Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

153675 April 19, 2007

On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him. On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition andmandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest. On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner, vs. HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee. The facts are: On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997. On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge. On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent.

On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed. On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001. Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post bail, thus: In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds further erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is granted subject to the following conditions: 1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government; 2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court; 3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly. SO ORDERED. On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings. In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus: Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail. In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan , Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo ,1 this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus: x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusfinds application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature. At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case. However, this Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other. The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law. On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community . Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution, 3 the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process. The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in order.

First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise been detained. Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights. The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings. In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainees right to bail. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired. Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government." Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition. 10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.14 But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the " immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the " provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently."

Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable. Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganancorrectly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail. The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met. An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence " should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch. SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120095. August 5, 1996]

3. Department Order No. 3-E, providing the minimum salary a performing artist ought to receive (not less than US$600.00 for those bound for Japan) and the authorized deductions therefrom. 4. Department Order No. 3-F, providing for the guidelines on the issuance and use of the ARB by returning performing artists who, unlike new artists, shall only undergo a Special Orientation Program (shorter than the basic program) although they must pass the academic test. In Civil Case No. 95-72750, the Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP), on January 27, 1995 filed a class suit assailing these department orders, principally contending that said orders 1) violated the constitutional right to travel; 2) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of law. FETMOP, likewise, averred that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and "in gross violation of the constitutional right... to life liberty and property." Said Federation consequently prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the aforestated orders. On February 2, 1992, JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. and Kary International, Inc., herein petitioners, filed a Motion for Intervention in said civil case, which was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 15 February, 1995. However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an Order denying petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint. On appeal from the trial court's Order, respondent court, in CA G.R. SP No. 36713 dismissed the same. Tracing the circumstances which led to the issuance of the ARB requirement and the assailed Department Order, respondent court concluded that the issuances constituted a valid exercise by the state of the police power. We agree. The latin maxim salus populi est suprema lex embodies the character of the entire spectrum of public laws aimed at promoting the general welfare of the people under the State's police power. As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually "extends to all public needs," [2] this "least limitable"[3] of governmental powers grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the state, as parens patriae gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers. Describing the nature and scope of the police power, Justice Malcolm, in the early case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro[4] wrote: "The police power of the State," one court has said...'is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed 'the law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.' Carried onward by the current of legislature, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual."[5] Thus, police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.

JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., and KARY INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MA. NIEVES CONFESSOR, then Secretary of the Department of the Labor and Employment, HON. JOSE BRILLANTES, in his capacity as acting Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and HON. FELICISIMO JOSON, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, respondents. DECISION KAPUNAN, J.: The limits of government regulation under the State's Police Power are once again at the vortex of the instant controversy. Assailed is the government's power to control deployment of female entertainers to Japan by requiring an Artist Record Book (ARB) as a precondition to the processing by the POEA of any contract for overseas employment. By contending that the right to overseas employment, is a property right within the meaning of the Constitution, petitioners vigorously aver that deprivation thereof allegedly through the onerous requirement of an ARB violates the due process clause and constitutes an invalid exercise of the police power. The factual antecedents are undisputed. Following the much-publicized death of Maricris Sioson in 1991, former President Corazon C. Aquino ordered a total ban against the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other foreign destinations. The ban was, however, rescinded after leaders of the overseas employment industry promised to extend full support for a program aimed at removing kinks in the system of deployment. In its place, the government, through the Secretary of Labor and Employment, subsequently issued Department Order No. 28, creating the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), which was tasked with issuing guidelines on the training, testing certification and deployment of performing artists abroad. Pursuant to the EIAC's recommendations,[1] the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994, issued Department Order No. 3 establishing various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the former. Performing artists successfully hurdling the test, training and certification requirement were to be issued an Artist's Record Book (ARB), a necessary prerequisite to processing of any contract of employment by the POEA. Upon request of the industry, implementation of the process, originally scheduled for April 1, 1994, was moved to October 1, 1994. Thereafter, the Department of Labor, following the EIAC's recommendation, issued a series of orders finetuning and implementing the new system. Prominent among these orders were the following issuances: 1. Department Order No. 3-A, providing for additional guidelines on the training, testing, certification and deployment of performing artists. 2. Department Order No. 3-B, pertaining to the Artist Record Book (ARB) requirement, which could be processed only after the artist could show proof of academic and skills training and has passed the required tests.

