2 Ac

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: T- MILITARY PRESENCE (1/2)
Page 1 of 116 2AC Block
We meet - United States TNWs in Turkey are viewed as a military presence this means its in the literature Lamond and Ingram 9 (Claudine, Senior analyst and contributor to International Security
Report, Paul , BASIC, Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states, British American Security Information Council, http://www.basicint.org/gtz/gtz11.htm) There is a rising sentiment amongst the population for the removal of US nuclear weapons from Turkish territory. In a recent survey, more than half the respondents stated that they are against nuclear weapons being stationed in Turkey. Almost 60% of the Turkish population would support a government request to remove the nuclear weapons from their country, and 72% said they would support an initiative to make Turkey a nuclear-free zone. There may be several causes behind this sentiment, including the Iraq War, Turkish relations with neighboring states, budget expenditure and the moral concern over nuclear weapons. The historic precedence of Greece, a NATO member and Turkeys historic rival, ending its commitment to nuclear sharing in NATO may have further strengthened this tendency. There have been public expressions of resentment towards the US military presence in Turkey ever since the lead up to the US war with Iraq. The United States insisted on the government allowing American troops to use Turkey as a staging post, despite overwhelmingly antiwar Turkish public and political opinion. Limited permission was granted after heavy debates and delay in the Turkish parliament. Turkeys location has added an element of both risk and opportunity to NATO nuclear sharing. Turkeys close proximity to states deemed potentially hostile, such as Iran and Syria, make Turkey a preferred NATO base for TNWs. The risk, of course, is that stationing TNWs in Turkey might provoke a pre-emptive strike upon NATO bases. Turkish parliamentarians have expressed to NATO the difficulty of explaining the continued presence of US TNWs on Turkish territory to Muslim and Arab neighbors. There is a fear that they undermine Turkeys clear diplomatic objectives to act as a mediator within the region. Turkey has a unique opportunity to play a positive role in promoting non-proliferation. Ending nuclear sharing and fully complying with the NPT would act as a powerful example to neighboring states and strengthen Turkeys legitimacy. Moreover, efforts by the Turkish government to play a leading role in the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction would receive overwhelming public support.
C/I: Military presence includes nukes this is Executive Secretary of the Department of Defense in 95 prefer our interpretation it is from NPR which establishes our military strategy (Nuclear Posture Review http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/dod/95_npr.htm)
Through forward basing and power projection capabilities, overseas U.S. military presence -- including nuclear capabilities -- helped promote regional stability, avert crises, and deter war.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: T MILITARY PRESENCE (2/2)
PERFER OUR INTERPRETATION Standards: Predictability: TNWs are the most predictable Turkey affirmative. Tactical Nuclear
Weapons are the only legitimate affirmative for Turkey. There are plenty of case negatives, disads, and counterplans available online against this affirmative.
a) Framers Intent: US troop presence in Turkey is almost nonexistent; the only reason
Turkey was added mid-meeting during the resolution selection meeting was to allow for TNWs aff. The topic paper originally wanted to overcome the difference between military forces and weapons system but the current resolution wording fails to do that -
Alderete 10 (Tim, Framer of the Resolution, January 12, 2010 at 10:10 AM

http://www.the3nr.com/2010/01/07/2010-2011-topic-reduce-u-s-militarypolice-presence/) Tactical nukes are tasked to specific military forces that specialize in handling them, so withdrawing those forces would, de facto, withdraw those weapons. The topic paper does say that we should distinguish between military forces and weapons systems, but in that portion of the paper, it says (paraphrased) "we should find the best phrasing to focus on forces, not weapons" but it doesn't say that this wording does that, and I remember Stefan explicitly saying that withdrawing TNWs from Turkey would probably be topical, since Turkey was added mid-meeting
Ground: The Negative has plenty of ground including politics DAs, counterplans, economy, etc. Limits: None of your limits arguments are true in context of Turkey there are basically only TNWs
in Turkey. And we only justify one more case, one that is fundamentally related to the topic. Education: Our counter interpretation provides the most amount of education in this round. Our Alderete 10 evidence clearly explains how tactical nuclear weapons are the core of the topic for Turkey. Deeming this affuntopical destroys the educational value of having Turkey in the topic. Reasonability: We only justify one more case, one that is fundamentally related to the resolution. If our plan is reasonable, there is absolutely no reason to vote us down. Default to reasonability. They have to prove that we are UNREASONABLE to debate, not just that we make it harder. As long as we dont make debating impossible, dont vote on T. Critique of T: Deeming tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey outside of presence allows the USFG to continue its preemptive policies and therefore allowing an even more insidious form of biopolitical mindset. This allows all our aff harms to happen. Also their claims for necessitation of limits are filled with rhetoric in support of attempting to cut out our nuclear weapons policy from the topic. This also creates a more sneaky form of biopolitical control.
Topical Version of the Aff: There is no version of the aff where we could garner the same
education as our current aff. They have no evidence explaining how removing (fill in here, ex. bases) will remove the tactical nuclear weapons in turkey. And if the judge thinks in a world where we did run a aff that they claim is topical, they would complain how we only garner our evidence on the tactical nuclear weapons and not the (fill in here, ex. bases) they claim is topical. It would be a loss for us either way and there is specific education loss if we have to change from the core of the topic.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: GENERIC CONSULT (1/1) 1.
DOUBLE BIND. CONSULTATION IS EITHER NORMAL MEANS OR THIS ONE INSTANCE OF CONSULTATION WONT DO ANYTHING. 2. PERM DO BOTH 3. PERM DO BOTH AS 2 SEPEARTE POLICIES 4. PERM DO CP ITS PLAN PLUS 5. PERM DO THE PLAN AND CONSULT ON AN ISSUE OF GREATER OR EQUAL IMPORTANCE SUCH AS 6. PERM CONSULT AS PER THE COUNTERPLAN AND DO THE PLAN REGARDLESS 7. CONSULTATION CANT SOLVE, ANY CONSULTATION MOVES AWAY FROM THE PUBLIC DEBATE NEEDED TO SOLVE BIOPOWER. 8. DELAY PRVENTS THE CP FROM SOLVING SYSTEMIC IMPACTS COME FIRST. 9. THE NET BENEFITS THEY CLAIM JUST REINFORCE THE BIOPOLITICAL MINDSET. 10. CONSULT COUNTERPLANS ARE BAD AND A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS a. THEY ARE ARTIFICIALLY COMPETTIVE, TAKE THE DEBATE AWAY FROM THE CORE OF THE TOPIC. WE CANT TURN ANY PART OF IT BECAUSE WE HAVE NO IDEA WHAT THE NET BENEFIT WILL BE SINCE ITS ARTIFICIALLY COMPETITIVE AND WE CANT TURN OUR OWN AFF. b. THEY STEAL ALL OF THE 1AC, MAKING THE AFFIRMATIVE TEAM WASTE THEIR FIRST 8 MINUTES. c. WE HAVE NO IDEA WHO THEYRE GOING TO CONSULT; ABUSE IS ALREADY SEEN IN THIS ROUND.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CONSULT EU(1/2)
1. CONSULTATION IS NORMAL MEANS BRADTKE 05 PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, MARCH 2, PANEL SIX OF A HEARING OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE Mr. Chairman, you mentioned President Bush's visit to Brussels and Bratislava last week, and they, these visits did provide us the opportunity to put into perspective our foreign policy successesin Europe and Eurasia, as well as the challenges that we still face there. Those successes could not have been achieved without the contribution of our foreign assistance. And, without the contribution of our foreign assistance, we will not succeed in addressing the challenges that we still face. In Brussels, the President consulted with our partners and friends in the EU and NATO. These two institutions have acted like magnets in recent years. Very powerful forces pulling countries towards democracy, free markets, the rule of law, the resolution of ethnic and territorial conflicts. In other words, towards the values consistent with American values, and favorable to our foreign policy interests. PERM DO BOTH PERM DO CP ITS PLAN PLUS PERM DO THE PLAN AND CONSULT ON AN ISSUE OF GREATER OR EQUAL IMPORTANCE. 5. PERM CONSULT THE EU AS PER THE COUNTERPLAN AND DO THE PLAN REGARDLESS. 6. CONSULTATION CANT SOLVE. ANY CONSULTATION MOVES AWAY FROM THE PUBLIC DEBATE NEEDED TO SOLVE BIOPOWER. 7. DELAY PREVENTS THE COUNTERPLAN FROM SOLVING THE EU TAKES YEARS TO RESOLVE A DECISION. LARSON 07Alan P. Larson, Assis. Sec. of State, 10-15-1997, Press Briefing, 2. 3. 4.
www.fas.org/news/usa/1997/10/97101502_wpo.html
No, I think we have two ideas on the questions that you've raised. One idea is that there is in the OECD something called an Instrument on Conflicting Requirements. It's an instrument that grows out of a great deal of experience in the area of conflicting requirements and extraterritorial jurisdiction and recognizes the fact that there are many areas in international economic policy where all states exercise jurisdiction in a manner that's extraterritorial. Everyone who was watching the newspapers this summer understands that competition policy, for example, is an area where the European Union asserts a right to extraterritorial jurisdiction, as does the United States. This is something where both of us say that we have the ability and the right to look at things in an extraterritorial fashion. So, what we have seen, and this is the issue of competition policy is not unique. There many other areas where countries exert jurisdiction in a way that extends beyond their borders. So what we have suggested is that this OECD instrument and the measures that are associated with it, including consultative measures, might well be incorporated into this OECD investment treaty as to give them enhanced prominence and strengthen the way that they operate. In addition, we've argued that the
root causes of some of the differences that we've had on foreign policysanctions issues, issues that I come about arguably because of imperfect consultative mechanisms, consultative mechanisms that weren't quick enough off the mark, that didn't result in a shared assessment of how serious a threat to interest in values the situation really represented, didn't result in a concerted response to that type of situation .And when, as a result of that imperfect process, you sometimes have had in the past, disparate responses that affect each other's interests. Sometimes the disparate response might be inaction in a situation that would seem clearly to call for action. In other cases it might be action that's taken that adversely affects the interests of some of the other major parties, including European friends. So, we think that this type of enhanced, more high-level consultations,
would describe as threats to shared interests and values, have could be part of the answer to avoiding these types of problems in the future.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CONSULT EU (2/2) 8.
CONSULT COUNTERPLANS ARE BAD AND A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS a. THEY ARE ARTIFICIALLY COMPETTIVE, TAKE THE DEBATE AWAY FROM THE CORE OF THE TOPIC. WE CANT TURN ANY PART OF IT BECAUSE WE HAVE NO IDEA WHAT THE NET BENEFIT WILL BE SINCE ITS ARTIFICIALLY COMPETITIVE AND WE CANT TURN OUR OWN AFF. b. THEY STEAL ALL OF THE 1AC, MAKING THE AFFIRMATIVE TEAM WASTE THEIR FIRST 8 MINUTES.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CONSULT NATO(1/3)
1. CONSULTATION IS NORMAL MEANS Zaman 4/3/10 (Turkish newspaper, Report: US considers withdrawing nuclear bombs from Turkey, accessed at http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-206266-report-us-considers-withdrawing-nuclearbombs-from-turkey.html on 6/26/10//dml) The United States may withdraw its tactical nuclear weapons deployed in five NATO member European countries, including Turkey, The Times reported on Friday. The United States positioned B61 gravity bombs in Turkey, Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Germany during the Cold War years to serve as a bulwark against the Soviet Union. There are a total of 200 B61 bombs deployed in the five countries, The Times said. Turkey is believed to be hosting 90 bombs at ncir lik Air Base in southern Anatolia. According to the report, the Obama administration is preparing to revise US policy on nuclear weapons -- heralding further reductions in the US stockpile and a pledge not to develop new systems. But a possible decision to withdraw the B61 gravity bombs is not expected to be included in the revised nuclear policy, as it is a matter for discussion within NATO. 2. AND NATO WILL SAY NO. THEY WANT TNWS. JONES 10 CHRISwriter for Center for Strategic & International
Studies 5 7, 2010 http://csis.org/blog/process-over-politics-nato%E2%80%99s-tnw-decision

The primary reason there is so much disagreement with removing TNWs from Europe is not because the B61 plays a critical role in deterring the Red Army like it did during the Cold War but because it is a symbol of commitment between the United States and Europe. Elaine Bunn likens them to wearing a wedding ring. She explains: Nuclear weapons are kind of like the wedding ring of the marriage there are those in cultures that dont wear wedding rings who are perfectly committed to their spouses, and others who wear them who dont really have much of a commitment at all. But once you start wearing one, it means something entirely different to be seen without it than it does for someone who never wore one. 3. CONSULTATION DOESNT DO ANYTHING DOESNT AFFECT EFFECTIVENESS OR RELATIONS KOWK 5 James Harvard International Review Staff Writer, Summer 2005, Defining Power, Vol.
27(2), MENDING NATO: SUSTAINING THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP

