Democratization without Democracy: Political Openings and Closures in Modern Morocco Author(s): Catherine Sweet Source: Middle East

Report, No. 218 (Spring, 2001), pp. 22-25 Published by: Middle East Research and Information Project Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1559306 . Accessed: 10/08/2011 15:34
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Democratization Without Democracy

Political
Catherine

Openings
Sweet

and

Closures

in

Modern

Morocco

When King Mohammed VI succeeded the late Hassan II in the summer of 1999, expectations soared.The young king's investiture seemed to be the final step in a series of political changes that would set Morocco on the road to democracy.Along with a new bicamerallegislature and an opposition government led by the much-revered socialist Abderrahmane Youssoufi, the change in regime raised hopes that Morocco was at last moving away from authoritarianism. Such hopes were bolsteredby Mohammed's which actions, early clearly set him apart from his father. The new king permitted the unconditional return of several opposition figures, notably Abraham Serfaty, who was stripped of his citizenship after questioning Morocco'sclaim over the Western Sahara.At home, he lifted the ban on comedian Ahmed Snoussi, whose sardoniccritiques of the system went too far for King Hassan'staste. More recently,the king freed Islamist sheikh Abdeslam Yassineafter more than a decade of house arrest. But the most important indicator that Mohammed would chart his own course came when he fired the omnipotent interior minister Driss Basri in October 1999. The speed of Basri's firing surprised Moroccans and foreign observers alike, and heralded a sense that a new era of greater freedom had begun. Indeed, the early reign of Mohammed VI has been unlike that of any of his predecessors. He has dispensed with the royal protocol that suggests he keep physical distance from ordinary Moroccans, preferringinstead to minister to the poor, the disabled and the dispossessed. With the royal seal of approval, activists began to tackle formerly taboo topics like sexual trafficking in women and children. His subjects have receivedthese changes enthusiastically. Dubbed "the king of the poor" or simply "M6," Mohammed has fundamentally altered perceptions of the monarchy. In some ways, his image is like that of Britain's late Princess Diana: an advocate for the
Catherine Sweet is a Ph.D. candidatein political scienceat the University of California, LosAngeles.

underdog, who brings the monarchy closer to the people and gives the office of king a human face. Yet despite all of the progress that occurred during Mohammed's first year on the throne, the last few months have witnessed a substantial reversal.The permanent ban imposed on three upstartpublications and the government's harsh crackdown on human rights demonstrators are more reminiscent of Morocco under Hassan'srule than the heady first months under his son. This sudden reversal of fortune reveals the superficiality of recent political reforms, and shows the necessity of drawing a distinction between political liberalization and true democratization. Morocco has unquestionably seen improvements in civil liberties in the past several years, notably with regard to freedom of expression and association, but the expansion of political liberties has lagged far behind. In spite of the impressive arrayof democratic-looking institutions-a bicameral parliament, multiparty electoral competition and an opposition government-no significant power has devolved outside the regime.

orDemocratization? Liberalization
The Moroccan political system, with its awkwardcombination of moderate civil liberties and continued political authoritarianism,is not unique. It is an authoritariansubtype-pseudodemocracy-that has emerged in the wake of the vaunted "thirdwave" of democracy.1 Born of a global environment hostile toward overt authoritarianism, pseudodemocratic regimes hide classic authoritarianbehavior behind a democratic facade. Authoritarian leaders-who are fully cognizant of the importance now imputed to democracy worldwide-have devised methods of creatingdemocratic-lookinginstitutions that will satisfy their foreign patrons, but have little appreciable effect on their domestic political power.These regimes can call themselves "democratic"because political liberal2001 SPRING 218 * " REPORT EAST MIDDLE EAST REPORT 218 SPRING 2001

