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The Social Dimension European Developments in Social Psychology Edited by Henri Tajfel Book DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511759154 Online ISBN: 9780511759154 Hardback ISBN: 9780521239783 Paperback ISBN: 9780521283878

Chapter 31 - Intergroup and interpersonal dimensions of bargaining and negotia tion pp. 646-667 Chapter DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511759154.014 Cambridge University Press

3i. Intergroup and interpersonal dimensions of bargaining and negotiation


G. M. STEPHENSON

In this chapter I describe a series of studies of intergroup bargaining and negotiation performed since the early 1970s by myself and colleagues at the Universities of Nottingham and Kent at Canterbury. Some are experimental, others are field studies, but all bear on the central theme of the balance and conflict between the representatives' interpersonal and intergroup relationships, and the strategies by which the conflict is managed and the balance maintained. The work will be described in three sections. In the first section the results of a number of experimental studies will be described. These show that when the salience of the interpersonal relationships is decreased, the outcomes of bargaining reflect more the relative strength of case of the respective party positions. In the second section, a number offieldstudies of wage negotiations are described which indicate that (i) in practice, negotiations pass through stages in which the balance between interpersonal and intergroup orientations varies; and (ii) successfully concluded negotiations are characterized by periods of both intense intergroup competition and interpersonal cooperation. In the third section some recent studies of arbitration are described. These indicate that skilful arbitrators structure the hearing so as to satisfy the stage-by-stage requirements of successful negotiation. 1. The balance between intergroup and interpersonal exchange: experimental work 1.1. Variations in bargaining style. The relationships between industrial wage bargainers representing management and unions have been said to vary from 'conflict' and 'containment-aggression' at one extreme to 'cooperation' and 'collusion', and especially'collusion', at the other (Walton & McKersie 1965). In ' containment-aggression' it is as though the intergroup competition has taken over the relationship, whereas in ' collusion' and ' cooperation' inter646

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personal considerations of the negotiators determine the decisions that are taken. Whereas in the one extreme ('conflict'), 'the parties correctly distrust each other's motives and actions; no quarter is asked and none is given', in the other ('collusion'), the parties 'form a coalition in which they pursue common ends', exchanging favours irresponsibly in a' sweetheart relationship' (pp. 186-8). Both these extremes are generally regarded as undesirable, the first because it leads to mutually unproductive and damaging exchanges, and the latter because issues of principle important to one side or the other may be betrayed. In intergroup negotiations - e.g. industrial wage bargaining - the negotiator has the twin tasks of doing his or her job as a representative and of maintaining a personal relationship with his or her opposite number. ' Conflict' and ' collusion' may be said to represent extremes of devotion to one or the other task, as a means of avoiding effective solution of the problems created by the simultaneous existence of the two tasks. The tasks create problems for the negotiators because the tactics required by the intergroup conflict of interests - demolishing opposition arguments, and defending own side's position - are destined to make as unrewarding as possible the job of one's opposite number. The tempting, soft option for negotiators is to put their interpersonal interests first - to veer towards collusion - and to let the outcome be that which least threatens their relationship. For example, one side or the other frequently believes that an important point of principle underlies its stated position, as when the principle of parity with other comparable groups of workers is invoked by a union. The principle demands allegiance to the full claim, but such a course of action would place an intolerable strain on the bargaining relationship because, on the basis of past experience, some degree of compromise is a reasonable interpersonal expectation. Such interpersonal expectations between negotiators are threatened when representatives are given little or no discretion to act as they see fit. For example, managers are frequently under strict instructions from higher authority not to yield to what they themselves perceive to be perfectly reasonable union demands. The more salient the interpersonal relationship the more likely it is that the collusive soft option will influence the outcome of a negotiation. That hypothesis guided much of the experimental work to be described in this section. The interpersonal and intergroup demands on bargainers - to maintain the relationship on the one hand, to defend group interests on the other - impinge more or less strongly on bargaining relationships in different situations. For example, it would seem from the work of Batstone, Boraston & Frenkel (1977) that stewards representing 'white collar' workers tend not

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INTERGROUPDEMANDS High

'Compromise' H INTERPERSONAL L DEMANDS g h 'Collusion'

'Conflict'

INTERPERSONAL DEMANDS

'Apathy'

Low INTERGROUPDEMANDS Figure 1. Bargaining climates defined by respective strengths of intergroup and interpersonal demands

to champion the union cause, nor to value their interpersonal relationships with their opposite numbers from management. Both intergroup and interpersonal demands are low. Stewards representing manual workers on the other hand are impelled more by ideological motives - intergroup loyalties are strong - and at the same time recognize the need to develop strong personal relationships with managers in order to create an effective, businesslike climate for their negotiations. The contrast between these two suggests an alternative pair of polar opposites, in some contrast to those of' collusion' and 'conflict'. Whereas in the latter pair either intergroup or interpersonal demands are uppermost, Batstone's analysis suggests a pair of opposites in which neither or both interpersonal and intergroup demands are keenly experienced: say, 'apathy' and 'compromise' respectively. Then we may suggest that intergroup and interpersonal demands are experienced more or less strongly, and independently of one another, according to circumstance; and that positions on these two dimensions of social relationship broadly define the prevailing bargaining climate. Figure 1 characterizes this approach, showing' collusion' to be a product of strong interpersonal and low intergroup demands, with 'conflict' the converse of collusion; whereas 'compromise' is produced by strong intergroup and interpersonal demands, and 'apathy' is its converse. The circumstances which determine movement along the intergroup and interpersonal dimensions are little understood. The two suggested contrasts,

