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1833-1840 sPArN
by Conrad Caims

Part I: The Courseof the Fbst CadistWar

andModeratos important wings ofthe Cristinos astheLiberales - borhofrhesetitles,unlike"Cnslinos",werewhatthe groups Thisflrstarticle isa hislorical introduction, andwillbe followed used as to describe themselves at the time.Th Liberaleswere. by detailed examinalions oflhe organhation, tactics, uniforms liberalsalwayshavebeenin spain. very differentfrom their and weapons of boih sides,and, it is hoped,a pieceon the nam-sakes as always. British in Franceor Britain, although, Oriamendi campaign of 1837 in real life andon the wargames liberalsmadeliltle effort to understand the diffrence. Their great inspiration was the 1812Constitution. a lengthywork Some ofthe materialhas appeared before. although in rather inspired by the Enlightenment, British.Americanand French different form, in a senesof atriclesin TheForcign Coftespon revolutionary ideas,as well as Liberal notionsof what was dpnr(newsletter of the Conrinental WarsStudyGroup of the wrongwith Spain.It wasnot in forceuntil 1836, whenit was V;ctorian Military Society) andin the VHS journal,Soldiedo/ promulgated Liberalcoup d'etat. by a violent and successful rr? Oxeer.To thosewho feelthey haveseen it before,I would The Liberales' who hadledan earlier herowasGeneral Riego. saytbatI hopetheywillforgiverepetition, andunderstandthat militarytake-over in 1820, andran the govemment until it was partsofthese crushed it wasimpossible to present the newlyproduced in 1823i their mainpolitical by LouisXvlll s invasion articles by themselves in anysensible fashion. Those whowould aim was to resistroyal absolutism and what they sawas the like further details, particularly on uniforms, and fuller obscurantist power of the Churchovcr all aspects of Spanish references, will, I hope, refer to the earlier articles. A life. Few were real republicansi they lendedto be stronger in bibliographywill appear in a forthcomingedition of this the cities than in the counrryside, and were particularly publicalion. well-represented in the regulararmy and, aboveall, in the The singularly apt tille is onewhichI wishI hadthought up with the Moderatos. who were NationalMilitia. Their alliance the peoplewho did are the staff of the Spanish magazin on thewholethepersonal was supportersofCristina andIsabel, that the only thing that prevented uneasy: ir couldbe argued I wouldlike to thankRon Poulterfor drawing the platethat Moderrro.allling sr(h rhe Carli.rr on some occa.ion\. illustrates thisarticle. andespecially RalphWeaverfor helpand panicularlyafier the 1836revolution.was th latter'srigid supportthroughouton my Carlist researches. and for the refusal or negotiate. to compromise illustrations of thewarriors ofboth sides. (royalists), Realirrdr andtheir The Carlisccalledrhemselves normallyspokeof them as the .itaccioror. The word cnemies or at leastfigurehead, Carlos, Carlistconesfrom their leader. THEPARTIES Vll. (To thosewho regarded him asthe brotherof Ferdinand he wasCharles Vi the Habsburg emperor The FirstCarlistWar wasthe first of threefull-scale civil wars Iegitimate monarch I ofSpain).Whether Charles or that Spain sufferedin a entury.and one of the bloodiesl wecallby thattitle nasCharles episodes of the factionalism that wasthe distinguishing feature lsabel was the legitimateruler can be arguedither way. hadbeenan ancient Castillian andSpanish of politicallife between rhe restoralion of Ferdifland VII and Womenmonarchs a largeextent,also tradition.but duringtheeighteenth ceniurythe BourbonKings the triumphof Franco.Its causes alongwith manyother French ideas, the so-called thecauses of muchof thestrifeof earlytwenrieth'ceniury Spain. introduced. Althoughin 1840 ir appeared yearsof struggle that no $,oman canbe a queenregnant. that seven had SalicLaw. whichsays Ferdinand depends on in thevictory wasfar fromextirpated whether or noi kabel could succeed ended ofoneside.Carlism issue I andwithin a decade a conslilutional the army hadanorher Carlistrevolton its wheiherSaliclaw wasin forcein 1833. hands. have no intntion of discussing. The contestants are normallycalledCristinos why did it matter? During Fcrdinand'slong, generally and Carlists. reign. the hopesof a and an examination of thesenames and their alternatives will ractionary. and until 1830childless. groupof Spaniards hadbeenlinkedto the person of serve to introduce some ofthe ideas andprejudicesthal inspired significant were impeccable. Don Carlos. whose illiberal credentials the sides. produced an Thesupporters ofthe Madridgovernment. theCristinos. owe when. to rheir surpriseand horror. Ferdinand was bitter. as until thar point $e their nameto Maria Cristina.fourth wife of Ferdinand VIl. heir. their disappointment to Carloson Ferdinandsdeath. AfterFerdinand's deathin 1833 Cristina became Regeni throne would have passed Queen power by peaceful on behalfof th infant IsabelII (who gavethe party a second Facedwith the impossibility of obtaining in the govemment. name, lsabelinos). The Cristinoswere! as any readerat all means. and worried by Liberalinfluence controlld th anny.they familiar with twentieth-century Spanish historywill have no theyturnedto force:asthe Cristinos difficultyin apprecialing, held together only by determination raised theirown rivalhosts. haschanged over the years,but it is almost to defeatthe Carlisis,by a desireto maintai. ihe Queen"for Carlistideology nature not until the fearof{indingsomething worse', andby the circumstance that ahlaysof a fairly extremereactionary a left'wing Carlism be they wrein ontrolof all rhe normalmachinery of the state. 1960\ could anythingapproaching and including the armyandnavy. found.A Carliststwin aimswereto upholdthe Monarchy forms. As thisarticle isbasicallya look atthenilitarysideofthewar, rheChurch.bothin theirmostiraditionalandabsolutist was of the early Carlists andI willhaveto keepthe political complexitiesto a minimum, (Notablyabseniftom the pantheon I will grossly over-simplify matters by describing the two most what was later to becomethe third immutableoblecl of



