TllE SINO-VII:'I"AMESE

C R I S I S , 1975- 1 9 7 9 :

AN IIISTOKICAL CASE STUDY

A t h e s i s p r e s e n t e d t o ttie F a c u l t y of t h e U.S. Ariny Conimnnd and G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e i n p a r t i a l

l u l f i l l n i e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n L s for t h e degrre
MASTE:I< OF MILITARY AICT M I ) SCIENCE

by
MARK A . C O Y L E , CPT, USA G e o r g e t o w n U n i v c r s i t y , 1968 M . A . , U n i v e r s i t y o f I l l i n o i s , 1973
I\.S.,

F o r t Leavenwortti, 19R5

Kansas

Appi-oved for p u b l i c rc!lease; d i s t r i b u t i o n i s u i i l i m i t c d .

MASTER OF MIi2r:rAw

ART A N D S C L E N C E

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE Namt, of c a n d i d a t e

MARK A . COYLE
AN

T i t l i , o f t h e s i s- THE SINO-VIETNAMESE CRISIS, 1 9 7 5 - 1 9 7 9 :

HISTORICAL CASE STUDY Approved b y :

w%,Vw.
,
T h e s i s Committee Chairinari
I , JOSEPH

Msmber, G r a d u a t c F n c u l ~ y

It. GOLDMAN, lh.D.,

Ph.

Acceptrd t h i s day o f & 1985 by D i r(* c t o r , Grndua t e Degree Programs.

__

T h e opinions and conc1u:;ions e x p r e s s e d h e r e i n a r c t h o s e of t h e s t u d e n t a u t h o r and do nor n e c e s s a r i l y r e p r e s e n t the views o f t h e U.S. Army Command and General. S t a f f C o l l e g e o r any o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t a l a g e n c y . (References. -t o t h i s s t u d y s h o u l d i n c Lude t h e f o r e g o i n g s t a t e m e n t . )

i!i

ABSTRACT

THE SINO-VIETNAMESE CRISIS, 1975-1979: C a p t a i n Mark A . C o y l e , USA

AN HISTORICAL CASE STUDY, b y

How d i d C h i n a and Viet Nam e a c h r e a c t t o t h e c r i s i s i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s between 1975 and 1979? Why d i d t h e C h i n e s e u l t i m a t e l y wage war a g a i n s t the V i e t n a m e s e ? T h i s work i s a n h i s t o r i c a l c a s e s t u d y t h a t a d d r e s s e s these c e n t r a l q u e s t i o n s .
I n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s i s management r a s e s t u d i e s done by Allen W h i t i n g , Ole H o t s t i , A l t ! x n n d ( ~ rG e o r g e , and R i c h a r d Smoke Eorm a b a s e Eor d e v e l o p i n g the a n a l y s i s . J o u r n a l i s t i c r e p o r t s and government d o c i u w n t s c o n s t i c u t e t h e m a j o r i t y of t h e p r i m a r y s o u r c e m a t e r i a l s u s e d . Iloth Hanoi a n d U e i j i n g Eelt t h a t t h e o t h e r posed a s e r i o u s t h r e a t t n i t s n a t i o n a l s ~ x u r i t y . Each s i d e s o u g h t t o c o m n u n i c a t e i t s c o n c e r n t o t h e o t h e r t h r o u g h a s e r i e s oE s i g n a l s . The s t u d y f o c u s e s m a i n l y on t h e p a t t e r n oE C h i n e s e s i g n a l s , a s B e i j i n g r e s p o n d e d t o w h a t i t c o n s i d e r e d i n c r e a s i n g l y u n a c c e p t a h l e b e h a v i o r b y Hanoi. 'She means of d e l i v e r y , t h e r h e t o r i c a l i n t e n s i t y , t h e l e v e l o f i s s u i n g a u t h o r i t y , and t h e r e l a t i v e t i m i n g oE t h e s i g n a l s a11 showed i n d i c a t i o n s o e s c a l a t i n g a s t h e c r i s i s became morc s e v e r e . 'The p a p e r p r o p o s e s a n i n d e x of i n d i c a t o r s by which t o j u d g e t h e p r o g r e s s o f c r i s i s d e v e l o p m e n t and c r i s i s c o n t r o l . One oE t h e c h i e E d i E E i c u l t i e s i n t h e S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e d i s p u t e was a c o n f l i c t of p e r c e p t i o n s . Each s i d e was using a d i E e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e i n v i e w i n g i t s own and t h e o t h e r side's position. By u s i n g i n d i c a t o r s t o u n d e r s t a n d c r i s i s d e v e l o p m e n t more f u l l y , d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s may b e a b l e t o e x e r c i s e c r i s i s nlanagement more e f f e c t i v e l y .

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish t o acknowledge t h e s p e c i a l a s s i s t a n c e g i v e n me i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of t h i s s t u d y by LTC J o s e p h A. S c h l a t t e r a n d Dr. J o s e p h R. Goldman. LTC S c h l a t t c r - s d e t a i l e d k n o w l e d g e of C h i n e s e s t r a t e g y a n d S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e r e l a t i o n s was i n v a l u a b l e i n i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e e v e n t s t h a t l e d t o t h e 1979 war. D r . Goldman--who h o l d s two Ph.D.s, i n h i s t o r y a n d i n p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e - - h e l p e d g i v e d i r e c t i o n a n d s c o p e to t h e s t u d y . 8 0 t h g e n t l e m e n c h a l l e n g e d me t o e x p l o r e t h e s u b j e c t i n g r e a t e r d e p t h a n d from p e r s p e c t i v e s I p r e v i o i . i s l y had n o t c o n s i d e r e d .

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

.............................. ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AC KNOW LE DGliMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

APPROVAL

11

..

iii
iv
v

Chapter
1

INTRODUCTION

........................ rroblem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1
1

Research Questi o n s Limitations

.................... and D e l i m i t a t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
................

. 7
3 3 4
4

S i g n i f i c a n c e o f the Study Subsequent Chapters

SUIWEY OF THE

................... LITERATURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.......................

Introduction

A n a l y t i c a l Models

.................... Documentary M a t e r i a l s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chinese . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Vietnamese Thirdparty

5 5
7

.......................

......................

8
8

General M a t e r i a l s

.................... .1ournals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rooks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

V

8
9

3-

AMETHODOLOGY

....................... A T h e o r y of D e t e r r e n c e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D e c i s i o n s under S t r e s s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H i s t o r i c a l Case S t u d i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G e n e r a l S i m i l a r i t i e s . 1950 a n d 1962 . . . . . . . . . .

" T h r e a t s and T h e i r D e t e r r e n c e as S e e n from B e i j i n g "

i1
11 13 14 14

.................... Chinese S i g n a l s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Methodology f o r T h i s T h e s i s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 . 'Tracing t h e T r o u b l e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A T r a d i t i o n of T r o u b l e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cooperation a g a i n s t Colonialism . . . . . . . . . . . . T h e Geneva C o n v e n t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Viet Nam War and t h e S i n o - S o v i e t Dispute Era of t h e ATheme

14 15
18

21
21

21
23
24

....................... P a r i s Peace Accords . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25 28

........................ I n t e r e s t s . G o a l s . and S t r a t e g y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VietNam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P e r c e p t i o n s and M i s p e r c e p t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . A P o l i c y of C a u t i o n . 1975-1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Contentious Issues. 1975 Contention Continues.

31
32 32 34 35 36

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 1976-1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

vi

C o n t e n L i o n Becomes C r i s i s . 1978-1979 Emerl;ing C r i s i s . January t o L a t e Fehni:iry 1978

...........

47

....................

47

Ileightening C r i s i s . Late February t o I.ote May 1978 C r o s s i n g a C r i t i c a l T h r e s h o l d . Late May and E a r l y June 1978 G s c a l a t i n g A t t a c k s . Mid J u n e t o Mid .July 1978 C o n t e n d i n g and N e g o t i a t i n g . t h r o u g h O c t o b e r 1978

....................
...............
Mid J u l y

48

51
54

......................

.................

56
60

Edging toward t h e P r e c i p i c e . Novembfr and December 1978 I ' r e p a r i n g f o r War. J a n u a r y t o Mid F e b r u a r y 197Y
j

..................

....................

62

CONCLUSION

.........................
GO

7'1
73 74
75

The D e c i s i o n t o

t o war

................

Til,? R e l e v a n c e of H i s t o r y
'The P c r c e p t i . o n s
(I

................. Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

R v a c t i n g under S t r e s s Chinese I k t e r r e n c e

..................

7') 79
81

.................... A n Indtix of I n d i c a t o r s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Oblique Moderate S i g n a l l i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I n d i r e c t Accusatory S i g n a l l i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . Direct Accusatory S i g n a l l i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Face- to-Face Accusatory Signalling Warning

81

82 83

...................... S i .g n a l l i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

83 84

vii

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 C o n t e n t i o u s I s s u e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 87 D e l i v e r y Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 I n t o n s i t y Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 A u t h o r i t y Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Timing Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U t i l i t y of the I n d e x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 91 A Caveat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 UIRLIOGIUIHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 DISTRIBUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
An Examination o f the Indcx

viii

Chapter 1

INTKODUCTI ON

P r o b lern S t a tenieii t

The? piirpost' of t h i s s t u d y i s t o e x a m i n e t h e e v e n t s l e n d i n g up t o t h c I979 war b e t w e e n t h e IJeoplc's R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a ( P I X ) mid the S o c i a I . i s t IRi'piibI i c o f V i c t Nan1 (SKV) a n d t o a n a l y z e t h e s f e v i , n t s i n
t('r11ls

ot

tilt!

m y s t h a t China p r o t e c t s i t s s t r a t i ? g i c i n t e r e s t s i n

Sciut h e a s t A!; i a .

Background

The war b e t w e n Communist C h i n a and Communist Viet Nnm p r e s e n t e d

tlle w o r l d w L t h
011

intriguing situation.

Had n o t Zhou E n l a i dec1arc.d Had n o t B e i j i n g

B e i j i i i g and Haiioi Lo be "as c l o s e a s l i p s and t e e t h " ?

b e e n a s t a u n c h s u p p o r t e r of Hanoi i n i t s t h i r t y - y e a r d r i v e t o c11nqt1er S o u t h Viet Nam? dcteriorate? Why d i d r e l a t i o n s between t h e two C o l m u n i s t s t a t e s

Why, i.ndeed, d i d the? PRC f e e l c o m p e l l e d t o i n i t i a t e armed

h o s t i l i t i e s a g a i n s t t h e SRV? The h i s t o r y o t S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e r e l a t i o n s , from t h c t i r s t m i l l e n n i u m

H.C. o n , r c v e a l s a n i m o s i t y and c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s .

'The i m p o s i t i o n of
An e x a m i n a t i o n

Communist r r g i m r s i n b o t h c o u n t r i e s d i d n o t c h a n g e t h i s .

a ~ l da n a l y s i s o f the e v e n t s t h a t p r e c i p i t a t e d t h e u a r may s h e d l i g h t on C h i n a - s p e r c e p t i o n o f i t s v i , t a l i n t e r e s t s and s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s .

S u c h a s t u d y may a i d i n i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e s i g n a l s C h i n a g i v e s d u r i n g a

c r i s i . s , e s p e c i a l l y a s t h e c r i s i s t e n d s t o b a r d war.
Research Questions

T h i s s t u d y o f t h e S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e c r i s i s t h a t d e v e l o p e d a f t e r 1975

bill. explorc several questions:

(1)
Hob

h a s China p e r c e i v e d i t s s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s i n v o l v i n g Viet

Nam, I n d o c h i n a , and S o u t h c a s t Asia?

(2)

How d o e s t h e h i s t o r y o f S i n o - V i e t n a m e s c r e l a t i o n s e l u c i , d a t e

C t i i n a ' s f e e l i n g s a b o u t v i o t n ; m ~ o s e i n d e p e n d c n c c and V i e t n a m r s c hegcmony i n Indochina'?

(3)

I n G h a t r e s p e c t s has t h c PRC perceiVCd Viet Nam t o be a t h r e a t

t o C h i n e s e i n t e r e s t s s i n c e 1975?
(4)

h a s C h i n a communicated i c s p o s i t i . C n t o V i e t Nam? and n e g a t i v e s i g n a l s d i d i t g i v e ?

!dhat

(5)
heeded ' !

What a c t i o n s h a s China t a k e n bhen i t s signals have gone un-

(6)

How d i d t h e Chinest. and V i e t n a m e s e r r s p o n d t o t h e c r i s i s v h i c h

Hob d i d e a c h s i d e r e a c t u n d e r i n c r e a s i n g

arose b e t b e e n 1975 and 197Y?

stress?

(7)
t o Gar?

U l t i m a t e l y , Ghat a r e t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r b h i c h China b i l l go

L i m i t a t i o n s and D e l i m i t a t i o n s

The s t u d y c o v e r s p r i m a r i l y t h e p e r i o d Trmn 1975 t o 1 9 7 9 , and i t f o c u s e s on t h o s e i n c i d e n t s t h a t l e d t o t h e b a r . C h i n a a n d Viet Xam are

t h e main a c t o r s d i s c u s s e d ; b u t a t t e n t i o n i s g i v e n t o t h e S o v i . ~ t Union,

t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , a n d Cambodia i n terms of t h e r o l e s t h e y p l a y e d .

_Significance

of ttic S t u d y

I)etermininl: b h a t m o t i v a t e s t h e C h i n e s e t o f i g h t and hob lnuch ~ o r ~ sistency

ttltbrc

i s i n t h e i , r warmaking p o l i c i e s i.s s i g n i f i c a n t f o r A i n c r i -

c a n s t r a t e g i c p1;inniiig i n !Cast A s i a .

Su bseqiient Chapters

The s w o n d c h a p t e r of' t h i s thesis s u r v e y s the p r i n c i p i l l l i t e r a t u r c t h a t is npp:icahlc co t h e S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e c r i s i s of c h c l a t t . 1970s.

C h a p t c r t h r p e c x p l o r e s a nn? t h o d o l o g i c a l a p p r o a c h t o a n a l y z i n g t h r cvcncs. S e v e r a l t h e o r i t - s d e a l i n g w i t h d e t e r r e n c o arid c r i s i s b e h a v i o r

n r r examined. The f o i i r t h c h a p t e r t r a c e s t h e e v e n t s t h a t c u l m i n a t e d i n the a r t i i a l f i g h t i n g i n 1979.

I L

t r i ? a t s b r i e f l y t h e Long h i s t o r y o f d i s c o r d t h a t

h a s e x i s t e d b e t h e m China 2nd Vi.et Nem 2nd q u c s c i o n s b h e t h c r t h e t h o

countries w r e ~ v e r "as c l o s e a s l i p s and t e e t h . "

C h i n a and V i c t

Nan1

h a d i n t e r e s t s and o b . i e c t i v t ? s i n I n d o c h i n a whi.ch o E t e n came i n t o c o n -

flict.

C h a p t e r Eour t h c n Cocuscs on t h e a c t i o n s of t h e PRC and the SRV Particular consideration

b e t h e e n 1 9 7 5 and 1979 t h a t b r o u g h t on t h e war.

i s g i v e n t o t h o s e moves o f Hanoi t h a t B e i j i n g found i n t o l e r a b l e and t h e

mHnner

i n which t h ( ! C h i n e s e l e a d e r s h i p s o u g h t t o s i g n a l i t s d i s p l e a s u r e

t n t t ~ cV i r t n a n i i ~ s c and t o managc the c r i s i s .

C h a p t e r f i v e draws g e n e r a l c o n c l u s i o n s b a s e d on t h e r e s e a r c h q u e s tions. war? U l t i , m a t e l y , w h a t a r c t h e c o n d i t i o n s under which China w i l l go

CO

Chapter 2

SCRVEY OF THE 1,ITEIWTURE

Introduction

'The S u r v e y of t h e L i t e r a t u r e w i l l bc r e s t r i c t e d t o t h o s c items t h a t have a d i r e c t b e a r i n g on t h e S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e c r i s i s of 1975-1979 a n d i t s interpretation. thc bibliography. B r o a d e r h i s t o r i c a l s o u r c e s and a n a l y s e s a r e i n c l u d e d i n

A n a l y t i c a l Models

A l e x a n d e r George and R i c h a r d Smoke have a n a l y z e d d e t e r r e n c e t h e o r y

i n d e t a i l i n t h e i r work D e t e r r e n c e i n American F o r e i g n P o l i c y :
and P r a c t i c e . behavior.

Theory

They examine several models o f d e t e r r e n c e a n d c r i s i s

One of t h e i r main c o n t e n t i o n s i s t h a t t h e s e t h e o r i e s must b e

'The h o r k i s v a l u a b l e because i t

t e s t e d by h i s t o r i c a l c a s e s t u d i e s .

p o i n t s t h e way t o a g r e a t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e o p e r a t i o n oE d e t e r r e n c e through h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s .
Ole R .

H o l s t i h a s done a l a r g e amount o work i n v e s t i g a t i n g t h e

ways i n which d e c i s i o n s a r e made by n a t i o n a l l e a d c r s i.n c r i s i s s i t u a t ions.

In "The I914 C a s e , " American P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Review, J u n e ,

- -

1965 and i n C r i s i s , E s c a l a t i o n , War, __ H o l s t i m a i n t a i n s t h a t l e a d e r s do n o t usriaLly r e s p o n d b i t h c o o l c a l c i i i . a t i o n i n times of c r i s e s and t h a t t h e s i g n a l s t h e y g i v e one a n o t h e r a r e n o t a l w a y s c i e a r a n d e a s i l y u n d e r stood.

T h i s i s important because t h e o r i e s of d e t e r r e n c e and c r i s i s

L

management g e n e r ; i l , l y assume m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g and r a t i o n a l d e c i s i.ons. T)ecisi.on i n c r i s i s i s slso t r e n t e d by Oran Young in The -__ Politics of
Force: --_

Young l o o k s a t --I l a r g a i n i n ) ; D u r i n g [ n t c r n a t i o n a l C r i ~ t ! ~ .

thf,

s p e c t r u m 01:

c o e r c i o n by which n a t i o n s t r y t o i n E l u e n c e o n e a n o t h e r .

The work of A l l e n W h i t i n g i s a l s o v a l u a b l e t o t h i s t h e s i s . w t l i t i r i g
h a s d o n e two d e t : i i I c d h i s t o r i c a l c a s e s t u d i e s o f t h e P R C ' s e n t r y i n t o

wars.

Crosses _-Chi.n;i _-

-.

the

--

ah:

'Phe D e c i s i o n t o E n t e r t h e

or ear^ war

n n a l y z c s t h v p r e l u d t . t o t h e PRC's

goi.rig i n t o K o r ~ ai n 1950; and 'lt11~

o r ____ Detrrrence: I n d i a :and I n d o c h i n a c o n s i d e r s t h e CIIinest! C a l c u l u s ~

e v e n t s l e a d i n g u p t o t h e S i , n o - I n d i a n War of 1962.

Whiting holds that

C h i n e s e l e a d e r s h a v e proved t o be vt.ry c a u t i o u s i n t h e i r warmaking policies,

t h a t t h e y d o riot go t o war w i t h o u t good rerisons ( t r o m t h e i r

s t a n d p o i n t ) , and t h a t t h e y g i v e c l e a r s i g n a l s t h a t a m i l i t a r y a c t i o n

w i l l be tiikLAn b e f o r r they a c t u a l l y commit t r o o p s .

A l l oE t h e s e works w i l l Iit?lp t o g u i d e t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h i s
research.

Documentary M a t e r i a l s

C hinese Ren M i n I t i Dao __ __ PalWr.

tivl,

( P e o p l e - s D a i l y ) i s t h e n a t i o n a l PRC d a i l y n e w s -

_-

I t is o f s p e c i a l . v a l u e t o t h i s s t u d y .
thts

The o f f i c i a l , a u t h o r i t a -

Linr, o f

[:tiinese Communist l e a d e r s h i p i.s p r e s e n t e d t o the world

L t h a s a l s o been o n e of t h e c h i e f v o h i c l e s by which tht?

i.n t h i s p a p e r .

Ctlinese

h a v e j.ssut:d

and w a r n i n g s t o thctir a d v e r s a r i e s i n times

o f c r i s i s , and i t r e n d e r s o f f i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f
those adversaries. A d d i t i . o n a l l y , Ren Min Ki Bao performs the

t r a d i . t i o n a 1 f u n c t i o n o f n n e h s p a p v r i n r e p o r t i n g t h e news.

Tts v a l u e as

a s o u r c c o f r a b [ a c t , h o w v c r , m u s t bc t e m p e r e d by t h e r c a l i z a t i o n t h a t

i t is a Communist government p a p e r . Hong Qi ( R e d F l a g ) i s t h e o f f i c i a l p a p e r of t h e P e o p l e s L i b e r a t i o n

--

Army ([LA). Bao, -

I t h a s v i r t u e s and v i c e s s i m i l a r t o t h o s e o f Ken Hin R i

_--

a l t h o u g h i t i s n a r r o w e r i n s c o p e and not u s e d as e x t e n s i v e l y a s a

v e h i c l e f o r p u b l i c announcements of n a t i o n a l p o l i c y . B e i j i n g R a d i o , c h i e f l y a s m o n i t o r e d by t h e P o r c i g n B r o a d c a s t h f o r m a t i o n S e r v i c e (VBIS), r e i n f o r c e s t h e p r o c l a m a t i o n s of Ken X i n R i I3ao and g i v e s news i t e m s . Xin Hua S h e _ -t l w PRC. Chinese (Neb China News Agency) i s t h e o f f i c i a l news s e r v i c e o f

__--

I t is a good s o u r c e f o r t r a c i n g e v e n t s a s r e p o r t e d from t h e

perspective=.

The PLK p u t s o u t a n e b s - a n d - v i e w s m a g a z i n e i.n E n g l i s h and o t h e r Loreign languages: B e i j i n g Keviev ( f o r m e r l y ___ Peking Keview). neijing ortcrl

Review p u b l i s h e s a r t i c l c z s from v a r i o u s C h i n e s e o f f i c i a l sourc(!s, Ren _ Min R iBao, _

and a g a i n p r e s e n t s t h o s e o p i n i . o n s t o tht! biorld t h a t t h e

PRC l e a d c r s h i p c o n s i d e r s t o be v e r y i m p o r t a n t .

In 1981 an i n t e r e s t i n g book was p u b l i s h e d by Kingsway I n t e r n a t i o n a l

P u b l i c a t i o n s i n Hong Kong:

The Sino-Vietnamese -

War by __

L i Man Kin.

This

work i s on t h e m a r g i n s o f b e i n g a d o c u m e n t a r y s o u r c e .
former

L i Man Kin i s a

of ra Kung pao, a s e m i - o f f i c i a l , y r o - B e i j i n g H o w Kong I t i s amazingly f r a n k i n i t s assessment of t h c P R C - s s h o r t -

-__

newspaper.

comings i n t h e war.

The work i s q u i t e u s e f u l i n a n a l y z i n g t h e m i l i t a r y

o p e r a t i o n i t s e l f , Tor i t h a s good b a t t l e maps and a r e a s o n a b l y d e t a i l e d description of the action.

I t is a l s o r e p l e t e w i t h p i c t u r e s .

The t r e a t m e n t t h a t t h e O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e r e c e i v e d a t t h e h a n d s o f

t h e V i e t n a m e s e was a f a c t o r i n t h e l a t e 1970s c r i s i s .
6

T h e PHCs F o r e i g n

L a n g u a g e Prrss hiis p u b l i s h e d On Viet Nam's _ _ E x p u l s i o n o f C h i n e s e Resid e n t s , and China.

R?kii.

A l l e y h a s p u b l i s h e d from C h i n a R e f u g e e s f r o m Viet Nam i n

_ . _ _ _ -

hot11 o c these w o r k s r e c o u n t t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s of the CIIinesv i n

Conimunist Viet Nam, b u t more i m p o r t a n t t h e y g i v e a n i n d i c a t i o n o f the r e a s o n s t h a t . U a i , j i i i g c o n s i d e r e d them so i m p o r t a n t i n t h e l a t e 1970s.

Vietnamese
The SKV's o f f i c i a l n e w s p a p e r s Nhan Dan ('The People) a n d Quan Doi

-_

Nhan __ Dan (The __ __ -Bao and Hang

Peop1e.s M i l i t a r y ) a r e s i m i l a r i n f u n c t i o n t o Ken M in Ki . $ 1-

respectively.

They a r e v a l u a b l e s o u r c e s f o r d i s c e r n i n g

t h e o f f i c i a l v i e w s of the H a n o i I i a a d e r s h i p .

Likr:wise,

the Vietnamese

C o m u n i s t s < ) t e n g i v e t h e i r warnings and s i g n a l s i n t h e s e o r g a n s . Tap C h i Gong Sail (<:ommunist P r a c t i c e ) i s H a n o i ' s theory. l e a d i n g .journal o f

I t i s vc!ry usel:iil i n h e l p i n g t h e r e a d e r u n d e r s t a n d l o n g r a n g e

V i c t n a m e s c i:overnment Hanoi l l a d i o i s Nom

NWS
ii

policy. good s o u r c e o r s p e c i i c news items a s is t h e Vi,cst

~ g ~ n c yT . h e s e sources were e s p c c i a l l y u s e f u l d i l r i n g t h e a c t u a l

f i g h t i n g of F e b r u a r y a n d March of I979 b e c a u s e ac t h a t time the V i r t names<! p r e s c . n t o d c o n s i d t ! r a b l e c o v e r a g e o f t h e w a r . The V i e t n a m e s e h a v e s u b m i t t e d t h e i r b r i e f a g a i n s t C h i n a i n s e v e r a l s m a l l works: Cliinese Aggression Against Vietnam: T h e Root of t h e

problem, Thc C h i n e s e A g g r e s s i o n :

How and Why I t F a i l e d , _-___

and "The T r u t h
T h e w works

a b o u t Victtnani-Cliin;l R e l a t i o n s o v e r t h e L a s t 30 Years."

a s s e r t t h a t t h e PKC h a s n o t a b a n d o n e d t h e t r i b u t a r y o u t l o o k on f o r e i g n a f f a i r s that r h a r a c t e r i z e d imperial China. f r u s t r a t i o n wi.th i t s g i a n t n e i g h b o r . 'They e x p r e s s Viet Nam's

'Third

Party TLCO US g o v e r n m c n t s o u r c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y u s e f u l f o r t h i s s t u d y .

The f i r s t i s C h i n a - V i e t n a m Horder T e n s i o n s :

A -

C h r o n o l o g y , 2 2 J u n e 1976-_.-

5 -Y Ma -

1981. -

T h i s work s u m m a r i z e s t h e i n c i d e n t s t h a t m a n i f e s t e d t h e
Tho s e c o n d s o u r c e is t h e

c r i s i s and g i v e s t h e primary soirrce c i t a t i o n s .

F o r e i g n B r o a d c a s t I n f o r m a t i o n S e r v i c e (FUIS), rjhich m o n i t o r s t h e n e h s o r g a n s of c o u n t r i e s a r o u n d t h e w o r l d . t e d i o u s s p a d e bark f o r the r e s e a r c h e r . The F B I S r e p o r t s do much o f tile

General Materials

J o u r n a 1s

S e v e r a l i m p o r t a n t a r t i c l e s d e a l i n g r i t h t h c S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e War
have appeared i n English language j o u r n a l s .

The f i r s t t o come o u t bias

"China-s

'?unitive'

War On Vietnam:

A M i l i t a r y ~ s s e s s m e n t , " llsian
J e n c k s a s s e r t s t h a t tile main

w, August,

1979 b y LTC H a r l a n J e n c k s .

r e a s o n f o r t h e PRC a t t a c k was t o p r o v e t o t h e V i e t n a m e s e t h a t t h e y c o u l d not challenge Beijing w i t h impunity. H e g o e s on t o g i v e a g e n e r a l

o u t l i n e of t h e m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s and c o n c l u d e s t h a t i n t h e e n d , " t h e Chinese a u t h o r i t i e s .

. .probably

l o s t more t h a n t h e y g a i n e d . " about i t .

For

D a n i e l T r e t i a k t h e r e a r e no " p r o b a b l i e s "

1.n h i s a r t i c l e December,

" C h i n a - s V i e t n a m War and i t s C o n s e q u e n c e s , "

China Q u a r t e r l y , -

1 9 7 9 , T r e t i a k m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e P K C ' s g o a l s were l a r g e l y u n r e a l i z e d . Moreover, T r e t i a k d o e s n o t see t h e same p a t t e r n of s i g n a l l i n g by t h e Chinnscl t h a t o c c u r r e d p r i o r t o t h e Korean War. S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e War:

A t h i r d a r t i c l e i s "The

Causes, Conduct, and Consequences,"

Parameters,

S e p t e m b e r , 1979 by l.'CC Charles R.

Nelson.

N e l s o n places the b a r i n the

conLrxt of t h e Sino-Soviet d i s p u t e .

U n l i k e T r r t i a k , he does n o t p e r -

c e i v e the c e n s c q u e n c e s o f the war f o r C h i n a t o be p a r t i c u l a r l y d i r e .

sees t h e c o n t i n u i n g ; d r a i n on S o v i e t
~ ~ S O U K Ci~ n Sits

tie

e f f o r t t o SuppOrt

the SHV t o b e ;in importent b e n e f i t f o r B e i j i n g .

In a d d i
ti.011

t o t h c journals indicated above, the Thc J o u r n a l of

Asian --

S t u d i c , s i s a good s o u r c e f o r a r t i c l e s , book r e v i e w s , a n d c t i r o n -

01 og i e 8 .
The w t s c k l y nebs m a g a z i n e F a r E a s t e r n Economic Review t o g e t h e r w i t h - i t s Asia Yi!arbonk
_ .

i s a n o u t s t a n d i n g s o u r c e o f m a t e r i a l on l i a s t Asia.
i t h a s e x c e l l c n t c o v e ~ ? i g eof t h e nebs o f tlic

P u b l i s h e d in Hong Kong,

r e g i o n . Thc a r t i c l e : ; o f l o r c o n s i d e r n b l c a n a l y s i s . Wen W r i P a o i s
I

--

ii

p r o - B e i . j i n g n e s s p a p e r published i n Hong Kong.

~t

h a s c o n n e c t i o n s w i t h t h e PllC and e n j o y s a s e m i - o f f i c i a l s t a t u s .

As s u c h

i t is

:i

y,ool.l s o ~ i r c f f o r i i n d e r s t a n d i n g c u r r e n t PRC p l i c i e s and

percept ions. 'The Btillgkok P o s t

O ~ ~ ! K good S

c o v e r a g e o f e v e n t s i n 111dochina al1d is

q u i t e u s p f u l i n t r a c i n g Hanoi's

o p e r a t i o n s i n Cambodia.

Bonks The Thi.rd I n d o c h i n a C o n f l i c t i s a compendium of a r t i c l e s e d i t e d b y

D a v i d bi. P . E l l i o t t .

I n i t t h e a u t h o r s d i s c u s s t h e numerous p r o b l e m s

t h a t b e s e t t h e H a n o i r r q i m e a f t e r 1975 a n d h o b t h e V i e t n a m e s e h s a d e r s h i p reacted to
thrill.

I t i s e s p e c i a l l y good i.n a n a l y z i n g t h e C h i n a - C a m b o d i a -

Vier Nam dilen1m:l.

The C h i n a F a c t o r :

S i n o - A m e r i c a n R e l a t i o n s and t h e G l o b a l S c e n e ,

----

r d i . t e d by Kictiard Solomon, c o n s i d e r s C h i n a ' s c h a n g i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h ttle c o u n t r i e s of S o u t h e a s t : A s i a . 'The c h a p t e r s w r i t t e n by L u c i e n Pyc a n d

k r r y H a r d i n g q u e s t i o n w h d t h e r Bei.j i n g a n d H a n o i bere e v e r v c r y c l o s e ,
e v e n d u r i n g the h a l c y o n d ; ~ y s of i n t c r n a t i o n a l Communist c o o p e r a t i o n . Nguyen Van C a n h - s Vi.,tnnm Under Communism h o l d s t h a t t h e Communist r e g i m e i n Hanoi s e e k s d o m i n a t i o n o f a l l S o u t h e a s t A s i a .

It is britten

from t h o p e r s p e c t i v e o f a n a n t i - C o m i u n i s t Vitltnamesc n a t i o n a l i s t . D o u g l a s P i k e looks a t t h e S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e c r i s i s i n a n a r t i c l e i n

The Sino-Soviet -

Conflict:

A -G l o b a l _

P e r s p e c t i ve , e d i t e d by H e r b e r t

Ellison.

P i k e a s s e r t s t h a t since 1 Y i 5 Hanoi h a s b e e n C r y i n g t o b r e a k

t h e t r a d i t i o n a l i n c l u e n c c t h a t China h i s t o r i c a l l y has e x e r t e d over t h e Vietnamese. t l a r i o i , P i k e r n a i n t a i , n s , h a s n o t become a c l i e n t o f Moscou

b u t r a t h e r i s u s i n g the S o v i e t s as a balance a g a i n s t t h e C h i n o s c .

I n Tho Wars i n Vietnam, 1 9 5 4 - 1 9 8 0 , E d g a r O*Ballance g i v e s a good

n a r r a t i v e o E t h e everlts o f 1 9 7 5 - 8 0 .
H e h o l d s t h a t t h e C h i n e s e havt! been

---

s u c c f s s f u l i n d e t e r r i n g V i e t n a m e s e s u b v e r s i o n in T h a i l a n d .

I0

Chapter 3

A METHODOLOGY

The puIpose o f t h i s c h a p t e r is t o e x a m i n e v a r i o u s m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a p p r o a c h e s t o d e t e r r e n c e a n d c r i s i s b e h a v i o r a l o n g w i t h two ma.jor h i s t o r i c a l cilsi' s t u d i e s o f t h c PRC's c ? n t r y i n t o war.

A s y n t h e s i s c>f

these

t l i e n r i e s b i l l be iised a s a g u i d e t o the i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e S i n o Vi.ctnamest? c r i s i s o f 1975- 1 9 7 9 .

A Theory 0 1 D e t e r r e n c e

A1ex;lniJer Gcorgf! an d R i c h a r d Sniokc hove imade an e x t e n s i v e s t u d y deterrencc theory i n D e t e r r e n c e i n American F o r e i g n P o l i c y : Practice.

,If

'Theory and

'L'hey d e l i n e d e t e r r e n c e a s " t h e p e r s u a s i o n o f o n e a s opponent

Of

that t h e c n s t s and/or r i s k s of a given course

a c t i o n he m i g h t t a k r

I
outueigh i t s b e n e f i t s . " George and Smoke c o n t e n d t h a t , i n t h e p a s t , l e a d e r s have p e r c e i v e d t h e c o n c e p t of d e t e r r e n c e too n a r r o w l y and t o 0 negatively. To be more e f f e c t i v e , i t m u s t become p a r t O F a b r o a d e r
on

p o l i c y o f i n f l u c o c e t h a t r e l i e s on p o s i t i v e i n d u c e m n t a s w e l l as t h r i ? o t s of p u n i s h m e n t .

