Preferred Citation: Sheehan, James J., and Morton Sosna, editors The Boundaries of Humanity: Humans, Animals, Machines.

Berkeley: University of California Press, c1991 1991. http: ark.cdli!.or" ark: 1#$#$ ft##%n!&$'

The Boundaries of Humanity

Humans, Animals, Machines Edited by James J. Sheehan and Morton Sosna
UNIVERSITY O !"#I ORNI" $RESS

Berkeley Los Angeles Oxford

% &''& The Re(ents of the Uni)ersity of !a*ifornia

(or Bliss Carnochan and )an *att, directors e+traordinaires, and the staff and friends of the Stanford ,-manities Center

Preferred Citation: Sheehan, James J., and Morton Sosna, editors The Boundaries of Humanity: Humans, Animals, Machines. Berkeley: University of California Press, c1991 1991. http: ark.cdli!.or" ark: 1#$#$ ft##%n!&$'

(or Bliss Carnochan and )an *att, directors e+traordinaires, and the staff and friends of the Stanford ,-manities Center

"!+NO,#E-.MENTS
.he editos /o-ld like to ackno/led"e some of those /ho made possi!le the 19%0 Stanford University conference, 1,-mans, 2nimals, Machines: Bo-ndaries and Pro3ections,1 on /hich this vol-me is !ased. *e are partic-larly "ratef-l to Stanford4s president, 5onald 6ennedy, and its provost, James 7oose, for this s-pport of the conference in connection /ith the -niversity4s centennial. *e also /ish to thank 8llis and 6atherine 2lden for their "enero-s s-pport. Special thanks are o/ed the staff of the Stanford ,-manities Center and its director, Bliss Carnochan, /ho "enero-sly assisted and other/ise enco-ra"ed o-r endeavors in every /ay possi!le. *e are also inde!ted to James 9i!!ons, 5ean of Stanford4s School of 8n"ineerin", /ho committed !oth his time andthe 8n"ineerin" School4s reso-rces to o-r efforts: Michael 7yan, 5irector of ;i!rary Collections, Stanford University ;i!raries, /ho, alon" /ith his staff, not only made the li!raries4 facilities availa!le !-t arran"ed a handsome !ook e+hi!it, 1Beasts, Machines, and other ,-mans: Some )ma"es of

Mankind1: and John Cho/nin", Center for Comp-ter 7esearch in M-sic and 2co-stics, /ho oran"i<ed a comp-ter m-sic concert. =ther Stanford University mem!ers of the conference plannin" committee to /hom /e are very "ratef-l incl-de James 2dams, Pro"ram in >al-es, .echnolo"y, Science, and Society: *illiam 5-rham, 5epartment of 2nthropolo"y: and .homas ,eller, School of ;a/. Several mem!ers of the plannin" committee, John 5-pr?, St-art ,ampshire, and .erry *ino"rad, contri!-ted to this vol-me. @ot all /ho participated in the conference co-ld !e incl-ded in the !ook. *e /ish, nonetheless, to thank @icholas Barker of the British ;i!rary, 5avydd 9reen/ood of Cornell University, Br-ce Ma<lish of the Massach-setts )nstit-te of .echnolo"y, ;an"don *inner of the 7ensA B+B selaer Polytechnic )nstit-te, and from Stanford, Joan Bresnan and Carl 5e"ler, for their important contri!-tions. .heir vie/s and o!servations "reatly enriched the intellect-al '-ality of the conference and helped foc-s o-r editorial concerns. (inally, /e /ish to thank 8li<a!eth 6noll and others at the University of California Press for their steadfast s-pport. J.J. S. M. S. B1B

.ENER"# INTRO-U!TION
Morton Sosna .he essays in this vol-me "re/ o-t of a conference held at Stanford University in 2pril 19%0 -nder the a-spices of the Stanford ,-manities Center. .he s-!3ect /as 1,-mans, 2nimals, Machines: Bo-ndaries and Pro3ections.1 .he conference or"ani<ers had t/o "oals. (irst, /e /anted to address those recent developments in !iolo"ical and comp-ter researchCnamely, socio!iolo"ya nd artificial intelli"enceCthat are not normally seen as fallin" in the domain of the h-manities !-t that have reopened important iss-es a!o-t h-man nat-re and identity. By askin" /hat it means to !e h-man, these relatively ne/ areas of research raise the '-estion that is at the heart of the h-manistic tradition, one /ith a lon" history. *e !elieved s-ch a '-estion co-ld !est !e addressed in an interdisciplinary for-m !rin"in" to"ether h-manities scholars /ith researchers from socio!iolo"y and artificial intelli"ence, /ho, despite their overlappin" concerns, lar"ely remain isolated from one another. Second, /e /anted to link related !-t -s-ally separate disco-rses a!o-t h-mans and animals, on the ond hand, and h-mans and machines, on the other. *e /ished to e+plore some of the parallels and differences in these respective de!ates and see if they can help -s -nderstand /hy, in some cases, hi"hly speciali<ed and even esoteric research pro"rams in socio!iolo"y or artificial intelli"ence can !ecome overridin" visions that carry lar"e intellect-al, social, and political implications. *e reco"ni<ed !oth that this is a da-ntin" task and that some limits had to !e placed on the material to !e covered. *e have divided this vol-me into several sections. )t opens /ith a "eneral statement !y philosopher

Bernard *illiams on the ran"e of pro!lems enco-ntered in attemptin" to define h-manity in relation either or animals or machines. .his is follo/ed !y sections on h-mans and B&B animals and on h-mans and machines. .hese are separately introd-ced !y James J. Sheehan, /ho provides historical !ack"ro-nd and commentary to the essays in each section /hile e+plorin" connections !et/een some of the iss-es raised !y socio!iolo"y and artificial intelli"ence. Sheehan f-rther develops these connections in a concl-din" after/ood. .o"ether, Sheehan4s pieces -nderscore the e+tent to /hich socio!iolo"y and artificial intelli"ence have reopened iss-es at the core of the *estern intellect-al tradition. )n assem!lin" the contri!-tors, /e chose to emphasi<e the philosophical, historical, and psycholo"ical aspects of the pro!lem as opposed to its literary, artistic, theolo"ical, and p-!lic policy dimensions. *e so-"ht sophisticated statements of the socio!iolo"ical and proAartificial intelli"ence vie/points and /ere fort-nate to o!tain overvie/s from t/o of the most active and infl-ential researchers in these areas, Melvin 6onner and 2llen @e/ell. 6onner pro!es the /ays "enetic research and st-dies of animal !ehavior have narro/ed the "ap !et/een !iolo"ical and c-lt-ral processes, and he raises '-estions a!o-t the interactions !et/een "enetic predispositions and comple+ social environments. @e/ell o-tlines some of his and other4s /ork on artificial intelli"ence, ar"-in" that the increasin"ly sophisticated '-est for a 1-nified theory of mind1 /ill, if s-ccessf-l, profo-ndly alter h-man kno/led"e and identity. 2ltho-"h neither 6onner nor @e/ell claims to represent the diversity of opinion in the fields of socio!iolo"y or artificial intelli"ence Das other essays in the vol-me make clear, considera!le differences of opinion e+ist /ithin these fieldsE, each holds an identifia!ly 1mainstream1 position. .he reader /ho /ishes to kno/ more a!o-t the specifies of socio!iolo"y or artifical intelli"ence mi"ht /ish to start /ith their essays. Since the '-estion of /hat it means to !e h-man is a!ove all philosophical, ho/ever, the vol-me !e"ins /ith the reflections of Bernard *illiams. )n 1Makin" Sense of ,-manity,1 *illiams critici<es some of the claims made in the names of socio!iolo"y and artificial intelli"ence /itho-t denyin" their -sef-lness as research pro"rams that have contri!-ted to h-man -nderstandin". ,e foc-ses on the pro!lem of red-ctionism, that is, red-cin" a series of comple+ events to a sin"le ca-se or to a very small n-m!er of simple ca-ses. (or *illiams, !oth the appeal and shortcomin"s of socio!iolo"y and artificial intelli"ence lie in their po/erf-lly red-ctive theories that provide nat-ral and mechanistic e+planations for /hat *illiam James once called 1the !loomin", !-<<in" conf-sion of it all.1 )n makin" the case for h-man -ni'-ences, *illiams contends that, -nlike the !ehavior of animals or machines, only h-man !ehavior is characteri<ed !y conscio-sness of past time, either historical or mythical, and !y the capa!ility of distin"-ishin" the real from the representational, or, as he deftly p-ts it, distin"-ishin" a ra!!it from a pict-re of a B#B ra!!it. 2ne -nlike animal etholo"ies, h-man etholo"y m-st take c-lt-re into acco-nt. 2ccordin" to *illiams, neither 1smart1 "enes nor 1smart1 machines affect s-ch attri!-tes of h-manity as ima"ination, a sense of the past, or a search for transcendent meanin". .hese, he insists, can only !e -nderstood c-lt-rally. .he section, ,-mans and 2nimals, foc-ses more directly on the relationship !et/een !iolo"y and h-man c-lt-re. 2rnold ). 5avidson takes -p some of the philosophical pro!lems in a specific historical

conte+t, the cent-ry or so piror to the scientific revol-tion of the seventeenth cent-ry, /hen h-man identity stood firmly !et/een the divine and nat-ral orders. 5avidson4s 1.he ,orror of Monsters1 is a -sef-l reminder that in earlier times, definitions of h-manity /ere formed more !y reference to an"els than to animals, let alone machines. Since science as it emer"ed from medieval traditions /as often indistin"-isha!le from theolo"y, the task of definin" the h-man readily mi+ed the t/o disco-rses. 2mon" other thin"s, 5avidson ho/s ho/ the notion of monsters tested the lon"Astandin" !elief in *estern c-lt-re in the a!sol-te distinction !et/een h-mans and other animal forms in /ays that prefi"-red some contemporary de!ates a!o-t socio!iolo"y and artificial intelli"ence. ,is essay traces repeated attempt to red-ce the h-man to a sin"le a priori concept, to -ncover linka"es !et/een moral and nat-ral orders Dor disordersE, and to create alle"ories that le"itimate a "iven c-lt-re4s most cherished !eliefs. =-r o/n c-lt-re may find o-r predecessors4 fascination /ith animal monsters am-sin"ly mis"-ided, !-t /e contin-e to take more serio-slyCand are appropriately fasinated !yC representations of monsters, from 5r. (rankenstein4s to 7o!ocop, that com!ine h-man intention /ith mechanical capacity. )n 1.he 2nimal Connection,1 ,arriet 7itvo, a specialist in nineteenthcent-ry British c-lt-re, !rin"s 5avidson4s disc-ssion of mar"inal !easts as pro3ections of h-man an+iety closer to the present. By e+aminin" the ideas of animal !reeders in >ictorian 8n"land, she sho/s that m-ch of their tho-"ht o/ed more to pervasive class, racial, and "ender attit-des than to !iolo"y. Unlike the theolo"ically inspired interpreters of "eneration analy<ed !y 5avidson, the -pperA and middleAclass !reeders descri!ed !y 7itvo did not hesitate to tinker /ith the nat-ral order !y 1mi+in" seeds.1 *hat one a"e conceived as monstro-s !ecame to them a ro-tine matter of improvin" the species and introd-cin" ne/ !reeds. Still, pro3ections from these !reeders4 -nderstandin"s of h-man society so permeated their vie/s of !iolo"ical processes that they commonly violated an essential element of >ictorian c-lt-re: faith in the a!sol-te dichotomy !et/een h-man !ein"s and animals. (or >ictorians, this /as no small matter. Shocked !y 5ar/in4s theories !-t as yet innocent of (re-d4s, many sa/ the open violation of the !o-ndary !et/een h-mans and !easts as a BFB s-re recipe for disaster. )n 7o!ert ;o-is Stevenson4s The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde , for e+ample /hen the kindly 5r. ,enry Jekyll reali<es that his e+periment in ass-min" the identity of the apelike and m-rdero-s 8d/ard ,yde has "one terri!ly a/ry, he is horrified at !oth his o/n en3oyment of ,yde4s depravity and at his ina!ility to s-ppress the !east /ithin himself, save !y s-icide.G1H B-t >ictorian animal !reeders /ho claimed they co-ld distin"-ish 1depraved1 from 1normal1 se+-al activities on the part of female do"s /ere, accordin" to 7itvo, openly Dif -nselfconscio-slyE ackno/led"in" this very 1animal connection.1 7itvo also o!serves that the "reatest slippa"eCthat is, the displacement of h-man moral 3-d"ments onto co/s, do"s, sleep, "oats, and catsCocc-rred precisely in those areas /here contemporary -nderstandin" of the act-al physiolo"y of reprod-ction /as /eakest. ,-man 1slippa"e1 -nder the "-ise of science, especially at the frontiers of kno/led"e, is 8velyn (o+ 6eller4s main concern in 1;an"-a"e and )deolo"y in 8vol-tionary .heory: 7eadin" C-lt-ral @orms into @at-ral ;a/.1 6eller ar"-es that the concept of competitive individ-alism on /hich so m-ch evol-tionary theory depends is not dra/n from nat-re. 7ather, like the rampant anthropomorphism descri!ed !y 7itvo, it, too, is a pro3ection of h-man social, political, and psycholo"ical val-es. (oc-sin" on ass-mptions /ithin the fields of pop-lation "enetics and mathematical ecolo"y, 6eller '-estions /hether individ-alism necessarily means competition, pointin" o-t many instances in nat-re Cnot the least !ein" se+-al reprod-ctionC/here interactin" or"anisms can more properly !e said to

!e cooperatin" rather than competin". Iet, so deeply is the notion of competition em!edded in these fields that 6eller /onders /hether s-ch lin"-istic -sa"e is symptomatic of a lar"er c-lt-ral pro!lem, ideolo"y passin" as science, /hich makes evol-tionary theory as m-ch a prescriptive as a descriptive enterprise. (or 6eller, lan"-a"e and the /ay /e -se it, not to mention o-r reasons for -sin" it as /e do, limit o-r disc-ssion of /hat nat-re is. @ot opposed to a concept of h-man nat-re, as s-ch, 6eller o!3ects to the ideolo"ically char"ed terms on /hich s-ch a concept often rests. .he pro!lem of lin"-istic slippa"e permeates dic-ssion of !oth socio!iolo"y and artificial intelli"ence. 2s a "eneral r-le, the "reater the claims made !y either of these disciplines, the "reater is the potential for claims made !y either of these disciplines, the "reater is the potential for slippa"e. ;ike philosophical red-ctionism, lin"-istic slippa"e can sim-ltaneo-sly ener"i<e other/ise arcane scientific research pro3ects, providin" them /ith readily "raspa!le concepts, /hile -nderminin" them thro-"h oversimplification and distortion. )n any case, socio!iolo"y and artificial intelli"ence raise traditional '-estions a!o-t the relationship !et/een lan"-a"e and science, !et/een the o!server and the o!served, and !eA BJB t/een the s-!3ects and the o!3ects of kno/led"e. .o one de"ree or another, all the essays in this vol-me confront this pro!lem. )s socio!iolo"y merely the latest attempt to transfer strictly h-man preocc-pations to a !iolo"ical, and hence scientific, realmK @ot accordin" to Melvin 6onner. )n 1,-man @at-re and C-lt-re: Biolo"y and the 7esid-e of Uni'-eness,1 6onner, an anthropolo"ist and physician, makes the case for the socio!iolo"ical perspective. 5ra/in" on recent "enetic and primate research, he ar"-es that cate"ories like 1the mental1 or 1the psycholo"ical,1 previo-sly tho-"ht to !e distinctively h-man c-lt-ral traits, are in fact shared !y other species. 2s 6onner sees it, this is all that socio!iolo"y claims. Moreover, the ackno/led"es si"nificant criticisms that -ndermined the credi!ility of earlier social 5ar/inists: their ref-sal to distin"-ish !et/een an or"anism4s s-rvival and its reprod-ction, their ina!ility to acco-nt for altr-ism in h-man and animal pop-lations, or their mis-nderstandin" of the e+ceedin"ly comple+ and still not f-lly -nderstood relation !et/een an or"anism and its environment. )f left at that, apart from f-rther red-cin" the already m-ch narro/ed "ap separatin" h-mans from other animals, there /o-ld not !e m-ch f-ss. B-t 6onner also s-""ests that this inherited !iolo"ical 1resid-e,1 as he p-ts it, constit-tes an essential 1h-man nat-re.1 ,e then raises the '-estion, )f h-man nat-re does e+ist, /hat are the social implicationsK ,is ans/ers ran"e from the po/er of "enes to determine o-r co"nitive and emotional capacities to the assertion that, in h-man societies, conflict is inherent capacities to the assertion that, in h-man societies, conflict is inherent rather than some 1transient a!erration.1 )f there is h-man -ni'-eness, accordin" to 6onner, it consists in o-r possessin" the 1intelli"ence of an advanced machine in the moral !rain and !ody of an animal.1 9iven the diminished role of c-lt-re in s-ch an analysis, socio!iolo"y has aro-sed stron" criticism. )n his "eneral reflections on the theme of !iolo"y and c-lt-re, philosopher John 5-pr? characteri<es it as a fla/ed pro3ect that com!ines red-ctionism /ith conservative ideolo"y. 5avidson, 7itvo, and 6eller, he notes, provide interestin" case st-dies of ho/ "eneral theories can "o "ro/in". 5-pr? finds 6onner4s vie/ of science inade'-ate, !oth in its faith in o!3ectivity and in its epistemolo"ical certainty. 2ltho-"h not a c-lt-ral relativist in the classic sense, 5-pr?, m-ch like *illiams, /o-ld have -s pay more attention to h-man c-lt-res in all their varia!ility as a !etter /ay of -nderstandin" h-man !ehavior than !iolo"ical determinism "ro-nded in evol-tionary theory. 2mon" the stron"est appeals of any e+planatory theory is its appeal to mechanism. .his is as tr-e for

@e/ton4s physics, 2dam Smith4s theory of /ealth, or Mar+4s theory of class conflict as for evol-tion or socio!iolo"y. 6no/ a little and, thro-"h mechanism Das if !y ma"icE, one can predict a BLB lot. .his !rin"s -s to h-manity4s other alter a"o, the machine. 2s /ith the !o-ndary !et/een h-mans and animals, the one !et/een h-mans and machines not only has a history !-t has !een e'-ally infl-ential in shapin" h-man identity. )n some /ays, o-r relationship to machines has !een more pressin" and pro!lematic. @o one denics that h-man !ein"s are animals or that animals, in some very important respects, resem!le h-man !ein"s. .he '-estion has al/ays !een /hat kind of animal, or ho/ different from others, are /e. B-t /hat does it mean if /e are machines or, perhaps more dist-r!in"ly, if some machines are 1like -s1K 7o"er ,-man !e"ins the section, ,-mans and Machines, /ith several historical o!servations, /hich provide a -sef-l conte+t for considerin" c-rrent de!ates a!o-t the comp-ter revol-tion and artificial intelli"ence. )n 1.he Meanin" of the Mechanistic 2"e,1 ,-man distin"-ishes !et/een machines and the concept of mechanism as it come to !e -nderstood in seventeenthAcent-ry 8-rope. Machines, he notes, have !een /ith -s since anti'-ity Dif not !eforeE, !-t prior to the Scientific 7evol-tion, their creators rarely strove to make their /orkin"s visi!le. )ndeed, as a /ay of demonstratin" their o/n cleverness, they often deli!erately hid or dis"-ised the inner /orkin"s of their contrivances, m-ch like ma"icians /ho keep their tricks secret. 8arly machines, in other /ords, did not offer themselves as !l-eprints for ho/ the /orld /orked. @or did they principally operate as a means of harnessin" and controllin" nat-ral forces for distinctively h-man p-rposes: more likely, they served as am-sin" or decorative c-rios. ,o/ever, in the /ake of the ne/ astronomy, the ne/ physics, and other discoveries emphasi<in" the -niverse as a /ellordered mechanism, the machine, accordin" to ,ahn, !ecame somethin" '-ite different: a device that openly displayed its inner /orkin"s for others to -nderstand. By callin" attention to their mechanisms, often thro-"h detailed vis-al representations, machines came to sym!oli<e a ne/ a"e of scientific kno/led"e and material pro"ress attaina!le thro-"h mechanical improvements. 1.he vis-al representation of the machine forever stripped them of secret recesses and hidden forces,1 /rites ,ahn. 1.he tone of the ne/ science /as to displace the occ-lt !y the visi!le, the mysterio-s !y the palpa!le.1 .o see /as to kno/, and to kno/ /as to chan"e the /orld, pres-ma!ly for the !etter. 2t !est, machines have only partially f-lfilled this hope, and /e are lon" past the day /hen dia"rams of "ears and p-lleys co-ld alone "-arantee their tan"i!ility and -tility. Iet the concept of mechanismC /hat it means and /hat it can doCcontin-es to "enerate controversy. Biolo"ical and evol-tionary theories, despite their mechanistic determinism, co-ld still have -s /ith minds, psyches, or so-ls. B-t /ith the advent of comp-ters and artificial intelli"ence, even these attri!-tes to h-manity are in dan"er of "ivin" /ay for "ood. .he essays !y 2llen @e/ell, .erry B0B *ino"rad, and Sherry .-rkle consider the implications of the comp-ter revol-ion. )n 1Metaphors for Mind, .heories of Midn: Sho-ld the ,-manities MindK1 @e/ell reminds -s that the comp-ter is a machine /ith a difference, 1clearly not a rollin" mill or a tickAtock clock.1 .he comp-ter threatens not only ho/ /e think a!o-t !ein" h-man and the fo-ndation of the h-manities as traditionally conceived !-t all intellect-al disciplines. @otin" that a comp-tational metaphor for 1mind1 is very common, @e/ell e+presses dissatisfaction /ith s-ch metaphorical thinkin", indeed /ith all

metaphorical thinkin" /hen it applies to science. (or @e/ell, the !etter the metaphor, the /orse the science. 2 scientific 1theory of mind,1 ho/ever, if achieved Dand @e/ell !elieves /e are /ell on o-r /ay to/ard achievin" oneE, /o-ld !e '-ite another matter. ,e insists that, -nlike the artificial rhetorical device of metaphor, theories formally or"ani<e kno/led"e in revealin" and -sef-l /ays. )n -r"in" co"nitive scientists to provide a -nified theory of mind that can !e represented as palpa!ly as the /orkin"s of a clock, @e/ell e+emplifies the epistemolo"ical spirit of the mechanistic a"e descri!ed !y ,ahn. ,e also !elieves that 1"ood science1 can and sho-ld avoid the kind of lin"-istic slippa"e that has characteri<ed the de!ate a!o-t !iolo"y and c-lt-re. 2s to /hat s-ch a theory of mind Dif correctE /ill mean for the h-manities, @e/ell spec-lates that it /ill !reak do/n the dichotomy !et/een h-mans and machines. Biolo"ical and technolo"ical processes /ill instead !e vie/ed as analo"o-s systems respondin" to "iven constraints and havin", '-ite possi!ly, similar -nderlyin" feat-res. 2t most, there /ill remain a narro/er distinction !et/een nat-ral technolo"ies, s-ch as 5@2, and artificial ones, s-ch as comp-ters, /ith !oth conceived as operatin" accordin" to the same f-ndamental principles. 8ven elements fre'-ently tho-"ht to !e incommens-ra!ly h-man, s-ch as 1personality1 or 1insi"ht,1 mi"ht !e sho/n to !e part of the same overall co"nitive str-ct-re. 2nd technolo"y itself mi"ht finally come to !e vie/ed as an essential part of o-r h-manity, not an alien presence. @e/ell4s analysis treats artificial intelli"ence D2)E as an e+citin" research pro3ect, am!itio-s and potentially si"nificant, yet still limited in its claims and applications. B-t critics have '-estioned /hether 2) has remained, or can or o-"ht to remain, -nmetaphorical. )s not, they ask, the concept of artificial intelli"ence itself a profo-ndly determinin" metaphorK 2s the editor of a special Daedalus iss-e on 2) recently p-t it, 1,ad the term artifcial intelligence never !een created, /ith an implication that a machine mi"ht !e a!le to replicate the intelli"ence of a h-man !rain, there /o-ld have !een less incentive to create a research enterprise of tr-ly mythic proportions.1G&H 2mon" other diffic-lties, a science /itho-t metaphor may !e a science /itho-t patrona"e. B%B .erry *ino"rad, himself a comp-ter scientist, is less san"-ine a!o-t 2). )n 1.hinkin" Machines: Can .here BeK 2re *eK1 *ino"rad characteri<es 2) research as ine+trica!ly tied to its technolo"icalCand hence metaphoricalC-ses. *hy seek a theoretical model of mind, he asks, -nless /e also desire to create 1intelli"ent tools1 that can serve h-man p-rposesK /ino"rad is tro-!led !y the slippa"e !ack and forth !et/een these parts of the 2) enterprise, /hich he feels comprises its inte"rity and leads to e+a""erated e+pectations and overdetermined statements, s-ch as Marvin Minsky4s notorio-s assertion that the mind is nothin" more than a 1meat machine.1 .he h-man mind, *ino"rad ar"-es, is infinitely more complicated than mathematical lo"ic /o-ld allo/. 7evie/in" 2) efforts of the past thirty years, *ino"rad finds that a !asic philosophy of 1patch/ork rationalism1 has "-ided the research. ,e compares the intelli"ence likely to emer"e from s-ch a pro"ram to ri"id !-rea-cratic thinkin" /here applyin" the appropriate r-le can, all too fre'-ently, leadto 6afkaes'-e res-lts. 1Seeers after the "litter of intelli"ence,1 he /rites, 1are mis"-ided in tryin" to cast it in the !ase metal of comp-tin".1 .he notion of a thinkin" machine is at !est fool4s "oldCa pro3ection of o-rselves onto the machine, /hich is then pro3ected !ack as 1-s.1 *ino"rad -r"es researchers to re"ard comp-ters as 1lan"-a"e machines1 rather than 1thinkin" machines1 and to consider the /ork of philosophers of lan"-a"e /ho have sho/n that, to /ork, h-man lan"-a"e -ltimately depends on tacit -nderstandin"s not s-scepti!le to mechanistically determina!le mathematical lo"ic. )n 17omantic 7eactions: Parado+ical 7esponses to the Comp-ter Presence,1 social scientist Sherry .-rkle provides a third perspective on 2). *here ,ahn emphasi<es the palpa!ility of machines and

their mechanisms as leadin" to 1the a"e of reason,1 .-rkle4s empirical approach -nderscores a parado+ial reaction in the other direction. 1Comp-ters,1 she reminds -s, 1present a scintillatin" s-rface and e+citin" comple+ !ehavior !-t no /indo/, as do thin"s that have "ears, p-lleys, and levers, in their internal str-ct-re.1 @otin" that romaniticsm /as, at least in part, a reaction to the rationalism of the 8nli"htenment, .-rkle raises the possi!ility that the very opacity of comp-ter technolo"y, alon" /ith the kind of disill-sionment e+pressed !y *ino"rad, mi"ht !e leadin" -s to romantici<e the comp-ter. .his co-ld, she s-""ests, lead to a more romantic rather than a more rationalistic vie/ of people, !eca-se if /e contin-e to define o-rselves in the mirror of the machine, /e /ill do so in contrast to comp-ters as r-leAprocessors and !y analo"y to comp-ters as 1opa'-e.1 .hese '-estions of definin" the self in relation and in reaction to comp-ters takes on ne/ importance "iven c-rrent directions in 2) research that foc-s on 1emer"ent1 rather than r-leAdriven intelli"ence. By emphasi<in" the comp-ter as a pro3ection of o-r psycholo"ical B9B selvesCcomple+, divided, and -npredicta!le as /ell areC.-rkle speaks to *ino"rad4s concern that comp-ters cannot !e made to think like h-mans !y reversin" the '-estion. (or her, the iss-e is not only /hether comp-ters /ill ever think like people !-t, as she p-ts it, 1the e+tent to /hich people have al/ays tho-"ht like comp-ters.1 .-rkle does not re"ard h-mans4 inclination to define themselves in relation to machines or animals as patholo"ical: rather, she vie/s it as a normal e+pression of o-r o/n psycholo"ical -ncertainties and of the machine4s am!ivalent nat-re, a mar"inal o!3ect poised !et/een mind and notAmind. 2t the same time, in contrast to @e/ell, .-rkle s-""ests that comp-ters are as m-ch metaphorical as they are mechanistic and that there are si"nificant implications for nonAr-leA !ased theories of artificial intelli"ence in researchers4 "ro/in" reliance on metaphors dra/n from !iolo"y and psycholo"y. .he section concl-des /ith some reflections on the h-mans animals machines trichotomy !y philosopher St-art ,ampshire. Philosophy, he confesses, often seems like 1a prolon"ed conspiracy to avoid the rather o!vio-s fact that h-mans have !odies and are !iolo"ical !ein"s,1 a vie/ that allo/s socio!iolo"y more le"itimacy than *illiams and 5-pr? /o-ld perhaps !e /illin" to "ive it. B-t, as opposed to .-rkle4s notion of 1romantic1 machines, ,ampshire "oes on to make the point that, precisely !eca-se h-mans possess !ioloi"cally rooted mental imperfections and -npredicta!ilities, the more machines mana"e to imitate the /orkin"s of the often m-ddled h-man mind, the less h-man they !ecome. M-ddled h-mans, he notes, at times still perform inspired actions: m-ddled machines, ho/ever, are simply defective. ,ampshire4s tho-"hts, in any event, are deli"htf-lly h-man. .he essays in The Boundaries of Humanity consider the '-estion, /hether h-manity can !e said to have a nat-re and, if so, /hether this nat-re Dor nat-resE can !e o!3ectively descri!ed or sym!olically reprod-ced. .hey also s-""est that socio!iolo"y and artificial intelli"ence, in all their technical sophistication, p-t may old '-estions in a ne/ li"ht.

$RO#O.UE/ M"+IN. SENSE O HUM"NITY

Bernard ,i**iams 2re /e animalsK 2re /e machinesK .hose t/o '-estions are often asked, !-t they are not satisfactory. (or one thin", they do not, from all the relevant points of vie/, present alternatives: those /ho think

that /e are machines think that other animals are machines, too. )n addition, the '-estions are too easily ans/ere.d *e are, strai"htfor/ardly, animals, !-t /e are not, strai"htfor/ardly, machines. *e are a distinctive kind of animal !-t not any distinctive kind of machine. *e are a kind of animal in the same /ay that any other species is a kind of animalC/e are, for instance, a kind of primate.

Etho*o(y and !u*ture

Since /e are a kind of animal, there are ans/ers in o-r case to the '-estion that can !e asked a!o-t any animal, 1,o/ does it liveK1 Some of these ans/ers are more or less the same for all h-man !ein"s /herever and /henever they live, and of those -niversal ans/ers, some are distinctively tr-e of h-man !ein"s and do not apply to other animals. .here are other ans/ers to the '-estion, ho/ h-man !ein"s live, that vary strikin"ly from place to place and, still more si"nificantly, from time to time. Some other species, too, display !ehavior that varies re"ionallyCthe calls of certain !irds are an e+ampleC!-t the de"ree of s-ch variation in h-man !ein"s is of a '-ite different order of ma"nit-de. Moreover, and more f-ndamentally, these variations essentially depend on the -se of lan"-a"e and, associated /ith that, the non"enetic transmission of information !et/een "enerations, feat-res that are, of co-rse, themselves amon" the most important -niversal characteristics distinstice of h-man !ein"s. .his variation in the /ays that h-man !ein"s live is c-lt-ral B 1F B variation, and it is an etholo"ical fact that h-man !ein"s live -nder c-lt-re Da fact represented in the ancient doctrine that their nat-re is to live !y conventionE. *ith h-man !ein"s, if yo- specify the ethnolo"ical in detail, yo- are inevita!ly led to the c-lt-ral. (or e+ample, h-man !ein"s typically live in d/ellin"s. So, in a sense, do termites, !-t in the case of h-man !ein"s, the description opens into a series of c-lt-ral specifications. Some h-man !ein"s live in a d/ellin" made !y themselves, some in one made !y other h-man !ein"s. Some /ho make d/ellin"s are constrained to make them, others are re/arded for doin" so: in either case, they act in "ro-ps /ith a division of la!or, and so on. )f one is to descri!e any of these activities ade'-ately and so e+plain /hat these animals are -p to, one has to ascri!e to them the comple+ intentions involved in sharin" a c-lt-re. .here are other dimensions of c-lt-re and f-rther types of comple+ intention. Some of the d/ellin"s systematically vary in form, !ein" fo-r!edroom >ictorians, for instance, or in the Palladian style, and those descriptions have to !e -sed in e+plainin" the variations. S-ch styles and traditons involve kinds of intentions that are not merely comple+ !-t selfAreferential: the intentions refer to the tradition, and at the same time, it is the e+istence of s-ch intentions that constit-tes the tradition. .raditions of this kind display another feat-re that they share /ith many other c-lt-ral phenomena: they imply a conscio-sness of past time, historical or mythical. .his conscio-sness itself has !ecome more refle+ive and comple+ in th co-rse of h-man development, a!ove all, /ith the introd-ction of literacy. 2ll h-man !ein"s live -nder c-lt-re: many live /ith an idea of their collective past: some live /ith the idea of s-ch an idea. 2ll of this is etholo"y, or an e+tension of ethnolo"y: if one is "oin" to -nderstand a species that lives -nder c-lt-re, one has to -nderstand its c-lt-res. B-t it is not all !iolo"y. So ho/ m-ch is !iolo"yK 2nd /hat does that '-estion meanK ) shall s-""est a line of tho-"ht a!o-t similarities and differences. .he story so far implies thar some differences in the !ehavior of h-man "ro-ps are e+plained in terms of their different c-lt-res and not in !iolo"ical terms. .his may enco-ra"e the idea that c-lt-re e+plains differences and !iolo"y e+plains similarities. B-t this is not necessarily so. )ndeed, in more than one respect, the '-estion is not /ell posed. (irst, there is the a!sol-tely "eneral point that a "enetic

infl-ence /ill e+press itself in a partic-lar /ay only "ranted a certain sort of environment. 2 strikin" e+ample of s-ch an interaction is provided !y t-rtles4 e""s, /hich if they are e+posed to a temperat-re !elo/ #$ de"rees Celsi-s at a certain point in development yield a female t-rtle !-t if to a hi"her temperat-re, a male one. Moreover, the possi!le interactions are B 1J B comple+, and many cases cannot !e characteri<ed merely !y addin" to"ether different infl-ences or, a"ain, 3-st in terms of tri""erin".G1H Chan"es in the environment may depend on the activities of the animals themselves. )n the case of h-man !ein"s, the environment and chan"es in it may /ell re'-ire c-lt-ral description. 9ranted these comple+ities, it may not !e clear /hat is meant !y ascri!in" some similarity or difference !et/een different "ro-ps of h-man !ein"s to a !iolo"ical rather than a c-lt-ral infl-ence. B-t insofar as it makes sense to say anythin" of this sort, it can !e appropriate to ascri!e a difference in h-man !ehavior to a !iolo"ical factor. .h-s, the nota!le differences in the fertility rates of h-man societies at different times Da phenomenon that defies simple e+planationE may !e connected to a differential perception of risk.G&H .his /o-ld provide a stron" analo"y to differences in the reprod-ctive !ehavior in "ro-ps of other species, and in this sense, it /o-ld s-""est a !iolo"ical e+planation. B-t many feat-res of the sit-ation /o-ld demand c-lt-ral description, s-ch as the reprod-ctive !ehaviors so affected, the /ays in /hich risks are appreciated, and, of co-rse, /hat events co-nted as dan"ero-s De."., /arE. )n the opposite direction, it has !een a pervasive error of socio!iolo"y to s-ppose that if some practice of h-man c-l-t-re is analo"o-s to a pattern of !ehavior in other species, then it is all the more likely to !e e+plained !iolo"ically if it is Dmore or lessE -niversal amon" h-man !ein"s. )f this follo/s at all, it does so in a very /eak sense. S-ppose D/hat is -ntr-eE that the s-!ordinate role of /omen /ere a c-lt-ral -niversal. .his mi"ht nevrtheless depend on other c-lt-ral -nivrsals and their conditions, for e+ample, the a!sence -p to no/ of certain kinds of technolo"y: it co-ld t-rn o-t to !e !iolo"ically determined at most to this e+tent, that if roles related to "ender /ere to !e assi"ned in those c-lt-ral conte+ts, !iolo"y favored this assi"nation. *e cannot !e in a position to "ive a !iolo"ical e+planation of any phenomenon that has a c-lt-ral dimension, ho/ever /idespread the phenomenon is, -nless /e are also in a position to interpret it c-lt-rally. .his is simply an application, to the very special case of h-man !ein"s, of the "eneral tr-th that one cannot e+plain animal !ehavior !iolo"ically Din partic-lar, "eneticallyE -nless one -nderstands it etholo"ically.

!o(niti)e S0ien0e and o*1 $sy0ho*o(y

.he claim that /e are animals is strai"htfor/ardly tr-e. .he claim that /e are machines, ho/ever, needs a determinate interpretation if it is to mean anythin". *hat some people mean !y it Ddespite the e+istence of machines capa!le of random !ehavior$ is merely that /e, like other lar"e thin"s, can !e deterministically characteri<ed, to some accepta!le apA B 1L B pro+imation, in terms of physics. .his seems to me pro!a!ly tr-e and certainly -ninterestin" for the present disc-ssion. 2ny more interestin" version m-st claim that /e are each a machine: and ) take the contemporary contnet of this to !e that /e are each !est -nderstood in terms of an informtionA

processin" device. .his, in t-rn, represents a !elief in a research pro"ram, that of psycholo"y as co"nitive science. ,o/ever, the claim that h-man !ein"s are in this sense machines involves more than the claim that h-man !ein"s are s-ch that co"nitive science is a "ood pro"rma for psycholo"y. it m-st also imply that psycholo"y provides an ade'-ate pro"ram for -nderstandin" h-man !ein"s: this is a point ) shall come !ack to. .o some e+tent, the claim that h-man !ei"ns can !e -nderstood in terms of psycholo"y as co"nitive science m-st s-rely !e an empirical one, to !e tested in the s-ccess of the research pro"ram. (or an empirical claim, ho/ever, it has attracted a s-rprisin" amo-nt of a priori criticism, desi"nedto sho/ that the -ndertakin" is mistaken in principle. ;ess e+treme, o!vio-sly, than either the comprehensive research pro"ram or the comprehensive ref-tation of it is the modest s-""estion that this kind of model /ill !e val-a!le for -nderstandin" h-man !ein"s in some respects !-t not others. .he s-""estion is initially attractive !-t at the same time very indeterminate, and, of co-rse, it may t-rn o-t that, like some other compromises, it is attractive only !eca-se it is indeterminate. ) sho-ld like to raise the '-estion of ho/ the compromise mi"ht !e made more determinate. .hose /ho /ant to prod-ce a comprehensive ref-tation of the pro"ram sometimes make the o!3ection that only a livin" thin" can have a psycholo"y. .his can mean t/o different thin"s. =ne is that psycholo"ical processes, of /hatever kind, co-ld !e reali<ed only in a !iolo"ical system, that a mind co-ld only !e secreted !y a !rain.G#H .his, if tr-e, /o-ld certainly p-t the research pro"ram o-t of !-siness, since, /hatever other refinements it receives, its central idea m-st !e that psycholo"ical processes co-ld in principle !e reali<ed !y any system /ith an ade'-ate informationAtheoretical capacity. ,o/ever, ) see no reason /hy in this form the o!3ection sho-ld !e tr-e: that mind is essentially !iochemical seems a no more appealin" !elief than that it is essentially immaterial. 2 more interestin" version of the o!3ection that only a livin" thin" can have a psycholo"y takes the form of sayin" that a h-man psycholo"y, at least, can !e possessed only !y a creat-re that has a life , /here this implies, amon" other thin"s, that its e+perience has a meanin" for it and that feat-res of its environment display salience, relevance, and so on, partic-larly in the li"ht of /hat it sees as val-a!le. .his seems to me m-ch more likely to !e tr-e, and it has a disco-ra"in" conse'-ence for B 10 B the research pro"ram in its more am!itio-s forms, !eca-se the e+perience descri!ed in these terms is so stron"ly holistic. 2n e+ample is provided !y comple+ emotions s-ch as shame, contempt, or admiratin, /here an a"ent4s appreciation of the sit-ation, and his or her selfreflection, are closely related to one another and also dra/ on an indefinitely /ide ran"e of other e+periences, memories, social e+pectations, and so on. .here is no reason to s-ppose that one co-ld -nderstand, still less reprod-ce, these e+peiences in terms of any system that did not already em!ody the comple+ interconnections of an e'-ally comple+ e+istence.GFH 2nother e+ample is /orth mentionin" partic-larly !eca-se it has so often appeared in the rhetoric of ar"-ments a!o-t s-ch '-estions. .his is creativity. 2n informationAprocessin" device mi"ht !e a creative pro!lem solver, and it mi"ht come -p /ith /hat it itself co-ld 1reco"ni<e1 as fr-itf-l sol-tions to pro!lems in mathematics or chess 9/a"ers on this !ein" impossi!le /ere al/ays illAadvisedE. B-t it co-ld not display a similar creativity in some less formali<ed intellect-al domain or in the arts. .his is not Drepeat, not E !eca-se s-ch creativity is ma"ical or a resplendent co-ntere+ample to the la/s of nat-re.GJH )t is simply that /hat /e call creativity is a characteristic that yields not merely somethin" ne/ or -nlikely !-t somethin" ne/ that strikes -s as meanin"f-l and interestin": and /hat makes it meanin"f-l and interestin" to -s can lie in an indeterminately /ide ran"e of associations and

connections !-ilt -p in o-r e+istence, most of them -nconscio-s. .he associations are associations for us : the creative idea m-st strike a !ell that /e can hear. )n the sense that a device can !e pro"rammed to !e a pro!lem solver, there may !e, in these connectoins, no antecedent pro!lem. D5ia"hilev, askin" Coctea- for a ne/ !allet, memora!ly said, 1 tonne!moi, Jean. 1E @one of this is to deny that there may !e a description in physical terms of /hat "oes on /hen a h-man !ein" comes -p /ith somethi"n ne/ and interesitn". .hey diffic-lty for the research pro"ram is that there is no reason to e+pect that in these connections, at least, there /ill !e an e+planatory psycholo"ical acco-nt at the levle that it /ants, lyin" !et/een the physical acco-nt, on the one hand, and a f-lly interpretive acco-nt, /hich itself -ses notions s-ch as meanin", on the other. .he activities and e+periences that i have mentioned as providin" a diffic-lty for the research pro"ram are all specifically h-man. 2ltho-"h it may sometimes have !een ar"-ed that some s-ch holistic feat-res m-st !elon" to any mentality at all, the most convincin" acco-nt of the pro!lem connects them /ith special feat-res of h-man conscio-sness and c-lt-re. .he '-estion on these iss-es that i sho-ld like to leave for consideration is the foolo/in": )f /e "rant this m-ch, /hat follo/s for activities and, partic-larly, a!ilities that h-man !ein"s do prima facie B 1% B share /ith other creat-resK )f /e "rant /hat has 3-st !een s-""ested, there /ill not !e an ade'-ate co"ntiiveAscientific acco-nt of /hat it is to feel em!arrassment, or of reco"ni<in" a scene as em!arrassin", or DperhapsE of seein" that a pict-re is a *attea-. B-t there co-ld !e, and perhaps is, s-ch an acco-nt of seein" that somethin" is a cylinder or of reco"ni<in" somethin" as a ra!!it. =ther animals have a!ilities that can !e descri!ed in these terms, !-t are they 3-st the same a!ilties in h-man !ein"s and in other animalsK DConsider, for instance, the relations, in the h-man case, !et/een !ein" a!le to reco"ni<e a ra!!it and !ein" a!le to reco"ni<e a ra!!it in many different styles of pict-re.E *hat does seem clear, at the very least, is that a co"nitiveAscientific pro"ram for ra!!it reco"ntion, and a h-man !ein" skilled in reco"ni<in" ra!!its, /o-ld not !e disposed to make '-ite the same mistakes. *hat /e shall need here, if this kind of research pro"ram is to help -s in -nderstandin" h-man !ein"s, is an effective notion of a fragment of h-man capacities. .here is no reason to think that there cannot !e s-ch a notion, !-t /e need more tho-"hts a!o-t ho/ it may /ork. the co"nitive science research pro"ram and the hopes that may !e reasona!ly entertained for it are a very different matter from the am!itions that some people entertain on the !asis of a metaphysics of the co"nitive science pro"ram, in partic-lar, that t he concepts of s-ch a science /ill event-ally replace, in serio-s and literal disco-rse, those of 1folk psycholo"y.1 .he main diffic-lty in assessin" this idea is that the !o-ndaries of 1folk psycholo"y: are va"-e. Sometimes it is taken to incl-de s-ch conceptions as Cartesian d-alism or the idea that the mental m-st !e immediately kno/n. .hese conceptions are indeed -nso-nd, !-t if yo- attend to /hat 1the folk1 re"-larly say and do rather than to /hat they may rehearse /hen asked theoretical '-estions, it is far from clear that they have these ocnceptions in their psycholo"y. )f they do, it does not need co"nitive science to remove them, !-t, if anythin", reflection, that is to say, philosophy. )n any case, the interestin" claims do not concern s-ch doctrines !-t rather the !asic materials of folk psycholo"y, notions s-ch as !elief, desire, intention, decisions, and action. .hese really are -sed !y the folk in -nderstandin" their o/n and other people4s psycholo"y. .hese, too, the metaphysicans of co"nitive science e+pect to !e replaced, in ed-cated tho-"ht, !y other, scientific, conceptions.GLH )n part, this stance may depend on conf-sin" t/o different '-estions, /hether a "iven concept !elon"s to a partic-lar science and /hether it can coe+ist /ith that science, as opposed to !ein" eliminated !y it. 19olf !all1 is not a concept of dynamics, !-t this is '-ite consistent /ith the tr-th that amon" the thin"s

to /hich dynamics applies are "olf !alls.G0H )t may !e said here that the sit-ation /ith concepts s-ch as "elief, desire, and intention is different, B 19 B !eca-se they, -nlike the concept of a "olf !all, have e+planatory am!itions, and folk psycholo"y, correspondin"ly, is in the same line of !-siness as the theory, call it co"nitive science, that /ill prod-ce more developed e+planations. B-t this is to pres-ppose that co"nitive science does not need s-ch concepts to characteri<e /hat it has to e+plain. @o science can eliminate /hat has to e+ist if there is to !e anythin" for it to e+plain: @e/ton4s theory of "ravitation co-ld not sho/ that there are no fallin" !odies or Marr4s theory of vision, that there is no s-ch thin" as vision. .he metaphysicians perhaps ass-me that there is a ne-tral item that co"nitive science and folk psycholo"y are alike in the !-siness of e+plainin", and that is !ehavior. B-t to s-ppose that there co-ld !e an ade'-ate sense of 1!ehavior1 that did not already involve concepts of folk psycholo"yCthe idea of an intention, in partic-larCis to fall !ack into a !asic error of !ehaviorism. Co"nitive science ri"htly prides itself on havin" left the errors of !ehaviorism !ehind: !-t that sho-ld mean not merely that it has "iven -p !lack !o+ theori<in" !-t, connectedly, that it reco"ni<es that the kinds of phenomena to !e e+plained cannot !e !ro-"ht to"ether !y p-rely nonpsycholo"ical criteria, as, for instance, classes of displacements of lim!s.G%H

Humanity and the Human S0ien0es

.he claim that /e are machines /as the claim, ) said earlier, that /e are each a machine, and this, as ) paraphrased it, entailed the idea that psycholo"y is ade'-ate for the -nderstandin" of h-man !ein"s. *hat ) have partic-larly in mind here relates to the m-chAdisc-ssed idea that for most p-rposes, at least, of e+plainin" /hat h-man !ein"s do, /e can adopt the post-re of /hat is called methodolo"ical solipsism and think of these creat-res, in principle, as each e+istin" /ith its o/n mental set-p, either alone or in relation to a physical environment not itself characteri<ed in terms of any h-man science. .his approach has !een critici<ed in any case for reasons in the theory of meanin".G9H My concern here, ho/ever, is not /ith those iss-es !-t /ith the point that to make sense of the individ-al4s psycholo"y, it may /ell !e necessary to descri!e the environment in terms that are the concern of other h-man sciences. )t may !e helpf-l, in this connection, to see ho/ the false conception of methodolo"ical solipsism differs from another idea, /hich is correct. .he correct idea is inoffensive to the point of triviality: ) la!el it 1formal individ-alism,1G1$H and it states that there are -ltimately no actions that are not the actions of individ-al a"ents. =ne may add to this the tr-th that the actions of an individ-al are e+plained in the first place !y the psycholo"y of that individ-al: in folk psycholo"ical terms, this means, for instance, B &$ B that to the e+tent those actions are intentional, they are e+plained in the first place !y the individ-al4s intentions. .he simple tr-ths of formal individ-alism are eno-"h to r-le some thin"s o-t. .hey imply, for instance, that if some str-ct-ral force !rin"s a!o-t res-lts in society, it m-st do so in /ays that iss-e in actions prod-ced !y the intentions of individ-als, tho-"h those intentions, of co-rse, /ill not ade'-ately e+press or represent those forces. )t also follo/s D-ns-rprisin"ly, ) hopeE that if 9ermany declared /ar, then some individ-als did thin"s that, in the partic-lar circ-mstances, constit-ted this happenin". B-t

none of this re'-ires that s-ch thin"s as 9ermany4s declarin" /ar are logically reduci"le to individ-al actions. D9ermany em!arked on /ar in 191F and a"ain in 19#9, !-t the types of individ-al action that occ-rred /ere different. (or one thin", 9ermany had different constit-tions in these years.E @or is it implied that the concepts that occ-r in individ-als4 intentions and in the descriptions of their actions can necessarily !e red-ced to individ-alist terms: in the co-rse of 9ermany4s declarin" /ar on some occasion, someone no do-!t acted in the ca#acity of chancellor , and there is no credi!le -npackin" of that conception in p-rely individ-alist terms. 2"ain, it is a matter not only of the content of a"ents4 intentions !-t of their ca-ses. Some of the intentions that a"ents have may /ell re'-ire e+planation in irred-ci!ly social terms. .h-s, some intentions of the person /ho is 9erman Chancell or /ill have to !e e+plained in terms of his !ein" 9erman Chancellor.G11H *hat is tr-e is that each action is e+plained, in the first place, !y an individ-al4s psycholo"y: /hat is not tr-e is that the individ-al4s psycholo"y is entirely e+plained !y psycholo"y. .here are h-man sciences other than psycholo"y, and there is not the sli"htest reason to s-ppose that one can -nderstand h-manity /itho-t them. ,o/ the h-man sciences are related to one anotherCindeed, /hat e+actly the h-man sciences areCis a m-chAdisc-ssed '-estion that ) shall not try to take -p. ) hope that if /e are a!le to take a correct approach to the /hole iss-e, this /ill make it less alarmin" than some o!vio-sly find it to accept that the h-man sciences sho-ld essentially deploy notions of intention and meanin" and that they sho-ld flo/ into and o-t of st-dies s-ch as history, philosophy, literary criticism, and the history of art /hich are la!eled 1the h-manities1 and perhaps are not called 1sciences1 at all. )f it is an etholo"ical tr-th that h-man !ein"s live -nder c-lt-re, and if that fact makes it intelli"i!le that they sho-ld live /ith ideas of the past and /ith increasin"ly comple+ conceptions of the ideas that they themselves have, then it is no ins-lt to the scientific spirit that a st-dy of them sho-ld re'-ire an insi"ht into those c-lt-res, into their prod-cts, and into their real and ima"ined histories. Some resistance to identifyin" the h-man sciences in s-ch tersmC B &1 B 1h-manistic1 terms, as /e mi"ht sayCcomes, no do-!t, simply from v-l"ar scientism and a ref-sal to accept the tr-th, at once po/erf-l and limitin", that there is no physics !-t physics. B-t there are other reasons as /ell, to !e fo-nd closer to the h-man sciences themselves. ) have s-""ested so far that !iolo"y, here as else/here, re'-ires etholo"y and that the etholo"y of the h-man involves the st-dy of h-man c-lt-res. ;ookin" in a different direction, ) have s-""ested that psycholo"y as co"nitive science, /hatever place of its o/n it may t-rn o-t to have, sho-ld not have -niversalist and a-tonomo-s aspirations. B-t there is a different kind of challen"e to the h-mane st-dy of h-manity, /hich comes from c-lt-ral st-dies themselves. ) cannot in this conte+t do m-ch more than mention it, !-t it sho-ld !e mentioned, since it raises real '-estions, sometimes takes the form of e+trava"antly deconstr-ctive am!itions, and often elicits -nhelpf-lly conservative defenses. .his challen"e is directed to the role of the h-manities no/. )t is !ased not on any scientific considerations, or on any "eneral characteristics of h-man life, !-t on certain feat-res of the modernC or perhaps, in one sense of that m-ltip-rpose e+pression, postmodernC/orld. .he claim is that this /orld is li!erated from, or at least floatin" free from, the past, and that in this /orld, history is kitsch . 2!ove all, it is a /orld in /hich partic-lar c-lt-ral formations are of declinin" importance and are !ecomin" o!3ects of an interest that is merely nostalo"ic or concerned /ith the pict-res'-eCthat is to say, a commercial interest. )f applied to -r need for historical -nderstandin", s-ch a vie/ is s-rely selfAdefeatin", !eca-se the ideas

of modernity and postmodernity are themselves historical cate"ories: they em!ody an interpretation of the past. .his /o-ld !e tr-e even if the conception of a "eneral modernity completely transcendin" local and c-lt-ral variation /ere correct. B-t it remains to !e seen /hether that conception is even correct: there is no reason at the moment, as ) -nderstand the sit-ation, to s-ppose that patterns of development are independent of history and c-lt-re: So-th 6orea and >ictorian 8n"land are !y no means the same place. B-t ho/ever that may !e, these are indisp-ta!ly matters for historical and c-lt-ral -nderstandin". *hat is more pro!lematic is o-r relation in the modern /orld to the literat-re and art of the past. =-r historical interest in itCo-r interest in it as, for instance, evidence of the pastCraises no special '-estion, !-t the st-dy of the h-manities has al/ays "one !eyond this, in enco-ra"in" and informin" an interest in certain /orks, picked o-t !oth !y their '-ality and their relation to a partic-lar tradition, as c-lt-ral o!3ects for -s, as formative of o-r e+perience. .here is o!vio-sly a "reat deal to !e said a!o-t this and a!o-t s-ch phenomena as the interest sho/n !y all developin" co-ntries in the canon of 8-ropean paintin" and m-sic. B && B Some of /hat needs to !e said is o!vio-sly ne"ative, and it is a real '-estion /hether certain famo-s art/orks can s-rviveCa fe/ of them physically, all of them aestheticallyCtheir international marketin". B-t the conversion of /orks of art into commodities is one thin", and their internationali<ation is another, even if the t/o thin"s have -p to no/ coincided, and /e simply do not yet kno/, as it seems to me, /hat depth of e+perience of ho/ m-ch of the art of the past /ill !e availa!le to the h-man race if its c-lt-ral diver"ences are in fact diminished. ,o/ever, it is /orth recallin" the n-m!er of c-lt-ral transitions that have already !een effected !y the /orks of the past in arrivin" even /here they no/ are in o-r conscio-sness. *hat /as there in classical anti'-ity itself, or in the comple+ history of its transmission and its infl-ence, that mi"ht have led -s to e+pect that as o!3ects of serio-s st-dy seven plays of Sophocles sho-ld no/ !e alive and /ell and livin" in CaliforniaK 1,-manity1 is, of co-rse, a name not merely for a species !-t for a '-ality, and it may !e that the deepest contemporary reasons for distr-stin" a h-manistic acco-nt of the h-man sciences are associated /ith a distr-st of that '-ality, /ith despair for its prospects, or, '-ite often, /ith a hatred of it. Some le"atees of the -niversalistic tendencies of the 8nli"htenment lack an interest in any specific c-lt-ral formation or other typically h-man e+pression and at the limit -r"e -s to rise a!ove the local preocc-pations of 1speciesism.1 =thers, /ithin the areas of h-man c-lt-re, have emphasi<ed the role of str-ct-ral forces to a point at /hich h-man !ein"s disappear from the scene. .here are other /ellA kno/n tendencies /ith similar effects. B-t the more that c-lt-ral diversity /ithin the h-man race declines, and the more the /orld as a /hole is shaped !y str-ct-res characteristic of modernity, the more /e need not to for"et !-t to remind o-rselves /hat a h-man life is, has !een, can !e. .his re'-ires a proper -nderstandin" of the h-man sciences, and that re'-ires -s to take serio-sly h-manity, in !oth senses of the term. )t also helps -s to do so.

