Introduction Fire situations pose one of the most serious problems in an industrial establishment with the potential loss

of lives & property as well as damage to the environment. Careful pre planning, implementation of well-planned & engineered fire prevention measures and proper response by trained personnel can minimize the risk & damage caused by fire. However, in spite of several advances made in fire detection and fire fighting, fire continues to be highly unpredictable and hence the best course of action is to put the ma imum emphasis on fire prevention. ! "fire protection programme# is an integrated effort involving e$uipment, procedures and personnel necessary to conduct all fire protection activities. %t includes system and facility design and analysis& fire prevention, detection, annunciation, confinement and e tinguishing& administrative controls& fire brigade organization& training& inspection, maintenance and testing& and $uality assurance. 'tructures, systems and components (''Cs) important to safety are re$uired to be designed and located, consistent with other safety re$uirements, so as to minimize the likelihood and effects of internal fires and e plosions caused by e ternal or internal events. *he capability for shutdown, removal of residual heat, confinement of radioactive material and monitoring of the state of the plant is re$uired to be maintained. *he conse$uences of fire can be more severe in a nuclear installation due to the added risk of release of radioactivity. Hence there is a need for regulating the fire protection system in nuclear facilities and strengthen the fire safety aspects to ensure nuclear and radiological safety. Fire safety aspects of nuclear facilities include fire prevention, detection & protection systems along with other considerations such as personnel safety, environmental safety and property protection. Fire safety system aims to achieve a defence-in-depth concept and provides direction to select the optimum combination of the three levels - prevention, detection & suppression and mitigation to ensure safety. Fire safety is important throughout the lifetime of a plant, from design to construction and commissioning, throughout plant operation and in decommissioning. Fire protection systems, including fire detection systems and fire e tinguishing systems, fire containment barriers and smoke control systems, shall be provided throughout the nuclear power plant, with due account taken of the results of the fire hazard analysis. ! typical fire protection system should have following re$uirement+ (a)*he fire protection systems installed at the nuclear power plant shall be capable of dealing safely with fire events of the various types that are postulated. (b) Fire e tinguishing systems shall be capable of automatic actuation where appropriate. Fire e tinguishing systems shall be designed and located to ensure that their rupture or spurious or inadvertent operation would not significantly impair the capability of items important to safety. (c) Fire detection systems shall be designed to provide operating personnel promptly with information on the location and spread of any fires that start.

Fire detection systems and fire e tinguishing systems that are necessary to protect against a possible fire following a postulated initiating event shall be appropriately $ualified to resist the effects of the postulated initiating event. Defence in depth *o ensure ade$uate fire safety in a nuclear power plant in operation, an appropriate level of defence in depth should be maintained throughout the lifetime of the plant, through the fulfilment of the three principal ob,ectives identified in -. .revention of fire to start& /. 0etecting fires $uickly, suppressing those fires that occur, putting them out 1. 0esigning plant safety systems, so that a fire that starts in spite of prevention programme shall not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed. %t should be ensured by means of the above approach that the probability of a fire occurring is reduced to as low as reasonably practicable and safety systems are ade$uately protected to ensure that the conse$uences of a single fire will not prevent those systems from performing their re$uired function.*he three ob,ectives of defence in depth can be achieved through a combination of+ design, installation and operation of fire prevention and protection systems& management of fire safety& fire prevention and fire protection measures& $uality assurance& and emergency arrangements. Fire Hazard Analysis ! detailed fire hazard analysis should be carried out during initial plant design to reflect the proposed construction arrangements, materials and facilities. *his analysis should be revised periodically as design and construction progress and before and during ma,or plant modifications. *he fire hazard analysis should be a systematic study of (a) all elements of the fire protection programme being proposed to ensure that the plant design has included ade$uate identification and analysis of potential fire hazards (b) the effect of postulated fires relative to maintaining the ability to perform safe shutdown functions and minimizing to ic and radioactive releases to the environment and (c) suggest remedial measures. *he fire risk can be $uantified for the process industries based on the indices like 0ow inde (Fire & 2 plosion %nde ) and 3ond inde . *he indices are comprehensive and give a realistic value to the risk of individual process unit due to potential fires and e plosion. Facilities handling and storing flammable li$uids are e posed to a potential fire risk. *he fires due to flammable li$uid may be a .ool Fire, 4et Fire, Flash Fire or a 5oiling 6i$uid 2 panding 7apour 2 plosion (56272) depending on the containment, type of release and source of ignition. Computer models are available to simulate the fire conditions and estimate the potential conse$uences. *he fire hazard analysis should separately identify hazards and provide appropriate protection in locations where safety related losses could occur as a result of+ (a) Concentrations of combustible materials, including transient fire loads due to combustibles e pected to be used in normal operations&