T h i s i n f l u e n c e s h o u l d seek t o r e d u c e t h e l r v p l

'

of c o n f l i c t and buy time t o a l l o r . c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n s t o pass.

The

a u t h o r s c r i t i c i z e a b s t r a c t , p r e s c r i p t i v e models o f d e t e r r e n c e f o r n o t p o r t r a y i n g Ghat a c t u a l l y h a p p e n s i n a c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n , and t h e y a s s e r t t h a t d e t c r r f n c e t h e o r y n e e d s t o be examined i n t h e l i g h t of h i s t o r i c a l 3 experience. They s e e k a r e s e a r c h m e t h o d o l o g y f o r t h i s .

What seems r e q u i r e d i s a r e s e a r c h methodology u h i c h i s c a p a b l e of d i l c r e n t i a t i n g and i d e n t i f y i n g t h e v a r i a t i o n s i n a n u m b e r o f rc??levant d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g v a r i a b l e s from one s e t O C d e t e r r e n c e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t o n n o t h c r and n s s c s s i n g ttit!ir s i g n i l i c a n c e , whi1.c. remaining cumulable a c r o s s m u l t i p l e cascs.4 t i f o r g e and Smoke have c o n s t r u c t r d an a n a l y t i c g u i d e f o r d o i n g an h i s t o r i c a l case study of a crisis s i t u a t i o n . [ t is designed t o shed

...

l i g h t on t h e i n t e r a c t i o n s of s t a t e s a s c r i s e s develop.
(1) (2)

Examine t h e p r i n c i p a l - s v a l u a t i o n o f i t s i n t e r e s t s and o b j e c t i v e s . Examine t h e a d v e r s a r y s v a l u a t i o n o f i t s i n t e r e s t s and o b j e c t i v e s . D e t e r m i n e t h e p r i n c i p a l ~ sp e r c e p t i o n of t h e t h r e a t t h e a d v e r s a r y

(3)

poses.

(4)

C o n s i d e r t h c p o l i c y o p t i o n s t h e p r i n c i p a l b e l i e v e s a r e open. Trace the formulation of t h e p r i n c i p a l s perceived oPtiolls

the

(5)

r e q u i r e m e n t s and c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t t h o s e o p t i o n s b r i h g .

(6)

Determine whether t h e p r i n c i p a l has c o n tin g e n c y p la n s i f d e t e r r e n c e

fails.

(7)
(8)

I d e n t i f y t h o s e s i g n a l s the p r i n c i p a l s e n d s t o t h e a d v e r s a r y . Consider t h e adversarys perceptions o f the principals deterrence

p o s t u r e ( e . g . commitment, c a p a b i l i t y , r e s o l v e ) and thc? r i s k s o f c o n tinued defiance.

(9)

E v a l u a t e the a d v e r s a r y s r e a s s e s s m e n t of i t s a c t i v i t i e s i n r e a c t i o n

5
to the deterrence signals.

The a u t h o r s p o i n t o u t s e v e r a l m i s t a k e s n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s o f t e n make

i n applying deterrence.

There i s a t e n d e n c y t o assume a o n e - o n - o n e
The

s c e n a r i o vhen a m u l t i p l i c i t y o f p l a y e r s a r e a c t u a l l y i n v o l v e d .

e f f i c a c y o f t h r e a t o v e r more p o s i t i v e i n d u c e m e n t s f r e q u e n t l y i s p r e sumed: a n d w i t h i n t h e framework o f t h r e a t , m i l i t a r y means a r e t h o s e most preferred. L e a d e r s a r e v o n t t o c o n s i d e r f i r s t m i l i t a r y and m a t e r i a l

c a p a b i l i t i e s w i t h o u t t a k i n g i n t o a c c o u n t t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of e f f e c t i v e

12

strategy o r home s u p p o r t .

P e r h a p s most s r r i o u s of a l l , t h o u g h , is t h e

f:ict

tl1:lt

lesdcrs

bl10

w i s h t o d c t c r g e n e r a l l y assume t h a t t h e i r signal!;

a r c Ileing rc'ccivcd and u n d s r s t o o d by t h e a d v c r s n r y , nnd t h a t t h e advt!r-

6
s a r y i s making l o g i c a l d e c i s i o n s t h e r e f r o m .
Decisions under-Strcss

Ole H o 1 s t i has i n v e s t i g a t e d how n a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s a c t u n d e r

the stress of international c r i s i s . i t i c n l Science _ Review, -~ _ .June,
In "The 1910 C a s e , " Anlrric,?n P o l

__

1965 and i n

C r i s i s , E s c a l a t i o n , and War,

_ _

H o l s t i show!; t h a t " r a t i o n a l " d e c i s i o n making i s n o t the g e n e r a l r u l r

during crisvs.
OVPK

N a t i o n a l l e a d c r s become p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h t h e S h o r t term
tliilt

t h e l o n g t e r m , and t h e y become c o n v i n c e d

t h e i r own o p t i o n s a r c

c o n s i d e r a b l y n a r r o w e r t h a n t h o s e or t h e i r a d v e r s a r i e s . t i o n s and s i g n a l s bccomc: more s t c r e o t y p e d and c o n f u s i n g .

q ; a i n s t dc t (1 r r e n c P
3 nd

'Thi!ir communicaT h i s works

c r i s i s re so h

i t

i on

A c c o r d i n g t o H o l s t i s k i l l f u l c r i s i s management h e a r s s e v e r a l hnllmarks. The p r i n c i p i i l i s aware o f t h e adVeKSaKy'S frame of r e f e r e n c e

and r c ? a l i z e s t h i , c o n s t r n i n t s u n d e r b h i c h t h e a d v e r s a r y i s o p e r a t i n g . The p r i n c i p a l a l w a y s l e a v e s an o p e n i n g t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e a d v e r s a r y c a n withdraw..

A carroL and s t i c k c o m b i n a t i o n of i n d u c e m e n t s i s u s e d r a t h e r
A s t h e c r i s i s d e v e l o p s t h e s k i l l f u l manager

ttlan . j u s t one o r t l ~ co t h e r .

makc*s e v e r y e f i o r t t o s l o w t h e pact'

of c r i t i c a l e v e n t s .

F i n a l l y , Lhv

n a t i o n a l 1 e ; i d c r s h i p makes c e r t a i n t h a t i t s d e c i s i o n s a r e n o t p r e e m p t e d 8 O K f i n e s s e d by o u t s i d e f o r c e s .

13

H i s t o r i c a l Cnsc S t u d 2
I n t h o b o o k s , C h i n a Crosses t h e Yalu:

The I l e c i s i o n -

t o E n t e r the Indochina,

Korean War --

and T h e C h i n e s e C a l c u l u s of D e t e r r e n c e :

I n d i a and --

A l l e n W h i t i n g has a n a l y z e d t h e C h i n e s e d e c i s i o n s t o go t o bar i n Korea

i n 1950 and i n I n d i a i n 1962.
W h i t i n g p o s e s t h e q u e s t i o n s o f why C h i n a
He

r c a c t s i n t h e manner t h a t i t d o e s and how i t makes i t s d e c i s i o n s .

c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e PRC g o e s t o w a r f o r good r e a s o n s , c e n t e r e d around r j t r a t e g i c s e c u r i t y c o n c e r n s , and t h a t i t g i v e s r e p e n t e d b a r n i n g s

be fort! hand.

ra I s i m i I n r i t i e s 1951) a n d 1962

S e v e r a t s i m i L a r i t i e s e x i s t b e t b e e n t h f Korean and I n d i a n c r i s e s .
'The d o m e s t i c s i t u ; i t i o n i n the PKC was u n s c ? t t l e d .

B e i j i n g p e r c e i v e d an

immediate t h r e a t a l o n g i t s b o r d e r s .
Led i t s e l t o t h e C h i n e s e l e a d e r s h i p .

T h e s p e c t e r of e n c i r c l e m e n t presenThe c r i s e s developed ovcr a

p e r i o d o f months, a l l o w i n g I k i j i n g t o employ i , t s " c a 1 c u I . u ~o f d c t e r r e n c e " ; b u t c o n t i n u i n g enemy c h a l l e n g e s t o i t s c r e d i b i l i t y d r e b t h e PKC i n t o m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s , tor which i t was n o t t o t a l l y p r e p a r e d . 9 E e i j i n g had t o c o n t e n d b i t h ~ o s c o b ' s m a n e u v e r s . " T h r e a t s and ' r h e i r D e t e r r e n c e as Seen from B e i j i n g " l 0

ina ally,

W h i t i n g d e f i n e s t h e " C h i n e s e c a l c u l u s o f d e t e r r e n c e " a s t h e "gen-

e r a l s t r a t e g y [ t h a t ] u n d e r l i e s p e r s i s t e n t p a t t e r n s of b e h a v i o r aimed a t
p e r s u a d i n g a p e r c e i v e d o p p o n e n t t h a t t h e c o s t s of h i s c o n t i n u i n g conf l i c t u a l a c t i v i t y b i l l e v e n t u a l l y prove u n a c c e p t a b l e t o him b e c a u s e o f

14

11
t h e C h i n e s c ~r e s p o n s e . "

He f u r t h e r c o d i f i e s t h e p r i n c i p l e s of t h r

c a l c u l t i s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e f : o l l o w i n g schemc.
'I'lirt!nts and 'Thcir D e t e r r e n c e as seen from k i j i n g

1. '[Il(. ~ V O K S ( ! O U K d0mesti.c s i t u a t i o n , t h e morc! l i k e l y o u r e x t c r n a l situation will WOKS~II. a ) I\ s u p e r i o r power i n p r o x i m i t y w i l l s e e k t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f OUK domestic v u l n e r a b i l i t y . h ) 'Ih~o o r more powers w i l l combine a g a i n s t u s i f t h e y can ternp o r a r i l y overcome t h e i r oFn c o n C l i c t s of i n t e r e s t . c ) W e inust p r e p a r e f o r t h e w o r s t a n d t r y O K t h e b e s t . 2 . 'rhe! b c s t d n t e r r c n c e i s b e l l i g e r e n c e . a ) To be c r e d i b l e , move m i l i t a r y f o r c e ; words do n o t s u f f i c e . b ) To be d i p l o m a t i c , leave t h e encmy ' f a c e ' and a h a y o u t . c ) 'To he p r u d e n t , leave y o u r s e l f a n . o p t i o n . ' d ) If a t f i r s t you d0Il.t SllCCeed, t r y algain bllt IllOK? SO. 3 . Correct t i m i n g i.s e s s e n t i a l . a ) Warning must be g i v e n < ? a r t y vhen a t h r e a t i s p e r c ( ! i v e d h u t not y e t i.mi.nent. b ) Thr rhythm of s i g n a l s must p e r m i t t h e enemy t o r e s p o n d and US t o c o n r i r m the, s i t u a t i o n . c ) !Je m u s t c o n t r o l O U K inovrs and n o t r e s p o n d t o the, e n e m y - s c h o i c e . I.!

a 1s C h i n e s e Sigi . W h i t i n g i s e s p e c i a l l y i n t e r e s t e d i n the s i g n a l s t h a t t h e PKC b 71ves

as p a r t of i t s d r t e r r e n c e c a l c u l u s .
t h r e t ! b r o a d categories:

he s i g n a l s c a n be d i v i d e d i n t o

(1) verbal warnings,

( 2 ) t r o o p m a n e u v e r s , and

( 3 ) r a p i d a t t a c k s l o l 1 , o ~ e db y a gcneKal d i s e n g a g e m e n t a s t h e f i n a t
warning.
In t h e v e r b a l w a r n i n g s W h i t i n g t r a c e s a p a t t e r n of e s c a l a t i o n

i n r h e t o r i c and a use of k e y p h r a s e s t o i n d i c a t e t h a t a n o t h e r p h a s e l i n e h a s been c r o s s e d on t h e r o a d t o a c t u a l m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t . Examples of V e r b a l Warnings:

22 Sep

Korea,

1950

K(!n Min Ri I h o a n n o u n c e s t h a t the Chinesix " v i l l

a l w a y s s t a n d on

the s i d e o f t h e K o r e a n p e o p l e . "

25 Sep

Ni.r Rongzhen, A c t i n g C h i e f of S t a f f of t h e PLA, i n f o r m s t n d i a n Pani.kkar t h a t B e i j i n g v i l l n o t " s i t back w i t h f o l d e d

a m b a s s a d o r K. M.

h a n d s and :.et t h e h i e r i c a n s come t o t h e b o r d e r . "

15

30 S c p

Ztiou E n l a i d e c l a r e s :

"The C h i n e s e p e o p l e

. . will

not' s u p i n e -

l y t o l p r n t e s e e i n g t t i c i r n e i g h b o r s b e i n g s a v a g e l y i n v a d e d by the? i m p e r i a l ists."

02 Oct

Zhou g i v e s P a n i k k a r o f f i c i a l n o t i f i c a t i o n t h a t , i f t h e U n i t e d t h e PRC w i l l e n t e r t h e war.

S t a t e s cross(!s t h e 3 8 t h p a r a l l e l , 10 Oct

The M i n i s t r y o f F o r e i g n A f C a i r s i n B e i j i n g f o r m a l l y a n n o u n c e s :

"Th(! C h i n e s e p e o p l e c a n n o t s t a n d by i d l y w i t h r e g a r d t o

. . . the
13

i n v a s i o n o f Korea by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and i t s a c c o m p l i c e s a n d k i t h r e g a r d t o the d a n g e r o u s t r e n d t o h a r d e x t r n d i n g t h e war."

Examplt?s o f V e r b a l W a r n i n g s : (blrt! P r o t e s t s ) 22 JuI

rndi.il,

1962

"The C h i n e s e g o v e r n m e n t c a n by no mfans s i t i d l y b y w h i l e i t s

f r o n t i e r g u a r d s a r e b e i n g e n c i r c l e d and n n n i h i l a t c d by a g g r e s s o r s . " 2 7 Aug

" T h e C h i n e s e s i d e w i l l Ilave t o r e s o r t t o s e l f - d e f e n s e . "

0 5 Si?p

"The I n d i a n Government

. . . should

b r aware t h a t whocver p l a y s

w i t h Eire w i l l h u r t h i m s r . l f . "

13 Scp

"He who p l a y s w i t h f i r e w i l l e v e n t u a l l y be consumed b y f i r e . border d e f e n s e f n r c e s a r e dtlcy bound t o d e f e n d t h e i r t e r r i t o r y . "

"The s i t u a t i o n i s e x t r e m e l y d a n g e r o u s , and tlic l a m e s of war may

Chinese
21 S e p

break out there."

25 SeP

"In t h r f a c e of i n c r e a s i n g l y f r a n t i c armed a t t a c k s by t h e agthe C h i n e s e f r o n t i e r g u a r d s c a n n o t b u t t a k e

grc!ssivc l n d i a n t r o o p s ,
S 0 1 U t' L'

m e il SIJr c? s

0f

s e 1 f -d

e fensp

I'

03 O c t

"~.!~lrnever I n d i a

China i s

SLIK~

t o s t r i k e back."

11 Oct

"Should the I n d i a n s i d e s t i l . l n o t r e i n i n b e f o r e t h e p r e c i p i c e
yilr,

b u t continuc? t o s p r e a d t h e f l a m e s o f

t h e I n d i a n Govcrnnirnt must

16

bear f i l l 1 responsibility f o r t h e r e s u l t i n g c a s u a l t i e s on b o t h s i d c s and

14 ;11 I ntlier c o n s e q u e n c c s t h a t may e n s u e . "

T h e s i g ~ l a l sg i v e n b y t h e Chinese government o c c u r a t f a i r l y r e g u l a r
i n t e r v a l s and conform t o
ii

c o n s c i o u s rhythm a c c o r d i n g t o Whititlg.

'rhis

g i v e s the o t h e r s i d e time t o t a k e n o t i c e and r e s p o n d , and i t g i v e s t h C C h i n e s e si.dc t i m e t o p r e p a r e f o r t h e n e x t s t e p . B e i j i n g develops a

numb<!r o t ; ~ I t e r n ; i t i v e s . I f t h e o p p o s i n g s i d e r ( ! o c t s i n a manner t h a t I k i j i n g p e r c e i v e s t o be l e s s t h r e a t e n i n g , l o n g e r i n t e r v a l s b i l l o c c u r between ~ a r n i n j i su n t i l t h e y t a p e r o f f a l t o g e t h e r . Whiting maintains

t h a t t h i s I ~ a g p c u c d d u r i n g tlit! 1962 Taiwan c r i s i s a n d d u r i n g the American i n v o l v e m e n t i n Viet Nani, when Washington b a s a b l e t o c o n v i n c e B e i j i n g

t h a t the Unitcd S t a t e s d i d not pose a t h r e a t t o China's

security.

t h p o t h e r hand, i f t h e o p p o s i n g s i d e r e m a i n s t h r e a t e n i n g i n I k i j i n g ' s

o p i n i o n , tlien t h ( ? w a r n i n g s w i l l i n c r e a s e i n tempo and i n t e n s i t y .

happened b i t h t h e Korean and I n d i a n c r i s e s .

This

I n s h o r t , t h e PRC p o s i t s

p h a s e l i n e s i n i t s e s c a l a t i o n oE d e t e r r e n c e t o e x e r t a s much c o n t r o l

o v c r t h e s i t u a t i o n as p o s s i b l e , t o r e a s s e s s c h a n g i n g c o n d i t i o n s , t o
prc?pore f o r m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s a s n e c e s s a r y , and t o o v o i d a p r e c i p i t a n t s t u m b l i n g i n t o bar when i t m i g h t be p r e v e n t e d . When v t ' r b n l s i g n a l s d o n o t p r o d u c e t h e d e s i r e d r e s u l t , t h e PLA c o l m e n c e s m i l i t a r y movements i n t o t h e c r i s i s a r e a . The m i l i t a r y a c -

t i o n s , h o w v c r , a r e a l s o phased i n o r d e r t o g i v e o n e l a s t d e t e r r e n c e
'rill? f o l l o w i n g schelne

r e f l ~ c t st h e b u i l d up t o f u l l - s c a l e war i n

Korea and I n d i a . Korean C r i s i s , 1950

25 S e p

Nie Rongzhen t e l l s P a n i k k a r t h e PKC w i l l i n t e r v e n e i f US t r o o p s

come t o t h e Yalu.

17

02 Oct

Zhou t e l l s Paniklcar t h c PKC w i l l i n t e r v e n e i f US f o r c e s c r o s s

thr 3 8 t h p a r a l l e l .
26 Oct T h e PLA a t t a c k s S o u t h Korean t r o o p s n e a r t h e Y a l u .

02 Nov
07 Nov

The PLA a t t a c k s US t r o o p s n e a r t h e Y a l u . The PLA d i s e n g a g e s a l o n g the e n t i r e f r o n t .

2 6 Nov
front.

T h e PLA l a u n c h e s a m a s s i v e g e n e r a l o f f e n s i v e a l o n g t h e e n t i r e

I n d i a n C r i s i s , 1962

L3 S e p

The PllC p r o p o s e s t a l k s h i t h I n d i a and c a u t i o n s Nch D e l h i a g a i n s t

b e i n g consumed b y f i r e .
2o SeP

The PLA a t t a c k s a t v a r i o u s s p o t s on t h e b o r d e r a n d d i s e n g a g e s . Lhe PLA l a u n c h e s a g r i i c r a l a t t a c k and d r i v e s i n t o I n d i a n t e r r i -

30 o c t
tory.

15
20 Nov

13eijing announces a c e a s e - f i r e and w i t h d r a u a l .

T h i s i s a v e r y b r i e f o u t l i n e of W h i t i n g s t h e o r y of C h i n e s e d e t e r r e n c e and o f h i s two h i s t o r i c a l c a s e s t u d i e s a n a l y z i n g t h a t t h e o r y .

Methodology Tor T h i s The&

A l l o f the a u t h o r s c i t e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r make u s e o f t h e h i s t o r i c a l case s t u d y t o e x p l a i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f c r i s e s and t h e manner i n which

t h e p a r t i e s c o n c e r n e d t r y t o manage t h e s e c r i s e s . s y s t e m a t i c methodology i n doing t h i s , By u s e of a

t h e y hope t o e l u c i d a t e b o t h the The

manner i n w h i c h n a t i o n s i n t e r a c t and t h e e f f i c a c y of t h e i r a c t i o n s .

u l t i m a t e p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t of t h i s i s i n t h e p e r c e p t i o n of g e n e r a l i t i e s and c o n s i s t a n c i e s t h a t would l e a d t o b e t t e r c r i s i s management.

At
il

minimum i t s h o u l d y i e l d a c l e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e h i s t o r i c a l r e a s o n s and methods f o r

il

given n a t i o n - s a c t i o n s d u r i n g a t i m e of

intense international confrontation. 18

TI)(! i n n i n p u r p o s e ot' t h i s paper is t o a n a l y z e t h e d e v o l o p i n g c r i s i s

betwecri China anti V i e t R a i n from 1975 t o 1979 a s a n h i s t o r i c a l c a s e study.

l:i r s t , s e v e r a l i m p o r t a n t c r i s i s p o i n t s i n S i n o - V i e t n a i i i r s r r e l a -

t i o n s during that period a r e i d e n t i f i e d .

S e c o n d , t h e s t u d y examines

U e i . j i n g s ' s h a n d l i n g of t h e s e c r i s e s i n terms

or

i t s perception o f i t s

i n t e r e s t s and o b j e c t i v e s , and t h e t h r e a t t h a t i t p e r c e i v e s V i e t Nam

poses t o Lliose i n t r r r s t s and o b j e c t i v e s .
I c also c o n s i d e r s C h i n a ' s

s r n s i t i v i t y t o V i e t Nani's

interests.

'Third, t h e p a p e r looks a t t h e

giiriiur of s i g n a l s i,ssued by t h o C h i n r s c a n d t h e i r r e c e p t i o n b y t h e V i e t nilmese.

'I'tlr? n a t i i r c ,

i n t e n s i t y , i r u t h o r i t y , a n d t i m i n g o f t h e s i g n a l s aris

considered.

An i n d e x o f i n d i c a t o r s i s d r a w n up t o t r a c e t h e Chines11

r(?sponses b i t h i l l thcse v a r i a b l e s .

F o u r t h , t h e s t u d y determines the

r i ! l a t i v e c f f i c a c y of U c i j i i i g ' s

a c t i o n s , e x a m i n i n g them i n l i g h t of

I l o l s t i ' s h y p o t h e s i ! ~ r e g a r d i n g t l w p r o p e r p e c e p t i o n s o r t i m e , ot' alLernativcs,

iiiitl

0 1 coiiiinunication.

Viftli,

the c o n c c p t of C h i n r s e

d t , t c r r e n c c i s examined t o d e t e r m i n e how the s t r a t e g y of l i m i t e d , p u n i t i v e war i s u s e d .

19

FXFERRENCES CITED

A l e x a n d e r GeorgP and R i c h a r d Smoke, D e t e r r e n c e i n American F o r e i g n P o l i c y : T h e o r y and P r a c t i c e (New York: C o l u m c a UP, 1 9 7 4 ) ,

z
George 3 George 4 George 5 George 6 George

--

and Smoke, p . 590. and Smoke, p p . 6 6 - 6 7 . and Smoke, p. 94.

and Smoke, p p . 9 9 - 1 0 3 . and Smoke, p p .

72-82.

7
O l e R. H o l s t i , C r i s i s , E s c a l a t i o n , War ( M o n t r e a l : Y c G i l l - Q u e e n s UP, 1 9 7 2 ) , pp. 7 - 2 5 ; a i i 8 ~ t ~ T t lYT47Zisc, i e American P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e K e v i e k , 59:2:365-66, J u n e , 1965.

7 Holsci, C r i s i s , pp. 222-23.

9

--10
12 ~-

A l l e n S. W h i t i n g , C h i n a C r o s s e s t h e Y a l u : the D e c i s i o n t o E n t e r t h e Korean War ( S t a n f o r d : S t a n ~ , ~ 6 0 ) , a s s i m ; and W h i t z g C h i n e s e C a l c u l u s of D e t e r r e n c e : I n d i a a n d t n d o c h i n a (Ann A r b o r : U n i v e r s i t y of MicKigan P r e s s , 1 9 7 5 ) , a S m ;

W h i t i n g , C a l c u l u s , p. 202. 11 W h i t i n g , C a l c u l u s , p. 201. W h i t i n g , C a l c u l u s , p p . 202-03. 13 W h i t i n g , E, p. 93.

14
W h i t i n g , C a l c u l u s , p. 210. 15 W h i t i n g , Y a l u , pp. 93 a n d 1 1 7 ; and C a l c u l u s , p. 214.

20

Chapter 4

TKACING THE TROUBLES

Background

X'Srndit ion -

o f T r ___ oubles

China and V i i ! t Nan1 h a v e lied a l o n g h i s t o r y

OE troubled reiatil,ns,

V ; e t n a m r s c c i v i l i z a t i o n grew up i n t h e Red R i v e r d e l t a i n t h e l a t t e r
h-1I.f o f tile c i r s t mil l c n n i u m BC, ctlilt. an expanliing
rlllpire

e x e r t e d pr(!ssure on i t From thtx n o r t h .

I n 111 HC Han Wudi i n c o r p o r a t e "

tlie Ked K i v P r c l ~ l and t ~ t h e c a r l y V i e t n a m e s e i n t o the: lian d y n a s t ) r ' s d!,nmins.

Salllth),

'The Chinese c a l l e d t h e i r new a c q u i s i t i o n An Nam ( t h e Peaceful

and i t r o m n i n e d t h c s o u t h e r n m o s t p r o v i n c e o f t h e C h i n e s e e m p i r e

u n t i l I\D 0 9 9 .

in r a t h e r t y p i c a l c o l o n i a l f a s h i o n , t h e Chinese adminis1 t r a t o r s i r i Viet: %am r e g a r d e d ttie i n d i g e n o u s i n h a b i t a n t s w i t h c o n d c s c e n -

s i o n ; and the V i e t n a m e s e , f o r t h e i r p a r t , f r e q u c n t l y t r i e d t o a s s e r t
t h e i r indepcmdi!nco,

o f t e n r i s i n g up i n r e b e l l i o n .

N e v e r t h e l e s s , thc!

b r i l l i a n c e o f C h i n e s e c u l t u r e and c i v i l i z a t i o n was n o t l o s t on t h e Vietnamese,

wl10

a d o p t e d much o f i t [ o r t h e i r own.

T h i s , too, led to a

n o t u n t y p i ( : i ~ l c o l o n i a l phenomenon:
t o c a r d ttie c o l o n i z e r s .

ambivalent f e e l i n g s o f t h e colonized

C n t h e i r r o l e as l i t t l e b r o t h e r , t h e V i e t n a m e s e

b o t h adnlired and d e s p i s e d t h e i r b i g b r o t h e r , t h e C h i n e s e .

This duality

or p a s s i o n s was L o c o n t i . n u e t h r o u g h o u t t h e h i s t o r y o f S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e 2 K $! 1 3 L i o n s

Vict Nan g a i n e d i t s i n d e p e n d e n c e i n 9 3 9 , a f t e r t h e c o l l a p s e o l t h e
Tang d y n a s t y i n C h i n a ; a n d , s h o r t l y a l t e r tltc e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e Song d y n a s t y i n 9 6 0 , i t became p a r t o f t h e C h i n e s ( , t r i b u t a r y s y s t e m , which a l l o k e d C h i n a s i n f l u e n c e t o c o n t i n u e t h r o u g h a more i n d i r e c t n e t h o d .
A t t h e same t i m e , V i e t N a m began i t s own i m p c r i a l i s t d r i v e i n t o I n d o -

c h i n a , t h e r e b y d e v e l o p i n g a n o t h e r o n g o i n g theme i n S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e r e l a tions.

As the V i e t n a m e s e pushed s o u t h a n d west, t h e C h i n e s e h o u l d o f t e n

a l l y t h e m s e l v e s w i t h t h e p e o p l e s a s t r i d e Viet Nam<s a d v a n c e , v i z . t h e

Chams and t h e Klinters, t o b l o c k V i e t Nams e x p a n s i o n i s m .

B e t h e e n 1075

and 1079, t h e Song C l i i n e s c a s s i s t e d t h e Chams and Khmers i n d e f e a t i n g t h e V i e t n a m e s e a n d t h u s p o s t p o n e d t h e i r s o u t h h a r d movement.

tittle,

For a s h o r t

t h e Song o c c u p i e d c o n s i d e r a b l e p a r t s o r VirtnameS<.! t e r r i t o r y .
Nam had t o f a c e two s u b s e q u e n t major i n c u r s i o n s

Viet

from t h e n o r t h .

The Mongols r a v a g e d much of t h e Ked K i v e r d e l t a i n t h e m i d d l e of t h e

t h i r t e e n t h c e n t u r y , t a k i n g Hanoi i n 1257. C l i m a t e , t e r r a i n , and f i e r c e

V i e t n a m e s e r e s i s t a n c e , h o w e v e r , c a u s e d them t o h i t h d r a w b i t h o u t a b s o r b i n g Viet Nan i n t o t h e Yuan d y n a s t y . When t h e Ming d y n a s t y a s s e r t e d

i t s e l f i n f o r c i g n v e n t u r e s , V i e t Nam was o n c e tnorf c o l o n i z e d .

Th<,

p e r i o d o f d i r e c t C h i n e s e d o m i n a t i o n was s h o r t , from 1409 t o 1428; b u t i t r e a f f i r m e d t o t h e Vietnameae t h a t China would a l h a y s s e e k t o d o m i n a t e 3 them %hen t h e o p p o r t u n i t y p r e s e n te d i t s e l l . D u r i n g t h e L a t t e r p a r t of t h e s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y , b o t h C h i n a and
V i e t ?lam were e x p e r i e n c i n g c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f i c u l t i e s .

I n China t h e Ming

d y n a s t y was i n t e r m i n a l d e c l i n e , and i n Virt Nam t h o h o s t i l e c l a n s - - t h e T r i n h i n t h e n o r t h a n d t h e Nguyen i n t h e s o u t h - - h a d e f f e c t i v e l y d i v i d e d

the country.

The Ming f e l l i n 1644 and was p r e s e n t l y r e p l a c e d by t h e

Qing d y n a s t y of t h e Manchus.

In Hanoi t h e T r i n h c l a n e a g e r l y s o u g h t t h e

p a t r o n a g e of t h e newly e s t a b l i s h e d Qing d y n a s t y , w h i l e i n t h e S o u t h t h e 22

Nguyen domairis became a Itavcn For many Ming l o y a l i s t r e f u g e e s . Ngk~yi!n weri. n o t

iis

The

c ! n t h u s i a s t i c a b o u t a Cllincse c o n n e c t i o n a s t h e were

t h v ' I r i n h , b i i t t h e y u s e d thi! C h i n e s e i m m i g r a n t s t o h e l p them i n t h e i r d~ i v e t o c o n q u e r Canihodio.

C h i n e s e a r m i e s once a g a i n i n v a d e d Viet Nam i n 1788.

They s o u g h t t o

t a k e a d v a n t a 4 e o t d i s u n i o n a n d r e b i l l i o n b i t h i n Viet Nam i n o r d e r t o r e a s s e r t a l a r g e r incasurt? of C h i n e s e i n f l u e n c e . They c a p t u r e d l t a n o i and

o c c u p p i e d t l i u c i t y l o r t h o w e e k s , but t h e y were s o o n d e f e a t e d by a
V i C A t n m e s e army 311d w i t h d r e w from the c o u n t r y .
In 1802 t h e Nguyen h e r e a b l e t o c o n c l u d e a s u c c e s s f u l b a r a g a i n s t
t h t ' l ' r i n h and u n i t e a l l o f V i r t Nam; I~ow(?vcr,i n d o i n g s o , t h e y had

e n l i s t e d the ?id of contribute

LO

s m n l l g r o u p oC F r e n c h f r e e b o o t e r s , khicli b a s t o 4 France-s g e t t i n g i t s foot i n the door. T h e French began

il

a h s o r b i n g l n d o c h i n a b i t by b i t , s t a r t i n g w i t h t h o S o u t h , i n t h e m i d d l r
01

t h e n i n e l n e n t l i c1:ntury.

As t h e y a p p r o a c h e d C h i n a ' s b o r d e r s i n t h e

lt180s, H e i j i i i g become a l a r m e d and began t o o p p o s e t h e i r e f f o r t s .

c u l m i n a t ( ? d i n the S i n o - F r e n c h b a r of 1883-85.
ill

This

( G r o u i n g F r e n c h hegemony

Indochina d i d not c o n s t i t u t e t h e o n l y r e a s o n f o r t h i s war, b u t i t bas

5
one of t h e major c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r s . )
~ o o p e r aito n - a gainst -

-C o l o n i a l ism

D u r i n g t h c f i r s t h a l f of t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , t h e r e bas a l a r g e mansure o f common i n t e r e s t betbeen t h e n a t i o n a l i s t i c Chinese and V i e t -

n:imese i n t h w a r t i n g t h e e n c r o a c h m e n t s o f t h e c o l o n i a l powers and i n

d,?veloping modern, independent n a t i o n a l s t a t e s . T h e Guomindang (GMD)

( N a t i o n a l i s t P a r t y ) i n C h i n a s u p p o r t e d t h e n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n Viet Naln, v s p e c i a l l y t h e V i e t Nnm Quoc Dan Dang ( V i e t Nam N a t i o n a l i s t P a r t y ) ,

23

b h i c h was p a t t e r n a f t e r t h e C h i n e s e GMD.

L i k e w i s e , t h c Chines(! Commu-

n i s t P a r t y ( C C P ) l e n t s u p p o r t t o i t s c o u n t e r p a r t , the I n d o c h i n a Comnlui i i s t P a r t y (ICP).

Even w i t h i n t h e f r a m e b o r k o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t c o tensions arose. The GMD j a i l e d Ho Chi Minh r e -

o p e r a t i o n , however,

p e a t e d l y ; a n d , when GMD t r o o p s e n t e r e d n o r t h e r n V i e r Nam i n 1945 t o a c c e p t t h e J a p a n e s e s u r r e n d e r a t t h e end of World War 11, t h e y rampaged t h r o u g h t h e c o u n t r y s i d e and showed d e f i n i t e s i g n s of w a n t i n g t o s e t u p more t h a n a t e m p o r a r y o c c u p a t i o n .