adolationof many Spanish rightists,the army). They were hostiletoliberal modemityinall itsforms,whichtheysawasnot only politicalincorret, but impiousaswell, andeveninspired by "Lutherans" andFreemasons. This setof mind goesa long way to explaintheir ;nabilityto rnodifytheir demands when wouldhavebenefitted compromise their cause,lheir frequent (although atrocities thoseo{theCristinos wereperhaps at least as bad), and such pronouncements as the DurangoDecree, whichsaidall foreigneN takenin armsagainst them ouldbe greatlyoftheirownrightness executed. Theywereconvincedso thattheydidnot seem to consider theeffet such derees hadon foreign opinion. The generalantipathyof the Portuguese, govemmenN Brilish andFrench ro rheCarlisls $asnora major cause oftheir downfall, but it certainly did themno good. Duringthe 1820 s traditionalists hadenjoyed muchinfluence if with the government, and so were able to organise a large THENoRTHERNPRovtNcEs'ffi privatearmy of "RoyalistVolunteers" all over the country naturally,this was of value to the Carlists\rhen they found of thousands offirst-class infantry,overa thousand morethan themselves in urgent need of a real army. Despite the passable will lancers. anda smallnumberof guns full details nation-wide extent ofthis organhaiion. a.d despite thefactrhat was originally recruitedfrom appear in a later article. It in all parts of Spain people could be found who were volunteers but these weresoonjoined from the four provinces, (although sympa$etic to absolutism in manycitiesil wasnot who deserted from the Crislino by others, notably Castillians, safe to air such views). Carlismwas not rally a national theirhomelands, orwerepickedup by the arny. marched fuom movement. There were two Carlisthomelands. eachwith its Like lhe Basques and Carlistson their roving expeditions. own army,andalthough othe.r Carlistforces existed, andeven Navarrese, wereexcellent soldiers, andcameto the Castillians thrivedfor a while-in La Mancha andCatalonia, for examplehalfthearmy. oncethe armies in the northandin Aragongaveup the Carlisi formone third ro All rhisisgetting ratherahead ofevents. To returnto 1833: on Statewasno more. It is convenient to treat the stories of the proclaimed 51h OctoberDon Carloswas King,andarmed bands ArmiesoftheNorth andofthe Centre separately. sprung up ro supporthim. Carlosappointed a former regular general,SantosLadr6n,commandeFin-hief,bulhis'll-train weredefeated forces at theirfint battle,LosArcos.andhe was ZUMALACARREGUI ANDTHERISEOFTHE captured andshot.Thiswasnot a totaldisastcrforthe Carlistsl ARMYOFTHENORTH, T$3.1835 for one thing,it taughtthemthey couldnot standin the open trainedtroopsuntil they became soldiersi for another, Thefirst.anduntilthelate1830's mostimponant, Carlistregion against was Tom6sZumalacarregui y de wasthe four provinces ofvhcaya (Biscay). Guipfzcoq,Alava SanlosLadr6n'ssuccessor (all Basqueprovinces)and Navarra. In thse areas. the lmaz (1788-1835), a colonelof regularinfantryand oneof the backboneof the Carlist movementwas provided by the greatest soldiers of hisage. peasantry. Zumalacdrregui's aim was to producea completemodern andwhat made Carlot supporters soloyalwas notso mucbthe absolutist was army.but withoutforcingits mento losetheir naturalmilitary ideas ofrhe leadership but rhat Carlos He