have been acLuired as a 9eans of ,rotection, beco9es a 9enace to international ,eace as soon as the country ,ossessing it co9es to feel stronger than any ,ossible foe! t is no less necessary to 9aintain the balance of ,ower in international ,olitics, than it is to ,revent so9e s,ecial interest fro9 gaining the aseendency in the state! But since this balance of ,ower idea is based on the fear of attac$ and assu9es that every nation should be ,re,ared for war, it can not be regarded as in any real sense a guaranty of international ,eace!J @Re,rinted by ,er9ission of the ,ublisher!A (f! also The (a9bridge Modern History, Eol! E @"ew #or$B The Mac9illan (o!, ./42A, ,! =13! 3 (f! the illu9inating discussion of the general ,roble9 in +ohn Stuart Mill, (onsiderations on Re,resentative Govern9ent @"ew #or$B Henry Holt and (o9,any, .22=A, ,! .6=B J n a state of society thus co9,osed, if the re,resentative syste9 could be 9ade ideally ,erfect, and if it were ,ossible to 9aintain it in that state, its organiHation 9ust be such that these two classes, 9anual laborers and their affinities on one side, e9,loyers of labor and their affinities on the other, should be, in the arrange9ent of the re,resentative syste9, eLually balanced, each influencing about an eLual nu9ber of votes in Parlia9ent> since, assu9ing that the 9aGority of each class, in any difference between the9, would be 9ainly governed by their class interests, there would be a 9inority of each in who9 the consideration would be subordinate to reason, Gustice, and the good of the whole> and this 9inority of either, Goining with the whole of the other, would turn the scale against any de9ands of their own 9aGority which were not such as ought to ,revail!J See also ,age .50, and, concerning the balance of ,ower within federal states, ,ages /, =44! 1 The '9erican (o99onwealth @"ew #or$B The Mac9illan (o9,any, .2/.A, Eol! , ,,! 0/4-. 2 The Re,ublic @"ew #or$B The Ei$ing Press, ./66A, ,,! ./4 - .!

of individuals, or of the 9inority, will be in little danger fro9 interested co9binations of the 9aGority!J Security will lie Jin the 9ulti,licity of interests,J and the degree of security Jwill de,end on the nu9ber of interests!J 'nd (harles '! Beard thus su99ariHes the ,hiloso,hy of the '9erican govern9entB JThe fra9ers understood that govern9ent in action is ,ower! They tried to ,it the a9bitions, interests, and forces of hu9an beings in the three de,art9ents against one another in such a way as to ,revent any one set of agents fro9 seiHing all ,ower, fro9 beco9ing dangerously ,owerful!J / ;ne needs only to substitute the ter9inology of international ,olitics for the conce,ts used by The &ederalist, %ord Bryce, and (harles '! Beard in their analysis of the structure and dyna9ics of the '9erican govern9ent, and there e9erge the 9ain ele9ents co99on to both the syste9 of chec$s and balances of the '9erican (onstitution and the international balance of ,ower! n other words, the sa9e 9otive forces have given rise to the '9erican syste9 of chec$s and balances and to the international syste9 of the balance of ,ower! Both syste9s see$ to fulfill the sa9e functions for their own stability and the autono9y of their constituent ele9ents, however 9uch they 9ay differ in the 9eans they e9,loy and in the degree to which they realiHe their ai9! Both are subGect to the sa9e dyna9ic ,rocesses of change, diseLuilibriu9, and the establish9ent of a new balance on a different level! 8hich are the 9ain ,atterns of the international balance of ,owerF 8hat are the ty,ical situations out of which i@ arises and within which it o,eratesF 8hat functions does it fulfillF 'nd to what transfor9ations has it been subGected in recent historyF

T%O $AIN PATTERN' OF THE "ALANCE OF PO%ER Two factors are at the basis of international societyB one is the 9ulti,licity> the other is the antagonis9 of its ele9ents, the individual nations! The as,irations for ,ower of the individual nations can co9e into conflict with each other C and so9e, if not 9ost of the9, do at any ,articular 9o9ent in history C in two different ways! n other words, the struggle for ,ower on the international scene can be carried on in two ty,ical ,atterns! The Pattern o! %ire$t Opposition "ation ' 9ay e9bar$ u,on an i9,erialistic ,olicy with regard to "ation B, and "ation O 9ay counter that ,olicy with a ,olicy of the status Luo or with an i9,erialistic ,olicy of its own! &rance and its allies o,,osing Russia in .2.=, +a,an o,,osing (hina fro9 ./0. to ./6., the :nited "ations vs! the ')is fro9 ./6. on, corres,ond to that ,attern! The ,attern is one of direct o,,osition between the nation that wants to establish its ,ower over another nation and the latter, which refuses to yield! "ation ' 9ay also ,ursue an i9,erialistic ,olicy toward "ation (, which 9ay either resist or acLuiesce in that ,olicy, while "ation O follows with regard to "ation N either a ,olicy of i9,erialis9 or one of the status Luo! n this case, the do9ination of N is a goal of 'Is ,olicy! B, on the other hand, is o,,osed to 'Is ,olicy because it either wants to ,reserve the status Luo with res,ect to N or wants the do9ination of N for itself! The ,attern of the struggle for ,ower between ' and O is here not one of direct o,,osition, but of co9,etition, the obGect of which is the do9ination of (, and it is only through the inter9ediary of that co9,etition that the contest for ,ower between ' and O ta$es ,lace! This ,attern was visible, for instance, in the co9,etition between Great Britain and Russia for the do9ination of ran, in which the struggle for ,ower between the two countries has re,eatedly 9anifested itself during the last hundred years! t is also clear in the co9,etition for do9inant influence in Ger9any which in the after9ath of the Second 8orld 8ar has 9ar$ed the relations between &rance, Great Britain, the Soviet :nion, and the :nited States! The co9,etition between the :nited States and (hina or between the Soviet :nion and (hina for control of the countries of Southeast 'sia offers another e)a9,le of the sa9e ,attern! t is in situations such as these that the balance of ,ower o,erates and fulfills its ty,ical functions! n the ,attern of direct o,,osition, the balance of ,ower results directly fro9 the desire of either nation to see its ,olicies ,revail over the ,olicies of the other! ' tries to increase its ,ower in relation to O to such an e)tent that it can control the decisions of O and thus lead its i9,erialistic ,olicy to success! B, on the other hand, will try to increase its ,ower to such an e)tent that it can resist 'Is ,ressure and thus frustrate 'Is ,olicy, or else e9bar$ u,on an i9,erialistic ,olicy of its own with a chance for success! n the latter case, ' 9ust, in turn, increase its ,ower in order to be able to resist BIs i9,erialistic ,olicy and to ,ursue its own with a chance for success! This balancing of o,,osing forces will go on, the increase in the ,ower of one nation calling forth an at least ,ro,ortionate increase in the ,ower of the other, until the nations concerned change the obGectives of their i9,erialistic ,olicies C if they do not give the9 u, altogether C or until one nation gains or believes it has gained a decisive advantage over the other! Then either the wea$er yields to the stronger or war decides the issue! So long as the balance of ,ower o,erates successfully in such a situation, it fulfills two functions! t creates a
/

bid! ;f! also +ohn (! (alhoun, J' *isLuisition on Govern9ent,J in The 8or$s of +ohn (! (alhoun @(olu9biaB '! S! +ohnston, .25.A, Eol! ., ,,! 05 - 3, 02 - /!

,recarious stability in the relations between the res,ective nations, a stability that is always in danger of being disturbed and, therefore, is always in need of being restored! This is, however, the only stability obtainable under the assu9ed conditions of the ,ower ,attern! &or we are here in the ,resence of an inevitable inner contradiction of the balance of ,ower! ;ne of the two functions the balance of ,ower is su,,osed to fulfill is stability in the ,ower relations a9ong nations> yet these relations are, as we have seen, by their very nature subGect to continuous change! They are essentially unstable! Since the weights that deter9ine the relative ,osition of the scales have a tendency to change continuously by growing either heavier or lighter, whatever stability the balance of ,ower 9ay achieve 9ust be ,recarious and subGect to ,er,etual adGust9ents in confor9ity with intervening changes! The other function that a successful balance of ,ower fulfills under these conditions is to insure the freedo9 of one nation fro9 do9ination by the other! ;wing to the essentially unstable and dyna9ic character of the balance, which is not unstable and dyna9ic by accident or only ,art of the ti9e, but by nature and always, the inde,endence of the nations concerned is also essentially ,recarious and in danger! Here again, however, it 9ust be said that, given the conditions of the ,ower ,attern, the inde,endence of the res,ective nations can rest on no other foundation than the ,ower of each individual nation to ,revent the ,ower of the other nations fro9 encroaching u,on its freedo9! The following diagra9 illustrates this situationB

The Pattern o! Competition n the other ,attern, the ,attern of co9,etition, the 9echanics of the balance of ,ower are identical with those discussed! The ,ower of ' necessary to do9inate N in the face of BIs o,,osition is balanced, if not outweighed, by BIs ,ower, while, in turn, BIs ,ower to gain do9inion over N is balanced, if not outweighed, by the ,ower of '! The additional function, however, that the balance fulfills here, aside fro9 creating a ,recarious stability and security in the relations between ' and B, consists in safeguarding the inde,endence of N against encroach9ents by ' or O! The inde,endence of N is a 9ere function of the ,ower relations e)isting between ' and B!

f these relations ta$e a decisive turn in favor of the i9,erialistic nation C that is, ' C the inde,endence of N will at once be in Geo,ardyB

f the status Luo nation C that is, O C should gain a decisive and ,er9anent advantage, (Is freedo9 will be 9ore secure in the 9easure of that advantageB

f, finally, the i9,erialistic nation C ' C should give u, its i9,erialistic ,olicies altogether or shift the9 ,er9anently fro9 N to another obGective C that is, * C the freedo9 of N would be ,er9anently securedB

"o one has recogniHed this function of the balance of ,ower to ,reserve the inde,endence of wea$ nations 9ore clearly than Ed9und Bur$e! He said in .1/. in his JThoughts on &rench 'ffairsJB 's long as those two ,rinces Qthe 7ing of Prussia and the Ger9an E9,erorR, are at variance, so long the liberties of Ger9any are safe! But if ever they should so far understand one another as to be ,ersuaded that they have a 9ore direct and 9ore certainly defined interest in a ,ro,ortioned 9utual aggrandiHe9ent than in a reci,rocal reduction, that is, if they co9e to thin$ that they are 9ore li$ely to be enriched by a division of s,oil than to be rendered secure by $ee,ing to the old ,olicy of ,reventing others fro9 being s,oiled by either of the9, fro9 that 9o9ent the liberties of Ger9any are no 9ore! .4 S9all nations have always owed their inde,endence either to the balance of ,ower @Belgiu9 and the Bal$an countries until the Second 8orld 8arA, or to the ,re,onderance of one ,rotecting ,ower @the s9all nations of (entral and South '9erica, and PortugalA, or to their lac$ of attractiveness for i9,erialistic as,irations @SwitHerland and S,ainA! The ability of such s9all nations to 9aintain their neutrality has always been due to one or the other or all of these factors, e!g!, the "etherlands, *en9ar$, and "orway in the &irst, in contrast to the Second, 8orld 8ar, and SwitHerland and Sweden in both world wars! The sa9e factors are res,onsible for the e)istence of so-called buffer states C wea$ states located close to ,owerful ones and serving their 9ilitary security! The outstanding e)a9,le of a buffer state owing its e)istence to the balance of ,ower is Belgiu9 fro9 the beginning of its history as an inde,endent state in .20. to the Second 8orld 8ar! The nations belonging to the so-called Russian security belt, which stretches along the western and southwestern frontiers of the Soviet :nion fro9 &inland to Bulgaria, e)ist by leave of their ,re,onderant neighbor, whose 9ilitary and econo9ic interests they serve! Korea an( the &a"an$e o! Po-er 'll these different factors have brought to bear successively u,on the fate of 7orea! Because of its geogra,hic location in the ,ro)i9ity of (hina, it has e)isted as an autono9ous state for 9ost of its long history by virtue of the control or intervention of its ,owerful neighbor! 8henever the ,ower of (hina was not sufficient to ,rotect the autono9y of 7orea, another nation, generally +a,an, would try to gain a foothold on the 7orean ,eninsula! Since the first century B!(!, the international status of 7orea has by and large been deter9ined either by (hinese su,re9acy or by rivalry between (hina and +a,an! The very unification of 7orea in the seventh century was a result of (hinese intervention! &ro9 the thirteenth century to the decline of (hinese ,ower in the nineteenth century, 7orea stood in a relationshi, of subservience to
.4

8or$s, Eol! E @BostonB %ittle, Brown, and (o9,any, .22/A, ,! 00.!

(hina as its suHerain and acce,ted (hinese leadershi, in ,olitics and culture! &ro9 the end of the si)teenth century +a,an, after it had invaded 7orea without lasting success, o,,osed to the clai9 of (hina its own clai9 to control of the country! +a,an was able to 9a$e good that clai9 as a result of its victory in the Sino - +a,anese 8ar of .2/6-/5! Then +a,an was challenged in its control of 7orea by Russia, and fro9 .2/3 on the influence of Russia beca9e do9inant! The rivalry between +a,an and Russia for control of 7orea ended with the defeat of Russia in the Russo-+a,anese 8ar of ./46 - 45! +a,anese control of 7orea, thus fir9ly established, was ter9inated with the defeat of +a,an in the Second 8orld 8ar! &ro9 then on, the :nited States re,laced +a,an as a chec$ u,on Russian a9bitions in 7orea! (hina, by intervening in the 7orean 8ar, resu9ed its traditional interest in the control of 7orea! Thus for 9ore than two thousand years the fate of 7orea has been a function either of the ,redo9inance of one nation controlling 7orea, or of a balance of ,ower between two nations co9,eting for that control! *, cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc .ifferent $ethods of the "alance of Power

The balancing ,rocess can be carried on either by di9inishing the weight of the heavier scale or by increasing the weight of the lighter one!

%I@I%' AN% +;L' The for9er 9ethod has found its classic 9anifestation, aside fro9 the i9,osition of onerous conditions in ,eace treaties and the incite9ent to treason and revolution, in the 9a)i9 Jdivide and rule!J t has been resorted to by nations who tried to 9a$e or $ee, their co9,etitors wea$ by dividing the9 or $ee,ing the9 divided! The 9ost consistent and i9,ortant ,olicies of this $ind in 9odern ti9es are the ,olicy of &rance with res,ect to Ger9any and the ,olicy of the Soviet :nion with res,ect to the rest of Euro,e! &ro9 the seventeenth century to the end of the Second 8orld 8ar, it has been an unvarying ,rinci,le of &rench foreign ,olicy either to favor the division of the Ger9an E9,ire into a nu9ber of s9all inde,endent states or to ,revent the coalescence of such states into one unified nation! The su,,ort of the Protestant ,rinces of Ger9any by Richelieu, of the Rhinebund by "a,oleon , of the ,rinces of Southern Ger9any by "a,oleon , of the abortive se,aratist 9ove9ents after the &irst 8orld 8ar, and the o,,osition to the unification of Ger9any after the Second 8orld 8ar C all have their co99on deno9inator in considerations of the balance of ,ower in Euro,e, which &rance found threatened by a strong Ger9an state! Si9ilarly, the Soviet :nion fro9 the twenties to the ,resent has consistently o,,osed all ,lans for the unification of Euro,e, on the assu9,tion that the ,ooling of the divided strength of the Euro,ean nations into a J8estern bloc\ would give the ene9ies of the Soviet :nion such ,ower as to threaten the latterIs security! The other 9ethod of balancing the ,ower of several nations consists in adding to the strength of the wea$er nation! This 9ethod can be carried out by two different 9eansB Either O can increase its ,ower sufficiently to offset, if not sur,ass, the ,ower of ', and vice versa> or O can ,ool its ,ower with the ,ower of all the other nations that ,ursue identical ,olicies with regard to ', in which case ' will ,ool its ,ower with all the nations ,ursuing identical ,olicies with res,ect to B! The for9er alternative is e)e9,lified by the ,olicy of co9,ensations and the ar9a9ent race as well as by disar9a9ent> the latter, by the ,olicy of alliances! COMP'NSATIONS (o9,ensations of a territorial nature were a co99on device in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries for 9aintaining a balance of ,ower which had been, or was to be, disturbed by the territorial acLuisitions of one nation! The Treaty of :trecht of .1.0, which ter9inated the 8ar of the S,anish Succession, recogniHed for the first ti9e e),ressly the ,rinci,le of the balance of ,ower by way of territorial co9,ensations! t ,rovided for the division of 9ost of the S,anish ,ossessions, Euro,ean and colonial, between the Ha,sburgs and the Bourbons Jad conservandu9 in Euro,a eLuilibriu9,J as the treaty ,ut it! The three ,artitions of Poland in .11=, .1/0, and .1/5, which in a sense 9ar$ the end of the classic ,eriod of the balance of ,ower, reaffir9 its essence by ,roceeding under the guidance of the ,rinci,le of co9,ensations! Since territorial acLuisitions at the e),ense of Poland by any one of the interested nations C 'ustria, Prussia, and Russia C to the e)clusion of the others would have u,set the balance of ,ower, the three nations agreed to divide Polish territory in such a way that the distribution of ,ower a9ong the9selves would be a,,ro)i9ately the sa9e after the ,artitions as it had been before! n the treaty of .11= between 'ustria and Russia, it was even sti,ulated that Jthe acLuisitions ! ! ! shall be co9,letely eLual, the ,ortion of one cannot e)ceed the ,ortion of the other!J &ertility of the soil and nu9ber and Luality of the ,o,ulations concerned were used as obGective standards by which

to deter9ine the increase in ,ower which the individual nations received through the acLuisition of territory! 8hile in the eighteenth century this standard was rather crudely a,,lied, the (ongress of Eienna refined the ,olicy of co9,ensations by a,,ointing in .2.5 a statistical co99ission charged with evaluating territories by the standard of nu9ber, Luality, and ty,e of ,o,ulation! n the latter ,art of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, the ,rinci,le of co9,ensations was again deliberately a,,lied to the distribution of colonial territories and the deli9itation of colonial or se9icolonial s,heres of influence! 'frica, in ,articular, was during that ,eriod the obGect of nu9erous treaties deli9iting s,heres of influence for the 9aGor colonial ,owers! Thus the co9,etition between &rance, Great Britain, and taly for the do9ination of Ethio,ia was ,rovisionally resolved, after the 9odel of the ,artitions of Poland, by the treaty of ./43, which divided the country into three s,heres of influence for the ,ur,ose of establishing in that region a balance of ,ower a9ong the nations concerned! Si9ilarly, the rivalry between Great Britain and Russia with res,ect to ran led to the 'nglo-Russian treaty of ./41, which established s,heres of influence for the contracting ,arties and a neutral s,here under the e)clusive do9ination of ran! The co9,ensation consists here not in the outright cession of territorial sovereignty, but rather in the reservation, to the e)clusive benefit of a ,articular nation, of certain territories for co99ercial e),loitation, ,olitical and 9ilitary ,enetration, and eventual establish9ent of sovereignty! n other words, the ,articular nation has the right, without having full title to the territory concerned, to o,erate within its s,here of influence without co9,etition or o,,osition fro9 another nation! The other nation, in turn, has the right to clai9 for its own s,here of influence the sa9e abstinence on the ,art of the for9er! Even where the ,rinci,le of co9,ensations is not deliberately a,,lied, however, as it was in the afore9entioned treaties, it is nowhere absent fro9 ,olitical arrange9ents, territorial or other, 9ade within a balance - of - ,ower syste9! &or, given such a syste9, no nation will agree to concede ,olitical advantages to another nation without the e),ectation, which 9ay or 9ay not be well founded, of receiving ,ro,ortionate advantages in return! The bargaining of di,lo9atic negotiations, issuing in ,olitical co9,ro9ise, is but the ,rinci,le of co9,ensations in its 9ost general for9, and as such it is organically connected with the balance of ,ower! AR$A$ENT' The ,rinci,al 9eans, however, by which a nation endeavors with the ,ower at its dis,osal to 9aintain or re-establish the balance of ,ower are ar9a9ents! The ar9a9ents race in which "ation ' tries to $ee, u, with, and then to outdo, the ar9a9ents of "ation B, and vice versa, is the ty,ical instru9entality of an unstable, dyna9ic balance of ,ower! The necessary corollary of the ar9a9ents race is a constantly increasing burden of 9ilitary ,re,arations devouring an ever greater ,ortion of the national budget and 9a$ing for ever dee,ening fears, sus,icions, and insecurity! The situation ,receding the &irst 8orld 8ar, with the naval co9,etition between Ger9any and Great Britain and the rivalry of the &rench and Ger9an ar9ies, illustrates this ,oint! t is in recognition of situations such as these that, since the end of the "a,oleonic 8ars, re,eated atte9,ts have been 9ade to create a stable balance of ,ower, if not to establish ,er9anent ,eace, by 9eans of the ,ro,ortionate disar9a9ent of co9,eting nations! The techniLue of stabiliHing the balance of ,ower by 9eans of a ,ro,ortionate reduction of ar9a9ents is so9ewhat si9ilar to the techniLue of territorial co9,ensations! &or both techniLues reLuire a Luantitative evaluation of the influence that the arrange9ent is li$ely to e)ert on the res,ective ,ower of the individual nations! The difficulties in 9a$ing such a Luantitative evaluation C in correlating, for instance, the 9ilitary strength of hW &rench ar9y of ./0= with the 9ilitary ,ower re,resented by the industrial ,otential of Ger9any C have greatly contributed to the failure of 9ost atte9,ts at creating a stable balance of ,ower by 9eans of disar9a9ent! The only outstanding success of this $ind was the 8ashington "aval Treaty of ./==, in which Great Britain, the :nited States, +a,an, &rance, and taly agreed to a ,ro,ortionate reduction and li9itation of naval ar9a9ents! #et it 9ust be noted that this treaty was ,art of an over - all ,olitical and territorial settle9ent in the Pacific which sought to stabiliHe the ,ower relations in that region on the foundation of 'nglo-'9erican ,redo9inance! /

ALLIANCE' The historically 9ost i9,ortant 9anifestation of the balance of ,ower, however, is to be found not in the eLuilibriu9 of two isolated nations but in the relations between one nation or alliance of nations and another alliance! The Genera" Nature o! A""ian$es 'lliances are a necessary function of the balance of ,ower o,erating within a 9ulti,le-state syste9! "ations ' and B, co9,eting with each other, have three choices in order to 9aintain and i9,rove their relative ,ower ,ositions! They can increase their own ,ower, they can add to their own ,ower the ,ower of other nations, or they can withhold the ,ower of other nations fro9 the adversary! 8hen they 9a$e the first choice, they e9bar$ u,on an ar9a9ents race! 8hen they choose the second and third alternatives, they ,ursue a ,olicy of alliances!
/

The ,roble9 of disar9a9ent will be discussed in greater detail in (ha,ter .2!

8hether or not a nation shall ,ursue a ,olicy of alliances is, then, a 9atter not of ,rinci,le but of e),ediency! ' nation will shun alliances if it believes that it is strong enough to hold its own unaided or that the burden of the co99it9ents resulting fro9 the alliance is li$ely to outweigh the advantages to be e),ected! t is for one or the other or both of these reasons that, throughout the better ,art of their history, Great Britain and the :nited States have refrained fro9 entering into ,eaceti9e alliances with other nations! #et Great Britain and the :nited States have also refrained fro9 concluding an alliance with each other even though, fro9 the ,rocla9ation of the Monroe *octrine in .2=0 to the attac$ on Pearl Harbor in ./6., they have acted, at least in relation to the other Euro,ean nations, as if they were allied! Their relationshi, during that ,eriod ,rovides another instance of a situation in which nations dis,ense with an alliance! t occurs when their interests so obviously call for concerted ,olicies and actions that an e),licit for9ulation of these interests, ,olicies, and actions in the for9 of a treaty of alliance a,,ears to be redundant! 8ith regard to the continent of Euro,e, the :nited States and Great Britain have had one interest in co99onB the ,reservation of the Euro,ean balance of ,ower! n conseLuence of this identity of interests, they have found the9selves by virtual necessity in the ca9, o,,osed to a nation which ha,,ened to threaten that balance! 'nd when Great Britain went to war in ./.6 and ./0/ in order to ,rotect the Euro,ean balance of ,ower, the :nited States first su,,orted Great Britain with a cons,icuous lac$ of that i9,artiality befitting a neutral and then Goined her on the battlefield! Had in ./.6 and ./0/ the :nited States been tied to Great Britain by a for9al treaty of alliance, it 9ight have declared war earlier, but its general ,olicies and concrete actions would not have been 9aterially different than they actually were! "ot every co99unity of interests, calling for co99on ,olicies and actions, also calls for legal codification in an e),licit alliance! #et, on the other hand, an alliance reLuires of necessity a co99unity of interests for its foundation! = :nder what conditions, then, does an e)isting co99unity of interests reLuire the e),licit for9ulation of an allianceF 8hat is it that an alliance adds to the e)isting co99unity of interestsF 'n alliance adds ,recision, es,ecially in the for9 of li9itation, to an e)isting co99unity of interests and to the general ,olicies and concrete 9easures serving the9!0 The interests nations have in co99on are not ty,ically so ,recise and li9ited as to geogra,hic region, obGective, and a,,ro,riate ,olicies as has been the '9erican and British interest in the ,reservation of the Euro,ean balance of ,ower! "or are they so inca,able of ,recision and li9itation as concerns the ,ros,ective co99on ene9y! &or, while a ty,ical alliance is directed against a s,ecific nation or grou, of nations, the ene9y of the 'nglo-'9erican co99unity of interests could in the nature of things not be s,ecified beforehand, since whoever threatens the Euro,ean balance of ,ower is the ene9y! 's +efferson shifted his sy9,athies bac$ and forth between "a,oleon and Great Britain according to who see9ed to threaten the balance of ,ower at the ti9e, so during the century following the "a,oleonic 8ars, Great Britain and the :nited States had to decide in the light of circu9stances ever liable to change who ,osed at the 9o9ent the greatest threat to the balance of ,ower! This blan$et character of the ene9y, deter9ined not individually but by the function he ,erfor9s, brings to 9ind a si9ilar characteristic of collective security, which is directed against the abstractly designed aggressor, whoever he 9ay be! The ty,ical interests which unite two nations against a third are both 9ore definite as concerns the deter9ination of the ene9y and less ,recise as concerns the obGectives to be sought and the ,olicies to be ,ursued! n the last decades of the nineteenth century, &rance was o,,osed to Ger9any, and Russia was o,,osed to 'ustria, while 'ustria was allied with Ger9any against &rance and Russia! How could the interests of &rance and Russia be brought u,on a co99on deno9inator, deter9ining ,olicy and guiding actionF How could, in other words, the casus foederis be defined so that both friend and foe would $now what to e),ect in certain contingencies affecting their res,ective interestF t was for the treaty of alliance of .2/6 to ,erfor9 these functions! Had the obGectives and ,olicies of the &ranco-Russian alliance of .2/6 been as clear as were the obGectives and ,olicies of 'nglo-'9erican coo,eration in Euro,e, no alliance treaty would have been necessary! Had the ene9y been as indeter9inate, no alliance treaty would have been feasible! "ot every co99unity of interests calling for co-o,eration between two or 9ore nations, then, reLuires that the ter9s of this co-o,eration be s,ecified through the legal sti,ulations of a treaty of alliance! t is only when the co99on interests are inchoate in ter9s of ,olicy and action that a treaty of alliance is reLuired to 9a$e the9 e),licit and o,erative! These interests, as well as the alliances e),ressing the9 and the ,olicies serving the9, can be distinguished in five different ways according toB their intrinsic nature and relationshi,, the distribution of benefits and ,ower, their coverage in relation to the total interests of the nations concerned, their coverage in ter9s of ti9e, and their effectiveness in ter9s of co99on ,olicies and actions! n conseLuence, we can distinguish alliances serving identical, co9,le9entary, and ideological interests and ,olicies! 8e can further distinguish 9utual and onesided, general and li9ited, te9,orary and ,er9anent, o,erative and ino,erative alliances! The 'nglo-'9erican alliance with regard to Euro,e ,rovides the classic e)a9,le of an alliance serving identical interests> the obGective of one ,artner C the ,reservation of the balance of ,ower in Euro,e C is also the obGective of the other! The alliance between the :nited States and Pa$istan is one of 9any conte9,orary instances of an alliance serving co9,le9entary interests! &or the :nited States it serves the ,ri9ary ,ur,ose of e),anding the sco,e of the ,olicy of contain9ent> for Pa$istan it serves ,ri9arily the ,ur,ose of increasing her ,olitical, 9ilitary, and econo9ic ,otential vis-a-vis her neighbors! The ,ure ty,e of an ideological alliance is ,resented by the Treaty of the Holy 'lliance of .2.5 and the 'tlantic
= 0

See the Luotations fro9 Thucydides and %ord Salisbury, ,ages .4 and ..! Glancing through the treaties of alliance of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, one is struc$ by the 9eticulous ,recision with which obligations to furnish troo,s, eLui,9ent, logistic su,,ort, food, 9oney, and the li$e, were defined!

(harter of ./6.! Both docu9ents laid down general 9oral ,rinci,les to which the signatories ,ledged their adherence, and general obGectives whose realiHation they ,ledged the9selves to see$! The Treaty of the 'rab %eague of ./65 ,rovides a conte9,orary e)a9,le of an alliance, e),ressing, since the war against srael of ./62, ,ri9arily ideological solidarity! Much 9ore ty,ical is the addition of ideological co99it9ents to 9aterial ones in one and the sa9e treaty of alliance!6 Thus the Three E9,erorsI %eague of .210 ,rovided for 9ilitary assistance a9ong 'ustria, Ger9any, and Russia in case of attac$ on any of the9 and, at the sa9e ti9e, e9,hasiHed the solidarity of the three 9onarchies against re,ublican subversion! n our ti9es, the ideological co99it9ent against (o99unist subversion, inserted in treaties of alliance, ,erfor9s a si9ilar function! The ideological factor also 9anifests itself in the official inter,retation of an alliance, based u,on 9aterial interests, in ter9s of an ideological solidarity transcending the li9itations of 9aterial interests! The conce,tion of the 'nglo-'9erican alliance, co99on before the British invasion of Egy,t in ./53, as allinclusive and world-e9bracing, based u,on co99on culture, ,olitical institutions, and ideals, is a case in ,oint! 's concerns the ,olitical effect of this ideological factor u,on an alliance, three ,ossibilities 9ust be distinguished! ' ,urely ideological alliance, unrelated to 9aterial interests, cannot but be stillborn> it is unable to deter9ine ,olicies or guide actions and 9isleads by ,resenting the a,,earance of ,olitical solidarity where there is none! The ideological factor, when it is su,eri9,osed u,on an actual co99unity of interests, can lend strength to the alliance by 9arshaling 9oral convictions and e9otional ,references to its su,,ort! t can also wea$en it by obscuring the nature and li9its of the co99on interests which the alliance was su,,osed to 9a$e ,recise and by raising e),ectations, bound to be disa,,ointed, for the e)tent of concerted ,olicies and actions! &or both these ,ossibilities, the 'nglo-'9erican alliance can again serve as an e)a9,le! The distribution of benefits within an alliance should ideally be one of co9,lete 9utuality> here the services ,erfor9ed by the ,arties for each other are co99ensurate with the benefits received! This ideal is 9ore li$ely to be a,,ro)i9ated in an alliance concluded a9ong eLuals in ,ower and serving identical interests> here the eLual resources of all, res,onding to eLual incentives, serve one single interest! The other e)tre9e in the distribution of benefits is one sidedness, a societas leonia in which one ,arty receives the lionIs share of benefits while the other bears the 9ain bul$ of burdens! n so far as the obGect of such an alliance is the ,reservation of the territorial and ,olitical integrity of the receiving ,arty, such an alliance is indistinguishable fro9 a treaty of guarantee! (o9,le9entary interests lend the9selves 9ost easily to this $ind of dis,ro,ortion, since they are by definition different in substance and their co9,arative assess9ent is li$ely to be distorted by subGective inter,retation! ' 9ar$ed su,eriority in ,ower is bound to add weight to such inter,retations! The distribution of benefits is thus li$ely to reflect the distribution of ,ower within an alliance, as is the deter9ination of ,olicies! ' great ,ower has a good chance to have its way with a wea$ ally as concerns benefits and ,olicies, and it is for this reason that Machiavelli warned wea$ nations against 9a$ing alliances with strong ones e)ce,t by necessity!5 The relationshi, between the :nited States and South 7orea e)e9,lifies this situation! However, this correlation between benefits, ,olicies, and ,ower is by no 9eans inevitable! ' wea$ nation 9ay well ,ossess an asset which is of such great value for its strong ally as to be irre,laceable! Here the uniLue benefit the for9er is able to grant or withhold 9ay give it within the alliance a status co9,letely out of $ee,ing with the actual distribution of 9aterial ,ower! n recent history, the relationshi,s between the :nited States and S,ain with regard to bases and between the :nited States and Saudi 'rabia with regard to oil co9e to 9ind! The 9isinter,retation of the 'nglo-'9erican alliance, 9entioned before, also illustrates the confusion between li9ited and general alliances! n the age of total war, warti9e alliances tend to be general in that they co9,rise the total interests of the contracting ,arties both with regard to the waging of the war and the ,eace settle9ent! ;n the other hand, ,eaceti9e alliances tend to be li9ited to a fraction of the total interests and obGectives of the signatories! ' nation will conclude a 9ultitude of alliances with different nations which 9ay overla, and contradict each other on s,ecific ,oints! ' ty,ical alliance atte9,ts to transfor9 a s9all fraction of the total interests of the contracting ,arties into co99on ,olicies and 9easures! So9e of these interests are irrelevant to the ,ur,oses of the alliance, others su,,ort the9, others diverge fro9 the9, and still others are inco9,atible with the9! Thus a ty,ical alliance is i9bedded in a dyna9ic field of diverse interests and ,ur,oses! 8hether and for how long it will be o,erative de,ends u,on the strength of the interests underlying it as over against the strength of the other interests of the nations concerned! The value and the chances of an alliance, however li9ited in sco,e, 9ust be considered in the conte)t of the over-all ,olicies within which it is e),ected to o,erate! General alliances are ty,ically of te9,orary duration and 9ost ,revalent in warti9e> for the overriding co99on interest in winning the war and securing through the ,eace settle9ent the interests for which the war was waged is bound to yield, once victory is won and the ,eace treaties are signed, to the traditionally se,arate and freLuently inco9,atible interests of the individual nations! ;n the other hand, there e)ists a correlation between the ,er9anency of an alliance and the li9ited character of the interests it serves> for only such a s,ecific, li9ited interest is li$ely to last long enough to ,rovide the foundation for a durable alliance! 3The alliance between Great Britain and Portugal,
6

t ought to be ,ointed out that the Holy 'lliance and the 'tlantic (harter usually su,,le9ent 9aterial co99it9ents contained in se,arate legal instru9ents! 5 The Prince, (ha,ter =.! 3 This correlation, however, cannot be reversed! Es,ecially in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, li9ited alliances were

concluded in .140, has survived the centuries because PortugalIs interest in the ,rotection of her ,orts by the British fleet and the British interest in the control of 'tlantic a,,roaches to Portugal have endured! #et it can be stated as a general historical observation that while alliance treaties have freLuently assu9ed ,er9anent validity by being concluded Jin ,er,etuityJ or for ,eriods of ten or twenty years, they could not have been 9ore durable than the generally ,recarious and fleeting configurations of co99on interests which they were intended to serve! 's a rule, they have been short-lived! The de,endence of alliances u,on the underlying co99unity of interests also accounts for the distinction between o,erative and ino,erative alliances &or an alliance to be o,erative C that is, able to coordinate the general ,olicies and concrete 9easures of its 9e9bers C those 9e9bers 9ust agree not only on general obGectives, but on ,olicies and 9easures as well! Many alliances have re9ained scra,s of ,a,er because no such agree9ent was forthco9ing, and it was not forthco9ing because the co99unity of interests did not e)tend beyond general obGectives to concrete ,olicies and 9easures! The classic case of an ino,erative alliance is that of the :nited States and &rance, 9ade ino,erable by 8ashingtonIs "eutrality Procla9ation of .1/0 after the 8ar of the &irst (oalition had bro$en out between &rance and the 9onarchies of Euro,e! Ha9ilton Gustified that Procla9ation with an argu9ent of general a,,licability> JThere would be no ,ro,ortion between the 9ischiefs and ,erils to which the :nited States would e),ose the9selves, by e9bar$ing in the war, and the benefit which the nature of their sti,ulation ai9s at securing to &rance, or that which it would be in their ,ower actually to render her by beco9ing a ,arty!J The &ranco-Russian alliances of ./05 and ./66 and the 'nglo-Russian alliance of ./6= are other cases in ,oint! The legal validity of a treaty of alliance and its ,ro,agandistic invocation can easily deceive the observer about its actual o,erational value! The correct assess9ent of this value reLuires e)a9ination of the concrete ,olicies and 9easures which the contracting ,arties have ta$en in i9,le9entation of the alliance! These considerations are ,articularly relevant for alliances between a nuclear ,ower @'A and a non-nuclear ,ower @BA, directed against another nuclear ,ower @(A! 8ill ' ris$ nuclear destruction at the hands of N in order to honor the alliance with BF The e)tre9ity of the ris$ involved casts doubt u,on the o,erational Luality of such an alliance! This doubt, first e),licitly raised by *eGaulle, has wea$ened the alliances between the :nited States and so9e of its 9aGor allies! A""ian$es 8s. Wor"( %omination 8hile the balance of ,ower as a natural and inevitable outgrowth of the struggle for ,ower is as old as ,olitical history itself, syste9atic theoretic reflections, starting in the si)teenth century and reaching their cul9ination in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, have conceived the balance of ,ower generally as a ,rotective device of an alliance of nations, an)ious for their inde,endence, against another nationIs designs for world do9ination, then called universal 9onarchy! B, directly threatened by ', Goins with (, *, and E, ,otentially threatened by ', to foil 'Is designs! Polybius has ,ointed to the essence of this configuration in his analysis of the relations between the Roans, the (arthaginians, and Hiero of SyracuseB The (arthaginians, being shut in on all sides, were obliged to resort to an a,,eal to the states in alliance with the9! Hiero during the whole of the ,resent war had been 9ost ,ro9,t in 9eeting their reLuests, and was now 9ore co9,laisant than ever, being convinced that it was in his own interest for securing both its Sicilian do9inions and his friendshi, with the Ro9ans, that (arthage should he ,reserved, and that the stronger Power should not be able to attain its ulti9ate obGect entirely without effort! n this he reasoned very wisely and sensibly, for such 9atters should never be neglected, and we should never contribute to the attain9ent by one state of a ,ower so ,re,onderant, that none dare dis,ute with it even for their ac$nowledged rights! 1

freLuently concluded ad hoc> that is, to counter an attac$, to engage in one, or to e9bar$ u,on a ,articular e),edition! 8ith the ,assing of the s,ecific occasion in view of which the alliance was concluded, the alliance itself lost its obGect and ca9e to an end! 1 Polybius , 20!

n 9odern ti9es, &rancis Bacon was, after the &lorentine states9en and historians Rucellai and Guicciardini, the first to recogniHe the essence of the balance of ,ower by way of alliances! n his essay ;f E9,ire he saysB &irst, for their neighbors, there can no general rule be given @the occasions are so variableA, save one which ever holdeth C which is, that ,rinces do $ee, due sentinel, that none of their neighbors do overgrow so @by increase of territory, by e9bracing of trade, by a,,roaches, or the li$e,A as they beco9e 9ore able to annoy the9 than they were! ! ! ! *uring that triu9virate of $ings, 7ing Henry E of England, &rancis , $ing of &rance, and (harles E, e9,eror, there was such a watch $e,t that none of the three could win a ,al9 of ground, but the other two would straightways balance it, either by confederation, or, if need were, by a war, and would not in any wise ta$e ,eace at interest> and the li$e was done by that %eague @which Guicciardine saith was the security of taly,A 9ade between &erdinando, $ind of "a,les, %orenHius Medices, and %udovicus Sforsa, ,otentates, the one of &lorence, the other of Milan! The alliances &rancis concluded with Henry E and the Tur$s in order to ,revent (harles E of Ha,sburg fro9 stabiliHing and e),anding his e9,ire are the first 9odern e)a9,le on a grand scale of the balance of ,ower o,erating between an alliance and one nation intent u,on establishing a universal 9onarchy! n the second half of the seventeenth century, %ouis D E of &rance too$ over the role of the Ha,sburgs, and called forth a si9ilar reaction a9ong the Euro,ean nations! 'lliances were for9ed around England and the "etherlands with the ,ur,ose of ,rotecting the Euro,ean nations fro9 &rench do9ination and establishing a new balance of ,ower between &rance and the rest of Euro,e! The wars against the &rance of .12/ and against "a,oleon show the sa9e configuration of one ,re,onderant nation ai9ing at world do9ination and being o,,osed by a coalition of nations for the sa$e of ,reserving their inde,endence! The 9anifesto with which the first coalition initiated these wars in .1/= declared that Jno ,ower interested in the 9aintenance of the balance of ,ower in Euro,e could see with indifference the 7ingdo9 of &rance, which at one ti9e for9ed so i9,ortant a weight in this great balance, delivered any longer to do9estic agitations and to the horrors of disorder and anarchy which, so to s,ea$, have destroyed her ,olitical e)istence!J 'nd when these wars a,,roached their conclusion, it was still the ,ur,ose of the 'llied ,owers, in the words of the (onvention of Paris of ',ril =0, .2.6, Jto ,ut an end to the 9iseries of Euro,e, and to found her re,ose u,on a Gust redistribution of forces a9ong the nations of which she is co9,osedJ> that is, u,on a new balance of ,ower! The coalitions that fought the Second 8orld 8ar against Ger9any and +a,an owed their e)istence to the sa9e fear, co99on to all their 9e9bers, of the latter nationsI i9,erialis9, and they ,ursued the sa9e goal of ,reserving their inde,endence in a new balance of ,ower! Si9ilarly, the 8estern bi and 9ultilateral alliances have since the late forties ,ursued the obGective of ,utting a halt to the i9,erialistic e),ansion of the Soviet :nion through the creation of a new world balance of ,ower! A""ian$es 8s. Countera""ian$es The struggle between an alliance of nations defending their inde,endence against one ,otential conLueror is the 9ost s,ectacular of the configurations to which the balance of ,ower gives rise! The o,,osition of two alliances, one or both ,ursuing i9,erialistic goals and defending the inde,endence of their 9e9bers against the i9,erialistic as,irations of the other coalition, is the 9ost freLuent configuration within a balance - of - ,ower syste9! To 9ention only a few of the 9ore i9,ortant e)a9,lesB the coalitions that fought the Thirty #earsI 8ar under the leadershi, of &rance and Sweden, on the one hand, and of 'ustria, on the other, sought to ,ro9ote the i9,erialistic a9bitions, es,ecially of Sweden and 'ustria, and, at the sa9e ti9e, to $ee, the a9bitions of the other side in chec$! The several treaties settling the affairs of Euro,e after the Thirty #earsI 8ar tried to establish a balance of ,ower

serving the latter end! The 9any coalition wars that filled the ,eriod between the Treaty of :trecht of .1.0 and the first ,artition of Poland of .11= all atte9,ted to 9aintain the balance that the Treaty of :trecht had established and that the decline of Swedish ,ower as well as the rise of Prussian, Russian, and British strength tended to disturb! The freLuent changes in the align9ents, even while war was in ,rogress, have startled the historians and have 9ade the eighteenth century a,,ear to be ,articularly un,rinci,led and devoid of 9oral consideration! t was against that $ind of foreign ,olicy that 8ashingtonIs &arewell 'ddress warned the '9erican ,eo,le! #et the ,eriod in which that foreign ,olicy flourished was the golden age of the balance of ,ower in theory as well as in ,ractice! t was during that ,eriod that 9ost of the literature on the balance of ,ower was ,ublished and that the ,rinces of Euro,e loo$ed to the balance of ,ower as the su,re9e ,rinci,le to guide their conduct in foreign affairs! 's &rederic$ the Great wroteB t is easy to see that the ,olitical body of Euro,e finds itself in a violent conditionB it has, so to s,ea$, lost its eLuilibriu9 and is in a state where it cannot re9ain for long without ris$ing 9uch! t is with it as it is with the hu9an body which subsists only through the 9i)ture of eLual Luantities of acids and al$alies> when either of the two substances ,redo9inates, the body resents it and its health is considerably affected! 'nd when this substance increases still 9ore, it can cause the total destruction of the 9achine! Thus when the ,olicy and the ,rudence of the ,rinces of Euro,e lose sight of the 9aintenance of a Gust balance a9ong the do9inant ,owers, the constitution of the whole body ,olitic resents itB violence is found on one side, wea$ness on the other> in one, the desire to invade everything, in the other i9,ossibility to ,revent it> the 9ost ,owerful i9,oses laws, the wea$est is co9,elled to subscribe to the9> finally, everything concurs in aug9enting the disorder and the confusion> the 9ost ,owerful, li$e an i9,etuous torrent, overflows its ban$s, carries everything with it, and e),oses this unfortunate body to the 9ost disastrous revolutions! 2 t is true that the ,rinces allowed the9selves to be guided by the balance of ,ower in order to further their own interests! By doing so, it was inevitable that they would change sides, desert old alliances, and for9 new ones whenever it see9ed to the9 that the balance of ,ower had been disturbed and that a realign9ent of forces was needed to restore it! n that ,eriod, foreign ,olicy was indeed a s,ort of $ings, not to be ta$en 9ore seriously than ga9es and ga9bles, ,layed for strictly li9ited sta$es, and utterly devoid of transcendent ,rinci,les of any $ind! Since such was the nature of international ,olitics, what loo$s in retros,ect li$e treachery and i99orality was then little 9ore than an elegant 9aneuver, a daring ,iece of strategy, or a finely contrived tactical 9ove9ent, all e)ecuted according to the rules of the ga9e, which all ,layers recogniHed as binding! The balance of ,ower of that ,eriod was a9oral rather than i99oral! The technical rules of the art of ,olitics were its only standard! ts fle)ibility, which was its ,eculiar 9erit fro9 the technical ,oint of view, was the result of i9,erviousness to 9oral considerations, such as good faith and loyalty, a 9oral deficiency that to us see9s deserving of re,roach! &ro9 the beginning of the 9odern state syste9 at the turn of the fifteenth century to the end of the "a,oleonic 8ars in .2.5, Euro,ean nations were the active ele9ents in the balance of ,ower! Tur$ey was the one notable e)ce,tion! 'lliances and counteralliances were for9ed in order to 9aintain the balance or to restore it! The century fro9 .2.5 to the outbrea$ of the &irst 8orld 8ar saw the gradual e)tension of the Euro,ean balance of ,ower into a world - wide syste9! ;ne 9ight say that this e,och started with President MonroeIs 9essage to (ongress in .2=0, stating what is $nown as the Monroe *octrine! By declaring the 9utual ,olitical inde,endence of Euro,e and the 8estern He9is,here and thus dividing the world, as it were, into two ,olitical syste9s, President Monroe laid the groundwor$ for the subseLuent transfor9ation of the Euro,ean into a world - wide balance -of - ,ower syste9! This transfor9ation was for the first ti9e clearly envisaged and for9ulated in the s,eech George (anning 9ade as British &oreign Secretary to the House of (o99ons on *ece9ber .=, .2=3! (anning had been criticiHed for not having gone to war with &rance in order to restore the balance of ,ower which had been disturbed by the &rench invasion of S,ain! n order to disar9 his critics, he for9ulated a new theory of the balance of ,ower! Through the instru9entality of British recognition of their inde,endence, he included the newly freed %atin-'9erican re,ublics as active ele9ents in the balance! He reasoned thusS But were there no other 9eans than war for restoring the balance of ,owerF C s the balance of ,ower a fi)ed and unalterable standardF ;r is it not a standard ,er,etually varying, as civiliHation advances, and as new nations s,ring u,, and ta$e their ,lace a9ong established ,olitical co99unitiesF The balance of ,ower a century and a half ago was to be adGusted between &rance and S,ain, the "etherlands, 'ustria, and England! So9e years after, Russia assu9ed her high station in Euro,ean ,olitics! So9e years after that again, Prussia beca9e not only a substantive, but a ,re,onderating 9onarchy! C Thus, while the balance of ,ower continued in ,rinci,le the sa9e, the 9eans of adGusting it beca9e 9ore varied and enlarged! They beca9e enlarged, in ,ro,ortion to the increased nu9ber of considerable states C in ,ro,ortion, 9ay say, to the nu9ber of weights which 9ight be shifted into the one or the other scale! ! ! ! 8as there no other 9ode of resistance, than by a direct attac$ u,on &rance C or by a war to be underta$en on the soil of S,ainF 8hat, if the ,ossession of S,ain 9ight be rendered har9less in rival hands C har9less as regarded us C and valueless to the ,ossessorsF Might not co9,ensation for dis,arage9ent be obtained !!! by 9eans better ada,ted to the ,resent ti9eF f &rance occu,ied S,ain, was it necessary, in order to
2

&rederic$ the Great, J(onsiderations on the ,resent state of the ,olitical body of Euro,e,J ;euvres de &rederic le (rand, Eol! E @BerlinB Rudol,h *ec$er, .262A, ,! =6! have su,,lied the translation fro9 the &rench!

avoid the conseLuences of that occu,ation C that we should bloc$ade (adiHF "o! loo$ed another way C saw 9aterials for co9,ensation in another he9is,here! (onte9,lating S,ain, such as our ancestors had $nown her, resolved that if &rance had S,ain, it should not be S,ain Jwith the, ndies!J called the "ew 8orld into e)istence, to redress the balance of the ;ld! / This develo,9ent toward a world - wide balance of ,ower o,erating by 9eans of alliances and counteralliances was consu99ated in the course of the &irst 8orld 8ar, in which ,ractically all nations of the world ,artici,ated actively on one or the other side! The very designation of that war as a JworldJ war ,oints to the consu99ation of the develo,9ent! n contrast to the Second 8orld 8ar, however, the &irst 8orld 8ar had its origins e)clusively in the fear of a disturbance of the Euro,ean balance of ,ower, which was threatened in two regionsB Belgiu9 and the Bal$ans! Belgiu9, located at the northeastern frontier of &rance and guarding the eastern a,,roaches to the English (hannel, found itself a focal ,oint of great ,ower co9,etition, without being strong enough to ,artici,ate actively in that co9,etition! That the inde,endence of Belgiu9 was necessary for the balance of ,ower in Euro,e was a)io9atic! ts anne)ation by any of the great Euro,ean nations would of necessity 9a$e that nation too ,owerful for the security of the others! This was recogniHed fro9 the very 9o9ent when Belgiu9 gained its inde,endence with the active su,,ort of Great Britain, 'ustria, Russia, Prussia, and &rance! These nations, asse9bled at a conference in %ondon, declared on &ebruary ./, .20., that JThey had the right, and the events i9,osed u,on the9 the duty to see to it that the Belgian ,rovinces, after they had beco9e inde,endent, did not Geo,ardiHe the general security and the Euro,ean balance of ,ower!J .4 n furtherance of that ai9, in .20/ the five nations concerned concluded a treaty in which they declared Bergiu9 to be Jan inde,endent and ,er,etually neutral stateJ under the collective guaranty of the five signatories! This declaration sought to ,revent Belgiu9 forever fro9 ,artici,ating, on one or the other side, in the Euro,ean balance of ,ower! t was the Ger9an violation of Belgiu9Is neutrality which in ./.6 crystalliHed the threat to the balance of ,ower e9anating fro9 Ger9any and enabled Great Britain to Gustify its ,artici,ation in the war on the side of &rance, Russia, and their allies! The concern of 'ustria, Great Britain, and Russia in the ,reservation of the balance of ,ower in the Bal$ans was conco9itant with the wea$ening of Tur$ish ,ower in that region! The (ri9ean 8ar of .256 - 53 was fought by an alliance of &rance, Great Britain, and Tur$ey against Russia for the ,ur,ose of 9aintaining the balance of ,ower in the Bal$ans! The alliance treaty of March .0, .256, declared Jthat the e)istence of the ;tto9an E9,ire in its ,resent e)tent, is of essential i9,ortance to the balance of ,ower a9ong the states of Euro,e!J The subseLuent rivalries and wars, es,ecially the events that led to the (ongress of Berlin of .212 and the Bal$an 8ars of ./.= and ./.0, are all overshadowed by the fear that one of the nations 9ainly interested in the Bal$ans 9ight gain an increase in that region out of ,ro,ortion to the ,ower of the other nations concerned! n the years i99ediately ,receding the &irst 8orld 8ar, the balance of ,ower in the Bal$ans increased in i9,ortance> for, since the Tri,le 'lliance between 'ustria, Ger9any, and taly see9ed a,,ro)i9ately to balance the Tri,le Entente between &rance, Russia, and Great Britain, the ,ower co9bination that gained a decisive advantage in the Bal$ans 9ight easily gain a decisive advantage in the over-all Euro,ean balance of ,ower! t was this fear that 9otivated 'ustria in +uly ./.6 to try to settle its accounts with Serbia once and for all, and that induced Ger9any to su,,ort 'ustria unconditionally! t was the sa9e fear that brought Russia to the su,,ort of Serbia, and &rance to the su,,ort of Russia! n his telegra,hic 9essage of 'ugust =, ./.6, to George E of England, the Russian (Har su99ed the situation u, well when he said that the effect of the ,redo9inance of 'ustria over Serbia Jwould have been to u,set balance of ,ower in Bal$ans, which is of such vital interest to 9y E9,ire as well as to those Powers who desire 9aintenance of balance of ,ower in Euro,e! !!! trust your country will not fail to su,,ort &rance and Russia in fighting to 9aintain balance of ,ower in Euro,e!J .. 'fter the &irst 8orld 8ar, &rance 9aintained ,er9anent alliances with Poland, (Hechoslova$ia, #ugoslavia, and Ru9ania and, in ./05, concluded an alliance C which was, however, not i9,le9ented C with the Soviet :nion! This ,olicy can be understood as a $ind of ,reventive balance - of - ,ower ,olicy which antici,ated Ger9anyIs co9ebac$ and atte9,ted to 9aintain the status Luo of Eersailles in the face of such an eventuality! ;n the other hand, the for9ation in ./03 of an alliance between Ger9any, taly, and +a,an, called the ')is, was intended as a counterweight against the alliance between &rance and the Eastern Euro,ean nations, which would at the sa9e ti9e neutraliHe the Soviet :nion! Thus the ,eriod between the two world wars stands in fact under the sign of the balance of ,ower by alliances and counteralliances, although in theory the ,rinci,le of the balance of ,ower was su,,osed to have been su,erseded by the %eague of "ations ,rinci,le of collective security! #et, actually, collective security, as will be shown later in greater detail, .= did not abolish the balance of ,ower! Rather, it reaffir9ed it in the for9 of a universal alliance against any ,otential aggressor, the ,resu9,tion being that such an alliance would always outweigh the aggressor! (ollective security differs, however, fro9 the balance of ,ower in the ,rinci,le of association by virtue of which the alliance is
/

S,eeches of the Right Honourable George (anning @%ondon, .203A, Eol! E , ,,! .4/-..! Protocols of (onferences in %ondon Relative to the 'ffairs of Belgiu9 @.204 - 0.A, ,! 34! .. British *ocu9ents on the ;rigins of the 8ar, .2/2 - ./.6 @%ondonB His MaGestyIs Stationery ;ffice, ./=3A, Eol! D , ,! =13! .= See (ha,ter ./!
.4

for9ed! Balance - of - ,ower alliances are for9ed by certain individual nations against other individual nations or an alliance of the9 on the basis of what those individual nations regard as their se,arate national interests! The organiHing ,rinci,le of collective security is the res,ect for the 9oral and legal obligation to consider an attac$ by any nation u,on any 9e9ber of the alliance as an attac$ u,on all 9e9bers of the alliance! (onseLuently, collective security is su,,osed to o,erate auto9atically> that is, aggression calls the counteralliance into o,eration at once and, therefore, ,rotects ,eace and security with the greatest ,ossible efficiency! 'lliances within a balance - of - ,ower syste9, on the other hand, are freLuently uncertain in actual o,eration, since they are de,endent u,on ,olitical considerations of the individual nations! The defection of taly fro9 the Tri,le 'lliance in ./.5 and the disintegration of the &rench syste9 of alliances between ./05 and ./0/ illustrate this 8ea$ness of the balance of ,ower! THE 9HOL.ER9 OF THE "ALANCE 8henever the balance of ,ower is to be realiHed by 9eans of an alliance C and this has been generally so throughout the history of the 8estern world C two ,ossible variations of this ,attern have to be distinguished! To use the 9eta,hor of the balance, the syste9 9ay consist of two scales, in each of which are to be found the nation or nations identified with the sa9e ,olicy of the status Luo or of i9,erialis9! The continental nations of Euro,e have generally o,erated the balance of ,ower in this way! The syste9 9ay, however, consist of two scales ,lus a third ele9ent, the JholderJ of the balance or the Jbalancer!J The balancer is not ,er9anently identified with the ,olicies of either nation or grou, of nations! ts only obGective within the syste9 is the 9aintenance of the balance, regardless of the concrete ,olicies the balance will serve! n conseLuence, the holder of the balance will throw its weight at one ti9e in this scale, at another ti9e in the other scale, guided only by one consideration C the relative ,osition of the scales! Thus it will ,ut its weight always in the scale that see9s to be higher than the other because it is lighter! The balancer 9ay beco9e in a relatively short s,an of history consecutively the friend and foe of all 9aGor ,owers, ,rovided they all consecutively threaten the balance by a,,roaching ,redo9inance over the others and are in turn threatened by others about to gain such ,redo9inance! To ,ara,hrase a state9ent of Pal9erston> 8hile the holder of the balance has no ,er9anent friends, it has no ,er9anent ene9ies either> it has only the ,er9anent interest of 9aintaining the balance of ,ower itself! The balancer is in a ,osition of Js,lendid isolation!J t is isolated by its own choice> for, while the two scales of the balance 9ust vie with each other to add its weight to theirs in order to gain the overweight necessary for success, it 9ust refuse to enter into ,er9anent ties with either side! The holder of the balance waits in the 9iddle in watchful detach9ent to see which scale is li$ely to sin$! ts isolation is Js,lendidJ> for, since its su,,ort or lac$ of su,,ort is the decisive factor in the struggle for ,ower, its foreign ,olicy, if cleverly 9anaged, is able to e)tract the highest ,rice fro9 those who9 it su,,orts! But since this su,,ort regardless of the ,rice ,aid for it, is always uncertain and shifts fro9 one side to the other in accordance with the 9ove9ents of the balance, its ,olicies are resented and subGect to conde9nation on 9oral grounds! Thus it has been said of the outstanding balancer in 9odern ti9es, Great Britain, that it lets others fight its wars, that it $ee,s Euro,e divided in order to do9inate the continent, and that the fic$leness of its ,olicies is such as to 9a$e alliances with Great Britain i9,ossible! JPerfidious 'lbionJ has beco9e a byword in the 9ouths of those who either were unable to gain Great BritainIs su,,ort, however hard they tried, or else lost it after they had ,aid what see9ed to the9 too high a ,rice! The holder of the balance occu,ies the $ey ,osition in the balance - of -,ower syste9, since its ,osition deter9ines the outco9e of the struggle for ,ower! t has, therefore, been called the JarbiterJ of the syste9, deciding who will win and who will lose! By 9a$ing it i9,ossible for any nation or co9bination of nations to gain ,redo9inance over the others, it ,reserves its own inde,endence as well as the inde,endence of all the other nations, and is thus a 9ost ,owerful factor in international ,olitics! The holder of the balance can use this ,ower in three different ways! t can 9a$e its Goining one or the other nation or alliance de,endent u,on certain conditions favorable to the 9aintenance or restoration of the balance! t can 9a$e its su,,ort of the ,eace settle9ent de,endent u,on si9ilar conditions! t can, finally, in either situation see to it that the obGectives of its own national ,olicy, a,art fro9 the 9aintenance of the balance of ,ower, are realiHed in the ,rocess of balancing the ,ower of others! &rance under %ouis D E and taly in the decade before the &irst 8orld 8ar atte9,ted to ,lay this role of arbiter of the Euro,ean balance of ,ower! But &rance was too dee,ly involved in the struggle for ,ower on the Euro,ean continent, too 9uch a ,art of its balance of ,ower, and too 9uch lac$ing in the co99anding su,eriority to ,lay that role successfully! taly, on the other hand, had not enough weight to throw around to give it the $ey ,osition in the balance of ,ower! &or this reason it earned only the 9oral conde9nation, but not the res,ect, that si9ilar ,olicies had brought Great Britain! ;nly Eenice in the si)teenth century and Great Britain since the reign of Henry E were able to 9a$e the holding of the balance between other nations one of the cornerstones of their foreign ,olicies, using the three 9ethods 9entioned above either severally or Gointly! The idea a,,eared for the first ti9e with reference to the Eenetians in a letter written in .550 by Kueen Mary of Hungary to the i9,erial a9bassador in England! She ,ointed out that the talians had good reason to o,,ose &rance> but, she continuedB J#ou $now how they fear the ,ower of the one and of the other of the two ,rinces Q(harles E and

&rancis R and how they are concerned to balance their ,ower!J .0 n the following years, on the occasion of EeniceIs refusals of &rench offers of alliance, &rench states9en characteriHed the foreign ,olicy of Eenice in si9ilar ter9s, with s,ecial reference to the as,ects of isolation and detach9ent fro9 alliances with either side! n .556 for instance, Henry of &rance was re,orted by a Eenetian a9bassador to have e),lained such refusals by the fear of Eenice that in the event of the death of (harles E S,ain 9ight beco9e inferior to &rance> Eenice, however, tried to J$ee, things in balance @tener le cose in eLuale statoA!J 'nother Eenetian a9bassador re,orted in .552 that the &rench e),lained the foreign ,olicy of Eenice by its sus,icion of the increase in ,ower of &rance and S,ain! Eenice wanted to ,revent Jthat the balance ti, to either side @Lue la buancia d[d ,endesse da alcuna ,arteA!J The a9bassador added that Jthis ,olicy is being ,raised and even ad9ired by intelligent ,eo,le> in these turbulent ti9es the wea$ find ,rotection nowhere but in the Re,ublic of Eenice and therefore all talians in ,articular, desire her inde,endence and welco9e her ar9a9ents!J.6 The classic e)a9,le of the balancer has, however, been ,rovided by Great Britain! To Henry E is attributed the 9a)i9B cui adhaero ,raeest @he who9 su,,ort will ,revailA! He is re,orted to have had hi9self ,ainted holding in his right hand a ,air of scales in ,erfect balance, one of the9 occu,ied by &rance, the other by 'ustria, and holding in his left hand a weight ready to be dro,,ed in either scale! ;f England under EliHabeth it was said Jthat &rance and S,ain are as it were the Scales in the Balance of Euro,e and England the Tongue or the Holder of the Balance!J .5 n .3=6, a &rench ,a9,hlet invited 7ing +acob to follow the glorious e)a9,le of EliHabeth and Henry E , Jwho ,layed his role so well between the E9,eror (harles E and 7ing &rancis by 9a$ing hi9self feared and flattered by both and by holding, as it were, the balance between the9!J 8ith the a,,earance of %ouis D E as a new as,irant for the universal 9onarchy, it beca9e 9ore and 9ore co99on, in England and elsewhere, to consider it the English 9ission to act as Jarbiter of Euro,eJ by $ee,ing the Ha,sburgs and &rance in balance! This sa9e standard was a,,lied critically to the foreign ,olicies of (harles and +a9es , who 9ade co99on cause with %ouis D E, the strongest rival of British ,ower, against the "etherlands, and in su,,ort of the anti-&rench ,olicies of 8illia9 ! 8ith the 8ar of the S,anish Succession, that standard was erected into a dog9a, es,ecially in England! t re9ained, as a,,lied to ever new co9binations of ,owers, ,ractically unchallenged until the Manchester liberals after the 9iddle of the nineteenth century advocated co9,lete and ,er9anent detach9ent fro9 the affairs of the Euro,ean continent C that is, isolationis9 C as the ,rinci,le of British foreign ,olicy! 's the tradition and ,ractice of British di,lo9acy, this variety of the balance of ,ower see9s to have disa,,eared only in recent years with the decline of British, and the growth of '9erican and Russian, ,ower! 8hen that tradition and ,ractice were about to disa,,ear, Sir 8inston (hurchill su99ariHed it 9ost eloLuently in a s,eech to the (onservative Me9bers (o99ittee on &oreign 'ffairs in March ./03B &or four hundred years the foreign ,olicy of England has been to o,,ose the strongest, 9ost aggressive, 9ost do9inating Power on the (ontinent, and ,articularly to ,revent the %ow (ountries falling into the hands of such a Power! Eiewed in the light of history these four centuries of consistent ,ur,ose a9id so 9any changes of na9es and facts, of circu9stances and conditions, 9ust ran$ as one of the 9ost re9ar$able e,isodes which the records of any race, nation, state or ,eo,le can show! Moreover, on all occasions England too$ the 9ore difficult course! &aced by Phili, of S,ain, against %ouis D E under 8illia9 and Marlborough, against "a,oleon, against 8illia9 of Ger9any, it would have been easy and 9ust have been very te9,ting to Goin with the stronger and share the fruits of his conLuest! However, we always too$ the harder course, Goined with the less strong Powers, 9ade a co9bination a9ong the9, and thus defeated and frustrated the (ontinental 9ilitary tyrant whoever he was, whatever nation he led! Thus we ,reserved the liberties of Euro,e, ,rotected the growth of its vivacious and varied society, and e9erged after four terrible struggles with an ever-growing fa9e and widening E9,ire, and with the %ow (ountries safely ,rotected in their inde,endence! Here is the wonderful unconscious tradition of British foreign ,olicy! 'll our thoughts rest in that tradition today! $now of nothing which has occurred to alter or wea$en the Gustice, wisdo9, velour and ,rudence u,on which our ancestors acted! $now of nothing that has ha,,ened to hu9an nature which in the slightest degree alters the validity of their conclusions! $now of nothing in 9ilitary, ,olitical, econo9ic, or scientific fact which 9a$es 9e feel that we are less ca,able! $now of nothing which 9a$es 9e feel that we 9ight not, or cannot, 9arch along the sa9e road! venture to ,ut this very general ,ro,osition before you because it see9s to 9e that if it is acce,ted everything else beco9es 9uch 9ore si9,le! ;bserve that the ,olicy of England ta$es no account of which nation it is that see$s the overlordshi, of Euro,e! The Luestion is not whether it is S,ain, or the &rench Monarchy, or the &rench E9,ire, or the Ger9an E9,ire, or the Hitler regi9e! t has nothing to do with rulers or nations> it is concerned solely with whoever is the strongest or the ,otentially do9inating tyrant! Therefore we should not be afraid of being accused of being ,ro-&rench or antiGer9an! f the circu9stances were reversed, we could eLually be ,ro-Ger9an and anti-&rench! t is a law of ,ublic ,olicy which we are following, and not a 9ere e),edient dictated by accidental circu9stances, or li$es and disli$es, or any other senti9ent! .3
.0 .6

Pa,iers dIEtat du (ardinal de (ranvelle @Paris, .260A, Eol! E, ,! .=.! Eugeno 'lberi, %e RebHioni degli '9biasciatori Eeneti al Senate, Series @&irenHe, .23=A, Eol! , ,,! =21, 636! .5 8illia9 (a9den, 'nnales of the History of the Most Renowned and Eictorious Princess EliHabeth, %ate Kueen of England @%ondon, .305A, ,! ./3! .3 8inston S! (hurchill! The Second 8orld 8ar, Eol!, , The Gathering Stor9 @BostonB Hough-ton Mifflin (o!, ./62A, ,,! =41-2! @Re,rinted by ,er9ission of the ,ublisher!A

*. BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB The 'tructure of the "alance of Power

.O$INANT AN. .EPEN.ENT '3'TE$' 8e have s,o$en thus far of the balance of ,ower as if it were one single syste9 co9,rehending all nations actively engaged in international ,olitics! (loser observation, however, reveals that such a syste9 is freLuently co9,osed of a nu9ber of subsyste9s that are interrelated with each other, but that 9aintain within the9selves a balance of ,ower of their own! The interrelationshi, between the different syste9s is generally one of subordination, in the sense that one do9inates because of the relatively great weight accu9ulated in its scales, while the others are, as it were, attached to the scales of that do9inant syste9! Thus, in the si)teenth century, the do9inant balance of ,ower o,erated between &rance and the Ha,sburgs, while at the sa9e ti9e an autono9ous syste9 $e,t the talian states in eLuilibriu9! n the latter ,art of the seventeenth century a se,arate balance of ,ower develo,ed in "orthern Euro,e out of the challenge with which the rise of Swedish ,ower confronted the nations adGacent to the Baltic Sea! The transfor9ation of Prussia into a first-rate ,ower in the eighteenth century brought about a ,articular Ger9an balance of ,ower, the other scale of which had 'ustria as its 9ain weight! This autono9ous syste9, Ja little Euro,e within the great,J was dissolved only in .233 with the e),ulsion of 'ustria fro9 the Ger9anic (onfederation as a conseLuence of the Prusso - 'ustrian 8ar of the sa9e year! The eighteenth century saw also the develo,9ent of an Eastern balance of ,ower occasioned by the ascendancy of Russia! The ,artitions of Poland, by virtue of the ,rinci,le of co9,ensations, between Russia, Prussia, and 'ustria are the first s,ectacular 9anifestations of that new syste9! Throughout the nineteenth century until the ,resent day, the balance of Power in the Bal$ans has been of concern to the nations of Euro,e! 's early as .1/4 Tur$ey concluded a treaty with Prussia in which the latter ,ro9ised to go to war with 'ustria and Russia Jbecause of the ,reGudice which the ene9ies in crossing the *anube, have brought to the desirable and necessary balance of ,ower!J n the latter ,art of the nineteenth century one began to s,ea$ of an 'frican balance of ,ower with reference to a certain eLuilibriu9 a9ong the colonial acLuisitions of the great ,owers! %ater on, the balance of ,ower in the 8estern He9is,here, in the Pacific, in the &ar and "ear East were added to the di,lo9atic vocabulary! ;ne even s,o$e of an J'ustrian eLuilibriu9J> and of the 'ustrian 9onarchy with its antagonistic nationalities it was said that it Jis constrained to a,,ly to itself the rules of conduct which the ,owers of Euro,e with their ,er,etual rivalries follow with regard to each other!J . t is not by accident that the autono9y of such local balance - of - ,ower syste9s is the greater and their subordination to a do9inant syste9 the less noticeable, the 9ore re9oved they are ,hysically fro9 the center of the struggle for ,ower C the 9ore they o,erate at the ,eri,hery of the do9inant syste9, out of reach of the do9inant nations! Thus an talian balance of ,ower could develo, during the fifteenth century in relative autono9y, while the great nations of Euro,e were occu,ied in other regions! &or the better ,art of the history of 8estern civiliHation the different balance - of - ,ower syste9s of 'sia, 'frica, and '9erica were entirely inde,endent of the configurations of the Euro,ean nations, to the ,oint of being hardly $nown to the9! The balance of ,ower in the 8estern He9is,here u, to the Second 8orld 8ar and in Eastern Euro,e until the end of the eighteenth century owe their relative autono9ous develo,9ent to their location at the ,eri,hery of the ,ower centers of the ti9e! The ,artitions of Poland which were intended to ,reserve the balance of ,ower in Eastern Euro,e were e)ecuted by the directly interested nations without interference of any other nation! The alliance concluded in .25. between BraHil and :ruguay against 'rgentina for the ,ur,ose of 9aintaining the balance of ,ower in South '9erica had only a very re9ote connection with the Euro,ean balance of ,ower! ;n the other hand, it has now beco9e ,ossible to s,ea$ of an autono9ous 'frican balance of ,ower! Since the indigenous ,eo,les of 'frica have started to co9,ete for ,ower with each other and with non 'frican nations, 'frica is no longer solely an obGect of the struggle for ,ower centered elsewhere! The 9ore inti9ately a local balance of ,ower is connected with the do9inant one, the less o,,ortunity it has to o,erate autono9ously and the 9ore it tends to beco9e 9erely a localiHed 9anifestation of the do9inant balance of ,ower! The balance of ,ower within the Ger9an (onfederation fro9 &rederic$ the Great to the 8ar of .233 ,resents an inter9ediate situation between full autono9y and co9,lete integration! t co9bines a certain degree of autono9y with integration into the do9inant syste9! 8hile the eLuilibriu9 between Prussia and 'ustria was, as we have seen, = a ,recondition for the ,reservation of the liberties of the 9e9bers of the Ger9anic (onfederation, this eLuilibriu9 was also indis,ensable for the 9aintenance of the Euro,ean balance of ,ower as a whole! The Ger9an balance thus fulfilled a dual functionB one within its own fra9ewor$, another for the general syste9 of
. =

'lbert Sorel, Euro,e et la revolution francaise @ParisB E! Plon, .225A, Eol! , ,! 660! See ,ages ./. - /=!

which it was a ,art! (onversely, the fusion of Prussia and 'ustria or the do9ination of one by the other would not only have been destructive of the inde,endence of the individual Ger9an states but would as well have threatened the freedo9 of the other Euro,ean nations! J f Euro,e,J as Ed9und Bur$e ,ut it, Jdoes not conceive the inde,endence and the eLuilibriu9 of the e9,ire to be in the very essence of the syste9 of balance of ,ower in Euro,e !!! all the ,olitics of Euro,e for 9ore than two centuries have been 9iserably erroneous!J0 The ,er,etuation of the balance between Prussia and 'ustria was, therefore, in the interest not only of the other 9e9bers of the Ger9anic (onfederation but of all Euro,ean nations! 8hen, as a conseLuence of the 8ar of .233, Prussia and later Ger9any gained a ,er9anent advantage over 'ustria which destroyed the balance between the two nations and 9ade Ger9any ,redo9inant in Euro,e, it beca9e one of the functions of the Euro,ean balance of ,ower to ,reserve at least the inde,endence of 'ustria against infringe9ent by its stronger neighbor! t was in conseLuence of that ,er9anent Euro,ean interest that after the &irst 8orld 8ar the victorious 'llies sought by legal, econo9ic, and ,olitical 9easures to ,revent the fusion of 'ustria with Ger9any! Moreover, it was within the logic of this situation that Hitler regarded the anne)ation of 'ustria as a necessary ste,,ing stone on the road toward the overthrow of the Euro,ean balance of ,ower! The balance of ,ower in the Bal$ans has fulfilled a si9ilar function since the last decades of the nineteenth century! Here, too, the 9aintenance of a balance of ,ower a9ong the Bal$an nations has been regarded as a ,rereLuisite for the 9aintenance of the Euro,ean balance! 8henever the local balance was threatened, the great nations of Euro,e intervened in order to restore it! The state9ent of the Russian (Har at the beginning of the &irst 8orld 8ar, Luoted above,6 clearly illustrates that connection!