T h i s o n c e more s t i r r e d V i e t n a m e s e

b i t t e r n e s s toward t h e C h i n e s e and seemed t o c o n f i r m Cllinas i m p e r i a l i s t 6 d e s i r e t o d o m i n a t e V i e t Xam.

I n 1946 b o t h China and Viet N a m became c?ngulfed i n i n t e r n a l wars.

C h i n a s ended i n 1949 w i t h a Canmunist v i c t o r y . The C h i n e s e Ccmmunists

t h e n went on t o g i v e s i g n i f i c a n t a i d t o t h e Communist-led Viet Minh i n Indochina. 7 1954.

This h e l p e d t h e Viet Hinh t o p r e v a i l a g o i n s t t h e F r e n c h i n

T h e Geneva C o n v e n t i o n

A c o n v e n t i o n was c a l l e d a t Geneva i n 1954 t o d e a l w i t h t h e p r o b l e m s

o f Korea and I n d o c h i n a .

I n a t t e n d a n c e a t t h e I n d o c h i n a s e s s i o n s were
the Peoples
t h e V i e t Minh,

r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h e S o v i e t Union, R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a , t h e S t a t e o f Viet Nan1 (non-Cormnunist), F r a n c e , B r i t a i n , Cambodia, and Laos.

The maneuvers and m a c h i n a t i o n s

t h a t t o o k p l a c e a t t h e Geneva C o n v e n t i o n have l o n g been the s u b j e c t of c o n t r o v e r s y and r e c r i m i n a t i o n .

Viet Nam was d i v i d e d between t h e ComA f t e r y e a r s of f i g h t i n g , t h e

m u n i s t N o r t h a n d the non-Communist S o u t h . Communists g o t o n l y h a l f o f t h e l o a f .

S i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h e PRC s u p p o r t e d

t h e p a r t i t i o n , a n d t h e r e i s e v i d e n c e t h a t i t p r e s s u r e d t h e Viet Minh

8
into accepting i t . Could t h e V i e t n a m e s e Communists have g a i n e d c o n t r o l 24

ovi!r t h e fihol(? c o i l n t r y by w a l k i n g o u t of t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s and back o n t o

t1.v b a t t l c ~ f i e l d ? Was U v i j i n g d e l i b e r a t e l y t r y i n g t o i n s u r c t h a t nn D o u g l a s Pikt? b e 1 i w e s

i r d c , p c n d e n t Viet Nam remained b e a k and d i . v i d e d ?

t h a t t h e C m m u n i s t f o r c e s i n Viet Nam were l a r g e l y e x h a u s t e d i n 1954 a n d 9 t h a t t h e V i e t Minh w r e 8 s e a g e r f o r p e a c e a s anybody e l s e . 'Thereforc, t h o deal may n o t have been a s bad f o r them a s t h e y w e r e t o a s s e r t l a t e r
w l i c o t h e y nlainLai.ned t h a t t h e y had been f i n e s s e d o u t of h a l l the c o u n -

try.

On t h e otli(!r h a n d , t h e I'KC g a v e some i n d i c a t i o n s Chat a " n e u -

tr;ilizc!d" 10 viaw.

1ndoctiina was n o t a l t o g e t h e r u n a t t r a c t i v t > from t h e i r p o i n t o r

Tlit? Vit!tnanirsi? Communists g e n e r a l l y t r i . e d t o w a l k the l i n r between t h e i r h r e t h r ' c n i n Moscow and I l e i j i n g , and from 1950 t h r o u g h c a r l y 1 3 7 3

t h e y were i n d e e d a b l e t o t a c k r a t h e r s u c c e s s f u l l y between t h e C h i n e s r
and t h e S o v i e t s .
T t is p o s s i b l e t o d i s c e r n s i x p h a s e s o f V i e t n a m e s e

CommiinisL maneuvtsrs d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d .
F r o m 1'350 t o 1956, t h e y were on good terms w i t h b o t h of t h e Com-

nninist g i a n t s .

The S i n o - S o v i e t r i f t had n o t y e t o p e n e d , and t h e s e h e r e

t h e h a l c y o n d a y s of i n t c r n a t i u n a l Communist c o o p e r a t i o n and s o l i d a r i t y . E l e v e r t h e l e s s , H o ' s r a g i m e was r a t h e r c l o s e r t o t h e C h i n e s e t h a n t o t h c S o v i e t s a t t h i s time. From 1950 t o 1954, t h e PRC was p r o v i d i n g a

s a n c t u a r y f o r Viet Minh t r o o p s a n d was g i v i n g c o n s i d e r a b l e a i d and ; ~ s s i s t n n c eL O t h e m i.n the war a g a i n s t t h r F r e n c h . The V i e t n a m e s e Com-

m u n i s t s a l s o l o o k e d t o t h e C h i n e s e r e v o l u t i o n a r y e x p e r i e n c e a s a model f o r t h r Vietnamcse r e v o l u t i o n .

25

Betbeen 1957 and 1960, t h e S l e d g l i n g I k m o c r a t i c Kepub1i.c or V i e t

Nam ( D K V )

moved c l o s e r t o t h e S o v i e t s .

Hanoi began t o d e v e l o p a n

i n k l i n g of d i s t r u s t o v e r the p r e s e n c e i n N o r t h Viet Nnm of t h o s c l a r g c numbers of Chinese a d v i s o r s , hho had proved s o v a l u a b l e d u r i n g t h e war

b u t who now d i d n o t seem e s p e c i a l l y e a g e r t o d e p a r t .

The North V i e t -

nameso were a l s o a n x i o u s t o b e g i n i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , and i n t h i s t h e S o v i e t model a p p e a r e d more a p p r o p r i a t e t h a n t h e Chinest?. Hanoi wanted

the a d v a n c e d a i d t h a t t h e S o v i e t s , n o t t h e C h i n e s e , c o u l d p r o v i d e .
D u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d t h e r e were f r e q u e n t v i s i t s of S o v i e t and C h i n e s e d i g n i . t a r i e s back a n d f o r t h between Hoscoh and H a n o i . F i n a l l y , t h e PRC's

d i s a s t r o u s Three Red B a n n e r s campaign from 1958 t o 1960 l a r g e l y d i s a b u s e d t h e V i e t n a n w s c of t h c e f f i c a c y of t h e Chinese model. T h e S i n o - S o v i e t s p l i t came i n t o t h e open i n 1960. A t tIlc
Same

t i m e , Hanoi bas c o m e n c i n g o p e r a t i o n s aimed a t s u b j u g a t i n g S o u t h V i c t

Nnm and f e a r e d t h a t h o s t i l i t y between t h e USSR a n d t h e PKC m i g h t d i s -

t r a c t them from t h e f r a t e r n a l s o c i a l i s t s u p p o r t t h a t t h e N o r t h V i e t namese hod been a n t i c i p a t i n g . T h e r e f o r e , from 1960 t o 1 9 6 3 , H a n o i t r i e d

T h e PKC t r i e d t o

t o p l a y a m e d i a t i n g r o l e b r t w e n ?110scob and B e i j i n g .

r e c o u p some of i t s waning s t a t u r e w i t h t h e N o r t h V i e t n a m e s e by p r o m i s e s
of increased s u p p o r t .

Between 1963 and 1 9 6 5 , t h e DRV swung toward t h e PRC i n t h e S i n o Soviet dispute. Hanoi s u s p e c t e d t h a t Rhrushchev * s p o l i c y of p e a c e f u l

c o e x i s t e n c c and a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h c U n i t e d S t a t e s o n a n u c l e a r t e s t ban s i g n a l l e d a s l i d e back i n S o v i e t s u p p o r t f o r b o r l d - b i d e Connnunist i n s u r gency movemenes. Host o f t h e DRV l e a d e r s h i p p r e f e r r e d 1 3 e i j i n g . s more

b e l l i c o s e r h e t o r i c ; and the i d e o l o g i c a l p u r i s t s i n H a n o i , e . g . h e l d sway.

Le Duan,

T h e DRV o f t e n . j o i n e d r a n k s w i t h t h e PRC i n c r i t i c i z i n g

Soviet revisionism;

y e t Hanoi r e f u s e d t o denounce Moscow.

26

[ n 1964 t h e N o r t h Vietnamese, h a v i n g e n j o y e d some s u c c e s s ~ ~ wsi t h

tIits

g u c r r i I l a war i.n t h e S o u t h , d e c i d e d t o p u s h Tor a q u i c k v i c t o r y b y a

1;lI-j;e (~Sc;113ti011O r I:he war e f f o r t .

'The PRC t e n d e d

llOt

t o support t h i s ,

u r g i n g t h e Viei:namest! Communists t o c o n t i n u e t o app1.y t h e M a o i s t s t r a t e:<y o f p r o t r a c t e d w a r f a r e .

A t tlie same time, KhKUShchev h a d b e e n o u s t t . d

in

tIiC

S~vit~ Un t i o n , a n d t h e new K r e m l i n l e a d e r s h i p had d e c i d e d t o t a k e

a more a g g r e s s i v v coursc i n b a c k i n g ''wars o f n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n . "

Woscok, k a s now m a r i m i v e r i n g t o s u p p o r t Hanoi b o t h i d e o l o g i c a l l y a n d

mntcrially, w h i l c nei jing was singing

ii

rather d i f f e r e n t ideologicat
As

tiina ;and d i d n o t h a v e t h e m a t e r i a l means t o beck H a n o i ' s a m b i t i o n s .

a r e s u l t t h i ? DRV nlovrd b a c k t o w a r d t h e USSR i n 1964 and 1965.

'rhl?

I:nited S t i l t c s b e g a n m a s s i v e a i d t o S a i g o n i n 1965, and S out h H a n o i hed

V i e t n a m e s e r e s i s t a n c e t o a Communist t a k e o v e r s t i f f e n e d .

f a i l e d t o x h i e v e i t s q u i c k v i c t o r y and nob camc t o a c c e p t t h a t the war

~ ~ 1 ~ bc 1 1 d long a n d b i t t e r .

With t h i s p r o s p e c t , t h e No r t h Vi e t n a m e s c

r p c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e y would n e e d a l l tht! h e l p t h e y c o u l d g e t and had no

Cl?Si.Kt?
tO

alienatl, e i t h e r of their petrons.

Therefore,

the pt!riod o f

1965-73 was one o f o f f i c i a l N o r t h V i e t n a m e s e n e u t r a l i t y i n t h e S i n o Soviet rivalry. N e v c r t h e l e s u , t h e DKV e d g e d g r a d u a l l y c l o s e r t o the

As the
~ i

IJSSR.

T h e r e were s e v e r a l r e a s o n s f o r t h i s .

in i t e~ nsified,

c h e N o r t h V i e t n n m e s e became i n c r e a s i n g l y d e p e n d e n t on s o p h i s t i c a t e d : j o v i e t l n i l i t a r y e q u i p m e n t , e s p e c i o l l y tlie a n t i a i r c r a f t s y s t e m s t h a t ,.Icfendc,d t h e homeland a g a i . n s t A m e r i c a n b o m b e r s . !Army ( N V A ) , politics.

The N o r t h V i e t n a m e s e

hi?aded by Vo Nguyen G i a p , became more i n f l u e n t i a l i n U R V

'The o f f i c e r s o f t h e NVA p r e f e r r e d S o v i e t h a r d w a r e t o the,

M a o i s t p h i i o s o p h y of p r o t r a c t e d b a r , a n d G i a p was t h e leadrr o f t h t ? most p r o - S o v i e t and a n t i - C h i n e s e f a c t i o n i n Hanoi. I n t e r n a l Chinese

27

po I.i t i c s , e s p e c i a 1 l y the Great P r o l e t a r i a n Cu I. t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n , c a u s e d

s e v e r e s t r a i n s i.n S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e r e l a t i o n s .

Vietnamese o f f i c i a l s i n

t h e PRC here a t t a c k e d and b e a t e n by Red G u a r d s , and S o v i e t arms s h i p ments t r a v e r s i n g t h e PRC by r a i l on t h c i r way t o t h e DRV here i n t e r 11 d i c t e d and l o o t e d . T h e n o t i o n o f t h e People:: War, i . e . p r o t r a c t e d w a r f a r e based on t h e Maoist model, has h e r a l d e d by L i n B i a o and became the s t r a t e g i c m i l i t a r y o r t h o d o x y d u r i n g t h e C u l t u r a l . R e v o l u t i o n .

In

s p i t e o f t h e b e l l i c o s e b l u s t e r of i t s r h e t o r i c , L i n Uiao-s formulation

o f P e o p l e s War was a m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f t h e PRCe t u r n i.nbard.

Chincse

Corntinism was r e d e f i n i n g i t s e l f , and t h i s b a s a time of c o n s i d e r a b l e i n t r o v e r s i o n f o r t h e PRC. Zhou E n l a i , who h e l d the r e i n s of f o r e i g n

p o l i c y as best he c o u l d , wanted n o E o r e i g n v e n t u r e s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d
Of

C h i n a s s e l f - i n d u c e d we:ikncss.

F i n a l l y , H;lnoi became p a r t i c u l a r l y

provoked w i t h Beij i n g o v e r t h e IRC - s r a p p r d c h e m e n t w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n 1971-72. T h i s was b a l a n c e d , hohCver, by t h e I)KVs d i s p l e a s u r e

w i t h t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e US-USSR d e t e n t r . .

Yct Hanoi had t o b e a r a l l 12 o f t h i s i n r e l a t i v e s i l c ? n c e , for t h e r e b a s no p l a c e e l s t ? t o go. E r a -o f - t h e

P a r i s Peace A c c o r d s

I j e i j i n g was c r i t i c a l . of Hanoi x h e n t h e l a t t e r a g r e e d t o e n t e r i n t o

peace t a l k s w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n A p r i l 1968, h h i l e Noscow s u p p o r t e d

t h e U R V i n t h i s maneuver.

The C h i n e s e were i n t h e l a s t g a s p s o f t h e

i d e o l o g i c a l r a d i c a l i s m of the C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n a t t h i s time and saw

t h e t a l k s a s a b e t r a y a l of t h e P e o p l e s War.

T h e y even t h r e a t e n e d t h e

North Vietnamese w i t h a c u t o f f o f a i d . p l o y t o c o n t r o l Hanoi more c l o s e l y .

Hci.jing a l s o s u s p e c t e d a S o v i e t

However, i n 1969 t h e PRC d i d an Not o n l y d i d

about f a c e and began t o s u p p o r t t h e P a r i s n e g o t i a t i o n s .

28

t h c C h i n e s e w p p o r t t h e t a l k s , b u t t h e y soon became c h a m p i o n s of m o d e r a tion. In 1911

Maii

u r g e d Lhani Van Dong t o e i n u l a t c B e i j i n g s h a n d l i n g oC

13
t h ( , Taiwan p r o b l ( m , i . e .
t h a t Hanoi e x e r c i s e p a t i e n c e .

This, too, rf-

f l t t c t e d i n t e r n a l C h i n e s e p o l i t i c s as well as i t s p e r c e p t i o n s of f o r e i g n affairs. Thv N i n t h CCI C o n g r e s s i n 1969 d e c i d e d t o a b o r t t h e v i o l e n c e

of t h e C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n a n d t o p u r s u e a somewhat more m o d e r a t e p a t h .
Thc C u l t u r a l . R e v o l u t i o n had t o r n C h i n a a p a r t a n d weakened i t c o n s i d erably. B e i j i n g bi,came n e r v o u s o v e r i t s v u l n e r a b i l i t y a s i t w i t n e s s e d i n v a s i o n oC C z e c h o s l o v a k i a i n 1968, w h i c h b a s j u s t i f i e d by

C ~ I PS0vii.t

t h e v e r y d a n g e r o u s Brezhnev d o c t r i n e .

A s e r i e s o f Cierce b o r d e r c l a s h e s
Thr

t o o k p l a c e b e t w e r n t h e C h i n e s e a n d S o v i e t s d u r i n g 1969 a s b e l l . Chines(, l c u d e r s h i p
bas

now i n t e r e s t e d i n k e e p i n g t h e l i d on a v e r y

ecplosive situation.

I t was i n t h i s a t m o s p h e r e t h a t t h e y embarked upon

t h e i r s t r a t e g y of r a p p r o c h e m e n t w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d r e c o n c i l i a -

t i o n i n S o ~ r t h c n n t Asia.

C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e C h i n e s e may not h a v e b e e n t o o

d i s p l e a s e d when t h e P a r i s P e a c e A c c o r d s were made o f f i c i a l o n 2 7 J a n u a r y 14 1973.

Ry 1971 t h r C h i n e s e had b e g u n t o s o b e r up f r o m t h e bingt? of t h e

Great P r o l e t a r i a n C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n and were s e e i n g t h e i r n a t i o n a l

i n t e r e s t s r a t h e r more c l e a r l y .

The U n i t e d S t a t e s was no l o n g e r p e r southern regions. The S o v i e t

c e i v e d t o bt? t h e g r e a t t h r e a t t o C h i n a s

Union s t o o d as t h e u n d i s p u t r d number o n e enemy, and C h i n a s m a i n s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e i n I n d o c h L n a was t o t h w a r t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o C S o v i e t power .Ln t h a t a r e a .

A d i v i d e d V i e t Nam w i t h a c o n t i n u i n g A m e r i c a n i n f l u e n c e

i n t h e S o u t h c o u l d be h e l p f u l i n a c c o m p l i s h i n g t h i s m i s s i o n ; a n d , acc o r d i n g t o t h e N o rt h V i e t n a m e s e , t h i s is p r e c i s e l y what t h e C h i n e s e s o ~ g h t . r h e y a s s e r t t h a t Zhou E n l a i t o l d them t o s t a n d down m i l i t a r i l y and n o t t r y t o c o n q u e r t h e S o u t h a n d t h a t Zhou o f f e r e d C h i n e s e e c o n o m i c

29

15
a s s i s t a n c e b u t no m i l i t a r y a i d . S t e p h e n D. Young, who s e r v ~ db i t h t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t i n V i c t N a m and w 8 s c l o s e t o Ambassador L ~ ~ s w o r t t l Hunker, has r e p o r t e d t h a t U ( ? i j i n g e v o n o E e r a d a i d t o Saigon i n t h e waning d a y s o f t h e w a r . A f t e r t h e P a r i s P c a s e Agreements were s i g n e d i n 1973, P e k i n g s e n t T h i e u a l e t t e r t h r o u g h t h e good o f t i c e s of S i n g a p o r e - s Lee Kwan Y e w . F e a r i u l o r thi? c o n s e q u e n c e s , T h i e u d i d n o t r e p l y . Then weeks b e f o r e t h e c o l l a p s e o f S a i g o n i n 1975, P e k i n g a g a i n a p p r o a c h e d T h i e u . Chis time t h e C h i n e s e u s e d his b r o t h e r as a c o n t a c t and o f f e r e d t o s u p p o r t S o u t h Vietnam a g a i n s t Hanoi i f C h i e u would o p e n a ew d o o r s t o power f o r t h e NLF [ N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n F r o n t ] . R e e l i n g from t h e c o l l a p s e o f tiis armies, T h i c u had no c o u r a g e f o r s u c h a d r a m a t i c g a m b l e . 1 6
Ihc H a n o i l e a d e r s h i p c o n s i d e r e d t h a t the I ) R V - s

i n t e r e s t s would be

s c r v e d b e s t by t a k i n g S o u t h Viet Nan1 a t t h e f i r s t p o s s i b l e o p p o r t u n i t y . The N o r t h V i e t n a m e s e p e r c e i v e d I l e i j i n g s o r e i g n p o l i c y as n modern

Of

v e r s i . o n o f t r a d i t i o n a l Hall chaiivi.nism, w i t h V i e t Nam t o p l a y t h e r o l e tributary s t a t e to the court a t Beijing.

Those who had been a n g e r e d by

C h i n a s w i l l i n g n e s s t o a c c e p t a d i v i d e d Viet Nan1 a t Geneva now saw history repeating itsel. Many i n Hanoi r e a s o n e d t h a t the PRC s i m p l y T h i s i s why t h e

wanted t o k e e p V i e t Nam i n a c o n s t a n t l y weakened s t a t e .

C h i n e s e had a l w a y s u r g e d p r o t r a c t e d lriar and why t h e y had o r i g i n a l l y opposed t h e P a r i s t a l k s .

A s long a s t h e war c o n t i n u e d , V i e t Nam would

remain d i v i d e d , and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and the S o v i e t Union would be a t

odds. T h u s , t h e PRC c o u l d o c c u p y t h e h i l l t o p w h i l e s e v e r a l t i g e r s

f o u g h t below.

Once t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s g o t underway, however, China r i s k e d

Now

becoming t h e odd man o u t a n d q u i c k l y s c r a m b l c d t o g e t i n t o t h e a c t . I 5 e i j i n g u r g e d Hanoi t o o b s e r v e t h e a g r e e m e n t s s c r u p u l o u s l y ,

t o l e a v e the

T h i e u g o v e r n m e n t b e , a g a i n w i t h t h e u l t i m a t e g o a l o f k e e p i n g V i e t Nam 17 weak and d i v i d e d . A f t e r t h e SRV F o r e i g n M i . n i s t r y p u b l i s h e d t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e i n i t s O c t o b e r 1Y79 White Book, 18 d e n i a l of t h e a l l e g a t i o n s .

t h e PRC i s s u e d a c a t e g o r i c a l

30

'The Norcli Vit!tnamese b e g a n t h e i r f i n a l o f f c n s i v v i n J a n u a r y 1 9 7 5 .

Sa i g o n s i ~ r r e n d e r m lon 30 A p r i l . .

A f t e r y e a r s of c o u r a g e o ~ ~r s esistance,

Soiitli VicL Nam liad h r c o n ~ f , t o t a l l y e x t ~ a u s t e d - - m o r a l l y and p h y s i c a l l y .

Its

long-timt! p a t r o n ,

the) U n i t e d S t a t e s , was i t s e l e x p e r i e n c i n g a
to

s e r i e s o f u n p r e c e d c n t e d i n t e r n a l c r i s e s and c o u l d n l J t come

its aid.

R c i j i n g c h e e r c d , a l o n g w i t h much of the r e s t o f the W o r l d , a s NVA t a n k s

smashed t h r o u g h the g a t e s o f t h e P r e s i d e n t i a l P a l a c e i n S a i g o n ; y e t , ns

C I I C ~ p r c c c d i n g p a r n g r a p h s d e m o n s t r a t e , a t r a d i t i o n of t h o u s a n d s o f y e a r s 19 i)! t r o u b l e s d i e s h a r d .

A ~ ~ i i c r tlii!ine a l a p p e a r s i n this examination of tlir h i s t o r y o t

Sino-Vietnomcsi. r e l a t i o n s .

I n h i s s t u d y of

the S i n o - F r e n c h b a r o f thl'

13805, t k n r y M c A l i i a v y makes t h e f o l l o w i n g o b s e r v a t i o n .

IC t h c r e i s o n e l ~ s s o nf o r C h i n a t o draw f r o m t h t ? e v e n t s o f t I w L a s t c e n c u r y and a q u a r t e r i t is t h a t m i l i t a r y w e a k n e s s on h e r p a r t c o n s t i t u t t s s a n i r r e s i s t i b l e i n v i t a t i o n t o a g g r e s s i o n f r o m a b r o a d , and t h a t Vietnam, u n d e r tlie c o n t r o l of a p o t e n t i a l enemy, must a l w a y s form a p e c u l i a r l y l e t h a l t h r e a t t o tier n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . 2 0

T h i s is a l e s s o n more a p p r o p r i a t e l y l e a r n e d by t h e V i e t n a m e s e t h a n tlic C h i i i e s r , f o r t h e C h i n e s e have l o n g b e e n a w a r e of i t .
On the o t l i e r

hand, t h e Chincse might he well a d v i s e d t o l e a r n a n o t h e r lesson. ~ i e t n a i n e s e - - w h e t t i e r Coirniunist or n o n - C a n m u n i s t , Soutticrner, bhether u n i t e d OK disunited--have

'The

whether N o r t h e r n e r o r

a l b a y s s o u g h t t h e i r own

j d r n t i t y a n d havi? alway!; r e s i s t e d Chinese d o m i n a t i o n no m a t t c r hob much

Lhey may h a v e a d m i r e d Chinese c u l t u r e .
U E ~ Cl e a r n e d

T h a t t h e s e and o t h e r lessons

i m p e r p c t l y - - b y b o t h t h e C h i n e s e and t h e V i e t n a m e s e - - b a s

< ] . l u s t r a t e d p o i g n a n t l y by t h e e v e n t s t h a t f o l l o w e d t h e u n i f i c a t i o n o f
Viet Nam by H a n o i i n 1975.

31

Interests, Goals, and S t r a t e g y

The spri.ng of 1975 ushered i n

throughout Indochina. Laos.

il

b a s i c power r e o r i e n t a t i o n

Communist r e g i m e s were e n s c o n c e d i n Cambodia and and c o n t i n u i n g

US i n f l u e n c e i n t h e r e g i o n bas a t i t s n a d i r ,

p o l i t i c a l d i s a r r a y i n Washington seemed t o p r e c l u d e a n y American r r a s s e r t i o n of p o k e r i n S o u t h e a s t Asia f o r t h e near term.

On t h e o t h e r

h a n d , t h e S o v i e t Union a p p e a r e d t o be e n t e r i n g a p e r i o d o f more a g g r e s s i . v e i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e T h i r d World.

W i t h t h i s new s i t u a t i o n , hob d i d B e i j i n g and llanoi e a c h perceive

i t s own i n t e r e s t s and g o a l s , and how much u n d e r s t a n d i n g d i d e a c h e x h i b i t

r e g a r d i n g t h e i n t e r e s t s and g o a l s of t h e o t h e r ? What p o l i c i e s and

s t r a t e g i e s d i d each f o l l o b t o s e c u r e i t s i n t e r e s t s and a c h i e v e i t s

goals?
china M a i n t a i n i n g a s e c u r e s o u t h e r n f l a n k was Uc!i,jing*s f i r s t s t r a t e g i c 21 i n t e r e s t regarding Indochina. W i t h Hanoi * s v i c t o r y i n 1 9 7 5 , B e i j i n g

became e v e r more c o n c e r n e d w i t h S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i n t h e a r e a and a c c u s e d

the S o v i e t s of t r y i n g t o p e n e t r a t e t h e a r e a through massive a i d pro22 grams. The PHC s u s p e c t e d t h a t t h c USSll was a t t e m p t i n g t o c o n t r o l a l l
of S o u t h A s i a and t h e I n d i a n Ocean by g a i n i n g f o o t h o l d s i n t h e tWo

e x t r e m i t i e s or t h e v a s t l a n d mass, v i z . ,
Southeast Asia.

i n S o u t h r e s t Asia a n d i n

Moscox had a l r e a d y s e c u r e d a p o s i t i o n i n S o u t h Yemen.

The C h i n e s e f e a r e d t h a t t h e S o v i e t s would be a b l e to d e v e l o p t h e o t h e r end of t h e p i n c e r s t h r o u g h a Moscor-Hanoi a x i s t h a t would f i r s t s e e k hegemony in I n d o c h i n a and t h e n i n a l l S o u t h e a s t A s i a . The C h i n e s e

32

l c a l e r s :;ecnic.d w i Lling t o a c c c p t tlie f a c t t h a t Vietnamese n a t i o n a l i s m

w u l d n s s c r t i t s e l f r a t h e r a g g r e s s i v e l y a t t h i s time a n d t h a t i t ~ ~ o u l d

t a k e on

iiii

anti-Chinesc posture.

What t h e C h i n e s a Eound u n a c c e p t a b l e ,

h o k e v e r , was t h e p o s s i , b i l , i t y t h a t Viet Nam ~ o u l dc o l l a b o r a t e w i t h t h e S o v i e t Ilnion t o d ( i m i n a t c C h i n a ' s Vietnamesc a c t i v e 23 t i o s t i l i.tv ~ o b a r dCambodia was r e g a r d e d a s p a r t i c u l a r l y o m i n o u s .

be i.jin g Cear<!d a polu(ir vilcuum i n Cambodia, which the S o v i e t s and

soutlierii [lank.

V i e t n a m e s e c i i u l d f i l l , and t h e C h i n e s e hoped t o dc!vrlop Cambodia i n t o a b u r t c r b p t w e m Vit!t

Nam and t h e r e s t o f S o u t h e a s L A s i a .
6100

For t h i s r i ? a s o n

t h e C h i n c s c L e a d e r s h i p bagan t o

the Pol P o t r e g i m e , r i ? p r e l i e n s i b l r 24 though i t may h a v e a p p e a r e d t o much of t h e w r ~ d . 'To t h e C h i n e s e , ii

S o v i e t c o n s o I i d ; i t i i , n i n S o u t h e a s t : Asia would be a s i g n i f i c a n t d r v r l o p 25 mt!nt i n i t s g r a n d s t r a t e g y o e n c i r c l i n g t h e PRC.

W i t h t h e f a 1 1 o f S o u t h V i c t Nam, the C h i n e s c developed a fundanit.n26 s t r a t e } ; ) t o g u i d e i t s r r l a t i o n s w i t h Communist VieL N n m . Heijing The C h i n e s c believed

t.11

dr:ci(lcd t u u s c r c ? s t r a i n t i n d e a l i n g w i t h l l a n o i . t h a t time b a s on t h i a i r s i d e .

They here r a t h e r c o n r i d e n t t h a t t h e

S o v i e t s woii1.d become o v e r b e a r i n g i n V i e t Nam and t h a t Hanoi w i u l d soon

become a l i e n a t e d .
bas

'They a l s o f e l t t h a t V i e t Nani-s p a t t e r n of d e v e l o p m e n t
C h i n a - s t h a n t o t h e S o v i e t U n i o n - s and t h a t , a s a
OK

more a k i n

tii

r e s u l t , t h e Vietnamesi? k o u l d I.ook
~ ( > s c o k . 'Cti\?

g u i d a n c c morp t o D e i j i n g t h a n t o

Uei j i n g l e a d e r s h i p p l a n n e d t o bend e v e r y e f f o r t t o a v o i d d i s p u w s w i t h its neighbors.

'L'he PRC h n u l d

bccoming i i i v o l v i ~ d i n H a n o i ' s

5,ork t o expand i . n t e r n a t i o n a 1 d i p l o m a t i c s u p p o r t t o b o l s t e r i t s p o s i t i o n .
T h i s would i n v o l v e c u l t i v a t i n g , e s p e c i a l l . y , Cambodia, t h e A s s o c i a t i o n o f

! i o u t h e a s t A s i a n N a t i o n s (ASEAN) c o u n t r i e s , J a p a n , and t h e U n i t e d 21 States. F i , n a l l y , t h e I'RC would o p p o s e a s s t r o n g l y as p o s s i b l e any ! s o v i e t p e n e t r a t i o n s i n t o the r e g i o n .

33

In a s s e s s i n g i t s n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s , l l a n o i was g u i d e d b y t h r e e

28
primary c o n s i d e r a t i o n s : history, i d e o l o g y , and t h e i m m e d i a t e t h r e a t . C h i n a h a d b e e n Viet Nam-s h i s t o r i c a l enemy, f o r a p e r i o d w h i c h s t r e t c h e d o v e r two m i l l e n n i a . This engendered a pervasive s u s p i c i o n

k i . t h i n Vietnamese t h i n k i n g t h a t c o u l d n o t b e e r a s e d e a s i l y .

I n terms o f i d e o l o g y , t h e V i e t n a m e s e - - c o n t r a r y t o C h i n e s e e x p e c t a tions--perceived a more a t t r a c t i v e model i n t h e USSR t h a n i n the PRC.

The DKV had Collowcd t h e M a o i s t p a t t e r n o f Land r e f o r m a n d r u r a l d c v e l opment i n t h e m i . d - I % Q s , and t h e p r o g r a m had p r o v o d t o b c , l a r g e l y , failure.
R

by 1960 Hanoi had d e t e r m i n e d n o t f o f o l l o w t h e PRC p a r a d i g m 29 revolution. The war b i t h S o u t h Viet Nan1 nntl t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s had a l s o i n f l u e n c e d Hanoi's thinking. The Viecnilmese Comnunis t s had S e e n

Of

f i r s t hand t h a t modern w a r E a r e r e q u i r e s e x t e n s i v e i n d u s t r i a l a n d t e c h n o L o g i c a l b a c k i n g , a n d t h e y had become i n c r e a s i n g l y d i s e n c h a n t e d k i t h t h e

Chinese c o n c e p t ~f p e o p 1 e . s

war, w h i c h p l a y s down the m a t e r i a l element

i n warfare.

Hanoi had n a t i o n a l i s t i c v i s i o n s o f hecoming a g r e a t power T h e r e f o r e , the S o v i e t

and w a n t e d t o d e v e l o p i t s o m i n d u s t r i a l b a s e .

e x a m p l e of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i d n a p p e a l e d more t o them t h a n t h e C h i n e s e p a t t e r n of r u r a l d e v e l o p m e n t .

I n s h o r t , they d i d n o t view t h e i r K C ! V O ~ U 30 t i o n a s t h e C h i n o se t h o u g h t t h e y would. Ttic Vietnainesc bere a l s o

p r o b a b l y h o p i n g t o use t h e S o v i e t s t o k e e p t h e C h i n e s e a t bay.

R e g a r d h g t h e i m m e d i a t e t h r e a t , t h e Hanoi g o v e r n m e n t s a v i t s e l f
c a u g h t b e t w e n two h o s t i l e p o w e r s who were i n c o n c e r t , t h e PRC a n d t h e Khmer Rouge * s Cambodia. The V i e t n a m e s e p e r c e i v e d t h e P R C - s f o r e i g n

p o l i c y t o be a n e x t e n s i o n o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l C h i n e s e t r i b u t a r y s y s t e m .

34

l n f a c t , tli(? V i e l n a m e s e suspected t h a t Maos T h i r d World t h e o r y was

: i

modern i n : i n i f t ~ s t a t i o n o f ! : h i s t r a d i t i o n a l C h i n e s e c o n r i g u r a t i o n .
saw China a s d e s i r i n g a malleable V i c t n a m e s e h e d g e

Ilanoi

s t a t e t o act as a

b u f f e r a l o n g Chin:is

Moreover, t h e Vietnamese Comu31 n i s t s c o n s i d e r e d I l c i j i n g t o be i n l e a g u e w i t h W a s h i n g t o n . H a n o i d e v c l o p e d a s t r a t e g y aimed a t c o n s o l i d a t i n g i t s s t i l l s h a k y p o s i t i o n in Indochina.

PIlC and Cambodia.

southern border.

