RIL on Workers Power 1995

This position has got the LRCI leadership into a series of hopeless tangles and convoluted arguments, as their positions have zigzagged in response to the shifting circumstances of the Bosnian war. One general feature has ecome steadil! more pronounced however, the adaptation to the feeling among sections of li eral western opinion that "our# governments must $do something# % a sentiment that pla!s directl! into the hands of imperialism. &o now we have the ludicrous position of the LRCI tr!ing to sound revolutionar!, and calling for the '( and ()TO out of the Bal*ans and condemning the om ing, while at the same time demanding that #our# government sends arms to the Bosnian forces and opens the orders to +Islamic, "volunteers" going to fight with them. In other words -or*ers .ower does not want the imperialists to fight in the Bal*ans/ the! 0ust want them to get their clients and pro1ies to do the fighting2 (o wonder that this reactionar! nonsense has lown the LRCI apart and e1posed it as an unprincipled loc.3 That sounds ver! li*e Li !a to me2 4err!

Introduction
Who are Workers Power?
-or*ers .ower in Britain is one of the man! "left$ organisations that li*es to call itself Trots*!ist +Revolutionar! 5ar1ist,. On paper, the! li*e to appear as the "purest$ of 5ar1ist, ut li*e so much of the rest of Britain$s left the! have gone through a stead! process of political degeneration and opportunist adaptation. Increasingl! the! have ecome 0ust another irrelevant sect, more interested in selling their paper than uilding an! real struggles that can forge a new revolutionar! vanguard and part!. The! have uilt up an "international$ in much the same wa! as British groups li*e 5ilitant, and their own former ancestors, the &-.6 instead of developing a genuine democratic internationalist part!, the! have set up "satellite$ sections who must follow the line of the British leaders. The! call this the "League for a Revolutionar! Communist International$ +LRCl,, ut as we shall see in this document the LRICI is no more than the e1tension of -or*ers .ower in Britain. &ince our organisation, the Revolutionar! Internationalist League +RIL, and internationall! the International Trots*!ist Committee +ITC,, was formed in the earl! 789:s we have had man! de ates and differences with -or*ers .ower. In our histor! there have even een suggestions that our organisations fuse as we have oth een traditionall! more on the "left$ than most of Britain$s centrist 7

groups that descri e themselves as Trots*!ist. 7 The differences we have had with -or*ers .ower have often seemed academic to outsiders, as if we were arguing a out unimportant secondar! ;uestions, when reall! we were "all on the same side$. But we have alwa!s maintained that ehind even the smallest of differences lies a difference in method which is fundamental to uilding a successful international revolutionar! part!. Over the past few !ears and in particular since the collapse of the &talinist regimes in <astern <urope in the earl! 788:s -or*ers .ower has rapidl! speeded up its process of political degeneration and deca!. It has come out with more and more rotten positions, it has developed an undemocratic and unhealth! internal regime and it has made a complete mess of 0ust a out ever! ma0or area of practical wor* it has engaged in. Toda!, -or*ers .ower holds out no hope of winning militant wor*ers and !outh to its organisation, it has ecome part of the British left$s living dead. =ow was it that an organisation with so man! correct revolutionar! positions could ecome such an unhealth! waste of space> 'nfortunatel!, the stor! is all too familiar/ the iggest danger for revolutionar! organisations in the world toda! is their own political degeneration as a product of the defeats of wor*ers$ struggles since the 78?:s. It should e important to an!one who wants to ma*e a revolution to stud! this process of degeneration and deca!, to learn the hard lessons necessar! to ensure that the mista*es of the pest are not repeated in the future. That$s wh! we direct this pamphlet not 0ust at those mem ers or e1%mem ers of -or*ers .ower, ut to an!one serious a out uilding a movement that can smash capitalism and oppression in Britain and throughout the world. -or*ers .ower$s rapid degeneration has led to e series of splits within their international movement and the British section. Three important splits have occurred this !ear, the most recent eing the most important % the complete rea* of all the Latin )merican comrades from -or*ers .ower % the split of the .eruvian section. .oder O rero +.O, and the Bolivian section also called .oder O rero, late in &eptem er, as well as that of the ".roletarian @action$ of the -or*ers .ower (ew Aealand group in earl! &eptem er. In this pamphlet we hope to give an account of some of the differences that led to the splits as man! show signs of the rottenness of -or*ers .ower$s method. But this won$t e a commentar! on someone else$s divorce ut a drawing out of the real pro lems of political degeneration that we have seen and struggled against in -or*ers .ower for !ears. -e will outline what these differences mean in practice, from the anti%racist struggles B Britain to the implications of -or*ers .ower$s counter revolutionar! positions on eastern <uro/ -e will spell out what Trots*!ists would doing these areas, and what our small organisation h as een a le to achieve compared to -or*ers .ower.

Workers Powers Centrist Method

In essence -or*ers .ower$s centrist method can e reduced to a sectarianism towards the wor*ing class and !outh, which characterises its passive propagandistic arrogant and literalist approach to class struggle and an opportunism to the various "left$ misleaders of the class/ centrist groups li*e C

5ilitant and the &-. and "communit! leaders$ etc. In their practical wor* this is shown in their endless attempts to achieve 0oint conferences of centrists instead developing action to fight racism for instance. -hilst -or*ers .ower often zigzag etween this sectarian and opportunist moods oth to the wor*ing class and centrist left reformist leaders we will show how in theor! and practice -or*ers .ower$s method contains this ma0or wea*ness. )long with this -or*ers .ower displa!s a centrist attitude to the transitional programme, the method of Trots*!ism. -hilst churning out lists and action programmes choc*%a loc* with fanc! transitional demands for struggles throughout the world when it comes to practice the! desert the transitional method altogether. It is almost as if the transitional programme is a i for them to regurgitate and eat their reasts with, ut the! don$t reall! elieve it applies to the situation in the concrete class struggles. This sectarian opportunist revision of the transitional programme is given "theoretical$ legitimac! in their misnamed% named hodgepodge "Trots*!ist 5anifesto$. C -e will show that in theor! and practice wor*ers .ower re0ects the transitional programme when it is most re;uired. Increasingl!, -or*ers .ower has een further characterised ! a total capitulation to ourgeois democrac!, and middleclass pu lic opinion. -e have said this of them for five !ear and now some of their own sections have split awa! from them ma*ing the same charge. The adaptation to middleclass pu lic opinion has reached its pea* in regards to the pro%imperialist polic! -or*ers .ower advance in relation to the war in Dugoslavia. ut goes ac* to their fears of raising the demand "victor! to Ira;$ during the 4ulf war and their constant refusal to defend the gains of the Octo er wor*ers revolution in the former &oviet 'nion from capitalist restorationist and counter revolution which cloa*s itself in the h!pocritical gown of western " ourgeois democrac!$. It has recently been revealed that the present leadership of Workers Power and the LRCI has for years been advancing the policy that it is correct to fight for bourgeois democracy within degenerated workers states. This shows a remarkable ignorance of class rule in capitalism an ignorance all too often shared by groups like the !"#I and $atgamna%s "ocialist &rganiser who are so desperate to prove to the middle classes that socialists are more in favour of bourgeois democracy than the bourgeoisie.' "ince its first progressive period during the (nglish Civil War and the #rench revolution bourgeois democracy has always been the political system to which capitalist e)ploitation is best suited. It is about abstract *human rights% that hide class power. Counter revolution within the workers% states whether healthy or degenerate was always going to be best disguised in bottles marked *democratic rights% especially when the so+called *Communists% are so eager to swallow the whole bottle without studying the ingredients. &ur pamphlet will show how Workers Power capitulation to middle class public opinion which in ,ritain and most imperialist countries today means bourgeois democracy has led it to adopt openly counter revolutionary positions. What is the relevance of Workers Power? E

The British left is dominated ! ignorance and philistinism. &o often a mem er of a larger organisation, i.e. &-.F5ilitant will reduce ever! political ;uestion to size, who$s got a igger group, !ou or us> Revolutionaries who have studied histor! *now this is a surd. Lenin split with the 5enshevi*s ecause he demanded an organisation of professional revolutionaries, of leaders not 0ust a mass part! open to an!one who wants to sign the dated line on a card. Our organisation, the RIL is a dramatic e1ample of wh! we value ;ualit! over ;uantit!. Over the past few !ear the RIL has led more successful struggles and engaged with more militant wor*ing class !outh than man! of the organisations ten or a hundred times our size. Of course we want to grow, ut uilding an organisation that leads real struggle, and develops real leaders has alwa!s een our priorit!. -or*ers .ower, on the other hand, is a perfect e1ample of a sect. There might even e ten times as man! mem ers of -or*ers .ower as are in the RIL, ut when did the! last lead a struggle, when did the! last even organise a march> Increasingl!, -or*ers .ower hasn$t done an!thing. The! can go to other peoples meetings and marches, criticise ever!one else, and sell a few papers and that to them is active political wor*. (o wonder that -or*ers .ower has never tried to even tal* to the wor*ing class !outh that the RIL attracts to political activit! the! *now those !outh wouldn$t e in the slightest it interested in a group of people who treat revolution li*e an interesting school o! ho !. -or*ers .ower has ecome a sect/ if it had the 8::: mem ers the &-. oasts of it wouldn$t e an! etter. It has no perspective of winning or even leading an!thing. )nd not surprisingl! the sect has ecome a cli;ue +the term cult might impl! something more e1citing than the mundane e1istence of this increasingl! irrelevant group,. ) cli;ue of leaders and full timers who go ac* !ears with one another run the group and demand personal lo!alt! from all its mem ers. &ome of the material from the recent splits will ma*e that so apparent we need not comment further. &o, !ou ma! as*, if -or*ers .ower are increasingl! so irrelevant wh! waste our time writing a out them> )nd this is e good ;uestion ecause the RIL does not elieve that in order to win an!one to revolutionar! politics we must first deal with the pro lems of -or*ers .ower. The opposite is true. The conservatism, routinist sect that -or*ers .ower has ecome onl! serves as an e1ample of how not to uild a revolutionar! organisation, how not to win wor*ers and !outh, how to a stain from struggle and criticise ever!one else, how to turn revolution into its opposite % into a drin*ing clu for left wing people who want e ho ! and li*e to sound sanctimonious and a little it intellectual. .art of the reason we write this pamphlet is ecause -or*ers .ower has een an important force on the left efore. 5an! people genuine a out the need for revolution have 0oined or loo*ed with interest upon them. Gespite our disagreements, we ourselves have fought shoulder to shoulder alongside them in attles against police, fascists, right%wing ureaucrats or other centrist groups tr!ing to shut us up. It is important for the education of new generations of revolutionaries to e1amine the cause of the cancer that has ta*en over -or*ers .ower. H

