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Journal of Research in Industrial Organization

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Copyright 2011 Chokri Aloui and Khareddine. This is an open access article distributed under
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Contact Author$ Chokri Aloui" e%mail$ alouichokry200&'yahoo.(r
Optimal Pricing of a Duopoly Platform
with Two-Sided Congestion Effect

Chokri Aloui
1
and Khareddine Jebsi
2


1
Facult de Droit et des Sciences Economiques et Politiques, Sousse, Tunisia
2
Institut suprieur de Gestion, Sousse, Tunisia

______________________________________________________________________
Abstract
)e study" in this paper" the impact o( t#o%sided congestion e((ect on the pricing policy o( a t#o%
sided duopoly plat(orm. *elative to Armstrong +200,-" #e sho# that" #ith congestion e((ect" +i-
competition (or submarket share is so(tened" +ii- the divide%and%con.uer pricing strategy is
modi(ied inso(ar as it depends upon the di((erential o( the marginal congestion costs and +iii- each
plat(orm charges any agent o( one side a price that covers not only the marginal congestion cost
that he imposes on agents o( his o#n side having /oined its plat(orm" as the traditional principle o(
the te0tbook congestion pricing" but also it covers the marginal congestion cost that he indirectly
imposes on the o(%his%type agents having chosen to /oin the rival plat(orm. This issue matters
despite there is no technical link bet#een the t#o plat(orms.

Keywords T#o%sided markets" duopoly" t#o%sided congestion e((ect" divide%and%con.uer pricing
strategy.
11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111


!ntroduction
2t3s #ell recogni4ed that #omen and men
need each other3s attending in a nightclub.
The higher the number o( #omen a nightclub
attracts" the higher #ill be the number o(
men adhering to such a club and vice versa.
5ince any nightclub o((ers a (i0ed area o( a
dance (loor to the t#o genders
simultaneously" each attendee (eels boring
#hen the number o( his o#n type is
increasing relative to that o( the opposite se0.
6ightclubs are considered as plat(orms"
acting in a t#o%sided market #here t#o
distinct categories o( consumers interact and
share a (i0ed space. These t#o%sided
plat(orms are characteri4ed by negative
direct net#ork e0ternalities taking the (orm
o( congestion or cro#ding e((ect inso(ar as
agents o( one side dislike the increasing
number o( agents o( their o#n side. )e call
such congestion by t#o%sided congestion
e((ect because it reaches the t#o sides
simultaneously. Another e0ample to note in
this conte0t is a shopping mall luring both
retailers and buyers and it enables them to
interact in a (i0ed settled%space. 7uyers and
retailers value each other but the satis(action
o( any shopping mall agent decreases #ith
respect to the overuse o( the shopping mall3
space by the o(%his%o#n%type agents. Any
t#o%sided plat(orm characteri4ed by such
net#ork e0ternalities must take into account
this e((ect #hen it charges prices to the t#o
sides.

2n addition to the negative direct net#ork
e0ternalities" some plat(orms are
Journal of research in Industrial Organization 2

characteri4ed by negative indirect ones.
These latter are linked to the (act that some
agents o( one side dislike the increasing
participation o( agents o( the opposite side.
8or instance" more ads being placed in a
/ournal or broadcast in a channel may
represent a nuisance to some 9eyeballs:
notably the ad%avoiders.

The ma/ority o( the (rame#orks caring about
t#o%sided markets has interested in studying
the impact o( their positive indirect net#ork
e0ternalities +or cross%e0ternalities- common
(eature on the plat(orms3 pricing policies. The
positive cross%e0ternalities signi(y that
agents o( one side value more the increasing
participation o( agents belonging to the
opposite side. 8or instance" cardholders
+resp. merchants- are more incited to use
+resp. to accept- ;isa card #hen there are
numerous merchants +resp. cardholders-
#ho accept +use- it as a method o( payment.
Advertisers bene(it (rom the audience o( a
maga4ine and ad%lovers readers value a
maga4ine publishing more ads. The
increasing number o( <icroso(t )indo#s
applications developers enhances <icroso(t
)indo#s users3 #el(are and vice versa.
There are many other e0amples that come to
mind and that prove such a common (eature
o( t#o%sided markets
1
. =lat(orms #ould earn
positive pro(its i( they manage 9#ell: the t#o
submarkets o( agents. The pioneering
(rame#orks in this conte0t" such as *ochet
and Tirole +200! and 200,-" Armstrong
+200,-" >agiu +200,- among others" have
studied the main characteristics o( t#o%sided
markets and they have let such an economic
issue occupying an important place in the
industrial organi4ation literature.

