SudanNeg (PointerCarverDennis)

GDI2K4 Intermediate Lab 7/11/04
1 Sudan Neg
Privatized Armies Cannot Solve........................................................................................................................................... 2 UN PKOs Fail ..................................................................................................................................................................... 4 Sudan not behind Junjaweed................................................................................................................................................. 5 AU Solving............................................................................................................................................................................ 6 .US Cannot Solve .................................................................................................................................................................. 6 US Cannot Solve ................................................................................................................................................................... 7 ***Ans. To Genocide Advantages*** .............................................................................................................................. 9 Eritrea/Ethiopia Conflict..................................................................................................................................................... 11 No Coalition Will Form ...................................................................................................................................................... 15 Yes- Humanitarian Intervention Could Solve.................................................................................................................... 16 Consult Libya Counterplan Solvency................................................................................................................................. 17 Answers to Disease Advantages......................................................................................................................................... 18 Answers to Genocide .......................................................................................................................................................... 19 Answers to Genocide .......................................................................................................................................................... 20 AU Counterplan Shell......................................................................................................................................................... 21 Solvency .............................................................................................................................................................................. 22 Solvency .............................................................................................................................................................................. 23 Solvency .............................................................................................................................................................................. 24 Solvency .............................................................................................................................................................................. 25 Solvency .............................................................................................................................................................................. 26 Solvency .............................................................................................................................................................................. 27 OAU solves best.................................................................................................................................................................. 28 Should consult OAU ........................................................................................................................................................... 29 The AU must act soon; consultation now .......................................................................................................................... 29 AU monitors human rights abuses...................................................................................................................................... 30 OAU key to African unity................................................................................................................................................... 32
2 Sudan Neg
Privatized Armies Cannot Solve

Lack of Clear Direction and Oversight Make Privatized Armies a Problem for the UN Hukil in 2004 (Traci, The Progress Report, accessed online at http://www.progress.org/2004/merc01.htm, jec)
For the United Nations, bringing private military firms into peacekeeping is anything but a trouble-free solution. The involvement of two CACI International employees in the Abu Ghraib prisoner-abuse scandal in Iraq is an exclamation point at the end of a long list of problems with private military firms: They undermine the principle that the state should have a monopoly on organized violence; they lure away, with high salaries, special forces in whom the military has invested heavily; they operate beyond the public's field of vision; and they're functionally accountable to no one. The U.N. would have no guarantee that the firms would stay in a situation that gets messy or runs over budget, and if a firm's employees misbehave, the U.N. would have little recourse.
3 Sudan Neg
No easy in-and-out for U.S. in Sudan

Pinkerton 2004 (James P., July 6 NewsDay, Accessed online: 7-10-04, url: http://mathaba.net/sudan/sudan_news.htm, srg) Everybody seems to agree that the United States should do something about Sudan. But is anybody thinking seriously about the cost to America? Or the chances that we can succeed in truly helping? The Sudanese crisis - tens of thousands massacred, more than a million displaced in just one province, Darfur - has united the American establishment. The New York Times editorializes for "strong action," while Rich Lowry of National Review, invoking the memory of past genocides, declares, "If 'never again' is to mean anything, it must mean something now." Rep. Donald Payne (D-N.J.), a past chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus, has been working the cable news circuit, pushing for U.S. intervention, and many Capitol Hill Republicans want to help, too. Republican Sens. Mike DeWine of Ohio and John McCain of Arizona wrote recently in The Washington Post, "The United States must stand ready to do what it can to stop the massacres." In truth, the situation in Sudan is a harmonic convergence for both the neoconservative right and the traditional left. The Bush administration, stung by accusations that it has been polarizingly "unilateralist" on Iraq, is looking for an opportunity to show that it can work multilaterally with the United Nations. Secretary General Kofi Annan recently made a high-profile trip to Sudan, where he and Secretary of State Colin Powell agreed that attention must be paid. Meanwhile, Democrats, on the defensive over the perception that they aren't "tough enough," see Sudan as their chance to show that they can support robust American action around the world. But before the United States rushes into its next rendezvous with faraway destiny, we might note a few difficult realities. For starters, Sudan's 39 million people are spread over a million square miles, an area almost twice the size of Alaska. And here's how the CIA's World Fact Book describes Sudan's situation: "Military regimes favoring Islamic-oriented governments have dominated national politics since independence from the United Kingdom in 1956. Sudan has been embroiled in a civil war for all but 10 years of this period (1972-82). The wars are rooted in northern economic, political, and social domination of non-Muslim, non-Arab southern Sudanese." What does one say about a country that has been in a state of civil war for 38 of its 48 years of existence? These wars, in total, have caused the death of perhaps 3 million people. Given this history, does American intervention have the makings of an easy inand-out, or might the problems take years - or maybe eternity - to resolve? To be sure, nobody in Washington is talking about a major commitment of American resources. But Washingtonians never do, of course - on the way in. Almost all of Uncle Sam's commitments start out "minor," never "major." Consider, for example, the Middle East. In the '40s, we began guaranteeing the security of two small countries, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Today, we have de facto responsibility - and vulnerability - in an area that stretches from Egypt to Pakistan, including hundreds of millions of people, some of whom love us, many of whom hate us. And now we want to add the largest country in Africa? We went into nearby Somalia with the best of intentions in 1992, although we had no clue, to be sure, about the local language and culture. And we turned friends into foes, ending up with "Black Hawk Down."
Humanitarianism Gone Bad

Hazou 2004 (Christopher, February 4. Accessed online: 7-10-04, url: http://www.theconcordian.com/news/2004/02/04/News/When-Humanitarian.Groups.Go.Bad-597214.shtml, srg) There are a disturbing number of incidents that suggest that humanitarians can be, if you will, unhumanitarian," said Barnett. "There are reports where humanitarian organizations turn their back on basic human rights norms, violate humanitarian principles and leave vulnerable the very populations for whom they have responsibility." While acknowledging the difficulties and dangers inherent in aid work, Barnett, a political scientist and director of the International Relations Program at the University of Wisconsin, criticized what he called the "underside of humanitarianism."As examples, he cited a number of cases where the United Nations (UN) and other aid agencies were either complicit or actively involved in human rights abuses, including genocide in Bosnia and Rwanda, and the forced repatriation of Rohingyan refugees to Burma.
4 Sudan Neg
UN PKOs Fail
Turn: WAR TERMINATION INCREASES VIOLENCE AND CRIME
Evans 2001 (Gareth, President, International Crisis Group, former Foreign Minister of Australia, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, April-June 2001, p. 119.) The termination of war, of course, removes many of the threats to civilians of displacement, death, and human rights violations. However, the very process of ending war contributes to the potential for intensified violence and common crime. War termination involves the demobilization of combatants and the release of arms into society. Former combatants encounter few job opportunities in war-shattered economies, and even where work is available, many lack marketable skills other than soldiering. They therefore have strong incentives to resort to criminal activity. Many former combatants, especially those who served for many years or began fighting when they were children, have become psychologically accustomed to danger and violence. Criminality is made easier, and more dangerous, by disarmament efforts that are as a rule incomplete, particularly with respect to small arms, which can be readily cached, retrieved, and sold. In addition, clandestine paramilitary and intelligence structures once used for repress ion can easily be converted into powerful criminal organizations, especially where wartime criminals receive amnesties.
TURN: PEACE AGREEMENTS CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR OTHER FORMS OF VIOLENCE
Evans 2001 (Gareth, President, International Crisis Group, former Foreign Minister of Australia, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, April-June, p. 119.) Analysts of civil war settlements have devoted significant attention to how the security of warring parties can be enhanced to reduce their mutual vulnerabilities and foster peace. Less work has been done, however, on another serious challenge of postwar settings: the security of the general population. Once safe from the crossfire of warring armies, civilians often face new threats from violent criminals, excombatants, rioters, vigilantes, or members of other ethnic groups with whom they are to cohabit under a peace agreement. In the aftermath of virtually all the civil wars of the 1980s and 1990s, civilians perceived greater insecurity, often as a result of documented increases in violent crime. Ironically, in places like El Salvador and South Africa, civilians faced greater risk of violent death or serious injury after the end of the conflict than during it. Even in cases where the end of civil wars has incontrovertibly reduced the dangers to civilians, postwar crime waves have been common, as have civil disturbances of various kinds.
LITTLE EMPIRICAL SUCCESS FOR UN PKOS

GAO, 97 (UN Peacekeeping: Status of Long-Standing Operations and US Interests in Supporting them, April, 1997, The eight long-standing operations are deployed in environments where the underlying conflicts have defied diplomatic resolution, sometimes for decades, and have become, essentially, costly and open-ended commitments. Only two of these operations had successfully carried out their mandates, while the remaining six either had only partially carried out their mandates or had not carried them out. Although all but one of these operations were undertaken to create stable, secure environments to assist diplomatic efforts aimed at settling these underlying conflicts, diplomatic efforts to resolve these conflicts had stalled in all but one case.
5 Sudan Neg
Sudan not behind Junjaweed