$"RT ONE2 HUM"NS "N- "NIM"#S

B &0 B

One2 Introdu0tion
James J. Sheehan )n 1%1$, *illiam Blake painted a pict-re that came to !e kno/n as Adam $aming the Beasts . Blake4s portrait of the first man reminds -s of a By<antine icon of Christ: calm, massive, and immo!ile, 2dam dominates the science. =ne of his arms is raised in an ancient "est-re si"nifyin" speech, /hile aro-nd the other a serpent meekly coils. )n the !ack"ro-nd, animals move in an orderly, peacef-l file. =f co-rse, /e kno/ the harmony depicted here /ill not last. Soon 2dam and his pro"eny /ill lose their serence place in nat-re: no lon"er /ill they !e comforta!le in their soverei"nty over animals or sec-re in the -n'-estioned po/er of their speech. =-r kno/led"e of /hat is comin" "ives !lake4s pict-re is special, melancholy po/er.G1H Since the (all, man4s place in nat-re has al/ays !een pro!lematic. .he pro!lems !e"in /ith 9enesis itself, /here the story of creation is told t/ice. )n the second chapter, the so-rce of Blake4s pict-re, 9od creates 2dam and then all other livin" thin"s, /hich are presented to man 1to see /hat he /o-ld call them: and /hatsoever 2dam called every livin" creat-re, that /as the name thereof,1 .he first chapter, ho/ever, has a some/hat different version of these events. ,ere man is the last rather than the first creat-re to !e made: /hile still s-perior to the rest !y his special relationship to 9od, man nevertheless appears as part of a lar"er nat-ral order. 2 similar am!i"-ity can !e fo-nd in Chapter @ine, /hich !e"ins /ith a divine promise to @oah that all !ein"s /ill fear him !-t then "oes on to descri!e a covenant !et/een 9od and @oah and 1every livin" creat-re of all flesh.1 (rom the very start of the J-deoAChristian tradition, therefore, h-manity is at once set apart from, and 3oined /ith, the realm of other livin" thin"s.G&H )n 9reek cosmolo"y, h-manity4s relationship to animals /as yet more B &% B -ncertain. ;ike the ,e!re/s, the 9reeks seemed ea"er to esta!lish h-man he"emony over nat-re. 2nimals sacrifice, /hich /as so central to 9reek reli"ion, rit-ally affirmed the distinctions !et/een h-mans and !easts, 3-st as it so-"ht to esta!lish connections !et/een the h-man and divine. 2ristotle, the first "reat !iolo"ist to spec-late a!o-t h-man nat-re, developed an ela!orate hierarchy of livin" !ein"s, in /hich all creat-resC!e"innin" /ith h-man femalesC/ere defined on a slidin" scale that !e"an /ith ad-lt males. B-t the line !et/een h-manity and its !iolo"ical nei"h!ors /as more permea!le for 9reeks than for ,e!re/s. 9ods fre'-ently took on animals form, /hich allo/ed them to move a!o-t the /orld in dis"-ise. 2s p-nishment, h-mans co-ld !e t-rned into !easts. Moreover, a fi"-re like ,eracles, /ho /as h-man !-t /ith s-pernat-ral connections, e+pressed his association /ith animals !y /earin" skins on his !ody and a lion4s head a!ove his o/n. 2nd if animal sacrifice set h-mans and animals apart, there /ere other rit-als that seemed to !l-r the distinction !et/een them. 5ionys-s4s Maenads, for instance, lived /ild and free, cons-med ra/ flesh, and kne/ no se+-al restraint. By !ecomin" like !easts, the Maenads achieved a 1divine deliri-m1 and th-s direct contact /ith the "ods.G#H Christians sa/ nothin" "odlike in actin" like a !east. .o them, the devil often appeared in animal form, a dia!olic !east or, as 2rnold 5avidson points o-t, in some terri!le mi+ of species. Bestiality, se+-al

trans"ression across the species !arrier, /as officially re"arded as the /orst sin a"ainst nat-re: it remained a capital crime in 8n"land -ntil the second half of the nineteenth cent-ry. ,-manity4s proper relationship to animals /as that of master: !easts e+isted to serve h-man needs. 1Since !easts lack reason,1 Saint 2-"-stine ta-"ht, 1/e need not concern o-rselves /ith their s-fferin"s,1 an opinion echoed !y an 2n"lican !ishop in the seventeenth cent-ry /ho declared, 1*e may p-t them GanimalsH to any kind of death that the necessity either of o-r food or physic /ill re'-ire.1 8ven those /ho took a softer vie/ of h-manity4s relationship /ith animals !elieved that o-r he"emony over the /orld reflected o-r special ties to the creator. 1Man not only r-les the animals !y force,1 the 7enaissance philosopher, (icino, /rote, 1he also "overns, keeps and teaches them. Universal providence !elon"s to 9od, /ho is the -niversal ca-se. ,ence man /ho "enerally provides for all thin"s, !oth livin" and lifeless, is a kind of 9od.1GFH 2ltho-"h set apart from the rest of creation !y their privile"ed relationship /ith 9od, many Christians felt a special kinship to animals. 2s 6eith .homas sho/s in his splendid st-dy, Man and the $atural %orkd, so close /ere the ties of people to the animals amon" /hom they lived that often 1domestic !easts /ere s-!sidiary mem!ers of the h-man comm-nity.1 @o less important than these pressin" sympathies of everyday interA B &9 B dependence /ere the /ei"ht of c-lt-ral ha!it and the persistent po/er of halfAfor"otten !eliefs. Until /ell into the ei"hteenth cent-ry, many (-ropeans vie/ed the /orld anthropomorphically, imposin" on animals h-man traits and emotions, holdin" them responsi!le for their 1crimes,1 admirin" them for their alle"ed e+pressions of pio-s sentiment. 2ltho-"h condemned !y the orthodo+ and ridic-led !y sec-lar intellect-als, !elief in the spirit-ality of animals persisted. 2s late as the 100$s, an 8n"lish cler"yman co-ld /rite, 1) firmly !elieve that !easts have so-ls: so-ls tr-ly and properly soAcalled.1GJH By the end of the ei"hteenth cent-ry, s-ch convictions /ere s-rely e+ceptional amon" ed-cated men and /omen. .he e+pansion of scientific kno/led"e since the 7enaissance had helped to prod-ce a vie/ of the /orld in /hich there seemed to !e little room for animal so-ls. .he "reat classification schemes of the late seventeenth and ei"hteenth cent-ries enco-ra"ed rational, sec-lar, and scientific conceptions of the nat-ral order. 2s a res-lt, the anthropomorphic attit-des that had invested animalsC and even plantsC/ith h-man characteristics "rad-ally receded: nat-re /as no/ seen as somethin" apart from h-man affairs, a realm to !e st-died and mastered /ith the instr-ments of science. ,ere is .homas4s concise s-mmary of this process: )n place of a nat-ral /orld redolent /ith h-man analo"y and sym!olic meanin", and sensitive to man4s !ehavior, they Gthe nat-ral scientistsH constr-cted a detached nat-ral scene to !e vie/ed and st-died !y the o!server from the o-tside, as if !y peerin" thro-"h a /indo/, in the sec-re kno/led"e that the o!3ects of contemplation inha!ited a separate realm, offerin" no omens or si"ns, /itho-t h-man meanin" or si"nificance.GLH *ithin this ne/ /orld, h-mans4 claims to he"emony /ere !ased on their o/n rational fac-lties rather than divine dispensation. 7eason !ecame the 3-stification as /ell as the means of h-manity4s mastery. Beca-se they lack reason, 5escartes ar"-ed, animals /ere like machines, /itho-t so-ls, intelli"ence, or feelin". 2nimals do not act independently, 1it is nat-re that acts in them accordin" to the arran"ement of their or"ans, 3-st as /e see ho/ a clock, composed merely of /heels and sprin"s, can reckon the ho-rs.1 7o-ssea- a"reed. 8very animal, he /rote in A Discourse on &ne'uality, /as 1only an in"enio-s machine to /hich nat-re has "iven sense in order to keep itself in motion and protect itself.1 ,-mans are not in thrall to their instincts and senses: -nlike !easts, /hen nat-re commands, h-mans need not

o!ey. (ree /ill, intellect, and a!ove all, the command of lan"-a"e "ives people the a!ility to choose, create, and comm-nicate.G0H @ot every ei"hteenthAcent-ry thinker /as s-re that h-manity4s -n'-estioned -ni'-eness had s-rvived the sec-lari<ation of the nat-ral B #$ B order. ;ord Bolin"!roke, for e+ample, still re"arded man as 1the principal inha!itant of this planet1 !-t ca-tioned a"ainst makin" too m-ch of h-manity4s special stat-s. Man is connected !y his nat-re, and therefore, !y the desi"n of the 2-thor of all @at-re, /ith the /hole tri!e of animals, and so closely /ith some of them, that the distance !et/een his intellect-al fac-lties and theirs, /hich constit-tes as really, tho-"h not so sensi!ly as fi"-re, the difference of species, appears, in many instances, small, and /o-ld pro!a!ly appear still less, if /e had the means of kno/in" their motives, as /e have of o!servin" their actions. *hen 2le+ander Pope p-t these ideas into verse, he added that the sin of pride that !ro-"ht 2dam4s fall came not from his approachin" too close to 9od !-t rather from dra/in" too far a/ay from other livin" thin"s: Pride then /as not, nor arts that pride to aid: Man /alk4d /ith !east, 3oint tenants of the shade: 2nd it /as Pope /ho !est e+pressed the lin"erin" an+iety that m-st attend h-manity4s position !et/een "ods and !easts: Plac4d in this isthm-s of a middle state, 2 !ein" darkly /ise and r-dely "reat, *ith too m-ch kno/led"e for the sceptic side, *ith too m-ch /eakness for the stoic pride, ,e han"s !et/een: in do-!t to act or rest: )n do-!t to deem himself a "ood or !east: )n do-!t his Mind or Body to prefer: Born !-t to die, and reas4nin" !-t or err. . . . Chaos of .ho-"ht and Passion all conf-s4d, Still !y himself a!-s4d, or disa!-s4d: Created half to rise, and half to fall, 9reat lord of all thin"s, yet a prey to all: Sole 3-d"e of .r-th, in endless error h-rl4d: .he "lory, 3est, and riddle of the /orld.G%H )n the second half of the ei"hteenth cent-ry, /hat Pope had once called the 1vast chain of !ein"1 !e"an to !e seen as dynamic rather than static, or"anic rather than mechanistic. .he nat-ral order no/ seemed to !e the prod-ct of a sosmic evol-tion that, as 6ant /rote in 10JJ, 1is never finished or complete.1 .his meant that everythin" in the -niverseCfrom species of plants and animals to the str-ct-re of distant "ala+ies and the earth4s s-rfaceC/as prod-ced !y and s-!3ect to po/erf-l forces of chan"e. By the early nineteenth cent-ry, scientists had B #1 B

!e"-n to e+amine this evol-tonary process in a systematic fashion. )n 1%$9, Jean Baptiste de ;amarck p-!lished (hiloso#hie )oologi'ue, /hich set forth a comple+ theory to e+plain the transformation of species over time. Charles ;yell, /hose (rinci#les of *eology !e"an to appear in 1%#$, do-!ted !iolo"ical evol-tion !-t offered a compellin" acco-nt of the earth4s chan"in" character thro-"h the lon" corridors of "eolo"ic time. .h-s /as the sta"e set for the arrival of 5ar/in4s +rigin of S#ecies, !y far the most famo-s and infl-ential of all renditions of 1temporali<ed chains of !ein".1 *ith this !ook, 5ar/in provides the !asis for o-r vie/ of the nat-ral order and th-s links ei"hteenthAcent-ry cosmolo"y and t/entiethAcent-ry evol-tionary !iolo"y.G9H 8ven !efore 5ar/in form-lated his theory of nat-ral selection, he seems to have sensed this his scientific o!servations /o-ld have po/erf-l implications for the relationship !et/een h-mans and animals. )n a note!ook entry of 1%#0, 5ar/in first sketched /hat /o-ld !eocme a central theme in his life4s /ork: )f /e choose to let con3ect-re r-n /ild, then animals, o-r fello/ !rethren in pain, diseases, death, s-fferin" and famineCo-r slaves in the most la!orio-s /orks, o-r companions in o-r am-sementsCthey may partake GofH o-r ori"ins in one common ancestorC/e may !e all netted to"ether. *hen he p-!lished +rigin of S#ecies t/entyAt/o years later, he approached the matter delicately and indirectly: 1it does not seem incredi!le1 that animals and plants developed from lo/er forms, 1and if /e admit this, /e m-st like/ise admit that all the or"anic !ein"s /hich have ever lived on this earth may !e descended from some one primordial form.1 )n any event, he promised that in f-t-re research inspired !y the theory of nat-ral selection, 1m-ch li"ht /ill !e thro/n on the ori"in of man and his history.1G1$H .he meanin" of 5ar/inism for h-man history '-ickly moved to the center of the controversies that follo/ed the p-!lication of +rigin . )n 1%L#, .. ,. ,-+ley, for e+ample, prod-ced Man,s (lace in $ature . 5ar/in himself t-rned to the evol-ton of h-manity in The Descent of Man, /here he set o-t to demonstrate that 1there is no f-ndamental difference !et/een man and the hi"her mammals in their mental fac-lties.1 8ach of those characteristics once tho-"ht to !e -ni'-ely h-man t-rn o-t to !e shared !y hi"her animals, al!eit in lesser de"rees: animals cannot speak, !-t they do comm-nicate: they are intellect-ally inferior to h-mans, !-t they 1possess some po/er of reasonin"1: they cannot /ork as /e do, !-t they can even -se tools in a r-dimentary /ay. 5ar/in4s disc-ssion of animal selfAconscio-sness is /orth '-otin" at len"th, not simply !eca-se it conveys the flavor of his ar"-ment !-t also !eca-se it ill-strates the B #& B ease /ith /hich he slipped from talkin" a!o-t differences !et/een h-mans and animals to descri!in" differences !et/een 1races1 of men. )t may !e freely admitted that no animal is selfAconscio-s, if !y this term it is implied that he reflects on s-ch points, as /hence he comes or /hither he /ill "o, or /hat is life and death, and so forth. B-t ho/ can /e feel s-re that an old do" /ith e+cellent memory and some po/er of ima"ination, as she/n !y his dreams, never reflects on his past pleas-res and pains in the chaseK 2nd this /o-ld !e a form of selfAconscio-sness. =n the other hand, as BMchner has remarked, ho/ little can the hardA/orked /ife of a de"raded 2-stralian sava"e, /ho -ses very fe/ a!stract /ords, and cannot co-nt a!ove fo-r, e+ert her selfA conscio-sness, or reflect on the nat-re of her o/n e+istence. 5ar/in carried on his e+amination of h-mans and animals in The -.#ression of the -motions in Man

and Animals. ,ere he seeks to demonstrate that !asic emotions have common ori"ins and a !iolo"ical !ase !y pointin" o-t the similarity of emotional e+pressions amon" h-man societies and !et/een h-mans and animals. ;ike reason, lan"-a"e, and conscio-sness, emotions s-ch as love, fear, and shame are not the sole and -ndisp-ted property of h-manity.G11H .he research pro"ram s-""ested in this /ork on h-man and animal emotions /as not immediately taken -p !y 5ar/in4s many disciples. .here /ere, to !e s-re, many /ho so-"ht to apply 5ar/inism to h-man society, !-t they -s-ally did so /itho-t a systematic e+amination of the resem!lances !et/een h-man and animal !ehavior. .o social scientists infl-enced !y 5ar/in, /hat mattered /as less that people /ere animals than that they /ere stillCin ,arriet 7itvo4s phraseC1the top animals,1 separated from the rest !y /hat 5a//in himself had called man4s 1no!le '-alities1 and 1"odlike intellect.1 Most of the nat-ral scientists /ho follo/ed 5ar/in t-rned in the opposite direction, a/ay from h-mans to/ard other species /ith lon"er evol-tionary histories and more accessi!le !iolo"ical str-ct-res. 2s a res-lt, empirical /ork on the connection !et/een h-man and animal !ehavior, so central to 5ar/in4s /ork on emotions, did not !ecome an important part of his le"acy -ntil the second half of the t/entieth cent-ry.G1&H .he direct heirs of 5ar/in4s research on h-man and animal emotion /ere scientists /ho st-died !ehavioral !iolo"y, the discipline that /o-ld come to !e called etholo"y. 2ltho-"h important research on etholo"y had !een cond-cted d-rin" the 19&$s and 19#$s, the s-!3ect did not !ecome prominent -ntil the 19L$s: in 190#, three leadin" etholo"ists shared the @o!el Pri<e. .he ne/ interest in etholo"y enco-ra"ed the p-!lication of a variety of /orks of '-ite -neven '-ality, !-t all shared the conviction that st-dyin" the similarity of !ehavior e+istin" across B ## B animal species co-ld yield important insi"hts into the character of h-man individ-als and "ro-ps. (or e+ample, 6onrad ;oren<, a pioneer in the field and one of the @o!el la-reates, maintained that, in !oth man and animals, a""ressive !ehavior /as instinct-al. 1;ike the tri-mph ceremony of the "reyla" "oose, militant enth-siasm in man is a tr-e a-tonomo-s instinct: )t has its o/n releasin" mechanisms, and like the se+-al -r"e or any other stron" instinct, it en"enders a specific feelin" of intense satisfaction.1 S-ch deeply rooted instincts, ethnolo"ists /arned, /ill inevita!ly pose pro!lems for, and set limits on, h-mans4 a!ility to control themselves and their societies.G1#H By the 190$s, pop-lar and scientific interest in ethnolo"y had !ecome enmeshed /ith a lar"er and more am!itio-s set of ideas and research enterprises conventinally called socio!iolo"y. 8d/ard =. *ilson, perhaps socio!iolo"y4s most vi"oro-s e+ponent, descri!es it as the 1scientific st-dy of the !iolo"ical !asis of all forms of social !ehavior in all kinds of or"anisms, incl-din" man.1 *ilson !e"an to define his vie/ of the field in the concl-din" chapter of The &nsect Societies D1901E, /hich called for the application of his /ork on the pop-lation !iolo"y and <oolo"y of insects to verte!rate animals. (o-r years later, he concl-ded Socio"iology: The $e/ Synthesis /ith a chapter entitled 1Man: (rom Socio!iolo"y to sociolo"y.1 .his /as follo/ed in 190% /ith the more pop-larly /ritten +h Human $ature, /hich e+amined /hat *ilson re"arded as 1fo-r of the elemental cate"ories of !ehavior, a""ression, se+, altr-ism, and reli"ion,1 from a socio!iolo"ical perspective. *ilson !ro-"ht an ethnolo"ist4s !road kno/led"e of animal !ehavior to these s-!3ects !-t added his o/n "ro/in" concern for the "enetic !asis of instincts and adaptations. .his "enetic dimension has !ecome increasin"ly important in *ilson4s most recent /ork.G1FH Socio!iolo"y in "eneral and *ilson in partic-lar have !een the s-!3ect of intense attacks from a variety of directions. )n the co-rse of these controversies, the term has tended to !ecome a catchall for a variety

of different developments in !ehavioral !iolo"y. ;ike many other controversial movements, socio!iolo"y often seems more solid and coherent to its opponents, /ho can easily define /hat they oppose, than to its advocates, /ho have some tro-!le a"reein" on /hat they have in common. )t is /orth notin", for e+ample, that Melvin 6onner, /hile sympathetic to *ilson in many /ays, e+plicitly denies tht his o/n /ork, The Tangled %ing D19%&E, is socio!iolo"y. B-t /hat 6onner and the socio!iolo"ists do share is the !elief that most st-dies of h-man !ein"s have !een too 1anthropocentric.1 )f, as *ilson and others claim, 1homo sapiens is a conventional animal species,1 then there is m-ch to !e learned !y vie/in" the h-man e+perience as part of a !roader !iolo"ical contin--m. 5oin" so /ill help -s to -nderstand /hat 5ar/in, in the dark passa"e at B #F B the end of The Descent of Man, referred to as 1the indeli!le stamp of his lo/ly ori"in1 /hich man still carries in his !ody and /hat 6onner, in a contemporary version of the same ar"-ment, calls the 1!iolo"ical constraints on the h-man spirit.1G1JH *e /ill ret-rn to some of the '-estions raised !y socio!iolo"y in the concl-sion to this vol-me. (or the moment, it is eno-"h to point o-t that the conflicts s-rro-ndin" itCill-strated !y the /orks of 6onner and 5-pr? in the follo/in" sectionCare ne/ versions of ancient controversies. .hese controversies, /hile informed !y o-r e+pandn" kno/led"e of the nat-ral /orld and e+pressed in the idiom of o-r scientific c-lt-re, have at thier core o-r persistent need to define /hat it means to !e h-man, a need that leads -s, 3-st as it led the a-thors of 9ene+is, to confront o-r kinship /ith and differences from animals.

T3o2 The Horror of Monsters4

"rno*d I. -a)idson 2s late as 19F1, ;-cien (e!vre, the "reat (rench historian, co-ld complain that there /as no history of love, pity, cr-elty, or 3oy. ,e called for 1a vast collective investi"ation to !e opened on the f-ndamental sentiments of man and the forms they take.1G1H 2ltho-"h (e!vre did not e+plicitly invoke horror amon" the sentiments to !e investi"ated, a history of horror can, as ) hope to sho/, f-nction as an irred-ci!le reso-rce in -ncoverin" o-r forms of s-!3ectivity.G&H Moreover, /hen horror is co-pled to monsters, /e have the opport-nity to st-dy systems of tho-"ht that are concerned /ith the relation !et/een the orders of morality and of nat-re. ) /ill concentrate here on those monsters that seem to call into '-estion, to pro!lemati<e, the !o-ndary !et/een h-mans and other animals. )n some historical periods, it /as precisely this !o-ndary that, -nder certain specific conditions that ) shall descri!e, operated as one ma3or loc-s of the e+perience of horror. =-r horror at certain kinds of monsters reflects !ack to -s a horror at, or of, h-manity, so that o-r horror of monsters can provide !oth a history of h-man /ill and s-!3ectivity and ahistory of scientific classifications. .he history of horror, like the history of other emotions, raises e+traordinarily diffic-lt philosophical iss-es. *hen (e!vre4s call /as ans/ered, mainly !y his (rench collea"-es /ho practiced the soAcalled history of mentalities, historians '-ickly reco"ni<ed that a host of historio"raphical and methodolo"ical pro!lems /o-ld have to !e faced. @o one has faced these pro!lems more directly, and /ith more profo-nd res-lts, than Jean 5el-mea- in his mon-mental t/oAvol-me history of fear.G#H B-t these are iss-es to /hich /e m-st contin-ally ret-rn. *hat /ill !e re'-ired to /rite the history of an emotion, a

form of sensi!ility, or type of affectivity, 2ny s-ch history /o-ld re'-ire an investi"ation of B #0 B "est-res, ima"es, attit-des, !eliefs, lan"-a"e, val-es, and concepts. (-rthermore, the pro!lem '-ickly arose as to ho/ one sho-ld -nderstand the relationship !et/een elite and pop-lar c-lt-re, ho/, for e+ample, the concepts and lan"-a"e of an elite /o-ld come to !e appropriated and transformed !y a collective mentality.GFH .his pro!lem is especially ac-te for the horror of monsters, since so many of the concepts ) disc-ss /hich are ncessary to o-t -nderstandin" of monsters come from hi"h c-lt-reC scientific, philosophical, and theolo"ical te+ts. .o /hat e+tent is the e+perience of horror, /hen e+pressed in a collective mentality, "iven from !y these conceptsK *itho-t even attemptin" to ans/er these '-estions here, ) /ant to insist that a history of horror, at !oth the level of elite concepts and collective mentality, m-st emphasi<e the f-ndamental role of description. *e m-st descri!e, in m-ch more detail than is -s-ally done, the concepts, attit-des, and val-es re'-ired !y and manifested in the reaction of horror. 2nd it is not eno-"h to descri!e these components piecemeal: /e m-st attempt to retrieve their coherence, to sit-ate them in the str-ct-res of /hich they are a part.GJH 2t the level of concepts, this demand re'-ires that /e reconstr-ct the r-les that "overn the relationships !et/een concepts: th-s, /e /ill !e a!le to discern the hi"hly str-ct-red, r-leA"overned concept-al spaces that are overlooked if concepts are e+amined only one at a time.GLH 2t the level of mentality, /e are re'-ired to place each attit-de, !elief, and emotion in the conte+t of the specific collective conscio-sness of /hich it forms part.G0H 2t !oth levels, /e /ill have to "o !eyond /hat is said or e+pressed in order to recover the concept-al spaces and mental e'-ipment /itho-t /hich the historical te+ts /ill lose their real si"nificance. )n 1J&#, Martin ;-ther and Phillip Melancthon p-!lished a pamphlet entitled Deuttung der c)/o gre/lichen 0iguren, Ba#stesels c)u 1om und Munchkal"s c)u 0reyer"eg i2nn Meyss)en funden .G%H )t /as enormo-sly infl-ential and /as translated into (rench, /ith Calvin4s endorsement, in 1JJ0, and into 8n"lish in 1J09 -nder the title +f t/o /onderful #o#ish monsters . .he pamphlet consisted of a detailed interpretation of t/o monsters: a popeAass, disc-ssed mainly !y Melancthon, s-pposedly left on the !anks of the .i!er 7iver in 1F9L, and a monkAcalf, interpreted !y ;-ther, that /as !orn on 5ecem!er %, 1J&&, in (rei!-r" Dfi"s. &.1, &.&E. Both of these monsters /ere interpreted /ithin the conte+t of a polemic a"ainst the 7oman ch-rch. .hey /ere prodi"ies, si"ns of 9od4s /rath a"ainst the Ch-rch /hich prophesied its imminent r-in. .here /ere t/o dimensions to the ;-theran e+e"esis of these monsters.G9H =n the one hand, there is a prophetic or eschatolo"ical dimension, only diffidently mentioned in this pamphlet, in /hich monsters and prodi"ies, as a "eneral phenomenon, /ere taken to !e si"ns of f-ndamental chan"es a!o-t to B #% B

(i". &.1. .he PopeA2ss. affect the /orld. =ften these si"ns /ere interpreted as nothin" less than an anno-ncement that the end of the /orld /as at hand, and s-pport for this prophetic interpretation /as add-ced !y citin" the Book of 5aniel, a !i!lical te+t invokec !y !oth Melancthon and ;-ther. .he other dimension, /hich, follo/in" Jean C?ard, /e can call alle"orical, is the one /ith /hich this pamphlet is most preocc-pied.

.he alle"orical e+e"esis of these monsters is intended to sho/ that each monster has a very specific B #9 B

(i". &.&. .he MonkACalf. interpretation that can !e "rasped !eca-se, in one /ay or another, it is represented !efore o-r eyes in the constit-tion of the monster itself: each monster is a divine hiero"lyphic, e+hi!itin" a partic-lar feat-re of 9od4s /rath. So, for instance, the popeAass, accordin" to Melancthon, is the ima"e of the Ch-rch of 7ome: and 3-st as it is a/f-l that a h-man !ody sho-ld have the head of an ass, so it is like/ise horri!le that the Bishop of 7ome sho-ld !e the head of the Ch-rch. Similarly, the overly B F$ B lar"e ears of the calfAmonk e+hi!it 9od4s deno-ncement of the practice of hearin" confessions, so important to the monks, /hile the han"in" ton"-e sho/s that their doctrine is nothin" !-t frivolo-s prattle. 2 -sef-l st-dy co-ld !e made of the ad3ectives that appear in this te+t: in lie- of s-ch a st-dy, let me 3-st note that 1horri!le1 and 1a!omina!le1 occ-r fre'-ently in !oth ;-ther4s and Melancthon4s disc-ssions, often modifyin" 1monster.1 .he mood of these ad3ectives is acc-rately conveyed in the translator4s introd-ction to the 1J09 8n"lish translation of the te+t. )t !e"ins: 2mon" all the thin"s that are to !e seen -nder the heavens D"ood Christian readerE there is nothin" can stir -p the mind of man, and /hich can en"ender more fear -nto the creat-res than the horri!le monsters, /hich are !ro-"ht forth daily contrary to the /orks of @at-re. .he /hich the most times do note and demonstrate -nto -s the ire and /rath of 9od a"ainst -s for o-r sins and /ickedness, that /e have and do daily commit a"ainst him.G1$H John Brooke "oes on to tell -s that his motive for translatin" this pamphlet is the !etter 1to move the hearts of every "ood Christian to fear and trem!le at the si"ht of s-ch prodi"io-s monsters,1G11H and he /arns his readers not to interpret these t/o monsters as if they /ere !-t fa!les. ,e closes his preface /ith the hope that, after readin" this pamphlet, /e shall 1repent in time from the !ottom of o-r hearts of o-r sins, and desire him G9odH to !e mercif-l -nto -s, and ever to keep and defend -s from s-ch horri!le monsters.1G1&H ,e concl-des /ith a fe/ more specific remarks a!o-t the popeAass and calfA monk addressed, and /e shall not overlook the form of the address, 1-nto all /hich fear the ;ord.1 )n order to !etter -nderstand the preocc-pation and fascination /ith monsters d-rin" the si+teenth cent-ry, a fascination fastened onto !y ;-ther and Melancthon, /hose te+t is f-lly representative of an entire "enre, /e m-st place these disc-ssions /ithin a /ider conte+t. 2s Jean 5el-mea- has ar"-ed in the second vol-me of his history of fear, it is /ithin 1the frame/ork of a "lo!al pessimistic 3-d"ment on a time of e+treme /ickedness that one m-st place the copio-s literat-re dedicated to monsters and prodi"ies !et/een the end of the fifteenth cent-ry and the !e"innin" of the seventeenth.1G1#H Sinf-lness /as so "reat that the sins of men e+tended to nat-re itself /hich, /ith 9od4s permission and for the instr-ction of sinners, seemed to have !een sei<ed !y a stran"e madness: the res-ltin" monsters /ere to !e -nderstood as ill-strations of these sins. ,eresy and monsters /ere fre'-ently linked d-rin" this period, !oth !y reformers and Catholics alike. Prodi"ies /ere not only specific p-nishments for

partic-lar sins !-t they also anno-nced "reater p-nishments to comeC/ar, famine, and perhaps even the end of the B F1 B /orld. .his proliferation of monsters presa"ed a dark f-t-re e+plained !y 9od4s /rath at the increase of /ickedness on earth.G1FH (ranNais Belleforest s-mmari<ed the shared sensi!ility: 1.he present time is more monstro-s than nat-ral.1G1JH .o make as clear as possi!le the relationship !et/een horror and monsters, ) am "oin" to foc-s primarily on one te+t, 2m!roise Par?4s Des monstres et #rodiges, ori"inally p-!lished in 1J0# and fre'-ently reprinted after that.G1LH Since ) am "oin" to set the concept-al conte+t for my disc-ssion of Par? in a rather -nconventional /ay, ) /ant to state e+plicitly that a f-ll comprehension of this treatise re'-ires that it !e placed in relation to other learned and pop-lar treatises on monsters that !oth preceded and follo/ed it. *e are fort-nate in this respect to have C?ard4s thoro-"h treatment of Par? in his !rilliant 3a $ature et les #rodiges and in the notes to his critical edition of Des monstres et #rodiges4G10H moreover, in the !est 8n"lishAlan"-a"e treatment of monsters, 6atharine Park and ;orraine 5aston have provided a threeAsta"e periodi<ationCmonsters as divine prodi"ies, as nat-ral /onders, and as medical e+amples for comparative anatomy and em!ryolo"yCthat is indispensa!le in helpin" -s to -nderstand shifts in the concept-ali<ation and treatment of monsters from the Middle 2"es to the ei"hteenth cent-ry.G1%H 7ather than s-mmari<in" the /ork of these scholars, ) am "oin" to t-rn to a different kind of te+t to prepare my disc-ssion of Par?, namely, .homas 2'-inas4s Summa Theologica . 2'-inas4s Summa is not only the "reatest /ork of "eni-s prod-ced !y medieval moral theolo"y !-t also a profo-nd synthesis of previo-s /ork, coherently connectin" doctrines, ideas, and ar"-ments /hose relationships had never !een made very clear: moreover, the Summa also made concept-ally determinate notions that had had a deep and /ideAran"in" si"nificance in the Middle 2"es !-t that had not really !een approached /ith s-fficient analytical precision. ) am "oin" to -se one portion of the Summa as representative of medieval attit-des, attit-des that have lasted, in one form or another, for many s-!se'-ent cent-ries. ) shall not address the '-estion of the Summa 4s ori"inality in this area: s-ffice it to say that ) !elieve that this is one place in /hich 2'-inas "ave a concept-ally po/erf-l form-lation to a set of dieas that had !een essential, even if not very precise, to most of medieval moral theolo"y. Part )) of Part )), O-estions 1# and 1JF, of the Summa Theologica deal /ith l-st and the parts of l-st, respectively. 2'-inas !e"ins, in 2rticle & of O-estion 1JF, !y considerin" the '-estion of /hether the venereal act can !e /itho-t sin. ,e ar"-es as follo/s: if the dictate of reason makes -se of certain thin"s in a fittin" manner and order for the end to /hich they are adapted, and if this end is tr-ly "ood, then the -se of these thin"s in s-ch a fittin" manner and order /ill not !e a sin. @o/ the B F& B preservation of the !odily nat-re of an individ-al is a tr-e "ood, and the -se of food is directed to the preservation of life in the individ-al. Similarly, the preservation of the nat-re of the h-man species is a very "reat "ood, and the -se of the venereal act is directed to the preservation of the /hole h-man race. .herefore, 2'-inas concl-des, /herefore 3-st as the -se of food can !e /itho-t sin, if it !e taken in d-e manner and order, as re'-ired for the /elfare of the !ody, so also the -se of venereal acts can !e /itho-t sin,

provided they !e performed in d-e manner and order, in keepin" /ith the end of h-man procreation.G19H ,e proceeds in the first article of O-estion 1JF to differentiate si+ species of l-stCsimple fornication, ad-ltery, incest, sed-ction, rape, and the vice contrary to nat-reCall of /hich are disc-ssed in the remainin" articles. My concern is /ith the vices contrary to nat-re, /hich are disc-ssed in 2rticles 11 and 1&. )n 2rticle 11, he ar"-es that this type of vice is a distinct species of l-st, since it involves a special kind of deformity: vices contrary to nat-re are not only contrary to ri"ht reason, as are all the l-stf-l vices, !-t are also 1contrary to the nat-ral order of the venereal act as !ecomin" to the h-man race,1 /hich order has as its end the "eneration of children.G&$H 2'-inas distin"-ishes fo-r cate"ories of vice contrary to nat-reC!estiality, sodomy, /hich he interprets as male male or female female cop-lation, the sin of selfAa!-se, and not o!servin" the nat-ral manner of cop-lation. )t is diffic-lt to determine e+actly /hat falls -nder this last cate"ory, !-t it is clear from ))A)), O-estion 1JF, 2rticle 1&, 7eply to =!3ection F, that male female anal and oral cop-lation are t/o of the most "rievo-s /ays of not o!servin" the ri"ht manner of cop-lation. )n 2rticle 1&, 2'-inas rankAorders, from /orst to least /orst, all of the l-stf-l vices. ,e claims, first, that all fo-r cate"ories of vice contrary to nat-re are /orse than any of the other vices of l-st. So that !estiality, sodomy, not o!servin" the nat-ral manner of cop-lation, and selfAa!-se are /orse, !eca-se of their special deformity, than ad-ltery, rape of a vir"in, incest, and so on.G&1H >ices contrary to nat-re are /orse in kind and not merely in de"ree than other l-stf-l vices. 2'-inas then "oes on to rankAorder the vices contrary to nat-re. .he least !ad of these vices is selfAa!-se, since the 1"ravity of a sin depends more on the a!-se of a thin" than on the omission of the ri"ht -se.1G&&H @e+t /orse is the sin of not o!servin" the ri"ht manner of cop-lation, and this sin is more "rievo-s if the a!-se concerns the ri"ht vessel than if it affects the manner of cop-lation in respect of other circ-mstances. .hird /orse is sodomy, since -se of the ri"ht se+ is not o!served. (inally, the most "rievo-s of all the vices contrary to nat-re, and so the most "rievo-s of any l-stf-l vice, B F# B is !estiality, since the -se of the d-e species is not o!served: moreover, in this instance, 2'-inas e+plicitly cites a !i!lical te+t as s-pport.G&#H =ne final remark of 2'-inas4s m-st !e mentioned !efore ) t-rn to Par?. 2!o-t the vices contrary to nat-re, from mast-r!ation to !estiality, 2'-inas /rites, 3-st as the orderin" of ri"ht reason proceeds from ne, so the order of nat-re is from 9od ,imself: /herefore in sins contrary to nat-re, /here!y the very order of nat-re is violated, an in3-ry is done to 9od, the 2-thor of nat-re.G&FH .o act contrary to nat-re is nothin" less than to act directly contrary to the /ill of 9od. =ne may -nderstanda!ly !e /onderin" ho/ this disc-ssion of 2'-inas is relevant to the treatment of monsters, so let me t-rn immediately to Par?4s Des monstres et #rodiges . .he preface to his !ook !e"ins as follo/s: Monsters are thin"s that appear o-tside the co-rse of @at-re Dand are -s-ally si"ns of some forthcomin" misfort-neE, s-ch as a child /ho is !orn /ith one arm, another /ho /ill have t/o heads, and additional mem!ers over and a!ove the ordinary. Prodi"ies are thin"s /hich happen that are completely a"ainst @at-re, as /hen a /oman /ill "iven !irth to a serpent, or to a do", or some other thin" that is totally a"ainst @at-re, as /e shall sho/ hereafter thro-"h several e+amples of said monsters and prodi"ies.G&JH

CePrd has ar"-ed that Par? /as some/hat indifference to the pro!lem of precisely ho/ one sho-ld distin"-ish monsters from prodi"ies. Monsters and prodi"ies did not constit-te a!sol-tely separate classes and d-rin" the s-ccessive editions of his !ook, CePrd thin"s Par? !ecame more and more convinced that the term 1monster1 /as s-fficient to desi"nate all of these phenomena.G&LH B-t ho/ever imprecise and -nartic-lated this distinction mi"ht appear, the idea that there /as a separate class of phenomena, prodi"ies, that /ere completely a"ainst nat-re affected the lan"-a"e, attit-de, and concept-ali<ation /ith /hich Par? approached his e+amples. )n the first chapter of Des monstres et #rodiges , Par? distin"-ishes thirteen ca-ses of monsters, /hich ca-ses, altho-"h not completely e+ha-stive, are all the ones he is a!le to add-ce /ith ass-rance. .en of these ca-ses are strai"htfor/ardly nat-ral ca-ses: t/o, the "lory of 9od and the /rath of 9od, are strai"htfor/ardly s-pernat-ral ca-ses: and one, demons and devils, has a lon" and complicated classificatory history.G&0H Briefly, to classify the prod-cts of demons and devils as a res-lt of s-pernat-ral ca-ses /as to threaten to place the devil on a par /ith 9od, "rantin" him the same po/ers to overt-rn the nat-ral order that 9od B FF B possessed. .he possi!ility of s-ch a theolo"ically -ntena!le position led to detailed disc-ssions concernin" the stat-s of demonic ca-sation: and as /e can see from chapter &L to #F, Par? fit s'-arely into these disc-ssions, concerned !oth to "rant the reality of the devil and yet to limit his po/ers. =f the t/o strai"htfor/ardly s-pernat-ral ca-ses, Par?4s threatment of the first, the "lory of 9od, is e+ha-sted !y one e+ample, the restoration of a !lind man4s si"ht !y Jes-s Christ, an e+ample literally copied from Pierre Boaist-a-4s Histoires (rodigieuses , first p-!lished in 1JL$.G&%H .he other s-pernat-ral ca-se, the /rath of 9od, is far more interestin" for my p-rposes: most of the e+ample prod-ced !y ParP to ill-strate this cate"ory are of the same kind, and they are closely linked to the nat-ral ca-se of the mi+t-re or min"lin" of seed. ) /ant to disc-ss these e+amples in detail in order to s-pport some claims a!o-t the history of horror. B-t ) sho-ld make one more preliminary remark. Par?, like virt-ally every /riter d-rin" this period, had no intellect-al diffic-lty in referrin" to !oth s-pernat-ral and nat-ral ca-ses: he felt no incompati!ility in disc-ssin" these t/o types of ca-se to"ether. Iet altho-"h 9od /as al/ays in the !ack"ro-nd of Des monstres et #rodiges , !y far the most space is devoted to nat-ral ca-ses, /ith 9od4s e+plicit appearances !ein" relatively fe/. .his contrasts, for instance, /ith Jaco! 7-eff4s De conce#tu et generatione hominis , a !ook kno/n to Par?, p-!lished in 1JJF and for a lon" time the classic /ork on the pro!lems of "eneration. 7-eff also disc-ssed s-pernat-ral and nat-ral ca-ses to"ether, !-t in Book > of De conce#tu , /hen he disc-sses monstro-s !irths, 7-eff considers them all as divine p-nishment, and their physical ca-ses, ho/ever active, are almost i"nored in favor of the evidence of the 3-d"ments of 9od. )n 7-eff4s te+t, /hether the physical or nat-ral ca-ses of the prod-ction of monsters, monsters are first of all p-nishments inflicted !y 9od on sinners.G&9H So Par?4s !ook already demonstrates a shift of emphasis that makes his treatment of s-pernat-ral ca-ses all the more interestin". Par?4s chapter on th/ /rath of 9od opens /ith these /ords: .here are other creat-res /hich astonish -s do-!ly !eca-se they do not proceed from the a!ove mentioned ca-ses, !-t from a f-sin" to"ether of stran"e species, /hich render the creat-re not only monstro-s !-t prodi"io-s, that is to say, /hich is completely a!horrent and a"ainst @at-re. . . . )t is certain that most often these monstro-s and prodi"io-s creat-res proceed from the 3-d"ment of 9od, /ho permits fathers and mothers to prod-ce s-ch a!ominations from the

disorder that they make in cop-lation, like !r-tish !easts. . . . Similarly, Moses for!ids s-ch co-plin" in ;evitic-s DChapter 1LE Dfi". &.#E.G#$H .he creat-res disc-ssed in this chapter are prod-ced !y the nat-ral ca-se of the f-sin" to"ether of stran"e species, !-t, more important, B FJ B

(i". &.#. 2 colt /ith a man4s head. their, so to speak, first ca-se is 9od4s /rath at the cop-lation !et/een h-man !ein"s and other species, a practice that is e+plicitly for!idden in ;evitic-s. .he res-lt is not only a monster !-t a prodi"y, a creat-re that is contrary to nat-re and that is descri!ed as completely a!horrent. )f /e t-rn to the chapter that treats the nat-ral ca-se of the mi+t-re or min"lin" of seed, /e find Par? endorsin" the principle that nat-re al/ays strives to create its likeness: since nat-re al/ays preserves its kind and species, /hen t/o animals of different species cop-late, the res-lt /ill !e a creat-re that com!ines the form of !oth of the species.G#1H .he kind of nat-ralistic e+planation e+hi!ited in this chapter is, ho/ever, framed !y cr-cial openin" and closin" para"raphs, /hich ) '-ote at len"th. .he chapter !e"ins /ith this statement: .here are monsters that are !orn /ith a form that is halfAanimal and halfAh-man . . . /hich are prod-ced !y sodomists and atheists /ho 3oin to"ether, and !reak o-t of their !o-nds contrary to nat-re, /ith animals, and from this are !orn several monsters that are hideo-s and very scandalo-s to look at or speak a!o-t. Iet the dis"race lies in the deed and not in /ords: and it is, /hen it is done, a very -nfort-nate and a!omina!le thin", and a "reat horror for a man or /oman to mi+ /ith and cop-late /ith !r-te animals: and as a res-lt some are !orn halfAmen and halfAanimals Dfi"s. &.F, &.JE.G#&H .he chapter closes /ith this: @o/ ) shal refrain from /ritin" here a!o-t several other monsters en"endered from s-ch "rist, to"ether /ith their portraits, /hich are so hideo-s and a!omina!le, not only to see, !-t also to hear tell of, that, d-e to their B FL B

(i". &.F. 2 monstro-s lam!. "reat loathsomeness ) have neither /anted to relate them nor have them portrayed. (or Das Boaist-a- says, after havin" related several sacred and profane stories, /hich are all filled /ith "rievo-s p-nishments for lechersE /hat can atheists and sodomists e+pect, /ho Das ) said a!oveE co-ple a"ainst 9od and @at-re /ith !r-te animalsKG##H *hat ) /ant to isolate is the con3-nction of 9od4s /rath at h-man diso!edience of his la/s Da

s-pernat-ral ca-seE /ith the prod-ction of a creat-re contrary to nat-re, a prodi"y, the reaction to /hich is horror: and, finally, ) /ant to emphasi<ed that the prime e+ample for Par? of s-ch h-man diso!edience is !estiality. .hese feat-res are in effect Par?4s analo"-e to 2'-inas4s disc-ssion in the Summa Theologica . (or .homas, there is a distinct cate"ory of l-st, /orse in kind than other species of l-st, namely, 3-st contrary to nat-re Dremem!er that prodi"ies, !ein" completely a"ainst nat-re, are /orse in kind than monsters, !ein" only o-tside the co-rse of nat-reE, the most "rievo-s e+ample of /hich is !estiality: moreover, /hen s-ch sins are committed, an in3-ry is done to 9od. Par? physicali<es this frame/ork of concepts !y e+hi!itin" the conse'-ence of s-ch an in3-ry to 9od: the res-ltin" !estial creat-re is a symA B F0 B

(i". &.J. 2 child, half do". !olic representation of 9od4s /rath, and the reaction of horror /e have to s-ch hideo-s creat-res is intended to remind -s of, and to impress -pon -s, the horror of the sin itself. .h-s, the special vicio-sness of sins contrary to nat-re e+tends to the creat-res prod-ced !y these sins. Par? reserves his most char"ed lan"-a"eChorror, horri!le, hideo-s, loathsome, a!omina!leCfor these creat-res and the sins they represent. B F% B .he link !et/een moral disorder and the disorder of nat-re /as a constant theme d-rin" this period. )t /as /idely !elieved that evil committed on earth co-ld leave its mark on the str-ct-re of the h-man !ody.G#FH 2nd the /ay in /hich the physical form of the !ody "ave rise to moral and theolo"ical '-estions /ent far !eyond the case of prodi"ies. .he iss-e of monstro-s !irths as a /hole raised practical pro!lems for priests, since they had to decide /hether any partic-lar monstro-s child /as h-man, and so /hether it sho-ld !e !apti<ed or not. .here /ere, of co-rse, disa"reements a!o-t ho/ to make these determinations, !-t the form of the !ody served as a "-ide to theolo"ical resol-tion. .he kind of reasonin" employed is /ell represented !y 9-ido of Mont 7ocher4s Mani#ulus Curatorum +fficia Sacerdotus of 1F%$: B-t /hat if there is a sin"le monster /hich has t/o !odies 3oined to"ether: o-"ht it to !e !apti<ed as one person or as t/oK ) say that since !aptism is made accordin" to the so-l and not accordin" to the !ody, ho/soever there !e t/o !odies, if these is only one so-l, then it o-"ht to !e !apti<ed as one person. B-t if these are t/o so-ls, it o-"ht to !e !apti<ed as t/o persons. B-t ho/ is it to !e kno/n if there !e one or t/oK ) say that if there !e t/o !odies, there are t/o so-ls. B-t if there is one !ody, there is one so-l. 2nd for this reason it may !e s-pposed that if there !e t/o chests and t/o heads there are t/o so-ls. )f, ho/ever, there !e one chest and one head, ho/ever m-ch the other mem!ers !e do-!led, there is only one so-l.G#JH ) mention this e+ample to indicate that Par?4s -se of the !ody as a moral and theolo"ical cipher is only a special instance, and not an entirely distinctive one, of a m-ch more "eneral mentalit?. *hat is most remarka!le ao!-t Par?4s !ook is that /hen he confines himself to p-rely nat-ral ca-ses, he employs the concept of monster e+cl-sively Dphenomena o-tside the co-rse of nat-reE and not the

concept of prodi"y. (-rthermore, the e+perience of horrror is a!sent from his descriptions. ,orror is appropriate only if occasioned !y a normative ca-se, the violation of some norm, as /hen the h-man /ill acts contrary to the divine /ill. .he chapter that immediately follo/s Par?4s disc-ssion of the /rath of 9od concerns monsters ca-sed !y too "reat a '-antity of seed. Compare its openin" lan"-a"e /ith the lan"-a"e of the previo-s chapter already '-oted. =n the "eneration of monsters, ,ippocrates says that if there is too "reat an a!-ndance of matter, m-ltiple !irths /ill occ-r, or else a monstro-s child havin" s-perfl-o-s and -seless parts, s-ch as t/o heads, fo-r arms, fo-r le"s, si+ di"its on the hands and feet, or other thin"s. 2nd on the contrary, if the seed is lackin" in '-antity, some mem!er /ill !e lackin", Gs-chH as feet or head, or Ghavin"H some other part missin" Dfi"s. &.L, &.0E.G#LH 8ven Par?4s disc-ssion of hermaphrodites in chapter L !ears no trace of horror, and /e see that their formation is d-e entirely to nat-ral ca-ses, B F9 B

(i". &.L. 8+amples of too "reat a '-antity of seed.

(i". &.0. 8+amples of lack in the '-antity of seed. B J$ B

(i". &.%. ,ermaphrodites. /ith no admi+t-re of /illf-l violation of a norm Dfi". &.%E. ,ermaphrodites are monsters, not prodi"ies, nat-rally e+plica!le and normatively ne-tral. )f /e read Par?4s treatise chapter !y chapter, /e find that horror is a normative reaction, a reaction en"endered !y a violation of a specific kind of norm. *hen ca-sal kno/led"e, that is, kno/led"e of the nat-ral ca-ses, is prod-ced to e+plain a monster, the effect of s-ch e+planation is to displace horror, to alter o-r e+periences of the phenomenon /ith /hich /e are confronted. ,orror is linked to Par?4s disc-ssion of s-pernat-ral ca-ses !eca-se the iss-e in these disc-ssions is al/ays the normative relation !et/een the divine and h-man /ills. 2 horri!le prodi"y is prod-ced /hen the h-man /ill acts contrary to nat-re, contrary to the divine /ill, and so /hen this contrariness Das 2'-inas makes concept-ally artic-late and as is reflected in Par?E involves the th/artin" of a very partic-lar kind of norm. ) see no reason to do-!t the acc-racy of Par?4s descriptions, of /here and /hen he e+perienced horror, especially !eca-se this kind of description is confirmed in so many other treatises.G#0H )t strikes me as no odder that Par? and his contemporaries /o-ld e+periA

B J1 B ence horror only /hen confronted !y a prodi"y, !y some especially vicio-s normative violation, than that the )sraelites of the =ld .estament /o-ld come to e+perience horror at the seemin"ly hetero"eneo-s "ro-p of phenomena called 1a!ominations.1 2nd the inverse relationship !et/een horror and ca-sal e+planation is the other side of the similar relationship !et/een /onder and ca-sal e+planation. 2 sense of /onder /as the appropriate reaction to the prod-ction of a miracle, 3-st as horror /as the appropriate reaction to the prod-ction of a prodi"y. ;orraine 5aston has ar"-ed, in e+aminin" the decline of miracles and the sensi!ility of /onder, that 1it /as a+iomatic in the psycholo"y of miracles that ca-sal kno/led"e drove o-t /onder, and in the seventeenth cent-ry the converse /as also emphasi<ed: /onder drove o-t ca-sal kno/led"e.1G#%H .he psycholo"y of miracles and the psycholo"y of prodi"ies /ere phenomenolo"ically and analytically akin to each other. )n his chapter on the mi+in" and min"lin" of seed and the hideo-s monsters that res-lt from !estiality Dfi". &.9E, Par? descri!es a manApi", a creat-re !orn in Br-ssels in 1JLF, havin" a man4s face, arms, and hands, and so representin" h-manity a!ove the sho-lders, and havin" the hind le"s and hind'-arters of a s/ine and the "enitals of a so/ Dfi". &.1$E. .his manApi" /as one of a little of si+ pi"s and, accordin" to Par?, 1it n-rsed like the others and lived t/o days: then it /as killed alon" /ith the so/ on acco-nt of the horror the people had of it.1G#9H 2s one /o-ld e+pect from /hat ) have ar"-ed, horror /as in fact the reaction tri""ered !y this manApi", and it /as so cons-min" as to p-sh the people to kill !oth the so/ and her monstro-s offsprin". )n 1L99, 8d/ard .yson, a fello/ of the 7oyal Society and 7oyal Colle"e of Physicians, comm-nicated a report, p-!lished in the (hiloso#hical Transactions of the 1oyal Society, entitled 12 7elation of t/o Monstro-s Pi"s, /ith the 7esem!lance of ,-man (aces, and t/o yo-n" .-rkeys 3oined !y the Breast.1 .yson anno-nces his intention at the start: By the description of the follo/in" monsters ) desi"n to prove that the distortion of the parts of a fet-s may occasion it to represent the fi"-re of different animals, /itho-t any real coition !et/i+t the t/o species.GF$H ,e proceeds to descri!e, in m-ch detail, a soAcalled manApi", discovered at Staffordshire in 1L99. ,is article contains no evidence of horror, dis"-st, dread, or any related emotion. 2s he contin-es, it !ecomes clear that his description of the seemin"ly h-man face of the pi" is meant to sho/ that it is the res-lt of some depression of the pi"4s face, ca-sed !y a compression of the /om! or !y the press-re of the other pi"s in the same part of the /om!. @o reference to !estiality is necessary to -nderstand the prod-ction of this creat-re, and no horror is, or sho-ld !e occasioned !y it. .yson mentions the case of a manApi" reported !y Par?, B J& B

(i". &.9. 2 monster, half man and half s/ine.

(i". &.1$. 2 pi", havin" the head, feet, and hands of a man, and the rest of a pi".

the very case ) have '-oted, and is content to point o-t some differences !et/een Par?4s case and his, for e+ample, that his manApi" did not possess h-man hands. .yson is ca-tio-s a!o-t /hether reco-rse to !estiality is ever re'-ired to e+plain s-ch monsters, !-t the main thr-st of his article is to sho/ that ca-sal e+planations of the kind he has prod-ced have a m-ch "reater e+planatory relevance than has often !een reco"ni<ed. ,is attit-de stands at a "reat distance from Par?4s, and it is e+emA B J# B plified !y his remark, made /hen disc-ssin" other reported cases of monstro-s pi"s, 1) !elieve either fiction, or /ant of o!servation has made more monsters than nat-re ever prod-ced1GF1H Csometimes almost employin" the concept of monster as if monsters /ere tho-"ht to !e creat-res contrary to nat-re, /hereas the /hole point of his comm-nication has !een to sho/ that they res-lt from a!normal deformations d-e to nat-ral ca-ses. .he displacement of horror as a res-lt of ca-sal e+planation, as tho-"h kno/in" the ca-se of a monster calms the horror /e mi"ht feel, can also !e seen in the case of John Merrick, the soAcalled 8lephant Man, and s-ch displacement operates in one and the same individ-al, namely, Merrick4s physician, (rederick .raves Dfi"s. &.11, &.1&E. )n the medical reports s-!mitted to the Patholo"ical Society of ;ondon, /ords s-ch as 1deformity,1 1a!normality,1 1remarka!le,1 1e+traordinary,1 and 1"rossly1 descri!e Merrick4s condition. .he reports do not convey an e+perience of horror !-t rather an impression of ho/ e+treme Merrick4s deformities are, and, !eca-se of that e+tremity, they indicate the immense medical interest of his condition. ,o/ever, /hen /e read .reves4s memoir and he descri!es his and others4 first enco-nters /ith the 8lephant Man, the mood is completely different. ,ere /e find /ords and phrases s-ch as 1repellent,1 1fri"ht,1 1aversion,1 1a fri"htf-l creat-re that co-ld only have !een possi!le in a ni"htmare,1 1the most dis"-stin" specimen of h-manity that ) have ever seen,1 1the loathin" insin-ation of a man !ein" chan"ed into an animal,1 and 1everyone he met confronted him /ith a look of horror and dis"-st.1GF&H DSee fi". &.1#.E )t is as tho-"h /e can descri!e .reves4s emotional history !y sayin" that /hen he attends to the complicated ca-sal etiolo"y of Merrick4s condition, he can transform his o/n reaction from one of horror and dis"-st to pity and, event-ally, sympathy. *e often ass-me that the appellation 18lephant Man1 derives from the fact that Merrick /as covered /ith papillomato-s "ro/ths, a derivation of this name reported in one of the medical comm-nications. 2nd certainly this appearance co-ld have acco-nted for that title. B-t it is easy to for"et that this is not the official reason that Merrick himself "ave for his !ein" called the 8lephant Man. ,e reported that shortly !efore his !irth, his mother /as knocked do/n !y a circ-s elephant and that this accident, /ith its horrifyin" conse'-ences, /as the so-rce of the la!el, 18lephant Man.1 )t is perfectly evident that this story conceals, and not very /ell, the fantasy of !estiality, and it is e+actly this fantasy that is em!edded in .raves4s memoir /hen he speaks of 1the loathin" insin-ation of a man !ein" chan"ed into an animal.1 2ltho-"h the ad3ective 1a!omina!le1 occ-rs fre'-ently in disc-ssions of monsters and prodi"ies, ) /ill not insist here on the o!vio-s differences !et/een this -se of the term and the concept of a!omination in the B JF B

(i". &.11.

John Merrick, 1%%FQ%J. =ld .estament. .he -se of 1a!omina!le1 to descri!e prodi"ies remains ine+trica!ly linked to horror, as ) have ar"-ed: !-t the doctrine of nat-ral la/, a!sent from the =ld .estament, decisively alters one feat-re of the !i!lical conception. 2 st-dy of the relevant !i!lical passa"es /o-ld sho/ that it is primarily one -ni'-ely specified people /ho, !eca-se of their special relation to 9od, feel horror at a!ominations. B-t in the te+ts ) have disc-ssed, it is rather as tho-"h the horror of sins contrary to nat-re, and of the prod-cts that res-lt from them, is e+perienced !y all h-man !ein"s '-a rational !ein"s. (or the -se of nat-ral reason alone is s-fficient to "rasp the vicio-sness of sins contrary to nat-re, and !estialA B JJ B

(i". &.1&. John Merrick. B JL B

(i". &.1#. Postmortem cast of the head and neck of John Merrick. ity, for e+ample, is a violation of nat-ral la/, /hich re'-ires no special act of divine revelation to !e kno/n !-t is nothin" else than the rational creat-re4s participation in 9od4s eternal la/.GF#H So every h-man !ein" o-"ht to e+perience horror at that /hich he kno/s, as a rational !ein", to !e contrary to nat-re. )n this conte+t, the doctrine of nat-ral la/ helped to conceal the reco"nition that horror is a c-lt-ral and historical prod-ct and not demanded !y reason alone, a fact that is more easily reco"ni<ed in the pertinent !i!lical te+ts. Since horror came to !e enmeshed in the frame/ork of nat-ral la/ and nat-ral reason, prodi"ies, and the /rath of 9od, co-ld !e descri!ed in a /ay that /as intended to represent the B J0 B e+perience of every h-man !ein", not simply the e+perience of a c-lt-rally specific "ro-p. =!3ects of horror co-ld no/ directly appear to !e nat-rally horrifyin". 2s ) have already sho/n, !estiality, the /orst of the sins contrary to nat-re, e+hi!ited its vicio-sness in the very str-ct-re of the h-man !ody itself, in the creat-res prod-ced !y the /illf-l violation of 9od4s nat-ral la/. B-t this confi"-ration, /here!y a certain kind of -nderminin" of norms /as e+hi!ited in the effects of physical patholo"y, /as not restricted only to this one form of l-st contrary to nat-re. 8i"hteenthA and early nineteenthAcent-ry treatises on onanism reprod-ce this same pattern of concepts: selfAa!-se, another one of 2'-inas4s sins contrary to nat-re, rava"es the physical str-ct-re of the !ody, prod-cin", amon" its effects, ac-te stomach pains: ha!it-al vomitin" that resists all remedies d-rin" the time this vicio-s ha!it is contin-ed: a dry co-"h: a hoarse, /eak voice: a "reat loss of stren"th: paleness: sometimes a li"ht !-t contin-o-s yello/ness: pimples, partic-larly on the forehead, temples,

and near the nose: considera!le emaciation: an astonishin" sensi!ility to chan"es in the /eather: an enfee!lement of si"ht sometimes leadin" to !lindness: a considera!le dimin-tion of all mental fac-lties often c-lminatin" in insanity: and even death Dfi". &.1FE.GFFH )ndeed, this relationship !et/een the vicio-sness of the sin and the patholo"y of the !ody even "ave rise to a "enre of a-topsy report, in /hich the a-topsy of a mast-r!ator /o-ld reveal that the effects of this loathsome ha!it had penetrated /ithin the !ody itself, affectin" the internal or"ans no less than the e+ternal appearance.GFJH )n .issot4s 3,+nanisme, Dissertation sur les maladies #roduites #ar la mastur"ation, /e find the same kind of terminolo"y and sensi!ility that accompanies 7enaissance descriptions of prodi"ies. .issot opens his disc-ssion of cases, /ith /hich he has had firsthand e+perience, /ith the follo/in" pream!le: My first case presents a scene /hich is dreadf-l. ) /as myself fri"htened the first time ) sa/ the -nfort-nate patient /ho is its s-!3ect. ) then felt, more than ) ever had !efore, the necessity of sho/in" yo-n" people all the horrors of the a!yss into /hich they vol-ntarily pl-n"e themselves.GFLH 2nd he invokes the idea of mast-r!ation as contrary to nat-re in strate"ically central passa"es.GF0H )t is often said that .issot4s treatise is the first scientific st-dy of mast-r!ation, and his !ook is en"-lfed !y medical terminolo"y and p-nct-ated !y attempts to "ive physiolo"ical e+planations of the patholo"ical effects provoked !y mast-r!ation. B-t it is 3-st as evident that his !ook remains firmly placed /ithin a tradition of moral theolo"y, /hich !e"ins /ith a conception of mast-r!ation as an especially vicio-s kind of l-st. )t prod-ces mental and physical disease and disorder, !-t even in the scienA B J% B

(i". &.1F. 5eath !y mast-r!ation. tific treatments ina-"-rated !y .issot, it remains a vicio-s ha!it, not itself a disease !-t a moral crime a"ainst 9od and nat-re. .issot !e"ins his !ook /ith the claim, /hich he says that physicians of all a"es -nanimo-sly !elieve, that the loss of one o-nce of seminal fl-id enfee!les one more than the loss of forty o-nces of !lood.GF%H ,e immediately reco"ni<es that he m-st then e+plain /hy the loss of a "reat '-antity of seminal fl-id !y mast-r!ation, !y means contrary to nat-re, prod-ces diseases so m-ch more terri!le than the loss of an e'-al '-antity of seminal fl-id !y nat-ral interco-rse. *hen he offers an e+planation, in 2rticle )), Section % of his !ook, he attempts to frame it in terms of p-rely physical ca-ses, the mechanical la/s of the !ody and of its -nion /ith the mind. B-t try as he mi"ht, he cannot help !-t concl-de this section !y reintrod-cin" the claim that mast-r!ators 1find themselves "-ilty of a crime for /hich divine 3-stice cannot s-spend p-nishment.1GF9H .heorists of sodomy also e+ploited this same kind of connection !et/een normative taint and physical deformation. .he normative ori"in of attit-des to/ard sodomy is contained not only in the very /ord, /ith its reference to the episode of Sodom and 9omorrah in 9enesis, !-t also in the emer"ence of other /ords to refer to the same practices. (or instance, !-""ery derives from the (rench "ougrerie, a /ord that refers to a Manichaean sect that arose at Constantinople in the ninth cent-ry, and B J9 B

/hich reco"ni<ed a sort of pontiff /ho resided in B-l"aria. .h-s, to !e a "ougre meant that one /as a participant in heresy, and there is no reason to !elieve that this heretical sect had any special proclivity to/ard sodomy. ,o/ever, event-ally, the acc-sation of "ougrerie came to !e identified /ith an acc-sation of sodomy, and the link to heresy !ecame s-!mer"ed.GJ$H Moreover, in (rench, the phrase 1chan"e of reli"ion1 co-ld !e -sed to descri!e pederasty: to !ecome a pederast /as to chan"e reli"ion Dchanger de religion E.GJ1H Both se+ and reli"ion have their orthodo+ies, their heresies, their apostasies Ctheir nomrative paths and deviations. 8ven /hen the theolo"ical -nderpinnin"s of the concept of sodomy receded into the !ack"ro-nd, its normative content and ori"in /as al/ays close at hand. 2m!roise .ardie-, /hose enormo-sly infl-ential tude m5dico!l5gale sur les attentats au. moeurs /as first p-!lished in 1%J0, devotes a!o-t oneAthird of this !ook to a disc-ssion of pederasty and sodomy. .ardie- restricts the term 1pederasty1 to the love of yo-n" !oys, /hereas the more "eneral term 1sodomy1 is reserved for 1acts contrary to nat-re, considered in themselves, and /itho-t reference to the se+ of the individ-als !et/een /hom the c-lpa!le relations are esta!lished.1GJ&H Most of the cases of sodomy .ardie- descri!es concern either male male anal interco-rse or male female anal interco-rse. .he fact that he repeatedly characteri<es these acts as contrary to nat-re indicates the normative tradition into /hich his /ork fits. 2ltho-"h .ardie- ackno/led"es that madness may accompany pederasty and sodomy, he /ishes to make certain that these acts escape 1neither the responsi!ility of conscience, the 3-st severity of la/, nor, a!ove all, the contempt of decent people.1GJ#H ,e is a/are that the 1shame and dis"-st1GJFH that these acts inspire have often constrained the reports of o!servers, and his !ook is intended to remedy this lack, and in e+traordinary detail. M-ch of .ardie-4s disc-ssion of pederasty and sodomy is concerned /ith the physical si"ns that permit one to reco"ni<e that these activities have transpired, /ith the material traces left !y these vices in the str-ct-re of the or"ans. .ardie- !elieved that an e+ha-stive disc-ssion of these si"ns is necessary if le"al medicine /as "oin" to !e a!le to determine /ith ass-rance /hether s-ch acts contrary to nat-re and p-!lic morality had taken place. ,e descri!es the deformations of the an-s that res-lt from the ha!it of passive sodomy, a topic that had already received m-ch disc-ssion in the (rench and 9erman medicole"al literat-re. B-t he "oes on to descri!e the si"ns of active pederasty, si"ns left on the viril mem!er itself, /hich he claims have !een completely i"nored in previo-s treatises. Chan"es in the dimension and form of the penis are the most relia!le indications of active sodomy and pederasty. .he active sodomist has a penis that is either very thin or very vol-mino-s. .he e+cessively vol-mino-s penis is analo"i<ed to 1the sno-t of certain animals,1GJJH /hile B L$ B .ardie- descri!es the m-ch more common, e+cessively thin penis of active sodomists in the follo/in" remarka!le /ay: )n the case /here it is small and thin, it "ro/s considera!ly thinner from the !ase to the tip, /hich is very tapered, like the fin"er of a "love, and recalls completely the canum more . GJLH .o confirm his "eneral o!servations, he reports the physical conformation of the penises of many active sodomists: ,avin" made him completely -ndress, /e can verify that the viril mem!er, very lon" and vol-mino-s, presents at its tip a characteristic elon"ation and taperin" that "ives to the "land the almost pointed form of the penis of a do".GJ0H 2nother of .ardie-4s active sodomists has a penis that 1sim-lates e+actly the form of the penis of a

p-reA!red do".1GJ%H 2s if to confirm that sodomy is contrary to nat-re and 9od, the relevant parts of the h-man !ody are transformed !y this activity so that they come to resem!le the !odily parts of a do". *hat co-ld !e more horrifyin" than the moral and physical transformation of the h-man into a !east, a manAdo" prod-ced no lon"er !y !estiality !-t !y the dis"-stin" practice of sodomy. ;on" after the classical disc-ssions of prodi"ies, the cate"ory of the contrary to nat-re contin-ed to mark o-t one f-ndamental domain of horror. By the late nineteenth cent-ry, the e+periences provoked !y soAcalled freak sho/s already contrasted /ith the horror of the contrary to nat-re. 7ather than e+hi!itin" the physical conse'-ences of normative deviation, the freaks e+hi!ited in sidesho/s and circ-ses /ere intended to am-se, entertain, and divert their a-diences. )n "eneral, the -r!an /orkers /ho came to stare at freaks /ere !y and lar"e an -nsophisticated a-dience in search of cheap and simple entertainment. . . . )n the early 1%0$s *illiam Cameron Co-p had introd-ced a t/oArin" concept /hile /orkin" /ith Barn-m and !y 1%%J most sho/s revolved aro-nd a m-ltiple rin" system. .he res-lt /as a drift to/ard "lamo-r and spectacle as the !asic prod-ct of the !i" sho/s. .he tendency /as /ell developed !y the early nineties and !ro-"ht specific chan"es to the e+hi!its. Contrasts of scaleCfat ladies and livin" skeletons, "iants and d/arfsCand e+hi!its involvin" internal contrastsC !earded ladies, hermaphroditic men and ladies toyin" /ith snakesC!e"an to displace the more rep-lsive e+hi!its. 2s the sho/s /ere frei"hted /ith fe/er m-tilated horrors they !ecame less emotionally loaded and less comple+ as e+periences.GJ9H )t sho-ld !e noted that part of the p-rpose of the m-ltipleArin" circ-s /o-ld have !een defeated !y the displayin" of horrors. (or if havin" more than one rin" /as intended to "et the spectators to look from e+hi!it to e+hi!it, to "a<e periodically and repeatedly at each of the B L1 B

(i". &.1J. (red *ilson, the ;o!ster Boy. rin"s, to e+perience the circ-is in all of its diversity, then the e+hi!ition of a horrifyin" o!3ect /o-ld have tended to th/art this e+perience. .he e+perience of horror disposes -s to fi+ on its o!3ect, -na!le to avert o-r "a<e, fascinated as /ell as rep-lsed, !lockin" o-t virt-ally everythin" !-t the o!3ect !efore o-r eyes. .h-s, horror is incompati!le /ith the "lamo-r, spectactle, and variety that is inherent in the m-ltipleArin" circ-s. B L& B

(i". &.1L. 2very Childs, the (ro" Boy. .he modern circ-is has to !e set -p so that no sin"le e+hi!it so predominated that the many rin"s /ere, in effect, red-ced to one.