The greatest misperception of the transatlantic relationship is that the U nited States is incapable of seeing eye-to-eyeon any issue with Europe. The eminent political scientist Robert Kagan has pointed out that the prevailing attitude toward the transatlantic relationship is usually described as that between cowboys and stiff Eurocrats. That the two peoples are diametrically opposed iscompletely false. Both sides of the Atlantic have the same fundamental beliefs in free markets, liberal government, and democracy. This dedication to liberalism and open societies was not only evident in the joint NATO peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and Croatia, but also most recently in Ukraine. Then-Secretary of State Colin Powell worked closely with his opposite numbers in BrusselsNATOs headquartersto ensure that the elections occurring in 2004 went smoothly and according to plan. NATO, while playing no military role in the Iraq War, recently has spearheaded the Training Implementation Mission in Iraq, which seeks to create a self-sufficient Iraqi army. If argument has made the relationship tenuous, it certainly has not paralyzed NATO. 4. 5. 6. PERM DO BOTH PERM DO CP ITS PLAN PLUS PERM DO THE PLAN AND CONSULT ON AN ISSUE OF GREATER OR EQUAL IMPORTANCE.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CONSULT NATO (2/3) PERM CONSULT NATO AS PER THE COUNTERPLAN AND DO THE PLAN REGARDLESS. THERE ARE NO LEAKS LOVEN 08 Jennifer, Great expectations: Obama will have to deliver, Associated Press ,http://www.cleveland.com/nation/index.ssf/2008/11/great_expectations_obama_will.html 7.
. The leak-proof, tightly managed and orderly Obama operation mimics the Bush White House, and flows from "No Drama Obama" himself -- a man so
He also showed himself to be a highly disciplined, CEO-style manager focused that he didn't give himself a day off from working out, even the morning after winning the presidency.
CONSULTATION CANT SOLVE. ANY CONSULTATION MOVES AWAY FROM THE PUBLIC DEBATE NEEDED TO SOLVE BIOPOWER. 9. DELAY PREVENTS THE COUNTERPLAN FROM SOLVING NATO TAKES YEARS TO RESOLVE A DECISION BECAUSE IT REQUIRES UNANIMITY. NATO Handbook, 8-21-2001, Ch. 7, Policy and Decision Making, The Principle Policy and Decision Making Institutions, North Atlantic Council, www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb070101.htm 8.
TheNorth Atlantic Council (NAC) has effective political authority and powers of decision, and consists of Permanent
Representatives of all member countries meeting together at least once a week. The Council also meets at higher levels involving Foreign Ministers, Defence Ministers or Heads of Government but it has the same authority and powers of decision-making, and its decisions have the same status and validity, at whatever level it meets. The Council has an important public profile and issues declarations and communiqus explaining the Alliance's policies and decisions to the general public and to governments of countries which are not members of NATO. The Council is the only body within the Alliance which derives its authority explicitly from the North Atlantic Treaty. The Council itself was given responsibility under the Treaty for setting up subsidiary bodies. Many committees and planning groups have since been created to support the work of the Council or to assume responsibility in specific fields such as defence planning, nuclear planning and military matters. The Council thus provides
a unique forum for wide-ranging consultation between member governments on all issues affecting their security and is
the most important decision-making body in NATO. All member countries of NATO have an equal right to express their views round the Council table. Decisions are the expression of the collective will of member governments arrived at by common consent. All member governments are party to the policies formulated in the Council or under its authority and share in the consensus on which decisions are based. Each government is represented on the Council by a Permanent Representative with ambassadorial rank. Each Permanent Representative is supported by a political and military staff or delegation to NATO, varying in size. When the Council meets in this format, it is often referred to as the "Permanent Council". Twice each year, and sometimes more frequently, the Council meets at Ministerial level, when each nation is represented by its Minister of Foreign Affairs. Meetings of the Council also take place in Defence Ministers Sessions. Summit Meetings, attended by Heads of State or Government, are held whenever particularly important issues have to be addressed or at seminal moments in the evolution of Allied security policy. While the Council normally meets at least once a week, it can be convened at short notice whenever necessary. Its meetings are chaired by the Secretary General of NATO or, in his absence, by his Deputy. The longest serving Ambassador or Permanent Representative on the Council assumes the title of Dean of the Council. Primarily a ceremonial function, the Dean may be called upon to play a more specific presiding role, for example in convening meetings and chairing discussions at the time of the selection of a new Secretary General. At Ministerial Meetings of Foreign Ministers, one country's Foreign Minister assumes the role of Honorary President. The position rotates annually among the nations in the order of the English alphabet. An Order of Precedence in the Permanent Council is established on the basis of length of service, but at meetings of the Council at any level, Permanent Representatives sit round the table in order of nationality, following the English alphabetical order. The same procedure is followed throughout the NATO committee structure. Items discussed and decisions taken at meetings of the Council cover all aspects of the Organisation's activities and are frequently based on reports and recommendations prepared by subordinate committees at the Council's request. Equally, subjects may be raised by any one of the national representatives or by the Secretary General. Permanent Representatives act on instructions from their capitals, informing and explaining the views and policy decisions of their governments to their colleagues round the table. Conversely they report back to their national authorities on the views expressed and positions taken by other governments, informing them of new developments and keeping them abreast of movement towards consensus on important issues or areas where national positions diverge. When decisions have to be made, action
is agreed upon on the basis of unanimity and common accord. There is no voting or decision by majority .
Each nation represented at the Council table or on any of its subordinate committees retains complete sovereignty and responsibility for its own decisions.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CONSULT NATO (3/3)
10. AND TURN GENUINE CONSULTATION WITH NATO CAUSES RISING EXPECTATIONS WHICH ONLY HURTS THE ALLIANCE. MEAD 4 (Walter Russell, MEAD, Senior Fellow @ The CFR, 2004 Power, Terror, Peace, and War, pg. 130134) Partly because it needed European cooperation in the Balkans, partly because ideologically many Clinton era officials agreed with European positions on issues like Kyoto and the ICC, and partly out of habits of consultation and deference that grew up during the cold war, the Clinton administration never quite made clear to Europeans just how unreasonable their hopes were.At the same time, most American diplomats and the broader "interlocutor class" of experts who specialize in transatlantic relations are generally more sympathetic to the ; European approach than they are to the red state, red meat approach of the American Jacksonians and the Revival Wilsonians who, since September 11th, have figured so prominently in the politics of American foreign policy.The Bush administration made the strategic decision that it no longer made sense to encourage Europe in illusions about the direction of American policy. Whether Europe liked that policy or disliked it was less important than that Europe understood it. Moreover, stroking Europe only seemed to increase Europe's already inflated sense of its importance in the world of American foreign policy. This transition was a necessary and normal one, I and it ultimately does offer the prospect of a more realistic but still very close relationship among the Cold War allies. If the Clinton administration and the broader American foreign policy establishment had done a better job of communicating the changing American approach in earlier years, the transition might not have been so painfulbut it is also true that the Bush administration could and should have done more to cushion the shock for what, after all, are some of our closest and most important allies in a dangerous world.The bitterness of the controversy was regrettable, and hasty remarks by Bush officials exacerbated it, but it was probably on balance a good thing to remind Europeans in general and Germans in particular that transatlantic crises have a way of turning into European crises. With Germany, France, and Russia locked in an anti-American alliance, Poland understandably becomes nervous, and rightly so. When Russia and Germany get close, Poland has a way of getting smaller. A good German relationship with the United States remains the best basis for continuing progress toward European integration. 11. CONSULT COUNTERPLANS ARE BAD AND A VOTER FOR EDUCATION AND FAIRNESS a. THEY ARE ARTIFICIALLY COMPETTIVE, TAKE THE DEBATE AWAY FROM THE CORE OF THE TOPIC. WE CANT TURN ANY PART OF IT BECAUSE WE HAVE NO IDEA WHAT THE NET BENEFIT WILL BE AND WE CANT TURN OUR OWN AFF. b. THEY STEAL ALL OF THE 1AC, MAKING THE AFFIRMATIVE TEAM WASTE THEIR FIRST 8 MINUTES.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CONSULT RUSSIA (1/3)
CONSULTATION IS EITHER NORMAL MEANS OR THIS ONE INSTANCE OF CONSULTING WONT DO ANYTHING. THEY HAVE NO SPECIFIC EVIDENCE CITING WHY CONSULTATION IN THIS SPECIFIC INSTANCE IS KEY. 2. PERM DO BOTH 3. PERM DO CP ITS PLAN PLUS 4. PERM DO THE PLAN AND CONSULT ON AN ISSUE OF GREATER OR EQUAL IMPORTANCE. 5. PERM CONSULT RUSSIA AS PER THE COUNTERPLAN AND DO THE PLAN REGARDLESS. 6. CONSULTATION CANT SOLVE. ANY CONSULTATION MOVES AWAY FROM THE PUBLIC DEBATE NEEDED TO SOLVE BIOPOWER. 7. CONSULTATION WILL FAIL, RUSSIA IS DOING EVERYTHING IT CAN TO HINDER US FOREIGN POLICY. Golts 09- Aleksandr; independent military analyst and deputy editor of YezhednevnyZhurnal; Restarting U.S.-Russia Relations Will Take More Than Pushing A Button February 28, 2009 http://www.rferl.org/Content/Restarting_US_Russia_Relations_More_Than_Pushing_Button/1500909.html Washington obviously doesn't need much from Putin and Co. -- just that they stay out of the way and don't interfere. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates noted, with clear irritation, that Moscow is sending conflicting signals. On the one hand, it is demonstrating its total willingness to help out regarding Afghanistan, including allowing the ground transit of nonmilitary cargoes across Russia. On the other, it is doing everything possible to hinder the U.S. effort, including, for instance, forcing Kyrgyzstan to close down the U.S. air base outside of Bishkek.
Under these circumstances,
1.
8. ALTERNATE CAUSES TO RELATIONS I.E. TRADE Carnegie Endowment No date- Nine former ambassadors to the US and Russia collaborate on the main issues facing the two nations; U.S.-Russian Relations: A Statement http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/ambassador_statement.pdf Expanding our economic ties canalsopromote a more stable and predictable relationship. We must move beyond the WTO issue and remove politically motivated barriers that have held up U.S.-Russian commercial exchange so that Russia takes its place as a full member of the global trading community. 9. DELAY PREVENTS THE COUNTERPLAN FROM SOLVING
X>9000. What is X?
10. CONSULTATION FAILS STABLE RELATIONS IMPOSSIBLE WITH US SURPRISES RT 10- RT is the first Russian 24/7 English-language news channel which brings the Russian view on global news. Reset button in US-Russian relations doesnt work Russias NATO envoy February 16, 2010; http://www.allvoices.com/s/event5238254/aHR0cDovL3J0LmNvbS9Qb2xpdGljcy8yMDEwLTAyLTE2L3RyYW5zZG5pZXN0ZXItaXNrY W5kZXItbWlzc2lsZS1hYm0uaHRtbA== there could be no talk yet of bilateral efforts to reset Russian-US relations if Moscow continues to find out about the United States plans to locate missiles in Eastern Europefrom mass media: How can we talk of a true partnershipwith Washington if we read unpleasant news in the newspapers? Earlier in February, NATO member Romania approved a US plan to deployAmerican SM-3 interceptor missiles on its territory. The US State Department said that such systems will be in operational readiness in Romania by 2015. Besides this, plans to host American ABMs in Bulgaria are also being discussed. The Russian Foreign Ministry has asked Bulgaria for clarification of its plans by asking a rather rhetorical question: Why is it that, after the Romanian surprise, a Bulgarian one follows?
Commenting on the Transdniester offer, Dmitry Rogozin also added that
11. CONSULTATION ULTIMATELY HURTS RELATIONS MEAD 4 (Walter Russell, MEAD, Senior Fellow @ The CFR, 2004 Power, Terror, Peace, and War, pg. 130134)
Partly because it needed European cooperation in the Balkans, partly because ideologically many Clinton era officials agreed with European positions on issues like Kyoto and the ICC, and partly out of habits of consultation and deference that grew up during the cold war, the Clinton administration never quite made clear to Europeans just how unreasonable their hopes were.At the same time, most American diplomats and the broader "interlocutor class" of experts who specialize in transatlantic relations are generally more sympathetic to the ; European approach than they are to the red state, red meat approach of the American Jacksonians and the Revival Wilsonians who, since September 11th, have figured so prominently in the politics of American foreign policy.The Bush administration made the strategic decision that it no longer made sense to encourage Europe in illusions about the direction of American policy. Whether Europe liked that policy or disliked it was less important than that Europe understood it. Moreover, stroking Europe only seemed to increase Europe's already inflated sense of its importance in the world of American foreign policy. This transition was a necessary and normal one, I and it ultimately does offer the prospect of a more realistic but still very close relationship among the Cold War allies. If the Clinton administration and the broader American foreign policy establishment had done a better job of communicating the changing American approach in earlier years, the transition might not have been so painfulbut it is also true that the Bush administration could and should have done more to cushion the shock for what, after all, are some of our closest and most important allies in a dangerous world.The bitterness of the controversy was regrettable, and hasty remarks by Bush officials exacerbated it, but it was probably on balance a good thing to remind Europeans in general and Germans in particular that transatlantic crises have a way of turning into European crises. With Germany, France, and Russia locked in an antiAmerican alliance, Poland understandably becomes nervous, and rightly so. When Russia and Germany get close, Poland has a way of getting smaller. A good German relationship with the United States remains the best basis for continuing progress toward European integration.
X>9000. What is X?
12. CONSULT COUNTERPLANS ARE BAD AND A VOTER FOR EDUCATION AND FAIRNESS a. THEY ARE ARTIFICIALLY COMPETTIVE, TAKE THE DEBATE AWAY FROM THE CORE OF THE TOPIC. WE CAN T TURN ANY PART OF IT BECAUSE WE HAVE NO IDEA WHAT THE NET BENEFIT WILL BE AND WE CANT TURN OUR OWN AFF. 13. THEY STEAL ALL OF THE 1AC, MAKING THE AFFIRMATIVE TEAM WASTE THEIR FIRST 8 MINUTES.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CONSULT JCS (1/2)
JCS WILL SAY NO. PREFER OUR EVIDENCE, SPECIFIC TO TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Gates 10, New Nuclear Posture Review BriefingAs Delivered by Robert Gates, Sec of Defense; Hillary Clinton, Sec. of State; Steven Chu, Sec. of Energy; and Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , The Pentagon, Washington D.C. Tuesday, April 06, 2010
1.
Secretary Gates is responsible for making this the most inclusive Nuclear Posture Review in history. Adm. Mullen, the Joint Chiefs, have been instrumental in working through a lot of the issues that have been raised. The Department of Energy has brought its expertise to the table and Im very proud of the role that the State Department played in helping to set the policy, and well be
working with our allies and partners to explain it and implement it. So it truly was a collaborative effort in keeping with the agenda and goals set by President Obama. The consultations that supported this process included more than 30 of our allies and partners. For generations, the United States nuclear deterrent has helped prevent proliferation by providing our non-nuclear allies in NATO, the Pacific and elsewhere with reassurance and security. The policies outlined in this review allow us to continue that stabilizing role.This NPR also makes it clear we will cooperate with partners worldwide to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.Under President Obamas leadership, we work to advance that agenda beginning with last years U.N. Security Council summit and the presidents speech in Prague. Thursday, the president will be back in Prague to sign a historic new START treaty with Russia and next week, President Obama will host more than 40 heads of state and government to tackle the most dangerous threat we face today, the threat of nuclear terrorism.This Nuclear Posture Review provides the strategic basis for all of these efforts, and it demonstrates our commitment to making progress toward disarmament under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.We are enforcing our commitment to the NPT by stating clearly, for the first time, that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states that are party to the NPT, and in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations We believe that this is an important step and it will help reinvigorate the global nonproliferation regime, especially as we approach the NPT review conference next month. So let me thank Secretary Gates, Secretary Chu and Adm. Mullen. And also youll be hearing from four of the experts who worked on this so hard: from the State Department, Undersecretary Ellen Tauscher; from the Energy Department, Tom DAgostino; from the Defense Department, Jim Miller; and also from the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Car twright.And I just want to thank everyone who helped work on this, because as Secretary Gates said, it took a lot of meetings, it took a lot of effort, but we believe that this represents the best interests for the United States, our partners and allies around the world.SECRETARY STEVEN CHU: Well, let me begin by first thanking Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton and Adm. Mullen. As was said before, while the Defense Department led the effort, this was a truly multi-agency review that reflects the important expertise of the State Department, at the Energy Department, as well as the Department of Defense.report reflects the administrations understanding that the effort to reduce nuclear dangers will require an all-out government approach. It also reflects the presidents commitment to addressing these issues in a way that improves security for the American people, our friends and allies around the world.As the president said in Prague, we will sustain a safe,secure, effective nuclear arsenal as long as nuclear weapons exist. This Nuclear Posture Review reflects the commitment and puts the nation on a path to providing the resources required to make that possible. It defines specific steps to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime and accelerate the securing of nuclear materials worldwide.The NPR is based on several key pr inciples that will guide U.S. future U.S. decisions on stockpile management. First, the United States will not conduct nuclear testing and will seek ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Second, we will not develop new nuclear weapons. Our laboratory directors and a host of ot heroutsideehia reviews have been very clear thatourlife-extensionprograms can maintain the safety, security and effectiveness of the stockpile without testing. To accomplish that goal, the NPR makes it clear the United States will study options for ensuring the safety, security and effectiveness of nuclear weapons on a case-by-case basis.Consistent with congressionally mandated stockpile-management programs, the full range of life-(extensive ?) programs life-extension programs approaches will be considered: refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads, and the replacement of nuclear components. This NPR makes clear that the United States will only use nuclear components based on previously tested designs and will not support new nuclear missions or provide new nuclear capabilities.Finally, in any decision to proceed to the engineering development for warhead life-extension programs, the United States will give strong preference to the options of refurbishment or reuse. This NPR makes clear that the replacement of nuclear components, as already said by Secretary Gates, would only be undertaken only if critical stockpile-management program goals cannot otherwise be met, and if specifically authorized by the president.These are the principles that define how we intend to implement the presidents strong commitment to maintain the safety, security and effectiveness of an aging stockpile. But this NPR does further than that. t provides an outline of the resources we will need to get the job done. The NPR calls for the modernization of nuclear weapons infrastructure and the sustainment of the science, technology and engineering base which is required to support the full range of nuclear security missions. This is reflected in the presidents budget request, which includes a 13.4 percent increase in the funding for the NNSA. his investment is critical to addressing our aging infrastructure, sustaining our deterrent and enhancing our efforts against nuclear proliferation and terrorism. It will also allow the U.S. to reduce many nondeployed warheads currently kept as a technical hedge. The NPR notes the importance of recruiting and retaining the human capital needed in the DOD and DOE, for the nuclear mission, and proposes building on currentefforts. If were going to succeed in our mission, we need to be able to recruit and retain the next generation of nuclear security professionals because at the department, our people are our greatest asset. So I applaud the team that worked so hard over the last year, to complete this review, and look forward to working with Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, Adm. Mullen and, of course, the Congress to implement this in the coming years. Thank you very much. And I turn it over to Adm. Mullen. ADM. MICHAEL MULLEN: Thank you. Thank you to Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton and Secretary Chu for your leadership in this tremendous effort and also leading it in a way where the process was very collaborative and really a strength of the interagency, which produced a great product. The chiefs and I fully support the findings of this nuclear posture review, because we believe it provides us and our field commanders the opportunity to better shape our nuclear weapons posture, policies and force structure to meet an ever-changing security environment. We appreciated the opportunity to inform it and, quite frankly, to be informed by it, as the process went forward.Even while it reduces the role played by nuclear weapons a reduction I wholly endorse this Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms ourcommitment to defend the vital interests of the United States and those of our partnersandallieswithamorebalancedmixof nuclear and non-nuclear means than we have at our disposal today.Even while it retains the strategic triad of bombers, submarines and missiles that have served us so well, the review further strengthens us the United States command and control, works to prevent nuclear terrorism and proliferation, and suggests new dialogues through which to improve transparency with Russia and China. And even while it precludes nuclear testing and the development of new warheads, the review bolsters regional deterrence by fielding new missile defenses, improving counter-WMD capabilities and revitalizing our nuclear support infrastructure.As Secretary Gates made quite clear, we must invest more wisely and more generously to preserve the life span and the effectiveness of our existing arsenal. We must hold ourselves accountable to unimpeachably high standards of nuclear training, leadership and management. And we must recruit and then retain the scientific expertise to advance our technological edge in nuclearweaponry.Im encouraged to see these requirements so prominently addressed in the Nuclear Posture Review, but Im also mindful of the challenge. Without such improvements, an aging nuclear force supported by a neglected infrastructure only invites enemy misbehavior and miscalculation.Thankyou.STAFF: (Off mike.)Q: Yes. Mr. Secretary, the review says that its the administrations goal to create conditions for which in which the only purpose of nuclear weapons would be to deter nuclear attack, as opposed to other kinds of attacks.What will it take to get to that state? And whycant you gothere now?IfI may ask a question of Secretary Clinton also, would you comment on Secretary I mean, Minister Lavrovs statement today in Moscow that Russia would reserve the right to withdraw from the new START treaty if it felt that the U.S. missile defense became a strategic threat to the Russian deterrent? And will the U.S. also have a unilateral statement about thetreaty?SEC. GATES: First, the NPR is very explicit in referring to the fundamental role of nuclear weapons being for deterrence. I know that there was theres been a lot of speculation outside the government and there was a lot of discussion inside the government of how to how to frame that and how to describe it, whether it would be the sole purpose, whether we would forgo non-first forgo first use and so on. And I think that there was agreement within the administration that we didnt think we were far enough along the road toward getting cont rol of nuclear weapons around the world to limit ourselves so explicitly. And so I think there was general agreement that the term fundamental purpose basically made clear and other language makes clear this is obviously a weapon of last resort, and we also are very explicit about that.So I think I think we recognized we need to make progress moving in the direction that the president has set, but we also recognize the real world we continue to live iSecretary?SEC. CLINTON: Well, Bob, Im not aware of the statement, but its no surprise that the Russians remain concerned about our missile defense program.We have persistently sought to expl ain tothemthepurposef ormissile defense, the role that we believe it can and should play in preventing proliferation and nuclear terrorism, and we have consistently offered the Russians the opportunity to cooperate with us.The START treaty is not about missile defense, as you know. It is about cutting the size the respective sizes of our arsenals, our strategic offensive weapons. And we will continue our conversations with the Russians. We have made it clear that we look forward to the ratification of START and then another round of discussions with the Russians about further reductions in our arsenal. And we will also be working with them to try to find common ground around missile defense, which we are committed to
Thank you. Mr. Secretary, tactical nuclearweapons have not yet been mentioned in your discussion today. What does the NPR say about American and allied tac nukes in Europe? What efforts are under way with the allies to reduce them? And what will be required of the Russians as part of this process? SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, the NPR is very explicit that any decision with respect to NATOs nuclear capabilities will be handled within NATO according to the consensus principle and that as long as there are nuclear weapons that threaten NATO, NATO will need to maintain a nuclear capability. But this is clearly one of the issues that will be addressed in the strategic concept that NATO is undertaking, the revision of the strategic concept.
pursuing.Q:
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2 CONSULT JCS (2/2) 2. MORE EVIDENCE THE MILITARY WILL SAY NO. QDR 2010(Quadrennial Defense Review, http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf) GAT
The mission of theDepartmentof Defense is to protect the American people and advance our nations interests. In executing these responsibilities, we must recognize that first and foremost, the United States is a nation at war. In Afghanistan, our forces fight alongside allies and partners in renewed efforts to deny Al Qaeda safe haven, reverse the Taliban's momentum, and strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces. In Iraq, U.S. military personnel advise, train, and support Iraqi forces as part of a responsible transition and drawdown. Above all, the United States and its allies and partners remain engaged in a broader war a multifaceted political, military and moral struggleagainst Al Qaeda and its allies around the world. Furthermore, as a global power, the strength and influence of the United States are deeply intertwined with the fate of the broader international systema system of alliances, partnerships, and multinational institutions that our country has helped build and sustain for more than sixty years. The U.S. military must therefore be prepared to support broad national goals of promoting stability in key regions , providing assistance to nations in need, and promoting the common good. With these realities in mind, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review advances twoclearobjectives. First, to further rebalance the capabilities of Americas Armed Forces to prevail in todays war s, while building the capabilities needed to deal with future threats. Second, to further reform the Departments institutions and processes to better support the urgent needs of the warfighter ; buy weapons that are usable, affordable, and truly needed; and ensure that taxpayer dollars are spent wisely and responsibly. The strategy and initiatives described in the QDR will continue to evolve in response to the security environment. Using the QDR as its foundation, the Department will continually examine its approachfrom objectives to capabilities and activities to resourcesto ensure its best alignment for the nation, its allies and partners, and our men and women in uniform. CONSULTATION CANT SOLVE BECAUSE IT MOVES AWAY FROM THE PUBLIC DEBATE NECESSARY TO SOLVE FOR BIOPOLITICS. 4. PERM DO CP,JUSTIFIED BECAUSE ITS JUST PLAN PLUS AND CP IS NORMAL MEANS. Stickland 10, NBC News producer, www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40426795/ns/politics-capitol_hill/ Levin disagreed, saying that the "chain of command" should dictate how military policy decisions are made."At the end of the day, the decision, in terms of any military decisions, are usually left to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs after consultation with the [service] chiefs,"Levin said. 5. PERM DO THE PLAN AND CONSULT ON AN ISSUE OF GREATER OR EQUAL IMPORTANCE, I.E. AFGHANISTAN OR NORTH KOREA. 6. PERM CONSULT THE JCS AND DO THE PLAN REGARDLESS. JCS KNOWS THE CHAIN OF COMMAND. 7. DELAY PREVENTS THE PLAN FROM SOLVING 8. CONSULT COUNTERPLANS ARE BAD AND A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS a. THEY ARE ARTIFICIALLY COMPETTIVE, TAKE THE DEBATE AWAY FROM THE CORE OF THE TOPIC. WE CANT TURN ANY PART OF IT BECAUSE WE HAVE NO IDEA WHAT THE NET BENEFIT WILL BE SINCE ITS ARTIFICIALLY COMPETITIVE AND WE CANT TURN OUR OWN AFF. b. THEY STEAL ALL OF THE 1AC, MAKING THE AFFIRMATIVE TEAM WASTE THEIR FIRST 8 MINUTES. 3.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: GENERIC CONDITIONS
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CONDITIONS RUSSIA (1/2)
THEY SOLVE ZERO PERCENT OF THE AFF. THIS IS JUST ANOTHER SPECIFIC EXAMPLE OF THE USE OF BIOPOWER. THEY DONT CREATE THE SPACE OF DISAGREEMENT AND ONLY RECREATE BIOPOLITICS. 2. EVEN IF YOU DONT BUY THAT ARGUMENT, RUSSIA WONT LISTEN TO THE US UNTIL WE PULL OUT TNWS. Millar, 3Vice President for the Fourth Freedom Forum, 2K3 (Alistair, Russia, NATO, and Tactical Nuclear Weapons after 11 September, in Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Emergent Threats in an Evolving Security Environment, eds. Alexander & Millar) The deadlock on this issue remains because NATO and Russia have diametrically opposed positions on the continued presence of NATO nuclear weapons in Europe. Moscowhas repeatedly asserted that it will not consider negotiations to control its tactical nuclear arsenal if the United States will not remove its nuclear weapons from Europe. As NATO expands eastward toward the boarders of mainland Russia, there are also anxieties about the deployment of NATO nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states. Russia has continually refused to enter into TNW talks until stipulations on the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe and the nondeployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of new NATO members are met. EVEN IF YOU DONT BUY THAT, THEY STILL CANT SOLVE BECAUSE RUSSIA WILL BARGAIN FOREVER AND THIS ACTUALLY KILLS US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS. Woodworth 1999, Deputy Negotiator of INF Treaty & Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy, 1999 (John, What Should Be Done About Tactical Nuclear Weapons?, THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES -- OCCASIONAL PAPER, March, http://www.acus.org/Publications/occasionalpapers/internationalsecurity/tacnukes41.pdf) For a variety of reasons, approaching the TNW issue as a matter ofdefenseand security cooperation rather than through traditional arms control negotiations could afford important advantages for advancing broader US and NATO policy goals toward Russia. This approach could be strongly in Russias interest as well. We may need to turn ultimately to traditional nuclear arms control negotiations, out of necessity if not choice, for dealing with TNW. Such negotiations could take various forms, e.g., separate US-Russian negotiations on TNW; folding TNW into negotiations on strategic arms; or multilateral negotiating venues. These alternatives are far from being equal in their implications, but what they share from Cold War experience is their use as tools in helping to manage adversarial relations between nuclear rivals. Today, however, it is precisely because we are working to move away from the adversarial relations of the past that relying on traditional arms control negotiations for TNW could be out of step with our main goals. The very dynamics of negotiations in this form reinforce the adversarial nature of the proceedings. Trust is not presumed, nor is it necessarily sought. Once underway, opportunities for capitalizing on more productive forms of cooperation could be lessened. The temptation to indulge in political grandstanding reminiscent of INF could be present. Moreover, such negotiations will play to Russian proclivities to bargain relentlessly and sometimes obsessively. Results could be prolonged or delayed indefinitely. While traditional arms control negotiations should certainly not be foreclosed, there would be distinct advantages to an approach that could represent progress toward a qualitatively new stage in working with Russia. 3. 4. 5. PERM CONDITION THE WITHDRAWAL OF TNWS FROM RUSSIA BUT REGARDLESS OF NEGOTIATION RESULTS, WITHDRAW THEM. PERM DO THE PLAN AND CONDITION RUSSIA ON AN ISSUE OF EQUAL OR GREATER IMPORTANCE, SUCH AS CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND/OR THE ARTIC CIRCLE. PERM DO COUNTERPLAN, ITS FUNCTIONALLY PLAN PLUS. PERM DO BOTH AS SEPARATE POLICES. THE NET BENEFIT TO THE PLAN ACTUALLY FLOWS AFF, IT JUST FURTHER JUSTIFIES BIOPOLITICS CREATING UNENDING WAR AND JUSTIFYING THE WORST ATROCITIES IN HISTORY. CONDITIONL COUNTERPLANS ARE A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS
1.
6. 7. 8.
9.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CONDITIONS RUSSIA (2/2) a. b.
EDUCATION - IT SHIFTS THE DEBATE AWAY FROM THE CORE OF THE TOPIC AND FOCUSES IT ON SOME MINUTE DIFFERENCE. FAIRNESS CONDITIONAL COUNTERPLANS LITERALLY STEAL AWAY ALL OF THE 1AC GROUND AND ARE REALISTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO DEBATE. ITS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE AFF TO PREPARE FOR EVERY POSSIBLE MINUTE NET BENEFIT.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: GENERIC AGENT COUNTERPLAN
1. AGENTS CANT ENACT PLAN Prakash08Herzog Research Professor of Law, University of San Diego Saikrishna William and Mary Law Review lexis accessed 6/24/10
Apart from claiming the power to initiate warfare, modern Commanders in Chief havealso asserted that the Constitution bars Congress from enacting statutes that interfere with presidential direction of wars. These claims were voiced as early as the mid-1950s by President Truman. n123 Many scholars have endorsed the [*1041] notion that the Commander in Chief has exclusive authority overcertain operational matters.n124 1. 2. 3. 4. PERM DO CP - JUSTIFIED BECAUSE ITS NORMAL MEANS. PERM DO BOTH AS 2 SEPARATE POLICIES. PERM HAVE 1 AGENCY DO THE PLAN AND ANOTHER ENFORCE IT. AGENT COUNTERPLANS ARE A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS a. EDUCATION AGENT COUNTERPLANS TAKE AWAY FROM THE ACTUAL DEBATE ABOUT THE CORE OF THE TOPIC, THAT IS, THE SHIFTING OF MILITARY PRESENCE. IF THE FRAMERS WANTED TO DISCUSS AGENTS, THEY WOULDNT BE TALKING ABOUT MILTIARY PRESENCE. b. FAIRNESS AGENT COUNTERPLANS STEAL ALL OF 1AC GROUND AND FORCE US TO TRY AND STRAIGHT TURN SOME MINUTE NET BENEFIT. c. AND WE STILL GIVE THEM AGENT DAS. SOLVES ALL THEIR OFFENSE ON THE THEORY FLOW.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: COURTS COUNTERPLAN (1/3)
THE COURTS CANT SOLVE THE MILITARY PRESENSE IN TURKEY IS PART OF A SOFA AND DOESNT VIOLATE ANY INTERNATIONAL LAW. Foley 09 Sean Foley, Assistant Prof. in History @ MTSU, The Iraq Status -of-Forces Agreement, Iran, and Guantanamo Bay, 34 Rutgers L. Rec. 39, Spring 2009 1. Significantly, the United States' SOFA with Iraq is part of a system of agreements which the United States and other national militaries have maintained with governments around the globe since the end of World War II.n15 Besides the United States; Russia, the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and many other nations have SOFAs or similar agreements(often called Laws of Visiting Forces). n16 The Soviet Union also had similar agreements with members of the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. n17SOFAs generally are not that much different from other international agreements or treaties, n18 and have been recognized under international law for many decades.n19 Although it is possible to challenge the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's SOFA in the International Court of Justice (ICJ ), no state has brought a case forward in the ICJ or another any other international legal forum. n20 At least 115 nations, or close to half the global community, had SOFAs with the United States in 2008. n21There is no standard format for SOFAs, which vary in length from one page to over two hundred. n22Some of these agreements, such as the United States' SOFA with West Germany, granted sweeping powers to foreign military forces.n23 For instance, American commanders not only had exclusive control over their soldiers and weapons on West German soil, but they also had the right to patrol roads, railways, restaurants, and other large public areas. n24 Other SOFAs have been far more limited in scope. 2. AND COURTS CANT SOLVE FOREIGN POLICY EXECUTIVE BRANCH WILL IGNORE THE PLAN. Nzelibe 2004,Jide [Bigelow Fellow and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School, March 2004 89 Iowa L. Rev. 941, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs] Unlike in domestic constitutional controversies, it isalsodoubtful that the judiciary can draw on the popular underpinnings of its legitimacy should the political branches ignore its foreign affairs determinations. As one commentator has explained, the public appetite for judicial involvement in international issues is not particularly strong. 217 The judiciary's lack of popular legitimacy in foreign affairs is particularly understandable whenthe relevant controversy touches on matters of national security. As demonstrated above, in matters involving the domestic operations of the government, the court plays an important role in legitimizing the activities of the other branches, as well as providing a reliable mechanism for the resolution of disputes between private individuals. When matters touch on the very existence of the state, however, such as when the state faces an external threat, the justifications for judicial involvement correspondingly diminish. 218 Thus, far from getting popular support in the event of a confrontation with the political branches, it is more likely that the courts will face public criticism for intervening improperly in foreign affairs or jeopardizing national security.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: COURTS COUNTERPLAN (2/3)
AND THE PLAN SOLVES BEST ONLY EXECUTIVE AND LEGISTALIVE BRANCHES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR OUR FOREIGN POLICIES. Grimmett 99(Richard, Specialist in National Defense for the US Department of State, US Department of State, June 1st, 1999, http://fpc.state.gov/6172.htm) NK 3. The United States Constitution divides the foreign policy powers between the President and Congress so that both share in the making of foreign policy. The executive and legislative branches each play important roles that are different but that often overlap. Both branches have continuing opportunities to initiate and change foreign policy, and the interaction between them continues indefinitely throughout the life of a policy. This report identifies and illustrates 12 basic ways to make U.S. foreign policy. The President or the executive branch can make foreign policy through: 1) -- responses to foreign events 2) -- proposals for legislation 3) -- negotiation of international agreements 4) -- policy statements 5) -- policy implementation 6) -- independent action. In nearly all of these circumstances, Congress can either support the President's approach or seek to change it. In the case of independent Presidential action, it may be very difficult to change policy in the short term; in the case of a legislative proposal by the executive branch or treaties and international agreements submitted to the Senate or Congress for approval, Congress has a decisive voice. In most cases Congress supports the President, but it often makes significant modifications in his initiatives in the process of approving them. Congress can make foreign policy through: 1) -- resolutions and policy statements 2) -- legislative directives 3) -- legislative pressure 4) -- legislative restrictions/funding denials 5) -- informal advice 6) -- congressional oversight. In these circumstances, the executive branch can either support or seek to change congressional policies as it interprets and carries out legislative directives and restrictions, and decides when and whether to adopt proposals and advice. The practices illustrated in this report indicate that making U.S. foreign policy is a complex process, and the support of both branches is required for a strong and effective U.S. foreign policy . THE COURTS WONT BE ABLE TO SOLVE. THEIR COUNTERPLAN FIAT BYPASSES THE PUBLIC DEBATE CITED IN OUR CHOSSUDOVSKY 06 EVIDENCE NEEDED TO SOLVE. 5. PERM DO CP - JUSTIFIED BECAUSE ITS NORMAL MEANS. DONT GIVE THEM THE SEVERENCE ARGUMENT. SHOULD ISNT MANDATORY Howard 5 Taylor and Howard, 05 - Resources for the Future, Partnership to Cut Hunger and Poverty in Africa (Michael and Julie, InvestinginAfrica'sfuture:U.S.Agricultural development assistance for SubSaharan Africa, 9/12, http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001784/5-US-agric_Sept2005_Chap2.pdf) Other legislated DA earmarks in the FY2005 appropriations bill are smaller and more targeted: plant biotechnology research and development ($25 million), the AmericanSchoolsandHospitals Abroad program ($20million), womens leadership capacity ($15 million), the International Fertilizer Development Center ($2.3 million), and clean water treatment ($2 million). Interestingly, in the wording of the bill, Congress uses the term shall in connection with only two of these eight earmarks; the others say that USAID should make the prescribed amount available. The difference between shall and should may have legal significanceone is clearly mandatory while 4. the other is a strong admonitionbut it makes little practical difference inUSAIDs need to comply with the congressional directive to the best of its ability. 6. AND RESOLVED ISNT IN THE RESOLUTION DOD 6 US Department of Defense (6/28, The Colon, http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:CRkgc8Pi1TsJ:www.dod.state.hi.us/HIARNG/298rti/298rti/l230is_ap p_d.pdf, AG) The colon introduces the following: [continues] g. A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor. 7. PERM DO BOTH HAVE THE COURTS RULE ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACTION DONE BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2 COURTS COUNTERPLAN (3/3) 8. AGENT COUNTERPLANS ARE A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS a.
b. c.
EDUCATION AGENT COUNTERPLANS TAKE AWAY FROM THE ACTUAL DEBATE ABOUT THE CORE OF THE TOPIC, THAT IS, THE SHIFTING OF MILITARY PRESENCE. IF THE FRAMERS WANTED TO DISCUSS AGENTS, THEY WOULDNT BE TALKING ABOUT MILTIARY PRESENCE. FAIRNESS AGENT COUNTERPLANS STEAL ALL OF 1AC GROUND AND FORCE US TO TRY AND STRAIGHT TURN SOME MINUTE NET BENEFIT. AND WE STILL GIVE THEM AGENT DAS. SOLVES ALL THEIR OFFENSE ON THE THEORY FLOW.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: XO COUNTERPLAN (1/3)
PRESIDENTIAL ACTION CANT SOLVE EXECUTIVE ORDERS ARE CONFUSING AND CAN BE ROLLED BACK. Cooper 97[Phillip, Prof of Public Administration @ Portland State, Nov 97, Power tools for an effective and responsible presidency Administration and Society, Vol. 29, p. Proquest] 2. Even if one takes a purely utilitarian approach, dangers exist in the use of executive orders. Because their development is unsystematic and ad hoc, they can create burdensome duplicative or overlapping obligations that do not fit well with statutory and regulatory obligations. Where the effort was merely to block action, as was true with the regulatory review orders, those burdens seem to help the president, but if the chief executive wants something positive to happen, the orders can be needless burdens on the accomplishment of the president's wishes. Even if they serve temporary goals, executive orders can produce a significant amount of complexity and conflict and not yield a long-term benefit because the next president may dispose of predecessors' orders at a whim. It may be easier than moving a statute through Congress and faster than waiting for agencies to use their rule-making processes to accomplish policy ends, but executive orders may ultimately be a much weaker foundation on which to build a policy than the alternatives. And to the degree that agencies prepare and advocate executive orders to avoid the burdensome process of rule making, they are plainly subverting the very body of law that supports their authority and effectiveness. 3. THE PLAN CANT SOLVE FIATING PRESIDENTIAL ACTION BYPASSES THE PUBLIC DEBATE NEEDED TO SOLVE CITED IN OUR CHOSSUDOVSKY EVIDENCE. 4. PERM HAVE 1 AGENCY DO THE PLAN AND ANOTHER ENFORCE IT. 5. PERM DO CP- JUSTIFIED BECAUSE PRESIDENTIAL ACTION IS NORMAL MEANS CONGRESS CANT INTERFERE.
Prakash08Herzog Research Professor of Law, University of San Diego Saikrishna William and
Mary Law Review lexis accessed 6/24/10
Apart from claiming the power to initiate warfare, modern Commanders in Chief havealso asserted that the Constitution bars Congress from enacting statutes that interfere with presidential direction of wars. These claims were voiced as early as the mid-1950s by President Truman. n123 Many scholars have endorsed the [*1041] notion that the Commander in Chief has exclusive authority overcertain operational matters.n124
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: XO COUNTERPLAN (2/3)
PRESIDENTIAL POWERS MAKES ABUSIVE AND AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR INEVITABLE, WHICH LEADS TO EXTINCTION. Forrester 89Ray, Professor, @ Hastings College of the Law, University of California, Former dean of the law schools at Vanderbilt, Tulane, and Cornell, Presidential Wars in the Nuclear Age: An Unresolved Problem George Washington Law Review, August, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1636, Lexis A basic theory--if not the basic theory of our Constitution--is that concentration of power in any one person, or one group, is dangerous to mankind. The Constitution, therefore, contains a strong system of checks and balances, starting with the separation of powers between the President, Congress, and the Supreme Court. The message is that no one of them is safe with unchecked power. Yet, in what is probably the most dangerous governmental power ever possessed, we find the potential for world destruction lodged in the discretion of one person. As a result of public indignation aroused by
the Vietnam disaster, in which tens of thousands lost their lives in military actions initiated by a succession of Presidents, Congress in 1973 adopted, despite presidential veto, the War Powers Resolution. Congress finally asserted its checking and balancing duties in relation to the making of presidential wars. Congress declared in section 2(a) that its purpose was to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations. The law also stated in section 3 that [t]he President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated. . . . Other limitations not essential to this discussion are also provided. The intent of the law is clear. Congress undertook to check the President, at least by prior consultation, in any executive action that might lead to hostilities and war. [*1638] President Nixon, who initially vetoed the resolution, claimed that it was an unconstitutional restriction on his powers as Executive and Commander in Chief of the military. His successors have taken a similar view. Even so, some of them have at times complied with the law by prior consultation with representatives of Congress, but obedience to the law has been uncertain and a subject of continuing controversy between Congress and the President. Ordinarily, the issue of the constitutionality of a law would be decided by the Supreme Court. But, despite a series of cases in which such a decision has been sought, the Supreme Court has refused to settle the controversy. The usual ground for such a refusal is that a "political question" is involved. The rule is well established that the federal judiciary will decide only "justiciable" controversies. "Political questions" are not "justiciable." However, the standards established by the Supreme Court in 1962 in to determine the distinction between "justiciable controversies" and "political questions" are far from clear. One writer observed that the term "political question" [a]pplies to all those matters of which the court, at a given time, will be of the opinion that it is impolitic or inexpedient to take jurisdiction. Sometimes this idea of inexpediency will result from the fear of the vastness of the consequences that a decision on the merits might entail Finkelstein, Judicial SelfLimitation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 338, 344 (1924)(footnote omitted). It is difficult to defend the Court's refusal to assume the responsibility of decisionmaking on this most critical issue. The Court has been fearless in deciding other issues of "vast consequences" in many historic disputes, some involving executive war power. It is to be hoped
6.
the spectre of single-minded power persists, fraught with all of the frailties of human nature that each human possesses, including the President. World history is filled with tragic examples. Even if the Court assumed its responsibility to tell us whether the Constitution gives Congress the
that the Justices will finally do their duty here. But in the meantime necessary power to check the President, the War Powers Resolution itself is unclear. Does the Resolution require the President to consult with Congress before launching a nuclear attack? It has been asserted that "introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities" refers only to military personnel and does not include the launching of nuclear missiles alone. In support of this interpretation, it has been argued that Congress was concerned about the human losses in Vietnam and in other presidential wars, rather than about the weaponry. Congress, of course, can amend the Resolution to state explicitly that "the introduction of Armed Forces" includes missiles as well as personnel. However, the President could continue to act without prior consultation by renewing the claim first made by President [*1639] Nixon that the Resolution is an unconstitutional invasion of the executive power. Therefore, the real solution, in the absence of a Supreme Court decision, would appear to be a constitutional amendment. All must obey a clear rule in the Constitution. The adoption of an amendment is very difficult. Wisely, Article V requires that an amendment may be proposed only by the vote of two-thirds of both houses of Congress or by the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states, and the proposal must be ratified by the legislatures or conventions of three-fourths of the states. Despite the difficulty, the Constitution has been amended twenty-six times. Amendment can be done when a problem is so
It is hardly necessary to belabor the relative importance of the control of nuclear warfare . A constitutional
important that it arouses the attention and concern of a preponderant majority of the American people. But the people must be made aware of the problem. amendment may be, indeed, the appropriate method. But the most difficult issue remains. What should the amendment provide? How can the problem be solved specifically? The Constitution in section 8 of Article I stipulates that "[t]he Congress shall have power . . . To declare War. . . ." The idea seems to be that only these many representatives of the people, reflecting the public will, should possess the power to commit the lives and the fortunes of the nation to warfare. This approach makes much more sense in a democratic republic than entrusting the decision to one person, even though he may be designated the "Commander in Chief" of the military forces. His
There is a recurring relevation of a paranoia of power throughout human history that has impelled one leader after another to draw their people into wars which, in hindsight, were foolish, unnecessary, and, in some instances, downright insane. Whatever may be the psychological influences that drive the single decisionmaker to these irrational commitments of the lives and fortunes of others, the fact remains that the behavior is a predictable one in any government that does not provide an effective check and balance against uncontrolled power in the hands of one human. We, naturally, like to think that our leaders are above such irrational behavior. Eventually, however, human nature, with all its weakness, asserts itself whatever the setting. At least that is the evidence that experience and history give us, even in our own relatively benign society, where the Executive is subject to the rule of law . [*1640] Vietnam and other more recent engagements show that it can happen and has happened here . But the "nuclear football"-the ominous "black bag" --remains in the sole possession of the President. And, most important, his decision to launch a nuclear missile would be, in fact if not in law, a declaration of nuclear war, one which the nation and, indeed, humanity in general, probably would be unable to survive.
power is to command the war after the people, through their representatives, have made the basic choice to submit themselves and their children to war.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA
A2: XO COUNTERPLAN (3/3) 7. AGENT COUNTERPLANS ARE A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS a. EDUCATION AGENT COUNTERPLANS TAKE AWAY FROM THE ACTUAL DEBATE ABOUT THE CORE OF THE TOPIC, THAT IS, THE SHIFTING OF MILITARY PRESENCE. IF THE FRAMERS WANTED TO DISCUSS AGENTS, THEY WOULDNT BE TALKING ABOUT MILTIARY PRESENCE. b. FAIRNESS AGENT COUNTERPLANS STEAL ALL OF 1AC GROUND AND FORCE US TO TRY AND STRAIGHT TURN SOME MINUTE NET BENEFIT. c. AND WE STILL GIVE THEM AGENT DAS. SOLVES ALL THEIR OFFENSE ON THE THEORY FLOW.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: DOD COUNTERPLAN (1/1) 1. 2.
THE DOD CANT SOLVE. MILITRAY ACTION HAS SOME ULTERIOR MOTIVE. THIS JUST INCREASES THE BIOPOLITICAL REGIME. DOD CANT ENACT PLAN EXCLUSIVE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT.
Prakash08Herzog Research Professor of Law, University of San Diego Saikrishna William and
Mary Law Review lexis accessed 6/24/10
Apart from claiming the power to initiate warfare, modern Commanders in Chief havealso asserted that the Constitution bars Congress from enacting statutes that interfere with presidential direction of wars. These claims were voiced as early as the mid-1950s by President Truman. n123 Many scholars have endorsed the [*1041] notion that the Commander in Chief has exclusive authority overcertain operational matters.n124 3. PERM DO CP - JUSTIFIED BECAUSE ITS NORMAL MEANS. 4. PERM HAVE 1 AGENCY DO THE PLAN AND ANOTHER ENFORCE IT 5. AGENT COUNTERPLANS ARE A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS a. EDUCATION AGENT COUNTERPLANS TAKE AWAY FROM THE ACTUAL DEBATE ABOUT THE CORE OF THE TOPIC, THAT IS, THE SHIFTING OF MILITARY PRESENCE. IF THE FRAMERS WANTED TO DISCUSS AGENTS, THEY WOULDNT BE TALKING ABOUT MILTIARY PRESENCE. b. FAIRNESS AGENT COUNTERPLANS STEAL ALL OF 1AC GROUND AND FORCE US TO TRY AND STRAIGHT TURN SOME MINUTE NET BENEFIT. c. AND WE STILL GIVE THEM AGENT DAS. SOLVES ALL THEIR OFFENSE ON THE THEORY FLOW.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: NO FIRST STRIKE COUNTERPLAN 1.
2.
3.
4. 5. 6.
NO FIRST STRIKE POLICY CANT SOLVE. AS LONG AS THE TNWs ARE STILL THERE, A SYSTEM OF BIOPOLITICS IS STILL PERPETUATED. DONT TELL ME THAT YOU WOULDNT HAVE FEAR IF SOMEONE HAD A GUN POINTED AT YOUR FACE BUT CLAIMED HE WOULDNT SHOOT. THEY DONT SOLVE ANY OF THE AFF, IN FACT, THEY ACTUALLY WORK IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION. THEIR REMOVAL OF THIS FIRST STRIKE IS JUST A FAADE THAT JUSTIFIES KEEPING THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS THERE AND INCREASING THE BIOPOLITICAL REGIME. PLAN SOLVES BETTER. OUR CHOSSUDVOSKY 06 AND KELLER AND WARREN 09 EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT THE PLAN WOULD END THE FIRST STRIKE POLICY AND ELIMINATES THE TNWS IN TURKEY. PERM DO BOTH PERM DO CP FUNCTIONALLY THE SAME. PERM DO COUNTERPLAN, AND THEN PLAN.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: POLITICS (1/1) 1. 2. 3. 4.
(PULL OUT POLITICS BLOCK) NO LINK. WHEN WE FIAT THE PLAN, WE EFFECTIVELY BYPASS ANY BACKLASH OR IMPACTS STEMMED FROM DISCUSSING THE PLAN. PERM DO BOTH JUSTIFIED BECAUSE THERES NO REASON A MEMBER OF CONGRESS WOULDNT BE ABLE TO DO BOTH PLANS. PERM DO COUNTERPLAN, AND THEN DO THE PLAN.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: TURKEY PROLIFERATION (1/5)
NO LINK OUR BELL AND LOHRKE 9 EVIDENCE FROM THE INHERENCY FLOW CLEARLY CITES HOW TNWS DONT PROVIDE DETERENCE. 2. NON UNIQUE - TURKEY ALREADY VIEWS US AS WEAK. Stelzer 10(Irwin, signatory of the Henry Jackson Society, a senior director and fellow of the HudsonInstitute, doctorate in economics, columnist for The Sunday Times UK, Do You Want The Good News Or The Bad News?, The Sunday Times UK, Edition 1; Ireland, Business; Pg. 4, 5/20, lexis) Yet all is not for the best in this best of all possible worlds. The happy economic news is accompanied by disturbing news on a variety of fronts. Israel is increasingly nervous at the inability of America and its partners to contain Iran's nuclear weapons programme, and is considering the feasibility of an attack to delay the regime's acquisition of a bomb it has promised to use to destroy "the Zionist entity". South Korea has responded to North Korea's torpedoing of one its vessels by blocking passage of that regime's ships through its waters, which might trigger a war that would involve the US troops stationed on the North-South border - unlessPresident Barack Obama pulls them out as part of his plan to "engage" the North Koreans. The war on terror goes on, with New York and its financial centre certainly among the leading targets , and, worst of all, America now seems so impotent thatits former allies, Turkeyand Brazil, have signed up with what Osama Bin Laden calls "the strong horse", which seems to include anti-Americans from Hugo Chavez to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Venezuelan and Iranian presidents. 3. AND NO LINK: TURKEY IS STILL PROTECTED UNDER THE NATO GUARANTEE. Kibaroglu 10 (Mustafa Kibaroglu, Ph.D., Professor of International Relations, Bilkent University, June 2010. Arms Control Today, Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_06/Kibaroglu#25) One concern might be the contingencies in which the security situation in Turkeys neighborhood deteriorates, thereby necessitating the active presence of an effective deterrent against the aggressor(s). Yet, given the elaborate capabilities that exist within the alliance eand the solidarity principle so far effectively upheld bytheallies,extendingdeterrence against Turkeys rivals should not be a problem. Turkey would continue to be protected against potential aggressors by the nuclear guarantees of its alliesFrance, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the three NATO nuclear-weapon states. Turkeys reliance onsuch a credibledeterrent, which will not be permanently stationed on Turkish territory, is less likely to be criticized by its Middle Eastern neighbors[27] and should not engender a burden-sharing controversy with its European allies. One cannot argue that once U.S. nuclear weaponsthat are stationed in Turkish territoryare sent back, thenucleardeterrentof the alliance extended to Turkey will be lost forever.
1.
X>9000. What is X?
A2: TURKISH PROLIF (2/5) 4. AND NO LINK: TURKEY WONT BUILD NUCLEAR WEAPONS Walsh 10(Brian Walsh, Senior Legal Research Fellow Heritage Foundation, 2010 http://www.ne.ncsu.edu/faculty/yim/documents/NE591-S2010/Report/Turkey_rep.pdf) Turkey is also in the midst of a decades long effort to accede to the European Union. As a part of this process Turkey has had to make numerous changes to its laws and culture, in order to fit the model required of European Union member states (8). It is hard to imagine that Turkey would jeopardize its relations with both the United States and Europe by attempting to develop a nuclear weapon of its own. It would almost certainly result in a total rejection of Turkeys bid to become a member of the European Union, and the United States wouldhavesignificant economic leverage to apply in the form of loss of aid payments and the end of military cooperation.From a national security perspective, Turkey has no need to develop a nuclear weapon to protect its territory. The United States is heavily invested in Turkey militarily, and as a member of NATO Turkey is under the nuclear umbrella, and enjoys the guaranteed protection brought by the NATO treaty. In addition, Turkey has the second largest standing military force in NATO, second only to The United States. Turkey will be able to respond militarily to any foreseeable attack, including one using a nuclear weapon. An attack with a large number of nuclear weapons would be devastating, but would 5 surely trigger a response from the other nuclear nations, as well as with the NATO weapons currently stationed in Turkey. Though Turkey certainly possesses the economic might and technical knowledge to produce nuclear weapons of its own, it has very little incentive to do so. Turkey would risk alienating itself from the West if it ever made an attempt to acquire nuclear weapons.Itwouldstand tolose billions of dollars in international investment and aid, as well as a possible loss of membership in NATOandthe removal of the weapons stationed in Turkey under the nuclear
weapons sharing program. Turkeys bid for full EU membership would also almost certainly be denied if a clandestine nuclear program were ever discovered.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: TURKISH PROLIF (3/5)
AND TURKEY WONT PROLIFERATE, COMMITED TO NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 10 <Turkeys Approach to Arms Control and Disarmament Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affiars, website updated June 23, 2010. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-controland-disarmament.en.mfa> Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their delivery means is a growing tangible threat in the 21st century. Easy access to these weapons through trafficking and willingness of some states to cooperate with terrorist, extremist or organized crime groups increase the concern that such weapons might end up in illegal hands. In the light of the threatening dimension of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Turkey sincerely desires to see that all countries will come to share the goals of non-proliferation and collectively work towards a safer and more stable world. In this vein, Turkey has welcome the UN Security Counsil Resolution 1540 on the nonproliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. Turkey, regularly reports to and contributes to the work of the Committee established pursuend to the UNSC Resolution 1540. Turkey does not provide any form of support and/or assistance to Non-State Actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transfer or use WMD and their means of delivery and fully supports all international efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery continue to be a matter of serious concern for Turkey. Since Turkey is situated close to regions posing high risks of proliferation, she monitors with vigilance the developments in this field and takes part in collective efforts aimed at devising measures to reverse this alarming trend. Turkey attaches great importance to arms control and non-proliferation treaties and also to export control regimes as means to prevent such proliferation. In this context, in order to follow the developments and enable an effective exchange of views in the field of nonproliferation regarding Turkeys obligations; regular meetings are held in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the participation of representatives of all related institutions. Turkey became party to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1979 and to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 2000. Turkey is also party to both the Chemical Weapons Convention since 1997 and the Biological Weapons Convention since 1974. In 1996, Turkey became the founding member of the Wassenaar Arrangement regarding export controls of conventional weapons and dual-use equipment and technologies. Turkey joined the Missile Technology Control Regime in 1997, the Zangger Committee in 1999, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australia Group which seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons, in 2000. 6. AND ABSENT A COMPLETE COLLAPSE OF NATO, TURKEY WONT GO NUCLEAR. Kaye and Wehrey 7(Dalia Dassa Kaye, Ph.D., associate director of the Center for Middle East Public Policy @ RAND, Frederic M. Wehrey, international policy analyst @ RAND, June 2007. Survival 49(2), A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of Neighbours, p. 111 128) In terms of non-Arab states,some analysts mentioned Turkey as a possible candidate for going nuclear , although experts also suggest that Turkey is very unlikely to go in this directionabsentsignificant strategic shifts (for example, the collapse of NATO).22Finally, there is the question as to whether a nuclear-armed Iran 5.
would force Israel to change its posture of ambiguity in order to strengthen its deterrence, a development that could significantly impact the calculations of other states in the region. Some Israeli analysts believe Israel's current posture has served it well and would prove sufficient to deter a nuclear Iran.23 Others, however, argue that the measures Israel would need to take to ensure a credible deterrent and second-strike capability - a likely movement toward a sea-based, submarine, retaliatory force, the dispersal of aircraft and ballistic missiles in hardened structures, and the possibility of testing for more advanced warheads would make Israel's current posture of ambiguity increasingly difficult to maintain.24
X>9000. What is X?
AND EVEN IF TURKEY DID PROLIFERATE, NONE OF THEIR IMPACTS HOLD TRUE. PROLIFERATION ACTUALLY DECREASES CONFLICT. Tepperman 09 (Johnathan, 8/29/2009; Newsweek Internationals Deupty Editor. Hes worked in the UN and has a BA in English Literature from Yale as well as MA from Oxford) A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume . The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few
politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that's a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama's idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it's not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn't be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke-free planet) that's both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear
7.
weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century.As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC
Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states." To understand whyand why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same wayyou need to start by recognizing that all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war:a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side and millions of innocents pay the price.Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable.Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a buttonand everybody knows itthe basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win and
might lose everything?"Why indeed? The iron logic of deterrenceand mutually assured destructionis so compelling, it's
led to what's known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile,the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there's very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuringbecause in each instance, very different leaders all came to the same safe conclusion.Take the mother of all
nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, "It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time."The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nucleararmed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring
atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. SumitGanguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and
Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it.Nuclear pessimistsand there are manyinsist that even if this pattern has held in the past, it's crazy to
rely on it in the future, for several reasons. The first is that today's nuclear wannabes are so completely unhinged, you'd be mad to trust them with a bomb. Take the sybaritic Kim Jong Il, who's never missed a chance to demonstrate his battiness, or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has denied the Holocaust and promised the destruction of Israel, and who, according to some respected Middle East scholars, runs a messianic martyrdom cult that would welcome nuclear obliteration. These regimes are the ultimate rogues, the thinking goesand there's no deterring rogues.But are Kim and Ahmadinejad really scarier and crazier than were Stalin and Mao? It might look that way from Seoul or Tel Aviv, but history says otherwise. Khrushchev, remember,
X>9000. What is X?
threatened to "bury" the United States, and in 1957, Mao blithely declared that a nuclear war with America wouldn't be so bad because even "if half of mankind died the whole world would become socialist." Pyongyang and Tehran support terrorism but so did Moscow and Beijing. And as for seeming suicidal, Michael Desch of the University of Notre Dame points out that Stalin and Mao are the real record holders here: both were responsible for the deaths of some 20 million of their own citizens.
Yet when push came to shove, their regimes balked at nuclear suicide, and so would today's international bogeymen. For all of Ahmadinejad's antics, his power is limited, and the clerical regime has always proved rational and pragmatic when its life is on the line. Revolutionary Iran has never started a war, has done deals with both Washington and Jerusalem, and sued for peace in its war with Iraq (which Saddam started) once it realized it couldn't win. North Korea, meanwhile, is a tiny,
impoverished, family-run country with a history of being invaded; its overwhelming preoccupation is survival, and every time it becomes more belligerent it reverses itself a few months later (witness last week, when Pyongyang told Seoul and Washington it was ready to return to the bargaining table).These countries may be brutally oppressive, but nothing in
their behavior suggests they have a death wish.

