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CARLISTIMANTRY

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4

SAVAGEANDROMANTICWAR"

SPAIN1833-1840

Part3A:TheCarltstArmyoftheNorth(Infantry)

TextbyConradCaims.IllustratiornbyRalphWeaver

INTRODUCTION

werepoorlyequipped,butin theBasqueprovincestherewere saidto be60,000Volunteenin 1833.The figureisverylikely exaggerated,but it showsthat somesortof organisationwas alreadyin place. Zumalacdrreguiimposeda rigid discipline,whichfeatured

orden or shoutingdemoralisingcries;for thelessercrimesof disobeyingorden thepunishmentwasstillsevere:a manthus convictedwasbeatenover a drumby sixmenwith canesfor threeminutes,anda secondoffencecouldresultin dismissal. ButZumalaciirreguiwasalwayscarefulofhismanpower.ashe hadto be.ln thelastcensusbeforethewar,thatof 1797,the four provinceshadonly 120,862menaged16to 50,although theremayhavebeenmoreby the 1830s.Of these9,538were clergy.The armywas,however,soonreinforced,notablyby Castilians,whowouldmarchfromtheirhomeland,berecruited byoneofthe rovingexpeditions,desert,or changesideswhen caDturcd.Castilianscameto form betweenonethird andone half of the Army of the North, and, Iike the Basquesand Navarrese.madeexcellentsoldiers,afactnotalwaysmentioned

byforeignwriters(Henningsen,Im67,183).Theheartlandof

Carlism,however,remainedthefour northernprovinces,not leastbecausethearmywasneverstrongenoughin cavalryand artilleryto performwellontheplainsofCastile.Accordingtoa Carlistsympathiserwritingearlyinthewar,theNavaresewere th€mostdaringandcouldonlyfightasguerrilleros(thislast,if evertrue,soonceased),whereastheBasquesweresteadierand

could{ormline.columnandsquare(Honan,203-4).

Thefirst,andatleastuntillate1838themostinportant,of rhe Carlistarmieswasthatfoundedin 1833byTomdsZumalacdlre- eui y deImaz(1778-1835),whodiedofwoundsreceivedat the

fiIst siegeof Bilbao. After his deaththe commandchanged the deathpenaltyfor offencessuchasopeningfire without

severaltimes,asmuchbecauseof intrigueat thecourtof Don Carlosasfor militaryreasons.As describedin part I of this series,the baseof thearmywasin theprovincesof Navarra, Vizcaya(Biscay),AlavaandGuiprizcoa,thefirstthreeknown colleclivelyastheBasqueprovinces. Thearmyleftitslairfortheroyalexpeditionof 1837andorher Iaids and expeditions,sometimesin collaborationwith the Anny of the Centre,whichwasbasedin Aragon.It wasnot broughtlowby anygreatbattle;th€endcame,aftera yearoI "Embrace

relativelylittle fightingin the north, ar rhe

Vergara"in August1839.The Carlistleader,Maroto,made peacewithEspartero,leaderoftheCdstinoArmyoftheNorth; CarlosnaturallycalledMarotoatraitor,butsincethebulkofhis ownforceshadhadenoughofthe wartherwaslittlehecould

do.TheArmy of theCentrewasattheheighrof itspowers,but theLrbefalsrcouldnowtum theirundividedattentiontoit. and itsdefeatbecameinevitable. Zumalacdrreguidid nothaveto buildhisarmyfromscratch. In the yearsbeforethe war, whatwasto becomethe Carlist partyhadconsiderableinfluencein thegovemment,ard iiwas thereforeveryeasyto organisetheso-calledRoyalistVolun- teerc,a semi-privatearmyof all threearns. In Navara they