F i r s t , i t would d e v e l o p n modus v i v e n d i w i t h t h c

S e c o n d , t h e V i e t n a m e s e l e a d e r s w u l d move q u i c k l y t o T h i r d , Viet Nan1 would c o u r t d i p l o m a t i c F o u r t h , Hanoi w u l d

g a i n priintiry i l i f l u e n c f ~i n Laos.

s l i p p o r t , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e r e s t of S o u t h e a s t A s i n . 32 r e n u i n on good tlirms w i t h t h e S o v i e t Union.

W r c e p t i o n s and N i s p e r c e p t i o n s 130th (:hin;i and Vict Nam p e r c e i v e d t h e i r

a ional security i n t e r e s t s
kitti

to

Ibi?

t h e most p r e s s i n g i m m e d i a t e f o r e i g n p o l i c y p r o b l e m i n d e a l i n g

e n c h o t h ( ! r iri m i d - 1 9 7 5 . forces.

Each saw i t s e l f as b e i n g e n c i r c l e d by h o s t i l e i n considering t h e position o

N r i t h e r b a s v(.,ry p e r s p i c a c i o u s

the o t h e r .

C h i n a d i d n o t a p p e a r t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e a l a r m H a n o i would The PRC f e a r e d most o f a l l t h e p o s -

[ ( ? e l o v e r a n u n f r i e n d l y Cambodia.

s i b i l i t y o f s i g n i f i c a n t S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i n V i e t Nam. h a s H a n o i t o go t o s e c u r e a p o w e r f u l p a t r o n ?

Yet where e l s e

The Vietnamese p e r c e i v e d ,

c o r r e c t l y , C h i n a s d e s i r e t o have b u f f e r s t a t e s a l o n g i t s s o u t h e r n b o r d e r ; b u t the!y d i d n o t a s s c s s c o r r e c t l y C h i n a s extreme s e n s i t i v i t y t o

i . t s t e r r i t o r i a l s e c u r i t y , e s p e c i a l l y where t h e S o v i e t Union m i g h t become involved. lioth s i d e s i n i t i a l l y p l a n n e d t o p l a y o r time, w h i c h ,

a c c o r d i n g t o H o l s t i , i s a s i g n of good c r i s i s management.

E v e n t s were

soon t o s t a r t moving f a s t e r t h a n e i t h e r s i d e had a n t i c i p a t e d .

35

A P o l i c y of C a u t i o n , 1975-1977

A E t c r thc. N o r t h V i e t n a m c s e c o n q u e s t o f the S o u t h i n A p r i l 1975, t h c

C h i n e s e a d o p t e d a p o l i c y o f c a u t i o n and r e s t r a i n t i n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e changed s i t u a t i o n i n S o u t h e a s t Asia. which i t s o u g h t t o a c h i e v e .

The PKC had b a s i c s t r a t e g i c g o a l s

Beijing kished t o e s t a b l i s h a configuration

of i n f l u e n c e i n S o u t h e a s t Asia t h a t would maximize C h i n e s e l e a d e r s h i p i n

thc r e g i o n .
area.

The C h i n e s e wanted t o t h w a r t any S o v i e t a d v a n c e s i n t h e

'To a c c o m p l i s h t h e s c o b j e c t i v c s , t h e PRC l e a d e r s h i p p l a n n e d t o p u t

p r i m a r y e m p h a s i s on d i p 1 o m a t i c m a n e u v e r s , e c o n m i c b l a n d i s h m e n t s , and p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s programs.

W i t h s p e c i f i c r e g a r d t o Hanoi, B e i j i n g

s o u g h t t o a v o i d any c o n f r o n t a t i o n t h a t h o u l d e x a c c r b a t ? tlie S i n o -

33
V i e t n a m e s e d i s p u t e and p u s h t h c Victnamosc c1osr.r t o t h c S o v i e t s . C o n t e n t i o u s L s s u e s , 1975

Ln s p i t e of C h i n a - s d e s i r e t o l i m i t t e n s i o n s , a s e r i e s of c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e s developed. The most s i g n i i c a n t o f t h e s e i s s u e s i n c l u d e d :

(1) d i f f e r e n t s t r a t e g i c p e r c e p t i o n s ;

( 2 ) a t t e m p t s by e a c h s i d e t o o u t -

maneuver t h e o c h e r ; ( 3 ) the s t a t u s o t Laos; ( 4 ) t h e d i s p u t e o v e r t h e S p r a t l y and P a r a c e l i s l a n d s ; ( 5 ) t h e c o n f l i c t o v e r t h e b o r d e r b e t k e e n China and V i e t N a m ; ( 6 ) t h e O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e p r o b l e m ; ( 7 ) t h e S i n o Vietnamese r i v a l r y i n S o u th e a s t As ia ; ( 8 ) t h e q u e s t i o n of a i d ; ( 9 ) t h e Cambodian s i t u a t i o n ; and ( 1 0 ) t h e r o l e o f t h e S o v i e t Union i n t h e r e -

gion.

Of t h e s e i s s u e s , t h e l a s t was by f a r t h e most s e r i o u s bone of

c o n t e n t i o n ; and i t p l a y e d a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t i n a l l o f t h e o t h e r problems.
T h e PRC p e r c e i v e d a power vacuum i n S o u t h e a s t Asia due t o t h e

c o l l a p s e of t h e American e f f o r t t o s u s t a i n the non-Communist r e g i m e s i n

36

t h i s a s r i p e f o r S o v i e t e x p l o i t a t i o n and f e a r e d 34 b e i n g flanki!d on t h e s o u t h by Moscow. indochinil. Ilei.jing

SRW

'The C l i i n r s o began s i g n a l l i n g the V i e t n a m e s e a l m o s t

i m m e d i a t e l y of

t h v i r c o n c i ? r i ~t h a t Moscow would t r y t o g a i n a d v a n t a g e i n llanoi a t Bci.jing*ri e x p e n s c .

On 2 9 J u l y 1975 an e d i t o r i a l i n Ren Min R i Bao

'The e d i t -

-_-_

c a u t i o n e d Hanoi a g a i n s t bcconiing t o o c l o s e t o t h e S o v i e t s .

o r i a l usr?d tlie o l d adagc o a l l o w i n g t h e t i g e r ( t h e USSK) t o come i n t h e

35
back d o o r whiie k i c k i n g the wolf ( t h e U S ) o u t of t h e f r o n t d o o r .
0 1 1

September 1 9 1 5 PKC V i c e - P r e m i e r Chcm X i l i a n , k h i l c s p e a k i n g in Viet Nom, 36 warned Hanoi t o gilard a g a i n s t bc,coining a v i c t i m o r S o v i c t hegemonism.

In t h e f a l l o f 1075, LE Uuan, t h e S e c r e t a r y - G r n e r a l of the V i r ~Nam

W o r k e r s ' P a r t y (VWP), made t r i p s t o b o t h B e i j i n g and Moscow. These

t r i p s were s i . g n i f i c a n t b t a c a u s e t h e y e s t a b l i s h e d t h e g e n e r a l o t i t l i n c o f Hanoi's r e l a t i o n s w i t h tlie C h i n e s e and t h e S o v i e t s .

Ln September t h e
'Cherr Drng X i a o p i n g

V i c t n n m e s r S c c r c t u r y - G e n c r a l j o u r n e y c d t o the P n C .

r e i t e r a t p d C h i n a - s c o n c e p t o f t h e T h i r d World and a s s e r t e d t h a t i t was 37 i.1, t h e b e s t i n t e r c i s c s o f Hanoi t o a l i g n i t s e l f w i t h t h i s movement.

The C h i n e s e had d e v e l o p e d the 'Third World n o t i o n t o p r o j e c t i t s l e a d e r 38 s h i p among the less d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s . The V i e t n a m e s e f o r t h e i r

p a r t s a x t h i s a s s t i f l i n g t h e i r own f o r e i g n p o l i c y o p t i o n s , a s e n d a n g e r i n g t h e i r r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e S o v i e t Union, and a s bei.ng w h o l l y i n t h e

i n t e r e s t s o f t h e PRC.
w1.th

Ln O c t o b e r Le Duan v i s i t e d Moscow.

His m e e t i n g s

t h e S o v i e t s werr' r a t h e r more c o r d i a l t h a n Lhose k i t h t h e C h i n e s e .

l i i s t e a d of p r e s s u r i n g h i m , the S o v i e t s o f f e r e d him a i d , t o t h e amount of 39 t h r e e b i l l i o n d o l l a r s over t h e next f i v e y e a r s . 'The q i i e s t i . o n of a i d became a v e r y sore p o i n t between the C h i n e s e and V i e t n a m e s e .
I n e a r l y 1975 R e i j i n g had g i v e n Hanoi c o n s i d e r a b l e a i d :

i n s u p p o r t o f Hanoi's

f i n a l o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t S n i g o n , and t o make up f o r

37

the l o s s o f W e s t e r n s u p p l i e s t o t h e S o u t h w i t h t h e d e t e a t o f t h e Repub-

l i c o f V i r t Rani.

China had been s u p p o r t i n g North Vice Nan1 w i t h a b o u t

$600 m i l l i o n i n g r a t i s a i d p e r y e a r , and Hanoi a p p a r e n t l y had c o u n t e d on

r e c e i v i n g this i n the f u t u r e .

I n August 1 9 7 5 , h o s e v e r , B e i j i n g i n f o r m e d

Hanoi t h a t i.t was r e d u c i n g i t s a i d p a c k a g e t o $400 m i l l i o n p e r year. and 40 t h a t i t would be i n t h e form o f lo an s. Nor would t h e PKC s i g n a l o n g 41 term economic a s s i s t a n c e a g r e e m e n t , which Hanoi had been a n t i c i p a t i n g . B e i . j i n g was s i g n a l l i n g Hanoi t h a t i t h a d b e t t e r behove. Hanoi p e r c e i v e d

i t a s a b l a c k m a i l m i n e u v e r and a c c u s e d C h i n a o f a d o p t i n g a c a r r o t and 42 s t i c k policy. The i s s u e o f t h e O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e a l s o f l a r e d u p s h o r t l y a f t e r

Hanoi-s v i c t o r y o v e r t h e S o u t h .

V i f t Nam had Over o n e m i l l i o n O v e r s e a s

43
Chinese, a b o u t f o u r - f i f t h s o f whom l i v e d in t h e S o u t h .

S i n c e 1949

Beijing's

i n t e r e s t i n t h e O v e r s e a s Chines(: c o m m u n i t y i n g e n e r a l had
A s o t h e r p r o b l e m s de-

waxed and waned d c p e n d i n g o n a s s o r t e d f a c t o r s .

v e l o p e d b e t s e e n China and V i e t Nam, however, t h e PKC c o u l d n o t a f f o r d t o o v e r l o o k a c t i o n s t a k e n b y llanoi a g a i n s t t h c O v c r s e a s C h i n e s e , f o r B e i j i n g p e r c e i v e d s u c h a c t i o n s a s a d i r c c t a f f r o n t t o the C h i n e s e leadership. For i t s p a r t Hanoi t h o u g h t i t had good r e a s o n t o t a k e The V i e t n a m e s e l e a d e r s

a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e C h i n e s e l i v i n g i n Viet Nam.

f e a r e d t h a t t h e O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e would become a f i f t h column t h a t would o p p o s e t h e government. They saw t h e s p e c t e r o f Malaya a n d I n d o n e s i a .

Hanoi was a l s o e a g e r t o g e t a t t h e r i c h C h i n e s e m e r c h a n t s o f t h c S o u t h . T h e i r c o n s i d e r a b l e w e a l t h would c e r t a i n l y be o f a s s i s t a n c e t o the f i n a n c i a l l y s t r a p p e d Vietnamese t r e a s u r y .

as

There was a n i d e o l o g i c a l e l e m e n t

well.

Hanoi c o u l d s t r i k e a blow a t t h e S o u t h e r n " c a p i t a l i s t " s t r u c -

44
t u r e by n e u t r a l i z i n g t h e C h i n e s e b u s i n e s s community. Additionally,

38

th(?re berc

Ctie

p a s s i o n s o f x e n o p h o b i a and r a c i s m l o o s e d by t h e sucChinese r c f u g c e s began f l e e i n g South

co!;sEul ~ : o u q i l c s t of t h e S o u t l i .

V i i ? t Nom a s :soon a s t h e (:ommunist m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y a p p e a r e d i s m i n e n l .

I n Flay of 1975 t h e D a n i s h s h i p C l a r a Maersk r e s c u e d a b o u t 4 , 0 0 0 Chinese

r e f u g e e s f r o m Viet Nam i n t h e S o u t h C h i n a S e a . L a r g e numbers of Chinese 45 were f l e e i n g t o Hong Uonj:. In S a i g o n a n t i - C h i n e s e measures commenced

w i t t i t h e CanniunisI- t a k e - o v e r of t h e c i t y . The PRC f l a g was f o r b i d d e n t o 46 be! f l o w n . S h o r t l y b e f o r e dawn on 11 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 7 5 , V i e t n a m e s e Commun i s t p o l i c e r a i d e d t h e homes a n d businesses o f l a r g e n u m b e r s of O v e r s e a s CIii.nesi! i n S a i g o n and s e i z e d t h e i r p r o p e r t y .
$1i n i s t c r
0I

Huynh Can P h a t , t h e Prime

t h e lr ov i s i o n a 1 Rcvo l u t i o n a r y Cove rnmen t ( PRG )

W ~ K C conducting

announcctl

t l i a t the Vietnamese

a p r o g r a m to w i p e

OlJt

compradore cut in

47
c . i p i t a 1is t s . I T h i s may h a v e been H a n o i s response t o Beijings

a i d a r m ~ n t he a r l i e r .
rcspondi.ng
to

I f i t w a s , t h e V i e t n a m e s e w e r e c e r t a i n l y not
The c l a m p cool

C h i n a a s s i g n a l as t h e C h i n e s e would h a v e them.

d o r n on t h e O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e may a l s o h a v e c o n t r i b u t e d t o Le Duans r e c e p t i o n in B e i j i n g l a t e r i n September. Nevertheless, the Chinese

loadership continued t o a c t w i t h r e s t r a i n t .

T h e r e was no v i t u p e r a t i v e

o u t p o u r i n g a g a i n s t Hanoi. a s t h e r e would b e l a t e r a f t e r s i m i l a r provocations. The t e r r i t o r i a l d i s p u t e s came i n t o t h e o p e n d u r i n g t h i s e a r l y p o s t b,iir

period

its

well.

T h c s r e n c o m p a s s e d two a r e a s :

t h e maritimr regions

and t h c Innrl b o r d e r .

T h e r e was c o n s i d e r a b l e b i c k e r i n g o v P r o k n e r s h i p o f There

v a r i o u s i s l a n d s , e s p e c i a l . l y t h e P a r n c e l and t h e S p r i l t l y g r o u p s .

tras a l s o a r g u m e n t o v e r t e r r i t o r i a l waters i n t h e G u l f o f T o n k i n . T h e s e

maritime d i s p u t e s had some merit i n and of t h e m s e l v e s beCauSe t h e r e :;ions tion. i n q u e s ~ : i o nwould a p p e a r t o o f f e r o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r o i l e x p l o r a The l a n d b o r d e r i s s u e , h o w e v e r , was l a r g e l y a s t r a w man.

It

39

became t h e symbol of a l l t h e o t h e r d i f f i c u l t i e s i n S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e r c l a t i o n s , and i t developed i n t o t h c f l a s h p o i n t f o r d i r e c t m i l i t a r y confrontation. A c c o r d i n g t o tlic V i e t n a m c s c , b o r d e r El arc?-ups had begun 48 t o o c c u r a s e a r l y as 1974. D o u b t l e s s l y , b o t h s i d e s s o u g h t t o use the

b o r d e r c l a s h e s a s a s i g n a l ; b u t these s i g n a l s proved t o be i n e f f e c t i v e b e c a u s e each s i d e p e r c e i v e d the b o r d e r maneuvers oC thc o t h e r as r e p r e 49 s e n t i n g t o t a l l y inamicable i n t e n t i o n s . Both sides began s t r a t e g i c maneuvers t o g a i n l e v e r a g e o v e r t h e o t h e r i n 1975. I l c i j i n g s o i ~ g l i t t o b u i l d a broad c o a l i t i o n t o s u p p o r t i t s
I t i n i t i a t e d 'a r a p i d r a p p r o c h e m c n t k i t h

p o s i t i o n i n Southeast Asia.
ASEAN.

The C h i n e s ( : a l s o e n c o u r a g P d Washington n o t t o h i t h d r a l v p r e -

c i p i t o u s l y from A s i a b u t t o c o n t i n u e t o m a i n t a i n a s t r o n g p r e s c n c c , 50 p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e P a c i f i c and I n d i a n Oceans. Although Hanoi, too, would soon t r y t o i n v o l v e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and ASEAN i n t h e r e g i o n , i t found t h i s t o be e x t r e m e l y i r r i t a t i n g i n 1975 i n Lhe i m n e d i a t e h a k e o f t h o war.
l n f r a m i n g i t s p o i n t o f r e E e r e n c e , howcver,

Beijing has c l e a r

i n e m p h a s i z i n g t h a t i t s main c o n c e r n was Sovi.et e x p a n s i o n i s m .

i t s s i g n a l s s t r e s s e d this.

A l l of

T h e Chinese h c r e c a r e f u l n o t t o be v i t r i o l i c

i n r e f e r r i n g t o t h e Vietnamese.

H a n o i , t h o u g h , seemed t o be e x t r e m e l y

u n s o l i c i t o u s of C h i n e s e views and q u i t e i n s e n s i t i v e t o C h i n e s e c o n c e r n s , f o r t h e V i e t n a m e s e l e a d e r s h i p came dawn o p e n l y a n d e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y on

t h e S o v i e t s i d e of e v e r y i s s u e .

Even more a l a r m i n g t o t h e Cliiiiesc here

v a r i o u s a g r e e m e n t s between Hanoi a n d Moscow t h a t e s t a b l i s h e d a c o n s i d e r a b l e S o v i e t p r e s e n c e i n V i e t Nam and g a v e t h e S o v i . e t s g r e a t i n fluence i n t h a t country.

F o l l o l v i n g Le Duan's

t r i p t o Moscolv i n O c t o b e r

o l 1975, E d i t h L e n a r t r e p o r t e d

in Far E a s t e r n Economic Review:

40

Mnscou e f f o r t s t o d i m i n i s h C h i n a ' s In tiirn, th(! S o v i 1 . t ~ :ire b a c k i n g I l a n o i . s movu Lowards a s p e e d y r e u n i f i c a t i ( i n 0 1 Vietnam. F o r i t s p a r t , P e k i n g had hoped t h a t t h e r e u n i f i c a t i o n ~ K O C ( ? S S b o u l d ho gradu:il.. The l a t e s t S o v i e t a i d a g r e e m e n t k i t h H a n o i g r a n t s t h e V i e t n a m e s e a n u n d i s c l o s e d amount of " c r e d i t s on c>asy tiirms." I t c a l A s f u r t h e " c o o r d i n f l t i o ( 1 o f t h e , twy c o u n t r i e s : de: v c l o p m e n t p l a n s and p r o v i d e s f o r S o v i e t s p e c i a l i s t s t o t r a i n V i e t namest5 in Viet Nam i n v a r i o u s b r a n c h e s o f cconomy, s c i e n c e , t e c h n o l o g y and c u l t u r e . " The S o v i e t Union w i l l " a s s i s t i n d e v e l o p i n g V i r t n a m e s i ! i n d u s t r y a n d a g r i c u l t u r e and s t u d y t h e t e c h n i c a l a n d e c o n o m i c ;Ispc!cts o f 1 ; i u n c h i n g S e v e r a l m a j o r c c o n o m i c p r o . j e c t s i n V i e t n a m . "5 1

The V i f t n a m f v c

. . support

influence i n tlie 'Third World and among n o n - a l i g n e d n a t i o n s .

...

T h a t V i s t Nam b o i i l d s e e k S o v i e t a i d a n d s u p p o r t i s n o t s u r p r i s i n g ,
arid p e r h a p s tlie C t i i i i o s i ~ would tiAvc, t i 1 1 c r : ~ t e d a m e a s u r e o f S o v i e t -

V i e t n a m e s e c o o p e r n t i u n w i t h o u t b e c o m i n g o v e r l y u p s e t ; b u t Hanoi u s e d i t s Scmviet c o n n e c t i o n n o t merely t o r e b u i l d the c o u n t r y b u t also a s to brandish in

th1,
: I

wapon

fact? o f t h e C h i n e s e .

By t h e nnd o f 1 9 7 5 , V i e t n a m ' s

ritibspaprrs r a n s r r i a l p a n c g y r i c s t o t h e S o v i e t Union and t h e S o v i e t system. Hanoi's d e s i . r e t o dominate a l l of Indochina c o u l d h a r d l y be d i s -

guised.

S u p p o r t e d b y t h e S o v i e t s , t h e Vietnamese r e s u r r e c t e d t h e i d e a Beijing feared the p o s s i b i l i t y

of a n I n d o c h i n a f e d e r a t i o n i n l a t e 1975.

t h a t t h i s might: Lead t o a n e v e n s t r o n g e r power on i t s s o u t h e r n b o r d e r and o p p o s e d t h e n o t i o n . Having c o n t r o l l e d t h c main f a c t i o n of thc

P a t h e t L a o Srorn i t s v e r y i n c e p t i o n , H a n o i was soon t o e x e r c i s e a u t h o r i t y

O V ~ KLaos.

W i t h t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e Lao P e o p l e ' s

D e m o c r a t i c RepubOK

l i c i n December 1975, H a n o i ' s d o m i n a t i o n o f t h a t c o u n t r y was most p a r t c o m p l e t e .

the

The PKC a c c e p t e d V i e t n a m e s e i n f l u e n c e i n Laos w i t h a c e r t a i n amount o f good g r a c e . Cambodia. Whnre B t ! i j i n g was d e t e r m i n e d t o make a s t a n d was k i t h
ii

I t was

poor c h o i c e .

C h i n a ' s a l l i a n c e w i t h t h e Khmer

Nouge's D e m o c r a t i c Kampiichea c o u l d do n o t h i n g b u t c a u s e B e i j i n g d i s c o m fiture. S u p p o r t i n g t h e g e n o c i d a l r e g i m e o f Pol P o t p u t China i n

( I

very

41

u n c o m f o r t a b l e p o s i t i o n ; and Communist Cambodias b e l l i g e r e n t i m t r a n s i g e n c c t o w a r d Viet Nnm was a l m o s t c e r t a i n t o lead t o w a r , ~ h i c h wou1.d p o s e C h i n a t h e dilenmin o f how t o r e s p o n d . N e v e r t h e l e s s , there

bere s e v e r a l r e a s o n s f o r i n i t i a l h o p e s i n China t h a t a Cambodian a l l i a n c e would b e a p p r o p r i a t e . F i r s t , the Khmer Rouge had f o l l o w e d t h e S e c o n d , i t had no s t r o n g t i e s

M a o i s t model o f r e v o l u t i o n a r y w a r f a r e .
bitti

Moscow.

I t had b e e n b a n k r o l l e d by the PRC a l m o s t e x c l u s i v e l y .

T h i r d , i t f l a n k e d Viet Nam t o t h e west a n d s t o o d a t h w a r t H a n o i - s p a t h t o

t h v r e s t of S o u t h e a s t A s i a .

F o u r t h , t h e Khmer Kougc has m i l i t a n t l y

anti-Vi.etnamese.

T h i s l a s t p o i n t has b o r n m i t by Cambodian a t t a c k s

a g a i n s t t h o Vietnamese a l o n g t h e b o r d e r and in t h e South C h i n a Sea i n 53 May and J u n c o f 1975. J u s t as t h e Vietnamesc seemed i n s e n s i r i v e t o Chinese concerns i n d e a l i n g k i t h the S o v i e t s , the Chinese l i k e w i s e d i d n o t SIIOW much a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r V i e t n a m c s e c o n c e r n s i n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e
Khmer Rouge l e a d e r s Khieu Sampham a n d I r n g S a r y v i s i t e d

Cambodians.

B e i . j i n g i n August of 1 9 7 5 .

They r e c e i v o d b o t h a warn1 welcome and a T h i s was a t a

promise of c o n s i d e r a b l e a i d , i n c l u d i n g m i l i t a r y hardware.

time when t h e r e w r e a c t i v e b o r d e r h o s t i l i t i e s betwcnn Cambodia a n d Viec 54 Nam a n d a t a time clien C h i n a was r e d u c i n g i t s a i d t o t l a n o i . The
Cambodians, f o r t h e i r p a r t , d e c l a r e d c o m p l e t e s u p p o r t f o r t h e p o l i c i e s 55 o f t h e PRC. By t h e end t h e e n d o f 1 9 7 5 , b o t h s i d e s had s t a k e d o u t t h e i r p o s i tions.

R e i j i n g had i s s u e d numerous s i g n a l s t o H a n o i b a r n i n g t h a t t h e

USSR was t r y i n g t o make Viet Nam n s a t e l l i t e a n d t h a t good r e l a t i o n s

w i t h t h e PKC h o u l d d e p e n d on how f a r Hanoi d i s t a n c e d i t s e l f f r o m
Moscow.

In g e n e r a l , B e i j i n g s c r i t i c i s m s o f Hanoi were r e s t r a i n e d a n d
The C h i n e s e w a n t e d i t c l e a r t h a t i t m s Noscob t h e y f e a r e d .

low-keyed.

42

111 t h i s Ithey seenicil t o bP i n a c c o r d w i t h I l o l s t i ' s p r i n c i p l e s o f good c r i s i s managcmenl.

!Jlierc the C h i n e s e showed rathi!r ltiss s k i l l was i n

t h e i r q u i c k r e d u c t i o n o f a i d t o llanoi and i n t h e i r u n q u a l i f i e d s u p p o r t
of Cambodia.

Had t h e y u s e d a b i t more c a r r o t t h a n s t i c k i n t h e s e e a r l y

s i g n a l s , t h e y may h a v e b e e n more s u c c e s s f u l i n d e f e r r i n g Hanoi from t a k i n g a c t i o n s t h e y deemed u n a c c e p t a b l e . p o s i t i v e l y t o n o n e of t h e C h i n e s e s i g n a l s .

'The V i e t n a m e s e seeined t o r e a c t

Almost i m m e d i a t e l y Hanoi

dtiveloped c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h Moscow i n a n e f f o r t t o d e t e r C h i n e s < ! i i i l ' l u e n c e i n SouLhctast A s i a and t o e n s c o n c e V i e t n a m e s e power t h r o u g h o u t Lndochina.

Cm>ritent i o n Continues,

1976-1977

Tht. y v a r s 1976 and 1977 saw a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the p a t t e r n s e s t n b Listied i n 1975; y e t c r i s i s management seemed t o b e w o r k i n g . d e [ i n i t i ! ea:iing o f t e n s i o n s i n 1976. This
was

T h e r e was a

d u e t o some e x t e n t a t

l p a s t t o t h ? f a c t t h a t t h e p a r t i e s c o n c e r n e d were p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h i n t e r n a l problems. The PRC w i t n e s s e d t h e d e a t h s o f Zhou E n l a i a n d Mao

Zedong, t h e f a l l . from g r a c e f o r t h e s e c o n d time o f Deng X i a o p i n g , and t l i r p u r g e of t h e Gang of Fo u r. Hanoi was busy s o l i d i f y i n g N o r t h e r n Even t h e

c o n t r o l o v e r t h e S o u t h a n d commencing p o s t - w a r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n .

Khmer Kollge were i n a q u i e s c e n t p e r i o d i n t h e i r f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s . D u r i n g 1976 Hanoi hoped t o d c v e l o p a r e a s o n a b l y i n d e p e n d e n t f o r r i g r l p o l i c y by i m p r o v i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h C h i n a a n d t h e West and by h o l d i n g the :;oviets a t a b i t o f a d i s t a n c e . Both C h i n e s e and V i e t n a m e s e p r e s s Economic a n d e d u c a t i o n a l

,:overage of t h e o t h e r became more c o r d i a l .

56
d e l e g a t i o n s o n c e more
W ~ K Ce x c h a n g e d .

Chines<? s i g n a l s t o Viet Nam a t t h i s time were g e n e r a l l y p o s i t i v e .

On 2 J u l y 1976, V i c t Nam was o f f i c i a l l y r e u n i f i e d and t h e S o c i a l i s t 43

R e p u b l i c o f Viet Nam (SRV) d e c l a r e d .

A l t h o u g h B e i j i n g h a d hoped t h a t a n

i n d e p c n d e n t Corrmiunist r e g i m e m i g h t s u r v i v e i n S o u t h Viet Nam f o r some

time, the C h i n e s e l e a d e r s h i p s e n t s e v e r a l m e s s a g e s o f good h i l l

57
w i t h the rvunification.

t o Hanoi

M o r e o v e r , t h e V i e t n a m e s e seemed t o bc r e s p o n -

d i n g p o s i t i v e l y f o r a change.

On I J u l y 1976 Hanoi p u b l i s h e d a r a t h e r

harm message o f c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s on t h e o c c a s i o n of t h e f i f t y - f i f t h

58
a n n i v e r s a r y o f t h e f o u n d i n g o f t h e CCP.

On 10 Scptismber 1 9 7 6 , t h e

V i e t n a m e s e s e n t c o n d o l e n c e s t o B e i j i n g on the d e a t h o f Mao Zedong. 59 T h e i r message s t r e s s e d Sino-Vietnamese F r i e n d s h i p . F u r t tierniorc, t he V i e t n a m e s e were of c o n s i d e r a b l e a s s i s t a n c e t o t h c C h i n ~ s e i n t h e c m 60 b a l m i n g o f Mao's body and i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f h i s mausoleum.
I.Jlii12

t e n s i o n s had b e e n r e l a x e d i n 1976, the c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e s The PRC c o n t i n u e d t o r e d u c e i t s a i d t o H a n o i . Uy t h e e n d o f

remained.

1 9 7 6 , m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e had b e e n c u r t a i l e d s h a r p l y , and v i r t u a l l y a l l 61 g r a n t s h a d been r e p l a c e d by l o a n s . " a r t of t h i s p e r c e i v e d p a r s i r o n y

bas t h e r e s u l t o f C h i n a ' s d e s i r e t o i n v e s t i t s l i m i t e d r e s o u r c e s more
i n t e n s i v e l y i n i t s ovn m o d e r n i z a t i o n program. Clashes a l o n g t h e S i n o -

Vietnamese b o r d e r a p p a r e n t l y c o n t i n u e d t o break o u t d u r i n g 1976, but i t 62 is i n s t r u c t i v e t h a t n e i t h e r s i d e made much of t h e s e . R e l a t i v e l y c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s liere t o p r e v a i l . t h r o u g h o u t much o f 1977.

On 10 J a n u a r y 1 9 7 7 , a Long a r t i c l e i n Ken Min K i Bao r e c a l l e d t h e

__--

d a y s o f S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e f r i e n d s h i p a n d Zhou E n l a i - s s p e c i a l a f f e c t i o n 63 f o r Viet Nam. F u r t h e r p o s i t i v e s i g n a l s were t o f o l l o v . 'She Chinese

lvere p a r t i c u l a r l y p l e a s e d by * h a t a p p e a r e d t o be a d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n

S o v i c t - V i e t n a m e s e r e l a t i o n s a t t h e time.

Thr V i e t n a m e s e h a d b e e n e x -

p r e s s i n g t h e i r d i s c o n t e n t u i t h t h e amount (if S o v i e t a i d and w i t h S o v i e t

high -handadni~ ss
M a r c h 1977
t h I ?

'The Chinese r e s p o n d e d by e n c o u r a g i n g H a n o i . On IY 65 PI((: i i n d tlie SRV c o n c l u d c d : I t r a d c agreement. Hano i

r\

(14

a l s o madc, moves t o improvi. r c l a t i o n s w i t h W a s h i n g t o n .

undi!r

cnnmission

Li?onard Woodcock v i s i t e d t h e SKV i n March

O F 1 9 7 7 , b u t normalizai n s i s t e n c e t h a t WashB e i j i n g may have had

t i o n o l US-SKV r e l a t i o n s bogged down o v e r I l a n o i ' s 66 i n g t o n p:iy h u g e r e p a r a t i o n s :IS a p r e c o n d i t i o n .

mixed f r e 1 i n i : s a b o u t an A m e r i c a n - V i e t n a m e s e r a p p r o c h e m e n t . h a n d , t h e PRC wanted t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o p l a y a n a c t i v e ~ S o u t h e a s t A s i a t o coiliiter t h e S o v i e t s . p r o b a b l y hiivt! b c e r i di:;pli!;ised

On the
o i nl

01113

On tlie o t h o r h a n d , U e i j i n g w o 1 1 1 d

i f t h e Ur1itc.d St;iti:s had recognized t l i v

SKV b e f o r e i t had r e c o g n i z e d t h e PIC.

The! n ~ a j o r inipeiIimt?nt t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t n i c1osc.r

t i e s brrween
W ~ K .

Hanoi and B e i j i n g i n 1977 was t h e r e k i n d l i n g o f t h e Cambodian

1:igtiting began a l o n g t h e b o r d e r i n A p r i l a n d i n t e n s i f i e d as tht! y ~ a r

wr!nt
on.

'I'ht! PRC had armed a n d s u p p o r t e d t h e Khmer Rouge r e g i m e , which

a n g e r e d the Vif.tnamesi:.

The Cambodians had i n c r e a s e d t h e i r m i l i t a r y 61 s t r e n g t h from s i x t o e l e v e n d i v i s i . o n s s i n c e 1975. D u r i n g October o f 1977 S o v i e t - V i e t n a m e s e r e l . a t i o n ~began t o improve

once more.

A t l e a s t e i g h t h i g h r a n k i n g d e l e g a t i o n s from t h e S o v i e t Union

v i . s i t e d t h e SRV i n O c t o b e r .

T h i s r e p r e s c n t e d a r e a f f i r m a t i o n of S o v i e t Hanoi r e s p o n d e d w i t h a

Vietnamesi? c o o p e r a t i o n a c r o s s a b r o a d f r o n t .

" l e a r n from t h e S o v i e t Union" c a m p a i g n , accompanied by t h e u s u a l s e r i e s

o f f u l s o m e iiews e d i t o r i a l s i n t h e ma.jor p a p e r s a n d . j o u r n a l s .

The SRV

moved c l o s e r t o t h c USSR f o r s e v e r a l r e a s o n s .
d i f f i c u l t ies

H a n o i was i n f i n a n c i a l

Thc V i e t n a m e s e C o m u n i s t s ' a t tempt t o e x t o r e re p a r a t i o n

p a y m e n t s from the U n i t e d S t a t e s h a d f a i l e d , and t h e PRC showed no s i g n

#)I: becoming more g e n e r o u s w i t h a i d .

In t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , S o v i c t

8!conomi.c s u p p o r t became e v e r more c r i t i c a l .