suceeded. TheCarlists' abilityto moverapidlyover seenas the protector of localrrelos (rights.laws.privileget talents. was land.cape of muchoI the noahempro!ince5 against the centralism of Madrid althoughthe strength of rhebroken provinces never equalled by most Cristinos, although the traditional religion in these naturally ahoinlined the Queen's greatlyoverthe improved course ofthe warin itsability inhabitants towardsCarlism.Even in the four provinces, th infantry wasnot unchallnged, to wageguerrillawarfare.(The Carlists almostalways relied Carlisistate howevr. The maincities B;lbao. San Sebastidn. on anyotherarm,but thiswasnota Pamplona,Vitoria remainedin muchmoreon in{antrythan government Iimitation hands.panly because aslongasonewasfightingin the fourCarlisl they were heavilygarri serious parllybecause soned. theCarlists werenot very!killedat taking The first raskwasto build in the new battalions a sDiritof largetowns. but alsobecausc the Carlists werenot very skilled while rrainingthern.Zumalacdrregui's answer ai takinglarge lowns,but alsobecause some oftheirinhabitants self-confidence whichhe knewhis weregenuine a series of battles, orambushes, Cristinos. Ir is probably significant thatanEnglish ';iastostage he wouldbreak visitor remarkedthat in Santandor rhat the bourgeois wore menwouldwin. or at leastnot lose.Iforessed. -English (i.e. modern won,a regularopponent foundescape far international) fashions. andthecountry offand disperse;ifhe 'Spanish drss people (Henderson, moredifficult. He keptawayfrom plains, especiallyinthe early retained l, 209). Not surprisingly. priests andhada habitofstartinga fight latein thedaysothat tendedto be Carlists. and couldbe months. hisforces. seenleadingrttacks in their splendid hadlitdechance to outflan k or surround blackgarb,wavinglarge theC.istinos at thestart crucifixes, but therewereplentyofclergywho did not support He normallycommitted onlya minorityofhis troops in open order. CarlosLawyers wererlsosaidto be in favourof the Pretender, of an engagement, holdingthe rest;n reserve perhaps wasa problem,and one that the Carlists because rheywereworriedrhatthe 1812 Constiturion Lack of ammunition completely, despite the setting up of manufacturers, set up locall',?cer de c""d1ii?.id,,officialswhosejob wasto neversold soZunalactlregui enforced a rigorous fire'discipline to prevent settle disputes andso reduce the nurnber of lawsuils. wasaccompanied that mightbe Don Carlos by a large,sruffy, andralher hismenfrom usingup all the l0 or even4 rounds per soldier. Carlists oftenreserved theirfire until the mobilecourt.with morethanenough of the peopleone might available wasveryshort, andrlida lot on the bayonet. expecttofind courtiers, displaced supporters fromotherparts range generally By theauturnn of 1834the Carlistarmyhadwona numberof of'seekers. toad'eaters andpoliticians part of the Carlislslate baules hada veryformidable infantry, but the mostimportant and credirable and.moreimportantly, waslhe Army of lbe North. (TheCristinos forcefacingit borc able to fight in line. column, and square,without having thesame name. but to avoidconfusion I willonlvusethetermto sacrificed its men'sabilities to act as guerrilleros. Its strategic ro:omeren\ achievements were less;mpressive.Many Cristino units, indicare rheCdrlisr arm) f'om norhing ). Thi\ gre\a