A thorough review of the facts and circumstances leading to the issuance of the assailed orders compels us to rule that the Artist Record Book requirement and the questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power. In 1984, the Philippines emerged as the largest labor sending country in Asia dwarfing the labor export of countries with mammoth populations such as India and China. According to the National Statistics Office, this diaspora was augmented annually by over 450,000 documented and clandestine or illegal (undocumented) workers who left the country for various destinations abroad, lured by higher salaries, better work opportunities and sometimes better living conditions. Of the hundreds of thousands of workers who left the country for greener pastures in the last few years, women composed slightly close to half of those deployed, constituting 47% between 1987-1991, exceeding this proportion (58%) by the end of 1991,[6] the year former President Aquino instituted the ban on deployment of performing artists to Japan and other countries as a result of the gruesome death of Filipino entertainer Maricris Sioson. It was during the same period that this Court took judicial notice not only of the trend, but also of the fact that most of our women, a large number employed as domestic helpers and entertainers, worked under exploitative conditions "marked by physical and personal abuse."[7] Even then, we noted that "[t]he sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers" compelled "urgent government action."[8] Pursuant to the alarming number of reports that a significant number of Filipina performing artists ended up as prostitutes abroad (many of whom were beaten, drugged and forced into prostitution), and following the deaths of a number of these women, the government began instituting measures aimed at deploying only those individuals who met set standards which would qualify them as legitimate performing artists. In spite of these measures, however, a number of our countrymen have nonetheless fallen victim to unscrupulous recruiters, ending up as virtual slaves controlled by foreign crime syndicates and forced into jobs other than those indicated in their employment contracts. Worse, some of our women have been forced into prostitution. Thus, after a number of inadequate and failed accreditation schemes, the Secretary of Labor issued on August 16, 1993, D.O. No. 28, establishing the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), the policy advisory body of DOLE on entertainment industry matters.[9] Acting on the recommendations of the said body, the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994, issued the assailed orders. These orders embodied EIAC's Resolution No. 1, which called for guidelines on screening, testing and accrediting performing overseas Filipino artists. Significantly, as the respondent court noted, petitioners were duly represented in the EIAC, [10] which gave the recommendations on which the ARB and other requirements were based. Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to "high risk" destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies. Moreover, here or abroad, selection of performing artists is usually accomplished by auditions, where those deemed unfit are usually weeded out through a process which is inherently subjective and vulnerable to bias and differences in taste. The ARB requirement goes one step further, however, attempting to minimize the subjectivity of the process by defining the minimum skills required from entertainers and performing artists. As the Solicitor General observed, this should be easily met by experienced artists possessing merely basic skills. The tests are aimed at segregating real artists or performers from those passing themselves off as such, eager to accept any available job and therefore exposing themselves to possible exploitation.

As to the other provisions of Department Order No. 3 questioned by petitioners, we see nothing wrong with the requirement for document and booking confirmation (D.O. 3-C), a minimum salary scale (D.O. 3-E), or the requirement for registration of returning performers. The requirement for a venue certificate or other documents evidencing the place and nature of work allows the government closer monitoring of foreign employers and helps keep our entertainers away from prostitution fronts and other worksites associated with unsavory, immoral, illegal or exploitative practices. Parenthetically, none of these issuances appear to us, by any stretch of the imagination, even remotely unreasonable or arbitrary. They address a felt need of according greater protection for an oft-exploited segment of our OCW's. They respond to the industry's demand for clearer and more practicable rules and guidelines. Many of these provisions were fleshed out following recommendations by, and after consultations with, the affected sectors and non-government organizations. On the whole, they are aimed at enhancing the safety and security of entertainers and artists bound for Japan and other destinations, without stifling the industry's concerns for expansion and growth. In any event, apart from the State's police power, the Constitution itself mandates government to extend the fullest protection to our overseas workers. The basic constitutional statement on labor, embodied in Section 18 of Article II of the Constitution provides: Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. More emphatically, the social justice provision on labor of the 1987 Constitution in its first paragraph states: The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. Obviously, protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone. Under the welfare and social justice provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the government's constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas. As this Court explained in Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI) v. Drilon,[11] in reference to the recurring problems faced by our overseas workers: What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home. We now go to petitioners' assertion that the police power cannot, nevertheless, abridge the right of our performing workers to return to work abroad after having earlier qualified under the old process, because, having previously been accredited, their accreditation became a property right," protected by the due process clause. We find this contention untenable. A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong.[12] Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, it must of course