(b) Configuration of combustible contents, furnishings, building materials, or combinations thereof conducive to fire spread& (c) 2 posure to fire, heat, smoke, steam that may necessitate evacuation from areas that are re$uired to be attended for safety functions& (d) Fire in control rooms or other locations having critical safety related functions& (e) 6ack of ade$uate access or of smoke removal facilities that impede fire e tinguishment in safety related areas& (f) 6ack of e plosion prevention measures& (g) 6oss of electric power and (h) %nadvertent operation of fire suppression systems *he possibility of a fire spreading from one unit to the other unit should be taken into account in the fire hazard analysis.i.e. *he analysis of conse$uences of the postulated fire on safety of the plant should be conducted by the persons trained and e perienced in the principles of industrial fire prevention & control and in fire phenomena from fire initiation through its propagation into ad,oining spaces and it should be done in consultation with the Fire .rotection 2ngineer. *he Fire Hazard !nalysis report is reviewed by the regulatory body prior to the commissioning of the facility. !ny changes emerged from review are appropriately incorporated by the facility. Design measures for fire prevention %n any nuclear power plant, every effort should be made to minimize fire risk by design. %n general, the fire containment approach is preferred, since it emphasizes passive protection and thus the protection of safety systems does not depend on the operation of a fi ed fire e tinguishing system. 8..s contain a range of combustible materials, as part of the structure,e$uipment, cabling or miscellaneous items in storage. 'ince fire can be assumed to occur in any plant area where combustible materials are present, design measures for fire prevention should be applied to all the fi ed and transient fire loads. 'uch measures include minimization of fi ed fire loads, prevention of accumulation of transient combustible materials and control or (preferably) elimination of sources of ignition. *he design of fire prevention measures should commence in the early stages of the design process. !ll such measures should be fully implemented before nuclear fuel arrives on the site. Control of combustible materials by design %n order to reduce the fire load and minimize the fire hazard, the following aspects should be considered in plant design + (a) *he use of non-combustible construction materials (e.g. structural materials, insulation, cladding, coatings and floor materials) and plant fi tures as far as practicable& (b) *he use of air filters and filter frames of non-combustible or low combustible construction& (c) *he use of a protected pipe or double pipe design for lubricating oil lines& (d) *he use of hydraulic control fluid of low flammability for the control system of steam turbines and other e$uipment&

(e) *he selection of dry type transformers for interior applications& (f)*he siting of large oil filled transformers in e ternal areas where a fire would not cause undue hazards& (g) *he use of non-combustible materials in electrical e$uipment such as switches and circuit breakers, and in control and instrumentation cubicles& (h) *he separation of switchgear boards from each other and from other e$uipment by means of fire barriers or fire compartments& (i)*he use of fire retardant cabling. *here should provide ade$uate provisions for separation of areas containing high fire loads of electrical cables from other e$uipment by means of fire barriers or fire compartments. !lso, it should use non-combustible scaffolding and staging materials.2lectrical systems should be designed neither to cause a fire nor, as far as practicable, to support a fire. 'torage allowances for flammable li$uids and gases inside plant buildings should be minimized. 'torage areas for bulk supplies of any flammable or combustible materials should be located in areas or buildings that do not contain items important to safety. 'ystems containing flammable li$uids or gases should be designed with a high degree of integrity in order to prevent leaks. *hey should be protected from vibration and other destructive effects. Control of ignition sources .otential ignition sources arising from plant systems and e$uipment should be controlled. 'ystems and e$uipment should be made safe through design so as not to provide any ignition source, separated from combustible materials, isolated or enclosed. 2lectrical e$uipment should be selected and classified for occupancy conditions. 2$uipment for dispensing flammable li$uids or gases should be properly earthed. Hot pipework near combustible materials that cannot be moved elsewhere should be shielded and9or insulated. %n the construction or operation of a multiunit power plant, steps should be taken to ensure that a fire in a unit under construction or in operation would not have any safety conse$uences for a neighbouring operating unit. *emporary fire separations should be used if necessary to protect the operating units. *he main control rooms should be ade$uately separated from possible sites of fire. Consideration should be given to the possibility of fires involving facilities shared between units. Control of explosion hazards !t 8..s where there is a potential hazard due to hydrogen in plant operations, provisions should be made to control the hazard by the use of hydrogen monitors, recombiners, ade$uate ventilation, controlled hydrogen burning systems, e$uipment designed for use in an e plosive atmosphere or other appropriate means. :here inerting is used, fire hazards arising during maintenance and refuelling should be considered, and care should be taken to ensure that gas mi tures remain within the limits of non-flammability. Provisions for Fire Detection 8..s should have competent fire detection e$uipment to ensure early detection of incipient fire or potential causes for fire. *heir capability of detection should not be hampered due to fire induced secondary effects such as smoke. Fire detection e$uipment should be based on diverse working principals.Fire detection system

