In what way did evolutionary theories contribute to nineteenth-century notions of national solidarity?

A number of evolutionary theories came to prominence during the 19th century. Most famously of these would be that of Darwin, as presented and popularised in The Origin of Species, but a number of similar theories of intra-species conflict and adaptation emerged from a number of sources during this time. This essay will look at the impact of such theories of evolution and species conflict - which were often reduced to Spencers simplified formulation of the survival of the fittest - had on political discourse, in particular, their effect on nationalism and national solidarity. We will assess the extent to which evolutionary theories led to new ideas and substantive changes, what their effect on political and nationalistic language was, or whether they only had an effect on the political fringes (evolution still being a controversial notion). To begin with, it is worth noting that most evolutionary theories talked in terms of individuals or species, rather than nations, and so it is not immediately obvious that they would be applied to the international politics of national solidarity, rather than more traditional approaches to evolutionary change that would occur at a sub-national level. Galton and other eugenicists (eugenics being closely linked to ideas of evolutionary conflict, even if it was different in its attempt to force the hand of change), for example, were often much more concerned with the effect of evolutionary/heredity-based theories, degeneration, or dysgenics within national populations, and so came from an elitist, rather than national-solidarity-based, perspective, seeing competitions between fitter and less fit groups within their own society. Social Darwinists, likewise, were often concerned more with the beneficial effects of ruthless capitalist competition within societies than anything else - arguably the opposite of national solidarity. Nonetheless, in a number of cases, evolutionary theories were able to be applied to notions of national solidarity, especially when joined to other nationalist movements. Just as diverse groups within species could be seen to compete for resources, and (most importantly for political applications of the doctrine) the fitter ones would be better equipped to survive, so too were national populations seen to be in a conflict for survival with their rivals. Writers and politicians like von Humboldt stressed the need for national solidarity and integrity (especially against outside threats and immigration), on the grounds that nations were in a struggle for survival. Humboldt, despite his general rejection of scientific racial divisions, held up the conquering of the Scythians by the Arabs as an example of what happened to states that were less gifted (despite pre-dating much of evolutionary theory, von Humboldts work was often used to justify later nationalism), while theorists like Richard Lee and Alfred Wallace used explicitly evolutionary terminology of the extinction of the races to exhort national populations and academia to support a sense of solidarity, and thus avoid destruction. In this way, evolutionary theory was often used to reinforce a sense that members of a national community needed to stick together and be more aggressive, powerful, or cunning than their competitors, lest they face extinction. Not only did evolutionary theories help to promote a sense of national solidarity at home, but they also seem to have found a significant role in justifying imperialism, and, in doing so, worked to reinforce claims to national solidarity. Darwin, when observing the slow destruction of the Fuegians by colonial forces, was remorseful but saw it as part of a historical inevitability because of their lesser fitness in the struggle for survival; this sort of observation would be repeated by pro-colonial authors like Benjamin Kidd and Friedrich Ratzel, who believed that the evident success of (usually) European nations in subjugating and colonising other peoples was a demonstration of their fitness and rightness to survive in the colonial struggle. Most authors tended to see their own countries as particularly fit and right in this struggle; Kidds social imperialism therefore was used to bolster British national solidarity by portraying the British as evidently superior victors over lesser peoples and their colonial competitors, while Ratzels use of evolutionary theory to call for Lebensraum for Germany was predicated on a sense of German national superiority. At the same time, in the United States, influential preachers like Josiah Strong invoked the language of the survival of the fittest and the final confrontation of races in order to bolster American resolve for imperialism. In Strongs view, Americans had to stick together as part of an (Anglo-Saxon, Protestant) United States in order to win in the evolutionary struggle of races, and, in doing so, realise their manifest destiny as rulers of the entire Americas and beyond.