be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.[13] In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider.[14] To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions. Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. Seamen are required to take tests determining their seamanship. Locally, the Professional Regulation Commission has began to require previously licensed doctors and other professionals to furnish documentary proof that they had either re-trained or had undertaken continuing education courses as a requirement for renewal of their licenses. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. So long as Professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists. Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-impairment clause of the Constitution to support their argument that the government cannot enact the assailed regulatory measures because they abridge the freedom to contract. In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon , we held that "[t]he nonimpairment clause of the Constitution... must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government." [15] Equally important, into every contract is read provisions of existing law, and always, a reservation of the police power for so long as the agreement deals with a subject impressed with the public welfare. A last point. Petitioners suggest that the singling out of entertainers and performing artists under the assailed department orders constitutes class legislation which violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. We do not agree. The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.[16] We have held, time and again, that the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as such classification is based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation.[17] If classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee. In the case at bar, the challenged Department Order clearly applies to all performing artists and entertainers destined for jobs abroad. These orders, we stressed hereinbefore, further the Constitutional mandate requiring Government to protect our workforce, particularly those who may be prone to abuse and exploitation as they are beyond the physical reach of government regulatory agencies. The tragic incidents must somehow stop, but short of absolutely curtailing the right of these performers and entertainers to work abroad, the assailed measures enable our government to assume a measure of control. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision sought to be reviewed, petition is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED. Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

The Facts

The facts were summarized by the NLRC in this wise:[6] [G.R. No. 122917. July 12, 1999] Complainants numbering 43 (p. 176, Records) are deaf-mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers. (pp. 68 & 69, Records) The full text of said agreement is quoted below: EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FOR HANDICAPPED WORKERS This Contract, entered into by and between: FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a universal banking corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, with business address at FEBTC Building, Muralla, Intramuros, Manila, represented herein by its Assistant Vice President, MR. FLORENDO G. MARANAN, (hereinafter referred to as the BANK); - and ________________, ________________ years old, of legal __________________ (hereinafter referred to as the (EMPLOYEE). WITNESSETH: That WHEREAS, the BANK, cognizant of its social responsibility, realizes that there is a need to provide disabled and handicapped persons gainful employment and opportunities to realize their potentials, uplift their socio-economic well being and welfare and make them productive, self-reliant and useful citizens to enable them to fully integrate in the mainstream of society; WHEREAS, there are certain positions in the BANK which may be filled-up by disabled and handicapped persons, particularly deaf-mutes, and the BANK ha[s] been approached by some civic-minded citizens and authorized government agencies [regarding] the possibility of hiring handicapped workers for these positions; WHEREAS, the EMPLOYEE is one of those handicapped workers who [were] recommended for possible employment with the BANK; NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and in compliance with Article 80 of the Labor Code of the Philippines as amended, the BANK and the EMPLOYEE have entered into this Employment Contract as follows: 1. The BANK agrees to employ and train the EMPLOYEE, and the EMPLOYEE agrees to diligently and faithfully work with the BANK, as Money Sorter and Counter. age, _____________, and residing at