28 particularly in the mounted arm,werein poorshape in 1833, so the government lostits chance to crushthe rebellion in the first months,but it became apparent that the Carlists had limited to influence events outside theirfour Drovinces. Tactical Dower developments will be covered in moredetaitinthe nextarticle, but itis wellto pointout herethatas Carlists leamtthevirtues of regular training, sothe Liberales, rathermoreslowly,leamt or re-leamtthe methodsof guerdllawarfarethat had been so effective in g ndingdowntheinvaders two decades before. The Spanish soldier is oneof the toughest on earth- whichwasjust as well, consideng the privations both sides had to endureand the Liberales' determination to put downthe dsingh too easyto underestimate, The same stubbomness, and refusal to giveup afterdefeats, whicheventuallydid forNapoleon's arny, Th'o sh'ordsof typesusedby the BritishAutiliary Legion. The in theendalsocrushed the Carlists. two Lancet rcgimentr would have prcbabry canied the 1822 The govemment strategy wasto ontain the Carlist"state", patten light cavaby sv'otd. (The specinen shoh'n is a andto holdontothemaintownsevenin whichwas tooper's; officets' wererery similar). Inlanty officets cafied Carlistareas. undoubtedly a wiseone.(Its fritteringawayof forces in holding the1822 pattem "Gothk Hilt" , somelimes in a sleelscabbardas places, a multitudeof lesser whichcouldbe, and often were, herc, mote olten in a black leathetone with brassmountt. The taken,wasprobablylesssensible)But although this gavethe Spanishanls would haw appearedon the hik, ratrcr than Cristinos suitable bases to launchoffensives to endicatethe thoseof the East India Companyon thisspecimen.The "pipe revolt, this secondstage proved far more difficult. One back" was an ingeniour featurc to stfun the blade lot the handicap, especially in ihe early years,was the fact that the terain workedto the Carlhts'advantage; anotherwasthat it took the Cristinossome time to produceleaderswith the gave hopeto theirpolitical ambitions haddisgusted Zumalaqirnecessary qualities. The govenment had, moreover, the regui so muchthat he had tried to resigncommandof the Army unfo(unate habit of sacking generalsfrequently - one, of the North. Carlosdid not ac.ept, but it appean that, after hh Zumalacdrregui\ old commander only lastedftom resignation, he no longer felt so rsponsible for strategic Quesada, Februaryto July 1834.In early 1835the commandof the decisions, sowentalongwith thesiege, whichheconducted with northemarmypassed y Mina,the legendary 14battalions to Franciso Espoz and10guns. Thegarrison,5,000 menand30guns, leaderinthe War oflndependence anda strongLiberal. As an won the greatestCristino victory to date, resistingthe siegeand ex-guerllero he waswell awareof the virtue of light troops, killingZumalacdrregui, whodiedon 24thJune.Neveragain did anddid all hecouldtoraisethem.but hewaslesssuccesstulas a the Carlists acquire a leader*ith such a combination oftactical, fieldcommander. In March1835 he launched a maiorattack. in inspirational andorganisational ability.His successor, Teniente treezr ngwearhe pan of rhe GeneralGonz6lezMoreno, facedup to the Cristino field army | . from Pamplona. ro try anddestroy Carlistarmy*hile Zumalacaregui, with the bulkofhis forces, on 16thJuly (now under C6rdova),at Mendigorria, and was wasabsent. Hisplanfa;led,largely because ofthe extraordinary badlybeaten. Had not C6rdova failedto lauochtb necessary mobilityofthe Carlistarmy,and Mina wasnearlysuffounded cavalry wouldhave charge at theendofbattle,the Carlists been and destroyed. Althoughhe extricated his armywithout very (partlyby forgingZumalacerregui's heavylosses signature on an orderwhichhe contrived gneral), to pass to anotherenemy and althoughsome of his forcesfought very well, Mina\ 1836-1837 TIIE CARLISTEXPEDITIONS, reputationsufferedirreparableharm. He was replacedby veryclearlysomeof theweaknessesof TheBilbaoaffairshowed Valds in April1835. lacked the poliorcetic expertise to takeeven the Carlists. They The earlysummer of that yearbroughtyet morevictories to a fortress, and the army hadbeenforcedinto the so mediocre the Carlists, not only in the field but againslminor Cristino To have held Bilbao siegeby non-militaryconsiderations. garrisons.It may have been these successes that led the downin something like would have allowed the court to settle Pretender to his first greaterror, to attackBilbaoagainst the haveenhanced the wascalculated, comfort. advie of Zumalac6rregui. Maite^were alsonot hlped at this monarchs chances of receiving aid from foreign Pretender's junctureby the factthat courtiers' back-biting at the manwho Russia ofreaction- thoseofPrussia, sympathetic to the cause Viloria, asa firststep to Zumalacerregui hadwanted to attack an offensiveagainstMadrid. By 1836it was obviousthat the Crhtinosmightnot be ableto crushthe Army of although *ould loseby default ifhe theNonh by mainforce,Don Carlos provinces. thenorthern As couldnotspread thefightiflgbeyond Pretender Carloshad to take the throie to win the warl as QueenRegent,all Cristinahad lo do waspreventhim. The weregaining in proficiency all the time, andin armies Queen's by lhiee substantial foreignlegions, 1835 hadbeenreinforced and British. (The Carlistsenjoyedthe French,Portuguese, supportonly of individual aliens. molivatedby politics or There were Carlisl movements in other partsof adventure.) in Aragon were building up a fomidable Spain, andthe Carlists army of their own. but the country as a whole remained the Queen\ chief minister,MendiCristino-ln January1836 won avote ofonfidence in the Cortes, anditwashoped zdbel, talentstoreinforcins he wouldbe ableto turn hisconsiderable