But there is a wider reason. -or*ers .ower is not 0ust -or*ers .ower in Britain, it is the principal section of the League for a Revolutionar! Communist International, which as an international organisation claiming to e Trots*!ist has attracted small ut important groups of revolutionaries in a num er of countries, who have one of the more left%wing elements thrown up ! the fragmentation of the @ourth International. )s a section of the international Trots*!ist Committee the RIL ta*es seriousl! the need to engage with such forces in a fight to uild an international tendenc! committed to the regeneration and reconstruction of the @ourth International. -e elieve the recent split of the Latin )merican sections from -or*ers .ower, following closel! on the split of the (ew Aealand section to e a decisive turning point for the LRCI. There is no longer an! national section within the LRCl that can fight to reverse the degeneration. The regime will no longer allow for that, and most of the remaining mem ers are too crushed and tied in terms of personal lo!alt! to do an!thing e1cept leave. -e don$t gloat at this depressing spectacle, nor do we wish an! harm to those comrades who have chosen to go down the road of degeneration. @ran*l!, we would e wasting our time to do either. Rather, we feel the recent split demands the drawing of a alance sheet, the learning of lessons % especiall! important to those !outh getting involved in politics for the first time, and for those e1% mem ers and e1%sections of -or*ers .ower which must now as* themselves where to go ne1t. )nd if there are people left inside -or*ers .ower and the LRCl who want to uild a genuine revolutionar! part! and are prepared to struggle to do that, then the! should allow themselves to seriousl! consider the recent splits in their organisation, loo* at the true nature of their origins, and discuss with the RIL and ITC a out how to regenerate the @ourth international, to re uild a mass international Communist .art!.

The recent s lits in the LRCI

!ustria
In spring 788I, the )ustrian section of the LRCI, )r eiter%lnnenstandpun*t split. In 788C )r eiter%Innenstandpun*t was the largest far left group in )ustria, igger than either the 5ilitant or the )ustrian RJL. )r eiter%lnnenstandpun*t had won a num er of !outh who were ;uic*l! turned into sectarians. The final straw in the degeneration for the )r eiter%Innenstandpun*t group came when the! 0oined a right%wing &er ian monarchist demonstration in Kienna. The! shared the same platform with the apologists monarchists and clerical counterrevolutionaries from the former Dugoslavia, and failed to utter a word of criticism of &er ian nationalism. The onl! &er mem er of the LRCI did tr! to ma*e some attac* on the monarchists and was promptl! eaten up ! &er nationalists. -or*ers .ower have refused to ever ma*e an! pu lic or internal correction to this complete de acle. It is ad enough to ma*e such a mista*e ut to go on defending it !ears later spells disaster. The )ustrian group ceased to grow and conservative I

pessimism set in. <arlier this !ear, the LRCl held what appears as a ridiculous de ate to an!one outside the sect. The! had an almight! argument a out whether the political period in the world was counter%revolutionar! with revolutionar! potentials, or whether it was revolutionar!, with a counter%revolutionar! situation. &uch nonsense denotes an organisation that has lost an! grip of 5ar1ist dialectics. The world political situation is e1tremel! contradictor!. The collapse of &talinism and the rightward shift of social democrac! has intensified oth revolutionar! and counter%revolutionar! pressures. The world is a more unsta le place. But to generalise that it is either revolutionar! +which clearl! it is not, or that it is counter%revolutionar! +suggesting the complete victor! of reaction and the impossi ilit! of ma*ing an! practical revolutionar! developments in the immediate future, is a nonsense. It is a classic attempt to tr! and ma*e an a stract schema fit a complicated and concrete world. -or*ers .ower in Britain decided the period was now revolutionar!. This has more to do with their cele ration of the collapse of &talinism than an!thing that e1isted in the class struggle, or that the! thought the! could actuall! do an!where. ) section of )r eiter%Innenstandpun*t, decided it was counter%revolutionar! and that, in fact, there was nothing much that could e done e1cept ma*e propaganda. This ridiculous argument led to the first of this !ear$s splits. The result is that there are now two tin! sects in )ustria oth of which are in realit! sterile passive propaganda groups.

"ew #ealand and Latin !$erica

In &eptem er 788I, the ".roletarian @action$ in the (ew Aealand section split. This was followed earlier in Octo er ! the departure of oth the .eruvian and Bolivian sections L the two Latin )merican sections of the L@ICI and their onl! groups in neo%colonial countries. The two splits have different origins and some important different positions. The! also share a great deal of correct criticisms of -or*ers .ower and the LRCI. The points of agreement include opposition to Workers Power%s counter+ revolutionary positions on the war in former -ugoslavia where Workers Power have called on imperialists to give military support to the ,osnian state and supported the ,osnian army whilst refusing to defend "erbs from ./T& bombing. They opposed Workers Power%s support for the counterrevolutionary government in Lithuania and their call for the Thatcher government to provide military aid to the pro capitalist government there to use against "oviet forces. They opposed Workers Power%s *united front% with ,oris -eltsin in the 0110 /ugust coup in the !""R. Workers Power had demanded socialists take sides with one section of the old bureaucracy the more openly pro+capitalist counter revolutionary and pro bourgeois democratic one against another which was more anti+democratic and wanted a slower process of capitalist restoration. Both opposed the insane line of the LRCI which stated that the Bolivian wor*ing class had suffered an historic defeat on the scale of the .aris Commune2 The! M

resisted this defeatism until the LRCI forced it to e finall! pu lished in Bolivia L on the eve of a one month general stri*e2 The! opposed -or*ers .ower$s positions on =aiti and Rwanda where -or*ers .ower re0ected elementary $ar)ism in failing to distinguish imperialism refusing to allow for the possibility of ever supporting the 2aitian government against a !" military invasion and backing the ,ritish and !" sponsored Tutsi RP# in Rwanda during the genocidal civil war on both sides with 2utus. They opposed Workers Power%s call for a *democratic% Popular front with the far right Islamic fundamentalists against the reactionary regime in /lgeria. $any of them had opposed Workers Power%s backsliding during the 3ulf war between imperialism and Ira4. Workers Power 5 4uickly retreated from demanding the victory of the oppressed nation Ira4 once the war was in full swing. In all these conflicts, we are completel! with the sections that have split from the LRCl, in so far as we have een a le to stud! their positions. 5an! of these criticisms have een made ! us for man! !ears, and the! are developed in this pamphlet. -or*ers .ower did not tolerate this opposition and it is clear that the internal regime of the LRCI made it increasingl! impossi le to wage these struggles from within. Bureaucratic suspensions and e1pulsions com ined with splits ecame inevita le. -e have three important differences with the (ew Aealand faction, some of which seem to e shared ! the Latin )merican sections. Li*e man! in the LRCI, the (ew Aealand split off is "Ith internationalist. Ith internationalism is usuall! an e1cuse for opportunist plans to lash up with an! old left%wing reformist, &talinist and petit% ourgeois nationalists, or for a sectarian refusal to intervene in the crisis of leadership. The split offs from the LRCI are proof to us, the ITC, that struggles for Trots*!ism can still develop within the degenerated fragments of the @ourth International. -e remain committed to a struggle for the political regeneration and organisational reconstruction of the @ourth International, the Latin )merican groups have alwa!s supported the polic! of a reconstruction of the @ourth International, whilst -or*ers .ower sit on the fence and tr! to pretend that the whole argument is a out num ers. The (ew Aealand section ma*es the mista*e of adopting -or*ers .ower$s schematic logic concerning the world political situation. In opposition to &talinopho ic -or*ers .ower$s declaration that the world political situation is revolutionar!, the (ew Aealand group declares it is counter%revolutionar!. )lso the (ew Aealand group claims that capitalism has alread! een restored in the former '&&R something that part conditions their anal!sis of the world political situation. The ITC does not elieve that the ;ualitative restoration has !et een achieved, whilst the overall process flows rapidl! in the capitalist direction. The overwhelming ma0orit! of the criticisms that the Latin )merican and (ew Aealand comrades have made of the LRCI are correct. But the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and it is practice which will e the proof. In practical terms -or*ers .ower$s centrist method has made it redundant. It surel! must have adl! affected the wor* of the Latin )merican and (ew Aealand sections as ?

well. But the most important point leading to the split for us is not the struggle over <astern <urope or Dugoslavia, centrall! important though these ;uestions are for Trots*!ists ut the resistance to the attempts of the LRCI leadership to impose an anal!sis of the political situation in Bolivia which would rule out an! intervention in the class struggle. The episode is an e1ample of -or*ers .ower$s rotten method. )ccording to the LRCI the Bolivian wor*ing class has, since 789M suffered a strategic and historical defeat with the massive cut ac*s in the mines and privatisation. -or*ers .ower said this defeat was as deep as that of the @rench wor*ing class after the .aris Commune was smashed and drowned in lood in 79?7. The! e;uated a series of important defeats of a com ative wor*ing class % which had not lost its com ativel! % to the world historical defeat of the -orld$s first attempt to esta lish a wor*ers$ state. The Bolivian comrades recognised that the wor*ers had suffered serious defeats and set ac*s, and that the ourgeoisie was on the offensive with further large% scale privatisations. But the! *new that to accept the LRCl$s anal!sis would condemn them to a passive, propagandist e1istence in the face of a realit! that was much more complicated and where the active struggle wor*ing class had not een crushed. Gespite heated protests against this new line dictated ! -or*ers .ower$s "Red .rofessors$ from their London computer *e! oards, the Bolivian section was finall! forced to swallow it. Their resistance rought them up against the ureaucratic internal regime of the LRCI. The! were told that the! would e suspended from the LRCI if the! did not print the "official$ line in their Bolivian paper. The! printed the line earlier this !ear, 0ust efore the out rea* of the 4eneral &tri*e in Bolivia. &uch an o viousl! foolish line must have made the Bolivian comrades loo* li*e clowns in their own class struggle. The Latin )merican comrades clearl! saw that the un%5ar1ist methods of the LRCI would destro! the possi ilities of revolutionar! wor* in their countries. )nd the internal regime was clearl! ma*ing a fight against these methods impossi le. The leadership tried to suspend NosO Kille, a leading Bolivian comrade in London for receiving a fa1 as*ing him to 0oin the (ew Aealand faction. Then the! suspended him for tr!ing to go to the International <1ecutive Committee, of which he was an alternate mem er, and where he would have had the pro1! vote of two a sent full mem ers from Latin )merica, and said that he would e e1pelled if he went to the meeting. =e was threatened with discipline for doing almost an!thing.