Still, even if Iran or North Korea are deterrable, nuclear pessimists fear they'll give or sell their deadly toys to terrorists, who aren'tfor it's hard to bomb a group with no return address. Yet look closely, and the risk of a WMD handoff starts to seem overblown. For one thing, assuming Iran is able to actually build a nuke, Desch explains that "it doesn't make sense that they'd then give something they regard as central to their survival to groups like Hizbullah, over which they have limited control. As for Al Qaeda, they don't even share common interests. Why would the mullahs give Osama bin Laden the crown jewels?" To do so would be fatal, for Washington has made it very clear that it would regard any terrorist use of a WMD as an attack by the country that supplied itand would respond accordingly. A much greater threat is that a nuclear North Korea or
Pakistan could collapse and lose control of its weapons entirely. Yet here again history offers some comfort. China acquired its first nuke in 1964, just two years before it descended into the mad chaos of the Cultural Revolution, when virtually every Chinese institution was threatenedexcept for its nuclear infrastructure, which remained secure. "It was nearly a coup," says
Desch, "yet with all the unrest, nobody ever thought that there might be an unauthorized nuclear use." The Soviets' weapons were also kept largely safe (with U.S. help) during the breakup of their union in the early '90s. And in recent years Moscow has greatly upped its defense spending (by 20 to 30 percent a year), using some of the cash to modernize and protect its arsenal.As for Pakistan, it has taken numerous precautions to ensure that its own weapons are insulated from the country's chaos, installing complicated firing mechanisms to prevent a launch by lone radicals, for example, and instituting special training and screening for its nuclear personnel to ensure they're not infiltrated by extremists. Even if the Pakistani state did collapse entirely the nightmare scenariothe chance of a Taliban bomb would still be remote. Desch argues that the idea that terrorists "could use these weapons radically underestimates the difficulty of actually operating a modern nuclear arsenal. These things need constant maintenance and they're very easy to disable. So the idea that these things could be stuffed into a gunnysack and smuggled across the Rio Grande is preposterous."The risk of an arms racewith, say, other Persian Gulf states rushing to build a bomb after Iran got oneis a bit harder to dispel. Once again, however, history is instructive. "In 64 years, the most nuclear-
weapons states we've ever had is 12," says Waltz. "Now with North Korea we're at nine. That's not proliferation; that's spread at glacial pace." Nuclear weapons are so controversial and expensive that only countries that deem them absolutely critical to their survival go through the extreme trouble of acquiring them. That's why South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan voluntarily gave theirs up in the early '90s, and why other countries like Brazil and Argentina dropped nascent programs.This doesn't guarantee that one or more of Iran's neighborsEgypt or Saudi Arabia, say
might not still go for the bomb if Iran manages to build one. But the risks of a rapid spread are low, especially given Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent suggestion that the United States would extend a nuclear umbrella over the region, as Washington has over South Korea and Japan, if Iran does complete a bomb. If one or two Gulf states nonetheless decided to pursue their own weapon, that still might not be so disastrous, given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior. Put this all together and nuclear weapons start to seem a lot less frightening. So why have so few people in Washington recognized this? Most of us suffer from what Desch calls a nuclear phobia, an irrational fear that's grounded in good evidencenuclear weapons are terrifyingbut that keeps us from making clear, coldblooded calculations about just how dangerous possessing them actually is. The logic of nuclear peace rests on a scary bargain: you accept a small chance that something extremely bad will happen in exchange for a much bigger chance that something very bad conventional warwon't happen. This may well be a rational bet to take, especially if that first risk is very small indeed. But it's a tough case to make to the public. Still, it's worth keeping in mind as Obama coaxes the world toward nuclear disarmament especially because he's destined to fail. The Russians and Chinese have shown little inclination to give up their nukes, for several reasons chief among them that the U.S. is vastly more powerful in conventional terms, and these weapons are thus their main way of leveling the playing field. Moscow and Beijing would likely be unmoved by anything short of a unilateral U.S. disarmament, which no one in Washington contemplates. And even if Russia and China (and France, Britain, Israel, India, and Pakistan) could be coaxed to abandon their weapons, we'd still live with the fear that any of them could quickly and secretly rearm. Meanwhile, the U.S. campaign to slow Iran's weapons program and reverse North Korea's is also unlikely to work. States want nukes if they feel their survival is in jeopardy. The Obama administration may have dropped talk of regime change, but it continues to threaten Pyongyang and Tehran. That ensures the standoff will continue, for so long as these states feel insecure, they'll never give up their nuclear dreams.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: HEG DA (1/5)
NO LINK OUR BELL AND LOHRKE 9 EVIDENCE FROM THE INHERENCY FLOW CLEARLY CITES HOW TNWS ARE FUNCTIONALLY WORTHLESS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CURRENT WORLD. 2. AND DOUBLE BIND, OBAMA SIGNED THE START TREATY LAST YEAR, IF REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DECREASED HEG, THEN THE IMPACT SHOULD HAVE ALREADY HAPPENED. 3. AND THERES ABSOLUETLY NO BRINK. THE NEGATIVE CANT PROVE THAT THE PLAN IS THE TIPPING POINT. 4. AND NO LINK- US HEG ISNT EVEN CLOSE TO BEING ON THE BRINK, THE US HASNT BEEN TESTED. WOHLFORTH 7 [William Wohlforth Olin Fellow in International Security Studies at Yale and Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth, Unipolar Stability, Harvard International Review, Spring 2007 http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/print.php?article=1611] US military forces are stretched thin, its budget and trade deficits are high, and the country continues to finance its profligate ways by borrowing from abroad --notably from the Chinese government. These developmentshave prompted many analysts to warn that the United States suffers from "imperial overstretch." And if US power is overstretched now, the argument goes,unipolarity can hardly be sustainable for long. The problem with this argument is that it fails to distinguish between actual and latent power. One must be careful to take into account both the level of resources that can be mobilized and the degree to which a government actually tries to mobilize them. And how much a government asks of its public is partly a function of the severity of the challenges that it faces. Indeed, one can never know for sure what a state is capable of until it has been seriously challenged. Yale historian Paul Kennedy coined the term "imperial overstretch" to describe the situation in which a state's actual and latent capabilities cannot possibly match its foreign policy commitments. This situation should be contrasted withwhat might be termed "self-inflicted overstretch"--a situation in which a state lacks the sufficient resources to meet its current foreign policy commitments in the short term, but has untapped latent power and readily available policy choices that it can use to draw on this power . This isarguably the situation that the United States is in today . But the US government has not attempted to extract more resources from its population to meet its foreign policy commitments. Instead, it has moved strongly in the opposite direction by slashing personal and corporate tax rates. Although it is fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and claims to be fighting a global "war" on terrorism, the United States is not acting like a country under intense international pressure.Aside from the volunteer servicemen and women and their families, US citizens have not been asked to make sacrifices for the sake of national prosperity and security. The country could clearly devote a greater proportion of its economy to military spending : today it spends only about 4
percent of its GDP on the military, as compared to 7 to 14 percent during the peak years of the Cold War. It could also spend its military budget more efficiently, shifting resources from expensive weapons systems to boots on the ground. Even more radically, it could reinstitute military conscript ion, shifting resources from pay and benefits to training and equipping more soldiers. On the economic front, it could raise taxes in a number of ways, notably on fossil fuels, to put its fiscal house back in order. No one knows for sure what would happen if a US president undertook such drastic measures, but there is nothing in economics, political science, or history to suggest that
1.
s. Most of those who study US politics would argue that the likelihood and potential success of such power-generating policies depends on public support, which is a function of the public's perception of a threat. And as unnerving as terrorism is, there is nothing like the threat of another hostile power rising up in opposition to the United States for mobilizing public support. With latent power in the picture, it becomes clear that unipolarity might have more built-in self-reinforcing mechanisms than many analysts realize.
such policies would be any less likely to succeed than China is to continue to grow rapidly for decade
X>9000. What is X?
AND EVEN IF US HEG DID DECLINE, THERES STILL NO IMPACT INTERNATIONAL ORDER ACCOMADATES RISING POWERS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS PREVENT WAR. Ikenberry 08professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University (John, The Rise of China and the Future of the West Can the Liberal System Survive?, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb) 5. Some observers believe that the American era is coming to an end, as the Western-oriented world order is replaced by one increasingly dominated by the East. The historian Niall Ferguson has written that the bloody twentieth century witnessed "the descent of the West" and "a reorientation of the world" toward the East. Realists go on to note that as China gets more powerful and the United States' position erodes, two things are likely to happen: China will try to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests, and other states in the system -- especially the declining hegemon -- will start to see China as a growing security threat. The result of these developments, they predict, will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power transition. In this view, the drama of China's rise will feature an increasingly powerful China and a declining United States locked in an epic battle over the rules and leadership of the international system. And as the world's largest country emerges not from within but outside the established postWorld War II international order, it is a drama that will end with the grand ascendance of China and the onset of an Asian-centered world order. That course, however, is not inevitable. The rise of China does not have to trigger a wrenching hegemonic transition. The U.S.-Chinese power transition can be very different from those of the past becauseChina faces an international orderthat is fundamentally different from those that past rising states confronted. China does not just face the United States; it faces a Western-centered system that is open, integrated, and rule-based, with wide and deep political foundations. The nuclear revolution, meanwhile, has made war among great powers unlikely-eliminating the major tool that rising powers have used to overturn international systems defended by declining hegemonic states.Today's Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join. This unusually durable and expansive order is itself the product of farsighted U.S. leadership. After World War II, the United States did not simply establish itself as the leading world power. It led in the creation of universal institutions that not only invited global membership but also brought democracies and market societies closer together. It built an order that facilitated the participation and integration of both established great powers and newly independent states. 6. AND HEGEMONY DOESNT SOLVE CONFLICT LAYNE 6[Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M University, 2006, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, p. 178] The bottom line is that the arguments of hegemonys proponents are not convincing. Great power wars in Eurasia dont happen often, and when they do, Americas economic stake s in Eurasia have never sucked it into war against its will. Doubtless, at some point in the coming decades great power war again will occur in Eurasia. When it does, the United States is uniquely well positioned to weather any economic disruption that might ensue. The United States benefits economically from great power peace in Eurasia, but Eurasia is at peace most of the timeand will be regardless of the presence of U.S. troopsand most of the time U.S. trade with Eurasia will not be affected by great power turmoil. In this sense, it is far from clear that any economic benefit accrues to the United States from its military commitments in Eurasia. Simply put, regardless of whether American troops are playing a hegemonic - stabilizing role, most of the time the UnitedStatesisgoingtobeabletoreapthe benefits of economic exchange with Eurasia. On the other hand, U.S. forces in Eurasia do not ensure the continuance of peace(just as their withdrawal would not mean the inevitable outbreak of war). What the U.S. forward presence does do, however, is expose the United States to automatic entanglement in a future great power war in Eurasia,
X>9000. What is X?
AND THEY HAVE IT ALL WRONG HEG CAUSES WAR, IT PUTS THE US ON A COLLISION COURSE WITH OTHER RISING POWERS. Layne, 7Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, (Christopher, "The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 54-55) 7. Contrary to what its proponents claim, in at least three respects, primacy causes insecurity for the United States. First, even before 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq, the heavy hand of U.S. primacy pressed down on the Middle East, as the United States sought to establish political, military, and cultural ascendancy in the region. Terrorist groups like al Qaeda are a form of blow-back against long-standing U.S. policies in the Middle East and the Persian Gulfincluding American support for authoritarian regimes in the region, and uncritical support for Israel in its conflict with the Palestinians. Americas current strategy of primacy and empire also means that the United States is on a collision course with China and Iran. In both cases, the logic of U.S. strategy suggests that preventive and preemptive options are on the table to thwart the rise of a prospective peer competitor(China) and a regional rival(Iran). Tensions with China and Iran also are being fueled by the liberalWilsonian thrust of American strategy
X>9000. What is X?
AND EVEN IF THERE WAS PROLIFERATION, NONE OF THEIR IMPACTS HOLD TRUE. PROLIFERATION ACTUALLY DECREASES CONFLICT. Tepperman 09 (Johnathan, 8/29/2009; Newsweek Internationals Deupty Editor. Hes worked in the UN and has a BA in English Literature from Yale as well as MA from Oxford) A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume . The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few
politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that's a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama's idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it's not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn't be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke-free planet) that's both unrealistic and possibly undesirable.The argument that nuclear
8.
Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states." To understand whyand why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same wayyou need to start by recognizing that all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war:a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side and millions of innocents pay the price.Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable.Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a buttonand everybody knows itthe basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it,"Why fight if you can't win and
X>9000. What is X?

X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: ALLIED PROLIF DA (1/6) 1.
2.
NO LINK OUR BELL AND LOHRKE 9 EVIDENCE FROM THE INHERENCY FLOW CLEARLY CITES HOW TNWS ARE FUNCTIONALLY WORTHLESS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CURRENT WORLD. AND NON-UNIQUE. GEORGIA CONFLICT RESPONSE KILLS SECURITY CREDIBILITY
Blank 9(Stephen, Prof. Russian National security Studies Strategic Studies Institute of US Army War College, Mediterranean Quarterly, America and the Russian-Georgian War, 20:4, p. 36, http://mq.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/20/4/32.pdf
NATOs and the EUs viability as security providers, the indivisibility of European security, and the vision of a truly integrated continent are at stake here. By the same token, the credibility of American security guarantees has been dealt a serious blow . Since Russia clearly states that Americas Euro- pean presence is unnatural and that European solidarity is silly and a complicating factor for Russia, that solidarity becomes all the more critical if European security is to be preserved.14 A disunited Europe bifurcated by blocs where Russia has a free hand to do as it pleases undermines all the work of past generations for a peaceful, whole, and free Europe.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: ALLIED PROLIF DA (2/6) 3. AND NON UNIQUE. US ALREADY DOESNT LOOK CREDIBLE
Hadar 9(Leon, Ph.D. in international relations, research fellow in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Washington correspondent for Singapore Business Times, Key US Allies Adjust to New Realities; But Japan and Turkey May Not Pursue an Anti-American Agenda or Embark On a Civilisational Confrontation with the US, Singapore Business Times, Views and Opinions; Opinion, 12/15, lexis)
Recent preoccupation of foreign policy wonks in Washington has been on whether the preeminent geo-strategic status of the United States will be challenged by China, India and other emerging economies and by assertive and antagonistic regional powers such as Russia and Iran.The conventional wisdom has been that the international system is moving beyond America's post-Cold War unipolar 'moment' and that a new multi-polar structure will eventually emerge under which the US will have to contend with economic and military competition from rising and aggressive powers.But according to the same conventional wisdom, no dramatic changes in the global balance of power would take place until these powers and, in particular, China
have both the will and the capability to undermine American hegemonic position. After all, with US defence expenditure now accounting for just under half of the world total, not even a coalition of global powers has the capacity to counter-balance America's dominant military standing. At the same time, while the recent financial crisis has eroded US economic power, the US still has the largest and most advanced economy in the world. Differing views From that perspective, analysts warning of American global decline, aka 'declinists', have been criticised for overstating what has been seen as their idee fixe - the notion that American military and economic power has been eroding since the end of the Cold War; and that it may be reaching bottom now, in the aftermath of Iraq war and the financial meltdown in Wall Street. As the anti-declinists see it, while America's economic growth has been overtaken by other powers since the 1950s, the reports about the decline and fall of the US have always been exaggerated. It ain't going to happen any time soon. And in any case, US decline is not inevitable. It is true that the declinists may have been crying wolf for too many times in the past. But, then, recall that the wolf did show up at the end of that story. The pestering declinists, like those annoying hypochondriacs, may prove to be right - sooner or later, as suggested by that tragic-comic inscription
, a process of gradual waning of American power has been taking place for a while, with the notion of a US monopoly in the international system being replaced with the concept of oligopoly of great powers . The US has ceased being No 1 and has started playing the role of first among equals - or primus inter pares for some years. In fact, some governments are already sensing that America is starting to lose its mojo. Leaders of two staunch US allies, Japan and Turkey, have been trying to adjust their policies to the realities as they hedge their strategic bets and diversify their global portfolio in response to waning Pax Americana. In Japan, the election defeat of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which had ruled Japan for more than four decades, and the
on the tombstone located in the cemetery in Key West, Florida, 'I Told You I Was Sick!' But while the US will not collapse with a bang a la Soviet Union landslide victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) led by Yukio Hatoyama, has marked a peaceful revolution in that nation's politics as well as the start of a transformation in the relationship between Tokyo and Washington and their 50-year-old bilateral security alliance, established at the beginning of the Cold War. In a way, both LDP's electoral dominance and the security agreement with the US were seen as integral part of the same anachronistic order created after World War II. Under this dispensation, Japan's political and economic system was controlled by an iron triangle consisting of the LDP, the bureaucracy and big business while its foreign policy was based on the alliance with Washington which obliged the Japanese to comply with US strategic dictates in exchange for an American nuclear umbrella. Notwithstanding the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US-Japan alliance - not unlike the Energizer Bunny - kept going and going and going, as the two sides focused on new common threats, including China and North Korea. For Washington, the status quo helped perpetuate its hegemony in Northeast Asia by maintaining its military presence, while for the Japanese it
But China's economic and military ascent at a time when the US seemed be shifting its attention from East Asia, coupled with American military blunders in the Middle East and the US-made financial crisis, has ignited a debate in Japan about whether the time may have come to replace that nation's traditional dependency on Washington with a more Asian-oriented strategy. This new position that would place a new emphasis on the relationship with China and the rest of Asia and help create the foundations for a European Union-type regional system (which may not include the US as a member). That view seemed to be shared by MrHatoyama who decided to suspend an earlier agreement to relocate American Marine bases on the island of Okinawa, a move that ignited an angry response from Pentagon and created a sense that the special relationship between Washington and Tokyo may be over. Like Japan, Turkey was a leading strategic ally of the US during the
permitted the free-riding on American military protection against China's strengthening military might and North Korean nuclear arms. Cold War. Turkey was not only an important member of Nato but it also helped the Americans contain the threat from the Soviet Union and its allies in the Middle East while maintaining close military ties with Israel. And like in the case of US-Japan relationship, both Ankara and Washington seemed to be interested in maintaining their alliance after the Cold War had ended. While the Americans promised to assist Turkey in its efforts to join the European Union, Turkey expressed its willingness to cooperate with the US in containing the Islamic Republic of Iran and other radical Islamist forces in
But dramatic political changes in Turkey in the form of the growing influence of political Islam that challenged Turkey's traditional secular and pro-Western orientation and, in particular, the 2002 electoral victory of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) that is committed to an Islamist ideology, seemed to be raising doubts about the continuing viability of the US-Turkey alliance. The failure of Washington to help get Turkey into the EU played into the hands of those Turks who questioned their nation's ties to the West.
the Middle East.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: ALLIED PROLIF (3/6) 4. AND NON UNIQUE. OBAMAS NUCLEAR STRATEGY IS DESTROYING DETERRENCE.
Lexington Institute 10(Daniel Goure, PhD, States News Service, NEW OBAMA NUCLEAR STRATEGY UNDERMINES EXTENDED DETERRENCE, 4-5, L/N)
Reports have surfaced that sometime this week President Obama will declare that the United States is changing the nuclear strategy that has maintained the security of the Free World for half a century. The essence of the U.S. strategy was the willingness of every administration since Eisenhower to place, first, its military, but ultimately, the American people in harms way. America's willingness to sacrifice our own in the defense of friends and allies was the glue that held together the alliances in Europe and Asia. Also, this commitment is what made our deterrent of non-nuclear threats credible in an era when we did not enjoy conventional superiority vis- -vis the Soviet Union. The United States was willing to escalate, to use nuclear weapons first. The key to the success of the U.S. deterrence strategy was the creation of a series of deterrence thresholds like rungs on a ladder. The idea was that at each step
up the ladder the adversary was left with only two choices, either accept defeat or escalate to the next level of conflict with the attendant risk of still greater destruction. Ultimately, deterrence against a nuclear-armed adversary required that he be placed in the position of making the next to last decision, the one to unleash general strategic nuclear war. The adversary knew that by unleashing a large-scale strike against U.S. cities that this country would have no choice but to retaliate in kind. Hence, it was better not to start a fight with the United States which the adversary might win at one rung on the escalatory ladder but which it would inevitably lose as the United States raised the ante. Now, if these reports are
The president is reported to be planning to announce that under the new strategy U.S. nuclear weapons use would only come in response to nuclear use by an adversary.The U.S. will also withdraw its remaining tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. The United States will no longer deter non-nuclear attacks by the threat to escalate
correct, President Obama will dismantle the successful strategy of the past fifty years. nor will it rely on its nuclear arsenal to deter attacks involving other types of weapons of mass destruction. The new Obama strategy is based on three premises. First, that U.S. conventional power is sufficient to deter not only conventional threats but even the use of chemical or biological agents against U.S. forces, allies and territory. Second, that other nations do not need "skin in the game" to make deterrence, particularly extended deterrence that protects U.S. allies, work. Third, that nuclear deterrence is a unique political-strategic formulation, one that can be segregated from the rest of the deterrence construct. By disconnecting nuclear weapons from the continuum of deterrence the theory is that they can be rendered all-but irrelevant. Taking U.S. nuclear weapons out of the deterrence continuum will, it is assumed, motivate other nations to do the same. Nuclear weapons will only deter other nuclear weapons hence they will never be employed. As a result, nuclear deterrence can be reduced to the need to deter a nuclear first strike and the number of nuclear weapons
. The reality is that conventional deterrence fails and fails often. Moreover, nations can lose a conventional war, even the United States. The only alternative to losing a war should not be to unleash countervalue nuclear strikes against an adversary thereby inviting the same on American cities. Moreover, it is doubtful that such a threat would be deterring to an adversary pursuing limited objectives. Even if U.S. conventional forces are adequate to take up the burden of strategic deterrence, this reality will act as a spur to other nations to retain or acquire nuclear weapons. For several decades now, first the Soviet Union and now Russia has argued that a role of its nuclear forces was to deter so-called conventional attacks with nuclear equivalent effects. A policy of deterrence that does not pose the threat of a series of escalatory action fairly begs other nations to pursue a nuclear deterrent option of their own.Recognizing the growing power of large-scale precision weapons, U.S. adversaries are investing heavily in deeply buried facilities. Many of these are directly under mountains where they are likely to be immune to
reduced to just enough to destroy a number of enemy cities. This approach is also known as minimum deterrence. The Obama strategy is wrong on all three counts even the largest conventional bombs. These facilities protect what these regimes value most highly -- government leaders, nuclear weapons production, advanced weapons storage,
If these sites are also heavily defended, they may not be even accessible to airborne attack. Nuclear weapons will be needed to provide a high certainty of their destruction. For deterrence to work, it was important that everyone had skin in the game. The U.S. had skin because of its conventional force deployments in Europe and the Far East. Our allies had skin because of the presence of theater nuclear weapons on their soil which would be likely targets of hostile nuclear attack. Also, they would be responsible for employing some of them in the event of a decision to employ nuclear weapons. If those weapons were withdrawn the escalation ladder is broken and a nuclear exchange could take place over our allies' heads, risking only U.S. targets but not those in allied countries. How long will the American people tolerate such a situation? Finally, the Obama strategy erroneously assumes that nuclear deterrence can be separated from
precisely the targets that a strategy of deterrence would wish to hold at risk. the rest of the deterrence continuum. The least likely event is a surprise nuclear attack against the U.S. homeland. This is true regardless of the prospective adversary. In reality, nuclear deterrence will come into play when adversaries commit aggression against U.S. allies and overseas interests. If the adversary avoids attacks on the U.S. homeland or perhaps
. Since there is virtually no ally or interest worth national destruction, deterrence itself will no longer work against an adversary who can achieve local conventional superiority or can muster even a single long-range nuclear delivery system.
even against U.S. allies it knows it will be safe from the threat of nuclear first use. This means that all the nuclear risk is on the U.S. side
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: ALLIED PROLIF (4/6)
5. AND NO I/L EACH INSTANCE OF CREDIBILITY IS EVALUATED SEPERATELY. Fettweis 7(Christopher, Assistant Prof. National Security Affairs National Security Decision Making Dept. US Naval War College, Political Science Quarterly, Credibility and the War on Terror, 122(4), p. 617 618) Mercers larger conclusions were that states cannot control their reputations or level of credibility , and that target adversaries and allies will ultimately form their own perceptions.Sending messages for their consideration in future crises, therefore, is all but futile.These arguments echoed some of the broader critiques of the credibility imperative that had emerged in response to the war in Vietnam, both by realists like Morgenthau and Waltz and by so-called area specialists, who took issue with the interdependence beliefs of the generalists. As Jervis observed, a common axis of disagreement in American foreign policy has been between those who focus on the specific situation and the particular nations involved (often State Department officials or area experts), and those who take a global geopolitical perspective (often in the White House or outside foreign policy generalists). The former usually believe that states in a region are strongly driven by domestic concerns and local rivalries; the latter are predisposed to think that these states look to the major powers for their cues and have little control over their own fates.41 Throughout most of the Cold War, since those who argued that events are interdependent won most of the policy debates, U.S. foreign policy was obsessed with credibility . A series of other studies have followed those of Hopf and Mercer, yielding similar results. The empirical record seems to suggest that there have been few instances of a setback in one arena influencing state behavior in a second arena.42 Daryl Press began his recent study expecting to find that perceptions of the opponents credibility would be an important variable affecting state behavior. 43 He chose three cases in which reputation would presumably have been vital to the outcome the outbreak of the First World War, the Berlin Crisis of the late 1950s, and the Cuban Missile Crisis and found, to his surprise, that in all three cases, leaders did not appear to be influenced at all by prior actions of their rivals, for better or for worse.Crisis behavior appeared to be entirely independent; credibility, therefore, was all but irrelevant. Mercers conclusions about reputation seem to have amassed a good deal more supporting evidence in the time since he wrote.
X>9000. What is X?
AND EVEN IF TURKEY DID PROLIFERATE, NONE OF THEIR IMPACTS HOLD TRUE. PROLIFERATION ACTUALLY DECREASES CONFLICT. Tepperman 09 (Johnathan, 8/29/2009; Newsweek Internationals Deupty Editor. Hes worked in the UN and has a BA in English Literature from Yale as well as MA from Oxford) A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume . The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few
politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that's a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama's idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it's not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn't be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke-free planet) that's both unrealistic and possibly undesirable.The argument that nuclear
6.
Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states." To understand whyand why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same wayyou need to start by recognizing that all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war:a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side and millions of innocents pay the price.Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable.Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a buttonand everybody knows itthe basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it,"Why fight if you can't win and
X>9000. What is X?