Two Spsni:h knivesof tlpes that would haveseenservicein the 1830's. The plug bayonethad sutvived as a huntsmsn'stool, but the othet specimen,the navaja, k specifrcay fot fighting. The vicious, stabbing blade (herc shotrn held in its open po'ition by asptind fold: up into the handle. The knife could be wo st'tck into a sashwith only the end of the hih shoh'ing.

29 the army.C6rdova built for.ifiedlinesaroundtbe Arnyofthe North'sterritory,with the aim ofcutting it off from the restof Spain, or{orcing itontotheplainsofCastille, where hehoped to winter offensive destroy't. Although C6rdova's at Arlaben, whichwassupponed by the BritishAuxiliaryLegion,wasless than totallysuccessful, in March 1836 Banolomeo Espartero. the risingCristinostar,won an elegant vicloryon the plainsof Orduna. The Carlistsattemptedto break oul of this siruationby sending'Expeditions" all over Spain,to '\how the flag" and. they hoped, lead and inspiretheir sympathisers, who, they believed, would rise up and form armies and governments of theirown oncethe Liberalarmyandmilitiaweredrivenaway. Thiswasnot to be. Whetherbecause moreSpaniardsthan they were hostileor apathetic realised to their cause, or whether because onceoneofthe powerful expeditions hadpassed on its way any partizans who "cameout" would be left eitherto be stampedupon by the governmentor reducedto a life of banditry, they set up no major bodies of active Carlists. Although the nilitary success of the expeditions mor than alarmed thc Cristinos. not eventhe factthat Madridandother citiesunderwent a violenlLiberalrevolulionin the summer of 1836gave anyrealadvantage to the Carlists. wereveryimpressive Neverthe less, theexpeditions exanples was that of Miguel G6mez of the military an. The greatest Damas,which set out on 3rd June with 5 battalions,two (ratherstronger squadrons andtwo guns.andreturned, dueto local recruiting),on 20th December, to find the main army engaged in its second attempton Bilbao- another failure.His original missionwas to raise insurrection in Asturias and Galicia, but from Santiago deComposlella hemarched through Leon and Castille to Aragon.At Bujaleroon 30thAugusthe foughtandcapturcdtwo battalions of RoyalGuards.Despite beingrouted andmauled at Villarrobledo a monthlater,hewas strongenoughto take C6rdobacity on lst October.In all, G6mezcovered about 2.800milesin six months,traininghis recruits ashe marched. By the beginning of 1837 both northemarmies wereled by .iore than competent generals. Espartero havingtakenover

Thk diagrltm shows, in sinplified fom, the llryout of requtar inla try colours (the Prcvincial rcgimentsand Gua s often had differcntflogr. This wasthe la war in which SpanLth rcgula\ fouBht undet the rasged .nss of Bursundr, rcd on In the comer o|als, which weresutroundedby baped fkgs or laurel Meaths, were the arms oJ the regiment- for exanple 3 ye otr flew-de-lys on bLue for Borbon. The clov'ns weresold jewels. The fiilt battalionofeach red, t|ith nulti colourcd and cotour, vhich had superinposed regi e t borc the ColoneL's on the abo|e an e[aborate,crcwned. anrs ol Spain, ofEn by ordercon chains. snrrcunded The oldest reginent in the atny, El Rey, had a unique distinction - the backqround b its flags was not h'hite, but

-1836 cOMEz's MARCH

(a far from despicable himsel0and commander from C6rdoba nephewto Don Carlos,beingin the Infante Don Sebasti6n, attempted a ofthe Carlistforces. In MarchtheCristinos charge grandthree-pronged De LacyEvans attack:theBritishgeneral \{as to advance from the fortress of SanSebastidn, by now a hometo the BritishAuxiliaryLegion,Esparsemi-permanent tero fiom Bilbao, and SaNfield,whoseforcesincludedthe FrenchForeignLegion, from Vitoria. The plan was over' beingunable to co-ordinate ambitious, andreliedon the enemy given rhreecolumn\- a foolishassumption a de[ence again5l that the Carlistswere operatingon interior lines, and their bothstrategically andtactically. rvonderfu | speed of movement, mustawaita fu(her article, A full desciptionofthe campaign defeated by the it to saythat Sarsfield let himselfbe but suffice weather. and EsDanero retiredwhenhe heardof the disaster that befell Evanson the heightsof Oriamendi,outsideSan Sebasti:in. Almost at onceCarloslaunched his maior offensive of the war.ThePretender himself accompanied rheRoyalExpedition (a dozen of16 battalions. almost all thecavalry squadrons), and gunners withoutpieces. some Thereis someuncertainty about purposcsofthis theprecisc expedition, aboutfromthe obvious givingthe inhabitants onesof "reinforcing succest'and ofthe Carlislprovinces a breakfrornsupplying so largean army.but clearly Carloswasmakinga serious bid for power.If everthe Carlistswere to take Madrid by fore, this was the time. especially when the Army of the No h joined wilh the Aragonese Arny of thc Centre. Thcy may also have been hopingtocapjtalise on desertionsin theCristino ranksfollowing -would a display the 1836 revolution of Carlistpowerpersuade