'TRUCTURAL CHAN)E' IN THE "ALANCE OF PO%ER2 n recent ti9es the relations between the do9inant balance of ,ower and the local syste9s have shown an ever increasing tendency to change to the detri9ent of the autono9y of the local syste9s! The reasons for this develo,9ent lie in the structural changes that the do9inant balance of ,ower has undergone since the &irst 8orld 8ar and that beca9e 9anifest in the Second! 8e have already indicated the gradual e),ansion of the do9inant balance - of - ,ower syste9 fro9 8estern and (entral Euro,e to the rest of the continent, and fro9 there to other continents, until finally the &irst 8orld 8ar saw all the nations of the earth actively ,artici,ating in a world - wide balance of ,ower! Hand in hand with the consu99ation of this e),ansion went a shift of the 9ain weights of the balance fro9 Euro,e to other continents! 't the outbrea$ of the &irst 8orld 8ar in ./.6, the 9ain weights in the balance were ,redo9inantly Euro,eanB Great Britain, &rance, and Russia in one scale, Ger9any and 'ustria in the other! 't the end of the Second 8orld 8ar, the ,rinci,al weights in each scale were either entirely non-Euro,ean, as in the case of the :nited States, or ,redo9inantly non-Euro,ean, as in the case of the Soviet :nion! n conseLuence, the whole structure of the world balance of ,ower has changed! 't the end of the &irst 8orld 8ar and even at the beginning of the Second, the two scales of the balance, so to s,ea$, were still in Euro,eB only the weights of the scales ca9e fro9 all over the earth! The 9ain ,rotagonists of the ,ower contest and the ,rinci,al sta$es for which it was fought were still ,redo9inantly Euro,ean! To ,ara,hrase the words of George (anning, already Luoted, non-Euro,ean ,owers were called in only for the ,ur,ose of redressing the balance of ,ower of Euro,e! n (hurchillIs words of ./64, JThe "ew 8orld, with all its ,ower and 9ight, ste,s forth to the rescue and the liberation of the ;ld!J Today the balance of ,ower of Euro,e is no longer the center of world ,olitics around which local balances would grou, the9selves, either in inti9ate connection or in lesser or greater autono9y! Today the Euro,ean balance of ,ower has beco9e a 9ere function of the world - wide balance of which the :nited States and the Soviet :nion have been the 9ain weights, ,laced on o,,osite scales! The distribution of ,ower in Euro,e is only one of the concrete issues over which the ,ower contests between the :nited States and the Soviet :nion have been waged! The revolution of ./2/ 9ay change this, but the e)act character of the change can not yet be foreseen! 8hat is true of the for9erly do9inant syste9 is true of all the traditional local syste9s as well! The balance of ,ower in the Bal$ans, no less than the balances in the "ear and &ar East, have shared the fate of the general Euro,ean syste9! They have beco9e 9ere functions of the new world - wide balance, 9ere JtheatersJ where the ,ower contest between the two great ,rotagonists is fought out! ;ne 9ight say that of all the local balance - of - ,ower syste9s only the South '9erican syste9 has retained a certain 9easure of autono9y, ,rotected as it is by the ,redo9inance of the :nited States!

PART FI#E Li itations of National Power: International $orality and %orld Public O&inion
0 6

8or$s, Eol! E @BostonB %ittle! Brown and (o9,any! .22/A, ,! 004! See ,age =42! 5 &or other structural changes, see ,ages =46 ff!

*/ BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB $orality; $ores; and Law as Restraints on Power

8e have seen in the ,receding cha,ter that ,ower is a crude and unreliable 9ethod of li9iting the as,irations for ,ower on the international scene! f the 9otivations behind the struggle for ,ower and the 9echanis9s through which it o,erates were all that needed to be $nown about international ,olitics, the international scene would indeed rese9ble the state of nature described by Hobbes as a Jwar of every 9an against every 9an!J.4 nternational ,olitics would be governed e)clusively by those considerations of ,olitical e),ediency of which Machiavelli has given the 9ost acute and candid account! n such a world the wea$ would be at the 9ercy of the strong! Might would indeed 9a$e right! 'ctually, however, the very threat of a world where ,ower reigns not only su,re9e, but without rival, engenders that revolt against ,ower which is as universal as the as,iration for ,ower itself! To stave off this revolt, to ,acify the resent9ent and o,,osition that arise when the drive for ,ower is recogniHed for what it is, those who see$ ,ower e9,loy, as we have seen, ideologies for the conceal9ent of their ai9s! 8hat is actually as,iration for ,ower, then, a,,ears to be so9ething different, so9ething that is in har9ony with the de9ands of reason, 9orality, and Gustice! The substance, of which the ideologies of international ,olitics are but the reflection, is to be found in the nor9ative orders of 9orality, 9ores, and law! &ro9 the Bible to the ethics and constitutional arrange9ents of 9odern de9ocracy, the 9ain function of these nor9ative syste9s has been to $ee, as,irations for ,ower within socially tolerable bounds! 'll ethics, 9ores, and legal syste9s do9inant in 8estern civiliHation recogniHe the ubiLuity of ,ower drives and conde9n the9! (onversely, such ,olitical ,hiloso,hies as MachiavelliIs and HobbesIs, which regard the ubiLuity of ,ower drives as an ulti9ate fact of social life, to be acce,ted rather than conde9ned and restrained, have 9et with the disa,,roval of ,revailing o,inion! They have lac$ed the intellectual and ,ractical influence that has 9ade such ,olitical ,hiloso,hies as St! 'ugustineIs and %oc$eIs ,otent forces in 8estern civiliHation! ;n the other hand, that very tradition of 8estern civiliHation which atte9,ts to restrain the ,ower of the strong for the sa$e of the wea$ has been o,,osed as effe9inate, senti9ental, and decadent! The o,,onents have been those who, li$e "ietHsche, Mussolini, and Hitler, not only acce,t the will to ,ower and the struggle for ,ower as ele9ental social facts but glorify their unrestrained 9anifestations and ,ostulate this absence of restraint as an ideal of society and a rule of conduct for the individual! But in the long run ,hiloso,hies and ,olitical syste9s that have 9ade the lust and the struggle for ,ower their 9ainstays have ,roved i9,otent and self-destructive! Their wea$ness de9onstrates the strength of the 8estern tradition that see$s, if not to eli9inate, at least to regulate and restrain the ,ower drives that otherwise would cither tear society a,art or deliver the life and ha,,iness of the wea$ to the arbitrary will of the ,owerful! t is at these two ,oints that 9orality, 9ores, and law intervene in order to ,rotect society against disru,tion and the individual against enslave9ent and e)tinction! 8hen a society or certain of its 9e9bers are unable to ,rotect the9selves with their own strength against the ,ower drives of others C when, in other words, the 9echanics of ,ower ,olitics are found wanting, as sooner or later they 9ust be C these nor9ative syste9s try to su,,le9ent ,ower ,olitics with their own rules of conduct! This is the 9essage the nor9ative syste9s give to strong and wea$ ali$eB Su,erior ,ower gives no right, either 9oral or legal, to do with that ,ower all that is ,hysically ca,able of doing! Power is subGect to li9itations, in the interest of society as a whole and in the interest of its individual 9e9bers, which are not the result of the 9echanics of the struggle for ,ower but are su,eri9,osed u,on that struggle in the for9 of nor9s or rules of conduct by the will of the 9e9bers of society the9selves! Three ty,es of nor9s or rules of conduct o,erate in all higher societiesB ethics, 9ores, and law! Their distinctive characteristics have been 9uch debated in the literature of ,hiloso,hy and Guris,rudence! &or the ,ur,ose of this study it is sufficient to ,oint out that every rule of conduct has two ele9entsB the co99and and the sanction! "o ,articular co99and is ,eculiar to any ,articular ty,e of nor9 C Jthou shalt not $illJ can be a co99and of ethics, 9ores, or law! t is the sanction that differentiates these three different ty,es of rules of conduct! JThou shalt not $illJ is a co99and of ethics, 9ores, or law according to whether, in case of its violation, a sanction ,eculiar to ethics or to 9ores or to law is a,,lied to ,unish the violator and ,revent further violations! f ' $ills O and afterward feels ,angs of conscience or of re9orse, we are in the ,resence of a sanction ,eculiar to ethics and, hence, of an ethical nor9! f ' $ills O and unorganiHed society reacts with s,ontaneous de9onstrations of disa,,roval, such as business boycott, social ostracis9, and the li$e, we have to do with a sanction ,eculiar to the 9ores, and, hence, to a nor9 of the 9ores! f, finally, ' $ills O and organiHed society reacts in the for9 of a rational ,rocedure with ,redeter9ined ,olice action, indict9ent, trial, verdict, and ,unish9ent, the sanction is of a legal nature and the nor9, therefore, belongs in the category of law! 'll do9estic societies are regulated by an intricate 9aHe of rules of conduct of this $ind, su,,orting or
.4

%eviathan, (ha,ter D !

contradicting each other or o,erating inde,endently! The 9ore i9,ortant a society considers those interests and values which it tries to safeguard by rules of conduct, the stronger are the sanctions with which it threatens an infraction of its rules! Society e)erts its greatest ,ressure, and therefore has the best chance of enforcing its rules of conduct against its recalcitrant 9e9bers when it brings all the different $inds of sanctions at its dis,osal si9ultaneously to bear u,on the infractor of its rules! t is wea$est, and therefore its sanctions are 9ost li$ely to be ineffective, when only one ty,e of sanction su,,orts its interests and values! 8hen one rule of conduct reLuires an action that another rule of conduct conde9ns, the fate of the interest or value concerned de,ends u,on the relative strength of the sanctions su,,orting the contradictory co99ands! 'gainst a threat to its own e)istence by treason or by revolution, or a threat to the e)istence of its individual 9e9bers by 9urder, society 9arshals all three ty,es of sanction! Thus 9orality, 9ores, and law, reinforcing each other, give threefold ,rotection to the life of society and to the lives of the individuals who co9,ose it! The would-be traitor or $iller faces the ,angs of his conscience, the s,ontaneous reactions of society in the for9, for instance, of ostracis9, and the ,unish9ent of the law, The sa9e situation ,revails where not the e)istence of society or of its individual 9e9bers but their ,ro,erty is at sta$e! Pro,erty, too, is surrounded by the tri,le wall of 9orality, 9ores, and law! Between the would-be thief and cheat and the ,ro,erty he covets, society inter,oses all the sanctions it is able to e9,loy! 8here less highly ,riHed interests and values are at sta$e, society 9ay call u,on only one ty,e of sanction! Thus certain $inds of co9,etitive ,ractices in business and ,olitics, such as lying, are o,,osed only by 9orality! The 9ores will co9e into ,lay only under e)tre9e conditions> if, for instance, the a9ount and degree of lying e)ceed the 9easure society regards as tolerable! The law will re9ain silent in the case of ordinary lying, if for no other reason than that no law ,rohibiting it can be enforced! t will s,ea$ only in case of Lualified lying, such as ,erGury and cheating, where the lie threatens interests and values beyond 9ere truth! The rules of fashion, on the other hand, are enforced e)clusively by the 9ores, for the issues involved are not i9,ortant enough for 9orality and law to be concerned about the9! t is, finally, the law alone that ta$es cogniHance of violations of traffic regulations! Morality and 9ores do not Partici,ate in their enforce9ent, for the sanctions of the law are generally sufficient to establish so9e $ind of 9echanical order in the real9 of traffic! The ,roble9 of the relative strength of different inGunctions beco9es acute when there is conflict between different rules of conduct! The classic e)a9,le 9uch discussed in the literature of Guris,rudence, of a conflict between two rules of the sa9e legal syste9 is the ,rohibition of dueling in the cri9inal codes of certain Euro,ean countries, while the 9ilitary codes of the sa9e countries reLuire officers to settle certain dis,utes by way of duels! ' syste9 of ethics which co99ands us to obey God rather than 9an and at the sa9e ti9e to give unto (aesar what is (aesarIs ,resents a si9ilar conflict when a law of the state contradicts one of GodIs co99and9ents! (onflicts of this $ind are ,articularly freLuent in the ,olitical s,here! Rival govern9ents C a revolutionary govern9ent and a legiti9ate govern9ent, a govern9ent in e)ile and a Luisling govern9ent C de9and obedience fro9 the sa9e grou, of ,eo,le! The rules of conduct with which a ,olitician is e),ected to co9,ly are often at odds with the nor9s that address all 9e9bers of society! The ethics and 9ores of ,olitics are considered to ,er9it greater leeway than the general ethics and 9ores of society in actions such as Jca9,aign oratoryJ and ,olitical advertising, although concern is growing! (onflicts between different rules of conduct are decided by the relative ,ressure the sanctions of the conflicting rules are able to e)ert u,on the will of the individual! :nable to co9,ly with all the nor9s addressed to hi9 at the sa9e ti9e, he 9ust choose the one to obey and violate the others! The relative strength of these ,ressures is, in turn, the e),ression of the relative strength of the social forces that su,,ort one set of values and interests against another! The nor9ative order of society whose ,ur,ose is to $ee, the ,ower as,irations of its individual 9e9bers within socially tolerable bounds is itself in a certain 9easure the result of social forces contending with each other for the do9ination of society through their influence, say, on legislation or court decisions! Social life consists overwhel9ingly of continuous reactions, which have beco9e largely auto9atic, to the ,ressures society e)erts u,on its 9e9bers through its rules of conduct! These rules of conduct watch over the individual fro9 9orning till night, 9olding his actions into confor9ity with the standards of society! ;ne 9ight even say that society as a dyna9ic force is nothing but the su9 total of its rules of conduct i9,osing ,atterns of action u,on its 9e9bers! 8hat we call civiliHation is in a sense nothing but the auto9atic reactions of the 9e9bers of a society to the rules of conduct by which that society endeavors to 9a$e its 9e9bers confor9 to certain obGective standards, to restrain their as,irations for ,ower, and to do9esticate and ,acify the9 in all socially i9,ortant res,ects! The civiliHation with which we are here of course 9ainly concerned C 8estern civiliHation C has been to a large e)tent successful in this endeavor! 8estern civiliHation has not, however, as 9any nineteenth- and twentieth-century writers believed, altogether banished the struggle for ,ower fro9 the do9estic scene and re,laced it with so9ething different and better, such as coo,eration, har9ony, ,er9anent ,eace, nor is it on its way to do so! This 9isconce,tion of the role that the as,irations and the struggle for ,ower ,lay in ,olitics has been treated in the third cha,ter of this boo$! The best that 8estern civiliHation has been able to achieve C which is, as far as we can see, the best that any civiliHation can achieve C has been to 9itigate the struggle for ,ower on the do9estic scene, to civiliHe its 9eans, and to direct it toward obGectives that, if attained, 9ini9iHe the e)tent to which life, liberty, and the ,ursuit of ha,,iness of the individual 9e9bers of society are involved in the struggle for ,ower! More ,articularly, the crude 9ethods of ,ersonal co9bat have been re,laced by the refined instru9ents of social, co99ercial, and ,rofessional co9,etition!

The struggle for ,ower is being fought not with deadly wea,ons but with co9,etitive e)a9inations, with co9,etition for social distinctions, with ,eriodical elections for ,ublic and ,rivate offices, and, above all, with co9,etition for the ,ossession of 9oney and of things 9easurable in 9oney! n the do9estic societies of 8estern civiliHation the ,ossession of 9oney has beco9e the outstanding sy9bol of the ,ossession of ,ower! Through the co9,etition for the acLuisition of 9oney the ,ower as,irations of the individual find a civiliHed outlet in har9ony with the rules of conduct laid down by society! The different nor9ative inGunctions against ho9icide and against individual and collective violence of any $ind see$ to create the nor9ative ,reconditions for such a civiliHed redirection of the struggle for ,ower! 'll the social instru9entalities and institutions relevant to the different co9,etitive devices of society serve the ,ur,ose, not of eli9inating the struggle for ,ower, but of creating civiliHed substitutes for the brutality and crudeness of an unli9ited and unregulated struggle for ,ower! Such is, in brief and s$etchy outline, the way ethics, 9ores, and law li9it the struggle for ,ower in the do9estic societies of 8estern civiliHation! 'nd what of international societyF 8hat rules of 9orality, 9ores, and law are effective on the international sceneF 8hat functions do they fulfill for international societyF 8hat $ind of international ethics, international 9ores in the for9 of world ,ublic o,inion, and international law is there to deli9it, regulate, and civiliHe the struggle for ,ower a9ong nations in the sa9e way the do9estic nor9ative syste9s affect the struggle for ,ower a9ong the 9e9bers of a do9estic societyF *2 BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB International $orality

' discussion of international 9orality 9ust guard against the two e)tre9es of either overrating the influence of ethics u,on international ,olitics or underesti9ating it by denying that states9en and di,lo9ats are 9oved by anything but considerations of 9aterial ,ower! ;n the one hand, there is the dual error of confounding the 9oral rules ,eo,le actually observe with those they ,retend to observe, as well as with those which writers declare they ought to observe! J;n no subGect of hu9an interest, e)ce,t theology,J said Professor +ohn (hi,9an Gray, Jhas there been so 9uch loose writing and nebulous s,eculation as on international law!J. The sa9e 9ust be said of international 9orality! 8riters have ,ut forward 9oral ,rece,ts that states9en and di,lo9ats ought to ta$e to heart in order to 9a$e relations between nations 9ore ,eaceful and less anarchic, such as the $ee,ing of ,ro9ises, trust in the otherIs word, fair dealing, res,ect for international law, ,rotection of 9inorities, re,udiation of war as an instru9ent of national ,olicy! But they have rarely as$ed the9selves whether and to what e)tent such ,rece,ts, however desirable in the9selves, actually deter9ine the actions of 9en! &urther9ore, since states9en and di,lo9ats are wont to Gustify their actions and obGectives in 9oral ter9s, regardless of their actual 9otives, it would be eLually erroneous to ta$e those ,rotestations of selfless and ,eaceful intentions, of hu9anitarian ,ur,oses, and international ideals at their face value! t is ,ertinent to as$ whether they are 9ere ideologies concealing the true 9otives of action or whether they e),ress a genuine concern for the co9,liance of international ,olicies with ethical standards! ;n the other hand, there is the 9isconce,tion, usually associated with the general de,reciation and 9oral conde9nation of ,ower ,olitics, discussed earlier,= that international ,olitics is so thoroughly evil that it is no use loo$ing for 9oral li9itations of the as,irations for ,ower on the international scene! #et, if we as$ ourselves what states9en and di,lo9ats are ca,able of doing to further the ,ower obGectives of their res,ective nations and what they actually do, we realiHe that they do less than they ,robably could and less than they actually did in other ,eriods of history! They refuse to consider certain ends and to use certain 9eans, either altogether or under certain conditions, not because in the light of e),ediency they a,,ear i9,ractical or unwise but because certain 9oral rules inter,ose an absolute barrier! Moral rules do not ,er9it certain ,olicies to be considered at all fro9 the ,oint of view of e),ediency! (ertain things are not being done on 9oral grounds, even though it would be e),edient to do the9! Such ethical inhibitions o,erate in our ti9e on different levels with different effectiveness! Their restraining function is 9ost obvious and 9ost effective in affir9ing the sacredness of hu9an life in ti9es of ,eace! THE PROTECTION OF HU$AN LIFE Prote$tion o! Human Li!e in Pea$e nternational ,olitics can be defined, as we have seen, as a continuing effort to 9aintain and to increase the ,ower of oneIs own nation and to $ee, in chec$ or reduce the ,ower of other nations! The relative ,ower of nations de,ends, however, as we have also ,ointed out,0 u,on the Luantity and Luality of hu9an beings in ter9s of siHe and Luality of
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"ature and Sources of the %aw @"ew #or$B The Mac9illan (o9,any, ./=1A, ,! .=1! See ,ages 01 ff! 0 See ,ages .05 ff!

,o,ulation, siHe and Luality of 9ilitary establish9ent, Luality of govern9ent, and, 9ore ,articularly, of di,lo9acy! Eiewed as a series of technical tas$s into which 9oral considerations do not enter, international ,olitics would have to consider as one of its legiti9ate ,ur,oses the drastic reduction or even the eli9ination of the ,o,ulation of a rival nation, of its 9ost ,ro9inent 9ilitary and ,olitical leaders, and of its ablest di,lo9ats! 'nd when international ,olitics was considered e)clusively as a techniLue, without 9oral significance, for the ,ur,ose of 9aintaining and gaining ,ower, such 9ethods were used without 9oral scru,les and as a 9atter of course! 'ccording to its official records, the Re,ublic of Eenice, fro9 .6.5 to .5=5, ,lanned or atte9,ted about two hundred assassinations for ,ur,oses of its foreign ,olicy! '9ong the ,ros,ective victi9s were two e9,erors, two $ings of &rance, and three sultans! The docu9ents record virtually no offer of assassination to have been reGected by the Eenetian govern9ent! &ro9 .653 to .61=, it acce,ted twenty offers to $ill the Sultan Maho9et , the 9ain antagonist of Eenice during that ,eriod! n .5.6, +ohn of Ragusa offered to ,oison anybody selected by the govern9ent of Eenice for an annual salary of fifteen hundred ducats! The Eenetian govern9ent hired the 9an Jon trial,J as we would say today, and as$ed hi9 to show what he could do with E9,eror Ma)i9ilian! n the sa9e ,eriod the cardinals brought their own butlers and wine to a ,a,al coronation dinner for fear they 9ight otherwise be ,oisoned> this custo9 is re,orted to have been general in Ro9e, without the hostIs ta$ing offense! Such 9ethods to attain ,olitical ends are no longer widely ,racticed today! #et the ,olitical 9otives for e9,loying the9 e)ist today as they did when ,ractices of this $ind actually ,revailed! t is not a 9atter of indifference for the nations engaged in the co9,etition for ,ower whether or not their co9,etitor can avail itself of the services of outstanding 9ilitary and ,olitical leaders! Thus they 9ay ho,e that an outstanding leader or governing grou, will be co9,elled to give u, the reins of ,ower, either through a ,olitical u,heaval or through infir9ity and death! 8e $now now that during the Second 8orld 8ar s,eculations as to how long Hitler and Mussolini would stay alive, or at least in ,ower, for9ed an i9,ortant ,art of the ,ower calculations of the antifascist alliance, and that the news of President RooseveltIs death revived HitlerIs ho,es of victory! *uring the (old 8ar one factor in '9erican ,olicy toward the Soviet :nion had been the e),ectation that the Soviet regi9e 9ight disintegrate fro9 within because of the inability of its rulers to $ee, the9selves in ,ower! The technical difficulties of engineering such re9ovals fro9 ,ower by violent 9eans are not greater today than they were in ,revious ,eriods of history! Such re9ovals are still as desirable and feasible as they always were! 8hat has changed is the influence of civiliHation, which 9a$es so9e desirable and feasible ,olicies 9orally re,rehensible and, hence, nor9ally i9,ossible of e)ecution! The e)istence and effectiveness of 9oral restraints beca9e 9anifest in the reactions to the assassination ,lots engendered by the (entral ntelligence 'gency @( 'A of the :nited States! 8hat the ,redo9inant seg9ent of '9erican ,ublic o,inion obGected to was not the lac$ of success of those atte9,ts but their violation of 9oral restraints! That such atte9,ts were 9ade at all ,oints to a wea$ening of 9oral restraint in a s9all nu9ber of ,ublic officials o,erating in secret! That such 9oral transgressions 9et with overwhel9ing disa,,roval on 9oral grounds testifies to the continued validity of such 9oral nor9s! Moral li9itations of the sa9e $ind ,rotect in ti9es of ,eace the lives not only of outstanding individuals but also of large grou,s, even of whole nations whose destruction would be both ,olitically desirable and feasible! n the ,roble9 of Ger9any, as seen both by the Ger9ans and by the rest of the world, 9odern history ,rovides a stri$ing illustration of the influence of ethics u,on international ,olitics! The funda9ental fact of international ,olitics fro9 the Ger9an ,oint of view has been fro9 Bis9arc$ to Hitler the Jencircle9entJ of Ger9any by ,owerful nations in the East and in the 8est! Bis9arc$, however ruthless and i99oral his ,articular 9oves on the chessboard of international ,olitics 9ay have been, rarely deviated fro9 the basic rules of the ga9e which had ,revailed in the society of (hristian ,rinces of the eighteenth century! t was a fraudulent and treacherous ga9e, but there were a few things no 9e9ber of that aristocratic society would stoo, to do! Thus, confronted with the ,ro)i9ity of Russia and &rance as a condition of Ger9anyIs ,olitical e)istence, Bis9arc$ acce,ted the inevitability of the fact and tried to turn it to Ger9anyIs advantage by 9aintaining close relations with Russia and by isolating &rance! Hitler, on the other hand, did not recogniHe the social fra9ewor$ within whose li9itations international ,olitics had o,erated fro9 the end of the Thirty #earsI 8ar virtually to his own ascent to ,ower! He was free of the 9oral scru,les that had co9,elled Bis9arc$ to acce,t the e)istence of &rance and Russia as the inesca,able fact u,on which to build a Ger9an foreign ,olicy! Hitler undertoo$ to change that fact by ,hysically destroying Ger9anyIs eastern and western neighbors! (onsidered as a 9ere ,roble9 of ,olitical techniLue devoid of ethical significance, HitlerIs solution was 9uch 9ore thorough and ,olitically e),edient than Bis9arc$Is, for it ,ro9ised to solve the ,roble9 of Ger9anyIs international ,osition once and for all as far as the eastern and western neighbors of Ger9any were concerned! &urther9ore, in itself HitlerIs solution ,roved to be as feasible as it would have been in Bis9arc$Is ti9e! t 9ight have succeeded had it not been for certain ,olitical and 9ilitary errors that carried Hitler and his ,olicies to destruction and that the ,olitical genius of Bis9arc$ 9ight well have avoided! The Ger9an ,roble9, as it ,resents itself to the non-Ger9an world, and es,ecially to the nations threatened with Ger9an hege9ony, was for9ulated with brutal fran$ness by the &rench states9an (le9enceau when he declared on the occasion of the &irst 8orld 8ar that there were twenty 9illion Ger9ans too 9any! This state9ent ,oints to the inesca,able fact, which has confronted Euro,e and the world since the &ranco-Ger9an 8ar of .214, that Ger9any is by virtue of siHe and Luality of ,o,ulation the 9ost ,owerful nation of Euro,e! To reconcile this fact with the security of the other Euro,ean nations and of the rest of the world is the tas$ of ,olitical reconstruction which faced the world after the &irst 8orld 8ar and which confronted it again after the Second! That, since (le9enceau, the Ger9an ,roble9 has always been ,osed in ter9s that ta$e the e)istence of Jtwenty 9illion Ger9ans too 9anyJ for granted reveals the

sa9e 9oral li9itations on the ,ursuit of ,ower which we found in Bis9arc$Is foreign ,olicy and which we did not find in HitlerIs! &or there are two ways of dealing with a ,roble9 of international ,olitics such as the Ger9an! ;ne is the 9ethod by which the Ro9ans irrevocably solved the (arthaginian ,roble9! t is the 9ethod of solving a technical ,olitical ,roble9 by the a,,ro,riate 9eans without regard for any transcendent 9oral considerations! Since, fro9 the ,oint of view of the ,ower as,irations of Ro9e, there were too 9any (arthaginians, (ato would end his every s,eech by ,roclai9ingB J(eteru9 censeo (arthagine9 esse delenda9J @J's for the rest, a9 of the o,inion that (arthage 9ust be destroyedJA! 8ith its destruction the (arthaginian ,roble9, as seen by Ro9e, was solved forever! "o threat to Ro9eIs security and a9bition was ever again to rise fro9 the desolate ,lace that once was (arthage! Si9ilarly, if the Ger9ans had been successful in their over-all ,lans and if their firing-sLuads and e)ter9ination ca9,s could have finished their tas$s, the Jnight9are of coalitionsJ would have been forever banished fro9 the 9inds of Ger9an states9en! ' foreign ,olicy that does not ,er9it 9ass e)ter9ination as a 9eans to its end does not i9,ose this li9itation u,on itself because of considerations of ,olitical e),ediency! ;n the contrary, e),ediency would counsel such a thorough and effective o,eration! The li9itation derives fro9 an absolute 9oral ,rinci,le, which 9ust be obeyed regardless of considerations of national advantage! ' foreign ,olicy of this $ind, therefore, actually sacrifices the national interest where its consistent ,ursuit would necessitate the violation of a 9oral ,rinci,le, such as the ,rohibition of 9ass $illings in ti9es of ,eace! This ,oint cannot be too strongly 9ade> for freLuently the o,inion is advanced that this res,ect for hu9an life is the outgrowth of Jthe obligation not to inflict unnecessary death or suffering on other hu9an beings, i!e!, death or suffering not necessary for the attain9ent of so9e higher ,ur,ose which is held, rightly or wrongly, to Gustify a derogation fro9 the general obligation!J6 ;n the contrary, the fact of the 9atter is that nations recogniHe a 9oral obligation to refrain fro9 the infliction of death and suffering under certain conditions des,ite the ,ossibility of Gustifying such conduct in the light of a Jhigher ,ur,ose,J such as the national interest! The funda9ental conflict between these two conce,tions of international ,olitics, one o,erating within a fra9ewor$ of 9orality, the other outside it, is gra,hically illustrated by an e,isode Sir 8inston (hurchill re,orts in his 9e9oirs! 't the Teheran (onference, Stalin raised the issue of the ,unish9ent to be inflicted u,on the Ger9ans after the war! The Ger9an General Staff, he said, 9ust be liLuidated! The whole force of HitlerIs 9ighty ar9ies de,ended u,on about fifty thousand officers and technicians! f these were rounded u, and shot at the end of the war, Ger9an 9ilitary strength would be e)tir,ated! ;n this thought it right to sayB JThe British Parlia9ent and ,ublic will never tolerate 9ass e)ecutions! Even if in war ,assion they allowed the9 to begin, they would turn violently against those res,onsible after the first butchery had ta$en ,lace! The Soviets 9ust be under no delusion on this ,oint!J Stalin however, ,erha,s only in 9ischief, ,ursued the subGect! J&ifty thousand,J he said, J9ust be shot!J was dee,ly angered! J would rather,J said, Jbe ta$en out into the garden here and now and be shot 9yself than sully 9y own and 9y countryIs honor by such infa9y!J 5 Prote$tion o! Human Li!e in War Si9ilar 9oral li9itations are ,laced u,on international ,olicies in ti9es of war! They concern civilians and co9batants unable or unwilling to fight! &ro9 the beginning of history through the better ,art of the Middle 'ges, belligerents were held to be free, according to ethics as well as law, to $ill all ene9ies whether or not they were 9e9bers of the ar9ed forces, or else to treat the9 in any way they saw fit! Men, wo9en, and children were often ,ut to the sword or sold into slavery by the victor without any adverse 9oral reactions ta$ing ,lace! n (ha,ter E of Boo$ of ;n the %aw of 8ar and Peace, under the heading J;n the Right of 7illing Ene9ies in a Public 8ar and on ;ther Eiolence against the Person,J Hugo Grotius ,resents an i9,ressive catalogue of acts of violence co99itted in ancient history against ene9y ,ersons without discri9ination! Grotius hi9self, writing in the third decade of the seventeenth century, still regarded 9ost of the9 as Gustified in law and ethics, ,rovided the war was waged for a Gust cause! 3 This absence of 9oral restraints u,on $illing in war resulted fro9 the nature of war itself! n those ti9es war was considered a contest between all the inhabitants of the territories of the belligerent states! The ene9y to be fought was the total nu9ber of individuals owing allegiance to a certain lord or living within a certain territory rather than the ar9ed forces of the legal abstraction called a state in the 9odern sense! Thus every individual citiHen of the ene9y state beca9e an ene9y of every individual citiHen of the other side! Since the end of the Thirty #earsI 8ar, the conce,tion has beco9e ,revalent that war is not a contest between whole ,o,ulations, but only between the ar9ies of the belligerent states! n conseLuence, the distinction between co9batants and nonco9batants has beco9e one of the funda9ental legal and 9oral ,rinci,les governing the actions of belligerents! 8ar is considered to be a contest between the ar9ed forces of the belligerent states, and, since the civilian ,o,ulations do not ,artici,ate actively in the ar9ed contest, they are not to be 9ade its obGect! (onseLuently, it is considered to be a 9oral and legal duty not to attac$, wound, or $ill nonco9batant civilians ,ur,osely! nGuries and death suffered by the9 as
6 5

E! H! (arr!, The Twenty #earsI (risis, ././ - ./0/ @%ondonB Mac9illan and (o9,any, ./0/A, ,! ./3! 8inston S! (hurchill, The Second 8orld 8ar, Eol! E, (losing the Ring @BostonB Houghton Mifflin (o!, ./5.A, ,,! 010 C 6! @Re,rinted by ,er9ission of the ,ublisher!A 3 See es,ecially ? !

incidents of 9ilitary o,erations, such as the bo9bard9ent of a town or a battle ta$ing ,lace in an inhabited area, are regretted as so9eti9es unavoidable conco9itants of war! However, to avoid the9 to the ut9ost is again considered a 9oral and legal duty! The Hague (onventions with res,ect to the %aws and (usto9s of 8ar on %and of .2// and ./41, and the Geneva (onvention of ./6/, gave e),ress and virtually universal legal sanction to that ,rinci,le! ' corres,onding develo,9ent has ta$en ,lace with regard to 9e9bers of the ar9ed forces unwilling or unable to fight! t follows fro9 the conce,tion of war ,revailing in antiLuity and in the better ,art of the Middle 'ges that no e)ce,tion to the 9oral and legal right to $ill all ene9ies could be 9ade for certain categories of disabled co9batants! Thus Grotius could still state as the ,revailing 9oral and legal conviction of his ti9eB JThe right to inflict inGury e)tends even over ca,tives, and without li9itation of ti9e! ! ! ! The right to inflict inGury e)tends even over those who wish to surrender, but whose surrender is not acce,ted!J 1 #et, as the logical outgrowth of the conce,tion of war as a contest between ar9ed forces, the idea develo,ed that only those who are actually able and willing to ,artici,ate actively in warfare ought to be the obGect of deliberate ar9ed action! Those who were no longer engaged in actual warfare because of sic$ness, wounds, or because they had been 9ade ,risoners or were willing to be 9ade ,risoners ought not to be har9ed! This tendency toward the hu9aniHation of warfare started in the si)teenth century and cul9inated in the great 9ultilateral treaties of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries! Practically all civiliHed nations have adhered to these treaties! Between .52. and .236, =/. international agree9ents were concluded for the ,ur,ose of ,rotecting the lives of the wounded and sic$! The Geneva (onvention of .236, su,erseded by those of ./43, ./=/, and ./6/, translated into concrete and detailed legal obligations the 9oral convictions of the age as to the treat9ent to be accorded to the wounded, the sic$, and the 9edical ,ersons in charge of the9! The nternational Red (ross is both the sy9bol and the outstanding institutional realiHation of those 9oral convictions! 's concerns ,risoners of war, their lot was still 9iserable even in the eighteenth century, although they were as a rule no longer $illed, but were treated as cri9inals and used as obGects of e),loitation by being released only for ranso9! 'rticle =6 of the Treaty of &riendshi, concluded in .125 between the :nited States and Prussia for the first ti9e clearly indicated a change in the 9oral convictions on that 9atter! t ,rohibited the confine9ent of ,risoners of war in convict ,risons as well as the use of irons and sti,ulated their treat9ent as 9ilitary ,ersonnel! The Hague (onventions of .2// and ./41, as well as the Geneva (onventions of ./=/ and ./6/, laid down a detailed syste9 of legal rules intended to assure hu9ane treat9ent of ,risoners of war! &ro9 the sa9e hu9anitarian concern for the life and sufferings of hu9an beings e),osed to the destructiveness of war e9anate all the international treaties concluded since the 9id-nineteenth century for the ,ur,ose of hu9aniHing warfare! They ,rohibit the use of certain wea,ons, li9it the use of others, define the rights and duties of neutrals C in short, they try to infuse into warfare a s,irit of decency and of res,ect for the co99on hu9anity of all its ,ros,ective victi9s and to restrict violence to the 9ini9u9 co9,atible with the goal of war> that is, brea$ing the ene9yIs will to resist! The *eclaration of Paris of .253 li9ited 9ariti9e warfare! The *eclaration of St! Petersburg of .232 ,rohibited the use of lightweight ,roGectiles charged with e),losives or infla99able substances! The Hague *eclaration of .2// ,rohibited the use of e),anding @du9-du9A bullets! ' nu9ber of international conventions ,rohibited gas, che9ical, and bacteriological warfare! The Hague (onventions of .2// and ./41 codified the laws of war on land and sea and the rights and duties of neutrals! The %ondon Protocol of ./03 li9ited the use of sub9arines against 9erchant vessels! 'nd, in our ti9es, atte9,ts are being 9ade to li9it nuclear warfare! 'll these efforts bear witness to the virtually universal growth of a 9oral reluctance to use unli9ited violence as an instru9ent of foreign ,olicy! There 9ay be legal argu9ents against the validity or effectiveness of these international treaties, derived fro9 the wholesale disregard or violations of their ,rohibitions! #et this is no argu9ent against the e)istence of a 9oral conscience that feels ill at ease in the ,resence of violence, or at least certain $inds of violence, on the international scene! The e)istence of such a conscience is attested to by the atte9,ts to bring the ,ractice of states into har9ony with 9oral ,rinci,les through international agree9ents! t reveals itself also in the general Gustifications and e)cuses defending alleged violations of these agree9ents in 9oral ter9s! Most nations subscribe to legal agree9ents of this $ind and try to live u, to the9, at least in a certain 9easure! Therefore, the ,rotestations of innocence or of 9oral Gustification with which accusations in such 9atters are unifor9ly 9et are 9ore than 9ere ideologies! They are the indirect recognition of certain 9oral li9itations, which nations at ti9es co9,letely disregard and freLuently violate! &inally, the 9oral conscience of large grou,s within a warring nation 9ay revolt against undeniable and flagrant violations of 9oral and legal li9itations u,on the conduct of war! Such grou,s 9ay de9onstrate against the war and refuse to su,,ort it, thereby testifying to the e)istence of a 9oral conscience aware of 9oral li9itations! Mora" Con(emnation o! War &inally, since the turn of the century, the attitude toward war itself has reflected an ever-increasing awareness on the ,art of 9ost states9en that certain 9oral li9itations restrict the use of war as an instru9ent of foreign ,olicy! States9en have decried the ravages of war and have since the beginning of history Gustified their own ,artici,ation in the9 in ter9s of self-defense or religious duty! The avoidance of war itself C that is, of any war C has beco9e an ai9 of statecraft only since the turn of the century! The two Hague Peace (onferences of .2// and ./41, the %eague of
1

bid!, ? D, D !

"ations of ././, the Briand-7ellogg Pact of ./=2 outlawing aggressive war! and the :nited "ations in our day all have the avoidance of war itself as their ulti9ate obGective! 't the foundation of these and other legal instru9ents and organiHations, of which Part Eight of this boo$ will treat in detail, there is the conviction that war, and es,ecially 9odern war, is not only a terrible thing to be avoided for reasons of e),ediency, but also an evil thing to be shunned on 9oral grounds! The student of the different collections of di,lo9atic docu9ents concerning the origins of the &irst 8orld 8ar is struc$ by the hesitancy on the ,art of al9ost all res,onsible states9en, with the e)ce,tion ,erha,s of those of Eienna and St! Petersburg, to ta$e ste,s that 9ight irrevocably lead to war! This hesitancy and the al9ost general dis9ay a9ong the states9en when war finally ,roved to be inevitable contrasts shar,ly with the deliberate care with which, as late as the nineteenth century, wars were ,lanned and incidents fabricated for the ,ur,ose of 9a$ing war inevitable and ,lacing the bla9e for starting it on the other side! n the years ,receding the Second 8orld 8ar the ,olicies of the 8estern ,owers were ani9ated, to their great ,olitical and 9ilitary disadvantage, by the desire to avoid war at any ,rice! This desire overrode all other considerations of national ,olicy! Si9ilarly, the an)iety of all the great ,owers without e)ce,tion to li9it the 7orean 8ar to the 7orean ,eninsula and thus ,revent it fro9 develo,ing into a third world war, and the self- restraint ,racticed by all of the9 during the 9any international crises that have arisen since the end of the Second 8orld 8ar, are stri$ing illustrations of a funda9ental change in the attitude toward war! t is es,ecially in the refusal to consider seriously the ,ossibility of ,reventive war, regardless of its e),ediency in view of the national interest, that the 9oral conde9nation of war as such has 9anifested itself in recent ti9es in the 8estern world! 8hen war co9es, it 9ust co9e as a natural catastro,he or as the evil deed of another nation, not as a foreseen and ,lanned cul9ination of oneIs own foreign ,olicy! ;nly thus 9ight the 9oral scru,les, rising fro9 the violated 9oral nor9 that there ought to be no war at all, be stilled, if they can be stilled at all! Internationa" Mora"it an( Tota" War Thus, in contrast to antiLuity and the better ,art of the Middle 'ges, the 9odern age ,laces 9oral li9itations u,on the conduct of foreign affairs in so far as they 9ight affect the lives of individuals or grou,s of individuals! However, certain i9,ortant factors in the ,resent condition of 9an$ind ,oint toward a definite wea$ening of those 9oral li9itations! %et us re9e9ber that the absence of 9oral li9itations with regard to the destruction of life was conco9itant with the total character of warfare in which whole ,o,ulations faced each other as ,ersonal ene9ies! %et us re9e9ber, too, that the gradual li9itation of $illing in war, and its subGection to certain conditions, coincided with the gradual develo,9ent of li9ited war in which only ar9ies faced each other as active o,,onents! 8ith war ta$ing on in recent ti9es, to an ever-greater degree and in different res,ects, a total character, the 9oral li9itations u,on $illing are observed to an ever-lessening degree! ndeed, their very e)istence in the consciences of ,olitical and 9ilitary leaders as, well as of the co99on ,eo,le beco9es ever 9ore ,recarious and is threatened with e)tinction! 8ar in our ti9e has beco9e total in four different res,ectsB @.A with regard to the fraction of the ,o,ulation engaged in activities essential for the conduct of the war, @=A with regard to the fraction of the ,o,ulation affected by the conduct of the war, @0A with res,ect to the fraction of the ,o,ulation co9,letely identified in its convictions and e9otions with the conduct of the war, and @6A with res,ect to the obGective of the war! Mass ar9ies su,,orted by the ,roductive effort of the 9aGority of the civilian ,o,ulation have re,laced the relatively s9all ar9ies of ,revious centuries, which consu9ed only a s9all ,ortion of the national ,roduct! The success of the civilian ,o,ulation in $ee,ing the ar9ed forces su,,lied 9ay be as i9,ortant for the outco9e of the war as the 9ilitary effort itself! Therefore, the defeat of the civilian ,o,ulation @the brea$ing of its ability and will to ,roduceA 9ay be as i9,ortant as the defeat of the ar9ed forces @the brea$ing of their ability and will to resistA! Thus the character of 9odern war, drawing its wea,ons fro9 a vast industrial 9achine, blurs the distinction between soldier and civilian! The wor$er, the engineer, the scientist are not innocent bystanders cheering on the ar9ed forces fro9 the sidelines! They are as intrinsic and indis,ensable a ,art of the 9ilitary organiHation as are the soldiers, sailors, and air9en! Thus a 9odern nation at war 9ust see$ to disru,t and destroy the ,roductive ,rocesses of its ene9y, and the 9odern technology of war ,rovides the 9eans for the realiHation of that ai9! The i9,ortance of civilian ,roduction for 9odern war and the interest in inGuring ene9y ,roduction were already generally recogniHed in the &irst 8orld 8ar! Then, however, the technological 9eans of affecting the civilian ,roductive ,rocesses directly were but in their infancy! The belligerents had to resort to indirect 9eans, such as bloc$ades and sub9arine warfare! They atte9,ted to interfere directly with civilian life through air attac$s and long-range bo9bard9ent only s,oradically and with indifferent results! The Second 8orld 8ar has 9ade the latter 9ethods of direct interference the 9ost effective instru9ent for the destruction of a nationIs ,roductive ca,acity and ability to resist! The interest in the 9ass destruction of civilian life and ,ro,erty coincided with the ability to carry such 9ass destruction through, and this co9bination has been too strong for the 9oral convictions of the 9odern world to resist! Eoicing the 9oral convictions of the first decades of the century, Secretary of State (ordell Hull declared on +une ..,./02, with reference to the bo9bard9ent of (anton by +a,an, that the ad9inistration disa,,roved of the sale of aircraft and aircraft ar9a9ents to countries that had engaged in the bo9bing of civilian ,o,ulations! n his s,eech of *ece9ber =, ./0/, President Roosevelt declared a si9ilar 9oral e9bargo against the Soviet :nion in view of its 9ilitary o,erations against &innish civilians! ;nly a few years later all belligerents engaged in ,ractices of this $ind on a scale dwarfing those which '9erican states9en had conde9ned on 9oral grounds! 8arsaw and Rotterda9, %ondon and (oventry, (ologne and "ure9berg, Hiroshi9a and "agasa$i are

ste,,ing stones, not only in the develo,9ent of the 9odern technology of war, but also in the develo,9ent of the 9odern 9orality of warfare! The ndochina 8ar for all ,ractical ,ur,oses obliterated the distinction between co9batants and the civilian ,o,ulation! The national interest in the destruction of ene9y ,roductivity and his will to resist, as created by the character of 9odern war, and the o,,ortunity the 9odern technology of warfare ,resents of satisfying that interest, have had a deteriorating effect u,on international 9orality! This deterioration is further accentuated by the e9otional involve9ent of the great 9asses of the warring ,o,ulations in 9odern war! 's the religious wars of the si)teenth and seventeenth centuries were followed by the dynastic wars of the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and as the latter yielded to the national wars of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, so war in our ti9e tends to revert to the religious ty,e by beco9ing ideological in character! The citiHen of a 9odern warring nation, in contrast to his ancestors of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, does not fight for the glory of his ,rince or the unity and greatness of his nation, but he JcrusadesJ for an Jideal,J a set of J,rinci,les,J a Jway of life,J for which he clai9s a 9ono,oly of truth and virtue! n conseLuence, he fights to the death or to Junconditional surrenderJ all those who adhere to another, a false and evil, JidealJ and Jway of life!J Since it is this JidealJ and Jway of lifeJ that he fights in whatever ,ersons they 9anifest the9selves, the distinctions between fighting and disabled soldiers, co9batants and civilians C if they are not eli9inated altogether C are subordinated to the one distinction that really 9attersB the distinction between the re,resentatives of the right and the wrong ,hiloso,hy and way of life! The 9oral duty to s,are the wounded, the sic$, the surrendering and unar9ed ene9y, and to res,ect hi9 as a hu9an being who was an ene9y only by virtue of being found on the other side of the fence, is su,erseded by the 9oral duty to ,unish and to wi,e off the face of the earth the ,rofessors and ,ractitioners of evil! These tendencies destructive of 9oral li9itations have been ,owerfully strengthened by the i9,ersonal nature of 9odern war! Throughout history until the &irst 8orld 8ar, soldiers 9et face to face in co9bat! These deadly encounters were not devoid of a hu9an ele9entB 9en loo$ed each other in the eye, trying to $ill and avoid being $illed! These encounters had roo9 for hu9an e9otions, virtues, and vices, de9onstrated and ,erceived by 9en! 'fter 'chilles has fatally wounded %y$aos, Ho9er has hi9 bend over the doo9ed adversary and say J*ie, friend!J Modern war is in large 9easure ,ush-button war, anony9ously fought by ,eo,le who have never seen their ene9y alive or dead and who will never $now who9 they have $illed! "or will the victi9s ever see the face of the ene9y! The only connection between the ene9ies is the 9achinery with which they try to $ill each other! Such a technologically dehu9aniHed war is bound to be 9orally dehu9aniHed as well! &or the o,erator of the 9achinery, the e),erience of target ,ractice is hardly different fro9 that of a real attac$, and an attac$ u,on a 9ilitary installation is for hi9 indistinguishable fro9 that u,on a civilian target! 's a ,ilot who flew bo9bing 9issions in Eietna9 ,ut itB J tIs li$e being trained to fi) TEIs, li$e being a technician!J Thus the technology of 9odern war drastically wea$ens, if it does not destroy altogether, the ability to 9a$e those factual distinctions without which it is i9,ossible to discri9inate between 9oral and i99oral acts of war! :nder the i9,act of this funda9ental change in the conce,tion of warfare, not only were the 9oral li9itations u,on $illing in war, to which we have referred above, e)tensively violated during the Second 8orld 8ar, but belligerents have tended to Gustify on 9oral grounds the refusal to ta$e ,risoners, the $illing of ,risoners, and the indiscri9inate $illing of 9e9bers of the ar9ed forces and of civilians, and thus to assuage their 9oral scru,les, if not to sha$e the9 off altogether! Thus, while the 9oral li9itations u,on $illing in ti9es or ,eace re9ain intact, the 9oral li9itations u,on $illing in war have ,roved to be largely ineffective! 8hat is by and large 9ore i9,ortant for the ,ur,oses or this discussion, they have shown a tendency under the i9,act of a funda9entally altered conce,tion of war to wea$en and disa,,ear altogether as rules of conduct! "early a century ago, in an era of general o,ti9is9, a great scholar clearly foresaw the ,ossibility of this develo,9ent and analyHed its ele9ents! +ohn 8estla$e, 8hewell Professor of nternational %aw at the :niversity of (a9bridge, wrote in .2/6B t is al9ost a truis9 to say that the 9itigation of war 9ust de,end on the ,arties to it feeling that they belong to a larger whole than their res,ective tribes or states, a whole in which the ene9y too is co9,rised, so that duties arising out of that larger citiHenshi, are owed even to hi9! This senti9ent has never been wholly wanting in Euro,e since the co99ence9ent of historical ti9es, but there have been great variations in the nature and e)tent of the whole to which the wider attach9ent was felt!!!! n our own ti9e there is a cos9o,olitan senti9ent, a belief in a co99onwealth of 9an$ind si9ilar to that of the Stoics, but stronger because the soil has been ,re,ared by (hristianity, and by the 9utual res,ect which great states tolerably eLual in ,ower and si9ilar in civiliHation cannot hel, feeling for one another! ! ! ! There have been ,eriods during which the level has fallen, and one such ,eriod it belongs to our subGect to notice! The wars of religion which followed the Refor9ation were a9ong the 9ost terrible in which the beast in 9an ever bro$e loose, and yet they occurred in an age of co9,arative enlighten9ent! Peal for a cause, however worthy the cause 9ay be, is one of the strongest and 9ost dangerous irritants to which hu9an ,assion is subGect> and the tie of Protestant to Protestant and of (atholic to (atholic, cutting across the state tie instead of e9bracing it unwea$ened in a 9ore co9,rehensive one, enfeebled the ordinary chec$s to ,assion when they were 9ost wanted! Such a degradation of war would tend to recur if socialis9 attained to the consistency and ,ower of a 9ilitant creed, and 9et the ,resent idea of the state on the field of bailie! is ,ossible that we 9ight then

see in war a license eLual to that which anarchis9 shows us in ,eaceS2

UNI#ER'AL $ORALIT3 #': NATIONALI'TIC UNI#ER'ALI'$ The deterioration of international 9orality which has occurred in recent years with regard to the ,rotection of life is only a s,ecial instance of a general and, for the ,ur,oses of this discussion, 9uch 9ore far-reaching dissolution of an ethical syste9 that in the ,ast i9,osed its restraints u,on the day-by-day o,erations of foreign ,olicy but does so no longer! Two factors have brought about this dissolutionB the substitution of de9ocratic for aristocratic res,onsibility in foreign affairs and the substitution of nationalistic standards of action for universal ones! Persona" 'thi$s o! the Aristo$rati$ Internationa" n the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and to a lessening degree u, to the &irst 8orld 8ar, international 9orality was the concern of a ,ersonal sovereign C that is, a certain individual ,rince and his successors C and of a relatively s9all, cohesive, and ho9ogeneous grou, of aristocratic rulers! The ,rince and the aristocratic rulers of a ,articular nation were in constant, inti9ate contact with the ,rinces and aristocratic rulers of other nations! They were Goined together by fa9ily ties, a co99on language @&renchA, co99on cultural values, a co99on style of life, and co99on 9oral convictions about what a gentle9an was and was not allowed to do in his relations with another gentle9an, whether of his own or of a foreign nation! The ,rinces co9,eting for ,ower considered the9selves to be co9,etitors in a ga9e whose rules were acce,ted by all the other co9,etitors! The 9e9bers of their di,lo9atic and 9ilitary services loo$ed u,on the9selves as e9,loyees who served their e9,loyer either by virtue of the accident of birth or because of the ,ro9ise of ,ay, influence, and glory! n .23=, Bis9arc$, who had been ,osted in Russia, declined an offer fro9 the (Har to serve in the Russian di,lo9atic service! 8hat is i9,ortant and significant for the ,ur,oses of our discussion is not that Bis9arc$ declined the offer C 9any such offers had certainly been declined before and ,erha,s even a few have been since C but that he did so Jcourteously,J and that even his re,ort, written 9ore than thirty years after the event, showed no trace of 9oral indignation! ;nly a century ago the offer to an a9bassador, who had Gust been a,,ointed ,ri9e 9inister, to transfer his loyalties fro9 one country to another was considered by the reci,ient as a sort of business ,ro,osition that did not at all insinuate the violation of 9oral standards! %et us i9agine that a si9ilar offer had been 9ade in our ti9e by a Russian Pri9e Minister to the '9erican '9bassador or by the '9erican President to any di,lo9at accredited in 8ashington, and visualiHe the ,rivate e9barrass9ent of the individual concerned and the ,ublic indignation following the incident, and we have the 9easure of the ,rofundity of the change that has transfor9ed the ethics of foreign ,olicy in recent ti9es! Today such an offer would be regarded as an invitation to treason> that is, the violation of the 9ost funda9ental of all 9oral obligations in international affairs C loyalty to oneIs own country! 8hen it was 9ade and even when it was re,orted, shortly before the close of the nineteenth century, it was a ,ro,osition to be acce,ted or reGected on its 9erits without any lac$ of 9oral ,ro,riety attaching to it! The 9oral standards of conduct with which the international aristocracy co9,lied were of necessity of a su,ranational character! They a,,lied not to all Prussians, 'ustrians, or &rench9en, but to all 9en who by virtue of their birth and education were able to co9,rehend the9 and to act in accordance with the9! t was in the conce,t and the rules of natural law that this cos9o,olitan society found the source of its ,rece,ts of 9orality! The individual 9e9bers of this society, therefore, felt the9selves to be ,ersonally res,onsible for co9,liance with those 9oral rules of conduct> for it was to the9 as rational hu9an beings, as individuals, that this 9oral code was addressed! 8hen it was suggested to %ouis DE that he counterfeit the bills of the Ban$ of England, the 7ing reGected such a ,ro,osition, which Jcould be considered here only with all the indignation and all the horror which it deserves!J 8hen a si9ilar ,ro,osition was 9ade in .1/= with res,ect to the &rench currency in order to save %ouis DE , the 'ustrian E9,eror &rancis declared that Jsuch an infa9ous ,roGect is not to be acce,ted!J This sense of a highly ,ersonal 9oral obligation to be 9et by those in charge of foreign ,olicy with regard to their colleagues in other countries e),lains the e9,hasis with which the writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries counseled the 9onarch to safeguard his JhonorJ and his Jre,utationJ as his 9ost ,recious ,ossessions! 'ny action %ouis DE undertoo$ on the international scene was his ,ersonal act in which his ,ersonal sense of 9oral obligation revealed itself and in which, therefore, his ,ersonal honor was engaged! ' violation of his 9oral obligations, as they were recogniHed by his fellow 9on-archs for the9selves, would set in 9otion not only his conscience ,ut also the s,ontaneous reactions of the su,ranational aristocratic society, which would 9a$e hi9 ,ay for the violation of its 9ores with a loss of ,restige> that is, a loss of ,ower! %estru$tion o! Internationa" Mora"it 8hen in the course of the nineteenth century de9ocratic selection and res,onsibility of govern9ent officials re,laced govern9ent by the aristocracy, the structure of international society and, with it, of international 9orality underwent a
2

(ha,ters on the Princi,les of nternational %aw @(a9bridgeB (a9bridge :niversity Press, .2/6A, ,,! =31 ff!

funda9ental change! :ntil virtually the end of the nineteenth century, aristocratic rulers were res,onsible for the conduct of foreign affairs in 9ost countries! n the new age their ,lace has been ta$en by officials elected or a,,ointed regardless of class distinctions! These officials are legally and 9orally res,onsible for their official acts, not to a 9onarch @that is, a s,ecific individualA, but to a collectivity @that is, a ,arlia9entary 9aGority, or the ,eo,le as a wholeA! 'n i9,ortant shift in ,ublic o,inion 9ay easily call for a change in the ,ersonnel conducting foreign ,olicy! They will be re,laced by another grou, of individuals ta$en fro9 whatever grou, of the ,o,ulation ,revails at the 9o9ent! Govern9ent officials are no longer e)clusively recruited fro9 the aristocratic grou,s, but fro9 virtually the whole ,o,ulation within which 9e9bers of the Jestablish9entJ occu,y a ,rivileged ,osition! This has, of course, been the tradition in the :nited States, yet it is un,recedented in such countries as Great Britain and the Soviet :nion! Mr! Bevin, for9er General Secretary of the Trans,ort and General 8or$ers :nion, beca9e in ./65 British Secretary of State for &oreign 'ffairs! Mr! Molotov, a for9er ,rofessional revolutionary, was for 9any years res,onsible for Russian foreign ,olicy! n such countries as Great Britain, &rance, or taly, where the govern9ent needs the su,,ort of a 9aGority of ,arlia9ent for its continuation in office, any change in the ,arlia9entary 9aGority necessitates a change in the co9,osition of the govern9ent! Even in such a country as the :nited States, where not (ongress, but only general elections can ,ut an ad9inistration into office or re9ove it, the turnover of the ,olicy9a$ers in the State *e,art9ent can be considerable! 8ithin eighteen 9onths, fro9 +uly ./65 to +anuary ./61, the :nited States had three secretaries of state! ;f all the ,olicy9a$ing officials of the State *e,art9ent C that is, the undersecretary and assistant secretaries C who held office in ;ctober ./65, none was still in office two years later! n the Reagan ad9inistration, a tendency which began in the (arter ad9inistration resulted in ,olitical a,,oint9ents being 9ade across the board in the *e,art9ent of State down to the level of de,uty assistant secretary ,ositions! The fluctuation of the ,olicy9a$ers in international affairs and their res,onsibility to an a9or,hous collective entity has far-reaching conseLuences for the effectiveness, even for the very e)istence, of an international 9oral order! This transfor9ation within the individual nations changed international 9orality as a syste9 of 9oral restraints fro9 a reality into a 9ere figure of s,eech! 8hen we say that George of England was subGect to certain 9oral restraints in his dealings with %ouis DE of &rance or (atherine the Great of Russia, we are referring to so9ething real, so9ething that can be identified with the conscience and the actions of certain s,ecific individuals! 8hen we say that the British (o99onwealth of "ations, or even Great Britain alone, has 9oral obligations toward the :nited States or &rance, we are 9a$ing use of a fiction! By virtue of this fiction international law deals with nations as though they were individual ,ersons, but nothing in the s,here of 9oral obligations corres,onds to this legal conce,t! 8hatever the conscience of the 9onarch as the constitutional head of the British (o99onwealth and of Great Britain de9ands of the conduct of the foreign affairs of Great Britain and of the (o99onwealth is irrelevant for the actual conduct of those affairs> for the 9onarch is not res,onsible for those affairs and has no actual influence u,on the9! 8hat of the Pri9e Ministers and the Secretaries of State for &oreign 'ffairs of Great Britain and of the *o9inionsF They are but 9e9bers of the cabinet, which as a collective body deter9ines foreign ,olicy, as any other ,olicy, by 9aGority decision! The cabinet as a whole is ,olitically res,onsible to the 9aGority ,arty, whose ,olitical ,references it is su,,osed to translate into ,olitical action! t is legally res,onsible to Parlia9ent, of which it is, constitutionally s,ea$ing, only a co99ittee! Parlia9ent, however, is res,onsible to the electorate, fro9 which it has received the 9andate to govern and fro9 which its individual 9e9bers ho,e to receive another 9andate at the ne)t general election! The individual 9e9bers of the electorate, finally, 9ay have no 9oral convictions of a su,ranational character at all which deter9ine their actions on election day and in between, or, if they have such convictions, they will be 9ost heterogeneous in content! n other words, there will be those who act according to the 9oral 9a)i9B JRight or wrong C 9y country!J There will be those who a,,ly to their own actions with regard to international affairs as well as to the actions of the govern9ent the standard of (hristian ethics! There will be those who a,,ly the standard of the :nited "ations or of world govern9ent or of hu9anitarian ethics! The fluctuating 9e9bers of the ,olicy9a$ing grou, or of the ,er9anent bureaucracy of the &oreign ;ffice 9ay or 9ay not reflect these and si9ilar divisions of o,inion! n any case, the reference to a 9oral rule of conduct reLuires an individual conscience fro9 which it e9anates, and there is no individual conscience fro9 which what we call the international 9orality of Great Britain or of any other nation could e9anate! 'n individual states9an 9ay follow the dictates of his own conscience in his conduct of foreign ,olicy! f he does, it is to hi9 as an individual that these 9oral convictions are attributed, not to the nation to which he belongs and in whose na9e he 9ay even actually s,ea$! Thus, when %ord Morley and +ohn Burns felt that the ,artici,ation of Great Britain in the &irst 8orld 8ar was inco9,atible with their 9oral convictions, they resigned fro9 the British cabinet! This was their ,ersonal act and those were their ,ersonal convictions! 8hen at the sa9e 9o9ent the Ger9an (hancellor ad9itted as head of the Ger9an govern9ent the illegality and i99orality of the violation of Belgiu9Is neutrality, Gustified only by a state of necessity, he s,o$e for hi9self only! The voice of his conscience could not be and was not identified with the conscience of the collectivity called Ger9any! The 9oral ,rinci,les that guided %aval as Minister of &oreign 'ffairs and Pri9e Minister of the ,ro-Ger9an Eichy regi9e during the Second 8orld 8ar were his, not those of &rance, and nobody ,retended that the latter was the case! Moral rules o,erate within the consciences of individual 9en! Govern9ent by clearly identifiable 9en, who can be held ,ersonally accountable for their acts, is therefore the ,recondition for the e)istence of an effective syste9 of international ethics! 8here res,onsibility for govern9ent is widely distributed a9ong a great nu9ber of individuals with different conce,tions as to what is 9orally reLuired in international affairs, or with no such conce,tions at all,

international 9orality as an effective syste9 of restraints u,on international ,olicy beco9es i9,ossible! t is for this reason that *ean Roscoe Pound could say as far bac$ as ./=0B J t 9ight be 9aintained ,lausibly, that a 9oral ! ! ! order a9ong states, was nearer attain9ent in the 9iddle of the eighteenth century than it is today!J/ %estru$tion o! Internationa" So$iet 8hile the de9ocratic selection and res,onsibility of govern9ent officials destroyed international 9orality as an effective syste9 of restraints, nationalis9 destroyed the international society itself within which that 9orality had o,erated! The &rench Revolution of .12/ 9ar$s the beginning of the new e,och of history which witnesses the gradual decline of the cos9o,olitan aristocratic society and of the restraining influence of its 9orality u,on foreign ,olicy! Professor G! P! Gooch wroteB 8hile ,atriotis9 is as old as the instinct of hu9an association, nationalis9 as an articulate creed issued fro9 the volcanic fires of the &rench Revolution! The tide of battle turned at Eal9y> and on the evening after the s$ir9ish Goethe ! ! ! re,lied to a reLuest for his o,inion in the historic words, J&ro9 to-day begins a new era, and you will be able to say that you were ,resent at its birth!J .4 @i$tor o! Nationa"ism o8er Internationa"ism The vitality of a 9oral syste9 is ,ut to its crucial test when its control of the consciences and actions of 9en is challenged by another syste9 of 9orality! Thus the relative strength of the ethics of hu9ility and self-denial of the Ser9on on the Mount and of the ethics of self-advance9ent and ,ower of 9odern 8estern society is deter9ined by the e)tent to which either syste9 of 9orality is able to 9old the actions or at least the consciences of 9en in accordance with its ,rece,ts! Every hu9an being, in so far as he is res,onsive to ethical a,,eals at all, is fro9 ti9e to ti9e confronted with such a conflict of conscience, which tests the relative strength of conflicting 9oral co99ands! ' si9ilar test 9ust deter9ine the res,ective strength, with regard to the conduct of foreign ,olicy, of su,ranational ethics and the ethics of nationalis9! To su,ranational ethics, co9,osed of Ghristian, cos9o,olitan, and hu9anitarian ele9ents, the di,lo9atic language of the ti9e ,ays its tribute, and 9any individual writers ,ostulate it! But the ethics of nationalis9 have been on the ascendancy throughout the world for the last century and a half! t is indeed true that, even before that ascendancy of the ethics of nationalis9, national ethics, as for9ulated, for instance, in the ,hiloso,hy of reason of state of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, has in 9ost conflict situations ,roved itself to be su,erior to universal 9oral rules of conduct! This is obvious fro9 a consideration of the 9ost ele9ental and also the 9ost i9,ortant conflict situation of this $ind, the one between the universal ethical ,rece,t, JThou shalt not $ill,J and the co99and of a ,articular national ethics, JThou shalt $ill under certain conditions the ene9ies of thy country!J The individual to who9 these two 9oral rules of conduct are addressed is confronted with a conflict between his allegiance to hu9anity as a whole, 9anifesting itself in the res,ect for hu9an life as such, irres,ective of nationality or any other ,articular characteristic, and his loyalty to a ,articular nation whose interests he is called u,on to ,ro9ote at the ,rice of the lives of the 9e9bers of another nation! n the words of PascalB 8hy do you $ill 9eF 8hatS do you not live on the other side of the waterF f you lived on this side, 9y friend, should be an assassin, and it would be unGust to slay you in this 9anner! But since you live on the other side, a9 a hero, and it is Gust! ! ! ! Three degrees of latitude reverse all Guris,rudence> a 9eridian decides the truth! !!! ' strange Gustice that is bounded by a riverS Truth on this side of the Pyrenees, error on the other side! .. Most individuals today and during all of 9odern history have resolved this conflict between su,ranational and national ethics in favor of loyalty to the nation! n this res,ect, however, three factors distinguish the ,resent age fro9 ,revious ones! &irst, there is the enor9ously increased ability of the nation state to e)ert 9oral co9,ulsion u,on its 9e9bers! This ability is the result ,artly of the al9ost divine ,restige the nation enGoys in our ti9e, ,artly of the control over the instru9ents 9olding ,ublic o,inion which econo9ic and technological develo,9ents have ,ut at the dis,osal of the state! Second, there is the e)tent to which loyalty to the nation reLuires the individual to disregard universal 9oral rules of conduct! The 9odern technology of war has given the individual o,,ortunities for 9ass destruction un$nown to ,revious ages! Today a nation 9ay as$ one single individual to destroy the lives of hundreds of thousands of ,eo,le by firing one 9issile with a nuclear warhead! The co9,liance with a de9and of such enor9ous conseLuences de9onstrates the wea$ness of su,ranational ethics 9ore i9,ressively than do the li9ited violations of universal 9oral standards of conduct which were co99itted in ,re - ato9ic ti9es! &inally, there is today, in conseLuence of the two other factors, 9uch less chance for the individual to be loyal to su,ranational ethics when they are in conflict with the 9oral de9ands of the nation! The individual, faced with the
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JPhiloso,hical Theory and nternational %aw,J Bihliotheca Eisseriana, Eo! @%eyden, ./=0A, P! 16! Studies in *i,lo9acy and Statecraft @%ondon, "ew #or$, TorontoB %ong9ans, Green and (o9,any, ./6=A, ,,! 044, 04.! .. Pensees, translated by 8! &! Trotter, Modern %ibrary @"ew #or$B Rando9 House, nc!, ./6.A, Section E! @Re,rinted by ,er9ission of the ,ublisher!A
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enor9ity of the deeds he is as$ed to co99it in the na9e of the nation, and with the overwhel9ing weight of 9oral ,ressure which the nation e)erts u,on hi9, would reLuire e)traordinary 9oral strength to resist those de9ands! The 9agnitude of the infractions of universal ethics co99itted on behalf of the nation, and of the 9oral co9,ulsion e)erted in favor of the9, affects the Lualitative relationshi, of the two syste9s of ethics! t ,uts in bold relief the des,erate wea$ness of universal ethics in its conflict with the 9orality of the nation and decides the conflict in favor of the nation before it has really started! Trans!ormation o! Nationa"ism t is at this ,oint that the i9,otence of universal ethics beco9es an i9,ortant factor in bringing about a significant and far-reaching change in the relations between su,ranational and national syste9s of 9orality! t is one of the factors that lead to the identification of both! The individual co9es to realiHe that the flouting of universal standards of 9orality is not the handiwor$ of a few wic$ed 9en, but the inevitable outgrowth of the conditions under which nations e)ist and ,ursue their ai9s! He e),eriences in his own conscience the feebleness of universal standards and the ,re,onderance of national 9orality as forces 9otivating the actions of 9en on the international scene, and his conscience does not cease to be ill at ease! ;n the one hand, the continuous disco9fort of a ,er,etually uneasy conscience is too 9uch for hi9 to bear> on the other, he is too strongly attached to the conce,t of universal ethics to give it u, altogether! Two ,ossibilities to resolve that conflict are o,en to hi9! He can sacrifice the 9oral de9ands of his nation for the sa$e of universal ethics! t is indeed the star$ness of the conte9,orary conflict that has driven a 9inority to 9a$e that sacrifice by refusing to su,,ort certain foreign ,olicies of their res,ective nations in the na9e of a higher universal 9orality! The 9aGority, however, in order to overco9e that conflict identifies the 9orality of a ,articular nation with the co99ands of su,ranational ethics! t ,ours, as it were, the contents of a ,articular national 9orality into the now al9ost e9,ty bottle of universal ethics! So each nation co9es to $now again a universal 9orality C that is, its own national 9orality C which is ta$en to be the one that all the other nations ought to acce,t as their own! The universality of an ethics to which all nations adhere is re,laced by the ,articularity of national ethics which clai9s the right to, and as,ires toward, universal recognition! There are then ,otentially as 9any ethical codes clai9ing universality as there are ,olitically dyna9ic nations! "ations no longer o,,ose each other, as they did fro9 the Treaty of 8est,halia to the "a,oleonic 8ars, and then again fro9 the end of the latter to the &irst 8orld 8ar, within a fra9ewor$ of shared beliefs and co99on values, which i9,oses effective li9itations u,on the ends and 9eans of their struggle for ,ower! They o,,ose each other now as the standard-bearers of ethical syste9s, each of the9 of national origin and each of the9 clai9ing and as,iring to ,rovide a su,ranational fra9ewor$ of 9oral standards which all the other nations ought to acce,t and within which their foreign ,olicies ought to o,erate! The 9oral code of one nation flings the challenge of its universal clai9 with Messianic fervor into the face of another, which reci,rocates in $ind! (o9,ro9ise, the virtue of the old di,lo9acy, beco9es the treason of the new> for the 9utual acco99odation of conflicting clai9s, ,ossible or legiti9ate within a co99on fra9ewor$ of 9oral standards, a9ounts to surrender when the 9oral standards the9selves are the sta$es of the conflict! Thus the stage is set for a contest a9ong nations whose sta$es are no longer their relative ,ositions within a ,olitical and 9oral syste9 acce,ted by all, but the ability to i9,ose u,on the other contestants a new universal ,olitical and 9oral syste9 recreated in the i9age of the victorious nationIs ,olitical and 9oral convictions! The first in$ling of this develo,9ent fro9 one genuinely universal syste9 to a 9ulti,licity of ,articular 9oral syste9s clai9ing, and co9,eting for, universality can be detected in the contest between "a,oleon and the nations allied against hi9! ;n both sides the contest was fought in the na9e of ,articular ,rinci,les clai9ing universal validityB here the ,rinci,les of the &rench Revolution, there the ,rinci,le of legiti9acy! But with the defeat of "a,oleon and the failure of the Holy 'lliance to u,hold its ,rinci,les in co9,etition with the rising 9ove9ent of nationalis9, this atte9,t at erecting a ,articular code of ethics into a universal one ca9e to an end and thus re9ained a 9ere historic interlude! The ,resent ,eriod of history in which generally and, as it see9s, ,er9anently universal 9oral rules of conduct are re,laced by ,articular ones clai9ing universality was ushered in by 8oodrow 8ilsonIs war Jto 9a$e the world safe for de9ocracy,J t is not by accident and it has dee, significance that those who shared 8ilsonIs ,hiloso,hy thought of that war as a JcrusadeJ for de9ocracy! The &irst 8orld 8ar, as seen fro9 8ilsonIs ,ers,ective, has indeed this in co99on with the (rusades of the Middle 'ges C it was waged for the ,ur,ose of 9a$ing one 9oral syste9, held by one grou,, ,revail in the rest of the world! n the words of Robert (! Bin$leyB The 8orld 8ar not only brought to the to, states9en who were ,hiloso,hers> it also brought the ,rofessional ,hiloso,hers down fro9 their intellectual ,edestals! n every country these 9en used their high talents to give to the JissuesJ of the war a cos9ic significance! They ,roved that the iniLuities of the adversary had been ,resent all along as i9,lications of a national ,hiloso,hy and culture, and that the triu9,h of their own ,arty was necessary in the ethical sche9e of the universe! 99ediately u,on the outbrea$ of hostilities, Bergson discovered that the war was a conflict between JlifeJ and J9atter,J with the Entente Powers ranged on the side of life and the (entral Powers defending 9atter! Scheler ,roclai9ed that English ,hiloso,hy and character were ali$e 9anifestations of cant> Santayana wrote of Jegotis9 in Ger9an ,hiloso,hyJ> and the gentle +osiah Royce, hi9self dee,ly in the debt of Hegel, reached the conclusion that JGer9any is the willful and deliberate ene9y of the hu9an race> it is o,en to

any 9an to be a ,ro - Ger9an who shares this en9ity!J The ,hiloso,hers were 9a$ing a Great Schis9 out of a 9ere ,olitical conflict! Then, as if to 9a$e a ,er9anent record of the ,rostitution of the ,hiloso,hic art, the victorious govern9ents issued to each soldier in their ar9ies a bronHe 9edal with the inscri,tion, JGreat 8ar for (iviliHation! J.= ' few 9onths after the de9ocratic crusade had gotten underway, in ;ctober ./.1, the foundations were laid in Russia for another 9oral and ,olitical structure that on its ,art, while acce,ted only by a fraction of hu9anity, was clai9ed to ,rovide the co99on roof under which all hu9an$ind would eventually live together in Gustice and in ,eace! 8hile, in the twenties, this latter clai9 was su,,orted by insufficient ,ower and, hence, was little 9ore than a theoretical ,ostulate, de9ocratic universalis9 retired fro9 the scene of active ,olitics and isolationis9 too$ its ,lace! t was only in the theoretical challenge that the ,riests of the new Mar)ian universalis9 flung in the face of the de9ocratic world and in the 9oral, ,olitical, and econo9ic ostracis9 with which the latter 9et the challenge that the conflict between the two universalis9 9ade itself felt at that ti9e in the field of international ,olitics! n the thirties the ,hiloso,hy of "ational Socialis9, grown in the soil of a ,articular nation, was ,roclai9ed as the new 9oral code that would re,lace the vicious creed of bolshevis9 and the decadent 9orality of de9ocracy and would i9,ose itself u,on 9an$ind! The Second 8orld 8ar, viewed in the light of our ,resent discussion, tested in the for9 of an ar9ed conflict the validity of this clai9 to universality, and "ational Socialis9 lost the test! #et, in the 9inds of 9any on the side of the :nited "ations, the ,rinci,les of the 'tlantic (harter and of the #alta 'gree9ent 9ade the Second 8orld 8ar also a contest for universal de9ocracy, and de9ocracy, too, lost the test! Since the end of the Second 8orld 8ar the two re9aining 9oral and ,olitical syste9s clai9ing universal validity, de9ocracy and (o99unis9, have entered into active co9,etition for the do9inion of the world, and that is the situation in which we find ourselves today! t would be the 9ost dangerous of illusions to overloo$ or even to belittle the de,th of the difference that e)ists between this situation and the condition of the 9odern state syste9 fro9 the end of the religious wars to the entrance of the :nited States into the &irst 8orld 8ar! ;ne needs only to ,ic$ at rando9 any conflict which occurred in that latter ,eriod, with the e)ce,tion of the "a,oleonic 8ars, and co9,are it with the conflicts which have torn the world a,art in the last three decades in order to realiHe the i9,ortance of that difference! %et us co9,are with the international issues of our ti9e the issues that brought &rance and the Ha,sburgs into al9ost continual conflict fro9 the beginning of the si)teenth to the 9iddle of the eighteenth century, or that ,itted Great Britain and Prussia against &rance in the eighteenth century! These issues were territorial aggrandiHe9ent and dynastic co9,etition! 8hat was then at sta$e was an increase or decrease of glory, wealth, and ,ower! "either the 'ustrian nor the British nor the &rench nor the Prussian Jway of lifeJ C that is, their syste9 of beliefs and ethical convictions C was at sta$e! This is e)actly what is at sta$e today! n the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, none of the contestants on the international scene as,ired to i9,ose its own ,articular syste9 of ethics, ,rovided it had one, u,on the others! The very ,ossibility of such an as,iration never occurred to the9, since they were aware only of one universal 9oral code to which they all gave unLuestioning allegiance! That co99on Jsyste9 of arts, and laws, and 9anners,J Jthe sa9e level of ,oliteness and cultivation,J and the Jsense of honour and Gustice,J which Gibbon had detected in Jthe general 9anners of the ti9es,J which for &enelon, Rousseau, and Eattel were a lived and living reality and whose ,olitical results 'rnold Toynbee has noted,.0 have today in the 9ain beco9e a historic re9iniscence, lingering on in learned treaties, :to,ian tracts, and di,lo9atic docu9ents, but no longer ca,able of 9oving 9en to action! ;nly shreds and frag9ents survive of this syste9 of su,ranational ethics which e)erts its restraining influence u,on international ,olitics, as we have seen, only in isolated instances, such as $illing in ,eaceti9e and ,reventive war! 's for the influence of that syste9 of su,ranational ethics u,on the conscience of the actors on the international scene, it is rather li$e the feeble rays, barely visible above the horiHon of consciousness, of a sun that has already set! Since the &irst 8orld 8ar, with ever-increasing intensity and generality, each of the contestants in the international arena clai9s in its Jway of lifeJ to ,ossess the whole truth of 9orality and ,olitics, which the others 9ay reGect only at their ,eril! 8ith fierce e)clusiveness, all contestants eLuate their national conce,tions of 9orality with what all 9an$ind 9ust and will ulti9ately acce,t and live by! n this, the ethics of international ,olitics reverts to the ,olitics and 9orality of tribalis9, of the (rusades, and of the religious wars!.6
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Selected Pa,ers of Robert (! Bin$ley, edited by Ma) H! &ish @(a9bridgeB Harvard :niversity Press, ./62A, ,! 0=2! .0 'rnold Toynbee, ' Study of History @%ondonB ;)ford :niversity Press, ./0/A!
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To what e)tent the ,rofession of universalistic ,rinci,les of 9orality can go hand in hand with utter de,ravity in action is clearly de9onstrated in the case of Ti9ur, the Mongol would-be conLueror of the world, who in the fourteenth century conLuered and destroyed southern 'sia and 'sia Minor! 'fter having $illed hundreds of thousands of ,eo,le C on *ece9ber .=, .0/2, he 9assacred one hundred thousand Hindu ,risoners before *elhi C for the glory of God and of Moha99edanis9, he said to a re,resentative of conLuered 'le,,oB J. a9 not a 9an of blood> and God is 9y witness that in all 9y wars have never been the aggressor, and that 9y ene9ies have always been the authors of their own cala9ity!J Gibbon, who re,orts this state9ent, addsB J*uring this ,eaceful conversation the streets of 'le,,o strea9ed with blood, and reechoed with the cries of 9others and children, with the shrie$s of violated virgins! The rich ,lunder that was abandoned to his soldiers 9ight sti9ulate their avarice> but their cruelty was enforced by the ,ere9,tory co99and of ,roducing an adeLuate nu9ber of heads, which, according to his custo9, were curiously ,iled in colu9ns and ,yra9ids! ! ! !J The *ecline and &all of the Ro9an