Sudan Government no longer supporting the Janjaweed PolitInfo, 2004 (July 1, Accessed online; 7-11-04. url: http://www.politinfo.com/articles/article_2004_07_1_5605.html, srg)
Asked how he could trust "negotiating directly with the same government officials who are backing the Janjaweed , the Arab militias," Powell said of the Sudan officials, "They did make a specific commitment that they would more aggressively use their police and military forces to deal with the Jingaweit and start to put security in place out in the countryside, security that the people will trust. ... The government has made some commitments today that we will see if they follow up on. Words alone are not enough. We want to see them follow up on these commitments to break the back of the Jingaweit and to provide full humanitarian support to these people in need and, as I said, monitor what's going on with the AU military monitors and then get on a process of political reconciliation."
No genocide in Sudan, Annan says

DPA, 2004 (June 24, Accessed online: 7-11-04, url: http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/8784.html, srg) While the killings of civilians in Sudan's western Darfur region violate international humanitarian law, they cannot be described as genocide or ethnic cleansing, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan said Thursday. Annan said Sudan would be among several African nations he plans to visit in early July to look into the humanitarian situation in that region, where an estimated one million people have been displaced and thousands killed because of fights between government and rebel troops. "I cannot call the killing a genocide even though there have been massive violations of international humanitarian law," Annan told reporters. Annan said the Sudanese government has also denied any involvement in the killings in the Darfur region. Khartoum has been accused of giving support to militia forces composed of Arab ethnics known as the "Janjaweed" to fight local ethnic rebels.
6 Sudan Neg
AU Solving
The AU is solving for Darfur crisis right now McDoom 2004 (Opheera, Reuters Foundation, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/B25692.htm) N.S.
Sudan reluctantly agreed on Tuesday to the deployment of about 300 African Union troops to protect ceasefire monitors in the remote Darfur region, where fighting has driven more than a million people from their homes. A senior AU official said on Monday forces from Nigeria and Rwanda were ready to deploy as soon as possible to the region. "As long as this is a will and the decision of the (AU) commission to take protection forces for the monitors, we are not going to block it," Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail told Reuters on Tuesday in Addis Ababa which is hosting an AU summit. "(Though) we'd prefer not to take this step now." The AU has already sent unarmed observers to Darfur. After long conflict between Arab nomads and African farmers over scarce resources in the arid western region, rebels took up arms last year, accusing Khartoum of arming marauding Arab militias, known as Janjaweed, to ethnically cleanse the area. The government denies the charges. Ismail said Sudan alone would disarm the Janjaweed. The United Nations says the fighting has created the world's worst humanitarian crisis with more than a million displaced Africans and about 200,000 refugees encamped in neighbouring Chad. Delegates at the AU summit say Sudan understands it is in its interests to keep efforts to resolve the conflict within Africa. "Either it will be the African Union or it will be the U.N. and I think Sudan knows that they will have more leeway with the AU," said one delegate. A senior AU official has said Darfur was a major concern of the summit because the racial element of the conflict had far-reaching and dangerous implications across Africa. The summit is considering a resolution on Darfur voicing grave concern about human rights violations by the Janjaweed militias and the potential for regional instability.
7 Sudan Neg
US Cannot Solve
US military tied up in Iraq, cant help Sudan Christensen 04 (Blair Christensen, devclue.com, software designer, June 21 2004. Date Accessed: July 10
2004. http://devclue.com/blog/politics/africa/sudan:_a_lovely_world.html) For the record, those folks out there who were so eager for America to involve itself in a little humanitarian do-goodery ought to take a look at a genuine humanitarian emergency. Once upon a time I would have counted myself a strong proponent of the view that we ought to be willing to deploy the American military to try and halt a genocide, but the reality is that the whole Army's in Iraq. That we can't solve all the world's problems was a cliche off the 90s-era debates over humanitarian intervention, but right now we're stretched so thin that we can't solve any of them. Meanwhile, the government of Sudan somehow got itself on the UN's Human Rights Commission and the European opponents of American hegemony have managed to allow an extremely wealth continent with over 300 million inhabitants to have no real capacity for military action independent of the United States, so even those countries who wisely stayed out of the fray in Iraq can do almost nothing. A lovely world.
Turn: American Military Intervention Never Solves, US should encourage regional initiatives in stead Conry, 1994 (Barbara, foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute. May 19. Accessed online: 711-04, url: http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-209es.html, srg)
As tragic as many of the regional wars are, most cannot be resolved by American military intervention. In fact, military involvement often aggravates the situation. Furthermore, intervention can create a number of problems for the United States, including a rise in anti-American sentiment, diminished American credibility if the mission fails, domestic skepticism about future military operations even when legitimate U.S. interests might be involved, and threats to vital interests where none previously existed. Proponents of intervention cite a number of interests, both security related and humanitarian, as justifications for U.S. military involvement in regional wars. The most common, and fallacious, argument for intervention is that global instability is a threat to U.S. security. That argument relies heavily on the discredited domino theory and the notion of deterrence by example. Global instability does not, per se, threaten vital American interests and is the normal state of affairs. A policy that views disorder or instability as a security threat would force the United States to expend vast resources in pursuit of an unattainable objective. Rather than attempt to stifle regional conflicts through military intervention, the United States should encourage regional initiatives. Washington must, however, recognize that many regional conflicts are so deeply rooted that no outside party, from within or outside the region, will succeed in ending the fighting.
Turn: Regional Initiatives Solve Conry, 1994 (Barbara, foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute. May 19. Accessed online: 711-04, url: http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-209es.html, srg)
Regional initiatives would also be more effective than American intervention because they minimize the likelihood of imposed solutions. Few entities outside the United States have the political, economic, or military capability to dictate a settlement; a regional solution is therefore more likely to represent genuine agreement among the parties. A good-faith accord will not require iron-fisted enforcement or long-term occupation to maintain peace. Furthermore, the absence of American involvement will relieve regional leaders of the stigma associated with American "puppets" and assuage the fears of foreign populations concerned about American hegemonic designs. U.S. intervention or "pax Americana," on the other hand, would erase all of those advantages.
8 Sudan Neg
US Involvment in Darfur Worsens the Conflict Boylan 2004 (Ross, University of Leeds and Macquarie University,
http://home.earthlink.net/~drrboylan/dsa/Sudan.html) N.S. Intervention in the name of human rights is suspect to many. First, international law and the U.N. both declare sovereignty and human rights sacrosanct. When they are in conflict, one must make uncomfortable judgements. Second, many people fear creating any opening for violations of sovereignty based on human rights. They observe, correctly, that powerful countries, particularly the U.S. may use human rights in the future, as they have in the past, as a justification for invasions that really spring from other motives. Third, some groups that claim to be left-wing take the extreme position, apparently motivated by an analysis that U.S. imperialism is the world's leading problem, that any U.S. intervention is bad, and that any person or country hated by the U.S. government must be good. The former premise (US imperialism the worst problem) is defensible, but the latter (opponents of the U.S. are good) is grotesque. Many opponents of U.S. interventions, having argued against violations of sovereignty in an absolute way, find themselves in a box. The appropriate response to these concerns is not to oppose all intervention, but to oppose unilateral U.S. military intervention while supporting multilateral intervention when needed. By multilateral I mean more than Bush's ``coalition of the willing.'' I mean an actually existing body such as the U.N., European Union/NATO, African Union, Organization of American States, etc. I believe the intervention in Yugoslavia met this test; intervention in Iraq failed it. None of these multilateral bodies are perfect. The U.S. has too much sway in some. Most seem much too slow to respond to major human rights violations or humanitarian crises. The fact that most are organizations of states (many of which are not democratic) makes them too partial to sovereignty; for that reason some have proposed a parallel world body composed of directly elected representatives from people, conceived of as world citizens. That seems worth exploring. For now, the choices are no action, unilateral action, or multilateral action. The last seems the best. There also are a number of logical fallacies in the case against intervention. It is popular to argue that the U.S. has been inconsistent or selective in its concern for human rights. Many enemies (Osama Bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, Manuel Noriega) were former best buddies of the U.S. government, even of the same officials who later called them monsters. It is also popular to show that the real motives for an intervention are other than the advertised ones. Or one can show that the U.S. has done similarly bad things. While such charges, if true (and they often are) should give one pause, they don't really prove that intervention is a bad thing. The atrocities claimed are often all too real. The proper issue is not whether those who would intervene have pure hearts or records, but whether intervention is a good idea or not. It is, of course, not quite so simple. For the bad faith often affects the intervention itself. People were being killed and tortured in Iraq, but because of the bad faith behind the intervention, they are being killed an tortured now by the U.S. It seems likely that genuine multilateralism would make this less likely. In short, we live in an imperfect world. This seems to me an insufficient excuse to ignore atrocities.
9 Sudan Neg
***Ans. To Genocide Advantages***
10 Sudan Neg
Classifying as Genocide Does Nothing to Stop the Violence Birchall 04(Jonathan, Financial Times Online, July 5, jec)
In Darfur, meanwhile, both Washington and the aid agencies face a similar dilemma; even if the situation in Darfur meets the judicial definition of genocide, there is currently no political will for a Kosovo-style direct military intervention in the vast and remote region. Both are therefore dependent on persuading the Sudanese government to open Darfur up for a large-scale international aid effort, and to disarm the militia groups, with the aid groups supporting the introduction of a UN resolution to increase the pressure. "It's not helpful to start talking of genocide," said a senior member of one aid agency. "It doesn't open any real new authorities to me, or give me any additional powers or responsibilities that I'm not now executing," Mr Powell said.
Deterrence of genocide is imperfect Martha Minow, Professor of Law at Harvard University, 1998, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, p. 146
No one really knows how to deter those individuals who become potential dictators or leaders of mass destruction, although much hard work has been spent on this question. 128 One hopes that current-day prosecutions would make a future Hitler, or Pol Pot, or Radovan Karadzic change course, but we have no evidence of this. Perhaps those who say evil will always be with us are right, and genocide and mass violence are their case in chief. Even if this view is right, and even if no deterrence can be secured, societies, and international communities, must respond to mass atrocities. For the victimized deserve the acknowledgment of their humanity and the reaffirmation of the utter wrongness of its violation. And bystanders must see a response, and face their own choices about action and inaction, for these, too, are significant. The response should do more than reiterate the boundaries between groups that helped give rise to the atrocities and instead enlarge a sense of community and membership. The response should resist the temptation to dehumanize perpetrators and instead seek to confirm the humanity of everyonewhether by holding all to account under basic norms of human rights, by including all in a process of truth-telling and healing, or by forging connections through rituals and monuments of commemoration, shared resources, or offers of apology and forgiveness. Affirming common humanity does not mean turning the other cheek or forgetting what happened. Perhaps the challenge is to meet a basic need for balance and wholeness. 129 Apparently pervasive processes for making amends within communities of nonhuman primates should interest those who look to evolution to assess human capacities."" A leading scholar in this field notes, in contrast, the inadequate studies of reconciliation behavior among humans.'31 Although chimpanzees apparently do keep negative acts of their peers in mind, a system of revenge has not yet been observed in any ani- mal but humans.'32 Nor have devastations like genocide.
11 Sudan Neg
Eritrea/Ethiopia Conflict
Sudan Emphasis Provides an Escape for Western Powers in Eritrean Conflict Financial Times 04 (July 3, London Edition. Lexis accessed, jec)
Western nations, however, appear reluctant to intervene, describing the impasse as a bilateral problem as they shift their focus in Africa to the crisis in western Sudan. Many diplomats believe Eritrea has the moral high ground on the issue of the boundary commission's ruling. Ethiopia, however, has far better relations with the international community, partly because of the country's strategic importance, but also because Mr Afwerki is increasingly being seen as a belligerent autocrat.
Both Sides are Discarding Their Peace Accord and Attempting to Buy Weapons Financial Times 04 (July 3, London Edition. Lexis accessed, jec)
When the United Nations sent peacekeepers to Ethiopia and Eritrea four years ago, the mission was heralded as a rare chance for success in a continent beset by complex, often intractable, conflicts. There were no warlords or drugged-crazed child soldiers to deal with, just two disciplined armies belonging to sovereign states that had signed internationally brokered accords to end a brutal 30-month border war costing more than 70,000 lives. Bill Clinton, the former US president, hailed both leaders as being among a new generation of more pragmatic African politicians, and western nations were quick to provide troops. But as Kofi Annan, UN secretary-general, flies into Eritrea today, the peace process is deadlocked, with neither nation willing to compromise on a pillar of the accords - the demarcation of their 1,000km boundary. Mr Annan is to hold talks with Eritrea's President Isaias Afwerki before flying to Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital, where he will meet Meles Zenawi, the prime minister. He will push the sides to compromise and move forward. But the signs do not look good. Relations between the two countries have not improved since the war erupted in May 1998, and both are believed to be buying weapons, diplomats say.
Ethiopia on the Verge of War Financial Times 04 (July 3, London Edition. Lexis accessed, jec)
Frustrated with the parties' intransigence, as well as the operation's mounting costs, the Security Council has asked Mr Annan to seek ways to streamline the Dollars 200m-a-year UN mission before its mandate comes up for renewal in September. "Everything is in suspense," said Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, Mr Annan's special representative to Ethiopia and Eritrea. "You can't see light at the end of the tunnel when there is no light at the end of the tunnel." The concern among diplomats and UN officials is that the longer the stalemate continues, the greater the chance that a minor border skirmish could escalate into a new war. "That cannot be ruled out," Mr Legwaila told the Financial Times. The peace process has been stalled since an international boundary commission delivered its ruling on the border in April 2002, awarding the town of Badme to Eritrea. Badme was administered by Ethiopia before the war. The 4,200 peacekeepers deployed in a buffer zone along the border are supposed to be in place until the boundary is physically demarcated. But that process has been suspended indefinitely. Ethiopia has refused to accept the commission's ruling as it stands - although both parties agreed that its findings would be final and binding - and says it wants dialogue with its neighbour. But Eritrea refuses to open negotiations, arguing that the border must first be demarcated and the international community should force Ethiopia to accept the commission's decision.
12 Sudan Neg
13 Sudan Neg
Sudan has Made Promises to Stop the Junjaweed Before and Failed to Live Up
Slavin in 2004 (Barbara, USA TODAY, pg. 1A, accessed on lexis, jec)
U.S. officials and the United Nations have been unable to push the Sudanese government to shut down the Janjaweed. After Powell's visit, in which he was briefly joined by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, there were hopeful signs. Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail pledged to send more government forces to provide security in Darfur, to ease restrictions on humanitarian groups and to speed up talks with rebel leaders. "We will combat any militias and Janjaweed so that we secure the protection of civilians," he said. Annan predicted "real progress" in Darfur in the next "24 to 48 hours." Powell told NPR that Sudan had made specific commitments, with a timeline, and that he had warned the government that the international community would consider tougher action unless it sees "changes, and changes soon." He said in a press conference with Annan in Khartoum that he expects Sudan's promises to be met "within days or weeks." Sudan has made similar promises in the past, however, with few results. After meeting with Powell on Tuesday night, Ismail admitted there was a "humanitarian problem" in Darfur. But he denied that his government was arming the Janjaweed or impeding delivery of food or other aid. "Words alone are not enough," Powell said in the public radio interview. "We want to see them follow up on these commitments."
Darfur Will Require 20,000 Peacekeepers to Stop the Violence Slavin in 2004 (Barbara, USA TODAY, pg. 1A, accessed on lexis, jec)
Opening a 'Pandora's box' Hostilities in Darfur may have been sparked by U.S.-led progress toward settling an unrelated, longer-standing conflict in Sudan -- a two-decade-old war between northern Muslims and southern Christians and tribal religious groups. In February 2003, two Darfur rebel groups made up of black Africans, resentful of concessions being considered for southerners in the North-South conflict, launched a military campaign against government forces. The groups argued that Khartoum had neglected Darfur's nonArab populace and was failing to protect such people from the Janjaweed. Aid and human-rights groups say the government shares the Janjaweed's goal of the "Arabization" of Darfur, an ideology Sudanese officials began touting in the 1990s. Princeton Lyman, an Africa expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, says Khartoum's fear of Indonesia-style separatism is one reason for what he called "vicious" retaliation against the Darfur uprising. Having granted southern rebels the right to vote for independence in six years under a new peace agreement, Lyman says Sudanese leaders wonder: "Have we opened up a Pandora's box?" The African Union, the continent's primary, multination political organization, recently sent two dozen military officers from several African countries to monitor a wobbly cease-fire reached in April between rebel groups in Darfur and the government. Mohammed Adam Ismail, a member of the rebel Sudanese Liberation Army, says there have been numerous violations by the government. "We look for justice and equality," he says, contending that only an international presence -- a U.N. peacekeeping force of 20,000 troops -- will bring stability. But there are no signs that such a force will be sent to Darfur. "This is a huge place, the size of France," Powell told reporters aboard his plane en route to Khartoum from Darfur. "The solution has to come from the government doing what is right."
14 Sudan Neg
Half the Victims of Malnutrition are Children and USAID Cannot Keep Up With the Pressing Needs of Intenrally Displaced Peoples Slavin in 2004 (Barbara, USA TODAY, pg. 1A, accessed on lexis, jec)
U.S. officials began circulating a draft United Nations resolution Wednesday that would impose an arms embargo and travel ban on the Janjaweed. But while the measure vaguely threatens more widespread sanctions if the situation in Darfur does not improve, it does not take any action against the oil-rich Sudanese government, as some human rights groups and Africa analysts have urged. And there is resistance from security council members such as China, which has investments in Sudan's oil fields. "A credible and serious threat of sanctions means multilateral economic and oil sanctions," says Susan Rice, assistant secretary of State for African Affairs during the Clinton administration. "The Sudanese understand force and pressure. Any weakness or ambivalence they will manipulate, as they have for months." Marcus Prior, a spokesman for the U.N. World Food Program, which is delivering aid to Darfur refugees, said Wednesday that it's "too early to say" whether the brief visit by Powell and Annan will mark a turning point. "We're extremely hopeful that the presence of two international figures of such standing will enhance our ability to deliver assistance," he said. Time is of the essence. Relief workers worry that the death toll will rise with the looming rainy season, which lasts until August and turns camps like Abu Shouk into lakes of mud. Already, there have been outbreaks of measles, diarrhea, meningitis and malaria and even one case of polio in Darfur camps. Malnourished children and the elderly are particularly vulnerable to such diseases. Half of the malnourished children who catch measles die, aid workers say. The U.S. Agency for International Development had NASA take aerial photos of the entire Darfur region. In their analysis of 500 villages, 300 had been destroyed and 76 nearly destroyed, according to Andrew Natsios, head of USAID. Lyman, a former U.S. ambassador to South Africa and Nigeria, suggests that Powell and Annan should press the Sudanese to allow the African Union to deploy a peacekeeping contingent of at least 1,000 men to protect refugees and humanitarian workers. Ten years after Rwanda, Lyman says, Darfur represents a "major test" for the international community. So far, he acknowledges, "resolve has been slow to develop."
15 Sudan Neg
No Coalition Will Form