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ization is conflated with political democratization.The two are emphatically not the same. Regimes will often liberalize-relaxing restrictions on individual rights and associational life and creating legislatures,multiparty systems and ostensibly independent judiciaries, but without devolving power outside the ruling bloc-when confronted with social upheaval or demands for change. But unless the democratically styled institutions can effect political change independent of the regime, no move toward greaterdemocracy has taken place. Moroccan institutions are certainly more liberal than before. But none of the changes under the late King Hassan or King Mohammed has affected the king's prerogatives-the monarchy retains supra-institutional power. There is no mechanism for removing the king from office, short of revolution. His power is not subject to modification by the mass public or elected officials. It would be incorrect, then, to characterizeMorocco's recent political evolution as democratization. To the contrary, many of these "democratic" changes have instead solidified the monarchy'sposition as the "firstamong institutions."2

forChange Catalysts
When Morocco switched from a unicameral to a bicameral legislature in 1996 and swore in an opposition government in 1998, many Moroccans and international observersconsideredthe changes proof of democratization.Since the early 1990s, the king had been calling for alternance-or alternation in power-recognizing that the longer he kept the left in the opposition, the strongerthey would become. By bringing the left into government, the king sought to strip them of their mystique, and to prevent the formation of a unified front between the legal opposition and the burgeoning Islamist movement. The opposition, however, declined to participate in Hassan's plans for alternance in 1993, for severalreasons. First, the opposition bloc (or Koutla) refused to sit in a government emanating from the 1993 legislative elections. These elections, marred by widespread corruption and regime interference,yielded a parliamentaryarrangementthat differed greatly from the popular vote.3 At the time, Morocco had a unicameral legislature in which two-thirds of the representatives(222) were directly elected and one-third (1 11) were indirectly chosen. Although the center-rightparties received only slightly more seats than the opposition parties in the direct elections (116 versus 99), they captured over five times more seats than the opposition in the indirect elections that followed (79 versus 15). To form a governmental majority,the Koutla would have had to ally with one of the center-right parties, whom they considered to be fully complicit with the regime in creating a poisonous, corrupt political atmosphere. Instead, the opposition preferred to wait for real alternance, issued from the ballot boxes rather than from the king. The opposition further refused to accede to King Hassan'sdemand that he appoint the prime minister (who would not necessarilycome
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from the parliamentarymajority) and the ministers of justice, interior,Islamicaffairsand foreign affairs.But the king's retention of Interior Minister Driss Basri was, in the opposition's view, the most egregious affront to the prospects for alternance,since they held Basripersonallyresponsible for riggingthe municipaland legislativeelections against the Koutla. For the time being, then, the opposition had scuttled the king's plans for alternance. Then several important international and domestic developments dramatically raised the stakes in the game for both the king and the opposition. As the bloody civil war between Islamists and the military worsened in neighboring Algeria, Islamist activity in Morocco became increasingly more difficult to ignore. Violent clashes between Islamist and leftist students on university campuses broke out repeatedly,causing concern about the inroads such organizations had made among the general population. A series of bloody attacks blamed on Islamists culminated in the August 1994 fatal shooting of two Spanish tourists vacationing in Marrakesh. A second catalystfor change was the deterioratingMoroccan economy and the resulting social unrest. In 1996, Morocco had sufferedsevenyearsof severedroughtout of fifteen. Drought underscored the dependence of the Moroccan economy on agricultureand the dependence of Moroccan agricultureon beneficial meteorological conditions.4 While some improvementsin irrigationhad been made, most of the countrywas not preparedto deal with scant rainfall.Drought forced the ruralpopulations into the cities to look for work, compounding the high unemployment rate.As of 1995, over 50 percent of the Moroccan population had migrated into urbanareas,exacerbatingalreadymiserableliving conditions in poorer neighborhoods.The clash between urban dwellers added another layer of hostility to an and rural "intruders" explosive socioeconomic mix, where the disparitiesbetween rich and poor became more blatantwith each passing day. Because of the deteriorating economic, political and social situation in Morocco, two important opposition figures returned to Morocco from France to convince the opposition to forge ahead-unilaterally, if necessary-to effect change. On April 10, 1995, AbderrahmaneYoussoufi, the leader of the opposition Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), ended his 18 months of self-imposed exile that began after the 1993 elections, and resumed his role as party chief. Two months later,one of the leadersof the Moroccan national resistancemovement during the French protectorate period, Mohamed "Fqih"Basri(whom King Hassan had called a "renegade,"and who had been sentenced to death four separatetimes), came home after 29 yearsof exile. The had establishedthe National Union Fqih and other "radicals" of Popular Forces (UNFP) in 1959, after splitting with Morocco'sfounding nationalistparty,Istiqlal;the UNFP later spawned the USFP.Their return signaled to the regime that the opposition would abandon their confrontational stance and move toward greatercooperation. Just months later, the king was hospitalized with bronchial pneumonia during an October visit to the US. At once,