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'conflict' vs. 'collusion' and 'compromise' vs. 'apathy', are based on unsystematic assessment of case-study material. However, Batstone's analysis suggests that balance of power between the sides is critical, whereas Walton & McKersie emphasize the importance of the broader economic position of the company and its market position. Interesting though such questions may be, the prime concern here is less with the determinants of bargaining climate than with its consequences, both for the process and the outcomes of negotiation. This was the question addressed by the first set of studies which examined the impact of medium of communication on bargaining. Let us now turn to those studies and describe them in some detail. 1.2. Medium of communication and the process and outcomes of experimental negotiation. When Ian Morley and I first embarked on studies of negotiation, we observed negotiations in two very different bargaining climates in two medium-sized industrial organizations. One was staffed by army officers, but employed civilian labour, the other took the form of a co-ownership cooperative. In terms of the model presented in figure 1, 'conflict' was a particularly appropriate epithet for the former, and 'compromise' for the latter. In the former, a productivity deal distinctly unfavourable to the unions had recently been concluded, and we observed the first annual pay negotiation following the conclusion of the deal. It was dour, and bitter, and a hard slog over many sessions led to an outcome which satisfied management but disappointed union expectations. The 'cooperative' negotiation was more fiery and overtly antagonistic (see Morley & Stephenson 1977, for the full text), and concerned the demands of a group of electricians bent on changing the rules governing 'call-out'. The result of this one-off negotiation between representatives of the electricians and the managers directly involved, was an unforeseen compromise which apparently satisfied both sides and led to agreeable expressions of commitment to shared principle. In both negotiations, undoubtedly there was intergroup conflict of interests, but the existence of strong interpersonal bonds in the co-ownership company changed the cast of its negotiation. Intergroup conflict could be openly expressed because the participants recognized that their interpersonal relationship set limits to its consequences. Moreover, each recognized that the deadlock they were heading for could be averted by a genuine attempt to create a satisfactory compromise. In the army-managed firm, no such confidence existed, and rightly: the interpersonal trust just did not exist, and all deliberations were conducted by individuals locked into the representative role. Compromise in the former had a creative, novel character, whereas in the latter it was purely a matter of where to split the difference.

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These observations prompted us to manipulate in experimental negotiations the extent to which interpersonal considerations were salient, whilst keeping intergroup demands constant, in an attempt to represent just the crucial difference we perceived between bargaining relationships in the two companies whose negotiations we had observed, i.e. the intensity of the interpersonal relationship. It certainly seemed to us that the different bargaining climates in the two companies concerned would have a direct effect on the kind of outcomes the negotiators would reach. Moreover, the critical determinant of the two climates seemed to be the relative salience of interpersonal relationships between members of the two sides. No doubt there were other differences, but this component seemed central and one which was open to experimental manipulation. One way of minimizing interpersonal aspects of social encounters is to eliminate opportunities for personal expression by excising different channels of nonverbal communication. For example, it is harder to convey subtle interpersonal attitudes by telephone than when meeting face-to-face. Indeed, it is a common enough experience to desist from discussing personally problematic issues by telephone, and to await a more opportune moment for a face-to-face discussion. The reason is clear: we wish to monitor and control the effect of what we say, and this can be done more readily when one another's responses are mutually visible. Even when meeting face-to-face the conditions may be less than conducive to this kind of interpersonal exchange. There were clearly conventional procedures in the army-managed company which prevailed against spontaneous verbal or nonverbal expression of attitudes during negotiation. Interruptions were minimized, principal spokesmen for each side monopolized the discussion, and separate caucuses were fairly frequently requested by both sides. Morley & Stephenson (1969, 1970a, b) manipulated both medium of communication and procedural requirements in their initial experiments on the role of interpersonal exchange in negotiation groups. We expected that in depersonalized conditions there would be less awareness of the other as an individual. The consequence would be a more adequate exploration of the respective strengths of the group position, and an outcome more in accord with relative strengths of case of the respective parties. Such an outcome would be less likely to occur in the normal conditions, because the greater awareness of the other as an individual would prevent the representative with the stronger position fully exploiting his or her advantage. The scenario for our' role-playing debates' (see Morley & Stephenson 1977) established a negative settlement range (see Walton & McKersie 1965), in that the respective ' targets' and ' resistance points' of the two sides created no

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10 9

651

2 1

I
face-to-face

Outcome levels (as defined in text: high number means victory for party with stronger case)

yj telephone

Figure 2. Number of dyads achieving different outcomes in telephone and face-to-face negotiations

outcome even minimally acceptable to both sides. One side always had the stronger case, and a 2 x 2 design was created in which medium of communication (face-to-face vs. telephone) and procedure (informal, i.e. interruption permitted, vs. formal, i.e. interruption forbidden) were systematically varied. We expected that the telephone and formal conditions, by permitting less interpersonal exchange than their counterparts, would tend to produce victories for the party with the stronger case. This is exactly what happened. Figure 2 portrays the comparison of telephone and face-to-face dyads. Victories for the party with the stronger case occurred most frequently in the telephone and least frequently in the face-to-face conditions. Subsequent experimental work by Short (1974) and Morley & Stephenson ( I 977) explored in greater detail the circumstances in which the effects of medium of communication on outcomes are obtained. Short replicated the effect using a different task, and using civil servants as subjects, whilst Morley extended the findings to instances of positive settlement ranges (see Walton & McKersie 1965) and showed that the effect was strongly dependent on the existence of only partial knowledge of the other's pay-offs. Complete information nullified the effect of medium of communication, perhaps because negotiators are less able to extract strategic advantage in the telephone conditions: deceptive tactics are effectively ruled out of court in the situation of complete information. Stephenson & Kniveton (1978) showed that seating position also affected outcomes in a way consistent with the