8ven if /e p-t aside the fact that the cate"ories of freaks and prodi"ies /ere !y no means composed of the same specimens, /e can see ho/ different this e+perience of freaks /as !y e+aminin" photo"raph of them. Charles 8isenmann /as a Bo/ery photo"rapher /ho took many portraits of freaks d-rin" the late nineteenth cent-ry. Some of these photo"raphs represent characters that are halfAh-man and halfA animal and so, at least in this respect, can !e tho-"ht of as s-ccessors to the medieval and 7enaissance prodi"ies prod-ced !y !estiality. B-t these photo"raphs e+hi!it no indication of horror. 2very Childs, the (ro" Boy, is evocative and am-sin"ly photo"raphed !-t no more horrifyin" than a contortionist, his slippers emphasi<in" that he is more h-man than fro" Dfi". &.1JE. )ndeed, these photo"raphs insist on the h-manity of their s-!3ects, precisely the opposite of Par?4s disc-ssions, /hich hi"hli"ht the B L# B

(i". &.10. Jo Jo, the 7-ssian 5o" (ace Boy. B LF B !estiality of prodi"ies. (red *ilson, the ;o!ster Boy, s-ffers from a serio-s con"enital deformity, !-t dressed in his S-nday !est, /ith his hair neatly com!ed, one is dra/n as m-ch to his h-man face as to his s-pposed lo!ster cla/s Dfi". &.1LE. 2nd even Jo Jo, the 7-ssian 5o" (ace Boy, one of Barn-m4s most famo-s attractions, /ears a frin"ed valo-r s-it and sports that "reat sym!ol of *estern civili<ation, the /atch chain Dfi". &.10E. (-rthermore, his ri"ht hand !ears a rin", and his left hand is neatly placed on his knee. 2nd he poses /ith a "-n, as if to s-""est that he is not an animal to !e h-nted !-t can himself participate in the all too h-man activity of the h-nt. ,orror at the prodi"io-s, am-sement !y the freakCthe history of monsters encodes a complicated and chan"in" history of emotion, one that helps to reveal to -s the str-ct-res and limits of the h-man comm-nity.

Three2 The "nima* !onne0tion4

Harriet Rit)o .he dichotomy !et/een h-mans and animalsCor man and !east, as it -sed to !e calledCis so old and a-tomatic that /e scarcely notice it. )t /as enshrined near the !e"innin" of o-r tradition, in the second chapter of 9enesis, /hen 9od presented the animals to 2dam one !y one, in the vain hope that one of them /o-ld prove a fit helpmeet for him. )n the end, of co-rse, none of them /o-ld do, and 9od had to provide 2dam /ith a creat-re more like himself.G1H 2t least since then, the notion that animals are radically other, on the far side of an -n!rid"ea!le chasm constr-cted !y their lack of either reason or so-l, has !een a constant feat-re of *estern theolo"y and philosophy.G&H )t has completely overshado/ed the most readily availa!le alternative, /hich /o-ld define h-man !ein"s as one animal kind amon" many others. 2nd the advent of modern science has not made m-ch difference. Most scientific research a!o-t animals has !een fo-nded on the ass-mption that they constit-te a distinct class to /hich h-man !ein"s do not !elon". .h-s, ei"hteenthA and nineteenthAcent-ry <oolo"ists /ere confident that 1the prero"ative

of reason,1 /hich animals lacked, distin"-ished h-manity 1as . . . intended for hi"her d-ties, and a more e+alted destiny.1G#H .his confidence ins-lated them from the implications of s-ch dis'-ietin" reco"nitions as the follo/in", taken from an early >ictorian <oolo"ical pop-lari<er: 1*hen /e t-rn o-r attention to Mammalia . . . /e find some startlin" -s !y forms and actios so m-ch resem!lin" o-r o/n, as to e+cite -npleasant comparisons.1GFH @or did Charled 5ar/in4s form-lations necessarily chan"e thin"s. .he "ap !et/een h-mans and animals remained a+iomatic even, or perhaps especially, in fields like comparative psycholo"y, /hich foc-sed on the kinds of intellect-al and emotional '-alities that /ere also ass-med to distin"-ish -s as a species. B L9 B 9eor"e 7omanes, a pioneer in s-ch research and the friend and prot?"? of 5ar/in, tried to '-antify this discontin-ity in a !ook entitled Mental -6olution in Animals, p-!lished in 1%%#. )t incl-ded a "raphic scale of emotional and intellect-al development, presented as a ladder /ith fifty steps. Civili<ed h-man ad-lts, capa!le of 1reflection and selfconscio-s tho-"ht,1 /ere at the top. .hen there /as a lar"e hiat-s. .he hi"hest animals /ere anthropoid apes and do"s, /hich 7omanes considered capa!le of 1indefinite morality1 as /ell as shame, remorse, deceitf-lness, and a sense of the l-dicro-s. .hey occ-pied step &%, alon" /ith h-man infants of fifteen months. Close !ehind them, on step &J, /ere !irds, /hich co-ld reco"ni<e pict-res, -nderstand /ord, and feel terror: and they /ere follo/ed on step &F !y !ees and ants, /hich co-ld comm-nicate ideas and feel sympathy.GJH .he details of this schemati<ation so-nd '-aint no/, !-t its -nderlyin" ta+onomy, /hich defines h-mans and animals as separate and e'-ivalent cate"ories on the !asis of their intellect-al, spirit-al, and emotional capacities, contin-ed to determine the co-rse of research on animal !ehavior for the s-cceedin" cent-ry. 2s 5onald 9riffin, a contemporary critic of this ta+onomy, has pointed o-t. 1.hro-"ho-t o-r ed-cational system st-dents are ta-"ht that it is -nscientific to ask /hat an animal thinks or feels . . . GandH field nat-ralists are rel-ctant to report or analy<e o!servations of animal !ehavior that s-""est conscio-s a/areness . . . lest they !e 3-d"ed -ncritical, or even ostraci<ed from the scientific comm-nity.1GLH 2ltho-"h the dichotomy !et/een h-mans and animals is an intellect-al constr-ction that !e"s a very important '-estion, /e are not apt to see it in that li"ht -nless it is challen"ed. 2nd serio-s challen"es have proved diffic-lt to mo-nt. .hose /ho have !ased their thinkin" on the -ni'-eness of o-r species Di.e., its -ni'-eness in a different sense than that in /hich every species is -ni'-eE have often resisted even the attempt to make the dichotomy controversial. .he scientific consens-s cited !y 9riffin e+emplifies entrenched instit-tional rel-ctance to ackno/led"e that an alternative ta+onomy mi"ht !e possi!le. 2n analo"o-s ref-sal !y philosopher 7o!ert @o<ick str-ct-red his revie/, /hich appeared several years a"o in the $e/ 7ork Times Book 1e6ie/, of .om 7e"an4s The Case for Animal 1ights . )nstead of "rapplin" serio-sly /ith 7e"an4s caref-lly /orked o-t and ela!orately researched ar"-ment, @o<ick simply dismissed it !y assertin" that animals are not h-man and therefore cannot possi!ly have any ri"hts. .hat is, he claimed that 7e"an had made a cripplin" cate"ory mistake !y failin" to reco"ni<e the ins-pera!le !arrier that separated h-mans from all other creat-res and that it /as therefore not necessary to think serio-sly a!o-t anythin" else that he said.G0H S-ch vie/s are not confined to scholars and scientists: so, despite its evasiveness, @o<ick4s strata"em is -nlikely to have !othered B 0$ B many of his readers. 7ecent research s-""ests that most ordinary 2mericans e+plicitly endorse the dichotomy that @o<ick post-lates, /hatever else they may think or feel a!o-t animals, for e+ample,

/hether or not they like them, or /hether they /ish to protect them or to e+ploit them.G%H B-t this repeatedly avo/d ta+onomy is not the /hole story, either a!o-t the relationship of h-man !ein"s to other species or a!o-t the /ay that people have perceived and interpreted that relationship. .here are other inde+es of !elief and -nderstandin" than e+plicit declarations. )n the case of other animals, and especially the mammalian species that h-man !ein"s resem!le most closely, the e+plicit denial of contin-ity may parado+ically have freed people to artic-late, in a veiled and -nselfconscio-s /ay, their competin" sense of similarity and connection. 2 lot of evidence s-""ests that /hen people are not tryin" to deny that h-mans and animals !elon" to the same moral and intellect-al contin--m, they a-tomatically ass-me that they do. 5isco-rses that seem to refer e+cl-sively to animals are fre'-ently shaped !y c-lt-ral constr-ctions clearly derived from h-man society, even in the scientific and technolo"ical fields /here it mi"ht seem that s-ch constr-ctions /o-ld !e co-nterprod-ctive, o-t of place, and easy to identify and discard. .he conse'-ences of this -nackno/led"ed connection have often !een enormo-s, even in the !ehavioral sciences most stron"ly committed to reinforcin" the dichotomy !et/een h-mans and animals. .h-s, it is no accident that the !a!oon st-dies p-!lished !y S. ;. *ash!-rn and )rven 5e>ore in the 19J$s and 19L$s stressed the importance of male dominance hierarchies. 2nalo"o-sly, the research -ndertaken !y the increasin" n-m!er of female primatolo"ists in the past t/o decades has emphasi<ed the e+tent to /hich female primates a""ressively mana"e their o/n reprod-ctive careers, radically revisin" earlier characteri<ations of them as se+-ally passive and even 1coy.1G9H th-s animalArelated disco-rse has often f-nctioned as an e+tended, if -nackno/led"ed metonymy, offerin" participants a concealed for-m for the e+pression of opinions and /orries imported from the h-man c-lt-ral arena. )ndeed, m-ch of /hat peopleCe+perts of one sort or anotherChave said a!o-t animals can only !e e+plained in this conte+t. .h-s, the fore"oin" e+amples from the recent history of primatolo"y s-""est ho/ social or political ideolo"y can determine the research a"enda of scientists. B-t these e+amples may seem too easy. 2fter all, despite the e+plicit professional commitment of primatolo"ists not to anthropomorphi<e the animals they st-dy, those creat-res are of special interest e+actly !eca-se of their closeness to h-mankind. .hey are o!vio-s tar"ets for pro3ection, as are the e+tinct pon"ide and hominids /hose fossil remains are interpreted !y st-dents of h-man ori"ins.G1$H )t is, ho/ever, possi!le to find evidence that the same intellect-al and B 01 B c-lt-ral preconceptions shape disco-rses that, on the face of it, look m-ch less promisin". =ne s-ch disco-rse informs the literat-re of animal !reedin" that emer"ed in late ei"hteenthAcent-ry Britain and developed and flo-rished thro-"ho-t the ne+t cent-ry. .he ostensi!le s-!3ects of this disco-rseC horses, cattle, sheep, pi"s, do"s, and catsCshare far fe/er characteristics /ith h-man !ein"s than do apes, monkeys, and a-stralopithecines: its participants /ere concerned /ith practical res-lts, rather than /ith anythin" so a!stract and potentially tendentio-s as the increase of kno/led"e or the development of theory. .he flavor of this literat-reC!oth its tone and its contentCis more easily demonstrated !y e+cerpts than !y "eneral characteri<ation. .he follo/in" selections to-ch in vario-s /ays on the relations !et/een the se+es, a s-!3ect that /as cr-cial to s-ccessf-l animal h-s!andry: they also make assertions that are diffic-lt to -nderstand /ith reference only to the e+i"encies of stock !reedin". )n 1%&%, the a-thor of an article that appeared in the 0arrier and $aturalist, a livestockAoriented 3o-rnal, asked, 1*hat is . . . the part of the female in the "reat act of reprod-ctionK1 ,e ans/ered his o/n '-estion, 1*hen the male predominates !y his vi"o-r, his constit-tion, and his health, she is limited, in some

meas-re, to perform the same office that the earth does for ve"eta!les . . . nothin" more than a receptacle, in /hich are deposited the seeds of "eneration.1G11H 2 fe/ years later, *illiam Io-att, the most distin"-ished British veterinarian of the early >ictorian period and a prolific /riter on domestic animals, reco-nted the follo/in" story as an ill-stration of the need to control the ima"ination of 1even so d-ll a !east as the co/1: a certain co/ 1chanced to come in season, /hile past-rin" on a field . . . o-t of /hich an o+ 3-mped, and /ent /ith the co/, -ntil she /as !ro-"ht home to the !-ll. .he o+ /as /hite, /ith !lack spots, and horned. Mr. M-stard Gthe o/ner of the co/H had not a horned !east in his possession, nor one /ith any /hite on it. @evertheless, the prod-ce of the follo/in" sprin" /as a !lack and /hite calf /ith horns.1G1&H 8arly in the t/entieth cent-ry, J-dith @eville ;ytton, a prominent if iconoclastic and com!ative mem!er of the toy do" fancy, s-""ested the follo/in" remedy for !arreness in pri<e !itches: 1)n desperate cases . . . try the old . . . recipe of !reedin" to a thoro-"h c-r. . . . )f the !itch !reeds to this connection . . . the ne+t time the !itch is p-t to a thoro-"h!red do" she /ill almost certainly !reed to him. . . . .he more . . . hi"hly !red the !itch is, the more likely this is to s-cceed.1G1#H 8ach of these statements depended on ass-mptions not only o!vio-sly false in the li"ht of modern science !-t also s-!3ect to pers-asive contradiction on the !asis of acc-m-lated practical e+perience that /as /idely availa!le in the nineteenth cent-ry. 8ach statement -ses, applied to the activities of domestic animals, lan"-a"e ordinarily reserved to descri!e B 0& B h-man social interco-rse. *hy, then, did e+pertsCthe very people /ho sho-ld have access to the most enli"htened tho-"ht and the /idest informationChold these opinions Dor !elieve these facts, as they /o-ld have p-t itE, and /hy did they e+press them in this /ayK )t is likely that !oth the form and the content of these e+cerpts /ere determined !y the e+i"encies of h-man "ender stereotypes rather than !y those of applied !iolo"y. .his /as the case even tho-"h animal h-s!andry /as a '-intessentially earth!o-nd p-rs-it, constrained !y physicality and detail on every side. )t had no o!vio-s connection to the stakes at iss-e in any arena of h-man social disco-rse, incl-din" that of "ender. Certainly, the techni'-es -sed to !reed animals /ere very different from those -sed to !reed people. .he res-lts of !reedin" /ere hi"hly concrete, and they /ere -s-ally presented to the "eneral p-!lic in the strippedAdo/n terms of cash val-e. 9iven all this, it /o-ld !e reasona!le to ass-me that !reeders4 -nderstandin" of their craft /o-ld !e str-ct-red !y empirical rather than rhetorical considerations. Iet /hat they said a!o-t their cattle, sheep, and do"s /as stron"ly conditioned !y their vie/s a!o-t the nat-re of h-man !ein"s, especially /omen. .his assertion may seem partic-larly s-rprisin" !eca-se, !y the nineteenth cent-ry, the !reedin" of pedi"reed animals had !ecome a hi"hly technical and speciali<ed endeavor, /hether it /as carried on !y professional a"ric-lt-ralists interested in prod-cin" improved farm livestock or !y selfAprofessed amate-rs /ho concentrated on do"s, cats, and s-ch smaller animals as "-inea pi"s, ra!!its, and po-ltry. )t /as cr-dely materialistic in its e+plicit aims. Since the primary "oal of all !reeders /as to prod-ce s-perior yo-n" animals, the cr-cial foc-s of their attention /as the selection of healthy and appropriately endo/ed parents for the ne/ "eneration. Several factors enco-ra"ed them to !e as pra"matic as possi!le in their matchmakin" decisions. )n the first place, mistakes /ere easy to spot. Strin"ent standards e+isted for almost every kin" of animal that /as fre'-ently !red, and these standards /ere /idely disseminated in hand!ooks, prints, and periodicals and vi"oro-sly enforced !y sho/ 3-d"es and !y the marketplace in /hich animals /ere !ro-"ht and sold !y knol/ed"ea!le fanciers. D.here /ere occasional e+ceptions to this r-le of consens-s and conformity, the most nota!le !ein" the pi", /hich seemed so "ross and amorpho-s that

!reeders had tro-!le fi"-rin" o-t /hat an ideal animal sho-ld !e like.EG1FH .hese fre'-ently reiterated standards meant that the inferiority of the offsprin" of illAconsidered pairin"s /o-ld sooner or later !ecome o!vio-sCperhaps at !irth, !-t certainly !y the time they reached mat-rity. )n addition, !reedin" /as an e+pensive p-rs-itCa!sol-tely e+pensive in the case of the lar"er animals, /hich co-ld cost B 0# B h-ndreds and even tho-sands of po-nds to p-rchase and then to maintain in an appropriate style, and relatively e+pensive in the case of the smaller ones. 2ny pre"nancy risked the life of the mother, and each s-ccessf-l pre"nancy cons-med a si"nificant portion of her reprod-ctive potential. =/ners of val-a!le female animals had to e+pend this limited reso-rce very caref-lly. )n the co-rse of the ei"hteenth and nineteenth cent-ries, the e+pertise of !reeders prod-ced some impressive res-lts. D.his seems tr-e even tho-"h recent historians have pers-asively modified the most e+trava"ant claims made !y participants in the 2"ric-lt-ral 7evol-tion and their s-!se'-ent admirers.E G1JH .he earlier and most cele!rated achievement of 8n"lish animal !reedin" /as the modern thoro-"h!red racehorse, /hich appeared to/ard the !e"innin" of the ei"hteenth cent-ry as the res-lt of an inf-sion of 2ra!ian !lood into native 8n"lish e'-ine stock. .he merit of s-ch horses /as easily meas-red on the track. By the middle of the ei"hteenth cent-ry, a"ric-lt-ralists /ere applyin" the techni'-es developed !y racehorse !reeders to farm livestock, /ith conse'-ent impressive increases in the si<e, most nota!ly, of cattle and sheep !-t also of pi"s and draft horses. 2nd the nineteenth cent-ry sa/ a related e+plosion in the diversity of fancy animals. Most modern do" !reeds ori"inated then, despite the calims of "reater 'nti'-ity made !y some aficionados: the same /as tr-e for cats, rodents, and the diverse starins of pi"eons that 5ar/in st-died. .his record of serio-s animal h-s!andry in ei"hteenthA and nineteenthAcent-ry Britain th-s seems to !e one of strai"htfor/ard, '-antifia!le, pra"matically oriented achievement. @e/ methods /ere developedCal!eit mostly thro-"h trail and error, rather than as a res-lt of systematic theori<in"Cand caref-lly applied, /ith predicta!ly impressive res-lts. .his /as the /ay the master !reeders themselves -nderstood their accomplishments, as doc-mented in their p-!lished reflections on their craft. S-ch reflections -s-ally took one of t/o forms: advice to !e"inners or records of partic-lar s-ccesses for the edification of posterity. 2-thors /orkin" in !oth "enres s-""ested that the comple+ proced-res they descri!ed co-ld !e rather mechanically applied either to the improvement of /hole !reeds !y those at the forefront of h-s!andry or to the imitation of s-ch res-lts !y !reeders content to follo/ modestly in paths !la<ed !y others. .h-s, one early >ictorian man-al for sheep !reeders confidently associated the method /ith the res-lt, assertin" that 1there cannot !e a more certain si"n of the rapid advanced of a people in civili<ation and prosperity, than increasin" attention to the improvement of livestock1: in a related vein, an earlier a"ric-lt-ral treatise had ass-red readers that 1the perfectin" stock already /ellA !red is a pleasant, short and easy task.1G1LH 2t the end B 0F B of the cent-ry, the a-thor of a hand!ook for cat fanciers similarly s-""ested that "ood res-lts /o-ld follo/ the methodical application of e+pertise: 1Gmatin"H re'-ires . . . caref-l consideration, and . . . e+perience and theory 3oin hands, /hile the kno/led"e of the nat-ralist and fancier is of . . . s-perlative val-e.1G10H Pedi"ree charts, the -!i'-ito-s schematic representations of the res-lts of animal !reedin", also corro!orated this rather mechanical sense of /hat the enterprise involved.

*hen their disc-ssions of animal !reedin" !ecame more specific, ho/ever, the e+perts tended to retreat from their assertive selfAconfidence. @either method or kno/led"e, even /hen operatin" on cats of impecca!le pedi"ree and ro!-st health, co-ld ass-re 1anythin" like certainty,1 accordin" to the e+pert 3-st cited.G1%H Man-als for !reeders of cattle, sheep, and horses often /arned novices not to attempt to prod-ce the kinds of animals that /on pri<es at national sho/s, !eca-se of the diffic-lty, risk, and e+pense involved. .h-s, /hen closely scr-tini<ed, animal !reedin" no lon"er seemed merely a mechanical, if comple+, technical proced-re !-t /as implicitly redefined as a more am!i"-o-s and impressionistic activity. 2nd the more precisely the instr-ctions /ere artic-lated, the more conf-sin" they !ecame. =ften e+perts raised iss-es or offered advice that /as irrelevant to the achievement of their stated aims, or even co-nterprod-ctive. =ld and /idely reco"ni<ed canards /ere rit-ally che/ed over for decades after they had !een pers-asively discredited. 2n e+planation mi"ht strees the -nima"inative and derivative nat-re of many of these /orks, /hich occ-pied the !orderline !et/een technical and pop-lar /ritin", or it mi"ht foc-s on the conservatism inherent in many fields of applied and pop-lari<ed technolo"y. 2nd there is do-!tless some tr-th to !oth of these possi!ilities. B-t the c-rio-s or anomalo-s elements in the disco-rse of animal !reedin" can !e more f-lly e+plained if that disco-rse is also vie/ed as an arena for the disc-ssion of h-man "ender iss-es. )n a /ay, it /as an e+tremely o!vio-s foc-s for each concerns. 2fter all, the central task of !reeders /as to mana"e se+-al relations of their animals. .his task often posed challen"es !eyond the merely intellect-al pro!lem of decidin" /hich ones to pair -p. .he fact that the participants in this disco-rse /ere -na/are of its do-!le f-nction merely allo/ed them to air their vie/s and /orries more directly. )n makin" their decisions a!o-t /hich animals to pair, !reeders selected parents on the !asis of !oth their individ-al '-ality Di.e., the e+tent to /hich they possessed the characteristics that /ere desired in their offsprin"E and a set of "eneral notions a!o-t the /ay that the transmission of s-ch characteristics took place. (or most of the nineteenth cent-ry, there /ere fe/ a-thoritative constraints on s-ch ideas. 5espite the B 0J B claims of scienticity that a"ric-lt-ralists had made since the !e"innin" of the ei"hteenthAcent-ry vo"-e for improvement, fe/ of them and even fe/er !reeders of small animals !elon"ed to the scientific comm-nity: the /orks of pop-lar nat-ral history that they /ere most likely to enco-nter did not deal /ith the '-estions of reprod-ctive physiolo"y that en"a"ed some elite !iolo"ists. 2nd even if !reeders had !een a/are of the most advanced contemporary research on reprod-ction, they co-ld not easily have applied its res-lts to their enterprise. 2ltho-"h it /as clear to scientists, as it /as to !reeders, that se+-al interco-rse /as necessary if the hi"her animals /ere to reprod-ce, there /as no e+pert consens-s -ntil late in the nineteenth cent-ry a!o-t /hy this /as so.G19H .hat is, the modern -nderstandin" of the !alanced contri!-tion of sperm and e"" to the development of a ne/ or"anism /as -navaila!le to ei"hteenthA and nineteenthAcent-ry animal !reeders. *itho-t this kno/led"e, they /ere free to predict and interpret the res-lts of their !reedin" vent-res /ith reference only to their o/n e+perience. .hat e+perience /as vast and, indeed, considered e+tremely val-a!le !y opeAminded scientists like Charles 5ar/in.G&$H )t also t-rned o-t to incl-de !reeders4 attit-des to/ard other people, as /ell as their o!servations of "enerations of animals. G&1H Many ei"hteenthA anc nineteenthAcent-ry theories of reprod-ction presented it as the "rad-al enlar"ment and development of a tiny !-t complete seed, !-t scientists /ho adhered to this vie/point

/ere divided a!o-t /hether that seed /as contri!-ted !y the male or the female. 2nimal !reeders, ho/ever, /ere of one mind a!o-t this '-estion. Many, like the a-thor of the 0arrier and $aturalist article '-oted earlier, defined the female parent as a mere receptacle. =ne e+pert, faced /ith e+plainin" /hy, in this case, it /as not 1an easy thin" to prod-ce at once very perfect animals, provided that males of the ri"ht form co-ld !e o!tained,1 preferred not to posit the mother as a si"nificant so-rce of variation. )nstead, he had reco-rse to the fact that 1the offsprin" /ill, to a "reater or lesser e+tent, partake of the form and str-ct-re of the "randparents Gi.e., the "randfathersH.1 2nd even if s-ch an a!sol-te assertion of male dominance needed modification in vie/ of the o!vio-s tendency of yo-n" animals to resem!le !oth their parents, !reedin" e+perts still reserved the more vi"oro-s "enetic role for the st-d. .he ima"ery of activity and passivity remained -sef-l in the modified case: it s-""ested, for e+ample that 1the male "ives the locomotive, and the female the vital or"ans.1G&&H .he preponderance of male infl-ence never escaped the attention of /riters on these s-!3ects for lon", even if they had !een momentarily diverted !y the need to comment on females. (or e+ample, a reminder that 1/itho-t first class females the descendants /ill not shine . . . in the B 0L B sho/ yard1 /as predicta!ly accompanied !y the ackno/led"ment that 1it m-st not !e for"otten that the male has most infl-ence in !reedin".1G&#H .he only sit-ations in /hich it /as "enerally considered that the female mi"ht disproportionately determine the res-lts of procreation /ere those /hich introd-ced a different, and also po/erf-l, c-lt-ral constr-ct. Social s-periorityCthat is, the terms of animal h-s!andry, a more distin"-ished pedi"reeCmi"ht tip the scales in the direction of the female. 2s Io-att pointed o-t, the infl-ence of 1a hi"hly !red co/ /ill preponderate over that of the halfA!red !-ll.1G&FH Since s-ch e+ceptional circ-mstances co-ld only res-lt from e+treme ne"li"ence or i"norance on the part of the !reeder, ho/ever, they did not have to !e incorporated into receive /isdom. )n "eneral, !reeders /ere advised to proceed on the ass-mption that 1not only . . . is the male parent . . . cpa!le of most speedily improved the !reed of livestock . . ., !-t . . . the male is the #arent, from motives of sense and so-nd polity, /hich /e can alone look to for the improvement of o-r !reed.1G&JH Perhaps it /as to maintain this stron" differentation in reprod-ctive roles that cattle sho/ 3-d"es /ere ad3-red to assess !-lls 1as males and not as females1 and co/s 1as females and not as males.1 .he telltale si"ns /ere admittedly diffic-lt for even firstAclass 3-d"es to detectCnot the o!vio-s thin"s !-t s-!tle variations in s-ch -nlikely feat-res as the conformation of head and horns. B-t the stakes /ere considered hi"h eno-"h to 3-stify the tro-!le, especially /here !-lls /ere concerned. 2ccordin" to one veteran cattle !reeder, 1effeminacy in the male m-st !e sh-nned as the most deadly poison.1G&LH .he principles that "-ided the prod-ction of livestock animals /ere ro-tinely applied to pet species. .he a-thor of a late Citorian cat !reedin" man-al ass-red his readers that 1the o-t/ard characteristics are in "reat meas-re transmitted !y the male cat.1G&0H @or did the advance of !iolo"ical kno/led"e necessarily shake the faith of animal !reeders in their timeAtested principles. )nstead, as it !ecame availa!le, the 3ar"on of science co-ld !e appropriated to the service of the conventional -nderstandin" of animal reprod-ction. 8verett Millais, one of the most prominent do" fanciers of the late nineteenth cent-ry, translated it into the ne/ terminolo"y as follo/s: 1that the male . . . does infl-ence the epi!lastic and meso!lastic str-ct-res lar"ely, and all o-t of proportion to the female is -ndo-!ted.1G&%H So po/erf-l /as the infl-ence attri!-ted to at least some males, it /as even !elieved that they co-ld determine the character of offsprin" in the conception of /hich they had had no part. .hat is, they mi"ht "ain access to the reprod-ctive or"ans thro-"h the eyes of receptive females, as /ell as in the

ordinary /ay. 2s a res-lt, !reeders an+io-s to preserve the p-rity and the '-ality of their stock had to "-ard the minds as /ell as B 00 B the !odies of their impressiona!le female animals from s-ch -ndesira!le approaches. )t /ent /itho-t sayin" that females /o-ld !e !oth -na!le and disinclined to resist them. )n short, females co-ld not !e tr-sted /ith the preservation of their o/n virt-e, even on the level of ima"ination. Mr. M-stard4s co/, referred to earlier, offered an e+treme e+ample of the feminine s-scepti!ility posited !y this vie/ of relations !et/een the se+es. .he offA!reed o+ that 3-mped into her past-re /hen she /as in heat /as not even completely maleCthat is, he had !een castrated and therefore rendered incapa!le of procreationC!-t, even so, he apparently left this make on the calf she s-!se'-ently conceived after interco-rse /ith the properly pedi"reed !-ll selected !y her o/ner. )f females of a relatively stolid species /ere so s-scepti!le to the infl-ence of random males, it /as not s-rprisin" that female do"s, /hich /ere considered !oth more intelli"ent and more e+cita!le, had to !e "-arded still more closely. Breeders a"reed that the animals they termed maiden !itches /ere partic-larly v-lnera!le to s-ch e+ternal stim-li and advised that 1d-e infl-ence sho-ld !e e+ercised in the thoro-"h isolation of !itches . . . or more than a temporary evil and disappointment may occ-r.1G&9H B-t more e+perienced !itches /ere also at risk, and !e"innin" !reeders /ere /arned that 1even very close intimacy !et/een a !itch d-rin" oestr-m and a do" she fancies may infl-ence the pro"eny, altho-"h the do" has not /arded her.1G#$H .he str-""les !et/een !itches and !reeders /ere descri!ed in terms that evoked st-!!orn da-"hters in romantic narratives /ho ref-sed to accept their fathers4 choice of s-itors. ,-"h 5al<iel, /ho /rote a!o-t a variety of >ictorian do" !reeds, once o/ned a 5andie 5inmont terrier /hose /ay/ard emotions made her -seless for !reedin": she 1!ecame enamo-red /ith a deerho-nd, and positively /o-ld not s-!mit to !e served !y a do" of her o/n !reed.1 8ven !itches /ho /ere more compliant mi"ht defeat their o/ners4 p-rposes. 5ela!ere Blaine, sometimes kno/n as 1the father of canine patholo"y,1 had a p-" !itch /hose constant companion /as a /hite spaniel. 2ll her litters /ere sired !y pedi"reed p-"s, and all consisted of -ndenia!ly p-" p-ppies, !-t one in each !atch /as /hite, a color that /as rare and not desira!le in that !reed.G#1H 7eco"ni<in" that it /as -seless to fi"ht a"ainst s-ch a predilection, one prolific !reeder of do"s and cats /ho confessed that he /o-ld allo/s his champion st-ds to serve almost any female /hose o/ner co-ld pay the fee made one of his rare ref-sals in the case of a !itch that had 1already formed an attachment to a do" of a meaner !reed.1G#&H S-ch inclinations /ere fairly common amon" !itches, /ho /ere likely to implement them !y st-!!ornly resistin" their o/ners4 pr-dent attempts to cloister them. .he a-thor of man-als fre'-ently /arned novice !reeders that !itches in heat /o-ld make -nima"ina!ly s-!tle and persistent attempts to esA B 0% B cape from /hatever '-arters they /ere confined in. B-t it /as necessary to persevere in th/artint them, !eca-se the stakes at risk in the preservation of female p-rity /ere hi"h. 2 match /ith an inappropriate partner, especially in the case of a vir"in animal, /as held to have conse'-ences far !eyond the iss-e of that partic-lar matin", as if a female4s first se+-al partner in some sense esta!lished a permanent proprietorship over her reprod-ctive capacities. 2ltho-"h it /as, as one lateAnineteenthAcent-ry kennel e+pert admitted, 1an e+ceedin"ly rare

phenomenon,1 /hich /as diffic-lt to verify, many !reeders contin-ed to !elieve in /hat /as -s-ally called 1the infl-ence of the previo-s sire1 !-t /as sometimes di"nified !y the scientificAso-ndin" term 1tele"ony.1G##H .he midcent-ry a-thor of a scientific treatise on a"ric-lt-re s-mmari<ed this doctrine as follo/s: 1.he effect of the first male is so "reat as to ca-se all the animals that female shall after/ard "ive !irth to, in a more or less de"ree, to resem!le that !y /hich the female /as first impre"nated.1 ,e chose to ill-strate this doctrine /ith the story of a chestn-t mare /hose ori"inal mate /as a '-a""a Da relative or variety of the <e!ra that !ecame e+tinct late in the nineteenth cent-ryE, and all of /hose s-!se'-ent offsprin" /ere striped, even tho-"h all !-t the first res-lted from her -nion /ith a !lack stallion.G#FH .he !reedin" literat-re teemed /ith similar e+amples of the dire conse'-ences of lettin" females slip even once from the strai"ht and narro/. .he appearance of spotted p-ppies in a litter prod-ced !y t/o pri<e for terriers /as e+plained !y the fact that the sire of the !itch4s previo-s litter had !een a dalmatian.G#JH =f kittens of 1a "ood Persian sire and dam1 /ho nevertheless appeared 1remarka!ly poor specimens . . . /hat mi"ht !e called halfA!reeds,1 a late >ictorian cat fancier said that 1) can only attri!-te this to the !l-e female havin" t/ice strayed from the paths of virt-e previo-s to the attentions of the pri<eA/innin" Persian.1G#LH 5espite their fre'-ent appearance in the !reedin" literat-re, instances of the infl-ence of the previo-s sire seemed to occ-r only at /idely spaced intervals in real life. .he cases 3-st reco-nted, for e+ample, /ere thirdhand at !est. 8ven in the earlier literat-re, therefore, a-thors sometimes "in"erly noted that there mi"ht !e "ro-nd on /hich to '-estion this principle. .he more scientists discovered a!o-t ho/ reprod-ction act-ally /orked, the harder it !ecame for !reeders to identify a mechanism that /o-ld acco-nt for s-ch anomalies. .hey nevertheless cl-n" tenacio-sly to this doctrine, perhaps !eca-se, /eak tho-"h it mi"ht !e as a predictor of the res-lts of -nsanctioned animal -nions, it precisely e+pressed the metaphorical conse'-ences of s-ch lapses !y h-man females. 8ven the most sophisticated e+perts hesitated to dismiss completely the possi!ility of infl-ence or, as it mi"ht !e more forthA B 09 B ri"htly e+pressed, contamination or infection !y a female animal4s first mate. 2t most, they mi"ht s-""est that s-ch occ-rrences /ere s-fficiently rare that !reeders did not need to /orry a!o-t them. .h-s, @eville ;ytton, ordinarily impatient /ith the shi!!oleths of her fello/ fanciers, conceded that 1) am inclined to think GitH does occasionally happen,1 !-t she asserted that 1it happens so seldom that no one has ever !eey a!le to collect evidence eno-"h to prove. )n any case it /o-ld only affect isolated individ-als, and pro!a!ly only as to a sin"le character, . . . Gand soH . . . ) do not think !reeders need tro-!le themselves a!o-t so small a matter as the possi!le infl-ence of a previo-s sire on a sin"le p-ppy.1G#0H )n addition to 3eopardi<in" the '-ality Dor le"itimacyE of f-t-re offsprin", the tendency of female animals to follo/ their o/n se+-al inclinations /as perceived to pose less concrete !-t perhaps e'-ally tro-!lesome threats. 2ltho-"h an occasional a-thority mi"ht compassionately recommend ind-l"in" the desires of !itches that /ere 1hi"hly fed . . . GandH livin" l-+-rio-sly, as a means of -sin" -p their e+cess stock of material,1 an interest in se+ for its o/n sake rather than as a means to procreation /as considered an indication of depraved character.G#%H .he !ehavior of !itches, in partic-lar, confirmed the /orst male fears a!o-t female proclivities. 2ltho-"h a sin"le cop-lation mi"ht have s-fficed for pre"nancy, !itches /o-ld /antonly contin-e to accept ne/ partners as lon" as they /ere in heat: connected /ith this -nseemly p-rs-it of pleas-re /as a c-lpa!le indifference to its providers. =ne early nineteenthAcent-ry sportsman complained that 1no convincin" proof of satiety is ever displayed . . . and she presents herself e'-ally to all,1 /ith the res-lt that the lar"est of her s-itors 1is "enerally !ro-"ht

into action.1 ,e noted /ith some satisfaction, ho/ever, that overse+ed !itches mi"ht pay for their fail-re to prefer refinement to !r-te stren"th: many died /hile !rin"in" forth tooAlar"e p-ppies.G#9H 2ccordin" to other a-thorities, ho/ever, this -nmatronly !ehavior mi"ht harm the offsprin" rather than the mother. )n the do", as in some other animals that ro-tinely "ive !irth to m-ltiple offsprin", it is possi!le for a sin"le litter to have more than one father. Breedin" a-thorities referred to this phenomenon as 4s-perfoetation,1 a technical term that made it so-nd like an a!erration or a disease. 2s even the possi!ility of this occ-rrence /o-ld 3eopardi<e the pedi"ree of the res-ltin" litter, aspirin" !reeders /ere stron"ly advised that 1for at least a /eek after the !itch has visited the do", the preca-tions for isolatin" her m-st not !e rela+ed, or all her o/ner4s hopes may !e marred.1GF$H B-t social sti"ma and -n/elcome halfAsi!lin"s /ere not the only ills that ne/ly conceived pedi"reed p-rppies mi"ht s-stain as a res-lt of their mothers4 licentio-sness. 5al<iel s-""ested that d-rin" or after an -nsanctioned and -nnecesA B %$ B sary second cop-lation, 1e+cessive pain, terror, or other stron" emotions, may affect the -n!orn p-ps.1GF1H )n other species, too, interest in cop-lation for its o/n sake si"naled the /eakness of female character. 2 lateAei"hteenthAcent-ry a"ric-lt-ralist critici<ed the female ass for !ein" 1f-ll as lascivio-s1 as the male, /hich he claimed made her 1a !ad !reeder, e3ectin" a"ain the seminal fl-id she has 3-st received in coition, -nless the sensation of pleas-re !e immediately removed !y loadin" her /ith !lo/s.1 Similarly, he condemned the so/, /ho 1may !e said to !e in heat at all times: and even /hen she is pre"nant she seeks the !oard, /hich, amon" animals, may !e deemed an e+cess.1 2n edifyin" contrast, he pointed o-t, /as offered !y the dem-re !ehavior of co/s, /hich, once pre"nant, 1/ill not s-ffer the !-ll to approach them.1GF&H )n males, ho/ever, ea"erness to cop-late /as matter for praise. .he heA"oat /as admired as 1no despica!le animal . . . so very vi"oro-s . . . that one /ill !e s-fficient for a!ove a h-ndred and fifty sheA "oats.1GF#H Breeders a"reed that the only reason to c-rt the enth-siasm of st-ds /as physical rather than moral, since tooAfre'-ent cop-lation /as feared to -ndermine the constit-tion of !oth sire and offsprin". .h-s, one a-thority on horses complained that 1o-r test stallion . . . cover too many mares in one season: and this is the reason /hy they "et so fe/ "ood colts1: another advised a"ainst past-rin" a stallion /ith a herd of mares !eca-se in this sit-ation 1in si+ /eeks, GheH /ill do himself more dama"e than in several years !y moderate e+ercise.1GFFH Similarly, one e+pert on pedi"reed do"s /arned, 1)f yo- possess a champion do" . . . do not !e tempted to st-d him too m-ch, or yo- may kill the "oose /hich lays the e""s of "old. =ne !itch a fortni"ht is a!o-t as m-ch as any do" can do, to have "ood stock and retain his constit-tion.1GFJH 5espite the need to practice s-ch precise acco-ntin", the se+-al mana"ement of male animals /as m-ch simpler than that of females. )n the company of a s-ita!le partner, !-lls, stallions, do"s, !oars, and rams ordinarily did 3-st /hat /as e+pected of them. B-t even after !reeders had presented their female animal to a s-ita!le male in the re'-ired receptive and -ns-llied condition, their cares /ere not over. 2t that point, the female mi"ht decide to e+ercise an inappropriate veto po/er, offerin" an -nmistaka!le challen"e to the a-thority of her o/ner. 2fter all, in an enterprise dedicated to the prod-ction of offsprin", too m-ch rel-ctance /as as !ad as too little, and resistance of le"itimate a-thority /as as -nfeminine as proscri!ed se+-al en3oyment. .he terms in /hich !reeder descri!ed s-ch ins-!ordination e+pressed not only the an"er it provoked !-t the e+tent to /hich that an"er reflected /orries a!o-t se+-al s-!ordination /ithin their o/n

species. Some cate"ories of females /ere vie/ed /ith special s-spicison. (or e+amA B %1 B ple, !itches of the lar"er !reeds, /hose physical endo/ments commanded respect /hether or not they /ere feelin" refractory, had 1to !e taped or m-<<led . . . to prevent either yo-rself or the do" from !ein" !itten.1 Maiden !itches, too, /ere 1"enerally a "reat annoyance from first to last.1 .heir coyness mi"ht have to !e co-ntracted /ith coercion, altho-"h !reeders /ere ca-tined to remem!er, 1not too m-ch.1GFLH B-t almost any kind of !itch mi"ht evince rel-ctance /hen confronted /ith a prospective made not of her o/ choosi", in /hich case, she co-ld !e casti"ated as 1tro-!lesome,1 1morose,1 or even 1sava"e.1GF0H .he prescri!ed remedy /as 1hard e+ercise, -ntil the !itch is thoro-"hly e+ha-sted1: often this /o-ld 1red-ce a tiresome animal to s-!mission.1 Bitches that refl-sed to particpate /illin"ly at this point provoked their o/ners to severer meas-resCmeas-res that a"ain recalled the clich?s of romantic fiction. .hey mi"ht !e 1dr-""ed /ith some narcotic,1 or, in the most serio-s cases of ins-!ordination, the male do" and the h-man !reeder mi"ht cooperate in /hat /as referred to as a 1forced service.1GF%H .he technical disco-rse of animal h-s!andry clearly reflected contemporary concerns a!o-t h-man "ender relations, even tho-"h the ei"hteenthA and nineteenthAcent-ry !reeders of domesticated animals /ere not e+plicitly a/are of this s-!te+t as they shared their practical /isdom and rehearsed their tri-mphs. B-t they /o-ld not have made the same claims a!o-t the nat-re of their animals or -sed the same lan"-a"e to descri!e !ovine and canine inclinations and !ehavior if they had not implicitly ass-med an identity !et/een h-man nat-re and animal nat-reCan identity they /o-ld certaily have denied if they had !een asked a!o-t it directly. (rom the perspective of the late t/entieth cent-ry, this partic-lar conflation of the h-man social /orld /ith that of domestic animals is easy to critici<e. .heir pro3ection of h-man social constr-ctions onto animal matin" ha!its led !reeders astray in some practical senses, introd-cin" inefficiency alon" /ith mis-nderstandin" and error. 2nd it e+pressed a vie/ of "ender relations that seems !oth incorrect and o!3ectiona!le !y contemporary standards. B-t it is hard not to feel that !y placin" people amon" the other animals, !reeders also implicitly ackno/led"ed an -nderlyin" tr-th, one that h-man !ein"s have traditionally striven to deny, no less today than in the past.

our2 #an(ua(e and Ideo*o(y in E)o*utionary Theory/ Readin( !u*tura* Norms into Natura* #a3
E)e*yn o5 +e**er )n the midAt/entieth cent-ry, !iolo"y !ecame a 1mat-re science,1 that is, it s-cceeded, finally, in !reakin" thro-"h the formida!le !arrier of 1life1 that had heretofore precl-ded it from f-lly 3oinin" the mechanicored-ctive tradition of the physical sciences. (or the first time in history, the 1secret of life1 co-ld credi!ly !e claimed to have !een solved: ;ivin" !ein"sCpres-ma!ly incl-din" man alon" /ith the rest of the animal kin"domCcame to !e -nderstood as DmereE chemical machines. B-t the chemical machine that constit-tes a livin" or"anism is -nlike machines of the ei"hteenth and nineteenth cent-ries. )t is not a machine capa!le only of e+ec-tin" the p-rposes of its maker, that is, man, !-t a machine endo/ed /ith its o/n p-rpose. )n short, it is a machine of the t/entieth cent-ry, a cy!ernetic machine par e+cellence: a!sol-tely a-tonomo-s, capa!le of constr-ctin" itself, maintainin"

itself, and reprod-cin" itself. 2s Jac'-es Monod has e+plained: . . . .he entire system is totally, intensely conservative, locked into itself, -tterly impervio-s to any 1hints1 from the o-tside /orld. .hro-"h its properties, !y the microscopic clock/ork f-nction that esta!lishes !et/een 5@2 and protein, as !et/een or"anism and medi-m, an entirely oneA/ay relationship, this system o!vio-sly defies any 1dialectical1 description. )t is not ,e"elian at all, !-t thoro-"hly Cartesian: the cell is indeed a machine . D11$Q111E .he p-rposeCthe sole p-rposeCof this machine is its o/n s-rvival and reprod-ction, or perhaps more acc-rately p-t, the s-rvival and reprod-ction of the 5@2 pro"rammin" and 1dictatin"1 its operation. )n 7ichard 5a/kins4s terms, an or"anism is a 1s-rvival machine,1 a 1l-m!erin" ro!ot1 constr-ctin" to ho-se its "enes, those 1en"ines of selfApreserA B %L B vation1 that have as their primary property that of !ein" inherently 1selfish.1 .hey are 1sealed off from the o-tside /orld, comm-nicatin" /ith it !y tort-o-s indirect ro-tes, manip-latin" it !y remote control. .hey are in yo- and in me: they created -s, !ody and mind: and their preservation is the -ltimate rationale for o-r e+istence1 D&1E. *ith this description, man himself has !ecome a machine, !-t perhaps it mi"ht alternatively !e said that the machine itself has !ecome man. .he "eneral '-estion is this: .o /hat e+tent can o-r contemporary scientific descrption of animate forms, c-lminatin" in the description of man as a chemical machine, !e said to !e strictly technical, and to /hat e+tent does it act-ally encode partic-lar conceptions of manCconceptions that derive not so m-ch from a technical domain as from a social, political, and even psycholo"ical domainK ,ave animate, even h-man, forms finally !een s-ccessf-lly deanimated and mechani<ed, or have their mechanical representations themselves !een inadvertently animated, s-!tly recast in partic-lar ima"es of manK ) s-""est that traces of s-ch ima"es mi"ht !e fo-nd in virt-ally all scientific representations of nat-re, !-t they are perhaps especially conspic-o-s in o-r descriptions of the evol-tion of animate formsC even in those representations that make the "reatest claims to concept-al ne-trality. )t is no secret that evol-tionary !iolo"y has provided a partic-larly fertile field for those /ho seek to demonstrate the impact of social e+pectations on scientific theory. )ndeed, it mi"ht !e said that it is precisely for this reason that modern evol-tionary theorists have so-"ht so stren-o-sly to place their discipline on firm scientific footin". Pop-lation "enetics and mathematical ecolo"y are the t/o s-!disciplines that have !een constr-cted to meet this needCto provide a ri"oro-s s-!str-ct-re for all of evol-tionary !iolo"y. .he "eneral methodolo"ical ass-mption that -nderlies !oth of these s-!disciplines can !e descri!ed as atomic individ-alism, that is, the ass-mption that a composite property of a system !oth can and sho-ld !e represented !y the a""re"ation of properties inherin" in the individ-al atoms constit-tin" that system, appropriately modified !y their pair/ise or hi"her order interactions.G1H 2s is conventional in !iolo"ical disco-rse, ) take the individ-al atom to !e, alternatively, the or"anism or the "ene. ) shall, therefore, foc-s on the partic-lar attri!-tes c-stomarily ass-med to characteri<e the !asic -nit of analysis, the individ-al or"anism or "ene. B-t my foc-s /ill !e on the practice rather than the principle of atomic individ-alism in evol-tionary theory. =thers hae ar"-ed for an ideolo"ical load in the very ass-mptions of this methodolo"ical orientation Dsee, e."., *imsatt, 5-pr?E, !-t here ) /ish to !racket s-ch '-estions and foc-s instead on the lack of ne-trality in its act-al applications. )n partic-lar, ) claim that properties of the 1individ-al1 that are "enerally

B %0 B ass-med to !e necessary are in fact contin"ent, dra/n not from nat-re !-t from o-r o/n social and psychosocial herita"e. More specifically, ) /ill ar"-e that m-ch of contemporary evol-tionary theory relies on a representation of the 1individ-al1C!e it the or"anism or the "eneCthat is cast in the partic-lar ima"e of man /e mi"ht call the 1,o!!esian man1: sim-ltaneo-sly a-tonomo-s and oppositional, connected to the /orld in /hich it finds itself not !y the promise of life and "ro/th !-t primarily !y the threat of death and loss, its first and foremost need !ein" the defense of its !o-ndaries. )n psycholo"ical terms, /e mi"ht say that s-ch an individ-al !etrays an ideali<ed conception of a-tonomy: one that pres-pposes a radical conception of self and that sim-ltaneo-sly attri!-tes to the relation !et/een self and other an a-tomatic ne"ative valence, a relation, finally, not so m-ch of independence as of dynamic opposition. ) claim that this psychosocial load is carried into evol-tionary theory not !y e+plicit intention !-t !y lan"-a"eC!y tacit lin"-istic conventions that privile"e the a-tonomy of the individ-al at the e+pense of !iolo"ically constit-tive interactions and, at the same time, o!sc-re the lo"ical distinction !et/een a-tonomy and opposition. )n this, they s-pport the characteri<ation of the !iolo"ical individ-al as someho/ 1intrinsically1 competitive, as if a-tonomy and competition /ere semantically e'-ivalent, collapsed into one !y that f-ndamentally am!i"-o-s concept, selfAinterest. 2ccordin"ly, it is the lan"-a"eof a-tonomy and opposition in contemporary evol-tionary theory that is the specific o!3ect of my concern.

-is0ourse of Se*f and Other

) !e"in /ith a relatively accessi!le e+ample of act-al conf-sion !et/een a-tonomy and opposition that is fo-nd not in the theoretical literat-re per se !-t in a more "eneral "enre of scientific disco-rse, at once pop-lari<in" and prescriptive. ,ere the foc-s is not so m-ch on the independence of one individ-al from another, of self from other, as on the independence of the most a!stract other from self Cof nat-re from man. 2ccordin"ly, the ne"ative val-e that tacitly accr-es to this relation attaches not so m-ch to the self as to the other, that is, to nat-re. *ith 5ar/in, evol-tionary !iolo"y 3oined a tradition already /ell esta!lished in the physical sciences Ca tradition that teaches that the la/s of nat-re are, in Steven *ein!er"4s /ords, 1as impersonal and free of h-man val-es as the r-les of arithmetic1 D*ein!er" 190FE. B-t this rhetoric "oes !eyond impersonality: nat-re !ecomes -ncarin" and 1hostile,1 traits that are impersonal in a '-ite personal sense. .o ill-strate this tendency, consider, for e+ample, *ein!er"4s o/n ela!oration of his messa"e: B %% B )t is almost irresisi!le for h-mans to !elieve that /e have some special relation to the -niverse, tht h-man life is not 3-st a moreAorAless farcical o-tcome of a chain of accidents reachin" !ack to the first three min-tes. . . . )t is very hard to reali<e that this all is 3-st a tiny part of an over/helmin"ly hostile -niverse. DMid"ley, %%E )n m-ch the same vein, Jac'-es Monod /rites, )f he accepts this messa"e in its f-ll si"nificance, man m-st at last /ake o-t of his millenary dream and discover his total solit-de, his f-ndamental isolation, he m-st reali<e that, like a "ypsy, he lives on the !o-ndary of an alien /orld, a /orld that is deaf to his m-isc, and as indifferent to his hopes as it is to his s-fferin" or his crimes.G&H DMonod, &E .he /orld /e m-st steel o-rselves to accept is a /orld of 1-ncarin" emptiness,1 a 1fro<en -niverse of

solit-de1 D10#E. .he nat-ral /orld from /hich animism has !een so caref-lly e+p-n"ed has !ecome not '-ite ne-tral !-t 1empty,1 1fro<en,1 1over/helmin"ly hostile,1 and 1terrifyin".1 (or the record, tho-"h, it /as a poet, not a scientist, /ho "ave -s o-r most familiar metaphor conflatin" an a!sence of !enevolence in nat-re /ith 1over/helmin" hostility.1 2 nat-re that does not care for -s !ecomes indeed a nat-re 1red in tooth and cla/1Ccallo-s, !r-tal, even m-rdero-s. )t is a nat-re that cries, 1) care for nothin": all shall "o.1 Mary Mid"ley s-""ests that s-ch resid-al animism properly !elon"s to /hat she calls 1the drama of parental callo-sness1: (irst, there is the tone of personal a""rievement and disill-sion, /hich seems to depend . . . on fail-re to "et rid of the animism or personficiation /hich Dthese scientistsE officially deno-nce. 2n inanimate -niverse cannot !e hostile. . . . =nly in a real, conscio-s h-man parent co-ld -ncarin"ness e'-al hostility. . . . Certainly if /e e+pect the nonAh-man /orld aro-nd -s to respond to -s as a friendly h-man /o-ld, /e shall !e disappointed. B-t this does not p-t it in the position of a callo-sly indifferent h-man.G#H D19%J: %0E Mid"ley4s e+planation is pers-asiveCperhaps precisely !eca-se the slippa"e !et/een an indifferent and a hostile nat-re so clearly does denote a lo"ical error, once pointed o-t. B-t a similar pro!lems s-rfaces in another set of conte+ts as /ellC/here the move from a ne-tral to a ne"ative valence in the concept-ali<ation of selfAother relations is less evidently a simple 1mistake.1 ,ere it is not nat-re !-t the individ-al or"anism, the firs rather than the second term of the selfAother dichotomy, /hom the insistently -nsentimental !iolo"ist ta+es /ith hostility. ) am referrin" in partic-lar to the tradition amon" evol-tionary !iolo"ists that not only privile"es the individ-al descriptively !-t that also, in the attempt to locate all relevant ca-sal dynamics in the properties intrinA B %9 B sci to the individ-al, tends to attri!-te to that individ-al not simply a-tonomy !-t an additional 1intrinsic1 competitive !ent, as if independence and competition /ere insepara!le traits. .he very same move that defines selfAinterest and altr-ism as lo"ically opposed makes independence virt-ally indistin"-isha!le from competition. Michael 9hiselin is one of the most e+treme representatives of this position and provides some partic-larly !latant e+amples of the rhetorical Dand concept-alE conflation ) am speakin" of. .o dramati<e his position, he concl-des: .he economy of nat-re is competitive from !e"innin" to end. . . . @o hint of "en-ine charity ameliorates o-r vision of society, once sentimentatlism has !een laid aside. . . . 9iven a f-ll chance to act for his o/n interest, nothin" !-t e+pediency /ill restrain Gan or"anismH from !r-tali<in", from maimin", from m-rderin"Chis !rother, his mate, his parent, or his child. Scratch an 1altr-ist1 and /atch a 1hypocrite1 !leed. D&F0E =f co-rse, 9hiselin4s lan"-a"e is intended to shock -sC!-t only to -nderscore his thesis. )n this effort, he is co-ntin" on o-r acceptance, as readers, first, of the r-le of selfAinterest as lo"ically e'-ivalent to the a!sence of altr-ism or charity, and second, of competitive e+ploitation as a necessary concomitant of selfAinterest. =-r -s-al /illin"ness to accept these ass-mptions, or rather, to allo/ them to pass -nnoticed, is itself a meas-re of the inaccessi!ility of a domain /here selfAinterest and charity Dor altr-ismE con3oin and, correlatively, of a distinction !et/een selfAinterest and competition. Unlike the previo-s e+ample, /here no one, if pressed, /o-ld say that nat-re 1really is1 hostile, 9hiselin4s ass-mptions do seem to accord /ith the /ay thin"s 1really are.1 Beca-se the difference !et/een selfA

interest and competition is less o!vio-s to most of -s than the difference !et/een impersonality in nat-re and hostility, the pro!lem here is m-ch more diffic-lt. )n other /ords, !efore /e can invoke a psychosocial e+planation of the concept-al conflation !et/een radical individ-alism and competition, /e need first to see them as different. *e can do this !est !y t-rnin" o-r attention from a prescriptive disco-rse that aims to set "ro-nd r-les for evol-tionary theory to an e+amination of -ses of the same lan"-a"e in the act-al /orkin" o-t of partic-lar theoretical strate"ies. ) /ant to look, therefore, at the technical -ses of the lan"-a"e of individ-alism in mathematical ecolo"y and pop-lation "eneticsCin the first case, on the lan"-a"e of competition, and, in the second, on the lan"-a"e of reprod-ctive a-tonomy. )n partic-lar, ) /ant to sho/ ho/ certain conventional interchan"es, or tradeAoffs, !et/een to sho/ ho/ certain conventional interchan"es, or tradeAoffs, !et/een technical and collo'-ial lan"-a"e cast a !lanket of invisi!ility, or rather, of -nspeaka!ility, over certain distinctions, cate"ories, and '-estions. )t is, ) s-""est, precisely thro-"h the maintenance of s-ch an a-ra of -nspeaka!ility that social, psycholo"ical, and political e+pectations B 9$ B "enerally e+ert their infl-ence, thro-"h lan"-a"e, on the act-al str-ct-re and content of scientific theory.