Workers Powers gutter response

In t!pical fashion, -or*ers .ower has attempted to o scure the real political disagreements with a coc*tail of slanders, misrepresentations, character assassinations, appeals to moral h!steria and assorted gutter rantings when all else fails the -or*ers .ower leaders TB&'( to la elling all opponents as individualistic undisciplined thieves against the wor*ers movement2 The I page -or*ers .ower &tatement on the <1pulsion of NosO Killa and the suspension of .oder O rero +Bolivia, from the LRCl3 +issued on Octo er 7E, 788I, 9

is no e1ception. The statement claims that the .eruvian section of the LRCI was de%recognised in "mid%788H, having % proven una le to carr! out the minimum o ligations of a section$. Det the Octo er%(ovem er 788I issue of Trots*!ist International, the international 0ournal of the LRCI, proudl! lists the .eruvian section amongst all its others. It laughingl! accuses the Bolivian section of failing "to assist the <uropean sections in their solidarit! wor* with the teachers and peasants fighting the state of emergenc! in Bolivia$ +2,. Because Killa refused to ta*e a side in reactionar! conflicts, maintaining the position of the independence of the wor*ing class, he is accused of increasingl! laming the oppressed nations and ethnic groups of the former &talinist states and the semi colonies, from the Baltic states to Rwanda and Bosnia, for the collapse of &talinist and anti%imperialist regimes, stigmatising them all as pawns of imperialism in its destructive wor*3. But it goes further, for sharing our position of neutralit! etween the warring factions in the former Dugoslavia, ut "defence of an! one of them from imperialist aggression +in this case the Bosnian &er s om arded ! ()TO,, -or*ers .ower sa! that Killa has declared his solidarit! with the genocidal Bosnian &er s32 The political h!steria soon gets personal/ Killa was an "unreforma le$ cult leader hostile to discipline, so -or*ers .ower tell us. But the most important thing is to come6 "in the shortest terms our attitude to .oder O rero will depends on whether the! possess a shred of revolutionar! moralit!. The Bolivian section has *ept the mone! sent them for the air fare and have not to date returned it despite man! re;uests to do so. Clearl! it the! do not and we still hope that the! will despite their spilt, this would ring into the whole situation a ;uestion of their honest! and honour as revolutionaries. Once again, -or*ers .ower see* to hide the political argument ! whipping up a moral outrage for their version of revolutionar! moralit! against the world of "thieves$ and "ro ers.$ -hen Chris Brind split it was the computer, now it is an airline tic*et/ an! piece of tittle%tattle will do for the -or*ers .ower leaders to demand lo!alt! ! creating an anti%political and h!sterical atmosphere. In issuing such crap the -or*ers .ower leaders displa! even more contempt for their own mem ers than the! do for Killa and those who have split. Because an!one who swallows all this in place of a political e1amination of the ;uestions concerned much e a total wooden head.

The roots of the crisis

The LRCl$s recent series of splits is the result of the contradictions in its politics. These contradictions have festered ecause of the inconsistenc! of its evolution towards Trots*!ism and the political compromises and deli eratel! am iguous formulae which the leadership has emplo!ed to hold together an essentiall! unprincipled grouping. &ince the LRCI was uilt around and has alwa!s een politicall! dominated ! its largest section, -or*ers .ower in Britain, the causes and histor! of its degeneration are fundamentall! those of -or*ers .ower. =owever, not onl! were the! apparent efore the formation of the LRCl, ut man! of the central pro lems 8

were incorporated in or Bsmoothed over$ ! its founding document, the so%called Trots*!ist 5anifesto. That is wh! comrades who are now rea*ing with -or*ers .ower and the LRCI and defending Trots*!ist positions on <astern <urope and aspects of the permanent revolution, must re%e1amine its histor! and method as a whole, particularl! as demonstrated ! the sharp tests of practice. -or*ers .ower$s degeneration cannot simpl! e attri uted to the impact of the crisis of &talinism and the low level of class struggle in Britain since the foundation of the LRCl, even though these factors have rought the pro lems to a head. -or*ers .ower$s method has alwa!s een characterised ! an Bacademic$, formalistic and essentiall! mechanical attitude to 5ar1ist theor! and programme. Its practical wor* has een mar*ed ! fre;uent zigzags etween propaganda group sectarianism and "0oint wor*$ ased on a limited, wooden understanding of the united front tactic. Over recent !ears this has united sectarianism with increasingl! crude opportunism, e1emplified ! its ill fated adaptation to Red )ction inside )nti%@ascist )ction in the earl! "8:s. (ow this method ta*es the form of conservative passivit! in "practical$ wor*, and a literar! output designed to provide a convoluted "5ar1ist$ cover for positions which are in fact an accommodation to the shifts of British li eral middle class opinion, principall! with regard to developments in the former &oviet 'nion and <astern <urope. The roots of the crisis lie in the incomplete and partial nature of Workers Power%s break with the politics and methods of Tony Cliff%s International "ocialists 6subse4uently the "WP7 in the 0189s and of its movement towards Trotskyism. The group$s earl! struggles undou tedl! had a generall! positive character, oth against Cliff and su se;uentl! against the rightward moves of 5atgamna$s International Communist League which the! were riefl! part of efore its &ocialist Organiser phase. In the course of these struggles the! turned increasingl! to Trots*!ist positions and made correct criticisms of the theories and practice of man! of the groups claiming to e Trots*!ist. Thus, though the! alwa!s tended to approach struggles on the asis of a stract propaganda interventions and ultimatums +li*e their Bta*e%it%or%leave%it$ fusion proposal to the -or*ers Revolutionar! .arr! after its e1pulsion of 4err! =eal! in 789I, the! appeared as a relativel! left%wing group during the depressing li;uidation and fragmentation of British "revolutionar!$ politics in the 789:s. The inconsistency in the break with Cliffism was clear then however and in three main areas: its understanding of the theory of permanent revolution; its attitude to the #ourth International and the Trotskyist Transitional Programme: and its essentially economistic approach to the special oppression issues 6racism se)ism and anti+lesbian anti+gay bigotry7. The last si) years have shown that the dominant leadership had only partially broken from a Cliffite view of the formerly "talinist+ruled states.

Workers Power and Per$anent Revolution

7:

The limitations of wor*ers .ower$s understanding of permanent revolution was displa!ed at a relativel! earl! stage in its political evolution. One of the *e! tests for Trots*!ist organisations at the eginning of the 789:s was their attitude to the Iranian revolution of 78?8, the counterrevolutionar! Islamic regime of )!atollah Jhomeini and the war etween Iran and Ira;. The main international currents claiming to e C0 Trots*!ist adapted in var!ing degrees to the spurious anti%imperialist rhetoric of the Islamic clerg!. on with tragic results for the emerging forces of Iranian Trots*!ism. -hen the war ro*e out etween Ira; and Iran organisations li*e the 5andelites '&@I too* an Iranian defencist position arguing that Ira; was an agent of western imperialism and that the Jhomeini regime$s war against Ira; was a defence of the revolution. Ira;, then as now, was a neo%colonial countr! ut the &addam =ussein regime was using )ra nationalism and a close relationship with the &oviet ureaucrac! to maintain a relative independence from the imperialists. It was using the turmoil following the fall of the &hah to strengthen its own regional position. The imperialists saw the war as a chance to contain oth these unrelia le regimes and ensure that neither came out victorious. #rom the start before the war broke out the main concern of Iran%s Islamic government had been to derail the revolutionary mass movement that had toppled the "hah and crush the militant forces of the working class. It used the war to complete the destruction of the revolution. The left+wing of the Iranian Trotskyists 6the 2<"7 correctly took a revolutionary defeatist position to the war fighting for the independent defence of the organs of working class revolution the "hores 6factory councils7. This was the position argued at the time by the Trotskyist International Liaison Committee 6TILC7 the forerunner of the ITC. -or*ers .ower failed to ta*e this principled revolutionar! position. Its line during the earl! stages of the war was closer to the centrism of the 5andelites, arguing that to support Iran against Ira; in the war was necessar! for the defence of the revolution. Later, of course, the! changed their line +so did the 5andelites eventuall!P. (ot of course that the! admitted a mista*e2 % (o. the war had simpl! Bchanged its character$ and B ecome$ reactionar! on oth sides. In fact it was precisely in the early stages of the war when there were still possibilities of struggle by the Iranian working class against the <homeini regime that it was most important to maintain a revolutionary defeatist position. =owever much -or*ers .ower dec*s out its position with "left$ criticisms of the regime, the fact is that their line of argument would have placed them among the 5enshevi*s in Russia during 787?. It is an instructive e1ample ecause it prefigures so much of -or*ers .ower$s su se;uent political development. @or e1ample, its support for the Tutsi%dominated and pro%imperialist, 'gandan% ac*ed Rwanda .atriotic @ront +R.@, during last !ear$s civil war, and it was necessar! for Trots*!ists to fight for integrated wor*ers$ and peasants$ defence organisations, independent of oth sides and giving support to neither % the position the RIL argued for in Revolutionar! @ighter (o. E. ) further e1ample, is -or*ers .ower$s call for a Bunited front$ +in fact a popular front, in )lgeria, against the regime$s 77