7y contrast" rare are the (rame#orks that
have dealt #ith negative net#ork
e0ternalities in t#o%sided markets
2
.
Anderson and Coate +200?- have studied the
negative indirect e0ternalities. They address
the case #here vie#ers dislike ads #hile
advertisers bene(it (rom the increasing
audience addressed to broadcasting
channels. The result to note in their study is
that" #ith t#o programmes" there e0ists a
threshold o( the nuisance cost such that the
advertising level is lo#er +resp. higher- than
the social optimal one as the nuisance cost is
smaller +resp. larger- than a threshold.

6egative direct net#ork e0ternalities" the
ob/ect o( our paper" have been studied" in the
t#o%sided markets conte0t" by 7elle(lamme
and Toulemonde +200@-. These authors
study the case #here a certain 9rivalry: e((ect
characteri4es one side o( agents that are
assumed to be homogenous #ith respect to
their pre(erences (or plat(orms. According to
them" 9rivalry: e((ect means that agents in
one side compete #ith each other. 8or
instance" merchants compete hard (or
trading #ith cardholders
!
.

7elle(lamme and Toulemonde +200@- assume
that there is an incumbent plat(orm and a
potential entrant that seeks entering the
market. They analy4e in #hat e0tent negative
direct net#ork e0ternalities a((ect the pricing
policy o( the entrant in order to decide
launching a ne# plat(orm. They (ind that the
t#o plat(orms cannot co%e0ist at the
e.uilibrium.

Relati)e to the literature on two*sided
mar+ets" we aim" in this paper" to introduce
negati)e direct networ+ e,ternalities ta+ing
the form of two*sided congestion effect. -e
attempt to anal.ze the impact of such a
congestion effect on the pricing polic. of a
two*sided duopol. competing /*la 0otelling.
1he goal is to find out in what e,tent the cross*
e,ternalities change the pricing policies of a
duopol. platform when two*sided congestion
effect is present.

2n (act" congestion goes in line #ith the
9rivalry: e((ect studied by 7elle(lamme and
Toulemonde +200@-. 7y contrast to these
latter" #e interest" in our model" in studying
the case #here plat(orms are simultaneously
active +co%e0ist- in the t#o%sided market and
agents are heterogeneous #ith respect to
their pre(erences (or plat(orms. 8urthermore"
the simultaneous participation o( the t#o
groups o( agents" sharing the same capacity"
causes t#o%sided congestion e((ect.
! Journal of Industrial Organizations




Armstrong +200,- has studied the case
#here agents are single%homers and there is
no congestion. This author considers t#o
plat(orms that compete #ith each other A%la
>otelling. The main (inding to note in the
Armstrong3s (rame#ork is that positive
indirect net#ork e0ternalities induce (ierce
competition (or submarket share and
there(ore the so%called divide%and%con.uer
pricing strategy arises$ each plat(orm aims at
targeting the side that represents the source
o( gain (or the other.

2n our paper" #ith t#o%sided congestion
e((ects" #e sho#" (irstly" that competition
bet#een the t#o plat(orms is so(tened. The
incentive o( each plat(orm as to attract the
needed%more side is mitigated by the t#o%
sided congestion e((ect. uring one agent to
one side negatively a((ects the participation
o( agents o( his o#n side and there(ore the
opposite side participation
&
. 5econdly" the
divide%and%con.uer pricing strategy is
modi(ied inso(ar as the gap bet#een the
sides3 prices depends on the di((erential o(
agents marginal congestion costs. Thirdly"
the per%access price charged by each
plat(orm to one agent covers not only the
marginal congestion cost that he imposes on
the o(%his%type agents /oining his plat(orm"
like the traditional principle o( the te0tbook
congestion pricing" but also it covers the
marginal congestion cost that he imposes on
the agents o( his o#n type having chosen to
/oin the rival plat(orm.