!om6etition and !oo6eration in Mathemati0a* E0o*o(y

=ne pro!lem ) /ant to e+amine arises in the systematic ne"lect of cooperative Dor m-t-laistE interactions and the correspondi" privile"in" of competitive interactions evident thro-"ho-t almost the entire history of mathematical ecolo"y. *hen /e ask practitioners in the field for an e+planation of this historical disinterest in m-t-alist interactions, their response is -s-ally one of p-<<lementCnot so m-ch over the phenomenon as over the '-estion. ,o/ else co-ld it, realistically, !eK Ies, of co-rse, m-t-alist interactions occ-r in nat-re, !-t they are not only rare, they are necessarily secondary. =ften it is ass-med that they are in the service of competition: s-ch pheomena have at times act-ally !een called 1cooperative competition.1 )ndeed, the e+pectation of most /orkers in the field that competition is !oth phenomenolo"ically primary and lo"ically prior is so deeply em!edded that the very '-estion has diffic-lty "ettin" airspace: there is no place to p-t it. My '-estion th-s !ecomes, *hat are the factors responsi!le for the closin"Aoff of that spaceK Part of the diffic-lty in ans/erin" this '-estion -ndo-!tedly stems from the massive lin"-istic conf-sion in conventional -se of the term com#etition. =ne central factor can !e readily identified, ho/ever, and that is the reco"nition that, in the real /orld, reso-rces are finite and hence -ltimately scarce. .o most minds, scarcity a-tomatically implies competition, !oth in the sense of 1ca-sin"1 competitive !ehavior and in the sense of constit-tin", in itself, a kind of de facto competitio, independent of act-al interactions !et/een or"anisms. )ndeed, so a-tomatic is the association !et/een scarcity and competition that, in modern ecolo"ical -sa"e, competition has come to !e defined as the sim-ltaneo-s reliance of t/o individ-als, or t/o species, on an essential reso-rce that is in limited s-pply Dsee, e."., Mayr 19L#: F#E. Since the scarcity of reso-rces can itself hardly !e '-estioned, s-ch a definition lends to competition the same a priori stat-s. .his technical definition of competition /as pro!a!ly first employed !y >oltera, ;otka, and 9a-se in their early attempts to provide a mathematical representatation of the effects of scarcity on the pop-lation "ro/th of 1interactin"1 species, !-t it soon came to !e em!raced !y a /ider comm-nity of evol-tionary !iolo"ists and ecolo"istsCpartly, at least, to ne-trali<e the disco-rse and so !ypass the

char"e of ideolo"ically laden e+pectations a!o-t D-s-ally animalE !ehavior, in fact freein" the disco-rse of any depenA B 91 B dence on ho/ or"anisms act-ally !ehave in the face of scarcity. .he term com#etition no/ covered apparently pacific !ehavior 3-st as /ell as a""ressive !ehavior, an a!s-rdity in ordinary -sa"e !-t protected !y the stip-lation of a technical meanin". 2s 8rnst Mayr e+plains, .o certain a-thors eve since G5ar/inH, competition has meant physical com!at, and, coversely, the a!sence of physical com!at has !een taken as an indication of the a!sence of competition. S-ch a vie/ is erroneo-s. . . . .he relatively rarity of overt manifestations of competition is proof not of the insi"nificance of competition, as asserted !y some a-thors, !-t, on the contrary, of the hi"h premi-m nat-ral selection pays for the development of ha!its or preferences that red-ce the severity of competition. D19L#: F&QF#E Pa-l Colinva-+ "oes one step farther, s-""estin" that 1peacef-l coe+istence1 provides a !etter description than any 1talk of str-""les for s-rvival.1 1@at-ral selection desi"ns different kinds of animals and plants so that the a6oid competition. 2 fit animal is not one that fi"hts /ell, !-t one that avoids fi"htin" alto"ether1 D190%: 1FFE. B-t ho/ ne-tral in practice is the ostensi!ly technical -se of competition employed !oth !y Mayr and Colinva-+K ) s-""est t/o /ays in /hich, rather than !ypassin" ideolo"ical e+pectations, it act-ally preserves them, al!eit in a less visi!le formCa form in /hich they en3oy effective imm-nity from criticism. so as not to !e ca-"ht in the very trap ) /ant to e+pose, let me henceforth denote competition in the technical sense as 1Competition1 and in the collo'-ial sense Dof act-al contestE as 1competition.1 .he first /ay is relatively strai"htfor/ard. .he -se of a term /ith esta!lished collo'-ial meanin" in a technical conte+t permits the sim-ltaneo-s transfer and denial of its collo'-ial connotations. ;et me offer 3-st one e+ample: Colinva-+4s o/n description of 9a-se4s ori"inal e+periments that /ere desi"ned to st-dy the effect of scarcity on interspecific dynamicsChistorically, the e+perimental -nderpinnin" of the 1competitive e+cl-sion coe+istence.1 ,e /rites, @o matter ho/ many times 9a-se tested Gthe parameciaH a"ainst each other, the o-tcome /as al/ays the same, complete e+termination of one species. . . . 9a-se co-ld see this deadly str-""le "oin" on !efore his eyes day after day and al/ays /ith the same o-tcome. . . . /hat /e Gmi"ht haveH e+pected to !e a permanent str-""lin" !alance in fact !ecame a po"rom. D1F&E J-st to set the record strai"ht, these are not 1killer1 paramecia !-t perfectly ordinary parameciaC mindin" their o/n !-siness, eatin" and dividin", or not, perhaps even starvin". .he terms e.termination, deadly struggle , and #rogram refer merely to the sim-ltaneo-s dependence of t/o species on a common reso-rce. )f, !y chance, yo- sho-ld have misinterA B 9& B preted and taken them literally, to refer to overt com!at, yo- /o-ld !e told that yo- had missed the point. .he ;otkaA>olterra e'-ations make no s-ch claims: strictly speakin", they are incompati!le /ith an ass-mption of overt com!at: the competitive e+cl-sion principle merely implies an avoidance of conflict. 2nd yet the description of s-ch a sit-ation, only competitive in the technical sense, slips smoothly from 1Competition1 to "enocideCm-ch as /e sa/ o-r neoA.ennysonians slip from

inpersonality to heartless re3ection. .he point of this e+ample is not to sin"le o-t Colinva-+ D/hich /o-ld s-rely !e -nfairE !-t to provide an ill-stration of /hat is, in fact, a rather /idespread investment of an ostensi!ly ne-tral technical term /ith a '-ite different set of connotations associated /ith its collo'-ial meanin". .he collo'-ial connotations lead pla-si!ly to one set of inferences and close off others, /hile the technical meanin" stands ready to disclaim responsi!ility if challen"ed.GFH .he second and more serio-s ro-te !y /hich the apparently a priori stat-s of competition is sec-red can !e e+plored thro-"h an in'-iry into the implicit ass-mptions a!o-t reso-rce cons-mption that are here pres-pposed and the aspects of reso-rce cons-mptions that are e+cl-ded. .he first pres-pposition is that a reso-rce can !e defined and '-antitatively assessed independent of the or"anism itself: and the second is that each or"anism4s -tili<ation of this reso-rce is independent of other or"anisms. )n short, reso-rce cons-mption is here represented as a <eros-m "ame. S-ch a representation mi"ht !e said to correspond to the a!sol-tely minimal constraint possi!le on the a-tonomy of each individ-al, !-t it is a constraint that has precisely the effect of esta!lishin" a necessary link !et/een selfAinterest and competition. *ith these ass-mptions, apparently a-tonomo-s individ-als are in fact !o-nd !y a <eros-m daynamic that "-arantees not '-ite an a!sence of interaction !-t the inevita!ility of a p-rely competitive interaction. )n a /orld in /hich one or"anism4s dinner necessarily means another4s starvation, the mere cons-mption of reso-rces has a kind of de facto e'-ivalence to m-rder: individ-al or"anisms are locked into a life and death str-""le not !y virt-e of their direct interactions !-t merely !y virt-re of their e+istence in the same place and time. )t is /orth notin" that the very same D;otkaA>olterraE e'-ations readily accommodate the replacement of competitive interactions !y cooperative ones and even yield a sta!le sol-tion. .his fact /as act-ally noted !y 9a-se himself as early as 19#J D9a-se and *itt 19#JE and has !een occasionally rediscovered since then, only to !e, each time, refor"otten !y the comm-nity of mathematical ecolo"ists. .he f-ll reasons for s-ch amnesia are -nclear, !-t it s-""ests a stron" prior commitment to the representation of reso-rce cons-mption as a <eroAs-m dynamicCa B 9# B representation that /o-ld !e fatally -ndermined !y the s-!stit-tion Dor even additionE of cooperative interactions. ;eft o-t of this representation are not only cooperative interactions !-t any interactions !et/een or"anisms that affect the individ-al4s need and -tili<ation of reso-rces. 2lso omitted are all those interactions !et/een or"anism and environment /hich interfere /ith the identification and meas-rement of a reso-rce independently of the properties of the or"anism. 7ichard ;e/ontin D19%&E has ar"-ed that or"anisms 1determine /hat is relevant1 in their environmentC/hat, for e+ample, is a reso-rceCand act-ally 1constr-ct1 their environment. B-t s-ch interations, either !et/een or"anisms or !et/een or"anism and environment, lead to payAoff matrices necessarily more comple+ than those prescri!ed !y a <eroAs-m dynamicCpayAoff matrices that, int-rn, considera!ly complicate the pres-med relation !et/een selfAinterest and competition, if they do not alto"ether -ndermine the very meanin" of selfAinterest. Perhaps the simplest e+ample is provided !y the 1prisoner4s dilemma.1 B-t even here, /here the ori"inal meanin" of selfAinterest is most closely preserved, 7o!ert 2+elrod has sho/n that -nder conditions of indefinite reiterations, a D1titAforAtat1E strate"y is "enerally !etter s-ited to selfAinterest than are more primitive competitive strate"ies. )nteractions that effectively "enerate ne/ reso-rces, or either increase the efficiency of reso-rce

-tili<ation or red-ce a!sol-te re'-irement, are more directly dama"in" to the very principle of selfA interest. .hese are e+actly the kinds of interactions that are "enerally cate"ori<ed as special cases: as 1m-t-alist,1 1cooperative,1 or 1symo!iotic1 interactions. (inally, interactions that affect the !irth rate in /ays not mediated !y scarcity of reso-rces, for e+ample, se+-al reprod-ction, are also e+cl-ded !y this representation. Perhaps the most important of these omissions for intraspecific dynamics, ) /o-ld point to se+-al reprod-ction, a fact of life that potentially -ndermines the core ass-mptions of radical individ-alism. )n the last fe/ years, there has !een a ne/ /ave of interest in m-t-alism amon" not only dissident !-t even a fe/ mainstream !iolo"ists, and n-mero-s a-thors are hard at /ork redressin" the ne"lect of previo-s years.GJH B-t in the si+ty years in /hich the ;otkaA>olterra e'-ations have rei"ned as the principal, if not the only, model of interspecific pop-lation dynamicsCeven in the more "enial climate of recent yearsCthe omission of se+-al reprod-ction from this model has sacrcely !een noted. .his omission, once reco"ni<ed, takes -s !eyond the '-estion of selective !iases in admissi!le or relevant interactions !et/een or"anisms. )t calls into '-estion the first and most !asic ass-mption for the methodolo"y of individ-alism in evol-tionary theory, namely, that inA B 9F B trinsic properties of individ-al or"anisms are primary to any description of evol-tionary phenomena.GLH .o e+amine this ar"-ment, let -s t-rn from mathematical ecolo"y to pop-lation "enetics, that !ranch of evol-tionary theory that promises to avoid the practical diffic-lties of selective foc-s on certain interactions !y e+cl-din" the entire '-estion of competitive or cooperative interactions from its domain. )n other /orkds, traditional pop-lation "enetics addresses neither interactions !et/ee or"anisms nor limitations in reso-rces: it effectively ass-mes pop-lations at lo/ density /ith infinite reso-rces. ,o/ever, one last pro!lem /ith the lan"-a"e of competition m-st !e noted lest it carry over int o-r disc-ssion of individ-al a-tonomy in pop-lation "enetics: the /idespread tendency to e+tend the sense of 1competition1 to incl-de not only the t/o sit-ations /e distin"-ished earlier Di.e., conflict and reliance on a common reso-rceE !-t also a third sit-ationG0H /here there is no interaction at all, /here 1competition1 denotes an operation of com#arison !et/een or"anisms Dor speciesE that re'-ires no 3-+taposition in nat-re, only in the !iolo"ist4s o/n mind. .his e+tention, /here 1competition1 can cover all possi!le circ-mstances of relative via!ility and reprod-ctivity, !rin"s /ith it, then, the tendency to e'-ate competition /ith nat-ral selection itself. 5ar/in4s o/n rhetorical e'-ation !et/een nat-ral selection and the Malth-sian str-""le for e+istence s-rely !ears some responsi!ility for this tendency. B-t contemporary readers of 5ar/in like to point o-t that he did try to correct the misreadin" his rhetoric invited !y e+plainin" that he meant the term struggle in 1a lar"e and metaphoric sense,1 incl-din", for e+ample, that of the plant on the ed"e of the desert: competition /as only one of the many meanin"s of str-""le for 5ar/in. =thers have !een even more e+plicit on this iss-e, repeatedly notin" the importance of distin"-ishin" nat-ral selection from 1a Malth-sian dynamic.1 ;e/ontin, for one, has /ritten. .h-s, altho-"h 5ar/in came to the idea of nat-ral selection from consideration of Malth-s4 essay on overpop-lation, the element of competition !et/een or"anisms for a reso-rce in short s-pply is not inte"ral to the ar"-ment. @at-ral selection occ-rs even /hen t/o !acterial strains are "ro/in" lo"arithmcally in an e+cess of n-trient !roth if they have different division times. D190$: 1E ,o/ever, s-ch attemptsC!y ;e/ontin, and earlier and more comprehensively, !y ;.C. Birch D19J0EC to clarify the distinction !et/een nat-ral section and competition D/hat 8n"els called 15ar/in4s

mistake1E have done little to stem the -nderlyin" conviction that the t/o are someho/ the same. )n a recent attempt to define the lo"ical essence of 1the 5ar/inian dynamic,1 Bernstein et al. D19%#E freely translate 5ar/in4s B 9J B 1str-""le for s-rvival1 to 1competition thro-"h reso-rce limitation1 D19&E, there!y claimin" for competition the stat-s of a 1!asic component1 of nat-ral selection. 8ven more recently, 9eor"e *illiams D19%LE descri!es a classic e+ample of nat-ral selection in the la!oratory as a 1competition e+periment,1 a 1contest1 !et/een a m-tant and normal allele, in /hich he cites differential fec-ndity as an e+ample of 1the competitive interactions amon" individ-al or"anisms1 that ca-se the relative increase in one pop-lation D11FQ11JE. 2t iss-e is not /hether overtly competitive !ehavior or more !asic ecolo"ical scarcity is the r-le in the nat-ral /orld: rather, it is /hether or not s-ch a '-estion can even !e asked. .o the e+tent that distinctions !et/een competition and scarcity, on the one hand, and !et/een scarcity and nat-ral selection, on the other, are o!literated from o-r lan"-a"e and tho-"ht, the '-estion itself !ecomes foreclosed. 2s lon" as the theory of nat-ral selection is -nderstood as a theory of competition, confirmation of one is taken to !e confirmation of the other, despite their lo"ical Dand !iolo"icalE difference. *hile this clearly raises pro!lems a!o-t the meanin" of confirmation, my principal concern is /ith the dynamics !y /hich s-ch an oversi"ht or conf-sion is s-stained in the theory and practice of /orkin" !iolo"istsC/ith the internal conventions that render it effectively resistant to correction. 5ynamics similar to those in the lan"-a"e of competition can also !e seen in the lan"-a"e of reprod-ctive a-tonomy, especially as employed in the theory and practice of pop-lation !iolo"y.

The $rob*em of Se5ua* Re6orodu0tion

)n m-ch of the disco-rse on reprod-ction, it is common to speak of the 1reprod-ction of an or"anism1Cas if reprod-ction is somethin" an individ-al or"anism does: as if an or"anism makes copies of itself, !y itself. Strictly speakin", of co-rse, s-ch lan"-a"e is appropriate only to ase+-ally reprod-cin" pop-lations since, as every !iolo"ist kno/s, se+-ally reprod-cin" or"anisms neither prod-ce copies of themselves nor prod-ce other or"anisms !y themselves. )t is a strikin" fact, ho/ever, that the lan"-a"e of individ-al reprod-ction, incl-din" s-ch correlative terms as an indi6idual,s offs#ring and lineage , is -sed thro-"ho-t pop-lation !iolo"yG%H to apply indiscriminately to !oth se+-ally and ase+-ally reprod-cin" pop-lations. *hile it /o-ld !e a!s-rd to s-""est hat -sers of s-ch lan"-a"e are act-ally conf-sed a!o-t the nat-re of reprod-ction in the or"anisms they st-dy De."., calc-lations of n-m!ers of offsprin" per or"anism are al/ays appropriately ad3-sted to take the mode of reprod-ction into acco-ntE, /e mi"ht nonetheless ask, /hat f-nctions, !oth positive and ne"ative, does s-ch manifestly pec-liar lan"-a"e B 9L B serveK 2nd /hat conse'-ences does it have for the shape of the theory in /hich it is em!eddedK ) /ant to s-""est, first, that this lan"-a"e, far from !ein" inconse'-ential, provides cr-cial concept-al s-pport for the individ-alist pro"ram in evol-tionary theory. )n partic-lar, my claim is that the startin" ass-mption of this pro"ramCthat is, that individ-al properties are primaryCdepends on the lan"-a"e of individ-al reprod-ction for its !asic credi!ility.G9H )n addition, ) /o-ld ar"-e that, 3-st as /e sa/

/ith the lan"-a"e of competition, the lan"-a"e of individ-al reprod-ction, maintained as it is !y certain methodolo"ical conventions, !oth !locks the perception of pro!lems in the evol-tionary pro3ect as presently cond-cted and, sim-ltaneo-sly, impedes efforts to redress those diffic-lties that can !e identified. .he pro!lems posed for evol-tionary theory !y se+-al reprod-ction and Mendelian "enetics are hardly ne/, and indeed, the !asic theory of pop-lation "enetics ori"inates in the form-lation of a partic-lar method Di.e., the ,ardyA*ein!er" calc-l-sE desi"ned to solve these pro!lems. .he ,ardyA*ein!er" calc-l-s Doften referred to as 1!eanA!a"1 "eneticsE invoked an i!vio-sly hi"hly ideali<ed representation of the relation !et/een "enes, or"anisms, and reprod-ction, !-t it /as one that accomplished a "reat deal. Most important, it provided a remarka!ly simple recipe for mediatin" !et/een individ-als and pop-lationsCa recipe that apparently s-cceeded in preservin" the individ-alist foc-s of the evol-tionists4 pro"ram. =ne mi"ht even say that it did so, perhaps some/hat parado+ically, !y tacitly disco-ntin" individ-al or"anisms and their tro-!lesome mode of reprod-ction. *ith the shift of attention from pop-lations of or"anisms to /ellAmi+ed, effectively infinite, pools of "enes, the "ap !et/een individ-al and pop-lation closed. )ndivid-al or"anisms, in this pict-re, co-ld !e tho-"ht of as mere !a"s of "enes Danticipatin" 7ichard 5a/kins4s 1s-rvival machines1 G190L: &1HECthe end prod-ct of a reprod-ctive process no/ red-ced to "enetic replication pl-s the random matin" of "ametes. 8ffectively !ypassed /ith this representation /ere all the pro!lems entailed !y se+-al difference, !y the contin"encies of matin" and fertili<ation that res-lted from the finit-de of act-al pop-lations and, sim-ltaneo-sly, all the am!i"-ities of the term re#roduction as applied to or"anisms that neither make copies of themselves nor reprod-ce !y themselves. )n shor, the ,ardyA*ein!er" calc-l-s provided a recipt for dealin" /ith reprod-ction that left -ndistr-!edCindeed, finally, reinforcedCthe temptation to think Dand to speakE a!o-t reprod-ction as simply an individ-al process, to the e+tent, that is, that it /as tho-"ht or spoken a!o-t at all. )n the s-!se'-ent incorporation of the effects of nat-ral selection into the ,ardyA*ein!er" model, for most a-thors in pop-lation "enetics, the B 90 B contri!-tion of reprod-ction to nat-ral selection fell lar"ely !y the /ayside. .r-e, the !asic calc-l-s provided a ready /ay to incorporate at least part of the reprod-ctive process, namely, the prod-ction of "ametes: !-t in practice, the theorietical Dand ver!alE convention that came to prevail in traditional pop-lation "enetics /as to e'-ate na-tral selection /ith differential s-rvival and i"nore fertility alto"ether. )n other /ords, the ,ardyA*ein!er" calc-l-s seems to ave invited not one !-t t/o kinds of elision from nat-ral selectionCfirst, of all those complications inc-rred !y se+ and the contin"ency of matin" Dthese, if considered at all, !et sh-nted off -nder the la!el of se+-al, rather than nat-ral, selectionE,G1$H and second, more o!li'-ely, of repor-dction in toto. )n /ant to s-""est that these t/o different kinds of elision in fact provided important tacit s-pport for each other. )n the first case, the representation of reprod-ction as "ametic prod-ction invited confidence in the ass-mption that, for calc-latin" chan"es in "ene fre'-ency, differential reprod-ction, or fertility, /as like differential s-rvival and hence did not re'-ire separate treatment. 2nd in the second case, the technical e'-ation of nat-ral selection /ith differential s-rvival /hich prevailed for so many years, in t-rn, served to deflect attention a/ay from the s-!stantive diffic-lties invoked in representin" reprod-ction as an individ-al process. .he net effect has !een to esta!lish a circle to confidence, first, in the ade'-acy of the ass-mption that, despite the mechanics of Mendelianism, the individ-al remains !oth the s-!3ect and o!3ect of reprod-ction, and second, in the ade'-acy of the metonymic collapse of reprod-ction and s-rvival in disc-ssions of nat-ral selection.

.he more o!vio-s cost of this circle s-rely comes from its second part. 2s a n-m!er of a-thors have recently !e"-n to remind -s, the e'-ation !et/een nat-ral selection and differential s-rvival fosters !oth the theoretical omission and the e+perimental ne"lect of a cr-cial component of nat-ral selection. Perhaps even more serio-s is the cost in -nresolved diffic-lties that this e'-ation has helped o!sc-re. =ne s-ch diffic-lty is the persistence of a chronic conf-sion !et/een t/o definitions of individ-al fitness: one, the Davera"eE net contri!-tion of an individ-al of a partic-lar "enotype to the ne+t "eneration, and the other, the "eometric rate of increase of that partic-lar "enotype. .he first refers to the contri!-tion an individ-al makes to reprod-ction, /hile the second refers to the rate of prod-ction of individ-als. )n other /ords, the first definition refers to the role of the individ-al as s-!3ect of reprod-ction and the second to its role as o!3ect. .he disparity !et/een the t/o derives from the !asic fact that, for se+-ally reprod-cin" or"anisms, the rate at /hich individ-als of a partic-lar "enotype are !orn is a f-ndamentally different '-antity from the rate at /hich individ-als of B 9% B that "enotype "ive !irthCa distinction easily lost in a lan"-a"e that assi"ns that same term, "irthrate , to !oth processes. Be"innin" in 19L&, a n-m!er of a-thors have attempted to call attention to this conf-sion DMoran 19L&: Charle/sorth 190$: Pollak and 6empthorne 1901: 5enniston 190%E, a"reein" that one definitionCthe contri!-tion a partic-lar "enotype makes to the ne+t "eneration4s pop-lationCis !oth conventional and correct, /hile the other Dthe rate at /hich individ-als of a partic-lar "enotype are !ornE is not. 5espite their efforts, ho/ever, the conf-sion persists.G11H )n part, this is !eca-se there remains a real '-estion as to /hat 1correct1 means in this conte+t or more precisely, as to /hich definition is !etter s-ited to the needs that the concept of fitness is intended to serveCin partic-lar, the need to e+plain chan"es in the "enotypic composition of pop-lations. 9iven that need, /e /ant to kno/ not only /hich "enotypes prod-ce more !-t also the relative rate of increase of a partic-lar "enotype over the co-rse of "enerations. @ot s-rprisin"ly, conflation of the t/o definitions of fitness is partic-larly likely to occ-r in attempts to esta!lish a formal connection !et/een the models of pop-lation "enetics and those of mathematical ecolo"y. Beca-se all the standards models for pop-lation "ro/th ass-me ase+-al reprod-ction, the t/o formalisms act-ally refer to t/o completely different kinds of pop-lations: one of "ametic pools and the other of ase+-ally reprod-cin" or"anisms. )n attemptin" to reconcile these t/o theories, s-ch a conflation is in fact re'-ire to finesse the lo"ical "ap !et/een them. 2 more ade'-ate reconciliation of the t/o formalisms re'-ires the introd-ction of !oth the dynamics of se+-al reprod-ction into mathematical ecolo"y and a compati!le representation of those dynamics into pop-lation "enetics. Co-nterint-itively, it is pro!a!ly the secondCthe incl-sion Din pop-lation "enetics modelsE of fertility as a property of the matin" typeCthat calls for the more s-!stantive concept-al shifts. =ver the last t/enty years, /e have /itnessed the emer"ence of a considera!le literat-re devoted to the analysis of fertility selectionCeadin" at least some a-thors to the concl-sion that 1the classical concept of individ-al fitness is ins-fficient to acco-nt for the action of nat-ral selection1 DChristiansen 19%#: 0JE. .he !asic point is that /hen fertility selection is incl-ded in nat-ral selection, the fitness of a "enotype, like the fitness of a "ene Das ar"-ed !y So!er and ;e/ontin 19%&E, is seen to depend on the conte+t in /hich it finds itself. @o/, ho/ever, the conte+t is one determined !y the "enotype of the matin" partner rather than !y the complementary allele. 2 cas-al readin" of the literat-re on fertility selection mi"ht s-""est that the matin" pair /o-ld !e a more appropriate -nit of selection than the

B 99 B individ-al, !-t the fact is that matin" pairs do not reprod-ce themselves any more than do individ-al "enotypes. 2s 8. Pollak has pointed o-t, 1even if a s-perior matin" prod-ces offsprin" /ith a potential for enterin" a s-perior matin", the reali<ation of this potential is dependent -pon the str-ct-re of the pop-lation1 D190%: #%9E. )n other /ords, in comp-tin" the contri!-tion of either a "enotype or a matin" pair to the ne+t "eneration4s pop-lation Dof "enotypes or matin" pairsE, it is necessary to take acco-nt of the contin"ency of matin": s-ch a factor, meas-rin" the pro!a!ility that any partic-lar or"anism /ill act-ally mate, inc-rs a fre'-ency dependence that reflects the dependence of matin" on the "enotypic composition of the entire pop-lation. >ery !riefly, the incl-sion of a f-ll acco-nt of reprod-ction in evol-tionary theory necessitates the concl-sion that nat-ral selection operates sim-ltaneo-sly on many levels D"ene, or"anisms, matin" pair, and "ro-pE, not 3-st -nder special circ-mstances, as others have ar"-ed, !-t as a r-le. (or se+-ally reprod-cin" or"anisms, fitness in "eneral is not an individ-al property !-t a composite of the entire inter!reedin" pop-lation, incl-din", !-t certainly not determined !y, "enic, "enotypic, and matin" pair contri!-tions. By -nderminin" the reprod-ctive a-tonomy of the individ-al or"anism, the advent of se+ -ndermines the possi!ility of locatin" the ca-sal efficacy of evol-tionary chan"e in individ-al properties. 2t least part of the 1ca-sal en"ine1 of nat-ral selection m-st !e seen as distri!-ted thro-"ho-t the entire pop-lation of inter!reedin" or"anisms. My point is not merely to ar"-e a"ainst the ade'-acy of the individ-alist pro"ram in evol-tionary theory !-tClike the point of my earlier remarks a!o-t competitionCto ill-strate a '-iet "eneral process !y /hich the partic-lar conventions of lan"-a"e employed !y a scientific comm-nity permit a tacit incorporation of ideolo"y into scientific theory and, sim-ltaneo-sly, protect participants from reco"nition of s-ch ideolo"ical infl-ences. .he net effect is to ins-late the theoretical str-ct-re from s-!stantive critical revision. )n disc-ssions of se+-al reprod-ction, the lin"-istic conventions of individ-al reprod-ctionCconventions em!odyin" an ideolo"ical commitment to the a priori a-tonomy of the individ-alC!oth perpet-ate that !elief and promte its incorporation into the theory of evol-tionary dynamics. 2t the same time, the conventional e'-ation !et/een nat-ral selection and differential s-rvival has served to protect evol-tionary theory from pro!lems introd-ced !y se+-al reprod-ction, there!y lendin" at least tacit s-pport to the ass-mption of individ-al a-tonomy that "ave rise to the lan"-a"e of individ-al reprod-ction in the first place. .he res-ltCno/ !oth of the lan"-a"e of a-tonomy and the lan"-a"e of competitionCis to effectively e+cl-de from the domain of theory those !iolo"ical phenomena that do not fit Dor even /orse, threaten to -ndermineE the ideolo"ical commitments B 1$$ B that are -nspoken yet in lan"-a"e, !-ilt into science !y the lan"-a"e /e -se in !oth constr-ctin" and applyin" o-r theories. )n this /ay, thro-"h o-r inescapa!le reliance on lan"-a"e, even the most ardent efforts to rid nat-ral la/ of c-lt-ral norms !ecome s-!verted, and the machinery of life takes on not so m-ch a life of its o/n as a life of -r o/n. B-t then a"ain, /hat other life co-ld it haveK

Referen0es
2+elrod, 7o!ert. The -6olution of Coo#eration. @e/ Iork: Basic Books, 19%F. Bernstein, ,., ,. C. Byerly, (. 2. ,opf, 7. 2. Michod, and 9. 6. >em-lapalli. 1.he 5ar/inian 5ynamic,1 The 8uarterly 1e6ie/ of Biology J% D19%#E: 1%JA&$0.

Birch, ;. C. 1Meanin"s of Competition.1 American naturalist 91 D19J0E: JA1%. Bo-cher, 5o-"las. The Biology of Mutualism. Cam!rid"e: =+ford University Press, 19%J. Charles/orth, B. 1Selection in Pop-lations /ith =verlappin" 9enerations. 1: .he Use of Malth-sian Parameters in Pop-lation 9enetics,1 Theoretical (o#ulation Biology 1, # D190$E: #J&A#0$. Christiansen, (.B. 1.he 5efinition and Meas-rement of (itness,1 in B. Shorrocks, ed., -6olutionary -cology: B. -. S. Sym#osium &#. =+ford and Boston: Black/ell Scientific P-!lications, 19%F. LJA09. Colinva-+, Pa-l. %hy Big 0iere Animals are 1are. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 190%. 5a/kins, 7ichard. The Selfish *ene. =+ford University Press, 190L. 5enniston, C. 12n )ncorrect 5efinition of (itness 7evisited,1 Annals of Human *enetics, 3ond. F& D190%E: 00A%J. 9a-se, 9. (., and 2. 2.*itt. 1Behavior of Mi+ed Pop-lations and the Pro!lem of @at-ral Selection,1 American $aturalist L9 D19#JE: J9LAL$9. 9hiselin, Michael. The -conomy of $ature and the -6olution of Se.. Berkeley, ;os 2n"eles, ;ondon: University of California Press, 190F. 6eller, 8velyn (o+. 17eprod-ction and the Central Pro3ect of 8vol-tionary .heory,1 Biology and (hiloso#hy & D19%0E: 0#A%L. 6eller, 8velyn (o+. 15emarcatin" P-!lic from Private >al-es in 8vol-tionary 5isco-rse,1 Journal of the History of Biology &1, & D19%%E: 19JA&11. ;e/ontin, 7ichard, 1=r"anism and 8nvironment,1 in 8. ,. C. Pltokin, ed., 3earning, De6elo#ment, and Culture. @e/ Iork: John *iley and Sons, 19%&. CCC. 1.he Units of Selection,1 Annual 1e6ie/ of -cology and Systematics D190$E: 1A1B. B 1$& B Mayr, 8rnst. Animal S#ecies and -6olution. Cam!rid"e: ,arvard University Press, 19L#. Mid"ley, Mary. -6olution as a 1eligion. ;ondon and @e/ Iork: Meth-en, 19%J. Monod, Jac'-es. Chance and $ecessity. @e/ Iork: 7andom ,o-se, 190&. Moran. P. 2. P. 1=n the @one+istence of 2daptive .opo"raphies,1 annals of Human *enetics , &0 D19L&E: #%#A#9#. Pollak, 8. 1*ith Selection for (ec-ndity the Mean (itness 5oes @ot @ecessarily )ncrease,1 *enetics 9$ D190%E: #%#A#%9. Pollak, 8., and =. 6empthorne. 1Malth-sian Parameters in 9enetic Pop-lations, )). 7andom Matin" Pop-lations in )nfinite ,a!itats,1 Theoretical (o#ulation Biology & D1901E: #J0A#9$. So!er, 8., and 7. ;e/ontin. 12rtifact, Ca-se, and 9enetic Selection,1 (hiloso#hy of Science F0 D19%&E: 1J0A1%$. .ennyson, 2lfred ;ord. &n Memoriam ;>A;>). *ein!er", Steven. 17eflections of a *orkin" Scientist,1 Daedalus 1$# DS-mmer 190FE: ##AFL. *illiams, 9eor"e. 1Comments,1 Biology and (hiloso#hy 1, 1 D19%LE: 11FA1&&.

B 1$# B

i)e2 Human Nature and !u*ture/ Bio*o(y and the Residue of Uni7ueness
Me*)in +onner

I
Since the '-estion, 1)s there s-ch a thin" as h-man nat-reK1 contin-es to !e posed, and to !e ans/ered !y some in the ne"ative, it seems necessary to !ein" !y e+plorin" the meanin" of this '-estion and sho/in" /hy it cannot, in any meanin"f-l form, have any !-t an affirmative ans/er. .he '-estion raises do-!ts a!o-t /hether aspects of the h-man condition can !e considered inevita!le o-tcomes of !iolo"ical elements in the h-man make-p. )n e+treme forms, s-ch do-!ts are d-!io-s. )f ) assert that it is h-man nat-re to re'-ire a diet s-pplyin" ei"ht essential amino acids, to /alk !ipedally, and to speak a lan"-a"e containin" no-ns and ver!s, there are only a fe/ /ays to '-estion the validity of the claim. (or e+ample, it is possi!le to point to a small n-m!er of individ-als /ho, from !irth on/ard, are poisoned !y an amino acid essential to all others, or /ho are never a!le to /alk or speack, !-t these o!servationsC/hich mi"ht !e called the 1rareAdefect o!3ection1Cdo not detract from the po/er of the "enerali<ations. Second, and some/hat more interestin", it is easy to sho/ that "reat varia!ility e+ists in the /ay these "enerali<ations are f-lfilled !y individ-als and "ro-ps and that most of this varia!ility is d-e to c-lt-ral or environmental ca-ses. B-t these o!servations, the 1crossAc-lt-ral o!3ection,1 do not address the point that there is, in each of the systems in '-estion, a core of feat-res that do not vary. .hird, there is the 1freedomAofA/ill1 o!3ections: some individ-als perfectly capa!le of /alkin" /ill choose never to do so, /hile others may learn to /alk faster or more "racef-lly than anyone in the /orld, or even to /alk on their hands. .here are several ans/ers to this o!3ection, !-t t/o are decisive. (irst, B 1$F B s-ch freedom of /ill e+ists, !-t the rarity /ith /hich it is e+ercised, at least at the e+tremes of the distri!-tion of !ehavior, is not irrelevant to the '-estion at hand. .his ans/er resem!les the reply to the rareAdefect o!3ection !-t is directed to motivation rather than capa!ility, and it implies that motivations as /ell as capa!ilities may !e le"itimately incl-ded in the definitional sphere of h-man nat-re, a point to /hich /e /ill ret-rn. Second, /ithin the defina!le !-t admittedly !road !and of variation in patterns of /alkin" res-ltin" fromt he e+ercise of freedom of /ill, it is possi!le to sho/ la/f-l relations !et/een h-man choices and physiolo"ical o-tcomes. 2fter the choice has !een e+ercisedCfor a "iven daily amo-nt of /alkin", say Cthere follo/ predicta!le conse'-ences for the str-ct-re and f-nction of m-scle, !one, and the cardiop-lmonary or"ans. .hese, in t-rn, have conse'-ences for !ehavioral capa!ility, health, and life span. .he la/s relatin" the precise spect-rm of choices to the predicta!le o-tcomes are also part of /hat is meant !y h-man nat-re. D,ere perhaps a co-ntero!3ection /ill !e raised: 1B-t that is 3-st /hat ) mean. ,-man !ehavior is fle+i!le, so m-ch so that !iolo"y itself is -nder the s/ay of h-man choices.1 =f co-rse it is: !-t predicta!ly so, and /ith thresholds and limits provided !y h-man nat-reC!y the

"enesCand not !y h-man choices. Biolo"ical concepts s-ch as fac-ltative adaptation, ran"e of reaction, and !o-nded learnin", amon" others, have !een developed to descri!e parallel phenomena in nonh-man species.E (inally, the 1soA/aht o!3ection1 holds that the sorts of characteristics le"itimately s-!s-med -nder the r-!ric of h-man nat-re are trivial and -ninterestin". 1=f co-rse every!ody can /alk: so /hatK )t4s the variations that are interestin".1 )t mi"ht !e pointed o-t that every person /ho can /alk e+hi!its a relatively stereotyped heelAtoe pro"ression /ith synchroni<ed alternate arm s/in"in", reflectin" a very comple+ /iredAin coordinatin" pattern involvin" many millions of ne-rons. =r that every child ass-mes the a!ility to /alk /ithin a narro/ly defined a"e period !eca-se of the mat-ration of certain parts of the nervo-s system, the "ro/th of /hich are -nder "enetic control. B-t then each s-ccessive comple+ity pointed o-t !ecomes s-!s-med -nder the hoAh-m or so/hat r-!ric, so that as soon as it is sho/n to !e !iolo"ically determined, it /ill !e deemed -ninterestin". 1.hat4s not /hat ) mean !y h-man nat-re1 /ill retreat to encompass only that /hich has not yet !een "iven a !iolo"ical !asis. =f co-rse, /hat most of -s mean !y h-man nat-re is not primarily the dependence on certain n-trients or the a!ility to /alk and talk !-t the condition of !ein" s-!3ect to certain patterns of motivation that seem to constrain h-man freedom, and to this e+tent, the soA/hat o!3ection really does apply to the characteristics /e have considered so B 1$J B far. ) /ill insist int he end that h-man nat-re fairly incl-des, in fact m-st incl-de, certain characteristically h-manCthat is, "enetically coded, /iredAinCperceptions, co"nitions, competencies, response systems, and motor action patterns as /ell as motivations. )ndeed, it is do-!tf-l /hether motivation can meanin"f-lly !e defined so as to e+cl-de s-ch other psycholo"ical characteristics. B-t it is necessary at this point for -s to leave the safe realms of amino acids and coordinated locomotion for the more treachero-s realms of love, fear, sacrifice, selfishness, l-st, and violence, /hich come most readily to the mind /hen the concept of h-man nat-re is invoked, and to esta!lish the e+tent to /hich these realms are s-!3ect to the kinds of ar"-ments applica!le in the safer ones. .o do this properly re'-ires a series of intellect-al strate"ies directed at e+plorin" the phylo"enetic ori"ins of the pattern: the evol-tionary, principally selective forces that have operated and contin-e to operate on it: the crossAc-lt-ra and other varia!ility in it Dor lack thereofE and the la/f-l relationships !et/een the varia!ility and variations in the environment that mi"ht !e e+pected to infl-ence it: the immediate physiolo"ical antecedents of the pattern: the se'-ence of development of the pattern, incl-din" !oth the mat-rational and environmental components: and the "enetics of the pattern, as e+plored thro-"h !oth classical Mendelian methods and the methods of molec-lar and developmental "enetics. 8ach of these intellect-al strate"ies has pro"ressed so far in the last t/o decades as to render s-spect any opinion on h-man nat-re that does not "ive clear evidence of havin" kept a!reast of their pro"ress. )t is not possi!le here to revie/ their implications even in relation to one of the motivational patterns of interest. ,o/ever, it is possi!le to to-ch on some of the hi"hli"hts relevant !oth to h-man motivation in "eneral and to a le"itimate concept of h-man nat-re D6onner 19%&" E.

II
.he fossil evidence for h-man and protoAh-man evol-tion has acc-m-lated steadily for more than one h-ndred years so no one familiar /ith it do-!ts the reality and contin-ity of that evol-tion DCiochon and (lea"le 19%0E, ,o/ever, ne/ discoveries are made each year /hich chan"e the details of the

pict-re, and d-rin" the past to/ decades, !iochemical ta+onomy has f-rther altered o-r concept of h-man evol-tion. .here is, therefore, little to !e "ained for o-r p-rposes in closely follo/in" each ar"-ment in h-man paleontolo"y. B-t there is m-ch to !e "ained from -nderstandin" the "eneral hi"her primate !ack"ro-nd of h-man evol-tion: the environment of h-man evol-tionary adaptedness, that of h-ntA B 1$L B in" and "atherin": and the principles of evol-tionary adaptation as applied to !ehavior and reprod-ction. 2ll hi"her primates /itho-t e+ception are social animals /ith "reat learnin" capacity and /ith the motherAoffsprin" !ond at the center of social life DCheney, Seyfarth, and Sm-ts 19%LE. .his !ond is al/ays prolon"ed, as is the anatomic and !ehavioral co-rse of individ-al development, incl-din" each phase of the life cycle as /ell as the life span as a /hole. ;a!oratory and field st-dies alike demonstrate the capacity for comple+ social co"nition and social learnin", -p to and incl-din" 1c-lt-ral1 transmission of social rank, toolA-sin" techni'-es, and kno/led"e of location of food so-rces. Play, especially social play, is characteristic of all primate species, partic-larly d-rin" development, and there are vario-s reasons to !elieve it to !e an important opport-nity for learnin". (or e+ample DMac;ean 19%JE, the hi"her primate emphasis on !oth the motherAinfant !ond and on play represents an intensification of the pattern esta!lished !y the early mammals and is essential to the -nderstandin" of the phylo"eny of the lim!ic system and the emotions. Primate "ro-ps "enerally incl-de a core of "enetically related individ-als /ith associated nonrealtives. )n most instances, the core is a matrilinea"e, sta!le over the life co-rse of the individ-als. )n any case, the distri!-tion of acts of social s-pport and "enerosity is preferentially to/ard "enetic relatives !-t not e+cl-sively so. Monkeys and apes aid nonrelatives and can -s-ally e+pect some aid in ret-rn. Cooperation is -!i'-ito-s, !-t so is competition, and one of the ma3or p-rposes of cooperation is m-t-al defense a"ainst other "ro-p mem!ers. Conflict is fre'-ent, /ith !oth se+es participatin" !-t /ith males "enerally e+hi!itin" more physical a""ression than females. Beyond these !road "enerali<ations, "reat variation e+ists in social or"ani<ation !oth !et/een and /ithin species D@apier and @apier 19%JE. Mono"amy is present in some So-th 2merican monkeys, in "i!!ons, and in one or t/o other forms, !-t in most species, lar"er "ro-p associations s-!s-min" more temporary Daltho-"h sometimes more than transientE associations !et/een individ-al males and individ-al females are the r-le. .he ca-ses of this variation in hi"her primate social or"ani<ation remain o!sc-re, !-t some relevant evol-tionary principles /ill !e considered !elo/. 2ltho-"h there are important species variations, it may !e "enerally said that hi"her primates are sensitive to si"nificant pert-r!ations of the early social environment, s-ch as isolation rearin" or repeated invol-ntary motherAinfant separation, and that these pert-r!ations "ive rise to a!normalities of se+-al, maternal, and a""ressive !ehavior that in h-mans /o-ld !e vie/ed as psychopatholo"y D,arlo/ 19L#, 19L9: 2rlin" and ,arlo/ 19L0: Sackett et al. 19%1E. )n a n-m!er of species B 1$0 B Dtho-"h not allE, isolation rearin" "ives rise to stereotyped !ehavior s-ch as rockin" and selfAdirected a""ression, and motherAinfant separation "ives rise to symptoms -s-ally descri!ed as protest follo/ed !y depression. 8ven deprivation of contact /ith peers d-rin" development has prod-ced a!normal !ehavior in some e+periments. 2pparent h-man analo"-es of these ca-sal relationships, altho-"h

diffic-lt to interpret, have enco-ra"ed the -se of primate models. .hese e+periments emphasi<e the e+tent to /hich the noraml development and !ehavior in s-ch animals has come to depend, in the co-rse of evol-tion, on an intact social matri+. @at-ral variation in sta!le individ-al !ehavior patterns D1personality1E occ-rs in freeAran"in" monkey and ape "ro-ps DSm-ts 19%JE and e+tends to variants that /o-ld !e considered patholo"ical if seen in h-mans, s-ch as hypera""ressive, isolative, pho!ic, or depressed !ehavior. )t is rarely possi!le to e+plore the ca-ses of s-ch variants, !-t most are pro!a!ly !oth "enetic and environmental in ori"in. Some a!normalities, s-ch as severe depression Das in the case of an ei"htAyearAold /ild chimpan<ee after the death of his motherE may !e incompati!le /ith s-rvival D9oodall 19%LE. =thers, ho/ever, s-ch as hypera""ressiveness Das in the case of t/o female chimpan<ees that systematically and repeatedly killed the infants of other femalesE may act-ally enhance reprod-ctive adaptation for the a!normal individ-al. .he a!ove "enerali<ations can !e considered applica!le to the social and psycholo"ical /orld of protoA h-man hi"her primate species for a period of appro+imately F$ million years. 2"ainst this !ack"ro-nd, hominids evolved d-rin" the last fe/ million years, c-lminatin" in the emer"ence of o-r species /ithin the last fe/ h-ndred tho-sand years, and finally in the appearance of tr-ly modern Homo sa#iens /ithin the last h-ndred tho-sand. 2side from the increase in intelli"ence, as indicated !y increasin" relative and a!sol-te !rain si<e as /ell as !y increasin" comple+ity of stone tools, one hallmark of the transition to hominids /as an increasin" reliance on h-ntin". 2ll monkeys and apes are lar"ely ve"etarians and insectAeaters: instances of meatAeatin" are instr-ctive !-t relatively infre'-ent. 2mon" the most technolo"ically primitive h-mans, /hether in the fossil record or in the ethno"raphic one, h-ntin" is invaria!ly of ma3or importance D;ee and 5e>ore 19L%, 5ahl!er" 19%1E. Most of the stone tools that have s-rvived archaeolo"ically /ere s-ed in h-ntin" or !-tcherin", and the demands ca-sed !y this activity have lon" !een held to !e central to the emer"ence of h-man intelli"ence and social or"ani<ation. 7ecent evidence has sho/n that the stone -sed for this p-rpose had to !e traded over lon" distances, implyin" -ne+pectedly comple+ social net/orks amon" o-r ancestors !efore & million years a"o. (-rthermore, B 1$% B even chimpan<ees share meat after a kill D!-t not plant foodsE, and amon" h-man h-nterA"atherers, the follo/in" of ela!orate re"-lations for s-ch sharin" of meat may !e a lifeAandAdeath matter. (inally, /ith one note/orthy e+ception Dthe 2"ta of the Philippines, /here /omen ro-tinely h-ntE, all h-ntin" and "atherin" societies in the ethno"raphic record have a division of la!or !y se+, /ith men doin" almost all the h-ntin" and providin" meat for their families and /omen providin" most of the ve"eta!le foods. .hese feat-res of soceity related to h-ntin" had to have !een "rafted onto an already comple+ social life characteristic of nonh-man hi"her primates. ,o/ever, this traditional maleAcentered vie/ "ives at most half the story D5ahl!er" 19%1E. )n many h-ntin" and "atherin" societies, plant foods "athered !y /omen constit-te more than half of the diet. Plant foods are shared in these societies Daltho-"h not !eyond the immediate familyE, /hile they are not shared in nonh-man primates. .he early advent of -pri"ht post-re may have had more to do /ith the need for females to carry plant foods as /ell as infants to a !ase camp than /ith any advanta"e -pri"ht post-re conferred in h-ntin", and it may !e that amon" the first tools invented /ere di""in" sticks and carryin" devices for plants or infantsCtools that, ho/ever cr-cial, /o-ld not !e preserved in archaeolo"ical assem!la"es and that /o-ld most likely have !een invented !y /omen. Psychodynamic theorist John Bo/l!y coined the phrase 1the environment of h-man evol-tionary

adaptedness,1 /hich aptly descri!es the h-ntin" and "atherin" /ay of life. .he phrase correctly implies that this is, or /as, the conte+t for /hich nat-ral selection prepared -s and from /hich /e have departed only in the past 1$,$$$ years, a very short time in evol-tionary terms. D.he ind-strial revol-tion, in the same terms, happened only a moment a"o.E (rom many st-dies of recent h-ntin" and "atherin" peoples, com!ined /ith archaeolo"ical evidence of those of the distant past, it is possi!le to make certain "enerali<ations a!o-t this conte+t Dlee and 5e>ore 19L%E: social "ro-ps /ere -s-ally small, ran"in" in si<e from fifteen to forty people related thro-"h !lood or marria"e: "ro-ps /ere nomadic, movin" fre'-ently to take advanta"e of chan"in" s-!sistence opport-nities, and fle+i!le in composition, si<e, and adaptive strate"ies: daily life involved physical challen"e, vi"oro-s e+ercise, and occasional h-n"er !-t /ith a -s-ally dependa!le food !ase from a moderate /ork effort and /ith a marked division of la!or !y "ender: disease, mainly infectio-s rather than chronic, prod-ced hi"h rates of mortality especially in infancy and early childhood, /ith conse'-ent fre'-ent e+perience of loss: virt-ally all of life4s activities /ere done in a hi"hly social conte+t /ith people one kne/ /ell, often the same people for different activities: and privacy /as limited, !-t creative e+A B 1$9 B pression in the arts /as fre'-ently possi!le, and conflicts and pro!lems /ere dealt /ith thro-"h e+tensive "ro-p disc-ssions. .hese "enerali<ations descri!e the conte+t in /hich most of h-man evol-tion and prehistory have occ-rred, so it is often said that /e are, in effect, h-nterA"atherers in skyscrapers. Simplistic o!servations a!o-t the conse'-ences of this chan"e are often made and are not helpf-l. Mental illnesses, !oth ma3or and minor, are present in s-ch societies. 2ll of them e+perience some level of violent conflict, -p to and incl-din" homicide. =ther h-man !ehaviors -s-ally considered -ndesira!le, s-ch as selfishness, deceit, adolescent re!ellion, ad-ltery, desertion, and child a!-se, occ-r in s-ch societies, and it is impossi!le to compare the rates of s-ch !ehaviors to those in o-r o/n society. 2ltho-"h fl-id in their /ay, life in s-ch societies is restricted to a m-ch smaller n-m!er of people than o-rs, and the lack of privacy and ina!ility to "et a/ay from those people m-st constit-te stresses, 3-st as cro/din" and hi"h levels of contact /ith stran"ers may constit-te stress in advanced societies. .he stresses of illness and mortality, as /ell as the stresses and -ncertainties of the daily food '-est, also m-st take their toll. 2 tr-ly tho-"htf-l set of o!servations and analyses of the differences !et/een psycholo"ical conditions in o-r society and the kind of society in /hich /e spent most of o-r history co-ld !e ima"ined !-t has not yet !een made.

III
Since the late 19L$s, there has !een rapid emer"ence of an infl-ential ne/ field of evol-tionary st-dy kno/n as neoA5ar/inian theory or, more commonly, socio!iolo"y D*ilson 190J, .rivers 19%JE. .his ne/ set of principles has !een '-ickly adopted !y most investi"ators /ho st-dy animal !ehavior -nder nat-ral conditions, incl-din" etholo"ists and !ehavioral ecolo"ists, and has also infl-enced many anthropolo"ists and psycholo"ists. Briefly s-mmari<ed, the principles are as follo/s D.rivers 19%JE: 2n or"anism is, in essence, a "ene4s /ay of makin" another "ene. P-t more strictly, it is a /ay fo-nd !y -p to tho-sands of "enes, tho-"h shortor lon"Aterm cooperation, to make copies of themselves. 2s lon" as it is admitted that there can !e no forces operatin" in nat-re other than physicochemical ones, it m-st !e admitted that contin-ed mem!ership in an on"oin" "erm plasm is the only "oal served !y any "iven "ene. .o the e+tent that a "ene infl-ences !ehavior, it can only contin-e in the "erm plasm if it maintains or enhances, thro-"h the !ehavior, the n-m!er of copies of itself in the "ene pool of the ne+t

"eneration. DContrary to a fre'-ently repeated conf-sion, the cohesiveness of the "enome has only '-antitiative, not '-alitative, !earin" on the validity of this Principle.E B 11$ B 9enes increase their n-m!er !y enhancin" reprod-ctive s-ccess. 8nhancin" s-rvival is only one /ay of doin" this. *here the t/o "oals, enhancin" s-rvival and enhancin" reprod-ctive s-ccess, are in conflict, as they often are, "enes that enhance reprod-ctive s-ccess /ill replace "enes that enhance s-rvival. .he concept of fitness in evol-tionary theory has no meanin" e+cept the relative fre'-ency of characteristics and of the "enes that infl-ence them. )t is a ta-tolo"ical description of reprod-ctive s-ccess and has nothin" necessarily in common /ith medical, social, or athletic definitions of fitness, all of /hich can !e and often are achieved /itho-t an increase, or even /ith a decrease, in technically defined reprod-ctive fitness. (itness is no/ !est defined as inclusi6e . By inclusi6e fitness is meant the tendency of "enes to infl-ence their fre'-ency not only thro-"h the s-rvival and reprod-ction of the individ-al carryin" them !-t also thro-"h the s-rvival and reprod-ction of other closely related individ-als /ho may !e carryin" the same "enes thro-"h common descent. .his is the concept introd-ced !y ,amilton D19LFE to acco-nt, -sin" the mathematics of evol-tionary "enetics, for the e+istence of altr-sim in animals, /hich previo-sly seemed somethin" to !e c-lled !y the process of nat-ral selection. ,ence the need for a ne/ly defined s-!process of nat-ral selection, called kin selection. )f ) die to save my identical t/in, then the fre'-ency of any "ene that helped predispose me to that action /ill Dall else !ein" e'-alE !e -naffected !y my death. )n "eneral terms, s-ch "enes, or any "enes predisposin" me to selfAsacrifice for a relative, sho-ld !e favored -nder conditions /here the ratio of the recipient4s !enefit to the altr-ist4s costs e+ceeds the inverse of the de"ree of "enetic relatedness. .his concept has !een invoked to e+plain selfAsacrifice of soldier ants for the colony, alarm calls of !irds and "ro-nd s'-irrels, and nepotism in h-man !ein"s, amon" many other phenomena of h-man and animal !ehavior. =ther theories !ro-"ht to !ear on the pro!lem of altr-ism have !een reciprocal altr-ism and the prisoner4s dilemma model of cooperation, neither of /hich re'-ires that the altr-ist and the recipient !e related. 2s ar"-ed !y 7o!ert .rivers D190&, 19%JE from a s-""estion of 5ar/in4s, in species /ith t/o se+es in /hich there is a physiolo"ical or !ehavioral difference in the ener"y invested in individ-al offsprin", the se+ that invests more /ill !ecome the scarce reso-rce over /hich the other se+ competes. )n mammals and in most !irds, females e+hi!it "reater investment, !-t direct male parental investment may !e very hi"h in some species. Species in /hich male parental investment is hi"h tend to !e those in /hich pairAformation of a !reedin" male /ith the !reedin" female is lon" lastin": se+-al dimorphism, !oth morpholo"ical and !ehavioral, is lo/: male competition for females is lo/: and varia!ility amon" males in B 111 B reprod-ctive s-ccess is lo/. .hese 1pairA!ondin"1 species, a cate"ory incl-din" %,$$$ species of !irds !-t only a minoirty of mammal species, may !e contrasted /ith 1lek1 or 1to-rnament1 species, so called !eca-se they sometimes have ann-al seasonal !reedin" 1to-rnaments1 in /hich males compete fiercely for females. .hese species often have hi"h se+-al dimporphism for display or fi"htin" De."., antlers or peacock feathersE, lo/ tendency for pair formation, lo/ direct male parental investment in offsprin", and hi"h varia!ility in reprod-ctive s-ccess. ,-man !ein"s are considered to !e near !-t not at the pairA!ondin" e+treme of the contin--m, as

vie/ed from the perspective of se+-al dimorphism, de"ress of direct male involvement in the care of offsprin" in a /ide ran"e of c-lt-res, and the kno/n distri!-tion of h-man marria"e forms D5aly and *ilson 19%#, M-rdock 19L0E. Poly"yny, in /hich one man marries several /omen, is allo/ed or enco-ra"ed in %# percent of kno/n c-lt-res in the anthropolo"ical record D0$% of %F9E, /hile the converse arran"ement, polyandry, is rare DF of %F9E, and a do-!le standard of se+-al restriction is e+tremely common: still, most h-man marria"es have pro!a!ly !een mono"amo-s at least in intent. 2 neoA5ar/inian model of parentAoffsprin" conflict advanced !y .rivers D190F, 19%JE has profo-nd implications for the nat-re of the family. *eanin" conflict is very common amon" mammals, and there are e'-ivalent phenomena amon" !irds, even incl-din" tantr-m !ehavior on the part of the /eanlin". )f the evol-tionary p-rposes of mother and offsprin" /ere isomorphic, then they sho-ld 1a"ree1 Dthe -se of this kind of lan"-a"e is shorthand for 1sho-ld have !een selected to act as if they a"reed1 and implies no conscio-s intentE that a "iven level and d-ration of investment is necessary and s-fficient, after /hich attention sho-ld !e t-rned !y the mother to her ne+t -n!orn offsprin". 2 naive model of the nat-re of the family ass-mes that since it f-nctions as a harmonio-s -nit -nder ideal conditions, that is pres-ma!ly ho/ it /as desi"ned !y evol-tion. ,o/ever, it /as not so desi"ned. ;ike the !reedin" pair disc-ssed a!ove, it is an association amon" individ-als /ith overlappin" !-t distinct evol-tionary p-rposes. )ts mem!ers nat-rally p-rs-e individ-al "oals that are sometimes at odds /ith each other4s -ltimate Dnot merely temporaryE p-rposes, and their relations are nat-rally conflictf-l rather than harmonio-s. .his nat-ral conflict is not the res-lt of friction in /hat sho-ld !e or co-ld !e a smoothly f-nctionin" system !-t is intrinsic. Competition amon" unrelated individ-als can !e e+pected at times to !e e+treme. >irt-ally all animal species for /hich there is s-fficent evidence have !een seen to e+hi!it e+tremes of violent conflict, -p to and incl-din" homicide, in the /ild D*ilson 190JE. .he !elief that h-man !ein"s are rare amon" animal species in that /e kill o-r o/n kind is erroneo-s, and more evidence to the contrary acc-m-lates every year. B 11& B =ne partic-larly note/orthy phenomenon is com#etiti6e infanticide , already all-ded to in relation to /ild chimpan<ees. .he paradi"matic case is that of the ,an-man lan"-r moneky of )ndia, as o!served !y Sarah Blaffer ,rdy D1900E, amon" others. ;an"-r troops consist of a core of related females and their offsprin", associated for a period of a fe/ years or less /ith -nrelated immi"rant males. =ccasionally, ne/ males arrive and challen"e the resident males. )f they /in and take over the troop, they drive the previo-s males a/ay and proceed systematically to attack and kill resident infants -nder si+ months of a"e. .he mothers of those infants then come into estr-s a"ain Dm-ch sooner than they /o-ld have if the infants has s-rvived and contin-ed to n-rseE and are impre"nated !y the ne/ males. Controversy has centered over /hether this is normal !ehavor or a response to cro/din" or other soical stress. S-ch controversy misses the point that the !ehavior enhances the reprod-ctive s-ccess of the ne/ males at the e+pense of the old ones and therefore can !e e+pected to !e favored !y nat-ral selection, /hether or not /e choose to call it normal. (-rthermore, similar phenomena have no/ !een o!served in many species. .he delineation of -niversal feat-res of h-man !ehavior is central to the el-cidation of the effects of phylo"eny. B-t nat-ral selection operatin" on or"anisms ancestral to o-rselves created not only individ-als /ith certain needs, drives, and capacities !-t also e'-ationsC1ifAthen1 statementsCrelatin" the environment to the social system, the social system to the individ-al, and so on. )n a crossAc-lt-ral st-dy of h-s!andA/ife intimacy D*hitin" and *hitin" 190JE, it /as hso/n that societies in /hich h-s!ands eat, sleep, and care for children to"ether /ith their /ives are also those that are less

!elli"erent. .hat is, phylo"eny appears to have provided a system s-ch that separatin" men from /omen and small children is associated /ith s-ccessf-l adapation as /arriors. .his is not to say that they m-st !e /arriors or that they m-st !e aloof from their /ives !-t that choosin" aloofness may increase effective !elli"erency and orperhaps vice versa. .he -niversal characteristic here is not a phenotypic characteristic at all !-t an -nderlyin" mechanism relatin" t/o sets of characteristics to each other. D2n e+tended disc-ssion of this concept-al frame/ork may !e fo-nd in 6onner 19%&" .E )n the past decade, the application of neoA5ar/inian or socio!iolo"ical theory to ethnolo"ical materials has prod-ced many findin"s that seem to !ypass the comple+ '-estions of the relationships amon" society, c-tl-re, and individ-al development. (or e+ample, societies in /hich yo-n" men inherit land from their mothers4 !rothers are more la+ a!o-t the prevention of female ad-ltery than are societies in /hich yo-n" men inherit from their fathers D6-rland 1909E: in societies in /hich poly"yny B 11# B is allo/ed, /ealthier and more infl-ential men tend to have more /ives DBet<i" 19%LE: and in smallA scale societies in /hich adoption of children it common, it tends to follo/ patterns predicted !y "enetic relatedness DSilk 19%0E. )nvesti"ators mkain" these findin"s -s-ally declare that they do not claim any direct "enetic !asis for these variations in h-man !ehavior, and indeed some of the /orst conf-sion a!o-t socio!iolo"y stems from a fail-re to appreciate this distinction !et/een the propositions of neoA 5ar/inian theory and those of traditioanl !ehavioral "enetics or molec-lar "enetics. 8ven in a nonh-man species s-ch as the redA/in"ed !lack!ird, males sin"in" on richer territories mate /ith several females instead of one D,ardin" and (ollett 1909E. B-t the mechanism of this fle+i!le adaptive systemCkno/n as a fac-ltative adaptationCm-st !e '-ite different in !lack!irds than the similar mechanism in h-man !ein"s Daltho-"h it /o-ld pro!a!ly -nderestimate !lack!irds to ass-me that in them the system is -nder ti"th "enetic controlE. .he /in"s of insects some from thoracic tiss-e, the /in"s of !irds from forearm str-ct-res, the /in"s of !ats from fin"ers, and the /in"s of h-mans from technolo"y. .hese fo-r adaptations to the pro!lem of fli"ht serve similar f-nctions /ith e+tremely different provenance. .he same /ill prove to !e tr-e of adaptations in social !ehavior D6onner 19%&" E. @eoA5ar/inian or socio!iolo"ical theory is sometimes pres-med to carry val-e 3-d"ments as a necessary concomitant. .his lo"ic appears to s-""est that /hatever is, is ri"ht. 2n e+tension of this fallacy /o-ld hold that sickle cell anemia and thallasemia m-st !e accepted !eca-se nat-ral selection has maintained them thro-"h !alnced polymorphism, the hetero<y"otes !ein" at an advanta"e in malaria resistance: or that myopia sho-ld not !e corrected !eca-se nat-ral selection in favor of sharp vision has rela+ed in the h-man pop-lation since the end of the h-ntin" and "atherin" era. ,-man 3-d"ments a!o-t /hat is desira!le are separate from and m-st take precedence over any o!servations or e+planations of /hat e+ists in nat-re, altho-"h they may !e enhanced !y takin" the facts of the nat-ral /orld into acco-nt.

IV
.he main enterprise of c-lt-ral anthropolo"y has !een the description and analysis of crossAc-lt-ral variation, !-t the enterprise has al/ays had an inevita!le, even if tacit, complement: the characteri<ation of feat-res of h-man !ehavior that do not vary or that vary relatively little. .he concept of -niversals has, ho/eve,r at least five different meanin"s: !ehaviors, s-ch as coordinated !ipedal /alkin" or smilin" in social "reetin", that are e+hi!ited !y all normal ad-lt mem!ers of every kno/n

B 11F B society: !ehaviors that are -niversal /ithin an a"e or se+ class, s-ch as the refleces in all normal neonates or the e3ac-latory motor action pattern in all postp-!ertal males: pop-lation characteristics that apply to all pop-lations !-t not all individ-als, s-ch as the se+ difference in physical a""ressiveness: -niversal feat-res of c-lt-re rather than of !ehavior, s-ch as the ta!oos a"ainst incest and homicide, or the hi"hly varia!le !-t al/ays present instit-tion of marria"e, or the social constr-ction of illness in attempts at healin": and, finally, characteristics that, altho-"h -n-s-al or even rare, are fo-nd at some lo/ level in every pop-lation, s-ch as homicidal violence, tho-"ht disorder, depression, s-icide, or incest. .he list of characters that fill these five cate"ories is a very lon" one, m-ch lon"er than the prominent anthropolo"ists of the early heyday of crossAc-lt-ral st-dy /o-ld have predicted D8i!lA8i!esfeldt 19%%E. .he search for societies /itho-t violence, or /itho-t "ender differences that "o !eyond child!earin", or /itho-t mental illness, or even /itho-t the a!ility to make and -se fire has !een a vain one, and altho-"h there is convincin" doc-mentation of variation in the incidence or conte+t of e+pression of most h-man !ehaviors, the e+istence of s-ch a lar"e core of constantly present, if varia!le, feat-res constit-tes a demonstration of the reality of h-man nat-re and its validity as a scientific constr-ct D6onner 19%&" E. )n the realm of psychosocial development, (re-d post-lated, and presentAday child psychiatry contin-es to accept in altered and disp-ted forms, a -niversal se'-ence of emotional development on /hich the social environment of the family co-ld !e claimed to prod-ce end-rin" traits of emotional disposition. Beyond some very "eneral elementsCthe e+istence of infantile se+-ality, the formation of an attachment to a primary caretake /ho is -s-ally the mother, the -!i'-ity of conflicts and 3ealo-sies /ithin the familyCthis alle"edly -niversal se'-ence has never fo-nd empirical s-pport: hence the -nresolva!le disp-tes amon" different schools of psychoanalysis and the end-rin" skepticism of o-tsiders. 8+tensive crossAc-lt-ral st-dies of h-man !ehavioral and psycholo"ical development have not prod-ced evidence relevant to these partic-lar models, !-t they have prod-ced e+tensive evidence s-pportin" some more empirically "ro-nded p-tative -niversals of psychosocial "ro/th. )n the a!sence of kno/led"e of ne-ropsycholo"ical development, psychoanalytic theory post-lated a li!idinal theory of this development D(re-d 19&$E that fe/ take serio-sly today. ,o/ever, the "ro/in" !ody of act-al kno/led"e a!o-t ne-ral and ne-roendocrine deveopment can no/ !e"in to serve a parallel f-nction in relation to the more empirically "ro-nded ne/er st-dies of psychosocial "ro/th. 2mon" the /ellAesta!lished crossAc-lt-ral -niversals of psychosocial development, the follo/in" are the !est s-pported and in many cases can B 11J B !e pla-si!ly related to p-tative -nderlyin" ne-ral events D6onner 19%&a , 1991E: the emer"ence of sociality, as heralded !y social smilin", d-rin" the first fo-r months of life, in parallel /ith the mat-ration of !asal "an"lia and cortical motor circ-its: the emer"ence of stron" attachments, as /ell as of fears of separation and of stran"ers, in the second half of the first year of life, in parallel /ith the mat-ration of the ma3or fi!er tracts of the lim!ic system: the emer"ence of lan"-a"e d-rin" the second year and after, in parallel /ith the mat-ration of the thalamic pro3ection to the a-ditory corte+ amon" other circ-its: the emer"ence of a se+ difference in physical a""ressiveness in early and middle childhood, /ith males on the avera"e e+ceedin" females, a conse'-ence in part of prenatal and ro"eni<ation of the hypothalam-s: and the emer"ence of ad-lt se+-al motivation and f-nctionin" in adolescence, in parallel /ith and follo/in" the mat-ration of the reprod-ctive system at p-!erty,

a"ainst the !ack"ro-nd of the previo-sly mentioned prenatal andro"eni<ation of the hypothalam-s. )n addition, there are a n-m!er of apparent crossAc-lt-ral -niversals of co"nitive development. .here are other pro!a!le crossAc-lt-ral developmental -niversals, s-ch as increased !a!!in" in the second half of the first year and possi!ly pro"ress thro-"h the first three, or perhaps fo-r, of the si+ sta"es in ;a/rence 6ohl!er"4s scheme of moral development in childhood. 2ltho-"h the -nderlyin" ne-ropsycholo"y is at an early sta"e of el-cidation, the crossAc-lt-ral -niversality of these traits is /ell esta!lished: in each case, there is e+tensive e+perimental evidence to s-pport the mat-rational nat-re of the process in !ehavioral development. .hey constit-te a first appro+imation of the tr-e str-ct-ral !asis of psychosocial development, /hich (re-d "roped fro /hit his cr-de theory of li!idinal development in the nervo-s system. .hey also constit-te a firm !asis for the f-t-re -nderstandin" of ho/ variations in social e+perience, /hether clinical or crossAc-lt-ral, act on the mat-rin" psychosocial competence to prod-ce potentially lastin" variations. )n each of the processes mentioned, crossAc-lt-ral differentiation of the mat-rin" competence !e"ins almost as soon as the mat-ration occ-rs. ,o/ever, the acceptance and increasin"ly detailed and relia!le description of the mat-rational constants -nderlyin" the variation in psychosocial "ro/th /ill provide a steadily firmer place on /hich to stand /hile attemptin" to investi"ate the role of c-lt-ral and individ-al e+perience.