state of emergenc! and militar! repression, to include the reactionar!, fundamentalist Islamic &alvation @ront +@I&, In neo%colonial countries it is essential to fight for a united front of the anti% imperialist forces of the wor*ing class and the peasants, the impoverished petit% ourgeoisie and the ur an poor fighting for their own interests against their own capitalists and landlords, Trots*!ists have to fight for such united fronts, without which the revolutionar! victor! of the wor*ing class is impossi le in the great ma0orit! of neo%colonial countries. The leaders of -or*ers .ower were incapa le of ma*ing a clear, honest distinction etween that vital, necessar! line of struggle and the possi ilit! of occasional, episodic locs with the neo%colonial ourgeoisie, or sections of its forces, when the! find themselves in temporar! conflict with the imperialists. The! are all "united fronts$ and all united fronts are the! *eep reminding us, 0ust Btactics$ around immediate practical ;uestions. These "theoreticians$ use such wordQgames to tr! and 0ustif! their confusion and the dangerousl! mista*en policies it has led to in the cases of Iran, )lgeria and Rwanda, arguing in favour of wor*ing class support for reactionar! ourgeois forces which are not fighting imperialism ut tr!ing to control the masses. In the fashion of law!ers or theologians loo*ing for literar! precedents to cover their I current positions the! "mine$ the documents of the earl! Comintern conferences for appropriate ;uotations a out united fronts with the national ourgeoisie. Their lifeless approach ignores the R actual method of the revolutionar! Comintern, the concrete conditions under which the discussions too* place, and the e1perience of revolutionar! struggles in the colonial and neoL S colonial countries since then % including Trots*!$s anal!sis of the struggles in China, India etc. But in the wa! that opportunism and sectarianism are alwa!s opposite sides of the same coin, -or*ers .ower$s failure to appl! the method of permanent revolution comes out in a lind sectarian attitude to nationalist movements or struggles that are actuall! a focus for the struggles of the advanced wor*ers and the fighting masses. This has een particularl! clear over ;uestions of electoral support. )n earl! e1ample was the initial refusal of -or*ers .ower and the Irish -or*ers 4roup to call for a vote to &inn @ein in the north of Ireland elections in the earl! 9:s, despite the importance of the Repu lican militar! struggle against British imperialism, let alone the clear indications of the strength of its ase among the most oppressed and militant sections of the nationalist wor*ing class. &u se;uentl! the! changed their position, merel! commenting that the! had not realised that &inn @ain would get so man! votes, as though it was 0ust the num er of crosses on allot papers2 5uch more recentl! we have seen a similar e1ample of this sectarianism in the &outh )frican elections L though without an! possi le e1cuse that the! did not *now the )(C would get so man! votes. Trots*!ists have to fight to rea* the wor*ers and the masses from the )(C. In the elections it was essential to fight for independent wor*ing class organisation and action, including defence to e1pose the treacher! of the )(C, and to call for the unions and mass organisations to uild a -or*ers .art!, all of which was the 7C

position ta*en ! the ITC. But this fight had to e ta*en into the living e1perience of the masses, who saw a vote for the )(C as constituting themselves as a nation, voting for social change and defending "their$ elections against sa otage. That is wh! we understood that on that asis and as part of that strateg! +and not for an! other reasons, consistent Trots*!ists had to e in favour of a vote for the )(C. (ot -or*ers .ower though. The! could not ring themselves to vote for the )(C. The! can vote for an! unch of counterrevolutionar! social democrats on the asis that the! are a ourgeois wor*ers part!. But the )(C and &inn @ern are not ourgeois wor*ers$ parties. The! are petit ourgeois or ourgeois nationalists and the )(C, moreover, is a popular front. That is how political arguments are settled ! -or*ers .ower6 it is 0ust a matter finding the right la el. -e are not ;uarrelling with the la els here, we are disagreeing with the LRCl$s un%5ar1ist method of settling ;uestions of revolutionar! strateg! and tactics L put a movement in the right categor! and up pops the appropriate response. This is a sectarian method which ignores the real ;uestions of the movement and consciousness of the masses and of the advanced sections of the wor*ing class and !outh, of their relationships to the various organisations and leaders, and of finding the most effective and d!namic wa! to intervene in their struggles and change the consciousness of the advanced wor*ers. &o in the &outh )frican elections the LRCI ended up calling for a vote for the -or*ers List .art!, an electoral front for a small centrist sect which got less than 7T of the vote. 5oreover the! *new perfectl! well that this group actuall! opposed fighting for the unions to form a -or*ers .art!, and that their electoral adventure was part of their sa otage of the Committee for a -or*ers .art!. But never mind % the! were not nationalists and the! were not a popular front2 In oth cases the opportunism towards reactionar! ourgeois forces and the sectarianism towards the masses, mechanical formulae have replaced 5ar1ist anal!sis and revolutionar! strateg!. It is not surprising. Therefore, that the most important opposition to the dominant -or*ers .ower leadership within the LRCl has come from its onl! sections in neo% colonial countries in Latin )merica.

The co$ ro$ise on the %uestion of the International&

The same mechanical approach and resort to am iguous compromise formulae mar*s the LRCl$s attitude to the vital ;uestion of the International. There can e no more important ;uestion for Trots*!ists than the strateg! for uilding the International. It is not possi le to uild a genuinel! revolutionar! international tendenc! without clarit! on this issue. But the L@ICI has een uilt on an unclear compromise on this ver! ;uestion, com ining sectarianism and opportunism. The two most recent splits illustrate the inevita le unravelling of the compromise. The (ew Aealand faction calls for a @ifth International. The ITC disagrees with this position and considers it fundamentall! sectarian, ut it is nevertheless a position with some consistenc!. On the other hand the Bolivian and .eruvian comrades have historicall!, efore and since their mem ership of the L@ICI, stood for the 7E

reconstruction of the @ourth International. This position is much closer to the ITC$s % though of course there is more to a strateg! than a mere form of words. Of course the -or*ers .ower leadership has written e1tensivel! a out the mista*es and degeneration of the main international and national Trots*!ist groupings over the last half centur!, and the great ul* of their criticisms are perfectl! correct. )t ottom, however, this is the same familiar, a stract method, as thought the issues are settled ! listing the mista*es. )t the end of the 78H:s the @ourth International ;ualitativel! degenerated into centrism. Centrist methods and positions were shared ! all sections of the leadership efore the split. Both sides in the split were mar*ed ! the same centrist features. The resulting crisis of the @ourth International has een and remains the sharpest e1pression of the international crisis of wor*ing class leadership in the second half of the twentieth centur!. @or -or*ers .ower, recognising that centrist degeneration means that the @ourth International can simpl! e pronounced dead % and the real pro lems for revolutionaries can e ignored. @or Lenin and Trots*!, recognising the points at which it was necessar! to rea* with the &econd and Third Internationals respectivel! was a ;uestion of when the fight for the political independence of the wor*ing class could onl! e ta*en forward ! launching a new, independent revolutionar! international. The grounds for that decision were different in the two cases. -ith the &econd international it was determined ! the role of the ureaucratic la!ers dominating the mass organisations in the imperialist war. -ith Trots*!$s rea* from the Comintern, the decisive point was neither when it ecame centrist, nor when it ecame counter%revolutionar!, ut when its conduct of polic! during the rise of the (azis to power in 4erman! and its response to that crisis signalled that there was no possi ilit! of continuing the fight for its regeneration. -ith the crisis of the @ourth international the ;uestion is to appl! the method of Lenin and Trots*!, not to tr! and cull analogies from ;uite different historical circumstances. The fragments of the @ourth International have in practice a andoned the fight to appl! and develop the Transitional .rogramme. (evertheless the Trots*!ist programme has remained a focus internationall! for the most politicall! advanced la!ers rea*ing from social democrac!, &talinism and nationalism. That attraction has rought them into the centrist fragments. Time after time this contradiction has led to e1plosions and struggles in which some elements have sought, to a greater or lesser clarit! to reassert the Trots*!ist programme, or certain elements of it. The origins of the LRCl$s Latin )merican sections in a struggle against the leadership of the Bolivian .OR is a case in point. )nd so to is their fight against the LRCl$s rightward movement on <astern <urope, its passivit! towards the class struggle in Latin )merica itself and its ureaucratic methods of control. It is for these reasons that the ITC does not consider that the #ourth International is simply dead for purposes of revolutionary struggle. It has not had its own e4uivalent of an /ugust 010= or a >anuary 01''. /n international tendency working for serious and principled revolutionary regroupment has to have an international strategy to intervene actively in this contradiction ? that is the strategy of fighting for the political 7H

regeneration and organisational reconstruction of the #ourth International. Workers Power%s leadership have never been able to take that step. ,ut they know that in practice the forces that they can win are going to come from struggles within the fragments of g the #ourth international so they want to keep their options open for instance to groups like the Latin /merican comrades. 2ence they do not call for the #ifth International. They declare that the number is not important they are simply for a *.ew% international. This is 0ust slipper! fudge ! the -or*ers .ower leadership. Of course the num er itself is in a sense not the important thing6 what matters is the strateg!. Their deli eratel! am iguous formula means that an international grouping can e uilt for a time at least which com ines elements with opposed views on this vital ;uestion, held together ! a "catchall$ slogan which em odies no strateg! at all. )ll that the leadership has to do is issue denunciations and ultimatums. Once again opportunism and sectarianism are opposite sides of the same coin.

The s ecial o ression issues and the influence of econo$is$ on Workers Power
On few issues has the ITC e attac*ed more vociferousl! or misrepresented more grossl! ! the -or*ers .ower leadership than on the ;uestions of special oppression. 5ore than an!where else, the continuing influence Cliffite economism on -or*ers .ower is shown in its anal!sis and polic! on special oppression which it rather oddl! prefers to call "social$ oppression +as though there are some sections of the wor*ing class and the masses who are not oppressed in class societ!2,. -or*ers .ower has of course moved e!ond the crudities of the &-. on these ;uestions. It defends les ian and ga! rights, the self organisation of women and lac* people etc,. On some of the ;uestions of democratic rights it has correctl! ta*en radical positions that go much further than most of the left in Britain % calling for the a olition of the age of consent laws, for instance. But it has failed to develop a real 5ar1ist anal!sis of the relationship etween class e1ploitation and special oppression, which understands the roots of special oppression in the development of class societ!, the wa!s in which oppression on the asis of race, se1 and se1ual orientation is not directl! reduci le to class e1ploitation and the essential role of all these forms of oppression in maintaining class societ!. -ithout such an anal!sis it is impossi le to develop a strateg! for the wor*ing class to lead the struggle against an! of these forms of oppression, The ITC maintains that the fight against all aspects of racism, se1ism and anti%les ianFanti% ga! igotr! has a strategic role in the fight for wor*ing class power, ecause of their role in class societ!. without this fight the wor*ing class cannot overcome its own divisions, gain a clear understanding of capitalist societ! and its own revolutionar! role, or win oppressed sections of the petit ourgeoisie to its leadership. Conversel! the oppressed cannot win the struggle for li eration without the revolutionar! victor! of the wor*ing class.