30 happy retreat; indeed, ir probablyma.ked the start of an irrevenible decline. Like all volunteers, the menof theAJmyof the Northhada tendencyto dip awayhomewhentheredid not seem to be anyprospect oI success, although thistendency was nodilied by severe discipline and a willingness of soldiers to retum tothe colours whentheysawsomepointin fighting. The failureofthe RoyalExpedition wasa severe blow to the belief that Don Carlos would ever be a real king, and the war-weariness that was to bring peaceat last datesfrom the auturnn of 1837. The ordinaryCarlistsoldier had turnedin his usualexcellent performance, but casuakies had been heavy, specially in thecavalry. Norcouldthesoldiers have beenmuch edifiedby the dissent in the high connand, panicularly thar betweenthe generals. and Carlosand his civilian advisors. Worstof all, this disseflt continued afler the Army's relum to the four nonhernprovinces, with manyofficers willingto iry a compromhepeace. Sebastidn wassacked; although hiseventual successor, RafaelMaroto,the lastcommander ofthe Armv o{ the NorLh.was a good enoughgenerdl.he was Lopur oiher things beforehisloyaltyto the cause.


by incidenr, The resloflhe warin the northwasnot unmarked but canbe related fairly briefly.A final largeexpedition, with the same aimasthoseof1836, setout in March1838, underthe Countof Negri.It consisted o{ 9 battalions, all Castillian. two mountaingunsj and four full squadrons wirh cadres for two more.Thestrong reliance on Castillians mayhave been because the Basques and Navarrese on the Royal Expedition had complained aboutbeingawayfrom rheil homeland for so long. Negri took Segovia.but his expediiion,lacking food and foolwear. thenfellbackin a miserable rerreatEsDarterocausht A rcpresentative Carld infantrynan and lancer,.biwn bf Ron il on 27lhApril.rheCrrlisr toot formed square, burcouldior Poulter. The cawlrynan sflanboyant haiis typiLot.Whitethe fireontheCristinocavahyasitspowdeiwassoaked byrain,and o inatj Spania was fat fton clop-headed, Ca bts had a the army surrendered en rnasse. Only Negri and the cavalry reputation for haniness. Zunalacliffegui, it is said, had escaped. On 22ndJune Espanerodeleated lhe main Carlist batbers accompan! his amy so the solrliers did no! hove to army, leading to the fall of the nearby Carlist rown of catt shdving-eq uip nent. Pe6acerrada. andihe replaceme.l of the thencommander-inchiefby the above,mentioned Maroto. Marolo\ aim was to rebuild rhe army, and especially its someModeldror to forsake the Liberaladministration for the mounted arm, into a force that could defeat Espartero in a absolutists? After twovictories at Huesca andBarbastro. ferocious affairs evenby the standards of this war, and a defeatat Orr. the Expeditionpassed through parts of Cataloniaheld by local Carlists,and headed south io join the Army of the Centre. Anotherdefeatat Chiyadeniedthe Carlhrsan opportunity to recuperatein the fertile area around Valencia. and the perhaps combined Carlistforces. 16.000 foot and2,000horse, advanced 10withina fewmileso{Madrid.Carlos neverordered the assault despite urgingfrom Sebastidn and frorn Ram6n Cabrera, theleader ofthe Aragonese. Nevera decisive man,he hadonthisoccasion plentyofreasons forcaution. The advance had beenso slow rhat lhe government forceshad had ample time to preparethe capiralfor artack.Carloswas no doubt unwillingto r'sk what wasperhaps the greatest field army he couldgatherin a typeof warfareat whichir wasnot eiperti he wasno lover of bloodshed; h wouldhavebeendisaDpointed lhat\o iew ot hispeople hadraken up arm' ro 'upponrne Expedition; and,while duringearlierstages of his journeyhe hadbeen in secret communication with Cristina with a viewto a negotiated peace, all suchcorrespondence had eased by rhis This sketch nnp shows the sinkttion in the s nner of 1837, After some hesiration.and because a large force under with the route of the Rolal Eryedition. Dotled arcoswerc - under Carlistcotlrol. (Bilbao, Vibtia, San Sebostidn Espartero wasbearing downon rhem,the Carlists retreared and Cabrera to Aragon,th Army of the North to irs home.being Pamplona wele Oisino). The hatchedarca is the pa of La pursued by Espartero who beat it at Reiuerta-It was nor a Mancha i fested bj Ca ist iteg la^.