V
*ithin the last t/o or three years, there has emer"ed a ne/ mode of in'-iry in the st-dy of h-man nat-re. .he c-rrent revol-tion in moA B 11L B lec-lar "enetics is rapidly leadin" !oth to a molec-lar ne-ro"enetics and to a molec-lar "enetics of !ehavior and mind. )ts esta!lished empirical !ase already e+tends from the simplest animal systems to the most comple+ f-nctions of the h-man mind and from the earliest to the latest sta"es of the life cycle. Some hi"hli"hts amon" its recent discoveries are the follo/in": 1E a family of "enes coded for a set of ne-ropeptides that, in t-rn, controls the stereotyped e""Alayin" !ehavior of the sea sl-" A#lysia californica DScheller et al. 19%FE: &E a Droso#hila !ehavioral m-tant has !een e+plained as the res-lt of kno/n "enes that alter the potassi-m channel of the ne-ronal mem!rane D.ano-ye et al. 19%LE: #E a sin"leA"ene form of h-man pse-dohermaphroditism has !een traced to deficiency in JAalphaA red-ctase, /hich converts testosterone to dihydrotestosterone: affected individ-als have an am!i"-o-s or feminine !ody ha!it-s and psycholo"ical disposition -ntil p-!erty, /hen they !ecome physically and psycholo"ically masc-line despite havin" !een raised as "irls D)mperatoAMc9inley et al. 1909, 19%$E: FE ,-ntin"ton4s disease, a ne-ropsychiatric condition that presents in the thirties or forties Doften !e"innin" /ith psychiatric manifestationsE, has !een sho/n to !e ca-sed !y a dominant "ene on the short arm of chromosome F D9-sella et al. 19%FE: JE manicAdepressive illness D!ipolar affective disorderE, a severe form of mental illness presentin" in ad-lthood, has !een sho/n in different kindreds to !e ca-sed in part !y a "ene on the R chromosome DBaron et al. 19%0E: LE 2l<heimer4s disease, the most common form of lateAlife dementia, has !een sho/n to !e ca-sed in some kindreds !y a "ene on chromosome &1: a 5@2 pro!e cloned from the amyloid protein lon"

kno/n to acc-m-late in the !rains of affected people has !een locali<ed to the same chromosome section: and the same "ene is d-plicated in individ-als /ith 5o/n4s syndromeC/ho develop early 2l<heimer4sCeven in the a!sence of the -s-al chromosomal anomaly, a d-plication of the /hole chromosome D.an<i et al. 19%0: St. 9eor"eA,yslop et al. 19%0: 9old"a!er et al. 19%0: 5ela!ar et al. 19%0E. .hese recent findi"ns remove any do-!t re"ardin" the a!ility of "enes to alter comple+ !ehavior thro-"h comprehensi!le !iochemical path/ays affectin" the nervo-s system. .hey are not s-!3ect to any of the methodolo"ical criticisms al/ays leveled at classical Mendelian !ehavioral "enetics, especially at correlational h-man st-dies. 8+treme skeptics /ill still claim that these findin"s have no !earin" on the development of normal h-man !ehavior, !-t there is no reason to !elieve that they are ri"ht. =n the contrary, it is likely that of the h-ndred tho-sand B 110 B or so "enes in the h-man "enome, the ones most easily identified /o-ld !e the ones /ith the most devastatin" effects and that s-!se'-ently it /o-ld !ecome possi!le to identify "enes affectin" physiolo"y and !ehavior /ithin the normal ran"e. *e can e+pect s-ch identifications /ithin one or t/o decades. S-ch findin"s, ho/ever, are not the end !-t the !e"innin" of the development of the epi"eneticC interactionistCapproach to h-man nat-re. )n the a!sence of other treatments, fe/ /o-ld ar"-e that /e sho-ld refrain from 1"ene s-r"ery1 for 2l<heimer4s disease, !-t even /ith manicAdepressive illness there /ill !e serio-s ethical iss-es in tamperin" /ith the system, /hich may prod-ce certain desira!le personality variations and even e+ceptional creativity as /ell as serio-s mental illness. *ithin the normal ran"e, the ar"-ments for restraint /o-ld !e even stron"er. @evertheless, from the vie/point of analysis of the development of !ehavior, a technolo"y of molec-lar "enetics /ill provide insi"hts that /ill transform o-r vie/ of h-man nat-re. 2lready /e have learned that !oth co"nitive and emotional f-nctions can !e altered !y specific "enes and that "enes can manifest themselves in the !ehavioral phenotype at almost any sta"e of life, sometimes /itho-t prior developmental manifestations of any kind. .he '-estion is, ,o/ /ill the environment prove to interact /ith "enetic predispositions and v-lnera!ilitiesK Phenylketon-ria provides a val-a!le model, )t is a simle "enetic disorder /ith increasin"ly -nderstood molec-lar "enetics, yet /ith an environmental pro+imate ca-se and a sol-tion hat involves modification of one of the most m-ndane feat-res of the environment, the diet. S-ch environmental modification essentially o!viates the impact of the "enotype. 5r-" treatments have also !ee tried, and in the not too distant f-t-re, a molec-lar "enetic intervention in the "erm line D1"ene s-r"ery1E may !e possi!le. 2t that point, there /ill !e a f-ll spectr-m of treatment possi!ilities, makin" phenylketon-ria a paradi"matic instance of the comple+ interactions of "enotype, meta!olism, and environment in the development of ne-ral, !ehavioral, and mental phenomena. )t is not diffic-lt to ima"ine in !road o-tline the similar ran"e of interpretations that /ill develop for a variety of other a!normalities of !rain and !ehavior and indeed for some variations /ithin the normal ran"e. )n addition, there are likely to !e many ne/ discoveries a!o-t the /ay environment e+erts its infl-ence on the development of !ehavior, and some of these are likely to !e s-rprisin". @e-roem!ryolo"ical research has "iven ne/ meanin" to the concept of plasticity !y sho/in" the "reat importance of competition amon" ne-rons and connections for destination sites in the developin" !rain, and the process of selective pr-nin" "oes on postnatally as /ell as prenatally DChan"e-+ 19%J: 9oldman7akic et al. 19%#E. Brain f-nctions as cr-cial to psycholo"y as laterality

B 11% B may depend on comple+ intra-terine mechanisms -nder indirect, rather than direct, "enetic control D9esch/ind and 9ala!-rda 19%0E, and these mechanisms of plasticity /ere not only -ne+plored !-t -ns-spected -ntil a fe/ years a"o.

VI
)n the eithteenth cent-ry, 9oethe DMa"n-s 19F9E posited the e+istence of a f-ndamental or archetypal form in plant life, a sort of key to the order of life itself in the lar"est sense, and perhaps even of the -niverse !eyond the realm of the livin". )ndeed, he made his search for order a foil to that of @e/ton, /hich he considered too mechanical: he tho-"ht that even the f-ndamental orderin" principles of the -niverse mi"ht !e !iolo"ical, not physical. 2ltho-"h in this he /ent too far, there is a sense in /hich the 9r#flan)e , 9oethe4s -ltimate plant form, really does e+ist and in /hich it has !ecome, t/o cent-ries after he posited it, as central to the enterprise of at least the life sciences as he !elieved it /o-ld !e. .he Urpflan<e is, of co-rse, 5@2, and /ith the scientific -nravelin" of its form has come, and /ill contin-e to come, a sense of order and po/er in the realm of !iolo"y that only a mind like 9oethe4s co-ld have ima"ined. .he e+tent to /hich the realm of !ehavior /ill also come -nder the s/ay of this intellect-al order remains to !e seen: !-t even the ans/er to this '-estion /ill !e lar"ely provided !y that order. Undo-!tedly, the ans/er /ill involve mechanisms of epi"enesis that incl-de s-ch phenomena as operant conditionin", snesitive periods, psycholo"ical tra-ma, co"nitive maps, and sym!ol systems as /ell as diet, infection, and in3-ry. B-t the /ay these phenomena operateC/ithin the constraints provided !y the h-man "enomeCto prod-ce individ-al and collective !ehavioral patterns and tendencies is vastly more -ncertain than the te+t!ooks in the relevant fields allo/, and the m-t-al contradictions of those te+t!ooks -nderscore the -ncertainties. .hat the delineation of ho/ the environment affects the individ-al, !eyond the hoary pieties of plasticity, remains a task almost completely for the f-t-re is perhaps the "reatest discovery of the past t/enty years. ./o f-rther implications of recent advances in !iolo"y need to !e emphasi<ed. (irst, if neoA5ar/inian principles of !ehavior and reprod-ction are even mostly correct, the f-ndamental metaphor of modern social science is in error. .hat metaphor, /hich is as venera!le as social science itself, claims that society is an or"anism, /ith individ-als as cells, speciali<ed s-!"ro-ps of individ-als as tiss-es or or"ans, and conflict as a transient a!erration, or pahtolo"y, the elimination of /hich restores the social or"ansm to health. .he !asic /eakness of the analo"y is most starkly e+posed each time an individ-al or "ro-p departs from the sociA B 119 B ety and 3oins or forms anotherCsomethin" the cells or or"ans of an animal cannot do, of co-rseC!-t in fact the /eakness is evident in the -!i'-ity of social conflict even /ithin the most intimately interdependent social relationships. S-ch conflict is not inadvertent friction in a system that sho-ld, !y desi"n, f-nction smoothly !-t is an inherent and inevita!le e+pression of the p-rposes of social life itself. Second, the motivational portions of the !rain, partic-larly the hypothalam-s, have f-nctional characteristics relevant to the apparent chronicity of h-man dissatisfaction. 2nimal e+periments on the lateral hypothalam-s s-""est that the motivated condition is to some e+tent nonspecific, /ith the

internal state responsive to !-t not "eared for the partic-lar e+ternal circ-mstances. 2 contin--m !et/een attentiveness or alertness and intense drive states ens-res that responsiveness /ill never !e lon" delayed !-t also that it /ill not al/ays !e appropriate and, more important, that the or"anisms4s chronic internal state /ill !e a va"-e mi+t-re of an+iety and desireC!est descri!ed perhaps !y the phrase 1) /ant,1 spoken i/th or /itho-t an o!3ect for the ver!. .his insi"ht of physiolo"ical psycholo"y a!o-t the internal motivational states of animals like o-rselves fits /ell /ith the more recent insi"hts of socio!iolo"y a!o-t the conflictf-l e+ternal relations entered -pon !y the same and similar animals and also /ith the fail-re of the or"anismal model of societal coherence. =ne conse'-ence of these insi"hts is that the vie/ of life c-rrent in !ehavioral !iolo"y !ears more resem!lance to the vie/ taken in the timeAhonored traditions of the h-manities than either does to the canons of social science. ,enry James once descri!ed life as 1slo/ advance into enemy territory1 and /rote, 1;ife is , in fact, a !attle, 8vil is insolent and stron": !ea-ty enchantin", !-t rare: "oodness very apt to !e /eak: folly very apt to !e defiant: /ickedness to carry the day: im!eciles to !e in "reat places, people of sense in small, and mankind "enerally -nhappy1 DSei!el 19J1E. Similar sentiments have !een common in the literary traditions of many societies from the earliest reli"io-s and epic sa"as to novels and plays completed this mornin". 7eli"io-s traditions of varied character reco"ni<e the reality of a deeply, even tra"ically, fla/ed h-man nat-re, !-t they e+hort a"ainst it, /hile literary artists seem satisfied to descri!e it. )n either case, it is vie/ed, sadly, as all too real, and these vividly !rilliant clasic o!servations of it fit /ell /ith 5ar/in4s remark to Joseph ,ooker: 1*hat a !ook, a 5evil4s Chaplain mi"ht /rite on the cl-msy, /astef-l, !l-nderin" lo/ and horri!ly cr-el /orks of nat-reT1 =f co-rse, that nat-re also incl-des an e'-ally inherent ethical component that derives from the necessity for cooperation and altr-ism, the potential for responsi!ility, decency, love, even happiness. .hese capacities, too, are shared !y amny other animals, and /e can take enco-ra"ement from the fact that they are so /idespread in nat-re. B-t for them B 1&$ B to prevail re'-ires the kind of collective attention that is possi!le only in the frame/ork of h-man c-lt-re. )n this frame/ork, reflection on the o-tcomes of nat-ral tendencies res-lts in 3-d"ments that restrain or modify those tendencies. )t is f-ll of deceptions, !-t it is m-ch !etter than nothin", and it e+ceeds the capa!ilities of any other animal for similar restraint and modification. .he evol-tionary, !iolo"ical vie/ of h-man nat-re provides many parallels /ith that of animal nat-res and only a fe/ clear distinctions. .raditionally and presently, distinctions !et/een o-rselves and animals have emphasi<ed the primacy and comple+ity of h-man rational fac-lties. B-t in recent years, the development of artificial intelli"ence has d-plicated a s-rprisin" n-m!er of those same fac-lties, and in the comm-nity of people /ho think a!o-t the implications of this fact, it is common to distin"-ish h-mans from hacines !y referrin" to the h-man emotional fac-ltiesCprecisely those /e share in common /ith animals. )t /o-ld seem that /e are sorted to a p-lp, ca-"ht in a vise made, on the one side, fo the increasin" po/er of evol-tionary !iolo"y in e+plainin" the emotions and, on the other, of the relentless d-plication of h-man mental fac-lties !y increasin"ly s-!le and comple+ machines. So, /hat is left of -sK *hat is left is that only /e com!ine the emotions and the life cycle drama of the animal /orld /ith a f-lly empo/ered reflective and comm-nicative fac-lty. @o other animal has that fac-lty, and no machine has an animal !odily life. =ther animals can comm-nicate, !-t they do not e+chan"e vie/s on the ri"htness or /ron"ness of their emotions. Machines can net/ork and think, !-t they cannot disc-ss their fear of dyin". *hat reli"io-s people think of as the so-l or spirit can perhaps !e fairly said to

consist of 3-st this: the intelli"ence of an advanced machine in the mortal !rain and !ody of an animal. 2nd /hat /e call c-lt-re is a collective /ay of -sin" that intelli"ence to e+press and modify the emotions of that !rain, the imp-lse and pain and e+hi!aration of that !ody. Both the intelli"ence and the imp-lse, the comm-nicative capa!ility and the pain, are components of h-man nat-re, and the /y they interact is the -ni'-e feat-re of that nat-re. *itho-t concedin" the e+istence of h-man nat-re, /itho-t descri!in" it as forthri"htly and richly as possi!le, /e /ill never f-lly e+ercise that cr-cial feat-re, /hich alone holds the prospect of an admittedly limited !-t a!sol-tely imperative transcendence.

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Si52 Ref*e0tions on Bio*o(y and !u*ture

John -u6r8 ) shall concentrate here on Melvin 6onner4s essay Dchap. JE for a reason perhaps em!arrassin"ly characteristic of professional philosophers: ) disa"ree /ith a "reat deal of it. ,o/ever, 2rnold 5avidson, ,arriet 7itvo, and 8velyn (o+ 6eller all help to ill-strate central points -nderlyin" my dissent from some of 6onner4s claims, so ) shall !riefly try to !rin" o-t some of these "eneral points !efore t-rnin" to my main task of dissent. ;et me !e"in /ith some very "eneral remarks that apply to !oth 7itvo4s and 5avidson4s contri!-tions.

2s a "eneral theoretical proposition, it /o-ld no/ !e '-ite /idely a"reed that ho/ /e -nderstand !oth o-rselves and nat-re m-st depend considera!ly on o-r "eneral theoretical !eliefs. 5espite ma3or differences in s-!3ect matter and approach, ) take !oth 7itvo and 5avidson to !e offerin", amon" other thin"s, more specific ill-strations of this "eneral tr-th. B-t it is not 3-st the -nderstandin" of, or, in the case of 5avidson4s s-!3ect matter, the affective response to, phenomena that is lia!le to s-ch infl-ences !-t even /hat /e take to !e the phenomena themselves. Many of 5avidson4s monsters, ) take it, /ere '-ite /idely s-pposed to act-ally e+ist, and their e+istence offered a variety of e+planatory etiolo"ies. .he -npleasant demise of 5avidson4s mast-r!ators is not merely asserted !-t descri!ed in ama<in" detail. )n 7itvo4s so-rces, the importance of !ovine virt-e is not merely ass-med, detailed 1fact-al1 reports of the alarmin" conse'-ences of its a!sence are offered. .he 1tele"onic1 effects of previo-s se+-al partners on female animals are ill-strated /ith n-mero-s anecdotal instances. .hese o!servations provide a -sef-l !ack"ro-nd for my main foc-s: ,o/ far do s-ch historical o!servations mandate skepticism a!o-t o-r B 1&L B c-rrent theories and even alle"ed factsK )n partic-lar, ho/ m-ch skepticism is properly s-""ested a!o-t o-r c-rrent theories a!o-t animals and the conse'-ences of these for o-r theories of o-rselves as animalsK .he ans/er, ) shall s-""est later, is a "ood deal. 7itvo4s essay not only s-""ests the appropriateness of s-ch skepticism !-t also indicates a partic-lar "ro-nd. .he tendency to see vie/s of o-rselves reflected in nat-re, the 1pro3ections1 she so clearly doc-ments, has also !een s-""ested for more contemporary theoriesCas, indeed, /e can see in 6eller4s essay, to /hich ) shall ret-rn shortly. .here are o!vio-s diffic-lties in relatin" historical lessons to criti'-es of contemporary !eliefs. .he opinions that 7itvo and 5avidson reco-nt strike -s as l-dicro-s and either comical or "rotes'-e. *e have o-r o/n theories that /e take to !e if not amply demonstrated, as least s-fficiently so to reveal the complete -ntena!ility of these historical vie/s. Conse'-ently, the concl-sion that these vie/s are pro3ections of pre3-dices a!o-t o-rselves onto animals has no serio-s contender. *hen /e come to consider contemporary !eliefs, ho/ever, partic-larly those that carry o-r hi"hest epistemolo"ical honorific, 1scientific,1 /e have no s-ch alternative and accepted standpoint from /hich to la-nch s-ch a criti'-e. B-t as 6eller has pers-asively ill-strated, this does not mean that clear "ro-nds for s-ch a criti'-e cannot, nevertheless, !e provided. ) think there is considera!le force to the o!3ections 6eller raises to contemporary evol-tionary theory. Since ) cannot possi!ly recapit-late the intricacies of her ar"-ment here, ) shall make 3-st one f-rther o!servation in s-pport of her concl-sion. Contemporary theorists of the evol-tion of social !ehavior often assert that the central pro!lem in their field is, or if they !elieve it to have !een solved, /as, the possi!ility of altr-ism. D@eedless to say, altr-ism is a concept like competition that allo/s considera!le e'-ivocal play !et/een technical and collo'-ial -sa"es.E .here are, of co-rse, compellin" reasons internal to evol-tionary theory for perceivin" altr-ism as a ma3or pro!lem. @evertheless, if one is at all inclined to skepticism a!o-t the a!sol-te o!3ectivity of scientific theory, this m-st s-rely add pla-si!ility to the contention that evol-tionary theory recapit-lates a traditional ima"e of ,o!!esian man. .here remain ma3or '-estions that, ) think, 6eller4s acco-nt raises !-t does not ans/er. )n partic-lar, ) have in mind '-estions a!o-t specifically, ) see t/o rather different, tho-"h perhaps not incompati!le, so-rces of this individ-alism. 6eller4s main s-""estion, in line /ith a point emphasi<ed earlier in these

remarks, is that /e pro3ect vie/s of h-man society onto the animal /orld: vie/s, that is, of ,o!!esian man or no/, perhaps, Homo economicus 6ar. Chicagoensis. ,o/ever, the individ-alism she descri!es is also an e+ample of /hat ) take to !e a more "eneral methodA B 1&0 B olo"ical pre3-dice in science. ) have in mind red-ctionism, or the "eneral !elief that the !ehavior of comple+ entities m-st !e -nderstood /hooly in terms of the properties of their constit-ent parts.G1H Perhaps this methodolo"ical ass-mption sho-ld itself !e -nderstood as a more farAreachin" pro3ection of social philosophy onto the entirely of nat-re. )f not, the relation !et/een these positions is somethin" that /ill re'-ire f-rther e+ploration for a f-ller -nderstandin" of these iss-es. 6eller, to ret-rn to my main thread, provides stron" evidence that the dan"ers of pro3ection of social ideolo"y onto the nat-ral /orld have relevance to o-r eval-ation of contemporary as /ell as historical ideas. 6onner, !y Contrast, has a very different kind of pro3ect em!odyin" a more complacent vie/ of science: he enco-ra"es -s to -nderstand o-rselves !etter !y applyin" to o-rselves the lessons that /e have learned from o-r st-dy of other animals. Since ) take it /e may all a"ree that /e are, amon" other thin"s, animals, this s-""estion s-rely has somethin" to commend it. ,o/ever, the /ork of 7itvo and 6eller sho-ld make clear a ma3or dan"er inherent in s-ch a pro3ect. .o /hatever e+tent o-r -nderstandin" of animals does involve a pro3ection onto them of antecedent vie/s a!o-t o-rselves, the attempt to -nderstand o-rselves !y applyin" o-r kno/led"e of naimals /ill complete a small and -nill-minatin" circle. D) think there is a close analo"y here /ith .erry *ino"rad4s ca-tions a!o-t the -se of machines as a ro-te to -nderstandin" o-rselves.E )n fact, ) !elieve that it is 3-st this methodolo"ical pro!lem, rather than the often very conf-sed de!ate a!o-t the e+istence of 1h-man nat-re,1 that is central to the acc-sation that h-man socio!iolo"y, the most conspic-o-s contemporary attempt to ill-minate h-man nat-re !y appeal to more "eneral !iolo"ical theory, f-nctions, in lar"e part, as a rhetorical device for the defense of conservative ideolo"y.G&H 2s ) have already confessed, ) disa"ree /ith a "ood deal of 6onner4s ar"-ment. 8ven if this reflects no more than my o/n ideolo"ical !iases, that itself /o-ld provide some evidence that even the eval-ation or -pAtoAdate scientific ideas is s-scepti!le to s-ch !ias. 6onner presents his vie/s /ith s-!tlety and sophistication, and ) certainly cannot hope, in the space of these comments, to "ive a compara!le defense of an opposin" position. *hat ) shall do, ho/ever, is !riefly indicate three ma3or points at /hich ) disa"ree stron"ly /ith the vie/s he e+presses. (irst, 6onner asserts at the o-tset that 1an or"anism is in essence a "ene4s /ay of makin" another "ene.1 .his is, of co-rse, an e+treme instance of the red-ctionism ) mentioned a!ove in disc-ssin" 6eller4s contri!-tion.G#H ) also think it is profo-ndly misleadin", even false. .he iss-e here are comple+ and some/hat technical, and ) can do the least 3-stice to this part of my dissent. ) take the f-ndamental error to !e the ass-mption that a "ene, or even, for that matter, an or"anism Das keller has ar"-edE, B 1&% B can !e ade'-ately characteri<ed in isolation. =r more acc-rately, the "ene that is characteri<ed in temrms of molec-lar !iolo"y cannot also !e ade'-ately descri!ed in terms of its phenotypic effects. P-t simply, this is !eca-se the development of an or"anism involves enormo-sly comple+ interactions !et/een "enes and /ith the environment, s-ch that the '-estion, /hat is the developmental -pshot of a partic-lar piece of 5@2 Ds-ch as an a'-iline nose, or criminal tendenciesEK is thoro-"hly illAconceived. GFH

6onner is, of co-rse, a/are of these diffic-lties and remarks parenthetically that it is a conf-sion to s-ppose that the cohesiveness of the "enomeCthat is, the enormo-sly comple+ set of interactions !et/een different "enes and the environment in the development of an or"anismChas any !-t a '-antitative !earin" on the validity of this red-ctionistic premise. ) !elieve he is mistaken. =ne /ay of seein" /ay this is so is to o!serve that "iven the incommens-ra!ility of the chemical and f-nctional descriptions of "enes, it is -nclear that there is any interpretation of the term gene /hich co-ld serve for an ela!oration of 6onner4s B-tlerian statement of the essence of an or"anism. 2s a matter of fact, this red-ctionistic slo"an is "enerally offered as a conse'-ence of spec-lations a!o-t the evol-tionary process. B-t ) think it is clear that if it cannot even !e "iven onto"enetic sense, it has no chance at all of havin" a correct phylo"enetic interpretation.GJH 2nd finally, even if it /ere correct from !oth a developmental and en evol-tionary perspective, there is a "reat deal more to an or"anism, especially a h-man one, than its onto"eny and phylo"eny. ) shall take -p this remark a"ain !riefly at my concl-sion. My second main point -ltimately concerns the role of lan"-a"e in science stressed !y 6eller and !rin"s -s !ack once more to the circle of pro3ections /ith /hich ) !e"an this part of my commentary. 6onner offers as s-pport for the importance of !iolo"ical considerations in -nderstandin" h-man !ehavior the claim that c-lt-ral anthropolo"y has already discovered n-mero-s crossAc-lt-ral -niversals. ) s-""est, on the contrary, that these divide e+ha-stively !et/een the hi"hly d-!io-s and the irrelevant. )n the latter cate"ory, ) incl-de e+amples s-ch as coordinated !ipedal /alkin" and the refle+es of neonates. Certainly, ) do not /ant to deny that h-man !ehavior is !-ilt on a s-!strate of DmoderatelyE -niversal !iolo"ical capacities. *hat are cleary more interestin" are the -niversalistic claims a!o-t comple+ !ehaviors, and s-ch claims ) take to !e -niformly d-!io-s. ;et me ill-strate the central pro!lem /ith 3-st one of 6onner4s e+amples. *hile admittin" that the form is varia!le, he s-""ests that one si"nificant -niversalCand hence pres-ma!ly one that is to !e taken to !e "ro-nded in !iolo"yCis the e+istence of marria"e. B-t the varia!ility of form, s-rely, is 3-st the point. .he '-estion that needs to !e asked is, B 1&9 B *hat is meant here !y the /ord marriage K Certainly for -s, in modern *estern society, the term is /ei"hed do/n /ith social, economic, and affective connotations. *itho-t a clear statement of /hich of these are, and /hich are not, incl-ded in the alle"ed anthropolo"ical -niversal, s-ch a claim can do nothin" !-t mislead. 2ny sense of the /orld marrriage thin eno-"h to make the claim even appro+imately tr-e /ill have, ) s-spect, very little to do /ith /hat /e mean !y the term.GLH D=ne is here not so far fromCor at least on a slippery slope to/ardCthe cr-de socio!iolo"y that claims to o!serve 1rape1 in mallards or scorpionflies and concl-des that rape m-st !e 1nat-ral1 for -s.EG0H ) /o-ld ar"-e that all the interestin" claims of this kind depend on 3-st s-ch oversimplistic -ses of terms for comple+ social phenomena. .hird, and finally, ) m-st take iss-e /ith the claims 6onner makes a!o-t the "enetic control of h-man !ehavior. 2t times, ) m-st admit to !ein" a little -ncertain /hat these claims are. .hat there are 1comple+ interactions of "enotype, meta!olism, and environment in the development of ne-ral, !ehavioral, and mental phenomena1 /o-ld !e diffic-lt to disp-te. Iet ) take it that the descriptions he offers of increasin" scientific kno/led"e of "enetically mediated mental disorders m-st !e intended to sho/ more than this. .hat these findin"s 1remove any do-!t re"ardin" the a!ility of "enes to alter comple+ !ehavior1 s-""ests, if it does not strictly imply, that 6onner has in mind the possi!ility of "enetic control of comple+ !ehavior.G%H 2t any rate, my o!3ective here is not e+e"esis of 6onner4s essay. *hat does seem /orth emphasi<in" is

the -tterly -ns-rprisin" character of the phenomena 6onner dra/s to o-r attention and the a!sol-te lack of any interestin" concl-sions a!o-t the determination of h-man !ehavior /hich follo/ from them. ;ike 6onner, ) think that 1phenylketone-ria provides a val-a!le model.1 .his, it /ill !e recalled, is a "enetic disorder that, in the a!sence of a specially controlled diet, res-lts in massive to+icity to the !rain and conse'-ent psycholo"ical dysf-nction. 2part from the !anal fact that people /ith dama"ed or serio-sly a!normal !rains are likely to !ehave stran"ely, it is very diffic-lt to see /hat co-ld follo/ from this. )n partic-lar, ) cannot see that it tells -s anythin" /hatsoever a!o-t the relation !et/een the "enetically mediated development of the !rain and mat-re h-man !ehavioral dispositions. .o claim the contrary seems rather like concl-din" from the severe !ehavioral conse'-ences of hittin" someone over the head /ith a hammer that !ehavior m-st !e determined to some important e+tent !y an internal mechanism involvin" the action of miniat-re hammers. 2t the very least, not a shared of s-pport is offered for hypotheses s-ch as that there are "enetic ca-ses for, say, a predisposition to marria"e. ;et me concl-de on a more constr-ctive note. ) mentioned a!ove that B 1#$ B there /as more to an or"anism, especially a h-man one, than phylo"eny and onto"eny. )n the h-man case, ) cannot state !etter, or pho!a!ly as /ell, /hat this is than Bernard *illiams has done for -s. .he nat-re of a species, incl-din" o-r o/n, centrally incl-des its etholo"y: and the most strikin" and f-ndamental feat-re of h-man etholo"y is its e+istence /itho-t c-lt-re. *itho-t espo-sin" some of the more e+cessive statements of c-lt-ral relativism, ) think that the a!ove fact re'-ires that /e take c-lt-re m-ch more serio-sly than socio!iolo"ists and their follo/ers and apolo"ists are "enerally prepared to do. 2 possi!le /ay of statin" the conse'-ences of so doin" is the follo/in". *e are inclidin" to s-ppose that !eca-se Homo sa#iens is -ndo-!tedly a perfectly respecta!le !iolo"ical speices, its -niversal properties m-st provide the f-ndametnal insi"ht into the nat-re and !ehavior of its mem!ers. B-t s-ch ta+onomic paralysis is 3-st a form of essentialism, a traditional philosophical vie/ almost -niformly re3ected !y contemporary theorists of !iolo"y.G9H )f /e re3ect essentialism, it is open to -s to concl-de, from the centrality of c-lt-re to h-man etholo"y and the "reat varia!ility of c-lt-re, that for most p-rposes, Homo sa#iens is m-ch too !road and coarse a cate"ory for -nderstandin" h-man !e"in"s. *e mi"ht more -sef-lly think of h-mans not primarily as constit-tin" one !iolo"ical species !-t rather as composin" many, no do-!t overlappin", c-lt-ral species.G1$H

$"RT T,O2 HUM"NS "N- M"!HINES

B 1#J B

Se)en2 Introdu0tion
James J. Sheehan .here has al/ays !een a metaphorical connection !et/een technolo"y and nat-re. People have often looked to the nat-ral /orld for ima"es to help them -nderstand social, political, and c-lt-ral developments, 3-st as they have often imposed on nat-re ima"es taken from h-man affairs. .he character of nat-ral and mechanical metaphors has chan"ed over time. .he !o-ndary !et/een nat-re and machine has sometimes !een redra/n. B-t it is only recently that /e have !een a!le to ima"ine machines comple+ eno-"h to !e like h-mans and h-mans predicta!le eno-"h to !e like machines. )n the ancient and medieval /orlds, /hat 5avid Bolter calls the 1definin" technolo"y1 /as not a mechanical device !-t rather some fairly simple form of man-al prod-ction. *hen Plato looked for a metaphor to descri!e the /ay the -niverse f-nctions, he spoke of a 1spindle of necessity1 /ith /hich the fates spin h-man destiny into the /orld. )n the Timaeus , he compared the creator of the -niverse to a carpenter and a potter. =nly in the seventeenth cent-ry, /ith the rise of a ne/ cosmolo"y, did the most important technolo"ical metaphors !ecome mechanical rather than man-al. .he clock replaced the carpenter4s lathe or the potter4s /heel as a /ay of -nderstandin" ho/ the -niverse operated. ;ike a clock, the -niverse /as tho-"ht to !e at once comple+ and comprehensi!le, a mechanism set in motion !y a divine maker /ho, '-ite -nlike the potter at his /heel, "ave his creation the po/er to operate /itho-t his constant s-pervision.G1H J-st as the 9reeks sometimes ima"ined that the "ods had made livin" thin"s from clay, so people in the mechanical a"e tho-"ht that some livin" thin"s /ere no more than comple+ machines. .his vie/ /as "iven B 1#L B its most infl-ential form-lation !y 5escartes, /ho stands at the intersection of h-manity4s chan"in" relationship to animals and machines. 2s /e sa/ in the introd-ction to Part ), ,-mans and 2nimals, 5escartes !elieved that animals /ere merely a-tomata made of flesh. 8ven h-man activities that /ere not "-ided !y reason co-ld !e seen as mechanical: 1the !eatin" of the heart, the di"estion of o-r food, n-trition, respiration /hen /e are asleep, and even /alkin", sin"in", and similar acts /hen /e are a/ake, if performed /itho-t the mind attendin" to them.1 S-ch opinions /o-ld not, 5escartes contin-ed, 1seem stran"e to those /ho kno/ ho/ many different a-tomata or movin" machines can !e made !y the ind-stry of man.1 B-t, of co-rse, 5escartes did not think that h-mans /ere merely mechanical. .he possession of reason opened a f-ndamental "ap !et/een h-manity and machinesCas /ell as !et/een h-manity and animals.G&H )n the ei"hteenth cent-ry, at the same time that some thinkers had !e"-n to /onder if the "ap !et/een h-mans and animals /as as f-ndamental as 5escartes insisted, others called into '-estion the !asic distinction !et/een h-mans and machines. .he classic e+pression of this position /as 3,Homme machine , p-!lished !y J-lien =ffray de ;a Mettrie in 10F0. 2s his title s-""ests, ;a Mettrie !elieved that ,-mans /ere no less machinelike than animals. 1(rom animals to men,1 he /rote, 1the transition is not e+traordinary.1 )n !l-nt, provocative lan"-a"e, ;a Mettrie ar"-ed that mind and !ody /ere e'-ally mechanical: 1the !rain has m-scles to think, as the le"s have to /alk.1 B-t he did not have m-ch to say a!o-t ho/ mental mechanisms act-ally /orked. ,is epistemolo"y, /hich emphasi<ed the po/er of ima"ination, had little connection /ith his notion of !rain m-scles. )n 8ffect. 3,Homme

machine /as /hat one scholar has called 1a pict-ra!le analo"y1 of the mind, a Cmodus cognoscendi , desi"ed to promote scientific in'-iry, in'-iry, rather than any -ltimate kno/led"e a!o-t the nat-re of thin"s.1G#H )n the nineteenth cent-ry, a "reat deal /as learned a!o-t the !ody4s physiolo"ical mechanisms. 7esearch on chemistry and !iolo"y ena!led scientists to -nderstand ho/ the !ody f-nctioned like a steam en"ineCthe machine that had replaced the clock as the era4s 1definin" technolo"y.1 7esearchers !elieved that this kno/led"e of physiolo"ical mechanisms /as part of a sin"le scientific enterprise that /o-ld em!race the st-dy of all matter, livin" and monlivin". 1Physilo"y,1 *ilhelm *-ndt maintained, 1th-s appears as a !ranch of applied physics, its pro!lems !ein" a red-ction of vital phenomena to "eneral physical la/s, and th-s -ltimately to the f-ndamental la/s of mechanics.1 S-ch la/s, some maintained, e+plained mental no less than physical phenomena. 8d/ard Io-mans, for e+ample, an 2merican disciple of ,er!ert Spencer, reA B 1#0 B "arded the (irst ;a/ of .hermodynamics as e+tendin" from the farthest "ala+ies into the hidden recesses of the mind: Star and nerveAtiss-e are parts of the systemCstellar and nervo-s forces are correlated. @ay more: sensation a/akens tho-"ht and kindles emotion, so that this /ondro-s dynamic chain !inds into livin" -nity the realms of matter and mind thro-"h meas-reless amplit-des of space and time. .he chain of !ein", once a hierarchy of e+istence for"ed !y divine decree, th-s !ecomes a -nified domain s-!3ect to the same physical la/s.GFH *ithin certain limits, the nineteenth cent-ry4s mechnical metaphors /ere -sef-l tools for -nderstandin" physiolo"ical phenomena like respiration and di"estion. B-t these metaphors /orked m-ch less /ell /hen applied to the mind. .o !e s-re, e+perimental psycholo"ists learned to meas-re some kind of perceptions and responses, and ne-rolo"ists did important /ork on the str-ct-re of the !rain: !-t it /as diffic-lt to ima"ine mechanisms comple+ and versatile eno-"h to appro+imate mental activities. @or co-ld anyone come close to !-ildin" a machine that co-ld perform anythin" !-t the most r-dimentary calc-lations. )n the 1%#$s, for e+ample, Charles Ba!!a"e failed in the attempt to man-fact-re an 1analytical en"ine1 that /o-ld !e a!le to 1think1 mathematically. Beca-se he did not have the technolo"icl means to perform the f-nctions he had in"enio-sly contrived, Ba!!a"e remained 1a !rilliant a!erration, a prophet of the electronic a"e in the heyday of the steam en"ine.1GJH Until /ell into the t/entieth cent-ry, those /ho !elieved that the !rain f-nctioned mechanically had "reat diffic-lty descri!in" 3-st ho/ these mental mechanisms /orked. =ne prod-ct of these diffic-lties /e !ehavioralism, perhaps the dominant school of empirical psycholo"y in the early t/entieth cent-ry, /hich denied that the nat-re of mental states /as kno/a!le and concentrated instead on st-dyin" !ehavioral responses to stim-li. )n the 19&$s, /hen a ne/ controversy er-pted over the concept of 1l4homme machine,1 it /as fo-"ht o-t on lar"ely !iolo"ical rather than psycholo"icla "ro-nds. Joseph @eedham, /ho took the ;a Mettriean position in this de!ate, ackno/led"ed that this mechanistic vie/ of h-man nat-re /as no more than a 1methodolo"ical fiction,1 even tho-"h he !elieved that 1in science, man is a machine: or if he is not, then he is nothin" at all.1 9iven the sort of machines that @eedham co-ld ima"ine in 19&%, it is not s-rprisin" that he co-ld not find one that m-ch resem!led the mental /orld of h-man !ein"s.GLH 2ll this chan"ed /ith the comin" of the comp-ter. .he theoretical and technolo"ical !asis for he comp-ter /as laid in the 19#$s !y 2lan .-rin" and others, !-t it /as only after the Second *orld *ar

that these machines moved from the realm of hi"hly technical spec-lation to the B 1#% B center of !oth scientific research and pop-lar c-lt-re. Comp-ters, -nlike the cr-de calc-latin" machines of the past, seemed fast, comple+, and s-pple neo-"h to appro+imate real tho-"ht. .he "ap !et/een mind and machine seemed to !e narro/in". (or e+ample, in 19F9, @or!ert *iener p-!lished his infl-ential /ork on 1Cy!ernetics,1 /hich he defined as 1the entire field of control and comm-nication theory, /hether in the machine or in the animal.1 .hat same year, John von @e-mann, /ho had !-ilt a r-dimentary comp-ter in Princeton, pointed o-t the similarities !et/een the comp-ter and the !rain. ./o years later, in an essay entitled 1Comp-tin" Machinery and )ntelli"ence,1 .-rin" predicted tht /ithin fifty years there /o-ld !e machines that co-ld perfectly imitate h-man intelli"ence.G0H So s/iftly did the -se of comp-ters spread that !y the 19L$s, they had !ecome o-r 1definin" technolo"y,1 as f-ndamental to the /ay /e vie/ o-rselves and o-r /orlds as Plato4s crafts or 5escartes4s clock/ork mechanisms had !een to theirs. *e no/ live in the era of 1.-rin"4s Man,1 /hose relationship /ith machines Bolter s-mmari<es in the follo/in" tellin" phrase: 1By makin" a machine think as a man, man reAcreates himself, defines himself as a machine.1G%H Comp-ters played an essential role in the form-lation of co"nitive science, /hich ,o/ard 9ardner defines as the 1empirically !ased effort to ans/er lon"Astandin epistemolo"ical '-estionsCpartic-larly those concerned /ith the nat-re of kno/led"e, its components, its so-rces, its development, and its deployment.1 )n the last t/o decades, this /ay of lookin" at the mind has tended to replace !ehavioralism as the most vi"oro-s !ranch of empirical psycholo"y. )n the li"ht of /hat comp-ter scientists claimed a!o-t the /ay their machines /orked, the !ehavioralists4 selfAimposed ref-sal to talk a!o-t mental states no lon"er seemed either necessary or desira!le. 2s 9eor"e Miller, /ho o!served the shift a/ay from !ehavioralism, recalled, .he en"ineers sho/ed -s ho/ to !-ild a machine that has memory, a machine that has p-rpose, a machine that plays chess, a machine that can detect si"nals in the presence of noise, and so on. if they can do that, then the kind of thin"s they say a!o-t machines, a psycholo"ist sho-ld !e permitted to say a!o-t a h-man !ein". Co"nitive scientists insisted that they co-ld open the soAcalled !lack !o+, /hich !ehavioralists !elieved concealed the mental connection !et/een stim-l-s and response *ithin this !o+, many /ere no/ convinced, they /o-ld find somethin" very m-ch like a comp-ter.G9H 7esearch on /hat came to !e kno/n as 1artificial intelli"ence1 !e"an d-rin" the e+citin" early days of the comp-ter revol-tion, /hen the technolo"y4s potential seemed /itho-t limit. .he follo/in" statement, B 1#9 B from an article p-!lished in 19J% !y ,er!ert Simon and 2llen @e/ell, provides a "ood e+ample of the style and tone /ith /hich the ne/ field /as anno-nced: )t is not my aim to s-rprise or shock yo-. . . . B-t the simplest /ay ) can s-mmari<e is to say that there are no/ in the /orld machines that think, that learn and that create. Moreover, thier a!ility to do these thin"s is "oin" to increase rapidly -ntilCin a visi!le f-t-reCthe ran"e of pro!lems they can handle /ill !e coe+tensive /ith the ran"e to /hich

the h-man mind has !een applied. ;a Mettrie had declared that h-mans /ere machines !-t co-ld say little a!o-t ho/ these machiens /orked. @ineteenthAcent-ry physiolo"ists co-ld ima"ine the h-man !ody as a 1hea en"ine,1 /hich converted f-el into "ro/th and activities. .o the advocates of artificial intelli"ence, the comp-ter finally provided a mechanism compara!le to the mind: to them, 1intelli"ent !ein"s are semantic en"inesC in other /ords, a-tomatic formal systems /ith interpretations -nder /hich they consistently make sense.1 Marvin Minsky p-t the matter m-ch less ele"antly /hen, in /hat /o-ld !ecome an infamo-s phrase, he defined the mind as 1meat machine.1G1$H 2rtificial intelli"ence dra/s on several disciplines and contains a variety of different elements. )t is, in the /ords of one of its practitioners, 1a field reno/ned for its lack of consens-s on f-ndamental iss-es.1 (or o-r p-rposes, t/o intradisciplinary divisions seem especially important. .he first is the difference !et/een 1stron"1 and 1/eak1 artificial intelli"ence. .he former Dvi"oro-sly e+amplified !y @e/ell4s essay in this vol-meE ar"-es for the potential identity of mind and machine: the latter is content /ith seein" comp-ters as models or metaphors for certain kinds of mental activities. .he second division is rather more comple+ since it involves t/o different /ays of thinkin" a!o-t and !-ildin" intelli"ent machines. .he one Dand a"ain, @e/ell is a fine e+ampleE seeks to define a se'-ential set of r-les thro-"h /hich the comp-ter can appro+imateCor d-plicateCthe /orkin"s of the mind. .his perspective, /hich dra/s its philosophical inspiration from 5escartes4s !elief in the possi!ility of definin" certain r-les of tho-"ht, !-ilds on concepts first developed !y .-rin" and von ne-mann. Sherry .-rkle calls the other approach to artificial intelli"ence 1emer"ent 2),1 /hich incl-des 1connectionist1 models as /ell as models !ased on the idea of a 1society of mind.1 Modeled on ass-mptions a!o-t ne-ral operations in the !rain, this approach emphasi<es parallel operations rather than se'-ences, the storin" and manip-lation of individ-al pieces of information rather than the form-lation of "eneral r-les. *hiel !oth !ranches of artificial intelli"ence developed at a!o-t the same time, the former !ecame dominant in the 190$s and B 1F$ B early 19%$s, /hile the latter seems to have !ecome increasin"ly infl-ential after 19%F.G11H ;ike socio!iolo"y, artificial intelli"ence has !een attacked from several directionsCas philosophically naive, methodolo"ically careless, and politically dan"ero-s. .erry *ino"rad4s essay s-""ests some of these criticisms, to /hich /e /ill ret-rn in the concl-sion. Critics like *ino"rad ar"-e that f-lfillin" the promises made d-rin" the early days of co"nitive science has t-rned o-t to !e m-ch more diffic-lt than .-rin" and his contemporaries had !elieved. Chan"in" the scale and !roadenin" the scope of /hat a comp-ter cna do have involved concept-al nd technolo"ical pro!lems fe/ of the pioneers envisioned. @evertheless, no one do-!ts that comp-ter scientists have made "reat pro"ress on a n-m!er of fronts. Moreover, "iven the -npredicta!le co-rse of scientific pro"ress, it is hard to say /hat is and /hat is not possi!le. 2fter all, as t/o scientists have recently /ritten, comp-ter e+perts have 1the /hole f-t-re1 in /hich to sho/ that intelli"ent mchines can !e created. 5o-!ts a!o-t the feasi!ility of artificial intelli"ence, therefore, can lead to skepticism, not cate"orical re3ection.G1&H 2 cate"orical denial that it /ill ever !e possi!le to !-ild machines that can think like h-mans can rest on t/o fo-ndations. .he first re'-ires a !elief in some spirit-al attri!-te that separates h-mans from machinesCand in *estern c-lt-re at least, from animals as /ell. .he second is !ased not on o-r possession of a so-l !-t rather of a !ody: accordin" to this line of ar"-ment, /hich is s-""ested in St-art ,ampshire4s concl-din" remarks to this section, !ein" h-man is insepara!le from the feelin"s and perceptions that come from o-r physical e+istece. *itho-t that kno/led"e of o-r o/n !irth and

death, a kno/led"e central to o-r conceptions of past, present, and f-t-re, any intelli"ence, no matter ho/ skilled at solvin" certain sorts of pro!lems, m-st remain essentially and -naltera!ly different from o-r o/n. Melvin 6onner makes this point !y comparin" the machines of the f-t-re to the "ods of ancient 9reece: 1incredi!ly po/erf-l and even capa!le of many h-man emotionsCnot !eca-se of their immortality, ineli"i!le for admission into that /arm circle of sympathy reserved e+cl-sively for h-mans.1G1#H

Ei(ht2 The Meanin( of the Me0hanisti0 "(e

Ro(er Hahan .he late 8d-ard J. 5i3ksterhis of Utrecht coined the term 1Mechani<ation of the *orld Pict-re1 to characteri<e the nat-re of the intellect-al revol-tion that emer"ed tri-mphant in the seventeenth cent-ry. )n his path!reakin" /ork, /ritten close to forty years a"o, he repeatedly ref-ses to provide a static definition for his central conception, choosin" instead to descri!e it !y sho/in" ho/ it emer"ed from a rediscovery and recom!ination of certain key strands of 9reek nat-ral philosophy in the late 7enaissance and ho/ it /as centrally shaped !y the s-ccess of 9alileo and 6epler4s ne/ astronomy, 5escartes4s and ,-y"ens4s ne/ philosophy of physics, and ne/ton4s "rand synthesis at the end of the cent-ry. Conceptions of the /orld pict-re since the seventeeth cent-ry have admittedly never !een the same. .he 2ristotelian -niverse of essential '-alities and "oalAdirected forms apparently /as displaced !y the ne/ mechanistic philosophy. (or the last forty years, that transformation, kno/n to historians !y the shorthand la!el of the Scientific 7evol-tion, has !een chronicled, its ori"ins hve !een esta!lished, and its character has !een the s-!3ect of do<ens of ma3or mono"raphs. C-rio-sly eno-"h, the iss-es 5i3ksterh-is !roached !-t ref-sed to settle have never !een f-lly analy<ed from a modern perspective. My concern is to offer some s-""estions for findin" a meanin" for this Mechanistic 2"e /hich rests on historically so-nd "ro-nds. .hat meanin" re'-ires special attention !eca-se 1mechanistic1 is the common epithet h-rled at 1red-ctionists.1 .hey are often cr-dely char"ed /ith a desire to eliminate the st-dy of livin" !ein"s !y "ro-ndin" them e+cl-sively on the physical sciences. )f /e proceed /ith a historical analysis, /e /ill see that the la!el 1mechanistic1 carries /ith it other s-!stantial implications. Perhaps the !i""est o!stacle to arrivin" at a f-ll appreciation of the B 1F# B notion is in fact for -s to remain captive of too strict a chronolo"icla vie/. ,istorians of scienceCand ) m-st incl-de myself amon" the "-ilty onesChave, thro-"h their decades of refinin" the meanin" and ar"-in" a!o-t the temporal limits of the Scientific 7evol-tion, locked themselves into a m-ch too narro/ identification of the Mechanistic 2"e /ith this movement. )t !ehooves -s first to clear a/ay these constrictin" and -ltimately misleadin" vie/s of the Sicnetific 7evol-tion to permit reachin" for a more encompassin" meanin". .he c-rrent notion of the Scientific 7evol-tion, tho-"h it has a history that /o-ld take -s !ack to the ei"hteenth cent-ry, is in fact the !yAprod-ct of a set of lect-res "iven at Cam!rid"e in 19F% !y the late Sir ,er!ert B-tterfield, event-ally p-!lished -nder the title, The +rigins of Modern Science . .hat notion /as s-ccessf-lly ela!orated !y a "ro-p of ma3or scholars that incl-des the aforementioned 5i3ksterh-is and my teachers and collea"-es 2le+andre 6oyr?, Marie Boas, her h-s!and, 2. 7-pert

,all, Paolo Casini, ). Bernard Cohen, .homas 6-hn, and most recently, 7ichard S. *estfall. .hey and their follo/ers all s-ffer from a common historic myopia, namely, the -nitary identification of the momento-s 7evol-tion /ith the 1Mechanical Philosophy1 and the conviction that its c-lmination came in the person of Sir )saac @e/ton, /hose (hiloso#hiae $aturalis (rinci#ia Mathematica is 3-stly hailed. 2s a conse'-ence of this shortsi"hted vie/, historians have too ri"idly e'-ated the Scientific 7evol-tion /ith the advent of a Mechanistic 2"e and str-""led to confine its development to the seventeenth cent-ry, principally in an 8n"lish conte+t appropriate to Sir )saac. 2n oversimplified vie/ of their ar"-ment r-ns some/hat as follo/s. (ollo/in" on the almost sim-latneo-s discovery in 1L$9 !y 6epler of the ellipticity of planetary or!its and !y 9alileo of the physical imperfections of celestial !odies like the Moon and J-piter seen in his telescope, pro"ressive nat-ral philosophers /ere forced one !y one to a!andon 2ristotelian and Ptolemaic dicta concernin" the cosmos. )n the ne+t decades, the old order /as shattered !eyond repair !y a flood of opinions that incl-ded a devastatin" criti'-e of Peripatetic concepts a!o-t the closed -niverse str-ct-red aro-nd a central point and its attendant terrestrial physics !ased on the idea that motion /as determined !y essential '-alities residin" in s-!stance. .he separation of the cosmos into a /orld of heavenly perfection and earthly imperfection /hich mirrored Christian !eliefs, and of the correspondence !et/een the microcosm of man and the macrocosm of the -niverse, /as reco"ni<ed as o!solete and 3ettisoned as misleadin". Critical philosophers like Bacon and 5escartes ridic-led ass-mptions a!otthe erroneo-s "ro-nds on /hich the older epistemolo"y /as !ased and !e"an to proclaim a ne/ philosophic order. By the 1L#$s, its !-ildin" !locks had !een individ-ally assem!led: a B 1FF B ne/ philosophy o mathematical co"ency, often co-pled /ith e+perimental confirmation: the post-lation of a corp-sc-lar ontolo"y that foc-sed on '-antifia!le elements and mechanisms immediately apprehended !y the eye and the mind: infinite, isotropic space that /as indifferent to the nat-re of the o!3ects placed in it and hence stripped of hierarchical val-es taken for "ranted !y traditional reli"io-s a-thorities. By the end of the seventeenth cent-ry, so the official line r-ns, all these pieces /ere !rilliantly assem!led into the @e/tonian system of the /orld /ith its -niversal la/s of motion, its ne/ metaphysic of inert matter, a!sol-te space and time, and the proclamation of a ne/ pro"ressive epistemolo"y of the mathematical and e+perimental nat-ral philsophy. Moreover, it is pointed o-t, @e/ton fo-nd it possi!le to incorporate a modified set of Christian val-es a!o-t the ;ord into his mechanical and corp-sc-lar system so that it /o-ld contin-e to reflect the harmony and po/er of the deity in the cosmos. Sir )saac ret-rned the favor of his prophetic !irth on Christmas 5ay, 1LF&, !y lendin" his "eni-s to the 2lmi"hty to 1save1 the cosmos for Christianity. Io- /ill s-rely recall Pope4s famo-s co-plet that e+presses the !lessin"s *estern Civili<ation received /hen 1@at-re and nat-re4s la/s hid in ni"ht: 9od said, let @e/ton !eT and all /as ;i"ht.1 *hat is /ron" /ith this interpretation from o-r perspectiveK )t evades lar"er historic iss-es !y "ivin" a narro/, temporal, and "eo"raphic location to the Scientific 7evol-tion, ass-min" it to coincide /ith the process of the mechani<ationof the cosmos. )deas as profo-nd and important as mechanisms have !oth roots and conse'-ences that cannot !e confined to seventeenthAcent-ry 8n"land. )n sayin" this, ) do not advocate the fashionin" of a co-nterthesis, merely the deco-plin" of the concepts. .oday as/ell as in the seventeenth cent-ry, in the /orld of *estern civili<ation, /hether it is fo-nd in )srael, Japan, or Merry =ld 8n"land, /e mainly operate /ith the ass-mptions of the Mechanistic 2"e. let me ela!orate. .he notion of the mechanical involves '-ite a fe/ dimensions that, for the sake of analysis, ) /o-ld

like to display sin"ly, keepin" in mind that they are hisotirclaly and concept-ally interlinked. (irst is the machine itself, /ith its internal /orkin"s displayed for all to apprehend. *hile it /as principally artic-lated after the invention and /ith the help of printin", the machine /as no ne/comer to the 7enaissance. 8very civili<ation fashions more or less ela!orate tools to cope /ith nat-re, !-t fe/ had "iven them s-ch a special place as did the ,ellenistic 9reeks and their 7oman follo/ers. 8n"ines of /ar and constr-ction /ere at first merely descri!ed /ith /ords and their principles laid do/n -sin" terminolo"y common to nat-ral philosophers !y ma3or fi"-res like 2rchimedes. 2lready in the third cent-ry B.C., it /s a+imomatic that their f-nctionin" /as !ased on a "eometric -ndersandin" of physical princiA B 1FJ B ples, in /hich n-m!er, proportion, si<e, and confi"-ration /ere critical and for /hich the stren"th of materials and thermal forces responsi!le for e+pansion nd contraction provided an essential e+planatory component. Simple la/s of levera"e and the schemes for m-ltiplyin" mechanical advanta"es !y the -se of the /ed"e, p-lleys, and "ears /ere /ell -nderstood !y en"ineers like Philo of By<anti-m and ,ero of 2le+andria /ho -sed them to make sense of the common machines of anti'-ity. B-t the 9reeks also developed mechanical principles to serve '-ite different ends. .hey fashioned a-tomata, that is, selfAmovin" o!3ects dressed -p to resem!le and imiate the operations "enerally ascri!ed to /illf-l a"ents. =ne finds descri!ed sin"in" !irds activated !y /ater press-re, temple doors that open in response to the li"htin" of fires, p-ppet sho/s representatin" shipyard /orkers, and mi+in" vessels that seem to !e filled mysterio-sly as they are visi!ly !ein" emptied. S-ch ela!orate toys, pop-lar in the By<antine /orld, !-ilt to asto-nd the spectator rather than enli"hten him, are a testimony of the "eni-s of ancient crafsmen.G1H B-t they also testify to the ancients4 -se of machines to "lorify their o/n a!ility to penetrate nat-re4s secrets and to mystify the "-lli!le p-!lic !y the fashionin" of mira"ilia . .hey are part of an ancient and tenacio-s tha-mat-r"ic tradition. 2ll themechanisms to prod-ce these effects are caref-lly hidden from vie/ so as to increase the sense of the marvelo-s. )n ancient times, s-ch a-tomata /ere not !-ilt as mechanical models to e.#lain livin" !ein"s: they e+isted merely to imitate nat-re they /ay that an ancient artist /o-ld strive to copy and reprod-ce nat-ral occ-rrences. 2 meas-re of the pro/ess of the artisan /as his a!ility to reprod-ce in the most faithf-l /ay possi!le the nat-ral processes /e e+perience. Prior to the advent of Christianity, nat-re /as /orshiped !eca-se it encompassed s-ch /onders: man4s accomplishments /o-ld !e meas-red !y his a!ility to mimic life, not to make it serve his sec-lar p-rposes. )n the rare instances /e kno/ a!o-t the 9reek mechanist /as pro-d to have o-tdone nat-re !y feats of trickery, often e+ec-ted !y -se of mirrors, !y /hich the ri"ht and left mi"ht !e transposed from their nat-ral order or !y /hich small o!3ects mi"ht !e ma"nified !y placin" them -nder a distortin" "lass o!3ect. *hat differentiates this -se of the mechanical artifact from the postA7anaissance version is the emphasis on secret processes, the revelin" in the mysterio-s /ays of nat-re. Mysterio-s at least to the p-!licT .he treatises from /hich /e "arner this pict-re of the 9reek notion of machine /ere meant for the en"ineers, the fe/ in society adept at -nderstandin" and imitatin" the cosmos. .he mechanicians of ancient times /ere in this sense askin to the alchemists: !y the -se of secret means, the alchemist had meant to reprod-ce in the la!oratory the comple+ proced-res fo-nd in nat-re to "ro/ metals in the tell-ric /om!. .he alchemiA B 1FL B

cal mahatma /as the one /ho co-ld imitate nat-re and perhaps speed -p its nat-ral processes. Man mi"ht coa+ nat-re alon", !-t he never meant to dominate it. .he pict-re chan"es markedly as these ancient treatises are rediscovered and edited in the renaissance, ,ero, for e+ample, in 1J0J. .he spell!indin" character of the mechanical contrivances is em!raced !y enth-siastis like 5ella Porta as part of the ma"ical tradition, kno/n to contemporaries as the secrets of nat-re. 6no/led"e a!o-t them /as shared amon" the adept as an initiation rite for entrance into his @eapolitan Accademia Secretorum $aturae . B-t alon"side the older approach to machines, a ne/ tradition had already fo-nd favor /ith the other, more practically minded aritsans. 2"ricola, for e+ample, despite his h-manistic trainin", foc-sed on the act-al descriptin of machines employed !y miners in his De 1e Metallica D1JJLE. ;ike his contemporaries, Birin"-ccio and 8rcker, he took his mission to !e to assem!le a hand!ook of minin" !ased directly on practices he o!served in Sa+on mines, and he strove to make them immediately accessi!le, tho-"h in the lan"-a"e of Col-mella and in the accompanyin" ill-strations. ,e /as not alone in this "enre. )ndeed, so many te+ts descri!in" the arts of sailin", carto"raphy, architect-re, fortifications, "-nnery, hydra-lics, !rid"e !-ildin", and so on, often presented in the vernac-lar and accompanied !y n-mero-s dia"rams, /ere p-!lished in the late si+teenth cent-ry that they provoked the compilation of encyclopedic treatises that !ecame an immediate printin" s-ccess. Jac'-es Besson4s Theatre des instrumens mathemati'ues et mechani'ues D1J0%E, 2"ostino 7amelli4s 3e Di6erse e artificiose machine D1J%%E, and >ittorio Sonca4s $o6o teatro di machine et edificii D1L$0E all have in common the e+altation of machines as h-man inventions, do/nplayin" the notion of artisans as mere imitators of nat-re. .hese compilers share the "oal of spreadin" ne/ kno/led"e to the m-ltit-des. 8vne the illiterate artisans /ere permitted to profit from them, merely !y st-dyin" the s-mpt-o-s ill-strations. Machines /ere no/ directly linked to the e+pectation of pro"ress thro-"h mechanical improvement, a phenomenon that /as /idespread in the increasin"ly commercial and -r!ani<ed society of early modern 8-rope.G&H .he same mood has contin-ed -na!ated to o-r present day and is the most important root of the Mechanistic 2"e in /hich /e operate. *hat /as "ained thro-"h this dimension for the makin" of the Mechanistic 2"e is not 3-st p-!licity and pro"ress and its concomitants, democrati<ation and the material improvement of society. .he vis-al representation of machines forever stripped them of secret recesses and hidden forces.G#H .he learned reader no/ e+pected to see for himself ho/ thin"s /orked, no lon"er dependin" solely on classicla a-thorities for confirmaA B 1F0 B tion. )n his preface to De 1e Metallica , 2"ricola ass-res -s he personally /ent into the mine itself. )n 1L$$, *illiam 9il!ert similarly dedicated his De Magnete: 1to yo- alone, tr-e philosophi<ers, honest men, /ho seek kno/led"e not from !ooks only !-t from thin"s themselves.1GFH .he ne/ style of philosophi<in", preferrin" thin"s to !ooks and concrete, vis-ally relia!le instances to rhetorical systems of tho-"ht, /as of co-rse at one /ith the ne/ e+perimental philosophy em!raced !y 9alileo, Bacon, and even, to some e+tent, 5escartes. 9alileo sets the de!ates !et/een his interloc-tors in his Discorsi in the >enetian 2rsenal /here deeds speak lo-der than /ords. )n a clear sense, the theoreticians of the Scientific 7evol-tion !orro/ed a frame of mind from the artisan traditions displayed in the 1theatre of machines1 literat-re. Scientists4 ne/ preference for the palpa!le is evident not only in their prefaces !-t in their defense of demonstrations and e+periments as the ne/ ar!iter amon" competin" theories. )t is no accident that all of the important disc-ssion "ro-ps of the seventeenth cent-ry, from 9resham Colle"e to the Berlin 2cademy, o/ned scientific e'-ipment and