X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: REVERSE SPENDING DA (1/2) 1. 2.
NO LINK NO EVIDENCE OF HOW REMOVING TNWS SPECIFICALLY DECREASES COSTS. AND NO LINK- REMOVING TNWS WOULD STILL INCUR THE SAME COSTS AS KEEPING THEM
Kelleher and Warren 9(Catherine M., Public Policy at the University of Maryland, and Scott L. executive director of the
nonprofit Generation Citizen Getting to Zero Starts Here: Tactical Nuclear Weapons http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_10/Kelleher)KM
The possibility exists in the near future for a reductionto a new symbolic level, for example, to 100 tactical weapons on the U.S. side, although the costs for infrastructure and security will remain near present levels. Because it is generally agreed that the present numbers are already purely symbolic, further reductions would be a signal and a commitment to the future, rather than a concrete measure such as elimination. A
specific attempt should be made now to identify and eventually destroy any remaining British and French systems now in storage.
3. 4.
NON UNIQUE IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, WITHDRAWAL FROM OTHER EUROPEAN STATES. TERMINALLY NON UNIQUE THE ADMINISTRATION IS SLATED TO INCREASE THE DODS BUDGET IN THE COMING YEARS
Preble 6-30 (Christopher Preble is director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and a member of the Sustainable
Defense Task Force, http://dailycaller.com/2010/06/30/toward-a-responsible-defense-budget/) NAR In a recent article in The Daily Caller, Chet Nagle claims that the Obama administration plans to eliminate over a trillion defense dollars in the next ten years. Unfortunately, he has no basis for saying so. The Department of Defenseisone of the onlygovernment agencies slated to receive real increases in spending over the next few years, according to the administrations budget submissions. Nagle pretends that the cuts proposed in a recent report by the Sustainable Defense Task Force have the administrations support. This is not the case. As a member of the task force, I actually wish Nagle were right. Even modest cuts to military spending which has grown by 86 percent since 1998 would show that the administration had reconsidered the approach to U.S. military power that has prevailed in Washington since the end of the Cold War. But like the last one, this administration seems to believe that U.S. troops should answer every 911 call,with American taxpayers footing the bill. Perhaps Nagle was misled by a series of speeches by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, in which Gates questioned the need for expeditionary fighting vehicles when we havent landed Marines on a hostile shore since the Inchon landing in September 1950. Perhaps Nagle confused Gates pledge to eliminate waste and inefficiency within the Pentagons budget as a sign that the secretary was serious about cutting military spending . Far from it;Gates is mainly shifting spending within the Pentagons budget. T he bottom-line figure continues to grow. Equally misguided is Nagles claim that eliminating the bomber leg of the nuclear triad is a step toward unilateral disarmament. This proposal finds support in a report published by the Air Force Associations Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies, not the province of peaceniks and anti-nuclear activists. A separate article published by the chief of the Air Force Strategic Plans and Policy Division and two Air Force War College professors concluded that as few as 311 nuclear warheads would constitute an effective and credible deterrent . The U.S. simply does not need the same nuclear force structure bombers, missiles, and submarines that it had during the height of the Cold War. The key shortcoming of Nagles article is his failure to confront the logic underlying our proposed cuts. Most of what Americans think of as defense spending isnt really intended to defend the U.S . Rather, our military is structured toward defending other countries that can and should defend themselves. Sheltered under the American security umbrella, our allies have allowed their own military capabilities to atrophy .
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: REVERSE SPENDING DA (2/2) 5.
NON UNIQUE DOD ALREADY ENGAGING IN COST-SAVING PROGRAMS _ MEANS THEY ARE OBTAINING EXCESS MONEY AT NO COST TO THEIR EFFECIVENESS.
The Wall Street Journal 6-28

(http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703964104575335180991820498.html)NAR The Department of Defense on Monday unveiled a new series of measures to wring more cost savings out of the roughly $400 billionit spends annually on weapons, equipment and services. Ashton Carter, the Pentagon's acquisition chief, held closed-door sessions Monday with top defense industry executives and defense procurement officials to explain the new initiative, which is part of a larger austerity drive within the department. Over the past decade, U.S. defense budgets have seen consistent, double-digit growth, but Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned in May that the post-9/11 defense spending boom was coming to an end. In an interview, Mr.
6.
Carter said the department wanted to "do more without more" by realizing 2% to 3% in annual savings through productivity enhancements and greater efficiencies. "If we can achieve that, we can avoid the alternative, which is instability, uncertainty, broken programs, and broken faith and confidence with the taxpayer that we're capable of delivering value for the defense dollar," he said. NO INTERNAL LINK COST SAVINGS COVER INFLATION, NOT SPECIFIC WEAPONS PROGRAMS
For the
Washington Post 10(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/09/AR2009060902647.html) NAR

Defense Departmentto merely tread water, a good rule of thumb is that its inflation-adjusted budget must grow about 2 percent a year(roughly $10 billion annually, each and every year). Simply put, the costs of holding on to good people, providing them with health care and other benefits, keeping equipment functional, maintaining training regimes, and buying increasingly complex equipment tend to grow faster than inflation. This is, of course, no more an absolute rule than is Moore's law about changes in computing capacity. But like
Moore's law, it tends to hold up remarkably well with time, especially when downsizing the Defense Department's force structure is not really an option, and it is not today. It is easiest to understand this by examining the four main categories of Pentagon spending: military personnel, operations and maintenance, procurement, and research and development. Regarding the first, there were times in the 1970s when we starved personnel accounts, but the result was a dispirited and "hollow" force. At a time of war, when we are asking so few troops to do so much for so long, this is not a viable option. In fact, over
the years of the Bush presidency, personnel spending increased 100 percent. About 25 percent of that was due to the cumulative effects of
inflation and another quarter to mobilizing reservists and enlarging the force. But the remaining half was real cost growth averaging 5 percent a year. Even if we slow the trend, we can't realistically end it. Operations and maintenance costs are always what budgeteers want to cut -- and always the area where they overestimate the potential for savings. This
was the case in the 1990s; almost every year the Clinton administration hoped to economize on such expenses through new types of efficiencies, but almost every year it wound up needing to add to those accounts retroactively. Among defense budget specialists, the
real debate is whether inflation-adjusted operations and maintenance costs per person grow at 2 percent annually or 3 percent or somewhere in between . Procurement and research and development are the chief areas in which Defense Secretary Robert Gates has sought savings in the proposals he announced in April. He has proposed cuts to programs including the F-22 fighter, the DDG-1000 destroyer, the Army's Future Combat System, the presidential helicopter fleet, the transformational communications satellite, aircraft carrier production runs, the airborne laser missile defense program and the next-generation bomber. These are solid proposals; he could make additional cuts to the V-22 Osprey and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter programs, as well as existing nuclear weapons platforms.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: NATO DA (1/5) 1. 2. 3.
NO LINK OUR BELL AND LORHKE 09 EVIDENCE CITES HOW TNWS ARE WORTHLESS NATO WOULDNT CARE IF WE WITHDREW THEM. AND NO LINK, US HAS BEEN WITHDRAWING TNWS FROM EUROPE FOR DECADES NOW. AND NON UNIQUE - NATO ALLIANCE IS NOT COHESIVE AFGHAN AND IRAQ SUPPORT PROVES
Kashmeri 10 (Sarwar, 7/1, is Senior Fellow of the Atlantic Council's International Security
Program and a resident of Reading. http://www.vpr.net/episode/48933/ accessed 7/8) CM
The North Atlantic Treaty Organizationwas set up in 1949 to fight the SovietUnion . Today it is increasingly dysfunctional, still searching for a new role two decades after the end of the Cold War. Left in this state, NATO may soon become irrelevant to the security needs of the EuroAtlantic area. Cohesion used to be NATO's hallmark, but there's little of it left. The Eastern and Central European members want NATO to act more aggressively against Russia, while the United States, Canada, and the Western Europeans no longer consider Russia a threat . Many of America's largest NATO allies refuse to fight in Afghanistan and are even unable to find a few hundred trainers for that war. And you may recall, NATO refused to support America's invasion of Iraq. 4. AND NO LINK THE US DOES NOT NEED TO DRAW NATO INTO MILITARY OPREATIONS NATO WONT BE AFFECTED BY THIS ONE INSTANCE OF WITHDRAWAL.
Bensahel 3 (Nora, Public Policy Expert at RAND, The Counterterror Coalitions,

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1746/MR1746.pdf)IM
The question of NATOs future role in counterterrorism is more complex. Many Europeans believed that the Article 5 invocation would lead to increased transatlantic cooperation against terrorism, but the United States decided to conduct Operation Enduring Freedom on a bilateral basis without any direct NATO role . The allies spent most of 2002 wrestling with the questions of why that occurred and what role NATO should play in future counterterror efforts. The Prague Summit endorsed some of the concepts that emerged from this debate, including the adoption of a new military concept against terrorism and a new capabilities initiative that will improve the alliances ability to respond to short-notice crises. Yet the fundamental question about NATOs role in counterterrorism remains unanswered. Most of the allies believe that NATO needs to expand its authority and capabilities in this important area and must address related issues such as consequence management. Yet France has vo- cally challenged this position, arguing that NATOs role in counterterrorism is sufficient as it is now, and that related issues such as consequence management should be addressed through the European Union rather than NATO. From a purely military perspective, September 11 showed that the United States does not need to draw on NATO to
conduct military operations against suspected terrorists and their state sponsors. The United States demonstrated its ability to conduct a major offensive campaign in Afghanistan , along with smaller training operations in the Philippines, Georgia, and elsewhere, while limiting the NATO role to backfilling U.S. forces by patrolling U.S. airspace and the oceans off the Horn of Africa. To be sure, individual NATO
allies did make significant military contributions, particularly in regard to special forces, but these were made on a bilateral basis and did not involve NATOs military staff. Barring a radical increase in European military ca pabilitiessomething which would take years to achieve, even under the best of circumstances the United States will most likely
choose to avoid giving NATO more than a minimal role in future military operations against terrorists and their sponsors. The United States should therefore emphasize bilateral military relation- shipswhen planning and conducting counterterror military operations, so that it can incorporate
useful contributions from the willing without automatically involving all 19and soon to be 26alliance members in the decisionmaking process.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: NATO DA (2/5) 5.
AND ALTERNATE CAUSE OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM HAS ALREADY KILLED US NATO RELATIONS
Bensahel 3(Nora, Public Policy Expert at RAND, The Counterterror Coalitions,

NATO, and transatlantic cooperation more broadly, suffered another blow when the United States shifted its attention from Afghanistan to Iraq.The diplomatic buildup to Operation Iraqi Freedom lasted more than a year, first involving divisions between the United States and the Europeans, and ultimately
resulting in divisions within Europe itself. A detailed examination of the diplomatic events during that buildup is beyond our scope here, but there were two primary areas of disagreement : whether Iraq should be categorized
as a problem of terrorism, and whether the United States had the right to take action in Iraq
without explicit authorization from the United Nations (UN) Security Council. First, many European states disagreed with the U.S. argument that operations against Iraq should be the next step in the counterterr or campaign. Despite the Bush administrations continuing insistence that Iraq supported intern ational terrorism, including support of al Qaeda, most European states remained unconvinced that they faced a significant threat. Instead, they believed that Iraq posed a problem related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. While this may seem like a semantic difference, these different conceptual- izations of the problem led to extremely different policy preferences.The United States argued that Saddam Husseins support for terrorism posed an imminent threat, and that regime change was the only way to mitigate this threat. Many of the European states, by contrast, believed that Saddam Hussein did not pose an imminent threat, but that he should not be allowed to achieve his long-term goal of procuring weapons of mass destruction. That objective required renewed UN weapons inspections but would not require regime change, at least in the short term. The Europeanswere encouraged by President Bushs speech to the United Nations on September 12, 2002,42 in which he emphasized the importance of renewed WMD inspections, and by the unanimous passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1441, which provided a new mandate for the inspectors.43 However, theygrew increasingly disillusioned in early 2003, when the United States argued that it had the right to proceed with military action because Iraq was not fully cooperating with the weapons inspectors . Many Europeans argued thatthe inspections should be given more time , whereas the United States contended that Iraqi obstructions demonstrated that the inspections had once again failed. Countering terrorism is an inherently challenging taskrequiring deep and sustained international cooperation across a wide range of issue areas. To date, the United States has chosen a strategy built primarily on bilateral relationships with the Europeans. The minimal role that NATO playedin Operation Enduring Freedom demonstrates that even when a multilateral option exists, the United States often prefers to pursue counterterror
cooperation through bilateral channels. 6. AND NO IMPACT THE GAP WOULD BE FILLED WITH RUSSIA UKRAINE AND MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES
Bensahel3 (Nora, Public Policy Expert at RAND, The Counterterror Coalitions,

7.
One of NATOs great strengths is that it promotes
cooperation not only among its members but with partner states as well. NATOs out- reach programs provide a good opportunity to strengthen cooperation against terrorism among the partner states, particularly because the institutional
mechanisms for cooperation already exist.25 The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is the oldest of these mechanisms, established in 1994 to foster cooperation with the states of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. However, the character and purpose of thePfP may change significantly in the coming years. Seven current PfP members were invited to join the alliance during the Prague Summit, and the remaining PfP members are not likely to join NATO in either the near
One possible direction for future cooperation is to address common threats such as terrorism. NATO also maintains special partnerships with Russia and Ukraine, which could also be used to address issues related to terrorism. The Mediterranean Dialogue may become the most important of these
or medium term.26 Thus, the PfP will have to re- orient its activities so that they focus less on preparing for NATO membership .
regional partnerships for the long-term struggle against terror- ismits seven non-NATO members are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. Terrorism has not traditionally been an area of cooperation within the Mediterranean Dialogue, and its 2002 Work Program states only that NATO
is considering possibilities for consultation on terrorism with interested Mediterranean Dialogue countries.27 Nevertheless, over the long term, the Mediterranean Dialogue could develop programs of cooperation in this important area that supplement what the United States and the other NATO members are able to achieve on a bilateral basis .
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: NATO DA (3/5)
AND EVEN IF THERE WAS PROLIFERATION, NONE OF THEIR IMPACTS HOLD TRUE. PROLIFERATION ACTUALLY DECREASES CONFLICT. Tepperman 09 (Johnathan, 8/29/2009; Newsweek Internationals Deupty Editor. Hes worked in the UN and has a BA in English Literature from Yale as well as MA from Oxford) A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few
8.
weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them.Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century.As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC
X>9000. What is X?
threatened to "bury" the United States, and in 1957, Mao blithely declared that a nuclear war with America wouldn't be so bad because even "if half of mankind died the whole world would become socialist." P yongyang and Tehran support terrorism but so did Moscow and Beijing. And as for seeming suicidal, Michael Desch of the University of Notre Dame points out that Stalin and Mao are the real record holders here: both were responsible for the deaths of some 20 million of their own citizens.

X>9000. What is X?
9. AND NATO BAD US HEGEMONY THROUGH NATO SPARKS WW3 Marshall 10(Andrew Gavin, June 29,is a Research Associate with the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). He is currently studying Political Economy and History at Simon Fraser University, Global Research http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=19951 accessed 7/8) CM
For the first time in the last 500 years, the East has risen with China and India as new global powers, rising within the system not against it; marking the first time that nation-states have not risen against the global power, but with the global power. China and India are being brought within a new global political and economic system that is being constructed: a global totalitarian system of continental colonies to a global state. In 1998, then Secretary-General of NATO, Javier Solana, gave a speech in which he said: It is my general contention that humanity and democracy - two principles essentially irrelevant to the original Westphalian order - can serve as guideposts in crafting a new international order, better adapted to the security realities, and challenges, of today's Europe.[40] Further, he explained, the Westphalian system had its limits. For one, the principle of sovereignty it relied on also produced the basis for rivalry, not community of states; exclusion, not integration.Thus,
to truly have global power, the international system of nation-states must be re-imagined and altered: first, into continental governance structures, and ultimately a global structure. As Solana
said, In the United Nations, the ideal of a global institution including all nations became a reality, and the ideal of European integration was set in motion. He elaborated: But an integral part of the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance was the idea of reconciliation: the integration of our militaries, the common project of collective defence, and the willingness to work towards a common approach to defend the Alliance's common values. Unfortunately, also out
of the same ashes of the second world waremerged the East-West confrontation that left Europe deeply divided for more than four decades. As our centurycomes to an end, we at last have the opportunity to overcome this division and to set free all the creative energies this continent can muster to build the new security order which will lead us into the 21st century.[41] It is a difficult balancing act for global powers particularly the United States tomanage the integration of China into the new world order,
while simultaneously both of them compete forcontrol
of global resources, located primarily in regions of the
world which are experiencing the most rapidand extensive awakening.
The imperial mindset like that of Brzezinskis seeks to rationalize global power as being equated with global stability , and that without empire, there is only chaos. Thus, imperial logic dictates that America must seek to dominate as much of the world as fast as possible, andhencecontrol global resources, which will allow it to determine the terms of China and other powers inclusion in the new worldorder. This has the potential to spark a global war a World War III type of scenario between the NATO powers and the China-Russia alliance the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) who seek to share power, not to be dominated. Global populations at home and abroad have never been so challenging to control: global war is inevitable in the imperial mindset. As Brzezinski himself stated in a speech to Chatham House in London in
2009: But these major world powers, new and old, also face a novel reality: while the lethality of their military might is greater than ever, their capacity to impose control over the politically awakened masses of the world is at a historic low.To
put it bluntly: in earlier times, it was easier to control one million people than to physically kill one million people; today, it is infinitely easier to kill one million people than to control one million people.[42]
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: SKFTA (1/2) 1. 2.
Politics file.
SKFTA CANT PASS, KOREA OPPOSES.
Huffington Post 2/15 (2/15/11, " The Korea Trade Deal Is Lose-Lose ", http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lori-wallach/the-korea-trade-deal-is-l_b_823137.html)
The Obama
administration's effort to convince Congress to pass a NAFTA-style trade pact
withSouth Korea on foreign relations and national security groundstook a beating last month when a large delegation of Korean opponents of the pact came to Washington. The administration has defaulted early on to the standard argument of last resort -- foreign policy -- because even the notoriously trade-pactboosterish U.S. International Trade Commission(USITC) has concluded that the Korea agreement will increase the overall U.S. trade deficit and undermine the prospects for seven diverse manufacturing sectors here. Prominent members of the Korean National Assembly, as well as leaders of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (equivalent to the AFL-CIO in Korea) and other civil society leaders, spoke with members of Congress, the press and U.S. civil society groups about why they oppose the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that former President George W. Bush negotiated and signed and President Obama is now pushing to pass. A majority of Koreans oppose the FTA, are offended that it requires South Korea to subject itself to the jurisdiction of foreign arbitral tribunals, and fear it will undermine the financial stability policies Korea has implementedfollowing the recent and 1997 financial crises; this was the message from the South Korean officials to U.S. members of Congress. The FTA is also "an unacceptable humiliation and an overly high
price to pay for the Americans' role in providing national defense," they said. This is exactly opposite of the mantra widely chanted by corporate lobbyists and the Obama administration officials that focuses on how passage of the FTA will be seen as cementing U.S. friendship with South Korea. The South Korean delegation found that concerns about the agreement's "investor-state" enforcement system, which empowers foreign investors to skirt domestic courts and seek cash compensation for regulatory costs before foreign tribunals, were shared by many U.S. representatives. They repeatedly asked why, given both Korea and the U.S. have well-functioning domestic court systems, private investors and corporations should be elevated to the same level as governments in obtaining rights to enforce a public treaty. And they repeatedly asked why this offensive system was being imposed on Korea when the U.S. trade pact with Australia did not include the private corporate enforcement. Moreover, they noted what a severe blow would be dealt to public sentiment in both countries when the first U.S. or Korean laws are attacked before foreign tribunals by one of the 2,055 cross-established corporate
Another issue intensifying opposition to the FTA in Korea is the pact's pre-crisis era financial deregulation requirements. After the 1997 Asian financial crisis wiped out decades of improvements to Korean living standards, Korea's policy response to the recent global crisis was forceful. Yet, aspects of both Korean and U.S. financial regulation would newly be exposed to direct challenge by the very firms that wrecked the global economy.
affiliates.
3.
SKFTA FAILS; HOUSE GOP PUTS IT IN A PACKAGED DEAL THAT CANT BE PASSED.
NYT 2/4(2/4/11, " More Trade Follie ", http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/05/opinion/05sat2.html)

It's been more than three years since the Bush administration signed a trade agreement with South Korea. And for more than three years Congress has been balking at it . To
Capitol Hill seemed happy until it wasn't.The agreement is the nation's most significant trade pact since the North American Free Trade Agreement and decidedly good for the United States. It would cement relations with an important ally in a dangerous region and boost American exports by at least $10 billion a year. Unfortunately, some powerful members of Congress, from both parties, seem more concerned about politics and narrow parochial interests. The House speaker, John Boehner, is now suggesting that the South Korea deal must be passed in tandem with long-delayed trade agreements with Colombia and Panama. Those two deals face fiercer resistance from trade-wary Democrats. And it is hard not to suspect that Mr. Boehner is more interested in embarrassing the White House than using the South Korea deal to leverage the other two deals through.Meanwhile, in the Senate, Max Baucus, the chairman of the Finance Committee, which handles issues related to trade, said he remains opposed to the South Korean pact because it doesn't go far enough to open its beef market
overcome that opposition, the Obama administration got Seoul to improve the terms for American carmakers.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: SKFTA (2/2) 4. AND SKFTA FAILS BLOCKED OVER BEEF DEAL.
DailyFinance 2/16(Bruce Kennedy, 2/16/11, " For US Beef Exports, 2010 Was Fat and Happy ", http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/2010-best-year-ever-for-u-s-beef-exports/19843260/)
There are some political obstacles, as well. According to the Washington Post, Senate Finance CommitteeChairman MaxBaucus(D-Mont.) is threatening to hold up the recently concluded U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement unless Seoul reconsiderssome of its restrictions on U.S.
beef.
NON-UNIQUE, SKFTA WONT BE VOTED ON TILL SPRING TOO MANY OTHER ITEMS IN THE INTERIM FOR PLAN TO TRADE-OFF. Yonhap News 2/16 (Hwang Doo-hyong, 2/16/11, " Obama wants FTAs with Korea, Colombia, Panama ratified this year: Geithner ", http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2011/02/17/52/0301000000AEN20110217000400315F.HTML) 5.
WASHINGTON, Feb. 16 (Yonhap) -- The
Obama administration is committed to pass through Congress pending free trade deals with South Korea, Panama and Colombia this year, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said Wednesday."We would like to pass all of them, alongside trade adjustment assistance, and we want to do it this
year," Geithner told a Senate Finance Committee hearing. "They're overwhelmingly in our favor economically and if we don't do it, what it means is that business just goes to other countries."Some Congressional Republicans want to consider the three FTAs concurrently, but U.S. Trade
Representative Ron Kirk has dismissed that as "a huge mistake."Kirksaid last week that the Obama administration will present the revised Korea FTA first to lawmakers within weeks, hoping Congress will be able to approve it "this spring ."
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: APPEASMENT (1/4) 1. 2. 3.
NO LINK WITHDRAWAL OF TNWS DOESNT APPEASE ANYONE. NON UNIQUE THE US HAS BEEN WITHDRAWING TNWS FROM EUROPE FOR AGES NO IMPACT AND NON UNIQUE US RETREATING NOW
Krauthammer 10 5/21/10[Charles Krauthammer, Obama's many retreats signal U.S. weakness, Washington Post, Friday,
May 21, 2010, Pg. http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2010/may/21/charles-krauthammer-obamas-many-retreats-signal/?print=1]
WASHINGTON -- It is perfectly obvious that Iran's latest uranium maneuver, brokered by Brazil and Turkey,is a ruse.Iran retains more than enough enriched uranium to make a bomb. And it continues enriching at an accelerated pace and to a greater
purity (20 percent). Which is why the French foreign ministry immediately declared that the trumpeted temporary shipping of some Iranian uranium to Turkey will do nothing to halt Iran's nuclear program. It will, however, make meaningful sanctions more difficult.America's
proposed Security Council resolution is already laughably weak-- no blacklisting of Iran's Turkey and Brazil- both current members of the Security Council -- are so opposed to sanctions that they will not even discuss the resolution. And China will now have a new excuse to weaken it further. But the deeper meaning of the uranium-export
central bank, no sanctions against Iran's oil and gas industry, no nonconsensual inspections on the high seas. Yet stunt is the brazenness with which Brazil and Turkey gave cover to the mullahs' nuclear ambitions and deliberately undermined U.S. efforts to curb Iran's program. The real news is that already notorious photo: the president of Brazil, our largest ally in Latin America, and the prime minister of Turkey, for more than half a century the Muslim anchor of NATO, raising hands together with Mahmoud
picture -- a defiant, triumphant take-thatUncle-Sam -- is a crushing verdict on the Obama foreign policy . It demonstrates how rising powers, traditional American allies, having watched this administration in action, have decided that there's no cost in lining up with America's enemies and no profit in lining up with a U.S. president given to apologies and appeasement. They've watched President Obama's humiliating attempts to appeaseIran ,
Ahmadinejad, the most virulently anti-American leader in the world. That as every rejected overture is met with abjectly renewed U.S. negotiating offers. American acquiescence reached such a point that the president was late, hesitant and flaccid in expressing even rhetorical support for democracy demonstrators who were being brutally suppressed and whose call for regime change offered the potential for the most significant U.S. strategic advance in the region in 30 years. They've watched America acquiesce to Russia's re-exertingsway over Eastern Europe, over Ukraine (pressured by Russia last month into extending for 25 years its lease of the Black Sea naval base at Sevastopol) and over Georgia (Russia's de facto annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is no longer an issue under the Obama "reset" policy). They've
watched our appeasement of Syria, Iran's agent in the Arab Levant -- sending our ambassador back to Syria even as it tightens its grip on
Lebanon, supplies Hezbollah with Scuds, and intensifies its role as the pivot of the Iran-Hezbollah-Hamas alliance. The price for this ostentatious flouting of the U.S. and its interests? Ever more eager U.S. "engagement." They've
observed the administration's gratuitous slap at Britainover the Falklands, its contemptuous treatment of Israel, its undercutting of the Czech Republic and Poland, and its indifference to Lebanon and Georgia.And in Latin America, they seenot justU.S. passivity as Venezuela's Hugo Chavez organizes his antiAmerican"Bolivarian" coalitionwhile deepening military and commercial ties with Iran and Russia. They saw active U.S.
support in Honduras for a pro-Chavez would-be dictator seeking unconstitutional powers in defiance of the democratic institutions of that country.This
is not just an America in decline. This is an America in retreat -- accepting, ratifying and declaring its decline, and inviting rising powers to fill the vacuum.Nor is this retreat by inadvertence.This is retreat by design and, indeed, on principle. It's the perfect fulfillment of Obama's adopted Third World narrative of American misdeeds, disrespect and domination from which he has come to redeem us and the world.
4. AND ANY ARTICULATION OF NEEDING FORWARD DEPOLYMENT JUST LINKS

INTO OUR AFFIRMATIVE. WE NEED TO BREAK FREE FROM THAT MINDSET; THE ALTERNATIVE IS UNENDING WAR AND GENOCIDE.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: APPEASEMENT DA (2/4)
AND TURN: WITHDRAWING TNWS ACTUALLY DOES THE OPPOSITE; NATO WANTS TNWS THERE. JONES 10 CHRISwriter for Center for Strategic & International Studies 5 7, 2010
5.
http://csis.org/blog/process-over-politics-nato%E2%80%99s-tnw-decision
The primary reason there is so much disagreement with removing TNWs from Europe is not because the B61 plays a critical role in deterring the Red Army like it did during the Cold War but because it is a symbol of commitment between the United States and Europe. Elaine Bunn likens them to wearing a wedding ring. She explains: Nuclear weapons are kind of like the wedding ring of the marriage there are those in cultures that dont wear wedding rings who are perfectly committed to their spouses, and others who wear them who dont really have much of a commitment at all. But once you start wearing one, it means something entirely different to be seen without it than it does for someone who never wore one.
X>9000. What is X?
AND EVEN IF THERE WAS PROLIFERATION, NONE OF THEIR IMPACTS HOLD TRUE. Tepperman 09 (Johnathan, 8/29/2009; Newsweek Internationals Deupty Editor. Hes worked in the UN and has a BA in English Literature from Yale as well as MA from Oxford) A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume . The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few
6.
led to what's known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile,the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there's very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuringbecause in each instance, very different leaders all came to the same safe conclusion. Take the mother of all
nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, "It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time."The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nucleararmed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior.Since acquiring
atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. SumitGanguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962 . The prospect of war brought Delhi and
X>9000. What is X?

might not still go for the bomb if Iran manages to build one. But the risks of a rapid spread are low, especially given Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent suggestion that the United States would extend a nuclear umbrella over the region, as Washington has over South Korea and Japan, if Iran does complete a bomb. If one or two Gulf states nonetheless decided to pursue their own weapon, that still might not be so disastrous, given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior. Put this all together and nuclear weapons start to seem a lot less frightening. So why have so few people in Washington recognized this? Most of us suffer from what Desch calls a nuclear phobia, an irrational fear that's grounded in good evidencenuclear weapons are terrifyingbut that keeps us from making clear, coldblooded calculations about just how dangerous possessing them actually is. The logic of nuclear peace rests on a scary bargain: you accept a small chance that something extremely bad will happen in exchange for a much bigger chance that something very bad conventional warwon't happen. This may well be a rational bet to take, especially if that first risk is very small indeed. But it's a tough case to make to the public. Still, it's worth keeping in mind as Obama coaxes the world toward nuclear disarmament especially because he's destined to fail. The Russians and Chinese have shown little inclination to give up their nukes, for several reasonschief among them that the U.S. is vastly more powerful in conventional terms, and these weapons are thus their main way of leveling the playing field. Moscow and Beijing would likely be unmoved by anything short of a unilateral U.S. disarmament, which no one in Washington contemplates. And even if Russia and China (and France, Britain, Israel, India, and Pakistan) could be coaxed to abandon their weapons, we'd still live with the fear that any of them could quickly and secretly rearm. Meanwhile, the U.S. campaign to slow Iran's weapons program and reverse North Korea's is also unlikely to work. States want nukes if they feel their survival is in jeopardy. The Obama administration may have dropped talk of regime change, but it continues to threaten Pyongyang and Tehran. That ensures the standoff will continue, for so long as these states feel insecure, they'll never give up their nuclear dreams.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: RUSSIA (1/3)
NO LINK TNWS DONT PROVIDE DETERRENCE NATOS CONVENTIONAL FORCES DO; THATS OUR BELL AND LOHRKE 09. 2. NON UNIQUE THE US HAS BEEN WITHDRAWING TNWS FROM EUROPE FOR AGES NO IMPACT 3. AND NON UNIQUE RUSSIA IS ALREADY EXPANDING CONTAINMENT ATTEMPTS FAIL. Klein 8 (Brian P, International Affairs Fellow for Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/17281/what_goes_around_comes_around_for_russia.html, AD: 7/5/10) jl Russia invades an eastern European republic, sends its navy to Latin America for military exercises in Americas backyard, and threatens to cut off energy supplies to western Europe . This reads like a chapter out of Cold War history.Yet2008 has marked the re-emergence of Russiaafter a two-decade hiatus. Flush with cash from oil and gas revenue and a hefty grudge against perceived Western insults to its great power status, Russia has launched the opening salvo in a more muscular foreign policy.While the United States and Europe hoped that Russia would become more integrated into the world system, talk of NATO expansion, support for nascent eastern European democracies, and plans for basing missiles in Poland have heightened Russias sense of alienation and its perception that it must not bend to the will of Western powers. 4. AND TURN US MILITARY PRESENCE IS USED TO JUSTIFY RUSSIA AGGRESSION. 1.
Young 9 (Cathy, Russian American journalist and writer, April,