The rest o( the paper is organi4ed as (ollo#s.
5ection 2 presents the model. The
Armstrong3s result is brie(ly noticed in
section !. 5ection & analy4es the pricing
policy o( a duopoly plat(orm #ith t#o%sided
congestion e((ect. The last section concludes.
The model
Bur model is given in a general setting so that
the t#o sides are simply called 9buyers: and
9sellers:. There are t#o plat(orms acting in a
t#o%sided market. Cach plat(orm serves
buyers" superscripted by 2" and sellers"
superscripted by 3" and it enables them to
transact +to meet-. 2n order to let plat(orms
di((erentiate solely by their 9locations: in
each submarket" #e assume that they o((er
the same amount o( capacity. )e label such a
capacity by the parameter 0 > .
=lat(orm 1, 2 i = charges each
group" , k B S = " a per%access price denoted
by
k
i
p . The plat(orms are located at the
e0tremities o( a linear distance o( measure 1
so that plat(orm 1 is located at 0 and
plat(orm 2 at 1. )ithout loss o( generality" #e
assume that the t#o groups are evenly
distributed on the interval [ ] 0,1 and they
have a unit mass. The plat(orms incur a
symmetric per%+%type cost denoted by
k
c .

Bn the one hand" #e suppose that buyers and
sellers need each other and there(ore they
value their 9meetings:. Bn the other hand" #e
assume that each agent o( one side dislikes
the increasing number o( the agents o( his
o#n side.
The utility (unction o( agent + adhering to
plat(orm i is
k k l k k k
i i i i
u N p e y = +1-
#here
k
is the marginal value that a +%type
places on an additional l%type. 5uch a
parameter is assumed to be the same (or all
+%types +#hether being subscribed to
plat(orm 1 or plat(orm 2-. 5o"
k l
i
N
measures the net#ork bene(its (or agent + in
plat(orm i. The term
k
k i
i
N
y =

is the
congestion (unction
?
o( side + in plat(orm i"
giving the level o( congestion" #here
k
i
N
stands (or the e0pected mass o( group +
adhering to plat(orm i. The
parameter
k
e notates the #illingness to pay
o( i%plat(orm%+%type participant in order to
avoid congestion +or his unit #aiting cost-
#hich is assumed to be also the same (or all
Journal of research in Industrial Organization &

agents o( side%+. 5o" the congestion cost born
by agent + in plat(orm i is given by
k k
i
e y .

The surplus o( agent + having chosen to
adhere to plat(orm 1 is


1 1
k k k k
S u t x = +2-
and the surplus o( agent + having chosen to
access to plat(orm 2 is

( )
2 2
1
k k k k
S u t x = +!-
#here
k
t is the so%called transportation cost
or product di((erentiation parameter
and
k
x +resp.
( )
1
k
x - inde0es the
pre(erence o( agent + to plat(orm 1 +resp. 2- .
The term
k k
t x +resp.
( )
1
k k
t x - can be
thought as the opportunity cost born by
agent + o( having chosen plat(orm 1 +resp. 2-
#hile it3s 9ideal: is plat(orm 2 +resp. 1-.
The location o( the marginal +%type #ho is
indi((erent bet#een the t#o plat(orms is

1 2
1
2 2
k k
k
k
u u
x
t

= + +&-
The pro(it (unction o( plat(orm i is
D


( ) ( )
B B B S S S
i i i i i
p c N p c N = + +?-
2n #hat (ollo#s" #e adopt the (ollo#ing
assumptions
Assumption A
k
k k
e
t >

Assumption A guarantees the submarket + to
be shared. )e adopt this assumption as to
avoid the (act that only one plat(orm corners
the t#o submarkets. 7roadly speaking" #e
can learn (rom assumption A that agents3
pre(erences (or the plat(orms dominate +net-
cross%e0ternalities bene(its
D
.
Assumption "
( )
2
4
B S B S
t t > +
Assumption 7 ensures the concavity o( the
pro(it (unction ( )
i
#ith respect to prices
B
i
p and
S
i
p .2n order to analy4e the pricing
policy o( a t#o%sided duopoly plat(orm #ith
t#o%sided congestion e((ect" #e need to
present in the (ollo#ing section the ma/or
results o( Armstrong +200,- studying the
pricing policy o( t#o no%congested plat(orms
competing A%la >otelling.
Duopoly pricing without two-sided
congestion effect a benchmar#
Armstrong +200,- has studied the pricing
policy o( a duopoly plat(orm #ithout
congestion e((ect. >e analy4es the case #here
the plat(orms compete #ith each other
according to the >otelling arti(act and the
t#o distinct groups are single%homers. The
main results o( Armstrong +200,- are given
in the (ollo#ing lemma$