should be reliable and provide distinct alarm and detailed information on location of fire ,ma,or e$uipment in the vicinity of fire,degree and spread of fire. *o ensure an ade$uate level of protection for fire compartments and fire cells, the following elements should be considered in the design of the plant+ (a) :here detection or e tinguishing systems are credited as active elements of a fire cell or fire compartment, arrangements for their design, procurement, installation, verification and periodic testing should be sufficiently stringent to ensure their permanent availability. ! fire e tinguishing system should be included in the assessment against the single failure criterion for the safety function it protects. (b) :here detection systems or fi ed fire e tinguishing systems are relied upon as protection against a potential fire following a postulated initiating event (.%2) (e.g. an earth$uake), they should be designed to resist the effects of this .%2. (c) *he normal or the spurious operation of fire e tinguishing systems should not impair safety functions. Fire detection and alarm systems 2ach fire compartment and fire cell should be e$uipped with fire detection and alarm system. *he detection system should provide detailed annunciation in the control room about the location of the fire (i.e. at the fire cell level) by means of audible and visual alarms. !ll detection and alarm systems should be energized at all times and should be provided with non-interruptible emergency power supplies, including fire resistant supply cables where necessary, to ensure functionality in the event of a loss of normal power. %ndividual detectors should be sited so that the flow of air due to ventilation or pressure differences necessitated for contamination control does not cause smoke or heat energy to flow away from the detectors and thus unduly delay actuation of the detector alarm. Fire detectors should also be placed in such a way as to avoid spurious signals due to air currents generated by the operation of ventilation system. *his should be verified by in situ testing. %n the selection and installation of fire detection e$uipment, account should be taken of the environment in which the e$uipment will function. :iring for fire detection systems, alarm systems or actuation systems should be protected from the effects of fire by a suitable choice of cable type, proper routing, a looped configuration or by other means, protected from mechanical damage, constantly monitored for integrity and functionality. Fire Extinguishing *he licensee should ensure that fire fighting systems (FF') should be able to reach all areas of 8.. to effectively e tinguish the fire. %t should ensure operability of FF' during all operating states by inspecting these periodically. 3oreover, FF' should have provisions for minimizing adverse effects on items important to safety as well as on people and environment. *heir operation should not hamper the operability of ''Cs important to safety and should not induce common cause failure in redundant system. !lso, design of FF' should ensure their maloperation does not ,eopardize protection against .%2s.

Fixed provisions for fire extinguishing 8..s should be provided with fi ed fire e tinguishing e$uipment. *his e$uipment should include provisions for manual fire fighting, such as fire hydrants and fire standpipes. *he fire hazard analysis should determine the need to provide automatic e tinguishing systems such as sprinklers, spray systems, foam, water mist or gaseous systems, or dry chemical systems. *he design criteria for fire e tinguishing systems should be based on the findings of the fire hazard analysis, so as to ensure that the design is appropriate for each fire hazard that is being protected against. *here are three different e tinguishing systems+ -. :ater based e tinguishing systems should be permanently connected to a reliable and ade$uate supply of fire fighting water, and these systems include automatic sprinkler, water spray, deluge, foam and water mist systems. !utomatic water sprinkler (or spray) protection should be provided at all locations where one of the following factors applies, sub,ect to the findings of a fire hazard analysis+ a. ! high fire load is present. b. ! potential for rapid spread of fire e ists. c. ! fire could compromise redundant safety systems. d. !n unacceptable hazard for fire fighters could be created. e. !n uncontrolled fire would make access for fire fighting difficult. /. ;aseous e tinguishing systems use carbon dio ide. 1. 0ry powder and chemical e tinguishing systems consist of a stored $uantity of powder or chemical suppression agent, a source of compressed gas propellant, an associated distribution network, discharge nozzles and provisions for detection and9or actuation. *he systems can be either manually operated at the hazard, or remotely or automatically actuated by a detection system. *hese systems are usually used to protect against flammable li$uid fires and certain fires involving electrical e$uipment. *hese e tinguishing agents should not be used on sensitive electrical e$uipment since they generally leave a corrosive residue. anual Fire Fighting .ortable and mobile fire e tinguishers of a type and size suitable for the hazards being guarded against should be provided for use in manual fire fighting by plant personnel. *he entire plant should be e$uipped with a sufficient number of portable and mobile e tinguishers of the appropriate types as well as spares or facilities for recharging. !ll fire e tinguisher locations should be clearly indicated. Fire e tinguishers should be placed close to the locations of fire hoses and along the escape and access routes for fire compartments. .ortable and mobile e tinguishers filled with water or foam solution and other e tinguishing agents with a neutron moderating capability should not be used in locations where nuclear fuel is stored, handled or transported unless an assessment of the criticality hazard has demonstrated that it is safe to do so. 3anual fire fighting forms an important part of the defence in depth strategy for fire fighting. *he design of the plant should allow for access by fire teams and fire brigades using heavy