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Zumalacdrreguiwasanxiousto avoidrecruitingdisreputable characters.andhe tumeddownthe servic€sof thenotorious curateof Allio, who subsequentlybecamea Cristinoguedl- lero.He madesurethathecouldnot beaccusedof leadingan army of brigands.None the less,atrocitiesdid take place, althoughnoton thescaleofthosein otherprovinces.Regulars takenprisonermightexpectfairlyhumanetreatment,espe€ially sincethe Carlistshopedto recruitthem,but nationalmilitia weresenttoworkin themines.andevenCarlistsadmittedthat massacresoccured(Henningsen,I, 251-52).TheCarliststook particularoffenceat{oreigners,andthe "Decree ofDurango" allowedtheirexecution.Althoughmenof theBritishAuxiliary Legionwere shot,the Carlistsvery wiselyaccordedrather bettertreatmenttothercgular{orcesofwilliam IV, suchasthe barlalionof Ro)alMarines$hichdssistedtheI egron. Quiteanothermatterweretheforeignerswhodesertedtothe Carlists.A battalionof450ex-Argelinoswasalmostwipedout by the real FrenchForeignL€gionat the terriblebattleof Barbastroontheroyalexpeditioncampaign.TheLegionitself wassobadlydamagedbytheCarlistbayonetsthatit playedno further important part in the war. There were also deserers fromtheBritishLegion,buttheywereofsuchpoorqualitythat theCarlistspreferredto depo( themratherthenemploythem. Foreignvolunteerofficers,mainlyFrcnch,alsoserved,but PrinceLichnowskyandCaptainHenningsen,whosebooksare of su€hgreatvalue,were Prussianand Bdtish respectively. Theywerebothlancerofficersin theArmy of theNofih and appeartohavebelievedin thecauseofCarlos.Apartfromthe pay,whichwasprobablynotverygoodorveryforthcoming,the foreignen'chiefreasonfor servingwasno doubttheir belief that by upholdingthe for€esof reactionin Spaintheywere holdingbacktheliberalsthroughoutEurope. The Arny of the North was (until the introductionof conscriptionin 1837),intheory,raisedbyvoluntaryenlistment, but it cameto includea veryhighproportionof theavailable manpowerofthefourprovinces,particularlybecausethemajor towns of Sar Sebastidn,Bilbao, PamDlonaand Vitoda suppo(edtheCristinos.A volunteerarmyhadadvantagesover onemadeupof conscript!.especiallywhenaflairsweregorng well.butintheendrtwasmorevulnerabletothewarweariness whicheventuallycausedMaroto's 'lreason". TheCa istsalso sufferedfrom homesickness,and considerablepressurewas broughtto bearontheroyalexpeditionto returnto itsbasein October1837.In addition,Ca ist arcaswerenaturallyplaced understrainby havinga largeproportionof their menaway fromhome.Becausethearmymainlyfoughtin itsownregion, men lended lo ddft awayin large numbersafter a reverseor duringa periodof inactivityandnormallydriftedbacklater. Sone, however,did not retum, andit wasallegedthat they wouldbenadeto dosobyhavingtheirrelativesbeatenbadly. At thebeginningofthe war,at least,wivesfollowedtheirmen oncampargn. Beingbasedamongits supporters,andd€pendentuponthe help or at leastacquiescenceof the civilianpopulation,the Carlistmilitarynaturallytried to devisea systemof supply whichwouldcauseoffenceonlywhenoffencewasintended.

Suchasystemwasinplaceby1835.Underit,generalsbeganby

payingfor whattheyneededby bonor(papermoney),which weremadeworthwhilebytheirbeingredeemableonlyif Carlos won.Muchmoresatisfactory,however,wasthe purchaseof cloth for uniforms from France or (through agents) ftom Bilbao,or tohaveraidingpartiesbringit backfromCastile.Th€ army sentthe cloth to towns and villages,which were eachto makea certainnumberof berets,trouselsand coats;those townsandvillagessuspectedofliberalsentimentsreceivedthe largestamountofwork.TheCarlists$ereahvayseagerto have theirarmywellfed,andtheydividedtheBasqueprovincesinto districts,appointingacommissaryin eachone.Everytownand

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villagewasrequiredto provideace(ainnumberofrationseach week;thesenumbersrosewhentroopswerebilleted in thearea, but aftertheymovedon the areawasexemptfot a time.A different systemprevailedin NavaJreifamers $,erecomp€lled to handin their crops,whichwerethen ground,storedand eventuallvdistributed. Thedailyrationwassupposedtobeapoundofwhitebread,a poundoI meatandapintofwine.Ifthe practiceof theCristino