MARITES BERNARDO, ELVIRA GO DIAMANTE, REBECCA E. DAVID, DAVID P. PASCUAL, RAQUEL ESTILLER, ALBERT HALLARE, EDMUND M. CORTEZ, JOSELITO O. AGDON GEORGE P. LIGUTAN JR., CELSO M. YAZAR, ALEX G. CORPUZ, RONALD M. DELFIN, ROWENA M. TABAQUERO, CORAZON C. DELOS REYES, ROBERT G. NOORA, MILAGROS O. LEQUIGAN, ADRIANA F. TATLONGHARI, IKE CABANDUCOS, COCOY NOBELLO, DORENDA CANTIMBUHAN, ROBERT MARCELO, LILIBETH Q. MARMOLEJO, JOSE E. SALES, ISABEL MAMAUAG, VIOLETA G. MONTES, ALBINO TECSON, MELODY V. GRUELA, BERNADETH D. AGERO, CYNTHIA DE VERA, LANI R. CORTEZ, MA. ISABEL B. CONCEPCION, DINDO VALERIO, ZENAIDA MATA, ARIEL DEL PILAR, MARGARET CECILIA CANOZA, THELMA SEBASTIAN, MA. JEANETTE CERVANTES, JEANNIE RAMIL, ROZAIDA PASCUAL, PINKY BALOLOA, ELIZABETH VENTURA, GRACE S. PARDO & RICO TIMOSA, petitioners vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION & FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, respondents. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: The Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that qualified disabled persons be granted the same terms and conditions of employment as qualified able-bodied employees. Once they have attained the status of regular workers, they should be accorded all the benefits granted by law, notwithstanding written or verbal contracts to the contrary. This treatment is rooted not merely on charity or accommodation, but on justice for all.

The Case

Challenged in the Petition for Certiorari[1] before us is the June 20, 1995 Decision [2] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),[3] which affirmed the August, 22 1994 ruling of Labor Arbiter Cornelio L. Linsangan. The labor arbiters Decision disposed as follows:[4] WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the above-mentioned complaint for lack of merit. Also assailed is the August 4, 1995 Resolution[5] of the NLRC, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

2. i ii. iii. iv. v.

The EMPLOYEE shall perform among others, the following duties and responsibilities: Sort out bills according to color; Count each denomination per hundred, either manually or with the aid of a counting machine; Wrap and label bills per hundred; Put the wrapped bills into bundles; and Submit bundled bills to the bank teller for verification.

9. The Employment Contract shall be for a period of six (6) months or from ____ to ____ unless earlier terminated by the BANK for any just or reasonable cause. Any continuation or extension of this Contract shall be in writing and therefore this Contract will automatically expire at the end of its terms unless renewed in writing by the BANK. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties, have hereunto affixed their signature[s] this ____ day of _________________, ____________ at Intramuros, Manila, Philippines. In 1988, two (2) deaf-mutes were hired under this Agreement; in 1989 another two (2); in 1990, nineteen (19); in 1991 six (6); in 1992, six (6) and in 1993, twenty-one (21). Their employment[s] were renewed every six months such that by the time this case arose, there were fifty-six (56) deaf-mutes who were employed by respondent under the said employment agreement. The last one was Thelma Malindoy who was employed in 1992 and whose contract expired on July 1993. xxx xxx xxx

3. The EMPLOYEE shall undergo a training period of one (1) month, after which the BANK shall determine whether or not he/she should be allowed to finish the remaining term of this Contract. 4. The EMPLOYEE shall be entitled to an initial compensation of P118.00 per day, subject to adjustment in the sole judgment of the BANK, payable every 15th and end of the month. 5. The regular work schedule of the EMPLOYEE shall be five (5) days per week, from Mondays thru Fridays, at eight (8) hours a day. The EMPLOYEE may be required to perform overtime work as circumstance may warrant, for which overtime work he/she [shall] be paid an additional compensation of 125% of his daily rate if performed during ordinary days and 130% if performed during Saturday or [a] rest day. 6. i. ii. iii. The EMPLOYEE shall likewise be entitled to the following benefits: Proportionate 13th month pay based on his basic daily wage. Five (5) days incentive leave. SSS premium payment.