vehicles. 'uitable emergency lighting should be provided for all fire compartments. Fire brigade for manual fire fighting ! fi ed wired emergency communication system with a reliable power supply should be installed at preselected stations. !lternative communication e$uipment such as two way radios should be provided in the control room and at selected locations throughout the plant. %n addition, portable two way radios should be provided for the fire fighting team. .rior to the first fuel loading, testing should be carried out to demonstrate that the fre$uencies and transmitter powers used does not cause spurious operation of the protection system and control devices. 'elf-contained breathing apparatus, including spare cylinders and a facility for recharging, should be provided at appropriate locations for the emergency response team. .rovisions for smoke and heat venting !n assessment should be carried out to determine the need for smoke and heat venting, including the need for a dedicated smoke and heat e traction system, to confine the products of combustion and prevent the spread of smoke, to reduce temperatures and to facilitate manual fire fighting. %n the design of a smoke and heat e traction system, the following criteria should be taken into account+ fire load, smoke propagation behaviour, visibility, to icity, fire brigade access, the type of fi ed fire e tinguishing system used and radiological aspects. Confinement of fire *he licensee should ensure that appropriate provisions have been installed for confining fire to the place at which it had originated. %t should put fire barriers penetration seals, water curtains, fire and9or smoke dampers, fire doors, etc., of sufficient fire resistant capability to prevent its progression. Fire detection systems, fire e tinguishing systems and support systems should be independent of their counterparts in other fire compartments to maintain their operability during fire in the compartment. 2arly in the design phase, the plant buildings should be subdivided into fire compartments and fire cells. *he purpose is to segregate items important to safety from high fire loads and to segregate redundant safety systems from each other. *he aim of segregation is to reduce the risk of fires spreading, to minimize secondary effects and to prevent common cause failures.! fire compartment is a building or part of a building that is completely surrounded by fire resisting barriers (all walls, floor and ceiling). *he fire resistance rating of the barriers should be sufficiently high so that the total combustion of the fire load in the compartment can occur (i.e. total burnout) without breaching the fire barriers. Confinement of fire within the fire compartment is intended to prevent the spread of fire and its effects (e.g. smoke and heat) from one fire compartment to another, and thus prevent the failure of redundant items important to safety. *he separation provided by fire barriers should not be compromised by temperature or pressure effects of fires on common building elements such as building services or ventilation systems. *he fire resistance rating of the barriers that form the boundaries of a fire compartment should be established in the fire hazard analysis. Further, a minimum resistance rating of one hour should be adopted. 8ational regulations may re$uire higher values for the minimum resistance rating of fire compartment boundaries. .rocedures should be established for the purpose of ensuring that amounts of

combustible materials (the fire load) and the numbers of ignition sources be minimized in areas containing items important to safety and in ad,acent areas that may present a risk of e posure to fire for items important to safety. 2ffective procedures for inspection, maintenance and testing should be prepared and implemented throughout the lifetime of the plant with the ob,ective of ensuring the continued minimization of fire load, and the reliability of the installed features for detecting, e tinguishing and mitigating the effects of fires, including established fire barriers . Emergency arrangements :ritten emergency procedures that clearly define the responsibility and actions of staff in responding to any fire in the plant should be established and kept up to date. *he emergency procedures should give clear instructions for operating personnel on immediate actions in the event of a fire alarm. *hese actions should be primarily directed to ensuring the safety of the power plant, including shutdown of the plant if necessary. *he procedures should set out the role of operating personnel in relation to the role of the fire fighting team taking immediate action, the plant fire brigade and outside emergency services such as local authority fire brigades. 'pecial attention should be paid to cases for which there is a risk of release of radioactive material in a fire. %t should be ensured that such cases are covered in the emergency arrangements for the plant. !ppropriate measures should be taken for radiation protection for fire fighting personnel. <egular fire e ercises should be held to ensure that staff have a proper under- standing of their responsibilities in the event of a fire. <ecords should be maintained of all e ercises and of the lessons to be learned from them. Full consultation and liaison should be maintained with any off-site organizations that have responsibilities in relation to fire fighting. .lant documentation should provide a clear description of the manual fire fighting capability provided for those areas of the plant identified as important to safety. *he manual fire fighting capability may be provided by a suitably trained and e$uipped on-site fire brigade, by a $ualified offsite service or by a co-ordinated combination of the two, as appropriate for the plant and in accordance with national practice Fire safety considerations in a typical !PP "#$ Fire Protection easures for echanical Components and %ystems Components containing flamable li&uid and gases (-) =il supplies shall be designed such that possible leakage oil will not come into contact with plant components having a surface temperature higher than />> ?C. *he heat insulation in the vicinity of oil supplies shall be designed such that auto idation from leakage oil seeping into the heat insulation is prevented. (/) =nly non-combustible materials shall basically be used. 2 ceptions are permissible in the case of sealants and gas kets, provided, they are protected against direct flames in the event of fire. Combustible hoses shall normally be completely surrounded by metal sheathing. (1) *he systems containing flammable li$uid or gaseous materials shall normally be