$emma% 8or , , k l B S and k l = and
, 1, 2 i j and i j =
The implicit +%market share
( ) ( )
2 1
1
2 2
k l k k
i j i
k
i k
N p p
N
t
+
= + +,-

The (irst order condition (or symmetric
e.uilibrium price charged to side +
( )
l
k k k k l l
l
p c t p c
t

= + + +D-

? Journal of Industrial Organizations




The symmetric e.uilibrium price charged to
side +
k k k l
p c t = + +E-
Proof% 5ee Armstrong +200,-

Armstrong sho#s that indirect net#ork
e0ternalities result in a (ierce competition (or
submarket share bet#een the t#o plat(orms.
>e relates his (inding to the (act that each
plat(orm seeks to lure more members in each
side in order to 9steer: all the submarkets
(rom its rival. >o#ever" the divide%and%
con.uer pricing strategy arises$ each
plat(orm subsidi4es the side that is 9needed
more: and it covers the loss on the other.
Duopoly platform with two-sided
congestion effect
6o#" #e are ready to give our main results"
taking into account t#o%sided congestion
e((ect" in the (ollo#ing proposition

Proposition 8or , , k l B S = and k l F
, 1, 2 i j = and i j
The implicit +%market share o( plat(orm i is
( ) ( )
2 1
1
2
2
k l k k
i j i
k
i
k
k
N p p
N
e
t
+
= +
| |
+
|

\

+@-
The e.uilibrium +%market share o( plat(orm i
is
( ) ( ) 1
2
2
l k k k l l
j i j i
k
i
B S
B S B S
t p p p p
N
e e
t t

+
= +
( | || |
+ +
( | |

\ \
+10-
The (irst order condition (or symmetric
e.uilibrium price charged to side + is
( )
k l
k k k k l l
l
l
e
p c t p c
e
t

= + + +

+11-
The e.uilibrium symmetric price charged to
side + is
k
k k k l
e
p c t
| |
= +
|

\
+12-
The e.uilibrium symmetric pro(it is
2
B S
B S B S
i
e e
t t

| | | |
+
| |

\ \
=
+1!-
Proof%5ee Appendi0
)e can learn (rom the proposition the
(ollo#ing
C0pression +@- sho#s that the lure o( an
additional l%type to plat(orm 1, 2 i = is
accompanied by the attraction
o(
k
k
k
e
t

+%types to that plat(orm.

5uch a (raction is lo#er the higher the
marginal congestion cost on side +"
k
e

.
8urthermore" #e sho# that the (raction
#ith congestion is lo#er than that
#ithout congestion"
k
k
t

. As a result" the
positive net#ork bene(its are
diminished by the #ithin%side cro#ding.

2n addition to the A%la >otelling
standard pricing result"
k k
c t + " #e
recogni4e that the access price charged
by each plat(orm to side +" given in +11-"
Journal of research in Industrial Organization ,

is ad/usted up#ard by the marginal
congestion cost that agent + imposes on
the o(%his%type agents"
k
e

" and
do#n#ard by the cross%e0ternality
related term
( )
l
k l l
l
l
p c
e
t

+
+

.
Compared #ith Armstrong +200,-" this
latter term" interpreted as the
opportunity cost 9of raising b. enough
the group*+ price to cause one group*+
agent to lea)e:" is reduced. The
opportunity cost is lo#er the higher the
marginal congestion cost that any l%type
agent imposes on the ls"
l
e

. 2ndeed" the
net#ork bene(it that any agent brings to
the opposite group is reduced due to
congestion e((ect because luring one
type to one group negatively a((ects the
participation o( his group and there(ore
the participation o( the opposite one.
=lat(orms take into consideration the
interplay bet#een the negative direct
and positive indirect e0ternalities.

*elative to Armstrong +200,-"
e0pressions +12- and +1!- demonstrate
that t#o%sided congestion e((ect so(tens
the competition bet#een plat(orms (or
submarket share in the sense that their
capability to compete is limited due to
the reduction o( the net#ork bene(its.
8or instance" in peak periods" some
shopping malls monitor the adhesion o(
both buyers and sellers and they tend to
ban the entry o( the additional ones.