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interpersonal exchange model. Their study used the more realistic conditions of negotiation teams (2 x 2) rather than the dyads (1 x 10) that previous studies had employed. It showed that when interpersonal nonverbal communication between members of opposed sides was facilitated, the party with the stronger case was less likely to win the negotiation. More specifically, when eye contact was more easily established with the opposition than with own side, the party with the stronger case exploited its advantage less effectively. Most recently, Stephenson & Tysoe (1982) reported on experiments which directly tested the model by manipulating the interpersonal/intergroup orientation of the negotiators. This time dyads were employed, and were given either 'interpersonal' or 'intergroup' instructions. Those with intergroup instructions were informed that they would subsequently be asked to evaluate the outcome as they thought their principals would. The interpersonal instructions, on the other hand, required an evaluation from the viewpoint of their opposite number. In addition, the conditions stressed that attention should be directed during the negotiation either to the feelings of the opposite number ('interpersonal'), or of their principals ('intergroup'). The findings were clear-cut, and indicated that in the intergroup conditions the party with the stronger case obtained the higher outcomes for his side. The effect was especially strong for women. 1.3. Conclusions. A number of experimentally manipulated conditions of negotiation have been shown to affect the outcomes of negotiations, in particular the likelihood that the party with the stronger case will effectively exploit its advantage over the opposite side. Procedural requirements, medium of communication, eye contact and third-party evaluation have all been shown to affect outcomes in a way which suggests that when intergroup conflict of interests is standardized, increasing the opportunities for interpersonal exchange has the effect of making it harder for the party with the stronger case to exploit effectively the advantage it possesses. In terms of the two-dimensional model of bargaining behaviour (figure 1), the suggestion is that there is a shift from 'conflict' to 'compromise' when representatives are made more intensely aware of the individual character with whom they are doing battle; what is regarded as proper and normative behaviour may dramatically shift. Rutter, Stephenson & Dewey (1981) and Rutter & Robinson (1981) report a series of experiments in which it is shown that behaviour does, indeed, change in predictable ways as the number of interpersonal cues is varied. A number of different media of communication have been examined, namely face-to-face, telephone and video conditions, and physical presence has also

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INTERPERSONAL CUES

^CONTENT

^OUTCOMES

Figure 3. The effect of interpersonal cues on interaction

been controlled. The general finding is quite clear: as the number of interpersonal cues is increased, so interaction becomes more spontaneous in style (and hence even more interpersonally informative), behaviour becomes generally less task-oriented and more interpersonally agreeable. A model of ' cuelessness' has been presented, which suggests that the availability of interpersonal cues directly affects the verbal content of interaction, which then determines style and outcome. A modified version of the model is shown in figure 3. This conveys the idea that the availability of interpersonal cues directly affects the content of interaction, but that style is determined both by available cues and by content, and that style in turn is an interpersonal cue in its own right (e.g. a formal style may mask true feelings). For instance, one is likely to be less considerate of others when they are not visible, also more formal in speech style: both these factors may be expected to affect markedly the consequences of interaction in terms of decisions taken, and in terms of the evaluation of those decisions by participants. The reduced consideration makes possible a range of tactics ('content') which, in the case of negotiation, would lead the more powerful adversary to exploit his/her position more effectively. The more formal manner ('style') necessitated by the absence of vision, itself reduces the level of interpersonal information even further, and so indirectly affects the content of the interaction and consequent outcomes. The experimental work on negotiations kept intergroup demands constant whilst varying interpersonal demands by the manipulation of a variety of situational factors. Characteristically different outcomes are achieved consistent with the hypothesized 'compromise' and 'conflict' bargaining climates. The further implications of the model should, of course, be explored in relation to more extensive studies of real-life climates. It is important, however, to bear in mind the more general implications of the work to date. Negotiators are representatives and their behaviour cannot be fully understood outside the framework of the intergroup relationship. But, representatives cannot merely give voice to the party line. As Morley (1981) points out, artifice is of the

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essence of negotiation, which is, to some degree, of necessity a cooperative exercise; what is constructed requires at least the assent of both parties. At this point we shall move on to examine the way in which, in the course of real negotiations, the interpersonal and intergroup demands are integrated into the total performance, and to indicate how interparty and interpersonal demands interact to produce characteristic bargaining climates in real life. 2. Field studies of negotiation 2.1. Bargaining climates. Morley & Stephenson (1977) published the full transcript of a negotiation at 'Demy Ltd.', a 'commonwealth' medium-sized chemical plant in the midlands of England. The ownership of Demy Ltd., and its decision-making structure, rendered unnecessary any formal negotiating machinery. Management was responsible to the 'Commonwealth', and complaints could be fairly processed in a working community which gave no special privileges to management above those possessed by other workers. This did not, however, obviate the need for informal mechanisms whereby injustices experienced by particular groups of employees could be speedily dealt with. Such an occasion arose when the electricians declined to operate the call-out procedure any longer, and the resulting conflict with management led to the negotiation reported fully by Morley & Stephenson. For our present purposes this negotiation is especially interesting because it illustrates some of the possible strategies which may be employed when the prevailing bargaining climate is disturbed. Further, it shows how those strategies can be effectively understood in terms of the dual orientation model (figure 1). The prevailing climate in Demy Ltd. was undoubtedly one of 'collusion'. This description is not intended to denigrate their customary manners, but merely reflects the fact that organized labour had no effective role in the company. The union had few members and kept no more than a ' watching brief on the general conduct of affairs. Wages of the 'workforce' were above minimum rates, and, indeed, there was an element of complacency amongst the employees of Demy Ltd. They knew they were well off, and had no particular desire to make life difficult for what was seen as a thoroughly benevolent company. Intergroup (management-worker) relations were at a low ebb because no realistic conflict was perceived to exist between the sides. Considerable emphasis, however, was placed on interpersonal relationships, and the mutual responsibilities of members of the Commonwealth towards another. This was reckoned by some to lead to a degree of untoward mutual