[http://reason.com/archives/2009/03/13/unclenching-the-fist/1] AD: 7/6/10) JM
It could even be argued that the Bush administrations aggressive unilateralism on the war in Iraq, its often cavalier attitude toward human rights in the War on Terror, and its executivepower grab on the home front emboldened Putin to behave similarly. While most of the alleged Bush-Putin parallels are specious, the actions of the Bush White Houseeasilylent themselves to a self-serving interpretation by the Putin clique, validating its cynical conviction that democracy is just a cover for might makes right. The war in Iraq also made it far too easy to equate all efforts at democracy promotion, even peaceful activities such as assisting civil rights groups, withnaked imperialism. Thishelpedthe Putinpropaganda machine stoke Russian unease about the U.S. role in the color revolutions in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004, which replaced those nations governments with ones less devoted to Moscow. Many Russians certainly experienced the collapse of the USSR and the weakening of Russias influence abroad as a blow to their national pride. But the notion that the United States rubbed Russias face in its humiliation is a myth. (If the West rejoiced in Communisms Cold War defeat, so did most of the Russian media and political elites at the time.) Yes, NATO expansion into Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics ranks high on the list of Russian grievances. But when NATO first began seriously considering admitting former Eastern Bloc states in the early 1990s, most supporters of expansion assumed that it could eventually include Russia and Russia seemed receptive. These prospects were undercut by pressures from neo-Communists and nationalists in the Russian parliament, who wanted a less pro-Western stance, and by mixed signals and suspicions on both the Russian and the U.S. sides. It could be that the conflict is
more contrived than real on Russias end. The belief that Kremlin rhetoric about the American threat is a faux paranoia, calculated to enable bullying at home and abroad, is shared by numerous
commentators inside Russia, from the Carnegie Endowments Li lia Shevtsova to former top-level Soviet arms negotiator Gen. Vladimir Dvorkin. Writing in the independent online journal EJ.ru in April 2008, Dvorkin pointed out the obvious: Given Russias nuclear potential, a military attack by NATO troops on Russia is unthinkable, no matter how many of its neighbors join the alliance. The real danger to Russia, in Dvrkins view, is civilizational isolation if the country continues to resist democratization and modernization and finds itself surrounded by neighbors integrated into the West.
AND TURN OVERSEAS BASES GIVE AN INCENTIVE FOR RUSSIA TO ENGAGE IN MILITARY ADVENTURISM Vine 9(David, prof of Anthropology at American U, February 25, [http://www.fpif.org/articles/too_many_overseas_bases] AD: 7/7/10)JM
Proponents of maintaining the overseas base status quo will argue, however, that our foreign bases are critical to national and global security. A closer examination shows that overseas bases have often heightened military tensions and discouraged diplomatic solutions to international conflicts. Rather than stabilizing dangerous regions, our overseas baseshave often increased global militarization, enlarging security threats faced by other
5.
nations who respond by boosting military spending(and incases like China and Russia,
X>9000. What is X?
foreign base acquisition) in an escalating spiral. Overseas bases actually make war more likely,
not less.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: RUSSIA (2/3) 6. AND NO IMPACT, NATO IS DETERRING RUSSIA NOW. Blank 97(Stephen, Ph.D. in History from the U of Chicago., November, [http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=146] AD: 7/7/10)JM
As in the past, European
security organizations must deter and reassure Russia while enhancing the security of the littoral states.11 These organizations must also jointly sharein any Baltic security plan so that no state or organization obtains a free ride. Free riding occurs when one or more states, or organizations, knowing
or believing that some other state or organization can or will formulate solutions for major issues like Baltic security, effectively abstains from serious participation in the solution. Instead that state/s or organization/s then lets other states act alone, gaining a free ride at their expense. If free riding pervades an entire alliance as in the 1930s, security guarantees are devalued and could even become worthless.12 Accordingly, to stabilize the Baltic region, states cannot keep looking, as they are now tempted to do, for others to ensure regional security. Free riding undermines Baltic integration in Europe by dissolving the cohesion of the new NATO-led security system. It also fosters renationalized and unilateral security policies. Germany could incline further to make a bilateral deal with Russia over Central and Eastern Europe. As it is, Baltic cohesion, too, is already eroding. Lithuania poses, not as a Baltic state, but as a Central European one that seeks unilateral entry to European organizations, while forsaking Latvia and Estonia. Estonia follows suit regarding its future entry into the EU and supports admitting at least one Baltic state into NATO so that others might later gain a hearing. 13 Free riding and allied divisions regarding the Baltic could create new and unforeseen regional problems and clearly are due to the EU's and NATO's hesitations over Baltic issues.14 Regional cooperation, which is already weakened due to NATO and the EU's reluctance to expand, will further decrease where free riding and renationalized agendas prevail.15 Russia could then be tempted to extend an unwelcome protectorate over the Baltic states.
To prevent such outcomes and protect the Baltic states, NATO must continue to provide security, deter Russia, reassure, and lead the non-NATO littoral states and Europe's other security organizations, the EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), toward regional as well as European military-political integration. Failure to do so will have grave consequences. Ex-Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt wrote that Russia's Baltic policy is a litmus test of its European and security policies.16 Volker Ruhe, Germany's Minister of Defense, wrote that the Baltic states are the practical testing ground for meeting the challenges of reshaping NATO's missions, territorial scope, the relations between
the United States and its European allies, the hoped for partnership with Russia, and, in general, for building the Europe we want to see.17 German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel also stressed these states' importance for future European security.18
7.
AND MORE EVIDENCE
Valasek 9 (Tomas, director of foreign policy &defence @ CER, November,

[http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/wp_929_nato_nov09.pdf] AD: 7/7/10)JM Are allies right to worry about a war? Some new NATO countries hold fears of Russia dating back to the Cold
War; and it is not obvious that these can be exorcised through contingency planning, as one NATO insider put it.1 Equally, the Central Europeans have suffered real harassment and occasional soft attacks (like cyber -strikes) from Russia in recent years. And their worries about Moscows intentions are shared by the Nordic countries. So can all fears of Russia be put down to historical animosities? And what precisely do the North and Central Europeans worry about? Does NATO have adequate measures in place to detera potential conflict with Russia or defend against it? In principle
NATOs all for one, one for all clause, known as Article V, should deter Russia from attacking any of the allies.2 And so should NATOs military superiority.But could Russia have reasons to doubt that
NATO would respond collectively to an attack on a Central European ally? And what is the state of NATOs preparations for the defence of a member-state in Central or Northern Europe?
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: RUSSIA (3/3)
AND NO CHANCE OF RUSSIAN THREAT_ THEIR MILITARY AND ECONOMY ARE IN RUIN. Friedman and Logan 9(Benjamin, PhD in econ from Harvard, and Justin, M.A in international relations from the U of Chicago, Spring, [http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/friedman_logan_hittingstopbuttononnatoexpansion.pdf] AD: 7/6/10)JM
This narrative is devoid of strategic logic. Leaving aside nuclear weapons, which deterrence renders unusable, Russia is not a great power, and is incapable of threatening Western Europe, let alone the United States. The World Bank predicts that Russias economy will shrink by 4.5 percent this year , and its unemployment will hit 12 percent. Even close to the height of oil prices, Russia possessed a gdp only roughly at 60 equivalent to that of Italy and Portugal combined. Its stock market is down by more than half since this time last year. Its defense spending totals about $70 billion annually (less than what the U.S. spends on defenseresearch and investment alone), for what remains a second-rate military. This is a country strong enough to pummel weak neighbors like Georgia, but one that shouldnt worry Europe, which spends roughly four times more. Balance of power theory tells us thatif Russia grows more threatening, the members of the EuropeanUnionnow collectively richer than the U.S.will respond by investing more on defense than their current average of 2 percent of gdp, and by further integrating their military capacity . No longer driven by a revolutionary ideology, Russia also lacks the Soviet Unions ambitions. True, Russia does not like the democratic governments on its flanks in Ukraine and Georgia. But that is because these governments are pursuing policies that anger Russia, not because they are democratic per se. What Russia wants are pliant neighbors.That desire is typical of relatively powerful states: The long U.S. history of violent interventions in Latin America undermines whatever lectures we might direct at Moscow.
8.
9. AND NO IMPACT, RUSSIA EXPANSION FAILS LOOK AT GEORGIA. Klitsounova 9(Elena, Centre for European Policy Studies Russias Response: Sovereign Democracy Strikes Back Oct. 30)AQB 10. Yet, while Russian soft power instruments may predominate on paper in a wide variety of policy areas, they seem to lack power in practice.The Georgian crisis of August 2008 clearly showed Russias limited ability to expand influenceover its immediate neighbours by pulling only on the levers of soft power. And the situation is likely to become even more complicated in the near future. As a result of the crisis, the Russian cabinet has already announced budget cuts, so establishing and expanding new areas of external aid on a shrinking budget will be extremely difficult. At the moment, some institutional features of Russias political model seem to be attractive to quite a number of regimes in the post-Soviet region. Moscows impetuous rebellion against the intervention of democracy promoters seems to be viewed with some sympathy in many post-Soviet capitals. Nevertheless, it is important not to overestimate Russias political attractiveness. With a younger generation of politicians soon to come to power, Russias leadership is likely to lose a large part of its capital of personalised relationships with post-Soviet political elites. The ongoing world economic crisis may dramatically change the structures of interest and power in the region and thus undermine the effectiveness and attractiveness of non-competitive political regimes. And last but not least, the EUs serious attempts at projecting its own political influence far beyond its borders may also change the expectations of political actors populating the EU-Russia common neighborhood.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: TURKISH ECON (1/2)
NO LINK WE DONT WITHDRAW INCIRLIK BASE; ONLY TNWS. NON UNIQUE THE ECONOMY IS ALREADY DOWN SHORT TERM STATS ARE DECEPTIVE. Ankara 6/20(Ali AslanKilic, 2010, Todays Zaman http://www.todayszaman.com/tz -web/news-213643105-govt-pleased-by-falling-unemployment-rate-opposition-incredulous.html) 1. 2.
Deputy Prime Minister and Economy Minister Ali Babacan shared his prediction that the rate will continue to fall steadily to 10 percent during the summer season, in a
. He was also bold enough to predict that while average unemployment figures continue to decrease in Turkey, they will rise in the EU in both 2010 and 2011. The Turkish economy started its recovery earlier than everyone else, and this recuperation in the economy has brought a reduction in the unemployment rate. Employment rose by 1.59 million in Turkey in a single year, and there are no figures to match to this anywhere across Europe, he asserted. Answering Sundays Zamans questions regarding the latest unemployment figures, Harunztrk, CHP zmir deputy and a prominent voice shaping his partys position on the economy, was skeptical of success. He claimed the drop was caused by seasonal factors and added, Besides, looking at this years figures alone would be deceptive.Still he didnt hesitate to agree that there have been positive developments in the economy recently while also underlining that the sustainability of these figures would be manifest by fall. 3. AND MORE EVIDENCE USSEC 9 (December 31, Filed April 1, 2010 United States Security and Exchange Commission, EDGA Online, Lexis ) As expected, the Turkish economy and domestic Turkish construction activity continued to contract in 2009. Implementation of strong cost-control measures and improved operating efficiencies helped partly to offset the downturn in domestic demand. Overall operating profit was lower. 4. AND MORE EVIDENCE. TURKEY ECONOMY PERMANENTLY HURT FROM THE 70s COUP LACKOF CAPITAL INVESTMENT, CORRUPTION AND LOW CONIDENCE DETERS FOREIGN INVESTMENT. Ankara 105/28 (Ali AslanKilic, Staff Writer 2019 Today Zaman http://www.todayszaman.com/tzweb/news-211320-101-the-economic-repercussions-of-may-27-2-osman-demir-may-27-stabbed-theeconomy-in-the-back.html)
meeting held the same day as TurkStat announced its glad tidings on unemployment
Professor Demir asserted that the lack of capital accumulation is extremely detrimental to the economy, and the military coup of May 27 is a serious contender for being a major hindrance . Defining confidence as a key concept for a sustainable economy , Demir asked, Is capital accumulation possible in a country that is worried about the military overthrowing the government at any moment? Without accumulated capital, the economy cannot be competitive, he said, with this negative effect on an already feeble economy having repercussions in the future. Under normal circumstances, small investors can use their profits to boost their capital and grow further. But if this process is obstructed, things cannot function as they should, and worse, if the banks are weakened by corrupt practices during these periods that lack transparency, is capital accumulation possible in such a country? How can we know what happens behind the scenes if the channels of communication are not as open as they are today? Capital accumulation is impossible in a non-transparent environment, he said. The heaviest price paid with the process that was started by the May 27 coup was paid during the post-modern coup of Feb. 28, 1997. Demir indicated that the Turkish nation is still paying for the bad debts of the banks that went out of business during this coup . Demir reiterated that there
were retired generals on the executive boards of these banks and argued that the general publics concern about potential coups is well evidenced by the generals
. Either the capital owners felt the need to maintain close or amicable relations with the power groups for survival, or they were guided by their ambitions for unfair profits.Can an economy function properly under such an atmosphere? As a consequence, many banks failed, with the nation paying the price. We are still paying it, he said. Professor Demir added that international investors will not be inclined to invest in a country where local investors are reluctant to do the same.If the
admission that they were invited by the banks to became board members. T here could be two explanations for this countrys own investors prefer to invest in financial sectors abroad rather than investing in non-financial sectors in their own country, will international investors be eager
unemployment inevitably emerges because employment opportunities cannot be created due to the lack of capital accumulation and appeal for international investors.
to invest in that country? he asked. Demir noted that economic, social and political relations are processes that complement each other and that
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: TURKISH ECON (2/2)
5. AND NO LINK US AID HAS SIGNIFICANTLY DECREASED. Migdalovitz 8(Carol, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 8/29/8, Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34642.pdf) JPG
Turkeys geostrategic importanceto the United States is symbolized by the Incirlik Air Base. Since the 1950's, with minor interruption, Turkish governments of all political persuasions have granted the United States forces permission to use the baseunder a bilateral defense cooperation agreement. In the past, the U.S. granted Turkey considerable foreign aid, tacitly in exchange for such access. In recent years as Turkeys economy has grown, however, the United States has not provided it with much assistance. The following sections of this report describe Turkeys policies on selected issues and, as
appropriate, U.S. Administration and congressionalviewsofTurkeyinthesecontexts.Thelast section deals with Turkeys Incirlik Air Base, which symbolizes the unwavering geostrategic importance of Turkey for the United States, despite bilateral differences on a growing range of subjects
AND LINK TURN US MILITARY PRESENCE ACTUALLY HURTS THE ECONOMY STUNTS INVESTMENT AND CREATES INFLATION. Gabelnick 99(Tamar, member of the Federation of American Scientists, May 1, 1999 [http://www.fpif.org/reports/turkey_arms_and_human_rights] AD: 6/23/10)JM U.S. arms sales and continued conflict in Turkeyalso damage Turkeys economyandprospects for economic cooperationwith the West. The 1998 CIA Factbook states that Turkey spends about $7 billion a year on the war with the PKK, which contributed to a 99% inflation rate for 1998 and a national debt equal to half the governments revenue. War-related political and financial instability has discouraged foreign investment. A U.S.-backed plan would route a Caspian Sea oil pipeline through territory where the PKK operates, leaving it susceptible to rebel attacks. An end to the war and improvements in human rights are also necessary preconditionsfor Turkeys entry into the European Union (EU), which the U.S. believes would draw Turkey closer to the West. Turkeys ceaseless provocation of Greece, again using U.S. arms, is another barrier to EU entry. 7. AND NO INTERNAL LINK TURKEY ECONOMY IS NOT KEY TO WORLD ECON. BBC 6/3 (2010, BBC Monitoring, Lexis) KLS Referring to economic targets,Prime Minister Erdogansaid: "Our target is to become one of the world's first ten economies in 2023. We have adopted an economic understanding based on exports. Our exports increased fourfold to 102bn dollars in the last 7.5 years. Turkish economy became the 17th biggest economy of the world in this process. Now, we aim at increasing our exports up to 500bn dollars by the year 2023. It is not a dream. It is not an uncatchable target." 6.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: GENERAL KRITIKS (1/4) 1. 2. 3.
THEY CONCEDED THE GROSSBERG EVIDENCE WHICH PROVES THAT THEY CANT SOLVE - THEIR INDIVIDUAL REJECTION DOESNT DO ANYTHING. PERM DO THE PLAN AND SOLVE FOR THE HARMS AND THEN DO THE ALTERNATIVE PERM DO THE PLAN AND ALL NON-COMPETITIVE PARTS OF THE ALTERNATIVE. ACTION IS NEEDED TO SOLVE.
Jarvis 2000(Darryl, Associate prof of IR @ Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Disciplinepg 198//dml)
I am, of course, being flippant. Yet we do have a right to asksuch questions of subversivepostmodernists if only because they portendto a moral highground, to insights otherwise denied realists, modernists, positivists, and mainstream international relations scholars. We have every right to ask, for example, how subversivepostmodern theory speaks to the practical problems endemic to international relations, to the actors and players who constitute the practices of world politics, or how literary devices and deconstructive readings help us better picture world society. My point, of course, is much the same as Robin Browns, that textual analysisand deconstruction does not, and cannot, speak to such problems other than to detect the limits of a particular text by identifying origins, assumptions, and silences. What it cannot do, however, is deal with the practical problem of international relations. Similarly, Hoffman too gives no answers to these questio ns save this justification for the turn to interpretivism. This move, he writes, connects international relations, both as a practice and a discipline, with similar developments within social and political theory and within the humanities, But what justification or rationale is this?So we are now doing what literary theorists do: ruminating over international theory as if such were the verses of lyricists written for the pleasures of reading and consumed only for their wit and romance. But there is a difference between the concerns and interests of, say, English departments and those of departments of Political Science or International Relations.Where literary criticism delights in the ethereal play of words and has as its epistemic basis the belief that one reads for pleasure, politics dabbles in the material, distributive, punitive play of power whose consequences effect much more than a sensibility committed to reading fiction. Why should we assume that tools developed in English departments are useful to theorists of international relations? Why should we take heed of the writings of Jacques Derrida who never once addressed issues of international relations, but from whom postmodernists now claim a wisdom which they insist is reason enough to dispense with past theory and begin anew our theoretical and disciplinary enterprise?
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: GENERAL KRITIKS (2/4)
THE KRITIK IS A DEPOLITICIZED AVERSION TO POLICYMAKING. THEIRWITHDRAWAL FROM POLITICS ALLOWS CORPORATE AND RIGHTWINGINTERESTS TO CANNABALIZE THE PUBLIC SPHERE. THE IMPACT ISEXTINCTION Boggs 97, Carl National University, Los Angeles, December 1997, The great retreA2: Decline of the public spherein latetwentieth-century America, Theory and Society, Volume 26, Number 6, JDI The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas andchallenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, postmodernism,Deep Ecology intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins inpopular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their differentoutlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles tocombat and overcome alienation.The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizingimpulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacityof individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgentproblems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved perhaps even unrecognized only to fester more ominously in the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay,spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside thelarger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically,the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendasthat ignore or sidestep these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence.In hiscommentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics,as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life ofcommon involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions. 74 In themeantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of antipoliticsbecomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of politicalpower that will continue to decide the fate of human societies.This last point demands further elaboration.The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that socialhierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold overpeoples lives. Far from it: the spaceabdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready toparticipate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites an already familiardynamic in many lesser-developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not veryfar removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a partof the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in theface of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for areassertion of politics in more virulent guise or it might help further rationalize the existing powerstructure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of thoseuniversal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.
4.
X>9000. What is X?
THE CRITIQUE CEDES POLITICS TO THE RIGHT AND PREVENTS US FROM BEING ABLE TO HOLD POLICYMAKERS ACCOUNTABLE. IT MISUNDERSTANDS POWER FORMATIONS AND CREATES A MORAL VACUUM THAT COLLAPSES INTO RESENTMENT, WHICH TURNS THEIR IMPACT. Carr, and Zanetti, 2001Adrian N. Carr, Principal Research Fellow in the School of Social, Community and Organisational Studies at the University of Western Sydney and Lisa A. Zanetti, assistant professor in the Harry S Truman School of Public. Affairs, University of Missouri-Columbia, Textuality and the postmodernist neglect of the politics of representation, Tamara : Journal of Critical Postmodern Organization Science, Vol. 1, Iss. 3; p. 14,
In their disposal of the subject and authorial motivation, the skeptical postmodernists,in our view, lay a
5.
dangerous precedent for absolving human subjects of responsibility for 'texts'and simultaneously direct attention away from the power dynamics and strugglesthat were and are involved in the creation and
promotion of certain texts. Our argument is that text is both a product and site of political struggle, and only by understanding text in such a way does the multiauthorship of identity itself become understandable along with the limitations and possibilities for self-authorship of identity. The demise of the author, inherent in postmodernist
theorising, announces an end to responsibility and, in so doing, creates a
moral vacuum.In setting aside the author and authorial motivation, skeptical postmodernists are promoting analysis of a text
in a manner that directs attention away from the power dynamics that influenced an author in the act of creation and promotion of that text. Earlier, we noted, along with Agger (1992: 297), Calhoun (1995: 116) and Rosenau (1992: 48), that disposing of the author and causality paves the way for a denial of any basis for critical judgement and moral responsibility. The issue of moral agency is dissipated as no one is seen to author (claim responsibility for) a text. Rosenau (1992: 33) makes a similar point when she observes: "Because no single human being can be held accountable for a situation in the sense of having causual input, no one "authors" a text event as such. For the social sciences the death of the author results in removing responsibility from human subjects (Pinter 1987:147). I am not responsible for how my children turn out; I did not author their lives, authro(ize) their effirts, have author(ity) over thier choices. Policy
makers do not author decisions, so they cannot be held accountable in any specific sense for policy outcomes (texts). Similarly, if U.S. policy in Central America (a text) is independent of its author's intentions, then the Carter (Bush or Regan) administration would not be viewed as the author (the responsible agent), answerable for the outcome." In this sense, postmodernists encourage a form of "social amnesia" (Jacoby 1975), a mode of consciousness that forgets its own ontology.As Marcuse (1964: 97) remarks, this suppression of history "is not an
academic but a political offair". In discussing the work of Marcuse, Giroux (1983: 31-32) argues: "It must be stressed that the ideological justificaion of the given social order is not to be found simply in modes of interpretation that view history as a 'natural' evoking process, nor in the ideologies distributer through the culture industry, but it is alos found in the material reality of those needs, desire and wants that bear the inscription of history. That is, history is to be found as 'second nature' in those concepts and views of the world that the make the most dominating aspects of the social order appear to be immune from historical sociopolitical development. Those aspects of reality that rest on an appeal to the universal ans invariant often slip from historical consciounessansbecomw embedded within those historically specific needs and desires that like individuals o the logic of conformity and domination." It was an understanding of the 'authoring' of history that was a crucial issue for Marcuse (1955, 1964) in his critique of psychology as being too cognitive and ahistorical in its recognition of where needs, wants and desires become fashioned. Marcuse's analysis highlighted the forms of repression and domination that are taken as `second nature' and are manifested in structures, norms and behaviours. Repression
becomes reproduced within the psyche of the individual and the collective as a psychological ideal to be realised, thus the individual becomes unwittingly a willing participant in the continuation of his/her own servitude. Careful analysis by
Marcuse, employing psychoanalytical and critical theory, illustrated how repression is reproduced both in (through the super-ego as both an ego-ideal and as a censor) and over (through the reality principle of the ego that takes note of the institutionalized repressive agencies in society) the individual - thus, repression
is located as both a psychological and political phenomenon(see Marcuse 1955; Carr 1989,1994,1995). This 'unmasking' of individual and collective "social amnesia", in the
case of Marcuse, was only possible through an intention to discover how ideology functions "as lived experience" which in turn caused him to reflexively examine the author and authorial motivation of a 'text'. Only through such a pursuit did an understanding of how instinctual drives and developmental issues can and are manipulated socially and institutionally (see Carr 1994 1995; Carr &Zanetti 1997). In many of the skeptical postmodemist formulations power seems to be everywhere and nowhere - a matter that has been noted by others,with some Marxists arguing that the lack of analysis of the power dynamics in the construction of text simply aids and abets those responsible for the exploitation of the working class (see Wood 1986). Thompson (1993), for example, suggests that the
postmodernist conception of power is one that above all
X>9000. What is X?
stresses "that power is not possessed by individuals,groups or functions but is always a relationship, implying positive-sum rather than zero-sum outcomes[as implied by many conflict theorists].
In this sense [consistent with the earlier discussion in this paper] such analysis is limited to decentering of the subject. That is,
power is understood without reference to agency, its mechanisms impersonal and independent of conscious subjects" (Thompson 1993:199, brackets indicate our comment). Thompson also goes on to challenge the
postmodernist notion that power is of necessity brought into being by and wedded to language, but his major argument is that ultimately we are left with a view that power is everywhere and nowhere (Thompson 1993: 200). Such
thinking leaves us with a concept of power which "loses its explanatory context and becomes a ubiquitous metaphysical principle" (Dews 1986 cited in Thompson 1993: 201). This notion of power is devoid of a cogent explanation of its internal dynamic. Such a rendering reifies power - power is seen as having a life of its own; the subject is placed on the periphery and the role of agency is ignored.This "works all by " mentality provides us with a human being who appears to be somewhat of a disarmed prisoner of society and, as one writer aptly describes, engenders an "ideology of resignation" 6. K FRAMEWORK BAD AND A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS a. IT STEALS ALL OF OUR GROUND. b. IT KILLS THE PLAN FOCUS EDUCATION WE JUST DEBATE ABOUT THE SAME GENERIC KRITIKS EVERY ROUND AND NEVER DEBATE ABOUT ANY POLICY ACTION. c. C/I: THE AFFIRMATIVE TEAM SHOULD WIN IF THE TOPICAL PLAN IS THE BEST POLICY OPTION PRESENTED. THE NEGATIVE TEAM HAS TO WIN THAT THE STATUS QUO OR AN ALTERNATIVE COMPETITIVE POLICYACTION IS BETTER THAN THE PLAN. 7. VAGUE ALTS BAD a. VAGUE ALTS MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DEBATE THE ALTERNATIVE OF THE KRITIK, KEY GROUND FOR THE AFF. IF WE ARTICULATE SOME ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ALT; THEYLL JUST SAY THATS NOT US AND SPIKE OUT OF OUR ARGUMENTS. b. ITS EDUCATIONALLY BANKRUPT BECAUSE ITS TOO VAGUE FOR US TO EVER DEBATE IT. c. IT PROVES THE SUPERIORITY OF THE PLAN. WE GIVE A CLEAR EXPLANATION OF HOW WE SOLVE FOR ITS HARMS WHEREAS THEY MAKE THESE FAR OUT CLAIMS THAT THEY CANT EVEN EXPLAIN HOW THEY REALLY SOLVE FOR THEM.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: BIOPOLITICS (1/4) 1. 2.
3. 4.
THEY CONCEDED THE GROSSBERG EVIDENCE WHICH PROVES THAT THEY CANT SOLVE - THEIR INDIVIDUAL REJECTION DOESNT DO ANYTHING. ABSOLUETLY NO LINK. WE SOLVE FOR BIOPOLITICS; DONT BUY THEIR ARGUEMTNS UNLESS THEY CAN GIVE A CLEAR STORY OF HOW WE ACTUALLY INCREASE BIOPOLITICS. PERM DO THE PLAN AND SOLVE FOR THE HARMS AND THEN DO THE ALTERNATIVE PERM DO THE PLAN AND ALL NON-COMPETITIVE PARTS OF THE ALTERNATIVE. ACTION IS NEEDED TO SOLVE.
I am, of course, being flippant. Yet we do have a right to asksuch questions of subversivepostmodernists if only because they portendto a moral highground, to insights otherwise denied realists, modernists, positivists, and mainstream international relations scholars. We have every right to ask, for example, how subversivepostmodern theory speaks to the practical problems endemic to international relations, to the actors and players who constitute the practices of world politics, or how literary devices and deconstructive readings help us better picture world society. My point, of course, is much the same as Robin Browns, that textual analysisand deconstruction does not, and cannot, speak to such problems other than to detect the limits of a particular text by identifying origins, assumptions, and silences. What it cannot do, however, is deal with the practical problem of international relations. Similarly, Hoffman too gives no answers to these questions save this justification for the turn to interpretivism. This move, he writes, connects international relations, both as a practice and a discipline, with similar developments within social and political theory and within the humanities, But what justification or rationale is this?So we are now doing what literary theorists do: ruminating over international theory as if such were the verses of lyricists written for the pleasures of reading and consumed only for their wit and romance. But there is a difference between the concerns and interests of, say, English departments and those of departments of Political Science or International Relations.Where literary criticism delights in the ethereal play of words and has as its epistemic basis the belief that one reads for pleasure, politics dabbles in the material, distributive, punitive play of power whose consequences effect much more than a sensibility committed to reading fiction. Why should we assume that tools developed in English departments are useful to theorists of international relations? Why should we take heed of the writings of Jacques Derrida who never once addressed issues of international relations, but from whom postmodernists now claim a wisdom which they insist is reason enough to dispense with past theory and begin anew our theoretical and disciplinary enterprise?
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: BIOPOLITICS (2/4)
AND THE KRITIK IS A DEPOLITICIZED AVERSION TO POLICYMAKING. THEIRWITHDRAWAL FROM POLITICS ALLOWS CORPORATE AND RIGHTWINGINTERESTS TO CANNABALIZE THE PUBLIC SPHERE. THE IMPACT ISEXTINCTION Boggs 97, Carl National University, Los Angeles, December 1997, The great retreA2: Decline of the public spherein latetwentieth-century America, Theory and Society, Volume 26, Number 6, JDI The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas andchallenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, postmodernism,Deep Ecology intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins inpopular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their differentoutlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles tocombat and overcome alienation.The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizingimpulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacityof individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgentproblems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved perhaps even unrecognized only to fester more ominously in the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay,spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside thelarger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically,the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendasthat ignore or sidestep these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence.In hiscommentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics,as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life ofcommon involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions. 74 In themeantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of antipoliticsbecomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of politicalpower that will continue to decide the fate of human societies.This last point demands further elaboration.The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that socialhierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold overpeoples lives. Far from it: the spaceabdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready toparticipate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites an already familiardynamic in many lesser-developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not veryfar removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a partof the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in theface of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for areassertion of politics in more virulent guise or it might help further rationalize the existing powerstructure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of thoseuniversal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.
5.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: BIOPOLITICS (3/4)
THE CRITIQUE CEDES POLITICS TO THE RIGHT AND PREVENTS US FROM BEING ABLE TO HOLD POLICYMAKERS ACCOUNTABLE. IT MISUNDERSTANDS POWER FORMATIONS AND CREATES A MORAL VACUUM THAT COLLAPSES INTO RESENTMENT, WHICH TURNS THEIR IMPACT. Carr, and Zanetti, 2001Adrian N. Carr, Principal Research Fellow in the School of Social, Community and Organisational Studies at the University of Western Sydney and Lisa A. Zanetti, assistant professor in the Harry S Truman School of Public. Affairs, University of Missouri-Columbia, Textuality and the postmodernist neglect of the politics of representation, Tamara : Journal of Critical Postmodern Organization Science, Vol. 1, Iss. 3; p. 14,
8.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: BIOPOLTICS (4/4)
thinking leaves us with a concept of power which "loses its explanatory context and becomes a ubiquitous metaphysical principle" (Dews 1986 cited in Thompson 1993: 201). This notion of power is devoid of a cogent explanation of its internal dynamic. Such a rendering reifies power - power is seen as having a life of its own; the subject is placed on the periphery and the role of agency is ignored.This "works all by " mentality provides us with a human being who appears to be somewhat of a disarmed prisoner of society and, as one writer aptly describes, engenders an "ideology of resignation" 9. K FRAMEWORK BAD AND A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS d. IT STEALS ALL OF OUR GROUND. e. IT KILLS THE PLAN FOCUS EDUCATION WE JUST DEBATE ABOUT THE SAME GENERIC KRITIKS EVERY ROUND AND NEVER DEBATE ABOUT ANY POLICY ACTION. f. C/I: THE AFFIRMATIVE TEAM SHOULD WIN IF THE TOPICAL PLAN IS THE BEST POLICY OPTION PRESENTED. THE NEGATIVE TEAM HAS TO WIN THAT THE STATUS QUO OR AN ALTERNATIVE COMPETITIVE POLICY ACTION IS BETTER THAN THE PLAN. 10. VAGUE ALTS BAD d. VAGUE ALTS MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DEBATE THE ALTERNATIVE OF THE KRITIK, KEY GROUND FOR THE AFF. IF WE ARTICULATE SOME ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ALT; THEYLL JUST SAY THATS NOT US AND SPIKE OUT OF OUR ARGUMENTS. e. ITS EDUCATIONALLY BANKRUPT BECAUSE ITS TOO VAGUE FOR US TO EVER DEBATE IT. f. IT PROVES THE SUPERIORITY OF THE PLAN. WE GIVE A CLEAR EXPLANATION OF HOW WE SOLVE FOR ITS HARMS WHEREAS THEY MAKE THESE FAR OUT CLAIMS THAT THEY CANT EVEN E XPLAIN HOW THEY REALLY SOLVE FOR THEM.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CAPITALISM(1/6) 1.
THEY CONCEDED THE GROSSBERG EVIDENCE WHICHPROVES THAT THEY CANT SOLVE -THEIR INDIVIDUAL REJECTION DOESNT DO ANYTHING. 2. THE ALTERNATIVE IS JUST A FANTASY THAT USES SCARE TACTICS TO TRY AND JUSTIFY ITSELF- ALL THEIR IMPACTS SHOULD BE DISREGARDED. Gibson-Graham 96,J.K. Professor of Human Geography at the Australian National University and Professor of Geosciences at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 1996 (The End of Capitalism (As We Know It)) pgs 256-258 If the unity of Capitalism confronts us with the mammoth task of systemic transformation it is the singularity and totality of Capitalism that makes the task so hopeless. Capitalism presents itself as a singularity in the sense of having no peer or equivalent, of existing in a category by itself; and also in the sense that when it appears fully realized within a particular social formation, it tends to be dominant of alone. As a sui generis economic form, Capitalism has no true analogues. Slavery, independent commodity production, feudalism, socialism, primitive-communism and other forms of economy all lack the systemic properties of Capitalism and the ability to reproduce and expand themselves according to internal laws. Unlike socialism, for example, which is always struggling to be born, which needs the protection and fostering of the state, which is fragile and easily deformed, Capitalism takes on its full form as a natural outcome of an internally driven growth process. Its organic unity gives capitalism the peculiar power to regenerate itself, and even to subsume its moments of crisis as requirements of its continued growth and development. Socialism has never been endowed with that mythic capability of feeding on its own crises; its reproduction was never driven from within by a life force but always from without; it could never reproduce itself but always had to be reproduced, often an arduous if not impossible process. Other modes of production that lack the organic unity of Capitalism are more capable of being instituted or replaced incrementally and more likely to coexist with other economic forms. Capitalism by contrast tends to appear by itself. Thus, in the United States, if feudal or ancient classes exist, they exist as residual forms; if slavery exists, it exists as a marginal form if socialism or communism exists, it exists as a pre-figurative form. None of these forms truly and fully coexists with Capitalism. Where Capitalism does coexist with other forms, those places (the so-called Third World, for example, or backward regions in what are known as the advanced capitalist nations) are seen as not funny developed. Rather than signaling the real possibility of Capitalism coexisting with non-capitalist economic forms, the coexistence of capitalism with non-capitalist economic forms, the coexistence of capitalism with non-capitalism marks the Third World as insufficient and incomplete. Subsumed to the hegemonic discourse of Development, it identifies a diverse array of countries as the shadowy other of the advanced capitalist nations. One effect of the notion of capitalist exclusivity is a monolithic conception of class, atleastin the contextofadvancedcapitalistcountries.Thetermclassusuallyrefers to a social cleavage along the axis of capital and labor since capitalism cannot coexist with any but residual or pre-figurative noncapitalist relations. The presence and fullness of the capitalist monolith not only denies the possibility of economic or class diversity in the present but prefigures a monolithic and modernist socialism one in which everyone is a comrade and class diversity does not exist. Capitalisms singularity operates to discourage projects to create alternative economic institutions and class relations, since these will necessarily be marginal in the context of Capitalisms exclusivity. The inability of Capitalism to coexist thus produces not only the present impossibility of alternatives but also their future unlikelihood pushing socialist projects to the distant and unrealizable future.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CAPITALISM (2/6) 3.
CAPITALISM INEVITABLE ITS EMBEDED INTO OUR LIVES. THE ALTERNATIVE REJECTS LIVING AND PROMOTES A STATE OF ANARCHY
Callinicos 03 Professor of European Studies 2003 (Alex, An Anti-Capitalist Manifesto)