2t (ollo#s (rom the proposition t#o
corollaries that go into our analysis in depth.
Corollary & The gaps bet#een the sides3
prices
( )
B S
p p #ith and #ithout
congestion are" respective
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
C B S B S S B B S
p c c t t e e = + + +

( ) ( ) ( )
B S B S S B
p c c t t = + +

Proof% 7ased on e0pressions +E- and +12-" corollary 1 is omitted
Compared #ith Armstrong +200,-" #e sho#
that" #ith congestion" the divide%and%con.uer
pricing strategy is modi(ied inso(ar as the gap
bet#een sides3 prices depends on the sign o(
the di((erential o( the agents unit #aiting
costs
( )
B S
e e . 2( the latter di((erential is
positive +resp. negative-" each plat(orm tends
to 9divide: more +resp. less- one side.
Corollary ' C0pression +11- can be re%
#ritten as

1 1
k k k l k k
i i
i j
p c t e N
| |
= + + +
|
|

\

Proof% Taking into account that the t#o plat(orms share the t#o submarkets e.ually at a symmetric
e.uilibrium and admitting that the plat(orms have the same amount o( capacity" corollary 2 is
omitted.

Corollary 2 raises a ne# interesting result
that has not been a((orded attention in the
literature studying congestion pricing. )e
sho# that the per%access price charged by
each plat(orm i to a +%type agent covers not
only the marginal congestion cost that he
imposes on the o(%his%type agents having
accessed to that plat(orm
k
i
e

" like the

traditional principle o( the te0tbook
congestion pricing" but also it covers the
marginal congestion cost that he imposes on
D Journal of Industrial Organizations




agents o( his o#n type having chosen to /oin
plat(orm j"
k
j
e

. 2ndeed" since all +%type

agents have the same #illingness to pay in
order to avoid congestion" #hen a +%type
chooses to /oin plat(orm i" he limits the
choice o( the other agents o( his side because
he makes this plat(orm less attractive (or
them" and there(ore he urges them to /oin
plat(orm j. >e thus indirectly imposes a
congestion cost on the +%type agents having
adhered to plat(orm j despite there is no
technical link bet#een the t#o plat(orms.

Conclusion
)e have studied in this paper the optimal
pricing o( a t#o%sided duopoly #hen the t#o
sides are characteri4ed by congestion. The
motivation to study the t#o%sided congestion
e((ect is related to the (act that it is not
al#ays the case that cross%e0ternalities
bene(its are the main 9gi(t: t#o%sided
plat(orms o((er to the groups in order to get
them together. 2t #ill be also optimal to
attract the ade.uate number o( gi(t%sharers.
)e have sho#n that #ith congestion e((ect"
the divide%and%con.uer pricing strategy is
modi(ied and there(ore the competition (or
attracting more members o( the t#o distinct
groups is 9calm:. 2n addition" each agent pays
both the marginal congestion cost that he
directly imposes on agents o( his o#n type
/oining his plat(orm and that he indirectly
imposes on agents o( his o#n type /oining the
rival plat(orm. The indirect one is linked to
the (act that each agent" #hile choosing any
plat(orm" urges some other agents o( his type
to choose the rival plat(orm.

8or (urther research" one can analy4e the
cases #here +i- plat(orms di((erentiate not
only by their 9locations: but also by the
capacities they o((er+ii- agents o( one side are
heterogeneous #ith respect to their
pre(erences to the opposite side and +iii-
agents belonging to the same side have
di((erent #illingness to pay in order to avoid
congestion.


Appendi(
Proof of the proposition
Gsing +1- and +&-" #e get
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 2 1 2 1
1
2 2
k
k l l k k k k
k
k
e
N N N N p p
x
t
+ +

= +
Taking into account the (act that
2 1
1
k k
N N = " #e obtain
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 2 1
2 1 1 2
1
2 2
k
k l k k k
k
k
e
N N p p
x
t
+ +

= +
Assuming the e0pected +%submarket share o( plat(orm 1 is (ul(illed" that is
1
k k
x N = " #e easily
obtain e0pression +@- in the proposition (or 1 i = . )e deduce e0pression +@- (or 2 i = taking into
account that
2 1
1
k k
N N = .
2t (ollo#s (rom e0pression +@- the (ollo#ing system
Journal of research in Industrial Organization E