However 9uch the content and obGectives of todayIs ethics of nationalistic universalis9 9ay differ fro9 those of ,ri9itive tribes or of the Thirty #earsI 8ar, they do not differ in the function they fulfill for international ,olitics, and in the 9oral cli9ate they create! The 9orality of the ,articular grou,, far fro9 li9iting the struggle for ,ower on the international scene, gives the struggle a ferocity and intensity not $nown to other ages! &or the clai9 to universality which ins,ires the 9oral code of one ,articular grou, is inco9,atible with the identical clai9 of another grou,> the world has roo9 for only one, and the other 9ust yield or be destroyed! Thus, carrying their idols before the9, the nationalistic 9asses of our ti9e 9eet in the international arena, each grou, convinced that it e)ecutes the 9andate of history, that it does for hu9anity what it see9s to do for itself, and that it fulfills a sacred 9ission ordained by Providence, however defined! %ittle do they $now that they 9eet under an e9,ty s$y fro9 which the gods have de,arted! Human +ights an( Internationa" Mora"it 8e have seen that the conduct of foreign ,olicy is not an enter,rise devoid of 9oral significance> it is always subGect to Gudg9ent, by the actor, those acted u,on, and those who 9erely witness! To conclude fro9 the o9ni,resence of the 9oral ele9ent in foreign ,olicy that a country has a 9ission to a,,ly its own 9oral ,rinci,les to the rest of hu9anity or to certain seg9ents of hu9anity is so9ething Luite different! &or there is an enor9ous ga, between the Gudg9ent we a,,ly to ourselves and our own actions, and the universal a,,lication of our own standards of action to others! Ta$e so ele9ental and obvious a ,rinci,le of action as res,ect for hu9an life and the refusal to ta$e hu9an life e)ce,t under the 9ost e)traordinary, e)cul,ating circu9stances! There are obviously civiliHations and even grou,s within western civiliHation that have a 9uch less strict conce,tion of the sanctity of hu9an life, that give 9uch less heed to s,ending the lives of others than we would under si9ilar circu9stances! So there e)ists of necessity a certain relativis9 in the relation between 9oral ,rinci,les and foreign ,olicy> one cannot overloo$ this if one wants to do Gustice to the ,rinci,les of 9orality in international ,olitics! The relativis9 is twofold! t is a relativis9 in ti9eB certain ,rinci,les are a,,licable in one ,eriod of history and not a,,licable in another! t is also a relativis9 in ter9s of culture C of conte9,oraneous culture C in that certain ,rinci,les are obeyed by so9e nations, so9e ,olitical civiliHations, but are not obeyed by others! n recent years the relationshi, of foreign ,olicy and international 9orality has often been discussed under the rubric of hu9an rights! The ,roble9 at the heart of this issue is the e)tent to which it is both 9orally Gust and intellectually tenable to a,,ly liberal de9ocratic ,rinci,les to states that, for a nu9ber of reasons, are i9,ervious to the9! t is obvious that the atte9,t to i9,ose so-called hu9an rights u,on others or to ,unish the9 for not observing hu9an rights assu9es that hu9an rights are of universal validity - that, in other words, all nations or all ,eo,les living in different nations would res,ect hu9an rights if they $new they e)isted and that in any event they are as inalienable for all 9en as the *eclaration of nde,endence declares the9 to be for '9ericans! t is unnecessary to enter into a discussion of the theological or strictly ,hiloso,hic nature of hu9an rights here! t suffices to say that whatever oneIs conce,tion of their theological or ,hiloso,hical nature, hu9an rights as ,erceived by individuals are inevitably filtered through historic and social circu9stances leading to different results in different ti9es and under different circu9stances! ;ne need only loo$ at the uniLue character of the '9erican ,olity and at the very s,ecial, nowhere - else - to - be - found characteristics of hu9an rights ,rotection within the confines of the :nited States! There is, after all, an al9ost co9,lete lac$ of res,ect for hu9an rights in 9any nations, or even in 9ost nationsB consider that only a relatively few countries in 'frica ,ossess a ,luralist ,olitical syste9> all others are authoritarian in character! Such reflection hel,s us realiHe how daring C or how ignorant if you will, which can also be daring C it is to try to i9,ose u,on the rest of the world our own res,ect for hu9an rights, or in ,articular to ,unish other nations for not showing res,ect for those rights! 8hat we see here is an abstract ,rinci,le we ha,,en to hold dear, which we ha,,en to a considerable e)tent to have ,ut into ,ractice, ,resented to the rest of 9an$ind not for i9itation but for 9andatory acce,t t is Luite wrong to assu9e that this has long been the '9erican tradition! t has not been the '9erican tradition at all! +ohn Kuincy 'da9s argued that it was not for the :nited States to i9,ose its own ,rinci,les of govern9ent u,on the rest of 9an$ind, but, rather, to attract the rest of 9an$ind through the e)a9,le of the :nited States! ndeed this has been the ,rinci,le the :nited States has usually followed! The '9erican Revolution, to Luote Tho9as Paine, Jwas not 9ade for '9erica alone, but for 9an$indJ> nevertheless, '9erican ,olicy has been that those universal ,rinci,les the :nited States had ,ut into ,ractice were not to be e),orted by fire and sword, but ,resented to the rest of the world through successful e)a9,le! This has been the great difference between the early conce,tion of '9erica and its relations to the rest of the world, on the one hand, and what 9ight be called the 8ilsonian conce,tion, on the other! 8oodrow 8ilson wanted to 9a$e the world safe for de9ocracyB he wanted to transfor9 the world through the will of the :nited States! The &ounding &athers wanted to ,resent an e)a9,le of what 9an can do to the nations of the world, calling u,on the9 to go and do li$ewise! So there is a funda9ental difference, both ,hiloso,hic and ,olitical, between conte9,orary agitation in favor of hu9an rights as a universal ,rinci,le and the longer-lived '9erican tradition in this 9atter! Two other obGections can be 9ade to the 8ilsonian conce,tion! ;ne is the i9,ossibility of enforcing the universal a,,lication of hu9an rights! 8e can tell the Soviet :nion C and we should fro9 ti9e to ti9e C that its treat9ent of
E9,ire @Modern %ibrary EditionA, Eol! , ,! .=60!

9inorities is inco9,atible with our conce,tion of hu9an rights! But once we have said this we will find that there is very little 9ore we can do to change 9atters! History has shown that the Soviet :nion 9ay yield under certain conditions to ,rivate ,ressure! There arc e)a9,les where ,rivate ,ressure C for e)a9,le, the sha9ing of high officials in the Soviet :nion C has had an obvious result! But it is inconceivable on general grounds that such ,ressure should be effective when e)erted ,ublicly! More ,articularly, in view of the nature of the Soviet :nionIs govern9ent C which uses every sign of e)ternal ,ressure to Gustify re,ression at ho9e C '9erican agitation for hu9an rights has no chance of being effective! So there is a considerable confusion in our theory and ,ractice of hu9an rights, es,ecially vis-a-vis other nations! There is a second wea$ness of the 8ilsonian a,,roach! The :nited States is a great ,ower with 9anifold interests throughout the world C of which hu9an rights is only one C and not the 9ost i9,ortant one at that! Thus the :nited States cannot consistently follow the ,ath of the defense of hu9an rights without 9aneuvering itself into a Kui)otic ,osition! This is obvious in our different treat9ent of South 7orea, (hina, and the Soviet :nion! The :nited States dares to criticiHe and affront the Soviet :nion because relations, in s,ite of ,eriods of detente, are not ,articularly friendly, The :nited States has an interest in continuing the nor9aliHation of relations with 9ainland (hina, and for this reason see$s not to hurt (hinese feelingsB little was heard in the (arter or Reagan ad9inistrations about (hinaIs hu9an rights record! South 7orea is an ally of the :nited States> it has achieved considerable 9ilitary i9,ortance for '9erican ,olicy9a$ers, so '9erican ,olicy will do nothing to har9 its relations with that state! n other words, the defense of hu9an rights cannot be consistently a,,lied in foreign ,olicy because it can and 9ust co9e in conflict with other interests that 9ay be 9ore i9,ortant in a ,articular instance! To say that the defense of hu9an rights 9ust be woven into the fabric of '9erican foreign ,olicy is 9erely to conceal the necessary inconsistencies of any such effort! Thus there are two basic hindrances to a foreign ,olicy integrally co99itted to the defense of hu9an rights! ;n the one hand, consistency in such defense is i9,ossible, since it is not the ,ri9e business of a state, interacting as it 9ust with other states, to defend hu9an rights! ;n the other hand, it is not feasible to ,ursue hu9an rights without ta$ing into consideration other as,ects of relations with other nations, which 9ay be 9ore i9,ortant than those connected with hu9an rights! ' further as,ect of the role of hu9an rights in foreign ,olicy concerns the notion of res,onsibility for the hu9an rights violations of others! The (a9bodian genocide carried out by the 7h9er Rouge in the late ./14s and early ./24s raised this Luestion in a ,articularly acute fashion! The chain of events that cul9inated in the destruction of (a9bodian society started with the '9erican e)tension of the Eietna9 8ar into (a9bodia through the 9assive bo9bing of (a9bodian territory! t was the ,olicy of the (a9bodian ruler, Prince Sihanou$, to $ee, (a9bodia out of the ar9ed conflict between the :nited States and "orth Eietna9! t was :nited States ,olicy to involve (a9bodia in active 9ilitary o,erations in order to facilitate victory in the Eietna9 8ar! There e)isted a causal ne)us between '9erican ,olicy with regard to (a9bodia and the catastro,he which befell that country! n other words, if the :nited States had not 9ade (a9bodia an active ,artici,ant in the Eietna9 8ar, (a9bodia would, in all li$elihood, have been s,ared catastro,he! This is not to say that the :nited States bore a direct 9oral res,onsibility for what ha,,ened in (a9bodia but rather to de9onstrate the continuous 9oral res,onsibility states9en bear for the unforeseen and unforeseeable conseLuences of their actions! t would be Luite another 9atter to assu9e that because of this causal ne)us the :nited States had a 9oral obligation to ,revent what ha,,ened in (a9bodia or to alleviate the sufferings of the (a9bodian ,eo,le! Rather, as we have seen, 9oral as well as legal obligations are subGect to the Lualification which is e),ressed in the ,rinci,le of Ro9an law that nobody is obligated beyond his ca,acity @ultra vires ne9o obligaturA! Thus, even if the :nited States were held 9orally res,onsible for what ha,,ened in (a9bodia, it could not be held res,onsible to carry out any ,articular ,olicy i9,le9enting that 9oral obligation! Even if the :nited States resolved to act, it would be unable to do so without dis,ro,ortionate ris$s and losses! The JHaw$J faction held that (a9bodia would never have suffered such 9isery and destruction had the :nited States 9aintained its resolve to Jstay the courseJ and win the war in Southeast 'sia! But aside fro9 the i9,ossibility of foreseeing all the conseLuences of the loss of the Eietna9 8ar, to forestall all ,ossible conseLuences of the loss by winning it at whatever ,rice would have violated the basic ,rinci,le of foreign and 9ilitary ,olicyB that the ris$s ta$en and losses incurred in a ,articular action 9ust be ,ro,ortionate to the chances for the success of that action! n this consideration of the relations of foreign ,olicy and 9orality we are in the ,resence not of a ,eculiar, e)traordinary situation but of a ,articular 9anifestation of the general hu9an condition! 8e are all 9oral beings to so9e degree, si9,ly because we are hu9an! 8e all try to a greater or lesser e)tent to realiHe the 9oral ,rinci,les with which we identify! 'gain and again we find ourselves faced with contradictions and difficulties! Perha,s the best we can do is to act u,on what 'braha9 %incoln ,ro,osed as the basis of ,olitical 9orality! He warned against the e)aggeration of 9oral virtue we clai9 for ourselves, and outlined the li9its within which 9an can act 9orally land at the sa9e ti9e have a chance for success! %incolnIs state9ent was 9ade during the (ivil 8ar and was a re,ly to a ,etition by a delegation of Presbyterian 9inisters who as$ed hi9 to e9anci,ate all slaves forthwithB n great contests each ,arty clai9s to act in accordance with the will of God! Both 9ay be, and one 9ust be wrong! God can not be for, and against the sa9e thing at the sa9e ti9e! ! ! ! a9 a,,roached with the 9ost o,,osite o,inions and advice, and that by religious 9en, who are eLually

certain that they re,resent the *ivine will! a9 sure that either the one or the other class is 9ista$en in that belief, and ,erha,s in so9e res,ects both! ho,e it will not be irreverent for 9e to say that if it is ,robable that God would reveal his will to others, on a ,oint so connected with 9y duty, it 9ight be su,,osed that he would reveal it directly to 9e> for, unless a9 9ore deceived in 9yself than often a9, it is 9y earnest desire to $now the will of Providence in this 9atter! 'nd if can learn what it is . will do itS These are not, however, the days of 9iracles, and su,,ose it will be granted that a9 not to e),ect a direct revelation! 9ust study the ,lain ,hysical facts of the case, ascertain what is ,ossible and learn what a,,ears to be wise and right! .5

PA+T SIC BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB Limitations o! Nationa" Po-er0 Internationa" La*3 BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB The $ain Proble s of International Law

THE )ENERAL NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LA% The sa9e warning against e)tre9es with which we started the discussion of international 9orality and of world ,ublic o,inion 9ust a,,ly also to the discussion of international law! 'n increasing nu9ber of writers e),ress the o,inion that there is no such thing as international law! ' di9inishing nu9ber of observers hold that international law, if duly codified and e)tended to regulate the ,olitical relations of states, could beco9es through its own inner force, if not a substitute for, at least a restraining influence u,on, the struggle for ,ower on the international scene! 's +! %! Brierly ,ut itB Too 9any ,eo,le assu9e, generally without having given any serious thought to its character or its history, that international law is and always has been a sha9! ;thers see9 to thin$ that it is a force with inherent strength of its own, and that if only we had the sense to set the lawyers to wor$ to draft a co9,rehensive code for the nations, we 9ight live together in ,eace and all would be well with the world! 8hether the cynic or the sciolist is the less hel,ful is hard to say, but both of the9 9a$e the sa9e 9ista$e! They both assu9e that international law is a subGect on which anyone can for9 his o,inions intuitively, without ta$ing the trouble, as one has to do with other subGects, to inLuire into the relevant facts!. The 9odern syste9 of international law is the result of the great ,olitical transfor9ation that 9ar$ed the transition fro9 the Middle 'ges to the 9odern ,eriod of history! t can be su99ed u, as the transfor9ation of the feudal syste9 into the territorial state! The 9ain characteristic of the latter, distinguishing it fro9 its ,redecessor, was the assu9,tion by the govern9ent of the su,re9e authority within the territory of the state! The 9onarch no longer been in a large 9easure the no9inal rather than the actual head! "or did he share it with the (hurch, which throughout the Middle 'ges had clai9ed in certain res,ects su,re9e authority within (hristendo9! 8hen this transfor9ation had been consu99ated in the si)teenth century, the ,olitical world consisted of a nu9ber of states that within their res,ective territories were, legally s,ea$ing, co9,letely inde,endent of each other, recogniHing no secular authority above the9selves! n one word, they were sovereign! f there was to be at least a certain 9easure of ,eace and order in the relations a9ong such entities endowed with su,re9e authority within their territories and having continuous contact with each other, it was inevitable that certain rules of law should govern these relations! That is to say, there 9ust be certain rules of conduct defined beforehand, whose violation would nor9ally call forth certain sanctions, also defined beforehand as to their nature and the conditions and 9ode of their a,,lication! States 9ust, for instance, $now where the frontiers of their territory are on land and on sea! They 9ust $now under what conditions they can acLuire a valid title to territory either owned by no one at all @as in the case of discoveryA, or by another state @as in the case of cession or anne)ationA! They 9ust $now what authority they have over citiHens of other states living on their territory and over their citiHens living abroad! 8hen a 9erchant vessel flying the flag of State ' enters a ,ort of State B, what are the rights of State O with regard to that vesselF 'nd what if the vessel is a warshi,F 8hat are the rights of di,lo9atic re,resentatives accredited to a foreign
.5

The (ollected 8or$s of 'braha9 %incoln, edited by Roy P! Basler @"ew Brunswic$, "!+! Rutgers :niversity PressA, Eol! E, ,,! 640 f!, 6./ f! . +! %! Brierly, The ;utloo$ for nternational %aw @;)fordB The (larendon Press, ./66A, ,,! ., =! @Re,rinted by ,er9ission of the ,ublisher!A

govern9ent, and what are the rights of the head of the state on foreign soilF 8hat is a state allowed and obligated to do in ti9es of war with res,ect to co9batants, civilians, ,risoners, neutrals, on sea and on landF :nder what conditions is a treaty between two or 9ore states binding, and under what conditions does it lose its binding forceF 'nd if a treaty or another rule of international law is clai9ed to have been violated, who has the right to ascertain the violation and who has the right to ta$e what $ind of enforce9ent 9easures and under what conditionsF These and 9any other issues of a si9ilar nature rise of necessity fro9 the relations a9ong sovereign states, and if anarchy and violence are not to be the order of the day, legal rules 9ust deter9ine the 9utual rights and obligations in such situations! ' core of rules of international law laying down the rights and duties of states in relation to each other develo,ed in the fifteenth and si)teenth centuries! These rules of international law were securely established in .362, when the Treaty of 8est,halia brought the religious wars to an end and 9ade the territorial state the cornerstone of the 9odern state syste9! Hugo GrotiusIs ;n the %aw of 8ar and Peace, ,ublished in .3=5, is the classic codification of that early syste9 of international law! ;n its foundation, the eighteenth and, 9ore ,articularly, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries built an i9,osing edifice, consisting of thousands of treaties, hundreds of decisions of international tribunals, and innu9erable decisions of do9estic courts! These treaties and decisions regulate, often in 9inute detail, the relations between nations arising fro9 the 9ulti,licity and variety of international contacts, which are the result of 9odern co99unications, international e)change of goods and services, and the great nu9ber of international organiHations in which 9ost nations have co - o,erated for the furtherance of their co99on interests! Such organiHations include the nternational Red (ross, the nternational (ourt of +ustice, S,ecialiHed 'gencies of the :nited "ations, such as the nternational %abor ;rganiHation @ %;A, the 8orld Health ;rganiHation @8H;A, the :nited "ations Econo9ic, Scientific and (ultural ;rganiHation @:"ES(;A, the :niversal Postal :nion, the nternational Monetary &und, and 9any others! t is also worth 9entioning, in view of a wides,read 9isconce,tion in this res,ect, that during the four hundred years of its e)istence international law has in 9ost instances been scru,ulously observed! 8hen one of its rules was violated, it was, however, not always enforced and, when action to enforce it was actually ta$en, it was not always effective! #et to deny that international law e)ists at all as a syste9 of binding legal rules flies in the face of all the evidence! This 9isconce,tion as to the e)istence of international law is at least in ,art the result of the dis,ro,ortionate attention that ,ublic o,inion has ,aid in recent ti9es to a s9all fraction of international law, while neglecting the 9ain body of it! Public o,inion has been concerned 9ainly with such s,ectacular instru9ents of international law as the Briand - 7ellogg Pact, the (ovenant of the %eague of "ations, and the (harter of the :nited "ations! These instru9ents are indeed of doubtful efficacy @that is, they are freLuently violatedA, and so9eti9es even of doubtful validity @that is, they are often not enforced in case of violationA! They are, however, not ty,ical of the traditional rules of international law concerning, for instance, the li9its of territorial Gurisdiction, the rights of vessels in foreign waters, and the status of di,lo9atic re,resentatives! To recogniHe that international law e)ists, however, is not tanta9ount to asserting that it is as effective a legal syste9 as the national legal syste9s are and that, 9ore ,articularly, it is effective in regulating and restraining the struggle for ,ower on the international scene! nternational law is a ,ri9itive ty,e of law rese9bling the $ind of law that ,revails in certain ,reliterate societies, such as the 'ustralian aborigines and the #uro$ of northern (alifornia!= t is a ,ri9itive ty,e of law ,ri9arily because it is al9ost co9,letely decentraliHed law! The decentraliHed nature of international law is the inevitable result of the decentraliHed structure of international society! *o9estic law can be i9,osed by the grou, that holds the 9ono,oly of organiHed force> that is, the officials of the state! t is an essential characteristic of international society, co9,osed of sovereign states, which by definition are the su,re9e legal authorities within their res,ective territories, that no such central law-giving and law-enforcing authority can e)ist there! nternational law owes its e)istence and o,eration to two factors, both decentraliHed in characterB identical or co9,le9entary interests of individual states and the distribution of ,ower a9ong the9! 8here there is neither co99unity of interest nor balance of ,ower, there is no international law! 8hereas do9estic law 9ay originate in, and be enforced by, the arbitrary will of the agencies of the state, international law is overwhel9ingly the result of obGective social forces! That the balance of ,ower is such a social force was recogniHed by one of the fore9ost 9odern teachers of international law! %! ;,,enhei9 calls the balance of ,ower Jan indis,ensable condition of the very e)istence of nternational %aw!J0 JSi) 9orals,J he states, can be said to be deduced fro9 the history of the develo,9ent of the %aw of "ationsB .A The first and ,rinci,al 9oral is that a %aw of "ations can e)ist only if there be an eLuilibriu9, a balance of ,ower, between the 9e9bers of the &a9ily of "ations! f the Powers cannot $ee, one another in chec$, no rules of law will have any force, since an over,owerful State will naturally try to act according to discretion and disobey the law! 's there is not and never can be a central ,olitical authority above the Sovereign States that could enforce the rules of the %aw of "ations, a balance of ,ower 9ust ,revent any 9e9ber of the &a9ily of "ations fro9 beco9ing o9ni,otent!6

= 0

See '! R! Radcliffe - Brown, JPri9itive %aw,J Encyclo,edia of the Social Sciences, Eol! D, ,,! =40 - 6> for literature, see ,! =3=! %! ;,,enhei9, nternational %aw, =nd ed! @%ondonB %ong9ans, Green and (o9,any, ./.=A Eol! .! ,! ./0! t is interesting to note that this and the following reference to the balance of ,ower were eli9inated by the editor fro9 the later editions! 6 bid!, ,! 24!

The balance of ,ower o,erates as a decentraliHing force only in the for9 of a general deterrent against violations of international law and in the e)ce,tional cases when a violation of international law calls for a law-enforce9ent action! ;n the other hand, identical and co9,le9entary interests as decentraliHing agents are continuously at wor$> they are the very lifeblood of international law! They e)ert their decentraliHing influence u,on three basic functions that any legal syste9 9ust fulfillB legislation, adGudication, and enforce9ent! THE LE)I'LATI#E FUNCTION IN INTERNATIONAL LA% Its %e$entra"iDe( Chara$ter n our conte9,orary do9estic societies, the 9ost i9,ortant rules of law are created by legislators and courts> that is to say, by centraliHed agencies that create law either for all 9e9bers of the national co99unity, as do (ongress and the Su,re9e (ourt of the :nited States, or for certain regional grou,s, as do state legislatures, city councils, and regional and local courts! n the international s,here there are but two forces creating lawB necessity and 9utual consent! nternational law contains a s9all nu9ber of rules concerning, for instance, the li9its of national sovereignty, the inter,retation of its own rules, and the li$e, which are binding u,on individual states regardless of their consent> for without these rules there could be no legal order at all or at least no legal order regulating a 9ulti,le-state syste9! 'side fro9 this s9all nu9ber of rules of what one 9ight call co99on or necessary international law, the 9ain bul$ of rules of international law owe their e)istence to the 9utual consent of the individual subGects of international law the9selves C the individual nations! Each nation is bound only by those rules of international law to which it has consented! The 9ain instru9entality by which international law is created is the international treaty! 'n international treaty creates international law only for those nations which are a ,arty to it! ' treaty concluded a9ong the '9erican nations binds only the9 and no other nation! ' treaty concluded between the Soviet :nion and ran has usually no legal effect for any third nation! Hence, the conditions under which the legislative function o,erates in the field of international law are si9ilar to what would e)ist on the do9estic scene if the legislative function within the :nited States were to be ,erfor9ed by the individual citiHens the9selves in the for9 of ,rivate contracts, instead of by legislatures and courts o,erating under the rule of stare decisis> that is, bound by ,recedents! nstead of a 9unici,al law regulating sewage dis,osal or Honing in a certain 9unici,ality, these issues would be ta$en care of by a nu9ber of ,rivate agree9ents concluded a9ong the residents of the different streets! The 9unici,ality, then, would have as 9any regulations as there are streets! The inevitable result of such a syste9 of legislation would be, on the one hand, lac$ of legal regulation altogether whenever the unani9ous consent of all those concerned was not forthco9ing! ;n the other hand, there would be uncertainty about what the law actually was in a ,articular case, and there would be contradictions a9ong the different sets of rules regulating the sa9e situations with regard to different individuals! That is the situation which e)ists in international law, 9itigated only by the relatively s9all nu9ber C about .34 sovereign nations C of subGects that 9ight create international law by concluding treaties a9ong the9selves! &ro9 this decentraliHed character of the legislative function two conseLuences follow for international law! ;n the other hand, 9any 9atters bearing u,on international relations, such as i99igration and 9any as,ects of econo9ic ,olicies, are not regulated by international law! The interests of the different nations in these 9atters are so divergent that they are unable to agree u,on legal rules! ;n the other hand, in those 9atters with regard to which agree9ent was ,ossible, insecurity and confusion freLuently reign! f one wants to $now which rules of international law the :nited States considers to be binding u,on itself, one 9ust consult all the treaties ever concluded by the :nited States, after deter9ining which are still in force at the 9o9ent of investigation! Then one 9ust e)a9ine the decisions of international tribunals in cases to which the :nited States has been a ,arty, and the decisions of '9erican courts a,,lying rules of international law! &inally, one 9ust study the di,lo9atic docu9ents in which the re,resentatives of the :nited States in international negotiations have ac$nowledged certain rules of international law as binding u,on the conduct of the :nited States in international affairs! The su9 total of all these rules is what (harles (! Hyde has called nternational %aw (hiefly as nter,reted and ',,lied by the :nited States!5 By a si9ilarly tedious ,rocess, the rules of international law recogniHed by other nations have also been co9,iled! n order to $now the su9 total of the rules of international law binding in a ,articular ,eriod of history throughout the world, it would be theoretically necessary to 9a$e si9ilar co9,ilations with regard to all nations of the world! f such a tas$ were actually underta$en, its results would show considerable divergencies with regard to general ,rinci,les as well as ,articular rules! 8orld - wide co9,ilations in li9ited fields of international law illustrate this lac$ of agree9ent! Many writers refer to continental law in contrast to 'nglo-'9erican international law, to the international law of the '9ericas, and to the Russian conce,tion of international law!3 To ta$e as a s,ecific e)a9,le the breadth of the 9ariti9e belt C that is, the Luestion as to how far into the sea the territorial Gurisdiction of the adGacent state e)tends C the rules of international law recogniHed by different nations in this field differ shar,ly! 8hile a nu9ber of nations adhere to the ,rinci,le of the three-9ile li9it, &inland and "orway C over the obGections of other states C clai9 a breadth of four 9iles for the 9ariti9e belt, taly, S,ain, #ugoslavia,
5 3

= vols! @BostonB %ittle, Brown, and (o9,any, ./63A! ;n these different conce,tions of international law and the literature concerning the9, cf! %! ;,,enhei9 and H! %auter,acht, nternational %aw, 2th ed! @%ondonB %ong9ans, Green and (o9,any, ./55A, Eol! , ,,! 62 ff!

ndia, Me)ico, celand, ndonesia, the Soviet :nion, Egy,t, &rance, and Poland, for another instance, clai9 twelve 9iles! 'lbania clai9s fifteen, Ecuador two hundred 9iles! ;ther nations, such as Ger9any, Belgiu9 and Great Britain, clai9 only three 9iles> but Britain clai9s a so-called contiguous Hone beyond the territorial waters ,ro,er! ;ther nations, while reGecting the clai9 of these nations to a contiguous Hone, recogniHe that under certain circu9stances a nation has the right to e)tend its Gurisdiction beyond the three-9ile li9it and to sub9it the 9erchant vessels of foreign nations to so9e 9easure of control! Part , Section =, 'rticle 0 of the %aw of the Sea Treaty of ./2= calls for a twelve9ile li9it by states ratifying the treaty unless otherwise ,rovided, but the Luestion re9ains whether states with differing Gurisdictional li9its will ratify this ,rovision and whether those who ratify it will at so9e ,oint renounce such ,rovisions! This lac$ of ,recision, resulting fro9 the confusing 9ultitude of unilateral clai9s, ,er9eates to a greater or lesser degree 9ost branches of the law or nations, by virtue of the decentraliHed character of the legislative function! Govern9ents, however, are always an)ious to sha$e off the restraining influence that international law 9ight have u,on their foreign ,olicies, to use international law instead for the ,ro9otion of their national interests, and to evade legal obligations that 9ight be har9ful to the9! They have used the i9,recision of international law as a ready-9ade tool for furthering their ends! They have done so by advancing unsu,,orted legal clai9s and by 9isinter,reting the 9eaning of generally recogniHed rules of international law! Thus the lac$ of ,recision inherent in the decentraliHed nature of international law is breeding ever 9ore lac$ of ,recision, and the debilitating vice that was ,resent at its birth continues to sa, its strength! ;nly those branches of international law, generally of a technical or hu9anitarian nature, which have been codified in general agree9ents, esca,e in a certain 9easure this wea$ness! 1 &or a codification of international law is in its legal effects the eLuivalent of a genuine ,iece of international legislation in that it binds all or virtually all subGects of international law! t is only the reLuire9ent of the consent of all those who are to be bound by it C in contrast to the 9aGority rule reLuired by the de9ocratic ,rocess of legislation C that sets codification of international law a,art fro9 genuine legislation! Interpretation an( &in(ing :or$e The need to substitute the unani9ous consent of all subGects of international law for genuine international legislation gives rise to yet another ty,e of co9,lication ,eculiar to international law! This is the ,roble9 of ascertaining the 9eaning of the ,rovisions of international treaties, of the rights they confer, of the obligations they i9,ose! n the do9estic s,here, this ,roble9 is solved by the legislative bodies the9selves, which generally try to 9a$e the legal rules they enact as ,recise as ,ossibleB by the courts, which are continually engaged in the tas$ of inter,reting the laws by a,,lying the9 to concrete cases> and by the e)ecutive and ad9inistrative agencies, which issue orders ,erfor9ing the sa9e function! nternational legal docu9ents, such as the (harter of the :nited "ations, as well as 9any others of a ,urely technical character, are vague and a9biguous, not by accident or, li$e the '9erican (onstitution, for ,articular and e)ce,tional reasons, but regularly and of necessity! &or such docu9ents, in order to obtain the a,,roval of all subGects of 9e law, necessary for their acLuiring legal force, 9ust ta$e cogniHance of all the divergent national interests that will or 9ight be affected by the rules to be enacted! n order to find a co99on basis on which all those different national interests can 9eet in har9ony, rules of international law e9bodied in general treaties 9ust often be vague and a9biguous, allowing all the signatories to read the recognition of their own national interests into the legal te)t agreed u,on! f this should ha,,en in the do9estic s,here, as it has actually ha,,ened to a considerable e)tent with regard to the (onstitution of the :nited States, so9e authoritative decision C whether of the Su,re9e (ourt as in the :nited States, or of Parlia9ent as in Great Britain C would give concrete 9eaning to the vague and a9biguous ,rovisions of the law! n the international field, it is the subGects of the law the9selves that not only legislate for the9selves but are also the su,re9e authority for inter,reting and giving concrete 9eaning to their own legislative enact9ents! They will naturally inter,ret and a,,ly the ,rovisions of international law in the light of their ,articular and divergent conce,tions of the national interest! They will naturally 9arshal the9 to the su,,ort of their ,articular international ,olicies and will thus destroy whatever restraining ,ower, a,,licable to all, these rules of international law, des,ite their vagueness and a9biguity, 9ight have ,ossessed! Mr! +ean Ray well analyHed this situation when he said with regard to the (ovenant of the %eague of "ationsB JBut the danger is obvious! f the 9e9bers of the %eague as individuals have ulti9ate authority in 9atters of inter,retation, divergent inter,retations, all eLually authoritative, are going to ,er,etuate the9selves> and when an a9biguous te)t is being invo$ed in a conflict between two nations, there will be an i9,asse!J2 This has ha,,ened ti9e and again in the history of the %eague of "ations, and the history of the :nited "ations has given us a nu9ber of instances of a si9ilar nature!/
1

E)a9,les are the codifications in the field of co99unications, such as the General Postal (onvention of .216, the (onvention on nternational (ivil 'viation of ./66, and 9any others, as well as the general international agree9ents referred to on ,ages ==2 ff!, which see$ the hu9aniHation of warfare! 2 (o99entaire du Pacte de la Societe des "ations @ParisB Sirey, ./04A, ,! 66! / ln order to re9edy this situation, the General 'sse9bly of the :nited "ations ,assed in its Second Session, on "ove9ber .6, ./61, a resolution declaring it to be of ,ara9ount i9,ortance that the inter,retation of the (harter and of the constitutions of the s,ecialiHed agencies be based on recogniHed ,rinci,les of international law! The resolution called s,ecifically u,on the agencies of the :nited "ations to see$ advisory o,inions fro9 the nternational (ourt of +ustice on ,oints of law which have arisen in the course

There is, finally, another difficulty that contributes to the wea$ness of international law fro9 the legislative ,oint of view, and that is the uncertainty as to whether a certain international treaty, duly signed and ratified, contains actually, in whole or in ,art, valid rules of international law binding u,on the signatories! Such a Luestion could hardly arise with regard to a ,iece of do9estic legislation in the :nited States! &or a federal law has either been ,assed by (ongress and signed by the President in confor9ity with the constitutional reLuire9ents or it has not, and it has either been invalidated by the Su,re9e (ourt or it has not! There 9ay be uncertainty as to its constitutionality or inter,retation until the Su,re9e (ourt has s,o$en with final authority, but not as to its very e)istence as a valid rule of law! t is this uncertainty as to the e)istence of certain funda9ental rules, duly signed and ratified by virtually all 9e9bers of the international co99unity, that sha$es the very foundation of international law! %et us consider the 9ost s,ectacular e)a9,le of this ty,e of international law, the Briand - 7ellogg Pact of ./=2, in which virtually all nations agreed Jto renounce war as an instru9ent of national ,olicy in their relations with one another!J Has this agree9ent been fro9 the beginning a rule of international law binding u,on all signatories, or is it 9erely a state9ent of 9oral ,rinci,le without legal effectF Has the international law of the "ure9berg trials, according to which the ,re,aration for, and the waging of, aggressive war is an international cri9e, a,,lied the already e)isting law of the Briand - 7ellogg Pact, or has it created international law that did not e)ist beforeF.4 'nd has it done the one or the other only for the s,ecific cases decided in "ure9berg, or for any si9ilar cases that 9ight occur in the futureF *ifferent schools of thought have answered these Luestions differently, and this is not the ,lace to settle the controversy! 8hat is i9,ortant to note in the conte)t of this discussion is the wea$ness of a legal syste9 that is inca,able of giving a ,recise answer to so funda9ental a Luestion as to whether it forbids collective acts of violence for certain ,ur,oses! Thus there is today no way of stating with any degree of authority whether any nation that went to war after ./=/ in ,ursuance of its national ,olicies has violated a rule of international law and is liable before international law for its violation> or whether only those individuals res,onsible for ,re,aring and starting the Second 8orld 8ar are liable in this way> or whether all nations and individuals that will ,re,are for, and wage, aggressive war in the future will thus be liable! 8hat about the legal validity of the (onvention with Res,ect to the %aws and (usto9s of 8ar on %and of .2// and ./41, and its binding force u,on its signatories in the Second 8orld 8ar and in a future warF This convention, which was fairly well observed during the &irst 8orld 8ar and whose violations were then ,ointed out regularly, was, as we have seen, violated regularly and on a 9ass scale by all belligerents during the Second 8orld 8ar! Have these violations, un,rotested and un,unished, ,ut an end to the binding force of this convention, or has the convention survived the Second 8orld 8ar as a legal instru9ent that can be invo$ed, enforced, and 9ade the standard of action in a future warF 'nd what about si9ilar Luestions with res,ect to the rules of 9ariti9e warfare which were also generally violated in the Second 8orld 8ar with hardly an atte9,t at enforce9ent being 9adeF The ')is san$ ene9y shi,s indiscri9inately and without warning, as did the 'llies, and both sides bo9bed civilians, Gustifying these violations of the rules of war with 9ilitary necessity! f rules of international law are consistently violated and the violations are acce,ted as a 9atter of course by all subGects of the law C if, therefore, the legal rules are treated by those who ought to enforce the9 as though they did not e)ist C the Luestion arisesB *o they still e)ist as binding legal rulesF "o ,recise answer can be given to these Luestions at the 9o9ent! Internationa" Courts Since no legal syste9 can be effective in li9iting the activities of its subGects without co9,ulsory Gurisdiction over their dis,utes, the two other funda9ental ,roble9s of adGudication C the organiHation of the Gudicial agencies and the effects of their decisions C are of subordinate i9,ortance! The establish9ent of the Per9anent (ourt of nternational +ustice and of its successor, the nternational (ourt of +ustice, 9ar$s an i9,ortant ste,, ,erha,s the 9ost i9,ortant of all, toward the centraliHation of functions in the field of international law! :, to the establish9ent of the Per9anent (ourt in ./=4, Gudicial organiHation in the international s,here was co9,letely decentraliHed! That is to say, whenever two states agreed u,on the Gudicial settle9ent of a s,ecific dis,ute, they also agreed u,on a ,articular ,erson, such as the Po,e, a ,rince, a fa9ous international lawyer, or a grou, of ,ersons to function as a tribunal for the decision of this ,articular case! 8ith the settle9ent of this dis,ute, the Gudicial function of this tribunal was auto9atically at an end! The Gudicial settle9ent of another dis,ute reLuired the establish9ent of another tribunal! The Tribunal of Geneva which in .21. decided the 'laba9a case illustrates this situation! The Hague (onventions for the Pacific Settle9ent of nternational *is,utes in .2// and ./41 tried to overco9e this decentraliHation of the Gudicial organiHation by creating the so-called Per9anent (ourt of 'rbitration! The latter consists only of a ,anel of so9e .=4 Gudges a,,ointed by the different signatories to the convention! &ro9 this ,anel the ,arties to a s,ecific dis,ute can select the 9e9bers of a tribunal to be constituted for the adGudication of this s,ecific dis,ute! t 9ight, therefore, well be said that this institution is neither ,er9anent nor a court! The so-called (ourt does not e)ist as a body> as such it does not fulfill Gudicial or any other functions! t is actually nothing 9ore than a list of individuals Jof recogniHed co9,etence in Luestions of nternational %aw, enGoying the highest 9oral re,utation!J .. t facilitates the selection of Gudges for one of the s,ecial tribunals to be organiHed for the adGudication of a s,ecific
of their activities @:nited "ations *ocu9ents, '<65/A! :,on the reLuest of the General 'sse9bly, the (ourt has rendered a nu9ber of advisory o,inions concerning the inter,retation of the (harter and other international treaties! .4 (f! Hans +! Morgenthau, Erich Hula, Moorhouse &! D! Millar, in '9erica, Eol! 13, "o! .4 @*ece9ber 1, ./63A, ,,! =33 - 2! .. 'rticle 66 of the (onvention!

dis,ute! The so-called Per9anent (ourt of 'rbitration has never decided a case> only individual 9e9bers of the ,anel have! t ,er,etuates the decentraliHation of Gudicial organiHation in the international field, while at the sa9e ti9e recogniHing in the ,retense of its na9e the need for a centraliHed Gudicial authority! The 9ain stu9bling bloc$ for the establish9ent of a really ,er9anent international court was the co9,osition of the court! "ations were as an)ious to ,reserve their freedo9 of action with res,ect to the selection of Gudges for each s,ecific case as they were an)ious to ,reserve their freedo9 of action with regard to the sub9ission of each s,ecific dis,ute to adGudication! More ,articularly, nations were reluctant to allow a dis,ute to be decided by an international tribunal of which neither one of their nationals nor a re,resentative of their ,oint of view was a 9e9ber! "o ,er9anent international court with Gurisdiction over 9ore than a li9ited nu9ber of nations could 9eet the letter of such a reLuire9ent> for the nu9ber of nations subGect to the Gurisdiction of a world court would of necessity e)ceed the nu9ber of Gudges! The s9all nations, es,ecially, feared that under these conditions 9ost of the9 would be ,er9anently de,rived of re,resentation in such a court, which 9ight thus easily beco9e an instru9ent of the great ,owers! The Statute of the Per9anent (ourt of nternational +ustice and of its successor has solved this ,roble9! The (ourt is co9,osed of fifteen 9e9bers, no two of who9 9ay be nationals of the sa9e state @'rticle 0A! ;n the other hand, JThe electors shall bear in 9ind ! ! ! that in the body as a whole the re,resentation of the 9ain for9s of civiliHation and of the ,rinci,al legal syste9s of the world should be assuredJ @'rticle ./A! The 9e9bers of the (ourt are no9inated and elected through a nu9ber of ingenious devices designed to insure high ,rofessional standards as well as co9,liance with the reLuire9ent of 'rticle ./ of the Statute! The no9inations are 9ade by the 9e9bers of the Per9anent (ourt of 'rbitration, organiHed into national grou,s, or by national grou,s a,,ointed by their res,ective govern9ents @'rticles 6, 5, 3A! The election is by absolute 9aGority of the votes of the General 'sse9bly and the Security (ouncil of the :nited "ations, each body voting inde,endently of the other @'rticles 2 - .=A! 'rticle 0. of the Statute 9a$es the additional concession of ,roviding for s,ecial national Gudges who 9ay be chosen by ,arties whose nationality is not re,resented a9ong the 9e9bers of the (ourt! This (ourt, a truly centraliHed Gudicial agency, fulfills through its very e)istence two i9,ortant functions for the international co99unity! ;n the one hand, the (ourt, through being established in ,er9anence and regardless of any dis,ute awaiting adGudication, is always available to nations that want to settle their differences by 9eans of adGudication! 8hatever else 9ay stand in the way of a Gudicial settle9ent of their dis,utes, the ,roble9s of establishing a tribunal, selecting its 9e9bers, ,roviding for its ,rocedure and substantive law have been solved for the9 once and for all by the Statute of the (ourt! The difficulties to which these ,roble9s, to be solved anew for each individual case of adGudication, 9ay have given rise before ./=4 no longer stand in the way of effective ad9inistration of international Gustice! The nternational (ourt of +ustice, whose 9e9bers are elected for a ,eriod of nine years and 9ay be re-elected, ,rovides for continuity in the ,erfor9ance of its Gudicial tas$! This Luality is necessarily absent in a tribunal convened for the settle9ent of a s,ecific dis,ute and ter9inating its e)istence with the rendering of the Gudg9ent! ' court whose 9e9bershi, is bound to re9ain a,,ro)i9ately identical for 9any years C the Gudges being elected for nine-year ter9s C cannot fail to develo, a tradition of its own which it trans9its to its successive 9e9bers and u,on the continuance of which the ,ros,ective ,arties can rely! This ele9ent of calculability and stability which is thus introduced into the o,erations of an international tribunal is in shar, contrast to the ha,haHard ,roceedings ty,ical of the arbitration courts before the &irst 8orld 8ar! The '!!e$t o! Ju(i$ia" %e$isions This stability and calculability are the ,sychological result of a ,er9anent organiHation rather than the legal effect of the Gudicial o,erations of the (ourt! ndeed, concerning the legal effect of the Gudicial decisions of the (ourt, the Statute ,ays tribute to the ,rinci,le of decentraliHation by ,roviding in 'rticle 5/ that Jthe decision of the (ourt has no binding force e)ce,t between the ,arties and in res,ect of that ,articular case!J 'lthough the social fact of the continuing o,eration of the sa9e ,ersons within one organiHation is conducive to the develo,9ent of unifor9ity and of a tradition in the Guris,rudence of the (ourt, the latter is under no legal duty, as the 'nglo-'9erican courts are, to follow the rule of stare decisis and to Gustify its decisions in the light of ,recedent! "evertheless, because of the social ,ressure for unifor9ity discussed above, the Guris,rudence of the (ourt during the first three decades of its e)istence would hardly have been different if the (ourt actually had been bound by the rule of stare decisis! "evertheless, the (ourt was and re9ains free to disregard its ,revious decisions should it so choose! Situations 9ay arise where a court bound by the rule of stare decisis would hesitate to disregard its ,revious decisions, while the nternational (ourt of +ustice 9ight not! This ele9ent of uncertainty within the Guris,rudence of the nternational (ourt of +ustice itself is, however, s9all in co9,arison with the one that, by virtue of 'rticle 5/ of the Statute, affects the relations between the Guris,rudence of the (ourt and the 9any and heterogeneous other Gudicial agencies o,erating in the international field! The strength of the national syste9s of adGudication as a 9eans of ,utting effective restraints u,on the actions of the individual citiHens derives in large ,art fro9 the hierarchical nature of that syste9! 8hatever act the individual citiHen 9ay ,erfor9, a court stands ready to say whether or not the act 9eets the reLuire9ents of the law! 8hen these courts have s,o$en, a higher court can be a,,ealed to in order to a,,rove or disa,,rove the decision of the lower court! 'nd, finally, a su,re9e court will state with ulti9ate authority the law in the case! Since all these courts o,erate under the rule of stare decisis, their decisions are logically consistent with each other not only within the sa9e court but also within the whole

syste9 of courts! The hierarchical character of their relations guarantees the unifor9ity of the decisions throughout the syste9! .= The co9bination of hierarchical organiHation and of the rule of stare decisis, then, ,roduces one syste9 of Guris,rudence throughout the Gudicial syste9, one body of coherent law ever ready to go into action at the reLuest of whoever clai9s the ,rotection of the law! "othing in the international s,here even re9otely rese9bles this situation! The nternational (ourt of +ustice is the one court that has ,otentially world - wide Gurisdiction! But the 9ultitude of other courts, created by s,ecial treaties for ,articular ,arties, for s,ecial ty,es of dis,utes, or for s,ecific single cases, have no legal connection at all either with each other or with the nternational (ourt of +ustice! The nternational (ourt of +ustice is in no sense a su,re9e court of the world which 9ay decide, with final authority, a,,eals fro9 the decisions of other international tribunals! t is but one international court a9ong 9any others, outstanding through the ,er9anency of its organiHation, the ,otential reach of its Gurisdiction, and the generally high legal Luality of its decisions! #et in no sense is it hierarchically su,eri9,osed u,on the other international courts! The decisions of the nternational (ourt of +ustice 9ay, by virtue of their ,rofessional e)cellence, ,ut their i9,rint u,on the decisions of other international courts! But, since they are not bound by the rule of stare decisis, other international courts are no 9ore under the legal obligation to 9a$e their decisions consistent with the decisions of the nternational (ourt of +ustice than they are to 9a$e their own decisions consistent with each other! Here again, decentraliHation is the ear9ar$ of the Gudicial function! THE ENFORCE$ENT OF INTERNATIONAL LA% Its %e$entra"iDe( Chara$ter 8hat for the legislative and Gudicial functions reLuired elaborate ,roof is clear for all to see in the case of the e)ecutive functionB its co9,lete and unLualified decentraliHation! nternational law does not even ,rovide for agencies and instru9entalities for the ,ur,ose of its enforce9ent a,art fro9 the agencies and instru9entalities of the national govern9ents! Brierly describes the situation thusB The international syste9 has no central organ for the enforce9ent of international legal rights as such, and the creation of any such general sche9e of sanctions is for the ,resent a very distant ,ros,ect! ! ! ! This absence of an e)ecutive ,ower 9eans that each state re9ains free !!! to ta$e such action as it thin$s fit to enforce its own rights! This does not 9ean that international law has no sanction, if that word is used in its ,ro,er sense of 9eans for securing the observance of the law> but it is true that the sanctions which it ,ossesses are not syste9atic or centrally directed, and that accordingly they are ,recarious in their o,eration! This lac$ of syste9 is obviously unsatisfactory, ,articularly to those states which are less able than others to assert their own rights effectively!.0 n the sa9e sense in which the individual nation is its own legislator and the creator of its own tribunal and of their Gurisdiction, it is also its own sheriff and ,olice9an! 8hen individual ' violates the rights of individual O within the national co99unity, the law-enforce9ent agencies of this state will intervene and ,rotect O against ' and co9,el ' to give O satisfaction according to the law! "othing of the $ind e)ists in the international s,here! f State ' violates the rights of State B, no enforce9ent agency will co9e to the su,,ort of O! O has the right to hel, itself if it can> that is to say, if it is strong enough in co9,arison with ' to 9eet the infringe9ent of its rights with enforce9ent actions of its own! ;nly under very e)ce,tional and narrow conditions, in the for9s of self-hel, and self-defense, does do9estic law give the victi9 of a violation of the law the right to ta$e the law into his own hands and enforce it against the violator! 8hat is a narrowly circu9scribed e)ce,tion in do9estic law is the ,rinci,le of law enforce9ent in international law! 'ccording to this ,rinci,le, the victi9, and nobody but the victi9, of a violation of the law has the right to enforce the law against the violator! "obody at all has the obligation to enforce it! There can be no 9ore ,ri9itive and no wea$er syste9 of law enforce9ent than this> for it delivers the enforce9ent of the law to the vicissitudes of the distribution of ,ower between the violator of the law and the victi9 of the violation! t 9a$es it easy for the strong both to violate the law and to enforce it, and conseLuently ,uts the rights of the wea$ in Geo,ardy! ' great ,ower can violate the rights of a s9all nation without having to fear effective sanctions on the latterIs ,art! t can afford to ,roceed against the s9all nation with 9easures of enforce9ent under the ,rete)t of a violation of its rights, regardless of whether the alleged infraction of international law has actually occurred or whether its seriousness Gustifies the severity of the 9easures ta$en! The s9all nation 9ust loo$ for the ,rotection of its rights to the assistance of ,owerful friends> only thus can it ho,e to o,,ose with a chance of success an atte9,t to violate its rights! 8hether such assistance will be forthco9ing is a 9atter not of international law but of the national interest as conceived by the individual nations, which 9ust decide whether or not to co9e to the su,,ort of the wea$ 9e9ber of the international co99unity! n other words, whether or
.=

This is true only ideally> it suffers e)ce,tions in the actual o,eration of the do9estic Gudicial syste9s! n the federal Gudicial syste9, for e)a9,le, logical consistency of the decisions of the different federal courts is assured only in so far as the Su,re9e (ourt has and ta$es Gurisdiction as the highest court of a,,eals! 8here, either by law or because the Su,re9e (ourt refuses to a higher tribunal, the legal rules a,,lied by the9 to si9ilar cases 9ay, and freLuently do, differ fro9 each other! To this e)tent, then, there e)ists within the federal Gudicial syste9 an e)ce,tional situation that is rather nor9al in the real9 of international adGudication! .0 The %aw of "ations, ,,! /=, /0! @Re,rinted by ,er9ission of The (larendon Press, ;)ford!A

not an atte9,t will be 9ade to enforce international law and whether or not the atte9,t will be successful do not de,end ,ri9arily u,on legal considerations and the disinterested o,eration of law-enforcing 9echanis9s! Both atte9,t and success de,end u,on ,olitical considerations and the actual distribution of ,ower in a ,articular case! The ,rotection of the rights of a wea$ nation that is threatened by a strong one is then deter9ined by the balance of ,ower as it o,erates in that ,articular situation! Thus the rights of Belgiu9 were safeguarded in ./.6 against their violation by Ger9any, for it so ha,,ened that the ,rotection of those rights see9ed to be reLuired by the national interests of ,owerful neighbors! Si9ilarly, when in ./54 South 7orea was attac$ed by "orth 7orea, their concern with the 9aintenance of the balance of ,ower in the &ar East and of territorial stability throughout 'sia ,ro9,ted the :nited States and so9e of its allies, such as &rance and Great Britain, to co9e to the aid of South 7orea! ;n the other hand, the rights of (olo9bia, when the :nited States su,,orted the revolution in ./40 which led to the establish9ent of the Re,ublic of Pana9a, and the rights of &inland, when attac$ed by the Soviet :nion in ./0/, were violated either with i9,unity or, as in the case of &inland, without the intervention of effective sanctions! There was no balance of ,ower which could have ,rotected these nations! t 9ust be ,ointed out, however, that the actual situation is 9uch less dis9al than the foregoing analysis 9ight suggest! The great 9aGority of the rules of international law are generally observed by all nations without actual co9,ulsion, for it is generally in the interest of all nations concerned to honor their obligations under international law! ' nation will hesitate to infringe u,on the rights of foreign di,lo9ats residing in its ca,ital> for it has an interest, identical with the interests of all other nations, in the universal observance of the rules of international law which e)tend their ,rotection to its own di,lo9atic re,resentatives in foreign ca,itals as well as the foreign di,lo9ats in its own ca,ital! ' nation will li$ewise be reluctant to disregard its obligations under a co99ercial treaty, since the benefits that it e),ects fro9 the e)ecution of the treaty by the other contracting ,arties are co9,le9entary to those antici,ated by the latter! t 9ay thus stand to lose 9ore than it would gain by not fulfilling its ,art of the bargain! This is ,articularly so in the long run, since a nation that has the re,utation of reneging on its co99ercial obligations will find it hard to conclude co99ercial treaties beneficial to itself! Most rules of international law for9ulate in legal ter9s such identical or co9,le9entary interests! t is for this reason that they generally enforce the9selves, as it were, and that there is generally no need for a s,ecific enforce9ent action! n 9ost cases in which such rules of international law are actually violated des,ite the underlying co99unity of interests, satisfaction is given to the wronged ,arty either voluntarily or in conseLuence of adGudication! 'nd it is worthy of note that of the thousands of such Gudicial decisions which have been rendered in the last century and a half, voluntary e)ecution was refused by the losing ,arty in fewer than ten cases! Thus the great 9aGority of rules of international law are generally unaffected by the wea$ness of its syste9 of enforce9ent, for voluntary co9,liance ,revents the ,roble9 of enforce9ent fro9 arising altogether! The ,roble9 of enforce9ent beco9es acute, however, in that 9inority of i9,ortant and generally s,ectacular cases, ,articularly i9,ortant in the conte)t of our discussion in which co9,liance with international law and its enforce9ent have a direct bearing u,on the relative ,ower of the nations concerned! n those cases, as we have seen, considerations of ,ower rather than of law deter9ine co9,liance and enforce9ent!

PART 'E#EN International Politics in the Conte &orary %orld

*4 <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< The New $oral Force of Nationalistic Uni7ersalis NATIONALI'$; OL. AN. NE% 8e should now be able to answer the Luestion we as$ed when we ,ointed to the intellectual and 9oral tradition of the 8estern world as the force that through the instru9entality of the balance of ,ower $e,t the 9odern state syste9 together fro9 the end of the religious wars to the &irst 8orld 8ar! 8hat is left of this heritage todayF 8e as$ed then! 8hat $ind of consensus unites the nations of the world in the ,eriod following the Second 8orld 8arF The answer can only be that the 9oral li9itations u,on the struggle for ,ower on the international scene are wea$er today than they have been at any ti9e in the history of the 9odern state syste9! The one international society of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has been re,laced by a nu9ber of national societies that ,rovide for their

9e9bers the highest 9easure of social integration! n conseLuence, the international 9orality that in ,ast centuries $e,t the as,irations for ,ower of the individual nations within certain bounds has, e)ce,t for certain frag9entary restraints, given way to the 9orality of individual nations! This 9orality not only does not recogniHe any 9oral obligations above and a,art fro9 it, but even clai9s universal recognition fro9 all the world! 8orld ,ublic o,inion is but an ideological shadow without even that substance of co99on valuations and reactions which in other ti9es at least the international aristocracy shared! The 9ain bul$ of the rules of international law owes its e)istence to the sovereignty of the individual nations! To surround that sovereignty with legal safeguards is one of the 9ain tas$s of the rules of international law! &ar fro9 restraining the as,irations for ,ower of individual nations, they see to it that the ,ower ,osition of individual nations is not adversely affected by whatever legal obligations they ta$e u,on the9selves in their relations with other nations! 8hat national 9orality is in the field of ethics, what national ,ublic o,inion is in the do9ain of the 9ores, sovereignty is for international law! Sovereignty refers in legal ter9s to the nation as the reci,ient of the individualIs ulti9ate secular loyalties, as the 9ightiest social force, as the su,re9e authority giving and enforcing laws for the individual citiHen! The su,ranational forces, such as universal religions, hu9anitarianis9, cos9o,olitanis9, and all the other ,ersonal ties, institutions, and organiHations that bind individuals together across national boundaries, are infinitely wea$er today than the forces that unite ,eo,les within a ,articular national boundary and se,arate the9 fro9 the rest of hu9anity! This wea$ening of the su,ranational forces, which 9ust be strong in order to i9,ose effective restraints u,on the foreign ,olicies of nations, is but the negative by-,roduct of the great ,ositive force that sha,es the ,olitical face of our age C nationalis9! "ationalis9, identified as it is with the foreign ,olicies of individual nations, cannot restrain these ,olicies> it is itself in need of restraint! "ot only has it fatally wea$ened, if not destroyed, the restraints that have co9e down to us fro9 ,revious ages, it has also su,,lied the ,ower as,irations of individual nations with a good conscience and a Messianic fervor! t has ins,ired the9 with a thirst and a strength for universal do9inion of which the nationalis9 of the nineteenth century $new nothing! The nationalis9 of the late twentieth century is essentially different fro9 what traditionally goes by that na9e and what cul9inated in the national 9ove9ents and the nation state of the nineteenth century! Traditional nationalis9 sought to free the nation fro9 alien do9ination and give it a state of its own! This goal was considered to be a rightful one not for one nation only, but for all nations! ;nce a nation had united its 9e9bers in one state, national as,irations were satisfied, and there was roo9 for as 9any nationalis9s as there were nations that wanted to establish or ,reserve a state of their own! The international conflicts in which the nationalis9 of the nineteenth century was involved were, therefore, essentially of two $indsB the conflicts between a nationality and an alien 9aster C the Bal$an nations and Tur$ey, the Slav nations of the *anube basin and the 'ustro - Hungarian 9onarchy, the Poles and Russia C and the conflicts between different nationalities over the deli9itation of their res,ective s,heres of do9inion, such as the struggle between the Ger9ans, on the one hand, and the Poles and the &rench, on the other! nternational conflicts in the nineteenth century grew out of either different inter,retations of the national ,rinci,le or the refusal to acce,t it at all! t was ho,ed as late as the after9ath of the &irst 8orld 8ar that, once the as,irations of all nations for nation states of their own were fulfilled, a society of satisfied nations would find in the legal and 9oral ,rinci,les of national selfdeter9ination the 9eans for its own ,reservation! To call by the sa9e na9e what ins,ired the o,,ressed and co9,eting nationalities of the nineteenth century and what drives the su,er,owers of the late twentieth century into deadly co9bat is to obscure the funda9ental change that se,arates our age fro9 the ,receding one! The nationalis9 of today, which is really a nationalistic universalis9, has only one thing in co99on with the nationalis9 of the nineteenth century C the nation as the ulti9ate ,oint of reference for ,olitical loyalties and actions! But here the si9ilarity ends! &or the nationalis9 of the nineteenth century the nation is the ulti9ate goal of ,olitical action, the end,oint of the ,olitical develo,9ent beyond which there are other nationalis9s with si9ilar and eLually Gustifiable goals! &or the nationalistic universalis9 of the late twentieth century the nation is but the starting-,oint of a universal 9ission whose ulti9ate goal reaches to the confines of the ,olitical world! 8hile nationalis9 wants one nation in one state and nothing else, the nationalistic universalis9 of our age clai9s for one nation and one state the right to i9,ose its own valuations and standards of action u,on all the other nations! This evil would not necessarily be 9itigated, but 9ight be aggravated, by the fusion of a nu9ber of nations into a su,ranational union! The nations of 8estern Euro,e, for instance, are too wea$ to 9a$e the9selves singly the effective s,earheads of the new nationalistic universalis9! The ti9e has ,assed when the &rench or the Ger9ans could drea9 of 9a$ing the world over in their own i9age! #et if the nations of 8estern Euro,e were able to unite and for9 a new ,olitical and 9ilitary unit of considerable ,otentialities, they would then have acLuired the ,ower basis for a new crusading s,irit, co99on to all of 8estern Euro,e, to co9,ete with the nationalistic universalis9 of other nations! That the traditional nation state is obsolescent in view of the technological and 9ilitary conditions of the conte9,orary world is obvious! #et, while trying to re,lace it with a larger unit, better attuned to these conditions, it is well to ta$e care that it not be re,laced si9,ly by a 9ore efficient vehicle for the crusading nationalis9 of our age! t is one of the characteristics of nationalistic universalis9, ste99ing fro9 its universalistic character and as,irations, that, although it is connected with a nation, it is not connected with any ,articular one! The Soviet :nion has indeed been the vehicle on which (o99unis9 has tried to transfor9 the world! But who can say that in this res,ect (hina or so9e other nation will not to9orrow ta$e the ,lace of the Soviet :nion, at least in 'siaF The nationalis9 of

the nineteenth century grew indeed fro9 the ,eculiar character and as,irations of a ,articular nation and could not be divorced fro9 it without losing its 9eaning and functions! The nationalistic universalis9 of our age is different in these res,ects! t is a secular religion, universal in its inter,retation of the nature and destiny of 9an and in its Messianic ,ro9ise of salvation for all 9an$ind! ' ,articular nation will bear its torch at any ,articular ti9e, but in ,rinci,le any nation can! Thus the clai9s to universal do9inion in the na9e of the new crusading nationalis9 9ay shift fro9 nation to nation according to the conditions of s,irit and ,ower!

PART EI)HT The Proble of Peace! Peace throu*h Li itation

*5 BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB %isarmament

THE PRO"LE$ OF PEACE IN OUR TI$E Two world wars within a generation and the ,otentialities of nuclear warfare have 9ade the establish9ent of international order and the ,reservation of international ,eace the ,ara9ount concern of 8estern civiliHation! 8ar has always been abhorred as a scourge! 's the rise of the territorial state transfor9ed the Holy Ro9an E9,ire fro9 the actual ,olitical organiHation of (hristendo9 into an e9,ty shell and a legal fiction, writers and states9en reflected 9ore and 9ore on substitutes for the lost ,olitical unity of the 8estern 8orld! Eras9us in the si)teenth century, Sully, E9eric (ruce, Hugo Grotius, and 8illia9 Penn in the seventeenth, and the 'bbe de Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, Bentha9, and 7ant in the eighteenth were the great intellectual forerunners of the ,ractical atte9,ts underta$en in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to solve the ,roble9s of international order and ,eace! ;f these atte9,ts, the Holy 'lliance, the Hague Peace (onferences of .2// and ./41, the %eague of "ations, and the :nited "ations are the outstanding e)a9,les! These organiHations and conferences, together with other less s,ectacular endeavors to sha,e a ,eaceful world, were 9ade ,ossible by four factors C s,iritual, 9oral, intellectual, and ,olitical C which started to converge at the beginning of the nineteenth century and cul9inated in the theory and ,ractice of international affairs ,revalent in the ,eriod between the two world wars! Since the ti9e of the Stoics and the early (hristians, there has been alive in 8estern civiliHation a feeling for the 9oral unity of 9an$ind which strives to find a ,olitical organiHation co99ensurate with it! The Ro9an E9,ire was such a ,olitical organiHation of universal sco,e! 'fter its downfall, the Ro9an E9,ire re9ained throughout the ages a sy9bolic re9inder of the unity of the 8estern 8orld, and the ulti9ate goal and standard which ins,ired (harle9agne no less than "a,oleon and deter9ined the ,olicies of the Holy Ro9an E9,ire until the beginning of the religious wars! t is not by accident that the dissolution of the Holy Ro9an E9,ire in .243 coincided with "a,oleonIs atte9,t to revive it and antedates by little less than a decade the beginning of that ,eriod of 9odern history which has 9ade the restoration of international order one of its 9aGor obGectives! The 9oral root of these atte9,ts to establish a stable and ,eaceful international order is to be found in the increase in the hu9aneness and civiliHed character of hu9an relations which the last centuries have witnessed in the 8estern world! The ,hiloso,hy of the Enlighten9ent and the ,olitical theory of liberalis9 ,ostulated res,ect for hu9an life and the ,ro9otion of hu9an welfare! The great ,olitical and social refor9s of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries drew their ins,iration fro9 these ,ostulates! To e)tend the reign of law, ,eace, and order to the international s,here was then the great hu9anitarian tas$ that the 9odern age had to solve! The intellectual factor ,ro9oting this develo,9ent is connected with the rise of the co99ercial classes first to social and then to ,olitical i9,ortance! 8ith the9 rose to ,ro9inence the co99ercial and scientific s,irit which dreaded war and international anarchy as irrational disturbances of the calculable o,erations of the 9ar$et! J' war in the 9idst of different trading nations,J the &rench ,hiloso,her *iderot noticed, Jis a fire disadvantageous to all! t is a ,rocess which threatens the fortune of a great 9erchant and 9a$es his debtors turn ,ale!J. 'ccording to 7ant, Jthe co99ercial s,irit cannot coe)ist with war!J= Thus, toward the end of the eighteenth century, it had beco9e the conviction of 9any that war was obsolete or in any case an atavis9 that a concerted rational effort of hu9anity could banish fro9 the earth with relative ease! t was, however, the cataclys9 of the "a,oleonic 8ars that de9onstrated the need for su,,le9enting with ,ractical 9easures the theoretical Luest for the solution of the ,roble9 of international order and ,eace! The i9,ortance of the "a,oleonic 8ars in this res,ect is twofold! They destroyed the balance of ,ower and threatened te9,orarily to
. =

J&rag9ents ,olitiLues,J @Euvres co9,letes, Eol! E @ParisB (arnier &reres, .215A, ,! 6=! Per,etual Peace @"ew #or$B The Mac9illan (o9,any, ./.1A, ,! .51!

re,lace it with a universal e9,ire! 8hile this factor ,assed with the definitive defeat of "a,oleon in .2.5, the other ele9ent has threatened the stability of the 9odern state syste9 for a century and a half and has not yet s,ent its force! This other ele9ent is nationalis9! The idea of nationalis9, evo$ed by the &rench Revolution and carried by the "a,oleonic conLuests through Euro,e, challenged the ,rinci,le of dynastic legiti9acy, which had been the organiHing ,rinci,le of the 9odern state syste9 and was still the foundation of the ,eace settle9ents of .2.5! The convergence of these four e),eriences at the beginning of the nineteenth century and their dyna9ic release into the ,olitical arena through the shoc$ of the "a,oleonic 8ars ,rovided the intellectual and 9oral energy that has sustained for nearly two centuries the search for alternatives to war and international anarchy! This search, in so far as it has left the real9 of 9ere ideas, ho,es, and ad9onitions and has 9aterialiHed in actual 9easures and institutions of an international character @it is with the latter that we are here alone concernedA, has been carried on through three different 9ediaB @.A li9itation of the destructive and anarchical tendencies of international ,olitics, @=A transfor9ation of international ,olitics by eli9inating its destructive and anarchical tendencies altogether, and @0A acco99odation of divergent interests by de,riving the destructive and anarchical tendencies of international ,olitics of their rational obGectives! ;f the atte9,ts to achieve ,eace through li9itation, the 9ost ,ersistent has been that of disar9a9ent! HI'TOR3 OF .I'AR$A$ENT *isar9a9ent is the reduction or eli9ination of certain or all ar9a9ents for the ,ur,ose of ending the ar9a9ents race! t is believed that, by doing away with one of the ty,ical 9anifestations of the struggle for ,ower on the international scene, one can do away with the ty,ical effects of that struggleB international anarchy and war! &our basic distinctions 9ust be $e,t in 9indB Between disar9a9ent and ar9s control, between general and local disar9a9ent, between Luantitative and Lualitative disar9a9ent, and between conventional and nuclear disar9a9ent! 8hile disar9a9ent is the reduction or eli9ination of ar9a9ents, ar9s control is concerned with regulating the ar9a9ents race for the ,ur,ose of creating a 9easure of 9ilitary stability! 8hen we s,ea$ of general disar9a9ent, we refer to a $ind of disar9a9ent in which all the nations concerned ,artici,ate! E)a9,les are the 8ashington Treaty for the %i9itation of "aval 'r9a9ents of ./==! signed by all 9aGor naval ,owers, and the 8orld *isar9a9ent (onference of ./0=, at which ,ractically all 9e9bers of the co99unity of nations were re,resented! 8e s,ea$ of local disar9a9ent when only a li9ited nu9ber of nations are involved! The Rush - Bagot 'gree9ent of .2.1 between the :nited States and (anada is an e)a9,le of this ty,e! Kuantitative disar9a9ent ai9s at an over-all reduction of ar9a9ents of 9ost or all ty,es! This was the goal of 9ost nations re,resented at the 8orld *isar9a9ent (onference of ./0=! Kualitative disar9a9ent envisages the reduction or abolition of only certain s,ecial ty,es of ar9a9ents, such as the aggressive wea,ons Great Britain tried to have outlawed by the 8orld *isar9a9ent (onference of ./0=, or nuclear wea,ons, the abolition and control of which were discussed by the 'to9ic Energy (o99ission of the :nited "ations and were the obGect of the so-called S'%T 'gree9ents @Strategic 'r9s %i9itation TreatyA and ST'RT @Strategic 'r9s Reduction Tal$sA between the :nited States and the Soviet :nion! The distinction between nuclear and conventional wea,ons bears u,on the ,olitical and 9ilitary ,reconditions for ar9s control and disar9a9ent! AR$' CONTROL IN THE NUCLEAR A)E 8hy has ar9s control, the effort to strengthen international ,eace by increasing 9ilitary stability, been only 9oderately successful in the nuclear field and failed altogether with regard to conventional ar9sF 's concerns the latter, the reasons for failure are identical with those for the failure of disar9a9ent! The Luantity and dis,osition of conventional wea,ons have a direct bearing u,on the distribution of 9ilitary ,ower! Since the nations concerned co9,ete for 9ilitary advantage, an agree9ent on the control of conventional wea,ons would signify the end of co9,etition! The ter9ination of 9ilitary co9,etition, however, de,ends u,on the settle9ent of the outstanding ,olitical issues! The control of nuclear wea,ons is 9ade ,ossible in theory at least by the ability of 9aGor nuclear ,owers to reach that o,ti9u9 of assured destruction beyond which it is irrational to go! This 9easure can be defined as the availability of the nu9ber of nuclear warheads and invulnerable delivery syste9s necessary to destroy the 9ilitary installations and industrial and ,o,ulation centers of a ,ros,ective ene9y! ' nation which ,ossesses this ca,ability has realiHed its 9a)i9u9 9ilitary ,otential both in ter9s of deterrence and of the actual waging of nuclear war! The acLuisition of additional warheads and delivery vehicles is wasteful because it adds nothing to the 9ilitary ,ower of the nation concerned! (onseLuently, the conventional conce,tions of 9ilitary su,eriority and inferiority here beco9e within certain li9its 9eaningless! ' nation which is ca,able of inflicting unacce,table da9age on its ,ros,ective ene9y ten ti9es over under the worst of circu9stances gains nothing 9ilitarily by increasing its already abundant nuclear ca,ability, and its ,ros,ective ene9y, ca,able of inflicting unacce,table da9age u,on the other nation JonlyJ si) ti9es over is not 9ilitarily inferior to the latter and gains no additional 9ilitary ,ower by increasing its nuclear ca,ability! ;nce the two nations have reached this o,ti9u9 of assured destruction, they are eLual in usable nuclear ca,abilitiesB within certain li9its Luantitative differences do not affect that Lualitative eLuilibriu9! These li9its would be left behind if one nation gained so great an advantage that it would be ca,able of destroying the retaliatory ca,ability of the other nation in a first stri$e!