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the rarelydiscussed succession issue became a topic of much bicameral configuration. The upper house mimics the preconcern. Would the king leave a legacy of authoritarianism vious one-third minority in every way, except that it is even for his heir Mohammed, or a legacy of greaterdemocracy? more powerful. Morocco's upper house has been granted the constitutional right to censure the government, like only two other upper chambers (Italy and South Africa) in the world. his Throne March the of The structural bias becomes even clearer when one re3, 1996, Day speech During king confirmed that Morocco would move from a unicameralto calls that in this period the king wanted to bring the oppoa bicameral legislature, pending approvalby popular refer- sition into government without ceding control over endum. In the new system, the entire lower house would be policymakingto them. As Moroccanpolitical reporterFouad directly elected to allow for greaterpopular participation in Nejjar states, bicameralism was instituted "to counterbalpolitics, while the senators in the upper house would be in- ance the action of the opposition insofar as it enters into the directlyelected by municipal councils, union representatives government within the framework of alternance.A 'leftist' and business councils. Hassan II reiterated his preference executive would then have to compromise with an upper for alternance,specifically that the opposition would head a chambercapableof checking it."6With such an institutional new government. This time, the opposition did not reject safeguardin place, the king'spower-sharingplan was almost The opposition could be brought into government, his proposalsoutright.All but a few smallpartiespronounced risk-free. themselves in favor of the constitutional revision, and on thus satisfying domestic demands for alternance(however instituted) and signaling to the outside world that Morocco September 13, 99.56 percent of the voters agreed. Elections for the new bicameral parliament began in was on the path to democracy.Meanwhile, the senate would November 1997, starting with the lower house. Of the 325 offer a powerfulcheck on both the governmentand the lower directly elected seats being contested, the opposition Koutla house's power, severely limiting the opposition's ability to bloc secured 102 slots, or 31 percent. The Wifaq bloc, com- deviate from extant policy orientations. The Moroccan parposed of the rightist-loyalistparties, was next with 100 seats liament is a classicpseudodemocraticinstitution: it enhances (31 percent) and the newly created center bloc (made up the power of the regime ratherthan limiting it. mostly of parties previously aligned with the right) came in third, with 97 seats (30 percent). Five other parties, including the first Islamist party,split the remaining 26 seats. In spite of promises that the regime would not interfere On February4, 1998, King Hassan nominated Youssoufias with the election results,there were credible reportsof wide- the first leftist prime minister since independence. Yet bespread vote-buying and race-rigging.5 To protest the falsi- cause of the parliamentaryseat distribution, Youssoufi was fied elections, two elected USFP legislators even refused forced to form a coalition government with the centrist and their seats, saying that their victories did not reflect the smaller parties. To accommodate his partners, Youssoufi appointed a cabinet of 31 ministers and nine secretariesof popular vote. in lower attenstate from seven different parties. But the most controverthe With no clear majority seated house, tion turned to the indirectly elected upper house. These sial members of the Youssoufi government were those apsenators would be chosen by electors from the municipal pointed by King Hassan: the ministers of Islamic affairs, and provincial councils, as well as by representativesfrom foreign affairs,justice and interior. Driss Basri would convarious professions and unions. In the December 1997 elec- tinue as interior minister, ostensibly because his responsibiltions, which were also scarred by extensive bribery, the ity for the WesternSaharaportfolio made him indispensable. Koutla parties fared even worse than in the lower house Ironically, Youssoufi and the Koutla wound up with a contests, winning only 44 out of a possible 243 non-union worse arrangement than the one they had summarily reseats (18 percent). The centrist parties seated 90 senators jected after the 1993 elections. The prime minister-even (37 percent), and the rightist bloc seated 76 (31 percent). this socialist one-would be appointed by the king, who These results confirmed the tripartite left-center-right di- also reservedthe right to appoint the ministers of interior, vision that emerged from the local and lower house elec- justice, foreign affairsand Islamic affairs.The reviled Basri, tions. They also ensured that the opposition could not hold whose presence in the post-1993 cabinet was the primary power without entering into the coalition they had fore- reason that the opposition declined to join, seemed more invincible than ever. Rather than contending with an unisworn after the 1993 elections. To what extent did this institutional modification bring camerallegislaturein which only one-third of the legislators Morocco closer to democracy? The new chamber did in- were indirectly elected, the opposition now had to deal with crease the number of participants in government at the an entire chamber of indirectly elected senators who could national level, and the directly elected lower house more force the government'sdissolution. The Youssoufigovernment's marginfor maneuverwas furaccuratelyreflectedthe popular will. But the structuralconinsistencethat the government servative bias of the unicameral legislature was not elimi- therconstrainedby the regime's or nated. Instead, it was simply shifted from a one-third maintainthe sacrosanct equilibresmacro-economiques, grands IMF the World and in economic a neoliberal an house entire by policies,prescribed minority in a unicameral legislature to