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indulgence. Some members expressed concern at the lack of discipline on the part of manual employees, and of negligence (in such areas as safety regulations) on the part of managerial employees. The term ' collusion' aptly characterizes the state of affairs that existed. In such circumstances, unilateral action by one group of workers in defiance of company regulations created an unwelcome and distinctly unfamiliar problem of negotiation. Intergroup relations were at once made salient, and the old (collusive) interpersonal strategies were no longer adequate. The opening stages of the negotiation make clear that previous arrangements were interpersonally fudged, with doubt as to what the formal agreement required - if, indeed, one existed: Mi = Chief management representative Ui = Chief representative of electricians Mi: U1: Mi: Ui: Mi: Yeah. Well. OK. So now, as far as I am concerned, to date - in our discussion to date - I understand - and there is no reason for me to suppose otherwise - that bank holidays were in fact... Unacceptable... (continued) Yeah. ...to us. Right? Yes. Because in fact it was done, it was never thought of as not being done, and therefore it was reasonable to think thisfrommy point of view, this now is something new as far as I'm concerned.

Against this agreeably' reasonable' background, the vociferous refusal by one group to cooperate happily is alarmingly problematic: Mi: This, this turnup: I mean, it is an embarrassment to us, in fact, not to have covered... This is manifestly obvious, because somewhere there has got to be some form of coverage.. But Ui leaves no doubt about his group's intransigent position, when asked by Mi if the electricians are merely asking for higher payment for covering bank holidays: Ui: No, we do not. We won't accept. We don't want to do it in any case. We just want bank holidays as bank holidays. We simply want the time off. We don't, we won't accept it. We don't want to accept for 20 per day. We don't want money for it. We don't want money for it. We don't want to do it. We never have wanted to do it, and we thought it was about time... We've been doing it now for aboutfiveyears and we thought it was about time we made a stand.

The strategy then adopted by Mi was effectively to deny the electricians a distinctive position as electricians: Mi: How would you suggest then that we deal with this now, as a company ? I mean, you're part of the community in this respect.

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And later: ...the issue is you don't want to be disturbed on that particular day... (continued) Ui: Yes. Mi: ... for any reason. Now, this leaves us holding the baby in fact. We have in fact positively to do something, but how are we to do this ? How in fact are we to cover this? Can you suggest to me some way out? Or, in fact, are we saying, 'Well that's your bloody problem?' (Very long pause) And if you feel that, then, then let's say so. I mean, if you say, 'Well that's your bloody problem, you say it.' Mi:

But the appeal to the electricians to adopt the attitude of committed members of the community cut little ice with Ui, who maintains his refusal to accept responsibility for management's problem, until finally, many pages later, worn down as follows:
Ui: Mi: Ui: Mi: Ui: Mi: Ui: Mi: Ui: I don't want money for it. I don't want a day off in lieu for it. I just don't want to do it, bank holiday. But then you pose us a problem, pressure from within... Well it's posed us a problem for the last five years. Yes, well this doesn't help us, Brian, does it? The fact of the matter is that, as... We, we employ all kinds of people, right? Yeah. For certain specific functions. And from within ourselves we try to cover all the needs that we've got. I'll still have the bloody need, whatever you do. Yeah. But then I'm lumbered with it. I can't find a solution. Well, here's one solution. Pay Stan for doing the bank holidays. He'll do 'em if he's paid for doing 'em. (Pause).

Mi's technique in this negotiation was consistently to deny the legitimacy of their intergroup stance: their common community interests had to be given priority. This he did in two main ways. Firstly, as we have seen, M i stressed the unfairness of creating an impossible situation for him personally. Secondly, suggestions were made that the electricians were being personally disloyal to the community, and these accusations were taken amiss, as the following extracts indicate: Ui: You, will, you say we don't care. Well we do care with due respect, 'cos we've done it for five years.

Or again: Mi: What you're saying is that you want to opt...You are in fact opting out you know. Ui: Yeah, we, we never opted in. We had it thrown. We had this list put in. We never accepted it there and then, so it's not a case of having opted out of doing it. We've done it for the last five years because, 'cos we done it, and that you know we didn't want to do it. We've never wanted to do it.

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Together, these tactics of Mi ensured the participation of the electricians in the task of undermining their own group position. The strategy - to emphasize interpersonal demands of the situation - was effective because there was, in fact, an overriding community interest in the company's 'Commonwealth'. Such a strategy would clearly be less appropriate in circumstances where separate and conflicting group interests are formally reorganized and enshrined in formal negotiating machinery. Mi's tactics ensured that the electricians' attempts to impose a highly competitive intergroup stamp on their relationships with management was modified at least to the extent of engendering acceptance of the necessity for 'reasonable' compromise. The attempt by the electricians to create a negotiation informed largely by intergroup demands was successfully thwarted, because competition was an inappropriate bargaining climate in the context of that particular company, and tactics designed to re-establish a collusive basis were destined to be successful. We now turn to a description of how intergroup and interpersonal demands (whatsoever their relative strengths overall) are integrated over the full length of a negotiation. 2.2. Interpersonal and intergroup stages in successful negotiation. Although I have described 'collusion' as a bargaining climate engendered by strong interpersonal and weak intergroup demands, there is no doubt an element of collusion in any bargaining relationship. This arises from the sheer difficulty of meeting both interpersonal and interparty demands simultaneously in an integrated performance. In some, but certainly not all circumstances, secret meetings between chief negotiators of opposed sides may take place in which the terms of an agreement are sketched out, to be 'ratified' later in an apparently spontaneous, but in reality well planned, public negotiation (Morley & Stephenson 1970b). This neatly overcomes the difficulty faced by negotiating teams of seeming to remain loyal to own group whilst at the same time responding reasonably to opponent's case. A chief management negotiator in a large engineering company once described to me sadly how problematic his bargaining relationships now were, following the retirement of his counterpart, the union convenor. The new man would have none of the secretly concluded arrangements customarily agreed prior to a full public negotiation. Rather, this new convenor insisted that all meetings with management were formal business meetings, and attended by at least one additional fellow shop steward. Any' understandings' that developed between the two chiefs would henceforth be common knowledge. An element of secret dealing, whereby the interpersonal demands of negotiation are at least partially met, is likely to occur in any institutionalized