Mindful that dis,arity 9ust re9ain within these li9its, the :nited States and the Soviet :nion have a co99on interest in stabiliHing the nuclear ar9s race by regulating it! They can do so in three different ways! &irst, they can li9it the ,roduction of nuclear wea,ons and delivery vehicles by unilateral action, based u,on their own Gudg9ent of what is enough in ter9s of deterrence and actual nuclear war! The :nited States has done this by cutting bac$ or discontinuing the ,roduction of certain ty,es of 9issiles and air,lanes, and it can be assu9ed that the Soviet :nion has done the sa9e! Second, nations can control their ar9a9ents by tacit agree9ent, one sideIs action or o9ission being ,redicated u,on the other sideIs e)a9,le, and vice versa! ;n that basis, the :nited States and the Soviet :nion refrained fro9 testing nuclear wea,ons in the at9os,here fro9 ./52 to ./3.> in ./36 they announced a cutbac$ in the 9anufacture of fissionable 9aterials! Third, nations can control their ar9a9ents by for9al agree9ent! The ,artial test ban treaty, concluded in ./30 by Great Britain, the Soviet :nion, and the :nited States, is a case in ,oint! t ,rohibits the testing of nuclear devices above ground and under water but ,er9its the continuation of underground tests! t thereby stabiliHes the technology of nuclear wea,ons insofar as their develo,9ent de,ends u,on at9os,heric or underwater tests! The nteri9 'gree9ent on ;ffensive Missiles @S'%T A draws fro9 the uniLue nature of nuclear wea,ons the 9ost far-reaching conseLuences for ar9s control thus far! t roughly stabiliHes the Luantity of nuclear wea,ons, but allows for their Lualitative i9,rove9ent! More ,articularly, by ,roviding for 9oderate increases in the nu9ber of sub9arines and sub9arine based 9issiles, it ta$es account of the technological shift away fro9 land - based 9issiles, which have beco9e vulnerable to Luantitatively and Lualitatively i9,roved offensive 9issiles! 'r9s control can also ta$e the for9 of e)cluding certain ty,es or all $inds of wea,ons fro9 certain geogra,hical regions or grou,s of nations! The 'ntarctic Treaty of ./3., the ;uter S,ace Treaty of ./31, the %atin '9erican "uclear &ree Pone Treaty of ./31, the "on,roliferation Treaty of ./14, the Seabed Treaty of ./1., and The (onvention on the Prohibition of the *evelo,9ent, Production, and Stoc$,iling of Bacteriological @BiologicalA and To)ic 8ea,ons of ./1= all fall into this category! t 9ust, however, be ,ointed out that 9ost of these treaties do nothing 9ore than ratify through legal sti,ulations what the nations concerned would have been unwilling or unable to do anyhow! 8ith continuing ,oor relations between countries such as the :nited States and the Soviet :nion and raL and ran, ,rogress in certain areas a,,eared threatened by reversals! The nuclear debate has raised a nu9ber of see9ingly vital issues, including the 9ilitary balance of ,ower between the :nited States and the Soviet :nion at ,resent and in the future, the ,otentialities of certain wea,ons syste9s, and the ,ossibility of verifying Soviet co9,liance with ar9s treaties! #et the debate has also brought to the fore an ele9ent that the various ca9,s share and that in the long run is li$ely to ,rove 9ore i9,ortant for the future of the :nited States than all the scenarios, details, and technicalities u,on which our attention has been focused so farB the obsolescence of our 9odes of thought and action with regard to nuclear wea,ons! 8hat Einstein said half a century ago is still true todayB JThe unleashed ,ower of the ato9 has changed everything e)ce,t our way of thin$ing!J n other words, the unleashed ato9 ,resents us with ,roble9s of un,recedented novelty, reLuiring for their solution 9odes of thought and action of si9ilar novelty! However, 9any ,arties on both sides continue to thin$ and act largely as though the ato9ic revolution of ./65 had not occurred! The availability of nuclear wea,ons has funda9entally altered the traditional relationshi, between ,olitical ai9s and ,hysical violence! *own to ./65 a great ,ower, such as the :nited States, had a rational choice between violence and non - violence in achieving its ends vis-a-vis other nations! f it wanted a certain result badly enough, and could not achieve it by ,eaceful 9eans, it 9ight well resort to violence, ,rovided a calculus of ris$ and advantage favored such a resort! Such a calculus a ,riori counsels against the use of nuclear wea,ons since their very destructiveness, in both the short- and long-ter9s eli9inates all ,ossible advantage, The use of nuclear wea,ons, even initially on a li9ited scale, is an un9itigated disaster, which in the end can only lead to the destruction of both sides! Thus even our conventional use of language, dealing with nuclear ,heno9ena in ter9s of Jwea,onsJ and Jwar,J shows a certain atavistic inadeLuacy! &or ter9s such as Jwea,onsJ and JwarJ i9,ly a rational relationshi, between those conce,ts and certain hu9an obGectives! ' Jwea,onJ traditionally serves a certain rational ,ur,ose, and JwarJ is traditionally underta$en for such a rational ,ur,ose> both are absent in the nuclear relations between two nuclear ,owers! Thus use of conventional language, when dealing with nuclear wea,ons and nuclear war, conceals the new reality for whose novelty a,,ro,riate words have not been found! :se of conventional words for novel ,heno9ena not only tends to hide the truth> it also suggests that the truth is to be found in the conventional 9eaning of conventional words! Since these words have over long stretches of history accu9ulated a networ$ of associations, assu9,tions, and conclusions, the uncritical a,,lication of such words to nuclear ,heno9ena ,recludes adeLuate understanding and successful action! Thus it is fatal to the cause of nuclear ar9s control and disar9a9ent to deal with nuclear wea,ons and nuclear war as though they were but a Luantitative e)tension of conventional wea,ons and war! n truth, they are different in $ind because they are instru9ents of total destruction, s,atially and te9,orally> therefore they are inca,able of ,erfor9ing the functions that history has taught us to assign to wea,ons and war! n recognition of irrationality, the su,er,owers have tried to control the nuclear ar9s race, such control issuing ulti9ately C it is ho,ed C in nuclear disar9a9ent! n the ,rocess they have shown alar9ingly the e)tent to which they are in Q,ractice oblivious to the distinction between conventional and nuclear ar9s control and disar9a9ent! They have bargained and haggled for years over issues which 9ight be relevant for conventional wea,ons but which are, in

9ost cases, irrelevant to the nuclear field! 8hat does it 9ean, for instance, that certain Russian 9issiles are allowed to carry only a s,ecified nu9ber of inde,endently targetable warheadsF 8hat would ha,,en if they were to carry 9ore, either by 9utual consent or in violation of the treatyF 's long as the nu9ber of warheads does not affect the ,rinci,le of 9utually assured destruction, the Luality and Luantity of the 9utual 9eans of destruction are irrelevant! To use a conventional 9eta,horB as long as 9y ene9y has one gun with which to $ill 9e it is irrelevant for our 9utual relations that he has also the finest collection of guns in town! To re,eat, the strategic nuclear balance between the :nited States and the Soviet :nion, which 9ust indeed be 9aintained, rests u,on the 9utual ability of utter destruction, which, in turn, rests not u,on eLuality of nu9bers and ,erfor9ance but e)clusively u,on the ability to destroy the ene9y regardless of the Luality and Luantity of nuclear wea,ons he 9ay have! (o9,arable 9ilitary strength is but one conce,t a9ong 9any, hallowed by tradition, that have been rendered obsolete by the nuclear revolution! *efense, li9ited war, victory, alliances, verification, and the distinction be-tvveen co9batants and nonco9batants are other fa9iliar conce,ts si9ilarly invalidated by the availability of nuclear wea,ons! 8hat is disLuieting and o9inous is the reluctance of 9ost of those who do our thin$ing in these 9atters to desist fro9 a,,lying obsolete 9odes of thought and action to the novel conditions of the ti9es! The confused and confusing debate on S'%T and the halting and unsuccessful character of subseLuent negotiations are ,ri9e e)a9,les of the o,eration of a cultural lag, one which leads us to atte9,t to solve issues of the nuclear age with the 9odes of thought and action of a bygone age! n a funda9ental way, this cultural lag has do9inated the theory and ,ractice of nuclear wea,ons since ./65! The history of nuclear 9ilitary doctrine and ,ractice is the story of a succession of futile atte9,ts to assi9ilate nuclear wea,ons to the traditional ,ur,oses of the nation state! &or 9ore than three decades C fro9 the so - called JcleanJ Hbo9b to the counterforce strategy C we have tried to 9a$e it a,,ear that nuclear wea,ons are Gust conventional wea,ons writ large, to be 9ani,ulated in a conventional way! The heart of that debate is the issue of strategic su,eriority between the :nited States and the Soviet :nion! Both sides in the debate recogniHe in the abstract the irrelevance of the conce,t when a,,lied to nuclear wea,ons! Henry 7issinger gave vent to that irrelevance when, during a ,ress conference in +uly ./16, he declaredB J8hat in the na9e of God is strategic su,eriorityF 8hat is the significance of it !!! at these levels of nu9bersF 8hat do you do with itFJ #et in his state9ent to the Senate &oreign Relations (o99ittee on +uly 0., ./1/, he voiced for whatever reasons his regret at having inti9ated in ./16 that strategic su,eriority had beco9e a 9eaningless conce,tB My state9ent reflected fatigue and e)as,eration, not analysis! f both sides 9aintain the balance, then indeed the race beco9es futile and S'%T has its ,lace in strengthening stability! But if we o,t out of the race unilaterally, we will ,robably be faced eventually with a younger grou, of Soviet leaders who will figure out what can be done with strategic su,eriority! t hardly needs to be ,ointed out that this is a less than convincing argu9ent in favor of strategic su,eriority! 7issinger and others have ad9itted the 9eaninglessness of the conce,t of su,eriority in the conventional 9ilitary sense while endeavoring to give it a new ,olitical 9eaning! ;nce a nation has attained the nuclear o,ti9u9 in ter9s of assured destruction, so the argu9ent runs, additional nuclear wea,ons can add significantly to its ,olitical ,ower, if what counts in the ,ower calculus is not only the actual ,ower available, but the ,erce,tion, by other nations, of the ,ower available! That is to say, if the Soviet :nion ,ossesses 9ore war -heads than the :nited States, it does not thereby beco9e 9ilitarily 9ore ,owerful than the :nited States, but it increases its ,olitical ,ower vis - a - vis the :nited States because ,eo,le ,erceive it C falsely C to have beco9e 9ore ,owerful 9ilitarily! The argu9ent, left at this ,oint, is inco9,leteB it lac$s a Lualification centered on the ,eo,le who are doing the ,erceiving! To be fran$, the argu9ent assu9es those doing the ,erceiving are ignorant! &or only ignorant ,eo,le, unaware of the distinction between conventional and nuclear wea,ons will attribute significance C 9ilitary or ,olitical C to the ,ossession of nuclear wea,ons in e)cess of the 9ilitary o,ti9u9! The defenders of the intellectual status Luo have also advanced a ,olitical and 9ilitary argu9ent that is a ty,ical e)a9,le of obsolete thin$ing! The strategy of 9utual assured destruction, so the argu9ent runs, li9its drastically the o,tions of the President of the :nited States! The govern9ent of the :nited States is faced with two eLually unacce,table choicesB the slaughter of tens of 9illions of civilians or, if it is re,elled by this barbarous alternative, a,,ease9ent! "uclear ar9s beyond the o,ti9u9 for assured destruction 9a$e it ,ossible to wage li9ited nuclear war, that is, a $ind of ato9ic warfare that leaves in its wa$e J9erelyJ the $ind of li9ited destruction with which 9odern conventional war has acLuainted us! This search for a way of dealing with nuclear wea,ons in a conventional 9anner has been, in different guises, a leit9otif of nuclear strategy since ./65! 'n enu9eration of the different atte9,ts at a new strategy, which would allow us to use nuclear wea,ons without the universal, uncontrolled destructive effects which, in theory, we correctly associate with nuclear wea,ons is instructive! Ta$e the so-called clean H-bo9b, which 9ade its a,,earance at the beginning of the ./54 s C that is, an H-bo9b that would not have the devastating, indiscri9inate effects which even the $iloton bo9bs dro,,ed on Hiroshi9a and "agasa$i had! t was a bo9b which would have little or no fallout and whose effects would be those of a gigantic conventional bo9b! n the words of a for9er (hief of Staff of the '9erican 'ir &orce, General (urtis %eMay, the nuclear bo9b is JGust another bo9b!J The :!S! 'to9ic Energy (o99ission 9ade short shrift of this idea in The Effects of "uclear 8ea,ons, ,ublished in ./3=! The co99ission said that there is no such thing as a clean H-bo9b, and that all H-bo9bs are 9ore or less JuncleanJ C even though the distribution of

blast, fire, and radiation 9ay be different in different designs of the bo9b! The idea that it is ,ossible to devise an Hbo9b which is not essentially different fro9 a conventional bo9b is utterly 9ista$en! (onsider, as another e)a9,le, the conce,tion of Jgraduated deterrence! This is a 9ethod of waging nuclear war which does not escalate al9ost i99ediately into all - out war! nstead C in a rational, al9ost ,redeter9ined way si9ilar to a chess ga9e C one side 9a$es a 9ove by, say, Jta$ing outJ one city, and the other side 9a$es another 9ove, Jta$ing outJ a city of its o,,onent! Thus each side, in a ,erfectly detached, rational way, inflicts a certain degree of da9age u,on the other! This idea has gained wide acce,tance in certain so-called thin$ tan$s, where ,laying ga9es with survival issues is highly develo,ed! 'n argu9ent can be 9ade in favor of reviewing the hy,othetical ,ossibilities that e)ist! However, in ,ractical ter9s, it is inconceivable that living hu9an beings, with the ideological conce,tions and values which the ,olicy9a$ers in the Soviet :nion, the :nited States, and (hina ,ossess, would loo$ at, say, the destruction of (hicago by the Soviet :nion or at the destruction of Mins$ by the :nited States with the sa9e detach9ent with which chess ,layers loo$ at the e)change of ,awns! They would Luic$ly arrive at a ,oint where C Luite aside fro9 the aroused e9otions which 9a$e calculation difficult C one side or the other would feel that in any rational si9ulation of a chess ga9e one side would ta$e advantage of the other! The eLuivalence theoretically assu9ed between Mins$ and (hicago would not be self-evident to the ,layers of the ga9e under such circu9stances! The Soviet :nion will inevitably find that Mins$ is 9ore i9,ortant than (hicago C and the :nited States will find that (hicago is 9ore i9,ortant than Mins$! They will find that this ty,e of graduated deterrence is really not deterrence at all, because it leads inevitably by its own dyna9is9 to escalation and to an all-out strategic war, which it was the ,ur,ose of the enter,rise to avoid in the first ,lace! ;nce the :nited States has arrived at the conclusion that (hicago is 9ore i9,ortant than Mins$, it will ta$e out two Soviet cities, which are regarded as the eLuivalent of another '9erican city, whereu,on the Soviet :nion will ta$e out two '9erican cities, which are regarded as the eLuivalent of one Soviet city! &urther9ore, we have to rec$on with the ,assions of the ,eo,le at large and those of the ,olicy9a$ers, for in such an underta$ing, started in a rational way, enor9ous ,owers of ,assion co9e into ,lay on both sides! The ,o,ulation of the :nited States will not loo$ with eLuani9ity at the successive, however rational, eli9ination or ,artial destruction of '9erican cities and their inhabitants> neither will the ,eo,le and the govern9ent of the Soviet :nion! ;nce again, we have a force that al9ost inevitably will lead to escalation and to the various effects which the graduated deterrence was intended to avoid! Since we are confronted with the ,ossibility of nuclear war, we want to 9a$e nuclear war as ,ainless as ,ossible, as li9ited as ,ossible, one 9ight even say, if so grotesLue a Gu)ta,osition is allowed, as hu9ane as ,ossible! ;n the other hand, the official 9ilitary doctrine of the Soviet :nion has never acce,ted those distinctions! Soviet doctrine assu9es that a war, es,ecially a Euro,ean war, which starts as a conventional or li9ited nuclear war and whose sta$es the belligerents regard as of ,ri9e i9,ortance, is bound to escalate into all-out nuclear war! Thus the idea of the fire brea$ C the ,ause between either conventional war or li9ited nuclear war, on the one hand, and all-out nuclear war, on the other C is alien to the 9ilitary doctrine of the Soviet :nion! The strategy of counterforce, first enunciated by Secretary of *efense Robert S! Mc"a9ara in ./3=, was another e)a9,le of a funda9ental 9isunderstanding of nuclear war! t was an atte9,t to li9it nuclear war, thus 9a$ing it acce,table as an instru9ent of national ,olicy! The counterforce strategy was si9,le> it assu9ed that a nuclear war could be waged and ought to be waged not against ,o,ulation and industrial centers, but against strictly 9ilitary obGectives! The revival of this doctrine in recent ti9es rests on the sa9e assu9,tion fortified by the increase in the so,histication of nuclear wea,ons! n ./3= one could well 9a$e the case that it was i9,ossible, in view of the character of nuclear wea,ons, to distinguish in ,ractice strictly between 9ilitary and civilian obGectives, that the indiscri9inate and wides,read destructiveness of nuclear wea,ons was so enor9ous that a nuclear wea,on ai9ed at a 9ilitary obGective was bound to destroy, by virtue of the 9ere ,ro)i9ity of civilian obGectives, the latter as well! That argu9ent is still valid! f the Soviet :nion tries to ta$e out the 9issile sites near Phoeni) and (heyenne, to give only two e)a9,les, the Soviet 9issiles are not li$ely to be so accurate as to destroy the 9issile sites without any negative effect u,on the adGacent ,o,ulation and industrial centers! Recent increases in accuracy 9ay have i9,roved the situation so9ewhat and there 9ay be a grain 9ore 9erit in the revival of the counterforce strategy than in its original for9ulation! ' 9ore ,rofound Luestion about the counterforce strategy can be as$ed, however, na9ely the Luestion as to its ulti9ate 9ilitary ,ur,ose! n the case of the '9erican version of the counterforce strategy, which has been the 9ost fa9iliar one, the :nited States will not initiate a nuclear war by a first stri$e! t will wait until the other side has initiated a nuclear war by a first stri$e> only then will it attac$ 9ilitary targets, which the other side ,resents not 9erely in the for9 of 9issile sites but also of the 9issiles the9selves! But the first stri$e would already have e9,tied of 9eaning the distinction between 9issile sites which still contain their 9issiles and other 9issile sites fro9 which the 9issiles have already de,arted! But let us su,,ose that this distinction can nevertheless be 9ade, and that this e)change o,erates as intended! This of course ,resu,,oses that the ene9y who started the war has not destroyed all oneIs own 9issile sites, and that one has a sufficient nu9ber of 9issiles left with which to destroy ene9y 9issile sites which still contain 9issiles! 'cce,t all of this and assu9e that the two belligerents $noc$ but their land - based 9issiles reci,rocally, what have they gainedF They are in the sa9e ,osition that they were originally, e)ce,t that now they have to rely e)clusively u,on the seaborne deterrent and ,erha,s u,on the airborne deterrent! So one would have the sa9e distribution of destructive ,ower with the sa9e deterrent effect one had at the beginning of the war with only the difference that the 9echanics would have changed fro9 land-based to sea-based 9issiles! So9e authorities argue that land-based 9issiles are obsolete anyhow, and that they should be ,hased out through ar9s control negotiations between the :nited States and the Soviet :nion! f

this ,osition is correct, then in the ,roGected counterforce e)change we would si9,ly have engaged in a 9utual disar9a9ent enter,rise by $noc$ing out each otherIs land-based 9issiles! 8e would then be in the sa9e ,osition as we were before C that is to say, there would be no victor and no vanLuished! This leads to another ,oint C the basic distinction between victory and defeat in war C which is again a distinction that is dee,ly ingrained in consciousness because it has been derived fro9 9illennia of historical e),erience! Thus the 9ilitary, in ,articular, have found it unacce,table both in 7orea and Eietna9 that a conventional war should not end in the clear-cut victory of that side whose cause is regarded to be Gust C which is of course oneIs own side! The sa9e reluctance to give u, the distinction between victory and defeat is a,,arent in thin$ing on nuclear war! The idea that a nuclear war should necessarily end in a stale9ate or in the 9utual destruction of the belligerents is unacce,table to those who have 9ade it their ,rofession to ,re,are for victorious wars! They are in the ,osition of a business9an whose 9ain ,ur,ose in life is to 9a$e a ,rofit for his co9,any> then he is suddenly faced with the assertion that the best he can ho,e for is to brea$ even! He will never 9a$e a ,rofit, never again ,ay a dividendB obviously such an idea goes against his nature! 's far as nuclear war is concerned, however, this is the sort of situation we face, a situation utterly different fro9 any in the ,astB war itself beco9es a co9,letely senseless, irrational enter,rise! Even if one can $ee, it li9ited @counterforce strategyA, it will si9,ly end in the sa9e $ind of eLuilibriu9 with which it started, e)ce,t the co9,osition of forces 9a$ing u, the eLuilibriu9 will be different! ;r ta$e the conce,t of defense! t has been a)io9atic throughout history that any new wea,on will sooner or later call forth a counterwea,on, a defense against it! %et us assu9e that this a)io9 is borne out by historical e),erience! #et the destructiveness of nuclear wea,ons is so enor9ous that it is inconceivable C in view of ,resent technology, and in ,articular of costs which were blithely overloo$ed by so9e in the Reagan ad9inistration C that an effective defense against nuclear wea,ons can be devised! Thus the abolition, for all ,ractical ,ur,oses, of antiballislic 9issiles @'BMsA by the two S'%T negotiations was a recognition of obGective facts of the nuclear age! ;nce we have a defense against nuclear wea,ons, we have re9oved the 9ain deterrent against nuclear war! t is this reality which ,ro,osals for star war defenses overloo$s! f 9an$ind e),ects to survive a nuclear war, then to wage or not to wage nuclear war involves an a,,roach si9ilar to that of conventional war, a ,rag9atic calculation of e),edience! ' tactical nuclear war strategy is another atte9,t to 9a$e ,ossible a nuclear war which will not lead to the destruction of both sides, but which can lead to the victory of one side! The conce,tion of tactical nuclear war C that is to say, of the battlefield use of nuclear wea,ons C faces a nu9ber of ,ractical and theoretical difficulties! &irst, there is the i9,ossibility of drawing an obGective, generally recogniHed and recogniHable line between tactics and strategy in general! Military schools of thought in all countries have debated this Luestion without arriving at a definitive conclusion! The distinction is not so 9uch in the obGective situation on the battlefield as in the 9inds of the 9ilitary ,lanner or director of 9ilitary o,erations! The fact that the Hiroshi9a and "agasa$i bo9bs today are classified as tactical nuclear wea,ons shows how far tactics can be stretched to cover what generally would be regarded as strategy! 8hat 9ight be intended by one side as a tactical 9aneuver 9ay thus be inter,reted by the other side as a strategic 9ove, and the re,ly of the other side 9ay be inter,reted in either tactical or strategic ter9s by the first side! Since in such situations both sides are inclined to use a worst-case a,,roach to the ,roble9s that is, to assu9e the worst in ter9s of the intentions of the ene9y, the distinction is bound to brea$ down very Luic$ly! 8hile this is true of conventional as well as nuclear war, the ,roble9 is aggravated by the nature of the latter! nstead of ada,ting our thin$ing to the ,heno9enon of nuclear wea,ons we have tried to ada,t the ,ro,osed use of nuclear wea,ons to our conventional way of thin$ing! But as 9ore than three decades of debate have shown, it cannot be done! %i9ited nuclear war with li9ited da9age is conceivable only on the ,re9ise that the sta$es of the war are eLually li9ited! #et it is difficult to i9agine a rational resort to nuclear wea,ons on behalf of interests which are not of the first 9agnitude, Gustifying C initially or through escalation C unli9ited nuclear co99it9ent and ,otentially unli9ited da9age! This is the 9ain reason why nuclear wea,ons have not been used since ./65! Their li9ited a,,lication is a contradiction in ter9sB nuclear wea,ons are instru9ents of uncontrollable and ,otentially unli9ited destruction, coordinated to interests of the first ran$! Thus Soviet 9ilitary doctrine sti,ulates that nuclear war on behalf of li9ited interests, while ,ossible in the initial stages of a nuclear war, is li$ely to escalate into all-out nuclear war! f they are used on behalf of first-ran$ interests, such as in Euro,e, they will be used as instru9ents of total war! The conventional 9odes of thought which have do9inated the nuclear debate thus far are not accidental! They are the sy9,to9s of a ,ervasive unwillingness to ,art with conventions hallowed by all of history and of a deter9ination to a,,ly to nuclear wea,ons the 9odes of thought and action a,,ro,riate to bygone eras! The issue of nuclear ar9s control is a literally vital issue, not only for the su,er,owers, not only for their allies, but for all of hu9anity! &or with ,roliferation now underway in earnest, there is little doubt that a nuclear ar9s race C no longer li9ited to two su,er,owers with cautious govern9ents that are 9ortally afraid of each other C but s,reading over the whole globe, is bound, sooner or later, to lead to an uns,ea$able catastro,he! &or history shows, if history shows anything, that all nations have been governed at ti9es by fools and $naves, and even a co9bination of both! That was bad enough before nuclear wea,ons e)isted! But i9agine a fool or $nave or a co9bination of both in the ,ossession of nuclear wea,ons, and nuclear war beco9es unavoidable! So it is the al9ost inevitable danger of actual nuclear war, inherent in the dyna9is9 of a generaliHed unli9ited nuclear ar9s race, which 9a$es nuclear ar9s control and in the end nuclear disar9a9ent a Luestion of life or death for all 9an$ind! #et what is theoretically reLuired is ,articularly difficult to obtain! The control of nuclear wea,ons is 9ade ,ossible by the ability of 9aGor nuclear ,owers to reach that o,ti9u9 of assured destruction beyond which it is irrational to go! But in ,ractice it is ,redicated u,on the stability of nuclear technology> for it is only on that assu9,tion that

the nations concerned can afford to desist fro9 co9,etition! Thus the 9aGor nuclear ,owers could agree u,on the cessation of at9os,heric and underwater tests since for the ti9e being no technological ,rogress can be e),ected fro9 testing in these 9edia! #et they continue to test underground and in outer s,ace, and to engage in research and e),eri9entation, searching for o,,ortunities of i9,roving e)isting wea,ons technologies and discovering new ones! "uclear ar9s control, in view of its de,endence u,on technological stability, is li$ely to re9ain both li9ited and te9,orary! 's long as with res,ect to conventional ar9s the ,olitical incentive to 9ilitary co9,etition ,ersists and the basic distinction between conventional and nuclear wea,ons is not consistently recogniHed, disar9a9ent is i9,ossible and ar9s control at best ,recarious! *6 BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB Se$urit

The 9ore thoughtful observers have realiHed that the solution for the ,roble9 of disar9a9ent does not lie within disar9a9ent itself! They have found it in security! 'r9a9ents are the result of certain ,sychological factors! So long as these factors ,ersist, the resolution of nations to ar9 the9selves will also ,ersist, and that resolution will 9a$e disar9a9ent i9,ossible! The generally ,rofessed and 9ost freLuent actual 9otive for ar9a9ents is fear of attac$> that is, a feeling of insecurity! Hence, it has been argued that what is needed is to 9a$e nations actually secure fro9 attac$ by so9e new device and thus to give the9 a feeling of security! The 9otive force and the actual need for ar9a9ents would then disa,,ear> for nations would find in that new device the security they had for9erly sought in ar9a9ents! Since the end of the &irst 8orld 8ar, all ,olitically active nations of the world have been, at one ti9e or another, legally co99itted to two such devicesB collective security and an international ,olice force!

COLLECTI#E 'ECURIT3 n a wor$ing syste9 of collective security, the ,roble9 of security is no longer the concern of the individual nation, to be ta$en care of by ar9a9ents and other ele9ents of national ,ower! Security beco9es the concern of all nations, which will ta$e care collectively of the security of each of the9 as though their own security were at sta$e! f ' threatens BIs security, (, *, E, &, G, H, , +, and e will ta$e 9easures on behalf of O and against ' as though ' threatened the9 as well as B, and vice versa! ;ne for all and all for one is the watchword of collective security! 's Bis9arc$ ,ut it to the British '9bassador %ord %oftus on ',ril .=, .23/, according to the latterIs re,ort to the British &oreign Secretary, the Earl of (larendon, on ',ril .1, .23/B J f you would only declare that whatever Power should wilfully brea$ the Peace of Euro,e, would be loo$ed u,on by you as a co99on ene9y C we will readily adhere to, and Goin you in that declaration C and such a course, if su,,orted by other Powers, would be the surest guarantee for the Peace of Euro,e!J 8e have already ,ointed out that the logic of collective security is flawless, ,rovided it can be 9ade to wor$ under the conditions ,revailing on the international scene! &or collective security to o,erate as a device for the ,revention of war, three assu9,tions 9ust be fulfilledB @.A the collective syste9 9ust be able to 9uster at all ti9es such overwhel9ing strength against any ,otential aggressor or coalition of aggressors that the latter would never dare to challenge the order defended by the collective syste9> @=A at least those nations whose co9bined strength would 9eet the reLuire9ent under @.A 9ust have the sa9e conce,tion of security which they are su,,osed to defend> @0A those nations 9ust be willing to subordinate their conflicting ,olitical interests to the co99on good defined in ter9s of the collective defense of all 9e9ber states! t is conceivable that all these assu9,tions 9ay be realiHed in a ,articular situation! The odds, however, are strongly against such a ,ossibility! There is nothing in ,ast e),erience and in the general nature of international ,olitics to suggest that such a situation is li$ely to occur! t is indeed true that, under ,resent conditions of warfare no less than under those of the ,ast, no single nation is strong enough to defy a co9bination of all the other nations with any chance for success! #et it is e)tre9ely unli$ely that in an actual situation only one single nation would be found in the ,osition of the aggressor! Generally, 9ore than one nation will actively o,,ose the order collective security tries to defend, and other nations will be in sy9,athy with that o,,osition! The reason for this situation lies in the character of the order defended by collective security! That order is of necessity the status Luo as it e)ists at a ,articular 9o9ent! Thus the collective security of the %eague of "ations sought the ,reservation of the territorial status Luo as it e)isted when the %eague of "ations was established in ././! But in ././ a nu9ber of nations were already strongly o,,osed to that territorial status Luo C the nations defeated in the &irst 8orld 8ar, as well as taly, which felt itself des,oiled of so9e of the ,ro9ised fruits of victory! ;ther nations, such as the :nited States and the Soviet :nion, were at best indifferent toward the status Luo! &or &rance and its allies, who were the 9ain beneficiaries of the status Luo of ././ and 9ost an)ious to defend it by 9eans of collective security, security 9eant the defense of the frontiers as they had been established by the ,eace treaties of ././ and the

,er,etuation of their ,redo9inance on the continent of Euro,e! Security for the dissatisfied nations 9eant the e)act o,,ositeB the rectification of those frontiers and a general increase in their ,ower relative to &rance and its allies! This grou,ing of nations into those in favor of the status Luo and those o,,osed to it is not at all ,eculiar to the ,eriod following the &irst 8orld 8ar! t is, as we $now, the ele9ental ,attern of international ,olitics! 's such, it recurs in all ,eriods of history! Through the antagonis9 between status Luo and i9,erialistic nations, it ,rovides the dyna9ics of the historic ,rocess! This antagonis9 is resolved either in co9,ro9ise or in war! ;nly on the assu9,tion that the struggle for ,ower as the 9oving force of international ,olitics 9ight subside or be su,erseded by a higher ,rinci,le can collective security have a chance for success! Since, however, nothing in the reality of international affairs corres,onds to that assu9,tion, the atte9,t to freeHe the ,articular status Luo by 9eans of collective security is in the long run doo9ed to failure! n the short run, collective security 9ay succeed in safeguarding a ,articular status Luo because of the te9,orary wea$ness of the o,,onents, as in the Persian Gulf war of .//.! ts failure to succeed in the long run is due to the absence of the third assu9,tion u,on which we have ,redicated the success of collective security! n the early ./24Is, Britain and 'rgentina clashed over the &al$land slands, srael invaded %ebanon, and the :nited States sent troo,s into Grenada! 8hatever resolutions the :nited "ations ,assed, neither it nor its 9e9bers were able to turn bac$ the states engaged in these actions! n the light of historic e),erience and the actual nature of international ,olitics, we 9ust assu9e that conflicts of interest will continue on the international scene! "o nation or co9bination of nations, however strong and devoted to international law, can afford to o,,ose by 9eans of collective security all aggression at all ti9es, regardless of by who9 and against who9 it 9ay be co99itted! The :nited States and the :nited "ations ca9e to the aid of South 7orea when it was attac$ed in ./54 because they had the strength and interest to do so! 8ould they 9a$e the9selves again the cha9,ions of collective security if to9orrow ndonesia should be the victi9 of aggression, or (hile, or Egy,tF 8hat would the :nited States and the :nited "ations do if two different aggressors should start 9arching at the sa9e ti9eF 8ould they o,,ose these two aggressors indiscri9inately, without regard for the interests involved and the ,ower available, and would they refuse to violate the ,rinci,les of collective security and refrain fro9 ta$ing on only the one who was either 9ore dangerous or easier to handleF 'nd if to9orrow South 7orea should turn the tables and co99it an act of aggression against "orth 7orea or (hina, would the :nited States and the :nited "ations then turn around and fight South 7oreaF The Ita"o#'thiopian War 'fter talyIs attac$ on Ethio,ia, the %eague of "ations ,ut into 9otion the 9echanis9 of collective security ,rovided for in 'rticle .3 of the (ovenant! t soon beca9e a,,arent that none of the assu9,tions u,on whose realiHation the success of collective security de,ends was ,resent or could have been ,resent under the actual conditions of world ,olitics! The :nited States, Ger9any, and +a,an were not 9e9bers of the %eague syste9 of collective security and were, further9ore, divided in their sy9,athies! Ger9any had already o,enly e9bar$ed u,on ,olicies designed to overthrow the e)isting status Luo in Euro,e! +a,an was already well on its way to overthrow the status Luo in the &ar East! Both, therefore, could only loo$ with favor on an underta$ing that, by overthrowing the status Luo in an out-of-the-way region, would wea$en the ,osition of Great Britain and &rance, who were vitally interested in the ,reservation of the status Luo in Euro,e and the &ar East! The :nited States, on the other hand, a,,roved of the atte9,ts to strengthen the defense of the status Luo, while the te9,er of ,ublic o,inion in the country ,revented it fro9 ta$ing an active ,art in such atte9,ts! The nations who were ,re,ared to do everything they could for the success of the %eague e),eri9ent were either too wea$ to do 9uch of conseLuence C such as the Scandinavian countries C or C as in the case of the Soviet :nion C their ulterior 9otives were sus,ect! &urther9ore, the Soviet :nion was lac$ing in naval strength, indis,ensable under the circu9stances, and had no access to the theater of decisive o,erations without the co-o,eration of the geogra,hically intervening nations, which was not forthco9ing! Thus the case of collective security vs! taly was in essence the case of Great Britain and &rance vs! taly! This was a far cry fro9 the ideal ,rereLuisite of a concentration of overwhel9ing ,ower which no ,ros,ective lawbrea$er would dare to challenge! t is of course true that the co9bined strength of Great Britain and &rance would have sufficed to crush taly! #et Great Britain and &rance were not only 9e9bers of the %eague syste9 of collective security> they had other 9oral, legal, and ,olitical co99it9ents! "or were they engaged in defending the status Luo against taly alone! They were involved in a worldwide struggle for ,ower, of which the conflict with taly was only one C and not the 9ost i9,ortant C seg9ent! 8hile they were o,,osing talyIs attac$ u,on the status Luo, they could not overloo$ the ,rogressing attac$ of +a,an, nor could they be oblivious to the ,re,arations for attac$ going on east of the Rhine! "or, finally, were they able to divorce fro9 their ,olicies toward the Soviet :nion their fear of (o99unis9 as a revolutionary 9ove9ent threatening the do9estic status Luo! 8hat Great Britain and &rance conceived as their national interests contradicted what collective security reLuired the9 to do! More ,articularly, they were resolved and 9ade their resolution $nown not to go so far in defense of Ethio,ia as to ris$ war with taly! n the already Luoted words of Sir 8inston (hurchillB J&irst, the Pri9e Minister had declared that sanctions 9eant war> secondly, he was resolved that there 9ust be no war> and thirdly, he decided u,on sanctions! t was evidently i9,ossible to co9,ly with these three conditions!J. :nwilling to subordinate their national interests to the reLuire9ents of collective security, Great Britain and &rance were also unwilling to ,ursue their national interests without regard to collective security! This was the fatal error of British and &rench foreign ,olicy! By ,ursuing either cause halfheartedly and without consistency, they failed in both! "ot only did they not save the status Luo in East 'frica, but they also ,ushed taly into the ar9s of Ger9any! They
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%ondon Evening Standard, +une =3, ./03!

destroyed the collective syste9 of the %eague of "ations as well as their own ,restige as defenders of the status Luo! '9ong the causes for the increasing boldness of the anti-status Luo nations in the late thirties, cul9inating in a war of aggression, this loss of ,restige holds a ,ro9inent ,lace! The debacle of collective security, as a,,lied to the talian aggression against Ethio,ia, conveys two i9,ortant lessons! t shows the contradiction between an ideally ,erfect sche9e of refor9 and a ,olitical reality that lac$s all the ele9ents u,on which the success of the sche9e was ,redicated! t shows also the fatal wea$ness of a foreign ,olicy that is inca,able of deciding whether to be guided by the national interest, however defined, or by a su,ranational ,rinci,le e9bodying what is considered to be the co99on good of the co99unity of nations! The Korean War The lessons that could have been learned fro9 the theoretical analysis of collective security, and that were borne out by the e),erience of the talo-Ethio,ian 8ar, were fully confir9ed by the e),erience of the 7orean 8ar! The attac$ of "orth 7orea against South 7orea on +une =5, ./54, Goined by (hina in "ove9ber of the sa9e year, was as clear-cut a case of aggression as one can i9agine! n the absence of even the slightest doubt as to the legal 9erits of the case, collective security would have reLuired that all 9e9bers of the :nited "ations co9e to the aid of South 7orea, the victi9 of aggression! n view of the nature and the 9ilitary conseLuences of the aggression, this aid, to be effective, could only have ta$en the for9 of the dis,atch of ar9ed forces to the battlefront! #et of the si)ty 9e9bers of the :nited "ations, only si)teen sent ar9ed forces of any $ind, and of these only the :nited States, (anada, Great Britain, and Tur$ey can be said to have contributed 9ore than to$en forces! South 7orea, the country i99ediately concerned, and the :nited States ,rovided about ninety ,ercent of the ar9ed forces that fought in 7orea! n the course of the war, one great ,ower, (hina, Goined the aggressor as an active ,artici,ant in the aggression itself! ;ther 9e9bers of the :nited "ations with 9ilitary ca,abilities, such as 'rgentina, BraHil, (Hechoslova$ia, ndia, Me)ico, Poland, re9ained on the side lines, ta$ing no active ,art in the 9ilitary o,erations on either side! Thus the reality of collective security, as a,,lied in the 7orean 8ar, corres,onds e)actly to the ,attern outlined above! Given the conditions of conte9,orary world ,olitics, it could not have been otherwise! n order to understand the different attitudes ta$en by different nations with regard to the 7orean 8ar, it is neither sufficient nor necessary to consult the legal te)ts concerning the obligations i9,osed u,on the 9e9ber states by a syste9 of collective security! t is, however, sufficient and indeed indis,ensable to consult their interests and the ,ower available to the9 in su,,ort of those interests! 's was shown above,= the very e)istence of 7orea as an autono9ous state has been for 9ore than two thousand years a function of the balance of ,ower in the &ar East, either in ter9s of the su,re9acy of one ,ower that controlled and ,rotected 7orea or in ter9s of rival i9,erialis9s 9eeting on the 7orean ,eninsula and establishing there a very unstable eLuilibriu9 for generally short duration! The controlling and ,rotecting ,ower was traditionally (hina, challenged fro9 ti9e to ti9e with varying success by +a,an! Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Russia re,laced (hina as the co9,etitor of +a,an for the control of 7orea! 't the end of the Second 8orld 8ar, with (hina and +a,an too wea$ to ,erfor9 their historic function with regard to 7orea, the :nited States and the Soviet :nion too$ over that function, the :nited States, as it were, ta$ing the ,lace of +a,an and the Soviet :nion that of (hina! "either the :nited States nor the Soviet :nion could allow the other ,ower to control all of 7orea! 's seen fro9 the vantage ,oint of +a,an, whose ,rotection is a vital interest of the :nited States, 7orea in the hands of a ,otentially hostile ,ower is li$e a drawn dagger and so it is as seen fro9 the vantage ,oint of Russia and, 9ore ,articularly, (hina! Thus the division of 7orea into an '9erican and Russian Hone at the end of the Second 8orld 8ar was the e),ression both of the interests of the two nations concerned and of the ,ower available to the9, since at that ti9e neither was in a ,osition to ris$ a 9aGor conflict over the control of all of 7orea! This issue of the control of all of 7orea was reo,ened when South 7orea was attac$ed by "orth 7orea, su,,orted by the Soviet :nion! The all-out su,,ort of the :nited States for South 7orea was Gustified by its interest in the security of +a,an and the over-all stability of the &ar East! t was that latter interest that Gustified the substantial su,,ort of (anada and Great Britain! The to$en contributions of other nations, such as 'ustralia, Belgiu9, (olo9bia, &rance, %u)e9bourg, and Tur$ey, can be e),lained either by the sa9e interest or by their s,ecial de,endence u,on the good will of the :nited States! 'nd the failure of 9ost nations to contribute anything derives fro9 lac$ of interest or lac$ of ,ower, or fro9 both! But even this su,,ort, slight when co9,ared with the total 9ilitary strength of the 9e9bers of the :nited "ations, would have been a9,le for the re,ulsion of the "orth 7orean aggression, short of a 9aGor war! n other words, collective security could have o,erated successfully even under the less than ideal conditions that ,revailed before the intervention of (hina! That intervention transfor9ed co9,letely the character of the 7orean 8ar! Before it, the war could still be called a collective security war or a ,olice action by virtue of the ,re,onderant 9ilitary force o,,osing the aggressor! 8ith that intervention the conflict too$ on the character of a traditional war in which the a,,ro)i9ately eLual forces of two coalitions o,,ose each other! Short of a general conflagration, there was no ,ossibility for either side to defeat the other, as South 7orea would have been able to defeat "orth 7orea with the assistance of the :nited "ations forces! &ro9 the 9o9ent a great ,ower Goined the aggressor, only a collective security effort co99ensurate with the 9agnitude of the aggression C that is, all - out war against a great ,ower C could have defeated the aggressors! n short, collective security, conceived as an instru9ent for the ,rotection of the status Luo by ,eaceful 9eans, defeats its avowed ,ur,ose and beco9es an instru9ent of all-out war if the aggressor is a great ,ower! The 7orean 8ar did not ,ut collective security to the full test of this ,arado), for the interests of the great ,owers involved in it li9ited the war to the 7orean ,eninsula! (hina intervened against the :nited "ations advance into "orth 7orea for the sa9e reasons that had led to the intervention of the :nited States against the "orth 7orean advance into
=

See ,age ./3!

South 7oreaB the fear of a united 7orea in ,otentially hostile hands! (ollective security would have reLuired not only the 9o9entary re,ulsion of aggression, but also the establish9ent of security for the future, an obGective to be achieved only by the defeat of (hina in an all-out war! Si9ilarly, the restoration of traditional (hinese control over the 7orean ,eninsula would have reLuired the defeat of the :nited States in an all-out war! "either the :nited States nor (hina was willing to ta$e u,on itself the burden and ris$s de9anded by such an enter,rise! Thus both nations were satisfied with a te9,orary continuation of the division, however ,recarious and unstable, of 7orea into two s,heres of influence, reflecting the balance of ,ower in the &ar East! n this res,ect, as in the others discussed before, the dile99as and contradictions to which the 7orean 8ar, considered as a collective security action, has given rise ste9 fro9 the contradictions inherent in the very idea of collective security when it is ,ut into ,ractice under the ,olitical conditions of the conte9,orary world! AN INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE The idea of an international ,olice force goes a ste, beyond collective security in that the a,,lication of collective force against an actual or ,ros,ective lawbrea$er no longer lies within the control of the individual nations! The international ,olice would o,erate under the co99and of an international agency, which would decide when and how to e9,loy it! "o such ,olice force has ever o,erated as a ,er9anent international organiHation! The 9e9bers of the :nited "ations are, however, obligated by 'rticles 6= ff! of the (harter to create such a force in the for9 of a :nited "ations 'r9ed &orce! "o substantial ,rogress has yet been 9ade in e)ecuting that obligation! The ho,es for the ,reservation of ,eace which have been connected with an international ,olice force since the end of the &irst 8orld 8ar are derived fro9 an analogy with the ,eace-,reserving functions the ,olice ,erfor9s in do9estic societies! This analogy is, however, 9isleading on three grounds! *o9estic societies are co9,osed of 9illions of 9e9bers of which at any one ti9e nor9ally only a very s9all fraction is engaged in violating the law! The s,read of ,ower a9ong 9e9bers of do9estic societies is e)tre9e, since there are very ,owerful and very wea$ 9e9bers> yet the co9bined ,ower of law-abiding citiHens will nor9ally be far su,erior to any co9bination of even the 9ost ,owerful lawbrea$ers! The ,olice as the organiHed agency of the lawabiding 9aGority does not need to e)ceed relatively s9all ,ro,ortions in order to be able to co,e with any foreseeable threat to law and order! n these three res,ects the international situation is significantly different! nternational society is co9,osed of a relatively s9all nu9ber of 9e9bers, a9ounting to 9ore than .34 sovereign states! '9ong these there are giants, li$e the :nited States and the Soviet :nion, and ,yg9ies, such as %u)e9bourg and "icaragua! 8hat is 9ore i9,ortant, the ,ower of any one of the giants constitutes a very considerable fraction of the total ,ower of the co99unity of nations! ' giant in co9bination with one or two second-rate nations or a few s9all ones 9ay easily e)ceed the strength of all the other nations co9bined! n view of such a for9idable ,otential o,,osition, a ,olice force of truly gigantic di9ensions would obviously be needed if it should be able to sLuelch an infringe9ent of law and order without transfor9ing every ,olice action into full-scale war! This would still be true, only on a ,ro,ortionately s9aller scale, if general disar9a9ent should reduce drastically the ar9ed forces of the individual nations! &or the international ,olice would still have to constitute a counterweight of overwhel9ing su,eriority to the 9ilitary s,irit and training, the industrial ca,acity, strategic advantages C in short, the ,ower ,otential of the great ,owers C which in case of conflict could easily be transfor9ed into actual 9ilitary strength! ;n the assu9,tion, then C which is indeed 9erely hy,othetical C that nations would be willing to surrender the instru9ents for the ,rotection and furtherance of their own interests to an international ,olice force, how is such an international ,olice force to be co9,osedF The nature of international society as it actually is allows no satisfactory answer to that Luestion! n do9estic societies the ,olice force is naturally co9,osed of 9e9bers who are fully identified with the e)isting law and order! But let us assu9e that a9ong the9 there are so9e o,,osed to the e)isting law and order, and that their nu9ber is ,ro,ortionate to the seg9ent of the total ,o,ulation o,,osed to it> the nu9ber of the disaffected would be so s9all as to be virtually negligible and unable to affect the stri$ing ,ower of the ,olice! 'n international ,olice force would necessarily have to be co9,osed of a ,ro,ortionate or eLual nu9ber of citiHens of the different nations! These nations, however, as we have seen, are virtually always divided into defenders and o,,onents of the e)isting status Luo> that is, of the e)isting law and order! Their citiHens as 9e9bers of the international ,olice force could not but share the national ,references in this res,ect! 8ould they be e),ected to fight against their own nations in defense of a status Luo to which they, as 9e9bers of their nations, 9ust be o,,osedF Given the relative strength of national and international loyalties in the conte9,orary world, in case of conflict the national loyalties could not but attract the res,ective 9e9bers of the international ,olice force li$e so 9any 9agnets, thus dissolving the international ,olice force before it could ever 9eet a challenge to the e)isting law and order! These general considerations, a,,lying to international society as a whole and 9ore ,articularly to its 9ost ,owerful 9e9bers, are of course not invalidated by the e)ce,tional ,ossibility for an international ,olice force to ,revent strictly circu9scribed local breaches of the law, ,rovided all the nations directly concerned have an interest in that ,revention! The classic e)a9,le of this ,ossibility is the :nited "ations E9ergency &orce established after the SueH invasion of ./53 to ,rotect the frontiers between Egy,t and srael around the GaHa Stri, and to enforce the de9ilitariHation of the Straits of Tiran! The e)a9,le of :"E& is also illustrative of the li9itations created by the o,,osing states when one recalls the i99ediate co9,liance with Egy,tIs reLuest to withdraw the force in ./31! To Gudge the ,ros,ects for an international ,eace force by the coalition asse9bled in the Gulf would be ,re9ature! ' relatively s9all nu9ber of nations su,,lied 9ost of the troo,s! The ,roble9 of an international ,olice force, to be solved at all, 9ust be solved within the fra9ewor$ of a world society that co99ands the ulti9ate secular loyalty of its individual 9e9bers and has develo,ed a conce,tion of Gustice by which the individual nations co9,osing it are willing

to test the legiti9acy of their individual clai9s! 0 ,7 BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB Internationa" Go8ernment The re9edies for international anarchy and war which have been discussed thus far are all s,ecific re9edies! They attac$ a ,articular ,roble9 in which the lac$ of international order and the tendency toward war are 9anifest, and they endeavor to solve the general ,roble9 of international order and ,eace through a solution of the ,articular ,roble9! nternational govern9ent owes its e)istence to the recognition that ,eace and order are the ,roducts, not of a s,ecific device 9eeting a ,articular ,roble9, but of the co99on bond that unites an integrated society under a co99on authority and a co99on conce,tion of Gustice! How to found such an authority in a society of sovereign slates and to create such a conce,tion of Gustice is, then, the tas$ any atte9,t at international govern9ent 9ust try to solve! Each of the three world wars of the last two centuries was followed by an atte9,t to establish an international govern9ent! The total failure to $ee, international order and ,eace called forth an over-all effort to 9a$e international order and ,eace secure! The Holy 'lliance followed the "a,oleonic 8ars> the %eague of "ations, the &irst 8orld 8ar> the :nited "ations, the Second 8orld 8ar! 8ith regard to each of these atte9,ts at international govern9ent, three Luestions 9ust be as$edB @.A 8here is the authority to govern vested, or who is to governF @=A By what ,rinci,le of Gustice is the govern9ent to be guided, or what is the conce,tion of the co99on good to be realiHed by the govern9entF @0A To what e)tent has the govern9ent been able to 9aintain order and ,eaceF THE HOL3 ALLIANCE Histor The international govern9ent co99only called the Holy 'lliance was based u,on three treatiesB the Treaty of (hau9ont of March /, .2.6, the Kuadru,le 'lliance signed at Paris on "ove9ber =4, .2.5, and the Treaty of the Holy 'lliance of Se,te9ber =3, .2.5! n the Treaty of (hau9ont, 'ustria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia concluded an alliance for twenty years, for the ,ur,oses of ,reventing the "a,oleonic dynasty fro9 returning to &rance and of guaranteeing the territorial settle9ent to be 9ade at the end of the war against "a,oleon! The Kuadru,le 'lliance reaffir9ed the ,rovisions of the Treaty of (hau9ont and in its 'rticle E laid down the ,rinci,les of what is $nown as Jcongressional govern9entJ or Jdi,lo9acy by conference!J. n contrast with the Kuadru,le 'lliance C which ,resented, as it were, the constitutional law of the international govern9ent of the Holy 'lliance C the Treaty of the Holy 'lliance itself, fro9 which the international govern9ent received its na9e, contained no ,rinci,les of govern9ent at all! t ,roclai9ed the adherence of all rulers to the ,rinci,les of (hristianity, with God as the actual sovereign of the world! t is re,lete with ,hrases such as Jreci,rocal service,J Junalterable good will,J J9utual affection,J J(hristian charity,J Jindissoluble fraternity!J ;riginally signed by the rulers of 'ustria, Prussia, and Russia, the Holy 'lliance was adhered to by all Euro,ean rulers, with the e)ce,tion of the Po,e and the Sultan!= ;bviously ins,ired by (Har 'le)ander of Russia, it reaffir9ed the 9oral unity of Euro,e! That reaffir9ation of a 9oral consensus a9ong the nations is the 9ain function the Treaty of the Holy 'lliance actually fulfilled! The Treaty of the Holy 'lliance was of no significance for the actual o,erations of the international govern9ent that bore its na9e! ts ,rinci,les were invo$ed fro9 ti9e to ti9e by the (Har, affir9ed in words and reGected in action by the other ,owers! (astlereagh, British &oreign Minister at the ti9e of its conclusion, called it Ja ,iece of subli9e 9ysticis9 and nonsense,J and the 'ustrian (hancellor Metternich 9ade vulgar Go$es at its e),ense! #et it served as 9oral Gustification for the ,rinci,les of Gustice that the three original signatories of the Treaty ,ro,ounded and for the ,olicies by which they endeavored to realiHe these ,rinci,les! Thus the Treaty of the Holy 'lliance also fulfilled an ideological function and beca9e the sy9bol of this whole era of international relations! n .2.2, the four signatories of the Kuadru,le 'lliance ad9itted &rance as a fifth 9e9ber to ta$e ,art in all further 9eetings to be held by virtue of 'rticle E of that treaty! n a circular signed in .2=4 at the (ongress of Tro,,au, 'ustria, Prussia, and Russia ,ledged the9selves never to recogniHe the right of any ,eo,le to circu9scribe the ,ower of
0

(f! in greater detail, Hans +! Morgenthau, JThe Political (onditions for an nternational Police &orce,J nternational ;rganiHation, Eol! DE , "o! = @S,ring ./30A! ,,! 0/0 ff> and JThe 9,artiality of the nternational Police,J in Salo Engel and B! '! Metall, %aw, State, and nternational %egal ;rderB Essays in Honor of Hans 7elsen @7no)villeB The :niversity of Tennessee Press! ./36A, ,,! =4/ ff! . 'rticle E reads as followsB JTo assure and facilitate the e)ecution of the ,resent Treaty, and to consolidate the inti9ate relations which to-day unite the 6 Sovereigns for the good of the world, the High (ontracting Parties have agreed to renew, at fi)ed ,eriods, whether under the i99ediate aus,ices of the Sovereigns, or by their res,ective Ministers, reunions devoted to the great co99on interests and to the e)a9ination of the 9easures which, at any of these ,eriods, shall be Gudged 9ost salutary for the re,ose and ,ros,erity of the ,eo,les, and for the 9aintenance of the ,eace of the State!J
=

The British 9onarch, for constitutional reasons, could not for9ally adhere> the Pri9e Minister acceded infor9ally!

their $ing! This co9,act is $nown as the "eo - Holy 'lliance! (astlereagh, in two dis,atches of the sa9e year, refused to have any ,art in ,olicies whose ,ur,ose was to interfere by force in the internal affairs of other countries! His successor, George (anning, 9aintained this ,rinci,le at the (ongress of Eerona in .2==, the last of the congresses Great Britain attended! 8hen the news of the failure of the (ongress of Eerona reached hi9, (anning, in a letter to the British di,lo9at Bagot of +anuary 0, .2=0, hailed the end of international govern9ent by congresses and the beginning of a new era, as far as Great Britain was concerned, by invo$ing the religious ,rinci,le of the Holy 'lliance with a vengeanceB JEvery nation for itself, and God for us allSJ nternational govern9ent by conference as a going concern did not survive the British defection! 'fter two 9ore abortive atte9,ts C one with reference to the S,anish colonies, the other concerning Greece and Tur$ey C it ca9e to an end in .2=5! The syste9 of an over - all international govern9ent instituted by 'rticle E of the Kuadru,le 'lliance of "ove9ber =4, .2.5, did not last even a decade! The lifeti9e of the syste9 of a9bassadorial conferences for the settle9ent of s,ecial ,roble9s was even shorter! t, too, was established by the Treaties of .2.5 and consisted of three agenciesB the a9bassadors to &rance of 'ustria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, dealing 9ainly with the ,roble9s raised by the ,eace treaties with &rance, yet acting in a general way as the ,ara9ount e)ecutive organ of the Kuadru,le 'lliance> the a9bassadors of the great ,owers 9eeting in %ondon to organiHe the abolition of the slave trade> and the a9bassadorial conference at &ran$fort for the discussion of Ger9an ,roble9s! 'll these agencies had disa,,eared by .2.2! )O#ERN$ENT "3 THE )REAT PO%ER' The international govern9ent of the Holy 'lliance was govern9ent by the great ,owers! The 'ustrian states9an and writer &riedrich GentH described its general character thusB The syste9 which has been established in Euro,e since .2.6 and .2.5 is a ,heno9enon unheard-of in the history of the world! The ,rinci,le of eLuilibriu9 or, to ,ut it better, of counterweights for9ed by ,articular alliances, a ,rinci,le which has governed and too often also troubled and covered Euro,e with blood for three centuries, has been su,erseded by a ,rinci,le of a general union, uniting the su9 total of states in a federation under the direction of the 9aGor ,owers! ! ! ! The second -, third -, and fourth-rate states sub9it in silence and without any ,revious sti,ulation to the decisions Gointly ta$en by the ,re,onderant ,owers> and Euro,e see9s to for9 finally a great ,olitical fa9ily, united under the aus,ices of an areo,agus of its own creation!0 The distinction between great and s9all ,owers as a ,olitical fact ,ointing to the e)tre9e differences in ,ower a9ong nations is of course one of the ele9ental e),eriences of international ,olitics! 's an institution of international ,olitics and organiHation, carrying differences in legal status, it s,rang fro9 the brain of (astlereagh and beca9e the very foundation of the sche9e ado,ted in .2.5! t is true that the ,rotocol of the (ongress of 'i) - la - (ha,elle of "ove9ber .5, .2.2, ,roviding for future 9eetings of the five great ,owers, also sti,ulated Jthat in the case of these 9eetings having for their obGect affairs s,ecially connected with the interests of the other States of Euro,e, they shall only ta$e ,lace in ,ursuance of a for9al invitation on the ,art of such of those States as the said affairs 9ay concern, and under the e),ress reservation of their right of direct ,artici,ation therein, either directly or by their Pleni,otentiaries!J #et this sti,ulation re9ained without a,,reciable influence u,on the ,olicies of the Holy and, 9ore ,articularly, of the "eo - Holy 'lliance! %ua" Meaning o! the Status 1uo To the Luestion as to what ,rinci,le of Gustice guided the Holy 'lliance, the answer see9s to be clearB the 9aintenance of ,eace on the basis of the status Luo! This ,rinci,le was never 9ore clearly stated than in the declaration of the five great ,owers signed at 'i) - la - (ha,elle on "ove9ber .5,.2.2B JThe obGect of this :nion is as si9,le as it is great and salutary! t does not tend to any new ,olitical co9bination C to any change in the Relations sanctioned by e)isting Treaties! (al9 and consistent in its ,roceedings, it has no other obGect than the 9aintenance of Peace, and the guarantee of those transactions on which the Peace was founded and consolidated!J This answer, however, beco9es highly a9biguous if one raises the further Luestion as to what was 9eant by the status Luo! 8hat Great Britain 9eant fro9 the very beginning was not at all what Russia 9eant, and the conce,tion of the status Luo which guided the ,olicies of the "eo - Holy 'lliance was dia9etrically o,,osed to the conce,tion behind the ,olicies of (astlereagh and (anning! The status Luo that Great Britain tried to ,reserve through the instru9entality of the Holy 'lliance was strictly li9ited to the ,olitical situation that e)isted at the end of the "a,oleonic 8ars with regard to &rance! To the British states9en, the 9ortal ,eril into which "a,oleon had ,ut the British sles was identical with the threat to the Euro,ean balance of ,ower which had e9anated fro9 the "a,oleonic E9,ire! Great Britain was willing to su,,ort an international govern9ent whose ,ur,ose was to forestall the rise of a new conLueror fro9 &rench soil and to that end to enforce the ,eace settle9ent of .2.5 against &rance! The British conce,tion of the status Luo was li9ited to the territorial settle9ent of .2.5 and the e)clusion of a 9e9ber of the
0

&riedrich GentH, *e,eches nedites du (hevalier de GentH au) Hos,odors de Ealachie @ParisB E! Plon, .213A, Eol! ., ,! 056! The English translation has been su,,lied by the author!