Institutional Safeguards

Government TheOpposition

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The implementation Bankand supportedby the palace. of these the USFP and its lefteconomic principlesnecessarily required ist alliesto abandontheirsocialistcampaignpromises,much to the dismayof theirpartybases.Nevertheless,most Moroccans greetedYoussoufi's appointment with great joy and expectawereimpeccable, tion. His "opposition" credentials havingbeen the for his leftist beliefs. Given persecutedby political regime his long historyof resistance, it was many argued, unlikelythat Youssoufiwould be coopted. These hopes soon faded. Neither the government's program nor its budget differed much from those of previous governments. As time wore on and the government showed itself to be largelyincapable of implementing even symbolic change, expectations turned to bitterness and disenchantment. Calls for a cabinet reshuffling at least, or Youssoufi's resignation at most, abounded. Critics inside and outside the prime minister'sparty accused the government of selling out. At the time of Hassan'sdeath in July of 1999, the king-who had sentencedYoussoufito death severaldecades earlier-was the prime minister'sprimary advocate. King Hassan'sseemingly bold embrace of alternancenow appearsto have been a cleverlycalculated maneuver.Allowing Youssoufi to lead the government seemed to presagethe devolution of political power, and perhapsthe emergence of a democratic space. But Youssoufi'slimited mandate paralyzed the new government. Rather than blame the regime for engineering the gridlock, most Moroccans fault the Youssoufigovernment for its impotence. Clearly,despite the new "democratic" institutions, the monarch is still the final arbiter of power in Morocco.

Time Against Working

Unlike the opposition government, the young Mohammed VI proved capable of rapidly implementing change-firing Basri, softening royal protocols and permitting freerpublic discourse. Morocco is undoubtedly a more liberal nation under Mohammed than it was under his father. Still, in the year and a half since his ascension, the new king has taken no action to delegate monarchical power to elected officials. In contrast to the first several months of his reign, Mohammed VI's Morocco is now rolling back civil liberties. On December 2, 2000, the government announced a permanent ban on two independent weekly publications, Le Journal and Assahifa. Under the bold direction of Aboubakr Jamai, Le Journal has repeatedly tested the boundaries of what is acceptable for publication. But when he published a letter that Fqih Basri allegedly wrote to AbderrahmaneYoussoufiand the late AbderrahimBouabid in 1974, the government said he had gone too far.7 The letter showed that the UNFP leadership-notably current Prime Minister Youssoufi-was involved in the 1972 failed coup d'etat. To justify the ban, the minister of communications invoked Article 77 of the Moroccan press code, which allows the government to halt publications "attacking the constitutional foundations-political or religiousof the Kingdom." A third paper, Demain, which published
MIDDLE * SPRING 2001 EAST REPORT 218 m