Crook rightly points out that in many of these cases of evolutionary theory being used to justify imperialism, the speakers were somewhat on the periphery of mainstream debate (like Strong), and that the course of imperialism based on the white mans burden or economic self-interest was not particularly changed by the introduction of evolutionary theories. Nonetheless, in highlighting the way that evolutionary theory was used to bolster imperialism as slogans, pantomime, and crude theatre, Crook does highlight the relationship between notions of national solidarity, ethnically based patriotism, and evolutionary theory. By endorsing the notion that some nations were justified in subjugating others, evolutionary theory provided for populations in European and American metropoles a seemingly scientifically-backed sense of self-congratulation and national solidarity, which, if not particularly influential in policy-making, was certainly widespread among many ordinary people. To be a man or woman in Britain was to be part of a society whose fitness had apparently been demonstrated by the success of its colonial ventures, and the domination of the British empire throughout the world; but it was, at the same time, a reason to be vigilant and do everything in ones power to safeguard national survival and prosperity. Both of these evolutionary notions helped to contribute to a sense of national solidarity. In noting that imperial/patriotic movements predated and were not particularly shaped by evolutionary theory, however, we run into a significant problem. In the self-fashioning of national identity and patriotic mythology, evolution was simply not necessary, and other national characteristics had been pressed into service as shared traits that denominated in-group from out-group, and helped to define national identity. Many European countries during the medieval period had found national (and regional) solidarity in defining themselves as members of Christendom or vassals of a particular monarch, against the Islamic world or foreign rulers respectively. After the reformation, and the development of either formally or informally constituted national religious movements in Britain and elsewhere provided other ways to reinforce national solidarity; not to mention generic xenophobia, jingoism, and military/nationalistic fears about other countries (or, in the case of Americans in the Old West, solidarity could spring from a sense of historic persecution and rugged individualist expansion). These concerns were still very much present in the nineteenth century; wars between Britain and Russia (the Crimean War), and France and Germany (the Franco Prussian War) gave both sides a great sense of national solidarity, and conflicts over religious diversity (such as with the Oxford Movement in the UK, and Catholics in the new German state) showed how much religious identity was still important in cementing national identity. Given the importance of all these other factors in securing national solidarity, it is not clear that evolutionary theory was necessary to create cohesion with ones fellow nationals, and was less adept at appealing to ordinary people (who might not have even accepted evolutionary theory) than the sort of jingoistic nationalism that was peddled at music halls and in popular culture. Furthermore, other developments in this time in culture and philosophy were arguably more important in shaping national solidarity movements, and in a number of cases outright rejected evolutionary theories. In literary circles, senses of racial and national solidarity were stoked not by evolutionary theories, as one might expect, but by Romantics like Schiller, Wordsworth, and Scott, who looked back into their natural heritage to find evidence that bound their nation together - Wordsworth wrote that In every thing we [the English] are sprung of Earths first blood, have titles manifold. Philosophers, too, sought to invoke race and the differentness of their people in order to promote national solidarity, without having the sense of the survival of the fittest that characterised evolutionary thought (most of these pre-dated Charles Darwins work on evolution, but were cognisant of earlier theories of evolution such as that of Lamarck and Erasmus Darwin). Barthold Niebuhr wrote extensively on the development of European civilisation as a conflict between kindred blood and color, using it to extol the current glories of Danish and German civilisation without having much sense of a developmental conflict that changed the characters of those involved, as evolution would suggest, but instead favouring an unchanging, intrinsic conception of characteristics. Even those writers who did incorporate notions of change and development into their theories of nationhood and race - such as Gobineau and Comte - generally rejected theories of evolution or development in response to ones environment in favour of more morally laden theories of degeneration or development or religion and spirituality. Ivan Hannford argues that it was this sort of Romantic/historical/philosophical sense of shared identity, that permeated throughout the political and popular cultures of the societies that advocated it (and led to later 20th centuries of aggressive national solidarity predicated on race), rather than any sense of evolutionary

theory. Rather than providing an uncertain, conflict-ridden basis for national solidarity, that implied the existence of a struggle within a nation as much as a struggle outside it, these theories provided a reassuring sense of national and racial essentialism, that often portrayed the nations they were spread in as uniquely superior, and were well-adapted to dissemination throughout popular culture political rhetoric. To conclude, we can draw two distinct, and somewhat contradictory conclusions about the role played by theories of evolution and Social Darwinism in 19th century European senses of nationhood. On the one hand, it seems to have been used fairly extensively to justify both a sense of nationhood, and national superiority (imperialism, in particular, was often perceived as a demonstration of both the truth of evolution, and the fitness and need to cohere among national communities); but on the other, we should recognise that imperialism, nationalism, and jingoism were doing just fine during this period without invoking evolutionary theory, and that a sense of national solidarity was, during the 19th century, often drawn from other cultural and philosophical sources. How to reconcile these two impressions? It would seem that, rather than being responsible to any great degree for a sense of nationalism and national solidarity - which undeniably predated evolutionary theories, and was largely based on a number of non-evolution theoretical notions during the period - but did provide a scientific justification that could help reinforce pre-existing cultural norms. For writers like Darwin, Strong, and Kidd - and their fairly considerable followings - evolutionary theory provided an apparent after-the-fact justification for political success, in such a way as to encourage national solidarity. Previous national success could be recast as national superiority and increased fitness, and this scientific gloss could be used to give a compelling argument for nations to stick together as political communities. This would continue into the 20th century, where - in Nazi Germany, for example - existing hostility and prejudice could be whipped up and turned into aggressive xenophobia and a sense of shared ethnic-national solidarity by application of misrepresented scientific principle such as evolution, acting in the service of pre-existent prejudice.