armywasfollowed, ofliceN would dineindividually rather than

in a mess,andthemenwoulddivideinto groupsof about12with a largepot. Everymanwould havea woodenspoonanda lump of bread.As he cameto the pot he dippedin his spoonand retired,theprocesscontinuinguntilthepotwasempty. Like theCristinos,theCarlistsseemto havedwelt in billetsor in theopen.A BritishofficerthoughtthatSpainwasanideal country for the transportof tentsbecausethere were somany firstrate mules,but apparentlySpaoiardstendedto do without suchcover(Henderson,I,255-57). lt is alsolikely that the Carlists usedrunners and not horsemento deliver messases. Thispracticewasob\ervedbya BritishofficernearSalarnairca in 1832,who statedthat relaysof men equippedwith only musketsand cross-beltswould run adoss country, travelling b€tweenpostsa leagueanda half or two leaguesapart,andthey would convey despatchesquicker than horsemen(Badcock, 54). The fleetness of foot of Carlis. inJantry, their light equipment and the rocky terrain of much of the northem provinceswould haveaddedto the advantagesof runners.lt is knownthat Cabremhadabodyof light infantry (zdaotes), who couldkeepupwith adder overter to twelv€leagues,evenwhen thelaltertrottedfor partof theway.

INFANTRY

The infantry wasnot formed into regimentsbut into indepen- dentbattalions,whichweresaidto be600,800or,inthecaseof units from Guiprizcoa,850 strong. The battalions, which of

coursewerefrequentlyunderstrength,wereorganisedmuchas in the Cristino army, with six companiesof irrilelos, one of sranaderosor canbinercs and orc ol cazadorcsor tiradorcs, ;ith drumsand buglesto relayorders.(In 1835a captured regimental band was recnrited, but after Zumalacirregui rcalisedthat the bandrequireda cart andtwo mulesto carryits instrumentshe packedit off to royalheadquarters,whereit seemsto have been plaing as late as July 1838.)Three battalionsformed a brigadeandsix to eight, dependingon the province,adivision.At leastin battle,formationslargerthana brigadeappearto havebeenof varyingsize.Battalionshom dilferenrprovincesfoughliogetberonmanyoccasion The rnajorityof the troopswereconsideredasline, even thoughCarlistsdidnotusetheterm,andtherewasalsoagroup of 6fiteor specialunits. Apartftom theGronadercsdelEjlr.ito. fomed in 1836ftom voluntee^previouslyin Femando\alll's Royal Guard, there were battalionsof Navarreseand Alavese Guides(Gl.&?r),independentcompaniesof invalidson the borderwith France,andcustomsguards(,4ducn?ros). TheGuiasdeNava a, atfint saidto beNavaresebutlater largelyconsistingof CastiliansandLeonesedesertersfromthe RoyalGuard, and the 3rd Navaresewerereportedty one Carlisttohavebeenthebestinthearmy;healsomentionedthat Zumalacerregui\ favoured6th Navarresewasnot aparticularly distinguishedunit (Henningsen,I, 128-29).Anotherrenowned unit wasthesth Guipfzcoa$,called Los Chapelzuis alre heit

distinctivewhiteberets-

A popularCarlistsongof thetimerecordstheraisingof the

fint fourbattalionsof Navara in 1833.In it arementionedEl pimero Ia ensalada(hodgepodge), El segundo la morena (brown, swarthy), El relcercel reque6 andEl cuatto Ia hiefia bt]€nd(goodgrass).The nameof thethird battalionissaidto havebeena Frenchhuntingcall usedby panisansof CharlesX, who fled to Spain to support the Absolutists after the 1830 revolurion.In thelastCarlistwar.thatof 1936-39,thewordwas appliedgenenllyto Carlistmilitia. At the time of the deathof Zumalacrrreguithe armyhad glown to about 30,000men. The infantry wasorganisedin 35 battalions - 12lineandoneofguidesfromNavarra,fivelineand oneofguidesfromAlava,fivelinefromGuipfzcoa,sevenfrom Vizcayaandfoul ftom Castile(Barado,226;Albi andStampa, 222.Henningsen,l,ix, givesslightlydifferentfigures).By 1837 therewere 2|4 battalions.TheNavareseweredownto 1l line, buttheGuipfzcoansandVizcayanshadeighteach.Therewere aho two eachof Aragoneseand Valencians(formedfrom