provided e$uipment for leakage detection, e.g., filling level monitors in the case of li$uid mate rials and pressure monitors in the case of gaseous materials, and, if applicable, for the draining off of leakages. (@) 7essels containing larger amounts of flammable li$uids shall be provided with collecting facilities. *he volume of the collecting facilities shall be specified under consideration of the ma imum possible non-isolatable leakage amount of the largest individual vessel and, in the case of the presence of a stationary fire e tinguishing system, also of the accumulated fire suppres sant& measures shall be taken to enable a controlled draining off of the accumulated fire suppressant and li$uid leakage. (A) Combustible materials escaping from safety valves shall be safely drained or dissipated off. (B) !ny hot component parts shall basically be avoided in the vicinity of components containing combustible or combustion supporting materials. %f this is not possible for technical reasons, measure shall be taken to prevent self ignition of the leakages (e.g., insulation, concentric guard pipe, encapsulation, air e haust). (C) %t is not permissible to use cutting ring fittings for pressure retaining pipes containing flammable li$uid materials. 'eactor Coolant Pumps (-) %n the case of an e ternal oil supply, the oil amount in the oil tank shall be monitored by suitable means. !s soon as the oil amount falls below a minimum value to be specified depending on the oil supply, the oil supply shall automatically be interrupted. (/) %n the case of reactor coolant pumps and associated motors are provided with an integrated oil supply, the pumps shall be e$uipped with a collecting facility for the entire oil amount of the largest individual supply vessel. (1) %n the case of an integrated oil supply with cooling e$uipment inside the oil vessel, the level in the oil vessel shall be monitored. :hen the ma imum permissible level is reached, the cooling water supply to the oil cooler shall be shut off. (@) %n the case of an e ternal oil tank, the oil tank including the au iliary e$uipment in the same room does not need to be designed against e ternal events, provided, it is validated analytically that the structural partitions of the fire subcompartment of the oil tank compartment will remain functional even after an e ternal event and that the oil collection vessel is still leak tight. %teel 'eactor Containment (-) *he integrity of the reactor containment in the event of fire shall be ensured. *herefore, larger fire loads in the direct vicinity of the containment wall shall basically be avoided. 2 ceptions are such fire loads that are protected by suitable structure related or e$uipment-related fire protection measures. %n case such measures cannot be applied, other re$uirements shall be specified in each individual case, e.g., protective coating of the cables in the vicinity of cable penetrations. (/) *he measures specified under para. - shall also ensure that no fire spreading occurs on account the influence from direct heat or thermal radiation on the other side of the con tainment wall.

(1) *he air locks and air lock anne es shall be kept free of any fire loads that are not re$uired for the operation of the locks or for the purpose of personnel protection. (@)*he function of safety-related actuators, valves and fittings shall be ensured such that even in the event of fire the necessary safety-related measures can be taken to the re$uired e tent. (urbine )enerator *uilding *he turbine building should be separated from ad,acent structure containing e$uipment important to safety by a fire barrier with a rating of at least 1 hours. *he fire barriers should be designed to maintain structural integrity even in the event of a complete collapse of the turbine structure. =penings and penetrations in the fire barrier should be minimized and should not be located where the turbine oil system or generator hydrogen cooling system creates a direct fire e posure hazard to the barrier. Considering the severity of the fire hazards, defense in depth may dictate additional protection to ensure barrier integrity, and the potential effect of a ma,or turbine building fire on the ability to maintain operator control of the plant and safely shut down should be evaluated. *urbine buildings contain large sources of combustible li$uids, and piping for systems lube oil, seal oil, and electrohydraulic s includingreservoirs ystems. *hese should be separated from systems important to safety by 1-hour rated barriers. !dditional protection should be provided on the basis of the hazard or where fire barriers are not provided. *urbine generators may use hydrogen for cooling. Hydrogen storage and distribution systems should meet the safety guidelines .'moke control should be provided in the turbine building to mitigate potential heavy smoke conditions associated with combustible li$uid and cable fires. Emergency po+er generating facilities +ith diesel generator units (-) *he fuel oil storage tank of each redundancy shall be located, and the fuel oil day tank of each redundancy shall basically be located, in individual fire sub compartments apart from the diesel generator units. (/) *he e haust gas lines shall be insulated and encased with non-combustible building materials of Class ! - , such that the surface temperature even during continuous operation will not e ceed />> ?C. %t shall be ensured that neither fuel oil nor lubrication oil will penetrate into the insulation. (1) *he fuel oil system and the lubrication oil system of the diesel motor shall be routed or insulated such that no leakages can come in contact with components the surface temperatures of which are above />> ?C. *he fuel oil in,ection lines shall be designed with a concentric guard pipe or with a comparable shielding. (@) *he pipe connections of fuel oil in,ection lines shall be metallically sealing or of an e$uivalent design. (A) Fuel or oil leakages from the diesel motor, oil day tank, fuel oil storage tank or supply lines shall be collected in, or drained into vats or vessels and shall be monitored and displayed. %f applicable, a siphoning effect from the %torage of Combustible ,perating aterials and Pressurized )as *ottles