7I

-e as* ever! honest supporter of the LRCI % where in this is the popular frontism and capitulation to petit ourgeois leaderships which !our leaders constantl! accuse the ITC of> Our method is ased on that which Lenin sets out in "-hat is to e Gone> 6 ... To react to every manifestation of tyranny and oppression, no matter where it appears, no matter what stratum or class of the people it affects: to take advantage of every event to clarify for all +Lenin$s emphasis, the world-historic: significance of the struggle for the emancipation of the proletariat. The method of -or*ers .ower ears too man! similarities to the "economists$ who Lenin was criticising. Thus -or*ers .ower has an o session with the sociological class composition or movements of the oppressed, especiall!, in fact, with les ian ga! movements, rather than with the political class character and orientation of the leadership and policies which it should e fighting for. The result is that -or*ers .ower never goes e!ond either trade unionist or democratic +civil rights, demands in relation to the movements of the speciall! oppressed. Thus it is not the ITC, ut -or*ers .ower, that limits the political struggles of the speciall! oppressed to li eral, purel! democratic politics as well as failing to challenge pre0udice consistentl! in the course of other struggles. The histor! of -or*ers @lower is littered with e1amples of oth t!pes of mista*e. If we repeat some *e! e1amples now it is ecause of the need to com at a sustained campaign of misrepresentation % and ecause at the end of the da! the proof of the pudding is in the eating. The highpoint of -or*ers .owers les ian and ga! wor*, and its final limit, was without dou t the Trade 'nionists against &ection C9 campaign in the late 789:s. -or*ers .ower comrades were right to ta*e the tight against &ection C9, the most serious institutional attempt ! the state to attac* the gains of the les ian ga! movement, into the unions. The pro lem was that the! limited this to a narrow trade union, wor*place perspective. Thus the! called for non%cooperation ! council unions, and for stri*e action to defend an! wor*ers who were discriminated against on grounds of se1ual orientation. )t the Trade 'nionists against &ection C9 conferences the RIL pointed out that the iggest affect of the &ection C9 would e in whipping up a reactionar! anti%les ian anti%ga! climate, which would lead to an increase in ph!sical attac*s +this is e1actl! what happened, in fact,. -e proposed a motion calling for la our movement organisations to maintain and defend an! les ian ga! facilities threatened with closure as a result of &ection C9, and to organise the ph!sical defence of les ian ga! centres, clu s, ars etc. from anti les ianFanti ga! attac*s. -e are at a loss to see what is popular frontist or li eral a out this proposal, ut wor*ers .ower opposed it, and united with the &-. and 5ilitant to vote it down. The other side of the economistic outloo* which la! ehind that decision was demonstrated at the founding conference of the )ll%Britain )nti%.oll Ta1 @ederation in (ovem er 7898. RIL mem ers who were delegates to the conference moved a motion stressing the importance of drawing the most oppressed sections of societ! into a trul! integrated movement to smash the poll ta1. The motion made it clear that this would e impossi le without a light against the influence of 7M

racism, se1ism and homopho ia in the movement, and that therefore racist, se1ist and anti%les ian anti%ga! activit! was incompati le with mem ership of the anti poll ta1 movement. Those words were chosen with care, ecause this was not a motion to automaticall! e1clude an!one had ac*ward ideas or aver ehaved in a pre0udiced wa! from the fight against 7H the poll ta1. That is how wor*ers .ower has misrepresented it, ecause in the face of the opposition to the motion from 5ilitant who controlled the conference, the! chose to a stain % even though we had won ver! wide support from delegates and were having a ma0or impact on 5ilitant mem ers man! of whom made it clear to our comrades that the! opposed the line that had een imposed on them. It was not the first time, nor was it to e the last, that -or*ers .ower has failed to challenge pre0udice or refused to support a polic! commitment to fight pre0udice within road campaigns. )lwa!s the! defend themselves with essentiall! economistic argument a out united fronts around immediate practical issues, and then resort to misrepresentation. The reverse side of this method is -or*ers .ower$s repeated refusal to challenge the limited democratic politics of the petit ourgeois leaders of the les ian ga! movement. ) national demonstration against Clause CI, a measure designed to restrict les ian and ga! adoption rights was called for @e ruar! 7887. B! the time of the demonstration, of course, the imperialist attac* on Ira; was in full swing, The RIL too* the view that the ;uestion of the war was of central importance for ever! struggle of the wor*ing class and the oppressed in Britain. -e raised the slogan Kictor! to Ira; on the march, and our spea*er raised it on the platform at the end of the march land was cheered ! a section of the demonstration. -or*ers .ower mem ers refused to 0oin in the slogans on the march, ut limited themselves to calls for "les ian and ga! rights$. -hen our spea*er got down from the platform a mem er of -or*ers .ower, who was due to spea* on ehalf of the =ands Off the 5iddle <ast Committee criticised him, complaining that he should not have used that slogan ecause it would ma*e it more difficult for him +the -. mem er, to get to spea*. 5ore recentl!, in antiracist and antifascist wor*, -or*ers .ower has ta*en to using the slogan Support black self-defence. Of course this is something we have to support, as a asic civil right, and there are circumstances where we would e in favour of calling for it and organising it ut it cannot e the programme that Trots*!ists should fight for in general, ecause it leaves the lac* communities isolated and does nothing to mo ilise integrated wor*ing class action. Det when, two !ears ago, -or*ers .ower put forward a programme for an attempt to set up new London anti%fascist networ*, this was their onl! reference to organised defence. The! opposed an amendment from the RIL to change the demand to organise wor*erFcommunit! defence. If an!one has een adapting to li eral popular frontism here it is -or*ers .ower, not the RIL or the ITC. The developments of movements and struggles of the speciall! oppressed have een a significant feature of the period since the second world war, especiall! 7?

since the 78M:s. These movements have ! and large developed separatel! from the wor*ers$ movements, and under the political domination of petit% ourgeois or ourgeois leaders, ecause of the unresolved crisis of wor*ing class leadership. Thus the a ilit! to respond to these developments as revolutionar! 5ar1ists is a critical test of the political health of groups claiming to e Trots*!ist. In this area, too, -or*ers .ower$s rea* with its Cliffite ac*ground has een incomplete and it has imposed a confused half%wa! house of radical democratic and economist positions on the LRCl.

Workers Powers practice; the united front

The *e! test of revolutionar! organisations is what the! do, not what the! sa!. )nd it is in its practice in Britain, and most nota l! in its understanding, or rather misunderstanding, of the united front that its centrism and its general rightwards tra0ector! are most clear. -e support what we understand to e the general criticism which the Latin )merican comrades have made of the opportunist direction ta*en ! -or*ers .ower during the imperialist war against Ira; at the eginning of 7887, Before the war started -or*ers .ower, along with the RIL and the -or*ers International League, argued that once war started the position of the united front =ands Off the 5iddle <ast Committee should immediatel! e Kictor! for fre;., and together we won that position on the committee. Once the war started, however, -or*ers .ower started to edge awa! from the priorit! given to that centrall! important slogan. -e are proud that in the two main imperialist countries engaged in the war it was sections of the ITC, the RIL in Britain and the Revolutionar! -or*ers League in the '&), that were in the forefront of the fight for Kictor! to Ira; line +in the '&). totall! alone in an! practical wor*,. -or*ers .ower, on the other hand increasingl! accommodated to waveres on the =O5< committee. This ecame increasingl! pronounced in the latter stages of the war when tal* of a split in the popular frontist Committee )gainst the -ar in the 4ulf held out to -or*ers .ower the prospect of a roader campaign in which the! could 0oin with the &-.. Then we started to hear the argument that the slogan is less important than getting some action. Of course we would support and uild concrete action, including united fronts on a lower level than the Kictor! to Ira; slogan, wherever that would advance the struggle % ut that would mean that it could not e at the e1pense of or counterposed to the central anti%imperialist demand. But as so often with -or*ers .ower the possi ilit! of a limited united front ecomes an alternative or a loc* to raising vitall! important elements of a Trots*!ist programme. That is what the! did when the! opposed the =O5< committee putting out a leaflet on the C 5arch C(G march e1plaining the Kictor! to Ira; demand and in the Lam eth Committee to &top the war in the 4ull the! opposed an RIL. motion that the committee should e ased on Kictor! to Ira; and then voted for &top the -ar% Cease%@ire (ow as the asis for the committee + efore the war the LRCl secretariat had descri ed this as ") hopeless pacifist slogan$,. 79