activities detailsof drugtrafficking purportedly takingplace with the knowledgeof highlyplacedindividuals,suffered the samefate. letterhavegenerAlthoughthe contentsof Fqih Basri's reated much buzz of theirown accord,the government's debate. The to the has incited even sponse charges greater denouncedthe regimefor same politicos who repeatedly presslaw to silence their publicainvokingthe repressive tions while theywerein the opposition,who maderevocahave tion of thatverylaw partof theircampaign platform, The now usedArticle77 to mute criticismof themselves. seizures of controversial ban followson the heelsof several of theAgenceFrance Presse andthe revocation publications The regimehas likewisebecome chief'scredentials. bureau much less tolerantof publicdemonstrations, violentlyterin a human advocates December. minating protestby rights Therearetwo possibleinterpretations of whatis happenreis that the closures ing in Morocco.One interpretation flecta pitchedbattleunderway betweena pro-liberalization factionand those opposedto change.The alternative, peris that the sunnyprojechapsmorecynical,interpretation were commitment to democracy tionsabouttheyoungking's back Those referred overlyoptimistic. projections generally to to one oft-repeated (but unconfirmed) quote attributed Carlos-and Mohammed that Spain's reformist Juan king, not his own father-was his rolemodel.In his firstmonths on the throne,perhaps Mohammedwasfollowingthe patternof his forebears, purgingthe courtof thosewith uncerhis own style.Whatever the tain loyaltiesand establishing it the much as did case,timeis working against against king, WhileMohammed VI enjoys Prime Minister Youssoufi. great havebegun to supportfrom the public, many Moroccans toward democcomplainquietlyaboutthe lackof progress Moroccois suffering yet anotherseveredrought,drivracy. closer to the30 percent mark andadding ing unemployment fire. Those socioeconomic morefuelto analready smoldering in maintaining with vestedinterests the statusquo aretrying their utmost to stymieany move towarddecentralization. It remains to be seenwhetherthis new kingwill fulfill Moroccan democrats. the hopesof aspiring l Endnotes
in LarryDiamond,JuanJ. Linzand Seymour firstappeared 1 The termpseudodemocracy Countries: Martin "Introduction: WhatMakes forDemocracy," in Politics in Developing Lipset, Diamond et al., eds. (Boulder, CO: LynneRienner with Democracy, Comparing Experiences Journal Publishers, 1995), pp. 8-9. SeealsoDiamond,"IstheThirdWaveOver?" ofDemocracy TowardConsolidation 7 (1996) and Developing (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins Democracy: Press,1999). University 2 King HassanII referred to the monarchyas such in his ThroneDay speechof March3, 1992. A CritiqueBasedon One ElectionMonitoring: 3 See Henry Munson,Jr., "International MiddleEastReport in Morocco," Monitor's 209 (Winter1998). Experience 4 Agriculture accountsfor about20 percentof Morocco's grossdomesticproduct. of State,Bureau of Democracy, HumanRightsand Labor, 5 Forexample,US Department Practices DC: Department on HumanRights Morocco Country for 1997 (Washington, Report
of State, 1998).

La VieEconomique et assainissement sur fond de consensus," 6 Fouad Nejjar,"Reformes 3899 (January 3-9, 1997). available in 7 The bannedissueof LeJournal, includingthe text of Basri's letter,is currently section of the ReportersWithout Borderswebsite: http:// the Maghreb/Moyen-Orient in from Demain be found The article on may question www.press-freedom.org/home.html. the Courrier International website: http://www.courrierinternational.com/numeros/528/ 052804901.asp?TYPE=archives.

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