"a,oleonic fa9ily fro9 the &rench throne! n this res,ect there was no difference between the foreign ,olicies of (astlereagh and (anning! The conce,tion of the status Luo which deter9ined the ,olicies of Russia fro9 the outset, and those of 'ustria, Prussia, and &rance fro9 the end of the second decade of the nineteenth century, was unli9ited territorially and as to subGect 9atter! 'ccording to that conce,tion, for9ulated in 9ore unco9,ro9ising ter9s than the actual ,olitical conditions ,er9itted to realiHe, it was the ,ur,ose of the international govern9ent of the Holy 'lliance to 9aintain everywhere in the world the territorial status Luo of .2.5 and the constitutional status Luo of the absolute 9onarchy! The instru9ent of the realiHation of the latter ,ur,ose was bound to be intervention into the internal affairs of all nations where the institution of the absolute 9onarchy see9ed to be in danger! The inevitable by-,roduct of such intervention was an increase in the ,ower of the intervening nations! The 9ore wides,read national and liberal 9ove9ents beca9e, the greater was the chance for the intervening nation or grou, of nations to increase their strength and e),and and thus disturb the balance of ,ower again! The 9ain beneficiary of such a develo,9ent was bound to be Russia! 't this ,oint Great Britain and Russia ,arted co9,any! Great Britain had not, for al9ost a Luarter of a century, fought the "a,oleonic E9,ire, nourished by the dyna9is9 of the &rench Revolution, to e)change it for a Russian E9,ire, ins,ired by the religious 9ysticis9 of universal brotherhood and of absolute govern9ent! n the 9easure that the s,read of national and liberal 9ove9ents gave the "eo - Holy 'lliance an o,,ortunity to test its ,rinci,les of general intervention, Great Britain held aloof fro9 it and o,,osed its ,olicies! 8hen in .2.2 Russia ,ro,osed to send an allied ar9y to aid S,ain in the war against its '9erican colonies, Great Britain ,revented the e)ecution of the ,lan! #et, when in .2=4 revolutions bro$e out in "a,les, Pied9ont, and Portugal, 'ustria, in the na9e of the "eo - Holy 'lliance, restored the absolute 9onarchies of "a,les and Pied9ont to their thrones by force of ar9s! n .2=4, a revolution bro$e out in S,ain! 'gainst the constitutional regi9e installed by it, &rance intervened by force of ar9s in .2=0, acting on its own behalf, but with the 9oral su,,ort of 'ustria, Prussia, and Russia! Pea$e9 Or(er9 an( the Nationa" Interest These actions of the Holy 'lliance reveal two facts! ;ne is the absence of a serious threat of war in any of these situations! The dis,arity of ,ower between the intervening state and the obGect of intervention C the revolutionary grou, that had to contend not only with its own antirevolutionary co9,atriots but also with a foreign ar9y C was such as to give the intervention the character of a ,unitive e),edition rather than of a war! The other fact is the deter9ination of the ,olicies of all nations by their national interests, however 9uch the language of di,lo9acy of the ,eriod 9ade concessions to the 9ystical ,redilections of the Russian (Har! This is 9ost obvious in the actions of Great Britain! "either (astlereagh nor (anning C who was ,articularly fran$ and eloLuent in this res,ect C too$ ,ains to hide the fact that he was guided by the traditional interests of Great Britain, li9ited only by the general interest in ,eace and security! Both the 'ustrian intervention in taly and the &rench intervention in S,ain were dictated by traditional national interests! This connection is de9onstrated by the very fact that the ,olicy of interventions on the ,art of 'ustria and &rance in the affairs of their neighbors to the south survived the Holy 'lliance by al9ost half a century! More i9,ortant still in view of our discussion is the victory the ,articular national interests gained over the general ,rinci,les of the Holy 'lliance when ever both ca9e into conflict! This ha,,ened twice, in .2=4 and in .2==! n both cases Russia ,ro,osed a collective intervention on the ,art of all the 9e9bers of the 'lliance and to that end offered to send a large Russian ar9y into (entral and 8estern Euro,e! That Great Britain would have o,,osed such a ,ro,osal is obvious fro9 what has already been said of the British return to its traditional balance - of - ,ower ,olicy! That Great Britain should have been Goined in this o,,osition by 'ustria, the other ,illar of the "eo - Holy 'lliance, de9onstrates the ideological character of the ,rinci,les of the Holy 'lliance! These ,rinci,les were invo$ed when they see9ed to be able to give 9oral Gustification to ,olicies dictated by the national interest! They were discarded when nothing was to be gained for the national interest by invo$ing the9! The attitude of the ,owers when in .2=. the Gree$s revolted against the Tur$s is instructive in this res,ect! This is also the only situation arising during the era of the Holy 'lliance which contained the ger9s of a general war and which in the century following it led ti9e and again to the actual outbrea$ of war! The ,rinci,les of the "eo - Holy 'lliance allowed of only one attitude to be ta$en vis-a-vis a national revolt against a legiti9ate govern9entB the legiti9ate govern9ent 9ust be given active su,,ort! #et this was not the answer the national interest of the 9ost affected ,ower de9anded! Russia had been the traditional ,rotector of the subGects of the ;tto9an E9,ire who were of the ;rthodo) (hristian faith! The ,ossession of (onstantino,le was a centuries-old drea9 of the rulers of Moscow! Thus, when the Gree$ revolt bro$e out, the Russian (Har was inclined, in co9,lete disregard of the ,rinci,les of the "eo - Holy 'lliance, to declare war against Tur$ey! 'ustria and Great Britain, on the other hand, could only see with 9isgivings, felt before and for al9ost a century afterward, the e)tension of Russian ,ower in the Bal$ans and RussiaIs advance toward the Mediterranean! Thus (astlereagh, the o,,onent of the "eo - Holy 'lliance, and the 'ustrian (hancellor Metternich, its ardent su,,orter, Goined hands in order to dissuade Russia fro9 ta$ing active ste,s in su,,ort of the Gree$ insurgents! That they 9ade successful use of the ,rinci,les of the "eo - Holy 'lliance against their author is an ironic co99ent on the difficulties facing a foreign ,olicy based u,on abstract ,rinci,les rather than u,on a clear recognition of the national interest! 's (astlereagh wisely ,ut itB t is difficult enough in international affairs to hold the

balance Jbetween conflicting nations,J it is still 9ore difficult to hold the balance Jbetween conflicting ,rinci,les!J 8hen, finally, in .2=3 the danger of war between Russia and Tur$ey beca9e acute, it was not the defunct Holy 'lliance that averted it, but (anningIs audacious 9ove of entering into an agree9ent with Russia for the ,ur,ose of forcing Tur$ey to 9a$e concessions to the Gree$s, without RussiaIs gaining i99ediate advantages fro9 such internal refor9s! 'fter (anningIs death, the event occurred that (anning had been successful in ,reventingB in .2=2 Russia alone declared war on Tur$ey, thus having the latter at its 9ercy! The outbrea$ of this war 9ay have been ,artly due to the decline of British states9anshi, after (anningIs death! t certainly was not at all due to the absence of the international govern9ent of the Holy 'lliance! The Holy 'lliance, then, was a short-lived e),eri9ent that contributed nothing to the 9aintenance of international ,eace! 's an international govern9ent i9,osing its rule u,on its s,here of do9ination, it was successful for hardly 9ore than half a decade! 't the very hour of its ascendancy, in .2.2, &riedrich GentH, one of its architects and its outstanding ,hiloso,her, ,ut his finger on its congenital wea$nessB The strongest obGection to the ,resent syste9 is the obvious difficulty to 9aintain for long the co9bination of heterogeneous ele9ents of which it is co9,osed! The 9ost divergent interests, the 9ost antagonistic tendencies, the 9ost contradictory ,redictions, views, and secret thoughts are for the 9o9ent enco9,assed and sub9erged in the co99on action of a league which rese9bles 9uch 9ore a coalition, created for an e)traordinary ,ur,ose, than a genuine alliance based u,on distinct and ,er9anent interests! :niLue circu9stances were needed to bring about such a league> it would be against hu9an nature and the nature of things for it to ta$e for any length of ti9e the ,lace of that o,,osition and strife to which the diversity of situations, interests, and o,inions always leads a nu9ber of inde,endent nations, each of necessity with its own ,articular character and ,lan of action!6 Two congenital infir9ities 9ade the early de9ise of the Holy 'lliance inevitable! ;ne was the dia9etrical o,,osition between the two 9ain 9e9bers of the 'lliance as to what the defense of the status Luo C u,on which they had all agreed as the guiding ,rinci,le of Gustice in the abstract C 9eant in concrete ,olitical ter9s! That 9eaning was deter9ined by the national interests of the individual 9e9bers! f those interests ha,,ened to coincide, the 'lliance could act in unison as one collective body! f those interests diverged, as they were bound to do fro9 ti9e to ti9e and as they did ,er9anently in the case of Great Britain and Russia, the 'lliance ceased to o,erate! The other infir9ity fro9 which the Holy 'lliance suffered was the contrast between the ,rinci,le of Gustice u,on which the govern9ents of Russia, Prussia, and 'ustria agreed as a guide to concrete ,olitical action, and the conce,tion of Gustice adhered to by the 9aGority of the individuals living under the rule of the Holy 'lliance! The conflict between the ,rinci,les of legiti9ate govern9ent and the ,rinci,les of liberalis9 and nationalis9 9ade the o,eration of an international govern9ent ins,ired by the for9er de,endent u,on the continuous use of ar9ed force in order to ,rotect and restore absolute 9onarchies and their ,ossessions throughout the world! t is a 9atter for conGecture how long an international govern9ent could have ,erfor9ed such a tas$ had all its 9e9bers shared the convictions and the Heal of 'le)ander of Russia! The Holy 'lliance could not ,revail against the o,,osition of so9e of its 9e9bers and of the ,eo,les subGect to its rule! n the era of (astlereagh, that dual o,,osition 9oved without contact on ,arallel lines, (astlereagh abstaining fro9 active coo,eration with the ,olicies of the "eo Holy 'lliance! t was (anningIs great innovation, favored by the increasing strength of the national and liberal 9ove9ents and later ,erfected by his successor Pal9erston, to use those 9ove9ents in su,,ort of British ,ur,oses> that is, as weights in the scales of the balance of ,ower! 8ith that innovation, (anning ushered in the British ,olicy toward the continent of Euro,e which was to re9ain do9inant throughout the nineteenth century! The international govern9ent of the Holy 'lliance lac$ed any $ind of ,er9anent organiHation and consisted, aside fro9 the e,he9eral a9bassadorial co99ittees 9entioned above, of nothing but a nu9ber of international congresses for the ,ur,ose of settling current international affairs! "evertheless, the Holy 'lliance was an international govern9ent in the true sense of the ter9! 'n inco9,lete list of the issues on the agenda of the (ongress of 'i) - la -(ha,elle will illustrate the range of its govern9ental activitiesB the clai9s of the Ger9an 9ediatiHed ,rinces against the abuses of their new sovereigns, the ,etition of the Elector of Hesse to e)change his title for that of $ing, the reLuest by "a,oleonIs 9other for the release of her son, the grievances of the ,eo,le of Monaco against their ,rince, the clai9s of Bavaria and the House of Hochberg to the succession in Baden, a dis,ute between the *u$e of ;ldenburg and (ount Bentinc$ about the lordshi, of 7nu,enhaussen, the situation of the +ews in Prussia and 'ustria, the ran$ of di,lo9atic re,resentatives, the su,,ression of the slave trade and of the Barbary ,irates, and the Luestion of the S,anish colonies! The Con$ert o! 'urope n co9,arison with these wides,read govern9ental activities of the Holy 'lliance, the subseLuent century was retrogressive! The s,ectacle of a govern9ent of great ,owers sitting in Gudg9ent over the affairs of the world did not rea,,ear until in ././ the (ouncil of the %eague of "ations re-enacted the role that the Holy 'lliance had ,layed! #et the era between the Holy 'lliance and the %eague of "ations was not devoid of ad hoc atte9,ts at settling international ,roble9s through the concerted action of the great ,owers! 'fter the de9ise of the Holy 'lliance, the great ,owers continued to assu9e res,onsibility for the settle9ent of ,olitical issues that without such settle9ent 9ight have led to
6

bid!, ,! 055!

war! That res,onsibility was realiHed in a nu9ber of conferences dealing with ,roble9s endangering the ,eace, such as the Belgian Luestion at the beginning of the .204s, the Eastern Luestion at the beginning of the .254s and again in .212, and the ,roble9s of 'frica at the beginning of the twentieth century! t was to that res,onsibility of the great ,owers for the ,eace of the world, o,erating through ad hoc conferences and generally $nown as the (oncert of Euro,e, that Sir Edward Grey a,,ealed in vain on the eve of the &irst 8orld 8ar! The (oncert of Euro,e differed fro9 a genuine international govern9ent in two res,ects! ;n the one hand, it was not institutionaliHed! There was no agree9ent a9ong the great ,owers to 9eet regularly or to 9eet at all! The great ,owers 9et whenever the international situation see9ed to de9and concerted action! ;n the other hand, the (oncert of Euro,e was no longer ani9ated, as has already been noted,5 by a strong 9oral consensus that could have neutraliHed conflicts and su,,lied standards for co99on Gudg9ents and actions! The cleavage between nationalis9 and legiti9acy which the &rench Revolution had o,ened re9ained o,en throughout the nineteenth century! t 9ight at ti9es narrow or widen, but it did not close! ;nly at the end of the &irst 8orld 8ar did the national ,rinci,le triu9,h, carrying to their doo9 the 9onarchies of (entral and Eastern Euro,e! #et, des,ite the lac$ of a strong 9oral consensus, of an institutionaliHed govern9ent by conferences, let alone of an organiHed one, the (oncert of Euro,e was 9ost successful in ,reserving general ,eace during the ninety years of its e)istence! The only 9aGor international war the world e),erienced during that ,eriod, the (ri9ean 8ar of .256 - 53, was due to a series of accidents! Had any one of these accidents failed to 9aterialiHe, the war 9ight well have been avoided! The (oncert of Euro,e had already agreed u,on the for9ula for ,eace, but a delay of twenty-four hours in the trans9ission of the for9ula changed the ,icture! 8hat accounted for the success of the (oncert of Euro,e in ,reventing general warsF Three factors 9ust be 9entioned! n that ,eriod of history the 9oral consensus of the Euro,ean co99unity lived on as a feeble echo, strengthened, however, by the hu9anitarian 9oral cli9ate of the ti9es! The ,olitical configuration favored e),ansion into ,olitically e9,ty s,aces with acco99odation of conflicting interests! &inally and 9ost i9,ortantly, however, that ,eriod of history saw a succession of brilliant di,lo9atists and states9en who $new how to 9a$e ,eace, how to ,reserve ,eace, and how to $ee, wars short and li9ited in sco,e! The lesson their wor$ conveys to our age will be ,ondered later in this boo$! THE LEA)UE OF NATION' 8ith the end of the &irst 8orld 8ar, a new e,och began in the history of international govern9ent! The %eague of "ations showed in its functions a great deal of si9ilarity with the Holy 'lliance! n its organiHation, however, it constituted a radical de,arture fro9 the e),eri9ent that had ,receded it a century before! OrganiDation The %eague of "ations, in contrast to the Holy 'lliance, was a real organiHation with a legal ,ersonality, agents, and agencies of its own! ts ,olitical agencies were the 'sse9bly, the (ouncil, and the Per9anent Secretariat! The 'sse9bly was co9,osed of re,resentatives of all the 9e9ber states! n the 'sse9bly as well as in the (ouncil each state had one vote, and unani9ity of all 9e9bers ,resent was reLuired for all ,olitical decisions, including those which concerned the ,revention of war!3 The 9ain e)ce,tions were 'rticle .5, ,aragra,h .4,1 and the rule that in decisions concerning the settle9ent of international dis,utes the votes of the ,arties to the dis,ute were not to be counted! The (ouncil consisted of two ty,es of 9e9bersB ,er9anent and non,er9anent! 'll great ,owers belonging at a ,articular ti9e to the %eague were ,er9anent 9e9bers> e!g!, originally &rance, Great Britain, taly, and +a,an, to which were later added Ger9any and the Soviet :nion! The non,er9anent 9e9bers nu9bered originally four! Their nu9bers were increased successively until in ./03 the (ouncil co9,rised eleven non,er9anent 9e9bers! Thus originally ,er9anent and non,er9anent 9e9bers were eLual in nu9bers! &ro9 ./== on, the non,er9anent 9e9bers had an ever-increasing 9aGority over the ,er9anent ones! n ./0/, after Ger9any, taly, and +a,an had resigned and the Soviet :nion had been e),elled, the (ouncil co9,rised two ,er9anent @&rance and Great BritainA and eleven non,er9anent 9e9bers! 8hat is i9,ortant in view of the distribution of ,ower between great and s9all nations is not their nu9erical
5 3

See ,ages =66 ff! (f! the e9,hasis the Per9anent (ourt of nternational +ustice ,laced u,on the ,rinci,les of unani9ity in the 'dvisory ;,inion concerning 'rticle 0, ,aragra,h =, of the Treaty of %ausanne @&rontier between Tur$ey and raLAB J n a body ! ! ! whose 9ission is to deal with any 9atter within the s,here of action of the %eague or affecting the ,eace of the world, observance of the rule of unani9ity is naturally and even necessarily indicated! ;nly if the decisions of the (ouncil have the su,,ort of the unani9ous consent of the Powers co9,osing it, will they ,ossess the degree of authority which they 9ust haveB the very ,restige of the %eague 9ight be i9,eriled if it were ad9itted, in the absence of an e),ress ,rovision to that effect, that decisions on i9,ortant Luestions could be ta$en by a 9aGority! Moreover, it is hardly conceivable that resolutions on Luestions affecting the ,eace of the world could be ado,ted against the will of those a9ongst the Me9bers of the (ouncil who, although in a 9inority, would, by reason of their ,olitical ,osition, have to bear the larger share of the res,onsibilities and conseLuences ensuing therefro9!J @P! (! ! +! Series B, "o! .=, ,! =/!A 1 &or the te)t, see ,age 04/, note 2!

relationshi, but the ,er9anent 9e9bershi, of the great ,owers in the (ouncil! By virtue of this ,er9anent 9e9bershi,, in conGunction with the rule of unani9ity, the great ,owers could be sure that the (ouncil could 9a$e no decisions without the consent of all of the9! &urther9ore, the distribution of voting strength in an international agency never tells the whole story! "o great ,ower will ever be alone in voting in favor of or against a certain 9easure if it does not want to be alone, nor need any grou, of great ,owers ever run the ris$ of being outvoted if it is an)ious not to be in the 9inority on a ,articular Luestion! Most s9all and 9ediu9 ,owers de,end econo9ically, 9ilitarily, and ,olitically u,on the su,,ort of a great ,ower! Such a nation will hardly cast its vote against a great ,ower that has inti9ated that the s9aller nation is e),ected to heed its advice! Thus every great ,ower controlled a nu9ber of votes of the s9all and 9ediu9 9e9bers of the %eague! ;n any i9,ortant issue &rance could be certain of the votes of Belgiu9, (Hechoslova$ia, #ugoslavia, Ru9ania, and C for 9ore than a decade C Poland! Great Britain could count u,on the votes of the do9inions, the Scandinavian countries, and Portugal! This controlling influence of the great ,owers, regardless of the legal structure of the organiHation, o,erated in the %eague of "ations side by side with the brilliant intellectual leadershi, of the re,resentatives of a nu9ber of s9all and 9ediu9 nations! These re,resentatives e)erted an influence u,on the wor$ of the %eague of "ations out of all ,ro,ortion to, and irres,ective of, the ,ower of their ,articular countries! The scene of that leadershi, was ,ri9arily the 'sse9bly! The 'sse9bly of the %eague of "ations, in contrast to the General 'sse9bly of the :nited "ations, had the authority to render binding decisions not only with regard to routine 9atters or Luestions of secondary i9,ortance, but also concerning ,olitical ,roble9s, such as ,eace-,reserving 9easures!2 To that e)tent the 'sse9bly of the %eague of "ations ,layed the role of a real ,arlia9ent where leadershi, fell 9any ti9es to the best Lualified re,resentative, regardless of the ,ower and so9eti9es even of the interests of his country! But that leadershi, sto,,ed at the line where the vital interests of the great ,owers began! n the great crises of the %eague the leadershi, of the great ,owers asserted itself! 8hen in a conflict of first-rate ,olitical i9,ortance, such as the talo - Ethio,ian 8ar or the S,anish (ivil 8ar, the attitude of so9e of the s9all and great ,owers diverged, the ,olicies of the great ,owers were bound to win! &or the ,re,onderance of the great ,owers on the international scene is a fact, as the ,re,onderance of great econo9ic organiHations is a fact, in do9estic society! "o legal arrange9ent nor organiHational device, short of destroying that ,re,onderance of ,ower itself, can undo the ,olitical conseLuences of that dis,arity of ,ower! Thus in the %eague the s9all nations enGoyed a greater o,,ortunity for influence and inde,endent action than they ever did before or since in 9odern ti9es! #et the international govern9ent of the %eague of "ations, at least in the s,here of high ,olitics, was a govern9ent of the great ,owers! %ua" Meaning o! the Status 1uo0 :ran$e 8s. Great &ritain 8hat were the ,rinci,les of Gustice which the international govern9ent of the %eague of "ations was to realiHeF That Luestion has found a sy9bolic answer in the fact that the twenty-si) articles of the (onvenant of the %eague of "ations are identical with the first twenty-si) articles of the ,eace treaties that settled the issues of the &irst 8orld 8ar! The inti9ate connection between the %eague of "ations and the status Luo of ././ was thus 9ade obvious fro9 the very outset! The ,rovisions of the (ovenant ,ut that connection in e),licit legal ter9s! The Prea9ble refers to Jinternational law as the actual rule of conduct a9ong govern9entsJ and to Ja scru,ulous res,ect for all treaty obligations!J 'rticle .4 9a$es the %eague of "ations the defender of the territorial status Luo of ././ by establishing the legal obligation of the 9e9bers Jto res,ect and ,reserve as against e)ternal aggression the territorial integrity and e)isting inde,endence of all 9e9bers of the %eague!J 'll ,rovisions of the subseLuent articles concerning the settle9ent of dis,utes and its enforce9ent 9ust be read in the light of this ,rovision of 'rticle .4! This ,rovision lays down the standard by which the agencies of the %eague were to be guided in evaluating the clai9s and actions of nations and in devising 9ethods to 9eet a threat to the ,eace! t is true that the fra9ers of the (ovenant tried to relieve the %eague fro9 the stig9a of being co9,letely identified with the status Luo of ././! To that end, they ,rovided in 'rticle ./ for ,eaceful change! 8e have already ,ointed to the intrinsic wea$ness of that ,rovision, which re9ained a dead letter fro9 the beginning! But aside fro9 its intrinsic defects, 'rticle ./ ,ales into insignificance if seen in its or,hanli$e isolation within the structure of the (ovenant and if co9,ared with the organic connection in which 'rticle .4 stands to the ,eace treaties of ././, on the one hand, and to the ,eace-,reserving and law-enforcing ,rovisions of 'rticles .. - .3 of the (ovenant, on the other! 'rticle ./, then, was little 9ore than a verbal concession to the undeniable fact of change! ts funda9ental law no less than its origin, identical with the ,eace treaties of ././, 9ade it inevitable that the %eague as a wor$ing organiHation of international govern9ent should Gudge and act as the defender of the status Luo! Two ,rinci,les were at the foundation of the status Luo of ././B the ,er9anent inability of Ger9any to wage war, and the ,rinci,le of national self - deter9ination! #et, fro9 the very outset, the two nations 9ainly res,onsible for the
2

See 'rticle 0, ,aragra,h 0, of the (ovenantB JThe 'sse9bly 9ay deal at its 9eetings with any 9atter within the s,here of action of the %eague or affecting the ,eace of the world!J See also 'rticle .5, ,aragra,hs /, .4B JThe (ouncil 9ay in any case under this 'rticle refer the dis,ute to the 'sse9bly! The dis,ute shall be so referred at the reLuest of either ,arty to the dis,ute ,rovided that such reLuest be 9ade within fourteen days after the sub9ission of the dis,ute to the (ouncil! J n any case referred to the 'sse9bly, all the ,rovisions of this 'rticle and of 'rticle .= relating to the action and ,owers of the (ouncil shall a,,ly to the action and ,owers of the 'sse9bly, ,rovided that a re,ort 9ade by the 'sse9bly, if concurred in by the Re,resentatives of those 9e9bers of the %eague re,resented on the (ouncil and of a 9aGority of the other 9e9bers of the %eague, ! ! ! shall have the sa9e force as a re,ort by the (ouncil concurred in by all the Me9bers thereof! !!!J

,olicies of the %eague, Great Britain and &rance, inter,reted these two ,rinci,les in distinctly different ways and tried to sha,e the ,olicies of the %eague according to these different inter,retations! &or &rance, Ger9anyIs ,er9anent inability to wage war was synony9ous with the ,er9anent ,re,onderance of &rance on the continent of Euro,e! &or Great Britain, Ger9anyIs ,er9anent inability to wage war was not inco9,atible with the co9ebac$ of Ger9any as a great ,ower within controlled li9its so that at least the se9blance of a balance of ,ower would again e)ist on the continent of Euro,e! &rance loo$ed to the %eague of "ations ,ri9arily as a $ind of collective sheriff that would add its strength to the 9ilitary 9ight of &rance for the defense of the status Luo of ././! Great Britain considered the %eague of "ations ,ri9arily a $ind of clearinghouse where the states9en of the world would 9eet to discuss their co99on ,roble9s and see$ agree9ent by way of co9,ro9ise! &inally, &rance used the ,rinci,le of national self-deter9ination as a ,olitical wea,on with which to strengthen its allies in Eastern Euro,e against Ger9any! Great Britain saw in it a ,rinci,le ca,able of universal a,,lication, at least on the Euro,ean continent, which one 9ight well use to strengthen Ger9any at the e),ense of the allies of &rance! 't the botto9 of these divergent inter,retations of standards of Gustice and of ,olitical ,rinci,les we find again the basic ,attern of international ,olitics! &rance subordinated all its ,olicies as one of the leading 9e9bers of the international govern9ent of the %eague of "ations to its overriding desire to 9aintain the status Luo of ././! This status Luo was identical with &ranceIs hege9ony on the Euro,ean continent! Great Britain thought it could regain the controlling influence it had e)erted over the affairs of Euro,e during the nineteenth century! To that end, it tried to restore the ,ower configuration that had e)isted during that ,eriodB a balance of ,ower on the Euro,ean continent with Great Britain as its Jholder!J Thus its ,olicies as the other leading 9e9ber of the international govern9ent of the %eague were all directed toward under9ining the status Luo of ././ C within 9anageable li9its which Great Britain thought it could deter9ine at will! This goal of British foreign ,olicy could only be attained by wea$ening &rance! This conflict between the British and &rench conce,tions and ,olicies did not, however, wrec$ the %eague of "ations, as the conflict between Great Britain and Russia had the Holy 'lliance! t rather led to a cree,ing ,aralysis in the ,olitical activities of the %eague and to its inability to ta$e deter9ined action against threats to international order and ,eace! t cul9inated in the triu9,h of the British over the &rench conce,tion! The distribution of ,ower between Great Britain and &rance was in the 9ain res,onsible for this develo,9ent! The 9argin of &rench su,eriority started to shrin$ in the 9id-twenties in ,ro,ortion to the growth of Ger9an strength, first slowly and i9,erce,tibly, and then C following HitlerIs ascent to ,ower C with ever - increasing s,eed! n ././, &rance sought the se,aration of the left ban$ of the Rhine fro9 Ger9any and treaties of alliance with Great Britain and the :nited States! &rance received neither! t was able to 9a$e only two additions to its own 9ilitary strength which barely concealed its intrinsic wea$ness in co9,arison with the ,otentialities of Ger9an ,ower! ;ne addition was the alliances with Poland, (Hechoslova$ia, and Ru9ania, and the treaty of friendshi, with #ugoslavia! These allies, however, were at best 9ediu9 states! So9e, if not all of the9, were 9ilitarily overrated and could not be relied u,on to act always in unison! The other addition was the %ocarno Treaties of ./=5, ,utting the &ranco-Ger9an frontier under the Goint guarantee of Great Britain and taly! #et &rance was unable to obtain a si9ilar guarantee for the Ger9an-Polish frontier, nor was it able to gain British su,,ort for an auto9atic syste9 of collective security which would have closed certain loo,holes left o,en by the (ovenant of the %eague of "ations!/ :nder such conditions of hege9onial ,ower in the short run and incurable wea$ness in the long run, &rance started in the 9id-twenties to follow the British lead in its ,olicies within the %eague of "ations, at first hesitatingly, and in the thirties without alternative!.4 &or by then, due to its own indecision and now a,,arent wea$ness, &rance was no longer able to see$ on its own account the i9,le9entation of those ,rovisions of the (ovenant through which the %eague could have ,layed the role of an international govern9ent for the 9aintenance of international order and the ,revention of war! &rance by itself did not have the ,ower to 9a$e the %eague ,lay that role! Great Britain had no interest in 9a$ing the %eague ,lay it! &or the ,erfor9ance of that role would have 9eant the ,er,etuation of unchallenged &rench su,re9acy on the Euro,ean continent C a su,re9acy that Great Britain was resolved to bring to an end! Thus the British conce,tions and ,olicies ,ut their i9,rint u,on the govern9ental activities of the %eague of "ations! Three WeaEnesses o! the League o! Nations This is not to say that the %eague of "ations did not e)ercise i9,ortant govern9ental functions! The %eague of "ations governed two territoriesB the Saar Basin and the (ity of *anHig! t governed indirectly C according to the te)t of 'rticle == of the (ovenant C rather than in actuality the 9andated territories!.. #et, when it ca9e to the 9aintenance
/

See ,ages 0.6-0.3! This trend was interru,ted only for a short while in ./06 when &rench &oreign Minister Barthou ,re,ared the ground for a 9ilitary alliance with the Soviet :nion, which, however, none of his successors dared to i9,le9ent! The foreign ,olicy of %aval in that ,eriod, while strongly anti-British in intent and favoring an understanding with the ')is ,owers, was identical with that of Great Britain in under9ining the status Luo of ././! .. (f! the following ,rovisions of 'rticle ==B JTo those colonies and territories which as a conseLuence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which for9erly governed the9 and which are inhabited by ,eo,les not yet able to stand by the9selves under the strenuous conditions of the 9odern world, there should be a,,lied the ,rinci,le that the well-being and develo,9ent of such ,eo,les for9 a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the ,erfor9ance of this trust should be e9bodied in this (ovenant!
.4

of international order and the ,reservation or restoration of ,eace, it governed only in the rare instances when either the interests of the great ,owers a9ong its 9e9bers were not affected or the co99on interests of the 9ost influential a9ong the9 see9ed to reLuire it! The %eague of "ations did not act as an international govern9ent when in ./=4 Poland seiHed Eilna, the old %ithuanian ca,ital> for that violation of international law was co99itted by the strongest ally of &rance, and the intervention of the %eague was o,,osed by the Soviet :nion! But in ./=5, inci,ient war between Bulgaria and Greece was easily sto,,ed by the President of the (ouncil of the %eague, who sent a telegra9 to the ,arties de9anding i99ediate cessation of hostilities! He was actively su,,orted by &rance and Great Britain, who acted on this occasion in unison and used their influence in ,articular to deter Greece fro9 offensive action! The %eague of "ations refused to act when in ./=0 taly occu,ied the Gree$ island of (orfu! t did nothing even a,,roaching the nature of enforce9ent action after +a,an invaded Manchuria in ./0., and after it invaded (hina ,ro,er in ./01! The %eague did nothing to ,revent or sto, the (haco 8ar between Bolivia and Paraguay in ./0=-05, e)ce,t to reco99end an ar9s e9bargo! &ro9 ./05 on, the %eague did nothing effective to 9aintain its authority within the territory of *anHig, and it did nothing in the face of the continuous violations of the Treaty of Eersailles by Ger9any! 8hat the %eague did in ./05 - 03 with res,ect to talyIs attac$ u,on Ethio,ia could not, as we have seen, .= have been different had it been calculated to be ineffective! &ro9 ./03 - 0/, the %eague did nothing to control the international effects of the S,anish (ivil 8ar! n *ece9ber ./0/, however, the %eague e),elled the Soviet :nion because of its attac$ against &inland! t was the last and C aside fro9 the sanctions against taly C the 9ost drastic of the %eagueIs ,olitical actions! The %eague of "ations ,revented no 9aGor war, and it was ineffective in 9aintaining international order! The reasons for this failure, aside fro9 the ,revalence of the British conce,tion over the &rench, are threefoldB constitutional, structural, and ,olitical! Constitutiona" WeaEness The (ovenant of the %eague of "ations did not outlaw war as such! The 9e9bers of the %eague were not allowed to go to war under certain conditions! By the sa9e to$en, they were allowed to go to war in the absence of those conditions! Thus the Prea9ble to the (ovenant sti,ulated Jthe acce,tance of obligations.0 not to resort to war!J 'rticle .= ,rovided that the 9e9bers should not Jresort to war until three 9onths after the award by the arbitrators! ! ! !J By virtue of 'rticle .0, ,aragra,h 6, the 9e9bers agreed Jthat they will not resort to war against a 9e9ber of the %eague which co9,liesJ with the Gudicial decision of a dis,ute! &inally, according to 'rticle .5, ,aragra,h 3, J f a re,ort by the (ouncil is unani9ously agreed to by the 9e9bers thereof other than the Re,resentatives of one or 9ore of the ,arties to the dis,ute, the Me9bers of the %eague agree that they will not go to war with any ,arty to the dis,ute which co9,lies with the reco99endations of the re,ort!J ;nly the two latter ,rovisions contain an outright ,rohibition to go to war! 's +ean Ray ,ut itB J8e are convinced that this ti9idity of the authors of the (ovenant has serious conseLuences and ,uts in Geo,ardy the new syste9 which they tried to erect! 's a 9atter of fact, since the contrary o,inion was not clearly e),ressed, it re9ained tacitly ad9itted that war is a solution, the nor9al solution, of international conflicts! These obligations, as a 9atter of law, are ,resented only as e)ce,tions> the i9,licit rule is the recourse to war!J .6 Even if the 9e9bers had lived u, to the ,rovisions of the (ovenant, they would have found in the funda9ental law of the %eague an instru9ent for the ,revention of so9e wars and for the legaliHation of others! Stru$tura" WeaEness This constitutional wea$ness, however, did not affect the actual o,erations of the %eague, for the %eague did not live u, to its constitution! ;n the other hand, the structural wea$ness of the %eague had a direct bearing u,on its failure to ,revent the wars that occurred under its Gurisdiction! That wea$ness consisted in the contrast between the distribution of ,ower within it and the distribution of ,ower in the world at large! The structure of the %eague was ,redo9inantly Euro,ean in a ,eriod when the 9ain factors of international ,olitics were no longer ,redo9inantly Euro,ean! Both great ,owers that in turn do9inated it, &rance and Great Britain, were Euro,ean ,owers! The only non-Euro,ean great ,ower that was a 9e9ber of the %eague was +a,an! ;f the two nations that in the twenties were already ,otentially the two 9ost ,owerful nations on earth, the :nited States was never a 9e9ber, and the Soviet :nion only during the %eagueIs declining years, fro9 ./06 to ./0/!
JThe best 9ethod of giving ,ractical effect to this ,rinci,le is that the tutelage of such ,eo,les should be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their e),erience or their geogra,hical ,osition, can best underta$e this res,onsibility, and who are willing to acce,t it, and that this tutelage should be e)ercised by the9 as Mandatories on behalf of the %eague! ! ! ! J n every case of 9andate, the Mandatory shall render to the (ouncil an annual re,ort in reference to the territory co99itted to its charge! JThe degree of authority, control or ad9inistration to be e)ercised by the Mandatory shall, if not ,reviously agreed u,on by the Me9bers of the %eague, be e),licitly defined in each case by the (ouncil! J' ,er9anent (o99ission shall be constituted to receive and e)a9ine the annual re,orts of the Mandatories and to advise the (ouncil on all 9atters relating to the observance of the 9andates!J .= See ,ages =/=-=/6! .0 n contradistinction to Jthe obligation!J The &rench te)tB @Jcertaines obligationsJA is 9ore e9,hatic on that score! .6 (o99entaire du Pacte de la Societe des "ations @ParisB Sirey, ./04A, ,,! 10 C 6!

t is, of course, true that of the thirty-one original 9e9bers, only ten were Euro,ean and of the thirteen nations that Goined it later, only seven! But here again nu9bers do not tell the story! 'n international organiHation whose 9ain ,ur,ose is the 9aintenance of international order and ,eace does not need to be universal in the sense that all nations of the world belong to it! t 9ust, however, be universal in the sense that all ,owerful nations, which are 9ost li$ely to disturb the ,eace of the world, are under its Gurisdiction! 'rticle .1 of the (ovenant, therefore, atte9,ted to 9a$e the Gurisdiction of the %eague universal regardless of 9e9bershi,! t gave the %eague authority in case of a dis,ute between two states, one or both of which were not 9e9bers of the %eague, to invite the non9e9bers Jto acce,t the obligations of 9e9bershi, in the %eague for the ,ur,oses of such dis,utes, u,on such conditions as the (ouncil 9ay dee9 Gust! !!! f a state so invited shall refuse to acce,t the obligations of 9e9bershi, and shall resort to war against a 9e9ber of the %eague,J the sanctions of 'rticle .3 shall be a,,licable against such a state! J f both ,arties to the dis,ute ! ! ! refuse to acce,t the obligations of 9e9bershi, ! ! ! the (ouncil 9ay ta$e such 9easures, and 9a$e reco99endations as will ,revent hostilities and will result in the settle9ent of the dis,ute!J This last ,aragra,h of 'rticle .1 endeavored to 9a$e the %eague of "ations a world govern9ent for the ,ur,ose of ,reserving ,eace! The feasibility of such a govern9ent 9ust again de,end u,on the distribution of ,ower between the 9e9bers of the %eague acting in unison and those states over which the govern9ental functions are to be e)ercised! The %eague would have had no difficulty in 9a$ing its will ,revail over two s9all or 9ediu9 states! %et us su,,ose, however, that a dis,ute had bro$en out between a 9e9ber of the %eague, on the one hand, and the :nited States or the Soviet! :nion or both, on the other> or between the two latter ,owers any ti9e between ././ and ./06, when neither country was a 9e9ber of the %eague! :nder such circu9stances, the atte9,t to i9,ose the %eagueIs will u,on the :nited States or the Soviet :nion or both would have a9ounted to a world war between the 9e9bers of the %eague and either one or two of the ,otentially 9ost ,owerful nations on earth, with a nu9ber of non9e9ber nations either Goining the latter or re9aining neutral! The atte9,t to ,reserve ,eace on a universal scale would have led to war on a universal scale! Thus the 9e9bershi, of so9e great ,owers and the non9e9bershi, of other great ,owers rendered the %eague ,owerless to ,reserve ,eace on a world - wide scale! This lac$ of universality in the 9e9bershi, of the great ,owers also indicates the funda9ental reason for the failure of British and &rench ,olicies in the ,eriod between the two world wars! The ,olicies of both countries were anachronistic! The ,olicies of &rance 9ight ,erha,s have succeeded in the age of %ouis D E! Then the 9ain weights of the balance of ,ower were located in (entral and 8estern Euro,e, and such a ,re,onderence as &rance gained in ././ would have given it a real chance to establish its ,er9anent hege9ony over the continent! #et after Russia had beco9e one of the 9ain factors in the balance of ,ower, "a,oleon had to learn that a hege9ony over the Euro,ean continent 9eant little, with the resources of Eastern Euro,e and of the better ,art of 'sia either unco99itted or hostile! This lesson was heeded by the brilliant &rench di,lo9atists who in the two decades ,receding the &irst 8orld 8ar founded &rench foreign ,olicy u,on close ties with Russia! Their successors in the ,eriod between the two world wars based their ho,es u,on a syste9 of alliances with the bal$aniHed countries of Eastern and Southeastern Euro,e, a ,oor substitute for the Jgrand allianceJ with Russia! ;bsessed with the fear of revolution, very 9uch li$e the &rench aristocrats in the years after .12/, they were ready to co99it national suicide rather than yield to the logic of a new international configuration! British foreign ,olicy in that ,eriod was as anachronistic as the &rench! Great Britain was intrinsically as wea$ with regard to the continent of Euro,e as &rance was with regard to Ger9any! The role that Russia ,layed in relation to &rance was si9ilar to the one the :nited States and, to a 9uch lesser degree, +a,an ,layed in relation to Great Britain! ' ,olicy that was still successful in the age of *israeli was doo9ed to failure in the age of Stanley Baldwin! Throughout the nineteenth century, Great BritainIs bac$ yard, as it were, had been secure> the British navy controlled the seas without challenge! n the thirties, other great naval ,owers had arisen, one of the9 ,otentially the 9ost ,owerful nation on earth! &urther9ore, the air,lane brought the British sles closer to the continent than ever before! Such conditions allowed British foreign ,olicy but two alternatives! t could ,lace its weight ,er9anently in that scale of the Euro,ean balance of ,ower where British interests in the long run see9ed to be 9ost secure! ;r it could 9a$e itself the s,earhead of '9erican ,olicy in Euro,e!.5 8hat British ,olicy could not do was to continue the ,olicy of Js,lendid isolation!J 'nd this is what it did! t will re9ain forever a 9oot Luestion whether or not &rance and Great Britain had any real choice in the face of the ,olicies actually ,ursued by the Soviet :nion and the :nited States! t is, however, beyond doubt that an international govern9ent never had a chance whose leading 9e9bers, either by choice or by necessity, followed ,olicies so co9,letely at odds with the actual distribution of ,ower in the world! Po"iti$a" WeaEness This would have been true even on the assu9,tion that the %eague of "ations had been able to act as a unit in the face of a threatening war of 9aGor ,ro,ortions! 'ctually this assu9,tion was never realiHed! *ivergent national interests ,ursued by the great ,owers ,revailed over the ,rinci,les of Gustice defined by the %eague of "ations in ter9s of the status Luo! n ./=., i99ediately alter the &irst 8orld 8ar, the lour ,er9anent 9e9bers of the (ouncil of the %eague were still able to act in unison with res,ect to relatively i9,ortant ,olitical issues, such as the fortification of
.5

t is worthy of note that since the end of the Second 8orld 8ar Great Britain has ,ursued these two foreign ,olicies si9ultaneously! !

the 'aland slands involving &inland and Sweden and the ,artition of :,,er Silesia, which was a bone of contention between Ger9any and Poland! 'fter these ,ro9ising beginnings, it was not only the conflict between &rance and Great Britain that inca,acitated the %eague for collective action on 9atters of 9aGor i9,ortance, but the se,arate and generally antagonistic ,olicies of the great ,owers! 8hen Ger9any Goined the %eague in ./=5, it ,ursued a ,olicy of under9ining the status Luo of Eersailles, 9ainly using the ,rinci,le of national self-deter9ination as the dyna9ite with which to crac$ the foundations of the territorial status Luo! This ,olicy was at odds with the ,olicies of &rance and its Eastern allies and was ai9ed, first surre,titiously and later o,enly, at the ter9ination of their ,re,onderance on the continent of Euro,e! n addition to the ,rinci,le of national self-deter9ination, Ger9any used the dual fear of bolshevist revolution and Russian i9,erialis9, which obsessed the 8estern ,owers, as a wea,on with which to strengthen its own ,osition! 8hile alternately offering itself as a bulwar$ against bolshevis9 and threatening to ally itself with the Soviet :nion, Ger9any was able to wring concessions fro9 the 8estern ,owers, to isolate Poland fro9 &rance, and to ,aralyHe the %eague! taly, on its ,art, ,ursued in the twenties a ,olicy so9ewhat si9ilar to the one ,ursued by Great Britain! taly welco9ed the co9ebac$ of Ger9any within certain li9its as a 9eans to wea$en &rance and its Eastern allies, es,ecially #ugoslavia! 8hen in the thirties the i9,otence of the %eague had beco9e obvious, taly used Ger9any as Ger9any was using the Soviet :nion, alternately as co99on 9enace and as a silent ,artner, and 9ade an o,en bid against Great Britain and &rance for do9ination of the Mediterranean! The Soviet :nion was as isolated within the %eague as it had been without! ts ,otential strength as a nation and its s,onsorshi, of world revolution 9ade it a dual 9enance to the 8estern ,owers! t ,roved to be i9,ossible for &rance, Great Britain, and the Soviet :nion to unite for co99on action in any of the great crises fro9 ./06 to ./0/, with the e)ce,tion of the sanctions against taly! n all those crises the 8estern ,owers and the Soviet :nion found the9selves in o,,osite ca9,s! Even when in ./0/ Ger9any threatened both the Soviet :nion and the 8estern ,owers with war, they were unable to agree u,on co99on ,reventive action! nstead, each side tried to deflect the threatening stro$e of lightning to the other side! t was only HitlerIs folly in waging war against both at the sa9e ti9e that 9ade the9 allies des,ite the9selves! &inally, +a,an, s9arting under the inferiority which the treaties of ./== had i9,osed u,on it, ,re,ared for the 9o9ent when it could establish its own hege9ony in the &ar East! +a,an could do so only by dislodging Great Britain and the :nited States fro9 their ,ositions in the &ar East and by Jclosing the doorJ to (hina which, as a 9atter of traditional ,olicy, Great Britain and the :nited States had insisted u,on $ee,ing o,en for all nations! Thus, when +a,an too$ the first ste, toward establishing its &ar Eastern e9,ire by invading Manchuria in ./0., it could not hel, co9ing into conflict with &rance and Great Britain, the leading 9e9bers of the %eague of "ations! t is not without ironic significance that +a,an, in establishing its do9inion, 9ade use of the sa9e ,rinci,le of national self-deter9ination which had carried &rance and Great Britain to do9inance in the %eague! "ow it was e9,loyed to rally the colored races of the &ar East against the colonialis9 of the leaders of the %eague! #et neither while +a,an re9ained a 9e9ber of the %eague nor after its resignation in ./0= did Great Britain feel strong enough to lead the %eague in effective collective action in order to sto, +a,anIs attac$ against (hina! The ability of the %eague of "ations to ,revent war was ,redicated u,on the unity of its 9e9bers, and es,ecially of the great ,owers! By virtue of the ,rinci,le of unani9ity, any 9e9ber of the %eague, e)ce,t ,arties to a dis,ute, could veto a decision by voting against a 9otion to ta$e action! Given the antagonistic ,olicies ,ursued by the leading 9e9bers of the %eague, the very li$elihood of a veto i9,eded even atte9,ts at decisive collective action! ;nly an overriding ,rinci,le of Gustice could have 9ade such action ,ossible! 's we have seen, such ,rinci,les of Gustice did e)ist in the abstract as collective defense of the status Luo against the nations vanLuished in the &irst 8orld 8ar and as national self-deter9ination! (onfronted with a ,olitical situation de9anding concrete action, these abstract ,rinci,les transfor9ed the9selves into ideological Gustifications for the se,arate ,olicies ,ursued by the individual nations! Thus these abstract ,rinci,les of Gustice, far fro9 ,roviding co99on standards of Gudg9ent and guides for co99on action, actually strengthened international anarchy by strengthening the antagonistic ,olicies of individual nations! The inability of the %eague of "ations to 9aintain international order and ,eace, then, was the inevitable result of the ascendancy that the ethics and ,olicies of sovereign nations were able to 9aintain over the 9oral and ,olitical obGectives of the international govern9ent of the %eague of "ations! ,* BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB International )o7ern ent! The United Nations

n order to understand the constitutional functions and actual o,erations of the :nited "ations, it is necessary to distinguish shar,ly between the constitutional ,rovisions of the (harter and the 9anner in which the agencies of the :nited "ations, under the ,ressure of unforeseen ,olitical circu9stances, have actually ,erfor9ed their functions under

the (harter! The govern9ent of the :nited "ations, li$e the govern9ent of the :nited States, can be understood only by confronting the ,rovisions of the constitution with the realities of ,olitical ,ractice! Such a se,arate analysis of constitutional @unction and actual ,erfor9ance ,oints u, a series of significant transfor9ations not only in the ,articular ,olitical functions ,erfor9ed by the agencies of the :nited "ations, but in the very character of the :nited "ations as an international organiHation! THE UNITE. NATION' ACCOR.IN) TO THE CHARTER Go8ernment b Superpo-ers n its constitutional organiHation the :nited "ations rese9bles the %eague of "ations! t, too, has three ,olitical agenciesB the General 'sse9bly co9,osed of all 9e9bers of the :nited "ations, the Security (ouncil as the ,olitical e)ecutive of the organiHation, and the Secretariat! The distribution of functions between the General 'sse9bly and the Security (ouncil, however, differs distinctly fro9 that between the (ouncil and the 'sse9bly of the %eague of "ations! The tendency toward govern9ent by the great ,owers, which was already un9ista$able in the %eague of "ations, co9,letely do9inates the distribution of functions in the :nited "ations! This tendency 9anifests itself in three constitutional devices of the (harterB the inability of the General 'sse9bly to 9a$e decisions in ,olitical 9atters, the li9itation of the reLuire9ent of unani9ity to the ,er9anent 9e9bers of the Security (ouncil, and the right of ,arties to dis,utes to veto any enforce9ent 9easures against the9selves! The 'sse9bly of the %eague of "ations was, as we have seen, a real international ,arlia9ent, which could ta$e action in ,olitical 9atters alone or in co9,etition with the (ouncil of the %eague! The General 'sse9bly of the :nited "ations, according to 'rticles .4 - .6 of the (harter, has only the ,ower to 9a$e reco99endations in ,olitical 9atters either to the ,arties concerned or to the Security (ouncil! 8ith regard to the 9aintenance of international ,eace and security, it can debate, investigate, and reco99end, but it cannot act! Even those 9odest functions are Lualified by 'rticle .= of the (harter, which ,recludes the General 'sse9bly fro9 9a$ing even reco99endations on 9atters that are on the agenda of the Security (ouncil! Thus the concurrent Gurisdiction of a deciding (ouncil and a deciding 'sse9bly, which was a distinguishing feature of the %eague of "ations, is re,laced by the alternate Gurisdiction of a deciding Security (ouncil and a reco99ending General 'sse9bly, 8hen the Security (ouncil concerns itself with a 9atter, the General 'sse9bly 9ay still debate, but it can no longer even reco99end! This device enables the Security (ouncil to control indirectly the functions of the General 'sse9bly in 9atters of ,olitical i9,ortance! By si9,ly ,utting a 9atter on its agenda, the Security (ouncil can transfor9 the General 'sse9bly into a debating society without even the right to e),ress its collective o,inion on the 9atter! This li9itation of the functions of the General 'sse9bly has endowed the :nited "ations with a s,lit ,ersonality! The General 'sse9bly 9ay with two-thirds 9aGority reco99end to the Security (ouncil a solution of an international ,roble9 which the Security (ouncil 9ay disregard at its discretion! This discretion of the Security (ouncil would be no serious 9atter if the General 'sse9bly were an advisory body of li9ited 9e9bershi, and not the re,resentative body of virtually all the nations of the world! 's it is, the distribution of functions between the Security (ouncil and the General 'sse9bly is a constitutional 9onstrosity! The :nited "ations 9ay s,ea$ with res,ect to the sa9e issue with two voices C the General 'sse9blyIs and the Security (ouncilIs C and between these two voices there is no organic connection! Two-thirds or 9ore of the total 9e9bershi, of the :nited "ations 9ay reco99end one thing, and nine of the fifteen 9e9bers of the Security (ouncil 9ay disregard the reco99endation and decide so9ething else! The vice of this constitutional arrange9ent does not lie in the ,redo9inance of the great ,owers, which we found to e)ist in the Holy 'lliance and the %eague of "ations as well! The vice lies rather in the o,,ortunity for the General 'sse9bly to de9onstrate its i9,otence! The Holy 'lliance was fran$ly an international govern9ent of the great ,owers! The %eague of "ations was an international govern9ent of the great ,owers with the advice and consent of all 9e9ber nations, each of which, by virtue of the ,rinci,le of unani9ity and save for 'rticle .5, ,aragra,h .4, of the (ovenant, could sto, the international govern9ent fro9 acting! The :nited "ations is an international govern9ent of the great ,owers which rese9bles in its constitutional arrange9ents the Holy 'lliance and in its ,retense the %eague of "ations! t is the contrast between ,retense and constitutional actuality, between the de9ocratic e),ectations roused by the words of the (harter and the autocratic ,erfor9ance envisaged by the actual distribution of functions which characteriHes the constitutional ,rovisions of the :nited "ations! The international govern9ent of the :nited "ations, then, is identical with the international govern9ent of the Security (ouncil! The Security (ouncil a,,ears, as it were, as the Holy 'lliance of our ti9e! The ,redo9inance of the Security (ouncil having thus been established, the (harter ,roceeds to establish the ,redo9inance of the great ,owers within the Security (ouncil! &or in actuality it is the five ,er9anent 9e9bers that are su,,osed to ,erfor9 the govern9ental functions! 8e have seen that the ,rinci,le of unani9ity has been abrogated with res,ect to all decisions of the Security (ouncil and has been re,laced with regard to substantive decisions by the reLuire9ent of nine affir9ative votes in which the votes of the five ,er9anent 9e9bers 9ust be included! Given the ,re,onderant influence of so9e of the five ,er9anent 9e9bers @(hina, &rance, Great Britain, the Soviet :nion, the :nited StatesA, their unani9ous decision is e),ected to attract at least four 9ore votes of other 9e9bers of the Security (ouncil! The :nited "ations, then, is ,redicated u,on the continuing unity of the ,er9anent 9e9bers of the Security (ouncil! n the sche9e of the (harter, these five 9e9bers are, as it were, the nucleus of a world federation, a Holy

'lliance within a Holy 'lliance! By li9iting the ,rinci,le of unani9ity to the9, the (harter 9a$es the9 the international govern9ent of the :nited "ations! t follows that with but one ,er9anent 9e9ber dissenting there can be no international govern9ent of the :nited "ations! This great-,ower 9ono,oly of govern9ental action is still further enhanced by 'rticle =1, ,aragra,h 0, according to which a ,arty to a dis,ute is ,revented fro9 voting only with regard to the ,acific settle9ent of dis,utes under (ha,ter E of the (harter! n other words, the great-,ower veto a,,lies to the enforce9ent 9easures under (ha,ter E ! 8hen a great ,ower is a ,arty to a dis,ute, the Security (ouncil can render a decision by virtue of 'rticle =1, ,aragra,h 0, regardless of the attitude of that great ,ower! f the Security (ouncil should try to enforce that decision, the dissent of any of the great ,owers, although a ,arty to the dis,ute, would erect a legal barrier to enforce9ent action! n such a contingency the decision of the Security (ouncil would re9ain a dead letter! 'ctually, however, the international govern9ent of the :nited "ations is govern9ent of the great ,owers to a still greater degree than the foregoing analysis would indicate! ;f the five ,er9anent 9e9bers of the Security (ouncil only two, the :nited States and the Soviet :nion, are really great ,owers! Great Britain and &rance are 9ediu9 ,owers> (hina is only ,otentially a great ,ower! :nder ,resent conditions of world ,olitics, 9ost 9e9bers of the Security (ouncil, the ,er9anent 9e9bers included, can be ,revailed u,on, if need be, to su,,ort the ,osition ta$en by the :nited States, (hina, and the Soviet :nion! The international govern9ent of the :nited "ations, stri,,ed of its legal tri99ings, then, is really the international govern9ent of the :nited States, (hina, and the Soviet :nion acting in unison! 't best C if they are united C they can govern the rest of the world for the ,ur,ose of 9aintaining order and of ,reventing war! 't worst C if they are disunited C there will be no international govern9ent at all! deally the :nited "ations is an instru9ent for governing the world through the co9bined ,ower of the :nited States, (hina, and the Soviet :nion! The (harter of the :nited "ations, however, does not envisage the ,ossibility that the :nited "ations o,erate as an international govern9ent for the ,ur,ose of establishing or 9aintaining order in the relations a9ong the :nited States, (hina, and the Soviet :nion or of ,reventing war a9ong the9! The device of the veto e)cludes the ,ur,ose of subGecting the :nited States, (hina, and the Soviet :nion to an international govern9ent against their will! ;n(e!ine( Prin$ip"es o! Justi$e The standards of Gustice which shall guide the Gudg9ent and actions of the agencies of the :nited "ations are found in three ,lacesB in the Prea9ble, in (ha,ter . dealing with Pur,oses and Princi,les, and inters,ersed through the (harter! #et, in contrast to the basic ,rinci,les of the Holy 'lliance and of the %eague of "ations, the ,rinci,les of Gustice u,on which the :nited "ations is founded are beset by two $inds of inner contradictionsB one concerning the 9ode of actions to be ,erfor9ed by the :nited "ations, the other concerning the ,ur,oses for which the actions are to be ,erfor9ed! The Prea9ble reaffir9s Jfaith !!! in the eLual rights ! ! ! of nations large and s9all,J and 'rticle =, ,aragra,h ., declares that Jthe ;rganiHation is based on the ,rinci,le of sovereign eLuality of all its Me9bers!J That ,rinci,le is strengthened by 'rticle =, ,aragra,h 1, which e)e9,ts J9atters which are essentially within the do9estic Gurisdiction of any stateJ fro9 the Gurisdiction of the :nited "ations, e)ce,t in so far as enforce9ent 9easures under (ha,ter E are concerned! #et the whole structure of the :nited "ations, as laid out in the 9ain body of the (harter, is based u,on what one 9ight call ,arado)ically the Jsovereign ineLualityJ of its 9e9bers! 8e have already ,ointed to the fact that if the :nited "ations were to o,erate as ,rovided for in its (harter, all its 9e9bers who are not 9e9bers of the Security (ouncil would lose their sovereignty and would re9ain sovereign in na9e and for9 only! Thus the ,rinci,le of sovereign eLuality ,roclai9ed by the (harter in its introductory ,rovisions is contradicted by the actual distribution of functions which the (harter itself ,rovides! The Prea9ble and (ha,ter for9ulate five ,olitical ,ur,oses of actionB @.A 9aintenance of international ,eace and security, @=A collective security, @0A ,rohibition of the use of force Jagainst the territorial integrity or ,olitical inde,endence of any stateJ and reservation of its use for Jthe co99on interestJ as defined in the (harter, @6A 9aintenance of JGustice and res,ect for the obligations arising fro9 treaties and other sources of international law!J and @5A national self-deter9ination! ;f these five ,ur,oses, the first two are general and of an instru9ental nature! They tell us that whatever the :nited "ations does it should do ,eacefully and according to the ,rinci,le of collective security! The other three ,rinci,les are s,ecific and concrete! They tell us what the :nited "ations should or should not do in concrete situations! t should use force under certain conditions and not use it under others> it should act Gustly and in har9ony with the rules of international law and with the ,rinci,le of national self-deter9ination! t is significant that the (harter is 9ost e),licit in elaborating and i9,le9enting the first two ,ur,oses @ef! ,articularly (ha,ters E and E A and that it is virtually silent with regard to the re9aining three! 'rticle .., ,aragra,h ., and 'rticle =6, ,aragra,h =, refer the General 'sse9bly and the Security (ouncil in general ter9s to the Pur,oses and Princi,les as guides for their deliberations and actions! But the concrete 9eaning of such conce,ts as Gustice, res,ect for international +aw, and national self-deter9ination is not self-evident, nor is it the sa9e everywhere and at all ti9es! n the abstract, 9ost 9en 9ay be able to agree u,on a definition of those ter9s! t is the concrete ,olitical situation that gives these abstract ter9s a concrete 9eaning and enables the9 to guide the Gudg9ent and actions of 9en! "owhere in the 9ain body of the (harter is there a definition of, or reference to, a substantive ,rinci,le of Gustice! "or are there any other sources that would give uneLuivocal content to these abstractions!

THE UNITE. NATION' = POLITICAL REALIT3 ' shift in the distribution of voting strength resulted fro9 the fact that the 9assive increase in the 9e9bershi, of the :nited "ations ,ri9arily benefited nations belonging to the so-called 'fro-'sian bloc! The 'fro-'sian bloc co9,rises 9ore than one-third of the 9e9bershi, of the :nited "ations! Thus, if it were to vote in unison, it could either e)ercise a veto on any resolution adverse to its interests or else, by Goining either the '9erican or the Soviet bloc, beco9e the core of a wor$ing two-thirds 9aGority! n reality, however, the 'fro-'sian bloc has but rarely voted as a unit> its vote has ty,ically been s,lit, with so9e 9e9bers voting with the '9erican, others with the Soviet bloc, and a very considerable nu9ber abstaining! (onseLuently, as concerns the ability of the :nited "ations to function ,olitically through the General 'sse9bly, the 'fro-'sian bloc has thus far ,erfor9ed a negative function! By s,lintering its vote between the9, it has strengthened the ,ower of the '9erican and Soviet blocs to o,,ose the will of a si9,le 9aGority with the veto of 9ore than one-third of the 9e9bershi,! 's a result, the General 'sse9bly has found it difficult to ,ass resolutions calling for substantive ,olicies 9ore s,ecific than o,,osition to the re9nants of colonialis9 and racial discri9ination, invitations to warring ,arties to cease firing and negotiate a settle9ent, and authoriHations to the Secretary General to investigate, observe, re,ort, use his good offices, organiHe ,eace-$ee,ing forces, and do what he dee9s necessary to restore ,eace and order! Thus the difficulty of two-thirds of the General 'sse9bly to agree u,on s,ecific substantive ,olicies resulted in the ascendancy of the Secretary General to the te9,orary e9inence of chief e)ecutive officer of the :nited "ations! The (harter intends the Secretary General to be Jthe chief ad9inistrative officer of the organiHation!J He J9ay bring to the attention of the Security (ouncil any 9atter which in his o,inion 9ay threaten the 9aintenance of international ,eace and security!J 'nd he Jshall ,erfor9 such other functions as are entrusted to hi9 by @theA organsJ of the :nited "ations! t is fro9 this ,rovision of the (harter that the new functions of the Secretary General as the a,,arent chief ,olitical agent of the :nited "ations derive! The new functions are inti9ately related to the i9,otence of the General 'sse9bly, as the res,onsibility for action which the General 'sse9bly has ta$en on is inti9ately related to the i9,otence of the Security (ouncil! 'nd one can go one ste, further and say that the res,onsibility for the settle9ent of ,olitical issues with which the :nited "ations as a whole had been burdened is a by-,roduct of the inability of the nations directly concerned, es,ecially the great ,owers, to settle outstanding ,olitical issues a9ong the9selves! So they charge the :nited "ations with finding a settle9ent! The 9e9bers of the General 'sse9bly, ta$ing the ,lace of the ,aralyHed Security (ouncil, are no 9ore able to agree on a settle9ent collectively than they were when acting as individual nations! So they charged the Secretary General with finding a solution! Thus the Secretary General beca9e a $ind of Pri9e Minister of the :nited "ations! By virtue of delegations of ,ower, generally vague, by the Security (ouncil or the General 'sse9bly, his office too$ over ,olitical functions which the Security (ouncil and the General 'sse9bly the9selves should have ,erfor9ed but were unable to! This transfor9ation of the office owes 9uch to the initiative and s$ill of *ag Ha99ars$Gold, who was Secretary General fro9 ./50 to ./3.! He transfor9ed the :nited "ations, to use his own words, into Ja dyna9ic instru9ent of govern9ents!J He set out, to Luote hi9 again, to create a new e)ecutive res,onsibility so9ewhere !!!J and Jto hel, fill any vacuu9 that 9ay a,,ear in the syste9s which the (harter and traditional di,lo9acy ,rovide for the safeguarding of ,eace and security!J Ha99ars$Gold even went beyond inter,reting broadly the 9andate he had received fro9 the General 'sse9bly or the Security (ouncil and acted at ti9es without any 9andate at all and in the face of the e),licit o,,osition of a 9e9ber of the :nited "ations! Thus he established in ./5/ a :nited "ations ,resence in %aos even though the Soviet :nion had declared beforehand that it was o,,osed to his visit and s,ecifically to his leaving a :nited "ations re,resentative behind! Thus he decided in ./52 to enlarge the :nited "ations observer cor,s in %ebanon even though the Soviet :nion had already vetoed an '9erican ,ro,osal to enlarge it as well as a +a,anese ,ro,osal that he should be given a free hand! This enlarge9ent of the Secretary GeneralIs office into so9ething a,,roaching a su,ranational ,olitical agency was bound not only to evo$e the o,,osition of ,articular nations to ,articular 9easures ta$en by the Secretary General but also to ,ose in acute for9 the inner contradiction which has ,aralyHed all ,olitical international organiHationsB the contradiction between national sovereignty and the effectiveness of an international organiHation! The Soviet :nion consistently defended national sovereignty against encroach9ents by international treaties and organiHations and it consistently> o,,osed the stewardshi, of Ha99ars$Gold and his ,redecessor, Trygve %ie, as the e9bodi9ent of the su,ranational as,irations of the :nited "ations! 8hen (harles *eGaulle ca9e to ,ower in ./52, the Soviet :nion was Goined by &rance! The Soviet :nion tried to destroy the ,ower of the Secretary General through the so-called troi$a ,ro,osal which would have re,laced a single Secretary General with three officials of eLual ,ower acting in unison, one each re,resenting the unco99itted nations, the Soviet, and the 8estern blocs! Had this ,ro,osal succeeded, the office of the Secretary General would have been subGected to the veto and would have been ,aralyHed by it as the veto has ,aralyHed the Security (ouncil! 8hen it failed, both the Soviet :nion, &rance, and the nations su,,orting the9 found another instru9ent to halt and reverse the su,ranational trend of the :nited "ations! They found it in the issue of financial su,,ort for the ,eace-$ee,ing 9easures reco99ended by the General 'sse9bly! The defenders of national sovereignty and o,,onents of a strong :nited "ations won a definitive victory when in ./35 the General 'sse9bly decided to forgo the enforce9ent of 'rticle ./ of the (harter and to acce,t the ,rinci,le of voluntary contributions to ,eace-$ee,ing 9easures of the :nited "ations! This victory a9ounted to a veritable counterrevolution against the :nited "ations as it had develo,ed by virtue of the e)tra-constitutional develo,9ents

outlined above! This decision nullified these e)tra-constitutional develo,9ents of al9ost two decades! t returned the :nited "ations to the original intentions of the (harter! That 9eant in ,ractice that the Security (ouncil beca9e again the chief e)ecutive organ, still threatened with ,aralysis by the veto and by the e),ansion of its 9e9bershi, fro9 eleven to fifteen, that the General 'sse9bly was reduced essentially to a debating society debilitated by the 9assive influ) of 9ini-states whose collective voting strength is out of ,ro,ortion to their actual ,ower, and that the Secretary General was stri,,ed of the e)ecutive ,ower which the General 'sse9bly had bestowed u,on hi9! ;nly the future can tell whether there e)ist now sufficient co99unities of interest a9ong the ,er9anent 9e9bers of the Security (ouncil to allow it to o,erate according to the intentions of the (harter and whether there e)ists now a9ong the 9e9bers of the General 'sse9bly a sufficient awareness of their interest in a strong :nited "ations to restore to the General 'sse9bly the ,ower it once ,ossessed! The Gulf e),erience is no definitive answer! The decline of the ,owers of the Secretary General is the result not only of the o,,osition fro9 within the :nited "ations to which we have referred but also of the congenital wea$ness of his office! Parties to a ,olitical conflict can be induced by outsiders to agree on a ,eaceful settle9ent by four 9ethods e9,loyed alternately or si9ultaneouslyB they can be threatened with disadvantages e),ected to outweigh the advantages to be gained fro9 continuing the conflict> they can be ,ro9ised advantages greater than those to be e),ected fro9 seeing the conflict through to a successful conclusion> they can be ,ersuaded by rational argu9ents ,ointing to the advantages and disadvantages to be e),ected and to the intentions and ca,abilities of the other side and of interested third ,arties> they can be hel,ed in ta$ing the last s9all ste, toward the consu99ation of a settle9ent already achieved in substance through the elaboration of a face-saving and technically satisfactory for9ula! ;f these four devices, the first two tower in i9,ortance over the two others, which ,erfor9 essentially subsidiary functions! t is the 9easure of the wea$ness of the Secretary GeneralIs ,osition as a ,olitical agent that he is al9ost co9,letely de,rived of the two 9ost ,otent instru9ents of conciliation, threat and ,ro9ise, and li9ited to the use of rational ,ersuasion and for9ulation of agree9ents already substantially attained! The wea$ness of the General 'sse9bly, as ,resently co9,osed, then, is reflected in the wea$ness of the Secretary General! Both can tal$, e),lain, and for9ulate, but neither can at ,resent ,ut a hand on that lever of threats and ,ro9ises which is the very soul of ,olitical action! The te9,orary e9inence of the Secretary General was but a function of his ,ersonality and of the General 'sse9blyIs e9barrass9ent at being called u,on to act without being able to! 8hen Secretary General 7urt 8aldhei9 sought to free the hostages in ran, he was 9et first by hostility fro9 their ca,tors and thereafter by criticis9 fro9 '9ericans for his failure! 'nd a call to action addressed to the General 'sse9bly is in turn but the great ,owersI cry of des,air at being unable to settle a9ong the9selves issues which, as long as they re9ain unsettled, carry within the9selves the threat of war! Thus the actions of the Secretary General, li$e the resolutions of the General 'sse9bly, are not so 9uch harbingers of recovery, let alone a cure for the disease, as sy9,to9s of its intractability! #et they can also have the effect of sedatives for Gangled nerves and of 9edication which ,revents e)isting wounds fro9 o,ening still wider! This is indeed the contribution which the :nited "ations is at ,resent able to 9a$e to the ,eaceful settle9ent of international dis,utes! The General 'sse9bly is, at any rate for the ti9e being, in the ,osition in which the Security (ouncil found itself fro9 the very beginningB it is unable to act for the reason that the 9aGority reLuired by the (harter is lac$ing! #et, while the Security (ouncil was ,aralyHed fro9 the outset by the foreseeable and al9ost auto9atic use of the veto by the Soviet :nion, the ,aralysis of the General 'sse9bly has been the result of a dyna9ic ,rocess which can be bro$en down into three ,hasesB disintegration of the two - thirds 9aGority led by the :nited States, the vain atte9,t by the two su,er,owers to fashion a two-thirds 9aGority in su,,ort of their res,ective ,olicies, and the atte9,t by the two su,er,owers to 9ini9iHe the voting su,,ort of the other side, an action which :!"! '9bassador +eane 7ir$,atric$ in the Reagan ad9inistration described as ,ri9arily one of forestalling action by others! This continual search for votes, or at least abstentions, has beco9e one of the 9ain ,reoccu,ations of the great ,owers in the General 'sse9bly! ;ut of it, a new di,lo9atic ,rocedure has develo,ed, the significance of which is twofold! t forces the great ,owers to defer, at least in the for9ulation of their ,olicies, to the ,references of the s9all 9e9ber nations and thereby blunts the shar, edges of international conflict! t ,rovides the nations concerned with an o,,ortunity to shift the a,,arent res,onsibility for un,leasant decisions to the :nited "ations and thereby acts as a face-saving and shoc$-absorbing device! The e)ce,tions have been the tenures of '9bassadors 7ir$,atric$ and Moynihan, both of who9 chose to for9ulate and defend '9erican ,olicy in the :nited "ations in confrontational ter9s! Ne- Pro$e(ures The ,owerful nation which needs for the successful e)ecution of its ,olicies the su,,ort of s9all nations can follow one of two courses of action! t can resort to the traditional 9ethod of di,lo9acy and bring its su,erior ,ower directly to bear u,on the wea$er nations! n this way de,endencies are established and alliances are for9ed! However, a ,owerful nation which tries to gain su,,ort for its ,olicies through the :nited "ations General 'sse9bly cannot rely u,on its su,erior ,ower alone! Su,erior ,ower avails it nothing it it is unable to attract the nu9ber of votes sufficient for the ,ur,oses of its ,olicy! Thus it 9ust ,ursue a different course of action, which is deter9ined by the ,rocedures of the General 'sse9bly! These ,rocedures and the new :nited "ations di,lo9acy which has develo,ed fro9 the9 tend to di9inish the distinction between great and s9all nations, since all of the9 have but one vote! f a great ,ower had only the tas$ of fashioning an alliance with the techniLues of traditional di,lo9acy, it would

select the 9e9bers of that alliance ,ri9arily in view of the ,ower they could add to it! #et the tas$ of the new :nited "ations di,lo9acy is not so 9uch to build an alliance with a 9a)i9u9 of ,olitical and 9ilitary ,ower as to for9 a 9aGority with a 9a)i9u9 of voting strength! n the General 'sse9bly, ndiaIs vote counts for as 9uch as celandIs and KatarIs is as valuable as Great BritainIs! The 9ost ,owerful 9e9ber of an alliance can afford to disregard the ,references of s9all states whose ,ower counts for nothing, 9a$ing concessions only to those whose ,ower counts! The 9ost ,owerful 9e9ber of a 9aGority in the ,rocess of for9ation 9ust heed the wishes of even the wea$est nation whose vote is needed! &or this reason, so9e :!"! '9bassadors of the :nited States, including 'dlai Stevenson, (harles #ost, 8illia9 Scranton, and *onald McHenry, are best re9e9bered for their ,atient efforts in the corridors and cloa$ roo9s see$ing su,,ort for :!S! ,olicies '9bassador Tho9as Pic$ering distinguished hi9self in .//4 - /.! t stands to reason that the ,ower of the big nation is still felt, as is the wea$ness of the s9all one> for the for9er s,ea$s in the ,ersuasive voice of ,ower to which the latter can re,ly only in the whis,er of wea$ness! #et while ,ower and wea$ness still count in the new :nited "ations di,lo9acy, they do not count for as 9uch as they do in the traditional one! Here lies the i9,ortant distinction between the techniLues of traditional and :nited "ations di,lo9acyB the latter is co9,elled to ,ersuade where the for9er could afford not to care! Thus a great ,ower 9ust ,resent the issues to be voted on in ter9s acce,table to the 9e9bers whose votes are needed! This necessity involves a dual transfor9ation of the 9easure fro9 what it would be were it to serve e)clusively the ,ur,oses of the great ,ower! &irst of all, the 9easure 9ust be ,resented in language reflecting the co99on interests of the ,ros,ective 9e9bers of the two-thirds 9aGority rather than the interests of a ,articular nation or 9ore li9ited grou, of nations! This linguistic transfor9ation 9ay freLuently a9ount to no 9ore than the ideological Gustification and rationaliHation of national ,olicies in ter9s of su,ranational ones! #et the constant use of a certain ter9inology, not only for ,ur,oses of ,ro,aganda, but in the give and ta$e of ,olitical transactions, 9ay well e)ert a subtle influence u,on the substance of the transactions the9selves! &or the language constantly used will create in the ,artici,ants to the transaction e),ectations to which the transaction so9ehow 9ust confor9 or fro9 which, at the very least, it cannot co9,letely deviate! Thus a foreign ,olicy with which a certain nation or li9ited grou, of nations is co9,letely identified and for which the broad su,,ort of two-thirds of the General 'sse9bly is sought 9ay well undergo a subtle change if, for the ,ur,ose of gaining such broad su,,ort, it is constantly ,resented in su,ranational ter9s! Such a change would hardly ever go so far as to run counter to the obGectives and 9ethods envisaged by the original national ,olicy! #et it 9ay well result in the blunting of the shar, edges of a national ,olicy, its retreat fro9 an advanced ,osition, and its refor9ulation and ada,tation in the light of the su,ranational ,rinci,les e9bodied in the language of the resolution! The 9ore e),erienced :!"! di,lo9ats have gained recognition for their s$ill in drawing other nations to their side by tri99ing and adGusting their own ,olicies to accord with those of an e9erging 9aGority of states! The sa9e result will be directly and al9ost inevitably achieved in the course of the negotiations by which a twothirds 9aGority in su,,ort of the resolution is for9ed! The divergence of interests, ca,abilities, and ,oints of view a9ong the 9e9bers whose su,,ort is sought necessitates a search for a co99on deno9inator, which is bound to be below the 9a)i9u9 desired by the originator of the national ,olicy! How far below that 9a)i9u9 the 9easure enacted by the General 'sse9bly is going to be will de,end in ,art u,on the s$ill with which different nations 9a$e use of the new 9ethods of :nited "ations di,lo9acy! n large 9easure, however, the distribution of 9aterial ,ower between the nations see$ing su,,ort for a ,olicy and the nations whose su,,ort is sought will decide the e)tent to which the for9er 9ust give way in order to gain that su,,ort! &or the nations that can afford to do so will use their ,ower as a lever through which to gain concessions and avoid 9a$ing the9! t is here that old and new di,lo9acy 9erge! #et the :nited "ations ,resents two great induce9ents for 9a$ing concessions, at least in the for9ulation of ,oliciesB it is at ,resent ,owerless to act, and it s,ea$s with a voice which ,retends and a,,ears to be, and within certain li9its actually is, different fro9 that of the great ,owers! Thus nations in conflict with each other can afford to do vis-a-vis the :nited "ations what they thin$ they cannot afford to do in their relations with each other C 9a$e concessions in the for9ulation, if not the substance, of their ,olicies without fear of losing face! This is ,articularly so if the face-saving for9ula is ,ro,osed by a JneutralJ nation or grou, of nations! &or then the ,arties to the dis,ute a,,ear to 9a$e concessions, not to each other, but to the 9aGority of the General 'sse9bly in whose na9e the JneutralJ nation a,,ears to s,ea$! (onversely, the refusal to 9a$e concessions a,,ears in the circu9stances not so 9uch as defense of oneIs own rightful ,osition against the ene9y, but rather as defiance of the J,olitical voice of 9an$ind itself!J However intangible and i9,onderable these influences are which the General 'sse9bly is able to bring to bear by virtue of its very e)istence as an o,erating agency, they do e)ist and are being ta$en into account by the nations concerned! The Secretary General, as designer of the face-saving for9ula, ,ersonifies both the JneutralJ nations and the J,olitical voice of 9an$indJ and ,arta$es of the influences they e)ert in the General 'sse9bly! However, he has at his dis,osal two 9ore devices which enable hi9 under favorable circu9stances to 9itigate international conflicts! ;ne is a function of his office and the sole 9eans of real ,ressure at his dis,osal! He can warn a reluctant ,arty that he will bring the situation to the attention of the General 'sse9bly as a threat to international ,eace and security, and in ter9s which ,lace the bla9e where the Secretary General thin$s it belongs! By doing this, he threatens to bring those influences into 9otion which enable the General 'sse9bly to ,lay the 9ediating and 9itigating role to which we have referred!

The other instru9ent at the dis,osal of the Secretary General is a function of his ,ersonality and lies ,urely in the real9 of ,ersuasion! The late Mr! Ha99ars$GoldIs tenure of office shows i9,ressively how de,endent the ,eace,ro9oting functions of the Secretary General are u,on the intellectual and 9oral Lualities of the holder of that office! ;nly a 9an of Ha99ars$GoldIs ,ersonality could have tried to do what he did in this res,ect, and have achieved what he achieved! n view of the 9agnitude of the unsettled issues, it is fair to say that what he achieved is little enough, and this Gudg9ent 9ust be e)tended to the :nited "ations as a whole! But in view of the enor9ity of the conseLuences with which these unsettled issues threaten not only individual nations but civiliHation itself it 9ust also be said that the little that has been achieved by the :nited "ations is better than nothing!

PART NINE <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< The Proble of Peace! Peace throu*h Transfor ation
,, BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB The %orld 'tate

;ur investigation of the ,roble9 of international ,eace has left us with two conclusionsB no atte9,t to solve the ,roble9 of international ,eace by li9iting the national as,irations for ,ower has succeeded, and none could have succeeded under the conditions of the 9odern state syste9! 8hat, then, accounts for the instability of ,eace and order in the relations a9ong states, and what accounts for their relative stability within statesF n other words, what factor 9a$ing for ,eace and order e)ists within national societies which is lac$ing on the international sceneF The answer see9s obvious C it is the state itself! "ational societies owe their ,eace and order to the e)istence of a state which, endowed with su,re9e ,ower within the national territory, $ee,s ,eace and order! This was indeed the doctrine of Hobbes, who argued that without such a state national societies would rese9ble the international scene and the war Jof every 9an against every 9anJ. would be the universal condition of 9an$ind! &ro9 this ,re9ise it was logically inevitable to conclude that ,eace and order a9ong nations would be secure only within a world state co9,rising all the nations of the earth! Since the brea$down of the universal order of the Middle 'ges, this conclusion has been advanced fro9 ti9e to ti9e!= The e),erience of two world wars within a Luarter of a century and the ,ros,ects of a third one to be fought with nuclear wea,ons have i9,arted to the idea of a world state an un,recedented urgency! 8hat is needed, so the argu9ent runs, in order to save the world fro9 self-destruction is not li9itation of the e)ercise of national sovereignty through international obligations and institutions, but the transference of the sovereignties of individual nations to a world authority, which would be as sovereign over the individual nations as the individual nations are sovereign within their res,ective territories! Refor9s within the international society have failed and were bound to fail! 8hat is needed, then, is a radical transfor9ation of the e)isting international society of sovereign nations into a su,ranational co99unity of individuals! The argu9ent rests u,on an analogy with national societies! t is, therefore, our first tas$ to find out how ,eace and order are ,reserved in national societies! CON.ITION' OF .O$E'TIC PEACE Peace a9ong social grou,s within the nation re,oses u,on a dual foundationB the disinclination of the 9e9bers of society to brea$ the ,eace and their inability to brea$ the ,eace if they should be so inclined! ndividuals will be unable to brea$ the ,eace if overwhel9ing ,ower 9a$es an atte9,t to brea$ it a ho,eless underta$ing! They will be disinclined to brea$ the ,eace under two conditions! ;n the one hand, they 9ust feel loyalties to society as a whole which sur,ass their loyalties to any ,art of it! ;n the other hand, they 9ust be able to e),ect fro9 society at least an a,,ro)i9ation of Gustice through a 9odicu9 of satisfaction for their de9ands! The ,resence of these three conditions C overwhel9ing force, su,rasectional loyalties, e),ectation of Gustice C 9a$es ,eace ,ossible within nations! The absence of these conditions on the international scene evo$es the danger of war! 8hat are the factors that 9a$e for the ,resence of these conditionsF 'nd what is the role the state ,lays in this res,ectF ' closer consideration of the inter,lay of social forces that 9a$e for ,eace within the nation will hel, us to answer these Luestions!
. =

%eviathan, (ha,ter D !

See the references on ,ages =20 if!