hired demonstrators. .he tone of the ne/ sciences /as to displace the occ-lt !y the visi!le, the mysterio-s !y the palpa!le. ,ere once comes to the second important /ay !y /hich /e may analy<e the meanin"s of the Mechanistic 2"e. )t is characteristics of philosophical disc-ssions of the era to re3ect occ-lt forces /henever possi!le and to s-!stit-te for them selfAevident principles m-ch like one sees /hen /atchin" a simple machine in operation. 2ccordin" to the ne/ mechanical philosophers, 2ristotelian reliance on essential '-alities as the central e+planatory device in physics /as the ma3or /eakness !lockin" the "ro/th of -nderstandin". .o e+plain chan"e !y referrin" to an immaterial form that 1informs1 matter /as '-ite -nprod-ctive. .he char"e /as advanced, for e+ample, that assertin" an o!3ect falls to the center of the -niverse !eca-se its essence is heaviness is as ill-minatin" as MoliVre4s medical st-dent /ho e+plains the po/r of opi-m to p-t patients to sleep as the res-lt o a 6irtus dormiti6a Dopi-m is a soporific !eca-se it contains a dormitive po/erE.GJH Peripatetic strate"y seemed to o!f-scate !y s-!stit-tin" /ords for real ca-ses. *hen asked f-rther /hy earthy matter /as heavy or opi-m soporific, the ans/er invaria!ly /as circ-lar: !eca-se it /as 1in the nat-re1 of the o!3ect to act in this fashion. ,o/ co-ld pro"ress ens-e /hen playin" s-ch a deadAend rhetorical "ameK ,istorians of the Scientific 7evol-tion c-stomarily claim that the introd-ction of the mechanical philosophy !roke this impasse !y providin" a sol-tion to this philosophic dilemma. )f visi!le, palpa!le mechanisms of chan"e /ere s-!stit-ted for the hidden, occ-lt forms, the f-t-re of nat-ral philsophy mi"ht !e ens-red. 2nd none seemed more intelli"iA B 1F% B !le than ction thro-"h direct contact. .he immediacy of -nderstandin" that comes from /atchin" a stationary !illiard !all move /hen str-ck !y another, or ho/ po/er is transmitted from one "ear to another, or even ho/ !lood "-shes from an opened artery /hen the heart contracts had a dramatic impact on the mind conf-sed !y Peripatetic ver!osity. 8ven the seemin"ly complicated f-nctions of animate !ein"s /ere rendered more -nderstanda!le !y ass-mptions that their mem!ersCthe hand or arm, for instanceCoperated as did machines, /ith levers, "ears, p-lleys, and "ates, follo/in" the commands of the mind.GLH )n the late seventeenth and early ei"hteenth cent-ries, !odily parts /ere pict-red as individ-al mechanisms. .he str-ct-ral correspondence !et/een manAmade manchines and livin" entities /as adopted !eca-se it promised a ne/ de"ree of intelli"i!ility. .he ne/ scientists of the seventeenth cent-ry co-ld readily "ive -p on the old metaphysics /hen they 3-+taposed the mechanical /orld of their era /ith the scholastic a-ditori-m in -niversities, one vital, ill-minatin", and pro"ressive, the other st-ltifyin", fr-itless, and ta-tolo"ical. *hat principles did they propose insteadK .he ne/ r-le adopted /as to "ro-nd all e+planations on the idea of matter in motion. .he corp-sc-lar philosopher, /ho -nashamedly !orro/ed from ancient atomists, fo-nd ne/ psycholo"ical satisfaction in red-cin" the comple+ity of nat-re to the simplicity of corp-scles capa!le of motion and ca-sin" chan"e !y impact only. .o the mind tro-!led !y the old ver!ia"e, they /ere s-rely prefera!le to Peripatetic forms and '-alities. (or 5escartes, the principal systematic proponent of this vie/, matter /as the analo"-e of e+tension, in the same /ay space /as defined !y the o!3ects that occ-pied it. Common sense as /ell as lo"ic sho/ed -s /ith -ndenia!le reality that thin"s are composed of matter and that ne+t to impenetra!ility, matter /as principally characteri<ed !y its location. Motion, too, /as "ro-nded on irref-ta!le visi!le e+istence. @either /as hidden or occ-lt. Both /ere, as 5escartes en3oyed repeatin", clear and distinct and, to his mind, -ltimately real. .he mechanical philosopher reveled in havin" fo-nd an ontolo"iclaly satisfyin" !asis

for apprehendin" nat-re, one that /as not merely tr-e !y virt-e of /hat the senses and the mind perceived !-t that co-ld also !e manip-lated !y mathematical sym!ols rather than scholastic terminolo"y. 2doptin" the mechanical philosophy !ro-"ht in its /ake the ascendancy of mathematical lan"-a"e that p-rportedly "-aranteed that proper lo"ic /o-ld !e o!served and clarity maintained. )t seemed to ans/er all the criticism laid at the door of the ancients and to offer a hope for depenin" o-r -nderstandin". .o a considera!le e+tent, the mechanical philosophy provided a m-chAdesired ne/ ideolo"y that !ro-"ht s-ccess to many seventeenthAcent-ry nat-ral philosophers. )t had all kinds of advanta"es. (or 5esA B 1F9 B cartes, as it had for 9alileo earlier and /as to have later for ;ocke, it permitted the separation of primary from secondary ca-ses into the f-ndamental '-antitative and the derivative '-alitative realm. 2s a /ellAta-"ht paradi"m, it served to foc-s "enerations of scientists on specific riddles of nat-reCfor e+ample, the nat-re of the vac--m, the prod-ction of colorsCthat re'-ired e+perimental el-cidation. B-t it /o-ld !e a "ross historical simplification to s-ppose that this ne/ philosophy solved all the old pro!lems and earned 5escartes -niversal accolaim. Practitioners of the ne/ philosophy reali<ed all too '-ickly that 5escartes had s-!stit-ted a ne/ ontolo"y for the old oneCthe '-antifia!le for the '-alitativeC!-t it /as itself metaphysical. )nstead of relyin" directly on tan"i!le e+perience, it proposed principles, different from those of 2ristotle !-t principles nonetheless. Scholastic de!ate /as !y no means a!sent from disc-ssion centers /here 5escartes4s philosophy /as ta-"ht and applied. *as e+tension cotermino-s /ith matterK ,o/ divisi!le /ere corp-scles, and ho/ many kinds of matter /ere thereK ,o/ /as movement transmitted and its total '-antity in the -niverse to !e meas-redK ,o/ co-ld one verify !y palpa!le, vis-al e+periments the s-!microscopic e+planations for the action of the lodestone, or the prod-ction of colorsK ;eavin" aside for a moment the immense pro!lems posed !y livin" matter for 5escartes, ho/ co-ld one f-lly -nderstand the motion of the heavenly !odies in elliptical pathsK .he ne/ mechanical philosophy seemed to have created as many ne/ pro!lems as it resolved. Some of the sol-tions offered clearly reintrod-ced into o-r lan"-a"e the very occ-lt terms that 5escartes and his follo/ers had tho-"ht to have rep-diated. 2 ma3or "ro-p of thinkers, partic-larly in 8n"land and incl-din" Sir )saac, so-"ht the ans/er to the mechanical philosopher4s /eak points in the nat-re of the deity, or !y post-latin" -niversal "ravitation and shortAran"e affinities of an electric, ma"netic, or even alchemical sort. )t is partic-larly !eca-se of this historic t-rn of events that ) -r"e a deco-plin" of that /hich has led -s too cas-ally to e'-ate the Mechanistic 2"e /ith the Scientific 7evol-tion. By follo/in" the intellect-al path chosen !y @e/ton too e+cl-sively, as most of my collea"-es have done, they have made -s lose si"ht of the contin-in" a"enda of those /ho instit-ted the Mechanistic 2"e. 2 third and very s-!tle aspect of the Mechanistic 2"e /as the chan"e in emphasis traditionally "ive to the notion of ca-sality from /hat 2ristotle called formal and final ca-ses to efficient and material ones. )ndeed, many /ho em!arked on this path fo-nd themselves holdin" a nominalist position that /ent so far as to deny ca-sality alto"etherC/itness 5avid ,-me4s midAei"hteenthAcent-ry criti'-e. .he detailed history of this chan"e has yet to !e /ritten, !-t its main sta"es /ithin the history of science are clearly evident and provide a ma3or "ro-nd for later criticism B 1J$ B

of the mechanistic philosophy.G0H By diminishin" the importance of first ca-ses, or even denyin" the possi!ility of reachin" them, the mechanistic scientist has a!andoned a task nat-ral philosophers ori"inally ass-med for themselves: to make complete sense o-t of the /orld and to provide an e+planation for it !y attri!-tin" a "oal for nat-re and its creator. .he Mechanistic 2"e completed the process of displacin" teleolo"y in favor of a search for la/s that link phenomena in re"-lar, repeata!le patterns of !ehavior. @ote that the historical tra3ectory that takes -s from Plato to the positivists of the nineteenth cent-ry passes thro-"h the Scientific 7evol-tion !-t is not restricted !y it. Conversely, all the actors of the Scientific 7evol-tion /ere not e'-ally committed to the a!andonment of final ca-ses. Moreover, leavin" o-t ,-me, the main proponents of this constit-ent lived on the Continent and operated ne+t to the mainstream of the traditional Scientific 7evol-tion: Pascal, Male!ranche, d42lem!ert, B-ffon, ;aplace, Bernard, and 5- BoisA7eymond. .here is ins-fficient space to caref-lly map this path, so ) /ill confine myself to ill-stratin" it mainly /ith ;aplace, for it /as in his hands that this aspect of the Mechanistic 2"e fo-nd its most assertive and pre"nant o-tcome, the principle of strict mechanical determinism. 2s is /ell kno/n, !oth Plato and 2ristotle dre/ on telos as the central concept for e+plainin" the /orld. @ot only /ere str-ct-res of livin" !ein"s !est -nderstood thro-"h their f-nction !-t all physical chan"e /as e+pressed in terms of a process analo"o-s to s-!stances f-lfillin" their nat-ral destiny. 2ristotle had specifically sin"led o-t the atomists for criticisms !eca-se their system left events to chance. (or him, all satisfactory e+planations re'-ired an overdetermined set of ca-ses that left no room for fort-ne. *hen atomist notions /ere ref-r!ished in the seventeenth cent-ry and /ere adopted for the esta!lishment of a co"ent mechanical philosophy, the char"e of impiety /as added to the discomfort evidenced over the !elief that all co-ld -ltimately !e made intelli"i!le !y the fort-ito-s interplay of invisi!le material elements. B-t there /ere devo-t Christians like Pascal and Male!ranche /ho took ref-"e in the idea that even tho-"h the nat-ral philosopher co-ld never divine the real intentions of 9od, he co-ld at least note nat-re4s re"-larities and esta!lish the phenomenal la/s -nder /hich they operated. ;ike other nominalists, they radically separated 9od4s omniscience from man4s limited a!ilities to reach essences and to fathom p-rposes. )t is no accident that s-ch developments took root precisely at the time /hen the scientific comm-nity !e"an to or"ani<e and define itself a"ainst the older nat-ral philosophic tradition. @ot only did scientists of the second half of the seventeenth cent-ry develop comm-nication net/orks and prod-ce /orks collectively sanctioned !-t they also so-"ht o-t a rationale for a separate e+istence /hich offered them a differential role in B 1J1 B the /orld of intellect-als. )n effect, scientists like pascal and Male!ranche ackno/led"ed the e+istence of a sphere of activity in /hich scientists had little to contri!-te, namely, theolo"y, !-t proclaimed the special a!ility of collea"-es to st-dy nat-re directly and e+tract from it ever more precise re"-larities. .hose familiar /ith the 8n"lish tradition in nat-ral reli"ion, in /hich Sir )saac @e/ton participated, /ill notice /hat a radical t-rn this Continental path represents, a point that once more -nderscores my admonition to stray from the strai"ht and narro/ path mapped o-t !y traditional historians of the Scientific 7evol-tion. Iet in another important sense, the follo/ers of this Continental path shared /ith their collea"-es across the Channel a distr-ct of essential '-alities. 2t a!o-t the same time, !-t on different occasions, d42lem!ert and B-ffon, /ho /ere each acc-sed of antiAChristian leanin"s, /ere annoyed !y the contin-ed fascination their contemporaries displayed for claimin" to apprehend nat-re4s tr-e !ein".

B-ffon ar"-ed for an empirical system of nat-ral classification to descri!e the realm of nat-ral history: d42lem!ert ar"-ed for a redefinition of the el-sive concept of /hat /e no/ call ener"y conservation, to avoid havin" to "ro-nd his physics on an essentialist -nderstandin" of "ravitational forces. Both of them 3-stified their stand !y narro/in" the territory in /hich scientists /ith their c-rrent methods co-ld reasona!ly e+pect to make head/ay. 2ltho-"h reli"io-s a-thorities failed to interpret it this /ay, nominalist scientists retreated from the impenetra!le domain of final ca-ses, cheerf-lly t-rnin" it over to the ecclesiastic comm-nity, /hile assertin" their a-thority to speak a!o-t the empirically !ased la/s of nat-re /ith selfAass-rance. .hat position is still fashiona!le today and contin-es to constit-te a ma3or ar"-ment in defense of science4s a-tonomo-s ri"ht to kno/ re"ardless of its conse'-ences in other domains of c-lt-re. ;aplace4s ma3or contri!-tion to this component of the Mechanistic 2"e /as to demonstrate /ith heavy scientific artillery in pro!a!ility theory, celestial mechanics, and physics that s-ch a speciali<ed, professional approach, far from diminishin" the e+tent and richness of the scientist4s domain, helped him foc-s on /hat it /as reasona!le for man to -nderstand and to dream constr-ctively a!o-t /hat mi"ht !e possi!le. ,e did this on several occasions. )n a classic paper on heat /ritten /ith ;avoisier in 10%#, he ar"-ed that the -ltimate tr-th of competin" theories a!o-t its nat-re Dkinetic vs. materialistE /as !est set aside in favor of the esta!lishment, /ith caref-l e+periments, of the !ehavior of thermal phenomena.G%H .o that end, ;aplace invented the ice calorimeter to meas-re heat e+chan"es in com!-stion and respiration and derived ta!les pointin" to la/s for the e+pansion of metals on heatin". (or -s, it matters little that his efforts /ere B 1J& B easily !ested !y the ne+t "eneration of physicists. *hat is note/orthy, considerin" his "reat a-thority in the scientific comm-nity, /as his e+plicit disre"ard for '-iddity as lon" as some pro"ress co-ld !e achieved !y empirical means. ;aplace laid "reat store in /hat /e call an operational or instr-mentalist vie/ of science, one that favors the kno/la!le mechanisms of nat-re, st-died mathematically, over its deeper and less evident aspects. ,e preferred the palpa!le to the spec-lative. )n disc-ssin" respiration, for e+ample, ;aplace and ;avoisier confined themselves to statements a!o-t the o+y"en cons-med and the heat prod-ced, leavin" aside all reflections on the relationship !et/een the nat-re of life and vital heat, a commonplace s-!3ect in their epoch.G9H *e le"itimately ask if this conscio-s choice /as merely a strata"em to disarm nettlesome reli"io-s or philosophic critics or a conviction a!o-t the speical nat-re of the scientists4 occ-pation.G1$H Undo-!tedly !oth. Beyond this, and for personal reasons, ;aplace also preferred epistemolo"ical certainty to ontolo"ical prof-ndity. )n one of those parado+ical events that !efalls so many in their lieftime, his conventional career choice of the priesthood had !een shattered !y a conversion e+perience !ro-"ht a!o-t !y the discovery of the !ea-ty and po/er of the analytic versions of @e/tonian astronomy practiced in (rance. ;aplace, moreover, fashioned a ne/ mathematical tool, the a posteriori calc-l-s of pro!a!ilities Dstatistical inferenceE that he ass-med /o-ld lead /ith inel-cta!le po/er from o!served phenomena to la/s of nat-re and from la/s to ca-ses. .he most remarka!le !yA prod-ct of his efforts /as his massive fivevol-me Trait5 de M5cani'ue C5leste , /hich offered a thoro-"h analysis of the @e/tonian astronomical /orld, -sin" the ne/ lan"-a"e of calc-l-s !-t entirely stripped !are of the theolo"ical and metaphysical concerns @e/ton pri<ed so dearly. ;ike @e/ton, ;aplace sh-nned -nfo-nded hypotheses. 2 partic-larly clear instance of his rel-ctance to accept spec-lative theory /hen no direct evidence /as availa!le /as his reaction to a clever !-t !i<arre hypothesis proposed !y the 9enevan ;e Sa"e to e+plain -niversal "ravitation.G11H .his completely

mechanistic theory involved n-mero-s tiny -ltram-ndance particles travelin" at "reat speed thro-"h space in a random fashion. )n this model, attraction /as the res-lt of the m-t-al shieldin" efect solid !odies /o-ld have /hen in pro+imity to each other, an effect that /o-ld increase "reatly as the distance !et/een them decreased. ;aplace demanded to kno/ /hat speeds and masses the hypothesis entialed. *hen they t-rned o-t to !e lar"er than the speed of li"ht, he lost interest. ;e Sa"e4s particles /ere a clever !-t vac-o-s 3ypothesis that co-ld not !e tested directly /ith apparat-s at hand and hence /ere not /orthy of the concern of a practicin" mechanistic scientist. .he Mechanistic 2"e demanded tan"li!le evidence rather than -nA B 1J# B s-pported models, even /hen these tr-ned o-t to !e !ased on the principles of matter in motion. )t m-st not !e ass-med from this that s-ch a positivist stance, /hich favored fact over fancy, r-led o-t hypotheses, or alto"ether !locked their -se. )t merely distin"-ished !et/een p-re con3ect-re and ima"inative sol-tions that /ere testa!le. ;aplace4s post-lation of the ne!-lar hypothesis to acco-nt for the ori"ins of the solar system is an apt ill-stration of this. Usin" pro!a!ility theory, he ar"-ed that there m-st !e a physical ca-se responsi!le for the planet4s or!itin" aro-nd the s-n in a place close to the ecliptic, all in the same direction and /ith nearly circ-lar paths. ,is hypothesis, tho-"h thoro-"hly spec-lative, /as nonetheless testa!le and fr-itf-l, hence accepta!le -ntil it /as ref-ted. Clearly, the philosophy of /hat /e mi"ht call phenomenolo"ical positivism did not constit-te an o!stacle to the scientist4s ima"ination. =n the contrary, none is more visionary than ;aplace4s mechanistic assertion of determinism: .he present state of the system of nat-re is evidently a res-lt of /hat it /as in the precedin" instant, and if /e conceive of an )ntelli"ence /ho, for a "iven moment, em!races all the relations of !ein" in this Universe, )t /ill a!le !e a!le to determine for any instant of the past and f-t-re their respective positions, motions, and "enerally their affections. Physical astronomy, that s-!3ect of all o-r -nderstandin" most /orthy of the h-man mind, offers -s an idea, al!eit imperfect, of /hat s-ch an )ntelli"ence /o-ld !e. .he simplicity of the la/s !y /hich celestial !odies move, the relationship of their masses and their distances allo/ -s to follo/ their motions thro-"h analysis, -p to a certain point: and in order to determine the state of the system of these lar"e !odies in past or f-t-re cent-ries, it is eno-"h for the mathematician that o!servation provide him /ith their position and speeds at any "iven instant. Man o/es this advanta"e to the po/er of the instr-ment he -ses and to the small n-m!er of relations he employs in his calc-lations: !-t i"norance of the diverse ca-ses that prod-ce the events and their comple+ity, taken to"ether /ith the imperfection of analysis, prevent him from makin" assertions /ith the same certit-de on most phenomena.G1&H )t is clear from this remarka!le credo that ;aplace e+pected f-t-re pro"ress in science to depend on a patient !-t correct adaptation of the methods of astronomy to the -nsolved pro!lems of nat-re in other realms. =n different occasions, he e+pressed this vision specificially for crystallo"raphy, chemistry, and psycholo"y. )n an -np-!lished man-script, he repeated this conviction for !iolo"y. B-t /e /o-ld !e mistaken if /e ass-med his philosophy of astronomy depended on the adoption of specific a+ioms a!o-t matterCfor e+ample, that it !e inert rather than selfAactivatin"Cany more than if /e ass-med he ref-sed to consider alternate theories of heat and li"ht to the corp-sc-lar ones favored in his day.

B 1JF B (or him, as for many of the !iolo"ical red-ctionists of the nineteenth cent-ry, it /as the proper scientific approach to pro!lem solvin" that co-nted more than the specific character of the theory employed. .he epistemolo"ical virt-e of the 1mechanistic1 approach mattered more than its materialistic ontolo"y. .he physiolo"ist Ma"endie, /ho /as ;aplace4s desciple, and his famo-s st-dent Cla-de Bernard accepted the notion that livin" !ein"s co-ld not trans"ress the la/s of the inor"anic /orld !-t maintained they /ere additionally held to la/s of the or"anic realm.G1#H 5- BoisA7eymond, /ho !elon"ed to the "ro-p that si"ned a red-ctionist manifesto in 1%FL, also adhered to this notion and recommended that only physical and chemical tools !e employed to analy<e physiolo"ical phenomena. ,e did so principally !eca-se their operations /ere intelli"i!le, not !eca-se physics and chemistry /ere ontolo"ically more relia!le or prior. )t seems to me a ma3or historical mis-nderstandin" to ar"-e that the philosophy of !iolo"ical red-ctionism t-rned on a temperamental philosophic preference for the physical over the life sciences. .he record, as it is no/ !ein" -nfolded !y historians of the nineteenth cent-ry, sho/s that it /as the e+ample provided !y the physical sciences more than their principles that impressed researchers in !iolo"y.G1FH Most of the "reat fi"-res received trainin" and developed their ideal pict-re of /hat a solid science mi"ht !e from e+perience /ith astronomy, physics, and chemistry. )n one /ay or another, they all took to heart messa"es like the one offered !y ;aplace that, /ith s-fficient persistence, the life sciences /o-ld soon arrive at a sta"e of mat-rity that "ave them the kind of po/er of penetration reached !y follo/ers of @e/tonian astronomy. *e no/ kno/ that their optimism /as perhaps a !it premat-re. )n their enth-siasm, they may have failed to co-nt on the almost limitless variety that e+ists in the nat-ral /orld and the comple+ity of livin" processes. Iet the faith in pro"ress thro-"h the adoption of e+perimental science is still the drivin" force !ehind today4s research pro"rams. )n that sense, the effects of the Mechanistic 2"e are still /ith -s. Ultimately, the critical !yAprod-ct of the Mechanistic 2"e /as to have provided e+amples of ho/ nat-re co-ld !e apprehended !y men of science. to !e accepta!le, as /e have seen, any ne/ science had to reveal the mechanism of its theories to the eye, to !e "ro-nded on verifia!le evidence, to adopt an -nam!i"-o-s voca!-lary for the sake of clarity, to ar-"e co"ently Dprefera!ly employin" a lo"ically relia!le lan"-a"eE, and to concern itself /ith immediate rather than distant ca-ses, in any case, ca-ses that co-ld !e tested. )n short, the Mechanistic 2"e offered a philosophy for scientific -nderstandin" that had proven to !e effective and remarka!ly prod-ctive. .here are other feat-res that o-r rapid historic s-rvey may have B 1JJ B ena!led -s to have "limpsed, tho-"h they are more implied than made manifest. )t is perhaps most evident in the ;aplacean credo. *hereas in ancient times, man and the -niverse /ere considered first as the !yprod-cts of a creator to !e contemplated and imitated, since at least the nineteenth cent-ry, the scientifically informed mind has !een prepared to s-!stit-te his mental pro/ess for that of 9od. ;aplace4s )ntelli"ence co-ld 3-st as easily !e a perfected h-man calc-lator as the S-preme Bein". .h-s it is that the modern scientist is potentially in as "ood a position to constr-ct the -niverse and manip-late it accordin" to his c-m-lative insi"hts as he is to analy<e a -niverse created !y a deity. )n the modern era, -nderstandin" has !ecome a means of control. Man is no/ the mechanic, the maker of the machine: *hat >ico implied !y assertin" the identity of 6erum and factum , /hat man makes, he is a!le to kno/.G1JH

.he ;aplacean credo of determinism not only offered the potential of prediction, and hence a meas-re of control, !-t it also promoted man to the rank of a lesser "od. .hat messa"e /as /ell -nderstood !y many of the !iolo"ical red-ctionists /ho /ere -neasy /ith its implications. 5- BoisA7eymond /as the most e+plicit spokesman /ho raised do-!ts a!o-t the -ltimate po/er of the scientific mind. )n a series of pop-lar addresses on science over a cent-ry a"o, he e+plicitly set limits to the po/er of science, maintainin" that despite the likelihood f-rther research /o-ld dissolve some of o-r i"norance, there /ere iss-ed that /o-ld never !e settled !y science.G1LH ,e listed seven impenetra!le riddles of nat-re that /o-ld forever remain !yeond o-r ken. *hat is si"nificant a!o-t them is that they incl-ded iss-es dear to physical scientists as /ell as his !ilo"ical collea"-es. .hey are not canonical eni"mas, !-t his list nonetheless ill-strates the kinds of metascientific iss-es he considered !eyond the limits of the /isdom of scientists: the essence of force and matter: the ori"in of movement: the ori"in of life: the p-rposef-l character of nat-re: the nat-re of simple sensations: the ori"ins of intelli"ence and lan"-a"e: and the riddle of freedom of the /ill. 5espite the remarka!le pro"ress of science, the nineteenth cent-ry /as also the period in /hich do-!ts a!o-t the implications of the ;aplacean credo emer"ed. )t is a meas-re of the am!i"-ity /ith /hich his messa"e /as "reeted that 5- BoisA7eymond reminded his listeners that man /as not omniscient. Perhaps he sho-ld also have reminded -s that he is not omnipotent either. ) have al/ays !een impressed that 9oethe4s 0aust and Shelley4s 0rankenstein appear on the historic scene 3-st as the Mechanistic 2"e is in its f-ll "lory. 5oes this not s-""est that iss-es of this ma"nit-de are never settledK 2s stated at the o-tset, the modern a"e /as nonetheless irretrieva!ly transformed !y the esta!lishment of a philosophy of mechanism that sho/ed ho/ m-ch -nderstandin" co-ld !e enlar"ed !y adoptin" its B 1JL B tenets. .r-e, modern man co-ld not e+pect to e'-al the pro/ess of the deity simply !y the -se of his ne/ sec-lar instr-ment, !-t he co-ld no/ hope to deepen his "rasp on nat-re /ith considera!ly more confidence.

Nine2 Meta6hors for Mind9 Theories of Mind/ Shou*d the Humanities Mind:
"**en Ne3e** .he o-ter frame of this essay is the comp-ter revol-tion. .he comp-ter threatens to infiltrate the h-manities and, indeed, all intellect-al disciplines. .here is m-ch to the /orld !esides disciplines, of co-rse, and the comp-ter has its effects on the lar"er sta"e of economics and /ar. B-t the disciplines provide a more than ade'-ate frame for -s. .he comp-terC!y /hich ) mean the hard/are, the soft/are, and the al"orithms, alon" /ith their -nderlyin" theoryCis leadin" to a technical -nderstandin" of all intellect-al operations. By takin" intellect-al operations to !e the technolo"y for processin" information as represented in data str-ct-res, the comp-ter is proceedin" to transform them all. (rom /ord processors, to comm-nication net/orks, to data !ases, to data analysis, to theoretical calc-lations, to sim-lations, to a-tomatic r-nnin" of e+periments, to preparation of scholarly papers, to sched-lin" appointmentsCall across the !oard, it transforms first this intellect-al operation and then that one. .he transformations are piecemeal, mostly commercially driven, and often attack the intellect-ally peripheral and the social m-ndance. B-t, as /ith the loc-sts, one can hear the munch,

munch, munch across the land. Since /e did not previo-sly -nderstand intellect-al operations all that /ell, the s/eep of this revol-tion is -nclear and contentio-s. )t is possi!le to !elieve that only certain intellect-al operations /ill !e transformed and that others /ill remain /ithin a separate and sheltered realm. .his is one reason the comp-ter revol-tion is only a threat: the reality has only partly arrived, and it is -nclear that the rest /ill ever come. Contentio-sness arises !eca-se the lack of clarity e+tends even to /hether it is a threat. Perhaps the metaphor of the loc-sts is false. Perhaps the arrival sho-ld !e "reeted /ith 3oy and hosannas. (or it /ill !rin" /ith it not only the capa!ility for intellect-als to en"a"e in more intellect-al operations B 1J9 B per day !-t to d so /ith an immeas-ra!ly deepened -nderstandin" of /hat the intellect-al operations themselves mean. .he sit-ation is yet more comple+. =ne of the insidio-s aspects of the comp-ter revol-tion is that it arrives on /in"s of !eneficeCcost !enefice, it is tr-e, !-t since the disciplines val-e f-nds as m-ch as the /orld at lar"e, and also find them in short s-pply, the inflitration of the comp-ter is -s-ally /elcomed in the small, even /hile in the lar"e, it is disc-ssed in symposia, papers, and !ooks. So m-ch for the o-ter frame. .he theme of this vol-me is the location of h-manity, and its method is to /ork alon" the !o-ndaries !et/een h-manity and other thin"s, s-ch as !easts and machines. .his connects it /ith the comp-ter revol-tion, altho-"h in over lappin" and partial /ays. (or the comp-ter as machine to-ches this theme at more than one place: as an e+emplar of the modern technolo"ical a"e, as a machine that deals in the root operations of intellect-als, and as somethin" that mimics the h-man mind. *hich introd-ces the inner frameCcomp-ters and mind. .his is the aspect of the comp-ter revol-tion that concerns -s. *henever the iss-e e+plicitly arises of ho/ the comp-ter locates o-r h-manity, the ans/er invaria!ly centers on /hat comp-ters tell -s a!o-t o-r mind. )t is not clear that /e are ri"ht in al/ays movin" to this foc-s. =ther aspects of the revol-tion may in the lon" r-n !e more important. B-t, as in m-ch that is h-man, there is rec-rsive selfAf-lfillment: /e in'-ire a!o-t /hat is important, !-t o-r criteria for importance is lar"ely ho/ m-ch /e o!serve o-rselves in'-irin". ) accept this framin". ;et -s in'-ire once more a!o-t /hat the comp-ter tells -s a!o-t o-rselves, as reflected in o-r minds. ,o/ever, this inner frame is still too lar"e. *e m-st pick o-t a sin"le thread /ithin it. @evertheless, at last /e are ready to !e"in, altho-"h the framin" is not '-ite ready to end.

Meta6hors for Mind

.he comp-ter is a meta#hor for the mind . .hat is ho/ it so often "ets said. )t does not even seem stran"e any more. *estern society has al/ays -sed the technolo"ies of the time as metaphors for the h-man mind. (or all ) kno/, all other civili<ations do the same. )n any event, it is eno-"h that /e do. *e often trace the co-rse of technolo"ical metaphors for mind from 5escartes and the hydra-lic fo-ntains of his time, thro-"h the telephone s/itch!oard, and on -p to the comp-ter. 7isin" a!ove the se'-ence, !y the sort of modest indictive capa!ility nat-ral to -s all, /e have often !een ass-red that the leadin" metaphor for mind /ill move on /ith the B 1L$ B

ne+t technolo"ical advance Dholo"rams /ere once a favoriteE. Some tr-th resides in this, no do-!t. Metaphor is a partic-larly disarmin" /ay of arrivin" at tr-th. )t invites the listener to find /ithin the metaphor those aspects that apply, leavin" the ret as the false resid-al, necessary to the essence of metaphor. 2nd since /ithin the meta#hor is al/ays, !y the lin"-istic t-rn D.oe/s 19%0E, /ithin the listener , the invitation is to find /ithin oneself some tr-th that fits. ,avin" done that, it is diffic-lt to ar"-e a"ainst the tr-th that the metaphor reveals. )ndeed, to fail to find any tr-th that applies seems to say more a!o-t the listener than a!o-t the metaphor: perhaps he is one of those /ho does not "et 3okes either. So there is tr-th in the comp-ter as a metaphor for mind, tho-"h perhaps as m-ch social tr-th as scientific tr-th. .his !rin"s -s to the final framin", /hich is personal. .his pervasive -se of comp-ter as metaphor for mind has al/ays someho/ rankled. 2l/ays ) e+perience a sense of discomfort in -sin" it, or in hearin" it, or in takin" it as the ri"ht /ay of p-ttin" it. May!e ) do not "et the 3oke, May!e ) do and do not like it. May!e ) like it !-t do not kno/ ho/ to do it. May!e ) think it is no metaphorin" matter. )n any event, let -s e+plore the iss-e. ) shall e+pand on my *illiam James ;ec-res at ,arvard University D@e/ell 19%0E. 2ltho-"h those /ere a perfect place for a /ider vie/, in fact, ) foc-sed stron"ly on matters internal to the science of co"nition and did not address s-ch iss-es as the comp-ter metaphor. ) no/ !elieve, ho/ever, that ) can ans/er the '-estion of /hat dist-r!s me a!o-t the -se of comp-ter as metaphor for mind. it contrasts /ith a theory of mind . )t distances the o!3ect, so to speak. )f the comp-ter is a metaphor for mind, it is !y that same token no more a!o-t mind than a metaphor. Metaphors !ein" clearly in the eye of the !eholder, they leave the o!3ects themselves -nto-ched, or to-ched in only a literary /ay that does not deran"e the topic itself, !eca-se it is only commentary. .h-s, to vie/ the comp-ter as a metaphor for mind is to keep the mind safe from analysis. Science is not like that. 2t least science does not take itself as metaphorical. 2ckno/led"in" al/ays the necessity of appro+imation and the inevita!ility of error, it still sees itself as attemptin" to descri!e its s-!3ect matter directly and not metaphorically. )t has indeed !ecome fashiona!le !oth to deconstr-ct science D;ato-r and *ool"ar 1909E and to take all science as metaphoricalCto take metaphor as a metaphor for science. .his can !e done, of co-rse. 2s already noted, metaphor has a certain inevita!ility a!o-t it /ith respect to s'-ee<in" o-t some tr-th. 2 !oa constrictor is not a !ad metaphor for metaphor. B-t sometimes the !ones crack. )n partic-lar, it is clearly /ron" to treat science as metaphor, for the more metaphorical, the less scientific. )n contrast to metaphors B 1L1 B for mind, to -nderstand the mindC/hat it is, ho/ it can !e, /hy it /orks, ho/ far it reaches, /hence it arises, and /here it is locatedCre'-ires a scientific theory of mind. .he metaphor for mind that the comp-ter makes availa!le for o-r -se is availa!le to -s all already. )t is -nclear that it can or needs to !e sharpened. )t is already richer than mi"ht !e ima"ined. )t indicates mind as somethin" mechanical, atomistic, conte+t independent, slavishly r-le follo/in", repetitive, stereotypical, 3erky, sin"le minded GsicH, '-antitative, -nchan"in", ri"id, -nadaptive, po/erf-l, comp-lsive, e+ha-stive, o!sessed /ith detail, noncarin", a spindler m-tilator, passionless, formal, lo"ical, errorless . . . P-ll the pl-"T ) am !ein" too comp-lsive. )n fact, the comp-ter as metaphor mi+es many so-rces and chan"es !efore o-r eyes. .he comp-ter as comp-ter contin-es to !ecome different thin"s at a rapid rate. =-r e+pos-re to it, in all its forms, increases correspondin"ly, !oth directly !y personal e+perience and indirectly thro-"h !oth the advertisin" and p-!lic media and the technical and intellect-al literat-re. =ne so-rce "oes !ack all the

/ay to the comp-ter as machine, in /hich the comp-ter is all "ears. B-t /e have all seen eno-"h to reali<e that the comp-ter is clearly not a rollin" mill or ticktock clock. So the machine vie/ "ets overlaid /ith others that arise from the nat-re of pro"rammin" and from the speciali<ed nat-re of applications, s-ch as the lean, clean, sat-rated color panels of comp-ter animation or the /hi< and a!stract thrill and terror of interactive comp-ter "ames. .hese different so-rces !ear family resem!lances, !-t they !l-r the metaphor and allo/ it to convey different thin"s on different occasions. 9ood thin", in fact, for a metaphor, /here the richer, the !etter. .he comp-ter metaphor can take care of itself very /ell, /itho-t any help from me. My p-rpose is to pro!e /hether the /ay to treat /hat the comp-ter can tell -s a!o-t mind is as metaphor or as science.

Theories of Mind
More effort needs to !e spent e+plicatin" the nat-re of a scientific theory of mind. ) prefer to do that at a specific level, not at the level of science in "eneral. Still, somethin" "eneral needs to !e said, if only !eca-se so m-ch has !een /ritten and m-sed a!o-t the nat-re of science as it mi"ht pertain to h-mans and their societies and c-lt-res, or /hether in fact it co-ld pertain at all. 2"ain, the foc-s here is not to strai"hten o-t the notion of science per se. 7ather, ) /ant to !e s-re the notion of science that ) -se is clear. By a theory of mind , ) mean 3-st /hat ) /o-ld in talkin" a!o-t any scientific theory. ) mean it in the same sense as in the theory of plate tectonics in "eolo"y, the theory of or"ain chemistry, the astronomical B 1L& B theory of the planetary or!its, the theory of the atom, and on and on. .hese e+amples are themselves not '-ite the same, !-t they all contain a solid common kernel. Society, in the !ody of the attendin" scientists, attempts to or"ani<e its kno/led"e of some !ody of phenomena. )ts "oal is to -se the kno/led"e for prediction, e+planation, desi"n, control, or /hatever. .heory is the sym!olic or"ani<ation of this kno/led"e. Sciences all "ro/ to look alike in many /aysCthe nat-ral and !iolo"ical sciences very m-ch so, as /ell as !its and parts of the h-man sciences. .hey all develop !odies of solid fact and re"-larities and s-rro-nd them /ith an e+plicit, if some/hat conventional, apparat-s of evidential s-pport. .hey all develop theories, /hich tend to mathematical and formal sym!olic form. .hese theories tend to !e mechanistic. .hat is, they posit a system or collection of mechanisms, /hose operation and interaction prod-ce the re"-larities. .he theories of all the sciences all fit, more or less /ell, into a sin"le theoretical fa!ric that is a stitchedAto"ether coherent pict-re of a sin"le -niverse. 2n article of faith for a lon" time, this has !ecome increasin"ly evident /ith the ama<in" emer"ence of !iolo"y to match in po/er and ele"ance the older physical sciencesCand to !e one /ith them in a seamless scientific /e!. Some aspects of the sciences reflect the nat-re of the /orld, others the nat-re of the enterprise itself. .hat scientific theories are cast in terms of -nderlyin" mechanisms seems to reflect the nat-re of the /orld. .heories co-ld !e different and sometimes are. .hat theories have a formal and calc-lational character reflects the scientific enterprise. .his '-ality makes the kno/led"e that is the science deriva!le from the theory and not from the theorist. .o -se a scientific theory re'-ires !oth kno/led"e and skill, especially the latter. ,ence, not every!ody can take a theory and prod-ce its res-lts Dor even reprod-ce themE. B-t the res-lts, /hen prod-ced, are the res-lts of the theory, not of the theoristCa matter of no small import, since h-mans themselves have Dor contain, dependin" on yo-r metaphorE !odies of kno/led"e. ,-mans can predict, e+plain, desi"n, and control, all /itho-t !enefit of science,

m-ch less theory. Perhaps /hat !est characteri<es science methodolo"ically is its a!ility to "et these activities into e+ternal sym!olic artifacts, availa!le to all /ho are 1skilled in the art.1 )f science stayed o-tside the ho-se of man, there /o-ld !e nothin" to consider in contrastin" metaphors and theories of mind. B-t, of co-rse, a scientific psycholo"y does e+ist, and it is reco"ni<a!ly a family mem!er of the science kin "ro-p. .he contrast re'-ires more than 3-st a scientific psycholo"y, ho/ever. .he comp-ter m-st -nderlie !oth the metaphor of mind D/hich it avo/edly doesE and the theory of mind. )f this /ere not the case, the contrast /o-ld still amo-nt only to the prover!ial one hand clappin". B 1L# B B-t the co"nitive revol-tion has occ-rred D9ardner 19%JE. )t is thirty years old. )t has come to dominate individ-al psycholo"y. @e/ scientific -pstarts no/ rail a"ainst it instead of a"ainst !ehaviorism. 2nd this revol-tion has !een dominated !y the comp-terCor more correctly, !y the a!stract notions of comp-tation and information processin" that have emer"ed as the theoretical co-nterpart to the technolo"ical advance. 8ven the phiosophers say so D5ennett 19%%, (odor 19%#E. .he acceptance has moved to the creation of an -m!rella interdiscipline called co"nitive science. )n some '-arters, /e can act-ally hear the clappin". .here is indeed a contrast to consider.

Unified Theories of !o(nition

My *illiam James ;ect-res "ive some indication of /hat it mi"ht mean for there to !e a theory of mind, in the sense /e have !een disc-ssin". Psycholo"y has arrived at the possi!ility of -nified theories of co"nitionCtheories that "ain their po/er !y havin" a sin"le system of mechanisms that operate to"ether to prod-ce the f-ll ran"e of h-man co"nition. ) did not say they are here yet, !-t ) ar"-ed they are /ithin reach and that /e sho-ld strive to attain them. @or did ) claim there /as a sin"le s-ch -nified theory. )ndeed, in my lect-res ) ar"-ed that in o-r c-rrent state of kno/led"e, there /o-ld !e several theories. ) did claim that eno-"h /as kno/n to attempt -nified theories and that they had immense !enefits for co"nitive scienceC!rin"in" into one theoretical str-ct-re the constraints from the "reat store of empirical re"-larities that co"nitive psycholo"y has amassed, alon" /ith /hat /e no/ -nderstand a!o-t the mechanisms of co"nition. .he lect-res /ere !-ilt aro-nd the presentation of an e+emplar -nified theory, em!odied in a system called Soar, developed !y John ;aird of the University of Michi"an, Pa-l 7osen!loom of the )nformation Sciences )nstit-te at the University of So-thern California, and me D;aird, @e/ell, and 7osen!loom 19%0E. Soar provides an appreciation of /hat is re'-ired of a -nified theory, /hat its yield mi"ht !e, and ho/ ready the field is to develop them. Soar is only an e+emplar: there are others as /ell D2nderson 19%#E. (i"-re 9.1 presents the elements of the theory of h-man co"nition em!odied in Soar. So far, ) have taken care to say theory em"odied in Soar . 2s /e shall see, Soar is a specific kind of systemCan architect-re or machine or"ani<ation.G1H *e -s-ally take a theory of some domain, here a theory of the mind, as !ein" the assertions a!o-t the nat-re of that domainChere assertions a!o-t ho/ the mind is str-ct-red, ho/ it operates, ho/ it is sit-ated, and so on. So Soar, as a system, cannot literally !e a theory. B-t the theory asserts that the central str-ct-re in mind is the

B 1LF B 1. ControllerAPerceptionACo"nitionAMotor

&. 6no/led"e and 9oals

#. 7epresentation, Comp-tation, Sym!ols

F. 2n 2rchitect-re pl-s Content

J. 7eco"nition Memory Da!o-t 1$ msE

L. 5ecision CyclesC2-tomatic Da!o-t 1$$ msE

0. Pro!lem Spaces and =perators Da!o-t 1 sec.E

%. )mpasses and S-!"oals

9. Ch-nkin" Da!o-t 1$ sec.E

1$. )ntended 7ationality D1$$ sec. and -pE (i". 9.1 Soar a -nified treory of co"nition. co"nitive architect-re, that h-mans have one nad that its nat-re determines the nat-re of mind. .he theory then specifies a lot a!o-t that architect-re. Soar is a system that em!odies these partic-lar specifics. Beca-se the architect-re is so central and determines so m-ch a!o-t the mind, it is convenient to slip lan"-a"e a !it and identify Soar /ith the theory of co"nition it em!odies. (i"-re 9.1 en-merates the main mechanisms in Soar. .he top fo-r items are shared !y all comprehensive co"nitiveAscience theories of h-man co"nition. Soar operates as a controller of the

h-man or"anism, hence it is a complete system /ith perception, co"nition, and motor components. .his already takes mind in essentially f-nctional termsCas the system that arose to control the "ross movements of a manmmal in a mammalian /orld. Soar is "oal oriented /ith kno/led"e of the /orld, /hich it -ses to attain its "oal. .hat kno/led"e is represented !y a sym!ol system, /hich means that comp-tation is -sed to encode repreA B 1LJ B sentations, e+tract their implications for action, and decode specific desired actions. .h-s, Soar is an architect-reCa str-ct-re that makes possi!le a hard/areAsoft/are distinction. Most of the kno/led"e in s-ch a system is em!odied in the content that the architect-re makes meanin"f-l and accessi!le. .he rest of the items descri!e Soar from the !ottom -p, temporally speakin". Soar comprises a lar"e recognition memory . .his is reali<ed !y an =psJAlike prod-ction system DBro/nston et al. 19%JE. 2 prod-ction system consists of a set of prod-ctions, each consistin" of a set of conditions and a set of actions. 2t each moment, the conditions of all prod-ctions are matched a"ainst the elements of a temporary /orking memory , and those prod-ctions that are satisfied then e+ec-te, p-ttin" ne/ elements into /orkin" memory. ,-man lon"Aterm memory comprises many prod-ctions, in the millions perhaps. 2 cycle of prod-ction e+ec-tion also occ-rs very rapidly, aro-nd 1$ milliseconds DmsE.G&H 2ltho-"h in artificial intelli"ence D2)E and co"nitive science, prod-ctions are -s-ally taken to correspond to operators Ddeli!erately deployed actionsE, in Soar they correspond to an associational memory. .h-s, prod-ction actions !ehave like a memory retrieval: they only enter ne/ elements into /orkin" memory and cannot modify or delete /hat is there. 2lso, there is no conflict resol-tion Dof the kind familiar from =psJE: instead, each prod-ction e+ec-tes independently, 3-st like an isolated memory access and retrieval. .he ne+e level of or"ani<ation, /hich occ-rs /ithin a!o-t 1$$ ms, consists of the decision cycle . .his comprises a se'-ence of retrievals from lon"Aterm memory Di.e., a se'-ence of prod-ction firin"sE /hich assem!le from memory /hat is immediately accessi!le and relevant to the c-rrent decision conte+t. .his se'-ence -ltimately terminates /hen no more kno/led"e is forthcomin" Din practice, it '-iesces '-icklyE. .hen a decision #rocedure makes a choice of the ne+t step to !e taken. .his chan"es the decision conte+t, so that the cycle can repeat to make the ne+t decision. 2t the 1$$ ms level, co"nitive life is an endless se'-ence of assem!lin" the availa!le kno/led"e and -sin" it to make the ne+t deli!erate choice. .he decisions taken at the 1$$ ms level implement search in #ro"lem s#aces , /hich comprise the ne+t level of or"ani<ation, at the 1 second Dsec.E level. Soar or"ani<es all its "oalAoriented activity in pro!lem spaces, from the most pro!lematical to the most ro-tine. )t performs a task !y creatin" a space /ithin /hich the attainment of the task can !e defined as reachin" some state and /here the moves in the space are the operations that are appropriate to performin" the task. .he pro!lem then !ecomes /hich operators to apply and in /hat order to reach a desired state. .he search in the pro!lem space is "overned !y the kno/led"e in the reco"niA B 1LL B tion memory. )f Soar has the appropriate kno/led"e and if it can !e !ro-"ht to !ear /hen needed, then Soar can p-t one operator in front of another, so step its /ay directly to task attainment. )f the memory contains little relevant kno/led"e or it cannot !e accessed, then Soar m-st search the pro!lem space, leadin" to the com!inatorial e+plosion familiar to 2) research.

9iven that the pro!lemAspace or"ani<ation is !-ilt into the architect-re, the decisions to !e made at any point are al/ays the sameC/hat pro!lem space to /ork in: /hat state to -se Dif more than one is availa!leE: and /hat operator to apply to this state to "et a ne/ state, on the /ay to a desired state. Makin" these choices is the contin-al !-siness of the decision cycle. =perators m-st act-ally !e applied, of co-rse: life is not all decision makin". B-t applyin" operators is merely another task, /hich occ-rs !y "oin" into another pro!lem space to accomplish the implementation. .he rec-rsion !ottoms o-t /hen an operator !ecomes simple eno-"h to !e accomplished /ithin a sin"le decision cycle, !y a fe/ memory retrievals. .he decision proced-re that act-ally makes the choice at each point is a simple, -niform process that can only -se /hatever kno/led"e has acc-m-lated via the repeated memory searches. Some of this kno/led"e is in the form of #references a!o-t /hat to chooseCthat one operator is preferred to another, that a state is accepta!le, that another state is to !e re3ected. .he decision proced-re takes /hatever preferences are availa!le and e+tracts from them the decision. )t adds no kno/led"e of its o/n. .here is no ma"ic in the decision cycle. )t can e+tract from the memory only /hat kno/led"e is there, and it may not even "et it all. 2nd the decision proced-re cna select only from the options there!y prod-ced and !y -sin" the preferences there!y o!tained. Sometimes this is s-fficient, and Soar proceeds to move thro-"h its "iven space. SometimesCoften, as it t-rns o-tCthe kno/led"e is ins-fficient or conflictin". .hen the architect-re is -na!le to contin-e: it arrives at an im#asse . .his is like a standard comp-ter tryin" to divide !y <ero. 8+cept that, instead of a!ortin", the architect-re sets -p a su"goal to resolve the impasse. (or e+ample, if several operators have !een proposed !-t there is ins-fficient information to select one, then a tie im#asse occ-rs, and Soar sets -p a s-!"oal to o!tain the kno/led"e to resolve the tie, so it can then contin-e. )mpasses are the dynamo of Soar: they drive all its pro!lem solvin". Soar simply attempts to e+ec-te its topAlevel operators. )f this can !e done, Soar has attained /hat it /anted. (ail-res imply impasses. 7esolvin" these impasses, /hich occ-rs in other pro!lem spaces, can lead to other impasses, hence to s-!pro!lem spaces, and so on. .he entire B 1L0 B s-!"oal hierarchy is "enerated !y Soar itself, in response to its ina!ility to attain its o!3ectives. .he different types of impasses "enerate the f-ll variety of "oalAdriven !ehavior familiar in 2) systemsC operator implementation, operator instantiation, operator selection, precondition satisfaction, state re3ection, and so on. )n addition to pro!lem solvin", Soar learns contin-o-sly from its e+periences. .he mechanism is called chunking . 8very time Soar enco-nters and resolves an impasse, it creates a ne/ prod-ction Da ch-ckE to capt-re and retain that e+perience. )f the sit-ation ever rec-rs, the ch-nk /ill fire, makin" availa!le the information that /as missin" on the first occasion. .h-s, Soar /ill not enco-nter an impasse on a second pass. .he little dia"ram at the ri"ht of chunking in fi"-re 9.1 sketches ho/ this happens. .he vie/ is lookin" do/n on /orkin" memory, /ith time r-nnin" from left to ri"ht. 8ach little circle is a data element that encodes some information a!o-t the task. Startin" at the left, Soar is ch-""in" alon", /ith prod-ctions p-ttin" in ne/ elements and the decision proced-re determinin" /hich ne+t steps to take. 2t the left vertical line, an impasse occ-rs. .he architect-re adds some elements to record the impasse, hence settin" a ne/ conte+t, and then !ehavior contin-es. (inally, Soar prod-ces an element that resolves the impasse Dthe element c at the ri"ht vertical lineE. Behavior then contin-es in the ori"inal conte+t,

!eca-se operationally resolvin" an impasse 3-st is !ehavior contin-in". .he ch-nk is !-ilt at this point, /ith an action correspondin" to the element that resolved the impasse and /ith conditions correspondin" to the elements prior to the impasse that led to the resol-tion Dthe elements a and !E. .his capt-res the res-lt of the pro!lem solvin" to resolve the impasse and does so in a /ay that permits it to !e evoked a"ain to avoid that partic-lar impasse. Ch-nkin" operates as an a-tomatic mechanism that contin-ally caches all of Soar4s "oalAoriented e+perience, /itho-t detailed interpretation or analysis. 2s descri!ed, it appears to !e simply a practice mechanism, a /ay to avoid redoin" the pro!lem solvin" to resolve prior impasses, th-s speedin" -p Soar4s performance. ,o/ever, the conditions of the prod-ctions reflect only a fe/ of the elements in /orkin" memory at the time of the impasse. .h-s, ch-nks a"stract from the sit-ation of occ-rrence and can apply in different sit-ations, as lon" as the specific conditions apply. .his provides a form of transfer of learnin". 2ltho-"h far from o!vio-s, this mechanism in fact "enerates a /ide variety of learnin" DSteier et al. 19%0E, eno-"h to con3ect-re that ch-nkin" mi"ht !e the only learnin" mechanism Soar needs. Ch-nks "et !-ilt in response to solvin" pro!lems Di.e., resolvin" impassesE. ,ence, they correspond to activities at a!o-t the the 1 sec. level and B 1L% B a!ove. .he ch-nk itself, of co-rse, is a prod-ction, /hich is an entity do/n at the memoryAaccess level at a!o-t 1$ ms. .he hi"her or"ani<ation of co"nitive activity arises from topAlevel operators not !ein" implementa!le immediately /ith the information at hand. .hey m-st !e implemented in s-!spaces /ith their o/n operators, /hich themselves may re'-ire f-rther s-!spaces. 8ach descent into another layer of s-!spaces means that the topAlevel operators take lon"er to complete, that is, are hi"her level. .h-s, the time scale of or"ani<ed co"nitive activity clim!s a!ove /hat can !e called the re"ion of co"nitive mechanism and to/ard the re"ion of intendedly rational !ehavior. ,ere, eno-"h time is availa!le for the system to do s-!stantial pro!lem solvin" and -se more and more of its kno/led"e. .he or"ani<ation of co"nition !ecomes increasin"ly dictated !y the nat-re of the task and the kno/led"e availa!le, rather than !y the str-ct-re of the architect-re. .his rapidAfire to-r thro-"h the mechanisms of Soar serves primarily to !o+ its compass, to see the mechanisms that are involved. )t is an architect-re that spans an e+tremely /ide ran"e of psycholo"ical f-nctions. Some limits of the ran"e sho-ld !e noted. Perception and motor !ehavior c-rrently e+ist in the theory only in nascent form. Perhaps as important, the impasseAdriven meansAends str-ct-re that !-ilds -p in a "iven sit-ation is ephemeral. ;on"Aterm sta!le or"ani<ation of !ehavior co-ld hardly !e held in place !y the momentary piledA-p impasse s-!"oal hierarchy. Soar does not yet incorporate a theory of /hat happens as the ho-rs "ro/, disparate activities p-nct-ate one another, and sleep intervenes to let the /orld of co"nition start afresh each mornin". 2ll these aspects m-st event-ally !e /ithin the scope of a -nified theory of co"nition. Soar4s fail-re to incl-de them sho/s it to !e like any scientific theory, al/ays in a state of !ecomin". =-r description of Soar contains a stron" emphasis on tem#oral le6el . Soar models !ehavior from a!o-t 1$ ms on -p to a!o-t 1,$$$ sec. D#$ min.E. Soar, as a theory of h-man co"nition, is tied stron"ly to the /orld of real time. (i"-re 9.& provides a -sef-l vie/ of the time scale of h-man action. .he characteristic time taken !y processes fractionates o-r /orld into realms of distinct character. @e-ral systems take times of the order of 1$$ microseconds DWsecE to 1$ ms to prod-ce si"nificant effects. Co"nitive systems take times of the order of 1$$ ms to 1$ sec. to prod-ce si"nificant effects. Beyond

that, in the min-tes to ho-rs ran"e, is somethin" la!eled the rational !and. 2nd -p a!ove that stretch time scales that are primarily social and historical, left !lank !eca-se theories of -nified co"nition are initially sit-ated in the lo/er !ands, foc-sed on the architect-re. .hese !anks correspond to realms of scientific la/. .he ne-ral !and is /ithin the realm of physical la/, as /e have come to -nderstand it in B 1L9 B Time S0a*e of Human "0tion Scale Dsec.E 1$0 1$L Time 9nits System %orld DtheoryE

months /eeks So0ia* Band

1$J 1$F 1$#

days ho-rs 1$ min-tes .ask .ask Rationa* Band

1$& 1$1 1$$

min-tes 1$ seconds ) second

.ask Unit task =perations !o(niti)e Band

1$A1 1$A& 1$A#

1$$ milliseconds 5eli!erate act 1$ milliseconds 1 millisecond @e-ral circ-it @e-ron Bio*o(i0a* Band

1$AF

1$$ microseconds

=r"anelle

(i". 9.&. .ime scale of h-man action nat-ral science. 2nd it is physical la/ on do/n, altho-"h /ith a t/ist as it enters the realm of the very small and '-ant-m indeterminacy. B-t the co"nitive !and, /hich is the str-ct-rin" into a co"nitive architect-re, is the realm of /hat can !e called representational la/. By appropriate comp-tational str-ct-rin", internal happenin"s represent e+ternal happenin"s. .he comp-tations o!ey physical la/s: they are physical systems after all. B-t they also o!ey the la/s of /hat they represent. (rom the internal tokens that represent t/o n-m!ers, an addition al"orithm fashions another internal token for a s-m of the t/o n-m!ers. .o discover an addition al"orithm is precisely to discover a tiny physical system that, /hile doin" its physical thin", also prod-ces sit-ations that o!ey the la/s of addition D"iven f-rther encodin" and decodin" processesE. 2s comp-tations operate in the service of the system4s "oals, the sysA B 10$ B tem itself !e"ins to !ehave as a f-nction of the environment to attain its "oals. .his is the realm of reason. @o ri"id la/s hold here, !eca-se "oaloriented comp-tation is precisely a device to circ-mvent /hatever is in the /ay of "oal attainment. )n 2ristotelian terms, this is the realm of final ca-ses, /hereas the ne-ral !and is the realm of efficient ca-ses, and there /as nothin" in the 2ristotelian scheme that corresponded to comp-tation, /hich is the apparat-s for movin" !et/een the t/o. 2 key point in this is that it takes time to move a/ay from the mechanics Dthe architect-re$ and -p into rational !ehavior. 2nd, indeed, it never f-lly happens, so that a lon"er !-t !etter term /o-ld !e intendedly rational "and . *ith the pict-re of fi"-re 9.&, one can see that a -nified theory of co"nition is primarily a theory of the co"nitive !and. it provides a frame /ithin /hich to consider the other "reat determiners of h-man !ehaviorCthe str-ct-res of the task environments people /ork in and the kno/led"e people have acc-m-lated thro-"h their social /orldsC!-t it does not determine this. 7ather, it descri!es ho/ these determiners can !e possi!le and /hat limits their e+pression.

ra(ments of the Theory

;et me provide a fe/ '-ick ill-strations of the theory. .hese /ill !e like stro!eAli"ht e+pos-resCa fra"ment here, a flash there. Still, ) hope they can !rin" home t/o critical points. (irst, Soar is a theory, in the same mold as theories in the other sciences, a collection of mechanisms that com!ine to"ethet to predict and e+plain empirical phenomena. .he predictions come from the theory, not the theorist. Second, as a -nified theory of co"nition, Soar has a /ide scope, !oth in types of !ehavior covered and in terms of time scale. .ho-"h never as "reat as /ishes /o-ld have it, Soar can still stand for the possi!ility that -nified theories of co"nition mi"ht !e in the offin". ;et -s !e"in /ith immediate reactive !ehavior, /hich occ-rs at a time scale of a!o-t 1 sec., and /ork -p the time scale of h-man action.

Stimu*us;Res6onse !om6atibi*ity
Stimulus!res#onse com#ati"ility is a phenomenon kno/n to everyone, tho-"h perhaps not !y that name. 2nyone /ho has arrived at an elevator to find the Up !-tton located physically !elo/ the 5o/n !-tton /o-ld reco"ni<e the phenomena. .he Up !-tton should map into the direction of travelCu# on top. .his h-man sense of should , in fact translates into lon"er times to hit the !-tton and "reater chances to hit the /ron" !-tton. Stim-l-sAresponse compati!ility effects are every/here. (i"-re 9.# sho/s another e+ample, perhaps less o!vio-s. 2 person at a comp-ter editor /ants to delete some /ord. .he editor -ses a!!revations, in this case droppin" the vo/els to "et dlt . .h-s, the B 101 B

(i". 9.#. S7C e+ample: 7ecall command a!!reviation person needs to "et from delete to dlt to command the editor appropriately. Stim-l-sAresponse compati!ility occ-rs here. =n the more compati!le side, the desi"ner of the editor mi"ht have chosen delete itself, altho-"h it /o-ld have re'-ired more typin". =n the less compati!le side, the desi"ner mi"ht have chosen gro , thinkin" of get rid of . (i"-re 9.#. sho/s an acco-ntinf of ho/ Soar /o-ld predict the time it takes a person to type dlt . (irst is the processin" that ac'-ires the /ord and o!tains its internal sym!ol: #ercei6e the sensory stim-l-s Din the e+perimental sit-ation, the /ord /as presented on a comp-ter displayE: encode it Da-tomaticallyE to o!tain its internal sym!ol: attend to the ne/ inp-t: and com#rehend it to !e the task /ord. Second is the co"nitive processin" that develops the intended ans/er: "ettin" each sylla!le: e+tractin" each letter: determinin" if it is consonant: and, if so, creatin" the command to the motor system that constit-tes the internal intention. .hird is the motor processin": decode the command, and mo6e the fin"er to hit the key Ds-ccessively d, l , and t E. .he entire response is predicted to take a!o-t &.1 sec. D&,1F$ msE, /hereas it act-ally took &.F sec. Soar is operatin" here as a detailed chronometric model of /hat the h-man does in respondin" immediately in a speeded sit-ation. .his does not fit the -s-fl vie/ of an 2)Alike system, /hich is -s-ally foc-sed on hi"herAlevel activities. B-t a theory of co"nition m-st cover the f-ll temA B 10& B poral ran"e of h-man activity. )n partic-lar, if the theory of the architect-re is ri"ht, then it m-st apply at this level of immediate !ehavior. .hese operators and prod-ctions are occ-rrin" /ithin the architect-ral frame indicated in fi"-re 9.1. B-t Soar is not an ori"ional theory here. ;ots of psycholo"ical research has !een done on s-ch immediateAresponse tasks, !oth theoretical and e+perimental. )t has !een a hallmark of modern co"nitive psycholo"y. )n this case, the e+perimental /ork "oes !ack many years D(itts and See"er 19J#E, and there is an e+tant theory, developed primarily !y Bonnie John D19%0E, /hich makes predictions of stim-l-sAresponse compati!ility. *hat is !ein" demonstrated is that Soar incorporates the essential characteristics of this theory to prod-ce ro-"hly the same res-lts Dthe n-m!ers s-!scripted /ith "2 are the predictions from John4s theoryE.