recruitscollectedbyG6mezonhismid),theforeignbattalion,

the Gnnaderosdel Ei'rcilo, andlast the Madrid Volunteers,a

unitof poorquality(Lichnowsky,I, 68;Pirala,IV, 29-31 ,

46battalionsin February1837).At alaterdateNavarrahad14 battalions,VizcayanineandAlavaseven,apparentlythemost whichwereraisedin theseprovinces.Bymid1838thearmyhad declinedto 26,000(Bacon,108;Albi andStamPa,277).One work (Apalategui,90) claimsthat there were 24 Castilian battalionsin thesummerof1837.Thisfigureseensunlikelyto havebeendttained,althoughno doubtsomeshort-livedunits wererairedinthewakeollheroyalexPedilion

gives

British regularsand Auxiliary l-egion and at a les thercgularCdstinosin thattheycouldmoveatamazingsPeed overrockyandmountainouslandscape,andtheyneverlostthis advantage. As statedin thepreviousadcle, in theearlydaysthemain aimof Zumahcareguiwasto buildupthespidtofhissoldiels, andhe thereforefoughthisbattlesin chosenandfavourable terrainin ordernot to exposehisforcesto morethanaminimum of risk. If threatened by an outflanldng manoeuwe he withdrew.Zumalacdrregoialsohadatrick of stadng afight late in thedayin orderto preventoutflankingmovementsandto allowhismento slipawaymoreeasilyif needbe.Normallyhe wouldat firstcommitonlya nino;ty of hisforce,holdingthe rest in resefle in openorder. The lack of ammunitionwas alwaysa problemfor the Ca ists. Zumahceregui orderedhis troopsnotto loaduntil theywereactuallyin battle,andsince theymighthaveonlyten,or evenfour,roundsamanfor afight, they were rigorouslytrained in self control. The infantry frequentlyopenedfireatveryshortrange,anditwastaughtto relyonthebayonet. Notsurprisingly,theearlyCarlistswerereluctanttostandthe fire of a formedline,but Zumalacdneguitrainedthemuntil they wereassteadyasany other infantry. They often launched bayonetcharges,althoughtheyprobablyfrequentlyfailedto makecontact.As anyonewhohasstudiedearlierwarsin this areawill know,whena bayoietattacklook placein theopen, oneofthesidesalmostalwaysbrokebeforetheclashofsteel.Be that asit may,theCristinoslostveryheavilyon theplainsof Salvatierra(alsoknown asAlegria) near Vitoria on 27 and 28 October1834whentheir lineswerebrokenby a Navarese bayonetassault,and as a result they took to moving in large columns,whichtheCarlistsde€linedio charge. Evenit did nothit ihe enemy,a massassaultbytheCarlhts wasstill a fearsomeevent.It wasespeciallyfiighteningif its participantsshouted,asdidtheBasquesatnight.Onewitness describedthelatterasstartinglikeahone,changing "to awolfs ho$,I,andfinally(ending)withtheshakeliketheexpiringnotes of a jackass's bray" (Bacon,380;Bolleart,II, 290).Another personoDthereceivingendof aCarlistattack,at Oriamendi(16 March1837)describedvividlyhow,afteralong,wailingsound "a

of bugles,

columnof Navarreseinfantry" rusheddown from a mountain andin 20minuteswereoverrunningenemylines and swarming overhils in theirthousandsin skinnishingorder.The author recentlyvisitedthesiteof thischargeandcanstatethat hewould nothavebeenableto coverthegroundin thattimetoday,even without being shot at (HenningseD,ll, 19-20). The Carlist forcesinvolvedwere,however,probablytwo Alavese,three Guiprizcoan,andtwoAragonesebattalions). In order to guardagainstsuchattacks,both sidesmadegreat useoffieldfortifications,entrenchmentsandfortifiedhouses.It is not diffi€uft 1o convert a Basquefarmhouse into a small strongholdby diggingditchesaroundit and loopholingthe walls.Muchbitterfightingtookplacearcundsuchstrongpoints, whichrheCarlislsprovedablero caprureon manyoccasions. Wheretheyfailedwasin attacksonmajortowns.Notonly was

mighty cloud of ski.mishers,fo owed by a dense

It mustnotbeforgottenthatZumalac6rregui'sgreatplanwas their artillery often insufficient, but it also appearcthat the

infantry may not have been ove y keen to form the close columnsneededto assaulta breach,An Englishmanwholived thrcughbothsiegesofBilbaobelievedthatanEnglishorFrench