(-) %t is not permissible to store combustible or combustion supporting gases, e.g., o ygen, in the vicinity of safety-related plant components. *he storage of combustible or combustion supporting gases inside the controlled area shall be limited to the amounts re$uired for the individual task. (/) *he storage of flammable li$uids or other combustible or combustion supporting materials in the vicinity of safety-related plant components shall basically be avoided. *his storage is only permissible if a fire of the materials stored cannot endanger any of the safety-related plant components. (1) %n the case of storage of flammable li$uids, means for the collection of the ma imum possible non-isolatable amount of leakage from the largest individual vessel shall be provided for in the direct vicinity of the place of installation of this vessel& furthermore, means shall be provided to enable a controlled draining off of the accumulated fire suppressant and li$uid leakage. (A) 8o stationary pressurized gas bottles, even for non flammable gases, may be installed in the vicinity of massive fire loads. 2 empted are pressurized gas bottles for small fire e tinguishing systems and for e$uipment protection systems. Insulation- Encasements and Coatings of Components (-) *he insulation of pipes and components shall basically consist of non-combustible materials in building material class !. (/) %n the case of low-temperature insulations it is permissible to use combustible foam isolation materials or combustible au iliary materials. (1) %n the vicinity of possible leakages of flammable li$uids, special measures shall be taken to prevent the penetration of these li$uids into the insulation materials, e.g., by baffles or sheet metal encasements. (@) *he decontaminable coatings of components shall be at flame retardant. Exhaust.)as %ystems ")as (reatment %ystems$ (-) :ith regard to e haust-gas systems, measures shall be taken that will prevent the occurrence of a fire, that will ensure fire detection and will limit the e tent of the fire. (/) *he e haust-gas systems in power plants with pressurized water reactors shall basically be operated under inert gas atmosphere. (1) %n the room of the place of installation, combustible materials are permissible only in such amounts as are re$uired for the operation of the activated charcoal filters. (@) *he filter containers shall consist of non-combustible material . Fire Protection easures for Electrical Facilities and Components )eneral 'e&uirements (-) ! low risk of occurrence of fire and fire spreading in electrical facilities and components shall be achieved by the proper choice of materials and by corresponding protective means. *o attain this goal the fire protection measures in accordance with the technical standards of 702 and 0%8 shall be supplemented by meeting the additional re$uirements as specified under this safety standard. (/) *he redundancies of electrical facilities and components shall be protected from

each other, either by sufficiently fire resistant structural elements or the physical separation or encapsulation of combustible materials, such that a fire cannot cause the failure of an impermissible number of redundant e$uipment. (1) *he fire protection measures for electrical facilities and e$uipment specified in the following sections shall be applied with highest priority. Electric Circuits / E&uipment %n closed ventilated areas, where smoke9heat venting is not possible, for power cables and control cables, halogen-free, fire-retardant, low smoke (F<6') materials shall be used for sheathing. Fire survival cables having copper conductors with special insulating materials are capable of maintaining circuit integrity for e tended periods under fire conditions and meets the special Fire 'urvival *est as per %2C 11-. *hese cables can safely be used in essential circuits, which serve plant safety functions. .lacement of power & control cables on the cable racks should be such that high voltage cables are on the top rack and low voltage cables are on the bottom rack as per !2<5 Fire 'tandard. Cable routing should be so chosen to avoid passing close to e$uipment such as steam pipe lines, oil pipe lines, resistor grids and process e$uipment which are capable of producing heat. :here cables are re$uired to be routed for loads located close to such systems, protection shall be provided to these cables. *he cables shall be protected against oil spillages. (ransformers !ll transformers shall meet the re$uirements of D*he %ndian 2lectricity <ules, -EAB as amended on 8ovember -B, />>> and D*he !tomic 2nergy (Factories) <ules -EEBF. *ransformers installed inside fire areas containing systems important to safety should be of the dry type or insulated and cooled with noncombustible li$uid. *ransformers filled with combustible fluid that are located indoors should be enclosed in a transformer vault. =utdoor oil-filled transformers should have oil spill confinement features or drainage away from the buildings and have a fire rating of at least 1 hours. *he transformers shall be protected by an automatic high velocity water spray system or by carbon dio ide or Halon alternatives fi ed installation system or 8itrogen in,ection and drain method. Cable (renches !ll cable outlet points in the trench shall be insulated 9 sealed with fire resistant materials 9 fiber wools or light .CC to prevent spreading of fire. Fire barriers shall be provided in cable trenches at periodical intervals. Fire detection and alarm system+ %n designing fire detection and alarm systems, it is important to consider the reliability of the system and individual components, to always perform their re$uired functions. For fire detection systems, this reliability may be affected by the reduction in sensitivity or of sensing devices leading to non- detection or late detection of a fire, or the spurious operation of an alarm system when no smoke or fire hazard e ists. *he detection system shall annunciate by audible and visual alarms in the control room and in-house fire station. Fire alarms shall be distinctive and shall not be capable or being confused with any other plant alarm. <eliable & uninterrupted power supply shall be ensured for the fire detection and alarm system. *o take care of failure of main supply, emergency power from diesel generating set and back-up