"07uirin( a tas1
(i"-re 9.F sho/s a se'-ence of sit-ations. 2t the top is a variant of a /ellAkno/n e+periment in psycholin"-istics from the early 190$s DClark and Chase 190&E. )n the top panel, a person faces a display, a /arnin" li"ht t-rns on, then a sentence appears in the lefthand panel and a pict-re of a vertical pair of sym!ols in the ri"htAhand panel. .he person is to read the sentence, then e+amine the pict-re and say /hether the sentence is tr-e or not. .his is another immediateAresponse chronometric e+periment, not too different in some /ays from the stim-l-sAresponse compati!ility e+periment a!ove. )n this case, one can relia!ly predict ho/ lon" it takes to do this task, dependin" on /hether the sentence is in affirmative or ne"ative mode, -ses a"o6e or "elo/ , and is act-ally tr-e or false. .his e+periment, alon" /ith many others, has shed li"ht on ho/ h-mans comprehend lan"-a"e DClark and Clark 1900E. =-r interest in this e+ample does not rest /ith the e+periment itself !-t /ith the ne+t panel do/n in the fi"-re. .his is a set of trialAspecific instr-ctions for doin" the task. 2 co"nitive theory sho-ld not only predict the performance in the e+periment !-t also ho/ the person reads the instr-ctions and !ecomes or"ani<ed to do the task. .he second panel "ives the proced-re for doin" the task. 2ct-ally, there /ere t/o variants of the e+periment, the one sho/, and one /here F reads 18+amine the pict-re1 and J reads 1.hen read the sentence.1 .hese are not the only instr-ctions needed for doin" the task. .he !ottom /ho panels indicate increasin"ly /ider conte+ts /ithin /hich a person does this task. .hese panels, /ritten in simple lan"-a"e, are an overly homo"eneo-s and systematic /ay of indicatin" these layers of conte+t. )n an act-al e+periment, the person /o-ld "ather part of this information !y o!servation, part !y the "est-res and !ehavior of the e+perimenter, and part !y interaction directly /ith the e+perimental apparat-s. B 10# B .he e+periment occ-rs 1. ;i"ht t-rns on. &. 5isplay sho/s. #. S-!3ect roads, e+<mines, and press a !-tton. Prior trialAspecific instr-ctions F. 17ead the sentnece.1 J. 1.hen e+amine the pict-re.1 L. XPress the .A!-tton if the sentence is tr-e of the pict-re.1 0. 1P-sh the (A!-tton if the sentnece is false of the pict-re.1 %. 1.hen the task is done.1

Prior "eneral instr-ctions 9. 1at some moment the li"ht /ill come on.1 1$. 12fter the li"ht comes on, a display /ill occ-r.1 11. 4.he left side of the display sho/s a sentence.1 1&. 1.he ri"ht side of the display sho/s a pict-re.1 )ntrod-ction 1#. 1,ello.1 1F. 1.his mornin" /e /ill r-n an e+periment.1 1J. 1,ere is the e+perimental apparat-s.1 1L. . . . (i". 9.F. 2c'-irin" a task Soar does !oth the top t/o panels D!-t not the !-ttom t/oE. (oc-sin" on the second panel, as the interestin" one for o-r p-rposes, Soar takes in each simple sentence and comprehends it. .his comprehension res-lts in a data str-ct-re in the /orkin" memory. Soar then remem!ers these specifications for ho/ to !ehave !y ch-nkin" them a/ay, that is, !y performin" a task /hose o!3ective is to !e a!le to recall this information, in the conte+t of !ein" asked to perform the act-al task. =n recallin" the instr-ctions at performance time, Soar performs the task initially !y follo/in" the recalled instr-ctions interpretively, essentially !y follo/in" them as r-les. 5oin" this leads to !-ildin" additional ch-nks Dsince Soar !-ilds ch-nks to capt-re all its e+periencesE. =n s-!se'-ent occasions, these ch-nks fire and perform the taks /itho-t reference to the e+plicitly e+pressed r-le. Soar has no/ internali<ed this task and performs it directly thereafter. .he point is that Soar com!ines performance and task ac'-isition in a sin"le theory, as re'-ired of a -nified theory of co"nition. )t sho/s one advanta"e of havin" -nified theories. .he theory of the performance B 10F B task is not simply stip-lated !y the theorist Das Clark and Chase had to doE !-t flo/s, in part, from the theory of ho/ the task instr-ctions or"ani<e the person to do that performance.

$rob*em So*)in(
;et -s move -p the time scale. (i"-re 9.J sho/s a little arithmetical p-<<le called cryptarithmetic. .he /ords 5=@2;5, 9872;5, and 7=B87. represent three LAdi"it n-m!ers. 8ach letter is to !e replaced !y a distinct di"it De."., 5 and . m-st each !e a di"it, say 5 Y J and . Y $, !-t they cannot !e the same di"itE. .his replacement m-st lead to a correct s-m, that is, 5=@2;5 Z 9872;5 Y

7=B87.. .he fi"-re sho/s the !ehavior of a s-!3ect solvin" the p-<<le D@e/ell and Simon 190&E. ,-mans can! e "iven cryptarithmetic tasks and protocols o!tained from transcripts of their ver!ali<ations /hile they /ork. .he s-!3ect proceeds !y searchin" in a pro!lem space: the fi"-re sho/s the search e+plicitly, startin" in the initial state Dthe -pper left dotE. 8ach short hori<ontal se"ment is an operator application, yieldin" a ne/ state. *hen the search line ends at the ri"ht of a hori<ontal line, the s-!3ect has stopped searchin" deeper and ret-rns to some prior state already "enerated Das inicated !y the vertical line, so that all vertically connected dots represent the same state on s-ccessive ret-rnsE. .he s-!3ect often reapplies an earlier operator, as indicated !y the do-!le lines, so the same path is retrod repeatedly. )t takes the s-!3ect a!o-t &,$$$ sec. D#$ min.E to traverse the &#% states of this search, avera"in" some 0 sec. per state. 2ltho-"h a p-<<le, it is still "en-inely free co"nitive !ehavior, constrained only !y the demands of the task. .his partic-lar data is from 19L$, !ein" part of the analysis of pro!lem solvin" !y ,er! Simon and me D@e/ell and Simon 190&E. 2 -nified theory of co"nition sho-ld e+plain s-ch co"nitive !ehavior, and Soar has !een or"ani<ed to do so, providin" detailed sim-lations of t/o stretches, lines 1QF and %Q1&. (i"-re 9.L sho/s the more comple+ !ehavior fra"ment Dlines %Q1&E, /here the s-!3ect has tro-!le /ith col-mn J of the s-m D8 Z = Y =E and th-s "oes over the material several times, a !ehavior pattern called #rogressi6e dee#ening . .hese t/o stretches are far from the /hole protocol, !-t they still amo-nt to some &$$ sec. /orth. .he reason for reachin" !ack to old data is the same as /ith the stim-l-sAresponse compati!ility and the sentenceAcomprehension cases. )nitially, the most important element in a proposed -nified theory of co"nition is covera"eCtaht it can e+plain /hat e+istin" theories can do. =ne attempts to "o f-rther, of co-rse. )n the sentence case, it is "ettin" the theory to cover the ac'-isition of the task !y instr-ction. )n the cryptarithmetic case, it is attainin" completness and detail.

-e)e*o6ment
(inally, consider an attempt to -nderstand ho/ the development of co"nitive f-nctions mi"ht occ-r. .his territory has !een B 10J B

(i". 9.J. Behaviro of a person on the cryptarithmetic task mapped o-t !y Pia"et, /ho "ave -s an ela!orate, !-t imperfect and incomplete, theoretical story of sta"es of development, /ith "eneral processes of assimilation and accommodation, oscillatin" thro-"h repeated e'-ili!rations. Pia"et also mapped the territory !y means of a lar"e and varied collection of tasks that seem to capt-re the varyin" capa!ilities of B 10L B

(i". 9.L. Soar sim-lation of the cryptrithmetic task

children as they "ro/ -p. Some are /idely kno/n, s-ch as the conservation tasks, !-t there are many others as /ell. .his e+ploration /ith Soar -ses the Pia"etian task of predictin" /hether a simple !alance !eam Dlike a seesa/ /ith /ei"hts at vario-s distances on each sideE /ill !alance, titl ri"ht, or tilt left /ith vario-s placements of /ei"hts. 2s they "ro/ -p, children sho/ strikin" differences in their a!ility to predict, only takin" total /ei"ht into acco-nt Daro-nd J yearsE, to considerin" !oth /ei"hts and distance, providin" they are separa!le, to DsometimesE effectively comp-tin" the tor'-e D!y late adolescenceE. 5evelopmental psycholo"ists have "ood informationAprocessin" models of each of these sta"es DSie"ler 190LE, models that are consonant /ith co"nitive architect-res s-ch as Soar. *hat is still missin"Chere and thro-"ho-t developmental psycholo"yCis /hat the transition mechanisms co-ld !e DStern!er" 19%FE. .hat, of co-rse, is the cr-+ of the developmental process. )t /ill finally settle, for instance, /hether there really are sta"es or /hether co"nitive "ro/th is effectively contin-o-s. Soar provides a possi!le transition mechanism. )t learns to move B 100 B thro-"h the first t/o transitions: from level 1 D3-st /ei"htsE to level & D/ei"hts and distance if the /ei"hts are the sameE to level # D/ei"hts, and distance if they do not conflictE. )t does not learn the final transition to level F Dcomp-tin" tor'-esE.G#H Soar predicts ho/ the v!eam /ill tilt !y encodin" the !alance !eam into a description, then -sin" that description to compare the t/o sides, and finally linkin" these comparisons to the three possi!le movements D!alance, tiltAleft, tiltAri"htE. Soar has to learn !oth ne/ encodin"s and ne/ comparin"s to accomplish the transitions, and it does !oth thro-"h ch-nkin". (i"-re 9.0 provides a hi"hAlevel vie/ of the transition from level 1 to level &. )t sho/s the diffrent pro!lem spaces involved and only indicates schematically the !ehavior /ithin pro!lem spaces. My p-rpose, ho/ever, is not to sho/ these learnin"s in detail. )n fact, !oth types of learnin" are s-!stantially less rich than needed to acco-nt for the sorts of e+plorations and tri!-lations that children "o thro-"h. .he a!ove provides the conte+t for notin" a critical aspect of this effort to e+plore development /ith Soar. Soar m-st learn ne/ kno/led"e and skill in the face of e+istin" learned kno/led"e and skill, /hich is no/ /ron". )n this developmental se'-ence, the child has sta!le /ays of predictin" the !alance !eam: they are 3-st /ron". 5evelopment implies replacin" these /ron" /ays /ith correct /ays Dand doin" so repeatedlyE. .hat seems o!vio-s eno-"h, e+cept that Soar does not for"et its old /ays. Ch-nkin" is a process that adds reco"nitional capa!ility, not one that deletes or modifies e+istin" capa!ility. (-rthermore, the essence of the decision cycle is to remain open to /hatever memory cn provide. Soar, as a theory of h-man co"nition, predicts that h-mans face this pro!lem, too, and there is "ood reason and some evidence on this score. ,-mans do not simply for"et and destroy their past, even /hen proved /ron". .he sol-tion /ithin Soar is to create cascades of pro!lem spaces. )f an e+istin" pro!lem space !ecomes contaminated /ith !ad learnin", a ne/ clean space is created to !e -sed in its stead. .hat is, /henever the old space is to !e -sed, the ne/ one is chosen instead. =f co-rse, /hen first created, this ne/ space is empty. 2ny attempt to -se it leads to impasses. .hese impasses are resolved !y "oin" !ack into the old space, /hich is still aro-nd, since nothin" ever "ets destroyed. .his old space contains the kno/led"e necessary to resolve the impasse. =f co-rse, it also has in it the !ad learnin". B-t this aspect can !e re3ected, even tho-"h it cannot !e made to "o a/ay. .he kno/led"e for this m-st come from a hi"her conte+t, /hich -ltimately derives from e+perimental feed!ack. =nce an impasse has !een resolved !y appropriate pro!lem solvin" in the old space, ch-nks are a-tomatically formed Das al/aysE.

.hese ch-nks transfer this kno/led"e into the ne/ space. .h-s, on s-!se'-ent occ-rrences B 10% B

(i". 9.0. Pro!lem spaces -sed in learnin" a!o-t the !alance !eam of -sin" the ne/ space, it /ill not have to ret-rn to the old space. )t may do so for some other aspect, !-t then that too is transferred into the ne/ space. 9rad-ally, /ith contin-ed e+perience, the ne/ space is !-ilt -p and the old space entered less and less often. B-t it al/ays remains, !eca-se Soar never kno/s all the information that /as encoded in the old space, nor co-ld it eval-ate its '-ality in the a!stract. =nly in the conte+t of an appropriate task does s-ch kno/led"e emer"e.

The S0o6e of Soar

Soar addresses a si"nificant ran"e of other phenomena that s-rro-nd central co"nition. (i"-re 9.% provides a s-mmary list. ,eadin" the list is the demonstration that Soar acco-nts for the a!ility to !e intelli"ent. =ne of the reasons 2) is closely related to co"nitive psycholo"y is that f-nctionality is so important. 2 theory of co"nition m-st e+plain ho/ h-mans can !e intelli"ent. B-t there seems no /ay to demonstrate this /itho-t constr-ctin" somethin" that e+hi!its intelli"ent !ehavior accordin" to the theory. Soar demonstrates this !y !ein" a stateAofAtheAart 2) system D;aird, @e/ell, and 7osen!loom 19%0E. Soar e+hi!its the '-alitative shape of h-man co"nition in many "lo!al B 109 B 1. .he a!ility to e+hi!it intelli"ence &. 9lo!al properties of co"nitive !ehavior #. )mmediateAresponse !ehavior F. Simple discrete motorApercept-al skills J. 2c'-isition of co"nitive skills L. 7eco"nition and recall of ver!al material 0. ShortAterm memory %. ;o"ical reasonin" 9. Pro!lem solvin"

1$. )nstr-ctions and selfAor"ani<ation for tasks 11. @at-ral lan"-a"e comprehension 1&. 5evelopmental transitions (i". 9.%. Co"nitive aspects addressed !y Soar /ays. (or instance, it is serial in the midst of parallel activity and it is interr-pt driven. @e+t, Soar provides a theory of immediate responses, those that take only a!o-t 1 sec. Stim-lsAresponse compati!ility /as an e+ample. Soar also provides a theory fo simple discrete motorApercept-al skills, namely, transcription typin". )n "eneral, ho/ever, Soar is still defincient in its covera"e of percept-al and motor !ehavior, /ith typin" as close as /e have "otten to these critical aspects. Soar provides a pla-si!le theory of ac'-isition of co"nitive skills thro-"h practice. )t also offers the main elements of a theory of reco"nition and recall of ver!al materialCthe classical learnin" domain of stim-ls response psycholo"y. Soar also provides some aspects of a theory of shortAterm memory, incl-din" a notion on ho/ the plethora of different shortAterm memories D/hose e+istence has !een revealed e+perimentallyE mi"ht arise. )t provides a theory of lo"ical reasonin", of pro!lem solvin", and of ho/ instr-ctions are converted into the selfAor"ani<ation for doin" ne/ immediateAresponse tasks. )n addition, it implies a specific !-t still -ndeveloped theory of nat-ral lan"-a"e comprehension. (inally, it has demonstrated an idea for a transiton mechanism in developmental psycholo"y. (i"-re 9.% presents the ran"e of thin"s that one candidate for a -nified theory of co"nition has addressed. it has done this /ith varyin" de"rees of s-ccess, depth, and covera"e. @o claim is made for its s-periority over e+istin" co"nitive theories. )ndeed, Soar contains mechanisms that make it a variant of e+istin" s-ccessf-l theories. .he iss-e is not to demonstrate nvoelty !-t to sho/ that a sin"le -nified theory can cover all these phenomenaCthat it is one architect-re that does all of these tasks and does them in fair accord /ith h-man !ehavior on the same tasks. (inally, to come !ack to o-r main point, Soar is a "en-ine theory. )t is not 3-st a !road frame/ork or a sim-lation lan"-a"e that provides a medi-m B 1%$ B to e+press specific microtheories. =ne does calc-lations and sim-lations /ith Soar and reasons from the str-ct-re of the architect-re to !ehavior. 2!ove all, Soar is not a metaphor for mind.

Shou*d the Humanities Mind:

*e have taken a !rief to-r of Soar. Sho-ld the h-manities careK .hey co-ld !e fascinated, of co-rse, or repelled, or !ored, or mildly pleased at !ein" informed a!o-t events across the intellect-al river. B-t sho-ld they care K 7ecall the contrast: metaphors for mind or theories of mind. .he comp-ter provides a metaphor for mind, to !e -sed at /ill, for all that metaphor is "ood for. Soar represents the other side of the contrast. )t is also the comp-terCa livin" representative of artificial intelli"ence and comp-ter science, a stateA ofAtheAart 2) system reali<ed as a comp-ter pro"ram, employin" many mechanisms historically central to 2). B-t Soar is also a theory of h-man co"nition, a theory of mind. )t is p-t forth not as metaphor !-t as a standard sort of scientific theory, analo"o-s to, say, the valence theory of chemical compo-nds or

the kinetic theory of "ases in thermodynamics. Soar em!odies m-ch that has "one into the comp-terA derived theories of mind, /hich have played a central role in the co"nitive sciences. Soar is not p-re 2), /hatever that mi"ht !e, !-t the meldin" of co"nitive psycholo"y and 2). *hat follo/s for the h-manities if it t-rns o-t that the metaphorical stance cannot prevail and that, /ith "reater or lesser speed, a theory of mind emer"esK )s the mind likely to clank, if the comp-tational vie/ is s-stainedK =r /ill it make no difference, !eca-se it /ill simply !ecome a ne/ psychophysics that occ-pies some o!sc-re scientific corner, /hile the "reat '-estions march on al/ays as !eforeK =r /ill it t-rn the h-manities into a part of scienceK )f s-ch a transformation /ere to occ-r, /o-ld it !e a "ood thin" for the h-manitiesK *o-ld it finally "ive them po/er to deal /ith '-estions they have fo-nd it diffic-lt to "rapple /ithK *o-ld they pose ne/ '-estionsK *o-ld they start to acc-m-late kno/led"e as opposed to historyK =r /o-ld it destroy them, !y "rindin" them do/n into la!oratory dr-d"es foc-sed only on small '-estionsK 8ven if it co-ld !e maintained that the tr-e, "ood, and !ea-tif-l still lay over the far hori<on, /o-ld it raise so m-ch havoc in the transition to not !e /orth the candleK 2nd if it is not /orth the candle, can it then !e avoidedK =r m-st it !e s-ffered like the pla"-eK S-ch '-estions cannot !e ans/ered any more than history can !e lived in advance. =ne /ay to approach them is !y spec-latin" from Soar as a -nified theory of co"nition. S-ppose this is ho/ a co"nitive theory /ill look. S-ppose, f-rther, this theory is as ri"ht a!o-t h-mans as, say, the B 1%1 B classical valence theory is a!o-t chemical reactions D/hich is not all that ri"ht, !y the /ay, and m-ch !etter appro+imations e+ist in or!ital theoryE. *hat kidns of thin"s mi"ht follo/ for the h-manitiesK *hat /o-ld s-ch a science tell them a!o-t the nat-re of mind, hence the nat-re of man, that they mi"ht find -sef-l, interestin", or provocativeK ) offer several s-ch spec-lations. .hey m-st !e taken as s-ch. .hey can !e appreciated, critici<ed, and -sed for f-rther spec-lation. B-t they are not solid scientific claims. .hey attempt too m-ch. .reat them as prec-rsors, perhaps. B-t none of this makes them metaphoricalCappro+imate, irrelevant, or do/nri"ht /ron", perhaps, !-t not metaphorical.

S6e0u*ation &2 On bein( #o(i0a* and the Nature of Insi(ht

.he iss-e is familiar and easily stated. 2re people lo"icalK *hy notK 5o people follo/ r-lesK )f so, do they do so on everythin" and al/aysK *hy in insi"ht opposed to reasonK *hat is insi"ht any/ayK .hese are not all the same '-estion, !-t they all cl-ster in the same corner of o-r concern /ith o-r nat-re. )ndeed, the comp-ter metaphor for mind is itself part of this cl-ster, tho-"h here /e -se the comp-tational theory of mind to e+plore the nat-re of the corner. *hat does the theory sayK ;et -s start /ith representationCthe form in /hich kno/led"e a!o-t the /orld or task is encoded into internal data str-ct-res. Consider a sit-ation /ith an apple, !all, and cap on a ta!le, vie/ed !y someone in passin" Dfi". 9.9E. 2 moment later, /hen asked /here the !all is, the person promptly ans/ers that it is !et/een the apple and the cap. .he sit-ation is simple, !-t prototypical, permittin" the inference that h-mans have memory, containin" kno/led"e of the e+ternal /orld, or"ani<ed to permit the performance of tasks Din this case, ans/erin" a simple '-estion a!o-t an o!served sit-ationE. ./o !road classes of representations can !e distin"-ished Damon" othersE. =n the one hand are #ro#ositions . .he statement, the a##le is to the left of the "all, can serve as prototype, altho-"h it is

necessary to a!stract a/ay from its specifically lin"-istic form to amdit vario-s "raphlike and ;ispAlike sym!olic str-ct-res Dand P1 of the fi"-re is a!stracted a littleE. =n the other hand are models . .he list D2 BE in the fi"-re at the ri"ht side DM1E can serve as prototype. 2n item is to the left of another if it occ-rs !efore it in a list. Both representations are sym!olic: they refer to somethin" e+ternal, to Din this caseE apples, !alls, and their spatial relation, and they are reali<ed in sym!olic str-ct-res of a familiar kind. B-t they represent in different /ays. 8ach re'-ires different processes to encode kno/led"e into the representationa nd make -se of it. Propositions involve the familiar apparat-s of connectives, varia!les, predicates, f-nctions, '-antifiers, modalities, and r-les of inference. .heir processin" is easily deA B 1%& B

(i". 9.9. Propositions and models limited and reali<ed in many kinds of comp-ter pro"rams, for e+ample, theorem provers. Models are also familiar. .heir str-ct-res can !e p-t in partAtoApart correspondence /ith /hat they represent. .heir processin" is not '-ite so easily delineated, !-t it can !e descri!ed as matchlike . .he difference is easily ill-strated in fi"-re 9.9 !y /hat is re'-ired to ans/er the '-estion of the /herea!o-ts of the !all. =n the propositional side, P1 and P& encode the information a!o-t the ta!le as ac'-ired in passin". P# and PF are t/o "eneral r-les of inference, and !y their appropriate application, the ans/er PJ is prod-ced. on the model side, M& encodes the information ac'-ired in passin" D!ein" an a-"mentation of M1, the initial encodin"E, and then inspection of this representation D!y the eye at the ottomE simply reads off the fact that the !all is !et/een the apple and the cap. .he readin"Aoff process m-st, of co-rse, em!ody the semantics of the encodin", /hich means it m-st have !een formed especially for this encodin" scheme Dtho-"h not especially for this partic-lar '-estionE. Soar posits that h-mans al/ays represent !y models.GFH .he eye of fi"-re 9.9 is the reco"nition memory of fi"-re 9.1. .he constr-ction of special reco"ni<ers for vario-s classes of tasks is accomplished !y ch-nkin" in response to initially /orkin" it thro-"h deli!erately. .here is a fair amo-nt of evidence "enerally in the co"nitive literat-re that h-mans do B 1%# B -se models DJohnsonA;aird 19%#E, altho-"h the case is not concl-sive. )t is diffic-lt to !e concl-sive a!o-t representations since alternative representations can mimic one another in many /ays. B-t /e are interested in /hat o-r theory says. *hy mi"ht h-mans employ modelsK 2 prime reason is f-nctional. 2 model is a representation that can !e processed rapidly and /ith ass-rance !y reco"nition DmatchlikeE processes. ./o models of somethin" can !e seen to !e the same Dor differentE 3-st !y p-ttin" them into partAtoApart correspondence and checkin" each part locally. @ot only are models fast !-t they can !e relied on to !e fast. Propositions, ho/ever, re'-ire "eneral inference techni'-esC essentially the provin" of theorems and the derivation or res-lts. .hese are processes that can take an indefinite amo-nt of tiem and that lead to com!inatorial e+plosions. (or a system !-ilt to operate in real time, -nder the necessity of rapid response, models are s-!stantially more satisfactory than propositions. )t mi"ht also !e o!served that models are a nat-ral representation for reco"nitionA

memories s-ch as Soar4s: after all, the prod-ction system is the eye that s-rveys the model and sees its properties. B-t that is not a coincidence. Model and reco"nition are as yin and yan". Models satisfy another f-nction, namely, the relation of !ein" the internal representation of the e+ternal sit-ation /ith /hich the or"anism is in closeAco-pled sensory contact. .o track and fi+ate a movin" vis-al tar"et re'-ires an internal representational str-ct-re. S-ch a str-ct-re f-nctions as a pointerA str-ct-re to permit the coordination of eye movements, occl-sion, o!3ect permanence /hen the o!3ect disappears !ehind a tree, and so on. )t has intense real time constraints, for contin-o-s -pdatin" and for coordinated action. Phenomenally, it /o-ld !e transparentCpipes thro-"h /hich attention reaches o-t to contact the movin" scene. Models /ith their partAtoApart correspondences are clearly fitted for this taskC!-ilt like an optic fi!er, /ith its m-ltiplicity of channels, to stay /ith the pipe metaphor. )t is a small D!-t realE leap to take the representations for all tho-"ht as !ein" "ro-nded str-ct-rally in the representations that are availa!le for percept-alAmotor p-rposes. B-t it is another reason to !elieve that h-man representations are models, to /it, they "re/ o-t of the operational models -sed in perceivin" and actin". 2s mi"ht !e e+pected, a tradeAoff is involved. Models are not nearly as po/erf-l a representation as propositions. )n their p-re form, they cannot deal /ith notions of dis3-nction, ne"ations, or '-antification. 8ven if a-"mented !y vario-s notations, s-ch as a ta" that a "iven model part is not in the real sit-ation D/hich th-s adds a local propositional elementE, they remain e+tremely limited. ,o/ever, propositional representations, especially forms that are e'-ivalent to '-antified lo"ics, have essentially, -nlimited representational po/er. B 1%F B )n terms of the theory, h-mans are not lo"ical !eca-se models do not lend themselves to /orkin" /ith "eneral sit-ations. Models /ork /ell for sit-ations s-ch as that of fi"-re 9.9. B-t h-man failin"s in reasonin" are typically revealed !y tasks s-ch as syllo"isms: 2ll !akers are "olfers. Some "akers are not card#layers . *hat follo/s necessarily a!o-t folfers and cardplayersK )t is diffic-lt to represent s-ch '-antified sit-ations /ith models. .he e+pressions can represent a diversity of possi!le sit-ations, /hich cannot !e capt-red in any sin"le model. .o reason correctly re'-ires "eneratin" all possi!le models and acceptin" as valid only /hat holds in all of them. B-t this re'-ires ela!orate and controlled processin", /hich h-mans find diffic-lties do in their heads. .hat h-mans represent !y models does not r-le o-t their employin" propositions mentally. .hey certainly hold internal dialo"-es /ith themselves and, no do-!t, more comple+ reasonin"s as /ell. *ithin the theory, this occ-rs !y /orkin" /ith models of #ro#ositions . .he internal representation is a model of the propositional form, and the operators are r-les of finerence. .hey co-ld !e r-les s-ch as P# and PF in the fi"-re, or even more !asic ones s-ch as mod-s ponens and s-!stit-tion, /hich apply encoded forms of r-les s-ch as P# and PF to other propositions s-ch as P1 and P&. .his mi"ht seem to a!olish the distinction !et/een models and propositions. =n the contrary, it reveals ho/ different they are. (or the co"nitive system, /orkin" /ith a model is /orkin" directly in terms of /hat the model refers to. .h-s, /hen it /orkin" /ith propositions, it is /orkin" directly /ith propositions, all ri"ht, !-t therefore only directlyCthat is, at one removeCfrom /hat the prositions refer to. .his is the !asis, /ithin the theory, for the fact that follo/in" r-les is al/ays co"nitively remote, compared to directly "raspin" or seein" the facts themselves. )nsi"ht is !o-nd -p /ith the modellike str-ct-re /e have descri!ed Seein" that the !all is !et/een the

apple and the cap in M& of fi"-re 9.9 is as close to direct appreciation as the or"anism comes. @o application of r-les mediates the process.GJH .he reco"nition of the memory system is inner si"ht, so to speak. )t is not a hom-nc-l-s: it does not reason, and it does not reflect Dthat happens in the hi"her levels of decision cycles and pro!lem spacesE. )t responds to patterns. .he patterns it sees are not fi+ed in advance, say, !y nat-re. Ch-nkin" adds contin-ally ne/ patterns. .hese can !e hi"hly specific, for e+ample, involvin" the relationship of !et/eenness, as e+pressed in a "iven modellike representation. S-ppose all the a!ove /ere tr-eK Sho-ld the h-manities careK )t /o-ld seem so. .he central point /o-ld !e to make evident e+actly /hy B 1%J B it is that h-mans fail to !e lo"ical or arrive at concl-sions !y applyin" r-les vers-s seein" the matter directly. )t /o-ld also make clear that this depends on specific feat-res of the h-man architect-re and /hy these feat-res are part of the architect-re. .his /o-ld lead on to -nderstandin" that there co-ld !e intelli"ent systems /ith different architect-ral properties, /hich /o-ld !e '-ite differentCnever sho/in" insi"ht, or al/ays !ein" lo"ical on small reasonin" tasks, on never !ein" a!le to apply r-les and /orkin" !y insi"ht. S-ch a <oo of intelli"ences /o-ld let -s -nderstand o-r o/n h-manity, /ith the li!eration that comparative st-dy al/ays !rin"s.

S6e0u*ation <2 On Bein( Embedded in the Natura* Order

.he iss-e is the place of man in the -niverse. .he !ack"ro-nd can start /ith the special version of this in o-r *estern herita"eC9reek and ,e!re/ roots, thro-"h 7ome and -p thro-"h the emer"ence of 8-ropean civili<ation. 2 strand of this herita"e is the -ni'-eness of man and his separateness from the other creat-es of the /orld, even his he"emony over them. @ot all c-lt-ral herita"es have this partic-lar homocentric foc-s, !-t o-rs certainly does. .he scientific contri!-tion to this herita"e, at least in the received version of c-lt-ral history, is a s-ccession of defeats for -ni'-esness and special position and a "rad-al reali<ation that man is part of nat-re, not to !e distin"-ished in kind and may!e only modestly in de"ree. Some of the ma3or scientific revol-tions are associated /ith s-ch defeats Dor victories, if yo- are rootin" for the other sideE. .hink of the Copernican revol-tion, /hich decentered man and his earth, the 5ar/inian revol-tion, /hich 3oined man firmly /ith the animals, and the (red-ian revol-tion, /hich removed man4s action from the control of his o/n conscio-s /ill. =ne c-rrent !attle"ro-nd over h-man -ni'-eness seems to !e the h-man mindCits intelli"ence, a!ility to -se lan"-a"e, and so on.GLH .he comp-ter, itself, is one of the skirmish lines. (or it h-mans /ere like a comp-terC/hatever that mi"ht mean, "iven the diverse and m-ltiple notions comprisin" the comp-ter metaphor for mindCthen h-mankind /o-ld no lon"er !e -ni'-e. =r at least its mind /o-ld not, so that some other so-rce of -ni'-eness /o-ld have to !e fo-nd. 2nd the s-pply is !ecomin" a little lean. *hat does the theory sayK .here is the o!vio-s statement that a scientific psycholo"y makes the h-man mind a part of the nat-ral order. )ndeed, a scientific !iolo"y does so almost as /ell. ,o/ever, !oth co-ld still leave the central claim of -ni'-eness essentially -nto-ched. )nstead, let -s foc-s on the attempt to admit comp-ters as capa!le of solvin" diffic-lt tasks !-t to take them as doin" so in an entirely different /ay than h-man intelli"ence. .h-s, it is said, the comp-ter solves pro!lems B 1%L B

!y !r-te force. )n the conte+t of the "rand !attle a!ove, s-ch a move yields on f-nctionalityCsolvin" diffic-lt pro!lems is not -ni'-e to h-mansC!-t preserves style and type. )n the /ords of Monty Python4s (lyin" Circ-s, any disc-ssion of comp-ter intelli"ence sho-ld !e prefaced !y, 12nd no/ for somethin" completely different.1 (i"-re 9.1$ provides an analysis of this iss-es. )t sho/s a space /ithin /hich intelli"ent systems are located !y the means they -se to perform their task.G0H .he vertical a+is is #re#aration , the e+tent to /hich a system dra/s on /hat it has prepared in advance of the task. .he hori<ontal a+is is deli"eration , the e+tent to /hich a system en"a"es in processin" once the task has !e"-n. .he c-rves represent e'-alAperformance iso!ars. 5ifferent choices of ho/ m-ch to dra/ on prepared material and ho/ m-ch to comp-te once the task is set can yield the same performanceCmore preparation and less deli!eration vers-s less preparation and more deli!eration. .ravelin" o-t alon" the arro/ moves from lo/er performance iso!ars to hi"her performance ones. Both a+es represent kno/led"eCkno/led"e that comes from stored memory str-ct-res D/hat has !een preparedE and kno/led"ed that comes from comp-tation d-rin" the decision process. .he a+es, ho/ever, are not meas-red in kno/led"e a!stractly. Stored kno/led"e is meas-red in str-ct-res Dn-m!er of r-les or n-m!er of memory !itsE and ac'-ired kno/led"e is meas-red in sit-ations searched or processed. .his tradeAoff is f-ndamental to informationAprocessin" systems. .he str-ct-re of a system places it in a local re"ion of this space, for it tends to treat all tasks similarly. .he ro-"h locations of vario-s types of 2) systems are sho/n in fi"-re 9.1$. .he early 2) systems /ere search oriented, /ith little kno/led"e De'-ivalent to a do<en r-lesE and modest search Dh-ndreds of sit-ationsE. 8+pert system -se more kno/led"e D-p to a!o-t 1$F r-les c-rrentlyE !-t do m-ch less search. )ndeed, they can !e seen as e+ploration into /hat can !e "ained !y immediately accessi!le kno/led"e /itho-t apprecia!le search. ,itech, ,ans Berliner4s hi"hmaster chess machine DBerliner and 8!elin" 19%%E is /ay o-t at the e+treme of deli!eration, /ith a!o-t 1$0 sit-ations e+amined per e+ternal move and /ith only a!o-t 1$& r-les. ,itech /o-ld certainly '-alify as one of those systems that attains its res-lts !y !r-te force, that is, !y massive search. )t is also possi!le to locate h-mans on this c-rve at least appro+imately. .akin" chess as an e+ample, h-mans can search only a!o-t 1$& sit-ations in decidin" on a move. .his ro-"h estimate can !e derived from Soar and is attested empirically. B-t h-mans have a!o-t 1$J r-les, as inferred from a SoarAlike theory DSimon and 9ilmartin 190#E to e+plain the empirical res-lts of the /ellAkno/n chess perceptions e+periments DChase and Simon 190#E. Chess is only one area of e+pertise, of B 1%0 B

(i". 9.1$. .he preparation vs. deliration tradeAoff co-rse. .he total kno/led"e that a h-man has availa!le over all tasks /o-ld amo-nt to many times this, altho-"h perhaps not !y more than t/o orders of ma"nit-de. .his space provides a f-ndamental vie/ of ho/ informationAprocessin" systems can differ and yet !e related to one another. )t tells -s that systems, s-ch as ,itech, are not completely differentCnot an -nrelated /ay of attainin" task performance Dla!eled say as "rute force E !-t rather a different part of the total space of informationAprocessin" systems. .he same considerations enter into systems s-ch as ,itech as into other systems in the space. (or instance, once the architect-re of a system is fi+ed,

/hether for a h-man or ,itech, the amo-nt of deli!eration in a "iven time !ecomes essentially fi+ed. .hen the system can improve only !y vertical movement in the space Dsee the small vertical arro/s in fi". 9.1$E. )ndeed, ,itech has moved from a lo/ e+pert to a hi"h master entirely !y addin" reco"nition kno/led"e. (or another instance, it is possi!le to have systems that move !ack and -p alon" an iso!ar, that is, decreasin" deli!eration and increasin" preparation. Soar, /ith its ch-nkin", is s-ch a system. )t appears m-ch more diffic-lt to move in the other direction. )n fact, ) do not kno/ any artifical systems B 1%% B that do so in any s-!stantial /ay. .o -nderstand intelli"ence re'-ires -nderstandin" the nat-re of this entire space. ,avin" located h-mans and !r-te force intelli"ent systems in the same space, can /e p-sh fartherK *hy, for instance, are h-mans located /here they areKG%H .he theory /e are ass-min" DSoarE offers a cl-e and echoes the prior e+ample. ,-man minds are controllers of real time systems. .heir form as reco"nitionAintensive rather than searchAintensive systems is f-nctional in that respect. (-rthermore, their architect-re is str-ct-red to learn contin-o-sly from e+perience, /hich contin-o-sly moves the system a/ay from deli!eration to/ard reco"nition.G9H S-ppose all the a!ove /ere tr-eK Sho-ld the h-manities careK .his analysis denies the separateness of machinelike, !r-te force intelli"ence from h-man reco"nitionAintensive intelli"ence, /hich relates only to one aspect of /hether the h-man mind is -ni'-e and /hat ass-res its -ni'-e role in the -niverse. @evertheless, this is reason eno-"h to care, "iven the lon" m-ltista"e !attle on this topic, /hich has occ-pied s-ch a sec-re place in *estern tho-"ht. .here is, perhaps, another small yield. S-ch a vie/ emphasi<es that o-r minds are a technolo"yClike other technolo"ies in !ein" a set of mechanisms for the ro-tine sol-tion of a class of pro!lems. .echnolo"ies differ /ith respect to the feat-res of the neat-ral they e+ploit and to the class of tasks they solve. B-t all technolo"ies have m-ch in common. .his mi"ht 3oin /ith o-r "ro/in" appreciation of other nat-ral !iolo"ical technolo"iesCthe !iochemical technolo"ies of meta!olism, the macromolec-lar D5@2 7@2E technolo"ies of replication and protein man-fact-re, and the cell-lar technolo"ies of the imm-ne system. *e mi"ht come to reali<e the essential role of technolo"ies in the scheme of all or"ani<ed comple+ systems, /hether nat-ral or artifical. .his mi"ht even lead -s to accept technolo"y as an essential part of /hat is h-man and therefore an essential part of a li!eral and h-manistic ed-cation. .hat also /o-ld !e reason eno-"h for the h-manities to care.

S6e0u*ation =2 On #in1in( the Mundane and the Sub*ime

.he iss-e is the nat-re of creativity, /hich occ-pies a special place in the h-manities. .here is confo-ndin" !et/een the role of social /orth, /hich introd-ces an -nsettlin" relativity, an the role of individ-al talent, /hich is /here /e *esterners seem to /ant to "ro-nd creative action. ,o/ever, too m-ch of /hat the h-manities cele!rateCfrom "reat composers to "reat artists to "reat /ritersCis polari<ed !y the matter of creativity. .he topic remains special. *hat does the theory sayK .here is a lon" history of attempts /ithin co"nitive psycholo"y to descri!e creativity as 3-st pro!lem solvin" D@e/ell, Sha/, and Simon 19L&E. More specifically, the activity of the creative a"ent

B 1%9 B /ithin the total social and historical creative process is asserted to !e intellect-al activity as predicted !y SoarAlike theories of co"nition. )t consists of searches in pro!lem spaces, -nder vario-s de"rees and amo-nts of kno/led"e, as prod-ced !y the e+periences of the a"ent. .his does not provide a f-ll acco-ntin" of /hat happens in creative activity, of /hy certain creative events occ-r on certain occasions /ith certain individ-als, and so on. M-ch is !-ried in the social and historical conte+ts. .he theory does say that no special processes are involved, !eyond those that /e -nderstand from more m-ndane co"nitive activities.G1$H S-ch a claim does not follo/ from the theory. Creativity is a phenomenon in the /orld, not a defined notion /ithin the theory. 7ather, s-ch a claim o!tains s-pport Dor notE, as the co"nitive theory of the mind is s-ccessf-l Dor notE in e+plainin" empirically la!eled creative activities. *e need to e+amine attempts to descri!e and e+plain creative activities, and clearly the more creative, the !etter. 2 -sef-l case is the research over the years !y my collea"-e ,er! Simon to -nderstand scientific discovery in informationAprocessin" terms. .his /ork has recently !een s-mmari<ed at !ook len"th D;an"ley et al. 19%0E, emphasi<in" that scientific discovery is pro!lem solvin" as form-lated in c-rrent co"nitive theories. .he theory that the /ork dra/s on is not a detailed co"nitive architect-re, s-ch as Soar, !-t a more "enerali<ed form-lation that is consonant /ith the Soar model, to /it, sym!ol manip-lation, "oal hierarchies, pro!lem spaces, and reco"nition memory. .he temporal "rain of scientific discovery is too lon" to re'-ire sharp ass-mptions a!o-t the details of the architect-re. By the same coin, this /ord e+tends the reach of a theory of the architect-re, s-ch as Soar. .he methodolo"y employed in this research is !oth interestin" and important. )t e+plains historically si"nificant events of scientific discoveryCBoyle4s la/ or 6epler4s third la/. .hese satisfy the criteria of !ein" hi"hly creative events. )t is not possi!le to e+periment /ith these events directly: they are history. .herefore, the "oal is to re#roduce these discoveries !y a pro"ram. .he act-al data that the discoverer -sed is presented to a discovery pro"ram, and the pro"ram sho-ld make the act-al discovery. )t sho-ld prod-ce Boyle4s la/, for instance. .he conte+t of /hat the discoverer kne/ is set as closely as possi!le accordin" to the historical evidence. .he record is only partial, especially the record of immediate kno/led"e and skill. B-t, in a positive confl-ence, creative scientific discoveries are e+actly those on /hich historians of science lavish special attention, so that often m-ch can !e said. .his approach is '-ite analo"o-s to that of the paleoarchaeolo"ists, /ho endeavor to chip flints !y the methods availa!le to early man, or to .hor ,yderdahl, /ith his sailin" of the 1a from 8c-ador to the Polynesian islands. Care m-st !e taken, !oth in settin" the sta"e and in B 19$ B interpretin" the res-lts. B-t the yield is ne/ data of a partic-larly intri"-in" and relevant sort. (i"-re 9.11 s-mmari<es the yield of this research effort. .he cases are taken from ;an"ley et al. D19%0E, pl-s one more recent effort, 6ekada D6-lkarni and Simon 19%%E, /hich reprod-ces the synthesis of -rea. .here have !een several different pro"rams, each of /hich addresses a different type of scientific discovery pro!lem. .he varieties of the Bacon pro"ram perform dataAdriven ind-ction from '-antitative data, 9la-!er and Stahl discover '-alitative la/s, and so on. Some of the pro"rams provide alternatives or more complete versions of the same discovery. .he e+act n-m!er of cases depends on ho/ to co-nt, !-t essentially a score of e+amples has no/ !een /orked thro-"h. )t is important to reali<e that these pro"rams DBacon, et.E act-ally discover the la/s. .he stip-lation is the conte+t of discovery, and the pro"ram then en"a"es in a search in the relevant pro!lem spaces. .his research raises many '-estions in addition to providin" s-pport for the "eneral proposition that

creativity is contin-o-s /ith pro!lem solvin" on m-ndane tasks. S-ch pro"rams re'-ire very modest search: they discover the la/s '-ickly. Scientific discovery, as /e /ell kno/, takes lon" efforts. .h-s, there is dissonance !et/een theory and common -nderstandin". .here are several possi!ilities to !e e+plored in e+plainin" this. Perhaps the "reats, like the rest of -s, never find the time act-ally to do science, so /hen they finally "et a fe/ ho-rs, interestin" thin"s happen. Perhaps there is lots of scientific detailed /ork to !e done, s-ch as settin" -p e+periments and ta!-latin" data, activities not acco-nted for !y these pro"rams. Perhaps the pro!lem spaces they /ork in are really m-ch !i""er and the pro!lem m-ch more diffic-lt, !-t that e+planation contains a dist-r!in" reversal. Perhaps, finally, the creative activities are really located else/here, and the act-al discovery from the data of, say, Boyle4s la/, is 3-st a minor !it of ro-tine activity. .hen the pro"rams are /orkin" on the /ron" aspect. ,o/ever, one sho-ld not em!race this last e+planation too '-ickly. .he events dealt /ith !y the pro"rams have certainly !een considered central !y scientific philosophers and historians and !y the scientists themselvesCas attested !y 2rchimedes4s cry of -ureka< as he leapt from a !ath that co-ld not have lasted more than a fe/ ho-rs. S-ppose all the a!ove /ere tr-eK Sho-ld the h-manities careK .he research certainly has an impact on history of science and philosophy of science. B-t that is to !e e+pected, !eca-se the research speaks to them directly /ith the details of its findin"s. )f, ho/ever, the research /ere taken to !e a concl-sive demonstration a!o-t the nat-re of creativity, it /o-ld affect all f-t-re disco-rse on the topic. B-t the research has B 191 B Bacon 1 Boyle4s la/, 9alileo4s la/ of -niform acceleration, =hm4s la/, 6epler4s third la/ D>ariant of Bacon. 1 /ith different he-risticsE )deal "as la/, 6epler4s third la/, Co-lom!4s la/, =hm4s la/ 2rchimedes4 la/ of displacement, Snell4s la/ of refraction, Black4s la/ of specific heat, la/ of "ravitation, =hm4s la/, la/ of conservation of moment-m, chemical la/ of com!ination Snell4s la/ of refraction, conservation of moment-m, Black4s specific heat, Jo-le4s la/ 2cids and alkalis D!asesE Phlo"iston theory, Black on Ma"nesi-m al!a, ;avoisier4s caloric theory and the discovery of o+y"en ,ydro"en and o+y"en to /ater, pla-si!le e+tension to particle physics

Bacon & Bacon # Bacon F

Bacon J

9la-!er Stahl

5alton

reactions, Mendelian "enetics 6ekada =rinthine cycle Dsynthesis of -reaE

(i". 9.11 Scientific discoveries reprod-ced !y pro"rams of ;an"ley et al. D19%0E and 6-lkarni and Simon D19%%E foc-sed only on scientific creativity. Many other activities are incl-ded -nder the r-!ric of creativityC novel and impressive performances in the fine arts, the performin" arts, literat-re, and poetryCto list only those in the heartland of the h-manities. .here is m-ch evidence a!o-t the separa!ility of these vario-s areas, each involvin" -ni'-e technolo"ies to !e manip-lated and skills to do the manip-lations. .h-s, it is possi!le to treat this evidence from creative scientific discovery as fra"mentary. ,o/ever, it /o-ld seem to raise stron" eno-"h si"nals to enco-ra"e seekin" analo"o-s investi"ations in related areas /here creativity plays a similarly important role.

S6e0u*ation >2 On +no3in( and Not "rti0u*atin(

.he iss-e is that h-mans kno/ thin"s they cannot artic-late. .his is often said /ith an overtone of ama<ement or dis!elief. =ne scientist c-m philosopher, Michael Polyani, even t-rned this o!servation into the central theme of his philosophic oe-vre: he called it tacit kno/ledge DPolyani 19J%E. 2 favorite e+ample /as ridin" a !icycle, /here it seemed clear for p-rposes of philosophy Di.e., /itho-t "atherin" empirical dataE that !icycle riders co-ld not artic-late ho/ they rode a !icycle, nor /o-ld tellin" non!icylists ho/ to ride, that is, /hat physical principles to -se, ena!le them to ride !icycles. .he central si"nificance of tacit kno/led"e has !een /idely ackno/led"ed thro-"ho-t the h-manities D9rene 19LLE, tho-"h not al/ays tied to Polyani. B 19& B *hat does the theory sayK )t yields a strai"htfor/ard ans/er to /hy h-man co"nition sho/s the phenomena of tacit kno/led"e. 2ct-ally, it provides t/o separate ans/ers: one for e+tended !ehavior and one for immediate !ehavior. .he e+tended case comes from the nat-re of lon"term memory, /hich is a reco"nition memory, in the sense /e descri!ed a!ove. )n s-ch a memory, kno/led"e is accessed !y means of the retrieval c-es that occ-r in shortAterm /orkin" memory. .h-s, kno/led"e is accessi!le only if the ri"ht c-es e+ist. B-t the c-es are ri"ht only if they p-ll o-t the ri"ht kno/led"e, and the system cannot kno/ /hat the ri"ht kno/led"e is. .hat is /hat it is tryin" to find o-t. .h-s, the system in effect m-st "-ess at the retrieval c-es Daltho-"h the "-essin" can !e intelli"entE. .his sit-ation holds for any associative or contentAaddressed memory, not 3-st the specific reco"nition memory system posited for Soar Dfi". 9.1E. )n s-ch a memory, it is no /onder that /hat the system kno/s for some p-rposes is not "enerally availa!le to it for another. Co-ple this /ith the fact, in Soar, that proced-res are also stored this /ay, that is, availa!ly !y reco"nition /hen the !ehavior is to !e prod-ced. )t follo/s that people in "eneral cannot artic-late the kno/led"e of ho/ they !ehave. *hen they do, they only constr-ct an artic-lated vie/ on the !asis of the internal and e+ternal o!servation of their o/n performance. .he immediateA!ehavior case arises from the str-ct-re of the decision cycle Dfi". 9.1E. .he decision cycle is composite, consistin" of a se'-ence or prod-ction firin"s that acc-m-late the availa!le

kno/led"e prior to a decision act-ally !ein" made. Simple reasonin" occ-rs /ithin a cycle as prod-ctions tri""er s-cceedin" prod-ctions. ,o/ever, the decision cycle is the shortest time scale at /hich deli!erate action can !e taken. )t is not possi!le for a person to artic-late /hat "oes on /ithin the decision cycle. .hey can report vario-s prod-cts that end -p in /orkin" memory, !-t there is no /ay they can monitor the detailed processin" /ithin the cycle /here!y these prod-cts ori"inated. Soar provides an e+plicit pict-re of the lo/er limits of artic-lation. .his is not, in "eneral, /hat Polyani /as referrin" to !y tacit kno/led"e, !-t !oth types of limitations easily mer"e to"ether, if there is no theoretical reason for separatin" them. S-ppose all the a!ove /ere tr-eK Sho-ld the h-manities careK .he main effect mi"ht !e 3-st de!-nkin" Cto make o!vio-s the limits on artic-lation, so that it /o-ld cease to play a role in lar"er, more profo-nd disc-ssions. .he conse'-ences of kno/in" /itho-t artic-lation remain, ho/ever. )t remains an important in"redient in disc-ssin" artistic and literary skills and ho/ they relate to the tho-"hts that artists and /riters have of their o/n art and craft. (rom this standpoint, havin" a theory of the mechanisms that lead to the separation of kno/in" from artic-latin" /o-ld seem to !e e+tremely /orth/hile. B 19# B

S6e0u*ation ?2 On Re6ression
.hs iss-e is emotion and co"nition. =ne strikin" feat-re of modern co"nitive theories is their fail-re to incorporate emotional !ehavior /ith the co"nitive mechanisms. Soar is no e+ception. .here have !een a fe/ efforts DCol!y 190J: M-eler 19%0: =atley and JohnsonA;aird 19%0: Simon 19L0E, /hich mostly conver"e on the role of emotions in the interr-ption of !ehavior. ,o/ever, they do not chan"e the overall pict-re. .his sit-ation reflects the pro!lematic relation of emotion to reason in o-r society as a /hole. .he emotion side of the scientific literat-re sho/s the same tension. (or instance, altho-" some theories act-ally comp-te a tra3ectory of a person4s affective state d-rin" an interaction, they have no co"nitive or task dimension D,eise 1900E. Iet, it seems almost -ndenia!le that emotion and affect e+ist /ithin, rao-nd, amon", and thro-"ho-t the mechanisms of the co"nitive architect-re. =ne potential approach is to identify co"nitive mechanisms that mi"ht enter into emotional !ehaviors in an interestin" /ay, as preparations for -nderstandin" ho/ co"nition and emotion mi"ht fit to"ether into a sin"le system. *hat mi"ht the theory s-""estK .he snapshot on developmental mechanisms in Soar provides an interestin" e+ample. 7ecall Dfi". 9.0E that the ma3or system pro!lem for Soar in the !alance !ecam task /as ho/ to relearn in the face of prior learnin" that is /ron". .his pro!lem has a specific character in Soar, !eca-se ch-nkin" is the permanent ac'-isition of prod-ctions. Soar4s sol-tion /as to create ne/ pro!lem spaces, /itho-t the !ad learnin". .hey did not necessarily contain all the "ood learnin", !-t these into the ori"inals. By operatin" mementarily in the old space, /ith additional considerations from the no/ one to filter o-t the /ron" !ehavior, it co-ld operate s-ccessf-lly. Ch-nkin" in the old space "rad-ally transfers filtered !ehaviors into the ne/ space. )n this respect at least, Soar /o-ld not have to ret-rn to the old space on s-!se'-ent occasions. .his entire mechanism is !-ilt /ithin Soar, -sin" ch-nkin", and does not involve any architect-ral modifications. .he p-rpose in revie/in" this methanism is to note /hat has !een prod-ced. Pro!lem spaces that contain -nderira!le effects are !ein" "rad-ally ins-lated from access !y the ne/ pro!lem spaces !-ilt in front of them. 9rad-ally, it /ill !ecome more and more diffic-lt to access these ins-lated spaces.

,=/ever, if one some occasion, perhaps m-ch later, a /ay of /orkin" /ith the ne/ space occ-rs /hich has not previo-sly !een attempted, the old space /ill !e reentered. )t co-ld !e like openin" the door to a lon"Alocked room. .he mind is pop-lated !y s-ch old spaces, since ne/ ones "et overlaid /ith additional ne/ ones ad infinit-m, dependin" on the larnin" history of the system. .his looks like a mechanism for repression, as (re-d has ta-"ht -s to B 19F B -nderstand it, namely, as central in the emotional life of the individ-al. .he Soar methanism /as not deli!erately desi"ned for repression: this is a side effect. )t /as desi"ned to let ne/ learnin" !ecome effective and not "et mi+ed -p /ith old learnin" that had !een re3ected. )t is a co"nitive mechanism for co"nitive p-rposes. *hen /e consider /hat a f-lly comptional mind mi"ht !e like, /e can ima"aine that the phenomenton /e Das "ood neoA(re-diansE think of as repression /o-ld involve this mechanism. .his does not say that (re-dian repression Dmore "enerally, affectively "ro-nded repressionE is nothin" !-t this mechanism. *e kno/ too little a!o-t emotion /ithin the con"itive realm to "-ess at that. 7ather, it opens the possi!ility that emotional repression /ill inha!it and -se s-ch a mechanism, perhaps rather like the hermit cra!, a mechanism defined for entirely co"nitive reasons, and !ecome an inte"ral part of the emotional apparat-s. S-ppose all the a!ove /ere tr-eK Sho-ld the h-manities careK ) /o-ld think so. .he attempt to -nderstand the realms of !ehavior of ma3or si"nificance to the h-manitiesCrepresented here !y emotion and affectC/ill !e enriched !y the -se of theories of co"nition. .hese /ill !e a so-rce of ideas a!o-t the character of emotion and ho/ it is manifest. )n short, s-ch a theory of mind mi"ht end -p !ecomin" a central theoretical reso-rce for the h-manities.

!on0*usions
*e have had five spec-lations to provide some indication of /hat mi"ht follo/ if there /ere to emer"e from the comin" of the comp-ter a theory of mind. .hey represent a postential yield from Soar, !-t Soar, in t-rn, represents the possi!ility of a -nified theory of co"nition, and s-ch a theory, in its t-rn, represents the "eneral and contin-ed development of co"nitive science. .hese spec-lations are fra"ile, !-t ) hope they are -sef-l. 2 "reater concern, perahsp, is their !ein" somethin" of a con"reries, rather than a coherence. .his arises from the method /e chose, namely, to move from Soar to/ard the h-manities. )t /as not /ithin my ken to pick a central iss-e in the h-manities and !-ild the case for /hat a theory of mind mi"ht say. Scattershot seemed the only /ay to have a chance at contact. .he point of all the spec-lations is to ill-strate that a theory of mind has a /ealth of detail that allo/s s-stained ar"-ment and investi"ation a!o-t /hy h-mans are the /ay they are. .here are mechanisms of partic-lar shapes and kinds !ehind the capacities and limits of o-r a!ilities to artic-late, !e lo"ical, have insi"ht, or repress. )n this /e! of mechanisms lies many of the cl-es to o-r h-mnaityC/hat it is like and /hat it can !e like. .he details of these spec-lations are not critical for B 19J B this point, tho-"h to some e+tent their pla-si!ility is. B-t most important is that they arise from the operations of a theory, not from reflections on a metaphor. (inally, does it make any difference to the h-manities /hich one of these t/o /ays of vie/in" the

matter of mind, metaphor or theory, t-rns o-t to !e s-stainedK .he t/o vie/s are not symmetric. S-stain the metaphorical vie/ and a nonevet has happened. .he comp-ter as metaphor enriches a little o-r total vie/ of o-rselves, allo/in" -s to see facets that /e mi"ht not other/ise have "limpsed. B-t /e have !een enriched !y metaphors !efore, and on the /hole, they provide 3-st a fe/ more threads in the fa!ric of life, nothin" more. .he comp-ter as "enerator of a theory of mind is another thin" entirely. )t is an event. @ot !eca-se of the comp-ter !-t !eca-se finally /e /o-ld have o!tained a theory of mind. (or a theory of mind, in the same sense as a theory of "enetics or of plate tectonics, /ill entrain an indefinite se'-ence of shocks thro-"h all o-r dealin"s /ith mindC/hich is to say, thro-"h all o-r dealin"s /ith o-rselves. 2nd the h-manities mi"ht 3-st !e ca-"ht in the maelstrom. =r so it /o-ld seem.