Despite Post- Rwanda Politics, Great Britain Will not Be Instrumental in Sudan Hilsum in 2004 (Lindsey, New Statesman, May 3, jec)
Again the cry goes up: 'Something must be done!' And again the response echoes along the corridors of power: 'But what?' A UN human rights team has reported that the government of Sudan and the militias it sponsors are pursuing a policy of 'rape, pillage, torture, murder and arson in villages and towns across Darfur'. Darfur, in western Sudan, is the worst humanitarian crisis of the moment, with more than a million forced from their homes, starving. The Americans estimate that 30,000 people have been killed. But what should be done and who should do it? The idea that armed force can be harnessed to the power of good reached its high water mark with the Nato attacks on Serbia over Kosovo. Liberals suddenly found themselves arguing in favour of bombing, and getting what they wanted. After the war, as I filmed Albanian Kosovars expelling elderly Serbian villagers, I realised how complex this concept was: you intervene to save one group, only to find it behaving exactly like the other. None the less, the idea of 'humanitarian intervention' became so deeply lodged that armed force by a foreign nation or coalition has become a first resort for many advocating action to restore human rights. The decision of UN forces in Rwanda to withdraw at the height of the 1994 genocide was a notorious failure. In Kigali, I watched in horror as Blue Beret troops retreated in the face of thugs armed with clubs and machetes. 'If Rwanda happened again today, when a million people were slaughtered in cold blood, we would have a moral duty to act there,' said Tony Blair at the 2001 Labour Party conference. So why even think of sending an extra 1,500 British troops to Iraq, not Sudan? The answer is obvious: Iraq matters politically in a way Sudan does not.
Abandoning Iraq for Sudan is Political Suicide for Blair Hilsum in 2004 (Lindsey, New Statesman, May 3, jec)
Blair has hitched British foreign policy to that of George W Bush - when the two men stood side by side in the Rose Garden in mid-April, it was clear that both had staked their political future on what happens in Iraq. Abandoning Iraq now might well be the worst possible course of action for the Iraqis as well as the politicians. But the Prime Minister suggests that this, too, is humanitarian intervention. In retrospect, rescuing the people from persecution at the hands of Saddam Hussein has rocketed up the list of justifications for the war, as the threat of weapons of mass destruction has seemed ever less convincing. Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, has come up with a formula which may help us judge this argument. He maintains that armed intervention is justified on humanitarian grounds if it can stop genocide or systematic slaughter; if criminal prosecution has already been tried and failed; and if it is reasonable to believe the people whom it is meant to benefit really will be better off afterwards. He adds that it is preferable, but not essential, that the intervention have UN Security Council approval; any armed assault should also follow the laws of war. The war in Iraq falls at his first hurdle: the excesses of Saddam's cruelty occurred in 1988 when he gassed the Kurds, and after the 1991 Gulf war, when the Iraqi regime slaughtered both Kurds and Shias because they had rebelled. According to Human Rights Watch, 'By the time of the March 2003 invasion, Saddam Hussein's killing had ebbed.' As for whether the war could reasonably have been expected to improve Iraqis' lives, the group of 52 retired British diplomats who wrote an open letter on 26 April to Blair, criticising his policy on Iraq, complained that there was no plan at all for what would happen afterwards.
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Yes- Humanitarian Intervention Could Solve

Humanitarian Aid is Key to Solve Hilsum in 2004 (Lindsey, New Statesman, May 3, jec)
The criteria can be tested again in Sudan. The slaughter continues; the need is urgent. The Khartoum government's claims that the Arab militia are out of control are not credible - the Sudanese air force provides air cover as bands of Arab horsemen rampage through African villages, looting and killing. Strong diplomatic pressure might prove effective: the Sudanese government is expecting a 'peace dividend' of aid and investment if it signs a deal with rebels in the south. Stopping the slaughter in Darfur could be part of the deal, and countries such as France, which would like to rush back to Sudan to exploit oil reserves, could use more leverage. Fear of negative publicity has forced Khartoum to let UN aid workers and human rights observers into Darfur - sustained pressure might persuade it that the international team charged with monitoring attacks in the south should be deployed immediately to Darfur. None of which sounds as compelling as armed intervention, but it is a programme of action that could be pushed through now. We should not allow the language of humanitarian intervention to be hijacked. Global IDP in 2004 ( accessed July 4,2004, http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpprojectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/SearchResults/E8DA1C451E4B4EF2C12568E7 004CDE81?OpenDocument,jec) "In addition, large-scale population displacements continued to increase due to the persistence of fighting in spite of the cessation of hostilities in western Upper Nile (Unity), Kassala and Greater Darfur. [] IDPs and returnee populations rely heavily on life sustaining and supporting assistance because their coping mechanisms have typically been significantly eroded. Sudan has the largest IDP population in the world. Of the estimated total of 4 million, 1.8 million are presumed to live in Khartoum and 500,000 in eastern Sudan and the transitional zones. Others are displaced within southern Sudan. In certain areas such as Juba in Equatoria the vulnerability of IDPs is further compounded by reported cases of abduction and forced servitude" (UN, 18 November 2003, Vol.I, p.7,25) "Rebuilding the Sudan will present formidable challenges. The war has resulted in 2 million deaths. Some 4 million people have been displaced - the largest population of internally displaced persons in the world." (UN GA, 6 August 2003) "Violence that erupted in Sudan's western Darfur region nearly one year ago and continues unrestrained today, has displaced at least 800,000 Sudanese civilians-including more than 110,000 who have fled to the remote deserts of eastern Chad-and has killed countless thousands of others. Although precise numbers are difficult to determine, it is estimated that the displacement caused by the Darfur crisis has increased the number of uprooted Sudanese from more than 4.5 million to nearly 5.5 million." (USCR, 24 February 2004) "An estimated 250,000 to 500,000 Sudanese fled their homes during 2002, including many people who were already displaced because of violence in previous years.
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Consult Libya Counterplan Solvency