supply from battery system shall be provided. *he selection of detectors shall be based on the nature of products released by the heating up, carbonization, or the initial bursting into flame of the materials present in the fire hazard area. *he appropriateness of the detection system shall be confirmed by Fire Hazard !nalysis (FH!). 'election of fire-detection e$uipment shall take into account the environment in which it functions, e.g. radiation fields, humidity, temperature and air flow. :here the environment (e.g. higher radiation level, high temperature etc.) does not allow detectors to be placed immediately in the area to be protected, alternative methods, such as sampling of the gaseous atmosphere from the protected area for analysis by remote detectors with an automatic operation should be considered. :here spurious operation is detrimental to the plant, activation shall be by two lines of protection system. .rovision for manually activated fire alarms shall also be made. Fire detection and alarm system %n designing fire detection and alarm systems, it is important to consider the reliability of the system and individual components, to always perform their re$uired functions. For fire detection systems, this reliability may be affected by the reduction in sensitivity or of sensing devices leading to non- detection or late detection of a fire, or the spurious operation of an alarm system when no smoke or fire hazard e ists. *he detection system shall annunciate by audible and visual alarms in the control room and in-house fire station. Fire alarms shall be distinctive and shall not be capable or being confused with any other plant alarm. <eliable & uninterrupted power supply shall be ensured for the fire detection and alarm system. *o take care of failure of main supply, emergency power from diesel generating set and back-up supply from battery system shall be provided. *he selection of detectors shall be based on the nature of products released by the heating up, carbonization, or the initial bursting into flame of the materials present in the fire hazard area. *he appropriateness of the detection system shall be confirmed by Fire Hazard !nalysis (FH!). 'election of fire-detection e$uipment shall take into account the environment in which it functions, e.g. radiation fields, humidity, temperature and air flow. :here the environment (e.g. higher radiation level, high temperature etc.) does not allow detectors to be placed immediately in the area to be protected, alternative methods, such as sampling of the gaseous atmosphere from the protected area for analysis by remote detectors with an automatic operation should be considered. :here spurious operation is detrimental to the plant, activation shall be by two lines of protection system. .rovision for manually activated fire alarms shall also be made. Fire 0ater %ystems %n selecting the type of suppression system to be installed, consideration shall be given to speed of operation, the type of combustible material present as indicated in the fire hazard analysis, possibility of thermal shock, its effect on human beings (e.g. asphy iation) and on items important to safety (e.g. <eaching criticality condition during water or foam flooding in the nuclear fuel storage area). <eliable power supply should be ensured for electrically operated control valves meant for automatic suppression systems. Fire suppression systems, which employ water as means for suppression of fire, could be principally categorized under fi ed water

e tinguishing systems as follows+ a) 'prinkler and other water spray systems b) Fire hydrant or standpipe and hose systems "a$ %prin1ler and other +ater spray system Complete automatically initiated water sprinkler protection should be provided as a conservative measure in all those locations of the plant or facility where significant amounts of combustible material might be present, which would result in unacceptable fire damage in the event of an uncontrolled fire. 'uch a design measure may also take into account aspects other than safety (for e ample), spread of contamination. ;enerally, water systems are preferred in areas containing a high fire load of electrical cable material and other combustibles where the possibility e ists for deep-seated fires. :ater sprinklers may also be used for large $uantities of oil (for lubrication or transformer cooling). Further, in cases where gas or other e tinguishing systems are provided for primary fire protection, water systems serve as a good backup fire protection. 'prinkler9spray e tinguishing systems shall, as a minimum, conform to re$uirements of appropriate standards. "b$Fire Hydrant or %tandpipe and Hose systems 'tandpipes with hose connections e$uipped with approved fire hose and nozzles should be provided for areas containing or e posing nuclear-safety-related structures, systems or components and should be spaced so that these areas are accessible to at least one hose stream. :ater supply and hose capability should be provided for the containment. Fire hose stations should be conspicuously located as dictated by fire hazard analysis and should not be blocked. *he fire hose standpipe system should be used for fire-fighting only. !lternative hose stations should be provided for an area if the fire hazard could block access to a single hose station serving that area. Fire hydrant or standpipe hose system, should, as a minimum, conform to re$uirement of appropriate standards such as 8F.! -@, D'tandpipe and Hose systemsF or %'+ AC-@-EC> DHydrant 'tandpipe for fire fightingF for sizing, spacing and pipe support re$uirements. Fire +ater system of a typical !PP *his system utilizes water to e tinguish the fire by hydrant system and different water spray system. .ersonnel protection spray system is provided inside reactor building to faciliate personnel to e it from reactor building in case rise of temperature due to 6=C!. Fire water is also used as a backup to end shield cooling and steam generator cooling duringstation blackout. Fresh water supply for this system is fulfilled by two reservoirs+ -). <eservoir - having capacity of />>>> cube meter /).<eservoir / having capacity of @>>> cube meter <eservoir-/ :ater re$uirement to e tinguish fire 0ivided into two compartments (/>>> m1 each) --A> m1

G hydrants operating simultaneously for / hours 6argest water spray for two hours 'o, water re$uirement to e tinguish fire :ater re$uirement as a backup during

H / I 1@ I G m1 H A@@ m1 H / I /E> m1 = AG> m1 = (544 + 580) m1 = 1124 m 3 @CA m1

station blackout (@ hours) for 29' cooling and '; cooling 2nd shield cooling re$uirement H -/1m1 'team generator cooling re$uirement = 352 m3 H (--A> J -/1 J 1A/)m1 H -B/A m1!s such only !s such only compartment is sufficient to cope with the situation. *otal re$uirement