The g r o w i n g war w i t h

45

Cambodia was p u t t i n g a s c v e r e s t r a i n on the Viecnamese.

Moscoh was tlie

o n l y re]. i.abl<, soiirce o E the i r a r i n a t e r i e l Chat Hanoi r e q u i r e d .

Hanoi h a s

p r o b a b l y s i g n a l l i n g I l e i j i n g of i t s c x t r c m e d i s p l e a s u r e bith Chincse
68

s u p p o r t f o r tlie Khmer Rouge. The C h i n e s e r e s p o n d e d t o H a n o i s p o s i t i o n w i t h r e s t r a i n t . Perhaps,

t h c r e was a g e n u i n e e E E o r t made by t h e C h i n e s c l e a d e r s t o u n d e r s t a n d
Viet Nams p e r c e p t i . o n s o f i t s i n t e r e s t s i n I n d o c h i n a .
At the b e h e s t o f

the C h i n e s c , Lo Duan v i s i t e d B e i J i n g from 20 November t o 2 5 November

1977.

While t h e m e e t i n g was n o t u n f r i e n d l y , i t had t o c o n t e n d w i t h some

tliC

oE the most b i t t e r f i g h t i n g t o d a t e a l o n g

Vir!tnaoess-Cainbodian

border. cont K O I

Yet t h e c r i s i s b e t b e e n Hanoi and U c i j i n g r e m a i n e d u n d e r

.
A c o n s i d e r a b l e amount o f c o o p e r a t i o n was

A t t h e end o f 1 9 7 7 , C h i n a c o u l d l o o k w i t h some s a t i s f a c t i o n on thc

stat~s of its foreign policy.

e v i d e n t smong t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , ASEAN, J a p a n , a n d tlie PKC.

O u t s i d e of
With

I n d o c h i n a , t h e S o v i e t s had made ew i n r o a d s in S o u t h e a s t A s i a .

r e g a r d t o H a n o i , H e i j i n g h a d b e e n r e a s o n a b l y s k i l l r u l in m a n a g i n g t h e crisis. The C h i n e s e h a d s i g n a l l e d t h e i r f e e l i n g s t o t h e V i e t n a m e s e b u t They h a d u s e d p o s i t i v e as well a s n e g a t i v e Often they

i n a r e s t r a i n e d manner. signals.

They had n o t r u s h e d t h e p a c e of c r i t i c a l e v e n t s .

h a d e x h i b i t e d s i g n s a t t e m p t i n g t o u n d e r s t a n d H a n o i - s Erame o f r e f e r e n c e .

A l l of t h e s e t h i n g s a r e p a r t o f what Ole H o l s t i would c o n s i d e r good

c r i s i s management. B e i j i n g a l s o had imade a g r i e v o u s e r r o r . By a l i g n i n g

i t s e l f so c l o s e l y and d e f i n i t i v e l y w i t h Cambodia, i t h a d s u r r e n d e r e d much i n i t i a t i v e and h a d p u t i r s e l f i n a most d a n g e r o u s p o s i t i o n , i n d e e d . T h i s h a s a k i n t o t h e 1914 c a s e i n E u r o p e . Here t h e C h i n e s e d i r e c t l y 69 v i o l a t ed Hol s t i * s a d m o n i t i o n t h a t d e c i s i o n -makers ma in t a i n c o n t r o l

46

C o n t e n t i o n Ueconirs C r i s i s , 1978-1979

'The y e a r 01:
o th6?

I 9 / 8 saw t h e breakdown o f e f f e c t i v e c r i s i s management Thc c o n t e n t i u u s i s s u e s t h a t i r r i t a t c d

Si.no-!'iel:namese d i s p u t e .

r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n Hanoi and B e i j i n g would b o i l up and e v e n t u a l l y l e a d t o

Eat-.

T h i s s t u d y e x a m i n e s t h e r i s e of the c r i s i s i n s e v e n s t a g e s from

J a n u a r y 1978 t o F e b r u a r y 1979.

Tliroiigliout the month or J a n u a r y 1978 t h e bordcr war b e t w e e n Cambod i a and V i r t Nan1 rngi?d w L t h a nelj i n t e n s i t y .

O n 31 December 1 9 7 7 , l'linont

Pt!nh had b r o k e n d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i . o n s w i t h H a n o i ; and Hanoi perceivcld

CIiinn,

in ciill~~siow i i i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t i ? s a n d Cambodia, t o his d o i n g

i1

e v c r y t h i . n g i t c o u l d ti) k e e p V i e t Nam from becoming power.

strong regional
I ~ E K ~

O n t h e oLt1t.r h a n d , the C h i n e s e b e l i e v e d t h a t t h c V i e t n a m e s e

p l o t L i n g w i t h t h e S o v i e t s t o g a i n hegemony o v e r f i r s t I n d o c h i n a , t h e n 70 Over a l l Southenst Asia. N e i t h e r t h r PRC nor the SKV had a b a n d o n e d p o s i t i v e c r i s i s managemt,nt completely, however.

In r e s p o n s e t o a c o m p l a i n t f r o m Hanoi t h a t

t h e PKC p r e s s was o n e - s i d e d i n r e p o r t i n g t h e w a r , Ren Min K i Bao publ i s h e d : i c c o u n t s front b o t h the V i e t n a m e s e a n d Cambodian p e r s p e c t i v e s on 71 10 .January 1978. A f t e r a m a s s i v e , two-month p u s h i n t o Cambodia, t h e !'i e t namesf :innounced a p e a c e p l a n on 5 F e b r u a r y 1978.
It called f o r a

w a s e - i r e , a m u t u a l t r o o p p u l l - b a c k from t h e b o r d e r , and a n e g o t i a t c d 72 :set t l e n i e n t . Nci t h e r Phnom Penh n o r B e i j i n g r e s p o n d e d

47

HE i gli t e i i i n g C r i s i s , La t c F e b r u a r y t o L a t e Nay, 1978 T o b a r d tlie e n d o f F e b r u a r y , S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e r e l a t i o n s b e g a n a precipitous decline. neb h e a d . S e v e r a l o f t h e c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e s now came t o a

Cambodian a t t a c k s had c o n t i n u e d u n a b a t e d s i n c e Hanoi's 5

February peace o f f e r .

On 2 1 F e b r u a r y 1 9 i 8 , R a d i o Hanoi a c c u s e d t h e PRC

oT g i v i n g m a s s i v e m i l i t a r y a i d t o Cambodia a n d o r e n c o u r a g i n g the Khmer nouge t o c o n t i n u e m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t thc SnV. To u n d e r l i n e t h c i r c o n c e r n , t h e y p o i n c r d o u t tlif l a r g r nunibt!r o f c a s u a l t i e s t h e y bere 71 taking. The C h i n e s e r e s p o n d p d p r e s e n t l y . A t ttif F i f t h N a t i o n a l p c o p l e * s C o n g r e s s , h r l d i n B e i j i n g from 28 P c b r u a r y t n 5 March 1 9 7 8 , H u a Guofeng d e c l a r e d t h a t ' h o c o u n t r y s h o u l d s e e k hegemony i n a n y r e g i o n o r 74 impose i t s w i l l on o t h e r s . " By t h i s time "hegcmony" had become a c o d e word a s s o c i a t e d
QS

much k i t h t h e SRV a s w i t h t h e USS1<.

On 5 March

B e i . j i n g s e n t a t e c h n i c a l m i s s i o n t o Cambodia.

The C h i n e s o p r a i s e d t h c 75 f k i j i n g was Cambodians f o r o p p o s i n g "imemies of a 1 1 c a t e g o r i , e s . " Shortly

c l e a r l y s i g n a l l i n g Hanoi t o k e e p i t s h a n d s o f f Cambodi.a.

t h e r e a f t e r , t h e Cambodians l a u n c l i e d a s h a r p a t t a c k a r o u n d the V i r t n a n i r s e 76 a Tien. Such h i t - a n d - r u n a s s a u l t s by t h e Cambodians border c i t y of H 77 were t o c o n t i n u e t h r o u g h o u t the s p r i n g .

A s e c o n d a r e a bhere t e n s i o n s o n c e a g n i n mounted r a p i d l y b a s t h a t o f
the O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e .

Ry t h e b e g i n n i n g o f 1 9 7 8 , tlie PRC was h o p i n g t o

m o b i l i z e O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e c a p i t a l , c o n n e c t i o n s , and e x p e r t i s e t o s u p p o r t
thc Four X o d e r n i z a t i o n s .

In J a n u a r y o f 1978 a s p e c i a l c o n f e r e n c e on t h e
The O v e r s o a s C h i n e s e A f I a i r s

O v e r s e a s Chinese bas h e l d i n B e i j i n g .

Commission was o n c e a g a i n set up a t m i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l , and p r o p s e d a 78 program of c o o p e r a t i o n b e t b e e n t h e O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e a n d t h e PRC.

-. I<en

__ Min

Ki Ilao - declared R e i j i n g ' s h e i g h t e n e d i n t i i r e s t i n the O v e r s e a s

79
211

(:hiii(!sn i n

a r l i c L i t on 4 J a n u a r y 1978.

To t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h i s

a r t i c l e bas

ii

s i g n a l t o l l a n o i , t h e I'RC p r o b a b l y m e a n t i t t o be n o t h i n g
for

more t h a n

ii

w a r n i n g t h a t B e i j i n g was i n t e r e s t e d in p r o p e r t r e a t m e n t

tli? e t l i r i i c Ctiiricse i n V i e t Nan); b u t Hanoi c o u l d e a s i l y i n t e r p r e t t h i s a s an i m p i n g e m e n t on V i e t Nam-s s o v e r e i g n t y , b o t h p o l i t i c a l l y a n d econoniically.

A t any rate!,

a g a i n t h e C h i n e s e f a i l e d t o d e t e r t h e Vietnamese
On 24

Erom t a k i n g n c o u r s e o C a c t i o n of w h i c h B e i j i n g d i s a p p r o v e d .
:.lsrcli 1 9 7 8 , t h ~ 'SRV's bttsinesses
iri

s e c u r i t y p n l i c c b e g a n m a s s i v e r a i d s on C h i n e s r

(:hoIon. 'The p o l i c e c l o s e d more t h a n 30,000 C h i n e s e b u s i RO nc. s s e s t a b 1i s hmen t s C h i n e s e m e r c h a n t s i n H a n o i a l s o began t o s u f f i . r 81 i n c r e a s e d I i m i t a t i u n s on t h e i r b u s i n e s s a c t i v i t i e s . I n e a r l y May

r i ! p o r t s fronl V i e L Nam i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h c r e had b e e n b l o o d y c l a s h e s b e t w e n the s e c u r i t y pol i c e and t h e O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e a n d t h a t many 82 Cliinesc had b e e n k i l l e d . The f i r s t wave of the g r e a t e x o d u s oC C h i n a s e frmi Viet N;im o c c u r r c d i n A p r i l a n d May of 1978. Almost 100,(~00

e t h n i c Cliinrse f l e d N o r t h Viet Nam a c r o s s the Land b o r d e r i n t o C h i n a . B e i j i n g perceived Hanoi's p e r s e c u t i o n of t h e O v e r s e a s C h i n c s e t o b e 83 primarily anti-Chinese r a t h e r than a n t i - f r e e e n t e r p r i s e . 'The f l a r i n g u p of t h e O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e p r o b l e m e x a c e r b a t e d t w o other contentious issues.
W i t h l a r g e numbers o f Chinese c r o s s i n g from

Li.et Nam in:() China by ].and, S i n o - V i . c t n s i n e s e b o r d e r t e n s i o n s r o s e .

'The

b o r d e r r(=gi.ons bt,came more m i l i t a r i z e d , and tlie nuiner o f i n c i d e n t s b e g e u

84
to increase.
On 1 2 May t h e F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y of tlie PRC i n f o r m e d H a n o i

1.i1at i t was c u r t a i l i n g s i g n i f i c a n t a m o u n t s of e c o n o m i c a i d t o the SKV. I k i i i n g was s i g n a l l i n g H a n o i t o d e s i s t i n i t s a n t i - O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e !policy because this F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y ' s n o t e a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e a i d e a r -

85
m a r k e d f o r H a n o i would now be u s e d t o a s s i s t t h e r e E l i g e e s .

49

Tn e a r l y May t h e C h i n e s e h(!gan t o s i g n a l t h e i r r i s i n g c o n c e r n o v e r
t h e i n c r e a s i n g S o v i e t p r c s e n c e i n Viet Nam.
lliis Gas d o n e t h r o u g h a

s e r i e s o l a r t i c l e s i n the pro-PRC Hong Kong n e w s p a p e r Wen Wei I m .

11 May 1978, Wen Wei Pa0 a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e S o v i e t s had e s t a b l i s h e d a
p e r m a n e n t , l a r g e - s c a l e p r e s e n c e i n t h e SRV.

___

On

Th(> a r t i . c l e m a i n t a i n e d t h a t 86 t h e t h e r e were S o v i e t a d v i s o r s t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o u n t r y . On 22 May an

a r t i c l e a p p e a r e d i n Wen Wei Pao d e s c r i b i n g t h e O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e c r i s i s

a s t h e C h i n e s e Communists p e r c e i v e d i t .
ception t h e t ~ a n a n t i LKC
F i r s t , i t r e i t e r a t e d the p e r -

-_-

~ p e r s, r c u~ t i o niO F* thc ~ e t h n i c C h i n e s e i n Viet Nam w a s

a c t i o n , d e s i g n e d t o i n f l a m e S i no-V i e t name sc rc 1a t i o n s

S e c o n d , i t saw the b l a c k hand o f t h e S o v i e t Union s t i r r i n g u p the difficulties. Wen Wei Pao _- _a c c u s e d t h e S o v i e t s of t r y i n g t o s u b j u g a t e

v i e t Nan1 and of N o r k i n g t o p o i s o n t h e a l r e a d y d i s t ~ r b c d a t m o s p h e r e 87 h e t w c n Hanoi a n d B e i j i n g .

11s the c r i s i s h e i g h t e n e d ,

t h e s i g n a l l i n g brcanie more n e g a t i v e , more

H o l s t i p o i n t s t o t h i s a s an i . n d i c a t o r t h a t t h e 88 p a r t i c i p a n t s are f e e l i n g themselves t o be under g r e a t e r stress. i n t e n s e , and more r a p i d . Nevertheless, b o t h s i d e s w e r e s t i l l h e h e v i n g w i t h some c i r c u m s p e c t i o n .

Each s i d e t e n d e d t o b e o b l i q u e i n i t s c r i t i c i s m s o f t h e o t h e r .

The

l e v e l of v i t r i o l i n t h e r h e t o r i c % a s k e p t r e a s o n a b l y low.

Beijing

i s s u e d some o f i t s s t r o n g e r s i g n a l s n o t t h r o u g h t h e o f f i c i a l PllC/CCP organs b u t r a t h e r through t h e pro-Beijing

press i n Hong Kong.

50

'She S i n o - V i e t n a m c s e d i s p u t e seemed t o r e a c h a c r i t i c a l t u r n i n g p o i n t on 24 May 1978.

On t h a t d a y t h e Khmer Rouge l a u n c h e d a v i c i o u s

c o m t c r a t t i l c k a g a i n s t pro-Hanoi Khmer t r o o p s i n e a s t e r l l Canlbodia and 89 r o u t c d them. 'She V i e t n a m e s e had hoped t o a v o i d e s c a l a t i n g t h e i r d i r e c t i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Cambodia by b u i l d i n g a n a t i v e Khmer r e s i s t a n c e inovenlent, a n d nob t h i s r c s i s t a n c e moveiiienL had been d e a l t a c r i p p l i n g
blob.

O n thi! same d a y , I k i j i n g f i r e d

a p r o p a g a n d a b r o a d s i d e a~ the SRV.
The PRC i s s u e d a agency d i r e c t l y

Gone wueri! r h e t o r i c a l r e s t r a i n t and i n d i r e c t a t t a c k .

SI

iltcnient o f a c c u s a t i o n s t h r o u g h i t s o f f i c i a l tlanoi.

nebs

aj:ainst

A c c o r d i n g t o U e i j i n g , Hanoi b a s g u i l t y of h e i n o u s p e r s e -

c i i t i o n s of t h e Chinese i n Vict Nam.

ic!i

The PRC a s s e r t e d t h a t i t had t r i e d

liest t o d i e s u a d e t h r SRV t h r o u g h l r i e n d l y b l a n d i s h m e n t s b u t t h a t

YO
H:inoi had d i s r e g a r d e d a l . 1 p o s i t i v e s i g n a l s . The SRV r e . j e c t e d a l l o t 91 tht?s(! c h a r g e s I:ht! I n l l o b i n g d a y . Nevertheless, the Chinese l e a d e r s c , ) n t i n u r d t h e i r a t t a c k on t h e V i e t n a m e s e .

On 26 May t h e y announced t h a t 92 t h e y would send s h i p s t o Viet Nam t o r e s c u e the O v e r s e a s C h i n e s < . . At

t h i s p o i n t t h e V i e t n a m e s e a t t e m p t e d t o c a l m t h e s i t u a t i o n by a c c e p t i n g t h e Chinesi! o f f e r t o s e n d s h i p s t o e v a c u a t e e t h n i c C h i n e s r from thi' SKV

and by (:;illing f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s t o d i s c u s s t h e i s s u e s . t l e i . j i n g , tiow93 e v e r , r t . j e c t c d n e g o t i a t i o n s a t t h a t time. The PRC made a c c u s a t i o n s a g a i n s t ttic SIN s u b s e q u e n t l y on 2 9 May, 30 May, 2 J u n e , 5 J u n e , and 7 94 Juni' 1978.

As a l w a y s , t h r C h i n e s e were p a r t i c u l a r l y a p p r e h e n s i v e a b o u t t h e
$ : o v i e t p o s i t i o n i n V i e t Nam.
A ' 3 0 May a r t i c l e i n Wen Wei Pao blamed

___

Eloscow f o r thc! p e r s e c u t . i o n s o f t h e O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e .

The S o v i e t s were

51

95

a c c u s e d o f making a s y s t r i n a t i c a t t e m p t t o s u r r o u n d t h c IHC.

Rcports

w r e c i r c u l a t e d i n Hong Kong o n 4 June t h a t t h c S o v i e t s had c o n s t r u c t c d

a m i s s i l e complex n o t f a r from Hanoi i n thc v i c i n i t y o f Hon Cay and t h a t

the S o v i e t s u e r e s u p p o r t i n g t h e 308th D i v i s i o n of t h e Peoples A r m y of

9G
Vict Nam (PAVN), a u n i t s t a t i o n e d a l o n g the China b o r d e r .
On 5 J u n e ,

Deng X i a o p i n g b r i e f e d t h e J a p a n B r o a d c a s t i n g C o r p o r a t i o n on t h e s t a t u s of the crisis. He s a i d t h a t C h i n a had r e d u c e d i t s economic a i d t o the

SRV and t h a t i t bas p r e p a r e d t o t a k e more d r a s t i c measures i f t h e

V i e t n a m e s e c o n t i n u e d t o h a r a s s t h e O v e r s e a s Ctiini.se.

Ile h i n t e d t h a t tlic
Ktle

S o v i e t s were b e h i n d H a n o i - s h o s t i l e a c t i o n s , and he r c v e a l e d t h a t V i e t n a m e s e h a d n e v e r been v e r y f r i e n d l y to5:ird t h c IRC, d u r i n g t h e times

even d u r i n g t h e

hen C h i n a was s u p p l y i n g Hanoi b i t h huge amounts of

97
aid. A n o t h e r s p a t e o f r e p o r t s were c i r c u l n t c d i n Hong Kong on 7 J u n e ;

t h e s e a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e S o v i e t s had been u s i n g t h e f o r m e r American base 98 a t Cam Kanh Bay. Why d i d t h e PRC u n d e r t a k e a quantum e s c a l a t i o n of i t s s i g n a l s - - i n volume, i n i n t e n s i t y , and i n n e g a t i v i t y - - a t
t h i s time?

Bei.jing f e l t

i t s e l f under c o n s i d e r a b l y i n c r e a s e d s t r e s s i n three major a r e a s .

T h e f i r s t matter h a s t h a t o f t h e O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e .

For B e i j i n g ,

H a n o i - s m a l t r e a t m e n t o f i t s e t h n i c C h i n e s e p o p u l a t i o n amounted t o n o t h i n g l e s s t h a n a h i g h l y v i s i b l e , p u b l i c s l a p in the f a c e o f t h e PHC. The C h i n e s e l e a d e r s h i p p e r c e i v e d s e v e r a l e l e m e n t s i n Hanois campaign. F i r s t , i t u a s i n s t i g a t e d by t h e S o v i e t Union t o a l i e n a t e Hanoi f r o m B e i j i n g so t h a t Moscow c o u l d become t h e sole p a t r o n of t h e SRV. This

would e n a b l e t h e S o v i e t s b o t h t o g a i n g r e a t e r i n f l u e n c e i n V i e t Nam a n d t o f l a n k China t o t h e s o u th . S e c o n d , Hanoi was t r y i n g t o i n f l a m e h a t r e d

for and s u s p i c i o n o f C h i n a t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o u n t r i e s of S o u t h e a s t A s i a ,

a l l of whom had l a r g e O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e m i n o r i t i e s .

T h i s would open t h e

52

I00
do~>r f o r V i ~ tN a m t o d u m i n a t c t l w r e g i o n . T h i r d , t h e c o m b i n a t i o n of

thc f i r s t

Ccc:

p o i n t s c a s e t h r ? SIN i n the r o l e of "thr Cuba o f A s i a . "

Just a s Moscok a n d Havana were i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n t o d o m i n a t e L a t i n

A m e r i c a and f l a n k t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , s o t o o were Moscow and l l a n o i i n c o l l u s i o n t o d o m i n a t c S o u t h e a s t Asia a n d f l a n k C h i n a . The> s e c o n d n i a t t c r was t h a t of Cambodia.

Viet Nam was now o p e n l y

A g a i n , thc!

and b r a z e n l y t r y i n g t o s u b v e r t a g o v e r n m e n t a l l i e d t o C h i n a .

PRC l e a d e r s p e r c w i v e d t h i , s a s n s l a p i n t h e f a c e o f C h i n a .
The t h i r d m a t t i ~ r has t h a t o f t h e e v c r i n c r e a s i n g p h y s i c a l p r e s e n c e
01 t h c ? S o v i e t IJnion i n t h e SKV.

'There n o r bas t h e r e a l d a n g e r o f a southern border.

s i g n i f i c a n t s u p e r p o c e r m i l i t a r y o c c u p a t i o n on C h i n a ' s R c i j i . n g p e r c e i v e d an i n s i d i o u s S o v i e t s t r a t e g y .

Moscor would e n c o u r a g e

Vietnamese x e n o p h o b i a s o t h a t Hanoi would become i s o l a t e d from t h c

i i i t t ~ r n a t i o n n l community :ind r o u l d g e t bogged down i n h o s t i l i t i e s w i t h

i t s neighbors.

lnternally,

t h e V i e c n a m e s c economy would be i n a

s t i n m o l a s , r h i l c , e x t e r n a l l y , Viet Nam would be e n g a g e d i.n p r o t r a c t c d b i - u s h - f i r e wars. T h i s would make l l a n o i d o u b l y d e p e n d e n t on Moscow.

V i v t N a m would r e q u i r e a i d b o t h t o p r o p up i t s d o m e s t i c economy and t o

p u r s w i t s i m p e r i a l i s t wars; a n d , s i n c e no o t h e r c o u n t r y would s u p p o r t

V i c t Naru,

i t c o u l d t u r n o n l y t o Noscor.

A t t h i s time t h e C h i n e s e would a p p e a r t o h a v e a c t e d i n a manner

t h a t H o l s t i d e s c r i b e s as d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g u n d e r s t r e s s . dc!cision-makers

'The I'KC

f e l t t h a t C h i n a ' s n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s had b e e n c h a l l e n g e d
OK

and t h a t t h ~ y would l o s e f a c e rapidly. rc.sponded

c r e d i b i l i t y i f they d i d not counter They

They f r l t t h e i r r a n g e o f o p t i o n s t o be s h r i n k i n g .

w i t h a s e r i e s of s i g n a l s of i n c r e a s e d volume a n d i n t e n s i t y t o 101 tietisr Hanoi from c o n t i n u i n g a l o n g a n u n a c c e p t a b l e c o u r s e .

53

E s c a l a t i n g A t t a c k s , Mid J u n e t o Mid J u l y 1978

l i e i j i n g Launched i t s s e c o n d m a j o r b a r r a g e a g a i n s t Hanoi o n 9 J u n e . The F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y of t h e PRC a c c u s e d the SRV o f l y i n g a b o u t i t s p e r s e c u t i o n of t h e O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e , o f m i s r e p r e s e n t i n g C h i n a - s o b j e c t i v e s i n Cambodia, a n d of s t i r r i n g u p a n i m o s i t y a g a i n s t C h i n a . Hanoi

was condemned f o r i t s b a r b a r o u s t r e a t m e n t of e t h n i c C h i n e s e i n Viet Nam.

On t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e Chinese h a d n o t y e t a b a n d o n e d a l l p o s i t i v e ap-

p r o a c h e s . The F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y a l s o c a l l e d f o r t a l k s s i t h the V i e t n a m e s e 102 t o t r y t o s e t t l e some of t h e p r o b l e m s o f the O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e . Lob-. l e v e l m e e t i n g s were, i n f a c t , c o n v e n e d on 1 3 J u n e 1978, b u t b r o k e down

L 03
soon without accomplishing any thing. J u n e a n d J u l y o f 1978 were c h a r a c t c r i z c d by c h a r g e s a n d c o u n t e r c h a r g e s , by b i t t e r r e c r i m i n a t i o n s on botll s i d e s . longer oblique i n expressing their concerns. The C h i n e s c s e r c no

After the a s s a u l t o E 9

J u n e 1 9 7 8 , t h e C h i n e s e i s s u e d s i g n i f i c a n t w a r n i n g s t a Hanoi on 1 7 J u n e , 104 2 1 J u n e , 12 J u l y , a n d 17 J u l y . 'The V i e t n a m e s e r e s p o n d e d w i t h a p r o p a g a n d a v o l l e y of t h e i r osn, b e g i n n i n g on 20 J u n e .

bas

The c e n t r a l theme

t h a t of Khmer Rouge g e n o c i d e w i t h t h e i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t t h e C h i n e s e 105 were i n v o l v e d .

I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e g r o w i n g war of w o r d s , more t a n g i b l e d e v c l o p m e n t s
were o c c u r r i n g . S p o r a d i c e x c h a n g e s o f f i r e began a l o n g t h e S i n o 106 V i e t n a m e s e b o r d e r a t l e a s t a s e a r l y a s 27 J u n e . On 3 J u l y B e i j i n g 107 Most s i g n i t i c a n t was t h e SRV-S c u t o f f a l l C h i n e s e a i d t o t h e SRV. j o i n i n g t h e C o u n c i l f o r M u t u a l Economic A s s i s t a n c e (CMEA, COMECON) i n 108 l a t e J u n e o f 1978. T h i s was an e s p e c i a l l y r e v o l t i n g d e v e l o p m e n t f o r
the C h i n e s e .
I t r e p r e s e n t e d a t r i u m p h f o r Moscow, f o r i t bound Hanoi

i o r m a l l y i n t o tli(2 I < n s t I,:uropean Communist p l a n n i n g s t r u c t u r e .

tbnce-

t o r t l i , i i a n o i s ~ ! c o n o m i c Iilnns rcould havf t o be c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h a n d a p p r o v c d by t h r S o v i e t s .

A s f o r t h e SKV, r e g u l a r a i d and t r a d c was now

a s s u r e d , g i v i n g Hanoi a t r e e r hand i n p u r s u i n g i t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j r c 108 t i v c s i n thc region.

T L i s i n s t r u c t i v e t o examine hob Hanoi was r e a c t i n g t o t h e p r e s -

sllres t h a t wlire b u i l d i n g up.

Chinese signals?

How were t h e V i e t n a m e s e r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e

D u r i n g .Junt! 1978 thc P o l i t b u r o o f the v i e t Nam Corrn~u10) n i s t Party (VCP) di:veloped a s t r a t e g y t o c o p e w i t h t h e c r i s i s .

Fi
K S ~ ,t h t ,

PKC w a s c o n i i r m e d as V i e t Nams number-one en~!my.

Hanoi

pcrc(.ived C h i n a s o b j e c t i v r t o b e t h e doniinaLion o f a l l Southtxast A s i : ~ . Sc~cond,

thts

SRV

I ! ? n d e r s p e r c e i v e d Cambodia t o be C h i n a - s c a t s

paw i n

S o ~ i t ! i e o s tAsi.a and d e c i d e d t h a t t h e Cambodian t h r e a t t o SKV i n t e r r s t s

h.id become

yo

grcsat t h a t d i r e c t V i e t n a m e s e m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s h o u l d be T h i r d , t l i ~d e c i s i o n b a s inade t o

t . l k e r i t o t o p p l t , Lhi! Khiricr Rouge r e g i m e .

o r i e n t the SKV economy o r a new b a r and t o d e f e r d o m e s t i c r e c o n s t r u c t i o n u n t i l t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s i s had s u b s i d e d . Fourth, t o accomplish Fifth, a t the

t h i s i t wou1.d be n e c e s s a r y t o g e t f u l l S o v i e t b a c k i n g .

same time, llaiioi ~ o u l dp u r s u e a n o f f e n s i v e t o b r o a d e n i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l

C e n t r a l t o t h i s e f f o r t b o u l d be a campaign t o i m 1 LO p r o v e r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and ASEAN. p o l i t i c a l support. The e v e n t s a J u n e and J u l y 1978 show t h a t t h e P R C s e c f o r t t o d c t t , r the SKV from t a k i n g f u r t h e r a c t i o n s t h a t B e i j i n g c o n s i d e r e d t h r t 3 a t e n i n g t o C h i n e s e i n t e r e s t f i had n o t been v e r y s u c c e s s f u l . Hanoi

had no^ r e a c t e d t o C h i n n - s s i g n a l s i n t h e way t h a t t h e P K C l e a d e r s had lioprd t h e y would. I n s t e a d of p e r c e i v i n g Chinas alarm w i t h Soviet

t?xpansi.onism i n S o u t h e a s t Asia a n d C h i n a s c o n c e r n w i t h l o s s or f a c e d u e
io t h e mistre:itiilt!nt
01 O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e i n Viet Nam ant! t h e t h r e a t e n e d

55

o v e r t h r o w o f a n allied government i n Cambodia, llanoi i n t c r p r e t e d

Ilc i j i i i g ' s

s i g n a l s a s i n d i c a t o r s t h a t t h e PRC i V a s a d v a n c i n g t h e t r a d -

i t i o n a l Chinese o b j e c t i v e o f t u r n i n g Southeast i\sia i n t o a t r i b u t a r y region.

l n s h o r t , Hanoi p e r c e i . v e d n e i j i n g t o b c w o r k i n g d i r e c t l y
'The l e a d e r s i n llanoi a l s o c a n b e seen t o

a g a i n s t Vietnamese i n t c r e s t s .

b e r e a c t i n g in the f a s h i o n d e s c r i b e d by H o l s t i a s d e c i s i o n - m a k i r i g [under

stress.

They saw the need

OK

quick a c t i o n .

They pcrceived their

a l t e r n a t i v e s as becoming e v e r f e b r r i n number. t h a t more d r a s t i c a c t i o n was r e q u i r e d . creasingly vituperative.

'They became c o n v i n c e d

T h e i r c o m m u n i c a t i o n s werc i.n-

They s u r r e n d c r c d nluctl o i t h r i r own freedom o f

a c t i o n by e n t a n g l i n g t h e m s e l v e s f u r l h e r w i t h a n o u t s i d e power, v i z . t h e S o v i e t Union. Con tending-and N e g o t i a t i n g Mid J u l y t o O c t o b e r 1978

the PKC c a l l e d u p o n t h e 111 SRV t o e n t e r i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s a t the v i c e - m i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l . Tlirec

On 19 J u l y 1 9 7 8 , t h e F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y o f

d a y s l a t e r Hanoi a c c e p t e d .

l t a p p e a r e d t h a r both s i d e s were w i l l i n g t o

make one more e f f o r t a t r c c o n c i l i a c i o n .

T h e d e l e g a t i o n s m e t i n Hanoi on 8 August 1978.

I n i t i a l l y , the
In its

V i e t n a m e s e seemed t o b e i n a more c o r d i a l mood t h a n t h e C h i n e s e . opening

K~IXIK~S,

t h e SRV d e l e g a t i o n c a l l e d f o r a renewal of t h e
The C h i n e s e n e g o t i a t i n g team

f r i e n d s h i p between China a n d Viet Nam.

a l s o p l e a d e d o r S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e f r i e n d s h i p hut t h e n l a u n c h e d i n t o a n a t t a c k a g a i n s t t h e SRV O K i t s s h a b b y t r e a t m e n t of Viet Nam's c t h n i c 112 Chinese. O n 19 A u g u s t , a t t h e t h i r d s e s s i o n of t h e t a l k s , t h e main i s s u e o f t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s was a d d r e s s e d , the p r o b l e m of t h e C h i n e s e r e s i d e n t s i n t h e SRV. Beijing's delegation presented a four-point

56

I)K~lgKain t o solvi:

tile'

[iroblem.

F i r s t , t h e SHV s h o u l d s t o p p e r s e c u t i n g
Second,

tlw CIii.ncssc\ and s n h g g l i a r d tl1ei.r r i g h t s a n d i n t e r e s t s .

sl1m)iild n o t p r u s s u r i . t h e C h i n e s e i.n V i f t

Ihnoi

Nam t o i i c c e p t V i p t l i a m l ~ s r c i t -

izenship.

'Third,

thi' V i u t n a m e s c s h o u l d make e v e r y e C f o r t t o r e t u r n

d i s p l a c e d Chinrse in V i < ! t Nam t o t h e i r o r i g i n a l homes w i t h o u t d i s c r i n i inntion. Beijj.iig w a n t e d p a r t i c u l a r l y t h o s e C h i n e s e who were camped F o u r t h , Hanoi

n l l l n g th(! Pl{(:-SKV bordc,r t o go b a c k t o t h e i r homes.

s h o i i l d a c c r p t back tlios,! C h i n e s e who had f l e d V i c t Nam h i i t who w a n t r d t o

be r r p a t r i a r : i ~ d . TIiV Vib?tiiemes(: s h o u l d r e s e t t l e t h e s e p e o p l e r i t h o ! l t

. i c t i o n s a g a i n s t them. tai<irig; a n y r k , t r i b i i t i v g l ~

'The Ctiinesr bere c teart!,

i n d i c a t i n g t h e s t r a i n s t h a t t h e s e re Sugees- -nor n u m b e r i n g a b o u t I I :I 2(10,1100- -ctsr(! p l : i c i n g on PKC r e S o L l r C < + S . The Vietnamese w g o t iatr)rs

r(. j t . c t e d tli(!se Cliiiiese dwnands.
'They wore e s p e c i a l l y i n c e n s c d b y the

p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h c y r e p a t r i . i i t e t h o s c C h i n e s e who had a l r e a d y l c f t I14 t h e i r homes. H a n o i Celt t h a t i t , t o o , was s u f f e r i n g an c c o n o m i c

biirdcn b r o i l g h t on by t h e r e f u g e e s i t u a t i o n .