Sudan Presents an Opportunity to Incorporate Libya Into Intl Peacekeeping Strategic Forecasting July 2,2004 ( accessed online 7-3-04 at www.stratfor.com, jec)
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has announced the possibility of deploying international peacekeepers to Sudan's restive Darfur region. After more than a year of conflict -- which has created hundreds of thousands of refugees -- Darfur finally is garnering serious international attention. The next step will be persuading U.N. members to provide troops, which might prove difficult because of the reluctance of U.N. member states to provide ground troops. The onus will probably fall on the African Union. The situation offers the United States an opportunity to give its newest African ally -- Libya -- a test drive.
Libyas Inclusion Will Increase Credibility as an African Leader Strategic Forecasting July 2,2004 ( accessed online 7-3-04 at www.stratfor.com, jec)
The African Union (AU) has expressed its willingness to mediate and monitor an eventual cease-fire between the Darfur rebels and the Khartoum-backed Janjaweed militia. The AU is still a fledgling organization with a limited ability to deploy and maintain troops in Darfur, although it successfully has deployed and maintained a 2,700-troop force to Burundi. The AU has relied primarily on South Africa and Nigeria -- and Nigeria is head of the AU's executive council. A large-scale sustained deployment to eastern Africa might have to rely more on other African nations -- which is where the United States comes in. Judging by geography, capability and potential willingness, Libya emerges as the most likely candidate to spearhead an AU/U.N. peacekeeping operation in Darfur. The United States has been seeking to quickly normalize ties with the formerly rogue state since Libya came clean about its outlawed weapons programs in December 2003. This effort since has been accelerated with the United States resuming diplomatic ties with Libya on June 28. The next obvious step for the United States and Libya is military cooperation, but because of years of bad blood and mistrust, that is much easier said than done. That is why Darfur could be a perfect way to test drive the new alliance. If Libya were to deploy peacekeepers into the region under the auspices of the United Nations and AU, it would not only be an operation the United States could openly back with money, equipment and intelligence sharing, but also an operation that would formally place Libya as a growing African power.
Libyan Involvement a Step Toward a Greater Alliance Strategic Forecasting July 2,2004 ( accessed online 7-3-04 at www.stratfor.com, jec)
Libya repeatedly has been involved militarily in the region -- invading Chad in 1980, 1983 and 1986 and brokering a cease-fire between Khartoum and the southern Sudanese rebel group Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement/Army in 2001 -- and formal recognition of its power and influence is what Libya wants. Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi long has viewed himself as a leader for Africa. For the United States, a AU/U.N.-endorsed peacekeeping mission dominated by African -- Libyan -- troops with a sprinkling of international soldiers will allow Washington to test Tripoli's willingness to participate in a U.S. foreign policy initiative: peacekeeping in western Sudan. For Libya, it would be a simple exercise in which the ultimate goal is not the pacification of Darfur, but an incremental step toward Washington's deep pockets and military might.
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Answers to Disease Advantages