Suprase$tiona" Lo a"ties "ational societies are co9,osed of a 9ulti,licity of social grou,s! So9e of these are antagonistic to each other in the sense that their res,ective clai9s are 9utually e)clusive! That 9utual e)clusiveness of o,,osing clai9s is ,articularly obvious in the econo9ic s,here, where one grou, 9ay de9and a share in the econo9ic ,roduct which another grou, refuses to grant! This ,roble9 of the distribution of the econo9ic ,roduct is only a s,ectacular instance of a ubiLuitous social ,heno9enon! Political ,arties, religious deno9inations, racial grou,s, regions, and localities 9eet in si9ilar contests! How are those conflicts being ,revented fro9 degenerating into violenceF &irst of all, citiHen ', who as a 9e9ber of econo9ic grou, E o,,oses citiHen O as a 9e9ber of another econo9ic grou, E=, is unable to identify hi9self co9,letely with El and give it his undivided loyalties! He is unable to do so for three reasons! ' is not only a 9e9ber of El, but also of the religious grou, R, the ,olitical grou, P, and the ethnic and cultural grou, (! 'll these grou,s 9a$e de9ands on his allegiance> and if he wants to do Gustice to all of the9, he cannot identify hi9self co9,letely with any! 8hile he acts as a 9e9ber of E., he cannot forget that he also has res,onsibilities to R! 8hile he throws hi9self into the struggle for the obGectives of P, he cannot hel, being 9indful of what he owes to (! This ,luralis9 of do9estic grou,ings and conflicts, then, tends to i9,ress u,on the ,artici,ants the relativity of their interests and loyalties and thus to 9itigate the clashes of different grou,s! This ,luralis9 brings about, as it were, an econo9y in the intensity of identification, which 9ust be s,read wide in order to give every grou, and conflict its share! &urther9ore, while ' as a 9e9ber of El o,,oses O as a 9e9ber of E=, he 9ight find hi9self in another res,ect on the sa9e side of the fence with B, both being 9e9bers of P! n other words, ' and O are ene9ies in the econo9ic s,here, yet they are friends in ,olitics! They are o,,osed to each other econo9ically, yet they are united ,olitically! ' and O are also 9e9bers of religious, ethnic, and regional grou,s, and so forth, and both of the9 9ay have si9ilar relations of conflict and association with any nu9ber of 9e9bers of these grou,s! ', then, is not only at the sa9e ti9e identified with a ,lurality of different social grou,s, but he is also, as a 9e9ber of these different grou,s, si9ultaneously the friend and foe of any nu9ber of his fellows, in so far as they belong to different grou,s of which he is either a 9e9ber or an o,,onent! This ,lural role of friend and o,,onent which ' ,lays with regard to a nu9ber of his fellows i9,oses restraints u,on hi9 as both a friend and a foe! He cannot identify hi9self co9,letely with his ,olitical friends who are also his econo9ic o,,onents without the ris$ of losing the struggle for econo9ic advantage! He cannot ,ush the struggle for econo9ic advantage to e)tre9es without losing the ,olitical su,,ort he needs as a 9e9ber of the ,olitical grou,! f ' wants to be econo9ic o,,onent and ,olitical friend at the sa9e ti9e, he 9ust ta$e care to be both within such li9its that one does not get in the way of the other! Thus the overla,,ing of social roles ,layed by different 9e9bers of society tends to neutraliHe conflicts and to restrain the9 within such li9its as to enable the 9e9bers of society to ,lay their different roles at the sa9e ti9e! &inally, ' and O are not only 9e9bers of contending econo9ic grou,s and have not only identical ,olitical affiliations, not to s,ea$ of all the other social grou,ings to which they belong, but by definition they are also 9e9bers of the sa9e national society! They ,arta$e of the sa9e language, the sa9e custo9s, the sa9e historic recollections, the sa9e funda9ental social and ,olitical ,hiloso,hy, the sa9e national sy9bols! They read the sa9e news,a,ers, listen to the sa9e radio ,rogra9s, observe the sa9e holidays, and worshi, the sa9e heroes! 'bove all, they co9,are their own nation with other nations and realiHe how 9uch 9ore they have in co99on with each other than with 9e9bers of the other nations! More ,articularly, they are convinced that the national characteristics they have in co99on are su,erior in all i9,ortant res,ects, es,ecially those of 9orality, to the Lualities of those who belong to a different nation! Thus ' and O co9e to feel not only that they belong to the sa9e national fa9ily, but also that because of that fa9ily relation they have so9ething very ,recious in co99on, so9ething that enhances their worth and 9a$es the9 JbetterJ 9en in every i9,ortant res,ect in co9,arison with outsiders! The self-res,ect of ' and B, as well as the estee9 in which they hold each other, is inti9ately connected with their 9e9bershi, in the sa9e national co99unity! Their intellectual convictions and 9oral valuations derive fro9 that 9e9bershi,! How that 9e9bershi, gives vicarious satisfaction to their ,ower drives has already been related in detail! 0 The loyalties with which they cling to the nation are 9ore than the 9ere re,ay9ent of a debt of gratitude for benefits received! They are the very conditions of those benefits! t is only by being faithful to the nation, by adhering to it as to the fountainhead of all earthly goods, by identifying oneIs self with it that one will e),erience as oneIs own the security of belonging, the e)ultation of national ,ride, the triu9,hs of the &atherland in the co9,etition with other nations! Thus ,rotection of the nation against destruction fro9 without and disru,tion fro9 within is the overriding concern of all citiHens! %i$ewise, loyalty to the nation is a ,ara9ount co99it9ent of all citiHens! "othing can be tolerated that 9ight threaten the coherence of the nation! nterests, ideas, and loyalties which 9ight not be co9,atible with the concern for the unity of the nation 9ust yield to that concern! This concern i9,oses an ever ,resent li9itation u,on the $ind of issues which will be allowed to se,arate ' and O and ,laces ever ,resent restraints u,on the 9ethods by which ' and O fight these issues out! 8hatever the sta$es of their conflicts, they will not raise the issue of national unity itself! 8hatever 9ethods ' and O 9ay e9,loy in order to settle the conflict on their own ter9s, they will not resort to 9easures that 9ight ,ut the coherence of the nation itself in Geo,ardy! 'll conflicts within a nation are thus li9ited as to obGectives ,ursued and 9eans e9,loyed! They are, as it
0

See ,ages ..1 ff!

were, e9bedded within the densely woven fabric of the national co99unity which $ee,s the9 within bounds! n conGunction with the ,luralis9 and overla,,ing of sectional loyalties, it is the li9iting and restraining influence of national loyalties that constitutes the first of the three factors that 9a$e for ,eace within the nation! ')pe$tation o! Justi$e How do national societies create the e),ectation on the ,art of hostile social grou,s that none of their clai9s will be co9,letely ignored, but that all have a chance for at least ,artial satisfactionF How are all contending grou,s enabled to e),ect at least an a,,ro)i9ation of Gustice fro9 the national society to which they belongF n national societies the ,roble9 of Gustice is ,osed on two levels! ;ne is the level of general ,rinci,les shared by society as a whole> the other is the level of s,ecific clai9s advanced by ,articular grou,s! ;n the level of general ,rinci,les no threat to the ,eace arises, for all are agreed u,on the general ,rinci,les by which the co99on good of society is defined! Princi,les such as de9ocracy, social Gustice, eLuality, and freedo9 of s,eech do not give rise to conflicts endangering the ,eace of society so long as they re9ain in the real9 of abstractions defining the ulti9ate goal of societyIs collective endeavors! These abstractions, however, beco9e ,otent wea,ons in social conflicts when seiHed u,on by social grou,s that advance their conflicting clai9s in the na9e of these ,rinci,les! These clai9s confront society with its su,re9e challenge! Society 9ay be able to disregard the clai9s of s9all and wea$ grou,s without endangering its ,eace! ts social cohesion and 9ono,oly of organiHed violence are strong enough to $ee, the resent9ent and disaffection of such s9all and wea$ grou,s fro9 turning o,enly against the social order! #et society cannot afford to re9ain deaf to the clai9s for Gustice of large and ,otentially ,owerful grou,s without inviting the ris$ of revolution and civil war> that is, without endangering its ,eace and its very survival as an integrated whole! t is here that the intricate 9echanis9 of ,eaceful change conies into ,lay, giving all grou,s a chance to sub9it their clai9s for Gustice to the arbitra9ent of ,ublic o,inion, of elections, of ,arlia9entary votes, of e)a9ination boards, and the li$e! These 9echanis9s guide the conflicting clai9s of social grou,s into ,eaceful channels by giving the9 a chance to 9a$e the9selves heard and to co9,ete with each other for recognition according to rules binding u,on all! :nder the conditions of these contests, no grou, can be sure to ,revail in the long run, but all grou,s can rely u,on the chance of ta$ing at one ti9e or another so9e forward ste,s toward the attain9ent of Gustice! O8er-he"ming Po-er The third factor in ,reserving ,eace within national societies is the overwhel9ing ,ower with which society can ni, in the bud all atte9,ts at disturbing the ,eace! This overwhel9ing ,ower 9anifests itself in two different waysB in the for9 of 9aterial force as a 9ono,oly of organiHed violence, and in the for9 of irresistible social ,ressure! The ,ower that is at the dis,osal of society in the for9 of a 9ono,oly of organiHed violence is set a,art by two characteristics fro9 any other for9 of violence, es,ecially the one we encounter in the international s,here! The organiHed violence of national societies is in so9e 9easure neutral with regard to the conflicting clai9s of social grou,s so long as they re9ain within the li9its of the law and avail the9selves of ,eaceful 9eans! The liberal doctrine of the nineteenth century held that the organiHed violence of society was co9,letely neutral, standing above the tur9oil of conflicting interests, ready to enforce the law against whoever had violated it! 'gainst that doctrine Mar)is9 clai9s that the organiHed violence of society is nothing but the wea,on with which the ruling class 9aintains its rule over the e),loited 9asses! 'ctually, the co9,ulsory organiHation of society cannot be co9,letely neutral, for, as we have seen,6 the legal order it enforces is not co9,letely neutral and cannot hel, favoring the status Luo to which it owes its e)istence! f challenged, the status Luo can count u,on the su,,ort of the co9,ulsory organiHation of society! t is, however, the ,eculiar characteristic of the co9,ulsory organiHation of society that it has a bias in favor of the status Luo, but in large 9easure not a bias in favor of any ,articular status Luo! The co9,ulsory organiHation of '9erican society has defended the status Luo of .244, of ./44, of ./0=, and of ./64! The co9,ulsory organiHation of British society has su,,orted in succession the status Luo of feudalis9, ca,italis9, and socialis9! #et it 9ay be that a ,articular status Luo is offensive to the funda9ental 9oral convictions and the vital interests of a considerable ,ortion of the ,o,ulation and that a considerable fraction of the enforce9ent agents sy9,athiHe with their unco9,ro9ising o,,osition to the status Luo! n such a case, the legal order e9bodying the status Luo will not be enforced! n the :nited States, the constitutional bac$ground of the (ivil 8ar and the fate of ,rohibition illustrate that case! The other characteristic ,eculiar to the co9,ulsory organiHation of national societies is the scarcity of its collective action! 's a rule, the co9,ulsory organiHation of national societies 9aintains ,eace and order only against individual lawbrea$ers! t is a rare e)ce,tion for it to o,,ose as a collective force another collectivity that threatens to disturb the ,eace! The use of force in labor dis,utes is the outstanding e)a9,le of this $ind! "or9ally, the very e)istence, in the hands of society, of a 9ono,oly of organiHed violence, ready to intervene in case of need, deters collective disturbances of do9estic ,eace! The very fact of its e)istence 9a$es it unnecessary for the co9,ulsory organiHation of society to act! 'side fro9 this factor and ,robably sur,assing it in i9,ortance is the enor9ous unorganiHed ,ressure society e)erts u,on its 9e9bers to $ee, the ,eace! ' grou,, in order to be able to esca,e that ,ressure, would have to erect within the very fra9ewor$ of the national society a social structure of its own, 9ore integrated, 9ore co9,elling, and
6

See ,ages =/3 ff!

co99anding higher loyalties than the national society in whose 9idst it dwells! n our ti9es, the intensity of nationalis9, its transfor9ation into the ,olitical religion of nationalistic universalis9, the ubiLuity of the 9odern 9ass 9edia of co99unications, and their control by a s9all and relatively ho9ogeneous grou, have 9ulti,lied and 9agnified the social ,ressures that in national societies tend to $ee, dissenting grou,s within the bounds of law and ,eace! The +o"e o! the State 8hat is the contribution of the state to the 9aintenance of do9estic ,eaceF JStateJ is but another na9e for the co9,ulsory organiHation of society C for the legal order that deter9ines the conditions under which society 9ay e9,loy its 9ono,oly of organiHed violence for the ,reservation of order and ,eace! 8hen we have s,o$en in the ,receding ,ages of the co9,ulsory organiHation and of the legal order of society we have really s,o$en of the state! ts functions for the 9aintenance of do9estic ,eace are threefoldB @.A The state ,rovides the legal continuity of the national society! t thus enables the individual to e),erience the nation as a continuu9 in ti9e and s,ace, as a ,ersonality in whose na9e 9en act, who de9ands and receives services and bestows benefits, to who9 one can feel ,ersonal loyalties that are felt toward few other social grou,s e)ce,t the fa9ily and the church! @=A The state ,rovides 9ost of the institutionaliHed agencies and ,rocesses of social change! @0A The state ,rovides the agencies for the enforce9ent of its laws! t re9ains for us to deter9ine how i9,ortant the stateIs contribution to do9estic ,eace is! The answer to this Luestion is twofold! The stateIs contribution to do9estic ,eace is indis,ensable, but it is not in itself sufficient! 8ithout the stateIs contribution there can be no do9estic ,eace, but with nothing but the stateIs contribution there can be no do9estic ,eace either! That there can be no do9estic ,eace without the state is already i9,licit in what we have said about the ,roble9s of ,ower, of the balance of ,ower, and of sovereignty! Hostile social grou,s will use whatever 9eans are at their dis,osal for the ,ur,ose of gaining the obGectives they consider vital to the9selves! f such social grou,s control the 9eans of ,hysical violence, as sovereign states do in their 9utual relations, they will use the9 in two different ways! They will either e)ert ,ressure u,on their o,,onents by dis,laying what they consider to be their su,eriority, or they will e9,loy the9 for the destruction of the o,,onentIs 9eans of ,hysical violence! n either alternative the ,ur,ose of ,hysical violence is the brea$ing of the o,,onentIs will to resist the de9ands of the other side! The history of national societies shows that no ,olitical, religious, econo9ic, or regional grou, has been able to withstand for long the te9,tation to advance its clai9s by violent 9eans if it thought it could do so without too great a ris$! However strongly the other social factors 9ight have su,,orted the cause of ,eace, their effectiveness did not long survive the ,ro9ise of a s,eedy and definitive victory which violence holds out to its ,ossessor! Thus national societies have disintegrated and have s,lit into a nu9ber of s9aller units, either te9,orarily or ,er9anently, whenever the state was inca,able of 9aintaining its 9ono,oly of organiHed violence and of using effectively whatever 9eans of violence it retained for the ,ur,ose of 9aintaining ,eace and securing its own survival! Since whoever is able to use violence will use it if the sta$es see9 to Gustify its use, a social agency is needed strong enough to ,revent that use! Society 9ight find substitutes for the legal unity the state conveys to it in ti9e and s,ace and for the agencies for social change through which the state regulates the dyna9ics of the social ,rocesses! Society has no substitute for the ,ower of the %eviathan whose very ,resence, towering above contending grou,s, $ee,s their conflicts within ,eaceful bounds! The state is indis,ensable for the 9aintenance of do9estic ,eace> such is the true 9essage of HobbesIs ,hiloso,hy! #et the state by itself cannot 9aintain do9estic ,eace> such is the great o9ission of HobbesIs ,hiloso,hy! That the ,ower of the state is essential, but not sufficient, to $ee, the ,eace of national societies is de9onstrated by the historic e),erience of civil wars! f there had been only few of the9 over a long ,eriod of history, they 9ight be disregarded as e)ce,tions to the rule! However, of a total of two hundred and seventy-eight wars fought between .624 and ./6., seventy-eight C =2 ,er cent of the total C were civil wars! n the ,eriod fro9 .264 to ./6., the ratio between civil and international wars was, with eighteen of the for9er and si)ty of the latter, a,,ro)i9ately one to three! &or the ,eriod between .244 and ./6., the figures are twenty-eight civil and eighty-five international wars, the ratio being al9ost e)actly one to three!5 (oncerning the costliness of civil wars, Kuincy 8right observesB J(ivil wars such as the &rench Huguenot wars of the si)teenth century, the British 8ar of the Roses of the fifteenth century and the (ivil 8ar of the seventeenth century, the Thirty #earsI 8ar fro9 the stand,oint of Ger9any, the Peninsula 8ar fro9 the stand,oint of S,ain, the '9erican (ivil 8ar, and the (hinese Tai,ing Rebellion were costly both in lives and in econo9ic losses far in e)cess of conte9,orary international wars!J3 The freLuency and destructiveness of civil wars de9onstrate that the e)istence of the state does not assure the ,reservation of do9estic ,eace! The reason lies in the nature of the state itself! The state is not the artificial creation of a constitutional convention, conceived in the i9age of so9e abstract ,rinci,les of govern9ent and su,eri9,osed u,on whatever society 9ight e)ist! ;n the contrary, the state is ,art of the society fro9 which it has s,rung, and ,ros,ers and decays as society ,ros,ers and decays! The state, far fro9 being a thing a,art fro9 society, is created by society! The ,eace of a society whose intergrou, conflicts are no longer li9ited, restrained, and neutraliHed by overriding loyalties, whose ,rocesses of social change no longer sustain the e),ectation of Gustice in all the 9aGor grou,s, and
5 3

Kuincy 8right, ' Study of 8ar @(hicagoB :niversity of (hicago Press, ./6=A, Eol! , ,! 35. bid!, ,! =61!

whose unorganiHed forces of co9,ulsion are no longer sufficient to i9,ose confor9ity u,on these grou,s C the ,eace of such a society cannot be saved by the state, however strong! The forces of destruction arising within society in the for9 of class, racial, religious, regional, or ,urely ,olitical struggles will eru,t in revolutions, cou,s dIetat, and civil wars! The state does not stand a,art fro9 these conflagrations as a fire de,art9ent stands a,art fro9 fires, ready to e)tinguish the9 when they brea$ out! The state is inevitably involved in these conflagrations in a dual sense! ;n the one hand, the state is the ,ri9e target of revolution, against which it 9ust defend itself through the use of force! ;n the other hand, the dissensions that disru,t society also s,lit its co9,ulsory organiHation, the state! The state, then, will either cease to o,erate as one body, its discordant ,arts will Goin the warring grou,s in society at large, and the unity of the state will dissolve in civil war, or else C and this is 9ore li$ely in our ti9e in view of the 9ono,oly of effective ,ower which 9odern technology gives to the state C the issues that divide the ,eo,le will be fought out not by the ,eo,le at large, but through internecine struggles within the organiHation of the state in the for9 of cou,s dIetat, cons,iracies, and ,urges! The Trip"e Test o! Popu"ar Support This tri,le test devised for s,ecific for9s of govern9ent 9ay well he a,,lied to the world state! 're the ,eo,les of the world willing to acce,t world govern9ent, or are they at least not so unwilling as to erect an insur9ountable obstacle to its establish9entF 8ould they be willing and able to do what is necessary to $ee, world govern9ent standingF 8ould they be willing and able to do or refrain fro9 doing what world govern9ent reLuires of the9 so that it 9ay fulfill its ,ur,osesF The answers to these Luestions are i9,licit in what has been said above in connection with the ,roble9s of nationalis9, nationalistic universalis9, international 9orality, and world ,ublic o,inion! The answers are also i9,licit in what has been said about the conditions for the 9aintenance of do9estic ,eace! The answers are bound to be in the negative! "o society e)ists coe)tensive with the ,resu9ed range of a world state! 8hat e)ists is an international society of sovereign nations! There does not e)ist a su,ranational society that co9,rises all individual 9e9bers of all nations and, hence, is identical with hu9anity ,olitically organiHed! The 9ost e)tensive society in which 9ost 9en live and act in our ti9es is the national society! The nation is, as we have seen, the reci,ient of 9anIs highest secular loyalties! Beyond it there are other nations, but no co99unity for which 9an would be willing to act regardless of what he understands the interests of his own nation to be! Men are willing to give food, clothing, and 9oney to the needy regardless of nationality! But they ,refer to $ee, the needy where they are rather than to allow the9 to go where they ,lease and thus beco9e useful citiHens again! &or, while international relief is regarded as co9,atible with the national interest, freedo9 of i99igration is not! :nder the ,resent 9oral conditions of 9an$ind, few 9en would act on behalf of a world govern9ent if the interests of their own nation, as they understand the9, reLuired a different course of action! ;n the contrary, the overwhel9ing 9aGority would ,ut what they regard as the welfare of their own nation above everything else, the interests of a world state included! n other words, the ,eo,les of the world are not willing to acce,t world govern9ent, and their overriding loyalty to the nation erects an insur9ountable obstacle to its establish9ent! "or are the ,eo,les of the world willing and able to do what is necessary to $ee, world govern9ent standing! &or they are not ,re,ared to ,erfor9 that revaluation of all values, that un,recedented 9oral and ,olitical revolution, which would force the nation fro9 its throne and ,ut the ,olitical organiHation of hu9anity on it! They are willing and able to sacrifice and die so that national govern9ents 9ay be $e,t standing! The odds are so 9uch in favor of the nation that 9en who 9ight be willing and able to sacrifice and die that the world state be $e,t standing do not even have the o,,ortunity to do so in the world as it is constituted today! The 9an who would want to o,,ose the interests and ,olicy of his own nation for the sa$e of hu9anity and its state would by that act of o,,osition @wea$ening his own nationA strengthen the nation with which his own govern9ent 9ight be engaged in deadly co9bat! 't best he 9ight 9a$e hi9self the 9artyr of his convictions by inviting the ,unish9ent that the nation 9etes out to traitors! "othing shows 9ore stri$ingly the absence of the social and 9oral ,reconditions for anything rese9bling a world state than the 9oral ,arado) that a 9an who would want to act as a citiHen of the world would by the conditions of the world be forced to act as ,artisan of another nation and as traitor to his own! &or above oneIs own nation there is nothing ,olitical on behalf of which a 9an could act! There are only other nations besides oneIs own! 8e shall not dwell u,on the ,roble9 of how the different ,eo,les of the world shall be re,resented in legislative agencies for social change! "u9erical re,resentation would obviously be unacce,table to the white races, since it would ,ut the world under the do9ination of the colored ones! 'ny ty,e of re,resentation that in violation of the 9aGority ,rinci,le would tend to stabiliHe white su,re9acy in the world would 9eet with the o,,osition of the colored races, who would thus be held in a ,er9anent state of inferiority! "or shall we dwell u,on the obvious i9,ossibility of ,utting such legislative agencies in o,eration, even if it were ,ossible to establish the9! ' ,arlia9ent re,resenting ,eo,les of such different 9oral convictions, ,olitical interests, and abilities for self-govern9ent as the '9ericans, the (hinese, the ndians, and the Russians would hardly be able to create out of these differences an o,erating whole! "one of its constituent grou,s would willingly sub9it to the 9aGority vote of a legislative asse9bly thus constituted! The threat and the actuality of civil war would hang over such institutions, which would have to substitute co9,ulsion for the lac$ing 9oral and ,olitical consensus! %et us consider two concrete issues with regard to which the clai9s of different nations traditionally collideB i99igration and trade! ' world state, li$e any other federal state, could not leave the regulation of interstate 9igration and interstate trade to the discretion of its co9,onent ,arts! t would itself have to regulate these issues! Even if the

authority of the world state in these two res,ects were strictly circu9scribed by the world constitution, is there any chance that the '9erican ,eo,le would be ,re,ared to give a world govern9ent ,owers to o,en the borders of the :nited States for the annual i99igration of, say, .44,444 Russians, =54,444 (hinese, and =44,444 ndiansF 8ould the '9erican ,eo,le allow the i9,ort of any Luantity of foreign agricultural ,roducts which 9ight co9,ete with do9estic ones on eLual ter9sF s there any li$elihood that the Russians would allow chea, consu9er goods to be i9,orted which 9ight u,set their ,lanned econo9y and under9ine confidence in their ,olitical syste9 as wellF f these Luestions 9ust be answered in the negative, as obviously they 9ust, how is a world state e),ected to govern at allF How is a world state e),ected to be able to resolve ,eacefully the tensions between nations which threaten the ,eace of the worldF There is no shir$ing the conclusion that international ,eace cannot be ,er9anent without a world state, and that a world state cannot be established under the ,resent 9oral, social, and ,olitical conditions of the world! n the light of what has been said thus far in this boo$, there is also no shir$ing the further conclusion that in no ,eriod of 9odern history was civiliHation 9ore in need of ,er9anent ,eace and, hence, of a world state, and that in no ,eriod of 9odern history were the 9oral, social, and ,olitical conditions of the world less favorable for the establish9ent of a world state! There is, finally, no shir$ing the conclusion that, as there can be no state without a society willing and able to su,,ort it, there can be no world state without a world co99unity willing and able to su,,ort it! T%O FAL'E 'OLUTION' How, then, can a world state be createdF Two solutions have been offeredB world conLuest and the e)a9,les of SwitHerland and of the creation of the :nited States by the (onstitutional (onvention of .121! Wor"( ConFuest 'll historic ,olitical structures that have co9e close to being world states have had one thing in co99onB ;ne ,owerful state created the9 by conLuering the other 9e9bers of what was then the $nown ,olitical world! Most of these world states have another thing in co99onB They hardly ever survived the lifeti9e of the founders! n 8estern civiliHation, the sole e)ce,tion to that rule is the Ro9an E9,ire! This world state owed its uniLue longevity to two unusual transfor9ations! The Ro9an conLuerors transfor9ed the conLuered into Ro9ans either by receiving the9 into the do9inant civiliHation as Ro9an citiHens or by u,rooting the9 fro9 their native civiliHations and 9a$ing the9 into slaves! #et in the ,rocess of conLuest, es,ecially of the Hellenistic world, the Ro9an conLueror transfor9ed hi9self by re9a$ing his own civiliHation in the i9age of the civiliHations of the conLuered! Through this dual ,rocess of a9alga9ation, Ro9e created a new 9oral and ,olitical co99unity coe)tensive with its conLuests and ca,able of lending stability to the new state! To these two transfor9ations 9ust be added the further circu9stance that after the conLuest of the Mediterranean world the Ro9an E9,ire e),anded into ,olitically e9,ty s,aces, settled by barbarians whose loosely organiHed civiliHations disintegrated under the i9,act of the su,erior and attractive civiliHation of the conLueror! Most of the other world states disintegrated as soon as conLuest had built the9! &or, beneath the ,olitical and 9ilitary su,erstructure erected by force, the national societies lived on, each with its se,arate 9oral values and ,olitical interests and each trying to sha$e off the conLuerorIs yo$e! These world states were not the natural outgrowth of a world co99unity coe)tensive with the9, but a creation of force artificially su,eri9,osed u,on a 9ulti,licity of unwilling national societies! t is of course true that, for instance, "a,oleonIs would X be world state was destroyed by the unta,,ed reserves of Great Britain and Russia! #et, when in .2.= that e9,ire for the first ti9e showed its 9ilitary wea$ness by failing in a 9aGor tas$ of e),ansion, the national societies of which it was co9,osed reasserted the9selves and Goined Great Britain and Russia in ,utting an end to it! (onLuests on a s9aller scale, which are unable to unite the conLuering and conLuered ,o,ulations in a new co99unity, face the s9aller ris$ of revolt and irredentist se,aratis9! The relations between reland and Great Britain and between the nations of Eastern Euro,e and Russia are cases in ,oint! f the conLueror can 9uster overwhel9ing strength, no danger to the ,eace 9ay arise fro9 the conflict of two national societies living within the sa9e state! f, however, the strength of the conLuered ,eo,le is not out of all ,ro,ortion to the conLuerorIs, a ,otential state of civil war between the conLueror and the conLuered will sa, the strength of the state, even though under the 9odern conditions of warfare it 9ay not endanger its e)istence! Such are the li$ely conseLuences of li9ited conLuests that are unable to create a new co99unity coe)tensive with the9selves! t follows that a world state created by conLuest and lac$ing the su,,ort of a world co99unity has a chance to 9aintain ,eace within its borders only if it can create and 9aintain co9,lete disci,line and loyalty a9ong the 9illions of soldiers and ,olice9en needed to enforce its rule over an unwilling hu9anity! Such a world state would be a totalitarian 9onster resting on feet of clay, the very thought of which startles the i9agination! The ')amp"es o! S-itDer"an( an( the ;nite( States 8hat the world state is e),ected to bring about, SwitHerland see9s to have already achieved C the creation of a new federal state out of a nu9ber of sovereign nations with language, culture, history, loyalties, and ,olicies of their own!

SwitHerland has been able to unite twenty-two sovereign states, s,ea$ing four different languages, in one ,olitical organiHation! 8hy should the .54-odd nations of the world not be able to do the sa9eF %et the9 ado,t a federal constitution as the Swiss have done, let the9 act toward each other as the Swiss states do, and the ,roble9 of the world state will be solved! The argu9ent see9s to be ,ersuasive and is considered freLuently in ,o,ular discussions! t dissolves, however, when confronted with the facts of Swiss history! &irst of all, the unified Swiss state dates fro9 .262! Before then the Swiss states for9ed a confederation that rese9bled 9ore a successful %eague of "ations or :nited "ations than a single state! That confederation grew fro9 a nu9ber of ,er9anent alliances concluded a9ong the so-called &orest (antons and so9e of the (ity (antons in the course of the fourteenth century! These alliances were the result of certain identical and co9,le9entary interests that drew these states together in defense against co99on dangers! 8hy did these alliances survive the s,ecial occasions fro9 which they arose and even harden into the close ties of a confederation with co99on agencies of govern9entF The answer to that Luestion will ,rovide the e),lanation to the ,heno9enon of SwitHerland! @.A The thirteen 9e9bers of the original (onfederation, occu,ying a contiguous territory, were united in a co99on o,,osition to the Ger9an E9,ire and the Ha,sburgs, of who9 they had all been subGects, fro9 who9 they had liberated the9selves in co99on efforts, and who re9ained the co99on ene9ies of the liberties of all of the9! @=A The fa9ous victories of the Swiss ar9ies over the $nights in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had a dual effect! They established for centuries the re,utation of the Swiss as the 9ost redoubtable soldiers in Euro,e, and they ,roved the virtual i99unity fro9 foreign attac$ of the 9ountain valleys which were the core of the original (onfederation! @0A (o9,ared with these 9ilitary ris$s which an attac$ u,on the Swiss entailed, the attractions of victory were s9all! n view of the ,overty of these valleys in natural resources, these attractions were e)clusively strategic> that is, the control of so9e of the 'l,ine ,asses Goining taly with the "orth of Euro,e! #et for four centuries, with the one significant e)ce,tion of the "a,oleonic 8ars, the great rival ,owers adGacent to SwitHerland found it 9ore advantageous to have the Swiss defend the 'l,ine ,asses against all warring nations than to try to ca,ture the9 fro9 the Swiss! t is, however, significant that the balance of ,ower e)erted this ,rotective influence only as long as the rivalry a9ong SwitHerlandIs ,owerful neighbors lasted! The "a,oleonic victories in taly at once destroyed that ,rotection, and fro9 .1/2 on SwitHerland was the ha,less ,rey of contending ar9ies! t is also worth re9e9bering that while 'ustria, Ger9any, and taly were Goined in the Tri,le 'lliance, the talian generaR staff ,ro,osed si) ti9es to the Ger9an general staff to 9arch through SwitHerland in a Goint ca9,aign against &rance! Thus it was not 9erely an act of will e),ressing itself in a constitutional arrange9ent, but a nu9ber of ,eculiar and, in their co9bination, uniLue circu9stances that 9ade it ,ossible for SwitHerland to be born and survive! 8hile these circu9stances allowed SwitHerland to survive in the 9idst of ,owerful neighbors, they did not ,er9it it to 9aintain ,eace a9ong its co9,onent states! 8ithin the s,an of little 9ore than 044 years, the Swiss states fought a9ong the9selves nu9erous 9inor wars and five religious wars involving all or virtually all of the9, the last as late as .261! ' great nu9ber of revolutions and cou,s dIetat round out the ,icture of civil strife! 8hat light, then, does the history of SwitHerland shed u,on the ,roble9 of the world stateF 8e can subscribe to Ra,,ardIs conclusions that SwitHerland as a confederation had li9ited national security only Jby virtue of s,ecial circu9stances alien to this regi9e itself! !!! n so far as the Swiss e),erience of five centuries of collective security can suggest a lesson to the ,resent generation, this lesson is clearly negative! t confir9s at the sa9e ti9e the observations drawn fro9 the 9ost recent ,ast and the teachings of si9,le co99on sense! 's long as the security of the international society de,ends only u,on the free coo,eration of fully sovereign states, it re9ains necessarily fragile!J1 Thus the Swiss e),erience confir9s our own conclusions concerning the fragility of ,eace by li9itation, while it e9,hasiHes both the need and difficulty of establishing a state above the national states! The e)a9,le of the way in which the :nited States was created is often cited as ,roof of the feasibility of creating a world state here and now by way of a constitutional convention! 'ctually, the e)a9,le of the :nited States ,roves only the de,endence u,on a ,re-e)isting 9oral and ,olitical co99unity of any state that can be e),ected to endure! 8hen the (onstitutional (onvention 9et in .121, the thirteen states were sovereign in na9e rather than in ,olitical actuality! They did not constitute thirteen se,arate sovereignties about to 9erge into a single one! 'fter they had declared their inde,endence fro9 Britain in .113, sovereignty re9ained in sus,ense! By establishing the :nited States, they e)changed one sovereignty C that of the British (rown C for another! 'nd they e)changed one co99on loyalty for another co99on loyalty! 'll the while they retained the sa9e language, the sa9e culture, the sa9e national heritage, the sa9e 9oral convictions, the sa9e ,olitical interests that had Gust been tested in a revolutionary war fought in unison under a single co99and! The thirteen colonies for9ed a 9oral and ,olitical co99unity under the British (rown, they tested it and beca9e fully aware of it in their co99on struggle against Britain, and they retained that co99unity after they had won their inde,endence! 's +ohn +ay ,ut it in "o! of The &ederalistB ! ! ! Providence has been ,leased to give this one connected country to one united ,eo,le> a ,eo,le descended fro9 the sa9e ancestors, s,ea$ing the sa9e language, ,rofessing the sa9e religion, attached to the sa9e ,rinci,les of govern9ent, very si9ilar in their 9anners and custo9s, and who, by their Goint counsels, ar9s and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established their general liberty and inde,endence! ! ! ! Si9ilar senti9ents have hitherto ,revailed a9ong all orders and deno9inations of 9en a9ong us! To all general ,ur,oses, we have unifor9ly been one ,eo,le! Each individual citiHen everywhere enGoying the sa9e
1

8illia9 E! Ra,,ard, (inL Siecles de Securite (ollective @.=/. - .1/2A @ParisB %ibrairie du Recueil Sirey, ./65A, ,! 5/6!

national rights, ,rivileges, and ,rotection! 's a nation, we have 9ade ,eace and warB as a nation, we have vanLuished our co99on ene9iesB as a nation, we have for9ed alliances and 9ade treaties, and entered into various co9,acts and conventions with foreign states! 8hat the (onvention of Philadel,hia did was to re,lace one constitution, one sovereignty, one state with another one, both resting u,on the sa9e ,ree)isting co99unity! The (onvention did not create one state where before there had been thirteen se,arate ones! &ar fro9 ,roving that a state can be created by agree9ent on the te)t of a constitution, the creation of the :nited States ,roves the truth of the two ,ro,ositions advanced earlierB 8ars can occur within states as well as a9ong states, and the :nited States was founded u,on a 9oral and ,olitical co99unity the (onstitution did not create but found already in e)istence! The co99unity of the '9erican ,eo,le antedated the '9erican state, as a world co99unity 9ust antedate a world state! ,. BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB The %orld Co unity

This last conclusion C that a world co99unity 9ust antedate a world state C has given birth to two efforts to create a world co99unityB the :nited "ations Educational, Scientific and (ultural ;rganiHation, $nown as :nesco, and the other s,ecialiHed agencies of the :nited "ations!. THE CULTURAL APPROACH! UNE'CO 'ccording to 'rticle . of the (onstitution of :nescoB The ,ur,ose of the ;rganiHation is to contribute to ,eace and security by ,ro9oting collaboration a9ong the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal res,ect for Gustice, for the rule of law and for the hu9an rights and funda9ental freedo9s which are affir9ed for the ,eo,les of the world, without distinction of race, se), language or religion, by the (harter of the :nited "ations! To realiHe this ,ur,ose the ;rganiHation willB @aA collaborate in the wor$ of advancing the 9utual $nowledge and understanding of ,eo,les, through all 9eans of 9ass co99unication and to that end reco9 9end such international agree9ents as 9ay be necessary to ,ro9ote the free flow of ideas by word and i9age> @bA give fresh i9,ulse to ,o,ular education and to the s,read of culture> by collaborating with Me9bers, at their reLuest, in the develo,9ent of educational activities> by instituting collaboration a9ong the nations to advance the ideal of eLuality of educational o,,ortunity without regard to race, se) or any distinctions, econo9ic or social> by suggesting educational 9ethods best suited to ,re,are the children of the world for the res,onsibilities of freedo9> 9aintain, increase and diffuse $nowledge> @cA by assuring the conservation and ,rotection of the worldIs inheritance of boo$s, wor$s of art and 9onu9ents of history and science, and reco99ending to the nations concerned the necessary international conventions> by encouraging coo,eration a9ong the nations in all branches of intellectual activity, including the international e)change of ,ersons active in the fields of education, science and culture and the e)change of ,ublications, obGects of artistic and scientific interest and other 9aterials of infor9ation> by initiating 9ethods of international coo,eration calculated to give the ,eo,le of all countries access to the ,rinted and ,ublished 9aterials ,roduced by any of the9! n order to evaluate the contribution :nesco is able to 9a$e for the ,reservation of international ,eace, three distinctions 9ust be 9adeB@lA 8e are here not concerned with the contribution :nesco is able to 9a$e to the disse9ination and i9,rove9ent of culture and education as ends in the9selves! @=A 8e are here not concerned with the contribution :nesco is able to 9a$e to the ,reservation of international ,eace through the very fact of international co-o,eration> this as,ect of the ,roble9 will be dealt with in the last section of this cha,ter! @0A 8e are here concerned only with the Luestion of what :nesco can do for the ,reservation of international ,eace by ,ro9oting international understanding, education, and general cultural activities! 8hat the (arnegie Endow9ent for nternational Peace declared in its a,,raisal of :nescoIs ,rogra9 for ./62, J'bove all else its individual ite9s were not always clearly and obviously related to the safeguarding of ,eace and security,J= is true of all activities of :nesco, however 9eritorious they 9ay be intrinsically! This defect is not an accidental Luality of certain ,rogra9s underta$en by :nesco, which only need to be revised and tightened in order to fulfill their ,eace-,reserving function! ;n the contrary, the defect is congenital, growing fro9 the very ,hiloso,hy that
. =

See, in connection with this cha,ter, what has been said above in (ha,ter 1 about world ,ublic o,inion! nternational (onciliation, "o! 602, &ebruary ./62, ,! 11!

is at the foundation of the agency and ,er9eates all its activities! Thus, su99ing u, on "ove9ber .1, ./5=, the discussions of the General (onference of :nesco, Mr! +ai9e Torres Bodet, its outgoing *irector-General, warned Jthat the greatest danger :nesco has to guard against is dissi,ation of its efforts!J The ,hiloso,hy of :nesco assu9es that education @es,ecially when it ai9s at international understandingA, cultural e)change, and, in general, all activities that tend to increase contacts a9ong 9e9bers of different nations and 9a$e the9 understand each other contribute necessarily to the creation of an international co99unity and the 9aintenance of ,eace! 9,licit in this assu9,tion is the su,,osition that nations are nationalistic and go to war with each other because they do not $now each other well enough and because they o,erate on different levels of education and culture! Both assu9,tions are erroneous! Cu"tura" %e8e"opment an( Pea$e There are ,ri9itive ,eo,les, co9,letely lac$ing in institutionaliHed education, who are generally ,eace-loving and rece,tive to the influence of foreign cultures to the ,oint of suicide! There are other ,eo,les, highly educated and stee,ed in classical culture, such as the Ger9ans, who throughout 9ost of their history have been nationalistic and warli$e! The 'thenians under Pericles and the talians of the Renaissance created cultures not eLualed in the history of 8estern civiliHation, and both were at least as nationalistic and warli$e in that ,eriod of their history as at any ti9e before or after! &urther9ore, in the history of so9e nations, such as the British and the &rench, ,eriods of nationalistic e)clusiveness and warli$e ,olicies alternate with cos9o,olitan and ,eaceful ones, and no correlation e)ists between these changes and the develo,9ent of education and culture! The (hinese ,eo,le have a tradition of res,ect for learning su,erior to that of any other ,eo,le, and they can loo$ bac$ u,on a history of cultural attain9ents longer than any other and at least as creative! These high Lualities of education and culture have 9ade the (hinese loo$ with conte9,t on the ,rofession of the soldier as well as u,on all other nations, which at the beginning of the nineteenth century were still regarded as barbarian vassals of the (hinese e9,eror! #et all this has not 9ade the (hinese ,eo,le less nationalistic and 9ore ,eaceful! Russian education in our ti9e has reached a higher level of achieve9ent than ever before, es,ecially in the fields of literacy and technical education! ts e)cellence has had no influence u,on the rece,tiveness of the Russian ,eo,le to foreign ideas or u,on the foreign ,olicies of the Russian govern9ent! These e)a9,les, ta$en at rando9, show that the Luantity and Luality of education and culture as such is obviously irrelevant to the issue of a world co99unity! That issue hinges, not u,on $nowledge and the creation and a,,reciation of cultural values, but u,on a 9oral and ,olitical transfor9ation of un,recedented di9ensions! Cu"tura" ;nit an( Pea$e 8hat has been said of education and culture as such holds true also of educational and cultural activities ai9ing at the interchange of the ,roducts of different national cultures! The e)istence of a 9ultitude of inter,ersonal relations transcending national boundaries is no answer to our ,roble9! More ,articularly, the e)istence of intellectual and esthetic ties across national boundaries ,roves nothing in favor of a world co99unity! ' world co99unity with ,olitical ,otentialities is a co99unity of 9oral standards and ,olitical action, not of intellect and senti9ents! That an intellectual elite in the :nited States enGoys Russian 9usic and literature and that Sha$es,eare has not been banned fro9 the Russian stage has no relevance at all for the ,roble9 with which we are concerned! This sharing of the sa9e intellectual and esthetic e),eriences by 9e9bers of different nations does not create a society, for it does not create 9orally and ,olitically relevant actions on the ,art of the 9e9bers of different nations with res,ect to each other which they would not have underta$en had they not shared in those e),eriences! t should be re9e9bered that on a 9uch higher ,lane than the intellectual and esthetic, and with the obGective of clearly defined action, the nations of the 8est, Russia included, have shared the sa9e e),eriences for 9ore than a thousand years! They have ,rayed to the sa9e God, have held the sa9e funda9ental religious beliefs, have been bound by the sa9e 9oral laws, and have had the sa9e ritual sy9bols in co99on! That co99unity of religious e),eriences, 9uch 9ore inti9ately related to the whole ,ersonality of the individual and to his actions than anything that su,ranational intellectual and esthetic e),eriences have to offer, has been able to create an international co99unity of sorts, but not an international co99unity sufficiently integrated to 9a$e a world state ,ossible! How, then, can we e),ect that the 9elodies of Tchai$ovs$y, the ,rofundities of *ostoevs$i, the insights of The &ederalist, and the i9agery of Moby *ic$, which 9ight be shared by all '9ericans and Russians ali$e, could create not only a fleeting co99unity of feeling, but a co99unity of 9oral valuations and ,olitical actions shunting aside old loyalties and establishing new onesF History has given an un9ista$able answer to that Luestion! (ultural unity, 9uch closer than anything :nesco can ,lan and achieve, has coe)isted with war in all ,eriods of history! 8e are not s,ea$ing here of civil wars, which by definition are fought by 9e9bers of the sa9e national culture! The wars a9ong the Gree$ city states, the Euro,ean wars of the Middle 'ges, the talian wars of the Renaissance, the religious wars of the si)teenth and seventeenth centuries, even the wars of the eighteenth century in so far as the elite was concerned, were fought within the fra9ewor$ of a ho9ogeneous culture! These cultures had all essentials in co99onB language, religion, education, literature, art! #et these cultures did not create a co99unity, coe)tensive with the9selves, that could have $e,t disru,tive tendencies in chec$ and channeled the9 into ,eaceful outlets! How, then, can one e),ect that such a co99unity will be created

through interchange a9ong cultures, so diverse in all the res,ects in which those historic ones were ho9ogeneousF Internationa" ;n(erstan(ing an( Pea$e t is in the third ,ur,ose of :nesco, international understanding, that the basic fallacy of :nescoIs conce,tion of international affairs co9es to the fore! nternational conflicts, it is believed, are the result of an intellectual deficiency, of ignorance and lac$ of Gudg9ent as to the Lualities of other ,eo,les! f '9ericans could only co9e to understand the Russians, and vice versa, they would realiHe how 9uch they are ali$e, how 9uch they have in co99on, and how little they have to fight about! The argu9ent is fallacious on two counts! ndividual e),erience, which anybody can du,licate at will, shows that increased friendshi, is not necessarily a conco9itant of increased understanding! There are, of course, nu9erous instances in which ' has 9isunderstood the character and the 9otives of O and in which clarification of the facts will re9ove the source of conflict! Such is not the case when ' and O are engaged in a conflict in which their vital interests are at sta$e! ' does not fight O for econo9ic advantage because he 9isunderstands the intentions of B> it is rather because he understands the9 only too well! Many an '9erican G went to &rance full of senti9ental friendshi, for the &rench ,eo,le who9 he did not $now! His friendly feelings did not survive the shoc$ of understanding! The si9ilar e),eriences of 9any friendly visitors to Russia are too ty,ical to need elaboration! '9ong those who fro9 the beginning were 9ost fir9ly o,,osed to the foreign obGectives of the "ational Socialist regi9e, even at the ris$ of war, were so9e who had a ,rofound understanding of Ger9an culture! t was e)actly that understanding that 9ade the9 i9,lacable ene9ies of the "ational Socialist regi9e! Si9ilarly, the students of Russian history and culture, those who really understand Russia and the Russians, have as a rule been eLually unaffected by the ,ro- and anti-Russian hysteria! They have $nown the traditional obGectives of Russian e),ansionis9 as well as the traditional 9ethods of Russian di,lo9acy! f their understanding had had an influence u,on the conduct of foreign affairs in the 8estern de9ocracies, that conduct would certainly have been 9ore intelligent and successful than it actually was! 8hether or not such understanding would have 9ade for better relations with the Soviet :nion is an o,en Luestion! 'n intelligent and successful foreign ,olicy de,ends u,on the '9ericansI and the RussiansI understanding what both nations are and want! Peace between the :nited States and the Soviet :nion de,ends in the last analysis u,on whether what one of the9 is and wants is co9,atible with what the other one is and wants! This observation ,oints u, the other fallacy in :nescoIs conce,tion of international affairs! The conce,tion that international conflicts can be eli9inated through international understanding rests on the i9,licit assu9,tion that the issues of international conflicts, born as they are of 9isunderstandings, are but i9aginary and that actually no issue worth fighting about stands between nation and nation! "othing could be farther fro9 the truth! 'll the great wars that decided the course of history and changed the ,olitical face of the earth were fought for real sta$es, not for i9aginary ones! The issue in those great convulsions was invariablyB 8ho shall rule and who shall be ruledF 8ho shall be free and who slaveF 8as 9isunderstanding at the root of the issue between the Gree$s and the Persians, between the 'thenians and the Macedonians, between the +ews and the Ro9ans, between e9,eror and ,o,e, between the English and the &rench in the late Middle 'ges, between the Tur$s and the 'ustrians, between "a,oleon and Euro,e, between Hitler and the worldF 8as 9isunderstanding of the other sideIs culture, character, and intentions the issue, so that those wars were fought over no real issue at allF ;r could it not rather be 9aintained that in 9any of these conflicts it was e)actly the 9isunderstanding of the would-be conLuerorIs culture, character, and intentions that ,reserved ,eace for a while, whereas the understanding of these factors 9ade war inevitableF So long as the 'thenians refused to heed the warnings of *e9osthenes, the threat of war re9ained re9ote! t was only when, too late for their salvation, they understood the nature of the Macedonian E9,ire and of its ,olicies that war beca9e inevitable! That correlation between understanding and the inevitability of conflict is one of the 9elancholy lessons history conveys to ,osterityB The 9ore thoroughly one understands the other sideIs ,osition, character, and intentions, the 9ore inevitable the conflict often a,,ears to be! rres,ective of its great intrinsic 9erits, the ,rogra9 of :nesco is irrelevant to the ,roble9 of world co99unity because its diagnosis of the bars to world co99unity so co9,letely 9isses the ,oint! The ,roble9 of world co99unity is a 9oral and ,olitical and not an intellectual and esthetic one! The world co99unity is a co99unity of 9oral Gudg9ents and ,olitical actions, not of intellectual endow9ents and esthetic a,,reciation! %et us su,,ose that '9erican and Russian education and culture could be brought to the sa9e level of e)cellence or co9,letely a9alga9ated, and that Russians would ta$e to Mar$ Twain as '9ericans would ta$e to Gogol! f that were the case, the ,roble9 of who shall control the Middle East would still stand between the :nited States and the Soviet :nion, as it does today! So long as 9en continue to Gudge and act in accordance with national rather than su,ranational standards and loyalties, the world co99unity re9ains a ,ostulate that still awaits its realiHation! THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH The Spe$ia"iDe( Agen$ies o! the ;nite( Nations How is such a transfor9ation of standards and loyalties to be brought aboutF The s,ecialiHed agencies of the :nited

"ations have ,ointed a way! They are autono9ous organiHations, owing their e)istence to ,articular agree9ents a9ong a nu9ber of states whose identity differs fro9 agency to agency! They have their own constitutions, their own budgets, their own ,olicy9a$ing and ad9inistrative bodies, and each agency has a 9e9bershi, of its own! The na9es of so9e of these agencies are indicative of the functions they fulfillB nternational %abor ;rganiHation, &ood and 'griculture ;rganiHation, nternational Ban$ for Reconstruction and *evelo,9ent, nternational Monetary &und, nternational Teleco99unication :nion, :niversal Postal :nion, nternational (ivil 'viation ;rganiHation, :nesco, 8orld Health ;rganiHation! (ha,ters D and D of the (harter of the :nited "ations ,rovide for organiHational and functional relations between the s,ecialiHed agencies and the :nited "ations! The (harter stresses to a degree un$nown in the history of international organiHation the res,onsibility of the :nited "ations for the rights and the well-being of the individual regardless of national affiliation! t has created in the Econo9ic and Social (ouncil a s,ecial organ for the discharge of that res,onsibility! The Econo9ic and Social (ouncil has the authority to conclude agree9ents C and has done so in a nu9ber of instances C with the s,ecialiHed agencies, Jdefining the ter9s on which the agency concerned shall be brought into relationshi, with the :nited "ations!J0 The :nited "ations 9ay J9a$e reco99endations for the coordination of the ,olicies and activities of the s,ecialiHed agencies!J 6 The Econo9ic and Social (ouncil 9ay ta$e ste,s to receive regular and s,ecial re,orts fro9 the s,ecialiHed agencies and 9ay ,erfor9 services at the reLuest of 9e9bers of the :nited "ations and of s,ecialiHed agencies! 5 8hat is the ,hiloso,hy underlying the social and econo9ic activities the s,ecialiHed agencies are underta$ing with the co-o,eration of the :nited "ationsF 8hat is the relevance of that ,hiloso,hy for the ,roble9 of the international co99unityF This Luestion has been answered with great brilliance and ,ersuasiveness by Professor Mitrany! f the evil of conflict and war s,rings fro9 the division of the world into detached and co9,eting ,olitical units, will it be e)orcised si9,ly by changing or reducing the lines of divisionF 'ny ,olitical reorganiHation into se,arate units 9ust, sooner or later, ,roduce the sa9e effects> any international syste9 that is to usher in a new world 9ust ,roduce the o,,osite effect of subduing ,olitical division! 's far as one can see, there are only two ways of achieving that end! ;ne would be through a world state which would wi,e out ,olitical divisions forcibly> the other is the way discussed in these ,ages, which would rather overlay ,olitical divisions with a s,reading web of international activities and agencies, in which and through which the interests and life of all the nations would be gradually integrated! That is the funda9ental change to which any effective international syste9 9ust as,ire and contributeB to 9a$e international govern9ent co - e)tensive with international activities! !!! t 9ust care as 9uch as ,ossible for co99on needs that are evident, while ,resu9ing as little as ,ossible u,on a social unity which is still only latent and unrecogniHed! !!! Q n that wayR The co99unity itself will acLuire a living body not through a written act of faith but through active organic develo,9ent!!!! That trend is to organiHe govern9ent along the lines of s,ecific ends and needs, and according to the condition of their ti9e and ,lace, in lieu of the traditional organiHation on the basis of a set constitutional division of Gurisdiction of rights and ,owersfThe functional a,,roach !!!would hel, the growth of such ,ositive and constructive co99on wor$, of co99on habits and interests, 9a$ing frontier lines 9eaningless by overlaying the9 with a natural growth of co99on activities and co99on ad9inistrative agencies!3 This is indeed the way in which co99unities grow and in which govern9ents grow out of co99unities! 8e have already noted that sovereignty was a fact before it was a theory, and that the '9erican ,eo,le for9ed a co99unity before they created a state! How, then, can a co99unity be created where none e)istsF 'ccording to Professor Mitrany, an international co99unity 9ust grow fro9 the satisfaction of co99on needs shared by 9e9bers of different nations! The s,ecialiHed agencies of the :nited "ations, serving ,eo,les all over the world regardless of national boundaries, could create by the very fact of their e)istence and ,erfor9ance a co99unity of interests, valuations, and actions! :lti9ately, if such international agencies were nu9erous enough and served the 9ost i9,ortant wants of 9ost ,eo,les of the earth, the loyalties to these institutions and to the international co99unity of which they would be the agencies would su,ersede the loyalties to the se,arate national societies and their institutions! &or ,roof that such a develo,9ent is feasible under ,resent world conditions, Professor Mitrany relies in the 9ain u,on the e),eriences which the 'llies had during the Second 8orld 8ar with functional international agencies, such as the 'nglo-'9erican Raw Materials Board and the Middle East Su,,ly (entre! These e)a9,les ,ut in shar, focus the ,roble9 raised by the functional a,,roach! n war, the loyalties to the co99on cause and the co99on interest in victory over the co99on ene9y overrode se,arate national loyalties and 9ade ,ossible the successful o,eration of international functional agencies of 9aGor i9,ortance! n ,eace, what the nation has to offer the individual see9s to outweigh by far the benefits to be derived fro9 the international functional agencies, although it is ever 9ore widely recogniHed that the citiHens of different nations have certain interests in co99on, such as ,hysical survival through avoidance of nuclear war and non0 6

Article 0( 6aragra6h '. Article ./9 cf. also Articles 0, 0( 6aragra6h ,. 5 Articles 0) 00 6aragra6h ,. 3 *avid Mitrany, ' 8or$ing Peace Syste9 @6th ed!> %ondonB "ational Peace (ouncil, ./ ,,! .6, .5, .2, =2, 06, 05! @Re,rinted by ,er9ission of the author!A

,roliferation of nuclear wea,ons, ,rotection of the natural environ9ent, and econo9ic well-being through the control of international trade, the 9onetary syste9, and global cor,orations, which can be satisfied only a su,ranational basis! More ,articularly, the conflicts of ,ower which se,arate nations and the insecurity they create 9a$e identification with the nation the overriding concern of 9ost 9e9bers of all nations! The nation offers the individual ,rotection, vicarious gratification of ,ower drives, and i99ediate satisfaction of 9aterial needs! 8ith few s,oradic e)ce,tions, such as the assistance of the 8orld Health ;rganiHation in co9bating an e,ide9ic, the s,ecialiHed agencies of the :nited "ations offer ho,es and satisfactions far re9oved fro9 the direct e),eriences of ordinary ,eo,le and which 9ay 9a$e the9selves felt only through the inter9ediary of a nu9ber of national agencies, so that its international origins are hard to trace! 8hen 9ailing a letter to a foreign country, who would thin$ of giving than$s to the :niversal Postal :nion for the contribution that international agency is 9a$ing to the o,erationF Thus the contributions international functional agencies 9a$e to the well-being of 9e9bers of all nations fade into the bac$ground! 8hat stands before the eyes of all are the i99ense ,olitical conflicts that divide the great nations of the earth and threaten the well-being of the loser, if not his very e)istence! This is not ,ri9arily a 9atter of false e9,hasis born of ignorance! t is rather the recognition of the undeniable fact that, fro9 a functional ,oint of view what the national govern9ent does or does not do is 9uch 9ore i9,ortant for the satisfaction of individual wants than what an international functional agency does or does not do! More i9,ortant than anything else is the ability of the national govern9ent to defend its territory and citiHens against foreign aggression and within its territory to 9aintain ,eace and $ee, in o,eration the ,rocesses of social change! The neglect with which the ,ublic treats international functional agencies is but the e)aggerated reflection of the 9inor role these agencies ,lay for the solution of i9,ortant international issues!

PART TEN <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< The Proble of Peace! Peace throu*h Acco odation
,/ BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB .i&lo acy

8e have seen that international ,eace cannot be ,reserved through the li9itation of national sovereignty, and we found the reasons for this failure in the very nature of the relations a9ong nations! 8e concluded that international ,eace through the transfor9ation of the ,resent society of sovereign nations into a world state is unattainable under the 9oral, social, and ,olitical conditions ,revailing in the world in our ti9e! f the world state is unattainable in our world, yet indis,ensable for the survival of that world, it is necessary to create the conditions under which it will not be i9,ossible fro9 the outset to establish a world state! 's the ,ri9e reLuisite for the creation of such conditions, we suggested the 9itigation and 9ini9iHation of those ,olitical conflicts which in our ti9e ,it the two su,er,owers against each other and evo$e the s,ecter of a cataclys9ic war! This 9ethod of establishing the ,reconditions for ,er9anent ,eace we call ,eace through acco99odation! ts instru9ent is di,lo9acy!

:O;+ TASKS O: %IPLOMAC> 8e have already had occasion to e9,hasiHe the ,ara9ount i9,ortance of di,lo9acy as an ele9ent of national ,ower! The i9,ortance of di,lo9acy for the ,reservation of international ,eace is but a ,articular as,ect of that general function! &or a di,lo9acy that ends in war has failed in its ,ri9ary obGectiveB the ,ro9otion of the national interest by ,eaceful 9eans! This has always been so and is ,articularly so in view of the destructive ,otentialities of total war! Ta$en in its widest 9eaning, co9,rising the whole range of foreign ,olicy, the tas$ of di,lo9acy is fourfoldB @.A *i,lo9acy 9ust deter9ine its obGectives in the light of the ,ower actually and ,otentially available for the ,ursuit of these obGectives! @=A *i,lo9acy 9ust assess the obGectives of other nations and the ,ower actually and ,otentially available for the ,ursuit of these obGectives! @0A *i,lo9acy 9ust deter9ine to what e)tent these different obGectives are co9,atible with each other! @6A *i,lo9acy 9ust e9,loy the 9eans suited to the ,ursuit of its obGectives! &ailure in any one of these tas$s 9ay Geo,ardiHe the success of foreign ,olicy and with it the ,eace of the world! ' nation that sets itself goals which it has not the ,ower to attain 9ay have to face the ris$ of war on two counts! Such a nation is li$ely to dissi,ate its strength and not to be strong enough at all ,oints of friction to deter a hostile nation fro9 challenging it beyond endurance! The failure of its foreign ,olicy 9ay force the nation to retrace its ste,s and to redefine its obGectives in view of its actual strength! #et it is 9ore li$ely that, under the ,ressure of an infla9ed ,ublic o,inion, such a nation will go forward on the road toward an unattainable goal, strain all its resources to achieve it, and finally, confounding the national interest with that goal, see$ in war the solution to a ,roble9 that cannot be

solved by ,eaceful 9eans! ' nation will also invite war if its di,lo9acy wrongly assesses the obGectives of other nations and the ,ower at their dis,osal! 8e have already ,ointed to the error of 9ista$ing a ,olicy of the status Luo for a ,olicy of i9,erialis9, and vice versa, and of confounding one $ind of i9,erialis9 with another! . ' nation that 9ista$es a ,olicy of i9,erialis9 for a ,olicy of the status Luo will be un,re,ared to 9eet the threat to its own e)istence which the other nationIs ,olicy entails! ts wea$ness will invite attac$ and 9ay 9a$e war inevitable! ' nation that 9ista$es a ,olicy of the status Luo for a ,olicy of i9,erialis9 will evo$e through its dis,ro,ortionate reaction the very danger of war which it is trying to avoid! &or as ' 9ista$es BIs ,olicy for i9,erialis9, so O 9ight 9ista$e 'Is defensive reaction for i9,erialis9! Thus both nations, each intent u,on forestalling i9aginary aggression fro9 the other side, will rush to ar9s! Si9ilarly, the confusion of one ty,e of i9,erialis9 with another 9ay call for dis,ro,ortionate reaction and thus evo$e the ris$ of war! 's for the assess9ent of the ,ower of other nations, either to overrate or to underrate it 9ay be eLually fatal to the cause of ,eace! By overrating the ,ower of B, ' 9ay ,refer to yield to BIs de9ands until, finally, ' is forced to fight for its very e)istence under the 9ost unfavorable conditions! By underrating the ,ower of B, ' 9ay beco9e overconfident in its assu9ed su,eriority! ' 9ay advance de9ands and i9,ose conditions u,on O which the latter is su,,osedly too wea$ to resist! "ot sus,ecting BIs actual ,ower of resistance, ' 9ay be faced with the alternative of either retreating and conceding defeat or of advancing and ris$ing war! ' nation that see$s to ,ursue an intelligent and ,eaceful foreign ,olicy cannot cease co9,aring its own obGectives and the obGectives of other nations in the light of their co9,atibility! f they are co9,atible, no ,roble9 arises! f they are not co9,atible, nation ' 9ust deter9ine whether its obGectives are so vital to itself that they 9ust be ,ursued des,ite that inco9,atibility with the obGectives of B! f it is found that 'Is vital interests can be safeguarded without the attain9ent of these obGectives, they ought to be abandoned! ;n the other hand, if ' finds that these obGectives are essential for its vital interests, ' 9ust then as$ itself whether BIs obGectives, inco9,atible with its own, are essential for BIs vital interests! f the answer see9s to be in the negative, ' 9ust try to induce O to abandon its obGectives, offering O eLuivalents not vital to '! n other words, through di,lo9atic bargaining, the give and ta$e of co9,ro9ise, a way 9ust be sought by which the interests of ' and O can be reconciled! &inally, if the inco9,atible obGectives of ' and O should ,rove to he vital to either side, a way 9ight still be sought in which the vital interests of ' and O 9ight be redefined, reconciled, and their obGectives thus 9ade co9,atible with each other! Here, however C even ,rovided that both sides ,ursue intelligent and ,eaceful ,olicies C ' and O are 9oving dangerously close to the brin$ of war! t is the final tas$ of an intelligent di,lo9acy, intent u,on ,reserving ,eace, to choose the a,,ro,riate 9eans for ,ursuing its obGectives! The 9eans at the dis,osal of di,lo9acy are threeB ,ersuasion, co9,ro9ise, and threat of force! "o di,lo9acy relying only u,on the threat of force can clai9 to be both intelligent and ,eaceful! "o di,lo9acy that would sta$e everything on ,ersuasion and co9,ro9ise deserves to be called intelligent! Rarely, if ever, in the conduct of the foreign ,olicy of a great ,ower is there Gustification for using only one 9ethod to the e)clusion of the others! Generally, the di,lo9atic re,resentative of a great ,ower, in order to be able to serve both the interests of his country and the interests of ,eace, 9ust at the sa9e ti9e use ,ersuasion, hold out the advantages of a co9,ro9ise, and i9,ress the other side with the 9ilitary strength of his country! The art of di,lo9acy consists in ,utting the right e9,hasis at any ,articular 9o9ent on each of these three 9eans at its dis,osal! ' di,lo9acy that has successfully discharged its other functions 9ay well fail in advancing the national interest and ,reserving ,eace if it stresses ,ersuasion when the give and ta$e of co9,ro9ise is ,ri9arily reLuired by the circu9stances of the case! ' di,lo9acy that ,uts 9ost of its eggs in the bas$et of co9,ro9ise when the 9ilitary 9ight of the nation should be ,redo9inantly dis,layed, or stresses 9ilitary 9ight when the ,olitical situation calls for ,ersuasion and co9,ro9ise, will li$ewise fail! IN'TRU$ENT' OF .IPLO$AC3 These four tas$s of di,lo9acy are the basic ele9ents of which foreign ,olicy consists everywhere and at all ti9es! ;ne 9ight say that the chieftain of a ,ri9itive tribe 9aintaining ,olitical relations with a neighboring tribe will have to ,erfor9 these four functions in order to be successful and ,reserve ,eace! The need for the ,erfor9ance of these functions is as old and as wides,read as international ,olitics itself! ;nly the ,erfor9ance of these functions by organiHed agencies is of relatively recent origin! The organiHed instru9ents of di,lo9acy are twoB the foreign offices in the ca,itals of the res,ective nations and the di,lo9atic re,resentatives sent by the foreign offices to the ca,itals of foreign nations! The foreign office is the ,olicyfor9ing agency, the brains of foreign ,olicy where the i9,ressions fro9 the outside world are gathered and evaluated, where foreign ,olicy is for9ulated, and where the i9,ulses e9anate which the di,lo9atic re,resentatives transfor9 into actual foreign ,olicy! 8hile the foreign office is the brains of foreign ,olicy, the di,lo9atic re,resentatives are its eyes, ear, and 9outh, its fingerti,s, and, as it were, its itinerant incarnations! The di,lo9at fulfills three basic functions for his govern9ent C sy9bolic, legal, and ,olitical!
.

See ,ages 11 ff!, .43 ff!

S mbo"i$ +epresentation The di,lo9at is first of all the sy9bolic re,resentative of his country! 's such, he 9ust continuously ,erfor9 sy9bolic functions and e),ose hi9self to sy9bolic functions on the ,art of other di,lo9ats and of the foreign govern9ent to which he is accredited! These functions serve to test, on the one hand, the ,restige in which his nation is held abroad and, on the other, the ,restige with which his own nation regards the country to whose govern9ent he is accredited! The '9erican a9bassador in %ondon will, for instance, re,resent the President of the :nited States at the official functions to which he is invited and at those which he gives hi9self, such as state dinners, rece,tions, and the li$e, He e)tends and receives congratulations and condolences u,on occasions Goyful or sad for the nations concerned! He ,erfor9s the sy9bolic functions of the di,lo9atic cere9onial!= 's a significant e)a9,le of the sy9bolic function of di,lo9acy, 9ention has been 9ade of the lavish entertain9ent 9ost di,lo9atic 9issions feel constrained to offer to the 9e9bers of the govern9ent to which they are accredited, to their fellow di,lo9ats, and to the high society of the ca,ital where they reside! This custo9, which has been the obGect of 9uch adverse co99ent in de9ocratic countries, is not ,ri9arily the e),ression of a love for lu)ury on the ,art of the individual di,lo9ats, but fulfills a s,ecial function in the sche9e of di,lo9atic re,resentation! 8hile entertaining, the di,lo9at does not act for hi9self as an individual, but as the sy9bolic re,resentative of his country! t is the Soviet a9bassador as such who invites guests to a rece,tion in co99e9oration of the ;ctober Revolution of ./.1! Through hi9 @his identity is irrelevant for this sy9bolic ,ur,oseA, it is the Soviet :nion that entertains, celebrates, and tries to i9,ress its guests C as well as those who ,ointedly have not been invited C with its wealth and generosity! t is not by accident that in the thirties, after the Soviet :nion had regained an i9,ortant, yet sus,ect ,osition in the society of nations, the ,arties given by the Soviet e9bassies throughout the world were fa9ed for their lavishness and for the Luantity and Luality of food and drin$! The ,ur,ose of this e)travagance was not to show the bourgeois, inhabitants of the 8estern world how well off the Russian ,eo,le were! The ,ur,ose was rather to co9,ensate for the ,olitical inferiority fro9 which the Soviet :nion had Gust barely esca,ed and into which it feared it 9ight sin$ again! By instructing its di,lo9atic re,resentatives to act in 9atters of entertain9ent as the eLuals, if not the betters, of their colleagues in foreign ca,itals, the Soviet :nion C not unli$e an u,start who has Gust crashed society C endeavored to de9onstrate sy9bolically that it was at least as good a nation as any other! Lega" +epresentation The di,lo9at also acts as the legal re,resentative of his govern9ent! He is the legal agent of his govern9ent in the sa9e sense in which a do9estic cor,oration with its seat in 8il9ington, *elaware, is re,resented by legal agents in other states and cities! These agents act in the na9e of that legal fiction which we call a cor,oration, 9a$e declarations binding u,on it, sign contracts obligating it, and act within the li9its of the cor,orate charter as though they were the cor,oration! Si9ilarly, the '9erican a9bassador in %ondon ,erfor9s in the na9e of the govern9ent of the :nited States the legal functions that the (onstitution, the laws of the :nited States, and the orders of the govern9ent allow hi9 to ,erfor9! He 9ay be authoriHed to sign a treaty or to trans9it and receive ratification docu9ents by which a treaty already signed is brought into force! He gives legal ,rotection to '9erican citiHens abroad! He 9ay re,resent the :nited States at an international conference or in the agencies of the :nited "ations and cast his vote in the na9e, and according to the instructions, of his govern9ent! Po"iti$a" +epresentation The di,lo9at, together with the foreign office, sha,es the foreign ,olicy of his country! This is by far his 9ost i9,ortant function! 's the foreign office is the nerve center of foreign ,olicy, so are the di,lo9atic re,resentatives its outlying fibers 9aintaining the two-way traffic between the center and the outside world! :,on the di,lo9atsI shoulders lie the 9ain burden of discharging at least one of the four tas$s of di,lo9acy discussed aboveB They 9ust assess the obGectives of other nations and the ,ower actually and ,otentially available for the ,ursuit of these obGectives! To that end, they 9ust infor9 the9selves of the ,lans of the govern9ent to which they are accredited, through direct interrogation of govern9ent officials and ,olitical leaders, through canvassing the ,ress and other 9outh,ieces of ,ublic o,inion! &urther9ore, they 9ust evaluate the ,otential influence u,on govern9ent ,olicies of o,,osing trends within the govern9ent, ,olitical ,arties, and ,ublic o,inion! ' foreign di,lo9at in 8ashington 9ust $ee, his govern9ent infor9ed about the ,resent and ,robable future attitude of the different branches of the :nited States govern9ent with regard to current ,roble9s of international affairs! He 9ust a,,raise the i9,ortance for the develo,9ent of foreign ,olicy of different ,ersonalities in the govern9ent and the ,olitical ,arties! 8hat stands are different ,residential candidates li$ely to ta$e, in the event of their election, on the ,ending issues of foreign ,olicyF 8hat is the influence of a certain colu9nist or co99entator u,on official ,olicy and ,ublic o,inion, and how re,resentative of official thin$ing and of the trends in ,ublic o,inion are his viewsF Such are so9e of the Luestions the di,lo9at 9ust try to answer :,on the reliability of his re,orts and the soundness of his Gudg9ent the success or failure of the foreign ,olicy of his govern9ent and its ability to ,reserve ,eace 9ay well de,end! 8hen it co9es to evaluating the actual and ,otential ,ower of a nation, the di,lo9atic 9ission ta$es on the as,ects
=

See ,ages 21 ff!

of a high-class and sub rosa s,y organiHation! High-ran$ing 9e9bers of the ar9ed services are delegated to the different di,lo9atic 9issions where, as 9ilitary, naval, and air attaches, they are res,onsible for accu9ulating, by whatever 9eans are available, infor9ation about actual and ,lanned ar9a9ents, new wea,ons, the 9ilitary ,otential, 9ilitary organiHation, and the war ,lans of the countries concerned! Their services are su,,le9ented by the co99ercial attaches, who collect infor9ation about econo9ic trends, industrial develo,9ents, and the location of industries, es,ecially with regard to their bearing u,on 9ilitary ,re,aredness! n this and 9any other res,ects too nu9erous to 9ention, the accuracy and soundness of the re,orts a govern9ent receives fro9 its di,lo9atic 9issions abroad are indis,ensable for the soundness of its own decisions! n this function of gathering infor9ation, es,ecially secret infor9ation u,on which the foreign ,olicies of oneIs own nation could be founded, lies the root of 9odern di,lo9acy! n the Middle 'ges it was ta$en for granted that the s,ecial envoy of a ,rince traveling in a foreign country was a s,y! 8hen in the course of the fifteenth century the s9all talian states started to 9a$e use of ,er9anent di,lo9atic re,resentatives in their relations with stronger states, they did so ,ri9arily for the ,ur,ose of receiving ti9ely infor9ation of aggressive intentions on the ,art of the latter! Even when in the si)teenth century ,er9anent di,lo9atic 9issions had beco9e general, di,lo9ats were widely regarded as a nuisance and a liability for the receiving state! 't the beginning of the seventeenth century Hugo Grotius, the founder of 9odern international law, went so far as to advocate their abolition! *i,lo9atic re,resentatives are not 9erely the eyes and the ears that re,ort the events of the outside world to the nerve center of foreign ,olicy as the raw 9aterial for its decisions! *i,lo9atic re,resentatives are also the 9outh and the hands through which the i9,ulses e9anating fro9 the nerve center are transfor9ed into words and actions! They 9ust 9a$e the ,eo,le a9ong who9 they live, and es,ecially the 9outh,ieces of their ,ublic o,inion and their ,olitical leaders, understand and, if ,ossible, a,,rove the foreign ,olicy they re,resent! &or this tas$ of JsellingJ a foreign ,olicy, the ,ersonal a,,eal of the di,lo9at and his understanding of the ,sychology of the foreign ,eo,le are essential ,rereLuisites! n the ,erfor9ance of the ,eace-,reserving functions of ,ersuasion, negotiations, and threat of force, the di,lo9atic re,resentative ,lays an outstanding ,art! His foreign office can give hi9 instructions concerning the obGectives ,ursued and the 9eans to be e9,loyed! #et for the e)ecution of these instructions it 9ust rely u,on the Gudg9ent and the s$ill of the di,lo9atic re,resentative hi9self! The foreign office can tell its re,resentative to use ,ersuasion or to threaten force or to avail hi9self of both tactics si9ultaneously, but 9ust leave to the re,resentativeIs discretion how and when to 9a$e use of those techniLues! How ,ersuasive an argu9ent will be, what advantages a negotiated agree9ent will yield, what i9,ression the threat of force will 9a$e, how effectively e9,hasis is ,laced u,on one or the other of these techniLues C all this lies in the hands of the di,lo9at, who has it in his ,ower to bungle a good, and avoid the worst conseLuences of a bad, foreign ,olicy! 8e have 9entioned the s,ectacular contributions great di,lo9atists have 9ade to the ,ower of their nations! 0 Their contributions to the cause of ,eace are no less i9,ortant! THE .ECLINE OF .IPLO$AC3 Today di,lo9acy no longer ,erfor9s the role, often s,ectacular and brilliant and always i9,ortant, that it ,erfor9ed fro9 the end of the Thirty #earsI 8ar to the beginning of the &irst 8orld 8ar! The decline of di,lo9acy set in with the end of the &irst 8orld 8ar! n the twenties, a few outstanding di,lo9atists were still able to 9a$e i9,ortant contributions to the foreign ,olicies of their countries! n the decade ,receding the Second 8orld 8ar, the ,art di,lo9ats too$ in sha,ing foreign ,olicy beca9e even s9aller, and the decline of di,lo9acy as a techniLue of conducting foreign affairs beca9e 9ore and 9ore ,atent! Since the end of the Second 8orld 8ar, di,lo9acy has lost its vitality, and its functions have withered away to such an e)tent as is without ,recedent in the history of the 9odern state syste9! &ive factors account for that decline! %e8e"opment o! Communi$ations The 9ost obvious of these factors is the develo,9ent of 9odern co99unications! *i,lo9acy owes its rise in ,art to the absence of s,eedy co99unications in a ,eriod when the govern9ents of the new territorial states 9aintained continuous ,olitical relations with each other! *i,lo9acy owes its decline in ,art to the develo,9ent of s,eedy and regular co99unications in the for9 of the satellite, the air,lane, the radio, the telegra,h, the telety,e, the long distance tele,hone! 8hen at any ti9e before the &irst 8orld 8ar the govern9ents of the :nited States and of Great Britain wanted to enter into negotiations, it was indis,ensable for the9 to have ,er9anent re,resentatives, endowed with a great deal of discretion, in %ondon and 8ashington to carry on the negotiations These ,er9anent re,resentatives were necessary because the facilities for trans9itting ra,idly and continuously detailed 9essages were cu9berso9e and, 9ore ,articularly, because the ti9e consu9ed by travel 9ade ,ersonal consultations i9,ossible without disru,ting the negotiations! Today an official of the State *e,art9ent needs only to converse over the transatlantic tele,hone with his counter,art in the British &oreign ;ffice or with the '9erican a9bassador in %ondon, or to board a transatlantic ,lane in the evening to start negotiations in %ondon the ne)t 9orning! 8henever direct consultations with his
0

See ,ages .5/ ff!

govern9ent beco9e necessary, a day is all he needs to cross and recross the 'tlantic, infor9 his govern9ent of the latest develo,9ents, and receive its instructions! ;nly seventy-five years ago, it would have been unthin$able for the Secretary of State to absent hi9self fro9 8ashington for wee$s in order to ,artici,ate in an international conference or visit foreign ca,itals! "ow, when he is absent fro9 the ca,ital he re9ains in continuous contact with the State *e,art9ent through tele,hone and radio, and an overnight tri, will bring hi9 bac$ to 8ashington on a 9o9entIs notice! Thus as a rule i9,ortant negotiations are carried on, not by di,lo9atic re,resentatives, but by s,ecial delegates who 9ay be the foreign 9inisters the9selves or high officials of the foreign offices or technical e),erts! The 9odern technology of co99unications has 9ade Jshuttle di,lo9acyJ ,ossible! %epre$iation o! %ip"oma$ These technological develo,9ents are, however, not solely res,onsible for the discard into which the traditional 9ethods of di,lo9acy have fallen! To the technological ability to ,art with the services of di,lo9acy 9ust be added the conviction that those services ought to be ,arted with because they not only contribute nothing to the cause of ,eace, but actually endanger it! This conviction grew in the sa9e soil that nourished the conce,tion of ,ower ,olitics as an accident of history to be eli9inated at will! 6 That conviction and this conce,tion both recogniHe the inti9ate relation between ,ower ,olitics and the functions of di,lo9acy, and in this they are right! The e9ergence of di,lo9acy as an institution coincides with the rise of the nation state and, hence, with the a,,earance of international relations in the 9odern sense! The conte9,orary e9ergence of di,lo9acy and the 9odern state syste9 is, however, 9ore than a 9ere coincidence! f there is to be intercourse at all a9ong sovereign nations with the goal of creating and 9aintaining at least a 9odicu9 of order and ,eace in international affairs, that intercourse 9ust be carried on by ,er9anent agents! The o,,osition to, and de,reciation of, di,lo9acy is then but a ,eculiar 9anifestation of hostility to the 9odern state syste9 and the $ind of international ,olitics it has ,roduced! t is indeed true that the di,lo9at has been held 9orally in low estee9 throughout 9odern history, and not only by those who thought that there was an easy way of eli9inating the struggle for ,ower fro9 the international scene! The di,lo9atIs re,utation for deviousness and dishonesty is as old as di,lo9acy itself! 8ell $nown is the definition of a di,lo9at, attributed to Sir Henry 8otton, an English a9bassador at the beginning of the seventeenth century, as Jan honest 9an sent abroad to lie for his country!J 8hen Metternich was infor9ed of the death of the Russian a9bassador at the (ongress of Eienna, he is re,orted to have e)clai9edB J'h, is that trueF 8hat 9ay have been his 9otiveFJ The 9odern version of that de,reciation of di,lo9acy attaches s,ecial i9,ortance to one ,articular as,ect of the di,lo9atic techniLue C its secrecy! *uring and after the &irst 8orld 8ar, wide currency was given to the o,inion that the secret 9achinations of di,lo9ats shared a great deal, if not the 9aGor ,ortion, of res,onsibility for that war, that the secrecy of di,lo9atic negotiations was an atavistic and dangerous residue fro9 the aristocratic ,ast> and that international negotiations carried on and concluded under the watchful eyes of a ,eace loving ,ublic o,inion could not but further the cause of ,eace! 8oodrow 8ilson was the 9ost eloLuent s,o$es9an of this new ,hiloso,hy of international affairs! The Prea9ble to and the first of his &ourteen Points are the classic state9ent of the new ,hiloso,hy! The Prea9ble to the &ourteen Points statesB t will be our wish and ,ur,ose that the ,rocesses of ,eace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely o,en, and that they shall involve and ,er9it henceforth no secret understandings of any $ind! The day of conLuest and aggrandiHe9ent is gone by> so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of ,articular govern9ents, and li$ely at so9e unloo$ed-for 9o9ent to u,set the ,eace of the world! t is this ha,,y fact, now clear to the view of every ,ublic 9an whose thoughts do not still linger in an age that is dead and gone, which 9a$es it ,ossible for every nation whose ,ur,oses are consistent with Gustice and the ,eace of the world to avow, now or at any other ti9e, the obGects it has in view! The first ,oint readsB J;,en covenants of ,eace, o,enly arrived at, after which there shall be no ,rivate international understandings of any $ind, but di,lo9acy shall ,roceed always fran$ly and in the ,ublic view!J5 %ip"oma$ b Par"iamentar Pro$e(ures t was in deference to this new ,hiloso,hy that after the &irst 8orld 8ar the states9en of the world began to de,art fro9 the established ,attern of di,lo9acy! They created in the %eague of "ations and later in the :nited "ations a new ty,e of di,lo9atic intercourseB di,lo9acy by ,arlia9entary ,rocedure! nternational ,roble9s reLuiring solution are ,ut on the agenda of the deliberative bodies of these organiHations! The delegates of the different govern9ents discuss the 9erits of the ,roble9 in ,ublic debate! ' vote ta$en in accordance with the constitution of the organiHation dis,oses of the 9atter! This 9ethod has been e9,loyed before by s,ecial conferences, such as the Hague Peace (onferences of .2// and
6 5

See ,ages 01 ff! Selected 'ddresses and Public Pa,ers of 8oodrow 8ilson, edited by 'lbert Bushnell Hart @"ew #or$B Boni and %iveright, nc!, ./.2A, ,,! =61-2!