More seriously, Sen claims, in effect, that 'the right to interact economically with one another' must find expression in a market economy.' This makes the restriction let alonethe abolition of market mchanisms necessarily a violation of human freedom. The comparison of market exchanges to conversation has, moreover, the effect (familiar in defences of capitalism) of naturalizing the
market.Human society is unimaginable without language: if markets are as basic as that, then restricting or abolishing them threatens the very functioning of human societies.But Sen here elides certain important distinctions. There are markets and markets. Karl Polanyi in his classic work The Great Transformation (1944) argued that in the long run of human history economic practices have been embedded in larger social relationships,and
regulated according to one or more of the following principles reciprocity, redistribution, and house holding (i.e. production for one's own use). Where markets existed, they did so in the form of local trade (fairs and market days and the like) and long-distance trade: both external trade and local
trade are relative to geographical distance, the one being confined to goods which cannot overcome it, the other only such as can. Trade of this kind is rightly regarded as
complementary. Local exchange between town and countryside, foreign trade between different climactic zones are based on this principle. Such trade need not imply competition.2 4. AND THE NEG CANT DEFEND THAT THE ALTERNATIVE WORLD, A WORLD OF ANARCHY, IS A BETTER WORLD THAN OURS. 5. NON UNIQUE- THEIR TOTALIZING CLAIMS ARGUE THAT ______ CAUSES CAPITALISM 6. PERM DO THE PLAN AND SOLVE FOR ITS HARMS AND THEN WITHDRAW FROM ALL OTHER FORMS OF CAPITALISM NO REASON WHY THIS ONE INSTANCE IS ENOUGH TO DERAIL RESISTANCE. Stewart 09DEVIN Director of the Global Policy Innovations program at the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs is Ethical Capitalism Possible? 1-25-2009. http://vcr.csrwire.com/node/13160 From these developments, one could conclude that the global economic system is inherently flawed, that it is unethical and doomed to destroy itself. In fact, what is critically needed is moderation, a middle ground between total freedom and principled action. The incoming Obama Administration calls it "smart policies." The alternative is protectionism, a rolling back of the open global economy, and political if not armed conflict. Instilling the practice of ethical capitalism is possible and practical. Consumers increasingly demand products that coincide with their moral awareness. Likewise, politicians are under pressure to implement policies that mitigate the stresses of globalization.These forces can come together to produce products that are recycled, carbon neutral, free range, or fair trade, and policies that battle climate change, poverty, and global diseases. Non-action is highly risky. Looking at climate change alone, the possible long-term risks include a shift in arable land; sharpening competition for energy resources; and the emergence of climate change refugees from island nations or low-lying areas, who may carry with them or engender political violence and unrest, even terrorism. Given that carbon emissions are primarily related to business activities, how can business models become more sustainable? Global human civilization has all the moral tools it needs. As Peter David Pedersen of E-Square has noted, we neither have the time nor the need for another ideology or "ism." Ethical principles that emphasize reciprocal rights and responsibilities have long characterized human societies . The Golden Rule is a feature of more than 100 world religious and cultural canons "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you."
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CAPITALISM (3/6) 7. 8.
PERM DO THE PLAN AND SOLVE FOR THE HARMS AND THEN DO THE ALTERNATIVE PERM DO THE PLAN AND ALL NON-COMPETITIVE PARTS OF THE ALTERNATIVE. ACTION IS NEEDED TO SOLVE.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CAPITALISM (4/6)
THE KRITIK IS A DEPOLITICIZED AVERSION TO POLICYMAKING. THEIRWITHDRAWAL FROM POLITICS ALLOWS CORPORATE AND RIGHTWINGINTERESTS TO CANNABALIZE THE PUBLIC SPHERE. THE IMPACT ISEXTINCTION Boggs 97, Carl National University, Los Angeles, December 1997, The great retreA2: Decline of the public spherein latetwentieth-century America, Theory and Society, Volume 26, Number 6, JDI The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas andchallenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, postmodernism,Deep Ecology intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins inpopular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their differentoutlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles tocombat and overcome alienation.The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizingimpulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacityof individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgentproblems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved perhaps even unrecognized only to fester more ominously in the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay,spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside thelarger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically,the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendasthat ignore or sidestep these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence.In hiscommentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics,as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life ofcommon involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions. 74 In themeantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of antipoliticsbecomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of politicalpower that will continue to decide the fate of human societies.This last point demands further elaboration.The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that socialhierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold overpeoples lives. Far from it: the spaceabdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready toparticipate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites an already familiardynamic in many lesser-developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not veryfar removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a partof the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in theface of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for areassertion of politics in more virulent guise or it might help further rationalize the existing powerstructure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of thoseuniversal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society. 10. NO IMPACT DOUBLE BIND CAPITALISM HAS EXISTED FOREVER, YET THE 1NC IMPACTS HAVENT HAPPENED.
9.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CAPITALISM (5/6)
11. THE CRITIQUE CEDES POLITICS TO THE RIGHT AND PREVENTS US FROM BEING ABLE TO HOLD POLICYMAKERS ACCOUNTABLE. IT MISUNDERSTANDS POWER FORMATIONS AND CREATES A MORAL VACUUM THAT COLLAPSES INTO RESENTMENT, WHICH TURNS THEIR IMPACT. Carr, and Zanetti, 2001Adrian N. Carr, Principal Research Fellow in the School of Social, Community and Organisational Studies at the University of Western Sydney and Lisa A. Zanetti, assistant professor in the Harry S Truman School of Public. Affairs, University of Missouri-Columbia, Textuality and the postmodernist neglect of the politics of representation, Tamara : Journal of Critical Postmodern Organization Science, Vol. 1, Iss. 3; p. 14,
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CAPITAISM (6/6)
thinking leaves us with a concept of power which "loses its explanatory context and becomes a ubiquitous metaphysical principle" (Dews 1986 cited in Thompson 1993: 201). This notion of power is devoid of a cogent explanation of its internal dynamic. Such a rendering reifies power - power is seen as having a life of its own; the subject is placed on the periphery and the role of agency is ignored.This "works all by " mentality provides us with a human being who appears to be somewhat of a disarmed prisoner of society and, as one writer aptly describes, engenders an "ideology of resignation" 12. K FRAMEWORK BAD AND A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS g. IT STEALS ALL OF OUR GROUND. h. IT KILLS THE PLAN FOCUS EDUCATION WE JUST DEBATE ABOUT THE SAME GENERIC KRITIKS EVERY ROUND AND NEVER DEBATE ABOUT ANY POLICY ACTION. i. C/I: THE AFFIRMATIVE TEAM SHOULD WIN IF THE TOPICAL PLAN IS THE BEST POLICY OPTION PRESENTED. THE NEGATIVE TEAM HAS TO WIN THAT THE STATUS QUO OR AN ALTERNATIVE COMPETITIVE POLICY ACTION IS BETTER THAN THE PLAN. 13. VAGUE ALTS BAD g. VAGUE ALTS MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DEBATE THE ALTERNATIVE OF THE KRITIK, KEY GROUND FOR THE AFF. IF WE ARTICULATE SOME ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ALT; THEYLL JUST SAY THATS NOT US AND SPIKE OUT OF OUR ARGUMENTS. h. ITS EDUCATIONALLY BANKRUPT BECAUSE ITS TOO VAGUE FOR US TO EVER DEBATE IT. i. IT PROVES THE SUPERIORITY OF THE PLAN. WE GIVE A CLEAR EXPLANATION OF HOW WE SOLVE FOR ITS HARMS WHEREAS THEY MAKE THESE FAR OUT CLAIMS THAT THEY CANT EVEN EXPLAIN HOW THEY REALLY SOLVE FOR THEM.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CHERNUS (1/5) 1. 2.
WE DONT LINK. WE NEVER VIEW THE BOMB AS A SYMBOLIC GOD. AND EVEN IF WE DO, CHERNUS USES OUTDATED AND INCORRECT PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS THE CRITIQUE SHOULD BE REJECTED.
Summers 91Craig (Ph.D. Department of Psychology,.Mount Allison University), BOOK REVIEWS Ira Chernus. Nuclear
Madness: Religion and the Psychology of the Nuclear Age in Nuclear Texts and Contexts spring no 6
The mental health metaphors in Nuclear Madness are rooted in pre-1950s psychoanalysis. (Even continualreference to The bombrather than smart missiles, for example, is outdated.)Chernus
statesPsychologists may identify nuclear weapons with interper- sonal hostility, dominance needs, repressed rage, or magical defenses against insecurity. Freudians will find a mapping of infantile omnipotence desires. Jungians will find archetypal patterns of all sorts. Theologians will consider the bomb a mapped replication of our traditional image of God. But all will attest the existence of social fantasy. (p. 32. Infantile omnipotence desires? All will attest to the existence of social fantasy?
Nuclear Madness does, but it is surely a step backwards for any reader attempting tolearn something of explanations in contemporary political psychology. In relying on clinical metaphors from overforty years ago, Chernus has tied his philosophy to a clinical approach with little actual evidence, and which is generally no longer accepted. 3. AND TURN: FEAR GOOD MOTIVATES PEOPLE TO PURSUE CONSTRUCTIVE MEANS TO SUSTAIN PEACE AND PREVENT LARGE-SCALE CONFLICT
Lifton01 Distinguished Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at John Jay College and the Graduate Center of the City University
of New York 20 (Robert Jay, World Policy Journal, Illusions of the Second Nuclear Age, Spring, v18n1)
The trouble is that in other ways the dangers associated with nuclear weapons are greater than ever: the continuing weapons-centered policies in the United States and elsewhere; the difficulties in controlling nuclear weapons that exist under unstable conditions (especially in Russia and other areas of the former Soviet Union);(FN2) and the eagerness and potential capacity of certain nations and "private" groups to acquire and possibly use the weapons. In that sense, the nuclear quietism is perilous. Or, to put the matter another way, we no longer manifest an appropriate degree of fear in relation to actual nuclear danger. While fear in itself is hardly to be recommended as a guiding human emotion, its absence in the face of danger can lead to catastrophe.We human animals have built-in fear reactions in response to threat. These reactions help us to protect ourselves--to step back from the path of a speeding automobile, or in the case of our ancestors, from the path of a wild animal. Fear can be transmuted into constructive planning and policies: whether for minimizing vulnerability to attacks by wild animals, or for more complex contemporary threats. Through fear, ordinary people can be motivated to pursue constructive means for sustaining peace, or at least for limiting the scope of violence. Similarly, in exchanges between world leaders on behalf of preventing large-scale conflict, a tinge of fear--sometimes more than a tinge--can enable each to feel the potential bloodshed and suffering that would result from failure. But with nuclear weapons, our psychological circuits are impaired. We know that the weapons are around--and we hear talk about nuclear dangers somewhere "out there"--but our minds no longer connect with the dangers or with the weapons themselves. That blunting of feeling extends into other areas. One of the many sins for which advocates of large nuclear stockpiles must answer is the prevalence of psychic numbing to enormous potential suffering, the blunting of our ethical standards as human beings. In the absence of the sort of threatening nuclear rhetoric the United States and Russia indulged in during the 1980s, we can all too readily numb ourselves to everything nuclear, and thereby live as though the weapons pose no danger, or as though they don't exist. To be sure, we have never quite been able to muster an appropriate level of fear with respect to these weapons--one that would spur us to take constructive steps to remove the threat. We have always been able to numb ourselves in this regard, which must be seen as a basic human response to a threat that is apocalyptic in scope and so technologically distanced as to be unreal. But there were at least brief moments when we would awaken from our nuclear torpor. Now there is little but torpor. The weapons have been accepted as belonging on our planet no less than we do, as if they were part of nature--like great trees or mountains that are old, established, immovable--rather than technological instruments of genocide that we ourselves have created.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CHERNUS (1/5) 4. AND NUMBING IS INEVITABLE AND CAN BE USED PRODUCTIVELY
Lifton 99Robert JayInterview: Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley,
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people/Lifton/lifton-con3.html When I thought about that, I began to wonder not just about those who were exposed to the atomic bomb, [but] what about those who make, not just atomic but nuclear weapons, hydrogen bombs? And I thought about the psychic numbing involved in strategic projections of using hydrogen bombs or nuclear weapons of any kind. And I also thought about ways in which all
of us undergo what could be called the numbing of everyday life. That is, we are bombarded by all kinds of images and influences and we have to fend some of them off if we're to take in any of them, or to carry through just our ordinary day's work, or really deepen whatever we have to do or say. And yet, it isn't all negative. For instance, I realize that if you take the example of a surgeon who is performing a delicate operation, you don't want him or her to have the same emotions as a family member of that person being operated on. There has to be some level of detachment where you bring your technical skill to bear on it. And from that I formulated a model for professional work that I saw myself working at , and others too, of a combination of advocacy and detachment . And the detachment could involve selective professional numbing of that kind, but one's advocacy was right out there as well, as was mine in studying as accurately and as rigorously as I could the effects of the atomic bombings, but at the same time coming to that study as a person very worried and critical about nuclear weapons. 5. AND THE ALTERNATIVE DOES NOTHING- DISPLAYING NEGATIVE IMPACTS IS A PREREQUISITE TO ABOLISHING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
Whitmore 97, NGO Committee on Disarmament, (D.C. Prerequisites to Global Nuclear Disarmament (GND) 6/27,
http://abolishnukes.com/short_essays/prereg_gnd_whitmore.html)
The perceived gains in security through nuclear deterrence will not be given-up lightly. Many issues need to be resolved before serious progress towards nuclear abolition can be realistically expected. Abolition waits for a strong case.There are several major dimensions to a nuclear abolition rationale. Each is a spoke in the wheel justifying abolition and each spoke is reinforced by a bundle of supporting arguments. One major spoke is the positive benefits that accrue from nuclear disarmament, such as, (1) regime to minimize proliferation and nuclear terrorism risks, (2) contribution to regional security regimes, (3) accidental war risk reduction, (4)
immediate and long-term cost savings, and (5) improved resource utilization. The GND justification wheel should go well beyond the list of positive benefits and encompass all issues that likely bear on reaching GND consensus. Thus, another major spoke is nuclear deterrence theory and how it degrades, rather than bolsters, national and global security. A third spoke could be
spokes in the rationale wheel could address the derivation of security and defense requirements; ballistic missile defense; nuclear-free zones; conventional arms control; other weapons of mass destruction; enhancements to nonproliferation regime; abolition treaty verification; regional security measures; United Nations role; etc. Much work remains to be done to build a strong case for nuclear abolition. The principal theme of the rationale should be to demonstrate that the nuclear powers have more to gain from GND than to lose. It should be unquestionably persuasive. In brief, therationale prerequisite is the "homework assignment" for the GND advocate community and its satisfactory accomplishment is absolutely necessary to help ensure undelayed abolition. Non-Nuclear States Commitment A solid intellectual foundation for nuclear abolition is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for success. Given the realities of power dynamics in the international community, the nuclear powers may resist expedited GND unless led to understand that their choice is between painful alternatives. This dynamic is more often
labeled nuclear weapons policy and supporting considerations include tactical military utility; 1st use; launch risk reduction; new warhead research and testing; etc
. Additional
the rule than the exception and it has been frequently exploited by the nuclear powers in pressing its agenda, e.g., at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The non-nuclear states need to rise to this challenge.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CHERNUS (3/5) 6.
AND MORE EVIDENCE THE ALTERNATIVE CANT SOLVE- CHERNUS HIMSELF ADMITS THAT GETTING PAST THE NUMBING IS IMPOSSIBLE; THERE IS NO SPECIFIC SOLUTION AND THERE ARE TOO MANY CONTRADITIONS IN HIS THEORY.
Chernus, 91.Ira (PROFESSOR OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO AT BOULDER), Nuclear Madness:
Religion and the Psychology of the Nuclear Age p 13-14//jh
This concept of totalism is a crucial element in Lifton's work because it offers one solution to a difficult theoretical problem: How can psychic numbing, a concept developed in terms of individual psychodynamics, be ascribed to societal processes and institutions? But the concept raises other problems that it does not solve. Although it accounts for some continuity with prenuclear images of destroying the enemy, it fails to account for the central uniqueness of the nuclear age: images of destroying the enemy inevitably evoke images not only of revitalizing but of destroying one's own society too. Nor does totalism adequately account for the process of psychological self-destruction in psychic numbing. Lifton does point out that totalism involves a hope of stopping the process of history, which requires further numbing. But he puts little emphasis on this self-perpetuating dynamic of numbing. Nor does he explain how it can coexist with the simultaneous "explosion of symbolizing forays," the apparent urge to revitalization that is the dominant focus of his discussion. The theoretical problem is to make sense of an explosion of images that reinforces numbing rather than counteracting it. But this is not merely a theoretical problem. It also raises the very pressing practical problem of whether numbing can be counteracted at all. Lifton raises grave doubts on this point. Although he urges his readers to redirect the movement toward revitalization and aim it at more life-enhancing images, his paradigm cannot explain why this has not already occurred, and it offers little theoretical explanation of how it might occur in the future. Perhaps this is why Lifton says relatively little about specific remedies. 7His prescriptive writings consist largely of alerting readers to the dangers of psychic numbing and urging them somehow to muster the will to break through their numbing. But the "somehow" remains rather vague. Lifton's paradigm implies that breakthroughs against numbing will be exceedingly difficult and rare. The record of history, with sporadic outbursts of nuclear concern followed by long years of relative passivity, seems to validate that prediction. 7. AND THE ALTERNATIVE CEDES THE POLITICAL CHERNUS HIMSELF ADMITS
Charme 91. Stuart Z (B.A., Columbia University; M.A., Ph.D., University of Chicago, Professor of Religion at Rutgers), BOOK REVIEWS Ira Chernus. Nuclear Madness: Religion and the Psychology of
the Nuclear Age in the Review of Religious Research vol 33, issue 2
This book demonstrates many of the strengths and weaknesses of psycho-historical interpretations. Much of the argument is carried by suggestive analogies and heuristic metaphors, extended descriptions of suprapersonal entities like nations, cultures, and civilizations "as if" they operated according to individual psychodynamics. Chernus himself sprinkles dis- claimers throughout his book denying that his interpretations are empirically verifiable or indeed are anything more than useful fictions to stimulate thought. By the end of the book, however, Chernus' commitment to a particular psychological and metaphysical perspective is more than metaphorical. In his rush to reconnect to an archetypal world of symbols and images, he tends to be somewhat dismissive of more concrete political, economic, historical and scientific perspectives relating to nuclear arms. There can be no doubt that Chernus has produced a creative and unorthodox interpretation of nuclear weapons. Much of its success will depend on the reader's prior commitment (or new conversion) to the perspective of archetypal psychology . Accordingly, some will conclude from this book that Chernus is tuned in to the unconscious symbolic meaning of the global psyche, whereas others may remain more dubious that new ritual expressions of archetypal images are a sufficient response to the prospect of, say, nuclear proliferation into third world countries like Iraq.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CHERNUS (4/5) 8. 9.
PERM DO THE PLAN AND SOLVE FOR THE HARMS AND THEN DO THE ALTERNATIVE PERM DO THE PLAN AND ALL NON-COMPETITIVE PARTS OF THE ALTERNATIVE. ACTION IS NEEDED TO SOLVE.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CHERNUS (5/5)
10. K FRAMEWORK BAD AND A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS a. IT STEALS ALL OF OUR GROUND. b. IT KILLS THE PLAN FOCUS EDUCATION WE JUST DEBATE ABOUT THE SAME GENERIC KRITIKS EVERY ROUND AND NEVER DEBATE ABOUT ANY POLICY ACTION. c. C/I: THE AFFIRMATIVE TEAM SHOULD WIN IF THE TOPICAL PLAN IS TH BEST POLICY OPTION PRESENTED. THE NEGATIVE TEAM HAS TO WIN THAT THE STATUS QUO OR AN ALTERNATIVE COMPETITIVE ACTION IS BETTER THAN THE PLAN. 11. VAGUE ALTS BAD AND AVOTER FOR THESE REASONS a. VAGUE ALTS MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DEBATE THE ALTERNATIVE OF THE KRITIK, KEY GROUND FOR THE AFF. IF WE ARTICULATE SOME ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ALT; THEYLL JUST SAY THATS NOT US AND SPIKE OUT OF OUR ARGUMENTS. b. ITS EDUCATIONALLY BANKRUPT BECAUSE ITS TOO VAGUE FOR US TO EVER DEBATE IT. c. IT PROVES THE SUPERIORITY OF THE PLAN. WE GIVE A CLEAR EXPLANATION OF HOW WE SOLVE FOR ITS HARMS WHEREAS THEY MAKE THESE FAR OUR CLAIMS THAT THEY CANT EVEN EXPLAIN HOW THEY REALLY SOLVE FOR THEM.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: FEM IR (1/5) 1. 2. 3.
WE DONT LINK. THEIR LINK EVIDENCE IS EXTREMELY GENERIC AND SHOULD BE REJECTED AND DOESNT EVEN APPLY TO OUR AFFIRMATIVE. PERM DO THE PLAN AND SOLVE FOR THE HARMS AND THEN CRITIQUE THE SYSTEM. NO REASON WHY THIS INSTANCE IS KEY. PERM DO THE PLAN AND ALL NON-COMPETITIVE PARTS OF THE ALTERNATIVE. ACTION IS NEEDED TO SOLVE.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: FEM IR (2/5)
4. AND THEY CANT SOLVE PATRIARCHY IS INEVITABLE Goldberg, 1999(Steven, Chairman of the Department of Sociology, City College, City University of New York, The Inevitability
of Patriarchy http://lilt.ilstu.edu/gmklass/foi/readings/patriarchygoldberg.htm, EB) The thesis put forth here is that the hormonal
renders the social inevitable. Because of hormonal differences between males and females, it is inevitable that males will be socialized to aspire to the roles that have highest status in a society. Our biology makes the social arrangement known as patriarchy --the rule of males --inevitable. It is true (as the feminists never tire of pointing out) that what are
considered masculine roles in one society may be considered feminine roles in another society. Of far greater importance, however, is the fact that in every
known society the masculine roles are rewarded with higher status
than the feminine roles.