Disclaiming that complainants were regular employees, respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company maintained that complainants who are a special class of workers the hearing impaired employees were hired temporarily under [a] special employment arrangement which was a result of overtures made by some civic and political personalities to the respondent Bank; that complainant[s] were hired due to pakiusap which must be considered in the light of the context of the respondent Banks corporate philosophy as well as its career and working enviro nment which is to maintain and strengthen a corps of professionals trained and qualified officers and regular employees who are baccalaureate degree holders from excellent schools which is an unbending policy in the hiring of regular employees; that in addition to this, training continues so that the regular employee grows in the corporate ladder; that the idea of hiring handicapped workers was acceptable to them only on a special arrangement basis; that it adopted the special program to help tide over a group of handicapped workers such as deaf-mutes like the complainants who could do manual work for the respondent Bank; that the task of counting and sorting of bills which was being performed by tellers could be assigned to deaf-mutes; that the counting and sorting of money are tellering works which were always logically and naturally part and parcel of the tellers normal functions; that from the beginning there have been no separate items in the respondent Bank plantilla for sorters or counters; that the tellers themselves already did the sorting and counting chore as a regular feature and integral part of their duties (p. 97, Records); that through the pakiusap of Arturo Borjal, the tellers were relieved of this task of counting and sorting bills in favo r of deaf-mutes without creating new positions as there is no position either in the respondent or in any other bank in the Philippines which deals with purely counting and sorting of bills in banking operations. Petitioners specified when each of them was hired and dismissed, viz:[7] NAME OF PETITIONER WORKPLACE Date Hired Date Dismissed

7. The EMPLOYEE binds himself/herself to abide [by] and comply with all the BANK Rules and Regulations and Policies, and to conduct himself/herself in a manner expected of all employees of the BANK. 8. The EMPLOYEE acknowledges the fact that he/she had been employed under a special employment program of the BANK, for which reason the standard hiring requirements of the BANK were not applied in his/her case. Consequently, the EMPLOYEE acknowledges and accepts the fact that the terms and conditions of the employment generally observed by the BANK with respect to the BANKs regular employee are not applicable to the EMPLOYEE, and that therefore, the terms and conditions of the EMPLOYEEs employment with the BANK shall be governed solely and exclusively by this Contract and by the applicable rules and regulations that the Department of Labor and Employment may issue in connection with the employment of disabled and handicapped workers. More specifically, the EMPLOYEE hereby acknowledges that the provisions of Book Six of the Labor Code of the Philippines as amended, particularly on regulation of employment and separation pay are not applicable to him/her.

As earlier noted, the labor arbiter and, on appeal, the NLRC ruled against herein petitioners. Hence, this recourse to this Court.[9]

The Ruling of the NLRC

In affirming the ruling of the labor arbiter that herein petitioners could not be deemed regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, Respondent Commission ratiocinated as follows: We agree that Art. 280 is not controlling herein. We give due credence to the conclusion that complainants were hired as an accommodation to [the] recommendation of civic oriented personalities whose employment[s] were covered by xxx Employment Contract[s] with special provisions on duration of contract as specified under Art. 80. Hence, as correctly held by the Labor Arbiter a quo, the terms of the contract shall be the law between the parties.[10] The NLRC also declared that the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons was not applicable, considering the prevailing circumstances/milieu of the case.

Respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company argues that a review of the findings of facts of the NLRC is not allowed in a petition for certiorari. Specifically, it maintains that the Court cannot pass upon the findings of public respondents that petitioners were not regular employees. True, the Court, as a rule, does not review the factual findings of public respondents in a certiorari proceeding. In resolving whether the petitioners have become regular employees, we shall not change the facts found by the public respondent. Our task is merely to determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying the law to the established facts, as above-quoted from the assailed Decision.

Main Issue: Are Petitioners Regular Employees?

Issues

Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as money sorters and counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. They further allege that their contracts served merely to preclude the application of Article 280 and to bar them from becoming regular employees. In their Memorandum, petitioners cite the following grounds in support of their cause: Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as special workers and should not in any way be considered as part of the regular complement of the Bank. [12] Rather, they were special workers under Article 80 of the Labor Code. Private respondent contends that it never solicited the services of petitioners, whose employment was merely an accommodation in response to the requests of government officials and civic minded citizens. They were told from the start, with the assistance of government representatives, that they could not become regular employees because there were no plantilla positions for money sorters, whose task used to be performed by tellers. Their contracts were renewed several times, not because of n eed but merely for humanitarian reasons. Respondent submits that as of the present, the special position that was created for the petitioners no longer exist[s] in private respondent [bank], after the latter had decided not to renew anymore their special employment contracts. At the outset, let it be known that this Court appreciates the nobility of private respondents effort to provide employment to physically impaired individuals and to make them more productive members of society. However, we cannot allow it to elude the legal consequences of that effort, simply because it now deems their employment irrelevant. The facts, viewed in light of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, indubitably show that the petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed regular employees. As such, they have acquired legal rights that this Court is duty-bound to protect and uphold, not as a matter of compassion but as a consequence of law and justice. The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a period of one month, after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to finish the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate the contract at any time for a just and reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer, the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term. According to private respondent, the employment contracts were prepared in accordance with Article 80 of the Labor Code, which provides: ART. 80. Employment agreement. Any employer who employs handicapped workers shall enter into an employment agreement with them, which agreement shall include: (a) The names and addresses of the handicapped workers to be employed;

I. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the petitioners - money sorters and counters working in a bank - were not regular employees. II. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the employment contracts signed and renewed by the petitioners - which provide for a period of six (6) months - were valid. III. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in not applying the provisions of the Magna Carta for the Disabled (Republic Act No. 7277), on proscription against discrimination against disabled persons.[11] In the main, the Court will resolve whether petitioners have become regular employees.

This Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious. However, only the employees, who worked for more than six months and whose contracts were renewed are deemed regular. Hence, their dismissal from employment was illegal.

Preliminary Matter: Propriety of Certiorari

(b) The rate to be paid the handicapped workers which shall be not less than seventy five (75%) per cent of the applicable legal minimum wage; (c) The duration of employment period; and (d) The work to be performed by handicapped workers. The employment agreement shall be subject to inspection by the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives. The stipulations in the employment contracts indubitably conform with the aforecited provision. Succeeding events and the enactment of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons),[13]however, justify the application of Article 280 of the Labor Code. Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these facts show that they werequalified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them. In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. Section 5 of the Magna Carta provides: Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment.No disabled person shall be denied access to opportunities for suitable employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the same terms and conditions of employment and the same compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able bodied person. The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code, which provides: ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. -- The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered as regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists. The test of whether an employee is regular was laid down in De Leon v. NLRC,[14] in which this Court held:

The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such activity exists. Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more than six months. Thus, the following twenty-seven petitioners should be deemed regular employees: Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante, Rebecca E. David, David P. Pascual, Raquel Estiller, Albert Hallare, Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon, George P. Ligutan Jr., Lilibeth Q. Marmolejo, Jose E. Sales, Isabel Mamauag, Violeta G. Montes, Albino Tecson, Melody V. Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero, Cynthia de Vera, Lani R. Cortez, Ma. Isabel B. Concepcion, Margaret Cecilia Canoza, Thelma Sebastian, Ma. Jeanette Cervantes, Jeannie Ramil, Rozaida Pascual, Pinky Baloloa, Elizabeth Ventura and Grace S. Pardo. As held by the Court, Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code put an end to the pernicious practice of making permanent casuals of our lowly employees by the simple expedient of extending to them probationary appointments, ad infinitum.[15] The contract signed by petitioners is akin to a probationary employment, during which the bank determined the emplo yees fitness for the job. When the bank renewed the contract after the lapse of the six-month probationary period, the employees thereby became regular employees. [16] No employer is allowed to determine indefinitely the fitness of its employees. As regular employees, the twenty-seven petitioners are entitled to security of tenure; that is, their services may be terminated only for a just or authorized cause. Because respondent failed to show such cause,[17] these twentyseven petitioners are deemed illegally dismissed and therefore entitled to back wages and reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges.[18] Considering the allegation of respondent that the job of money sorting is no longer available because it has been assigned back to the tellers to whom it originally belonged, [19] petitioners are hereby awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.[20] Because the other sixteen worked only for six months, they are not deemed regular employees and hence not entitled to the same benefits.

Applicability of the Brent Ruling

Respondent bank, citing Brent School v. Zamora[21] in which the Court upheld the validity of an employment contract with a fixed term, argues that the parties entered into the contract on equal footing. It adds that the petitioners had in fact an advantage, because they were backed by then DSWD Secretary Mita Pardo de Tavera and Representative Arturo Borjal. We are not persuaded. The term limit in the contract was premised on the fact that the petitioners were disabled, and that the bank had to determine their fitness for the position. Indeed, its validity is based on Article 80 of the Labor Code. But as noted earlier, petitioners proved themselves to be qualified disabled persons who, under the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, are entitled to terms and conditions of employment enjoyed by qualified ablebodied individuals; hence, Article 80 does not apply because petitioners are qualified for their positions. The