casualtieswhichwouldhaveoccuned,but that theCarlistswere unableto doso (Bacon.338). Like the Cristinos,the Carlistswereexceptionallyfrugal and hadgreatpowersof patienceandendurance.Theywerealso mostcarefulnot to loseanyweaponin battle, for musketsw€re hardto comeby. Oneof theiradvantagesin thisrespectwas their superiormobility,whichallowedthemto keephold of

notto makebisarmya replicaof theregularforces(although thesesoonbecamemuchmorecompetentatlightwarfarethan mosiothe$in Europe)norto leaveit asa guerrillaband.He

wantedtocombinethebestofbothworldsandbuildaregularly general would have attacked and acceptedthe 1,000 or so

disciplined,organisedandsuppliedarmywhichwouldretainits powerto movefreely andrapidly over a typesof terain. lf the armydidnotventureontotheopenplainsveryfrequently,this failurewasnottheresultofitsinabilityto meettheCristinosin openbaitle,butmtherbecauseof difficultiesof supplyin often hostilelands,homesickness,andthelackof a strongcavalry. TheCarlistswere,nevertheless,at a $eat advantageoverthe

23

th€irweaponsiJtheyhadtoflee,somethingnotalwayspossible fortheregularforces. TheCarlistscommonlyplunderedeverythingusablefromt}le enemydeadexceptstocksandshakos,evenlootingunderheavy fire. It alsowastheir habitto try to preventtheenemyfrom takingthebodiesof theirowndead.If theyweredefendinga positiontheyduga trench,and just beforetheCristinoswere uponthemstrippedthebodiesof anythingof valueandburied them, Peasantswith woodenstretcherssometimescarried Carlistwoundedftomthefield. The Carlistsmay have formed battalionsrathet than regimentsbecausetheypreferredtheflexibilityof thesmaller units,althoughin fact the companyand battalionwerethe normaltacticalformationson bothsides.Zumalac6rreguialso ensuredthat his unitshad an unusuallyhigh propotion of NCOSin orderto allowthemto bedividedinto smallgroups withoutlossofcontrol.Apartfromthesechanges,however,the soldienwereapparentlydrilledin thecommontacticsof the period,no doubt at timeswith the aid of the 1791French regulationswhichwerestillstandardfor thegovernmentarmy. Carlistbattalionscouldand did form squareagainstcavalry, reservingtheirfireuntilthelastmoment. Accordingto the r€portof an observerwith the Crislino forceswrittenat theendof 1834.theCarlistsmovedforward andretreatedinDerfectorder.whetherinclosecolumnor line. The observeraddedthat the Carlistswerebetterskimhhers than the Cristinolight infantryand that their officeNwere coveredinscarsfromthewar of lndependence(Duncan,14). Itis clearthattheCarlists,liketheFrenchrevolutionariesand the Cistinos, would useentirebattalionsas skirmishers.A commontacticwastohaveabattalionengrefr,Tla,supportedby twoormorcincloseorder.Zumalacdneguiemployedthistactic at Salvatiera./Alegria,where a skirmishingbattalion was backedby two otherser,bdral/danda fourth in reserve;cavalry guardedthe flanks.At the Carlistvictoryo{ Villar de los Navarros(24 August1837)the right wing had a Navarese battalionin skirmishingorder,andbehindit otherNavarese lunits,the Granaderosdel Eillciro and two Aragonesebatta' lions.Thecentrewascomposedof theartillery(fourguns)and theleftconsistedof fourAlavesebattalionsin thefirstlineand Castiliansin the second.The cavalryappearsto havebeen lurkinginambush,anditdebouchedto greateffect. Notwithstandingthe Carlists' lack of ammunitionand fondnessfor the bayonet,they would sometimesdeliver

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great€oats, TheoneuniveNalfeatureof CarlistuniformswastheBasque

and Navareseberet,calledthe boinain Castilianand the ,.rapelain Basque.The beretwaslarge,157a'ord)cmacross (largerin sornecases),andit madetheCarlistsimpossibleto mistake(excptthat the Cristino crap?lSorriralsowore it see part 2). Moreover,becauseof its sizeandthefactthatit was madeftomthick,waterproof€loth,itcouldserveasanumbrella or sunshadeasconditionsdemanded.Mostberetshadacentral clothroundel,in a contrastingcolourto thatofthe rnainbody, andatassel.Internalhoopswere€ommonin ordettomaintain "secrets",