Humanity does not face extinction from disease Malcolm Gladwell, The New Republic, July 17 and 24, 1995, excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, 1999, p. 31-32
Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adapt a specific strategy but every strategy carries a corresponding cost and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all hut halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability its essential rigidity is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. AIDS is almost invariably lethal because it attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. Viruses are not superhuman. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flue, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms.
No impact anything virulent enough to be a threat would destroy its host too quickly Joshua Lederberg, professor of genetics at Stanford University School of Medicine, 1999, Epidemic The World
of Infectious Disease, p. 13 The toll of the fourteenth-century plague, the "Black Death," was closer to one third. If the bugs' potential to develop adaptations that could kill us off were the whole story, we would not be here. However, with very rare exceptions, our microbial adversaries have a shared interest in our survival. Almost any pathogen comes to a dead end when we die; it first has to communicate itself to another host in order to survive. So historically, the really severe host- pathogen interactions have resulted in a wipeout of both host and pathogen. We humans are still here because, so far, the pathogens that have attacked us have willy-nilly had an interest in our survival. This is a very delicate balance, and it is easily disturbed, often in the wake of large-scale ecological upsets.
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Answers to Genocide
Their claim to avoid responsibility for consequences by referring to moral "rules" is the primary tool justifying genocide (this evidence is gender-paraphrased) Zygmunt Bauman, University Of Leeds Professor Emeritus Of Sociology, Postmodern Ethics, 93, p. 47-53
Because it insists on the universality of moral rules which it is meant to support (and hence on mutual exchangeability of moral subjects), Kant's categorical imperative may make certain conduct a moral duty - if it is interpreted as setting out the sufficient condition for moral behaviour; but if treated as the description of the necessary condition for moral command, it also absolves conscience for failing to follow many a crucial moral impulse. The moral person and the object of that person's moral concern cannot be measured by the same yardstick - and this realization is precisely what makes the moral person moral. Ì am ready to die for the Other' is a moral statement; `[She] should be ready to die for me' is, blatantly, not. Neither is a command that the others should sacrifice their lives [she is my feminist editing CEO]
Universalizing sacrifice Kantian universalism demands that all be willing to sacrifice themselves. The power to claim that, "you must sacrifice yourself because your death is an indirect effect" refuses to recognize responsibility to all others. A moral stance would speak for I and I alone. I am willing to sacrifice myself" is our stance. Their stance singles out groups and commands you must sacrifice yourself. Zygmunt Bauman, University Of Leeds Professor Emeritus Of Sociology, Postmodern Ethics, 93, p. 50-53
Whatever else Ì-for-you' may contain, it does not contain a demand to be repayed, mirrored or `balanced out' in the `you-for me'. My relation to the Other is not reversible; if it happens to be reciprocated, the reciprocation is but an accident from the point of view of my being-for. The `we' that stands for a `moral party' is not, therefore, a plural of Ì' - but a term which connotes a complex structure that ties together units of sharply unequal standing. In a moral relationship, I and the Other are not exchangeable, and thus cannot be àdded up' to form a plural `we'. In a moral relationship, all the `duties' and `rules' that may be conceived are addressed solely to me, bind only me, constitute me and me alone as an Ì'. When addressed to me, responsibility is moral. It may well lose its moral content completely the moment I try to turn it around to bind the Other. As Alasdair MacIntyre pithily expressed it, `The man might on moral grounds refuse to legislate for anyone else than himself' :15 A moral hero such as Captain Oates, is one who does more than duty demands. In the universalizable sense of òught' it does not therefore make sense to assert that Captain Oates did what he ought to have done. To say of a man that he did his duty in performing a work of supererogation is to contradict oneself. Yet a man may set himself the task of performing a work of supererogation and commit himself to it so that he will blame himself if he fails without finding such failure in the case of others blameworthy.Because it insists on the universality of moral rules which it is meant to support (and hence on mutual exchangeability of moral subjects), Kant's categorical imperative may make certain conduct a moral duty - if it is interpreted as setting out the sufficient condition for moral behaviour; but if treated as the description of the necessary condition for moral command, it also absolves conscience for failing to follow many a crucial moral impulse. The moral person and the object of that person's moral concern cannot be measured by the same yardstick - and this realization is precisely what makes the moral person moral.Ì am ready to die for the Other' is a moral statement; `He should be ready to die for me' is, blatantly, not. Neither is a command that the others should sacrifice their lives for the homeland, the party, or any other cause, however worthy -though my own readiness to give up my own survival, so that some idea would not die without issue, could make me a moral hero. The readiness to sacrifice for the sake of the other burdens me with the responsibility which is moral precisely for my acceptance that the command to sacrifice applies to me and me only, that the sacrifice is not a matter of exchange or reciprocation of services, that the command is not universalizable and thus cannot be shrugged off my shoulders so that it falls on someone else's.
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Answers to Genocide
Kritik preproduces the symbolic order and leads to a worse disease Paul Mann, professor of comparative literature at Pomona college, Masocriticism, 1999, pg. 141-142
The stupid underground can be mapped onto a familiar and perhaps quite objectionable psychotopography: it is a zone of the repressed of culture and thus, according to this model, both a pathological site giving rise to all sorts of pathogenic surface effects, and a therapeutic matrix, a place where impacted energies may be guided toward a proper sublimation. The stupid underground presents itself as both a symptom of the disease of capital and an indication of the direction of its cure. But in the stupid underground, as in so many other sites, the direction of the cure often leads back into the disease; or the cure itself turns out to be nothing more than a symptom. For instance, in the terms of one standard hypothesis, the stupid underground reproduces the pathology of Other, of the Symbolic order, in the very attempt to avoid it, like the alcoholics son who is so repelled by his fathers disease that he can only end by becoming an alcoholic himself; at the same time, it is a kind of paranoid rechanneling of obsessions and defenses, a way to reconceive the social world by means of, indeed as a psychosis, perhaps merely the critical equivalent of lining your hat with aluminum foil to protect yourself from alien radiation or government microwave transmissions (often the same thing), perhaps a more radical form of schizoanalytic political action.
The criticism projects problems onto the external world, it ignores self-conciousness in the attempt to move away from identity problems Paul Mann, professor of comparative literature at Pomona college, Masocriticism, 1999, pg. 21-22
5. Something else: Is this yet another version of that fabled other with which criticism is currently obsessed figures of alterity, or difference, figures beyond the margins of this or that canon or ideological formation, beyond the boundaries of representation itself? One gestures vaguely (or precisely, for that matter) over there, marking the limits of ones reach in what presents itself as an ethical move of recognizing the others otherness, while at the same time hinting that even ones proper ignorance about the other is a privileged form of knowledge. There is something selfserving about these gestures of self-effacement that is entirely characteristic of criticism. And yet such an ethical, political criticism is likely to be impatient with a criticism that insistently calls attention away from the other, toward its own problems and processes. To be sure, critical reflexivity is rarely as interesting as the poem itself; there is indeed something embarrassing about too much self-consciousness, so that one hurries through self-critical passages with real discomfort. A whole book of such reflections would be unbearable.
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AU Counterplan Shell
Thesis-The AU already has committed troops to the Sudan but their numbers are small and they are not trained very well. The CP is intended to PIC out of the UN role so any UN bad args can function as net benefits. The other option is to consult AU and there are solvency cards in the file for that.
Text:
The United States federal government will increase support for AU peacekeepers in Sudan by providing all support from the 1Ac directly to the African Union
Competition
We are non-topical We dont offer any support to the UN We are net beneficial- The CP solves the case advantages and avoid the disads We are mutually exclusive We provide THE resources from the aff to the AU. Those resources are finite and cannot be given to both
Solvency History suggests that allowing Africans to Solve Africa Conflicts is Superior to UN Intervention OAU/IPA Joint Task Force Report on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Rapporteur: Ameen, January, 1998,
International Peace Academy, http://www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Reports/Africa/PublRepoAfriPP98Print.htm The record of African involvement in managing conflicts within Africa is impressive. The OAU's peacemaking efforts during the 1960's and 1970's, for example in the border disputes between Algeria and Morocco or between Ethiopia and Somalia, resulted in numerous successes. More recently, the OAU's quiet diplomacy in countries such as Nigeria, its political mobilization role such as in marshaling African military contributions for the UN peacekeeping operation at the height of the genocide in Rwanda, its dispatch of military observers in Burundi, and its electoral observation role in Republic of Congo, Togo, Gabon and elsewhere, makes it continually relevant in African conflict management efforts. Net Benefit UN credibility Disadvantage
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Solvency
AUs diplomacy is effective William Eagle (Correspondent at Voanews.com) July 6, 2004 (Accessed online at
http://www.voanews.com/article.cfm?objectID=1C3B03FC-25D6-4D9B-A0202A4A45D71338) MH Last month, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, the chair of AU's Peace and Security Council summoned the presidents of the two countries to Abuja to find ways of easing mutual tensions. Mr. Landsberg said that it's this type of diplomacy that's developing as one of the AU's most effective tools in reshaping the continent in the 21st century.
AU hopes to end African war William Eagle (Correspondent at Voanews.com) July 6, 2004 (Accessed online at
http://www.voanews.com/article.cfm?objectID=1C3B03FC-25D6-4D9B-A0202A4A45D71338) MH A three-day summit of African heads of state opened in the Ethiopian capital Tuesday. The Summit of the African Union is expected to focus in part on security issues including crises and instability in Ivory Coast, Sudan's Darfur region, and the Great Lakes states of Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Africa knows conflict. The continent has been the scene of over 30 wars in the last 40 years. According to the UN, they have cost Africa $250 billion and millions of lives. The African Union hopes to put an end to war. By the end of the decade it aims to have a rapid reaction force of 15,000 thousand men. They will be controlled by the AU's 15 member Peace and Security Council (PSC) which in turn will be advised by five eminent persons from the continent. Six current conflicts or areas of instability are expected to be discussed at the summit: Burundi, Comoros, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Sudan and border tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
U.S. should fund African nations to solve Sudan conflict Whnt19.com - July 5, 2004 (Accessed online at http://www.wtvo.com/Global/story.asp?S=2000816)
The African Union says it's sending 300 peacekeepers to western Sudan. An African Union official says the troops will be deployed quickly, but didn't give an exact date. More than a (m) million refugees have fled attacks by Arab militiamen. The situation is described by the United Nations as the world's worst humanitarian crisis. And Secretary-General Kofi Annan has said the crisis is "bordering on ethnic cleansing." Senator John McCain says the situation is "horrible" and quick action is needed to prevent further death. McCain tells C-N-B-C that the U-S ought to fund a force from African nations to go in and stop the killing.
The AU is brokering peace through consultation Panafrican News Agency, Africa News, July 8, 2000
Consultations are underway to achieve a comprehensive peace package in the two-year old conflict between Ethiopia and neighbouring Eritrea, OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim reported to the council of ministers Friday in Lome. The agreement to stop hostilities between the two states was brokered by OAU current Chairman and Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in collaboration with the UN, the US and the European Union before it was signed in Algiers 18 June. The two sides agreed, among other things, to an immediate cessation of hostilities; to have the UN deploy under the auspices of the OAU, a peacekeeping mission. They also agreed to create a buffer zone 25-km inside Eritrean territory as a temporary security zone, and to determine their common border to avoid future conflicts. Salim described the cessation of the hostilities as a significant victory for the people of the two countries, for all Africans and the OAU in a year which African leaders had declared as the year of peace, security and stability during their 1999 OAU summit in Algiers. "In conclusion, I wish to express my satisfaction at the signing of the agreement on cessation of hostilities after two years of sustained efforts by the OAU," he added.
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Solvency
The AU works effectively with the UN Raymond Thibodeaux (Correspondent at Voanews.com) July 5, 2004 (Accessed online at
http://www.voanews.com/article.cfm?objectID=4FBB55A7-D87B-4394-8E6BADDD124AD148#) MH The A.U. handed over the Burundi mission to the United Nations, mainly because of dwindling resources. But most of the A.U. troops are to remain in Burundi, re-hatted with the blue berets of the United Nations. Under the U.N. mandate, these soldiers, now part of a 5,600-strong peacekeeping force, are authorized to use force to protect civilians. That's a big relief to many of the families here. It means that they can go back to their war-shattered villages soon, where they can start rebuilding their lives. That, to them, is the true measure of peace. Some analysts and political observers say the A.U. mission here was a vital step in this country's difficult path to ending a civil war that has claimed the lives of more than 200,000 people. Now, it is up to the United Nations to finish the job of fostering a sustainable peace.
AU deployment needed to defeat African poverty and hunger William Maclean (Correspondent at Reuters.com) July 6, 2004 (Accessed online at http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=worldNews&storyID=5600621) MH