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bargaining forum, and especially when negotiators bargain regularly and have opportunities for frequent interaction. (The existence of * plea bargaining' whereby defendants agree prior to trial to plead guilty in exchange for a light sentence, is not officially acknowledged in England, but is nonetheless prevalent (Baldwin & McConville 1977); justice is' negotiated' interpersonally in ways which frequently betray at least one party's interests.) It does not always occur in industrial bargaining, and is not the only way in which interpersonal and intergroup demands may be reconciled. Another technique, first examined systematically by Douglas (1957, 1962), is to deal with intergroup and interpersonal demands at different stages of a negotiation. In the opening stages of negotiation negotiators are especially concerned to fulfil the formal requirements of their representative role, and Douglas suggested that the first stage of negotiation reflects an interparty climate in which parties 'establish the negotiating range'. The full extent of disagreement is explored, with beneficial long-term effects: 'To the extent that the contenders can entrench their seeming disparity in this period, the more they enhance their chances for a good and stable settlement in the end' (Douglas 1957: 73). Her defence of this assertion is two-fold. Firstly, if disagreement is explored early, the negotiators will at no subsequent stage entertain false hopes which, when confounded, will seriously disrupt the orderly progression towards settlement. Second, Douglas seems to suggest that having done justice to interparty demands in the first stage, negotiators may move more reliably into the interpersonal climate of the second stage of ' reconnoitering the negotiating range', without any sense of betraying own group interests. During this stage they function more as interchangeable agents, each with a commitment to securing agreement in the light of the outcome of the first stage. As evidence for the existence of these stages, Douglas indicates that the identifiability of negotiators changes as the negotiation proceeds. She claimed that when presented with the unlabelled transcript of a negotiation, the individual identity of the people was more apparent to judges in the first than in the second phase. Contributions in the second stage were relatively undifferentiated as individuals got caught up in the creative exercise of constructing a compromise that could be justified to both principals. As testimony to the truth of the explanation of effects of medium of communication on outcomes of negotiations, Morley & Stephenson (1977) showed that subjects negotiating by telephone were, indeed, more identifiable as management or union representatives from unlabelled transcripts than were those negotiating face-to-face, judges making 50 per cent more errors with the latter than with the former. Role identifiability emerged (as Douglas' work suggested it might), as an effective measure of interparty or intergroup orientation, and was subsequently employed in the analysis of a number of

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real-life negotiations, including the first session of the electricians' negotiation. The analysis of that session showed a high degree of identifiability overall, but also systematic variation from one phase to the next. There was a marked increase in the identifiability of negotiators as one moved from the first to the middle third of the negotiation, with the third phase showing a reduction to an intermediate position. In that particular negotiation there was, indeed, a crescendo of polarized discord from the first to the second phase, as one moved from defining the relevant background to a stark differentiation of the sides' positions. Subsequent analyses of a three-session annual wage negotiation at a medium-sized food processing plant in the Midlands, and a three-session negotiation of a nationwide deal on the employment of temporary labour in a major British chemical company indicate that, as Douglas (1957, 1962) suggested, a high level of conflict, and of role-dominated behaviour by negotiators keenly aware of their representative status, dominates the first phase of negotiation. (Details of the wage negotiation are given in Morley & Stephenson 1977, and in Stephenson & Kniveton 1977; and of the temporary labour agreement, in Stephenson 1981.) Moreover, in both these cases, there is an identical movement within the first negotiation session, whereby role identifiability reaches a peak in the middle and levels off during the final phase to a level a little above that in the first phase. Other measures taken from Conference Process Analysis (Morley & Stephenson 1977) give results which parallel those obtained for role identifiability. The pattern obtained makes sense if we assume that negotiators are particularly anxious in the opening session to demonstrate their effectiveness as representatives. But there is more to it than that. The negotiators in that first phase not only' establish the negotiating range' as Douglas suggests, they also implicitly determine the outcome of the negotiation. There is agreement, maybe tacit, that one side or the other, or both, must reconsider their position, adjust their demands or resistance to demands, or whatever. The outcome of what Walton & McKersie call' distributive bargaining' is broadly determined in the first stage, as bargainers attack, defend and assess the strength of their opening positions. In subsequent sessions the implications of the essentially intergroup performance in the opening session are explored more openly, and from less partisan positions. This is reflected in a progressively lower level of role identifiability in the speakers in subsequent sessions. Negotiators do not characteristically fight bitterly from entrenched positions until the eleventh hour, when the last concession is painfully extracted and compromise achieved. Rather, as fellow professionals, after engaging in battle they organize the peace, doing so as increasingly interchangeable individuals. The studies briefly described here confirm Douglas' suggestion that success-