After anottic,r s e s s i o n o f f r u i t l e s s t a l k s , t h e C h i n e s e s i g n a l l e d

tlic!ir d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n by r c ! c a l l i n g t h e i r c h i e f n e g o t i a t o r , Zhong X i d o n g , 115 f , > r c o n s u l t a t i o n : : o n 28 A u g u s t . O n 12 S e p t e m b e r t h e C h i n r s e i n ii

~:itht!r iiiorth c o n c i l i a t o r y t o n e u r g e d t h e V i e t n a m e s e t o s e t t l e t h e O v e r -

s e a s Chines(, problem through t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f China's program.

four-point

Tlie PRC d e l e g a t i o n b a n t c d t h e SRV, a t l c a s t a s a s t a r t , t o

I16
g u a r a n t t ? e the r i g l i t s of t h o s e C h i n e s e s t i l l r e s i d e n t i n Vice N a n .
Wheii t h c Vic!tnamesr

t e m p o r i z e d , t h o C h i n e s e became m o r e a d a m a n t . 19 S e p t e m b e r a n d on 26 S e p t e m b e K - - b u t

'Two
the

niorc, s e s s i w i s were h e l d - . - o n

o p p i i r t u n i t y a p p e a r e d t o h a v e been l o s t .

T h e s e l a s t two m e e t i n g s w r e

marked b y b i t t e r a c c u s a t i o n s r a t h e r t h a n by any c o n s t r u c t i v c

I17
d i a logiir.

A f t e r t h e 26 S e p t e m b e r s e s s i o n , t h e C h i n e s e d e l e g a t i o n I 3 e i j i n g blamed Hanoi lotthe,

f a i l u r e of t h e t a l k s and 118 a c c u s e d t h e SRV o f n e g o t i a t i n g i n bad f a i t h . l e f t Hanoi. A l t o g e t h e r there were e i g h t o f f i c i a l s e s s i o n s i n t h e S i n o V i e t n a m e s e t a l k s , s t r e t c h i n g from 8 August t o 26 S e p t e m b e r 1978.
There

was no g e n u i n e n e g o t i a t i o n , and t h e f a i l u r e o t t h e t a l k s s e r v e d o n l y t o 119 inflame the c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e s l u r t h e r .

I n O c t o b e r t h e r e was a n o t h e r a t t e m p t t o e a s e t e n s i o n s , arid i t came trom a r a t h e r u n e x p e c t e d s o u r c e , t h e Khmer Kougr. Ry no* the Cambodian

government Feared t h a t t h e Vietnani(,se i n t e n d r d t o i n i L i a t e l a r g e - s c a l e military operations against i t . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e P o l P o t regime s o u g h t

t o mend i t s f e n c e s k i t h V i r t Nain and t o improve i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l image.

'I'he Cambodian government o f f e r e d t o e n t e r i n t o a n o n - a g g r e s s i o n p a c t
k i t h t h e SRV.

T h c K h m c r Rouge i n v i t e d o u t s i d e o b s e r v e r s i n t o Cambodia

t o show t h e world t h a t t h e c h a r g e s o f g e n o c i d e had beeu e x a g g e r a t e d . The Cambodians a l s o r e s u r r e c t e d P r i n c e S i h a n o u k , bho began a p p e a r i n g a t o f f i c i a l functions. Hanoi b a s t a r from p l e a s e d k i t h t h i s neb m o d e r a t i o n
T h e V i e t n a m e s e l e a d e r s were c o u n t i n g on the

e m a n a t i n g from Phnom Penh.

h o r r e n d o u s r e c o r d o f t h e Khmer Rouge t o j u s t i f y t h e i r o v e r t h r o x o f t h e P o l Pot r e g i m e . I r o n i c a l l y , t h e Khmer Rouge g o o d - w i l l o f f e n s i v e p r o b a b 120 l y h a s t e n e d H a n o i ' s i n v a s i o n of Cambodia. W h i l e t a l k s were g o i n g on i n H a n o i , problems k i t h t h e c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e s b e t w e e n t h e SKV a n d thr PRC c o n t i n u e d u n a b a t e d . c o n t i n u e d t o f l e e V i e t Nam. r a g e d on. Chinesc? r e t u g e e s

The Vietnamese-Cambodian b o r d e r c o n f l i c t

S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i n Hanoi i n c r e a s e d r a t h e r t h a n d e c r e a s e d .

I n c i d e n t s a l o n g t h e PRC-SHV b o r d e r became an a l m o s t d a i l y a f f a i r , now 121 w i t h i n c u r s i o n s by e a c h s i d e i n t o t h e t e r r i t o r y of t h e o t h e r .

58

14 S e p t e m b e r 1978.

'This was two d a y s n t t e r t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e s i x t h

re.;nion o f t h e S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e t a l k s .

At: t h a t mt!et:in):

t h e C h i n e s e had

t r i ( ! d t o b e a s m o d e r a t e a s t h e y f e l t t h e y c o u l d , b u t t h c V i e t n a m e s c had

nor responded f a v o r a b l y .

The 14 S e p t e m b e r b r o a d s i d e a c c u s e d t h e SKV o f U e i j in): main-

b e i n g s y s t c m a t i c n l l y o n 1 . i - C h i n e s e and a n t i - C a m b o d i a n .

tainc.>d t h a t Ilanoi r a s l y i n g i n i t s a s s p r t i o n s t h a t t h e PRC w a s u s i n g the O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e a s somi: s o r t of

f i f t h column.

The PRC blamed t h e

122
O n t h e same d a y t h e 123 C h i n c s e c o n d u c t < ? d a r a i ( l a c r o s s t h e b o r d e r i n t o V i < ! t Nan].

S o v i e t Union f o r s t i r r i n g up a l l t h i s t r o u b l e .

notti s i d e s scranihlad f o r f o r e i g n s u p p o r t .

I n J u l y 1978 the V i e l Hanoi d r o p p e d i t s

nainew began a campaign t o r o o t h e Un i t e d S t a t e s .

demar~d f o r r ~ c o n s t r u c t i o na i d and o l e r e d t o a s s i s t ttw U n i t e d S t a t e s

The SRV w e n s o u g h t t o 124 at t r a c t h m i > r i c a n busin(!s:j i n t e r e s t s u i t l i p r o m i s e s of l u c r a t i v e d ~ a l s .

s t a r c h f o r t h e remai.ns o f i t s m i s s i n g i n a c t i o n .

l i e i j i n g , h o b e v e r , held a l l of t h e a c e s k i t h r e g a r d t o t h e American
conn(?ction.

'She consunimntion of d i p l o m a t i c r e l a c i o n s w i t h t h e PRC was

I25
W i ~ s h i n g t o r i ~p s r i m e r ) . g o a l i n A s i a a t t h a t time. pri.nic t a r g e t f o r i m p r o v e d r e l a t i o n s .
0 1 1t d i s t a n c e

ASEAN a l s o b r c i i m e

:I

Herr t o o t h c PKC was a b l e t o

S L I C C ~ S S of

t hi! SI<V

I26
China's biggest foreign policy the

sunmwr of I 9 7 8 r n s t h e t r e a t y o f p e a c e a n d f r i e n d s h i p i t c o n c l u d e d w i t h
Japan. The t r e a t y was s i g n e d on 12 A u g u s t , and t h e i n s t r u m e n t s o f

r a t i f i c a t i o n wcre r x c h a n g e d on 2 2 O c t o b e r 1978.

Of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t

was t h e i n c l u s i o n i n t h e t r e a t y of t h e a n t i - h e g e m o n y c l a u s e d i r t . c t e d

a g a i n s t t h e S o v i e t Union. Tho p e r i o d of t h e l a t e summer a n d e a r l y f a l l of 1978 was marked b y

the n o t u n t y p i c a l t a c t i c i n modern i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s o f s i m u l t a -

n e o u s n e g o t i a t i n g and E i . g h t i n g .

Thr Sino-Vietnamese t a l k s d i d not

59

p r o d u c e any t y p e o f g i v e and t a k e , a n y s o r t of compromise

that c h a r a c t e r i z e s s u c c e s s f u l n e g o t i a t i o n s .

OK

1:lexibility

Thc n e g o t i a t o r s on pnch

si.de a p p e a r e d t o b e i m p c r v i o u s t o any a w a r e n e s s of t h e o t h e r s i d e s frame o f r e f e r e n c e a n d l i m i t a t i o n s o f a c t i o n . Nor d i d t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s The f a c t t h a t the t a l k s

seem t o slow down t h e p a c e o f c r i t i c a l e v e n t s .

were a b o r t e d a f t e r l e s s t h a n t k o months o f n e g o t i a t i n g i n d i c a t e s t h e

p r e s s u r e o f time t h a t was p e r c e i v e d .

The i n t r a n s i g e n c e of b o t h s i d e s

r e v e a l e d t h e i r f e e l i n g t h a t t h e i r o p t i o n s had been s e v e r e l y r e s t r i c t e d .

Their e x c h a n g e s a t t h e s c s s i o n s bccamc i n c r e a s i n g l y s t e r e o t y p e d and

tlostilc.

rh1?y bere e x p e r i e n c i n g t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g

u n d e r s t r e s s a s c h a r t e d by H o l s t i .

Edging t o b a r d .the P r e c i p i c e , November a n d December ,- I Y I8 By t h e end o r O c t o b e r 1978, the s i t u a t i o n between Hanoi a n d B r i j i n g was e x t r e m e l y t e n s e . have been s t a b i l i z e d . Nevertht?less, evrn a t t h i s p o i n t , i t s t i l l could H a n o i , h o u e v e r , t o o k two s t e p s b e f o r e t h e y e a r s

end t h a t had an e x t r e m e l y d i s e q u i l i b r a t i n g t . f f e c t .
T h e f i r s t g r e a t s h o c k was t h e s i g n i n g o f the USSR-SRV T r e a t y of

F r i e n d s h i p a n d C o o p e r a t i o n on 3 November 1 9 7 8 .

Hanoi-s top l e a d e r s

j o u r n e y e d t o Moscow t o a f f i x t h e i r s i g n a t u r e s t o t h e t r e a t y .

Anti-PRC

s p e e c h e s were d e l i v e r e d i n t h e c a p i t a l o f t h e USSR by b o t h t h e V i e t -

namese and t h e S o v i e t s .
v i r t u a l l y every r e s p e c t :

T h e t r 2 a t y had a c l e a r a n t i - C h i n e s e t o n e i n

p o l i t i c a l , economic, i d e o l o g i c a l .

V i e t Nam

a p p e a r e d nok t o b e i n e x t r i c a b l y i n Moscows camp.

B c i . j i n g had bccn 127 d e a l t , q u i t e b r a z e n l y , b o t h t h e i n s u l t and t h e i n j u r y . Immediately f o l l o w i n g t h e t r e a t y , C h i n e s e s i g n a l s t o Viet Nam t o o k on a much more t h r e a t e n i n g tone.

60

O n I0 Novwahcr,

Hen Mi.n K i Uao p u b l i s h e d --

__

iin

t . d i L o r i a 1 condemninp.

S ~ J Lt, V I-- V i c, cnanw :ii c o 1 lu : , i on i n p<!rpt: t r a t i np, viir i o u s bo rda K i n c i de tit s

L t harncd L ~ ~ II:hc L Chiuese people a r e determined t o safeguard tlicir

s o v e r e i g n t y and territorial i n t e g r i t y and h i l l never alloc t h e r e c u r rence of
SIIC~I

incidents..

W e d o n o t want an inch of a n o t h e r c o u n t r y s

t e r r i t o r y , arid he do not: a l l o w a n y c o u n t r y t o o c c u p y an i n c h o f o u r 1 :!8 t e r r i t o r y .I

On 1 3 I)t!cemb(!r Vice Premier L i X i a n n i a n a s s e r t e d t h a t Cltinas

f o r t r o a r n n c r Iiws i t s I i m i t : s a n d t h e V i e t n a n w s c a u t h o r i t i e s a r c d e l u d i n g

I29
t l t m s ; e l v c s by t h i n k i n ] ; t h a t we a r e weak and c a n bc b u l l i e d .
On 2 4 Ueccmhrr Ren . Min R i Bao p i i b l i s h e d a n e d i t o r i a l t h a t a c c u s c d - -

__

the' ! X V Of 1Nlki.Ilg a t t a c k : ; on C h i n f s e tr?KKitoKy k i t h the s u p p o r t

01

tile

Sovir,:t U n i o n .

Phc ~ d i t o r i a l w a r n e d t h a t t h e PRC w i l l n o t a t t a c k u n l e s s
Dut

i t . i!; a t t a c k e d .
c o i ~ iti e r a t t a c k

i f i t is a t t a c k e d , i c w i l l c e r t n i n l y

130

That t h e V i e t n a m e s e kcre t a k i n g l i t t l e c o g n i z a n c e o f t h e s e s i g n a l s
h.ps

made e v i d e n t b y t h e s e c o n d g r e a t s h o c k .

On 25 December 1978, tht.

V i f t n a m e s c army i.nvadcd Cambodia w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n of c o n q u e r i n g t h e country.

Ily 7 J a n u a r y 1979, Phnom Penh had f a l l e n . On 8 J ~ I ~ u a~ I K ~

P e o p l e s R i ! v o l u t i o n n r y C o m m i t t c e u n d e r Heng S a m r i n was s e t up a s t h e neb g o v c r n m c n t v f Cambodia.

O n 9 JanliaKy V i e t n a m e s e t r o o p s l a u n c h e d an

o f f e n s i v e in w v s t e r n C m i b o d i a t o c o m p l e t e t h e i r c o n q u e s t of t h e whole 131 country. Beijiny, pass:

nolu

p e r c t ? i v e d t h e w o r s t - c a s e s c e n a r i o a s h a v i n g come t o

C h i n a h:ld b w n fl.anked t o t h e s o u t h by t h e S o v i e t s , a n d t h e SKV The PRC h a d b e e n i g n o m i n i o u s l y

h a d t a k e n c o n t r o l of a l l I n d o c h i n a .

i n s i i l t e d i n Moscow, and i t s i n t e r e s t s and c r e d i b i l i t y had b e e n o p e n l y

chatltnged i n Soiitlieast A s i a .

The C h i n e s e l e a d e r s h i p had s i g n a l l e d

61

Hanoi r e p e n t e d l y d u r i ng Noveinbe r a n d Deccmbcr , e s p e c i a l I y e m p h a s i z i n g

t h e i r c o n c e r n a b o u t t h e S o v i e t d a n g e r ; b u t t h i s had r a i l e d t o d e t e r the
VirtnamL: l+e. P r e p a r i n g f o r War, J a n u a r y t o >lid F e b r u a r y 1979

On 31 December 1978 B e i j i i i g r c c a l l t ? d i t s a m b a s s a d o r t o t h e SRV from

132

Hanoi.
I,

On 4 J a n u a r y 1979, t h e C h i n e s e a c c u s e d t h e V i e t n a m e s e o r I33
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e t h o s h o c k s o f November

frenzied provocations."

ant1 Dcccmbcr, t h e S i n o - V i c t n a m e s c b o r d e r Iiad s o n t i m i c d t o r o i l r c l e -

t i o n s , w i t h i n c i d e n t s ilolr o c c u r r i n g d a i l y ; a n d t h o O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e p r o b l e m showed
110

s i g n s of a b a t i n g .

By t h i s t i m e the PRC was s e r i o l l s l y

c o n t e m p l a t i n g bar.
The PRC h a d managed
CI

number of d i p l o m a t i c s u c c e s s e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e
C h i e f among t h e s e s u c -

k o r l d i n 1 9 7 8 , i n d e e d , f a r more t h a n ttic SRV.

c e s s ~ were ~ the t r e a t y k i t h J a p a n i n A u g u s t , t h e i n c r e a s e d good b i l l

t o w a r d C h i n a g e n e r a t e d i n ASEEAN and EuropP, and t h e approach OL formal

d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o be i n s t i t u t e d on I J a n u a r y 1979.

or

was the time t o t u r n some o f t h e s e s u c c e s s e s t o

imme-

d i a t e a d v a n t a g e , o r so t h o u g h t some i n E e i j i n g .

The PKC l e a d e r s h i p u a s

p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t e d i n s e c u r i n g t h e s u p p o r t of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d J a p a n i n i t s d i s p u t e k i t h t h e SKV. Deng X i a o p i n g made his " t r i u m p h a l t o u r " of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s from 28 J a n u a r y t o 4 F e b r u a r y 1 9 7 9 . k a r n i n g s t o Hanoi. While i n Airlerica he i s s u e d s e v e r a l

Hc hoped t o p r o j e c t a t L e a s t t h e image ,)f

us

support

f o r his s i g n a l s t o t h e V i e t n a m e s e , k h o a t t h i s time were a l s o s t i l l h o p i n g t o win some s y m p a t h y from W a s h i n g t o n .

62

On 10 . l a n u a r y 1979, Dellg aSSl?Kted, " W e need t o a c t a p p r o p r i a t e l y ,

w1,

ciinnot: i i l ! o w V i e t n a m t o r u n u i l d e v e ~ y w h e ~ e .Ln t h e i n t e r e s t o f
OUT

c o r l d peiicp and s t a b i l i t y and in t h e i n t e r e s t o f

own c o u n t r y , w e may

133
be f o r c r d t o do what w e do n o t l i k e t o do."

L a t e r t h a t d a y Uenq m a i n t a i n e d t h a t " C h i n a would not h e s i t a t e t o

s h o u l d ~ r thc n e c e s s a r y s a c r i f i c e s t o u p h o l d i n t e r n a t i o n a l j u s t i c e and I34 t h e l o n g - t e r m i.ntl!rests o f world p e a c e and s t a b i l i t y . "

O n 31 J a n u a r y neng issued h i s most c c t e b r a t r d of w a r n i n g s :
don'^ t t . a c h them somi! n e c e s s a r y l e s s o n s , i t j u s t won't

"If ce

do.

..I

can

t i . 1 1 you t h a t c h a t t h e C h i n e s e p e o p l e s a y c o u n t s .
b:r

. . . Any

action taken

t h e Chinese i s t h r o u g h c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n .

W e k i l l not take any

r.ish a c t i o n .
t l w p r o b Leni."

A s to w h a t m e a s u r e s we u i l l a d o p t , we are s t i l l s t u d y i n g

135

On h i s r e t u r n iron1 t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , Deng X i a o p i n g madc a bri1.r

stop-over

vi!;it
tli;it

t o Japan ( 6 - 8 F e b r u a r y 1 9 7 9 ) .

On 7 F e b r u a r y Deng a g a i n

assorted

" V i e t n a m m u s t be p u n i s h e d f o r i t s e x p a n s i o n i s t a c t i o n

a g a i n s t Cariihodia

. . . action

w h i c h h a s b e e n i n s t i g a t e d by t h e S o v i e t

I36
Union.
'I

Deng h;id p u t 'Tokyo a n d W a s h i n g t o n i n a n u n c o m f o r t a b l e p o s i t i o n .

B o t h w e r e e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y e a g e r for good r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e PHC; a n d , t h e r e f o r e , n e i t h p r wanted t o do a n y t h i n g t o a n t a g o n i z e the C h i n e s e . [ i s n ~ ; p l a y e d t h i s t o the h i l t .

I n A u g u s t 1 9 7 8 he had b e e n s u c c n s s f u l in

g:t?t~:ing t h e J a p a n e s e t o a c c e p t t h e a n t i - h e g e m o n y c l a u s e i n t h e Japan-PRC 1:re;ity.

#ow, he f o l l o k e d w i t h a n t i - H a n o i . s i g n a l s from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s

and Japan.

Neither W a s h i n g t o n nor Tokyo s u p p o r t e d t h e p r o p o s i t i o n u f a

C h i n e s e p u n i t i v e e x p e d i t i o n a g a i n s t Viet Nam; b u t , on t h e O t h e r h a n d , iboth f e l t i t n c c e s s a r y t o t a k e g r e a t p a i n s t o be v e r y d e l i c a t e i n d x p r e s s i n g t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n t o the C h i n e s e l e a d e r s h i p . H a n o i , t o o , had

63

been m a k i n g o v e r t u r e s t o Tokyo and W a s h i n g t o n t o w a r d t h e end o r 1 9 i 8 , and Deng hoped t h a t t h e a p p e a r a n c e t h a t J a p a n and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s were b a c k i n g ttie PKC would cause ttie V i e t n a m e s e t o t a k e course.
i-I

more m o d e r a t e

It did not.

T h r o u g h o u t J a n u a r y and i n t o F e b r u a r y , t h e PRC moved l a r g e numbers 137 of troops t o the border region. A c c o r d i n g t o Agence _ Fra_ n c e LPrcsse 9

--

on 8 F e b r u a r y , i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w i n g Deng-s r c t u r n from t h e Uniced S t a t e s a n d J a p a n , t h e C h i n e s e d e c i d e d t o go t o war w i t h t h e SRV.

A

u n i f i e d comnand u n d e r t h c l e a d e r s h i p o f G e n e r a l X i S h i y o u (Commander), G e n e r a l Yang Uezhi ( D e p u t y Commander), and G f n e r a l Zhang D i n g f a ( C h i e f 138 I n c o n c e r t b i t h t h i s , 1.i X i a n n i a n i s s u e d of S t a f f ) & a s e s t a b l i s h e d . one more v e r b a l G a m i n g t o t h e V i e t n a m e s f t o heed a l l of t h e p r e v i o u s I39 s i g n a l s t h a t t h e C h i n e s e had s e n t . A l t h o u g h t h e C h i n e s e were s i g n a l l i n g t h a t t h e e l e v e n t h h o u r b a s a t h a n d , t h e Vietnamese d o u b t e d t h a t B e i j i n g would a c t u a l l y l a u n c h a l a r g e s c a l e m i l i t a r y a t t a c k a g a i n s t t h e SIIV. F i r s t , t h e V i e t n a m e s e c o u n t e d on Second, t h e con-

their t r e a t y w i t h the Soviets t o d e t e r t h e Chinese. q u e s t o f Cambodia was a l r e a d y a f a i t a c c t m p li.

A Chinese a t t a c k bould

n o t be o f a n y m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e now t o t h e K h m e r Rouge.

T h i r d , Hanoi

knew t h a t t h e p r i m a r y c o n c e r n o f t h e PRC was i t s Four X o d e r n i z a t i o n s . The SKV l e a d e r s d o u b t e d t h a t C h i n a would r i s k s e t t i n g hack i t s economic p r o g r a m s by e n t e r i n g a c o s t l y war.
F o u r t h , Hanoi was well a w a r e of t h e

d e b i l i t a t i n g e f f e c t t h a t t h e C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n had had on t h e C h i n e s e military establishrent. Thc SRV l e a d e r s d o u b t e d t h a t t h e C h i n e s e u o u l d

t h r m t h e PLA a g a i n s t a t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y s u p e r i o r and g r e a t l y more e x p e r i e n c e d V i e t n a m e s e armed f o r c e b e f o r e t h e PLA had been m o d e r n i z e d . F i f t h , a l t h o u g h Hanoi r a i l e d a g a i n s t a Beijing-Tokyo-Washin&eon a x i s ,

64

t h c Vi<!tnnnies? l.c;iders k n r h t h a t C h i n a tiad no s e r i o u s o u t s i d e s u p p o r t 140 tot. p u r s u i n g u war a g a i , n s t t h o SKV. Rased on r e a s o n i n g s u c h as t h i s ,

tlniioi f e l t no c o m p u l s i o n t o make s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e g e s t u r c s t o IkLjing. Once a g a i n tlie V i e t n a m e s e had m i s c a l c u l a t e d . f a i l e d t o t a k e i.nt0 a c c o u n t k i j i n g s t h e y h a d noL het?di?d C h i r i a s s i g n a l s . Once a g a i n t h e y had Oncc a g a i n

frame o f r e f e r e n c e .

Above a l l e l s e t h e P R C f e a r e d t h a t

t h e USSR was g a i n i n g a s i g n i f i c a n t g e o p o l i t i c a l a d v a n t a g e t o C h i n a - s
SOutll

t h r o u g h t h e a c t i o n s of t h e SKV.

T h i s c o u l d n o t go u n a n s w c r e d , Not o n l y d i d

U e i j i n g had :;ig11allt~d t h i s c o n c e r n t o H a n o i repeatedly.

Hanoi n o t r r s p o i i d p o s i t i v e l y t o B e i j i n g s s i g n a l s , i t c h a l l e n g e d t h e PHC o p a n l y by p e r s e c u t i n g i t s e t h n i c C h i n e s e a n d by m a k i n g b e l l i c o s e s t a t ( * m e n t s i n Moscow. C h i n a , on i t s s i d e . , a l s o had made s e r i o u s m i s c a l c u l a t i o n s . Its

p I i r 1 c i p n l on? was t o t i e i t s e l f t o t h e o d i o u s and a g g r e s s i v e Khmer Kouge

ri>girne, w h i c h p r e s e n t e d a g e n u i n e t h r e a t t o t h e SRVs n a t i o n a l
iiitc!rcsts.
B e i j i n g had a l s o u n d e r e s t i m a t e d H a n o i s determination t o

keep t h e PRC o u t o l Vietnamese a f f a i r s .

The Cliinesc l e a d e r s d i d n o t

s ~ c mt o r e ; i l i z t ! f u l l y t h a t Viet Nam had v i r t u a l l y no a l l i e s and t h a t i t

~ ~ i a~ l n ilo s d t h a v e t o w l y on tlie S o v i e t Union.

The t i n d e r - b o x PKC-SRV b o r d e r s i t u a t i o n p r e s e n t e d b o t h a p r e t e x t
and
11.A
ii

flash point or a c t i v e m i l i t a r y a c t i o n .

On 1 7 F e b r u a r y 1979, t h c

i n v a d e d V i e L Nam.

She n a t u r e of t h e r e s u l t i n g war from B e i . j i n g s

p c r s p e c t i v e wn!; l i m i t e d and p u n i t i v e a n d , a s s u c h , was a c o n t i n u a t i o n of CI1ina.s c r i s i s m a n a g e m e n t , n o t an a b e r r a t i o n from i t .

65

KEFEREWCES CITED

'Chc name o f the! V i e t n a m e s c l a n d and p u o p l c lias c h a n g e d many times o v e r t h e c o u r s e o f h i s t o r y . For c l a r i t y a n d c o n s i s t e n c y , t h e terms "Viet Nam" a n d " V i e t n a m e s e " G i l l be u s e d t h r o u g h o u t t h i s p a p e r r e g a r d l e s s of t h e p e r i o d u n d e r c n n s i d c r a t i o n u n l e s s a s p e c i f i c h i s t o r i c a l name i s r e q u i r e d . 2 J o h n Y. Cady, S o u t h e a s t Asia: __ I t s t l i . s t o r ic a 1 Development - (Nee York: M c G r a w - H i l l , 1 9 6 4 ) , pp. 1 6 - 1 7 . 3 C a d y , pp. 1 0 4 - 0 6 . 4 Henry McAleavy, R l a c k F l a g s i n Victnarn ( N e b York: Xncmil t a n , __ __ 1 9 6 8 ) , pp. 2 6 - 4 1 .

_--

McAleavy,

pp.

233-43.

6
C a d y , pp.
7

558-61.
Origins 1 9 7 5 ) , p p , 81-86.

K o b e r t F. T u r n e r , V i e t n a m e s e Communism: Development - ( S t a n f o r d : Hoover I n s t i t u t i o n P r e s s ,

and

Bantam The N e w York T i m e s , e d . , P e n t a g o n Pnpers (Neb York: Books, I ~ ) ~ p . 4 7 - 4 9 . 9 D o u g l a s Pi.ke, H i s t o r y o f V i e t n a m e s e Communism, 1 9 2 5 - L Y 7 6 ( S t a n ford: H o o v e r I n s t i t u t i o n P r e s s , 1 9 7 8 ) , pp. 8 7 - 8 8 . 10 P e n t a g o n PHprrs, 4 7 - 4 9 .

The

..

11

S t a n l e y K a r n o r , Nao and C h i n a : From R e v o l u t i o n t o Revolution (New York: V i k i n g P r e s s , 1 9 7 2 ) , p. 4 3 9 . 12 T u r n e r .. .. DD. 2 9 0 - 3 0 4 : a n d G a r e t t i P o r t e r . "Vi.etnamese P o l i c v a n d t h e I n d o c h i n a C r i s i s , " The T h i r d I n d o c h i n a C o n f l i c t , e d . D a v i d W.P. E l l i o t t ( B o u l d e r : ! J e s t v l e u , 19811, pp. 7 2 - 7 7 . B o t h ' T u r n e r and P o r t e r t r a c e the twists and t u r n s i n Sino-Vietnamese r e l a t i o n s d u r i n g this period. T u r n e r ' s treatment i s g e n e r a l l y more d e t a i l e d . The a n a l y s i s g i v e n here d o e s n o t follow e i t h e r s o u r c e e x a c t l y b u t d r a w s m o r e on Turner t h a n P o r t e r . 13 SRV, F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y , "The T r u t h About Viet Nam-China R e l a t i o n s O v e r t h e Last T h i r t y Y e a r s , " F o r e i g n B r o a d c a s t I n f o r m a t i o n S e r v i c e ( P B I S ) D a i l y R e p o r t , A s i a a n d P a c i f i c , S u p p l e m e n t , 19 Oct 79, p . 22.

--

66

14 S t a n l c y Knrnow, vietnaiii: 1583), pp. h<). I5 SL<V, "'l'ht! ' I ' ~ u c I \ ,p ". 26.
16

H i s t o r y (New York:

V i k i n g Press,

S t e p h e n U. Young, "Good Government i n H a n o i , " The American Bpect a t o r , 1 5 : 4 : 2 3 , A p r i l , 1982. 17 SlW, F o r c i g n M i n i s t r y , "The T r u t h , " T h i s i s the g i s t o f tlir, g e n e r a l argunient p r e s e n t e d i n the SllV F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y ' s White Book. I8 Ken Min Iti Uno and Xin llua S h e , ed: On t h e V i e t n a m e s e F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y ' s 'White Book C o n c e r n i n g Viet Nam-China R e l a t i o n s T 8 7 . 7 c -t. l i n g : Fort3ign Language P r e s s , 1 9 7 9 ) , pp. 1-38. I0 Karnoh, Viatnani, p p . 661-70.

-.

l . -

- ---

, --

21)

McAleavy, p. 2tKi. 2INayan Chanda, "An Old War B r i n g s New P r o b l e m s , I 1 Par E a s t e r n Economic Revieb (hereafter F E E R ) , 94:40:72, 1 O c t o b e r 1976.
22

--

Chanda, p. 72.

2 '3
FEEII, 9 9 : 9 : 1 2 - 1 3 ,
2 I+

3 March 1978.

I:I!EX,

87:11:Y,

14 March 1975.

25FEEft, 9 1 : 5 : 9 , 30 J a n u a r y 1976. 2h--L v o G o o d s t a d t , " A f t e r D e t e n t p , S h i v e r s o[ A p p r e h e n s i o n , " R 9 : % 8 : 2 6 - 2 7 , I 1 . J u l y 1975. 27 R o b e r t S i i t t e r , " C h i n a ' s S t r a t e g y 'Tocard Vietnam and I t s l11ipl i c a t i o u s f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , " The T h i r d I n d o c h i n a C o n f l i c t , ~ d by . David E l l i o t t ( R o u l d e r : Westview P r e s s , 1 9 8 1 ) , p. 165. 28 Gareth ' 0 ~. t e r . " V i e t n a m e s e Policv a n d t h e I n d o c h i n a C r i s i s ," . ~ 1~ 'The T h i r d l n d o c l i i n a C o n f l i c t , e d . b y David E l l i o t t ( B o u l d e r : Westview ._ PWS, i 9 8 i T p . 69.
~

m,

'Third N a t i o n a l . C o n g r e s s o f t h e Viet Nam W o r k e r s ' Party ( H a n o i : r o r c i g i i L a n g u a g e s P u b i i s h i n g House, 196O), p. 31. 30 L'orter', p. 72. :I 1 t h e Problc!m Chinese Aggression Against Viet Nam: _ The _ Root.of -(Hanoi.: F o r c t g n L a n g u a g e s P u b l i s h i n g Housi?, 1 9 7 9 ) , csp. pp. 1-10. 32 M i c h a e l R i c h a r d s o n , "How t h r F i v e See I n d o c h i n a , " E R , 98:52:7-8, 30 December 1977. 33 S u t t t ! r , p. 3 3 .
~ ~~

__

__--

___

m,

67

34

nn:z$:z&,
35
76. .

Dev S i u r a r k a , "The Rivals--Mosciitv's 13 J u n + 1975.

hsian Strategy,"

m,

Ken H i n K i Uao

- - -'
011

2Y .IuI.y 1975.

Reported X i n Hua Shc. - 7 7.-

3 SepLeinbur 1975 i n Ren Min R i Bao a n d in

2 2 S e p t e m b e r 1975.

38-

Ren Win K i -Rao 7

Chalmcrs Johnson, Autopsy On P e o p l e ' s of C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1 9 7 3 ) , passim.

-War ( B e r k e l e y :

University

39
P o r t e r , p . 78. Trail,"

FEER, 98:49:38-39,
N i v i l o n , pp.

And F r a n c o i s N i v o l o n , "Vietnam on the Aid 9 December 1977.

4038-09.
IEIV P r i n r i L i. (? s

41

Chand a "V i (1 t nams ' s Economy : 41, 19 November 76.

FE I< R, , __
I'

9b :4 7 :40

42
SRV, "The T r u t h , "
p.

22.

43
V i c t o r P u r c e l l , The C h i n c s e i n South?!ist O x f o r d UP, 1 9 5 1 ) , pp. 1 6 m 9 .

Asia --

( F a i r Lawn, N.

J.:

44
P o r t e r , p. 85.

45 46 47 90:42:31-32,
W i l f r e d B u r c h c t t , " C r a c k i n g Down o f S a i g o n ' s C o i s p r a d o r e s , " 1 7 O c t o b e r 1975.
_ .