The war demonstrated what were to ecome increasingl! common features of -or*ers .ower$s practice L accommodation to left%li eral opinion, which of course is an e1pression of ourgeois "pu lic opinion$ and a narrow, wooden view of the united front which puts a du ious pretence of "unit!$ a ove the fight win the most advanced wor*ers and !outh to revolutionar! politics through struggle. )fter the war this ecame clear again in antifascist wor*, principall! in )nti%@ascist )ction +)@),. -ith the growth of racist and fascist activit! in the course of 7887, )@) could have een an important organising centre for antifascist defence. =owever it was dominated ! Red )ction, if a small splinter%group from the &-. which has a totall! rotten, s;uadist and su stitutionist approach to the ph!sical land thus to the politicalP fight against fascism. It opposes uilding mass action as part of the fight against fascism. )nd it refuses to have an! orientation to lac* and )sian !outh under attac*. It ;uite consciousl! states that its constituenc! is white wor*ing class !outh. )@) was uilt on the asis of these politics and -or*ers .ower did not challenge them and went along with their s;uadism. The argument was that this was a specific limited united front for the purpose of confronting the fascists. This was a surd on ever! count. It was a permanent organisation. It was uilt on a definite political perspective that e1cluded mass action and an orientation to the lac* communities, and its outloo* was promoted in a regular magazine that was activel! sold ! -or*ers .ower mem ers. It was onl! the RIL that challenged Red )ction$s method in practice and through internal discussion in )@). -e were witch hunted, e1pelled and ph!sicall! attac*ed as a result. Our lac* comrades in particular were singled out for a use end attac*. There are plent! of mem ers of -or*ers .ower who *now all a out this, ut their organisation did not defend us ecause we were undermining their opportunist relationship with Red )ction. Instead the! concentrated their fire on us claiming that we were tr!ing to turn )@) into a "propaganda loc$ ! putting forward too full a programme. @or -or*ers .ower the united front had to e *ept on the level of their allies not raised to the level that was demanded ! the nature of the struggle and the possi le role of the actual united front % in this case a small, permanent loc of left activists. In particular we raised the ;uestion of anti%racism, ecause it was clear that without an anti%racist perspective it is not possi le to have an orientation to the lac* and )sian communities, or to uild an integrated movement, or to com at fascism ideologicall!, or to uild mass wor*ing class action. Red )ctions "orientation$ to the white wor*ing class +which, of course, meant that the! never won an! white wor*ers or !outh, was an a solute o stacle to uilding an effective anti%fascist movement. Gisgracefull! the "Trots*!ists$ of -or*ers .ower ecame the attorne!s for the Red )ction thugs. -e were treated to ela orate "theoretical$ e1planations of wh! an antiracist united front was different from an anti%fascist united front, and wh! therefore it was wrong to demand of )@) that it should ta*e up a fight against racism. Of course the! suffered the fate of all opportunists L once we had een e1pelled and Red )ction were tired of them the! turned on -or*ers .ower, who eventuall! 78

had to get out of )@). But ecause the leaders of -or*ers .ower are as infalli le as the .ope there could not e an! honest alance sheet of its e1perience in )@). Instead the reason for ;uitting was put down to )@)$s sectarianism towards the &-. and the )(L. The stor! of the -or*ers .ower involvement in )@) indicates man! of its asic political pro lems U its opportunist and limited view of the united front tactic, its ina ilit! to understand the importance and relevance of the struggle against special oppression, and its leaders$ arrogant refusal to give an honest account of political mista*es.

Workers Power and the transitional ro'ra$$e

Revising the fundamental starting point of Trots*!$s @ourth International, the Transitional .rogramme, -or*ers .ower challenge the notion that the crisis of humanit! can e reduced to the crisis of proletarian leadership. The LRCl$s Trots*!ist 5anifesto oldl! declares6 owever today it would be wrong simply to repeat that ail contemporary crises are reduced to a crisis of leadership!!. The proletariat word-wide does not yet face the stark alternatively of either taking power or seeing the destruction of air its past gains. "evertheless, in many countries and, indeed, whole continents, the crisis of leadership does reach such a level of acuteness#. $ This shows a fundamental misunderstanding of Trots*!ism. The! are sa!ing that the crisis / of leadership can onl! e central in revolutionar! t!pe situations. But what factors push societ! from nonrevolutionar! to revolutionar! and from revolutionar! to counter%revolutionar! situations> )nd what factors are responsi le for the low levels of class struggle and political activit! ! the wor*ing class in nonrevolutionar! periods. The ;uestion of leadership is fundamental to this. The central factor remains the crisis of proletarian leadership. Trots*! never meant that onl! the crisis of leadership was important and when that was resolved all other factors would automaticall! fall into place. &uch an approach, li*e -or*ers .ower$s revision of Trots*!, shows an a andonment of dialectics and a refusal to understand the d!namics of struggle. The wor*ing class defeats suffered in recent !ears, the disorientation of wor*ers$ organisations, the political demoralisation and disinterest on the part of some wor*ers. all of these things are fundamentall! caused ! the crisis of leadership. The impact of defeats can reinforce that crisis as the relationship etween the class and its leadership is a dialectical and d!namic one. =owever the essential point in this relationship is the crisis of proletarian leadership6 the epoch we live in ma*es conditions for socialism ripe the misleadership of the wor*ers and oppressed movements is capitalism$s last salvage. The fundamental tas* of Trots*!ists remains the resolution of the leadership crisis. To misunderstand this is to misunderstand the central asis for the creation of the @ourth International. The LRCI$s position on the crisis of leadership would suggest that the struggle for an international Trots*!ist vanguard part! is no longer of prime importance rather we should 0oin up with reformist, &talinist and centrist leaderships to "help$ the wor*ers regain their com ativel! so that in future the crisis of leadership could once again e central2 C:

)long with this revisionism -or*ers .ower have a centrist approach to transitional demands. On paper the! can raise man! correct demands, ut when faced with practice the! ac*slide. This is shown in the e1ample we have referred to efore. -or*ers .ower$s refusal to raise the demand of wor*erFcommunit! defence preferring all *inds of other more li eral sounding demands instead, such as "support lac* self%defence$ or "self%defence is no offence3. The difference etween these two approaches helps us understand the real practical importance of the transitional method. Because of the high level of organised racist attac*s and murders on the lac* and )sian communities in parts of Britain man! !outh have automaticall! een forced to organise some spontaneous level of "self%defence$. The demand for wor*erFcommunit! defence was raised ! the R=. ecause it was a le to intercept with the most %L militant vanguard sections % in this case the !outh under attac* % and ta*e them forward instead of 0ust giving them a slogan the! alread! organised around. This demand posed the ;uestion of a political fight within the wor*ing class for active organisation against racist violence and fascist activit!. It raised the fundamental ;uestion of who controls the streets, estates, schools, colleges or wor*places. the wor*ing class L lac* and white united in a struggle against racism and fascism % or the racist state which protects the fascist and racist gangs. The slogan of wor*erFcommunit! defence is conceived from the standpoint of ta*ing a struggle further, developing it into a greater struggle, roadening the involvement of sections of the wor*ing class and !outh. lt is an immediatel! relevant concrete demand as well as one which ultimatel! leads to struggles that threaten capitalist power itself. It is a transitional demand the RIL has een a le to organise mass mo ilisations around in &hadwell for instance on a scale -or*ers .ower has never done. The demand for "self%defence$ on the other hand ta*es nothing forward. Of course we must support those who are defending themselves. But our tas* cannot e to simpl! support struggles as the! spontaneousl! develop ut to ta*e them forward, to offer them a programme which can win to raise the political level and roaden the struggle against the capitalist s!stem. in other words to lead the struggles with transitional demands. This is the difference etween the transitional method, and the all too common understanding of it ! centrists from militant to &ocialist Outloo*. -e use transitional demands as immediatel! relevant wa!s of developing, roadening and raising the political level of struggles toda! the! see them as ma*ing a struggle slightl! more "left%wing$, of demanding something capitalism cannot support of ma*ing propaganda. -hatever the a stract correctness of -or*ers .owers propaganda, when faced with sharp struggle, in the communit! campaign that drove the B(. off the streets in Bric* Lane or in organising around racist attac*s, -or*ers .ower has constantl! sided with the centrists and opposed us and our transitional demands that could ta*e the struggles forward. The same is true a out the wor*erFcommunit! tri unal we fought for and organised following the police murder of Brian Gouglas in &outh London this !ear. The aim of the tri unal was to go e!ond the anger that man! lac* !outh and C7

wor*ers have towards the racist police, to challenge the illusions that somehow the state can achieve 0ustice, and to create a movement that understands that onl! the wor*ing class and lac* communities can deal with racist police. Our whole conception was ased on this, the struggle for a movement that wanted independent action against police and state murders as well as court cover ups. -e won important sections of Lam eth 'nison, the iggest trade union in Lam eth, to this conception and we got 'nison itself to organise such a pu lic tri unal. -or*ers .ower turned up and tried to close the tri unal down, stating that what was needed was an in;uir! with a panel of "important figures in the lac* communit!$ that had esta lished reputations in the e!es of lac* * and "man! white people +5.s etc., to head the in;uir!. This panel would pass verdict on the police, not the communit! itself. -or*ers .ower said this might then convince more people that the police did murder Brian Gouglas. The pro lem was that we wanted to go e!ond that, the overwhelming ma0orit! of lac* S !outh and white !outh who had heard a out it *new the police were responsi le for the murder % the ;uestion was what do we do a out it. Our proposal for a tri unal was to aid the uilding of a movement that ta*es 0ustice into its own hands. -or*ers .ower$s craven opportunism was conceived from the standpoint of ma*ing attractive and accepta le propaganda. -or*ers .ower$s proposals would have demo ilised an! struggle and given the ureaucrats the control ac*. -e are not opposed to an! num er of li eral ourgeois in;uiries, ut to raise it in opposition to a wor*ersFcommunit! tri unal, when that had alread! een esta lished ! the iggest trade union in the area, is the opposite of the transitional method. 'nsurprisingl!, all the ran*%and% file wor*ers from Lam eth voted down -or*ers .ower$s right%wing proposal.