./41! 's an over-all 9ethod of dealing with international ,roble9s, it was e9,loyed for the first ti9e by the %eague of "ations! ts use by that organiHation was, however, a,,arent rather than real! The ,ublic discussions of the (ouncil and the 'sse9bly of the %eague were as a rule carefully rehearsed, es,ecially when ,olitical 9atters were under consideration! ' solution to which all could agree was generally sought and often found by the traditional 9eans of secret negotiations, ,receding the ,ublic 9eetings! The latter, then, si9,ly gave the delegates of the nations concerned an o,,ortunity of restating their ,ositions for ,ublic consu9,tion and of ratifying, in co9,liance with the ,rovisions of the (ovenant, the agree9ent secretly reached! The :nited "ations, on the contrary, has ta$en seriously the ,arlia9entary 9ethods of transacting the business of di,lo9acy! t has develo,ed the new 9ethods of :nited "ations di,lo9acy, whose ,ur,ose it is to recreate for every issue co9ing to a vote in the General 'sse9bly the two-thirds 9aGority reLuired by the (harter! Generally s,ea$ing, the ai9 of the new di,lo9acy of the :nited "ations is not the settle9ent of an issue dividing the 9e9bers, but the line-u, of a two-thirds 9aGority to outvote the other side! t is a vote at which its ,rocesses ai9 and in which they cul9inate! The trend toward ,ublic ,arlia9entary ,rocedures instead of traditional di,lo9atic negotiations, of which the o,erations of the General 'sse9bly of the :nited "ations are ty,ical, has also affected the ,ostwar international conferences which by co9,osition, issues, and obGectives 9ost closely rese9ble the di,lo9atic gatherings of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries! The Paris Peace (onference of ./63, attended by twenty-one nations, o,erated in the full light of ,ublicity and du,licated in its ,rocedures the ,attern established by the deliberative agencies of the :nited "ations! The &oreign MinistersI (onferences, co9,osed of the foreign 9inisters of &rance, Great Britain, the Soviet :nion, and the :nited States, which tried to dis,ose of the legacy of the Second 8orld 8ar, have debated and voted either in full ,ublic view or behind the trans,arent screen of se9isecrecy which allowed the ,ublic to follow the 9ain ,hases of the debate as re,orted by the different delegations to the corres,ondents of the ,ress! However, the ease of co99unications, the conde9nation of secret di,lo9acy, and the new ,arlia9entary di,lo9acy cannot fully account for this over-all disintegration of di,lo9acy! Two additional factors 9ust share res,onsibility for the declineB the ,eculiarly untraditional a,,roach of the two su,er,owers to the issues of international ,olitics, and the very nature of world ,olitics in the second half of the twentieth century! The Superpo-ers0 Ne-$omers to %ip"oma$ n its for9ative years the :nited States benefited fro9 the services of an unusually brilliant di,lo9acy! &ro9 the +ac$sonian era on, the e9inent Lualities of '9erican di,lo9acy disa,,eared as the need for the9 see9ed to disa,,ear! 8hen the need for an active '9erican foreign ,olicy beca9e 9anifest in the late ./04s there was nothing to build on but a 9ediocre foreign service, the conde9nation of ,ower ,olitics and of secret di,lo9acy transfor9ed into 9oral indignation at Jaggressor nations,J and the tradition of the big stic$, which had wor$ed so well in the 8estern He9is,here! Thus it was the i9,rovisations of &ran$lin *! Roosevelt alone, guided at ti9es by an intuitive gras, of the international realities, that $e,t '9erican foreign ,olicy in tune with '9erican interests! n that decisive ,eriod neither the Secretary of State nor the ,er9anent staff of the State *e,art9ent nor the di,lo9atic re,resentatives abroad e)erted 9ore than a subordinate influence u,on the conduct of '9erican foreign ,olicy! 8hen Roosevelt, who for twelve years had al9ost single-handedly 9ade '9erican foreign ,olicy, left the scene, there was no 9an or grou, of 9en ca,able of creating and o,erating that intricate and subtle 9achinery by which traditional di,lo9acy had given ,eaceful ,rotection and furtherance to the national interest! "or could that s9all grou, of able and devoted ,ublic servants who $new what foreign ,olicy was all about rely u,on the ,ublic understanding of, and ,o,ular su,,ort for, the rational and intricate ,rocesses of foreign ,olicy, without which foreign ,olicy in a de9ocracy cannot be successfully conducted! &or Luite different reasons the Soviet :nion has found it difficult to develo, adeLuate instru9ents for di,lo9atic intercourse! The Bolshevist Revolution of ./.1 destroyed the Russian di,lo9atic service, which could loo$ bac$ u,on a long tradition and had a nu9ber of brilliant achieve9ents to its credit! The few old-school di,lo9ats who were retained in office after the Revolution and the new di,lo9ats of talent who rose fro9 the ran$s of the revolutionaries had little o,,ortunity to ,rove the9selves! The hostility between the Soviet :nion and 9ost other nations and the resulting isolation of the Soviet :nion ,revented the conduct of nor9al di,lo9atic relations! &urther9ore, the Russian di,lo9at was the e9issary of a totalitarian govern9ent that ,unished failure, or even too 9uch discretion in inter,reting official orders, at least with loss of office! n conseLuence, ,ostrevolutionary Russian di,lo9ats have traditionally C and 9ore than ever since the conclusion of the Second 8orld 8ar C conceived of their tas$ as the trans9ission of the ,ro,osals of their govern9ents, which other govern9ents 9ight acce,t or reGect as they see fit! (ounter,ro,osals and other new ele9ents in the negotiations call for new instru9ents fro9 the foreign office! The content of these new instru9ents is again sub9itted to the other govern9ents, which 9ay ta$e it or leave it, and so forth, until the ,atience of one or the other or of all ,arties is e)hausted! Such a ,rocedure destroys all the virtues of di,lo9atic negotiations, such as Luic$ ada,tation to new situations, clever use of a ,sychological o,ening, retreat and advance as the situation 9ay reLuire, ,ersuasion, the Luid ,ro Luo of bargaining, and the li$e! *i,lo9atic intercourse, as ,racticed by the new Russian di,lo9acy, rese9bles nothing so 9uch as a series of 9ilitary orders relayed fro9 the high co99and C the foreign office C to the field co99anders C the di,lo9atic re,resentatives C who in turn co99unicate the ter9s of agree9ent to the ene9y! ' di,lo9at whose 9ain concern 9ust be to retain the a,,roval of his su,eriors is usually only too eager to re,ort what the latter would li$e to hear, regardless of whether the re,ort is true! This tendency to bend the truth to the wishes

of the foreign office and to ,aint the facts in favorable colors is found in all di,lo9atic services> for co9,liance enhances security in office and increases the chance for advance9ent! ,2 BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB The Future of .i&lo acy

HO% CAN .IPLO$AC3 "E RE#I#E.4 The revival of di,lo9acy reLuires the eli9ination of the factors, or at least of so9e of their conseLuences, res,onsible for the decline of the traditional di,lo9atic ,ractices! Priority in this res,ect belongs to the de,reciation of di,lo9acy and its corollaryB di,lo9acy by ,arlia9entary ,rocedures! n so far as that de,reciation is only the result of the de,reciation of ,ower ,olitics, what we have said about the latter should suffice for the for9er! . *i,lo9acy, however 9orally unattractive its business 9ay see9 to 9any, is nothing but a sy9,to9 of the struggle for ,ower a9ong sovereign nations, which try to 9aintain orderly and ,eaceful relations a9ong the9selves! f there were a way of banning the struggle for ,ower fro9 the international scene, di,lo9acy would disa,,ear of itself! f order and anarchy, ,eace and war, were 9atters of no concern to the nations of the world, they could dis,ense with di,lo9acy, ,re,are for war, and ho,e for the best! f nations who are sovereign, who are su,re9e within their territories with no su,erior above the9, want to ,reserve ,eace and order in their relations, they 9ust try to ,ersuade, negotiate, and e)ert ,ressure u,on each other! That is to say, they 9ust engage in, cultivate, and rely u,on di,lo9atic ,rocedures! The new ,arlia9entary di,lo9acy is no substitute for these ,rocedures! ;n the contrary, it tends to aggravate rather than 9itigate international conflicts and leaves the ,ros,ect for ,eace di99ed rather than brightened! Three essential Lualities of the new di,lo9acy are res,onsible for these unfortunate resultsB its ,ublicity, its 9aGor votes, and its frag9entation of international issues! The @i$e o! Pub"i$it Much of the confusion attending discussion of the ,roble9 of secret di,lo9acy results fro9 the failure to distinguish between two se,arate as,ects of the ,roble9B between Jo,en covenantsJ and Jcovenants o,enly arrived at,J between ,ublicity for the results of di,lo9atic negotiations and ,ublicity for the di,lo9atic negotiations the9selves! *isclosure of the results of di,lo9atic negotiations is reLuired by the ,rinci,les of de9ocracy, for without it there can be no de9ocratic control of foreign ,olicy! #et ,ublicity for the negotiations the9selves is not reLuired by de9ocracy and runs counter to the reLuire9ents of co99on sense! t ta$es only co99on sense derived fro9 daily e),erience to realiHe that it is i9,ossible to negotiate in ,ublic on anything in which ,arties other than the negotiators are interested! This i9,ossibility derives fro9 the very nature of negotiation and fro9 the social conte)t in which negotiations generally o,erate! t is a co99on characteristic of negotiations that they are started by each side with 9a)i9u9 de9ands, which are whittled down in a ,rocess of ,ersuasion, bargaining, and ,ressures until both sides 9eet on a level below the one fro9 which they started! The saving grace of negotiations is the result that satisfies the de9ands of either side, at least u, to a ,oint, and tends to strengthen a9ity between the ,arties by de9onstrating in the act of agree9ent the e)istence of identical or co9,le9entary interests binding the9 together! ;n the other hand, the ,rocess leading u, to the result reveals the ,arties in roles in which they would rather not be re9e9bered by their fellows! There are 9ore edifying s,ectacles than the bluffing, blustering, haggling, and deceiving, the real wea$ness and ,retended strength, which go with horse-trading and the drive for a bargain! To ,ubliciHe such negotiations is tanta9ount to destroying, or at least i9,airing, the bargaining ,osition of the ,arties in any further negotiations in which they 9ight be engaged with other ,arties! "ot only will their bargaining ,ositions suffer! Their social status, their ,restige, and their ,ower will face irre,arable da9age if ,ublicity attends these negotiations, uncovering their wea$ness and un9as$ing their ,retenses! (o9,etitors for the gains the negotiators see$ will ta$e advantage of what the ,ublic negotiations have revealed to the9! They will do so not only in further negotiations with the ,arties, but also in their over-all calculations, ,lans, and dis,ositions, which ta$e into account the Lualities and ,otentialities of all ,artici,ants in the co9,etition! t is for these reasons that in a free 9ar$et no seller will carry on ,ublic negotiations with a buyer> no landlord with a tenant> no institution of higher learning with its staff! "o candidate for office will negotiate in ,ublic with his bac$ers> no ,ublic official with his colleagues> no ,olitician with his fellow ,oliticians! How, then, are we to e),ect that nations are able and willing to do what no ,rivate individual would thin$ of doingF The disadvantage to which nations would be ,ut by the ,ublicity of their negotiations is further increased by the fact that the audience witnessing the s,ectacle of ,ublic international negotiations co9,rises not only a li9ited nu9ber
.

See ,ages 01 ff!

of interested ,arties, but the whole world! More ,articularly, the govern9ents concerned negotiate under the watchful eyes of their own ,eo,les and, es,ecially when they are de9ocratically elected, in full view of the o,,osition! "o govern9ent that wants to stay in ,ower or si9,ly retain the res,ect of its ,eo,le can afford to give u, ,ublicly ,art of what it had declared at the outset to be Gust and necessary, to retreat fro9 a ,osition initially held, to concede at least the ,artial Gustice of the other sideIs clai9s! Heroes, not horsetraders, are the idols of ,ublic o,inion! Public o,inion, while dreading war, de9ands that its di,lo9ats act as heroes who do not yield in the face of the ene9y, even at the ris$ of war, and conde9ns as wea$lings and traitors those who yield, albeit only halfway, for the sa$e of ,eace! &urther9ore, traditional di,lo9acy used to transact the business of state in a language and with 9anners well fitted for its ,ur,ose! The ai9 of di,lo9acy then was to ,ro9ote the national interest with 9oderation and leave the door o,en for co9,ro9ise in the for9 of a negotiated settle9ent! Measured words and for9aliHed ,hrases, used in those transactions, co99itted the s,ea$er to nothing or to Gust as 9uch as he was willing to 9a$e good! These ,hrases and for9alities are e9,ty of, or in any case vague in, 9eaning and hence are susce,tible to all $inds of inter,retations in su,,ort of whatever ,olicy or settle9ent see9s to be advantageous in the end! They are also ,olite and, hence, 9a$e it easy for those who use the9 to get along with each other, however grave the issues 9ay be that se,arate nations! n su9, they are the ,erfect instru9ent of the subtle, cautious, 9oderate, conciliatory negotiator! Public di,lo9acy and its advocates can have nothing but conte9,t for such an instru9ent, which, so they thin$, belongs to a bygone age of aristocratic snobbery and 9oral indifference! (rusaders for the right C and that is what ,ublic di,lo9ats are su,,osed to be C do not s,ea$ li$e that! Seated on a stage with the world as their audience, the ,ublic di,lo9ats s,ea$ to the world rather than to each other! Their ai9 is not to ,ersuade each other that they could find co99on ground for agree9ent, but to ,ersuade the world and es,ecially their own nations that they are right and the other side is wrong and that they are and always will re9ain staunch defenders of the right! "o 9an who has ta$en such a stand before the attentive eyes and ears of the world can in full ,ublic view agree to a co9,ro9ise without loo$ing li$e a fool and a $nave! He 9ust ta$e hi9self at his ,ublic word and 9ust stand unyielding Jon ,rinci,le,J the favored ,hrase of ,ublic di,lo9acy, rather than on negotiation and co9,ro9ise! He 9ust defend the ,osition initially ta$en, and so 9ust the other side! "either side being able to retreat or advance, a ,hony warJ of ,ositions ensues! Both sides o,,ose each other infle)ibly, each side $nowing that the other will not and cannot 9ove! To offer the ,ublic so9e se9blance of activity, they fire into the air the e9,ty shells of words, which e),lode noisily and, as everybody $nows, are ai9ed at nothing! t is only in 9utual vitu,eration that the 9inds of the delegates 9eet! 8hen the delegates finally ,art, e9bittered and frustrated, they reach, however indignantly, an agree9ent of sorts at last on one ,ointB the other side has engaged in ,ro,aganda! t so ha,,ens that on this ,oint both sides are right! This degeneration of di,lo9atic intercourse into a ,ro,aganda 9atch is then, the inevitable conco9itant of the ,ublicity of the new di,lo9acy! "ot only is a ,ublicly conducted di,lo9acy unable to reach agree9ent or even to negotiate for the ,ur,ose of reaching agree9ent, but each ,ublic 9eeting leaves international 9atters in a worse state than before! &or each ,ro,aganda 9atch strengthens the conviction of the different delegates and of their nations that they are absolutely right and that the other side is absolutely wrong and that the ga, se,arating the9 is too dee, and wide to be bridged by the traditional 9ethods of di,lo9acy! There is 9uch wisdo9 in the ,lea which the Secretary General of the :nited "ations 9ade in his re,ort of ./53, elaborated in the re,ort of ./5/, to Jgive greater e9,hasis to the :nited "ations as an instru9ent for negotiation of settle9ents, as distinct fro9 the 9ere debate of issues!J The @i$e o! MaGorit %e$ision The evil wrought by the ,ublic conduct of di,lo9acy is co9,ounded by the atte9,t to decide issues by 9aGority vote! n the General 'sse9bly of the :nited "ations, this 9ethod has develo,ed into the ,attern of at least two-thirds of the 9e9bers trying to vote down the rest! That this 9ethod of conducting the business of di,lo9acy has 9ade no direct contribution to the ,eaceful settle9ent of a single outstanding issue is obvious fro9 the results! &or instance, the Soviet bloc was voted down ti9e and again on the 7orean issue! #et the voting in the General 'sse9bly was relevant for the settle9ent of the 7orean issue only in so far as it de9onstrated the voting strength, and thereby enhanced the ,olitical strength, of the 8estern bloc and enabled the nations su,,orting the :nited "ations action in 7orea to act in unison visa-vis the Soviet bloc! Beyond that indirect contribution in ter9s of increasing the strength of one side, the voting contributed nothing to the settle9ent of the 7orean issue! That issue was settled on the battlefield and in di,lo9atic negotiations between East and 8est, not in the cha9ber of the General 'sse9bly! The reason why the outvoting of an o,,onent in a deliberative international body is a useless and 9ay even be a 9ischievous underta$ing, aside fro9 its occasional use for strengthening a ,articular grou,, is to be found in the very nature of international society in contrast to national societies! 8hen the (ongress of the :nited States votes down a 9inority, it actually decides the issue for the ti9e being! t is able to do so for four reasons, all of which are absent on the international scene! .! The ,arlia9entary 9aGority vote is an integral ,art of a whole syste9 of devices for ,eaceful change, each being able to o,erate in su,,le9entation or su,,ort of, or as a corrective u,on, the others, and all li9ited and coordinated by the (onstitution! The 9inority and the 9aGority in (ongress 9a$e u, an integrated society! 'side fro9 deliberative bodies deciding by 9aGority vote, the national society has created a series of devices, such as the ,residential veto and Gudicial review, by which the 9aGority vote can be overridden and the 9inority can be ,rotected against

unconstitutional use and arbitrary 9isuse of the 9aGority vote! Behind a 9aGority decision as well as behind the defeated 9inority stands the whole 9oral and ,olitical ,ower of the national co99unity, ready to enforce a decision of the 9aGority and to ,rotect the 9inority against inGustice and abuse! =! The instru9entalities of ,eaceful change which o,erate within the national co99unity give the 9inority a chance to beco9e a 9aGority so9eti9e in the future! That chance is inherent in the device of ,eriodical elections and in the dyna9ics of the social ,rocess, which ,roduce ever-new align9ents and distributions of ,ower! These dyna9ics also see to it that a 9inority in a deliberative asse9bly is never a 9inority in all the res,ects i9,ortant to it! ' grou, 9ay be a religious 9inority, outvoted in issues of this $ind, but 9ay be ,art of the econo9ic 9aGority deter9ining econo9ic legislation, and so forth! 0! The nu9erical relation between 9inority and 9aGority is at least an a,,ro)i9ation to the actual distribution of ,ower and interests within the whole ,o,ulation! 8hen the House of Re,resentatives votes a 9otion down C say, =14 to 34 C it is generally safe to assu9e that only a relatively s9all 9inority of the '9erican ,eo,le is identified with the defeated 9easure! 6! 8hile in (ongress each vote cast counts for one, it is of course true, ,olitically s,ea$ing, that all votes are not of eLual weight! The negative vote of a ,owerful co99ittee chair9an, industrialist, far9er, or labor leader with res,ect to a ,iece of legislation affecting the interests of his res,ective grou, 9ay well have a bearing u,on the ,olitical, econo9ic, or social conseLuences that the 9aGority intended the ,iece of legislation to have! #et even the 9ost ,owerful single vote in (ongress re,resents but a s9all fraction of the total ,ower of the '9erican ,eo,le! "one of these four factors that 9a$e ,ossible the contribution of the 9aGority vote to do9estic ,eaceful change o,erates on the international scene! .! The 9aGority vote is the sole device for co9,ulsory ,eaceful change within the fra9ewor$ of the :nited "ations! There is no constitution, no ,residential veto, no co9,ulsory Gudicial review, no bill of rights, i9,osing substantive and ,rocedural restraints u,on the 9aGority and ,rotecting the 9inority against inGustice and abuse! "or is there a co99unity i9,osing 9oral restraints u,on 9aGority and 9inority ali$e and able to enforce the decision of the 9aGority against a recalcitrant 9inority! The 9aGority can outvote the 9inority as often as its wants to and on any issue it chooses, and the 9inority can ,rotect itself with the veto and its ,ower against any 9aGority decision it wants to annul! =! ' 9inority in the :nited "ations is li$ely, es,ecially under ,resent ,olitical conditions, to be a ,er9anent one! &or the sa9e reason, its 9inority status is bound to e)tend to certain Luestions of 9aGor i9,ortance! The two-bloc syste9, 9odified by the inde,endent ,osition of (hina and the Third 8orld "ations, that do9inates conte9,orary world ,olitics leads to ,er9anent align9ents on either side of the divide! The tension between the two blocs transfor9s the 9aGority of issues into ,olitical ones! 8hen such issues co9e to a vote, the adherents of the two blocs are li$ely to s,lit along the line se,arating the blocs! 0! The nu9erical relation between a 9inority and a two-thirds 9aGority in the General 'sse9bly obviously does not of necessity corres,ond to the actual distribution of ,ower and interests a9ong the 9e9bers of the :nited "ations, nor does the vote of the 9ost ,owerful 9e9bers of the General 'sse9bly re,resent a relatively s9all fraction of the total ,ower of the co99unity of nations! 'n overwhel9ing 9aGority co9,osed of all the s9all nations of 'frica, 'sia, Euro,e, and %atin '9erica 9eans little in ter9s of ,ower as co9,ared with the one vote of the :nited States or the Soviet :nion! To outvote habitually a ,owerful 9inority in a deliberative international agency, while it 9ay have been a ,otent wea,on in the (old 8ar, does not contribute to the ,reservation of ,eace! &or the 9inority cannot acce,t the decision of the 9aGority and the 9aGority cannot enforce its decision short of war! 't best, ,arlia9entary ,rocedures transferred to the international scene leave things as they are> they leave ,roble9s unsolved and issues unsettled! 't worst, however, these ,rocedures ,oison the international cli9ate and aggravate the conflicts that carry the seeds of war! They ,rovide a 9aGority with an o,,ortunity to hu9iliate the 9inority in ,ublic and as often as it wishes! n the for9 of the veto, the corollary of the 9aGority vote in a society of sovereign nations, these ,rocedures ,rovide the 9inority with a wea,on with which to obstruct the will of the 9aGority and to ,revent the international agency fro9 functioning at all! "either the 9aGority nor the 9inority needs to use self-restraint or be aware of its res,onsibility to the international organiHation or to hu9anity, since what either side votes for or against cannot, as such, influence the course of events! &or one grou, of sovereign nations to vote down habitually another grou, of sovereign nations is, then, to engage in a ,uerile ga9e that can acco9,lish nothing for the ,eaceful settle9ent of international conflicts, but 9ay well carry 9an$ind further down the road to war! The @i$e o! :ragmentation The decision by 9aGority vote i9,lies the third of the vices that stand in the way of a revival of the traditional di,lo9atic ,racticesB the frag9entation of international issues! By its very nature, the 9aGority vote is concerned with an isolated case! The facts of life to be dealt with by the 9aGority decision are artificially se,arated fro9 the facts that ,recede, acco9,any, and follow the9, and are transfor9ed into a legal JcaseJ or a ,olitical JissueJ to be dis,osed of as

such by the 9aGority decision! n the do9estic field, this ,rocedure is not necessarily har9ful! Here the 9aGority decision of a deliberative body o,erates within the conte)t of an intricate syste9 of devices for ,eaceful change, su,,le9enting, su,,orting, or chec$ing each other, as the case 9ay be, but in any case attuned to each other in a certain 9easure and thus giving the individual decisions coherence with each other and with the whole social syste9! ;n the international scene, no such syste9 of integrating factors e)ists! (onseLuently, it is ,articularly inadeLuate here to ta$e u, one JcaseJ or JissueJ after the other and to try to dis,ose of the9 by a succession of 9aGority votes! ' case or issue, such as the Middle East or Berlin, is always a ,articular ,hase and 9anifestation of a 9uch larger situation! Such a case or issue is rooted in the historic ,ast and e)tends its ra9ifications beyond its ,articular locale and into the future! ;ur discussion of the relations between dis,utes and tensions has given us an indication of the inti9ate relations that e)ist between the surface ,heno9ena of international conflicts and those large and undefined ,roble9s which are buried dee, under the surface of the daily occurrences of international life! To deal with cases and issues as they arise, and to try to dis,ose of the9 according to international law or ,olitical e),ediency, is to deal with surface ,heno9ena and leave the underlying ,roble9s unconsidered and unsolved! The %eague of "ations fell victi9 to that vice, and the :nited "ations has been heedless of the %eagueIs e),erience! &or instance, there is no doubt that the %eague of "ations was right, according to international law, in e),elling the Soviet :nion in ./0/ because of its attac$ u,on &inland! But the ,olitical and 9ilitary ,roble9s with which the Soviet :nion confronted the world neither began with its attac$ on &inland nor ended there> it was unwise for the %eague to ,retend that such was the case and to decide the issue on that ,retense! History has ,roved the unwisdo9 of that ,retense, for only SwedenIs refusal to allow British and &rench troo,s to ,ass through Swedish territory in order to co9e to the aid of &inland saved Great Britain and &rance fro9 being at war with Ger9any and the Soviet :nion at the sa9e ti9e! 8henever the %eague of "ations endeavored to deal with ,olitical situations ,resented as legal issues, it could deal with the9 only as isolated cases according to the a,,licable rules of international law, not as ,articular ,hases of an over-all ,olitical situation which reLuired an over-all solution according to the rules of the ,olitical art! Hence, ,olitical ,roble9s were never solved, but only tossed about and finally shelved according to the rules of the legal ga9e! 8hat was true of the %eague of "ations has ,roved to be true of the :nited "ations! n its a,,roach to 9any of the issues brought before its ,olitical agencies, the :nited "ations has re9ained faithful to the tradition established by the %eague of "ations! These cases have ,rovided o,,ortunities for e)ercise in ,arlia9entary ,rocedure and Gust that chicanery for which traditional di,lo9acy has so often been re,roached, but only on rare occasions has even an atte9,t been 9ade to face the ,olitical issues of which these situations are the surface 9anifestations! The s,ecial ,olitical conferences of the ,ostwar ,eriod have re,eated the ,attern of frag9entation established by the %eague of "ations and the :nited "ations! They have dealt, for instance, with 7orea, Ger9an unification, or disar9a9ent! "one of these conferences has faced the ,roble9 of which all these issues are ,articular ,hases and 9anifestations and u,on whose solution the settle9ent of these issues de,endsB the ,roble9 of the over-all relations between the :nited States and the Soviet :nion! Since they were unwilling to co9e to gri,s with the funda9ental ,roble9 of international ,olitics, they were unable to settle any of the ,articular issues on which they concentrated their attention! This failure of conte9,orary di,lo9acy even to see the ,roble9 u,on whose solution the ,reservation of ,eace de,ends, let alone to try to solve it, is the inevitable result of the 9ethods it has e9,loyed! ' di,lo9acy that instead of s,ea$ing in conciliatory ter9s to the other side, addresses the for ,ur,oses of ,ro,aganda> that, instead of negotiating with co9,ro9ise as goal, strives for the chea, triu9,hs of futile 9aGority decisions and of obstructive vetoes> that, instead of facing the ,ri9ary ,roble9, is satisfied with 9ani,ulating the secondary ones C such a di,lo9acy is a liability rather than an asset for the cause of ,eace! These three essential vices of conte9,orary di,lo9acy are aggravated by the 9isuse of 9odern co99unications! The conLuest of ti9e and s,ace by 9odern technology has inevitably reduced the i9,ortance of di,lo9atic re,resentation! #et it has by no 9eans 9ade necessary the confusion of function between the foreign office and di,lo9atic re,resentation which is characteristic of conte9,orary di,lo9acy! ' secretary of state or foreign 9inister is ,hysically able to converse with any foreign ca,ital within a few 9inutesI ti9e by way of 9odern co99unications and to reach it in ,erson within a few days at the 9ost! Thus the tendency has grown for the 9en res,onsible for the conduct of foreign affairs to assu9e the role of roving a9bassadors, hurrying fro9 one conference to another, sto,,ing in between conferences for a short while at the foreign office, and using their ti9e there in ,re,aration for the ne)t 9eeting! The 9en who are su,,osed to be the brains of di,lo9acy, its nerve center, fulfill at best the functions of the nerve ends! n conseLuence, there is a void at the center! There is nobody who faces the over-all ,roble9 of international ,olitics and sees all the ,articular issues as ,hases and 9anifestations of the whole! nstead, each s,ecialist in the foreign office deals with the ,articular ,roble9s belonging to his s,ecialty, and the frag9entation of the conduct of foreign affairs to which the techniLues of conte9,orary di,lo9acy lend the9selves is ,owerfully su,,orted by the lac$ of over-all direction of foreign affairs! THE PRO$I'E OF .IPLO$AC3! IT' NINE RULE'=

8e by no 9eans intend to give here an e)haustive account of rules of di,lo9acy! 8e ,ro,ose to discuss only those which see9 to have a s,ecial bearing u,on the conte9,orary situation!

*i,lo9acy could revive if it would ,art with these vices, which in recent years have well-nigh destroyed its usefulness, and if it would restore the techniLues which have controlled the 9utual relations of nations since ti9e i99e9orial! By doing so, di,lo9acy would realiHe only one of the ,reconditions for the ,reservation of ,eace! The contribution of a revived di,lo9acy to the cause of ,eace would de,end u,on the 9ethods and ,ur,oses of its use! The discussion of these uses is the last tas$ we have set ourselves in this boo$! :our :un(amenta" +u"es *i,lo9acy Must Be *ivested of the (rusading S,irit This is the first of the rules that di,lo9acy can neglect only at the ris$ of war! n the words of 8illia9 Graha9 Su9nerB f you want war, nourish a doctrine! *octrines are the 9ost frightful tyrants to which 9en ever are subGect, because doctrines get inside of a 9anIs own reason and betray hi9 against hi9self! (iviliHed 9en have done their fiercest fighting for doctrines! The reconLuest of the Holy Se,ulcher, Jthe balance of ,ower,J Jno universal do9inion,J Jtrade follows the flag,J Jhe who holds the land will hold the sea,J Jthe throne and the altar,J the revolution, the faith C these are the things for which 9en have given their lives!!!! "ow when any doctrine arrives at that degree of authority, the na9e of it is a club which any de9agogue 9ay swing over you at any ti9e and a,ro,os of anything! n order to describe a doctrine, we 9ust have recourse to theological language! ' doctrine is an article of faith! t is so9ething which you are bound to believe, not because you have so9e rational grounds for believing it is true, but because you belong to such and such a church or deno9ination! !!! ' ,olicy in a state we can understand> for instance, it was the ,olicy of the :nited States at the end of the eighteenth century to get the free navigation of the Mississi,,i to its 9outh, even at the e),ense of war with S,ain! That ,olicy had reason and Gustice in it> it was founded in our interests> it had ,ositive for9 and definite sco,e! ' doctrine is an abstract ,rinci,le> it is necessarily absolute in its sco,e and abstruse in its ter9s> it is a 9eta,hysical assertion! t is never true, because it is absolute and the affairs of 9en are all conditioned and relative! ! ! ! "ow to turn bac$ to ,olitics, Gust thin$ what an abo9ination in statecraft an abstract doctrine 9ust be! 'ny ,olitician or editor can, at any 9o9ent, ,ut a new e)tension on it! The ,eo,le acLuiesce in the doctrine and a,,laud it because they hear the ,oliticians and editors re,eat it, and the ,oliticians and editors re,eat it because they thin$ it is ,o,ular! So it grows! !!! t 9ay 9ean anything or nothing, at any 9o9ent, and no one $nows how it will be! #ou accede to it now, within the vague li9its of what you su,,ose it to be> therefore, you will have to accede to it to9orrow when the sa9e na9e is 9ade to cover so9ething which you never have heard or thought of! f you allow a ,olitical catchword to go on and grow, you will awa$en so9e day to find it standing over you, the arbiter of your destiny, against which you are ,owerless, as 9en are ,owerless against delusions! ! ! ! 8hat can be 9ore contrary to sound states9anshi, and co99on sense than to ,ut forth an abstract assertion which has no definite relation to any interest of ours now at sta$e, but which has in it any nu9ber of ,ossibilities of ,roducing co9,lications which we cannot foresee, but which are sure to be e9barrassing when they arise S 0 't the very beginning of colonial history, this conflict between self-interest and the crusading s,irit was clearly recogniHed and decided in favor of the for9er by +ohn 8inthro,, the first governor of Massachusetts! n the words of Professor Ed9und S! MorganB 8inthro, had 9any 9ore occasions to notice how self-righteousness e)tinguished charity! t also blinded 9en to realities! He $new that "ew England de,ended on the outside world in its new econo9y, and his heart was gladdened every ti9e another shi, s,lashed off the ways at Boston to carry "ew England codfish to 9ar$ets where idolatrous Ro9an (atholics ,aid good, 9oney for the9! He also $new, what a good foreign 9inister had to $now, that righteousness endangered his co99unity when it ,roduced a blind and undiscri9inating defiance to surrounding evils! Thus, when his colleagues refused to aid Rhode sland against the ndians, he re9ar$ed that it was an error in state ,olicy, for though the Rhode slanders were Jdes,erately erroneous and in such distraction a9ong the9selves as ,ortended their ruin, yet if the ndians should ,revail against the9, it would be a great advantage to the ndians, and danger to the whole country by the ar9s etc!, that would there be had, and by the loss of so 9any ,ersons and so 9uch cattle and other substance belonging to above .=4 fa9ilies! ;r, if they should be forced to see$ ,rotection fro9 the *utch, who would be ready to acce,t the9, it would be a great inconvenience to all the English to have so considerable a ,lace in the ,ower of strangers so ,otent as they are!J6 The 8ars of Religion have shown that the atte9,t to i9,ose oneIs own religion as the only true one u,on the rest of the world is as futile as it is costly! ' century of al9ost un,recedented bloodshed, devastation, and barbariHation was needed to convince the contestants that the two religions could live together in 9utual toleration! 'fter 8orld 8ar , two ,olitical religions too$ the ,lace of the two great (hristian deno9inations of the si)teenth and seventeenth centuries! 8e as$ed, will the ,olitical religions of our ti9e need the lesson of the Thirty #earsI 8ar, or will they rid the9selves in ti9e of the universalistic as,irations that inevitably issue in inconclusive warF
0 6

J8ar,J Essays of 8illia9 Graha9 Su9ner @"ew HavenB #ale :niversity Press, ./06A, Eol! ., ,,, .3/ ff! Ed9und S! Morgan, The Puritan *ile99aB The Story of +ohn 8inthro, @BostonB %ittle, Brown ? (o!, ./52A, ,,! .2/, ./4!

:,on the answer to that Luestion de,ends the cause of ,eace! &or only if it is answered in the affir9ative can a 9oral consensus, e9erging fro9 shared convictions and co99on values, develo, C a 9oral consensus within which a ,eace-,reserving di,lo9acy will have a chance to grow! ;nly then will di,lo9acy have a chance to face the concrete ,olitical ,roble9s that reLuire ,eaceful solution! f the obGectives of foreign ,olicy are not to be defined in ter9s of a world-e9bracing ,olitical religion, how are they to be definedF This is the funda9ental ,roble9 to be solved once the crusading as,irations of nationalistic universalis9 have been discarded! 4he 8b:ectives of Foreign Policy Must ;e Defined in 4erms of the "ational 5nterest and Must ;e Su66orted #ith Ade<uate Po#er This is the second rule of a ,eace-,reserving di,lo9acy! The national interest of a ,eace-loving nation can only be defined in ter9s of national security, and national security 9ust be defined as integrity of the national territory and of its institutions! 5 "ational security, then, is the irreducible 9ini9u9 that di,lo9acy 9ust defend with adeLuate ,ower without co9,ro9ise! But di,lo9acy 9ust ever be alive to the radical transfor9ation that national security has undergone under the i9,act of the nuclear age! :ntil the advent of that age, a nation could use its di,lo9acy to ,urchase its security at the e),ense of another nation! Today, short of a radical change in the ato9ic balance of ,ower in favor of a ,articular nation, di,lo9acy, in order to 9a$e one nation secure fro9 nuclear destruction, 9ust 9a$e the9 all secure! 8ith the national interest defined in such restrictive and transcendent ter9s, di,lo9acy 9ust observe the third of its rules! Di6lomacy Must Loo3 at the Political Scene from the Point of %ie# of 8ther "ations J"othing is so fatal to a nation as an e)tre9e of self-,artiality, and the total want of consideration of what others will naturally ho,e or fear!J3 8hat are the national interests of other nations in ter9s of national security, and are they co9,atible with oneIs ownF The definition of the national interest in ter9s of national security is easier, and the interests of the two o,,osing nations are 9ore li$ely to be co9,atible, in a bi,olar syste9 than in any other syste9 of the balance of ,ower! The bi,olar syste9, as we have seen, is 9ore unsafe fro9 the ,oint of view of ,eace than any other, when both blocs are in co9,etitive contact throughout the world and the a9bition of both is fired by the crusading Heal of a universal 9ission! J! ! ! Eicinity, or nearness of situation, constitutes nationsI natural ene9ies!J1 #et once they have defined their national interests in ter9s of national security, they can draw bac$ fro9 their outlying ,ositions, located close to, or within, the s,here of national security of the other side, and retreat into their res,ective s,heres, each self-contained within its orbit! Those outlying ,ositions add nothing to national security> they are but liabilities, ,ositions that cannot be held in case of war! Each bloc will be the 9ore secure the wider it 9a$es the distance that se,arates both s,heres of national security! Each side can draw a line far distant fro9 each other, 9a$ing it understood that to touch or even to a,,roach it 9eans war! 8hat, then, about the interGacent s,aces, stretching between the two lines of de9arcationF Here the fourth rule of di,lo9acy a,,lies! "ations Must ;e 1illing to Com6romise on All 5ssues 4hat Are "ot %ital to 4hem 'll govern9ent, indeed every hu9an benefit and enGoy9ent, every virtue and every ,rudent act, is founded on co9,ro9ise and barter! 8e balance inconveniences> we give and ta$e> we re9it so9e rights, that we 9ay enGoy others> and we choose rather to be ha,,y citiHens than subtle dis,utants! 's we 9ust give away so9e natural liberty, to enGoy civil advantages, so we 9ust sacrifice so9e civil liberties, for the advantages to be derived fro9 the co99union and fellowshi, of a great e9,ire! But, in all fair dealings, the thing bought 9ust bear so9e ,ro,ortion to the ,urchase ,aid! "one will barter away the i99ediate Gewel of his soul! 2 Here di,lo9acy 9eets its 9ost difficult tas$! &or 9inds not beclouded by the crusading Heal of a ,olitical religion and ca,able of viewing the national interests of both sides with obGectivity, the deli9itation of these vital interests should not ,rove too difficult! (o9,ro9ise on secondary issues is a different 9atter! Here the tas$ is not to se,arate and define interests that by their very nature already tend toward se,aration and definition, but to $ee, in balance interests that touch each other at 9any ,oints and 9ay be intertwined beyond the ,ossibility of se,aration! t is an i99ense tas$ to allow the other side a certain influence in those interGacent s,aces without allowing the9 to be absorbed into the orbit of the other side! t is hardly a less i99ense tas$ to $ee, the other sideIs influence as s9all as ,ossible in the regions close to oneIs own security Hone without absorbing those regions into oneIs own orbit! &or the ,erfor9ance of these tas$s, no for9ula stands ready for auto9atic a,,lication! t is only through a continuous ,rocess of ada,tation, su,,orted both by fir9ness and self - restraint, that co9,ro9ise on secondary issues can be 9ade to wor$! t is, however, ,ossible to indicate a ,riori what a,,roaches will facilitate or ha9,er the success of ,olicies of co9,ro9ise!
5 3

&or a 9ore e)tensive discussion of the relevant ,roble9s, see (ha,ter ./! Ed9und Bur$e, JRe9ar$s on the Policy of the 'llies with Res,ect to &ranceJ @.1/0A, 8or$s, Eol! E @BostonB %ittle, Brown, and (o9,any, .22/A, ,! 661! 1 The &ederalist, "o! 3! 2 Ed9und Bur$e, JS,eech on the (onciliation with '9erica,J loc! cil!, Eol! , ,! .3/!

&irst of all, it is worth noting to what e)tent the success of co9,ro9ise C that is, co9,liance with the fourth rule C de,ends u,on co9,liance with the other three rules, which in turn are si9ilarly interde,endent! 's the co9,liance with the second rule de,ends u,on the realiHation of the first, so the third rule 9ust awant its realiHation fro9 co9,liance with the second! ' nation can only ta$e a rational view of its national interests after it has ,arted co9,any with the crusading s,irit of a ,olitical creed! ' nation is able to consider the national interests of the other side with obGectivity only after it has beco9e secure in what it considers its own national interests! (o9,ro9ise on any issue, however 9inor, is i9,ossible so long as both sides are not secure in their national interests! Thus nations cannot ho,e to co9,ly with the fourth rule if they are not willing to co9,ly with the other three! Both 9orality and e),ediency reLuire co9,liance with these four funda9ental rules! (o9,liance 9a$es co9,ro9ise ,ossible, but it does not assure its success! To give co9,ro9ise, 9ade ,ossible through co9,liance with the first three rules, a chance to succeed, five other rules 9ust be observed! :i8e PrereFuisites o! Compromise $ive U6 the Shado# of 1orthless =ights for the Substance of =eal Advantage g di,lo9acy that thin$s in legalistic and ,ro,agandistic ter9s is ,articularly te9,ted to insist u,on the letter of the law, as it inter,rets the law, and to lose sight of the conseLuences such insistence 9ay have for its own nation and for hu9anity! Since there are rights to be defended, this $ind of di,lo9acy thin$s that the issue cannot be co9,ro9ised! #et the choice that confronts the di,lo9at is not between legality and illegality, but between ,olitical wisdo9 and ,olitical folly! JThe Luestion with 9e,J said Ed9und Bur$e, Jis not whether you have a right to render your ,eo,le 9iserable, but whether it is not your interest to 9a$e the9 ha,,y! t is not what a lawyer tells 9e 9ay do, but what hu9anity, reason and Gustice tell 9e ought to do!J/ "ever Put >ourself in a Position from 1hich >ou Cannot =etreat #ithout Losing Face and from 1hich >ou Cannot Advance #ithout Crave =is3s The violation of this rule often results fro9 disregard for the ,receding one! ' di,lo9acy that confounds the shadow of legal right with the actuality of ,olitical advantage is li$ely to find itself in a ,osition where it 9ay have a legal right, but no ,olitical business, to be! n other words, a nation 9ay identify itself with a ,osition, which it 9ay or 9ay not have a right to hold, regardless of the ,olitical conseLuences! 'nd again co9,ro9ise beco9es a difficult 9atter! ' nation cannot retreat fro9 that ,osition without incurring a serious loss of ,restige! t cannot advance fro9 that ,osition without e),osing itself to ,olitical ris$s, ,erha,s even the ris$ of war! That heedless rush into untenable ,ositions and, 9ore ,articularly, the stubborn refusal to e)tricate oneself fro9 the9 in ti9e is the ear9ar$ of inco9,etent di,lo9acy! ts classic e)a9,les are the ,olicy of "a,oleon on the eve of the &ranco-Prussian 8ar of .214 and the ,olicies of 'ustria and Ger9any on the eve of the &irst 8orld 8ar! ts outstanding conte9,orary e)a9,le is the '9erican involve9ent in ndochina! These e)a9,les also show how closely the ris$ of war is allied with the violation of this rule! "ever Allo# a 1ea3 Ally to Ma3e Decisions for >ou Strong nations that are oblivious to the ,receding rules are ,articularly susce,tible to violating this one! They lose their freedo9 of action by identifying their own national interests co9,letely with those of the wea$ ally! Secure in the su,,ort of its ,owerful friend, the wea$ ally can choose the obGectives and 9ethods of its foreign ,olicy to suit itself! The ,owerful nation then finds that it 9ust su,,ort interests not its own and that it is unable to co9,ro9ise on issues that are vital not to itself, but only to its ally! The classic e)a9,le of the violation of this rule is to be found in the way in which Tur$ey forced the hand of Great Britain and &rance on the eve of the (ri9ean 8ar in .250! The (oncert of Euro,e had virtually agreed u,on a co9,ro9ise settling the conflict between Russia and Tur$ey, when Tur$ey, $nowing that the 8estern ,owers would su,,ort it in a war with Russia, did its best to ,rovo$e that war and thus involved Great Britain and &rance in it against their will! Thus Tur$ey went far in deciding the issue of war and ,eace for Great Britain and &rance according to its own national interests! Great Britain and &rance had to acce,t that decision even though their national interests did not reLuire war with Russia and they had al9ost succeeded in ,reventing its outbrea$! They had surrendered their freedo9 of action to a wea$ ally, which used its control over their ,olicies for its own ,ur,oses! 4he Armed Forces Are the 5nstrument of Foreign Policy "ot 5ts Master "o successful and no ,eaceful foreign ,olicy is ,ossible without observance of this rule! "o nation can ,ursue a ,olicy of co9,ro9ise with the 9ilitary deter9ining the ends and 9eans of foreign ,olicy! The ar9ed forces are instru9ents of war> foreign ,olicy is an instru9ent of ,eace! t is true that the ulti9ate obGectives of the conduct of war and of the conduct of foreign ,olicy are identicalB both serve the national interest! Both however, differ funda9entally in their i99ediate obGective, in the 9eans they e9,loy, and in the 9odes of thought they bring to bear u,on their
/

S,eech on (onciliation with the (oloniesJ @.115A, The 8or$s of Ed9und Bur$e @BostonB %ittle, Brown, and (o9,any, .235A, Eol! , ,! .64!

res,ective tas$s! The obGective of war is si9,le and unconditionalB to brea$ the will of the ene9y! ts 9ethods are eLually si9,le and unconditionalB to bring the greatest a9ount of violence to bear u,on the 9ost vulnerable s,ot in the ene9yIs ar9or! (onseLuently, the 9ilitary leader 9ust thin$ in absolute ter9s! He lives in the ,resent and in the i99ediate future! The sole Luestion before hi9 is how to win victories as chea,ly and Luic$ly as ,ossible and how to avoid defeat! The obGective of foreign ,olicy is relative and conditionalB to bend, not to brea$, the will of the other side as far as necessary in order to safeguard oneIs own vital interests without hurting those of the other side! The 9ethods of foreign ,olicy are relative and conditionalB not to advance by destroying the obstacles in oneIs way, but to retreat before the9, to circu9vent the9, to 9aneuver around the9, to soften and dissolve the9 slowly by 9eans of ,ersuasion, negotiation, and ,ressure! n conseLuence, the 9ind of the di,lo9at is co9,licated and subtle! t sees the issue in hand as a 9o9ent in history, and beyond the victory of to9orrow it antici,ates the incalculable ,ossibilities of the future! n the words of Bolingbro$e> Here let 9e only say, that the glory of ta$ing towns, and winning battles, is to he 9easured by the utility that results fro9 those victories! Eictories, that bring honour to the ar9s, 9ay bring sha9e to the councils, of a nation! To win a battle, to ta$e a town, is the glory of a general, and of an ar9y!! !! But the glory of a nation is to ,ro,ortion the ends she ,ro,oses, to her interest and her strength> the 9eans she e9,loys to the ends she ,ro,oses, and the vigour she e)erts to both! .4 To surrender the conduct of foreign affairs to the 9ilitary, then, is to destroy the ,ossibility of co9,ro9ise and thus surrender the cause of ,eace! The 9ilitary 9ind $nows how to o,erate between the absolutes of victory and defeat! t $nows nothing of that ,atient, intricate, and subtle 9aneuvering or di,lo9acy, whose 9ain ,ur,ose is to avoid the absolutes of victory and defeat and 9eet the other side on the 9iddle ground of negotiated co9,ro9ise! ' foreign ,olicy conducted by 9ilitary 9en according to the rules of the 9ilitary art can only end in war, for Jwhat we ,re,are for is what we shall get!J .. &or nations conscious of the ,otentialities of 9odern war, ,eace 9ust be the goal of their foreign ,olicies! &oreign ,olicy 9ust be conducted in such a way as to 9a$e the ,reservation of ,eace ,ossible and not 9a$e the outbrea$ of war inevitable! n a society of sovereign nations, 9ilitary force is a necessary instru9ent of foreign ,olicy! #et the instru9ent of foreign ,olicy should not beco9e the 9aster of foreign ,olicy! 's war is fought in order to 9a$e ,eace ,ossible, foreign ,olicy should be conducted in order to 9a$e ,eace ,er9anent! &or the ,erfor9ance of both tas$s, the subordination of the 9ilitary under the civilian authorities which are constitutionally res,onsible for the conduct of foreign affairs is an indis,ensable ,rereLuisite! 4he $overnment 5s the Leader of Public 86inion "ot 5ts Slave Those res,onsible for the conduct of foreign ,olicy will not be able to co9,ly with the foregoing ,rinci,les of di,lo9acy if they do not $ee, this ,rinci,le constantly in 9ind! 's has been ,ointed out above in greater detail, .= the rational reLuire9ents of good foreign ,olicy cannot fro9 the outset count u,on the su,,ort of a ,ublic o,inion whose ,references are e9otional rather than rational! This is bound to be ,articularly true of a foreign ,olicy whose goal is co9,ro9ise, and which, therefore, 9ust concede so9e of the obGectives of the other side and give u, so9e of its own! Es,ecially when foreign ,olicy is conducted under conditions of de9ocratic control and is ins,ired by the crusading Heal of a ,olitical religion, states9en are always te9,ted to sacrifice the reLuire9ents of good foreign ,olicy to the a,,lause of the 9asses! ;n the other hand, the states9an who would defend the integrity of these reLuire9ents against even the slightest conta9ination with ,o,ular ,assion would seal ns own doo9 as a ,olitical leader and, with it, the doo9 of his foreign ,olicy, for he would lose the ,o,ular su,,ort which ,ut and $ee,s hi9 in ,ower! The states9an, then, is allowed neither to surrender to ,o,ular ,assions nor disregard the9! He 9ust stri$e a ,rudent balance between ada,ting hi9self to the9 and 9arshaling the9 to the su,,ort of his ,olicies! n one word, he 9ust lead! He 9ust ,erfor9 that highest feat of states9anshi,B tri99ing his sails to the winds of ,o,ular ,assion while using the9 to carry the shi, of state to the ,ort of good foreign ,olicy, on however roundabout and HigHag a course! CONCL;SION The road to international ,eace which we have outlined cannot co9,ete in ins,irational Lualities with the si9,le and fascinating for9ulae that for a century and a half have fired the i9agination of a war-weary world! There is so9ething s,ectacular in the radical si9,licity of a for9ula that with one swee, see9s to dis,ose of the ,roble9 of war once and for all! This has been the ,ro9ise of such solutions as free trade, arbitration, disar9a9ent, collective security, universal socialis9, international govern9ent, and the world state! There is nothing s,ectacular, fascinating, or ins,iring, at least for the ,eo,le at large, in the business of di,lo9acy!
.4 ..

Bolingbro$eIs *efence of the Treaty of :trecht @(a9bridge :niversity PressB ./0=A, ,! /5! 8illia9 Graha9 Su9ner, o,! cit!, ,! .10! .= See ,ages .36 ff!

8e have 9ade the ,oint, however, that these solutions, in so far as they deal with the real ,roble9 and not 9erely with so9e of its sy9,to9s, ,resu,,ose the e)istence of an integrated international society, which actually does not e)ist! To bring into e)istence such an international society and $ee, it in being, the acco99odating techniLues of di,lo9acy are reLuired! 's the integration of do9estic society and its ,eace develo, fro9 the uns,ectacular and al9ost unnoticed day-by-day o,erations of the techniLues of acco99odation and change, so the ulti9ate ideal of international life C that is, to transcend itself in a su,ranational society C 9ust await its realiHation fro9 the techniLues of ,ersuasion, negotiation, and ,ressure, which are the traditional instru9ents of di,lo9acy! The reader who has followed us to this ,oint 9ay well as$B But has not di,lo9acy failed in ,reventing war in the ,astF To that legiti9ate Luestion two answers can be given! *i,lo9acy has failed 9any ti9es, and it has succeeded 9any ti9es, in its ,eace-,reserving tas$! t has failed so9eti9es because nobody wanted it to succeed! 8e have seen how different in their obGectives and 9ethods the li9ited wars of the ,ast have been fro9 the total war of our ti9e! 8hen war was the nor9al activity of $ings, the tas$ of di,lo9acy was not to ,revent it, but to bring it about at the 9ost ,ro,itious 9o9ent! ;n the other hand, when nations have used di,lo9acy for the ,ur,ose of ,reventing war, they have often succeeded! The outstanding e)a9,le of a successful war-,reventing di,lo9acy in 9odern ti9es is the (ongress of Berlin of .212! By the ,eaceful 9eans of an acco99odating di,lo9acy, that (ongress settled, or at least 9ade susce,tible of settle9ent, the issues that had se,arated Great Britain and Russia since the end of the "a,oleonic 8ars! *uring the better ,art of the nineteenth century, the conflict between Great Britain and Russia over the Bal$ans, the *ardanelles, and the Eastern Mediterranean hung li$e a sus,ended sword over the ,eace of the world! #et, during the fifty years following the (ri9ean 8ar, though hostilities between Great Britain and Russia threatened to brea$ out ti9e and again, they never actually did brea$ out! The 9ain credit for the ,reservation of ,eace 9ust go to the techniLues of an acco99odating di,lo9acy which cul9inated in the (ongress of Berlin! 8hen British Pri9e Minister *israeli returned fro9 that (ongress to %ondon, he declared with ,ride that he was bringing ho9e J,eace ! ! ! with honor!J n fact, he had brought ,eace for later generations, too> for a century and a half there has been no war between Great Britain and Russia! 8e have, however, recogniHed the ,recariousness of ,eace in a society of sovereign nations! The continuing success of di,lo9acy in ,reserving ,eace de,ends, as we have seen, u,on e)traordinary 9oral and intellectual Lualities that all the leading ,artici,ants 9ust ,ossess! ' 9ista$e in the evaluation of one of the ele9ents of national ,ower, 9ade by one or the other of the leading states9en, 9ay s,ell the difference between ,eace and war! So 9ay an accident s,oiling a ,lan or a ,ower calculation!.0 *i,lo9acy is the best 9eans of ,reserving ,eace which a society of sovereign nations has to offer, but, es,ecially under the conditions of conte9,orary world ,olitics and of conte9,orary war, it is not good enough! t is only when nations have surrendered to a higher authority the 9eans of destruction which 9odern technology has ,ut in their hands C when they have given u, their sovereignty C that international ,eace can be 9ade as secure as do9estic ,eace! *i,lo9acy can 9a$e ,eace 9ore secure than it is today, and the world state can 9a$e ,eace 9ore secure than it would be if nations were to abide by the rules of di,lo9acy! #et, as there can be no ,er9anent ,eace without a world state, there can be no world state without the ,eace-,reserving and co99unity-building ,rocesses of di,lo9acy! &or the world state to be 9ore than a di9 vision, the acco99odating ,rocesses of di,lo9acy, 9itigating and 9ini9iHing conflicts, 9ust be revived! 8hatever oneIs conce,tion of the ulti9ate state of international affairs 9ay be, in the recognition of that need and in the de9and that it be 9et, all 9en of good will can Goin! f authority were needed in su,,ort of the conce,tion of international ,eace ,resented in these ,ages, it can be found in the counsel of a 9an who co99itted fewer errors in foreign ,olicy than any of his conte9,oraries C Sir 8inston (hurchill! Eiewing with concern the conte9,orary scene in his s,eech to the House of (o99ons of +anuary =0, ./62, and as$ing hi9self, J8ill there be warFJ Mr! (hurchill called for ,eace through acco99odation C as he had done in al9ost fifty s,eeches since the outbrea$ of the (old 8ar C when he saidB will only venture now to say that there see9s to 9e to be very real danger in going on drifting too long! believe that the best chance of ,reventing a war is to bring 9atters to a head and co9e to a settle9ent with the Soviet Govern9ent before it is too late! This would i9,ly that the 8estern de9ocracies, who should, of course, see$ unity a9ong the9selves at the earliest 9o9ent, would ta$e the initiative in as$ing the Soviet for a settle9ent! t is idle to reason or argue with the (o99unists! t is, however, ,ossible to deal with the9 on a fair, realistic basis, and, in 9y e),erience, they will $ee, their bargains as long as it is in their interest to do so, which 9ight, in this grave 9atter, be a long ti9e, once things are settled! ! ! ! There are very grave dangers C that is all a9 going to say today C in letting everything run on and ,ile u, until so9ething ha,,ens, and it ,asses, all of a sudden, out of your control! 8ith all consideration of the facts, believe it right to say today that the best chance of avoiding war is, in accord with the other 8estern de9ocracies, to bring 9atters to a head with the Soviet Govern9ent, and, by for9al di,lo9atic ,rocesses, with all their ,rivacy and gravity, to arrive at a lasting settle9ent! There is certainly enough for the interests of all if such a settle9ent could be reached! Even this 9ethod, 9ust say, however, would not guarantee that war would not co9e! But believe it would give the best chance of co9ing out of it alive!.6
.0 .6

See ,ages .16 ff! Parlia9entary *ebates @HansardA, House of (o99ons! Eol! 663, "o! 62, ,,! 53=-0!

8hat (hurchill ,ro,osed as an a,,roach to the conflict between East and 8est a,,lies eLually to the ,ossible conflicts of the future involving "orth and South! Months, if not years, of neglect of a growing raLi threat to the balance of ,ower in the Middle East brought on the Gulf crisis of .//4 - /.! f di,lo9acy was used in the ./24s or before 'ugust of .//4, it was not used effectively! President Reagan was 9ore candid than his successor when he declared, regarding the di,lo9acy of the ,eriod, Jwe goofed!J The di,lo9acy (hurchill ,rescribed and which ,residents fro9 Eisenhower to Reagan ,ursued in 9eetings at the su99it with leaders such as 7hrushchev and Gorbachev eventually bore fruit! Having learned to ,ractice wise di,lo9acy in Soviet - '9erican relations, it would be tragic for leaders of the west not to ,rofit fro9 the lessons it ,rovides for foreign ,olicy around the globe!

Historical )lossary A(ams9 John .105 - .2=3! Second President of the :nited States @.1/1-.24.A! ',,ointed one of the ,eace co99issioners to &rance in .111> one of the negotiators of the Treaty of Paris @.120A to end the '9erican 8ar of nde,endence> envoy to Great Britain @.125 - 22A! 's President, 'da9s ,revented a war with &rance by a 9oderate, conciliatory ,olicy! A(ams9 John 1uin$ .131-.262! Si)th President of the :nited States @.2=5 - =/A! Minister to the "etherlands @.1/6 - /1A and to Prussia @.1/1-.24.A> :!S! Senator @.24!E2A> Minister to Russia @.24/ - .6A> hel,ed draw u, Treaty of Ghent @.2.6A, ending the 8ar of .2.=! Minister to Great Britain @.2.5 - .1A! 's Secretary of State @.2.1 - =5A he ,layed a large role in the enunciation of the Monroe *octrine! A"abama C"aims :nited States clai9s against England resulting fro9 da9age inflicted during the (ivil 8ar u,on "orthern shi,s by the (onfederate cruiser 'laba9a, which had been built and fitted out in England! The clai9s were finally settled in .21. by an arbitration tribunal 9eeting in Geneva! A"e)an(er I (Har of Russia @.24.-=5A! The failure of "a,oleonIs invasion left 'le)ander one of the 9ost ,owerful rulers in Euro,e! ns,ired by a strange co9bination of 9ysticis9 and reaction, he ,ro9oted the Holy 'lliance! A"e)an(er the Great 7ing of Macedon, 003 - =0 b!c! Through the 9ilitary conLuest of Thrace, llyria, and Egy,t, and the invasion of Persia and northern ndia, 'le)ander beca9e virtual 9aster of the Mediterranean center of civiliHation! Ange""9 Norman .216-./31! British ,acifist! He beca9e fa9ous through his ,o,ular boo$! The Great llusion @./.4A, which ,resented the thesis that wars did not ,ay and drew the inference that if nations would only realiHe this there would be no 9ore wars! At"anti$ Charter State9ent of general ,rinci,les, signed by President Roosevelt and Pri9e Minister (hurchill in 'ugust ./6.! setting forth the national ,olicies of the :nited States and Great Britain with res,ect to the ,ostwar world> included ,rinci,les of national sell-deter9ination, o,,osition to aggression, disar9a9ent, and eLual access to trade and raw 9aterials! Augustus 'do,ted son and heir of +ulius (aesar! &irst Ro9an E9,eror @=1 B!(! - '!:! .6A> gained control of taly, 'frica, Sardinia, and Sicily> beca9e sole ruler of the Ro9an world by defeating 'nthony and (leo,atra at the battle of 'ctiu9 @0. B!(!A! Auster"itD9 &att"e o! n .245 at 'usterlitH, in what is now (Hechoslova$ia, "a,oleon defeated the Russian and 'ustrian ar9ies! (onsidered "a,oleonIs 9ost brilliant victory, this battle 9ar$ed the ,ea$ of "a,oleonIs fortunes! &a$on9 :ran$is H@is$ount St. A"bansI

.53.-.3=3! English ,hiloso,her! &a"(-in9 Stan"e .231-./61! British (onservative leader> (hancellor of the E)cheLuer, ./==-=0> Pri9e Minister, ./=0 - =6, ./=6 =/, ./05 - 01! &arbarossa9 :re(eri$E E,ithet of &rederic$ , Holy Ro9an E9,eror and 7ing of Ger9any, ..5=-/4! &arrere9 Cami""e '. P. .25. - ./64! &rench '9bassador to taly @.2/1 - ./=6A! &urthou9 Jean Louis .23= - ./06! &rench states9an! 's &oreign Minister @./06A he sought to strengthen &ranceIs relations with Russia, Great Britain, and the %ittle Entente! &a o! Pigs ' ,art of the (uban coastline where in ./3. a grou, of (uban refugees staged an invasion under '9erican aus,ices and failed! &ear(9 Char"es A. .216-./62! '9erican historian and ,olitical scientist! &enes9 '(uar( .221 - ./62! (Hechoslova$ian states9an! 's &oreign Minister @./.2 - 05A and Pre9ier @./=. - ==A, he was largely res,onsible for the %ittle Entente and the (Hech alliance with &rance! Elected President in ./05> went into e)ile after Munich Pact @./02A> headed ,rovisional govern9ent during Second 8orld 8ar> re-elected President in ./63> resigned shortly after (o99unist cou, of ./62! &entham9 Jerem .162 - .20=! English ,hiloso,her and Gurist> founder of the utilitarian school! &er"in9 Congress o! .212! (alled by the signatories of the Treaty of Paris @.253A, which ended the (ri9ean 8ar, to reconsider the ter9s of the Treaty of San Stefano, forced on the ;tto9an E9,ire by Russia earlier in .212! &e8eri(ge9 A"bert J. .23= - ./=1! :!S! Senator @.22/ - ./..A and biogra,her of +ohn Marshall! 's a ,olitician his fa9e rests u,on his su,,ort of i9,erialis9 in international ,olitics and the ,rogressive 9ove9ent in do9estic ,olitics! &ig Sti$E Po"i$ The characteriHation of a vigorous e)ercise of national ,ower, derived fro9 President Theodore RooseveltIs @./4. - /A fa9ous dictu9B JS,ea$ softly, but carry a big stic$!J &ismar$E9 Otto 8on .2.5 - /2! Ger9an states9an! Prussian Pre9ier @.23=-1.A and Ger9an (hancellor @.21.-/4A> he united Ger9any under Prussian leadershi, and 9ade the Ger9an E9,ire one of the great ,owers! &oer War .2// - ./4=! 8ar between British and *utch colonists @called BoersA in South 'frica! &oh"en9 Char"es '. ./46 - ! '9erican di,lo9at! '9bassador to the Soviet :nion @./50 - 51A! &o"ingbroEe9 Henr St. John9 *st @is$ount .312 - .15.! English Tory states9an and writer! &ose9 Subhas Chan(ra .2/1-./65! ndian nationalist, Gailed by the British for his ')is sy9,athies during the Second 8orld 8ar! He esca,ed, fled to Ger9any, and headed +a,anese-s,onsored J,rovisional govern9ent of ndia!J &ourbons Royal fa9ily, originally of &rance, with branches that ruled S,ain, the Two Sicilies, and Par9a> ruled &rance, e)ce,t during the &rench Revolution and the "a,oleonic era, fro9 the end of the si)teenth century to .262! &o)er +ebe""ion ./44! Eiolent attac$s on foreigners and (hristians in (hina @es,ecially Pe$ingA, ,er,etrated by an anti-foreign 9ilitary organiHation $nown as the Bo)ers! &rian( # Ke""ogg Pa$t ' treaty, also called Pact of Paris, signed in ./=2 by the :nited States and 60 other nations, ,ledging the signatories to renounce war as an instru9ent of national ,olicy and to see$ the settle9ent of international dis,utes by ,eaceful 9eans only! (hiefly the wor$ of :nited States Secretary of State 7ellogg and &rench &oreign Minister Briand! &right9 John .2..-2/! Me9ber of British ,arlia9ent! %iberal cha9,ion of the 9iddle-class refor9 9ove9ent in England! &r $e9 James .202 - ./==! English historian, states9an, di,lo9at, and Gurist! (hiefly $nown in the :nited States for his classic

study of '9erican society and ,olitics, The '9erican (o99onwealth @.222A and his a9bassadorshi, to the :nited States @./41 C .0A! &uEharin9 NiEo"ai I. .222 - ./02! Russian (o99unist> chief ,arty theoretician after %eninIs death> 9e9ber of Politburo> e)ecuted in ./02 ,urge! &urEe9 '(mun( .1=/ - /1! British states9an and ,olitical ,hiloso,her of enlightened conservatis9! &urns9 John .252 - ./60! British socialist and 9e9ber of Parlia9ent @.2/=-./.2A! Caesar9 Ju"ius .44 - 66 B!(! Ro9an states9an and general, who founded the Ro9an E9,ire! Ca"houn9 John C. .12=-.254! '9erican states9an and ,olitical ,hiloso,her! *efender of the interests of the Southern ,lanter aristocracy and author of the constitutional theory of nullification! Secretary of 8ar @.2.1 - =5A> Eice - President @.2=5 - =/A> Secretary of State @.266 - 65A! Cambon9 Ju"es M. .265 - ./05! &rench di,lo9at> brother of Pierre Paul (a9bon! '9bassador to the :nited States during the S,anish-'9erican 8ar, to S,ain @./4= - 1A, and to Ger9any @./41-.6A! Cambon9 Pierre Pau" .260 - ./=6! &rench di,lo9at> brother of +ules (a9bon! 's '9bassador to England @.2/2 - ./=4A he hel,ed to create the Entente (ordiale @./46A and the 'nglo-Russian 'gree9ent of ./41, and he encouraged England to enter the &irst 8orld 8ar! Canning9 George .114 - .2=1! British states9an> Pri9e Minister @.2=1A> &oreign Secretary @.241-/, .2==-=1A! Carthaginian Pea$e The destruction of (arthage effected by Ro9e in .63 B!(! at the end of the Third Punic 8ar, .6/ - 63 B!(! Cast"ereagh9 +obert Ste-ar(9 MarFuess o! Lon(on(err 9 @is$ount .13/ - .2==! British Tory states9an! Secretary of 8ar @.245, .241-/A> &oreign Secretary @.2..-==A! Catherine the Great HCatherine III (Harina of Russia @.13=-/3A! E),anded and strengthened the Russian E9,ire, chiefly at the e),ense of Tur$ey! Cato Hthe '"(erI =06 - .6/ B!(! Ro9an states9an, i9,lacable foe of (arthage> his influence hel,ed to bring on the Third Punic 8ar! Ca8our9 Cami""o &. .2.4 - 3.! talian states9an, Pre9ier of Sardinia @.25= - 5/, .234 - 3.A> achieved the ,olitical unification of taly! Cha$o War ./0= - 05! 8ar between Bolivia and Paraguay over ,ossession of the (haco territory! Chamber"ain9 Joseph .203 - ./.6! British states9an! 's (olonial Secretary @.2/5 - ./40A he advocated i9,erial e),ansion, consolidation, and refor9! Chamber"ain9 Ne8i""e .23/ - ./64! English states9an> son of +ose,h (ha9berlain! 's Pri9e Minister @./01 C 64A he was the outstanding advocate of a ,olicy of Ja,,ease9entJ toward the ')is> forced to resign after British debacle in "orway @',ril ./64A! Char"emagne E9,eror of the 8est @244 - 2.6A> 7ing of the &ran$s @132 - 2.6A! Char"es II 7ing of England, Scotland, reland @.334 - 25A! Char"es @ E9,eror of Holy Ro9an E9,ire @.5./ - 52A and @as (harles A 7ing of S,ain @.5.3 - 53A! Char"es @III 7ing of &rance @.620 - /2A! nvaded taly in .6/6> forced to retreat by league co9,rising &erdinand E of S,ain, E9,eror Ma)i9ilian , Po,e 'le)ander E , and the rulers of Milan and Eenice! Chester!ie"(9 Phi"ip %ormer Stanhope9 /th 'ar" o! .3/6-.110! English states9an and author! Chur$hi""9 Winston L. S. .216-./35! British states9an and author! &irst %ord of the 'd9iralty @./..-.5, ./0/ - 64A> held various cabinet ,osts before and after &irst 8orld 8arB Pri9e Minister @./64 - 65, ./5.-55A! C"ause-itD9 Kar" 8on .124 - .20.! Prussian general and writer on 9ilitary strategy! His 9aster,iece, ;n 8ar, has had an enor9ous influence on 9ilitary strategy and tactics and the theory of war!