the shaDe.and some berets had metal

which

properyvolleyfire.At Segura(2-3January1835),Zumalacer- protectedthe headfrom swordstrokes.Exceptfor thegreen

boindrwombyPortuguesevolunteers,beretswerered,blueor white. The original systemof colour wasapparentlyfor inJantry to wear blue berets and regimental oficers red, but Cristino sha+shootersappearto havebeenthe only onesto have approvedof thisscheme,andgenenllyallranksin a unitwore b€retsof the samecolour.Officers,especiallyseniorones, tendedto havegoldor silvertassels.Ithasbeensuggestedthat

a

Ndrdlrd "opened leftandright"to allowthegeneral'ssquadron tasselswerered for 8rdndderos, yellow for cazadoferandwhite

of escortingcavalryto chargethroughat the gallop,a very considerablsfeatof drill.Thismanoeuvredoesnot. however. seemtohavedonethehorsemenmuchgood,sincethePtncrpe regiment,drawnupthreedeep,haltedthemwithitsfire.

regui,inordertohaltaCristinooffensive,decidedthathisarmy wouldfor oncehaveto sufferh€alylosses.Whenattackingthe enemycolumnson themarch,theCarlistsdelivereda rolling fire and then a fire by platoons,and Henningsenfound its

regularityand order surprisingfor what he still (probably

unfairly)rhought.obehalf-disciplinedtroops(Il,45-6,60).At

tat€rpeiod in the battleth€ 1stNavareseand Gulasde

fori6/e/or,

prevailedweretheTortosabattalionsof Cabrera'sarmy,and herethecoloun weredifferent. The flank companiesof at least onebattalionweredrcssedbetterthantheir comradesin the centre companies, and were composed of older soldiers. Infantry pioneen appearto haveworn red berctsat leastuntil

1837,andtheyalsoltorefullbeardsandcouldhavethea\esand

equipment of their equivalents in th€ Cristino forces. The Carlists,likesomeCristinos,sportedbeardsandmoustachesin plenty,andtheywerealsonotedfor theirlonghair. The coat wasnormally a double-breastedfrock which fell to just abovethe knees,but single-breastedshell jacketsand double-breastedgreatcoats(thelattersometimeshookedback likethoseof theCristinos)werealsowom.All threehadopen, standingcollars.The offi€ial dressof the line wasa greylrock

but theonlyunitswheresucha systemdefinitely

UMFORMS,WEAPONSANDEQUIPMENT

Althoughno dressregulationssurvive,the Carlistsdid try to uniformtheir forces,and a vaguelyconsistentappearanceis shownin most€ontemporarypaintingsandprints.Thesystem of manufacturinguniformshas alreadybeen described;in addition unifomswerepurchasedfromFrance.Evenso,there

,

wasseldomenoughclothingto go around,andCarlistswore whattheystrippedfromfriendandfoe,eventheredcoatsofthe

British Auxil'aryLegion,whichtheywore underneaththeir

*"ut, tt " "opa", ,"hi.t ,rascut downfrcm a Crisunogrealcoal It was to have had collar patchesof several colours rvhich denotedtheprovinces,butonlytheredofGuipfzcoaisknown. Browncoatsand iackets werealsoworn,andblueones,made ftom capturedgarments,must also have been common. Trousenweresupposedto havebeenredinwinterandwhitein summer,andweresometimesrolledup for easein marching. Buttonsappearto havebeenbrass.Theblueof th€beretwas fairlybright,withprobablya yellowroundelandawhitetassel in its centre.The G iar de,4/dvahada redberetandthe5th

Guipdzcoanswere known as Los Chapelzuri:(white-caps). even jackboots andaiguillettescouldb€seenon generalsand

witnessesdescribedonebattalionasrollingitsgreatcoatsand wearingthem acrosstheir bodies, and another in grey greatcoatsandblueberets,exceptfor theofficersandNCOS, whoworeall coloun. An officer of the British Auxiliary L€gion v/itha greatdealof experience,whichendedwiththesightof the armydrawn up at vergara, saidthat the Carlistfoot wore a short,loosebluetunic.redtrcusers,andaberetofred,whiteor blue if they were from Navarra, Vizcayaor Guipdzcoa respectively.A drummer-boywasseenin arcd jacket andwhite trousers,and one obsefler commentedthat other drummers werebadlycladin variouscolou$.He describedadrummajor "the

seen"(Honan,68,98iHenderson,I,334,II, 165;Henningsen, ac€omoaniedbattalionsintobattle.drcssedmuchlikethemen.