principally be men.
The role of healer might be a masculine role in a society such as ours, and a feminine role in some other culture; but in any society that accords this role high status, the expectation will be that it will be filled
The reason for this is simply that men are by nature more aggressive than women, and social arrangements have been designed to accommodate this fact. 5. AND TURN- FEM IR IS JUST A WESTERN CRITISICISM THAT REPLACES THE
PATRIARCHAL DOMINANCE WITH WHITE DOMINANCE REPLICATES THE HARMS.
Oloka-Onyango and Tamale, 95-Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Uganda, and spent the 19941995 academic year as a Visiting Professor at the University of Minnesota. Sylvia Tamale holds law degrees from Makerere University (Uganda) and Harvard Law School. She is currently a doctoral student in Sociology and Feminist Studies at the U niversity of Minnesota, (The Personalis Political or Why Womens Rights are Indeed Human Rights. J. Oloka-Onyango and Slyvia Tamale. Human Rights Quarterly 17.4, 691-731 . Project Muse, JPW)
In tandem with such an approach,feminists in third world contexts must be wary of cooptation and exploitation-a trait of western societies that appears to not respect boundaries of sex-particularly because the dominant mode of international feminism reflects the dominant character and color of international relations, Bourgeois/white, often predatory, and paternalistic.26 As Maivan Lam has recently pointed out in an article aptly entitled, Feeling Foreign in Feminism, the agenda of Western feminism appearsnot only to be off target, but also "filmic."27 According to Lam, Western feminism is "too cleanly and detachedly representational, with little connection to the ongoing lives of women who have experienced racial or colonial discrimination... ."28 VasukiNesiah is even more critical of the transposition of Western feminism onto the international scene because it ignores" global contradictions"29 by emphasizing the
commonality of women's experience. Instead, she urges theorists to look at gender identities as being "continually reconstituted through social processes."30 The bond that is necessary for a coalition to evolve within international feminism cannot be created from a romanticized sisterhood that assumes common oppression of all women."' Rather, such bonding can only occur after women's diverse priorities and interests have been recognized and the various barriers to this goal have been identified by the international community of women.
X>9000. What is X?
AND THE ALTERNATIVE FAILS IT ACTUALLY REPRODUCES GENDER STEROTYPES, AND THE RHETORIC OF THE NEGATIVE ACTUALLY REINFORCES PATRIARCHY THROUGH THEIR COMFORTABLE STEROTYPES. Witworth, 94 prof of political science and female studies @ York U, (Feminism and International Relations, pg 20, 1994) Even when not concerned with mothering as such, much of the politics that emerge from radical feminism within IR depend on a re-thinking from the perspective of women. What is left unexplained is how simply thinking differently will alter the material realities of relations of domination between men and women. Structural (patriarchal) relations are acknowledged, but not analysed in radical feminisms reliance on the experiences, behaviours and perceptions of women. As Sandra Harding notes, the essential and universal man, long the focus of feminist critiques, has merely been replaced here with the essential and universal woman. And indeed, that notion of woman not only ignores 6. important differences amongst women, but it also reproduces exactly the stereoty pical vision of women and men, masculine and feminine, that has been produced under patriarchy. Those women who do not fit the mold who, for example, take up arms in military struggle are quickly dismissed as expressing negative or inauthentic feminine values(the same accusation is more rarely made against
men). In this way, it comes as no surprise when mainstream IR theorists such as Robert Reohane happily embrace the tenets of radical feminism. It requires little in the way of re-thinking or movement from accepted and comfortable assumptions about stereotypes. Radical feminists find themselves defending the same account of women as nurturing, pacifist, submissive mothers as men do under patriarchy, anti-feminists and the New Right. As some writers suggest, this in itself should give feminists pause to reconsider this position.
AND THEY CONCEDED OUR GROSSBERG EVIDENCE, WHICH FURTHER SHOWS HOW THE ALT FAILS. 8. AND MORE EVIDENCE THE ALTERNATIVE FAILS IT CEDES THE POLITICAL AND WILL BE CO-OPTED BY THE STATE ONLY BY WORKING THROUGH THE SYSTEM CAN WE SOLVE. RORTY 1998, PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT PRINCETON AND THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, PROFESSOR OF COMPARATIVE LITERATURE AT STANFORD, ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY, P. 98-99 attempting to revive national politics. The trouble with this claim is that the governmentof our nation-state will be, for the foreseeable future, the only agent capable of making any real difference in the amount of selfishness and sadism inflicted on Americans. It is no comfort to those in danger of being immiserated by globalization to be told that, since national governments are now irrelevant, we must think up a replacement for such governments. The cosmopolitan super-rich do not think any replacements are needed, and they are likely to prevail. Bill Readings was right to say that the nation-state [has ceased] to be the elemental unit of capitalism, but it remains the entity which makes decisions aboutsocial benefits, and thus about social justice.The current leftist habit of taking the long view
The cultural Left often seems convinced that the nation-state is obsolete, and that there is therefore no point in and looking beyond nationhood to a global polity is as useless as was faith in Marxs philosophy of history, for which it has become a substitute. Both are equally irrelevant to the question of how to prevent the reemergence of hereditary castes, or of how to prevent rightwing populists from taking advantage of resentment at that reemergence. When we think about these latter questions, we begin to realize that one of the essential transformations which the cultural Left will have to undergo is the shedding of its semi- conscious anti-
7.
. This Left will have to stop thinking up ever more abstract and abusive names for "the system" and start trying to construct inspiring images of the country. Only by doing so can it begin to form alliances with people outside the academy If the Left forms no such alliances, it will never have any effect onthe lawsof the United States. To form them will require the cultural Left to forget about Baudrillard's account of America as Disneylandas a country of simulacraand to start proposing changes in the laws of a real country, inhabited by real people who are enduring unnecessary suffering, much ofwhich can be cured by governmental action.Nothing would do more to resurrect the American Left than agreement on a concrete political platform, a People's Charter, a list of specific reforms. The existence of such a list
Americanism, which it carried over from the rage of the late Sixties and, specifically, with the labor unions. Outside the academy, Americans still want to feel patriotic. They still want to feel part of a nation which can take control of its destiny and make itself a better place.
endlessly reprinted and debated, equally familiar to professors and production workers, imprinted on the memory both of professional people and of those who clean the professionals' toiletsmight revitalize leftist politics.
X>9000. What is X?
THE KRITIK IS A DEPOLITICIZED AVERSION TO POLICYMAKING. THEIRWITHDRAWAL FROM POLITICS ALLOWS CORPORATE AND RIGHTWINGINTERESTS TO CANNABALIZE THE PUBLIC SPHERE. THE IMPACT ISEXTINCTION Boggs 97, Carl National University, Los Angeles, December 1997, The great retreA2: Decline of the public spherein latetwentieth-century America, Theory and Society, Volume 26, Number 6, JDI The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas andchallenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, postmodernism,Deep Ecology intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins inpopular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their differentoutlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles tocombat and overcome alienation.The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizingimpulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacityof individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgentproblems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved perhaps even unrecognized only to fester more ominously in the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay,spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside thelarger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically,the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendasthat ignore or sidestep these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence.In hiscommentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics,as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life ofcommon involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions. 74 In themeantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of antipoliticsbecomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of politicalpower that will continue to decide the fate of human societies.This last point demands further elaboration.The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that socialhierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold overpeoples lives. Far from it: the spaceabdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready toparticipate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites an already familiardynamic in many lesser-developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not veryfar removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a partof the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in theface of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for areassertion of politics in more virulent guise or it might help further rationalize the existing powerstructure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of thoseuniversal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.
9.
X>9000. What is X?
10. K FRAMEWORK BAD AND A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS a. IT STEALS ALL OF OUR GROUND. b. IT KILLS THE PLAN FOCUS EDUCATION WE JUST DEBATE ABOUT THE SAME GENERIC KRITIKS EVERY ROUND AND NEVER DEBATE ABOUT ANY POLICY ACTION. c. C/I: THE AFFIRMATIVE TEAM SHOULD WIN IF THE TOPICAL PLAN IS TH BEST POLICY OPTION PRESENTED. THE NEGATIVE TEAM HAS TO WIN THAT THE STATUS QUO OR AN ALTERNATIVE COMPETITIVE ACTION IS BETTER THAN THE PLAN. 11. VAGUE ALTS BAD AND A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS a. VAGUE ALTS MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DEBATE THE ALTERNATIVE OF THE KRITIK, KEY GROUND FOR THE AFF. IF WE ARTICULATE SOME ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ALT; THEYLL JUST SAY THATS NOT US AND SPIKE OUT OF OUR ARGUMENTS. b. ITS EDUCATIONALLY BANKRUPT BECAUSE ITS TOO VAGUE FOR US TO EVER DEBATE IT. c. IT PROVES THE SUPERIORITY OF THE PLAN. WE GIVE A CLEAR EXPLANATION OF HOW WE SOLVE FOR ITS HARMS WHEREAS THEY MAKE THESE FAR OUR CLAIMS THAT THEY CANT EVEN EXPLAIN HOW THEY REALLY SOLVE FOR THEM.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: GIFT (1/3)
NO LINK WE ONLY SOLVE FOR BIOPOLITICS AND WE DONT VIEW ANY PEOPLE AS BELOW US, NOR DO WE GIVE ANY GITS 2. PERM DO THE PLAN AND ALL NON-COMPETITIVE PARTS OF THE ALT 3. PERM DO THE PLAN AND SOLVE FOR THE HARMS AND THEN DO THE ALTERNATIVE 4. THE ALTERNATIVE FAILS - THEY CONCEDED OUR GROSSBERG EVIDENCE 5. AND MORE EVIDENCE THE ALTERNATIVE FAILS ONLY BY WORKING FORM WITHIN THE STATE CAN WE SOLVE EVERYTHING ELSE IS CO-OPTED. RORTY 1998, PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT PRINCETON AND THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, PROFESSOR OF COMPARATIVE LITERATURE AT STANFORD, ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY, P. 98-99 attempting to revive national politics. The trouble with this claim is that the governmentof our nation-state will be, for the foreseeable future, the only agent capable of making any real difference in the amount of selfishness and sadism inflicted on Americans. 1.
The cultural Left often seems convinced that the nation-state is obsolete, and that there is therefore no point in
It is no comfort to those in danger of being immiserated by globalization to be told that, since national governments are now irrelevant, we must think up a replacement for such governments.The
cosmopolitan super-rich do not think any replacements are needed, and they are likely to prevail. Bill Readings was right to say that the nation-state [has ceased] to be the elemental unit of capitalism, but it remains the entity which makes decisions aboutsocial benefits, and thus about social justice.The current leftist habit of taking the long view
undergo is the shedding of its semi- conscious anti-Americanism, which it carried over from the rage of the late Sixties
and looking beyond nationhood to a global polity is as useless as was faith in Marxs philosophy of history, for which it has become a substitute. Both are equally irrelevant to the question of how to prevent the reemergence of
hereditary castes, or of how to prevent right-wing populists from taking advantage of resentment at that reemergence. When we think about these latter questions, we begin to realize that one of the essential transformations which the cultural Left will have to
. This Left will have to stop thinking up ever more abstract and abusive names for "the system" and start trying to construct inspiring images of the country. Only by doing so can it begin to form alliances with people outside the academy If the Left forms no such alliances, it will never have any effect onthe lawsof the United States. To form them will require the cultural Left to forget about Baudrillard's account of America as Disneylandas a country of simulacraand to start proposing changes in the laws of a real country, inhabited by real people who are enduring unnecessary suffering, much ofwhich can be cured by governmental action.Nothing would do more to resurrect the American Left than agreement on a concrete political platform, a People's Charter, a list of specific reforms. The existence of such a list endlessly
unions. Outside the academy, Americans still want to feel patriotic. They still want to feel part of a nation which can take control of its destiny and make itself a better place.
and, specifically, with the labor
reprinted and debated, equally familiar to professors and production workers, imprinted on the memory both of professional people and of those who clean the professionals' toiletsmight revitalize leftist politics.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: GIFT (2/3)
THE KRITIK IS A DEPOLITICIZED AVERSION TO POLICYMAKING. THEIRWITHDRAWAL FROM POLITICS ALLOWS CORPORATE AND RIGHTWINGINTERESTS TO CANNABALIZE THE PUBLIC SPHERE. THE IMPACT ISEXTINCTION Boggs 97, Carl National University, Los Angeles, December 1997, The great retreA2: Decline of the public spherein latetwentieth-century America, Theory and Society, Volume 26, Number 6, JDI The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas andchallenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, postmodernism,Deep Ecology intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins inpopular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their differentoutlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles tocombat and overcome alienation.The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizingimpulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacityof individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgentproblems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved perhaps even unrecognized only to fester more ominously in the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay,spread of infectious diseases , technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside thelarger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically,the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendasthat ignore or sidestep these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence.In hiscommentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics,as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life ofcommon involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions. 74 In themeantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of antipoliticsbecomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of politicalpower that will continue to decide the fate of human societies.This last point demands further elaboration.The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that socialhierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold overpeoples lives. Far from it: the spaceabdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready toparticipate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites an already familiardynamic in many lesser-developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not veryfar removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a partof the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in theface of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for areassertion of politics in more virulent guise or it might help further rationalize the existing powerstructure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of thoseuniversal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.
6.
X>9000. What is X?
A2: GIFT (3/3) 12. K FRAMEWORK BAD AND A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS a. IT STEALS ALL OF OUR GROUND. b. IT KILLS THE PLAN FOCUS EDUCATION WE JUST DEBATE ABOUT THE SAME GENERIC KRITIKS EVERY ROUND AND NEVER DEBATE ABOUT ANY POLICY ACTION. c. C/I: THE AFFIRMATIVE TEAM SHOULD WIN IF THE TOPICAL PLAN IS TH BEST POLICY OPTION PRESENTED. THE NEGATIVE TEAM HAS TO WIN THAT THE STATUS QUO OR AN ALTERNATIVE COMPETITIVE ACTION IS BETTER THAN THE PLAN. 13. VAGUE ALTS BAD AND A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS d. VAGUE ALTS MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DEBATE THE ALTERNATIVE OF THE KRITIK, KEY GROUND FOR THE AFF. IF WE ARTICULATE SOME ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ALT; THEYLL JUST SAY THATS NOT US AND SPIKE OUT OF OUR ARGUMENTS. e. ITS EDUCATIONALLY BANKRUPT BECAUSE ITS TOO VAGUE FOR US TO EVER DEBATE IT. f. IT PROVES THE SUPERIORITY OF THE PLAN. WE GIVE A CLEAR EXPLANATION OF HOW WE SOLVE FOR ITS HARMS WHEREAS THEY MAKE THESE FAR OUR CLAIMS THAT THEY CANT EVEN EXPLAIN HOW THEY REALLY SOLVE FOR THEM.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: GLOBAL LOCAL(1/4)
NO LINK ENGAGING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS THE MOST LOCAL WAY TO SOLVE FOR BIOPOLITICS EXTEND OUR GROSSBERG EVIDENCE THAT DEPICTS HOW ONLY THROUGH THE STATE CAN WE SOLVE. 2. PERM DO THE PLAN AND ALL NON-COMPETITIVE PARTS OF THE ALT 3. PERM DO THE PLAN AND SOLVE FOR THE HARMS AND THEN DO THE ALTERNATIVE 4. THE ALTERNATIVE FAILS - THEY CONCEDED OUR GROSSBERG EVIDENCE 5. AND MORE EVIDENCE THE ALTERNATIVE FAILS ONLY BY WORKING FORM WITHIN THE STATE CAN WE SOLVE EVERYTHING ELSE IS CO-OPTED. RORTY 1998, PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT PRINCETON AND THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, PROFESSOR OF COMPARATIVE LITERATURE AT STANFORD, ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY, P. 98-99 attempting to revive national politics. The trouble with this claim is that the governmentof our nation-state will be, for the foreseeable future, the only agent capable of making any real difference in the amount of selfishness and sadism inflicted on Americans. 1.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: GLOBAL LOCAL (2/4)
AND MORE EVIDENCE THE ALTERNATIVE FAILS GRASS ROOTS MOVEMENTS FAIL MARTIN 90 University of Wollongong Science Professor, 1990 (Brian, Uprooting War, London Freedom Press, Chapter: Grassroots mobilization, Section: Introduction, http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/, Date accessed: 7-14-06) Sparking a social movement does not automatically provide a strategy for the movement, nor even a clear set of goals. The problem of mobilising against the roots of war is more than the problem of stimulating people to become concerned about an issue. The more difficult problem is to create possible avenues for involvement and action which are both attractive and effective . Consider the situation of isolated individuals or small groups who are committed to trying to tackle the roots of war. They have thought out their goals and methods, and have a tentative strategy, for example promoting social defence, peace conversion or self-management. The question of mobilisation then is, how should actions or campaigns be designed to stimulate greater commitment and participation towards the goals of the activists? In the usual situation, much more than a spark is needed to launch a social movement. A patient process of developing goals, strategies and participation is required. I have assumed that the groups are small and weak. If they are large and strong, mobilisation is not such a problem, though other difficult problems are likely to exist. At the current time, it should be realised that structure-challenging movements are very weak. Some social movements, such as the peace movement in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and in the 1980s, can boast a high level of participation and public sympathy. But only a small fraction of activities even at these times systematically challenge the underpinnings of war. Furthermore, even large and apparently strong social movements and cultures may be vulnerable to attack by opposition forces . The European socialist and antiwar movement was smashed after the outbreak of World War One, and the bulk of left political activism and culture in the United States succumbed to cold war suppression in the late 1940s and the 1950s. Social activists should not mislead themselves that they are in a powerful position. Almost always they are not. 6.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: GLOBAL LOCAL (3/4)
THE KRITIK IS A DEPOLITICIZED AVERSION TO POLICYMAKING. THEIRWITHDRAWAL FROM POLITICS ALLOWS CORPORATE AND RIGHTWINGINTERESTS TO CANNABALIZE THE PUBLIC SPHERE. THE IMPACT ISEXTINCTION Boggs 97, Carl National University, Los Angeles, December 1997, The great retreA2: Decline of the public spherein latetwentieth-century America, Theory and Society, Volume 26, Number 6, JDI The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas andchallenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, postmodernism,Deep Ecology intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins inpopular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their differentoutlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles tocombat and overcome alienation.The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizingimpulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacityof individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgentproblems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved perhaps even unrecognized only to fester more ominously in the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay,spread of infectious diseases , technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside thelarger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically,the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendasthat ignore or sidestep these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence.In hiscommentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics,as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life ofcommon involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions. 74 In themeantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of antipoliticsbecomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of politicalpower that will continue to decide the fate of human societies.This last point demands further elaboration.The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that socialhierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold overpeoples lives. Far from it: the spaceabdicated bya broad citizenry, well-informed and ready toparticipate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites an already familiardynamic in many lesserdeveloped countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not veryfar removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a partof the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in theface of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for areassertion of politics in more virulent guise or it might help further rationalize the existing powerstructure.In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of thoseuniversal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.
7.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: GLOBAL LOCAL (4/4) 8.
9.
K FRAMEWORK BAD AND A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS d. IT STEALS ALL OF OUR GROUND. e. IT KILLS THE PLAN FOCUS EDUCATION WE JUST DEBATE ABOUT THE SAME GENERIC KRITIKS EVERY ROUND AND NEVER DEBATE ABOUT ANY POLICY ACTION. f. C/I: THE AFFIRMATIVE TEAM SHOULD WIN IF THE TOPICAL PLAN IS TH BEST POLICY OPTION PRESENTED. THE NEGATIVE TEAM HAS TO WIN THAT THE STATUS QUO OR AN ALTERNATIVE COMPETITIVE ACTION IS BETTER THAN THE PLAN. VAGUE ALTS BAD AND A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS g. VAGUE ALTS MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DEBATE THE ALTERNATIVE OF THE KRITIK, KEY GROUND FOR THE AFF. IF WE ARTICULATE SOME ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ALT; THEYLL JUST SAY THATS NOT US AND SPIKE OUT OF OUR ARGUMENTS. h. ITS EDUCATIONALLY BANKRUPT BECAUSE ITS TOO VAGUE FOR US TO EVER DEBATE IT. IT PROVES THE SUPERIORITY OF THE PLAN. WE GIVE A CLEAR EXPLANATION OF HOW WE SOLVE FOR ITS HARMS WHEREAS THEY MAKE THESE FAR OUR CLAIMS THAT THEY CANT EVEN EXPLAIN HOW THEY REALLY SOLVE FOR THEM.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: HILLMAN (1/6) 1. 2.
3. 4. 5.
NO LINK WE ONLY SOLVE FOR BIOPOLITICS AND WE DONT DEFEND ANY WAR SCENARIOS. THEIR CLAIM THAT WAR IS INEVITABLE MEANS THAT NUCLEAR WAR TO EXTINCTION BECOMES INEVITABLE IN THEIR WORLD. YOU CANT ENJOY WAR WHEN IT LASTS SUCH A BRIEF AMOUNT OF TIME. PERM DO THE PLAN AND ALL NON-COMPETITIVE PARTS OF THE ALT PERM DO THE PLAN AND SOLVE FOR THE HARMS AND THEN DO THE ALTERNATIVE PERMS SOLVE BEST STEPPING COMPLETELY OUT OF OUR MINDSET IS WORSE THAN THE STATUS QUO
Superpower syndrome196-197 HDG)
Lifton 03 (Robert
Stepping outof that syndrome would also include surrendering the claim of certainty, of ownership of truth and reality. That ownership gives rise to deadly righteousness, with a claim to illumination so absolute as to transcend ordinary restraints against mass violence. The healthier alternative is an acceptance of some measure of ambiguity, of inevitable elements of confusion and contradiction, whether in relation to large historical events or in matters of personal experience.This would include a more nuanced approach to Islam and Islamist thought and behavior that allows for the possibility of evolution and change. It is often claimed that no such acceptance of ambiguity is possible because superpowers, like nations, like people, are uncomfortable with it, thatthe tendency is always to seek clarity and something close to certainty. But this assumption may well underestimate our psychological capabilities. Ambiguity, in fact, is central to human function, recognized and provided for by cultural institutions and practices everyv.,here. American society in particular has cultivated the kinds of ambiguity that go with multiplicity and with shifting populations and frontiers.
6. THE ALT FAILS IT DOESNT DO ANYTHING
Heinegg 4 (Peter, teaches in the department of humanities at Union College, The Cult of
Ares,http://www.americamagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=3842,
Perhaps the only serious flaw in Hillmans case is the abrupt way he discounts the testosterone hypothesis, war as a more or less exclusively guy-thing. He mentions the legendary Amazonsand alludes to, without naming, IndiraGandhi, Margaret Thatcher and female suicide-bombers in Chechnya. Patriarchy,he somewhat dubiously claims, does not originate war but serves war to give it form and bring it to order by means of hierarchical control, ritual ceremony, art, and law.Perha ps the validity of such sky-writing generalizations cannot be fully tested until the distant day when women win full equality. At any rate,the inevitable question remains: having traced war into the very structures of humanness, what in heavens name are we to do about it? Of course, if 10,000 years of civilization have failed to come up with a satisfactory answer, we can hardly fault Hillmans for sounding lame: he calls for aesthetic intensity. Noting the relentless Philistinism of warlike nations, including the United States, he bids us imagine the creation of beauty transforming civilizations wasteful stress. War might lose some of its sublime magic if all [its] diabolic inventiveness, intolerant obsession and drive to conquer were compelled to ward culture. Needless to say, Hillman cannot tell us just how that might be done . But then again, concrete fixes are not what grand visionaries like Hillman are all about . In this warmhearted, learned, intensely personal yet densely theoretical Last Hurrah, he bids us look past the clichs of conservative patriotism and liberal meliorism into the scary abysses of our Martian selves. Given the hideous stories on the nightly news these
days, its an invitation that is hard to resist.
X>9000. What is X?
A2 : HILLMAN KIRITK (2/6) THE ALT FAILS THEY CONCEDED THE GROSSBERG EVIDENCE THAT STATES ONLY BY GOING THROUGH THE STATE CAN WE SOLVE. 8. AND MORE EVIDENCE THE ALTERNATIVE FAILS ONLY BY WORKING FORM WITHIN THE STATE CAN WE SOLVE EVERYTHING ELSE IS CO-OPTED. RORTY 1998, PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT PRINCETON AND THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, PROFESSOR OF COMPARATIVE LITERATURE AT STANFORD, ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY, P. 98-99 attempting to revive national politics. The trouble with this claim is that the governmentof our nation-state will be, for the foreseeable future, the only agent capable of making any real difference in the amount of selfishness and sadism inflicted on Americans. 7.
9.
62, AM)
WAR CAUSES PSYCHIC CASULATIES TURNS THE CRITIQUE
Hillman 4(James, retired Director of the Jung Institute, A Terrible Love of War, The Penguin Press, ISBN 1-59420-011-4, pgs
The iron will of Mars can endure only so long: "Each
moment of combat imposes a strain so great that men will break down in direct relation to the intensity and duration of their exposure ... psychiatric casualties are as inevitable as gunshot and shrapnel wounds in warfare," states an American official report, Combat Exhaustion. 42 "A World War II study determined that after sixty days of continuous combat, 98 percent of all surviving soldiers will have become psychiatric casualties.... [A] common trait among the 2 percent able to endure ... was a predisposition toward 'aggressive psychopathic personalities.' "43 By not granting home leave from beginning to end, requiring men to stay with their units until killed or disabled,44 was the Russian high command intentionally producing aggressive psychopaths ? Which might also account for the wild terror of the Germans as the Red Army advanced. "On Okinawa, American losses totaled7,613 killed and missing ... -and 26,211 psychiatric casualties."45 Of all World War II u.s. medical evacuations from combat zones, one in four were psychiatric. 46 The Arab-Israeli war of 1973 lasted only a few weeks, yet almost one third of Israeli casualties were psychiatric;47 the inhuman stress of war. The very idea that human agony can be named a "stress syndrome" is inhuma n, imagining a man as a machine part, a cog in a military wheel. To keep the war machine running, you kick the engine, boot up the computer, slap the soldier to get him back in line.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: HILLMAN (3/6)
10. ON FRAMEWORK; THEIR AUTHOR ACTUALLY FLOWS NEG. LANGUAGE IS SEVERED FROM THE TRUTH; WHAT WE REPRESENT DOESNT MEAN ANYTHING
Hillman 1990( Former Director of the Jung Institute, James Blue Fire pg 28 HDG)
In the modern language games of Wittgenstein, words are the very fundamentals of conscience existence, yet they are also severed from things and from truth. They exist in a world of their own. In modern structural linguistics, words have no inherent sense, for they can be reduced, every single one of them, to basic quasi-mathematical units.The fantasy of a basic number of irreducible elements out of which all speech can be constituted is a dissecting technique of the analytic mind which applies logical atomism to logos itselfa suicide of the word. Of course there is a credibility gap, since we no longer trust words of any sort as true carriers of meaning. Of course, in psychiatry, words have become schizogenetic, themselves a cause and source of mental disease. Of course we live in a world of slogan, jargon, and press releases, approximating the newspeak of Orwells 984. As one art and academic field after another falls into the paralyzing coils of obsession with language and communication, speech succumbs to a new semantic anxiety. Even psychotherapy, which began as a talking curethe rediscovery of the oral tradition of telling ones storyis abandoning language for touch, cry, and gesture. We dare not be eloquent. To be passionate, psychotherapy now says we must be physical or primitive. Such psychotherapy promotes a new barbarism. Our semantic anxiety has made us forget that words, too, burn and become flesh as we speak. A new angelology of words is needed so that we may once again have faith in them. Without the inherence of the angel in the wordand angel means originally emissary, message-bearer how can we utter anything but personal opinions, things made up in our subjective minds? How can anything of worth and soul be conveyed from one psyche to another, as in a conversation, a letter, or a book, if archetypal significances are not carried in the depths of our words? We need to recall the angel aspect of the word, recognizing words as independent carriers of soul between people. We need to recall that we do not just make words up or learn them in school, or ever have them fully under control. Words, like angels, are powers which have invisible power over us. They are personal presences which have whole mythologies: genders, genealogies (etymologies :oncerning origins and creations), histories, and vogues; and their )Wfl guarding, blaspheming, creating, and annihilating effects. For words are persons. This aspect of the word transcends their nominalistic definitions and contexts and evokes in our souls a universal
X>9000. What is X?
11. THE KRITIK IS A DEPOLITICIZED AVERSION TO POLICYMAKING. THEIRWITHDRAWAL FROM POLITICS ALLOWS CORPORATE AND RIGHTWINGINTERESTS TO CANNABALIZE THE PUBLIC SPHERE. THE IMPACT ISEXTINCTION Boggs 97, Carl National University, Los Angeles, December 1997, The great retreA2: Decline of the public spherein latetwentieth-century America, Theory and Society, Volume 26, Number 6, JDI The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas andchallenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, postmodernism,Deep Ecology intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins inpopular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their differentoutlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles tocombat and overcome alienation.The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizingimpulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacityof individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgentproblems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved perhaps even unrecognized only to fester more ominously in the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay,spread of infectious diseases , technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside thelarger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically,the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendasthat ignore or sidestep these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence.In hiscommentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics,as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life ofcommon involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions. 74 In themeantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of antipoliticsbecomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of politicalpower that will continue to decide the fate of human societies.This last point demands further elaboration.The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that socialhierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold overpeoples lives. Far from it: the spaceabdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready toparticipate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites an already familiardynamic in many lesserdeveloped countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not veryfar removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a partof the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in theface of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for areassertion of politics in more virulent guise or it might help further rationalize the existing powerstructure.In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of thoseuniversal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.
X>9000. What is X?
12. K FRAMEWORK BAD AND A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS g. IT STEALS ALL OF OUR GROUND. h. IT KILLS THE PLAN FOCUS EDUCATION WE JUST DEBATE ABOUT THE SAME GENERIC KRITIKS EVERY ROUND AND NEVER DEBATE ABOUT ANY POLICY ACTION. i. C/I: THE AFFIRMATIVE TEAM SHOULD WIN IF THE TOPICAL PLAN IS THE BEST POLICY OPTION PRESENTED. THE NEGATIVE TEAM HAS TO WIN THAT THE STATUS QUO OR AN ALTERNATIVE COMPETITIVE POLICY ACTION IS BETTER THAN THE PLAN. 13. VAGUE ALTS BAD AND A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS a. VAGUE ALTS MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DEBATE THE ALTERNATIVE OF THE KRITIK, KEY GROUND FOR THE AFF. IF WE ARTICULATE SOME ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ALT; THEYLL JUST SAY THATS NOT US AND SPIKE OUT OF OUR ARGUMENTS. b. ITS EDUCATIONALLY BANKRUPT BECAUSE ITS TOO VAGUE FOR US TO EVER DEBATE IT. c. IT PROVES THE SUPERIORITY OF THE PLAN. WE GIVE A CLEAR EXPLANATION OF HOW WE SOLVE FOR ITS HARMS WHEREAS THEY MAKE THESE FAR OUT CLAIMS THAT THEY CANT EVEN EXPLAIN HOW THEY REALLY SOLVE FOR THEM.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: HISTORICAL MATERIALISM (1/1) 1. 2.
3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
8.
NO LINK ABSOLUETLY NO I/L; EVEN IF IT IS WITHOUT HISTORICAL MATERIALISM; THEY FAIL TO ARTICULATE WHY OUR UNDERSTANDING IS WRONG IN THIS SITUATION; WITHOUT EMPIRICAL DATA, THEIR CLAIMS ARE EVEN WORSE THAN OURS. PERM DO BOTH THERES NO REASON WHY WE CANT REJECT BIOPOLITICS FROM A HISOTRICALLY MATERIALISTIC STANDPOINT. PERM DO PLAN AND THEN CRITIQUE THE SYSTEM; THERES NO REASON WHY WE CANT SOLVE FOR BIOPOLITICS FIRST. PERM DO THE PLAN AND ALL NON-COMPETITIVE PARTS OF THE ALT. AND MORE EVIDENCE THE ALTERNATIVE FAILS ONLY BY WORKING FORM WITHIN THE STATE CAN WE SOLVE EVERYTHING ELSE IS CO-OPTED. K FRAMEWORK BAD AND A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS j. IT STEALS ALL OF OUR GROUND. k. IT KILLS THE PLAN FOCUS EDUCATION WE JUST DEBATE ABOUT THE SAME GENERIC KRITIKS EVERY ROUND AND NEVER DEBATE ABOUT ANY POLICY ACTION. l. C/I: THE AFFIRMATIVE TEAM SHOULD WIN IF THE TOPICAL PLAN IS THE BEST POLICY OPTION PRESENTED. THE NEGATIVE TEAM HAS TO WIN THAT THE STATUS QUO OR AN ALTERNATIVE COMPETITIVE POLICY ACTION IS BETTER THAN THE PLAN. VAGUE ALTS BAD AND A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS d. VAGUE ALTS MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DEBATE THE ALTERNATIVE OF THE KRITIK, KEY GROUND FOR THE AFF. IF WE ARTICULATE SOME ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ALT; THEYLL JUST SAY THATS NOT US AND SPIKE OUT OF OUR ARGUMENTS. e. ITS EDUCATIONALLY BANKRUPT BECAUSE ITS TOO VAGUE FOR US TO EVER DEBATE IT. f. IT PROVES THE SUPERIORITY OF THE PLAN. WE GIVE A CLEAR EXPLANATION OF HOW WE SOLVE FOR ITS HARMS WHEREAS THEY MAKE THESE FAR OUT CLAIMS THAT THEY CANT EVEN EXPLAIN HOW THEY REALLY SOLVE FOR THEM.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: IMPERIALISM (1/5)
NO LINK WE ONLY SOLVE FOR BIOPOLITICS AND WE DONT IMPERIALIST ACTION 2. DONT GIVE THEM THEIR LINK CLAIMS; THEY BASICALLY SAY THAT ANY FEDERAL ACTION IS IMPERIALIST. 3. PERM DO THE PLAN AND ALL NON-COMPETITIVE PARTS OF THE ALT 4. PERM DO THE PLAN AND SOLVE FOR THE HARMS AND THEN DO THE ALTERNATIVE 5. PERM DO BOTH AND OUR POLICY ACTION SOLVES BEST 6. AND PERMS SOLVE BEST AND THE ALTERNATIVE FAILS ONLY BY WORKING FORM WITHIN THE STATE CAN WE SOLVE EVERYTHING ELSE IS CO-OPTED RORTY 1998, PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT PRINCETON AND THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, PROFESSOR OF COMPARATIVE LITERATURE AT STANFORD, ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY, P. 98-99 attempting to revive national politics. The trouble with this claim is that the governmentof our nation-state will be, for the foreseeable future, the only agent capable of making any real difference in the amount of selfishness and sadism inflicted on Americans. 1.
7.
CROSSAPPLY GROSSBERG FROM THE 1AC THE ALTERNATIVE FAILS.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: IMPERIALISM (2/5) 8.
MORE EVIDENCE THE ALT FAILS IMPERIALISM DOESNT ALLOW FOR THE SPACE OF ALTERNATIVES.
Ali 6 (Tariq, novelist, historian, and commentator on thecurrent situation in the Middle East, The
new imperialists Ideologies of Empire, Ch 3 Pg 51)JL
Then came the total collapse of the Soviet Union and the restoration of a peculiar form of gangster capitalism in the world. Did
the triumph of capitalism and the defeat of an enemy ideology mean we were in a world without conflict or enemies? Both Fukuyama and Huntington produced important books as a response to the new situation.
Fukuyama, obsessed with Hegel, saw liberal democracy/capitalism as the only embodiment of the world -spirit that now marked the end of history, a phrase that became the title of his book.3 The long war was over and the restless world -spirit could now relax and buy a condo in Miami. Fukuyama insisted that there were no longer any available alternatives to the American way of life. The philosophy, politics, and economics of the Other each and every variety of socialism/Marxism had disappeared under the ocean, a submerged continent of ideas that could never rise again. The victory of capital was irreversible. It was a universal triumph. Huntington was unconvinced, and warned against complacency. From his Harvard base, he challenged Fukuyama with a set of theses first published in Foreign Affairs (The Clash of Civilizations? a phrase originally coined by Bernard Lewis, another favourite of the current administration). Subsequently these papers became a book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. The question mark had now disappeared. Huntington agreed that no ideological alternatives to capitalism existed, but this did not mean the end of history. Other antagonisms remained.The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict wil l be cultural. . . . The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics .4 In particular, Huntington emphasized the continued importance of religion in the modern world, and it was this that propelled the book onto the bestseller lists after 9/11. What did he mean by the word civilization? Early in the last century, Oswald Spengler, the German grandson of a miner, had abandoned his vocation as a teacher, turned to philosophy and to history, and produced a master-text. In The Decline of the West, Spengler counterposed culture (a word philologically tied to nature, the countryside, and peasant life) with civilization, which is urban and would become the site of industrial anarchy, dooming both capitalist and worker to a life of slavery to the machine-master. For Spengler, civilization reeked of death and destruction
and imperialism. Democracy was the dictatorship of money and money is overthrown and abolished only by blood.5 The advent of Caesarism would drown it in blood and become the final episod e in the
history of theWest.Had the Third Reich not been defeated in Europe, principally by the Red Army (the spinal cord of the Wehrmacht was broken in Stalingrad and Kursk, and the majority of the unfortunate German soldiers who perished are buried on the Russian steppes, not on the beaches of Normandy or in the Ardennes), Spenglers prediction might have come close to realization. He was among the first and fiercest critics of Eurocentrism, and his vivid worldview, postmodern in its intensity though not its language, can be sighted in this lyrical passage: I see, in place of that empty figment of one linear history, the drama of a number of mighty cultures, each springing with primitive strength from the soil of a mother-region to which it remains firmly bound throughout its whole life-cycle; each stamping its material, its mankind, in its own image; each having its own idea, its own passions, its own life, will and feeling, its own death. Here indeed are colours, lights, movements, that no intellectual eye has yet discovered. Here the Cultures, peoples, languages, truths, gods, landscapes bloom and age as the oaks and stonepines, the blossoms, twigs and leaves. Each Culture has its own new possibilities of self-expression, which arise, ripen, decay and never return.6 In contrast to this, he argued, lay the destructive cycle of civilization: Civilizations are the most external and artificial states of which a species of developed humanity is capable. They are a conclusion, death following life, rigidity following expansion, intellectual age and the stone-built petrifying world city following motherearth . . . they are an end, irrevocable, yet by inward necessity reached again and again. . . . Imperialism is
civilization unadulterated. In this phenomenal form the destiny of the West is now irrevocably set. . . . Expansionism is a doom, something daemonic and intense, which grips forces into service and uses up the late humanity of the world-city stage.7
X>9000. What is X?
THE CRITIQUE IS A DEPOLITICIZED AVERSION TO POLICYMAKING. THEIRWITHDRAWAL FROM POLITICS ALLOWS CORPORATE AND RIGHTWINGINTERESTS TO CANNABALIZE THE PUBLIC SPHERE. THE IMPACT ISEXTINCTION Boggs 97, Carl National University, Los Angeles, December 1997, The great retreA2: Decline of the public spherein latetwentieth-century America, Theory and Society, Volume 26, Number 6, JDI The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas andchallenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, postmodernism,Deep Ecology intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins inpopular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their differentoutlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles tocombat and overcome alienation.The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizingimpulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacityof individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgentproblems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved perhaps even unrecognized only to fester more ominously in the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay,spread of infectious diseases , technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside thelarger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically,the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendasthat ignore or sidestep these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence.In hiscommentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics,as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life ofcommon involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions. 74 In themeantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of antipoliticsbecomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of politicalpower that will continue to decide the fate of human societies.This last point demands further elaboration.The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that socialhierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold overpeoples lives. Far from it: the spaceabdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready toparticipate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites an already familiardynamic in many lesserdeveloped countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not veryfar removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a partof the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in theface of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for areassertion of politics in more virulent guise or it might help further rationalize the existing powerstructure.In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of thoseuniversal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.
9.
X>9000. What is X?
X>9000. What is X?
thinking leaves us with a concept of power which "loses its explanatory context and becomes a ubiquitous metaphysical principle" (Dews 1986 cited in Thompson 1993: 201). This notion of power is devoid of a cogent explanation of its internal dynamic. Such a rendering reifies power - power is seen as having a life of its own; the subject is placed on the periphery and the role of agency is ignored.This "works all by " mentality provides us with a human being who appears to be somewhat of a disarmed prisoner of society and, as one writer aptly describes, engenders an "ideology of resignation" 15. K FRAMEWORK BAD AND A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS a. IT STEALS ALL OF OUR GROUND. b. IT IS UNPERDICTABLE; THEY COULD CRITIQUE US ON LITERALLY ANYTHING. THERE ARE THOUSANDS OF THINGS THEY COULD SAY IS BAD. c. IT KILLS THE PLAN FOCUS EDUCATION WE JUST DEBATE ABOUT THE SAME GENERIC KRITIKS EVERY ROUND AND NEVER DEBATE ABOUT ANY POLICY ACTION. d. C/I: THE AFFIRMATIVE TEAM SHOULD WIN IF THE TOPICAL PLAN IS THE BEST POLICY OPTION PRESENTED. THE NEGATIVE TEAM HAS TO WIN THAT THE STATUS QUO OR AN ALTERNATIVE COMPETITIVE POLICY ACTION IS BETTER THAN THE PLAN. 16. VAGUE ALTS BAD a. VAGUE ALTS MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DEBATE THE ALTERNATIVE OF THE KRITIK, KEY GROUND FOR THE AFF. IF WE ARTICULATE SOME ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ALT; THEYLL JUST SAY THATS NOT US AND SPIKE OUT OF OUR ARGUMENTS. b. ITS EDUCATIONALLY BANKRUPT BECAUSE ITS TOO VAGUE FOR US TO EVER DEBATE IT. c. IT PROVES THE SUPERIORITY OF THE PLAN. WE GIVE A CLEAR EXPLANATION OF HOW WE SOLVE FOR ITS HARMS WHEREAS THEY MAKE THESE FAR OUT CLAIMS THAT THEY CANT EVEN EXPLAIN HOW THEY REALLY SOLVE FOR THEM.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: NORMATIVITY (1/5)
NO LINK WE ONLY SOLVE FOR BIOPOLITICS AND IN THE POST-FIAT WORLD; THE ACTION FOLLOWS. 2. PERM DO THE PLAN AND ALL NON-COMPETITIVE PARTS OF THE ALT 3. PERM DO THE PLAN AND SOLVE FOR NUCLEAR FIREBREAK; AND THEN CRITIQUE NORMATIVITY. 4. PERMS SOLVE BEST EMBRACING THE LEGAL SYSTEM WHILE TRYING TO UNDERSTAND NORMATIVE LEGAL THOUGHT IS THE ONLY WAY TO NAVIGATE THE MAZE OF NORMATIVITY. Mootz 93 Francis J Mootz Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law, ESSAY: THE PARANOID STYLE IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, lexis) As Hilary Putnam concisely states, the elimination of the normative is attempted mental suicide. I would refine Putnams observation by including paranoid distanciation within the scope of mental suicide. Professor Schlag writes powerfully, invariably capturing my interst and leading me to important new insights, However, his effort to distance himself from the normative legal language that is our heritage falls short, as it must. I congratulate Schlag for his skill in destroying some of the most cherished talismans in our legal vocabulary, including the rule of law. But descrution is never total. In the wake of destruction we inevitably chart new paths in the maze. Legal theory properly is viewed not as an attempt to escape the maze of normative legal thought, but as an effort to develop shared strategies for navigating through the maze. Forging a path, rather than finding an exist, is the goal. That is enough for me. 5. NORMATIVITY IS INEVITABLE EVEN SCHLAG HIMSELF CREATES NORMATIVITY BY WRITING HIS LAW REVIEWS. Radin and Michelman 91 (SYMPOSIUM: The critique of normativity: Commentary: Pragmatist and poststructuralist critical legal practice, Lexis) 1. What should we do? What should the law be? What do you propose? asks normative legal thought Normative, we thus understand, is what every perspective utterance is; normativity marks every saying addressed to a question of what someone should (or should not) do. Now, it seems obviously correct that normativity, thus sweepingly defined, is pandemic in legal thought and writing. But so is it pandemic, we would say, in thought and writing about legal thought as represented, say, by the articles in this symposium. To work, in writing, at the displacement or destabilization of some named practice of writing (like normative legal thought) is already to exemplify and thereby to commend some different, some critically chastened, practice. Moreoever, it is extremely difficult to carry on the work of destabilization without appearing to lapse into normative modes of discourse. Take, for example, this passage from an article by Schlag: 6. TURN: TALKING ABOUT NORMATIVITY ENTRENCHES IT FURTHER INTO THE FORUM ITS BEING DISCUSSED. TELLING THE JUDGE HOW WE SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT TALK IMPLICITY ACKNOWLEDGES CHOICE. Radin and Michelman 91 (SYMPOSIUM: The critique of normativity: Commentary: Pragmatist and poststructuralist critical legal practice, Lexis) Take, for example.., this passage from an article by Schlag:
This talk-talk genre simply argues that we should talk some new talk Variations on this old talk/new talk include the following: we should talk more normatively, or more contextually or in that hopeful humanist way until we figure out what the hell were doing up here 30,000 feet from earth arguing about how we should land.
We should talk more normatively (WSTMN; for short) is the name of a certain sentence the one that says we should talk more normatively.If uttering WSTMN is contemptiable as just talk or as normative talk(and, to boot, as naively presupposing that how we talk, what we do, is within our power to decide), then what is a reader supposed to make of the sentence that says that uttering WSTMN is contemptible on those grounds?It seems that saying that cannot be an argument about whether or how we should (or should not) talk. How can one argue that what makes an utterance (or a genre) unworthy of attention or respect is that it is normative talk? To argue is to invoke the practice of argument, and that practice consists of normative talk. But if this utterance of Schlags is not argument, then what is it?
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: NORMATIVITY CRITIQUE (2/5)
AND NO REASON TO VOTE NEG; AFFIRMING NORMATIVITY HAS THE SAME EFFECT AS REJECTING IT ONLY CONSTANT CRITICISM COMING FROM BOTH SIDES GIVES US A BETTER UNDERSTANDING. Radin and Michelman 91 (SYMPOSIUM: The critique of normativity: Commentary: Pragmatist and poststructuralist critical legal practice, Lexis) It seems a possibility worth considering that there is not, and is not going to be, any critical speaker for whom the reconstructive, the visionary, the committed moment is not always already coming, and thus is not always already here. We can deconstruct because we can reconstruct; we are anti-normative insofar as we are normative. As the reconstructive moment seems ineradicable, so too does the human experience of agency. It seems, in other words, a possibility worth considering that the problematic, elusive, humanist experience of subjectivity agency is an historically ireeversible, inexpungible, constitutive aspect of our experience of being. Part of what we do, as concept-making strivers caught in forms of life, is think about the good the better- world and ourselves acting towards it. We cannot deny our own agency.We can call agency into question, and we had better, but to call into question is also to (re)affirm, (re)create, (re)construct. NO ALTERNATIVE. AS SOON AS ONE THINKS THEY ARE OUT OF THE MAZE OF NORMATIVE LEGAL THOUGHT, THEY FIND YET ANOTHER WALL. Mootz 93 Francis J Mootz Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law, ESSAY: THE PARANOID STYLE IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, lexis) The epistemological problems posed by modernist critical projects are only partially answered by adding a postmodern gloss. Schlags effort to analyze legal scholarship from outside the maze is extremely problematic. Schlag believes that most scholars reside within a maze characterized by dreariness, but that select few have found a way out, gained perspective on the maze and now engage in a fruitful questioning that reveals rather than obscures the law. Insharp contrast, I reject the idea that such a dramatic escape can take place. Just when a scholar believes that she has scaled the last wall of the maze, she will be confronted by a boundless horizon of paths endlessly circling within the ambit of the same maze. Hope for escape must always be dashed in the end, but this does not mean that an individuals comportment within the maze is without ethical or political significance. The central problem for contemporary jurisprudence is not the maze or the normative legal discourse, but the failure to recognize the maze as an unavoidable condition that is productive of knowledge. 8.
7.
X>9000. What is X?
10. THE CRITIQUE IS A DEPOLITICIZED AVERSION TO POLICYMAKING. THEIRWITHDRAWAL FROM POLITICS ALLOWS CORPORATE AND RIGHTWINGINTERESTS TO CANNABALIZE THE PUBLIC SPHERE. THE IMPACT ISEXTINCTION Boggs 97, Carl National University, Los Angeles, December 1997, The great retreA2: Decline of the public spherein latetwentieth-century America, Theory and Society, Volume 26, Number 6, JDI The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas andchallenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, postmodernism,Deep Ecology intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins inpopular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their differentoutlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles tocombat and overcome alienation.The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizingimpulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacityof individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgentproblems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved perhaps even unrecognized only to fester more ominously in the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay,spread of infectious diseases , technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside thelarger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically,the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendasthat ignore or sidestep these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence.In hiscommentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics,as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life ofcommon involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions. 74 In themeantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of antipoliticsbecomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of politicalpower that will continue to decide the fate of human societies.This last point demands further elaboration.The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that socialhierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold overpeoples lives. Far from it: the spaceabdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready toparticipate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites an already familiardynamic in many lesserdeveloped countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not veryfar removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a partof the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in theface of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for areassertion of politics in more virulent guise or it might help further rationalize the existing powerstructure.In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of thoseuniversal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.
X>9000. What is X?
X>9000. What is X?
thinking leaves us with a concept of power which "loses its explanatory context and becomes a ubiquitous metaphysical principle" (Dews 1986 cited in Thompson 1993: 201). This notion of power is devoid of a cogent explanation of its internal dynamic. Such a rendering reifies power - power is seen as having a life of its own; the subject is placed on the periphery and the role of agency is ignored.This "works all by " mentality provides us with a human being who appears to be somewhat of a disarmed prisoner of society and, as one writer aptly describes, engenders an "ideology of resignation" 18. K FRAMEWORK BAD AND A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS e. IT STEALS ALL OF OUR GROUND. f. IT IS UNPERDICTABLE; THEY COULD CRITIQUE US ON LITERALLY ANYTHING. THERE ARE THOUSANDS OF THINGS THEY COULD SAY IS BAD. g. IT KILLS THE PLAN FOCUS EDUCATION WE JUST DEBATE ABOUT THE SAME GENERIC KRITIKS EVERY ROUND AND NEVER DEBATE ABOUT ANY POLICY ACTION. h. C/I: THE AFFIRMATIVE TEAM SHOULD WIN IF THE TOPICAL PLAN IS THE BEST POLICY OPTION PRESENTED. THE NEGATIVE TEAM HAS TO WIN THAT THE STATUS QUO OR AN ALTERNATIVE COMPETITIVE POLICY ACTION IS BETTER THAN THE PLAN. 19. VAGUE ALTS BAD d. VAGUE ALTS MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DEBATE THE ALTERNATIVE OF THE KRITIK, KEY GROUND FOR THE AFF. IF WE ARTICULATE SOME ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ALT; THEYLL JUST SAY THATS NOT US AND SPIKE OUT OF OUR ARGUMENTS. e. ITS EDUCATIONALLY BANKRUPT BECAUSE ITS TOO VAGUE FOR US TO EVER DEBATE IT. f. IT PROVES THE SUPERIORITY OF THE PLAN. WE GIVE A CLEAR EXPLANATION OF HOW WE SOLVE FOR ITS HARMS WHEREAS THEY MAKE THESE FAR OUT CLAIMS THAT THEY CANT EVEN EXPLAIN HOW THEY REALLY SOLVE FOR THEM.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: ORIENTALISM (1/5) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
NO LINK WE ONLY SOLVE FOR BIOPOLITICS; WE DONT VIEW ANY AS THE OTHER. PERM DO THE PLAN AND ALL NON-COMPETITIVE PARTS OF THE ALT PERM DO THE PLAN AND SOLVE FOR BIOPOLITICS; AND THEN CRITIQUE THE STATE PERM DO BOTH; POLICY ACTION SOLVES BEST. PERMS SOVE BEST THEY CONCEDED THE GROSSBERG EVIDENCE AND MORE EVIDENCE A STRATEGY THAT TRIES TO REJECT IT ALL AT ONCE WILL NEVER SUCCEED.
Varisco 7 [ Daniel Martin, Reading Orientalism Said and the Unsaid Publisher: Seattle : University of Washington Press,]
I have no desire to repeat Saids uncritical mistake and stop short of su ggesting an alternative to the poleinical path of Orientclism-
We need to escape the faults of bias and distortion in representation of real people and their real history as well as the imaginative discourses that invade all historical understanding. This can best be accomplished by adapting rather than rejecting the available tools developed within the very guilds Said relegates to the latrines. Much of the available criticism documented here offers ways in which the target
of Saids rhetoric can be more credibly analyzed. Linguists are far more capable today of analyzing Oriental languages in a comparative sense because of the insights of earlier philologists and the Sheer force of experience in diverse contexts. Historians, like archaeologists have improved methods for looking at the material remains of daily life, including scraps of ordinary writing, to create a better understanding than Canonized texts afford on their own. It is still necessary to read Herodotus, for example, but what a more enlightening reading is possible given the fragments still visible of the real world that writers like Herodotus recorded. Anthropologists, never comfortable sitting above it all in academic armchairs, both learn and unlearn through the dialect of living with real Orientals and speaking in their native languages. Increasingly, ethnographers work with native intellectuals rather than simply parroting an outsiders perspective. Contemporary historians of Islam, no longer motivated by a desire to defend a beleagured Christian view, study the diversity of Muslims as well as the trajectory of their complex textual tradition. Political scient ists and economists debate views from the far right to the let. Contrary to what a reading of Orientalism today might suggest, the right kind of scholarly work is there; some of it has been there all along. In reading Orientalism, I have not only shown the many rhetorical excesses and historical flaws in Saids thesis but have also s uggested ways in which scholars have contributed
Moving beyond the East-West binary requires an academic approach that emphasizes the continued improvements of methods to reach a less biased representation of the otherwhile recognizing the inevitable ethnocentricity in us all. Moving beyond the politics of blame requires a switch from the rhetoric of polemic to civil academic debate with a measure of intellectual tolerance for opposing viewpoints. It would certainly help to shift the focus away from demagogic cultural criticism to informed analysis of cultures through refined methodologies .
to a less biased and more nuanced understanding of the real Orient.
No single specialization has the answers. But this should be a call to cooperate in a joint concern for ferreting out discernable truths rather than disparaging individuals and academic disciplines. Rather than the lone oppositional critic lashing out at an untidy world, I propose the model advocated by my colleague Jacques Berlinblau, that a public intellectual/sideration, writes in a lucid pr ose, clarifies complex issues, apprises readers of inconvenient facts, advocates unpopular opinions, questions and reveals his or her own
The challenge at hand is to contribute to a better, not eternally fixed, understanding of the other. If the idealized notion of Orient is an invention through discourse it should also be capable of being reinvented through sound scholarship. Serious academic study of Middle Eastern cultures and Islam, despite the limitations and prejudices of individual scholars, is not hostage to a latent hegemonic discourse in which representations of an imagined Orient of East is condemned to be inherently racist, sexist, and ideologically driven
motivations in doing so, and yes, ultimately, if possible, comes to a decision about the issue at hand. . Rather than succumb to the hubris of polemicists who make dogmatic assertions or manipulate history with Whiggish intent, the contemporary student of Middle Eastern cultures, or of any cultural setting, should focus on the question of fit with an assumed and irreducibly reality worth studying. The dreaded fork in the road to recovery need
. There is something real that is worth being conceptualized by and beyond the term Orient. Orientalism can be conjured, constricted, constructed, and deconstructed ad nauseam, tasks quite Herculean if done right but absurdly Sisyphean if carried on in the right same old spirit of competitive intellectualizing.
not be reduced to the choice between orthodoxicnihilobstat and Nietzschean orthodoxy duplication, nor one that can effectively distill manifest difference into a whole meaningful to all
What was once a broad field of geographical and cultural specialization will not go away, Saids book notwithstanding, because the real Orient is n ot about to fade
from view. Let us agree, at least in principle, on the following truisms at the start of the third millennium. All scholars, no matter how careful and sincere, carry with them assumptions and expectations from their own cultures and individual socialization. All generalizations about peoples ideas, beliefs, and behavior essentialize to some extent, invariably along an ethnocentric fault line. Representation, especially by someone writing in another language or from an outsiders perspecti ve, is never going to be an exact
.I
am not so nave as to assume that the damage of an
opportunistic East-West clash can simply be wished away, but neither do I doubt our ability to whittle away at bias and misinformation by using the methodologies of critical scholarship from established but evolving disciplines the best way to battle misleading binary thinking is to get on with sound academic scholarship and spend less time rhetorically damning the binary itself or reconstructing incomplete genealogies of intellectual history
by suggesting that
. If we cannot lay to rest the ghosts of Orientalism past, at least we can stop being frightened out of our critical scholarship by such a troublesome specter. I conclude
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: ORIENTALISM (2/5)
AND MORE EVIDENCE THE ALTERNATIVE FAILS ONLY BY WORKING FORM WITHIN THE STATE CAN WE SOLVE EVERYTHING ELSE IS CO-OPTED. RORTY 1998, PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT PRINCETON AND THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, PROFESSOR OF COMPARATIVE LITERATURE AT STANFORD, ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY, P. 98-99 attempting to revive national politics. The trouble with this claim is that the governmentof our nation-state will be, for the foreseeable future, the only agent capable of making any real difference in the amount of selfishness and sadism inflicted on Americans. 7.
NO LINK WE ONLY SOLVE FOR BIOPOLITICS; WE DONT VIEW ANY AS THE OTHER. 9. TURN: THE AFF WITHDRAWAL FROM TURKEY IS A REDUCTION OF ORIENTALIST POLICIES. Crooke 10, He has worked with Islamist movements for more than 20 years, serving until 2003 as an EU mediator charged with negotiating and facilitating various ceasefires and agreements with Islamist movements, 2010 [Alastair, July The Washington Quarterly 33:3 pp. 720 The Shifting Sands of State Power in the Middle East 8.
ThelastgreatWesternintervention intotheMiddleEast,fromapproximately 18211922,leftbehindagapingvoideventuallyfilledbythecolonialpowers,
.Butasleaders of the regional states and Islamist movements surveythe comingera, they seeno What theyseeisa gradual decrease in Western influence as the United States and its allies reduce their forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.For the first time in centuries,therefore,there will be no external powers stepping into any void. There will also be no Chinese or Russian intervention_atleastnotinthecolonialsenseofamassivepoliticalintervention. The realignment of trade, technology, and investment toward the East no doubt will continue itsrelentless creep, inline with the states look East policies.China andRussiawill certainlyplaytheirpart,butaspartnersnotaspowers. This new era, therefore, is likely to be heralded by a fierce struggle for influence.Unlike the1920s,it willnot take the formofexternal powers jockeyingbetweenthemselves,butitwillbewaged internallybytheactors_ stateandnon-state_forthefutureoftheregion. Andit is likely to be a bitter one, both at the conventional political level and within Islam. The economic and social stresses of the coming years will call for new responses. The ability of states and Islamist movements to respond to these stresses, to findtheIslamicharmoniesthroughwhichtoanswerthesharpnotesofpopularemotion,andtofind a visual language by which ordinary Muslims can imagine a new future and a way of living are the tests that lie ahead.
BritainandFrance prospectofa repetition ofthis earlier experience.
X>9000. What is X?
10. THE KRITIK IS A DEPOLITICIZED AVERSION TO POLICYMAKING. THEIRWITHDRAWAL FROM POLITICS ALLOWS CORPORATE AND RIGHTWINGINTERESTS TO CANNABALIZE THE PUBLIC SPHERE. THE IMPACT ISEXTINCTION Boggs 97, Carl National University, Los Angeles, December 1997, The great retreA2: Decline of the public spherein latetwentieth-century America, Theory and Society, Volume 26, Number 6, JDI The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas andchallenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, postmodernism,Deep Ecology intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins inpopular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their differentoutlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles tocombat and overcome alienation.The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizingimpulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacityof individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgentproblems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved perhaps even unrecognized only to fester more ominously in the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay,spread of infectious diseases , technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside thelarger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically,the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendasthat ignore or sidestep these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence.In hiscommentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics,as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life ofcommon involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions. 74 In themeantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of antipoliticsbecomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of politicalpower that will continue to decide the fate of human societies.This last point demands further elaboration.The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that socialhierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold overpeoples lives. Far from it: the spaceabdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready toparticipate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites an already familiardynamic in many lesser-developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not veryfar removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a partof the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in theface of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for areassertion of politics in more virulent guise or it might help further rationalize the existing powerstructure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of thoseuniversal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: ORIENTALISM(4/5)
X>9000. What is X?
thinking leaves us with a concept of power which "loses its explanatory context and becomes a ubiquitous metaphysical principle" (Dews 1986 cited in Thompson 1993: 201). This notion of power is devoid of a cogent explanation of its internal dynamic. Such a rendering reifies power - power is seen as having a life of its own; the subject is placed on the periphery and the role of agency is ignored.This "works all by " mentality provides us with a human being who appears to be somewhat of a disarmed prisoner of society and, as one writer aptly describes, engenders an "ideology of resignation" 12. K FRAMEWORK BAD AND A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS j. IT STEALS ALL OF OUR GROUND. k. IT KILLS THE PLAN FOCUS EDUCATION WE JUST DEBATE ABOUT THE SAME GENERIC KRITIKS EVERY ROUND AND NEVER DEBATE ABOUT ANY POLICY ACTION. l. C/I: THE AFFIRMATIVE TEAM SHOULD WIN IF THE TOPICAL PLAN IS THE BEST POLICY OPTION PRESENTED. THE NEGATIVE TEAM HAS TO WIN THAT THE STATUS QUO OR AN ALTERNATIVE COMPETITIVE POLICY ACTION IS BETTER THAN THE PLAN. 13. VAGUE ALTS BAD j. VAGUE ALTS MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DEBATE THE ALTERNATIVE OF THE KRITIK, KEY GROUND FOR THE AFF. IF WE ARTICULATE SOME ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ALT; THEYLL JUST SAY THATS NOT US AND SPIKE OUT OF OUR ARGUMENTS. k. ITS EDUCATIONALLY BANKRUPT BECAUSE ITS TOO VAGUE FOR US TO EVER DEBATE IT. l. IT PROVES THE SUPERIORITY OF THE PLAN. WE GIVE A CLEAR EXPLANATION OF HOW WE SOLVE FOR ITS HARMS WHEREAS THEY MAKE THESE FAR OUT CLAIMS THAT THEY CANT EVEN EXPLAIN HOW THEY REALLY SOLVE FOR THEM.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA SCHMIT (1/4)
NO LINK WE ONLY SOLVE FOR NUCLEAR FIREBREAK; PERM DO THE PLAN AND ALL NON-COMPETITIVE PARTS OF THE ALT PERM DO THE PLAN AND SOLVE FOR THE NUCLEAR FIREBREAK; AND THEN CRITIQUE THE SYSTEM. 4. PERM DO BOTH; NO REASON WHY WE CANNOT CRITIQUE BOTH BIOPOLITICS AND LIBEALISM. 5. PERMS SOVE BEST THEY CONCEDED THE GROSSBERG EVIDENCE. 6. AND THE ALT ONLY INCREASES LIBERALISM. Gross 2000(Oren Gross, Assistant Professor of Law at Tel Aviv University, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1825, Lexis Nexus, May 2000, LEQ) 1. 2. 3. Schmitt's alternative model, which he offers as a replacement to the liberal model,introduces as much predictability as the sovereign's whim. If liberalism's fault inheres in the normative and utopian nature of its structures, Schmitt's fault lies with the apologetic overtones of his proposals.132Against liberalism's rigidity, Schmitt puts forward an all too flexible alternative. Whatever the sovereign decides is legitimate. There is no substantive content against which legitimacy of such actions can be measured not even Hobbes's minimalist principle of self-preservation. Despite Schmitt's attacks against the content-neutrality of liberalism and positivism, his theory, in the last [*1852] account, is nihilistic. 133In its purest form, a decision emerges out of nothing, i.e., it does not presuppose any given set of norms, and it does
not owe its validity or its legitimacy to any preexisting normative structure. No such structure, therefore, can attempt to limit the decision's scope in any meaningful way. 134 Similarly, since the decision is not the product of any abstract rationality, but is rather reflective of an irrational element, it cannot by definition be bound by any element
reduces law to an altogether arbitrary, and potentially inconsistent, series of power decisions, and thus proves unable to secure even a modicum of legal determinacy. It represents a theoretical recipe for a legal system characterized by a kind of permanent revolutionary dictatorship ... Decisionism, at best, simply reproduces the ills of liberal legalism, and, at worst, makes a virtue out of liberalism's most telling jurisprudential vice. 7. AND THE ALT LEADS TO TOTAL WAR AND EXTINCTION THE ONE THING WE CANT RECOVER FROM. Moreiras, 04 Director of European Studies at Duke, (Alberto, 2004, A God without Sovereignty. Political Jouissance. The Passive Decision, CR: The New Centennial Review 4.3, p. 82 -83, Project MUSE, TH)
found in the rational dimension. 135 As William Scheuerman pointedly notes: A rigorous decisionist legal theory But the scandal gets worse, and this is something that Schmitt does not point out. He does quote, with high praise (it is impossible to understand the concept of a just enemy
Kants definition of the just enemyisitself scandalous, andpotentially throws Schmitts differentiation into disarray. For Kant, a just enemy would be one that Iwould be doing wrong by resisting, but then he would also not be my enemy (2003, 169). With this, with what we could
better than did Kant [169]), Kants definition of the just enemy. But call Schmitts refusal to deal with the implications of the Kantian definition, although he himself provides it, Schmitt shows a double face. It stands to reason that, if the
if the enemy, in virtue of his very justice, is always already a friend, then all enemies, in order to be enemies, must be unjust. If all enemies are unjust, then every single enemy stands outside the jurisdiction of the nomos. The nomic order has then effective jurisdiction only overfriends, andit loses its universality. It loses, indeed, more than its universality: it loses its position as apoliticalconcept, since it cannot account for, it can only submit to, the friend/enemy division
notion of the just enemy is an impossibility, that is ,
. Hence, the order of the nomos and the order (or, rather, the state) of any concrete politics are radically incompatible. If there is politics, then there is no binding nomos. If there is a nomos, the unjust enemy and that means any enemyfalls outside the political order. Schmitts position in The Nomos of the Earth seems to contradict his earlier position on the political successfully: the notion of a nomos of the earth, of an order of the political, accomplishes, perhaps against Schmitts own w ill, a deconstruction of his notion of the political. Or perhaps, on the contrary, we are faced with the fact that Schmitts own indications of the Kantian position deconstruct the notion of an order of the political beyond every concrete friend-enemy grouping and send us back to the absolute primacy of the friend/enemy division in terms of a determination of the politcal. Do we prefer to uphold the
If all enemies are unjust enemies, all enemies must be exterminated. There is no end and no limitation to war: war is total, and that is so both for the friends of the nomos, and for their unjust
notion of a nomic order, or do we prefer to abide by a savage, anomic notion of the political? Is there a choice ?4
enemies. But total war cannot be a fundamental orientation and a principle of order. The notion of total war announces the end of any possible reign of nomic order. It also
total war without a nomos is a totally unregulated, totally nondiscriminatory war, without legality. And a war under those conditions cannot abide by a concept of friendship, since it has generalized the friend/enemy division into their complete disruption. Friendship presupposes legality. Faced with total war, humanity finds itself deprived of amity, just as it finds itself deprived of enmity. At the logical end of the concept, the political division finds its own end. Total war is the end of the political. The whole notion of an order of the political has now been placed
announces a radicalization of the political, precisely as it opens itself to its most extreme determination as war, now tota l.
But a
beyond the line. Total war is an absolute threat.
X>9000. What is X?
A2: SCHMIDT (2/4) 14. THE KRITIK IS A DEPOLITICIZED AVERSION TO POLICYMAKING. THEIRWITHDRAWAL FROM POLITICS ALLOWS CORPORATE AND RIGHTWINGINTERESTS TO CANNABALIZE THE PUBLIC SPHERE. THE IMPACT ISEXTINCTION Boggs 97, Carl National University, Los Angeles, December 1997, The great retreA2: Decline of the public spherein latetwentieth-century America, Theory and Society, Volume 26, Number 6, JDI The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas andchallenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, postmodernism,Deep Ecology intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins inpopular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their differentoutlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles tocombat and overcome alienation.The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizingimpulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacityof individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgentproblems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved perhaps even unrecognized only to fester more ominously in the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay,spread of infectious diseases , technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside thelarger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically,the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendasthat ignore or sidestep these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence.In hiscommentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics,as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life ofcommon involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions. 74 In themeantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of antipoliticsbecomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of politicalpower that will continue to decide the fate of human societies.This last point demands further elaboration.The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that socialhierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold overpeoples lives. Far from it: the spaceabdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready toparticipate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites an already familiardynamic in many lesser-developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not veryfar removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a partof the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in theface of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for areassertion of politics in more virulent guise or it might help further rationalize the existing powerstructure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of thoseuniversal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: SCHMIDT (3/4)
X>9000. What is X?
HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: SCHMIDT (4/4)
thinking leaves us with a concept of power which "loses its explanatory context and becomes a ubiquitous metaphysical principle" (Dews 1986 cited in Thompson 1993: 201). This notion of power is devoid of a cogent explanation of its internal dynamic.AFF Such a rendering reifies power - power is seen as having a life of its own; the subject is placed on the periphery and the role of agency is ignored.This "works all by " mentality provides us with a human being who appears to be somewhat of a disarmed prisoner of society and, as one writer aptly describes, engenders an "ideology of resignation" 16. K FRAMEWORK BAD AND A VOTER FOR THESE REASONS m. IT STEALS ALL OF OUR GROUND. n. IT KILLS THE PLAN FOCUS EDUCATION WE JUST DEBATE ABOUT THE SAME GENERIC KRITIKS EVERY ROUND AND NEVER DEBATE ABOUT ANY POLICY ACTION. o. C/I: THE AFFIRMATIVE TEAM SHOULD WIN IF THE TOPICAL PLAN IS THE BEST POLICY OPTION PRESENTED. THE NEGATIVE TEAM HAS TO WIN THAT THE STATUS QUO OR AN ALTERNATIVE COMPETITIVE POLICY ACTION IS BETTER THAN THE PLAN. 17. VAGUE ALTS BAD m. VAGUE ALTS MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DEBATE THE ALTERNATIVE OF THE KRITIK, KEY GROUND FOR THE AFF. IF WE ARTICULATE SOME ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ALT; THEYLL JUST SAY THATS NOT US AND SPIKE OUT OF OUR ARGUMENTS. n. ITS EDUCATIONALLY BANKRUPT BECAUSE ITS TOO VAGUE FOR US TO EVER DEBATE IT. o. IT PROVES THE SUPERIORITY OF THE PLAN. WE GIVE A CLEAR EXPLANATION OF HOW WE SOLVE FOR ITS HARMS WHEREAS THEY MAKE THESE FAR OUT CLAIMS THAT THEY CANT EVEN EXPLAIN HOW THEY REALLY SOLVE FOR THEM.
X>9000. What is X?
A2: Security 1.
X>9000. What is X?