MINIATURES BATTLE HONOURS rd. 'e s L h i(hq r* rddns Na!.mr ffsg


mrd & i !*drd hi!,wtu*dd*ihlbFyd,is ir* 6d! 4pry ' smd'nF F) Mdumo

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GGiiFiE !-^ &4r S12 Sd "dh "ntuder 8rE oid Edi Btu C&i S16 &M rmm F6 @n 754d Pb*d 6diq: ta drd a x B'8Fd:lip']59Ff'11',5pF{ q !F6d

TheNational Militia had alrcady adoptedthe gol.I flag rceinental flag of Ihe rcgulars that w..t to becomethe standatul in the 1840s. This examplei,as caftied by the 2nd baialion of Zaragoza. The lette6 arc ye otr, the paln and laurel h,rcath green, the ams those of Casnle and Aragon vrith a rc.j inscurheon bearing a ye ow Iion rampant. Red and gold posts and forts. bannen also flen' orer government-held

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lTthSeptembel Phalanx'94, SlHelens. See u3on:Saturday deisive baltle.bul. desDite someCarlistsuccesses andthe lack of pay. clorhing. foorqedr andtoodin thegovernmenr arm).il wastoo lale. Thatrarest ofbattlesin thiswar.a cavalry action, thenorthern theirbest troopsagainst TheCristinos employed tookplaceat theendof 1838 wherethe Carlists. at Los ArcosorSesma, Militia wasusednormallyto ln thenonh, theNational renowned Cristi.o horsegeneral DiegoLeon provedMaroto's garrison but in Aragon militia unitsoften townsand villages, newcavalrv wasno match for the solendid Liberalborsemen. A formedpartoffield forces, happyresults. nor alwayswith similarresuh occured al Allo in June1839. But bv thenvarious Carlistarmy, in the ranksofthe Aragonese Cabrera started Carlistbattalions hadbeenwonoverby the hopeofpeace.and butir wasnotuntilheachieved eminene. in 1834, thatthisforce disputes in thecommand werechronic, theworsrbeingbetween found ils greatorganiser. Its growthwasslowerthan that of MarotoandCarlos. for the army. and it was most unfortunate Zumalacnrregui's The final disasler wasthat Carlos openlycalledhisgeneral a Carlists its only achieved asa wholethattheArmyofthe Centre traitor:Maroto,andthbulkoftheArmyofthe North.madean greatest strength in 1838.when the Army of the Noah had armisticeat Vergara on 24th August 1839-The symbolic alreadv started to decline. Like the other Carlist force, "Embrace of Vergara", celebrated in numerous pictures anda Cabrera'sarrny enjoyed the advantage of being basedin diorama in the MadridArmy Museum, left the Carlistofficers inaccessible of and ruggedterrain,in its casethe Maestrazgo - Aragon,whichmadeCnsdnoatlacks relatively happy theirterms of surrender wereverygenerous difficult on its heartland Carlos in flighl to France with a few troopers, and Espanero. rosaytheleast. atleastasrnuch andthewarin thisareainvolved withoutdoubtthe mostpowerfulmanin to put an weary marching by both sides Olher and counter-marching endto the Araeonese Carlisrs. Cabrera\arrny Because factors madeitevenmoreunpleasant. asthatin the wasnothinglikeaswell-run andcivilorganisation the Cristinosupplysysremhere was, if north. and beca'rse CABRERAANDTHE ARMY OF THE CENTRE in lhe northof thecountry. worse thanitscounterpart anything, The conduct of food andclothing. both sides suffered from lack I will cover the Army of the Centre. as it was rather of massacres barbarous. with {requent of the war was more quickly optinistically titled, muchmore thanI did the Aimyof - the mostfamous victimwasCabrera's andc;vilians the North. and other relativlyminor Carlistforces.suchas prisoners (Her sonmorethanrepaidin thosein Caialonia andLa Mancha, hardlyat all. Like the main mother,shotby way of reprisal. the Militia increased The freouent use of National army.lhat of the Centrewasthe creation of oneman. Ram6n kind.) as a sawthisbody th Carlists. not withoutreason, bitternessas (1806-77), Cabrra whosta.ted hisadultli{easaseminarian and - he is buried in tef.wing organisation.more politically suspectthan the endedit as an Englishcountry gentleman wasalsoto keep (Thatoneofthe Militia'schieftasks VirginiaWater.He wasa sincere enough Carlist,but for him, Reg'rlars. persecute or gnerally Carlists, and down conservative op;nion and for manvot his men.Carlismhad as muchto do with lhe government did litde to endear held areas suspected Carlists.;n advancementof asemiindependentsrateinAragonaswiththe therefore, On ocasions, fortunes of the Pretender. His army wasat aimes an ffective it to the trooDsof the Pretender.) were shot, the regularofficersand sergeants fighringforce. althoughdiscipline was not one of its strong while capturd points, but it wasneverasformidable astheArmy ofrhe Nonh. rank and file were sparedor forcedto join the captors,but of rank. killedregardless Militia takenwith themwere It did co-operate with northern troops.moslnotablyduringthe National RoyalExpedition andGomez smarch.but it nornally operated Apart from tyingdownCristinounitswhichcouldhavebeen used againstthe Army of the Nonh, perhapsthe greatest andwasor-qanned asan independenr entiiy.