YEEK, -f

88:21:5, 88:26:26,

2 3 May 1975.

FEER

2 7 J u n e 1975.

m,

48FEER, 88:15:5, 11 A p r i l 1975. 49 P o r t e r , p. 84. 50 S u t t e r , pp. 168-69. 51 E d i t h L e n a r t , "Hanoi-s I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t a g e - S e t t e r , " 90:47:22, 2 1 November 1975. 52 Nhan Dan, 12 F e b r u a r y 76; r e : P o r t e r , p. 79. 5389:33:13, 54

w,
B,

Y i c h a e l Morrow, "Two N o i g h b o r s o n thr Same W a v e l e n g t h , " 15 A u g u s t 1975.

FEER, 89:35:5, 55-

29 A u g u s t 1975.

X i n Hua S h e , 19 A u g u s t 1975; re: P o r t e r , p .

56-

--

78.
25

C h a n d a , "Vietnam O p t s f o r Broad A p p r o a c h , " . FEEK, 95:8:18-20, F e b r u a r y 1977.

57
FB 1s 58
N1l:lrl _ _

5Y

FUIS
60

FEER, Y4:52:5,
61
(1

24 December 1 9 7 6 .

__ FEEL<,

9 % : % 3 : 5 , h .June 1 9 7 6 .

2
3

__ F E E R , Y6:1&:5,

H A p r i l 77.

t1

IKcn Miri R i --' Bao 2 5 F c b r i i a r y 1977. 64.FEEK, - 95:1:5, 7 J a n u a r y 1977.

65 FHlS ( A l l ) , 2 1 March 87

66
Nhan . -

Dan, I 1 May 1 9 7 7 .
p. 96.

67
I'orter,

Qitcc,n's
.

O l e I<. H o l s t i , C r i s i s , E s c a l a t i o n , War ( M o n t r e a l : Y I J , 1 Y 7 2 ) , 111'. 2:!2-25.

___

YcCill-

..
" P v k i n g E s c a l a t e s t h e War of N e r v e s , "

1;'

Chanda, M;ircli 1 9 7 8 . 71 Ren M i n 72 l'ortcr, 73 Chanda,

3, 99:

1 I : 10- 1 1 ,

Ri I3a0, 1'.

10 J a n u a r y 1978,

in FUIS (PRC) 10 J a n u a r y 1 9 7 8 .

100.

"Prkinp, E s c a l a t e s , " p p .

10-11.

74Cliilnda, " P c k i n # E s c a l a t e s , " p p . 10-1 1 . 75 Clianda, "Pekin): E s c a l a t e s , " p p . 10-1 1. 76 FEEK, . 99:13:5, 3 1 March 1978. 7; L'oKl:l?r', 11. 1 0 4 . 7 ti Sti,pht!ri F i t z g e r a l d , " P e k i n g ' s New P u l l a t t h e P u r s e - S t r i n g s , " FEER, 100:24:111-20, 16 J u n e 1 9 7 8 . - -. i 1) IKon M i i i K i B a o , 4 J a n u a r y 1978. 80-C l i a r i d ; ~ , "Comrades C u r b t h e C a p i t a l i s t s , " F E E R , 100:15: 1 1 - 1 2 , 14 A p r i l 1978.

--

__

69

81
Chando, " C h o l o n ' s M e r c h a n t s F e e l t h e I b r d c r l l a c k l a s h , " 100:18:10-11, j May 1 9 7 8 . 82 -FEER, 1 0 0 : 1 9 : . 5 , I 2 May 1 9 7 8 . 83 C h a n d a , " C h o l o n ' s Merchants," p p . 10-11. 84 FEER 1 0 0 : 1 7 : 5 , 28 A p r i l 1 9 7 8 .

I;F.EK,

"5---'
86

FBIS ( P I K ) , 2 4 Nay 1 9 7 8 .

Wen Wei Baa, I 1 Nay 7 8 , i n -FKER, 100:2:12-13,

87-

19 May 1 9 7 8 .

-Wen Wei Bao, 2 2 Nay 1978, i n FRLS ( P R C ) , 2 4 May 1 9 7 8 .

88-Ole H. H o l s t i , "Thc 1 9 1 4 C a s e , " A m e r i c a n P o l i t i c al Scicnce Revieb, 5 9 : 2 : 3 6 5 - 7 8 , June, 1965. 89 P o r t e r , p . 104.

YO

91 92

Xin Hun -Stif, 2 4 -

May 1 9 7 8 , i n FDIS (PI<(:),

2 4 May 1 9 7 8 .

F n l S ( A P ) , 25 Nay 1 Y 7 8 .

X i n Hun She, 2 6 Hay 7 8 .

9394

--

FBIS ( M I , 6 J u n r 1 9 7 8 .

U.S., D e f e n s e I n t e l l i g e n c e A g e n c y , C h i n o - V i e t n a m B o r d e r Tonsions: A - C h r o n o l o g y , 2 2 June 1 9 7 6 - 5 May 1 9 8 1 ( W a s h i n g t o n : D I A , 1 9 8 2 ) , pp. 1 6 - 1 8 . 95 Wen Wei -P a o , 30 May 1 9 7 8 , i n YBIS ( P l t C ) , 2 June 1 9 7 8 . 96 L'BZS ( A P ) , 5 J u n c 1 9 7 8 . 97 FBIS (PRC), 5 J u n e 1 9 7 8 . 98 FBIS ( . W ) , 7 J u n e 1 9 7 8 .

99 .~

Chinese Residents, (Beijing: Foreign On V i e t Nam's E x p u l s i o n L a n g u a g e s P r e s s , 1 9 7 8 ) , pp. 131-38 a n d 1 6 1 - 7 0 . 100 On V i e t Nam-s E x p u l s i o n , pp. 1 4 9 - 5 4 . 101 D a v i d R o n a v i o , " S t r a i g h t ' T a l k From P e k i n g , " E,100:23:10-1 I , 9 June 1978. 102 FBLS (PKC), 12 J u n e 1 9 7 8 . 103 FBIS (PRC), 2 6 J u n e 1 9 7 8 . 104 U.S., DIA, C h i n a - V i e t n a m B o r d e r T e n s i o n s , p p . 1 8 - 2 4 . 105 Nhan Dan, 2 0 June 1 9 7 8 , i n P o r t e r , p. 106. --

_- -

70

I06
1:UIS (PI{<:), 7 J u l y 1978.

107

I ox
I\LI~;LIS

Fb:ER, .-

IO1:28:5,

14 J u l y 1978.

Ro1:i.r Uoyes, "Moscob J o l t s I t s A l l i e s , " __ FEEK, 101:33:9-11, 18 107 8. 109 Tht! Viet Nam Workers P a r t y (VWP) c h a n g e d i t s name t o t h e Viet Main C o m u n i s t P a r t y (VCP) i n December 1976. I10 P o r t e r , p. 105. P o r t e r r e p o r t s t h e s e d a t a from p e r s o n a l interviews t V i t h VCP 1'oIi.tbiiro members. Ill FBIS ( I ' I K ) , I 9 J u l y 1978.
f

I12 ..-

1:UlS ( A P ) ,

43.
11'1 70

11 August 1 9 7 8 ; and On Viet _ _ - Nam's E x p u l s i o n , pp. 2 9 2 1 ,\ugust

.
I
I
I 6

IFUrs (I'ltc),

1978; and On V i e t Nam's E x p u l s i o n , pp. 5 0 -

BBIS (PKC), 28 August

1078.

FnrS ( I ' R C ) , 12 Silptember 1 9 7 8 ; and On _ Viet _ - Nam's E x p u l s i o n , PI). 8 9 - 9 3 . 1I7 On Viet: _ . Nam's E x p u l s i o n , pp. 9 4 - 1 3 0 . IIR FI\IS (I'KC), 27 S e p t e m b e r 1978.
E x p u l s i o n of C h i n e s e I l e s i d e n t s i s t h e P R C ' s c o m p i l a t i i i n of documents i n E n g l i s h t h a t relate t o t h e O v e r s e a s Chinese p r o b l c m i n V i e t Nnm. I t g i v e s B e i j i n g ' s o f f i c i a l v e r s i o n of the n e g o l - i a t i o n s arid t h e e v e n t s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e SRV's h o s t i l i , t y t o t h c e t h n i c C h i n e s e r e s i . d e n t i n Viet Nam. I20 P o r t e r , p. 108. I21 U.S., I)[)\, C h i n a - V i e t n a m B o r d e r T e n s i o n s , p p . 24-33. I22 Re11 Min H i Ilao, 14 S e p t e m b e r 1978, i n FBIS, I 9 S e p t e m b e r 1978.
119 O n Viet Nam's
~~~

-__

___

__
FIlI!;

123 ( A P ) , 4 O c t o b e r 1978.

I2A FEER, 102:41:11Stephi?ii I l a r b c r , "No Grcen L i g h t Yet f o r Hanoi," __ 1 7 , 13 O c t o b e r 1978.

125

Chnnda, "Changing t h e I n d o c h i n a U a l a n c e , " FEEK, 102:52:14-15, I k c m b e r 1978. l2G P o r t c r , p. 107.

29

71

127
Moscow,"

Nayan Clianda, Rodney T a s k e r , a n d J o h n I x b i s , "A B e a r h u g from FEER, 1 0 2 : 4 6 : 8 - 1 1 , 1 7 November 1978.

I 28
Re11 M i n R i Bao, 10 Noveiiiber 1 9 7 8 , i n FIILS (PKC), 1 3 November 1978, q u o t e d i n D I A , C h i n a - V i e t n a m Uordfr T e n s i o n s , p. 34. 129 FBIS (PRC), 14 December 1 9 7 8 , q u o t e d i n D I A , p. 37. I30 FIIIS (PRC), 26 December 1 9 7 8 , q u o t e d i n D I A , p. 38. 131 __ FEEK, 103:3:5, 19 J a n u a r y 1979. 132 FBIS ( A P ) , 3 J a n u a r y 1 9 7 9 ; a n d F B I S (PKC), 5 J a n u a r y 1979. 133 The Neb York Tim%, 31 J a n u a r y 1 9 7 9 , i n D a n i e l T r e t i a k , " C h i n a - s V i e t n a m War a n d i t s C o n s e q u e n c e s , " China Q u a r t e r l y , 80:749, Decomber, 1979. I34 The Rer. York -Times 31 J a n u a r y 1 9 7 9 , i n I ' r e t i a k , p. 743. 9
~~~

_--

p.

__The KO* imes, __ _- York T 136 M a i n i c h i -D a i l y Nebs 747.

I35
I37

1 F e b r u a r y 1 9 6 9 , i n T r r t i a k , p.

743.

( T o k y o ) , 8 F e b r u a r y 1979, i n T r e t i a k ,

Chanda, " B l i t z k r i e g on Cambodia," 1979; a n d FBIS (AFP) 2 1 F e b r u a r y 1979. I 38 F B I S (PKC), 21 F e b r u a r y 1979. 139 PBIS (PRC), 2 1 F e b r u a r y 1979. 140 P o r t e r , pp. 109-110.

s, 103:?:14-15,

12 January

72

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

The __

U e c i s i o n t o Go t o War

Why d i d C h i n a F i n a l l y go t o war w i t h Viet Nam 1

A numbcr o f

conditions , p r e v i i i l e d t h n t i m p e l l e d t h e Chinese l t s n d e r s t o t a k e t h e s t e p s
w h i c h 1cd t o thr: i n v a s i o n of t h e

snv

i n F ~ b r u a r yof 1979.

First,

I l c i j i n g f e l t i t s s e c i i ~ i t y i n t e r e s t s were b e i n g s e r i o u s l y a n d i i r m e d i a t e l y tllrraten(!d and

ii

Inore p a s s i v e r e a c t i o n would o n l y h e i g h t t ? n t l l r t h r e a t .
O V ~ Kt h e

G e n t ~ r i ~ l lty m d e r l i n i n y , t h i s was a h i s t o r y of C h i n e s e c o n c e r n s e c u r i t y o f i t s S o u t h e r r l rt!alms,

w h i c h had c o n t r i b u t e d t o a long r e c o r d S e c o n d , Hanoi had

o f ; i n i m o s i t y b e t w e e n th t! C h i n e s e a n d t h e V i e t n a m e s e .
o p r n l y clial1engc.d B r i j i n g ' s

" f a c e " and c r e d i b i l i t y b y i t s p e r s e c u t i o n of

t h e c t h n i c C h i n c , s e i n V i e t Nam, by i t s d e l i v e r y of a n t i - C h i n e s e s p e e c h e s
i n Moscou, b y i t s p r e s s u r e on the s o u t h e r n b o r d e r of t h c PKC, i n v a s i o n o f Cambodia. Third,
and by i t s

t h e p r e s e n c e o f a h o s t i l e s u p e r p o u r r , the China d i d

S o v i e t [ I n i o n , on t h e w a n e r a i s e d t h e s t a k e s c o n s i d e r a b l y .

n o t view V i e t N a n nlerely a s a n o b s t r e p e r o u s r e g i o n a l p o w e r , b u t r a t h e r percc,ived i t a s p a r t o f p n c i x l e m e n t of t h e PRC.

ii

g l o b a l S o v i e t maneuver t o a c h i e v e a s t r a t e g i c The C h i n e s e l e a d e r s h i p f e l t o b l i g e d t o r e a c t

t o t h i s s e t of c i r c u m s t a n c e s u i t h a l i m i t e d war on Viet Nam.

73

L h ( * K e l e v a n c c of H i s t o r y

The f i r s t c o n c l u s i o n t h a t c a n b e d r a w n i s t h a t p r i o r h i s t o r i c a l experience i s r e l e v a n t t o subsequent developments.

'This i s n o t t o

a s s e r t d e t e r m i n i s m , b u t r a t h e r t o :iffirm thal- t h e p a t t e r n s o f t h e p a s t

may g i v e a c l u e t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e p a t t e r n s o f t h e p r e s e n t and f u t u r l . .
W h i l c ? t h e S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e d i s p u t e may h a v e scemed a b e r r a n t t o t h e c o n -

temporary o b s e r v e r , not. China's

from an h i s t o r i c a l p c r s p e c t i v c , i t c e r t a i n l y lvns

s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e in the r e g i o n h a s b e e n t o s e c u r c ~ i t s

s o u t h e r n r e a l m s - - h i s t o r i c a l l y and c u r r e n t l y .

Viet Nam's s t r a t e g i c o b -

. i c c t i v c h a s been co d o m i n a t e t h e I n d o c h i n a a r e a and t o e s t a b l i s h i t s i n d r p r n d t a n t i i l e n t i t y i n the f a c e o f i t s c ~ ~ l l l ~ r overwhe1ming ~ ~ l l y neighbor.

V i c t Nam a l s o h a s becn c o n c e r n e d w i t h s e c u r i t y , k i t h r e g a r d

t o b o t h China and Cambodia.

as c o n t e m p o r a r y phenomenon.

T h i s , t o o , h a s been an h i s t o r i c a l a s h e l l
'These o b j e c t i v e s of C h i n a and o f V i e t Nam

have c l a s h e d f o r two millennia. l a t e 1970s is not s u r p r i s i n g .

T h a t t h e y s h o u l d do s o again i n t l l e S i n c c t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , the element

o f a p o h e r f u l t h i r d - p a r t y p r e s e n c e i n V i c t Nam has s e r v e d t o i n t e n s i f y

China's concern.

F r a n c e , J a p a n , a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s have a l l been

i n t i m a t e l y i n v o l v e d i n V i e t Nam d u r i n g t h e p a s t t h o hundred y e a r s ; a n d , a l t h o u g h t h e n a t u r e o f e a c h one's i n v o l v e m e n t d i f f e r e d c o n s i d e r a b l y from

I t was, t h e r e f o r e ,

t h a t of t h e o t h e r s , China opposed t h e m a l l a l i k c .

h a r d l y e x t r a o r d i n a r y t h a t t h f ? PRC s h o u l d become q u i t e a l a r m e d a t t h e Soviet involvement i n the 1 9 7 0 s .

74

The -.--__I e r c e p t i o n s o f D e t c r r e n c e
Whi l a , ,

i n m~iiiy r t ! s p e c t s , CI1ina.s r e a c t i o n t o the e v e n t s of the 1;irt.

19;)s
iis

was s i m i l a r t o i t s l i a n d l i n g oE t h e K o r e a n and I n d i a n e m e r g e n c i e s
bpi

d e s c r i b e d by A1 Len W h i t i n g , t h e r o w e r e i m p o r t a n t v a r i a t i o n s a s
SOW

1.

In

nieasiirc t l w PRC had r e l i n e d i t s p o l i c y o f d e t e r r c l n c e i n t o a

I)rtisdcr p o l i c y

or

c r i s i s management.

Beijing s t i l l believed t h a t

t o i ~ i , q np o i t , r n woiiLd c o n s p i r e t o g a i n a n a d v a n t a g e o v e r C h i n e , a n d the'
Chines<% lead<>rs i c r c s t i l l c o n v i n c e d o r chr. i m p o r t a n c e o f t i m i n g in

d e l i v e r i n g tlicir s i g n a l s .

On the o t h e r h a n d , t h r C h i n e s c a p p e a r e d t o

br

Le,is i.mpelLrd t o a s s u m e n b e l l i g e r e n t p o s t u r e , a n d t h e y seemed t o bcs

w i l l i n g t o c o n s i d o r a u i d r r rangc o i o p t i o n s t h a n b e f o r e i n o r d e r t o
ilchi(?vc? t t i c i r o t ) j < : c t i v e s . . This h a s e s p c ! c i o l l y
tll(!

c a s e in t h e e a r l i e r

s t a g e s 01

tlic. c r i s i s . t h e IRC r x e r c i n r d m o d e r a t i o n i n d e a l i n g k i t h

F r o m 1975 t o mid-1!178,

V i e t Sam.

Tlie Chinese seemed h i l l i n g t o t r y C o u n d e r s L a n d H a n o i - s f r i i m t !

or r e f e r c n c e .

lhry

L?VBII

seemed t o b e h i l l i n g t o a c c e p t t h e f a c t t h a t

t:ic !:ietnamc:;e
China.

w e r e bound t o c x h i b i t a m e a s u r e of h o s t i l i t y t o h o r d t h e s p r e a d of S o v i c t

l l e i i i n g s o v e r r i d i n g g o a l h a s t o prt!clude!

i n f l u e n c e i n thr! a r e a .
approach.

To a c h i e v e t h i s t h e C h i n e s e a t t e m p t e d a b a l a n c e d

They l a u n c h e d d i p l o m a t i c i n i t i a t i v e s a r o u n d t h e w o r l d .

1lei.j i n g s

rand d e m a r c h e y i e l d c d s i g n i i c a n t r e s u l t s d u r in g

tII(.

1970s,

t u r n i n g inany erstwtii l e enemies i n t o a t l e a s t s o n i e t h i n g a k i n t o f r i e n d : ; . R t 1 n l : i o n s h i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , J a p a n , a n d m o s t of t h e ASEAN c o u n t r i e s bccame a l m o s t c o r d i a l .

At t h e same t i m e ,

t h e PRC r e d u c e d c o n s i d e r a b l y

i t s s u p p o r t or i n s u r g e n c i e s .

As t e n s i o n s w i t h H a n o i g r e w , B e i j i n g h a s

c a r e f u l t o k e e p i t s c r i t i c i s m s o E the V i e t n a m e s e low-keyed a n d o b l i q u e .

The C h i n c s e o f f e r e d p o s i t i v e i n d u c e m e n t s t o tlie V i e t n a m e s e a n d g c n e r a l l y avoided t h r e a t s .

A s l a t ? a s J a n u a r y 1 9 7 8 , t h e PRC has h i l l i n g t o con-

I
ti.nue i t s a i d progroin h i t h t h r SKV. Importaiitly, lleijing e x h i b i t e d

r e s t r a i n t , which h a d t h c e f f e c t o f s l o h i n g ttir pace o r c r i t i c a l e v e n t s .

A l l of t h e s e t h i n g s c o n t r i b u t e d t o k e e p i n g tlie s i t u a t i o n u n d e r c o n t r o l .
117

e f f f c t , t h e PKC has b e h a v i n g i n a manner t h a t c o n t r i b u t e d t o s u c -

c e s s f u l c r i s i s management a s d e s c r i b e d by I i o l s t i .
Thc! C h i n e s e sah t h i s t o b e the b e s t a p p r o a c h f o r a number o f

reasons.

On t h e hoinc f r o n t , the PRC was f a c e d w i t h t h o m a j o r c h a l l e n g e s

r h i c h c o u l d b e inet more c , E f c c t i v e l y i f C h i n a s f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s her,?

stable.

I n the p o l . i t i c n 1 a r e n a , t h c C h i n e s e wen f a c i n g an imminent

c h a n g e i n I c a d e r s h i p , k i t h b o t h Mao Zedong and Z t w u l h l a i s s r i o u s l y i l l

i n Late 1975.

l n the economic realm, the PRC had l a u n c h c d t h e Foiur

M o d e r n i z a t i o n s program i n J a n u a r y 1975, and O e i j i n g hoped t o c o n c e n t r a t e

i t s f u l l a t t e n t i o n and r e s o u r c e s on d o m e s t i c d e v e l o p m e n t .

On the i n t p r -

n a t i o n a l scene, t h e PHC had 1orgcl.y ab.juri?d r e v o l u t i o n a r y p e o p l e s war

a s a p r i m a r y i n s t r u m e n t o f f o r c i g i i p o l i c y and had a d o p t e d a more o r t h o -

dox a p p r o a c h of i n t e r s t a t e d i p l o m a c y .

D e i j i n g has p u r s u i n g a p o l i c y o f

c u l t i v a t i n g good r e l a t i o n s w i t h the c a p i t a l i s t r o r l d - - e s p e c i a l l y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and J a p a n - - a n d o f p r e s e n t i n g i t s e l f as t h e m o r a l l e a d e r o r t h e T h i r d World. salutary effects.

T h i s s t a n c e by t h e PRC l e a d e r s h i p had tbio i m p o r t a n t

I t p l a c e d a p r e m i u m on r e s t r a i n t i n C h i n a - s f o r e i g n

p o l i c y , and i t g a v e I l c i j i n g a widor r a n g e of n p t i o n s i n d r a l i n g w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l problems.

On t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e C h i n e s e made a s e r i o u s e r r o r i n a l l y i n g
t h e m s e l v e s r;itti t h e Khmer Rouge. The P o l Pot r e g i m e a n t a g o n i z e d t h e The Cambodians l o o k e d upon t h e V i e t from t h e

Vietnamese f r o m t h e v e r y s t a r t .

namese much a s t h e V i e t n a m e s e l o o k e d upon t h e C h i n e s e , i . e . ,

76

l)ei-sp'?ctiv~ Of

ii

smii1ler c o u n t r y w h i c h fanred b e i n g d o m i n a t e d by i t s

l a r g e r n r i ~ ~ l b o r .'rile Cambodian l e a d e r s p e r c e i v e d t h e i r range of o p t i o n s t o tw v e r y o a r r o b .

'The f a n a t i c a l Khmer Koiige i d e o l o g y a n d t h e g e n e r a 1

i s o l a t i o n oC Cambodia f r n m t h e i n t c r n a t i o n a l community e n g e n d e r e d i n t h e
POL P o t regime

he c o n v i c t i o n t h a t i t s only e f f e c t i v e r e s p o n s e t n Viet
S i n c e B e i j i n g r e a l l y could do l i t t l e t o con0

N a n was nnc o f h o s t i l i t y .

tr.>L t h e Caiiibodian C o m m u n i s t s , t h e y s u r r e n d e r e d much

t h e i r oun i n d e -

pendeiicc o f a c t i o n i n t t w r e g i o n by t h i s i.tL a d v i s e d a l l i n n c e . 'rh(, V i r ~ t n a i i i c s c per1 ~ c i v e d their o p t i o n s t o be f e w e r t h a n t h o s e a v a i l i l b l e t o t h t : Chinc,sf!.

F i r s t , t h e h i s t o r i c a l t r e n d was o n e o f

Chi.n;i .s a t t m p t i.ng t o clominatt- V i e t N a m , n o t t h e o t h e r b a y a r o u n d .

S e c o n d , t h e SRV had a 1.1rgc and w e a l t h y e t h i c C h i n e s e p o p i i l a t i o i i u i t l i i n

i t s b o r d e r s , but: t h e I'RC
it!; n a t i o n a l boundnri.f!s.
had no c o m p a r a b l e V i e t n a m e s e p r e s e l l c e w i t h i l l

T h i r d , H a n o i saw t h e e c o n o m i c r i ! l o t i o n s h i p I l e i j i n g was Cree

LO e x r r t

be twren C h i r 1 . i iind V i e t Nasi t o be o n e - s i d e d .

e c o n o m i c l 1 ? v e r s g e on H a n o i , b u t Hanoi was i n no p o s i t i o n t o r e c i p r o c a t e .

V i c t Nam had b w n exhausI:ed by y e a r s o f w a r f a r e , w h i l e C h i n a b a s b r g i n n i n g t o e n j o y n niaasure o f e c o n o m i c r e v i v a l . Fourth,

the V i e t n a m e s e

t t i o u g h t t h a t t h e PI<(: w a s i n a much s t r o n g e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o s i t i o n t h a n t h e SKV. Yuch of the w o r l d was b e a t i n g on B e i j i n g ' s

door i n t h e l a t e

l'I7Os:

d e s i r i n g c l o s e r d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s , c o u r t i n g t h e I'KC i n the

g ! o b a l power gemc, i n d u l g i n g t h e i r r a n c i c s w i t h the i n d e f a t i g a b l e m y t h

o t the China market.

V i c t Nnm sali ttiat i t c o u l d n o t hope t o c o m p e t c

w i t h tl1i.s.

l n s l i o r t , Hanoi p e r c e i v e d a d i s t i n c t l a c k s y n e n e t r y i n t h e
llanoi looked a t i t s r e l a -

r * ! l a t i v r p o s i t i o n s t o t h e PKC a n d t h e SHV.

t i o n s h i p u i t h H e i . i i n g its i f Viet N a m were t h e f i s h on the l i n c and C h i n a

tile

fishermm.

'Tht\

C h i n e s e c o u l d e x e c u t e t e n s i o n or s l a c k a s t h e y saw

77

f i t , b u t t h e Vietnamese could only s t r u g g l e t o extend the l i n e . otticr coursc of a c t i o n hould rcsult i n t h e i r being r r e l e d in.

Any

From t1ii.s f r a m e oC r r l e r e n c e , Hanoi d e v e l o p e d i t s obn " c a l c u l u s o f dc?terrencc." disadvantage, S i n c e t h e SRV l e a d e r s t h o u g h t t h e y were a t s u c h a g r e a t t h e i r c a l c u l u s h a s one p r i m a r i l y o f b e l l i g e r e n c e . They

wished t o s i g n a l t o t h e C h i n e s e t h a t t h e y were n o t g o i n g t o be b u l l i e d . H a n o i - s a c t i o n s a f t e r 1975 lcerc n o t u n l i k c B e i j i n g - s a c t i o n s a f t e r 1949, a s d e s c r i b c d by W h i t i n g . a c c u s a t i o n and w a r n i n g .

borders.

T h e V i e t n a m e s e r e s o r t e d t o t h e r h e t o r i c of

The SRV m a i n t a i n e d s t e a d y p r c s s u r e a l o n g i t s
In addition to

Hanoi was q u i c k t o c a l l on Noscoh COK s u p p o r t .

t h i s , t h e V i e t n a m e s e were a b l e t o s i g n a l . t h o i r d i s p l e a s u r e t o B e i j i n g by
the h a r s h m e a s u r e s t a k e n a g a i n s t the O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e .
B e c a u s e Hanoi

was t h e weaker p a r t y , y e t s u p p o r t e d by t h e S o v i e t Union, i t t h o u g h t i t

c o i i l d i n f l u e n c e C h i n e s ? b e h a v i o r by h o s t i l c , i n e a s u r e s w i t h o u t h a v i n g t o

suffer d e v a s t a t i n g consequences.

The SRV h o u l d makr t h Q PKC d e a l w i t h

i t on i t s own terms, and t h e r e b y f o r c e t h e C h i n e s e t o r e l i n q u i s h many of

t h e i r n a t u r a l advantages.

A s a r e s u l t , the V i r e n a m r s c l e a d e r s d i d n o t

a p p e a r t o t r y t o u n d e r s t a n d hliy China d i d pose a t h r e a t and t o a c t i n a hay t o reduce t h a t t h r e a t . i n l a m e t h e issue. I n s t e a d , they took a c t i o n s t h a t could o n ly

They began m a s s i v e p e r s e c u t i o n s o f t h e O v e r s e a s

C h i n e s e i n V i e t Nam, and t h e y d r e h c l o s e t o the S o v i e t Union.

T h c h e a r t o f the c r i s i s was i n t h i s c o n f l i c t of p e r c e p t i o n s .

Each

s i d e was u s i n g a d i C f c r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e i n v i u h i n ) : i t s own and t h c o t h e r s i d e - s p o s i t i o n , and e a c h s i d e was d e t e r m i n e d t h a t i t s w i l l b o u l d prevail.

70

R . .e a c t i n g

tinder S t r e s s

1.n t h e s p r i n g o i 1978, Hanoi began an i n t e n s i v e c a m p a i g n a g a i n s t

t h e C l i i n e s e r i ! s i d e i i t s of V i e t Nam. A t t h i s time B e i j i n g began r e a c t i n g

niuch more b e l l i g e r c n t l y .

Now, C h i n a ' s c r i s i s management a p p r o x i n i a t e d

iiior(! c l o s e l y ~ h t x " c s l c u l u s of d e t e r r e n c e " model t h a t had c h a r a c t e r i z e d

i t i n 1950 and 1 9 6 2 .

Likfwise,

the Chinese l e a d e r s s t a r t e d t o exhibiL

c t i o s ~c ~ l ~ a r a c t ~ r ii s c ts o f n c t i o n t h a t t y p i f y d e c i s i o n - m a k i , n g u n d e r s t r e s s
ils

d e s c r i b e d by Ole I l o l s t i .

'They began t o p e r c e i v e time d i f f e r e n t l y ,

'Tht,v

CeeI i n g c o n s t r a i n e d b y i t r a t h e r t h a n u s i n g i t t o chei.r a d v a n t a g e .

t h o u g h t t h e range 01:

c r e d i b l e r e s p o n s e s open t o them was d i m i n i s h i n g , What a t t e m p t s

anll et1ei.r r h e t n r i c a n d a c t i o n s became more b e l l i g e r e n t .

Rei.iiilg hod mad(! i . a r l i e r liolitation 01 actioll

bar.
WTC

t o understand Hanoi's

frame o f r e f e r e n c e and
t h i s led t o oprn

now put a s i d e .

Ultimately,

C ti i n e s t- D e t e r r e nc e

C h i n a may be one 01: the f e b c o u n t r i e s , p e r h a p s the o n l y c o u n t r y ,

t h a t has a c o h e r e n t s t r i l t e g y f o r g e n u i n e l y l i m i t e d w a r :

limited i n both

t a ( : t i c a l a n d strategic o b j e c t i v e , limited i n t
imt!.

l i m i t e d i n means, a n d - - e s p e c i a l l y - appreciation

l t stims, t o a l a r g e e x t e n t , from C h i n a ' s

oE i t s l i m i t - x d a b i l i t y t n p r o j e c t i t s power.

For B e i j i n g t h e l i m i t e d ,

p u n i t : i v c ~ a irs one inore way, d r a s t i c i n d e e d , O C d e l i v e r i n g a s i g n a l .

I t i s p a r t 01: t h e L o t a l p a c k a g e o f t h e " C h i n e s e c a l c u l u s o f d e t e r r c n c c . "
At

t h e o n s c c o f i n i l i t o r y o p e r a t i o n s , B e i j i n g makes s e v e r a l p o i n t s c l e a r . 'The PLA d o e s n o t i n t e n d t o c o n q u e r t h e enemy The PLA d o e s n o t e v e n i n t e n d t o

The war w i l l be q u i c k .

c o u n t r y or o v e r t h r o w i t s government.

d e f e a t t h e enemy army i n the senso o f making i t i n e f f e c t i v e a s a fighting

fort(,.

What tlir :(%t

is determinr!d t o d o i s q u i t e l i t e r a l l y

punish i t s adversary.

The PLA u i l l i n f l i c t m a s s i v e c a s u a l t i e s on t h e

enemy army, and i t w i l l n o t s p a r e any c i v i l i a n s who happen t o g e t i n t h e bay, e i t h e r . Xaximum p h y s i c a l d e s t r u c t i o n b i l l be v i s i t e d upon s e l e c t When

a r e a s of t h e enemy's c o u n t r y t h a t a r e o f s e c o n d a r y i m p o r t a n c c .
t h i s h a s o c c u r r e d , t h e PLA b i l l c l e a r o u t .

T h i s i s p r e c i s e l y what

happened i n Viet Nan1 i n 1979. 'The war l a s t e d o l f i c i a l l y froln 1 7 F e b r u a r y c o 1 5 March 1 9 7 9 .

~(1st

o f t h v i n t e n s e f i g h t i n g b a s o v e r , however, b y 5 March, uhen t h r L'LA 2 announced i t was commencing i t s b i t h d r a x a l . The Chinese d i d i n f l i c t

3
heavy c a s u a l t i e s o n the V i e t n a m e s e ( e s t i m a t e d a t a b o u t 50,000) and wrought m a s s i v e damage on t h e n o r t h e r n b o r d e r r e g i o n s o t h e S K V , most 4 n o t a b l y on t h c c i t y o Lang Son. T h i s E o l l o b e d t h e p a t t e r n t h a t had been e s t a b l i s h e d b i t t i the I n d i a n War o f 1962, a l t h o u g h t h e I n d i a n War b a s f a r l e s s b l o o d y and d e s t r u c t i v e . There i s c o n s i d e r a b l e d c b a t e as t o b h e t h e r t h e PRC "bon"

or "lost"

t h e war, k h e t h e r t h e c r e d i t o r d e b i t s i d e o i t h e l e d g e r came o u t w i t h t h e l a r g e r bottom l i n e .

T h e s e a r e c e r t a i n l y l e g i t i m a t e q u e s t i o n s , for

5
t h e Chinese s u f f e r e d considerably themselves.

Rather than addressing

t h e s e p r o b l e m s , however, i t i s more a p p r o p r i a t n t o t h i s s t u d y t o u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h e l i m i t e d u a r h a s b e e n , a n d most l i l w l y s t i l l i s , a n i n t e g r a l p a r t o f C h i n e s e s t r a t e g y , or C h i n e s e c r i s i s management, of t h e

I,

C h i n e s e c a l c u l u s of d e t e r r e n c e . " T h i s c o n c e p t of d e t e r r e n c e i s n o t new t o t h e I'RC.