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fully concluded negotiations progress from a period of intergroup differentiation to more integrative phases as the details of an agreement are worked out. Negotiators gradually contribute to the group process in interchangeable fashion, and their social identity as representatives is subdued. After the first phase, subsequent negotiating sessions serve a different function, and it is no surprise that our results indicate very strong interactions between sessions and phases within sessions, for various measures of interaction, including role identifiability. In particular, the middle session in negotiations is marked by extremes of phasic character, but with no prescribed pattern: maybe starting off competitively with unresolved issues from the previous meeting, or perhaps attempting to strike initially a more conciliatory note, having previously established the boundaries of conflict. Whichever is the case, movement towards a contrasting phase takes place, and the interactive character of the negotiations swiftly changes. On our evidence, the third stage of negotiation has least internal variation. It is, in Stevens' (1963) terms, a period of 'cooperation and coordination', when the problems of implementation of the provisional agreement are considered. It is a stage made possible by the previous differentiation of the first stage, and adequate exploration of alternatives in the second. Due process having been followed, the 'Tightness', or at least inevitability, of the deal, is assured. Like Douglas' studies, the results of these various investigations suggest three progressive phases of negotiation - distributive, exploratory and integrative - but with quite sharp variations of tone within these phases. Perhaps the most important point to make is that the period of differentiation cannot be circumvented. As Stephenson (1978) has pointed out elsewhere, there is a problem-solving, human relations tradition in psychology which has given rise to the view that negotiators should rather concentrate on that which unites, than that which divides, the teams: that conflict should be rigorously eschewed. This advice can now be seen to run counter to much evidence. 2.3. Management-union consultation: a form of negotiation. Walton (1969), describing the results of observations of third-party interventions in disputes, argued that:
At least two phases of an effective conflict dialogue can be identified - a differentiation phase and an integration phase... A conflict resolution episode does not necessarily include just one differentiation and one integration phase. It may be composed of a series of these two phases, but the potential for integration at any one point in time is no greater than the adequacy of the differentiation closely achieved, (p. 105)

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In our terms, the intergroup competitive demands cannot be expunged from the scene, and must be satisfactorily dealt with before the individuals involved can collude in doing a deal that will, of necessity, fall short of respective group demands. Further support for this position comes from the results of a study reported briefly by Stephenson (i981), in a rather different industrial relations context. The investigation charted the progress over 12 months of a managementunion consultative committee in the medium-sized food plant referred to earlier in this chapter. In a typical meeting, about 12 items are discussed, mostly relating to complaints or suggestions emanating from the union side. At each meeting the discussion of a handful of items is concluded and a few more new items are introduced, items normally taking three or more meetings before their discussion is concluded. We found that within any one meeting the 'role identifiability' of the speakers varied markedly from item to item, speakers being able to switch in and out of role according to the stage of discussion reached for that particular item. Of greater immediate interest is the longitudinal analysis of the discussions of items. In all, the total discussions of eight items were analysed. Of these, four were thought independently to have been successfully concluded to the satisfaction of both sides by the time they came off the agenda (from four to 11 sessions). In all of the successfully concluded items, role identifiability analysis indicated a statistically significant effect of meeting. That is, the identifiability of negotiators varied from meeting to meeting with respect to the discussion of successfully concluded items. Conversely, in all of the remaining four unsuccessfully concluded items, in which union hopes were frustrated by management and discussion of the items was finally dropped, there was no significant effect of meeting (from two to five sessions). That is, role identifiability remained at a more or less constant level during discussion of those items. The identifiability was moderately high, without ever being exceptionally high or low. There was, finally, a statistically significant tendency for discussion of successfully concluded items to exhibit reduced role identifiability with time in only one of the successfully concluded items, although a downwards trend was observed in all cases. Significant quadratic effects in two instances reflected a tendency to peak in the middle sessions and to decline dramatically in the final session. 3. Arbitration: interpersonal irresponsibility As I write, a strike by British train drivers belonging to the union, ASLEF, remains unresolved. Mediation by an arbitration and conciliation service,

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AC AS, continues, and the possibility of formal arbitration is discussed. It has been reported that during the last week, negotiators from the two sides have remained in separate rooms, and that the AC AS mediator travelled from room to room in search of 'common ground' (David Felton, in The Times, 10 January 1982). Two weeks later, as I correct the first draft of the chapter, the strike remains unresolved, ACAS mediation has failed, and the ASLEF drivers refuse to accept binding arbitration or to cooperate with a committee of enquiry. Stephenson & Webb (1982) suggest that the mere presence of third parties itself encourages the expression of intergroup demands: respective positions must be justified to the external observer. When mediators or arbitrators are called in, individual responsibility for bringing negotiations to a conclusion is manifestly side-stepped. The refusal of negotiators to meet face-to-face even in the presence of the mediator, or to accept arbitration, approaches the ultimate representation of interpersonal evasion. Mediators have the broad aim of bringing the sides to negotiate effectively; arbitrators may judicially impose a solution. As in a criminal court of law, so in arbitration, the two sides are adversaries whose performances in the contest are impartially adjudged. The individual responsibility of the representatives for interpersonally securing an agreed settlement is, for whatever reasons, evaded. However, arbitration itself may become part of the established procedure, such that particularly problematic issues conventionally go to arbitration more as a means of avoiding, than of coping with, a breakdown in negotiations. Something approaching this state of affairs was the case in Webb's (1982) study of the Arbitration Board operating routinely in one of Britain's largest nationalized industries. What predictions might be made regarding the process of arbitration? It has been suggested that when negotiations break down, the negotiators have, for whatever reason, abandoned their individual interpersonal responsibility for devising an acceptable outcome. The 'interpersonal' demands may now be said to devolve on the arbitrator. In the first place, it is he or she who inherits the responsibility of ensuring that progression through the stages is effected. The arbitrator's first task may then be to ensure that the representatives of the two sides carry out their representative roles effectively. If necessary, the arbitrator must assist the representatives in the presentation of their case. In this first stage he or she is likely to be relatively passive, to limit contributions to seeking clarification and to ensure that the parties appreciate that he/she has fully grasped the details of their cases. This will probably be followed by a second stage, in which the arbitrator's contributions increase as he/she 'reconnoitres the negotiating range', to use Douglas' phrase. Contributions by the representatives will be largely in response to the