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contibutionthe Army ofthe Centrecouldhavemadetowards Carlistvictory wasto co,operate with the RoyalExpedition. As we have seen,Cabreraand some of his men did join the expedition, andthe Aragonese hieftain wasoneof thosewho urged anassaulton Madrid.He seemsto havebeen disgusted by Carlos's refusalto risk an attack,for he then retired to the Maestrazgo, andthereafter took a lineevenmoreindependent fromtheCourt.A surprise assault on thenightof 25126 January 1838 by a Catalan lieutenant and75 menrook Morella,which Cabrera hadbeenbesieging for two monrhs. Morellawas,and is. a wonderfullyruggd and spectacular castellared city, althoughby no meansa modernfortressin the 1830t, and Cabrera tumed it into the capitalof his virtuallyautonomous viceroyalty,. the head of a widely-spread civil and military The Cristinos coulddo little to stopthe establishment ofthis ramshackle Carlht state:their forces wereover-stretched asit was,havingto dealnotonlywithverywidespread banditryfrorn wellarmedandnominally Carlisthorsemen in La Mancha, but. moreseriously, the Iiseofanothr,snaller,semi-independent Carlistareain Catalonia. (Thearmyof rheCatalan was Carljsts beingdisciplined for rhe filst time by the brutal but efficient general, ex-regular the Condede Espafra, andit wasfortunate for the Liberales ihat the Condewas assassinated befote his forcescould becomea seriousthreat.) Nor did it help the Cristinos that theyhad to defendand garrison so nany towns andplaces against the ever-mobile unitsofCabrera's army.In the latesummerof1838 the Cristinogeneral Marcellino Orra, anotherex-guerrillerowho hadserved underMina in theWar of Independence, assembled 22 battalions andperhaps 25gunsto takeMorella.AlthoughOriiawasinsome ways an ablesoldier, the siegewas markedby the incompetence of the Cdstino adllery, supply.and commandOda's army was lucky to escape withoutlosses moreserious thanthoseit receivd. Just over a monthlater, on 1st October1838.Cabrera inflicteda serious defeat in the field at Maella. 1839 sawCabrratrying to protct his 'kingdom' by building fixed fortifications, which would alsoserveasbases out of which to raid Cdstinoareas,while simultaneously reducing Liberal strongpoints in what he regarded as his own territory. It is remarkablethat asCarlos'sown forceswere disintegrating,his lieutenantshouldhavebeenconstructing forts morefomidable than the fieldvorks, barricades,and trenchesso popular with the Army of the North, and apparently intending to defy the restof Spain..He couldnot reallyhavebetieved that with his 16,000 foot,2,000horseand r08 gunshe couldresistnot only the Cristinoswho had beenfacing hirn for years,but also, after August1839,Espartero's The latter 34 battalions in four divisions,six battedesand 3,000cavalry were victorious, confident, high-class troops. As inthe north,thefinal campaignin Aragonwasone-sided. TheLiberaleslookCabrera'sfortsand beathismenin thefieldl in May lS40Moreliafell afterafeeble defence. Thelastbattleof thewar.Berga, on4th July 1840, wasa rout, andtwo dayslater Cabreraqas one ot rhou.ands ot retugee.who crossed the borderinto France. Cabrera wouldretum to SDain. but that is anotherstory, andanother war.



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