C"emen$eau9 Georges .26.-./=/! &rench states9an, twice Pre9ier @./43 - /, ./.1-./A! (hief antagonist of 8oodrow 8ilson at the Paris Peace (onference @././A! Cob(en9 +i$har( .246 - 35! English states9an, leader in the liberal refor9 9ove9ent> es,ecially concerned with the ,ro9otion of free trade! Co"ombo P"an ' British (o99onwealth ,lan, established in ./5., for co-o,erative econo9ic develo,9ent in South and Southeast 'sia! Cornei""e9 Pierre .343 - 26! &rench dra9atist Coun$i" o! 'urope nternational body created in ././ by re,resentatives of Great Britain, &rance, Belgiu9, the "etherlands, %u)e9bourg, "orway, Sweden, *en9ar$, reland, and taly> Goined by Greece and Tur$ey in ./54! The (ouncil ai9s, through the wor$ of its (o99ittee of Ministers and (onsultative 'sse9bly, to achieve a Euro,ean federation! Co8enant o! the League o! Nations (onstitution of the %eague of "ations! Crimean War .256-53! 8ar in which &rance, Great Britain, and Tur$ey were allied against Russia! The Treaty of Paris @.253A, ending the war, ,laced the *anubian ,rinci,alities under the Goint guaranty of the great ,owers, neutraliHed the Blac$ Sea, and ,ledged the signatories to res,ect the inde,endence and integrity of Tur$ey! Cru$e9 'meri$ .5/4 - .362! n %e "ouveau (ynee @.3=0A, (ruce envisioned a council of a9bassadors, re,resenting all 9onarchs and sovereign re,ublics, which would Gudge international dis,utes by 9aGority vote and enforce its decisions! %emosthenes 026 C 0== b!c! Greatest of Gree$ orators, he warned the 'thenians in his Phili,,ics @05., 066, 06. b!c!A about the threat of Phili, tIs Macedon, which conLuered Greece in 002 b!c! %es$artes9 +ene .5/3 - .354! &rench ,hiloso,her! %i(erot9 %enis .1.0 - 26! &rench ,hiloso,her and 9an of letters! %israe"i9 &enGamin H'ar" o! &ea$ons!ie"(I .246-2.! British states9an and author> Pri9e Minister @.231 - 32, .216 - 24A! RevitaliHed the Tory Party with a twofold ,olicy of i9,erialis9 and de9ocratic refor9! '"iDabeth I Kueen of England @.552 - .340A! 'rasmus9 %esi(erius .63/ - .503! ;ne of the great hu9anists of the Renaissance! 'ugene o! Sa8o .330 C .103! The greatest 9ilitary leader of his ti9e and a great states9an in the service of 'ustria! 'uropean %e!ense Communit 'bortive ,ro,osal agreed u,on in ./5= by &rance, Ger9any, taly, Belgiu9, the "etherlands, and %u)e9bourg, with the intention of creating a co99on defense force! 'uropean Pa ments ;nion ;rganiHation established in ./54 by 9e9bers of the ;rganiHation for Euro,ean Econo9ic (oo,eration @;EE(A in order to develo, and liberaliHe inter-Euro,ean e)changes! The :nion, now re,laced by the Euro,ean Monetary 'gree9ent, enabled 9e9bers to balance their accounts with the other 9e9ber states by utiliHing any foreign currency to settle debit balances with any country! :are-e"" A((ress .1/3! President George 8ashingtonIs advice to his country9en u,on retiring fro9 office at the end of his second ad9inistration! :ene"on9 :ran$ois .35.-.1.5! &rench theologian and author> 'rchbisho, of (a9brai! :i$hte9 Johann Gott"ieb .13=-.2.6! Ger9an ,hiloso,her! :o$h9 :er(inan( .25.-./=/! Marshal of &rance> fro9 March ./.2 on, chief of the unified 'llied co99and during the &irst 8orld 8ar! :our :ree(oms n his 9essage to (ongress ,ro,osing %end - %ease @+anuary 3, ./6.A, President &ran$lin *! Roosevelt stated that

four freedo9s should ,revail everywhere in the world C freedo9 of s,eech, freedo9 of worshi,, freedo9 fro9 want, and freedo9 fro9 fear! :ourteen Points President 8oodrow 8ilsonIs for9ulation of 'llied war ai9s and of a general ,eace ,rogra9, which he ,resented in an address to (ongress, +anuary 2, ./.2! :ran$is I 7ing of &rance @.5.5 - 61A! :ran$is II %ast E9,eror of the Holy Ro9an E9,ire @.1/= - .243A> first E9,eror of 'ustria @as &rancis , .246-05A> 7ing of Bohe9ia and Hungary @.1/=-.205A! :ranE"in9 &enGamin .143 - /4! '9erican states9an, ,rinter, scientist, and writer! ;ne of the greatest di,lo9ats of the '9erican Revolution and the newborn nation> ,layed a 9aGor role in gaining &rench recognition of the new re,ublic @.112A and in negotiating ,eace with Great Britain in .12=! :re(eri$E II H:re(eri$E the GreatI 7ing of Prussia @.164 - 23A! Through his brilliant 9ilitary tactics, es,ecially in the 8ar of the 'ustrian Succession @.164 - 62A and the Seven #earsI 8ar @.153 - 30A, he 9ade Prussia the fore9ost 9ilitary ,ower in Euro,e! :reeport9 Sir An(re;ne of the characters invented by Richard Steele and +ose,h 'ddison as 9outh,ieces for their views on current affairs in the English daily S,ectator, ,ublished in the early eighteenth century! %eGau""e9 Char"es .2/4 - ./14! &rench general and states9an! n the Second 8orld 8ar he o,,osed the &ranco-Ger9an ar9istice in ./64, fled to England, and beca9e leader of the &ighting &rench and of the &rench ,rovisional govern9ent! n ,ostwar &rance he was the leader of the nationalist - rightist ,arty, R!P!&! @Rasse9ble9ent du Peu,le &ranfaisA, and was elected in ./52 President of the &ifth Re,ublic! Genoa9 +epub"i$ o! 'n talian 9ariti9e ,ower, which reached the ,ea$ of its strength in the .6th century! 'nne)ed to &rance in .245 and united with the 7ingdo9 of Sardinia in .2.5! George III 7ing of Great Britain and reland @.134 - .2=4A! George @I 7ing of Great Britain @./03 - 5=A! Goethe9 Johann Wo"!gang 8on .16/ - .20=! Ger9an ,oet, dra9atist, and novelist! Gogo"9 Ni$o"ai @. .24/ - 5=! Russian novelist and ,laywright! Goo( Neighbor Po"i$ ' ,hrase that President &ran$lin *! Roosevelt chose to characteriHe his ,olicy, begun under President HooverIs ad9inistration, of eschewing ar9ed intervention in %atin '9erica in favor of a ,rogra9 of friendly co-o,eration! Gre 9 '(-ar( Gre 9 *st @is$ount .23=-./00! British states9an! 's &oreign Secretary @./45 - .3A he ,layed a 9aGor role in the for9ation of the Tri,le Entente! Grotius9 Hugo .520 - .365! *utch Gurist and hu9anist, the JfatherJ of international law! 8rote the first syste9atic te)t on international law @*e Gure belli ac ,acisA! Gui$$iar(ini9 :ran$es$o .620 C .564! talian historian and di,lo9at! ' follower of Machiavelli, Guicciardini is chiefly $nown for his history of the ,eriod of the talian 8ars @.6/=-.506A! GuiDot9 :ran$ois .121-.216! &rench historian and liberal states9an! Gusta8us A(o"phus .5/6 - .30=! 7ing of Sweden> leader of the Protestants in the Thirty #earsI 8ar! Hague Con8entions Treaties, signed by the :nited States and other 9aGor ,owers, resulting fro9 the Hague Peace (onferences of .2// and ./41! Provided for a so-called Per9anent (ourt of 'rbitration, defined the laws and usages of land warfare, rights and obligations of neutrals, etc! Hami"ton9 A"e)an(er .151-.246! '9erican states9an! *elegate to the &ederal (onstitutional (onvention, where he was a strong ,ro,onent of a centraliHed govern9ent> with Madison and +ay, author of &ederalist Pa,ers! 's Secretary of the Treasury and a leader of the &ederalist ,arty during 8ashingtonIs ad9inistration, Ha9ilton e)ercised great

influence over foreign, as well as fiscal, affairs! Hanniba" =61-.2= B!(! (arthaginian general> invaded taly by crossing the 'l,s in the Second Punic 8ar @=.2 - =4. B!(!A! Hapsburg Ruling house of 'ustria fro9 .=2= to ./.2> fro9 it were chosen the E9,erors of the Holy Ro9an E9,ire fro9 .602 to .243! Hege"9 Georg Wi"he"m :rie(ri$h .114 - .20.! Ger9an ,hiloso,her! Henr II 7ing of &rance @.561-5/A> continued the struggle of his father, &rancis , against E9,eror (harles E and (harlesIs son, Phili, of S,ain! Henr @III 7ing of England @.54/ - 61A! Hi"!er(ing9 +u(o"ph .211-./6.! Ger9an socialist and econo9ist> &inance Minister @./=0, ./=2 - =/A! Hobbes9 Thomas .522 - .31/! English ,hiloso,her! Hobson9 John A. .252 - ./64! English econo9ist! Ho" +oman 'mpire /3= C .243! ' 8estern Euro,ean ,olitical entity clai9ing to be the successor to the Ro9an E9,ire, which was sus,ended in 613! Re9ained until the si)teenth century a Euro,ean co99onwealth, though Euro,ean nations did not recogniHe its suHerainty! t lost virtually all ,olitical i9,ortance as a result of the Thirty #earsI 8ar @.3.2 - 62A, and was dissolved in .243! Hu""9 Cor(e"" .21.-./55! :!S! Secretary of State @./00 - 66A! Internationa" &anE !or +e$onstru$tion an( %e8e"opment 'utono9ous institution affiliated with the :nited "ations! ts function is to 9a$e loans to 9e9ber nations and foreign investors in order to facilitate ,roductive invest9ent, encourage foreign trade, and discharge international debts! Internationa" &ureau o! Weights an( Measures ntergovern9ental organiHation established in .215 to standardiHe weights and 9easures! 'ffiliated with the :nited "ations since ./6/! Internationa" Ci8i" A8iation OrganiDation 'ffiliate of the :nited "ations, organiHed in ./61> designed to e),and international air trade and 9a$e it safer and 9ore econo9ical! Internationa" %anube Commission Established by Treaty of Eersailles @././A to ad9inister the internationaliHed section of the river> re,udiated by Ger9any in ./03 and dissolved in ./64! nternational nstitute of 'griculture &ounded in ./45, with the obGect of collecting and disse9inating $nowledge relating to agriculture! Internationa" Monetar :un( 'utono9ous organiHation, affiliated since ./61 with the :nited "ations> co-o,erates closely with the nternational Ban$ for Reconstruction and *evelo,9ent> designed to facilitate international trade, reduce ineLuities in e)change, and stabiliHe currencies! Internationa" Te"e$ommuni$ation ;nion *esigned to 9aintain and e)tend international co-o,eration for the i9,rove9ent and rational use of all $inds of teleco99unication! t was established in ./06 as an a9alga9ation of the nternational Telegra,h :nion, established in .235, and the nternational Radiotelegra,h :nion, established in ./43! Internationa" Te"egraph ;nion Established in .235, this organiHation was the first i9,ortant ,ublic international union! Beca9e $nown as the Teleco99unication :nion in ./06> now a s,ecialiHed agency of the :nited "ations! James9 Wi""iam .26=-./.4! '9erican ,hiloso,her and ,sychologist! Ja 9 John .165 - .2=/! President of the (ontinental (ongress @.112A> Minister Pleni,otentiary to S,ain on a 9ission to see$ aid and recognition @.11/A> one of the co99issioners to negotiate ,eace with Great Britain! 'uthor, with Ha9ilton and Madison, of &ederalist ,a,ers! Secretary of &oreign 'ffairs @.126 - 2/A> first (hief +ustice of the Su,re9e (ourt @.12/ - /5A! (oncluded @.1/6A +ayIs Treaty with England, settling difficulties arising out of violations of the Treaty of Paris @.120A!

Je!!erson9 Thomas .160 - .2=3! Third President of the :nited States @.24.-/A! 'uthor of the *eclaration of nde,endence> Governor of Eirginia> served in (ontinental (ongress> succeeded &ran$lin as Minister to &rance @.125A> Secretary of State @.1/4 - /0A! John o! Sa"isbur c! ...5 - 24! English scholastic ,hiloso,her! Kant9 Immanue" .1=6 - .246! Ger9an ,hiloso,her! KautsE 9 Kar" Johann .256 - ./02! %eading Ger9an-'ustrian theoretician of socialis9! Kennan9 George :. ./46- ! '9erican di,lo9at and historian! '9bassador to the Soviet :nion @./5=A! Korean War Began with the attac$ by "orth 7orea on South 7orea @+une ./54A across the 02th ,arallel of latitude, the ,ostwar dividing-line fi)ed by an agree9ent between Russia and the :nited States! South 7orea was Goined by :nited "ations forces under :nited States co99and, after the :nited "ations ,assed a resolution @+une =5A charging a breach of ,eace and de9anding cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of "orth 7orean forces! "orth 7orea was Goined by (hinese (o99unists in "ove9ber ./54 when :nited "ations forces a,,roached the Manchurian border! n ./5. the battle lines were again stabiliHed at the 02th ,arallel! 'n ar9istice was concluded in +uly ./50! La8a"9 Pierre .220 - ./65! &rench ,olitician> Pre9ier @./0. - 0=, ./05 - 03A> virtual dictator of the Eichy govern9ent under Petain @./6= - 65A! 'fter the Second 8orld 8ar he was e)ecuted for collaborating with the Ger9ans! Lenin9 @. I. .214 - ./=6! Russian revolutionist and states9an> founder of Bolshevis9, the Third nternational, and the Soviet :nion! Leopo"( I 7ing of Belgiu9 @.20. - 35A! Leopo"( II 7ing of Belgiu9 @.235 - ./4/A! Litt"e 'ntente Treaties of alliance concluded in ./=4 and ./=. a9ong (Hechoslova$ia, Ru9ania, and #ugoslavia for the co99on defense of the status Luo of ././! L"o ( George9 %a8i( H*st 'ar" o! %- !orI .230 - ./65! British states9an and Pri9e Minister during 8orld 8ar ! Lo$arno Treaties ./=5! ncluded a treaty of 9utual guaranty of the &ranco - Ger9an and Belgo-Ger9an frontiers @signed by Ger9any, &rance, Belgiu9, and by Great Britain and taly as guarantorsA, various arbitration treaties, and a &ranco-Polish and &ranco - (Hechoslova$ian treaty for 9utual assistance in case of attac$ by Ger9any! (reated a brief ,eriod of international good feeling $nown as the Js,irit of %ocarno!J Lo$Ee9 John .30=-.146! English ,hiloso,her! Long9 Hue .2/0 - ./05! Governor of %ouisiana @./=2 - 0.A> :!S! Senator @./0.-05A! Louis CI@ 7ing of &rance @.360 - .1.5A! Louis C@ 7ing of &rance @.1.5 - 16A! Louis C@I 7ing of &rance @.116-/=A! Lo8e9 A"!re( Henr .204 - ./.0! '9erican ,acifist! Lu)emburg9 +osa .214 - ././! Ger9an Mar)ist> founded S,artacus Party in the &irst 8orld 8ar and aided in its transfor9ation into the Ger9an (o99unist Party! Ma$e(onian 'mpire Reached ,ea$ of its ,ower during the reign of 'le)ander the Great in the third century B!(!> defeated, divided, and anne)ed by Ro9e in the second and first centuries B!(! Ma$hia8e""i9 Ni$$o"o .63/ - .5=1! talian ,olitical ,hiloso,her and states9an!

Ma(ison9 James .15. C .203! 'uthor, with Ha9ilton and +ay, of &ederalist Pa,ers> Secretary of State @.24.-2A under +efferson, who9 he succeeded as President @.24/ - .1A! Maginot Line Syste9 of fortifications along the eastern frontier of &rance> na9ed for 'ndre Maginot, &rench Minister of 8ar @./== - =6, ./=/ - 0.A, who began its construction! (onsidered i9,regnable, the whole line beca9e useless when the Ger9ans turned it by 9eans of the brea$through at Sedan, which initiated the invasion of &rance in ./64! Mahan. A"!re( Tha er .264 - ./.6! '9erican historian, naval officer, and ,ublicist> for9ulated a doctrine of sea ,ower, which e)erted great influence in the :nited States, Great Britain, Ger9any, +a,an, and Russia! Mahomet II .6=/ - 2.! ;tto9an sultan @.65.-2.A> co9,leted conLuest of ByHantine E9,ire> founder of ;tto9an E9,ire! Maria Theresa E9,ress of 'ustria-Hungary @.164 - 24A! Mar)9 Kar" .2.2 - 20! Ger9an econo9ist and social ,hiloso,her, who laid the theoretical foundation of 9odern socialis9! MaDarin9 Ju"es .34= - 3.! &rench states9an> (ardinal of the Ro9an (atholic (hurch! %eading 9inister @.360 - 3.A in the first ,eriod of %ouis D EIs reign! Me(iatiDation The act by which in the Holy Ro9an E9,ire the Ji99ediateJ relationshi, between a state and the E9,ire was transfor9ed into a J9ediateJ one through the intercession of a su,erior state, who re,resented fro9 then on the 9ediatiHed state in its relations with the E9,ire! Metterni$h9 Prin$e K"emens 8on .110 - .25/! 'ustrian &oreign Minister @.24/ - =.A, (hancellor @.2=. - 62A> too$ a 9aGor ,art in sha,ing the di,lo9acy of Euro,e during the "a,oleonic 8ars, and was the leading states9an of Euro,e fro9 .2.5 to .262! Mi""9 John Stuart .243 - 10! English ,hiloso,her and econo9ist! Minorities Treaties Treaties, concluded after the &irst 8orld 8ar, binding 9ost of the states of (entral and Eastern Euro,e to ,rotect 9inorities within their borders by assuring the9 liberty to ,ractice their religions, s,ea$ their own languages, and educate their children in the 9inority cultures! The %eague of "ations was res,onsible for enforcing these sti,ulations! Mor"e 9 John9 @is$ount Mor"e o! &"a$Eburn .202 - ./=0! English liberal states9an and 9an of letters! Muni$h Sett"ement Se,te9ber ./02! Mar$ed the ,ea$ of the ,olicy of Ja,,ease9ent!J England, re,resented by "eville (ha9berlain, and &rance, re,resented by Edouard *ala-dier, surrendered to HitlerIs de9ands and ,er9itted Ger9any to occu,y the Sudetenland in (Hechoslova$ia! 'lthough &rance and Britain guaranteed the new boundaries, neither acted when Hitler too$ over all of (Hechoslova$ia in March ./0/! Napo"eon I .13/ - .2=.! E9,eror of &rance @.246 - .5A! Napo"eon III .242 - 10! E9,eror of &rance @.25= - 14A> ne,hew of "a,oleon ! 's President of the Second Re,ublic after the revolution of .262 he 9ade hi9self dictator and then E9,eror> abdicated after defeat in the &ranco-Prussian 8ar @.214 - 1.A! Napo"eoni$ Wars .1/3 - .2.5! 8ars waged by &rance, under "a,oleon Is 9ilitary and ,olitical leadershi,, against England, 'ustria, Prussia, Russia, and 9ost of the other countries of Euro,e at various ti9es and in various co9binations! Ended with "a,oleonIs defeat at 8aterloo! Nationa" So$ia"ists Me9bers of the "ational Socialist Ger9an 8or$ers Party @abbreviated to the ter9 J"aHisJA, founded after the &irst 8orld 8ar and led by Hitler! Nehru9 Ja-ahar"a" .22/ - ./36! ' leader of the ndian inde,endence 9ove9ent> President of the ndian "ational (ongress since ./=/> Pri9e Minister of inde,endent ndia, ./61-./36! NietDs$he9 :rie(ri$h Wi"he"m .266-./44! Ger9an ,hiloso,her! Nine Po-er Treat ./==! The :nited States, Great Britain, +a,an, and si) other 9e9bers of the 8ashington (onference bound the9selves to res,ect the Jsovereignty, the inde,endence, and the territorial and ad9inistrative integrity of (hina,J and to u,hold the ,rinci,le of the ;,en *oor!

North9 :re(eri$E North9 4th &aron .10=-/=! English Pri9e Minister @.114 - 2=A! Nuremberg Tria"s ./65 - 61! Trials of "aHis for Jwar cri9esJ by an nternational Military Tribunal sitting in "ure9berg, Ger9any! N e Committee Senate co99ittee @./06 - 03A, headed by Senator Gerald P! "ye @"orth *a$otaA, for9ed to investigate the activities of ban$ers and 9unitions 9anufacturers in the &irst 8orld 8ar! t concerned itself chiefly with ,roving that war ,rofiteers had been res,onsible for '9erican intervention! The ,o,ularity of this thesis was reflected in the neutrality legislation of ./05 - 01! Open %oor :nited States ,olicy toward (hina, originally ,ro9ulgated by Secretary of State +ohn Hay in .2// in the for9 of identical notes to the great ,owers calling for the observation of eLual co99ercial rights in (hina, and e),anded by a si9ilar note in ./44 u,holding (hinaIs territorial integrity and ,olitical inde,endence as well! Pa"eo"ogue9 Mauri$e .26/ - ./66! &rench di,lo9at and writer> '9bassador to Russia @./.6-.1A! Pa"merston9 Henr John Temp"e9 .r( @is$ount .126 - .235! British &oreign Secretary @.204 - 6.A> Pri9e Minister @.255 - 52A! Paris9 Treat o! .253! See (ri9ean 8ar! Pee"9 Sir +obert .122 - .254! British Ho9e Secretary @.2==-=1A> Pri9e Minister @.206 - 05, .26. - 63A! Penn9 Wi""iam .366-.1.2! English Kua$er> founder of Pennsylvania! n his Essay towards the Present and &uture Peace of Euro,e @.3/0A, Penn ,ut forth the idea of a league of nations whose dis,utes would be settled by an international court of arbitration! Permanent Court o! Internationa" Justi$e ;therwise $nown as the 8orld (ourt! Established in ./=., ,ursuant to the (ovenant of the %eague of "ations> ter9inated in ./65 when its functions were transferred to the nternational (ourt of +ustice ,rovided by the (harter of the :nited "ations! Peter the Great HPeter II (Har of Russia @.32=-.1=5A> founder of the 9odern Russian state Phi"ip II 7ing of S,ain, "a,les, and Sicily @.553 - /2A, and @as Phili, A 7ing of Portugal @.524 - /2A! Phili,Is foreign ,olicy was directed toward ,reserving S,anish hege9ony on the continent of Euro,e and securing the triu9,h of the Ro9an (hurch over heresy! :ndertoo$ disastrous e),edition against England, which resulted in the defeat of the S,anish 'r9ada in .522! Pitt Hthe >oungerI9 Wi""iam .15/ - .243! English states9an> Pri9e Minister @.120 - .24., .246-3A! Pots(am Agreement Result of a conference @./65A of the :nited States, the Soviet :nion, and Great Britain at Potsda9, Ger9any! Transferred the chief authority in Ger9any to the '9erican, Russian, British, and &rench occu,ation authorities and to a four-,ower 'llied (ontrol (ouncil> laid down the ter9s of denaHification, de9ilitariHation, and de9ocratiHation! *elivered, with the concurrence of (hina, a surrender ulti9atu9 to +a,an! Prou(hon9 Pierre J. .24/ - 35! &rench social> ,hiloso,her! Puni$ Wars 8ars between (arthage @whose language was called JPunicJA, which controlled "orthwest 'frica and the 8estern Mediterranean, and Ro9e! &irst Punic 8ar, =36 - =6. B!(! Second Punic 8ar, =.2 - =4. B!(! Third Punic 8ar, .6/ - .63 B!(! Ended in the destruction of (arthage and the ascendance of Ro9e as the greatest ,ower in the 8estern world! 1uis"ing Traitor or fifth colu9nist! The ter9 is derived fro9 Eid$un Kuisling, a "orwegian fascist leader who hel,ed Ger9any ,re,are the conLuest of "orway in ./64 and was later 9ade Pre9ier! E)ecuted in ./65! +a$ine9 Jean .30/ - //! &rench dra9atist! +a(iote"egraph ;nion Established in ./43> a9alga9ated with the nternational Telegra,h :nion to for9 the ,resent nternational Teleco99unication :nion! +e!orm A$ts Three bills @.20=, .231, .226A, which refor9ed the British electoral syste9 and e)tended the franchise!

+egensburg9 %iet o! ' ,er9anent congress of the envoys of the ,rinces of the Holy Ro9an E9,ire @.330 - .243A! +hinebun( ' league of Ger9an ,rinces for9ed in .243 under the leadershi, of "a,oleon ! +i$he"ieu9 Arman( Jean (u P"essis9 %ue (e .525 - .36=! &rench states9an> controlled the govern9ent as 9inister @.3=6 - 6=A of %ouis D > (ardinal of the Ro9an (atholic (hurch! +obespierre9 Ma)imi"ien Marie Isi(ore .152 - /6! 's head of the +acobins, an e)tre9ist re,ublican grou,, he instigated the Reign of Terror during the &rench Revolution and beca9e virtual dictator of &rance, before he hi9self was e)ecuted! +ousseau9 Jean Ja$Fues .1.=-12! &rench ,hiloso,her! +u$e""ai9 &ernar(o .66/ - .5.6! talian historian and di,lo9at! +usso # :innish War ./0/ - 64! Began with a Russian attac$ on &inland @"ove9ber 04,./0/A> ended one hundred days later with the colla,se of &innish resistance! n the ,eace treaty of March .=, ./64, &inland ceded to the :!S!S!R! the 7arelian sth9us, the city of Eii,uri, a naval base, and territories totaling .3,.10 sLuare 9iles, with a ,o,ulation of 654,444! Saint#Pierre9 Char"es I. C.9 Abbe de .352 - .160! &rench social ,hiloso,her! n his ProGect of Per,etual Peace @.1.0A he advocated an international court of arbitration, the renunciation of war, and a league of (hristian states, bound together in a ,er,etual alliance for 9utual security! Sa"isbur 9 +obert Arthur Ta"bot Gas$o ne # Ce$i"9 .r( MarFuess o! .204 - ./40! British &oreign Secretary under *israeli @.212 - 24A> Pri9e Minister @.225, .223 - /=, .2/5 - ./4=A! Sa"t Strategic 'r9s %i9itation Tal$s between the :nited States and the Soviet :nion! Se8en >ears= War .153 - 30! 8orld - wide war fought in Euro,e, "orth '9erica, and ndia between &rance, 'ustria, Russia, Sa)ony, Sweden, and @after .13=A S,ain on one side and Prussia, Great Britain, and Hanover on the other> originated in the colonial rivalry between &rance and England and the struggle for su,re9acy in Ger9any between 'ustria and Prussia! Sombart9 Werner .230 - ./6.! Ger9an econo9ist and sociologist who started out as a Mar)ist, then turned shar,ly against Mar)is9, and ended u, as a su,,orter of "ational Socialis9! Spanish Su$$ession9 War o! the See Treaty of :trecht! Spen$er9 Herbert .2=4 - ./40! English ,hiloso,her! Stare (e$isis The doctrine of adhering to ,recedents in a,,lying the sa9e ,rinci,le of law to si9ilar situations! Sternberg9 :ritD .2/5 - ./30! Mar)ist writer! Stoi$s 'dherents of the ,hiloso,hy of Stoicis9, founded by Peno at the beginning of the third century B!(! Su"" 9 Ma)imi"ien (e &ethune .534 - .36.! &rench states9an! His Grand *esign was a ,lan for the federation of all (hristian nations! Sumner9 Wi""iam Graham .264 - ./.4! '9erican sociologist and econo9ist> ,rofessor of ,olitical and social science at #ale :niversity! SuDeraint The ,olitical control of one state over another, which ,reserves all outward attributes of sovereignty! Ta$itus9 Corne"ius c! 55 - .=4! Ro9an historian! Ta""e ran(9 Char"es Mauri$e (e .156 - .202! &rench &oreign Minister @.1/1 - /, .244 - 1, .2.6 - .5A! Teheran Con!eren$e Meeting in ./60 of Roosevelt, (hurchill, and Stalin at Teheran, ran> reached agree9ent on sco,e and ti9ing of the invasion of &rance and o,erations against Ger9any! Thiers9 Louis A(o"phe .1/1-.211! &rench states9an, Gournalist, and historian! Three ti9es Pre9ier> first President of the Third Re,ublic @.21.-10A!

Thir( +epub"i$ o! :ran$e %asted fro9 &ranceIs defeat in the &ranco-Prussian 8ar @.21.A to the for9ation of the Eichy govern9ent under the Ger9an occu,ation in ./64! Thirt >ears= War .3.2 - 62! ' general Euro,ean war, fought 9ainly in Ger9any> essentially a war of ,etty Ger9an ,rinces and foreign ,owers C &rance, Sweden, *en9ar$, England C against the Holy Ro9an E9,ire, as re,resented by the Ha,sburgs in 'ustria, Ger9any, taly, the "etherlands, and S,ain, as well as a religious war of Protestants against (atholics! Thu$ (i(es c! 634 - 644 B!(! 'thenian historian! Titu"es$u9 Ni$ho"as .220 - ./6.! Ru9anian states9an! 's &oreign Minister @./=1-03A he cha9,ioned the &rench-s,onsored ,olicy of collective security and was one of the architects of the %ittle Entente with (Hechoslova$ia and #ugoslavia! (e To$Fue8i""e9 A"e)is .245 - 5/! &rench states9an, ,olitical theorist, and historian! 'fter a visit to the :nited States in .20., he wrote *e9ocracy in '9erica @.205 - 64A, a ,enetrating analysis of the nature of '9erican de9ocracy and of de9ocracy in general! TraGan Ro9an E9,eror @/2 - ..1A! Troppau9 Congress o! .2=4! nternational conference called by Metternich, under the ,rovisions of the Holy 'lliance, to consider 9eans of su,,ressing the liberal u,risings against the $ings of Sicily and S,ain! Truman %o$trine ;utlined by President Tru9an in an address to (ongress @March ./61A in su,,ort of the Gree$-Tur$ish aid bill! The ,olicy that ca9e to be $nown as the Tru9an *octrine calls, in effect, for the Jcontain9entJ of (o99unis9 by giving aid to govern9ents see$ing to re,el Jtotalitarian aggression!J ;nite( Nations '$onomi$ an( So$ia" Coun$i" (onstituent organ of the :nited "ations with the function of investigating international econo9ic and social Luestions and re,orting to the General 'sse9bly and other :nited "ations organs for action! ;nite( Nations :oo( an( Agri$u"ture OrganiDation Established in ./63, with the obGect of bettering the conditions of rural life, i9,roving agricultural ,roduction and distribution, and raising the level of nutrition! ;nite( Nations Trusteeship Coun$i" Su,ervises control of non-self-governing territories according to the (harter of the :nited "ations> consists of 9e9bers ad9inistering trust territories, and an eLual nu9ber of other 9e9ber nations @including always the ,er9anent 9e9bers of the Security (ouncilA! ;ni8ersa" Posta" ;nion Established in .215 with headLuarters in Bern, SwitHerland> beca9e a s,ecialiHed agency of the :nited "ations in ./61! ;N++A :nited "ations Relief and Rehabilitation 'd9inistration, founded in ./60 to give aid to countries ravaged by the war> discontinued Euro,ean o,erations in ./61> dissolved in ./6/! ;rban II Po,e @.422 - //A! ;tre$ht9 Treat o! (oncluded the 8ar of the S,anish Succession @.14. - 6A after the defeat of &rance by England and Holland! @atte"9 'meri$ (e .1.6 - 31! Swiss ,hiloso,her and Gurist> leading authority on international law! @eni$e9 +epub"i$ o! ;ne of the great 9ariti9e ,owers of the fifteenth and si)teenth centuries, whose a9bassadors develo,ed di,lo9acy into a great art! Eenice united with the 7ingdo9 of taly in .233! @erona9 Congress o! .2==! %ast conference under ,rovisions of Kuadru,le 'lliance> called to consider what to do about a revolution in S,ain! The (ongress decided, against the o,,osition of the English &oreign Secretary, (anning, to send a &rench ar9y to su,,ress this u,rising, @ersai""es9 Treat o! The ,rinci,al treaty ter9inating the &irst 8orld 8ar! @i$toria Kueen of England @.201 - ./4.A and E9,ress of ndia @.213 - ./4.A!

@ienna9 Congress o! .2.6-.5! Peace conference following the "a,oleonic 8ars, at which the great ,owers C 'ustria, Russia, Prussia, Great Britain, and &rance C agreed u,on territorial and ,olitical ter9s of settle9ent! @o"taire .3/6-.112! &rench ,hiloso,her and author! Wagram9 &att"e o! 't 8agra9, 'ustria, in .24/! "a,oleon won one of his 9ost brilliant victories! Si) days later 'ustria was forced to conclude an ar9istice! Weber9 Ma) .236-./=4! Most influential Ger9an sociologist! Weimar9 +epub"i$ o! ././ - 00! The Ger9an state that was established under a de9ocratic federal constitution ,assed by a constitutional asse9bly in the city of 8ei9ar! We""ington9 Arthur We""es"e 9 *st %uEe o! .13/ - .25=! British soldier and states9an! (o99ander of British and allied ar9ies in the wars against "a,oleon @.242 - .5A> won his 9ost fa9ous victory at 8aterloo @.2.5A> Pri9e Minister @.2=2 - 04A> &oreign Secretary @.206 - 05A! Westpha"ia9 Treat o! .362! General settle9ent ter9inating the Thirty #earsI 8ar> ended the ,ower of the Holy Ro9an E9,ire, with &rance e9erging as the do9inant Euro,ean ,ower! Wi""iam II .25/ - ./6.! Ger9an E9,eror @.222 - ./.2A! Wi""iam III .354 - .14=! 7ing of England, Scotland, and reland @.32/ - .14=A! Wi""iam the ConFueror HWi""iam II .4=1 - 21! 7ing of England @.433 - 21A! Wi"son9 Woo(ro.253 - ./=6! Twenty-seventh President of the :nited States @./.0 - =.A! Wo"se 9 Thomas .61= C .504! English states9an and (ardinal of the Ro9an (atholic (hurch> Privy (ouncilor and %ord (hancellor of Henry E ! Wor"( Hea"th OrganiDation :nited "ations s,ecialiHed agency, established in ./62! ts obGect is Jthe attain9ent by all ,eo,les of the highest level of health!J >a"ta Hor CrimeaI Agreement Result of a 9eeting @./65A of Roosevelt, (hurchill, and Stalin at #alta, (ri9ea, :!S!S!R!> co9,lete te)t not disclosed until ./61! Set forth the ter9s for the occu,ation of Ger9any, ,ledged the establish9ent of a new Poland on a de9ocratic basis, and bound the signatories to give Goint assistance to countries liberated fro9 "aHi do9ination, enabling the9 to establish, through Jfree elections,J govern9ents Jres,onsive to the will of the ,eo,le!J 'nnounced a for9ula for big-,ower voting in the :nited "ations, and co99itted the Soviet :nion to enter the war against +a,an in return for the restoration of certain territories lost in the Russo-+a,anese 8ar @./4. 5A, and Goint (hinese - Soviet o,eration of the (hinese-Eastern railway!

Inde+ 'da9s, +ohn, .4. 'da9s, +ohn Kuincy, =63 - =61 'fghanistan, Soviet invasion of, .3= 'frica, balance of ,ower and, ./5 - ./3, =.6 'griculture, .=1-.=2 'las$a, :!S! ,urchase of, 56 'le)ander the Great, 3= 'lgeria, /5 'llen of Hartwood, %ord, 66 'lliances, ./1-=4/ counteralliances versus, =46-=4/ distribution of benefits within, =44 X =4. general nature of, ./1 X =4= ideologies and, .// X =44 world do9ination versus, =4=-=46 'lliance treatiesB ,olicy of the status Luo and, 50 @See also Treaties, internationalA '9bassadors, 23 '9biguity of events, ./ '9erican Revolution, =61 'ngell, "or9an, 36 'nglo-Ger9an "aval 'gree9ent @./05A, 11 'nglo-Russian treaty @./41A, ./3 'nti-i9,erialis9, as ideology of i9,erialis9, .43, .42 ',,ease9ent, ,olicy of, 13 - 12, 24 'rab %eague, Treaty of @./65A, .// 'rab nations, 14, .=2 'rgentina, =.6 'ristocracyB do9ination of the 9iddle classes by the, 0/ ,ersonal ethics, =05 - =01 'r9a9entsB balance of ,ower and, ./3 X ./1 @See also *isar9a9ent> "uclear wea,onsA 'r9ed forcesB 'r9ed forces @(ont!A 9obiliHation of, /. Luantity and Luality of, as ele9ent of national ,ower, .02 X .0/ @See also entries beginning with MilitaryA 'r9s control, =1/ - =2/ 'ssassinations, ==5 'tlantic (harter, .//

'to9ic bo9b tests, /4 'ugustus, Ro9an e9,eror, 52 'ustralia, .64 'ustria, 50, ./5, =45 balance of ,ower and, =.0, =.6 Euro,ean balance of ,ower and, =42 Ger9an anne)ation of, 1=, 11 'ustrian-Hungarian E9,ire, .4/ national 9orale in, .5= 'ustro - Prussian 8ar @.233A, 3. 'utocratic govern9ents, national 9orale and, .5= ')is, =42 Balance of ,ower, .., =3, .20 - =.3 alliances and, ./1-=4/ counteralliances versus, =46 C =4/ distribution of benefits within, =44 - =4. general nature of, ./1-=4= ideologies and, .// - =44 world do9ination versus, =4=-=46 arbiter of, =.4 ar9a9ents and, ./3 - ./1 co9,ensations and, ./5 ./3 co9,etition ,atterns of, ./4 - ./= direct-o,,osition ,attern of, .22 divide - and - rule 9ethod of, ./6-./5 in do9estic ,olitics, .25 X .22 Balance of ,ower @(ont!A do9inant and de,endent syste9s of, =.0 X =.5 holder of, =4/ X =.= international law and, =53 X =51 7orea and, ./= X ./0 9eanings of, .20n structural changes in, =.5 - =.3 as universal conce,t, .20 - .25 Bal$ans, 32 balance of ,ower and, =.0 - =.6, =.5 Euro,ean balance of ,ower and, =41-=42 Bal$an 8ars, 32 Bay of Pigs invasion @./3=A, /5 Beard, (harles '!, 65n, .21-.22 Belgiu9, .53 Euro,ean balance of ,ower and, =41 8orld 8ar and, .5 Bentha9, +ere9y, 05, 36 Bin$ley, Robert (, =60 Biological ideologies of i9,erialis9, .45 Bis9arc$, ;tto von, 50, .65, .53 ethics and, ==3 X ==1 Ger9an di,lo9acy and, .51 i9,erialistic ,olicy of, 32 X 3/ international law and, =53 Bluff, ,olicy of, /5 - /3 Boer 8ar, 3. Bolivia, 3. BraHil, =.6 Briand - 7ellog Pact @./=2A, =3. Bridges, Robert, .25 Brierly, +! %!, =50 Bright, +ohn, 64 British-Polish 'lliance of ',ril 5, ./0/, 50 Bryce, +!, .23 - .21 Bu$harin, "! !, 24 - 20 Bulgaria, 5. Bur$e, Ed9und .66, .1/n, ./.-./=, =.5 Bush, George, /. (alhoun, +ohn (!, 64 (a9bodia, genocide in, =62 (anada, .64 (anning, George, =43, =.3 (a,italis9, i9,erialis9 and, 34 - 35 (aribbean, 56 - 53 (arr, E! H!, =. (arter, +i99y, =6, .3=-.30 (arthaginian Peace, 35 - 33 (arthaginians, =40, ==1 (entral '9erica, 56 econo9ic i9,erialis9 and, 1. (entral ntelligence 'gency @( 'A, =0 - =6, ==3 (haco 8ar, 3. (ha9berlain, +ose,h, 52

(ha9berlain, "eville, 3, .36, .1= (haris9a @charis9atic leadershi,A, 0=-00 (harles E, 7ing of S,ain, =.4 - =.. (harles E , 7ing of &rance, .03 (hina, .64 international status of govern9ent of, .6-.5 7orea and, ./= "ine Power Treaty @./==A, 5=-50 (hou En - lai, 2/ (hurchill, 8inston, 3, 52, 21, .01, .51, .1., =.3 on a,,ease9ent ,olicy, 12 on balance of ,ower, =.= on birth-rate, .60 9orality and, ==2 (le9enceau, Georges, .04, ==1 (oal, .00 - .06 (obden, Richard, 05 - 03 (old 8ar, /0 (oleridge, Sa9uel h!, .60 - .66 (ollective security, =42 - =4/ (olonialis9 @coloniesA, 65 (o99unist nternational, 10 (o99unist 9ove9ent@sAB national solidarity and, ../ (o99unist nationsB '9erican ,olicy toward, / i9,erialis9 and, 1/ - 24 (o99unist ,arty @&ranceA, ../ (o9,ensationsB balance of ,ower and, ./5 - ./3 (onferences, international, 2/ - /4 (ongo, .00 (ongress of Berlin of .212, 2/ (ongress of Eienna, 66, ./5 (ontain9ent, ,olicy of, 13 (ontinental i9,erialis9, 32 (onvention with Res,ect to the %aws and (usto9s of 8ar on %and @.2// and ./41A, =3.-=3= (ounteralliances, =46-=4/ (ounterforce, strategy of, =25 - =23 (ourts, international, =3=-=36 (ri9ean 8ar @.256-53A, 3., =41-=42 (ubaB Bay of Pigs invasion @./3=A, /5 in ./24s, 55 (uban 9issile crisis @./3=A, 56 - 55 (ultural i9,erialis9, 1=-15 (Hechoslova$ia, 50, 11 (Hechoslova$ia @(ont!A Ger9an 9inorities of, .4/ *ardanelles, .=3 *eGaulle, (harles, =4= *e9ocracy, international 9orality and, =01-=0/ *e9ocratic ,arty @:!S!A, .23 *e9onological a,,roach to foreign ,olicy, 1-/ *e9osthenes, .4=-.40 *en9ar$, 56, .56 *escartes, Rene, .66 J*evilJ theory of i9,erialis9, 34 - 3. *ewey, +ohn, .66 *iderot, *!, =12 *i,lo9acyB defined, .55n national ,ower and, .55 - .52 *i,lo9atic cere9onial, ,restige ,olicy and, 25 - /4 *isar9a9ent, 66, =11-=2/ balance of ,ower and, ./3 X ./1 history of, =1/ ideological co99it9ent to, ..4 - ... *israeli, BenGa9in, 66 British i9,erialis9 and, 52 *ivide - and - rule 9ethod of balance of ,ower, ./6 X ./5

*ollar di,lo9acy, 14 *o9estic ,olitics, balance of ,ower in, .25-.22 *o9ination, tendency for! !01 - 02 *urie, +ohn! 00 Econo9ic aid, .41 Econo9ic i9,erialis9, 14 - 1= Econo9ic ,olicies, 06 - 05 Econo9ic solutions to ,olitical and 9ilitary ,roble9s, / Econo9ic theoriesB of i9,erialis9, 5/ X 35 @See also s,ecific theoriesA Egy,t, .=2 EliHabeth ., Kueen of England, =.. E9erson, Ral,h 8aldo, 63 ELuality, econo9ic, .43 - .42 ELuilibriu9, conce,t of, .20 - .26 Ethics, ==4 @See also nternational 9oralityA Ethio,ia, ./3 Euro,eB 'nglo - '9erican alliance and balance of Euro,e @(ont!A 'nglo-'9erican alliance @(ont!A ,ower in, ./1-.// balance of ,ower in, =.3 alliances and (ounteralliances, =45 =4/ unification of, ../ - .=4 Evaluation of national ,ower! .33 - .1/ errors of, .14 - .1/ absolute character of ,ower, .14 - .1= fallacy of the single factor, .16-.1/ ,er9anent character of ,ower, .1= C .16 tas$ of, .33 - .14 Evil, 1 X / E),ansionis9, 64 - 6. '9erican, 5/, 32 &ear, i9,erialis9 and, 1/ - 24 &ederalist, The, .25, .21, .22 &ifth colu9n, 1= &inland, Soviet ca9,aign against @./0/ - ./64A, .6, /1 &irst (rusade, 3= &irst 8orld 8ar @see 8orld 8ar A &ood ,roduction, as ele9ent of national ,ower, .=1-.=2 &orceB 9ilitary, 06 ,olitical ,ower distinguished fro9! 0. &oreign aid! .41 &our &reedo9s! .3 &rance! =4! 61! S= balance of ,ower and! ./6! ./3, =.4 X =.. alliances and! .//! =4=! =46, =45! =42 (o99unists in, ../ cultural i9,erialis9, 16 i9,erialis9, 33 national character of, .66 nationalis9 in, ..2 - ../ national ,ower of, .04, .06-.05 di,lo9acy and, .53 evaluation of @././ - ./0/A, .14 - .1= national 9orale and, .5=-.50 ,o,ulation, .6. "ational Socialists in, 1= Soviet invasion of &inland and, .6 status Luo ,olicy and, 50 8orld 8ar Hand, .02 @See also s,ecific ,eo,le, events, and to,icsA &rancis , 7ing of &rance, .4/ &ranco-Ger9an 8ar @.214A, 3., 12 &ranco-Prussian 8ar, =0 &ranco-Russian 'lliance, 1/ &rederic$ the Great, ..2 &rederic$ the Great @(ont!A on balance of ,ower, =45 as 9ilitary leader, .02 &ree 9ar$et, 6. - 6= &ree,ort, 'ndrew, 36 &ree trade, 05 &ried, '! H!, 61 &uller, +! &!, =0n Geneva (onvention @./6/A, ==/, =04 Genoa, Re,ublic of, 23 Geogra,hy, as ele9ent of national ,ower, .=6-.=3 Geo,olitics, as single factor fallacy, .16-.15

George, %loyd,,.5/ Ger9anic (onfederation, balance of ,ower and, =.0 - =.5 Ger9anyB a,,ease9ent of @./04sA, 11-12 balance of ,ower and, ./6 defensive ,olicy after 8ar of .214, 12 - 24 di,lo9acy of, .66, .51 - .52 ethies and, ==3 - ==1 &rench di,lo9acy and, .53 Hfi,olitics and, .16-.15 i9,erialis9 @./05 - ./65A, 33, 11 - 12, 24 - 2., /=-/0 ideology of, .46-.43 national self-deter9ination, ,rinci,le of, .4/ national character of, .66, .61-.62 nationalis9 in, .=., .==, .13, .11 national ,ower of, .06-.05 food as ele9ent of, .=1 ,o,ulation, .6. status Luo ,olicy and, 50 8ei9ar Re,ublic, 33 8orld 8ar and, .5, .45, .=. '9erican ,ower underesti9ated, .6/ 8orld 8ar and, /3, /1 blitH$rieg, .02 food, .=1 national 9orale, .54 - .5= @See also s,ecific ,eo,le, events, and to,icsA Gibbon, Edward, .46, =66, =65n God, .0 Goethe, +ohann 8olfgang von, ..2 Gooch, G P!, =.4 Good "eighbor ,olicy, 5., /0, /6 Govern9entB national 9orale and, .5= - .56 national ,ower and, .52 - .35 balance a9ong resources, .5/ X .34 Govern9ent @(ont!A balance between resources and ,olicy, .5/ ,o,ular su,,ort, .34 - .36 ,ublic o,inion of other nations, .36 - .35 Graduated deterrence, conce,tion of, =26-=25 Granville, %ord, =0 Gray, +ohn (hi,9an, ==6 Great Britain, 11 balance of ,ower and, =..-=.= alliances and, ./1-=4= alliances and with Portugal, =4.-=4= (anning on, =43 - =41 co9,ensations and, ./3 colonies and ,ossessions of, 52, 5/ di,lo9acy of, .51 foreign service, .51 i9,erialis9, 53 - 5/, 14 - 1=, 2. - 2=, /6 Persia, 1.-1= ndia and, 52, .04, .5= international 9orality and, =01-=0/ legalistic9oralistic a,,roach and, .6, .5 national character of, .66 national ,ower of, ..2 - ../, .06 evaluation of, .1.-.1= food as ele9ent of, .=1 geogra,hy and, .=5 naval ,ower, .5/ - .34 ,redo9inant ,osition in nineteenth century, 00 X 06 Soviet invasion of &inland and, .6 8orld 8ar and, 9ilitary technology, .03 X .01 8orld 8ar and, /6 ,olitical ,restige, /3 Grenada, 55 Grey, Edward, .5 Grotius, Hugo, ==/, =56 GuiHot, Thus, =55 Gustavus 'dol,hus, 7ing of Sweden, 00 Hague (onventions @.2// and ./41A, ==/, =04 Hague (onventions for the Pacific Settle9ent of nternational *is,utes @.2// and ./41A, ==/, =04, =3= Ha9ilton, 'le)ander, =4= Ha,sburgs, =4, =.., =.0 JHeartland,J .16-.15 Henry , 7ing of &rance, =.. Henry E , 7ing of England, =4, =.. Hitler, 'dolf, 3/, 11, /1 Ger9an di,lo9acy and, .51-.52 i9,erialistic ,olicy of, 24 - 2., .4/ 9orality and, ==1 Hobbes, Tho9as, 31n Hobson, +ohn '!, 34 Holy 'lliance, 5=, .// Holy Ro9an E9,ire, =11-=12 Hull, (ordell, 03 Hu9anitarian aid, .41 Hu9an nature, 0 ,luralistic conce,tion of, .5 X .3 ,olitical realis9 and, 6 Hu9an rights, international 9orality and, =65 - =6/ Hyde, (harles (!, =52 deology, // - ..= alliances and, .// X =44 a9biguous, .42 C ... of i9,erialis9, .46-.42 nature of, // X .4= ,ower struggle as concealed by, // X .4. recognition of, ... X ..= of the status Luo, .4=-.46 99igration, national ,ower of the :!S! and, .64 - .6. 99igration %aw of ./=6, .64

9,erialis9, 64 - 6., 5., 53 - 20 a,,ease9ent ,olicy toward, 13 - 12, 24 balance of ,ower and, .22 X .2/ contain9ent ,olicy toward, 13 countering, 15 X 24 detection of, 24 X 20 JdevilJ theory of, 34 X 3. econo9ic theories of, 5/ - 35 criticis9 of, 3. X 35 goals of, 31 X 3/ ideologies of, .46-.42 induce9ents to, 35 X 31 Mar)ist theory of, 5/ - 3., 35 9ethods of, 3/ X 15 cultural i9,erialis9, 1=-15 econo9ic i9,erialis9, 14 - 1= 9ilitary i9,erialis9, 14 9isconce,tions about, 51 use of the ter9, 53 X 51 @See also under s,ecific countriesA ndiaB British ,olicy in, 52 coal and iron reserves, .06 Great Britain and, 52, .04, .5= ,o,ulation of, .64, .6= scarcity of food in, .=1-.=2 ndochina, /5 ndustrial ca,acity, as ele9ent of national ,ower, .00 - .05 nsecurity, nationalis9 and, .=4 - .=0 nterde,endence, 2 nterest, conce,t of, 5 - .= nternational conferences, 2/ - /4 nternational (ourt of +ustice, =3=-=35 nternational courts, =3=-=36 nternational law, .1, =50 X =32 core of rules of, =56-=55 decentraliHed nature of, =55 - =5/ enforce9ent of, =35 - =32 general nature of, =50 - =51 legislative function in, =51-=35 decentraliHed character of legislative function, =51, =5/ international courts, =3=-=36 inter,retation and binding force of, =5/ X =3= Gudicial decisions, effect of, =36-=35 status Luo ,olicies and, .40 - .46 nternational 9orality, ==6-=6/ destruction of, =01-=0/ destruction of international society and, =0/ X =64 hu9an rights and, =65 - =6/ nationalis9 and, =0/ C =65 ,ersonal ethics, aristocracy and, =05 - =01 ,rotection of hu9an life and, ==5 - =05 9oral conde9nation of war, =0.-=0= total war and international 9orality, =0= - =05 in war, ==2 - =0. universal, nationalistic universalis9 versus, =05 X =6/ victory of nationalis9 over, =64 - =6. nternational ,oliticsB as acade9ic disci,line, .1-.2 as ,ower ,olitics, 05 - 03 understandingB different a,,roaches to, .1-./ li9itations to, ./ - =6 nternational society, international 9orality and destruction of, =0/ - =64 nternationalis9, victory of nationalis9 over, =64 - =6. ran @for9erly PersiaA, =0 - =6, 1.-1=, ./3 ranian hostage crisis, .3= ron, .00 - .06 rrationality, 1 rrigation, .=2 srael, Palestinian self-deter9ination and, .4/ taly, 5. balance of ,ower and, =.4, =.6 geogra,hy of, .=5 i9,erialis9, .45 taly @(ont!A ,olicy of bluff, /5 8orld 8ar and, /1 +a,anB i9,erialis9 of, .45 7orea and, ./=-./0 national ,ower of, oil and, .04 - .0= 8orld 8ar and, Pearl Harbor, /3 - /1 +efferson, Tho9as, ..2, ./2 +oad, N! i! M!, 6= +ohn of Salisbury, 02 7h9er Rouge, =62 7ir$, Grayson, .1-.2 7issinger, Henry, =20 7nowledge, scientific a,,roach and, 6= C .0 7orea, balance of ,ower and, ./=-./0 %atin '9erica, 2= evaluation of 9a, of countries of, .10 ,o,ulation trends, .6= %ea, Ho9er, 6= - .0

%eague of "ations, =34 'rticle .4 of the (ovenant of, 5=, 50 ,olicy of the status Luo and, 5=, 50 Soviet invasion of &inland and, .6 %efebure, MaGor, 66 %egalis9, .6-.5 %egalistic ideologies, status Luo ,olicies and, .46 %egislative function in international law, =51-=35 decentraliHed character of legislative function, =51-=5/ international courts, =3=-=36 inter,retation and binding force of, =5/ - =3= Gudicial decisions, effect of, =36 - =35 %egiti9acy @legiti9ate ,owerA, 0= %eMay, (urtis, =26 %enin, E! !, =0 on i9,erialis9, 34 %eviathan @HobbesA, 31n %iberalis9, 62 i9,erialis9 fro9 ,oint of view of, 34 nineteenth-century, 6. - 6= %incoln, 'braha9, .=, =6/ %ist, &riedrich, 66 %ocarno Treaty @./=5A, 5= %oc$e, +ohn, .66 %ong, Huey, .43 %ori9er, +a9es, 6/n %ouis D E, 7ing of &rance, 3/,23,=46,=.. %ynd, Robert S!, 60 Mc(arthyis9, / Mac$inder, Halford, .16-.15 Mc"a9ara, Robert S!, =25 Madison, +a9es, .21 Mannhei9, 7arl, //n Marcuse, Herbert, 6. Mariti9e belt, =52 - =5/ Martin, (harles E!, .2 Mar), 7arl, 03 Mar)is9, i9,erialis9 and, 5/ - 3., 35 Mary, Kueen of Hungary, =.4 - =.. Master race, conce,t of, .13 Metternich, Prince von, 66 "a,oleon and, 23 Militaris9, as single factor fallacy, .11-.1/ Military conLuests, .=5 - .=3 Military (onvention of .2/6, 1/ Military force, 06 Military i9,erialis9, 14, 16 - 15 Military leadershi, as ele9ent of national ,ower, .02 Military ,re,aredness, .05 - .0/ 9ilitary leadershi, and, .02 technology and, .03 - .02 Military strength, ,restige ,olicy and dis,lay of, /4 - /., /0 MobiliHation, ,restige ,olicy and, /. Monroe, +a9es, =4, 50, =43 Monroe *octrine, =43 i9,erialis9 and, 32 ,olicy of the status Luo and, 50 X 55 Roosevelt corollary to, =5 Montaigne, Michel de, ./ Moon, Par$er Tho9as, 51n Morale, national, .6/ - .56 MoralityB realist theory and, 3 - 1, .= X .5 @See also nternational 9oralityA Mores, ==4

@See also nternational 9oralityA Motives, realist theory and, 5 - 3 Munich settle9ent @./02A, =., 11 Mussolini, Benito, /= "a,oleon Bona,arte @"a,oleon A, 3=, 30 crowning as e9,eror, 25 - 23 9eeting with Metternich, 23 "a,oleonic 8ars, 5=, ..2, =12 "ation states, .= "ational character, .60 - .6/ e)istence of, .60 - .65 nationalis9 and, .13 Russian, .65 - .62 "ational %iberation &ront @Eiet (ongA, 22 "ational 9orale, .6/ - .56 instability of, .6/ - .5. Luality of society and govern9ent and, .5= - .56 "ational ,owerB ar9ed forces as ele9ent of, .02 - .0/ di,lo9acy and, .55 C .52 evaluation of, .33 - .1/ errors of, .14 - .1/ tas$ of, .33 - .14 food as ele9ent of, .=1-.=2 geogra,hy as ele9ent of, .=6-.=3 govern9ent and, .52 X .35 balance a9ong resources, .5/ - .34 balance between resources and ,olicy, .5/ ,o,ular su,,ort, .34 - .36 ,ublic o,inion of other nations, .36-.35 identification with, ..3 - ..2, .==-.=0 industrial ca,acity as ele9ent of, .00 - .05 9ilitary leadershi, as ele9ent of, .02 9ilitary ,re,aredness as ele9ent of, .05 X .0/ national character as ele9ent of, .60 - .6/ national 9orale and, .6/ - .56 nature of, ..5 - ..2 ,o,ulation as ele9ent of, .0/ - .60 raw 9aterials as ele9ent of, .=2 - .06 @See also Balance of ,owerA "ational self-deter9ination, ideologies of, .42 - .4/ "ational Socialis9 @Ger9anyA, 33, .=. fifth colu9ns in Euro,e, 1= 9orality and, =60 - =66 "ational solidarity, nationalis9 and, ../ "ational sovereignty, 61-62 "ationalis9, ..2 - .=0 international 9orality and, =0/ X =65 old versus new, =1.-=10 ,ersonal insecurity, social disintegration and, .=4 - .=0 retreat fro9, ..2 - .=4 as single factor fallacy, .15 - .11 "ationalistic universalis9, =1.-=10 universal 9orality versus, =05 - =6/ "atural frontier, conce,t of, 60 "atural sciences, 6. "aval de9onstrations, /4 "avies, 9ilitaris9 and, .11-.12 "ear East, .=2, .04 "icaragua, 55 "ine Power Treaty @./==A, 5=-50 "i)on, Richard M! @"i)on ad9inistrationA, 2/ "oel-Ba$er! Phili,! 03 "or9ative syste9s, =./ - ==0 @See also nternational 9oralityB MoralityA "orth 'frica, .=2 "orth-South conflict, .43 - .42 "orth Eietna9, ,eace negotiations with :!S!, 22 "orway, .56 "uclear ar9s control, =24 - =2/ "uclear ,ower, .00 "uclear war, =.-== "uclear war strategy, tactical, =21-=22 "uclear wea,ons, .01-.02, .30 ,olitical ,ower and, 0. C 0= "ye (o99ittee, 34 - 3. ;il, ,olitical ,ower and, .04 - .00 ;il di,lo9acy, .04 ;ne-9an govern9ents, /= ;,en door ,olicy, 5= ;,,enhei9, %!, =53 ;rganiHation of '9erican States! /6 ;strogors$y! M!, 01 ;tto9an E9,ire, 21 Pacifis9, 6=

Paine, Tho9as, =61 Pa$istan, .// Palestine %iberation ;rganiHation @P%;A, .4/ Palestinian 'rabs, self-deter9ination of, .4/ Paraguay, 3. Paris, as site for international conferences, 2/ Paris, Treaty of @.2.5A, 5= Parlia9entary syste9s, .25 - .23 Pascal, Blaise! =64 - =6. Peace, international, =11-=1/ conce,t of, =3 ideology of, ..4 as ideology of the status Luo, .40 science of, 6. - 6/ Peace settle9ent, (arthaginian, 35 - 33 Pearl Harbor, attac$ on @./6.A, /3 - /1 Per9anent (ourt of 'rbitration, =3=-=30 Per9anent (ourt of nternational +ustice, =3=, =30 Persian Gulf war @.//.A, 3. Personal ethics of the aristocracy, =05 - =01 Personal insecurityB nationalis9 and, .=4 - .=0 Pied9ont, 32 Pitt, 8illia9, =0 Poland, 50, 11, .5/ balance of ,ower and, ./5 ,artitions of, =.0, =.6 Ger9an 9inorities of, .4/ 8orld 8ar and, .02 Political ideologies @see deologyA Political ,hiloso,hy, nineteenth-century, 0/ Political ,owerB basic ,atterns of, 54 - 5. charis9a and, 0=-00 conce,t of, =3, =/ - 05 de,reciation of, 05 X 6. '9erican e),erience, 0/ - 6. nineteenth-century ,hiloso,hy, 0/ force distinguished fro9, 0. legiti9ate ,ower distinguished fro9 illegiti9ate ,ower! 0= as 9eans to a nationIs ends, =/ - 04 scientific a,,roach to, 6. 6/ usable versus unusable, 0.-0= @See also "ational ,owerA Political realis9, 6-.3 autono9y of the ,olitical s,here and, .0, .5 X .3 deviations fro9 rationality and, 1-/ hu9an nature and, 6 interest and, 5 X .= legalistic-9oralistic a,,roach and, .6 9orality and, .=-.5 9otives and, 5 - 3 nor9ative ele9ent in, .4 ,luralistic conce,tion of hu9an nature and, .5 X .3 trends o,,osed to, .3 PoliticsB basic ,atterns of, 54 - 5. @See also *o9estic ,oliticsA Polybius, =4=-=40 Polyceutris9, of (o99unist 9ove9ent, ../ Po,e, 23 Po,ular su,,ort of govern9ent, .34 - .36 Po,ulation, as ele9ent of national ,ower, .0/ - .60 Portugal, 14 alliance between Great Britain and, =4.-=4= Potsda9 (onference @./65A, 21 Pound, Roscoe, =0/ PowerB Power @(ent!A conce,t of, .. interest defined in ter9s of, 5 9ilitary versus ,olitical, 0. re,utation for, i9,erialis9 and, /0 - /6 @See also "ational ,ower> Political ,owerA Power struggle, as concealed by ideological Gustifications and rationaliHations, // - .4. Prestige, ,olicy of, 26 - /2 corru,tions of, /6-/2 di,lo9atic cere9onial and, 25 - /4 dis,lay of 9ilitary force and, /4 - /., /0 as intrinsic ele9ent of international relations, 26 - 25 as neglected in 9odern ,olitical literature, 26 obGectives of, /.-/6 ,olicy of bluff versus, /5 - /3 Prisoners of war, =04 Productive ca,acity of the ene9y, destruction of, =00 Pro,aganda, /0, .36-.35 Pro,hecies in international affairs, ==-=0 Proudhon, Pierre G!, 05 - 03, 6=

Prussia, 3/ balance of ,ower and, =.0 C =.5 @See also Ger9anyA Public o,inion @See Po,ular su,,ortA Pyrenees, .=5

Racis9, nationalis9 and, .13, .11 Rational foreign ,olicy, .4 Rationality, 0 - 6, 1 Raw 9aterials, as ele9ent of national ,ower, .=2 - .06 Ray, +ean, =34 Reagan, Ronald @Reagan ad9inistrationA, 55 Realis9 @see Political realis9A Reason, nineteenth-century view of, 6., 6= Reinsurance Treaty, Russian-Ger9an, 1/ Religion, .3 Religious organiHations, cultural i9,erialis9 and, 10 - 16 Residues of the obsolete, 1 - 2 Rhineland, 11 Roberts, P! E!, 1. Robes,ierre, M!, 3 Roe, Tho9as, 00 Ro9an E9,ire, 52, /0 - /6, =40, =11 (arthaginians and, ==1 Ro9an Re,ublic, 52 Roosevelt, &ran$lin *!, 56 Roosevelt, Theodore, .5, =5n, 21 Ru9ania, 50, .53 Rush - Bagot 'gree9ent @.2.1A, =1/ Russell, +ohn, .10 - .16 Russia, 50, .=3 balance of ,ower and, ./5, =42 alliances and, .// i9,erialis9, 3/ Persia, 1.-1= national character of, .65 X .62 ,o,ulation of, .6. Tri,le 'lliance and, 1/ :!S! ,urchase of 'las$a and, 56 @See also Soviet :nion> and s,ecific ,eo,le, events, and to,icsA Russian ;rthodo) (hurch, 16 Russian Revolution @./.1A, =0 Russo-+a,anese 8ar @./46-./45A, 3., ./= Salisbury, Robert %ord, .4 S'%T 'gree9ents @Strategic 'r9s %i9itation TreatyA, =1/ Sanctions, ==4 - ==. Schu9,eter, +ose,h, 30 - 35 Scientific a,,roach, 6. - 6/ 9ethod of the single cause and, 65 - 61 Scientific uto,ianis9, 6. - 6/ Second 'fghan 8ar, 66 Self-deter9ination @see "ational self-deter9inationA Self-restraint of i9,erialist ,owers, /0 - /6 Self-sufficiency in food, .=1, .=2 Serbia, =42 Sihanou$, Prince of (a9bodia, =62 Single cause, 9ethod of the, 65 - 61 Single factor, fallacy of the, .16 - .1/ geo,olitics, .16 C .15 9ilitaris9, .11-.1/ nationalis9, .15 - .11 S9ith, 'da9, 6., 62 Social classB Ger9an nationalis9 and, .=.-.== identification with national ,ower and, ..1-..2 Social disintegration, nationalis9 and, .=4 - .=0 So9bart, 8erner, .45 South '9erica, =.6 Soviet :nion, ==3 ar9s control and, =24 - =2/

balance of ,ower and, ./6-./5 (hina and, cultural i9,erialis9 and, 10 (uba and, in ./24s, 55 Soviet :nion @(ont!A Eastern Euro,e andB cultural i9,erialis9, 10 i9,erialis9, 31 &inland invaded by, .6 &rench (o99unists and, ../ geo,olitics and, .15 i9,erialis9, .45 cultural, 10 international 9orality and, =61 invasion of 'fghanistan, .3= national ,ower of, .04 evaluation of, .1=-.10 geogra,hical factors, .=5 - .=3 industrial ca,acity, .00 - .06 nationalis9, .== ,restige ,olicy, /1-/2 status Luo ,olicy and, 50, ... - ..= 8orld 8ar and, 53 &inland, ca9,aign against @./0/ - ./64A, /1 national 9orale, .5= ,restige, /1 @See also Russia> and s,ecific ,eo,le, events, and to,icsA S,ain, 2=, 21, .53 balance of ,ower and, =43 - =41 deforestation in, .=2 geogra,hy of, .=5 S,anish-'9erican 8ar @.2/2A, 3. SLuid, .4=-.46 Stalin, +ose,h, 21, ==2 Standard of living, differences in, .43 - .42 Stare decisis, rule of, =36 ST'RT @Strategic 'r9s Reduction Tal$sA, =1/ Status Luo, ,olicy of, 54 - 55 ai9s of, 5. C 5= i9,erialis9 and, 15 - 12 %eague of "ations and, 5=, 50 Status Luo ante heliu9, 5. Streit, (larence, 6= Sub9arine warfare, .03 Su9ner, 8illia9 Graha9, /, .2 - ./, 5/ on e),ansion and i9,erialis9, 64 - 6. Su,erstition, / Survival of the fittest, as ideology of i9,erialis9, .45 Suttner, Bertha von, 60 Sweden, .6, =45 SwitHerland, 06, 2., .03 Taft, Howard, 21 Talleyrand, (harles M!, ..2 Tariffs, 65 Tawney, R! H!, .12n Taylor, '! +! P!, =. Technology, 9ilitary ,re,aredness and, .03 - .02 Third 8orldB food su,,ly in, .=2 ideologies and, .43 - .41 "orth-South conflict and, .43 - .42 Thirty #earsI 8ar, =45 Three E9,erorsI %eague, =44 Thucydides, .4, 02 TocLueville, 'le)is de, 01, .66, .34 - .3. Tolstoy, %eo, 02, .44, .5. Totalitarian govern9ents, cultural i9,erialis9 of, 10 Totalitarian states, national 9orale and, .50 Total war, international 9orality and, =0=-=05 Toynbee, 'rnold, =66 Trade, 05, 61 Treaties, international, =51-=52 inter,retation and binding force of, =5/ - =3= Tri,le 'lliance, 1/, =42 Tri,le Entente, =42 Tru9an, Harry S!, =4, 21 Tru9an *octrine, =4 Tur$ey @;tto9an E9,ireA, =43 - =42 Tur$o - talian 8ar @./..-./.=A, 3. :nited "ations, 03 ideology of, ..4 international law and, =34, =30 :nited States, =4, ... - ..= ar9s control and, =24 - =2/ balance of ,ower andB alliances and, ./1-=4= do9estic ,olitics and, .23 - .22 di,lo9acy of, .52 ,eace negotiations to end Eietna9 8ar, 22 8ashington social scene, 22 - 2/ e),ansionis9 of, 5/, 32 i9,erialis9, 53, 52, 5/, 32, 1. Good "eighbor ,olicy, /6 9orality and ,olicies of, ==3 national character of, .66 C .65 national 9orale of, .54 national ,ower ofB di,lo9acy and, .55 X .53 geogra,hy and, .=6 industrial ca,acity, .00 X .06 oil and, .0=, .00

:nited States @(ont!A national ,ower ofB @(ont!A ,o,ulation and, .64 - .6. nationalis9, .=0 ,olitical ,ower of, 00 ,o,ulation of, .64 - .6. ,ower ,olitics and, 0/ - 6. ,ublic o,inion and ,o,ular su,,ort in, .3.-.30 status Luo ,olicy and, 50 - 56 two-,arty syste9, .23 8orld 8ar and, .6/ 8orld 8ar andB Pearl Harbor, /3 - /1 ,restige, /3 - /1 @See also s,ecific ,eo,le, events, and to,icsA :raniu9, .=/, .00 :rban , Po,e, 3= :ruguay, =.6 :trecht, Treaty of @.1.0A, ./5, =45

Eenice, =.4 - =.. Re,ublic of, 23, ==5 Eersailles, Treaty of @././A, 5=, 35, 33, 11, 2., .46, .62 Eictoria, Kueen of Great Britain, .10 - .16 Eiet (ong, 22 Eietna9 8ar, =62 ,eace negotiations, 22 Einer, +acob, 30 Eiolence @see &orceA Eirgin slands, 56, 53 Eishins$y, 'ndrei, .=3

8ar, 01 i9,erialis9 and, 35 - 33 9oral conde9nation of, =0.-=0= nuclear, =.-== ,rotection of hu9an life in, ==2 - =0. 8arfare, technology of, .03 - .02 8ashington, George, .4 - .., =4, =0, 64 on Euro,e, 0/ 8ashington "aval Treaty @./==A, ./1 8ashington Treaty for the %i9itation of "aval 'r9a9ents @./==A, =1/ 8eber, Ma), .. 8estern civiliHation, ==4, ===-==0 8estern Euro,e, unification of, ../ - .=4 8estla$e, +ohn! =05 8est,halia, Treaty of @.362A, =56 8illia9 , Ger9an e9,eror, 1/, /., /=, ... i9,erialis9 and, 3/ 8ilson, 8oodrow, 03, .42 international 9orality and, =60, =61 8olfers, 'rnold, 04 8orld *isar9a9ent (onference @./0=A, =1/ 8orld do9ination, alliances versus! =4= - =46 8orld e9,ire, as goal of i9,erialis9! 31 X 32, 2=, 20 8orld 8ar , 50 balance of ,ower and, =41 Belgian neutrality and, .5 i9,erialis9 and, 33 8orld 8ar @(ont!A 9ilitary technology in, .03 - 01

9orality and, =60 8orld 8ar , 5., ..2 i9,erialis9 and, 31 international conferences and! 2/ - /4 international law and! =3. - =3= 9ilitary leadershi, in! .02 9ilitary technology in! .01 @See also s,ecific ,ersons, events, and to,icsA #ugoslavia, 50