2 Ac

Încărcat de

Informații document

Titlu original

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

2 Ac

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: T- MILITARY PRESENCE (1/2)

Page 1 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: T MILITARY PRESENCE (2/2)

Page 2 of 116 2AC Block

Alderete 10 (Tim, Framer of the Resolution, January 12, 2010 at 10:10 AM

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: GENERIC CONSULT (1/1) 1.

Page 3 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CONSULT EU(1/2)

Page 4 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CONSULT EU (2/2) 8.

Page 5 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CONSULT NATO(1/3)

Page 6 of 116 2AC Block

Studies 5 7, 2010 http://csis.org/blog/process-over-politics-nato%E2%80%99s-tnw-decision

27(2), MENDING NATO: SUSTAINING THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP

Page 7 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CONSULT NATO (3/3)

Page 8 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CONSULT RUSSIA (1/3)

Page 9 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CONSULT RUSSIA (2/3)

Page 10 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CONSULT RUSSIA (3/3)

Page 11 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CONSULT JCS (1/2)

Page 12 of 116 2AC Block

Page 13 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: GENERIC CONDITIONS

Page 14 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CONDITIONS RUSSIA (1/2)

Page 15 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: CONDITIONS RUSSIA (2/2) a. b.

Page 16 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: GENERIC AGENT COUNTERPLAN

Page 17 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: COURTS COUNTERPLAN (1/3)

Page 18 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: COURTS COUNTERPLAN (2/3)

Page 19 of 116 2AC Block

Page 20 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: XO COUNTERPLAN (1/3)

Page 21 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: XO COUNTERPLAN (2/3)

Page 22 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA

Page 23 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: DOD COUNTERPLAN (1/1) 1. 2.

Page 24 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: NO FIRST STRIKE COUNTERPLAN 1.

Page 25 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: POLITICS (1/1) 1. 2. 3. 4.

Page 26 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: TURKEY PROLIFERATION (1/5)

Page 27 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA

Page 28 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: TURKISH PROLIF (3/5)

Page 29 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: TURKISH PROLIF (4/5)

Page 30 of 116 2AC Block

HHS POLICY 2010-2011 XUE/UPADHYAYULA A2: TURKISH PROLIF (5/5)

Page 31 of 116 2AC Block

their behavior suggests they have a death wish.