( )
( )
2 2
2 2
B B
B B B S B B B B
i i j i
S S
S B S S S S S S
i i j i
e e
t N N t p p
e e
N t N t p p


| |
+ = + +
|

\

| |

+ + = + +
|

\

The resolution o( the above system gives e0pression +10-
(or , , ; k l B S k l = and , 1, 2; i j i j = .
The pro(it (unction o( plat(orm 1, 2 i = is
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 1 2
, , ; ,
B B B k k S S S k k
i i i i i
p c N p p p c N p p k B S = + =
#here ( )
k
i
N is given in +10-.
The ob/ective o( plat(orm 1, 2 i = is to solve the (ollo#ing ma0imi4ation program
( )
,
max ,
B S
i i
B S
i i
p p
p p
The 8.B.C result in the (ollo#ing system
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
0
2
1
0
2
S B B B S S S B B S S S
j i j i i i
B S S S B B B S S B B B
j i j i i i
t p p p p t p c p c
t p p p p t p c p c

(
+ + =

( + + =

#here 2 0
B S
B S B S
e e
t t
( | || |
= + + >
( | |

\ \
given assumption A.
Assuming a symmetric e.uilibrium" that is
1 2
k k k
p p p = = " #e obtain
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
0
2
1
0
2
S B B S S S
B S S B B B
t p c p c
t p c p c

(
+ =

( + =

@ Journal of Industrial Organizations




Cach e.uation o( the above system allo#s us to obtain e0pression +11- in the proposition
(or , , k l B S and k l = . )e can re%#rite the latter system as (ollo#s
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
2
S B B S S S
B B B B S S
t p c p c
p c t p c

+ =

+ =

The resolution o( the system allo#s us to easily obtain the e.uilibrium symmetric prices de(ined in
e0pression +12- in the proposition (or , , k l B S and k l = . The e.uilibrium e0ists because the
>essian matri0
( )
( )
2
2
B S
S
B S
B
t
H
t


| |
+
|

|
=
|
+
|

|
\

is negative semi%de(inite in the case #here assumptions A and 7 are met.
8inally" it3s easy to obtain +1!- by inserting +12- in e0pression +?- +the symmetric e.uilibrium
submarket shares are e.ual
1
2
-.
Endnotes

1
8or more e0amples o( t#o%sided plat(orms
see Cvans +200!-" among others.

2
The one%sided congestion e((ect in t#o%
sided markets setting is also studied by Aloui
and Hebsi +200E-. Their model concerns
commercial (airs and clinics in #hich the side
o( buyers +#hether visitors or patients- is
congested and the sellers3 +#hether
e0hibitors or doctors- is not.

!
Austin 8rakt +200@- argues that 9relati)e to
the old parit. pricing s.stem" if women pa.
less than men to enter $ude4s 5lub" the. are
both more willing to attend and to ha)e a
better time:. Conse.uently" #hat Austin 8rakt
claims about Iude3s club is not al#ays true.

&
5ee *eitman +1@@1- (or the (ormulation o(
congestion (unctions o( di((erent (orms o(
congestion in particular (or the processor
sharing.
?
The e0pected submarkets shares o( the
plat(orms are assumed to be (ul(illed
i.e.
1
k k
x N = and
( )
2
1
k k
x N =
,
2( the reverse case holds .i.e.
k
k k
e
t <

" all
+%agents choose the plat(orm having the
larger l%submarket share and there(ore that
plat(orm corners the t#o%sided market.
D
2( the reverse case holds .i.e.
k
k k
e
t <

" all
+%agents choose the plat(orm having the
larger l%submarket share and there(ore that
plat(orm corners the t#o%sided market.



Journal of research in Industrial Organization 10

)eferences

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#ith one%sided congestion e((ect:" ?D
th

con(erence o( A85C" =aris.
Anderson" 5=. and Coate" 5. +200?-" 9<arket
provision o( broadcasting$ a #el(are
analysis:" 1he Re)iew of 6conomic 3tudies
+D2-" @&D%@D2.
Armstrong" <. +200,-" 9Competition in t#o%
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+!D-" ,,E%,@1.
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Ie =alma" A. and eruth" . +1@E@-"
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2nstitute o( Cconomy Trade and 2ndustry"
Hapan.
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Kender%based price discrimination at the
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di((erentiation in congested markets:" 1he
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,&D.
*ochet" HC. and Tirole" H. +200!-" 9=lat(orm
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102@.
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