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arbitrator's questioning, and will constitute a smaller proportion of the interaction than heretofore. In a final stage the arbitrator will be concerned to ' sell' his/her verdict to the parties, and some control of the discussion in this period is likely to pass to the representatives. This description suggests that the first, distinctive phase is largely the responsibility of the parties. It is an intergroup phase when the best possible light is put on own case, and the most destructively searching on opponent's. The next phase is the arbitrator's responsibility, when he/she 'reconnoitres' the range of possible solutions using the parties as the source of additional information. The customary move to interpersonal cooperation between the bargainers is here replaced by the arbitrator's individual initiative. 3.1. Webb's studies. Webb's analysis of the content of a series of 12 arbitrated hearings provides an opportunity to examine the validity of this statement of the arbitrator's role. The 12 transcripts were each divided into parts according to readily distinguishable phases: presentation of arguments by the parties, a more loosely structured exchange between the parties and the arbitrator and a final period of summing up. Whereas the contributions of the two parties, management and union, were more or less equally divided between the three phases, the arbitrator's contribution was almost negligible in the first stage. His contributions range from 4 per cent in the first phase, through 30 per cent of the total in the second stage to 21 per cent in the final stage. The show is clearly in the hands of the contending parties in the first, intergroup, phase, with the arbitrator really coming into his own - as predicted - in the second,' interpersonal' phase of the arbitration. This is how Webb (1982) summarizes the phase sequence from an analysis in terms of CPA categories: In the first stage of the hearing, the ' evidence' is oriented towards the justification of divisive positions to the third party, characterised by high levels of statements about present practices, outcomes, persuasion of the negative effects of present agreements or proposed outcomes, and a high level of references to parties. During the second stage of the hearing, the third party in particular re-evaluates the pros and cons of party position in an attempt to find a workable solution to the dispute. Interestingly, Webb goes on to suggest that in arbitration some of the interpersonal antagonism which in negotiation proper would be manifest in the first stage, is, in arbitration, reserved for the second stage. Thus, there is in arbitration a more clear-cut divide between the first, 'intergroup', and the second, 'interpersonal', stage: [In the first stage] The extent of the dispute is expressed formally by a high level of statements framed as offers, of, for example, information about present parties,

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proposed outcomes and so on, with much reference to distinct parties. At this stage, the justification of party position relies, not on rejection of the opponent's stance, but on statements about the advantages and disadvantages of alternate courses of action. Only in the second stage of the hearing, when the procedure allows a more loosely structured discussion of the issues, does the more common pattern of disagreement and conflict emerge. Despite this adjustment of the process to the exigencies of arbitration, the character of the second stage conforms closely to the 'interpersonal climate' described by Douglas, and confirmed in the work on negotiation already described. As Webb goes on to say: This stage is characterised by a greater diversity in the form of the arguments brought forward and allows slightly more expression of underlying antagonisms between sides and within the group. The debate is more personalised, with increased reference to self and the individuals. From Webb's data, it becomes clear, as Thibaut & Walker (1975) found in their studies of procedural justice, that the nature of the case, and in particular its degree of complexity, is an important variable affecting the structure of the hearing, and we should expect this variable to affect the manner in which intergroup and interpersonal demands are reconciled. In Webb's work,' simple' cases typically refer to those instances in which a single issue (or a number of unrelated, 'run-of-the-mill' issues) is located within the context of an established framework and will have limited and foreseeable consequences for the industry. 'Complex' cases, on the other hand, cover a number of extensive and unpredictably inter-related issues, with no agreed framework for their analysis and resolution, and where wider and long term issues of equity and industrial relations practice are made salient. Proposals regarding pay restructuring, and the introduction of a 'Business Performance Scheme' to replace the 'Individual Bonus Scheme' were both regarded as complex issues, whereas 'rate of pay for traction trainees under 18', and 'increase in signing on and off allowance from 10 to 20 minutes' both fell into the 'simple' category. The predicted sequence of stages should be most evident in the complex cases, for it is in those cases that there is the greatest need to ensure an effective progression through the three stages. In the complex cases it is most important that the intergroup requirements of the first stage be fulfilled, in order that the parties may be satisfied with the opportunities given for exposition of their cases, and in order that the arbitrator may himself be assured that the negotiating range has been fully established. The arbitrator's interpersonal role in the second stage is also more likely to be evident in complex cases, for the creative work needed to discern and impose a solution