t,14142).

as

Sergeantsrnayhaveworn goldchevrcnson the lower arm, their pointsfacingup,withonefor a secondsergeantandtwofor a firstsergeant;corporalsmayhavehadthesamesystem,butin redandontheupperarm.Oneadditionalandpopularitemwas thezanafta, a plainblacktur (sometineswolf fur) pelissewith aboutthreetoggleson the chest,a simplifiedversionof the wel-knownhussar jacket. Generalsworewhattheypleased,buttheiruniJormusually includeda bluecoatanda redor white beret.Trappingsof rank suchasembroideredsaddle-clothsand holsters.orders.and

staffofficers,althoughit isdoubtful theywereusedin thefield. At Vergarathe Carlistleadersweredressedmuchmoresoberly thanEsparteroa;rdhis train. Ofleof Zumalacdrregui'sofficerswrotethat thegeneral,who wasknolvn familiarly aslrio ?onds (Uncle Thomas),always rode a white horse. He added that Zumalacirregui always dressedthe sameway (althoughthis statementis conradicted by severalpictures):a red beret with a silvertassel,black zarnalralinedwith white fur andwith red velvetedgingandgilt clasps,greytrousersandlargeSpanishspurs(Henningsen,l,

90).

It appearsthat the canrir€rff (vivandiaresin French), who

This conclusioncanbe drawn by the fact that the ofJicerof the Bitish Auxiliary Legionwho rescuedthewoundedc4l.tin€raof the 5th GuiprizcoaBattalion andwho later married her at first rnistook the young, cigar-smokingFrenchwomanfor a man. Shewaswearinga whiteberet,whitecashmerevest,embroi deredwaistcoat,overcoat,aredsashwithgoldends,similarto

Carlistofficers,"anda largeamountof

that wom by "many

jervellery(Henderson,I, 337-44,forherstory). The Carlistssometimeswore bootsor shoes,especiallyin winter,but their normalfootwearwasthe rope-soledsandal (d/pdgara),whichwasalsornuchusedby the queen'stroops andindeedby Spaniardsgenemllyfor a longtimeb€foreand

after the war. The sandalwasideal for rushingover mountains butnotsogoodin thewet,anditwasthenattimesreplacedby theabdlca,a leatherbrogue.Somesoldienwerenot "closed" usedto

anddid not taketo any

to them. Even though sandalswere more easily made than shoes,thelackof anyfootwearwasfrequentlyaproblen.

No doubt captured crcss-belts,packs and cartridge boxes weresometimesused,butthestandardinfantryequipment*as muchlighterand consistedof only two items.First wasthe

alsotakenupbytheCdstinos,alight, white canvas

sa.r-rro'al,

packheldin placebystrapsund€rthe arms.In it the soldierhad

a shirt, sparcalparyata: , andfood for day. Few picturesshow Carlistswith canteens;no doubt they alsokept their water bottlesintheirpacks.Aroundthewaist,sometimeswornovera redsash,wasablackbeltwhichheldacananaor bellybox.The

boxhad20tintubes,eachforacartridge,andtwopockets,each

shoesincesandalswerenatural

containingtwo packeasof canridges,thewholecoveredby a blackleatherflap.Thereweremanyadvantagesto thissystem.

It wasmore comfortableto wearthan a traditional box. which

bounced on th€ right hip (although the Cristino practice of wearingawaistbeltreducedthemovemento{ thelatter);it left

the upperhaffof the bodyftee (althoughif

wereaddedto the box this waslesstrue); it wasmore difficult for the soldier to lose rounds in his confusion;it allowed for nore rapidfire. Belly boxeshad beenwom by British and Americanlighttroopsin theAmericanWaroflndependence, butit wasclaimedthattheBritishandFrenchobjectedtotheir useby soldie^ formed in line becausethey weremore likely to

be ignitedby the fire of the manin front (HenniDgsen,I, 10G7; Lichnowsky, I, 70). The French Foreign l-egion, however, adoptedthebeuyboxin Spainandusedit for yearsafterthe

leather "braces"

leastimpressivepersonageof that rank I had hitheno

Someof the specialunitswore distinctiveuniforms.The e\le(Eghtilg GuiasdeNava./a, whichat onestageroseto I ,000 men,dressedfirstin greycoateeswithy€llowtails,collan,and souare-endedchestbars:$ouserswerered. As thiscostume woreout, themenequippedthemselvesfrom thedead;later