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan urged an African Union summit on Tuesday to back peace in Sudan's vast Darfur area, saying the crisis threatened to destabilize the region if attacks on civilians were not stopped. Sudan reluctantly agreed to about 300 African Union (AU) troops being deployed to protect truce monitors in Darfur, where fighting has driven more than a million people from their homes in what the U.N. says is the world's worst humanitarian crisis. Annan told the summit of about 30 heads of state that conflicts were holding back the 53-member AU's struggle to defeat poverty and hunger on the continent of 830 million. "I am thinking of the horrific situation in Darfur," said Annan, who visited the troubled western area of Sudan last week and held talks with the Khartoum government. "The ruined villages, the camps overflowing with sick and hungry women and children, the fear in the eyes of the people, should be a clear warning to us all. Without action, the brutalities already inflicted on the civilian population of Darfur could be a prelude to even greater humanitarian catastrophe -- a catastrophe that could destabilize the region."
The AU hopes to win Western investment for its action William Maclean (Correspondent at Reuters.com) July 6, 2004 (Accessed online at
http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=worldNews&storyID=5600621) MH The crisis in oil-producing Sudan is seen by analysts and diplomats as a major test for the two-year-old AU, which is trying to win increased Western investment in return for ending wars and despotism and curbing corruption. The AU is preparing to send Nigerian and Rwandan troops to guard an eventual 60 AU peace monitors as well as to patrol refugee camps and border areas between Sudan and Chad, where some 200,000 Sudanese have fled from attacks by Arab militias. "As long as this is a will and the decision of the (AU) commission to take protection forces for the monitors, we are not going to block it," Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail told Reuters. "(Though) we'd prefer not to take this step now." The AU has already sent unarmed observers to Darfur. After years of tension in Darfur between nomadic Arab tribes and African farmers, two groups rebelled last year, accusing Khartoum of arming the Arab militias known as Janjaweed. The government denies the charge. U.S. officials and human rights groups say the Janjaweed are carrying out a campaign of ethnic cleansing in Darfur, which borders Chad. Khartoum says the Janjaweed are outlaws and has promised to try to disarm them.
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Solvency
The AU is prepared to send troops into Sudan; now is the key time to consult Mathaba.net - July 6, 2004 (Accessed online at
http://mathaba.net/x.htm?http://mathaba.net/0_index.shtml?x=58607) The African Union says it's preparing to send hundreds of troops to Sudan's strife-torn Darfur region, where more than one million people have been uprooted by conflict. A senior union official says the protection force will be deployed as soon as possible and forces from Rwanda and Nigeria are on standby. The Darfur mission, announced on the eve of the annual summit of African leaders in Addis Ababa, will mark the organisation's only joint military deployment since it sent peacekeepers to Burundi last year. The African Union has deployed unarmed observers to Darfur and had said if all parties agreed it was necessary, it would send armed troops to protect the monitors. As many as one million people have been driven from their homes by the violence that erupted last year, and up to 30,000 have been killed.
The AU is successful in its process now but has lost credibility for past actions Iol.co.za - July 6, 2004 (Accessed online at
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=87&art_id=qw1089085682435A162) MH The African Union (AU), which on Tuesday begins its third annual summit in the Ethiopian capital, came into being two years ago in Durban, with the aim of further continental unity, peace and development. It took over from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) after 39 years, retaining the Ethiopian capital as its headquarters. But the AU has been presented as a more powerful body than its predecessor, whose credibility suffered because of its inaction and disinclination to criticise member states or embroil itself in their internal affairs. The AU's charter, by contrast, authorises the new body to intervene militarily in the event of grave circumstances such as genocide or crimes against humanity.
The AU is directly concerned with human rights Iol.co.za - July 6, 2004 (Accessed online at
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=87&art_id=qw1089085682435A162) MH An Executive Council made up of foreign ministers meets ahead of summits and advises the heads of state. There is also a Permanent Representative Committee, made up of ambassadors accredited to Addis Ababa. A continental parliament was inaugurated in March, with the swearing-in of 180 members representing the 36 countries that have already signed the protocol establishing the assembly. There are also plans for a human rights court, a central bank and, eventually, an African Economic Community with a single currency. It will be closely linked with Nepad, the New Partnership for Africa's Development, designed to pull Africa out of stagnation by promising good governance and sound economic practices in exchange for increased foreign aid and trade opportunities. The current chairman of the African Union is President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique.
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Solvency
The AU is directly concerned with human rights Iol.co.za - July 6, 2004 (Accessed online at
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=87&art_id=qw1089085682435A162) MH An Executive Council made up of foreign ministers meets ahead of summits and advises the heads of state. There is also a Permanent Representative Committee, made up of ambassadors accredited to Addis Ababa. A continental parliament was inaugurated in March, with the swearing-in of 180 members representing the 36 countries that have already signed the protocol establishing the assembly. There are also plans for a human rights court, a central bank and, eventually, an African Economic Community with a single currency. It will be closely linked with Nepad, the New Partnership for Africa's Development, designed to pull Africa out of stagnation by promising good governance and sound economic practices in exchange for increased foreign aid and trade opportunities. The current chairman of the African Union is President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique.
The OAU has taken responsibility for conflict resolution since the international community failed OAU/IPA Joint Task Force Report on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Rapporteur: Ameen, January, 1998,
International Peace Academy, http://www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Reports/Africa/PublRepoAfriPP98Print.htm International and regional responses to these situations of violent conflict have varied both in nature and effectiveness. In some, such as Angola, Mozambique and Somalia, the United Nations (UN) has played a key political and military role. Its success has varied - with Mozambique being perhaps the most effective case of an UN-brokered peace, and Somalia the clearest, and most expensive, failure. In other cases, like Burundi, Liberia and Sudan, the principal responses have been from within their respective sub-regions. Both the subregional military intervention in Liberia and the political and economic sanctions by the sub-regional states on Burundi have so far had mixed success. What has become increasingly clear, particularly since the failure of the international community to intervene in order to stop the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, is that the political will and resources of the international community to engage in managing conflicts in Africa has dwindled. This lack of interest on the part of the wider international community has placed added responsibility on African institutions - the Organization of African Unity (OAU), sub-regional organizations and groupings of states, individual states, and the civil society - to address the fires that burn in their own backyard.
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Solvency
The AU can solve African genocide and human rights violations William Eagle (Correspondent at Voanews.com) July 6, 2004 (Accessed online at
http://www.voanews.com/article.cfm?objectID=1C3B03FC-25D6-4D9B-A0202A4A45D71338) MH At the very least, you can expect serious declarations on Darfur and you might even see African leaders going a step further. If they think there is indifference or connivance by external actors, I don't think they'll hesitate to say it. These leaders want to prove the Peace and Security Council is a real legitimate body that will take intervention seriously." Mr. Landsberg notes that the Constitutive Act of the AU allows it to intervene in an African state to stop genocide and gross violations of human rights. It also allows for intervention to stop instability from spreading from one country to another or when there is an unconstitutional change of government, such as a coup.
The AU holds authority over the UNWilliam Eagle (Correspondent at Voanews.com) July 6, 2004 (Accessed online at http://www.voanews.com/article.cfm?objectID=1C3B03FC-25D64D9B-A0202A4A45D71338) MH
Chris Landsberg is the Director of the Centre for Policy Studies in Johannesburg, South Africa. He says the AU delegates are likely to discuss whether the conflict constitutes genocide. "I don't think we should be surprised if the AU teaches the UN a lesson or two by debating whether what is happening in Dafur constitutes genocide," he said. "If they come close to calling it genocide, it will be difficult for the UN not to agree with them. Kofi Annan and Colin Powell have taken pains not to call it genocide. The moment you [do so], it invokes serious international and continental obligations to intervene.
AU Development Allows US and European Disengagement Strategic Forecasting 2004 (April 30, accessed online at www.stratfor.com, jec)
The AU, with economic and political backing from the United Nations, has begun to deploy its own peacekeeping forces. Some 2,700 AU peacekeepers, for example, are on duty in Burundi. That deployment was followed by an agreement to form a 15,000-member all-African peacekeeping force. The force, under the auspices of the AU Peace and Security Council, is set to deploy to regional bases by 2005. These intraAfrican security initiatives have garnered praise from European and U.S. diplomats and have earned a $300 million donation from the European Union to establish the AU Peace Facility. U.S. defense officials recently outlined a plan to spend some $770 million over the next five years to develop an African peacekeeping force. The AU is also likely to play a key role in the war on terrorism and, eventually, in international operations abroad. One side effect of creating even a partially effective central organization, however, is that it makes it that much easier for Europe and the United States to continue their practice of disengaged attentiveness.
AU can solve for the Darfur crisis due to the Naivasha agreement
Fisher-Thompson 2004 (Jim, The Washington File, http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive/2004/Jul/0266556.html) N.S. , "What the Naivasha discussion does for us is provide a working relationship with us and the Sudanese so when we ask them to take immediate action in Darfur it doesn't come in the context of someone who won't work constructively with them." The Naivasha agreement also provides a process that could be employed to insert a monitoring group into Darfur to verify whether the Sudanese government is complying with its promises to rein in the militias, Snyder added. "The Nuba Mountains monitoring process that occurred earlier after a cease-fire was agreed to in that region proved that the relatively small size of this AU [African Union] proposed cease-fire force for Darfur can also operate successfully. "Naivasha will make it easier for the AU to succeed in Darfur because everyone understands the rules of the game and how these things work," Snyder added. "The reason the AU monitoring force has been set up so rapidly is that we literally lent some people from the civilian protection monitoring teams and planes that already existed under Naivasha to help the AU get started, and we couldn't have done this before Naivasha," Snyder concluded.
27 Sudan Neg
Solvency
The African Union is Sending Troops to Sudan to Intervene Now Associated Press, Researched On: July 6, 2004, (NY Times, July 5, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/business/AP-African-Union.html, LS) The African Union on Monday said it would send several hundred peacekeepers to the Darfur region of western Sudan, where thousands have been killed and more than a million black Africans have fled attacks by Arab militiamen. The announcement came as members of the 53-nation group gathered for a summit, where they were urged by a top economic adviser to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to refuse to pay their huge foreign debts if rich nations did not cancel them. The 300 soldiers will be the first peacekeeping force for Darfur, described by the United Nations as the world's worst humanitarian crisis. They will protect refugees in Sudan and in neighboring Chad. Sam Ibok, director of the African Union's Peace and Security Division, said the troops would be quickly deployed but he did not give an exact date. He said the force would include troops from Nigeria and Rwanda and possibly Tanzania and Botswana. The 300 peacekeepers being sent is a significant increase from the 150 unarmed African Union monitors expected to go to Darfur as part of an April cease-fire agreement in Sudan. A few African Union monitors already are there. ``We are discussing with the Sudanese government on the deployment of that protection force,'' Ibok said. ``We cannot describe what has happened in Darfur as genocide, but it has the potential of deteriorating or degenerating into something quite serious.'' The United Nations has said that thousands of people have been killed and more than 1 million others were forced from their homes, most taking shelter in makeshift camps along the Chad-Sudan border. U.N. officials and human rights groups have accused Sudan of backing the Arab militias, engaged in a campaign to violently expel African farmers from the vast western region. Annan has said the crisis is ``bordering on ethnic cleansing.'' During a visit to the region last week, Secretary of State Colin Powell won a commitment from Sudan's President Omar el-Bashir to contain the militias and allow human rights monitors into Darfur. Powell had earlier said that if Sudan refuses to take decisive steps to cut its ties to the Arab militias, Sudan cannot expect to have normal relations with the United States. Up to 30,000 people have been killed in the uprising, and the U.S. Agency for International Development believes the number could grow to 300,000 if aid doesn't reach those in desperate need. Sen. John McCain on Monday urged quick action to prevent further death. ``This is a horrible thing that's going on,'' McCain said on CNBC. `Ì think that all the sanctions and all the criticism and everything is appropriate but I also think we ought to fund, we the United States of America, should fund a force made up of military from other African countries to go in there and stop this.'' Meanwhile, Jeffrey Sachs, a top economic adviser to Annan, said African nations should ignore their debt. His comments were made at a conference on hunger, on the eve of an Africa Union summit, which estimates sub-Saharan Africa has foreign debts of $201 billion. ``The time has come to end this charade. The debts are unaffordable,'' said Sachs, director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University and special adviser to Annan on global anti-poverty targets. `Ìf they won't cancel the debts I would suggest obstruction; you do it yourselves.'' The leaders of Ethiopia, Mauritius, Sudan, Uganda, Mozambique, Mali and Burkina Faso attended Monday's hunger conference.
28 Sudan Neg
OAU solves best