(lectoral su ort and Workers Powers conservatis$ ) ada tion to social de$ocrac*
The narrow understanding of the united front is reflected also in a conservative application of the tactic of electoral support. -e have alread! discussed an e1ample of this in &outh )frica ut the LRCl has made apparentl! opposite ut in fact directl! related mista*es in recent elections in Britain and @rance. The purpose of electoral support for the La our .art!, or an! other ourgeois wor*ers part!, is onl! as an element in rea*ing most class conscious wor*ers from reformism. -here sections of the wor*ing class are coming into political conflict with the reformist ureaucrac! and this is eing reflected electorall!, Trots*!ists should in general give critical support, and see* to develop such resistance. On that asis the RIL called for a vote all three 5ilitant candidates in the last general election, ecause all of them clearl! had a real ase that was in conflict with the politics of the La our leadership, and more generall! ecause of the importance of the anti%poll ta1 struggle which had rought millions of wor*ers into conflict with La our politicians carr!ing out this Tor! polic! at local level and which 5ilitant was widel! identified with. CC

-or*ers .ower onl! supported the two candidates who had previousl! een sitting La our 5.s and had een e1pelled ! the part!. @or them having a ase could onl! e measured formall! in terms of La our movement positions. The! refused to support Tomm! &heridan the former chair of the )ll%Britain )nti%.oll Ta1 @ederation in 4lasgow, even though 4lasgow had had the highest non%pa!ment of the poll ta1 and mass mo ilisations to stop court officers removing the goods of non%pa!ers. (ot surprisingl! &heridan got a su stantial vote % 78T. -or*ers .ower could onl! "apologise$ that the! did not have an! od! in 4lasgow2 But the! have not learned % whereas the RIL has had a general polic! of critical support for 5ilitant candidates in local elections, -or*ers .ower has refused to do the same, even though the! normall! get etween 7:T and C:T of the vote, and in some cases more, and representing a significant section of the most class conscious wor*ers who are voting for what the! see as a militant alternative to the La our ureaucrats. In the @rench presidential elections earlier this !ear the LRCI stuc* to the same polic! of ac*ing the "main$ ourgeois wor*ers$ part!, in this case the &ocialists of the outgoing president, 5itterrand. The! refused to call for a vote for the candidate of Lutte OuvriVre, an organisation which presents itself as Trots*!ist and has a significant wor*ing class mem ership, and which regularl! pic*s up hundreds of thousands of votes in elections. Of course, Lutte OuvriVre got MT of the vote, a significant section of the wor*ing class re0ecting the esta lished social% democratic and &talinist leaderships In these cases -or*ers .ower$s mechanical ideas of electoral support which led it to call for at vote for the irrelevant "-or*ers List$ candidates in &outh )frica, meant that the! ignored the development among the most class conscious wor*ers of a measure of resistance to the etra!als of the reformists.

The LRCI and the crisis of +talinis$

5ore than an!thing else it is the development of the crisis of &talinism since 7898 that has accelerated the LRCI$s, general rightward movement, and rought the crisis of the LRCI to a head. . )t ever! critical turn of events in <astern <urope the -or*ers .owerFLRCl leadership has 0un*ed Trots*!ism and ta*en increasingl! revisionist positions. The ITC has consistentl! argued for an independent, wor*ing class, political% revolutionar! line against all the forces of capitalist restoration in the degenerated and deformed wor*ers$ states, from the upheavals of 7888, through 4erman reunification, the crises in the Baltic and the Caucasus, the )ugust coup and the rea*%up of the &oviet 'nion, to the wars in the former Dugoslavia. )t ever! stage we have had to fight and e1pose the dangerous, reactionar! direction ta*en ! the LRCI. The conflicts over these positions have een the main focus of opposition inside the LRCI. -e regard the opposition to the leadership over the ;uestions of Lithuania, the )ugust coup, and the civil war in Bosnia as an attempt to defend

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Trots*!ism within the LRCI and in general share the criticisms of the Latin )merican comrades and the (ew Aealand faction. These events have shown ver! clearl! that -or*ers .ower has not completel! ro*en from a Cliffite view of the &oviet 'nion, China, the east <uropean states etc., despite its re0ection of Cliff$s state capitalist characterisation of their economic s!stems. On this area, more than on an!thing else, its politics reflects the pressures of middle class Bli eral$ pu lic opinion. The first sign of these pro lems was clear ac* in 7898. Though the LRCI produced a generall! correct anal!sis of the significance and content of the 4or achev "reforms$ during the second half of the 9:s, its political anal!sis of the upheavals that swept eastern <urope in 7898 was seriousl! flawed. The ITC saw these upheavals as generall! negative from the point of view of wor*ing class interests. The! were generall! and overall pro% ourgeois democratic movements, loo*ing to "the west$ and testing out how far the! could go against the ureaucrac! in this direction under the changed conditions of 4or achev$s accommodation with the imperialist powers. )s the! ecame older, more openl! pro%capitalist forces came to the fore, replacing the more cautious ureaucratic reformists, ut the overall direction of these mass movements was esta lished from the eginning, and the wor*ing class hardl! ever pla!ed an! independent role. The LRCI on the other hand saw the upheavals in a far more positive light, as originall! moving towards a political revolutionar! situation % despite the lac* of evidence of an! struggle ! %Wr the wor*ing class for its own interests, e1cept in the most limited cases. Onl! Romania, from Gecem er 7898 through 788:, was a partial e1ception. Later the LRCI had to change its assessment of these movements ut of course it was not a reassessment ! the LRCI it was the movements that had changed their character li*e the Iran%Ira; war previousl!2 Xuite how "political revolutionar!$ developments in the wor*ing class had een reversed ! pro% ourgeois movements the! were never a le to e1plain. This serious misreading of the situation indicated the roots of the pro lem that has ecome deeper and deeper over the past five !ears. It was not that the LRCI leadership mistoo* a cross% class movement supporting ourgeois democrac!, and pushing for the restoration of e capitalist mar*et econom!, for a wor*ing class movement fighting for proletarian democrac! against the privileged ureaucrac!. There have een situations where strong elements of oth tendencies are com ined for a time, in the events of 5a! and Nune 7898 in China for instance, ut that was not the case in the eastern <uropean events. <ssentiall! the LRCI descri ed these events as positive, political%revolutionar! developments ecause the -or*ers .ower leaders saw ourgeois democrac! as progressive in the degenerated and deformed wor*ers states. The evolution of the LRCl$s positions over the su se;uent five !ears ear out the accurac! of this 0udgement, and of our 0udgement that the roots of their crisis lie in their incomplete rea* with Cliffism. Indeed the! are rapidl! following down the path eaten ! &ocialist Organiser ac* to their ideological roots. The following !ear the tendenc! ecame clearer still as a result of 4erman "reunification$ the capitalist ta*eover of <ast 4erman! and the developing crisis in CH

the Baltic repu lics of the &oviet 'nion. -hile avoiding the capitulation of much of the left in the face of the headlong collapse of <ast 4erman!, the LRCl$s opposition to the process was nota l! am iguous, declaring themselves against the 'ndemocratic reunification ". The danger of slogans li*e that should have een clear. Gemocrac! is a form of state rule and cannot e neutral in class terms. This slogan left open the ;uestion of whose democrac!, the ourgeoisie$s or the wor*ers$> )nd of course reunification was "democratic$, in the ourgeois democratic sense/ it was ased on the results of ourgeois democratic elections in <ast 4erman!. The capitulation to ourgeois democratic and ourgeois nationalist forces in eastern <urope came out full! as a result of the crisis in the Baltic repu lics, which led to the LRCI for the first, ut not the last time, ta*ing an outright counterrevolutionar! position. In the course of 788: openl! pro%capitalist nationalist movements had come to power in the three Baltic soviet repu lics, and in 5arch 788: the Lithuanian government declared its independence from the &oviet 'nion. In the conte1t of the overall negative development of the crisis of &talinism, without an! significant independent movement of the wor*ing class, and ecause of the real histor! of national oppression ! the &oviet ureaucrac!, these movements did have road popular support. The! were nevertheless counter%revolutionar! movements which were in effect the cutting edge of the accelerating movement towards the rea*up of the &oviet 'nion ! the forces of capitalist restoration. That is wh! the ITC opposed supporting or defending these governments. -e argued for a programme of independent wor*ing class action, with wor*ers$ control of industr! to defend collectivised propert! from the restorationists, and wor*ers$ defence guards. -e supported the right of wor*ers to esta lish independent socialist repu lics of Latvia, Lithuania and <stonia, and argued for such repu lics to form a socialist federation of the Baltic. -e did not call for &oviet troops to put down the Baltic regimes, and opposed the operations of the &oviet interior 5inistr! troops in the Baltic and their attac* on the Lithuanian capital, Kilnius, in Nanuar! 7887. But socialists could not support the mo ilisation against them ! the reactionar! government of .resident Lands ergis L that could onl! mean the supporting the li;uidation of the wor*ing class into a pro% ourgeois movement as a preparation for capitalist restoration. This should have een clear as cr!stal to Trots*!ists ut it was inconceiva le to the leaders of -or*ers$ .ower, who could onl! *eep repeating, whose side are !ou on> In 5a! 788: -or*ers .ower, under the headline =ands off Lithuania$, argued that, socialists should Gemand that the British government recognises Lithuania and supplies goods if re;uested ! Lithuania without conditions3. The! made it clear in discussion that this a solutel! included arms. &o the! had decided whose side the! were on. The! could onl! see a struggle etween the forces of ourgeois democrac! and the forces of the &talinist ureaucrac!, and in their view the former represented progress and had to e supported. If !ou did not ma*e the same decision !ou were vilified and misrepresented as supporters of &talinist repression. CI

lf we compare the positions of the LRCI on Lithuania and )zer ai0an, it ecomes clear 0ust how much their views have een influenced ! western ourgeois pu lic opinion. The ITC never, at an! point, called for &oviet troops to invade Lithuania and crush the proL ourgeois nationalist movement. =owever, the LRCI did support the occupation of )zer ai0an ! &oviet troops in 788: which the ITC opposed. -or*ers .ower argued that it was necessar! to stop the massacre of the )rmenians, ut the attac*s had stopped efore the troops went in. The real purpose was to crush the )zer ai0an national movement a movement that was less aggressivel! pro%imperialist than the Lithuanian government, and which was much less of a threat to the &oviet orders at that time. The difference was that whilst the western media ac*ed <uropean Lithuania to the hilt, it presented the conflict etween )zer ai0an and )rmenia in totall! pro% )rmenian terms, which had a strong undertone of racism +Christian )rmenians persecuted ! 5uslim, )siatic )zeris,.