"binding" andgreytrousers.

theyworebluejacketswith red

'ft,e Gmnadercsdel Ejarcirowore dark blue capotesor shell jackets, withwhiterard,neraronthecuffsandbarsonthecollar. Buttonswerewhite, trousersred, beretsbluewith a yellow roundelandwhitetassel.TheMadridVolunteers.whowereto guard the Cantabriancoast,had blue caporerwith brass buttons,greytrousersandred berets.Therewasalsoa small bodyguard known as rhe Alaba lercs de k Gua ia de k Personadel ReJ and later ^s the Gua iasde Honor. Yo,rng men sened in the company,which was a sort of military academy,andleftwiththerankoflieutenant.Thefirstuniform wasa sky blue fro€k coat with red cuff flaps, rdl.lir?errr, collar bars,andpoinlendedchestbars.Thecoatlaterbecamegrey (darkbluefor officers)withblackcuffsandcollarpatchesand whiterardrnerdr.Trcuserswerered, latergrey.Buttonswere white,beretsbluewithayellowroundelandwhitetassel. ThedesertersfromthePortugueseLegionbeganin theirold unifom (seepart2 ofthis series)withgreenbercts;theylater took up the greycoatand red trousersof the line infantry. The

Osna Battalionmay have worn a

uniform,with a tailed coatcut like the Frenchiart, with cut-awayredlapehwhichrevealeda*hite waistcoat,redcollar and cuffs, yellorvepaulettesand bnss buttons. Trous€Nwere redwithabluestripe,theberetwhitewth ayellowroundeland greytassel.Not all thecustomsguardsworc uniform, but those that did had a short brown jacket, of typical Spanishstyle but notmuchwom in theArmy of theNorth.Thejackethadfour rowsof silverbuttonsdownthefront andfivebuttonson the cuffs.lt waswom openin orderto displaya multi-buttoned brownwaistcoatandaredsash.Trouserswerebrowni theberet wasbluewithayellowroundelandwhitetassel. The unifom of officerswasby and largethe sameasthat of theirmen.Someofficen,especiallygenerals,woreepaulettes and red sashes,and it hasbeenspeculatedthat regimental officersshowedtheir rank by oneor two ringsof meta ic braid aroundth€cuffs,eitherstraight(lieutenant-colonels,captains andsecondlieutenants)or pointed(majorsandlieutenants).

"Napoleonic"

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Thebayonetwasnormallywom on theright of thecanaMin a black leather frog, with the socketangledto the front. When scabbardswerenottohand,soldiersattimesmadeholesintheir beltsandstuckthebayonetsthroughthem.Officers'swordbelts

wereof thenomal sort, of black,or occasionallywhite, leather, with two slings.Theycould bewom undemealhthefrock coat. Officers caried any swords they could obtain; th€ men likewise used a variety of types of muskets.Zumalacdnegui establishedmusket factories at Eulate and Segrara,and rhe Carlistsalsoheldtheold factory at Eybarfor thefiIst 18months

of the war. The mw materials and cnftsmen were available,

although at limes the necessarymachinerywas not. French, GermanandBritish modelswerecommon.The Soaniardsliked lheirbanelsroshine.butrbeBrilishpracliceofduUjngbanels would havebeenan advantagein mountainwarfare,wherethe glint of polishedsteel*ould give awaya position. The Cadists seemto have had a few rifles. A sniDerhit a Cdstinomarineofficerat the rao8eof 300or 400yardsafter manyattempts,but this feat could havebeenperfomed with a

(very) lucky shotwith anusket (Far, 120).TheAlradelos had

"English

carbines" with long sword-bayonets(Bueno

[198,4],

16). Like the weaponsof the Cristino light regiment Re,'la

Gobenadoru, the!tr,mlusthavebeenBaker.ifles. "about SomeCarlist

rnusketswere describedas

Bdtish musket), nuch nanower in the muzzle,and very light; theycarrya ball to ageat distance,doingex€cutionfor beyond

a mile."

3 or 4 incheslonger (thatr a

Skimishers sometimes loaded with two bulets

("Voluntee/', 21-22).

25

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