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will be greater than when only simple issues are at stake. We may therefore expect that in complex cases the stage-by-stage differentiation of arbitrator's and parties' roles will be greater than in simple cases. The findings generally supported this hypothesis. The evidence clearly indicated that the effect of phase was more pronounced in the complex than in the simple cases. There were a number of significant effects showing that, especially in the transition from the first to the second stage, the shift from intergroup to interpersonal behaviour was more marked in the complex than in the simple cases, and that this was especially true of the arbitrator's behaviour. In fact, the arbitrator, in complex cases, became a more salient protagonist in his own right, his authority deriving more from his control of procedure than from his expert knowledge. For example, in the complex issues whose arbitration Webb witnessed, the outcomes had manifold implications for the long-term relationship between the parties, and would influence the course of future negotiations. In such instances, procedural justice apparently became more important than distributive justice, in Webb's words: The place of ' equity' in arbitration becomes that of a subject for debate between the parties rather than a guiding principle; often referred to and appealed to, particularly in complex disputes, but rarely defined or explained by the third party. It appears to be more important to convince the parties that the Award is equitable by virtue of the process which preceded it, rather than on the basis of the grounds for decision itself. 4. Conclusions Tajfel (1978) and Brown & Turner (1981) emphasize the dangers of attempting to explain intergroup behaviour in terms of principles derived from studies of interpersonal behaviour. Evidence accumulates that many such principles are inapplicable when circumstances lead individuals to view others as representatives of social categories. For example, similarity does not necessarily lead to attraction when respective group memberships are made salient; indeed it may increase dislike (see Chapter 29). The work described in this chapter confirms the importance of the separable intergroup and interpersonal frameworks, but points rather to the strategies employed by negotiators - and arbitrators - in reconciling the contradictions between the two, rather than emphasizing - as Tajfel does - their incompatibility. There are increasing pressures on social scientists to demonstrate the relevance of their work to contemporary social problems and issues of policy. Although not addressed to practical problems, the research described here and the theoretical position which it vindicates have practical implications which are not trivial. Negotiators intent on ' winning' or at least holding their own,

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may perceive quite clear-cut strategic implications in the findings which relate the impact of strength of case to medium of communication. Negotiators may realize more clearly than hitherto the necessity for employing different approaches in different circumstances - as, for example, in one-off negotiations " nationally-concluded wage negotiation, as against plant-level h opponents who are colleagues in the same firm. In the former, the t may be one of establishing an appropriate interpersonal relationship, whereas in the latter the difficulty may lie in suppressing the interpersonal dimension and adequately sustaining intergroup demands. The integration of arbitration into the framework of negotiation is facilitated by the theoretical stance adopted. In particular, we now begin to have some real understanding of why in certain circumstances arbitration may become part of the established industrial relations procedure, and not the last desperate resort it so frequently appears to be. When the industrial relations climate is conflictual, the interpersonal demands of negotiation may become oppressively difficult, especially in complex cases where the respective merits of the case are more difficult to establish. In such cases justice can be seen to have been done when an 'ideal' negotiating procedure is imposed and supervised by the arbitrator.
References Baldwin, J. & McConville, M. 1977. Negotiated justice. London: Martin Robinson. Batstone, E., Boraston, I. & Frenkel, S. 1977. Shop stewards in action. Oxford: Blackwell. Brown, R. J. & Turner, J. C. 1981. Interpersonal and intergroup behaviour. In J. C. Turner & H. Giles (eds.) Intergroup behaviour. Oxford: Blackwell. Douglas, A. 1957. The peaceful settlement of industrial and intergroup disputes.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1, 6 9 - 8 1 .

1962. Industrial peacemaking. New York: Columbia University Press. Morley, I. E. 1981. Negotiation and bargaining. In M. Argyle (ed.) Social skills and work. London: Methuen. Morley, I. E. & Stephenson, G. M. 1969. Interpersonal and interparty exchange: a laboratory simulation of an industrial negotiation at the plant level. British Journal of Psychology, 60 (4), 543~5. 1970a. Formality in experimental negotiations: a validation study. British Journal of Psychology, 61, 383-4. 1970b. Strength of case, communication systems and outcomes of simulated negotiations: some social psychological aspects of bargaining. Industrial Relations Journal, Summer, 19-29. 1977. The social psychology of bargaining. London: George Allen and Unwin. Rutter, D. R. & Robinson, B. 1981. An experimental analysis of teaching by telephone: theoretical and practical implications for social psychology. In G. M. Stephenson & J. H. Davis (eds.) Progress in applied social psychology, vol. 1. Chichester: Wiley. Rutter, D. R., Stephenson, G. M. & Dewey, M. E. 1981. Visual communication and the content and style of conversation. British Journal of Social Psychology, 20, 41-52.

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Short, J. A. 1974. Effects of medium of communications on experimental negotiations. Human Relations, 27, 225-34. Stephenson, G. M. 1978. Negotiation and collective bargaining. In P. Warr (ed.) Psychology at work. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1981. Intergroup bargaining and negotiation. In J.C.Turner & H.Giles (eds.) Intergroup behaviour. Stephenson, G. M. & Kniveton, B. H. 1977. Interaction analysis of an industrial wage negotiation. Journal of Occupational Psychology, 50, 231-41. 1978. Interpersonal and interparty exchange: an experimental study of the effect of seating position on the outcome of negotiations between teams representing parties in dispute. Human Relations, 3 1 , 555-65. Stephenson, G. M. & Tysoe, M. 1982. Intergroup and interpersonal dimensions of social behaviour: the case of industrial bargaining. In H. Foot & G. Breakwell (eds.) Laboratory manual in social psychology. Stephenson, G. M. & Webb, J. 1982. A simulation study of third parties in industrial decision-making. In H. Brandstatter et al. (eds.) Group decision making. London: Academic Press. Stevens, C. M. 1963. Strategy and collective bargaining negotiation. New York: McGraw-Hill. Tajfel, H. (ed.) 1978. Differentiation between social groups: studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations. London: Academic Press. Thibaut, J. W. & Walker, L. 1975. Procedural justice: a psychological analysis. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Walton, R. E. 1969. Interpersonal peacemaking'.confrontations and third party consultation. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. Walton, R. E. & McKersie, R. B. 1965. A behavioral theory of labor negotiations: an analysis of a social interaction system. New York: McGraw-Hill. Webb, J. 1982. Social psychological aspects of third party intervention in industrial disputes. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Nottingham.

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