The AU solves better than outside actors with no vested interests OAU/IPA Joint Task Force Report on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Rapporteur: Ameen, January, 1998,
International Peace Academy, http://www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Reports/Africa/PublRepoAfriPP98Print.htm Recent experiences, especially in Somalia and Bosnia, have shown that the UN is not suited to carrying out enforcement action. For such action to be successful, a coalition of states that have strong military establishments and are willing to bear the human and financial burden attendant with an enforcement operation is necessary. The prevailing tendency appears to be the contracting out of more robust multilateral military action to ad hoc "coalitions of the willing." Sufficient political will to undertake such action, including the availability of necessary financial and logistical support, has recently been generated at this level. The UN, much less the OAU, currently has neither sufficient political support nor the practical capacity for effective enforcement action. However, recent experience in Africa (as described in Section III of this report) suggests that enforcement action can be undertaken by African states at the sub-regional level to deal with conflicts in those regions. In Uganda in the 1970s, for example, Tanzanian forces, arguing that they were acting to deter aggression by Ugandan forces, entered Ugandan territory to assist in dislodging the brutal and repressive regime of Idi Amin. ECOWAS launched the ECOMOG force into Liberia and employed enforcement action at various stages of the operation to protect civilian locations, strategic installations, and defend its own positions. Such a disposition of forces was possible because Nigeria and Ghana agreed to commit both men and materiel to the Liberian operation as well as to bear a large proportion of the financial burden. Nigeria again took the lead in mounting an enforcement operation, under the ECOWAS umbrella, against the military junta that deposed Sierra Leone's elected President, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, in early 1997. Ugandan and Rwandan military forces supported Laurent Kabila's military campaign to overthrow the Mobutu regime in Zaire in 1997. Shortly thereafter, in neighboring Republic of Congo, the Angolan government militarily supported the militia of Denis Sassou-Nguesso to overthrow the government of Pascal Lissouba.
Burundi claims are inaccurate AU is effective Raymond Thibodeaux (Correspondent at Voanews.com) July 5, 2004 (Accessed online at
http://www.voanews.com/article.cfm?objectID=4FBB55A7-D87B-4394-8E6BADDD124AD148#) MH But that wasn't their job, says Carolyn McAskie, the head of the 5,600-strong United Nations mission in Burundi, which took over the A.U. peace mission last month. Ms. McAskie says the aim of the A.U. mission was not to defend the population, but to protect the president's house, the parliament and government and rebel leaders who are part of the 2001 Arusha peace talks to set guidelines for Burundi's new unity government. "The AU force was brought in because the parties signatory to the accord were afraid to come home," she said. "A lot of these party members have been in exile, either in the region, in Europe or around the world, for years. So the agreement was that the African Union would provide a protection force that would allow them to come back in safety and start the [peace] process. Now, once you have foreign troops on the ground, everybody wants them to do everything. They did the job they were supposed to do."
29 Sudan Neg
Should consult OAU