2oc1ey pumps "P.# and P.3$ (=ne main duty and another standby duty) 'tart G.A kg9cm/ 'top E.A kg9cm/

Electrical motor driven fire +ater pump "P.4 and P.5$ 0ischarge header pressure reaches G kg9cm/ with time delay of 1> sec .ump-@ start 0ischarge header pressure reaches C.A kg9cm/ with time delay of 1> sec =nce started, pump is to be stopped manually .ump-1 start

Diesel engine driven FW pump (P-5 and P-6)

.ump-A start 0ischarge header pressure reaches C kg9cm/ with time delay of 1> sec .ump-B start 0ischarge header pressure reaches B.A kg9cm/ with time delay of 1> sec =nce started, pump is to be stopped manually Fire Water Supply to Various Equipment Hydrant System !otal "5# *he hydrant system covers the following buildings in addition to the outdoor area+ a) <eactor 5uilding (<5) nos. 1 and @ b) <eactor !u iliary 5uilding (<!5) nos. 1 and @. c) 'tation !u iliary 5uilding ('!5) nos. 1!, 15, @! and @5 d) 'ervice building, control building e) *urbine 5uilding (*5) nos. 1 and @ f) 2lectrical bay of *5 nos. 1 and @ g) !u iliary boiler, fuel oil tanks and heavy water upgrading plant h) CC: and !': pump house i) 8on-active process water pump house ,) 'ervice water pump house k) 0emineralizer (03) plant chlorination plant

h) 0iesel storage area i) !dministration building, permanent warehouses ,) :aste management plant k) .ipe and cable bridge area l) 'witchyard area 0ater %pray %ystem6 (otal 78 D9s a) ;enerator transformers b) Knit au iliary transformers c) 'tartup transformer d) *urbine oil tanks, lube oil e$uipment and piping e) Cable vault in '!5-1!, 15, @!, @5 f) Cable vault in *5 no. 1, C, @ at 26 ->C m and --B.AA m g) Cable trays in <5 (selected areas only) h) Cable passage between <5 and C5 and between <5 and '!5 i) Cable passage at 26 ->@ m in *5 up to cable bridge ,) .ipe and Cable 5ridge (.C5) at ->> m and ->B m between <5 and *5 k) 7ertical cable shaft in C5 between 26 EC m and --- m l) Cable trenches from CB to switch yard m) ay oil tan!s o"tside #$B%3$& 3B& 4$& 4B n) '() *"m* motors in +B%3 and 4 o) ,-. /a"lts in +B%3 and 4 *) ,-) rooms in +B%3 and 4 0) )1 bearin2 ho"sin2 and hydro2en seals r) Cable on raceways on +B 3C4 'e&uirements to be Ensured for Fire+ater %ystem ! minimum of one out of two diesel driven fire fighting pump shall always be operable. %f a pump is found in operable condition, the same shall be brought back to service within seven days.Fire fighting water system shall be kept filled and pressurized between B.A to E.A kg9cm/ (g) at all times. %f it falls below A.A kg9cm / (g), then reactor shall be shutdown.Fire deluge system should be in poised state for all e$uipments in useFire water pumps sump level shall be maintained above EB.//A m (minimum submergible level)

<2F2<!8C2' (-)'afety 'tandards of the 8uclear 'afety 'tandards Commission (L*!) L*! /->-.1 (-/9/>>>) (/) heavy water reactors+ status and pro,ected development&%nternational !tomic 2nergy !gency 7ienna, />>/ (1)safety systems for pressurised heavy water reactor& !2<5 safety guide no. aerb9npp-phwr9sg9d--> (@)! 3=8=;<!.H by L. <amprasad ,!shis Lumar .anda and 0iptendu 0as & %ndustrial .lants 'afety 0ivision (A) Current status of fire risk assessment for nuclear power plants & Heinz .eter 5erg-, 3arina <Mwekamp/ -5undesamt fNr 'trahlenschutz, ;ermany (B)Fire 'afety in the =peration of 8uclear .ower .lants safety guide no. 8s-g-/.- , %!2! (C) .rotection against %nternal Fires and 2 plosions in the 0esign of 8uclear .ower .lants safety guide 8o. 8'-;--.C , %!2! (G) Fire protection in pressurised heavy water type nuclear power reactor, safety guide, no-!2<59';90-@ (E)aerb safety guide no. !2<598..-.H:<9';90-G .rimary heat transport system for pressurised heavy water reactors (->) !2<5 '!F2*O ;K%02 8=. !2<598..-.H:<9';90-/> 'afety related instrumentation and control pressurised heavy water reactor (--) %!2!-*2C0=C--@/2 perience gained from fires in nuclear power plants+ 6essons learned (-/)%!2!-*2C0=C--AA@ ;eneric 'afety %ssues for 8uclear .ower .lants with .ressurized Heavy :ater <eactors and 3easures for their <esolution (-1) %!2!-*2C0=C--AE@ !nalysis of 'evere !ccidents in .ressurized Heavy :ater <eactors (-@)K'8<C&regulatory guide Fire protection for nuclear power plants (-A)'F.2 Handbook of Fire .rotection 2ngineering