Workers Powers su for$er +oviet .nion

ort for ,eltsin and counter-revolution in the

)fter all this, it came as no ig surprise when the L@ICI capitulated to "democratic$ and imperialist pressures and ac*ed the counter%revolutionar! Deltsin in the 7887 )ugust coup in the former &oviet 'nion. The ITC too* a principled Trots*!ist stand on this ;uestion. -e saw the refusal of the great mass of the &oviet wor*ing class to respond to calls for the defence of Deltsin$s "democrac!$ as essentiall! positive, though passive. The wor*ers were certainl! hostile to the coup, ut did not see Deltsin as offering an! alternative that the! were prepared to fight for. Trots*!ists needed to turn this passive hostilit! to oth wings of the restorationist ureaucrac! into an active independent mo ilisation of the wor*ing class. That is wh! we argued that those groups in the &oviet 'nion who identified with Trots*!ism should call for wor*ers$ councils to ta*e control of the factories etc., organise a wor*ers militia, egin a campaign of fraternisation with the soldiers to set up ran*%and%file committees in the arm!, and prepare for a political revolution against oth wings of the ureaucrac!. -e opposed support for Deltsin$s ineffective, and later rescinded, "general stri*e$ decree. ecause this would onl! su ordinate the wor*ing class to the most open pro% ourgeois wing of the ureaucrac!. -e were against defending the Russian .arliament the 5oscow "-hite =ouse ecause this had nothing to do with democratic rights for wor*ers. It was a ourgeois democratic institution which was a focus for capitalist restoration in a degenerated wor*ers$ state. )gain, when it came down to it -or*ers .ower were una le to fight for the independence of the wor*ing class, or see the connection etween that and the defence of collectivised propert!, The! could not thin* a out the crisis in class terms at all. )ll the! could see was a choice etween + ourgeois democrac!, and &talinist repression % so, in the words of one of their leading "theoreticians$. the! &tood arm%and%arm with Boris Deltsin3.

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Of course, we can rest assured that is was Boris$s left arm -or*ers .ower was lin*ing with2 )nd the! would pro a l! have held a red flag in their free hand too2 The! do have principles after all.

The Bosnian War

But it was over the long drawn%out civil wars in the former Dugoslavia, where the pressures of pro%imperialist ourgeois including "li eral$ ourgeoisP opinion have een strongest that the full e1tent of -or*ers .ower$s retreat from Trots*!ism has ecome apparent, precipitating the LRCI$s latest splits. The ITC has written on and de ated the Dugoslav crisis e1tensivel! over the past four !ears. -e have recognised that all the regional or "national$ capitalist% restorationist factions that rl have come to power in the repu lics of the former Dugoslav federation are tr!ing to use ethnic divisions to carve out a ase for themselves and esta lish their own privileged relationship with imperialism. The imperialists, insofar as the! have acted together, are tr!ing to e1ercise control over the whole region ! esta lishing a alance of power etween these factions. @or these reasons the ITC has refused to give an! support to an! of the governments, or to ta*e a defencist position in relation to an! of them in the course of the wars etween them. -e have argued that the onl! answer to their reactionar! nationalism, "ethnic cleansing$ and the destruction of the econom! is to fight for independent and integrated wor*ers$ and peasants$ defence guards. for wor*ing class control of distri ution, occupations of industries closed ! the war, and lin*s etween wor*ers$ organisations in the different repu lics. to uild action against the war efforts of all the governments and to prepare a wor*ers$ plan for the reconstruction of the econom! on the asis of collectivel! owned propert!, ta*ing ac* the factories stolen ! privatisation. )t different times -or*ers .ower, too, has said man! of these things, ut the! have onl! een irrelevant decorations to their articles, li*e ta*ing a red flag to the defence of the -hite =ouse. The! are not a programme for action now, onl! propaganda statements of what would e nice under ideal circumstances. The! are flatl! contradicted ! the main line of -or*ers .ower$s arguments, the immediate choices the! have actuall! made, which have alwa!s Re1cept ver! riefl! at the ver! start of the conflict in Bosnia een for the defence of a pro% capitalist, pro% imperialist government against its rivals. @irst it was for Croatia against &er ia, than for the Bosnian government against and the Bosnian &er s. -e support of an!one to defend themselves against genocide and the wor*ing class, given that it is organised andFacting as an independent force, can ma*e tactical militar! arrangements with an! forces to stop ethnic cleansing. This is a far cr!, however, from the LRCI$s position of defence of the Croatian or Bosnian governments. This .osition has got the LRCI leadership into a series of hopeless tangles and convoluted arguments, as their positions have zigzagged in response to the shifting circumstances of the Bosnian war.

C?

One general feature has ecome steadil! more pronounced however, the adaptation to the feeling among sections of li eral western opinion that "our$ governments must "do something$ % a sentiment that pla!s directl! into the hands of imperialism. &o now we have the ludicrous position of the LRCI tr!ing to sound revolutionar!, and calling for the '( and ()TO out of the Bal*ans and , condemning the om ing, while at the same time demanding that "our$ government sends arms to the Bosnian forces and opens the orders to +Islamic, "volunteers$ going to fight with them. In other words -or*ers .ower does not want the imperialists to fight in the Bal*ans/ the! 0ust want them to get their clients and pro1ies to do the fighting2 (o wonder that this reactionar! nonsense has lown the LRCI apart and e1posed it as an unprincipled loc.

The struggle for consistent Trotskyism

In 7887, in the one and onl! pu lic de ate etween -or*ers .ower and the RIL., on the crisis of &talinism, we used Trots*!$s phrase @rom a scratch to a danger of gangrene3 to descri e the evolution of -or*ers .owers politics on this ;uestion. It is clear new that the gangrene has gripped the whole od!. The ITC supports those comrades who have recognised the disease and are tr!ing to save something health!. But if the! are to move forward the! must recognise the real roots and course of the disease in the overall sectarian, centrist method of -or*ers .ower which was written into the foundations of the LRCI. This is the case, too, with the ureaucratic internal regime of the LRCI and with the methods of slander and character assassination which the leaders are resorting to. These things are not new. It is the ha it of -or*ers .ower, when an!one splits from them and criticises their rightward tra0ector! to divert attention from political ;uestions ! launching pu lic campaigns " "l over propert! or financial disputes or alleged reaches of discipline. This was precisel! what the! did when Chris Brind left -or*ers .ower, see*ing to divert attention from the political criticisms over les ian and ga! wor*, and whip their mem ers into a sense of moral outrage, with a campaign a out the ownership of a computer +while putting ever! possi le o stacle in the wa! of a solution,. &imilarl! when &teve 5asterson fought their ac*sliding during the war against Ira; the! sought to isolate him ! concentrating on issues of discipline. It appears that histor! is now repeating itself again, with the .u lic campaign against Nose Killa. This ureaucratic ehaviour on the national and international levels has political roots. It is the ehaviour of a cli;ue of intellectuals in control of rightward moving centrist sect. )s their accumulating political shifts and mis0udgements ma*es their leadership more and more vulnera le the! can onl! defend themselves ! ureaucratic demands for lo!alt! and claims to moral superiorit!. 'nprincipled locs lead to unprincipled politics, which lead to an unprincipled regime. -e appeal to ever! serious comrade in and around -or*ers .ower to reflect on the lessons of the splits in the LRCl, and thin* carefull! a out where their leadership is ta*ing them. -e appeal to them to e1amine and discuss the politics C9

method and wor* of the ITC, of the RIL in Britain the )J. in 4erman! and the R-L in the '&), and compare them with the record and wor* of -or*ers .ower and the LRCI. -e are not delivering ultimatums. -e are serious a out the need for revolutionar! leadership, and do not elieve that it will e ! endless discussion circles and 0ournals of de ate that lead nowhere. It will onl! e uilt if Trots*!ists esta lish a real fighting organisation that is giving leadership new in the struggles of the most militant wor*ers and !outh, ut on that asis we are more than read! to discuss and wor* patientl! with an! comrades who share that goal and are re0ecting the revisionism of -or*ers .ower. -e ma*e e1actl! the same appeal internationall! to the comrades who now find themselves outside the LRCI. It is clear that the Latin )merican and to some e1tent the Aealand comrades have ver! important areas of agreement with the ITC. -e have set these out in this statement, at least in outline. 5oreover their opposition was not 0ust to a set of positions ut to the damaging effect of the passive political method of -or*ers .ower on the wor* in their own class struggles +the notion that the Bolivian wor*ers had suffered an historic strategic defeat, for instance,. -e recognise that all these comrades have ta*en internationalism seriousl!. -e appeal to them to discuss the perspectives of the ITC and e1amine the wor* of our sections as we will do with theirs. -e hope the! will agree with us that there is no wa! forward without the construction of an international tendenc! of consistent Trots*!ists, which is fighting for revolutionar! leadership in real struggles and not 0ust serving as an international literar! centre, and which therefore must e ased on a shared strateg! and anal!sis reached ! clear and honest clarification. )nd we hope that all those left inside the LRCI who desire such a tendenc! rea* from its opportunist politics efore it is too late, and 0oin with us in the struggle for a real Trots*!ist international organisation. @irst edition6 Octo er, 788I -rite to6 RIL .: Bo1 8HE. London &<7E 7

.otes:

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Centrism is a political method that swings etween revolutionar! and counterrevolutionar! reformist positions and practice. @or instance, 5ilitant La our in Britain has engaged in practical wor* against police which has a revolutionar! character whilst having a reformist strateg! of demanding "police accounta ilit!$, as oppose to smashing the state. The &-., on the other hand, tal*s of "revolution$ and "smashing the state$ ut its practice on ever! demonstration is to ensure there le no organised defence or resistance to the police whatsoever. In oth cases these groups displa! themselves as neither reformist for counter%revolutionar! through and through, or consistentl! revolutionar!, rather the!, li*e most of the groups that claim to e Trots*!ist, are centrists. C The Trots*!ist 5anifesto$, the international programme of the League for a Revolutionar! Communist International first pu lished in 7898.
E

'&@I, the 'nited &ecretariat of the @ourth International, until recentl! led ! <arnest 5andel and the largest Trots*!ist%centrist international group. &ocialist Organiser, now *nown as the )lliance for -or*ers Li ert! land sometimes operating under (ew Left or La our Left Briefing la els a middle%class British centrist sect. Both organisations have seen the "democratic$ struggle as more important than the defence of wor*ers$ collectivised propert! in the former &oviet 'nion. Both groups ignored the class ;uestion, oth groups hailed the counterrevolution in <ast 4erman! as "progressive people$s democratic uprisings$. H The Trots*!ist 5anifesto, p78.