T h e r e l e v a n c e of

h i s t o r y i s a g a i n i n e v i d e n c e , f o r t h e c o n c e p t has d e e p r o o t s i n C h i n e s e tradition. S u n z i e x p r e s s e d many of t h e i d e a s t h a t c a n be s e e n i n t h e

d e t e r r e n c e p o l i c y o f t h e PRC.

Use s t r a t a g e m s and d i s p l a y s t o d e t e r t h e
80

opoonr!nt

s h o r t ot' b a r .

When r a r i s employed a s a n i n s t r u m e n t o f s t r a t -

e g y , c011cl1rdc i t ns q u i c k l y a s p o s s i b l e . o f t h e enemy.

D o n o t s e e k the a n n i h i l a t i o n 6 A l r a y s a1 Low a d e f e a t e d enemy a way o u t . 'The g o a l of

t h i s s t r a t e g y i s t o r e s t o r e harmony, t o r e s t o r e the p r o p e r weave of t h e

tapestry.

W l i i 1 . e i t would be a m i s t a k e t o e q u a t e t h e t h o u g h t o f S u n z i

r i c h t h a t of thc! modern PRC l e a d e r s h i p , t h e n o t i o n s tie propounded s t i l l

would a p p o a r t o c x e r c i s v much i n f l u e n c e i n C h i n a .

The SKV pt.c!scnted t h e PRC w i t h

a s t r a t e g i c t h r e a t by an a g g r e s s i v e

c x p r c ~ s s i o no i i t s n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y coiipled w i t h a c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p

w i t h the S o v i e t U n i i i n .

VLet Nam c h a l l e n g e d C h i n a ' s

c r e d i b i l i t y openly

ar,d ~ - e [ ) e a t e d l yo v e r s e v e r a l c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e s .
H:lIIOi

R e i j i n g sought t o dtlter
pl,litical,

' S

1InnCceptable bt!h.ivior

through

21

series o f s i g n a l s :

ci: onom i c

psycho lo g i c a 1, d i p loma t i c

a n d u 1t inia t e 1y m i 1i t a r y

The Cli i -

n e s r r e r e t r y i n g t o r e p a i r the t a p e s t r y .

An Index of l n d i c a t o r n

The e s c a l a t i o n of C h i n e s e r e s p o n s e s rom the b e g i n n i n g of 1978 u p t o t h e war c a n b e t r a c e d a l o n g a n i n d e x of i n d i c a t o r s .

On t h e one h a n d ,

t h i s i n d e x c o n s i d e r s the c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e s t h a t t r i g g e r e d a Cliinesp

reaction.

On t h e o t h e r . h a n d , i t e x a m i n e s t h e C h i n e s e s i g n a l i t s e l f i n

terms of i t s d e l i v e r y , i n t e n s i t y , a u t h o r i t y , a n d t i m i n g .

__

Oblique ModtLrate Signalling A t t h e be):inning o f 1978, t h e PRC was c o n t i n u i n g i t s c a r r o t - a n d s t i c k p o l i c y of r e l a t i v e r e s t r a i n t . The main mode of s i g n a l l i n g was
On 4

c'b1i.que and i n c l u d e d p o s i t i v e a s well as n e g a t i v e i n d u c e m e n t s .

J a n u a r y 1978, B e i j i . n g i n d i c a t e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e i t p l a c e d on t h e O v e r s c a s

81

C h i n e s e i s s u e by a n n o u n c i n g i n Ken Min R i Bao the r e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e

7
O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e A f f a i r s Cornmi s s i o n a t m i n i s t c r i a l l e v e l .
T h i s was

r a t t i e r m i l d i n t o n e and i n d i r e c t i n n a t u r e , a v o i d i n g p o i n t i n g t h e f i n g e r t o o s p e c i f i c a l l y a t Hanoi.

On 10 J a n u a r y t h e PllC p u b l i s h e d a c c o u n t s o f

the Vietnamese-Cambodian c o n t r o v e r s y g i v i n g t h e p o i n t of view of each 8 side. On t h e same d a y , a C h i n e s e ai.d p a c k a g e f o r t h e SRV was r e n e s e d .

T h e s e s i g n a l s a d d r e s s e d t h r e e mnjor c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e s - - t h e O v e r s e a s

C h i n e s e , Cambodia, a n d S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e - - i n a v e r y m o d e r a t e f a s h i o n .

I n d i r c c t Acc u s a t o r y S i pi1 a I 1i ng

T h e f i r s t q u a r t e r o f 1978 saw a r e k i n d l i n g of t h e c o n f l i c t along

t h e b o r d e r between V i e t Nam and Cambodia.

On 24 March 1 9 7 8 , Hanoi began

a n o t h e r round of p e r s e c u t i o n s o f t h e O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e , and soon tlir low

o T r e f u g e e s became t o r r e n t i a l .

b e i j i n g determined t h a t i t s o b l i q u e , In mid-May t h r PRC i s s u e d a n o t h e r

m o d e r a t e m e s s a g e s had gone unheeded.

series of s i g n a l s , s t r o n g e r than those s e n t e a r l i e r b u t s t i l l r a t h e r

indirect. The p r o - B e i j i n g Hong Kong n e s s p a p e r Wen Wei -Pao 9

on 11 May

and on 2 2 May, e x p r e s s e d t h e o p i n i o n t h a t Hanois

a c t i o n s were a n t i -

C h i n e s e r a t h e r t h a n a n t i , - c a p i t a l i s t and t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union was b e h i n d 9 the w h o l e problem. By b l a m i n g t h e S o v i e t U n i o n - - i t s number one enemy-B e i j i n g was i n d i c a t i n g t o Hanoi i t s r i s i n g c o n c e r n o v e r t h e i s s u e , and

i t sas a l s o g i v i n g t h e V i e t n a m e s e a bay o u t .

On 1 2 May B e i j i n g an-

nounced t h a t i t would r e d u c e i t s a i d co t h e S I N b e c a u s e i t b a s r e q u i r e d t o d i v e r t t h e monies t h u s s a v e d t o s u p p o r t t h e r e f u g e e s coming i n t o

10

China.

Here were e l e m e n t s o f C h i n e s e s i g n a l l i n g t h a t would be r e a r h e t o r i c a l o f f e n s i v e coupled w i t h a

peated throughout the c r i s i s :

s y m b o l i c (nnd o f t e n t a n g i b l e ) g e s t u r e .

The s i g n a l s bere c h a r a c t e r i z e d

b y c h a r g e s and a c c u s a t i o n s of V i e t n a m e s e m a l f e a s a n c e .
82

On 24 May 1978, t h v g l o v e s came o f f .

r h < ! t o r i c a l a I . t a c k on t h i ! SRV.

The PKC l a u n c h e d a d i r e c t

'There was no l o n g c r an e f f o r t Lo k e c p t h e
T h e c l i a r g e s n o 1ongc.r emariatt!d s i m p l y

a c c u s a t i o n s o b l ique and i n d i r e c t .

Irom nchspapt'r a r t i c l r s and e d i t o r i a l s .

Nor they s e r e b e i n g a s c r i b e d
A 1 1 of' t h e major i s s u e s

d i r e c L l y t o Chi! F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y o f the PKC. werr r a i s e d :

,:l~:irg~s

Vietnamese p e r s e c u t i o n

Ovcrs"as

Chinese, o f

Vi<stnnnirse o g g r u s s i m a g a i n s t Cambodia, and o t V i e t n a m e s e c o i l u s i o n w i t h I1 ttic, tiovicts. On l ). J u n t , thc C h i n e s e 1:oreign M i n i s t r y 1 " v e I l e d a n o t h e r sc.ritss o c .I ~ .c ' ~ u s a t i o nast t h c SKV, and t h i s t i m e i n niuch m o r e a c r i m o n i o u s 12 tt. rnii no l o g y . I l ~ i j i n gh a s now e s c a l a t i n g i t s a t t a c k s i n a u t h o r i t y , in i i l t c ? n s i t y , a n d i n twspo. gt!sture.
WIIQsn

'The r h e t o r i c was a g a i n a c c o m p a n i r d b y t h e
launched a v i c i o u s c o u n t e r a t t a c k
011

Th(,

I(tlmrr I<ougz+

24 May.

ttii,

SRV j o i n v d COllECON i n l a t e .liine o f 1978, t h c PKC r t ? s p v n d e d b y

13
ciiI:tinh: o i f a l l a i d iis o i 3 J u l y .

F.pcc- t o - Fncc __ S i g n a 11i n g

Accu sn t v r y

O n 19 J u l y 1 9 7 8 t h e PRC F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y c a l l e d f o r v i c c -

ministerial n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h H a n o i .
O v c r s e ; l s Chintssc i s s u e . .

Thr c c n t r n l t o p i c was t o b e t h e

Thc t a l k s r a n from A A u g u s t t o 26 S e p t e m b r r ,
Tlie PllC p r o b a b l y i n t e n d e d t h e
ilntl

b u t n o t h i n g has ~ e ; i l I y n e g o t i a t e d .

meetings t o t w used p r i n i a r i . l y as a medium t o d e l i v e r i t s s i g n a l s

bc a s s u r r d t h a t t h o s e s i g n a l s were b e i n g r e c e i v e d .
'Tht?

LO

signalling bas

iiiinit~dintc o n d d i r r c t ; t h e s e s s i o n s h e r e a t r e e k l y i n t e r v a l s ; and t h e I r v t ~ l o f a u t h o r i t y was t t i r t of thr V i c e - M i n i s t e r of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s . l'he n n t u r c v f the s i g n a l s c o i i t i , i l + , * c br, m a i n l y a c c u s a t o r y .

Somr

83

c o n s t r u c t i v e r c c o m m c n d a t i o n s werc p r e s e n t e d , and some e f f o r t s a t r e c o n c i l i a t i o n c e r c m a d r , but t h c s e t o o k s e c o n d p l a c e b e h i n d t h e c h a r g e s 14 and occusations.

While t h e t a l k s b e r e i n p r o g r e s s , B e i j i n g c o n t i n u e d t o s i g n a l by
o t h e r means a s b e l l . A n o t h e r mass media b a r r a g e a g a i n s t t h e SRV t o o k

p l a c e on 14 S e p t c m b e r , a g a i n c o v e r i n g a l l of t h e main issues o f c o n t e n -

I5
tion. Nor was t h e s y m b o l i c g e s t u r e abandoned.
T h i s t o o k on a n o t

atypical carrot-and-stick configuration.

A s t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s connnrnced

i n f \ u g u s t , t h e Khmer I<ouge madi= an o C f e r o f pcace t o Hanoi.

Later i n

t h e month, when B r i j i n g p e r c e i v e d Hanoi t o be p a r t i c u l a r l y u n r e s p o n s i v e

t o i t s signals a t t a l k s , i t c i t h d r e c its chief negotiator temporarily. The PRC withdrew i t s d e l e g a t i o n a l t o g e t h e r on 26 S e p t e m b e r , a f t e r o n l y r i g h t s e s s i o n s and n o t e v e n two months o f t a l k s .
t h e Cambodians renewed t h e i r p e a c e o i l e n s i v r .

I n October, hocever,

Once more, t h e V i e t n a m e s e

c e r e b e i n g o f f e r e d a f a c e - s a v i n g c a y t o r e d u c e t e n s i o n s by accommodating 16 Chinese s c n s i t i v i t ies.

Wa m iiig S i g n a1 1i n g On 3 Novamber 1978, t h e SllV c o n c l u d e d i t s t r e a t y w i t h the USSR,

r e p l e t e w i t h d e n u n c i a t i o n s o f R e i j i n g i s s u e d from ~ o s c o w . T h e C h i n e s e r e s p o n s e i n d i c a t e d t h a t a n o t h e r ma.jor p h a s e - l i n e had been p a s s e d .
On 7

Novembcr t h c C h i n e s e F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y i s s u e d w a r n i n g s t o Hanoi o f the s c r i o u s n e s s of V i e t n a m e s e e n c r o a c h m e n t s a c r o s s t h e b o r d e r i n t o C h i n e s e 17 territory. Ken Min R i I3ao r e p e a t e d t h r w a r n i n g s i n e v e n s t r o n g e r - 1 8 l a n g u a g e on 10 November. T h i s s i g n a l l e d a n e s c a l a t i o n i n two

--

ways.

C h a r g e s a n d a c c u s a t i o n s bere now accompanied by t h r e a t s and

w a r n i n g s ; and t h e b o r d e r p r o b l e m - - t h e most v o l a t i l e f l a s h p o i n t - - w a s

84

be).ng e m p h a s i z e d a s a p r i m a r y c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e .

China bas s i g n a l l i n g

tii.it s a r

uiis

not

OIIL
:I

o f the q u e s t i o n s i n c r v i o l a t i o n of- P n C t c s r r i t o r y
c l ~ C r~
S U S

a o i i l d constitute'

b e l l i under i n t e r n a t i o n a l lab.

On 13 I k c e i a b e r 1978, Li. X i a n n i a n warned Hanoi t h a t C h i n a s f o r 19 be arrince h a s i t s l i m i t s . A g a i n , a b a r n i n g had been p r e s e n t e d ; e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n L , a n e s c a l a t i o n o f t h e i s s u i n g a u t h o r i t y had occurred. X i a n n i a n was a v i c e - p r e m i e r oE t h e LRC a n d a member of the S t a n d i n g C o r n n i t t e e of t h s P o l i t b u r o o f the PKC. leadcrs.
C l l i n n s mo!iL

1.i

He b a s one o f C h i n a s h i g h e s l

s c r i o i i s t h r e a t t o d a t c b a s made o n 2 4 1)eccmbrr I Y 7 8 .

imminent a s s a u l t on Cambodia, Keu Min Ki 2iT-. __ Ibao b a r n e d t ! i a t tht! P I K would c o u n t e r a t t a c k , i f attackcxd.

tci

I n an eEfort

d e t r r Hanois

On 31 Dect~mber 1 9 7 8 , B e i . j i n g t o o k t h e s y m b o l i c a c t i o n o f recalling

%I
a n d , on 4 J a n u a r y 1 9 7 9 , t h e PKC mad<. a n o t h e r 22 g c , s t u r e by c i i t t : i n g o f f r a i l s e r v i c e between C h i n a and V i e t Nam. i t s m b a s s a d o r t o Hilnoi;

On 4 J a n u a r y 1 0 7 9 , 1 3 e i j i n g a s s e r t e d t h a t llanoi 23 1:renzied p r o v o c a t i o n s along the b o r d e r .

was

engaged i n

On 5 J a n u a r y 1979, Deng X i a o p i n g e x p r e s s e d c o n d e m n a t i o n o f tlic SRV 24 i n v a s i o n o f Cambodia. Once morc, a t o p PRC l e a d e r hod s p o k e n n u t . 25 On 7 J a n u a r y 1 9 7 9 , t h e PLA c a n c e l l e d a l l k a v e s . No* a d i r e c t
m i l i t a r y g e s t u r e had b e e n made. The PKC i s s u e d m a j o r a c c u s a t i o n s and w a r n i n g s r e g a r d i n g V i e t n a m e s e barder provocations, s u b s e q u e n t l y , on 8 J a n u a r y , 1 2 J a n u a r y , 1 5 J a n u a r y , 26 18 . J a n u a r y , 20 J a n u a r y , 27 J a n u a r y , and 29 J a n u a r y 1979. Thi? a u t h o r -

i t y , i n t e n s i t y , and teinpo of t h e s i g n a l s was i n c r e a s i n g .

Deng X i a o p i n g s v i s i t t o the U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 2 8 J a n u a r y - 4 F e b r u a r y

1 9 7 9 ) p r e s c n t o d h i m w i t h a s p e c i a l Eorum Erom which t o s i g n a l t o t h e Vietnamese. The u o r l d s a t t e n t i o n was on h i m , a n d h i s w o r d s c o u l d

85

h a r d l y go u n n o t i c e d .

A l s o , h e may h a v e s a v o r e d e n g a g i n g i n a b i t of

r e t a l i a t i o n i n k i n d f o r t h e liarsli r e m a r k s madf by t h e V i e t n a m e s e l e a d e r s

i n Moscow d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t t h e PKC t h e p r e v i o u s November.

Deng i s s u c d

t h r e a t s and w a r n i n g s t o Hanoi on a l m o s t a d a i l y b a s i s w h i l c he b a s i n America.

On 31 J a n u a r y h e g a v e h i s famous s p e e c h s a y i n g t h a t China 27 would have t o " t e a c h " Vict Nam "a l e s s o n . " T h i s theme c o n t i n u e d

d u r i n g Deng's

s t o p i n Tokyo ( 6 - 8 F e b r u a r y ) .

On 7 F e b r u a r y h e m a i n t a i n e d

t h a t "Vietnam must be p u n i s h e d " f o r i t s war i n Cambodia and For c o l 28 l u s i o n w i t h t h e USSR.

'The PKC s e n t a s t r e a m of k a r n i n g s t o the SRV a f t e r Drng's

return.

They k e r c p u b l i s h e d on 10 F e b r u a r y , I 1 F e b r u a r y , 1 5 F e b r u a r y , and I 6 29 February 1979; and t h e y i n c l u d e d a f i n a l . a d m o n i t i o n from L i X i a n n i a n 30 a d v i s i n g Hanoi t o t a k e h e e d of a l l C h i n a ' s p r e v i o u s s i g n a l s . 'These t h r e a t s c e n t ~ r e don what c o u l d b e the i m m e d i a t e , 1 c g i t i m a l . c c a s u s b e l l i, V i e t n a m e s e v i o l a t i o n s o f t h e PKC-SRV b o r d e r . B e i j i n g s e t up a command

s t r u c t u r e and began moving l a r g c numbers of PLA t r o o p s i n t o t h c b o r d f r

region.

Hanoi r e s p o n d e d by s i g n i n g a p r o t o c o l k i t h Moscow on 16 F c b r u a r y 31 1979, and t h e C h i n e s e i n v a s i o n commenced on 17 F e b r u a r y .

An E x a m i n a t i o n o f t h c I n d e x

Contentious Issues

The PllC c o n s i d e r e d t h r e e c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e s t o be a t t h e h e a r t o t

i t s d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h the SRV:

V i c t Nam's c h a l l e n g e t o C h i n e s e c r e d -

i b i l i t y by i t s " a g g r e s s i o n " a g a i n s t C h i n a - s a l l y Cambodia; H a n o i ' s c h a l l e n g e t o C h i n e s e " r a c e " by i t s o p e n p e r s e c u t i o n o f t h e O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e ; and t h e SRV-s c h a l l e n g e t o C h i n e s e s t r a t e g i c s e c u r i t y by i t s

86

c l o s e n e s s t o t h r S o v i e t Union.
PRI:-SI{V
the,

A E o u r t h major c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e , t h e
ail

l a l i d I ~ o ~ ~ Pd i Ks p u L c , i l l u s t r a t c d

i n t e r e s t i n g phenommon in

si.gnnllinfi procoss.
:I

111 and of i t s e l f , t h e b o r d e r i s s u e b a s r e l a OK

t i v t l l y minor; only

s m a l l amount oE r e a l e s t a t e w i t h l i t t l e economic ope[, t o q u e s t i o n . The b o r d c r p r o b l e m , h o u e v e r ,

s t r a t e g i c value
became
ii

wiis

t e s t o f n a t i o n a l b i l l and a f o c a l p o i n t f o r e x p r e s s i n g thr I t t o o k on an

l h o s t i l i t i e s $:enl?rated by t h e o t h e r c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e s .

extremely important rolv i n the Chinese s i g n a l l i n g process.

By s t r c s -

s i n g the S K V ' S v i o l a t i o n s of t h e b o r d e r , t h e PIK ,#as s e n d i n g a v e r y s t r o n g nirssn(:c 5 , i n c v t l w armed c r o s s i n g o f a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l bord<.r i s a c t o f bat-.

iin

An e s c a l a t i o n i n t b c means a n d manner b y which B e i j i n g d e l i v e r e d

i t s s i g n a l s c a n hc seen.
(1)

I n d i r e c t e x p r e s s i o n s o f c o n c e r n by d i p l o m a t i c g e s t u r e s and

t h r o u g h thiril p a r t y m c d i a . (2)
(3)

D i r e c t e x p r e s s i o n s of c o n c e r n t h r o u g h the PKC media. 1 ) i r e c t E x p r e s s i o n s of c o n c e r n i n g o v e r n m e n t - t o - g o v e r n m e n t

messages.
(4)

D i r e c t e x p r e s s i o n s of c o n c e r n i n e x t e n d e d fornia1 t a l k s . D i r e c t e x p r e s s i o n s ot' c o n c e r n i n p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s b y the

(5)

h i g h e s t PRC o f f i c i a l s .

87

I n t e n s i t y Index

A s t h e c r i s i s c o n t i n u c d , t h e i n t e n s i t y l e v e l of the s i g n a l s i n creased.

Not o n l y d i d the words and g e s t u r e s become more a c r i m o n i o u s

and b i t t e r , b u t t h e i r n a t u r e changed a s well.

(1)

M o d e r a t e r h e t o r i c and d i p l o m a t i c p r e s s u r e . A c c u s a t o r y r h e t o r i c and h o s t i l e d i p l o m a t i c g e s t u r e s . T h r e a t e n i n g r h e t o r i c , h o s t i l c d i p l o m a t i c g e s t u r e s , and mil-

(2)
(3)

i t a r y ilc t i v i t y

.
har.

((11 Open, l i m i t e d
A u t h o r i t y Index

A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t of t h e s i g n a l l i n g p r o c e s s was t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e puhlic sourcc.

As c r i t i c a l p h a s e - l i n e s

i n t h e c r i s i s here

c r o s s e d , h i g h c r l e v e l s o f a u t h o r i t y were i n v o k e d .
(1)
T h i r d p a r t y media and normal d i p l o m a t i c c h a n n e l s .

(2)
(3)

U n a t t r i b u t c d a r t i c l e s and e d i t o r i a l s i n t h e PKC media. G o v e r n m e n t a l b u r e a u c r a c y a t t h e v i c e - m i n i s t e r i a l a n d min-

isterial levels.
(4)

P u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s by t h e h i g h e s t PRC o f f i c i a l s .

Timing I n d e x

I n h i s s t u d i e s of t h e Korean and I n d i a n b a r s , A l l e n W h i t i n g h a s
paid s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n t o t h e timing of Chinese s i g n a l s . They were

g i v e n a t r e g u l a r i n t e r v a l s ; a n d , as t h e c r i s i s i n t e n s i f i e d , t h e time between s i g n a l s d e c r e a s e d . Determining tinling c o n f i g u r a t i o n s of t h e

s i g n a l s i s d i f r i c u l t b e c a u s e t h e message t r a f f i c between two h o s t i l e

88

i a r i o n s a l n i o s t a l k a y s c ; i r r i e s somi? form oC s i g n a l or ;another.

'Thf,

task

is t o s e p a r a t e [major s i g n a l s Crom s u p p o r t i n g s i g n a l s a n d i d e n t i f y m a j o r
!signal blocks.

Najor s i g n a l s i n d i c a t e a new e l e m e n t i n the c r i s i s , a

lieb d i r e c t i o n or i n i t i a t i v e , a c h a n g e i n t h e intensity o r e m p h a s i s , and

othi!r

s u c h c r i t i c a l markers.

Examining t h e o t h c r i n d i c e s o f i n d i c a t o r s
C h i n e s e s i g n a l s d u r i n g thl! y ~ a r

$:an h e l p t o e s t a b l i s h t h e t i m i n g i n d e x .
]prior
ti) t l i i .

Sirin-Vietneniase War d o a p p e a r t o have f o l l o t v e d a g e n e r a l

p a t t e r n s i m i l a r t i ) t h a t d i s c e r n e d by W h i t i n g i n h i s s t u d i e s o f t h e I'KC's
l p ~ ~ ~ ib~ a ris i . s

(1) 1978.
(2)

S p o r a d i c s i g n a l l i n g d u r i n g p e r i o d oC r e s t r a i n t p r i o r t o May

I l s u a l l y , o n e nia.ior s i g n a l . b l o c k per month b e t k e e n May and ttir

end o f Octob(,r 1978. (3)

At l e a s t three. major s i g n a l b l o c k s b e t k e e n t h e s i g n i n g o f t h v

Soviet-Vietnamese,

treaty

011

3 November 1978 and t h e i n v a s i o n O F Cambodia

o n 25 December.

(4)

Major s i g n a l L ~ l o c k s at: l e a s t o n c e a week a f t e r t h e V i e t n a m e s e

inv;ision o f Cambodia. U t i l i t y of the Index

11s H o l s t i . has i n d i c a t e d ,

thi? b i g g e s t p o t e n t i a l b e n e f i t t h a t c a n
inert'

conle rum s t u d y i n g c r i s i s d e v e l o p m e n t i s l e a r n i n g t o implenlent e f ' t e c t i v e c r i s i s management.

bc of some a s s i s t a n c e
ill

The i n d e x o C i n d i c a t o r s d e v e l o p e d h e r e may

a d v a n c i n g an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f how c r i s e s come

about.

G r e a t e r u n d c r s t a n d i n g w i l l n o t b e s u f f i c i e n t i n i t s e l f ti> b e t t f r

c r i s i s management, b u t i t i s o n e i n g r e d i e n t t h a t s h o u l d h e l p p r e c l u d e blundering i n t o s e r i o u s i n t e r n a t i o n a l problems through mispercept ions.

89

The i n d e x s h o u l d b e h e l p f u l i n t h e i n t f r p r c t a t i o n o f s i g n a l s , which can l c a d t o d e v e l o p i n g more a c c u r a t e r e a d i n g s of p e r c e p t i o n s .

tllc b i g g e s t

One o f

s t u m b l i n g b l o c k s t o s k i . l l f u 1 c r i s i s management i s t h e
The

i n i s p e r c e p t i o n n f o n e s o b n a n d o n e s o p p o n e n t s r a n g e oS o p t i o n s .

i n d e x of i n d i c a t o r s may be a p p l i e d t o s t u d y t h e c o r r e l a t i o n or a c t i o n and s i g n a l .

I there i s a p a t t e r n o f a s s o c i a t i o n b e t b e e n p a r t i c u l a r

a c t i o n s and s i g n a l s , i t may s e r v e as a g u i d e t o d e t e r m i n i n g t h e d i r e c t i o n and l c v e l o f a c r i s i s . T h i s may b e u s e f u l i n p r e v e n t i n g

a c t i o n s based on a m i s c a l c u l a t i o n o f s i g n a l s and i n t a k i n g a c t i o n s more likc?ly t o lead t o c r i s i s r e s o l u t i o n .

A n e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e S i n o - V i c t n a m e s e c r i s i s o l 1 9 7 5 - 1 9 7 9 u s i n g the

i n d c x of i n d i c a t o r s can s h e d some l i g h t on t h e rlevrlopinent o f a d i s p u t e b e t b e e n a b i g power and a s m a l l p o b e r .

The s m a l l power o f t e n c a n f o r c e
The

i t s b i l l on t h f l a r g e r power t o a n c x t e n c h a r d l y e x p e c t e d .

phenomenon o f t h e c r i s i s b e t b e e n a g r e a t p o r e r and a sinall p o w e r - - b i t t i

l e s s t h a n t o t a l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y r e s u l t s f o r t h e g r e a t power--has

become

r a t h e r p r e v a l e n t s i n c e t h e e n d o f World War 11.

The i n d e x o f i n d i c a t o r s may be of a i d t o the American a n a l y s t i n

i d e n t i . f y i n g how c o u n t r i e s p e r c e i v e t h e i r obi1 i n t e r e s t s and o p t i o n s and those of o t h e r s .

T h i s c a n lead t h e American d e c i s i o n - m a k e r t o f o r m u l a t e

p o l i c i e s which a d v a n c e IJS s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s w h i l e m i n i m i z i n g t h e d a n g e r s o f war and o t h e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l h o s t i l i t i e s . The h i s t o r i c a l c a s e s t u d y and t h e i n d e x o f i n d i c a t o r s p r e s e n t e d

here s h o u l d b e u s e d along w i t h o t h e r case s t u d i e s and i n d i c e s .

Greater

p r e c i s i o n i n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f c r i s i s b e h a v i o r w i l l come a s more s t u d i e s a r e made. a r e basic. A l l e n W h i t i n g s works on t h e Korean and I n d i a n b a r s

S e v e r a l good monographs have a p p e a r e d d e a l i n g b i t h v a r i o u s The m e t h o d o l o g y

a s p e c t s of t h e Sino-Vietnamese c r i s i s t r e a t e d here.
90

list4

i n these h i s t o r i c a l c a s e s t u d i e s may p r o v e I l r l p t u l i t a p p l i e d t o
u s c of

I:II,J S i n o - S o v i e t b o r d e r c r i . s i s o f 1969 o r t o t h e PItC's

r ? v o l u t i o n a ry w n r f a r e i n SoutlitAas t A s i a .

C a u c i o n must nlwayr: be e x e r c i s e d i n d e v e l o p i n g a n y model from a n h i s t o r i c a l case study.

The i n d e x o f i n d i c a t o r s d e s c r i b e d above i s by no

means e x h a u s t i v a .

I t m a y be h e l p f u l , however, in s h e d d i n g s ~ n i e l i g h t on

t h c p;itli th;il: t o o k Cliin;i L o war w i t h V i e t Nam i n 1079 a n d on t h e b r o a d e r

l a n d s c a p e o f hiiw C h i n a rc'ilcts i n i n t c ~ r n a t i o n a lc r i s e s .
'The i n d i v i d u a l s t e p s o r s t a g e s w i t h i n t h e v a r i o u s i n d i c e s d o n o t

e x c l u d c elem?nt:; r u m o t h c r s t e p s a n d s t a g e s .

'They do p o i n t t o what c a n

b e c ~ n s i d e r e d t h e p r i m a r y mode o f s i g n a l l i n g f o r a g i v e n p e r i o d .

Dif-

fercirit means oI' d e l i v e r y , d i f f e r e n t e c h e l o n s o f a u t h o r i t y , a n d d i t f e r o n t amounts o f i n t e n s i t y may b e wrapped up i n v a r i o u s s i g n a l s t h a t a r e b e i n g i s s u e d d u r i n g I:he same p e r i o d . i n p o r t a n c e : I t h i s i.s u s u a l l y - - b u t thermore,
ii

G e n e r a l l y , one l e v e l w i l l p r e d o m i n a t e i n not always--thc highest level. Fur-

h i g l w r s t a g e d o e s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y liilve t o f o l l o w i m m e d i a t e l y Therr can be a zigzag p a t t e r n i n c r i s i s development.

on a lower s t a g e .

G r e a t e r u n d i ! r s t a n d i n g of t h e phenomena of' c r i s i s d e v e l o p m e n t and c r i s i s manageniont i n v o l v i n g t h e PHC r e q u i r e s i n t e g r a t i n g a s many i n d i v i d u a l i n d i c v s n s p o s s i t r l e i n t o n b r o a d i n d e x oE i n d i c a t o r s .

91

REFEKENCES CITED

I
R o b e r t S u t t e r , " C h i n a ' s S t r a t e g y Toward Vietnam a n d Its Imp1 i c o t i o n s f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , " -The T h i r d I n d o c h i n a C o n f l i c t , e d . by David W.P. E l l i o t t ( B o u l d e r : Westvieb Press, 1981), p. 174. 7 L i Man K i n , S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e (Hong Kong: K i n g s s a y I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i c a t i o n s , L t d . , 1981), p . 1 . 3 L i , pp. 59-60. 4 L i , p. 96.

5
L i , p.
5Y-60.

War,

Samuel B. G r i f f i t h , t r a n s . , e d . , and i n t r o . , (Neb York, O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1Y63), pp. r c s pec t i v e 1y

S u n

. Ken 41in -_ _K i Baa, 4 J a n u a r y 1Y78. 8 Hen Min R i Bao, 10 J a n u a r y 1978, i n F o r e i g n B r o a d c a s t -_ S e r v i c e (FBIS) D a i l y R e p o r t ( P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c of C h i n a ) , 10
7
19 79.

T Z I I , The Art o f 7 7 , T 7 7 , 109-110

Information January

9 Wen Wci P a o , 11 May 1978 and 22 May 1978.

10-

FBIS 11 FBIS 12 FRIS 13 FBIS 14

--

(PRC), 24 May 1978.

(PKC), 24 May 1978. (PKC), 12 J u n e 1978. ( A s i a and P a c i f i c ) ,

10 J u l y 1978.

On Viet Nani's Ex u l s i o n of C h i n e s e K e s i d e n t s, (Beijin):: Foreign rmguags F F G ~ J V ~ ~ . ~ 15 FBIS (PlIC), 19 S f p t e m b f r 1978. 16 Gareth P o r t e r , "Vietnamese P o l i c y and t h e I n d o c h i n a C r i s i s , " The T h i r d I n d o c h i n a C o n f l i c t , e d . David W.P. E l l i o t t ( B o u l d e r : Westview P r e s s , 19811, p . 108.
I7
FUIS ( P K C ) ,

7 November 1978

92

IR
19'8.

Ren __ Min . Iti Rno, - __

10 Noveniher 1978,

i n FBIS (PKC), I 3 N o v m b @ r

I9
FUtS ( P K C ) , 20 21
14 Ih>criiiber 1978.

F B t S ( P R C ) , 2 6 Uecember 1978. I:B I S ( A P ) , 3 .January 1979.

22
FBIS
(i\P),

5 J a n u a r y 1979.

2 '1

FBIS (PKC), 5 J a n u a r y 1979.

24

FnTS ( P R C ) , 8 .January 1979.

25
FBIS (L'RC),
2h
~

2 2 J a n u a r y 1979.

U S

. . , IDe

,\ t:hroiiology, 421 . 21

f f i i s c I n L e I 1i y , eiice Agency , Cti i na - V i f ! t i i a m Bor de r 're[is io [ i s : 1981 ( W a s h i n g t o n : DIA, 19827, p p . 4022 J u n c 1976-5
~

-_

The New York 'Times, 3 1 J a n u a r y 1979, i n D n n i p l T r r t i a k , " C h i n a ' s V i ? t n a m War and i t s Consrquences," China Q u a r t e r l y , 80:743, D c w m b r r , 1979. 28 Mainichi Daily News -- ['Tokyol, 8 F e b r u a r y 1Y79, i n ' T r e t i a k , p . 7 4 7 .
20

__

__ ___

D I A , China-Vic!tnani
:10
FIIIS ( L ' K C ) ,

Border ' T e n sions, -

pp. 4 6 - 4 9 .

2 1 Pc,bruary 1979.

31
F l l l S ( A P ) , 23 F e b r u a r y 1979.

93

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