The OAU has to be consulted prior to action, even if they have nothing tangible to contribute OAU/IPA Joint Task Force Report on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Rapporteur: Ameen, January, 1998,
International Peace Academy, http://www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Reports/Africa/PublRepoAfriPP98Print.htm The UN Security Council, in accordance with international law, must endorse any enforcement action. Article 53 of the UN Charter clearly vests the authority for enforcement action with the Security Council. As some of the above examples suggest, unilateral enforcement actions can and have been undertaken for narrow political interests rather than for creating conditions for peace. In order to guard against the pursuit of such narrow self-interest through military means by individual states, it is essential that international law be respected. The Security Council can authorize regional organizations or other arrangements to carry out enforcement action. The Council must fulfill its obligation for maintaining international peace and security in this regard by providing such authorization before any enforcement action is actually taken. The importance of UN authorization lies both in the legitimacy that it confers on the action and in its constant oversight to ensure that the multinational forces on the ground respect the mandate it has provided. While there is no legal requirement for OAU authorization of enforcement action, there are political reasons for it to be involved in the decision-making process. The OAU Central Organ should therefore seek to be fully engaged in the debate preceding authorization of such action, and should voice its support (or lack thereof) for any enforcement action that is taken by a coalition of states.
The AU must act soon; consultation now William Maclean (Correspondent at Reuters.com) July 6, 2004 (Accessed online at
http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=worldNews&storyID=5600621) MH Rwandan President Paul Kagame, whose country is among those ready to send in armed forces, said he believed the AU should act swiftly and decisively. "I think there is the need to create a big force and go and deal with the problem," Kagame said on the summit's sidelines. "The thing is to protect the people who are targeted, not observers," said Kagame. The summit was considering a resolution on Darfur voicing grave concern about human rights violations "by the Janjaweed militias" and the potential for regional instability. "This is good news for the African Union because for the first time you have people starting to point fingers," said South African analyst Jakkie Cilliers. Khartoum has agreed to attend AU-mediated talks on Darfur in Ethiopia this month and said it would cooperate fully.
30 Sudan Neg
AU monitors human rights abuses

The OAU can monitor human rights abuses OAU/IPA Joint Task Force Report on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Rapporteur: Ameen, January, 1998,
International Peace Academy, http://www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Reports/Africa/PublRepoAfriPP98Print.htm In addition to sending special envoys and establishing missions in countries in order to provide good offices for negotiation or mediation, the OAU may also mount civilian observer missions in conflict theaters. Such observers provide the "eyes and ears" of the international community in a deteriorating political situation and can be effective in preventing the recourse to violence by conflicting parties. Monitors can be dispatched as part of the OAU's preventive measures in a growing conflict situation or in the immediate aftermath of a political agreement, which is usually a fragile period. Accordingly, confidence-building measures are of critical importance during these periods. Three kinds of monitors, namely human rights monitors, political monitors and parliamentarians, can serve this function.
All the AU Needs is More Resources and it Can Solve OAU/IPA Joint Task Force Report on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Rapporteur: Ameen, January, 1998, International Peace Academy,
http://www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Reports/Africa/PublRepoAfriPP98Print.htm The capacity to ensure more rapid dispatch of civilian monitors in a deteriorating situation should be developed within the OAU. The major limitations that need to be addressed by the OAU to create this capacity include the recruitment of adequately trained personnel, resources to pay salaries for such staff, and logistical and communications capability to mount such missions.
31 Sudan Neg
32 Sudan Neg
OAU key to African unity

A strong AU is an essential symbol of African unity OAU/IPA Joint Task Force Report on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Rapporteur: Ameen, January, 1998,
International Peace Academy, http://www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Reports/Africa/PublRepoAfriPP98Print.htm With the conclusion of the agenda for decolonization, the end of apartheid in South Africa, and the end of the Cold War, efforts were made at the OAU level in 1990 and 1991 to articulate new continental priorities for the changed global environment in which Africa found itself. The Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in 1990 on "The Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World" focused on the need for greater regional integration and collective self-reliance. Following this Declaration, the African Economic Community was established at the 27th Summit of the OAU in Abuja in 1991. The 1993 Declaration that established the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution further recognized the enormous problems caused by the scourge of conflicts within and between African countries, and affirmed a commitment on the part of African governments to resolve all conflicts peacefully. While these Declarations have established certain principles, there remains an absence of a crisp, coherent vision to animate a common commitment among African states. The OAU should take a lead in developing a pan-African regime of norms that provide for both positive and negative sanctions aimed at encouraging democratic governance and respect for human rights. A strengthened commitment to the OAU as a key African institution and forum for addressing these issues is critical in this regard. An "instrument" such as a charismatic African leader of high moral stature to catalyze action by member states towards the articulation of such standards would be extremely useful. The OAU can play an important role in providing an institutional focal point and establishing machinery to monitor and provide continuous attention to the progress made in the direction of articulated pan-African norms. The OAU's institutional machinery for this purpose could include a regular reporting system, the commissioning of studies to detail the current state of Africa in respect of these norms, concrete measures to follow-on the findings of such studies, and the appointment of special representatives and rapporteurs to follow progress and advocate for observance of agreed norms and standards. The experience of the UN, which has conducted various studies to highlight certain thematic issues that require greater attention, and has established high-level positions including the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Special Representative for Internally Displaced Persons, the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, and the Special Rapporteurs for numerous human rights-related problems, is a useful guide for OAU actions. The OAU should seek to learn from UN practice and develop analogous instruments of its own which can help energize future concrete actions from OAU member states in support of a common vision.
33 Sudan Neg

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