validation of the limit imposed on their contracts, imposed by reason of their disability, was a glaring instance of the very mischief sought to be addressed by the new law. Moreover, it must be emphasized that a contract of employment is impressed with public interest.[22] Provisions of applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract, and the parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other.[23] Clearly, the agreement of the parties regarding the period of employment cannot prevail over the provisions of the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, which mandate that petitioners must be treated as qualified ablebodied employees. Respondents reason for terminating the employment of petitioners is instructive. Because the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) required that cash in the bank be turned over to the BSP during business hours from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., respondent resorted to nighttime sorting and counting of money. Thus, it reasons that this task could not be done by deaf mutes because of their physical limitations as it is very risky for them to travel at night. [24] We find no basis for this argument. Travelling at night involves risks to handicapped and able-bodied persons alike. This excuse cannot justify the termination of their employment.

At this juncture, the leading case of Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora proves instructive. As reaffirmed in subsequent cases, this Court has upheld the legality of fixed-term employment. It ruled that the decisive determinant in term employment should not be the activities that the employee is called upon to perform but the day certain agreed upon the parties for the commencement and termination of their employment relationship. But this Court went on to say that where from the circumstances it is apparent that the periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy and morals. In rendering this Decision, the Court emphasizes not only the constitutional bias in favor of the working class, but also the concern of the State for the plight of the disabled. The noble objectives of Magna Carta for Disabled Persons are not based merely on charity or accommodation, but on justice and the equal treatment of qualified persons, disabled or not. In the present case, the handicap of petitioners (deaf-mutes) is not a hindrance to their work. The eloquent proof of this statement is the repeated renewal of their employment contracts. Why then should they be dismissed, simply because they are physically impaired? The Court believes, that, after showing their fitness for the work assigned to them, they should be treated and granted the same rights like any other regular employees. In this light, we note the Office of the Solicitor Generals prayer joining the petitioners cause. [28]

Other Grounds Cited by Respondent

Respondent argues that petitioners were merely accommodated employees. This fact does not change the nature of their employment. As earlier noted, an employee is regular because of the nature of work and the length of service, not because of the mode or even the reason for hiring them. Equally unavailing are private respondents arguments that it did not go out of its way to recruit petitioners, and that its plantilla did not contain their positions. In L. T. Datu v. NLRC,[25] the Court held that the determination of whether employment is casual or regular does not depend on the will or word of the employer, and the procedure of hiring x x x but on the nature of the activities performed by the employee, and to some extent, the length of performance and its continued existence. Private respondent argues that the petitioners were informed from the start that they could not become regular employees. In fact, the bank adds, they agreed with the stipulation in the contract regarding this point. Still, we are not persuaded. The well-settled rule is that the character of employment is determined not by stipulations in the contract, but by the nature of the work performed. [26] Otherwise, no employee can become regular by the simple expedient of incorporating this condition in the contract of employment. In this light, we iterate our ruling in Romares v. NLRC:[27] Article 280 was emplaced in our statute books to prevent the circumvention of the employees right to be secure in his tenure by indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written and oral agreements inconsistent with the concept of regular employment defined therein. Where an employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, such employee is deemed a regular employee and is entitled to security of tenure notwithstanding the contrary provisions of his contract of employment. x x x xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 20, 1995 Decision and the August 4, 1995 Resolution of the NLRC are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company is hereby ORDERED to pay back wages and separation pay to each of the following twenty-seven (27) petitioners, namely, Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante, Rebecca E. David, David P. Pascual, Raquel Estiller, Albert Hallare, Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon, George P. Ligutan Jr., Lilibeth Q. Marmolejo, Jose E. Sales, Isabel Mamauag, Violeta G. Montes, Albino Tecson, Melody V. Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero, Cynthia de Vera, Lani R. Cortez, Ma. Isabel B. Concepcion, Margaret Cecilia Canoza, Thelma Sebastian, Ma. Jeanette Cervantes, Jeannie Ramil, Rozaida Pascual, Pinky Baloloa, Elizabeth Ventura and Grace S. Pardo. The NLRC is hereby directed to compute the exact amount due each of said employees, pursuant to existing laws and regulations, within fifteen days from the finality of this Decision. No costs. SO ORDERED. Romero, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.