Referen0es
2nderson, J. 7. The Architecture of Cognition. Cam!rid"e: ,arvard University Press, 19%#. Berliner, ,., and C. 8!elin". 1Pattern 6no/led"e and Search: .he SUP78M 2rchitect-re,1 Artificial &ntelligence #% D19%%E: 1L1A19%. Bro/nston, ;., 7. (arrell, 8. 6ant, and @. Martin. (rogramming -.#ert Systems in +(SD. 7eadin", Mass: 2ddisonA*esley, 19%J. Chase, *. 9., and ,. 2. Simon. 1Perception in Chess,1 Cogniti6e (sychology F D190#E: JJA%1. Clark, ,. ,., and *. 9. Chase. 1=n the Process of Comparin" Sentences a"ainst Pict-res,1 Cogniti6e (sychology # D190&E: F0&AJ10. Clark, ,., and 8. Clark. The (sychology of 3auguage: An &ntroduction to (sycholingustics. @e/ Iork: ,arco-rt Brace Jovanovich, 1900. Col!y, 6. M. Artificial (aranoia. 8lmsford, @.I.: Per"amon, 190J. 5ennett, 5. C. The &ntentional Stance. Cam!rid"e: Bradford Books M). Press, 19%%. (itts, P. M., and C. M. See"er. 1SA7 Compati!ility: Spatical Characteristics of Stim-l-s and 7esponse Codes,1 Journal of -m#erimental (sychology FJ D19J#E: 199A&1$. (odor, J. 2. The Modularity of Mind. Cam!rid"e: Bradford Books M). Press, 19%#. 9ardner, ,. The Mind,s $e/ Science: A History of the Cogniti6e 1e6olution. @e/ Iork: Basic Books, 19%J. 9rene, M. The =no/er and the =no/n. ;ondon: (a!er and (a!er, 19LL. ,eise, 5. 7. 1Social 2ction as the Control of 2ffect,1 Beha6ioral Science && D1900E: 1L#A100. John, B. 8., and 2. @e/ell. 1Predictin" the .ime to 7ecall Comp-ter Command 2!!reviations,1 in (roceedings of CH&,?@ Human 0actors in Com#uting Systems , 2pril 19%0. @e/ Iork: 2ssociation for Comp-tin" Machinery. JohnsonA;aird, P. Mental Models. Cam!rid"e: ,arvard University Press, 19%#. 6-lkarni, 5., and ,. 2. Simon. 1.he Processes of Scientific 5iscovery: .he Strate"y of 8+perimentation,1 Cogniti6e Science 1& D19%%E: 1#9A10J. ;arid, J. 8., 2. @e/ell, and P. S. 7osen!loom. 1Soar: 2n 2rchitect-re for 9eneral )ntelli"ence,1 Artifical &ntelligence ## D19%0E: 1ALF. ;an"ley, P., ,. 2. Simon, 9. ;. Bradsha/, and J. M. Sytkno/. Scientific Disco6ery: Com#utational

-.#lorations of the Creati6e (rocesses. Cam!rid"e: M). Press, 19%0. ;ato-r, B., and S. *oolar. 3a"oratory 3i6e: The Social Construction of Scientific 0acts. Beverly ,ills: Sa"e, 1909. M-eller, 8. .. 15aydreamin" and Comp-tation: 2 Comp-ter Model of 8veryday Creativity, ;earnin", and 8motions in the ,-man Stream of .ho-"ht.1 Ph.5. B 190 B dissertation, Comp-ter Science 5epartment, University of California, ;os 2n"eles, 19%0. @e/ell, 2. 9nified Theories of Cognition. Cam!rid"e: ,arvard University Press Din pressE. D.he *illiam James ;ect-res, ,arvard University, Sprin" 19%0E. @e/ell, 2., and ,. 2. Simon. Human (ro"lem Sol6ing. 8n"l/ood Cliffs, @.J.: PrenticeA,all, 190&. @e/ell, 2., J. C. Sha/, and ,. 2. Simon. 1.he Processes of Creative .hin"in",1 in ,. 8. 9r-!er, 9. .errell, and J. *ertheimer, eds., Comtem#orary A##roaches to Creati6e Thinging. @e/ Iork: 2therton, 19L&. =atley, 6., and P. @. JohnsonA;aird. 1.o/ards a Co"nitive .heory of 8motions,1 Cognition and -motion 1 D19%0E: &9AJ$. Polayani, M. (ersoanl =no/ledge: To/ard a (ost!Critical (hiloso#hy. Chica"o: University of Chica"o Press, 19J%. Sie"ler, 7. S. 1.hree 2spects of Co"nitive 5evelopment,1 Cogniti6e (sychology % D190LE: F%1AJ&$. Simon, ,. 2. 1Motivational and 8motional Controls of Co"nition,1 (sychological 1e6ie/ 0F D19L0E: &9A#9. Simon, ,. 2., and 6. 9ilmartin. 12 Sim-lation of Memory for Chess Positions,1 Cogniti6e (sychology J D190#E: &9AFL. Steier, 5. 8., J. 8. ;arid, 2. @e/ell, P. S. 7osen!loom, 7. 2. (lynn, 2. 9oldin", .. 2. Polk, =. 9. Shivers, 2. Unr-h, and 9. 7. Iost. 1>arieties of ;earnin" in Soar: 19%0,1 in (roceedings of the 0ourth &nternational %orksho# on Machine learing , J-ne 19%0. ;os 2ltos, Calif: Mor"an 6a-fman. Stern!er", 7. J., ed. Mechanisms of Cogniti6e De6elo#ment. @e/ Iork: (reeman, 19%F. .oe/s J. 8. 1)ntellect-al ,istory after the ;in"-sitic .-rn: .he 2-tonomy of Meannin" and the )rred-ci!ility of 8+perience,1 The American Historical 1e6ie/ 9& D19%0E: %09A9$0. B 19% B

Ten2 Thin(in( Ma0hines/ !an There Be: "re ,e:

Terry ,ino(rad

Introdu0tion
(-t-rolo"ists have proclaimed the !irth of a ne/ species, Machina sa#iens , that /ill share Dperhaps -s-rpE o-r place as the intelli"ent soverei"ns of o-r earthly domain. .hese 1thinkin" machines1 /ill take over o-r !-rdensome mental chores, 3-st as their mechanical predecessors /ere intended to eliminate physical dr-"ery. 8vent-ally, they /ill apply their 1-ltraintelli"ence1 to solvin" all of o-r pro!lems. 2ny tho-"hts of resistin" this inevita!le evol-tion is 3-st a form of 1speciesism,1 !orn from a romanic and irrational attachment to the pec-liarities of the h-man or"anism. Critics have ar"-ed /ith e'-al fervor that 1thinkin" machine1 is an o+ymoron, a contradiction in terms. Comp-ters, /ith their fo-ndations of cold lo"ic, can never !e creative or insi"htf-l or possess real 3-d"ments. @o matter ho/ competent they appear, they do not have the "en-ine intentionality that is at the heart of h-man -nderstandin". .he vain pretensions of those /ho seek to -nderstand mind as comp-tation can !e dismissed as yet another demonstration of the arro"ance of modern science. 2ltho-"h my o/n -nderstandin" developed thro-"h active participation in artificial intelli"ence research, ) have no/ come to reco"ni<e a lar"er "rain of tr- th in the citicisms than in the enth-siastic predictions. B-t the story is more comple+. .he iss-es need not Dperhaps cannotE !e de!ated as f-ndamental '-estions concernin" the place of hymanity in the -niverse. )ndeed, artificial intelli"ence has not achieved creativity, insi"ht, and 3-d"ment. B-t its shortcomin"s are far more m-ndane: /e have not yet !een a!le to constr-ct a machine /ith even a modic-m of common sense or one that can converse on everyday topics in ordinary la-"-a"e. B 199 B .he so-rce of the diffic-lties /ill not !e fo-nd in the details of silicon microcirc-its or of Boolean lo"ic. .he !asic philosophy that has "-ided the research is shallo/ and inade'-ate and has not received s-fficient scr-tiny. )t is dra/n from the traditions of rationalism and lo"ical empiricism !-t has taken a novel t-rn a/ay from its predecessors. .his ne/ 1patch/ork rationalism1 /ill !e o-r s-!3ect of e+amination. (irst, /e /ill revie/ the "-idin" principles of artificial intelli"ence and see ho/ they are em!odied in c-rrent research. .hen /e /ill look at the fr-its of that research. ) /ill ar"-e that 1artficial intelli"ence1 as no/ conceived is limited to a very partic-lar kind of intelli"ence: one that can -sef-lly !e likened to !-rea-cracy in its ri"idity, o!t-seness, and ina!ility to adapt to chan"in" circ-mstances. .he /eakness comes not from ins-fficient development of the technolo"y !-t from the inade'-acy of the !asic tenets. B-t, as /ith !-rea-cracy, /eaknesses "o hand in hand /ith -ni'-e stren"ths. .hro-"h a reinterpretation and reform-lation of the techni'-es that have !een developed, /e can anticipate and desi"n appropriate and val-a!le -ses. )n concl-sion, ) /ill !riefly introd-ce an orientation ) call 1hermene-tic constr-ctivism1 and ill-strate ho/ it can lead do/n this alternative path of desi"n.

The Me0hani@ation of Rationa*ity

in the '-est for mechanical e+planations of Dor s-!stit-tes forE h-man reason, researchers in artificial intelli"ence are heirs to a lon" tradition. )n his 15isco-rse on the Method of Properly 9-idin" the 7eason in the search of .r-th in the Sciences1 D1L#0E, 5escartes initiated the '-est for a systematic method of rationality. 2ltho-"h 5escartes himself did not !elieve that reason co-ld !e achieved thro-"h mechanical devices, his -nderstandin" laid the "ro-nd/ork for the sym!olAprocessin" machines of the modern a"e. )n 1LJ1, ,o!!es descri!ed reason as sym!olic calc-lation: *hen a man reasoneth, he does nothin" else !-t conceive a s-m total, from addition of parcels: or conceive a remainder. . . . .he operations are not incident to n-m!ers only, !-t to all manner of thin"s that can !e added to"ether, and taken one o-t of another . . . the lo"icians teach the same in conse'-ences of /ords: addin" to"ether t/o names to make an affirmation, and t/o affirmations to make a syllo"ism: and many syllo"isms to make a demonstration.G1H ;ei!ni< Das descri!ed !y 7-ssellE cherished thro-"h his life the hope of discoverin" a kind of "enerali<ed mathematics, /hich he called Characteristica 9ni6ersalis , !y means of /hich B &$$ B thinkin" co-ld !e replaced !y calc-lation. 1)f /e had it,1 he says, 1/e sho-ld !e a!le to reason in metaphysics and morals in m-ch the same /ay as in "eometry and analysis. )f controversies /ere to arise, there /o-ld !e no more need of disp-tation !et/een t/o philosophers than !et/een t/o acco-ntants. (or it /o-ld s-ffice to take their pencils in their hands, to sit do/n to their slates, and to say to each other . . . 4;et -s calc-late.41G&H Behind this pro"ram of mechanical reason /as a faith in a rational and -ltimately -nderstanda!le -niverse. .he model of 1;et -s calc-late1 is that of 8-clidean "eometry, in /hich a small set of clear and selfAevident post-lates provides a !asis for "eneratin" the ri"ht ans/ers D"iven s-fficient dili"enceE to the most comple+ and ve+in" pro!lems. 7easona!le men co-ld !e relied on to a"ree on the post-lates and the methods, and therefore disp-te co-ld only arise from mistaken calc-lation. .he empiricists t-rned to physical e+perience and e+periment as the tr-e !asis of kno/led"e. B-t in re3ectin" the a priori stat-s of the propositions on /hich reasonin" /as !ased, they did not a!andon the vision of ri"oro-s Dpotentially mechani<a!leE lo"ical proced-res. (or o-r p-rposes, it /ill s-ffice to adopt a !roader characteri<ation, in /hich m-ch of !oth rationalism and empiricism fall /ithin a common 1rationalistic tradition.1G#H .his la!el s-!s-mes the varied Dand at times hotly opposedE inheritors of 5escartes4s le"acyCthose /ho seek to achieve rational reason thro-"h a precise method of sym!olic calc-lation. .he electronic comp-ter "ave ne/ em!odiment to mechanical rationality, makin" it possi!le to derive the conse'-ences of precisely specified r-les, even /hen h-"e amo-nts of calc-lation are re'-ired. .he first decades of comp-tin" emphasi<ed the applicationof n-merical techni'-es. 7esearchers in operations research and decision theory addressed policy '-estions !y developin" comple+ mathematical models of social and political systems and calc-latin" the res-lts of proposed alternatives.GFH 2ltho-"h these techni'-es /ork /ell in speciali<ed caes Ds-ch as sched-lin" delivery vehicles or controllin" the operation in a refineryE, they proved inade'-ate for the !roader pro!lems to /hich they /ere applied. .he 1mathemati<ation1 of e+perience re'-ired simplifications that made the

comp-ter res-ltsCacc-rate as they mi"ht !e /ith respect to the modelsCmeanin"less in the /orld. 2ltho-"h there are still attempts to '-antify matters of social import Dfor e+ample, in applyin" mathematical risk analysis to decisions a!o-t n-clear po/erE, there is an overall disill-sionment /ith the potential for ade'-ately red-cin" h-man concerns to a precise set of n-m!ers and e'-ations.GJH .he developers of artificial intelli"ence have re3ected traditional mathematical modelin" in favor of an emphasis on sym!olic, rather than n-merical, formalisms. ;ei!ni<4s 1;et -s calc-late1 is taken in B &$1 B ,o!!es4s !roader sense to incl-de not 3-st n-m!ers !-t also 1affirmations1 and 1syllo"isms.1

The $romise of "rtifi0ia* Inte**i(en0e

2ttempts to d-plicate formal nonn-merical reasonin" on a machien date !ack to the earliest comp-ters, !-t the endeavor !e"an in earnest /ith the artificial intelli"ence D2)E pro3ects of the midA19J$s.GLH .he "oals /ere am!itio-s: to f-lly d-plicate the h-man capacities of tho-"ht and lan"-a"e on a di"ital comp-ter. 8arly claims that a complete theory of intelli"ence /o-ld !e achieved /ithin a fe/ decades have lon" since !een a!andoned, !-t the reach has not diminished. (or e+ample, a recent !ook !y Minsky Done of the fo-nders of 2)E offers comp-tational models for phenomena as diverse as conflict, pain and pleas-re, the self, the so-l, conscio-sness, conf-sion, "eni-s, infant emotion, forei"n accents, and freedom of /ill.G0H )n !-ildin" models of mind, there are t/o distinct !-t complementary "oals. =n the one hand is the '-est to e+plain h-man mental processes as thoro-"hly and -nam!i"-o-sly as physics e+plains the f-nctionin" of ordinary mechanical devices. =n the other hand is the drive to create intelli"ent toolsC machines that apply intelli"ence to serve some p-rpose, re"ardless of ho/ closely they mimic the details of h-man intelli"ence. 2t times, these t/o enterprises have "one hadn in hand: at other times, they have led do/n separate paths. 7esearchers s-ch as ne/ell and Simon Dt/o other fo-ndin" fathers of artificial intelli"enceE have so-"ht precise and scientifically testa!le theories of more modest scope than Minsky s-""ests. )n red-cin" the st-dy of mind to the form-lation of r-leA"overned operations on sym!ol systems, they foc-s on detailed aspects of co"nitive f-nctionin", -sin" empirical meas-res s-ch as memory capacity and reaction time. .hey hypothesi<e specific 1mental architect-res1 and compare their detailed performances /ith h-man e+perimental res-lts.G%H )t is diffic-lt to meas-re the s-ccess of this enterprise. .he tasks that have !een e+amined Ds-ch as p-<<le solvin" and the a!ility to remem!er a!!revations for comp-ter commandsE do not even !e"in to approach a representative sample of h-man co"nitive a!ilities, for reasons /e /ill e+amine !elo/. =n the other side lies the "oal of practical system !-ildin". )n the late 190$s, the field of artificial intelli"ence /as drastically affected !y the contin-in" precipito-s drop in comp-tin" costs. .echni'-es that previo-sly demanded hi"hly speciali<ed and costly e'-ipment came /ithin the reach of commercial -sers. 2 ne/ term, 1kno/led"e en"ineerin",1 /as coined to indicate a shift to the pra"matic interests of the en"ineer, rather than the scientist4s search for theoretical kno/led"e. B &$& B (2C.S: .ank [&# contains s-lf-ric acid.

.he plaintiff /as in3-red !y a porta!le po/er sa/. 7U;8S: )f the s-lfate ion test is positive, the spill material is sl-f-ric acid. )f the plaintiff /as ne"li"ent in the -se of the prod-ct, the theory of contri!-tory ne"li"ence applies. (i". 1$.1. 7-les for an e+pert system Dfrom 5. *aterman, A *uide to -.#ert Systems , 1LE 18+pert systems,1 as the ne/ pro"rams /ere called, incorporate 1kno/led"e !ases1 made -p of simple facts and 1if . . . then1 r-les, as ill-strated in fi"-re 1$.1. .hese systems do not attempt to e+plain h-man intelli"ence in detail !-t are 3-stified in terms of their practical applications, for /hich e+trava"ant claims have !een made. ,-mans need e+pert systems, !-t the pro!lem is they don4t often !elieve it. . . . 2t least one hi"hAperformance medical dia"nosis pro"ram sits -n-sed !eca-se the physicians it /as desi"ned to assist didn4t perceive that they needed s-ch assistance: they /ere /ron", !-t that doesn4t matter. . . . .here4s a manifest destiny in information processin", in kno/led"e systems, a continent /e shall !e spread o-t -pon sooner or later.G9H .he hi"h hopes and am!itio-s aspirations of kno/led"e en"ineerin" are /ell doc-mented, and the claims are often taken at face val-e, even in serio-s intellect-al disc-ssions. )n fact, altho-"h a fe/ /idely kno/n systems ill-strate specific potentials, the s-ccesses are still isolated pinnacles in a landscape of research prototypes, feasi!ility st-dies, and preliminary versions. )t is diffic-lt to "et a clear pict-re of /hat has !een accomplished and to make a realistic assessment of /hat is yet to come. *e need to !e"in !y e+aminin" the diffic-lties /ith the f-ndamental methods these pro"rams employ.

The oundations of "rtifi0ia* Inte**i(en0e

2rtificial intelli"ence dra/s its appeal from the same ideas of mechani<ed reasonin" that attracted 5escartes, lei!ni<, and ,o!!es, !-t it differs from the more classical forms of rationalism in a critical /ay. 5escartes /anted his method to stand on a !edrock of clear and selfAevident tr-ths. ;o"ical empiricism so-"ht tr-th thro-"h o!servation and B &$# B the refinement of formal theories that predicted e+perimental res-lts. 2rtificial intelli"ence has a!andoned the '-est for certainty and tr-th. .he ne/ patch/ork rationalism is !-ilt on mo-nds of 1microAtr-ths1 "leaned thro-"h commonsense introspection, and hoc pro"rammin", and soAcalled kno/led"e ac'-isition techni'-es for intervie/in" e+perts. .he "ro-ndin" on this shiftin" sand is pra"matic in the cr-de sense: 1)f it seems to !e /orkin", it4s ri"ht.1 .he res-ltin" patch/ork defines lo"ic. Minsky o!serves, (or "enerations, scientists and philosophers have tried to e+plain ordinary reasonin" in terms of lo"ical principlesC/ith virt-ally no s-ccess. ) s-spect this enterprise failed !eca-se it /as lookin" in the /ron" direction: common sense /orks so /ell not !eca-se it is an appro+imation of lo"ic: lo"ic is only a small part of o-r "reat acc-m-lation of different, -sef-l /ays to chain thin"s to"ether.G1$H )n the days !efore comp-tin", 1/ays to chain thin"s to"ether1 /o-ld have remained a va"-e metaphor.

B-t the comp-ter can perform ar!itrary sym!ol manip-lations that /e interpret as havin" lo"ical import. )t is easy to !-ild a pro"ram to /hich /e enter 1Most !irds can fly1 and 1./eety is a !ird1 and that then prod-ces 1./enty can fly1 accordin" to a re"-lar Daltho-"h lo"ically '-estiona!leE r-le. .he artificial intelli"ence methodolo"y does not demand a lo"ically correct ans/er !-t one that /orks s-fficiently often to !e 1he-ristically ade'-ate.1 )n a /ay, this approach is very attractive. 8veryday h-man tho-"ht does not follo/ the ri"id strict-res of formal ded-ction. Perhaps /e can devise some more fle+i!le Dand even falli!leE system that operates accordin" to mechanical principles !-t more acc-rately mirrors the mind. B-t this appeal is s-!tly deceptive. Minsky places the !lame for lack of s-ccess in e+plainin" ordinary reasonin" on the ri"idity of lo"ic and does not raise the more f-ndamental '-estions a!o-t the nat-re of all sym!olic representations and of formal Dtho-"h possi!ly 1nonlo"ical1E systems of r-les for manip-latin" them. .here are !asic limits to /hat can !e done /ith sym!ol amnip-lation, re"ardless of ho/ many 1different, -sef-l /ays to chain thin"s to"ether1 one invents. .he red-ction of mind to the interactive s-m of deconte+t-ali<ed fra"ments is -ltimately impossi!le and misleadin". B-t !efore ela!oratin" on the pro!lems, let -s first revie/ some ass-mptions on /hich this /ork proceeds: 1E )ntelli"ence is e+hi!ited !y 1physical sym!ol systems.1 &E .hese systems carry o-t sym!ol manip-lations that correspond to some kind of 1pro!lem solvin".1 #E )ntelli"ence is em!odied as a lar"e collection of fra"ments of 1kno/led"e.1 B &$F B

The $hysi0a* Symbo* System Hy6othesis

.he f-ndamental principle is the identification of intelli"ence /ith the f-nctionin" of a r-leA"overned sym!olAmanip-latin" device. )t has !een most e+plicitly stated !y @e/ell and Simon: 2 physical sym!ol system has the necessary and s-fficient means for "eneral intelli"ent action. . . . By 4"eneral intelli"ent action4 /e /ish to indicate the same scope of intelli"ence /e see in h-man action: that in any real sit-ation !ehavior appropriate to the ends of the system and adaptive to the demands of the environment an occ-r, /ithin some limits of speed and comple+ity.G11H .his 1physical sym!ol system hypothesis1 pres-pposes materialismCthe claim that all of the o!served properties of intelli"ent !ein"s can -ltimately !e e+plained in terms of la/f-l physical processes. )t adds the claim that these processes can !e descri!ed at a level of a!straction in /hich all relevant aspects of a physical state can !e -nderstood as the encodin" of sym!ol str-ct-res and that the activities can !e ade'-ately characteri<ed as systematic application of sym!ol manip-lation r-les. .he essential link is re#resentation Cthe encodin" of the relevant aspects of the /orld. @e/ell lays this o-t e+plicitly: 2n intelli"ent a"ent is em!edded in a task en6ironment4 a task statement enters via a #erce#tual component and is encoded in an initial re#resentation . *hence starts a cycle of activity in /hich a recognition occ-rs . . . of a method to -se to attempt the pro!lem. .he method dra/s -pon a memory of general /orld kno/ledge . . . . )t is clear to -s all /hat re#resentation is in this pict-re. )t is the data str-ct-res that hold the pro!lem and /ill !e processed into a form that makes the sol-tion availa!le. 2dditionally, it is the data str-ct-res that hold the /orld kno/led"e and /ill !e processed to ac'-ire parts of the

sol-tion or to o!tain "-idance in constr-ctin" it.G1&H Gemphasis in ori"inalH Complete and systematic sym!olic representation is cr-cial to the paradi"m. .he r-les follo/ed !y the machine can deal only /ith the sym!ols, not their interpretation.

$rob*em So*)in(9 Inferen0e9 and Sear0h

@e/ell and Simon4s physical sym!ol systems aspire not to an ideali<ed rationality !-t to 1!ehavior appropriate to the ends of the system and adaptive to the demands of the environment.1 .his shift reflects the form-lation that /on Simon a @o!el Pri<e in economics. ,e s-pplanted decision theories !ased on optimi<ation /ith a theory of 1satisficin"1Ceffectively -sin" finite decisionAmakin" reso-rces to come -p /ith ade'-ate, !-t not necessarily optimal, plans of action. B &$J B 2s artificial intelli"nece developed inthe 19J$s and 19L$s, this methodolo"y /as formali<ed in the techni'-es of 1he-ristic search.1 .he task that a sym!ol system is faced /ith, then, /hen it is presented /ith a pro!lem and a pro!lem space, is to -se its limited processin" reso-rces to "enerate possi!le sol-tions, one after another, -ntil it finds one that satisfies the pro!lemAdefinin" test.G1#H .he 1pro!lem space1 is a formal str-ct-re that can !e tho-"ht of as en-meratin" the res-lts of all possi!le se'-ences of actions that mi"ht !e taken !ythe pro"ram. )n a pro"ram for playin" chess, for e+ample, the pro!lem space is "enerated !y the possi!le se'-ences of moves. .he n-m!er of possi!lities "ro/s e+ponentially /ith the n-m!er of moves and is !eyond practical reach after a small n-m!er. ,o/ever, one can limit search in this space !y follo/in" he-ristics that operate on the !asis of local c-es D1)f one of yo-r pieces co-ld !e taken on the opponent4s ne+t move, try movin" it . . .E. .here have !een a n-m!er of variations on this !asic theme, all of /hich are !ased on e+plicit representations of the pro!lem space and the he-ristics for operatin" /ithin it. (i"-re 1$.1 ill-strated some r-les and facts from e+pert systems. .hese are not represented in the comp-ter as sentences in 8n"lish !-t as sym!ols intended to correspond to the nat-ral lan"-a"e terms. 2s these e+amples indicate, the domains are nat-rally far richer and more comple+ than can !e capt-red !y s-ch simple r-les. 2 la/yer /ill have many '-estions a!o-t /hether a plaintiff /as 1ne"li"ent,1 !-t for the pro"ram, it is a simple matter of /hether a certain sym!olic e+pression of the form 1Ne(*i(ent D5 E1 appears in the store of representations or /hether there is a r-le of the form 1If . . . then Ne(*i(ent D5 E,1 /hose conditions can !e satisfied. .here has !een a "reat deal of technical de!ate over the detailed form of r-les, !-t t/o principles are taken for "ranted in essentially all of the /ork: 1E 8ach r-le is tr-e in a limited Dsit-ationAdependentE, not a!sol-te, sense. &E .he overall res-lt derives from the syner"istic com!ination of r-les, in a pattern that need not Din fact, co-ld not in "eneralE !e anticipated in /ritin" them. (or e+ample, there may !e cases in /hich the 1s-lfate ion test is positive1 even tho-"h the spill is not s-lf-ric acid. .he overall architect-re of the r-leAmanip-latin" system may lead to a concl-sion !ein" dra/n that violates one of these r-les Don the !asis of other r-lesE. .he '-estion is not /hether each of the r-les is tr-e !-t /hether the o-tp-t

B &$L B of the pro"ram as a /hole is 1appropriate.1 .he kno/led"e en"ineers hope that !y devisin" and t-nin" s-ch r-les, they can capt-re more than the ded-ctive lo"ic of the domain: *hile conventional pro"rams deal /ith facts, e+pert systems handle 4lore4 . . . the r-les of th-m!, the h-nches, the int-ition and capacity for 3-d"ment that are seldom e+plicitly laid don !-t /hich form the !asis of an e+pert4s skill, ac'-ired over a lifetime4s e+perience.G1FH .his ad hoc nat-re of the lo"ic applies e'-ally to the co"nitive models of @e/ell and Simon, in /hich a lar"e collection of separate 1prod-ction r-les1 operate on a sym!olic store, or 1/orkin" memory.1 8ach prod-ction r-les specifies a step to !e carried o-t on the sym!ols in the store, and the overall architect-re determines /hich /ill !e carried o-t in /hat order. .he sym!ols do not stand for chemical spills and la/ !-t for hypothesi<ed psycholo"ical feat-res, s-ch as the sym!olic contents of shortAterm memory. )ndivid-al r-les do thin"s like movin" an element to the front of the memory or erasin" it. .he co"nitive modeler does not !-ild an overall model of the system4s performance on a task !-t desi"ns the individ-al r-les in the hope that appropriate !ehavior /ill emer"e from their interaction. Minsky makes e+plicit this ass-mption that intelli"ence /ill emer"e from comp-tational interactions amon" a plethora of small pieces. )4ll call 1Society of Mind1 this scheme in /hich eahc mind is made of many smaller processes. .hese /e4ll call a"ents. 8ach mental a"ent !y itself can only do some simple thin" that needs no mind or tho-"ht at all. Iet /hen /e 3oin these a"ents in societiesCin certain very special /aysCthis leads to tr-e intelli"ence.G1JH Minsky4s theory is '-ite different from @e/ell4s co"nitive architect-re. )n place of finely t-ned clock/orks of precise prod-ction r-les, /e find an impressionistic pastiche of metaphors. Minsky ill-strates his vie/ in a simple 1microA/orld1 of toy !locks, pop-lated !y a"ents s-ch as BUI#-ER D/hich stacks -p the !locksE, "-- D/hich adds a sin"le !lock to a stackE, and the like: (or e+ample, BUI#-ER 4s a"ents re'-ire no sense of meanin" to do their /ork: "-merely has to t-rn on .ET and $UT . .hen .ET and $UT do not need any s-!tle sense of /hat those t-rnAon si"nals 1mean1C!eca-se they4re /ired -p to do only /hat they4re /ired -p to do.G1LH .hese a"ents seem like simple comp-ter s-!ro-tinesCpro"ram fra"ments that perform a sin"le /ellA defined task. B-t a s-!se'-ent chapter descri!es an interaction !et/een the BUI#-ER a"ent and the ,RE!+ER a"ent, /hich are parts of a $#"Y;,ITH;B#O!+S a"ent: B &$0 B )nside an act-al child, the a"encies responsi!le for BUI#-IN. and ,RE!+IN. mi"ht indeed !ecome versatile eno-"h to ne"otiate !y offerin" s-pport for one another4s "oals. 1Please, ,RE!+ER9 /ait a moment more till BUI#-ER adds 3-st one more !lock: it4s /orth it for a lo-der crashT1G10H *ith a simple 1mi"ht indeed !ecome versatile,1 /e have slipped from a technically feasi!le !-t limited notion of a"ents as s-!ro-tines to an impressionistic description of a society of hom-nc-li, conversin" /ith one another in ordinary lan"-a"e. .his slei"ht of hand is at the center of the theory. )t takes an almost childish leap of faith to ass-me that the modes of e+planation that /ork for the details of !lock manip-lation /ill !e ade'-ate for -nderstandin" conflict, conscio-sness, "eni-s, and freedom of /ill. =ne cannot dismiss this as an isolated fantasy. Minsky is one of the ma3or fi"-res in artificial

intelli"ence, and he is only statin" in a simplistic form a vie/ that permeates the field. )n lookin" at the development of comp-ter technolo"y, one cannot help !-t !e str-ck !y the s-ccesses at red-cin" comple+ and varied tasks to systematic com!inations of elementary operations. *hy not, then, make the 3-mp of the mind. )f /e are no more than protoplasmA!ased physical sym!ol systems, the red-ction m-st !e possi!le, and only o-r c-rrent lack of kno/led"e prevents -s from e+plicatin" it in detail, all the /ay from BUI#-ER 4s clever ploy do/n to the lo"ical circ-itry.

+no3*ed(e "s a !ommodity

2ll the approaches descri!ed a!ove depend on interactions amon" lar"e n-m!ers of individ-al elements: r-les, prod-ctions, or a"ents. @o one of these elements can !e taken as reprresentin" a s-!stantial -nderstanda!le tr-th, !-t this does not matter since someho/ the con"lomeration /ill come o-t all ri"ht. B-t ho/ can /e have any confidence that it /illK the proposed ans/er is a typical one of o-r modern society: 1More is !etterT1 16no/led"e is po/er, and more kno/led"e is more po/er.1 2 /idely -sed e+pert systems te+t declares, )t /asn4t -ntil the late 190$s that 2) scientists !e"an to reali<e somethin" '-ite important: .he pro!lemAsolvin" po/er of a pro"ram comes from the kno/led"e it possesses, not 3-st from the formalisms and inference schemes it employs. .he conceptional !reakthro-"h /as made and can !e '-ite simply stated. To make a #rogram intelligent, #ro6ide it /ith lots of high!'uality, s#ecific kno/ledge a"out some #ro"lem areas.G1%H Gemphasis in ori"inalH .his statementis typical of m-ch /ritin" on e+pert systems, !oth in the parochial perspective than inflates a homily into a 1concept-al !reakA B &$% B thro-"h1 and in its -se of slo"ans like 1hi"hA'-ality kno/led"e.1 M)chie Dthe death of artificial intelli"ence in BritainE predicts, G8+pert systemsH . . . can act-ally help to codify and improve e+pert h-man kno/led"e, takin" /hat /as fra"mentary, inconsistent and errorAinfested and t-rnin" it into kno/led"e that is more precise, relia!le and comprehensive. .his ne/ process, /ith its enormo-s potential for the f-t-re, /e call 1kno/led"e refinin".1G19H (ei"en!a-m proclaims, .he miracle prod-ct is kno/led"e, and the Japanese are plannin" to packa"e and sell it the /ay other nations packa"e and sell ener"y, food, or man-fact-red "oods. . . . .he essence of the comp-ter revol-tion is that the !-rden of prod-cin" the f-t-re kno/led"e of the /orld /ill !e transferred from h-man heads to machine artifacts.G&$H 6no/led"e is a kind of commodityCto !e prod-ced, refined, and packa"ed. .he kno/led"e en"ineers are not concerned /ith the a"eAold epistemolo"ical pro!lems of /hat constit-tes kno/led"e or -nderstandin". .hey are hard at /ork on techni'-es of 1kno/led"e ac'-isition1 and see it as 3-st a matter of s-fficient money and effort: *e have the opport-nity at this moment to do a ne/ version of 5iderot4s -ncyclo#edia , a "atherin" -p of all kno/led"eCnot 3-st the academic kind, !-t the informal, e+periential, he-ristic kindCto !e f-sed, amplified, and distri!-ted, all at orders of ma"nit-de difference in cost, speed, vol-me, and usefulness over /hat /e have no/.G&1H Gemphasis in ori"inalH

;enat has em!arked on this task of 1encodGin"H all the /orld4s kno/led"e do/n to some level of detail.1 .he plan pro3ects an initial entry of a!o-t F$$ articles from a desk encyclopedia Dleadin" to 1$,$$$ para"raphs /orth of materialE, follo/ed !y hirin" a lar"e n-m!er of 1kno/led"e enterers1 to add 1the last 99 percent.1 .here is little concern that fo-ndational pro!lems mi"ht "et in the /ay. ;enat asserts that 12) has for many years -nderstood eno-"h a!o-t representation and inference to tackle this pro3ect, !-t no one has sat do/n and done it.1G&&H

The undamenta* $rob*ems

.he optimistic claims for artificial intelli"ence have far o-tstripped the achievements, !oth in the theoretical enterprise of co"nitive modelin" and in the practical application of e+pert systems. Co"nitive models seek e+perimental fit /ith meas-red h-man !ehavior, !-t the enterprise is fra-"ht /ith methodolo"ical diffic-lty, as it straddles the /ide chasm !et/een the en"ineerin" !ravado of comp-ter science and the caref-l empiricism of e+perimental psycholo"y. *hen a B &$9 B comp-ter pro"ram d-plicates to some de"ree some caref-lly restricted aspect of h-man !ehavior, /hat have /e learnedK )t is all too easy to /rite a pro"ram that /o-ld prod-ce that partic-lar !ehavior and all too hard to !-ild one that covers a s-fficiently "eneral ran"e to inspire confidence. 2s Pylyshyn Dan enth-siastic participant in co"nitive scienceE o!serves, Most c-rrent comp-tational models of co"nition are vastly -nderconstrained and ad hoc4 they are contrivances assem!led to mimic ar!itrary pieces of !ehavior, /ith ins-fficient concern for e+plicatin" the principles in virt-e of /hich s-ch !ehavior is e+hi!ited and /ith little re"ard for a precise -nderstandin".G&#H @e/ell and his collea"-es4 painstakin" attention to detailed architect-re of prod-ction systems is an attempt to !etter constrain the comp-tational model, in the hope that e+periments can then test detailed hypotheses. 2s /ith m-ch of e+perimental psycholo"y, a hi"hly artificial e+perimental sit-ation is re'-ired to "et res-lts that can !e sensi!ly interpreted at all. Proponents ar"-e that the methods and theoretical fo-ndations that are !ein" applied to micro!ehavior /ill event-ally !e e+tended and "enerali<ed to cover the f-ll ran"e of co"nitive phenomena. 2s /ith Minsky, this leap from the microstr-ct-re to the /hole h-man is one of faith. )n the case of e+pert systems, there is a more immediate concern. 2pplied 2) is /idely seen as a means of mana"in" processes that have "ro/n too comple+ or too rapid for -nassisted h-mans. Ma3or ind-strial and "overnmental or"ani<ations are mo-ntin" serio-s efforts to !-ild e+pert systems for tasks s-ch as air traffic control, n-clear po/er plant operation, and, most distressin"ly, the control of /eapons systems. .hese pro3ects are 3-stified /ith claims of "enerality and fle+i!ility for 2) pro"rams. .hey i"nore or do/nplay the diffic-lties that /ill make the pro"rams almost certain to fail in 3-st those cases /here their s-ccess is most critical. )t is a commonplace in the field to descri!e e+pert systems as 1!rittle1Ca!le to operate only /ithin a narro/ ran"e of sit-ations. .he pro!lem here is not 3-st one of ins-fficient en"ineerin" !-t is a direct conse'-ence of the nat-re of r-leA!ased systems. *e /ill e+amine three manifestations of the pro!lem: "aps of anticipation, !lindness of representation, and restriction of the domain.

.a6s of "nti0i6ation
)n creatin" a pro"ram or kno/led"e !ase, one takes into acco-nt as many factors and connections as feasi!le. B-t in any realistically comple+ domain, this "ives, at !est, a spotty covera"e. .he person desi"nin" a B &1$ B system for dealin" /ith acid spills may not consider the possi!ility of rain leakin" into the !-ildin", or of a po/er fail-re, or that a la!eled !ottle does not contain /hat it p-rports to. 2 h-man e+pert faced /ith a pro!lem in s-ch a circ-mstance falls !ack on common sense and a "eneral !ack"ro-nd of kno/led"e. .he hope of patch/ork rationalism is that /ith a s-fficiently lar"e !ody of r-les, the tho-"htAthro-"h spots /ill s-ccessf-lly interpolate to the /astelands in !et/een. ,avin" /ritten 7-le 2 /ith one circ-mstance in mind and 7-le B /ith another, the t/o r-les in com!ination /ill s-cceed in yet a third. .his strate"y is the 3-stification for the claim that 2) systems are more fle+i!le than conventional pro"rams. .here is a "rain of tr-th in the comparison, !-t it is deceptive. .he pro"ram applies the r-les !lindly /ith erratic res-lts. )n many cases, the price of fle+i!ility Dthe a!ility to operate in com!inations of contin"encies not considered !y the pro"rammerE is irrepara!le and inscr-ta!le fail-re. )n attemptin" to overcome this !rittleness, e+pert systems are !-ilt /ith many tho-sands of r-les, tryin" to cover all of the relevant sit-ations and to provide representations for all potentially relevant aspects of conte+t. =ne system for medical dia"nosis, called !"-U!EUS Dori"inally INTERNIST E, has J$$ disease profiles, #J$ disease variations, several tho-sand symptoms, and L,J$$ r-les descri!in" relations amon" symptoms. 2fter fifteen years of development, the system is still not on the market. 2ccordin" to one report, it "ave a correct dia"nosis in only 0J percent of its caref-lly selected test cases. @evertheless, Myers, the medical e+pert /ho developed it, 1!elieves that the addition of another J$ GdiseasesH /ill make the system /orka!le and, more importantly, practical.1G&FH ,-man e+perts develop their skills thro-"h o!servin" and actin" in many tho-sands of cases. 2) researchers ar"-e that this res-lts in their remem!erin" a h-"e repertoire of speciali<ed 1patterns1 Dcomple+ sym!olic r-lesE that allo/ them to discriminate sit-ations /ith e+pert finesse and to reco"ni<e appropriate actions. B-t it is far from o!vio-s /hether the res-lt of e+perience can !e ade'-ately formali<ed as a repertoire of discrete patterns.G&JH .o say that 1all of the /orld4s kno/led"e1 co-ld !e e+plicitly artic-lated in any sym!olic form Dcomp-tational or notE, /e m-st ass-me the possi!ility of red-cin" all forms of tacit kno/led"e Dskills, int-ition, etcE. to e+plicit facts and r-les. ,eide""er and other phenomenolo"ists have challen"ed this, and many of the stron"est criticisms of artificial intelli"ence are !ased on the phenomenolo"ical analysis of h-man -nderstandin" as a 1readinessAtoAhand1 of action in the /orld, rather than as the manip-lation of 1presentAtoAhand1 representations.G&LH Be that as it may, it is clear that the correspondin" task in !-ildin" e+pert systems is e+tremely diffic-lt, if not theoretically impossi!le. .he kno/led"e en"ineer attempts to provide the pro"ram /ith r-les that B &11 B correspond to the e+pert4s e+perienct. .he r-les are modified thro-"h analy<in" e+amples in /hich the ori"inal r-les !reak do/n. B-t the patch/ork nat-re of the r-les makes this e+tremely diffic-lt. (ail-re in a partic-lar case may not !e attri!-tah!le to a partic-lar r-le !-t rather to a chance com!ination of

r-les that are in other circ-mstances '-ite -sef-l. .he !reakdo/n may not even provide sharp criteria for kno/in" /hat to chan"e, as /ith a chess pro"ram that is 3-st failin" to come -p /ith "ood moves. .he pro!lem here is not simply one of scale or comp-tational comple+ity. Comp-ters are perfectly capa!le of operatin" on millions of elements. .he pro!lem is one of h-man -nderstandin"Cthe a!ility of a person to -nderstand ho/ a ne/ sit-ation e+perienced in the /orld is related to an e+istin" set of representations and to possi!le modifications of those representations. )n tryin" to remove the potentially -nrelia!le 1h-man element,1 e+pert systems conceal it. .he po/er plant /ill no lon"er fail !eca-se a reactor operator falls asleep !-t !ecca-se a kno/led"e en"ineer did not think of p-ttin" in a r-le specifyin" ho/ to handle a partic-lar fail-re /hen the emer"ency system is -nder"oin" its periodic test and the !ack-p system is -ot of order. @o amo-nt of refinement and artic-lation can "-arantee the a!sence of s-ch !reakdo/ns. .he hope that a system !ased on patch/ork rationalism /ill respond 1appropriately1 in s-ch cases is 3-st thatCa hope, and one that can en"ender dan"ero-s ill-sions of safety and sec-rity.

The B*indness of Re6resentation

.he second pro!lem lies in the sym!ol system hypothesis itself. .o characteri<e a sit-ation in sym!olic form, one -ses a system of !asic distinctions, or terms. 7-les deal /ith the interrelations amon" the terms, not /ith their interpretations in the /orld. Consider ordinary /ords as an analo"y. )ma"ine that a doctor asks a n-rse, 1)s the patient eatin"K1 )f they are decidin" /hether to perform an e+amination, the re'-est mi"ht !e paraphrased, 1is she eatin" at this momentK1 )f the patient is in the hospital for anore+ia and the doctor is checkin" the efficacy of the treatment, it mi"ht !e more like, 1,as the patient eaten some minimal amo-nt in the past dayK1 )f the patient has recently -nder"one s-r"ery, it mi"ht mean, 1,as the patient taken any n-trition !y mo-thK1 and so on. )n respondin", a person interprets the sentence as havin" relevance in the c-rrent sit-ation and /ill typically respond appropriately /itho-t conscio-s choosin" amon" meanin". .o !-ild a s-ccessf-l sym!ol system, deconte+t-ali<ed meanin" is necessary: terms m-st !e stripped of openAended am!i"-ities and shadin"s. 2 medical e+pert system mi"ht have a r-le of the form, 1I E"TIN. D5 E . . .,1 /hich is to !e applied only if the patient is eatin", alon" /ith B &1& B others of the form 1I . . . THEN E"TIN. D5 E,1 /hich determine /hen that condition holds. Unless everyone /ho /rites or reads a r-le interprets the primitive term 18atin"1 in the same /ay, the r-les have no consistent interpretation and the res-lts are -npredicta!le. )n response to this, one can try to refine the voca!-lary. 1C-rrently 5inin"1 and 1.akin" Solids1 co-ld replace the more "eneric term, or /e co-ld add constr-al r-les, s-ch as, 1in a conte+t of immediate action, take 48atin"4 to mean 4C-rrently 5inin".41 S-ch approaches /ork for the cases that pro"rammers anticipate !-t of co-rse are s-!3ect to the infinite re"ress of tryin" to deconte+t-ali<e conte+t. .he ne/ terms or r-les themselves depend on nterpretation that is not represented in the system.

Restri0tion of the -omain

2 conse'-ence of deconte+t-ali<ed representation is the diffic-lty of creatin" 2) pro"rams in any !-t the most caref-lly restricted domains, /here almost all of the kno/led"e re'-ired to perform the task is special to that domain Di.e., little commonsense kno/led"e is re'-iredE. =ne can find speciali<ed tasks for /hich appropriate limitations can !e achieved, !-t these do not incl-de the ma3ority of /ork in

commerce, medicine, la/, or the other professions demandin" e+pertise. ,olt characteri<ed the sit-ation as follo/s: 2 !rilliant chess move /hile the room is fillin" /ith smoke !eca-se the ho-se is !-rnin" do/n does not sho/ intelli"ence. )f the capacity for !rilliant chess moves /itho-t re"ard to life circ-mstances deserves a name, ) /o-ld nat-rally call it 1artificial intelli"ence.1G&0H .he !rilliance of a move is /ith respect to a /ellAdefined domain: the r-les of chess. B-t actin" as an e+pert doctor, attorney, or en"ineer takes the other kind of intelli"ence: kno/in" /hat makes sense in a sit-ation. .he most s-ccessf-l artificial intelli"ence pro"rams have operated in the detached p-<<lelike domains of !oard "ames and technical analysis, not those demandin" -nderstandin" of h-man lives, motivations, and social interaction. 2ttempts to cross into these diffic-lt territories, s-ch as a pro"ram said to 1-nderstand tales involvin" friendship and ad-ltery,1G&%H proceed !y replacin" the real sit-ation /ith a cartoonlike caricat-re, "overned !y simplistic r-les /hose inade'-acy is immediately o!vio-s Deven to the creators, /ho ar"-e that they simply need f-rther ela!orationE. .his reform-lation of a domain to a narro/er, more precise one can lead to systems that "ive correct ans/ers to irrelevant pro!lems. .his is of concern not only /hen actions are !ased directly o nthe o-tp-t of the comp-ter system Das in one controllin" /eapons systemsE !-t also /hen, for e+ample, medical e+pert systems are -sed to eval-ate the /ork of physicians.G&9H Since the system is !ased on a red-ced representation of B &1# B the sit-ation, it systematically Dif invisi!lyE val-es some aspects of care /hile remainin" !lind to others. 5octors /hose salaries, promotions, or accreditation depend on the revie/ of their actions !y s-ch a pro"ram /ill find their practice !ein" s-!tly shaped to its mold. .he attempt to encode 1the /orld4s kno/led"e1 inevita!ly leads to this kind of simplification. 8very e+plicit representation of kno/led"e !ears /ithin it a !ack"ro-nd of c-lt-ral orientation that does not appear as e+plicit claims !-t is manifest in the very terms in /hich the 1facts1 are e+pressed and i the 3-d"ment of /hat constit-tes a fact. 2n encyclopedia is not a compendi-m of 1refined kno/led"e1 !-t a statement /ithin a tradition and a c-lt-re. By callin" an electronic encyclopedia a 1kno/led"e !ase,1 /e mystify its so-rce and its "ro-ndin" in a tradition and !ack"ro-nd.

The Bureau0ra0y of Mind

Many o!servers have noted the nat-ral affinity !et/een comp-ters and !-rea-cracy. ;ee ar"-es that 1!-rea-cracies are the most -!i'-ito-s form of artificial intelli"ence. . . . J-st as scientific mana"ement fo-nd its ideali<ation in a-tomation and pro"ramma!le prod-ction ro!ots, one mi"ht consider an artificially intelli"ent kno/led"eA!ased system as the ideal !-rea-crat.1G#$H ;ee4s stated "oal is 1improved !-rea-cratic soft/are en"ineerin",1 !-t his analo"y s-""este more. Stated simply, the techni'ues of artificial intelligence are to the mind /hat "ureaucracy is to human social interaction . )n today4s pop-lar disc-ssion, !-rea-cracy is seen as an evilCa patholo"y of lar"e or"ani<ations and repressive "overnments. B-t in his classic /ork on !-rea-cracy, *e!er ar"-ed its "reat advanta"es over earlier, less formali<ed systems, callin" it the 1-nam!i"-o-s yardstick for the moderni<ation of the state.1 ,e notes that 1!-rea-cracy has a 4rational4 character, /ith r-les, meansAends calc-l-s, and matterAofAfactness predominatin"1G#1H and that it s-cceeds in 1eliminatin" from official !-siness love,

hatred, and all p-rely personal, irrational, and emotional elements /hich escape calc-lation.1G#&H .he decisive reason for the advance of !-rea-cratic or"ani<ation has al/ays !een its p-rely technical s-periority over any other form of or"ani<ation. .he f-lly developed !-rea-cratic apparat-s compares /ith other or"ani<ations e+actly as does the machine /ith the nonA mechanical modes of prod-ction. Precision, speed, -nam!i"-ity, kno/led"e of the files, contin-ity, discretion, -nity, strict s-!ordination, red-ction of friction and of material and personal costsCthese are raised to the optim-m point in the strictly !-rea-cratic administration.G##H Gemphasis in ori"inalH B &1F B .he !enefits of !-rea-cracy follo/ from the red-ctio of 3-d"ment to the systematic application of e+plicitly artic-lated r-les. B-rea-cracy achieves a predicta!ility and mana"ea!ility that is missin" in earlier forms of or"ani<ation. .here are strikin" similarities here /ith the ar"-ments "iven for the !enefits of e+pert systems and e'-ally strikin" analo"ies /ith the shortcomin"s as pointed o-t, for e+ample, !y March and Simon: .he red-ction in personali<ed relationships, the increased internali<ation of r-les, and the decreased search for alternatives com!ine to make the !ehavior of mem!ers of the or"ani<ation hi"hly predicta!le: i.e., the res-lt in an increase in the rigidity of "eha6ior of participants G/hichH increases the amount of difficulty /ith clients of the or"ani<ation and complicates the achievement of client satisfaction.G#FH Gemphasis in ori"inalH 9iven Simon4s role in artificial intelli"ence, it is ironic that he notes these /eaknesses of h-manA em!odied r-le systems !-t sees the !ehavior of r-leA!ased physical sym!ol systems as 1adaptive to the demands of the environment.1 )ndeed, systems !ased on sym!ol manip-lation e+hi!it the ri"idities of !-rea-cracies and are most pro!lematic in dealin" /ith 1client satisfaction1Cthe mismatch !et/een the deconte+t-ali<ed application of r-les and the h-man interpretation of the sym!ols that appear in them. B-rea-cracy is most s-ccessf-l in a /orld that is sta!le and repetitive, /here the r-les can !e follo/ed /itho-t interpretive 3-d"ments. 8+pert systems are !est in 3-st the same sit-ations. .heir s-ccesses have !een in sta!le and precise technical areas, /here e+ceptions are not the r-le. Michie4s claim that e+pert systems can encode 1the r-les of th-m!, the h-nches, the int-ition and capacity for 3-d"ment1 is /ron" in the same /ay that it is /ron" to seek a f-ll acco-nt of an or"ani<ation in its formal r-les and proced-res. Modern sociolo"ists have "one !eyond *e!er4s analysis, pointin" to the informal or"ani<ation and tacit kno/led"e in individ-al e+pertise. *itho-t it, /e "et ri"idity and occasional !-t irrepara!le fail-re. .he depersonali<ation of kno/led"e in e+pert systems also has o!vio-s parallels /ith !-rea-cracy. *hen a person vie/s his or her 3o! as the correct application of a set of r-les D/hether h-man invoked or comp-ter !asedE, there is a loss of personal responsi!ility or commitment. .he 1) 3-st follo/ the r-les1 of the !-rea-cratic clerk has its direct analo"-e in 1.hat4s /hat the kno/led"e !ase says.1 .he individ-al is not committed to appropriate res-lts Das 3-d"ed in some lar"er h-man conte+tE !-t to faithf-l application of the proced-res. .his for"etf-lness of individ-al commitment is perhaps the most s-!tle and dan"ero-s conse'-ence of patch/ork rationality. .he person B &1J B

/ho p-ts r-les into a kno/led"e !ase cannot !e committed to the conse'-ences of applyin" them in a sit-ation he or she cannot foresee. .he person /ho applies them cannot !e committed to their form-lation or to the mechanics !y /hich they prod-ce an ans/er. .he res-lt !elon"s to no one. *hen /e speak here of 1commitment,1 /e mean somethin" more "eneral than the kind of acco-nta!ility that is ar"-ed in co-rt. .here is a deep sense in /hich every -se of lan"-a"e is a reflection of commitment, as /e /ill see !elo/.

"*ternati)es
*e !e"an /ith the '-estion of thinkin" machinesCdevices that mechanically reprod-ce h-man capacities of tho-"ht and lan"-a"e. *e have seen ho/ this '-estion has !een reform-lated in the p-rs-it of artificial intelli"ence, to reflect a partic-lar desi"n !ased on patch/ork rationalism. *e have ar"-ed taht the c-rrent direction /ill !e inade'-ate to e+plain or constr-ct real intelli"ence. B-t, one mi"ht ask, does that mean that no machine co-ld e+hi!it intelli"enceK )s artificial intelli"ence inherently impossi!le, or is it 3-st fiendishl diffic-ltK .o ans/er sensi!ly, /e m-st first ask /hat /e mean !y 1machine.1 .here is a simple a priori prof that machines can !e intelli"ent if /e accept that o-r o/n !rains are Din Minsky4s provocative /ordsE nothin" !-t 1meat machines.1 )f /e take 1machine1 to stand for any physically constit-ted device s-!3ect to the ca-sal la/s of nat-re, then the '-estion red-ces to one of materialism and is not to !e resolved thro-"h comp-ter research. )f, ho/ever, /e take machine to mean 1physical sym!ol system,1 then there is "ro-nd for a stron" skepticism. this skepticism has !ecome visi!le amon" practitioners of artificial intelli"e nce as /ell as the critics.

Emer(ent Inte**i(en0e
.he innovative ideas of cy!ernetics a fe/ decades a"o led to t/o contrastin" research pro"rams. =ne, /hich /e have e+amined here, took the co-rse of sym!ol processin". .he other /as !ased on modelin" ne-ral activity and led to the /ork on 1perceptrons1 a research line that /as disco-nted for many years as fr-itless and is no/ !ein" reha!ilitated in 1connectionist1 theories, !ased on 1massively parallel distri!-ted processin".1 )n this /ork, each comp-tin" element Danalo"o-s to a ne-ronE operates on simple "eneral principles, and intelli"ence emer"es from the evolvin" patterns of interaction.G#JH Connectionism is one manifestation of /hat .-rkle calls 1emer"ent 2).1G#LH .he f-ndamental int-ition "-idin" this /ork is that co"nitive str-ct-re in or"anisms emer"es thro-"h learnin" and e+perience, not thro-"h B &1L B e+plicit representation and pro"rammin". .he pro!lems of !lindness and domain limitation descri!ed a!ove need not apply to a system that has developed thro-"h sit-ated e+perience. )t is not yet clear /hether /e /ill see a t-rn !ack to/ard the herita"e of cy!ernetics or simply a 1massively parallel1 variant of c-rrent co"nitive theory and sym!olAprocessin" desi"n. 2ltho-"h the ne/ connectionism may !rethe ne/ life into co"nitive modelin" research, it s-ffers an -neasy !alance !et/een sym!olic and physiolo"ical description. )ts spirit harks !ack to the cy!ernetic concern /ith real !iolo"ical systems, !-t the detailed models typically ass-me a simplistic representational !ase m-ch closer to traditional artificial intelli"ence. Connectionism, like its parent co"nitive theory, m-st !e placed in the cate"ory of !rash -nproved hypotheses, /hich have not really !e"-n to deal /ith the comple+ities of mind and /hose c-rrent e+planatory po/er is e+tremely limited. )n one of the earliest criti'-es of artificial intelli"ence. 5reyf-s compared it to alchemy.G#0H Seekers

after the "litter of intelli"ence are mis"-ided intryin" to cast it from the !ase metal of comp-tin"..here is an am-sin" epilo"-e to this analo"y: in fact, the alchemists /ere ri"ht. ;ead can !e converted into "old !y a particle accelerator h-rlin" appropriate !eams at lead tar"ets. .he 2) visionaries may !e ri"ht in the same /ay, and they are likely to !e /ron" in the same /ay. .here is no reason !-t h-r!ris to !elieve that /e are any closer to -nderstandin" intelli"ence than the alchemists /ere to the secrets of n-clear physics. .he a!ility to create a "listenin" sim-lacr-m sho-ld not fool -s into thinkin" the rest is 13-st a matter of encodin" a s-fficient part of the /orld4s kno/led"e1 or into a '-est for the philosopher4s stone of 1massively parallel processin".1

Hermeneuti0 !onstru0ti)ism
5isc-ssions of the pro!lems and dan"ers of comp-ters often leave the impression that on the /hole /e /o-ld !e !etter off if /e co-ld ret-rn to the precomp-ter era. )n a similar vein, one mi"ht decry the advent of /ritten lan"-a"e, /hich created many ne/ pro!lems. (or e+ample, *e!er attri!-tes the emer"ence of !-rea-cracy to the spread of /ritin" and literacy, /hich made it possi!le to create and maintain systems of r-les. )ndeed, the /ritten /ord made !-reac-racy possi!le, !-t that is far from a f-ll acco-nt of its relevance to h-man society. .he comp-ter is a physical em!odiment of the sym!olic calc-lations envisa"ed !y ,o!!es and ;ei!ni<. 2s s-ch, it is really not a thinkin" machine, !-t a language machine . .he very notion of 1sym!ol system1 is inherently lin"-istic, and /hat /e d-plicate in o-r pro"rams /ith their r-les and propositions is really a form of ver!al ar"-ment, not the /orkin"s of mind. )t is temptin"C!-t -ltimately misleadin"Cto pro3ect the B &10 B ima"e of rational disco-rse Dand its reflection in conscio-s introspectionE onto the desisn of em!odied intelli"ence. )n takin" inner disco-rse as a model for the activity of Minsky4s tiny a"ents, or of prod-ctions that determine /hat token to process ne+t, artificial intelli"ence has operated /ith the faith that mind is lin"-istic do/n to the microscopic level. B-t the -tility of the technolo"y need not depend on this faith. .he comp-ter, like /ritin", is f-ndamentally a comm-nication medi-m, one that is -ni'-e in its a!ility to perform comple+ manip-lations on the lin"-istic o!3ects it stores and transmits. *e can reinterpret the technolo"y of artificial intelli"ence in a ne/ !ack"ro-nd, /ith ne/ conse'-ences. )n doin" so, /e dra/ on an alternative philosophical "ro-ndin", /hich ) /ill call 1hermene-tic constr-ctivism.1 *e !e"in /ith some f-ndamental '-estions a!o-t /hat lan"-a"e is and ho/ it /orks. )n this, /e dra/ on /ork in hermene-tics Dthe st-dy of interpretationE and phenomenolo"y, as developed !y ,eide""er and 9adamer, alon" /ith the concepts of lan"-a"e action developed from the later /orks of *itt"enstein thro-"h the speech act philosophy of 2-stin, Searle, and ,a!ermas.G#%H ./o "-idin" principles emer"e: D1E #eo#le create their /orld through language4 and D&E language is al/ays inter#reted in a tacitly understood "ackground . 2-stin pointed o-t that 1performative1 sentences do not convey information a!o-t the /orld !-t act to chan"e that /orld. 1yo-4re hired,1 /hen -ttered in appropriate conditions, createsCnot descri!esCa sit-ation of employment. Searle applied this insi"ht to do somethin". ,a!ermas e+tended it f-rther, sho/in" ho/ sentences /e /o-ld naively consider statements of fact have force !y virt-e of an act of commitment !y the speaker. .he essential pres-pposition for the s-ccess of Ga lan"-a"eH act consists in the speaker4s

enterin" into a specific en"a"ement, so that the hearer can rely on him. 2n -tterance can co-nt as a promise, assertion, re'-est, '-estion, or avo/al, if and only if the speaker makes an offer that he is ready to make "ood insofar as it is accepted !y the hearer. .he speaker m-st en"a"e himself, that is, indicate that in certain sit-ations he /ill dra/ certain conse'-ences for action.G#9H 5escartes4s descendants in the rationalistic tradition take the lan"-a"e of mathematics as their ideal. .erms are either primitive or can !e f-lly defined: the "rammar is -nam!i"-o-s: and precise tr-th conditions can !e esta!lished thro-"h formal techni'-es. B-t even in apparently simple and strai"htfo/ard sit-ations, h-man lan"-a"e is metaphorical, am!i"-o-s, and -ndefina!le. *hat /e can take as f-ndamental is the en"a"ementCthe commitment to make "ood /hat cannot !e f-lly made precise. B &1% B .his "ro-ndin" is especially evident for statements of the kind that 7os<ak characteri<es as 1ideas1 rather than 1information.1GF$H 12ll men are created e'-al1 cannot !e 3-d"ed as a tr-e or false description of the o!3ective /orld. )ts force resides in the commitments it carries for f-rther characteri<ation and f-rther action. B-t it is critical to reco"ni<e that this social "ro-ndin" of lan"-a"e applies e'-ally to the m-ndane statements of everyday life. 1.he patient is eatin"1 cannot !e held -p to any specific set of tr-th conditions across sit-ations in /hich it may !e -ttered. .he speaker is not reportin" an o!3ectively delineated state of affairs !-t indicatin" the 1en"a"ement1 to enter sincerely into a dialo"-e of artic-lation of the relevant !ack"ro-nd. .his -navoida!le dependence of interpretation on -nspoken !ack"ro-nd is the f-ndamental insi"ht of the heremen-tic phenomenolo"ists, s-ch as 9adamer. )t applies not 3-st to ordinary lan"-a"e !-t to every sym!olic representation as /ell. *e all reco"ni<e that in 1red-cin" thin"s to n-m!ers,1 /e lose the potential for interpretation in a !ack"ro-nd. B-t this is e'-ally tr-e of 1red-cin" tem to sym!ol str-ct-res.1 *henever a comp-ter pro"ram is intended to "-ide or take action in a h-man domain, it inevita!ly imports !asic val-es and ass-mptions. .he !asic nat-re of patch/ork rationalism o!sc-res the -nderlyin" constit-tive 1ideas1 /ith a mosaic of fra"mentary !its of 1information.1 .he social and political a"enda concealed !ehind these patches of deconte+t-ali<ed and depersonali<ed !elief is dan"ero-s in its invisi!ility.

#an(ua(e Ma0hines
Sym!ol str-ct-res are -ltimately created !y people and intepreted !y people. .he comp-ter, as lan"-a"e machine, manip-lates sym!ols /itho-t respect to their interpretation. .o the e+tent that relations amon" the meanin"s can !e ade'-ately reflected in precise r-les, .he comp-tational manip-lations make sense. .he error is in ass-min" that thes manip-lations capt-re, rather than a-"ment or reify, parts of the meanin". )f an e+pert system prints o-t 19ive the patient penicillin1 or 1fire the missiles no/,1 room for interpretation is limited and meanin" is lost. B-t instead, /e can see the comp-ter as a /ay of or"ani<in", a searchin", and manip-latin" te+ts that are created !y people, in a conte+t, and -ltimately intended for h-man interpretation. *e are already !e"innin" to see a movement a/ay from the arly vision of comp-ters replacin" h-man e+perts. (or e+ample, the medical dia"nostic system descri!ed a!ove is !ein" converted from 1)nternist1 Da doctor speciali<in" in internal medicineE to an 1advisory system1 called 1OM71 DO-ick Medical 7eferenceE.GF1H .he r-les can !e tho-"ht of as constit-tin" an a-tomated te+t!ok, /hich can

access and lo"ically com!ine entries that are relevant to a partic-lar case. .he "oal is to s-""est B &19 B and 3-stify possi!ilities a doctor mi"ht not other/ise have considered. .he pro"ram need not respond /ith an eval-ation or plan for action !-t is s-ccessf-l thro-"h providin" relevant material for interpretation !y an e+pert. Similarly, in areas of realAtime control Dlike a n-clear po/er plantE, an advisory system can monitor conditions and provide /arnin"s, reports, and s-mmaries for h-man revie/. )n a similar vein, an interactive comp-terA!ased encyclopedia need not cover all of h-man kno/led"e or provide "eneral p-rpose ded-ction in order to take advanta"e of the o!vio-s comp-ter capacities of speed, vol-me, and sophisticated inferential inde+in". 2nother opport-nity for desi"n is in the re"-larities of the str-ct-re of lan"-a"e -se. 2s a simple e+ample, a re'-est is normally follo/ed in coherent conversation !y an acceptance, a re3ection, or a re'-est to modify the conditions. .hese, in t-rn, ar efollo/ed !y other lan"-a"e acts in a lo"ic of 1conversation for action1 oriented to/ard completion Da state in /hich neither party is a/aitin" f-rther action !y the otherE. .he theory of s-ch conversations has !een developed as the !asis for a comp-ter pro"ram called .he coordinator, /hich is -sed for facilitatin" and or"ani<in" comp-terAmessa"e conversations in an or"ani<ation.GF&H )t emphasi<es the role of commitment !y the speaker in each speech act and provides the !asis for timely and effective action. ,o/ard has st-died the -se of comp-ter systems !y professionals eval-atin" loan applications for the *orld Bank. ,e ar"-es taht their -se of comp-ters /hile on field missions increases the 1transpoarency1 of their decisionAmakin" process, hence increasin" their acco-nta!ility and enhancin" opport-nities for meanin"f-l ne"otiation. .he comp-ter serves as a medi-m of disco-rse in /hich different commitments and their conse'-ences can !e 3ointly e+plored. 2s a res-lt, the dialo"-e !et/een them Gthe !ankers and their clientsH s-ddenly !ecomes less a!o-t the final res-ltsC1the n-m!ers1Cand more a!o-t the ass-mptions !ehind the n-m!ers, the criteria on /hich decisions are themselves !ased. . . . G'-otin"a !ank professionalH 1)nstead of 3-st sayin", 4) don4t !elieve yo-, my opinion is R,4 /e e+plore it. *e say, 4let4s see /hat the conse'-ences of that are.4 2nd, sometimes, /e end -p chan"in" o-r ass-mptions.1GF#H C-rrent e+pert systems methodolo"ies are not /ell s-ited to this kind of dialo"-e. .hey separate the constr-ction of the kno/led"e !ase from the -se of its 1e+pertise.1 .he e+perts D/ith the help of kno/led"e en"ineersE enter the kno/led"e in the la!oratory, and the -sers apply it in the field to "et res-lts. B-t /e mi"ht instead -se the comp-ter to s-pport the disco-rse that creates the realityCas a tool for the cooeprative artic-lation of the characteri<ations and r-les that /ill !e applied. 7ather than B &&$ B seein" the comp-ter as /orkin" /ith o!3ectified refined kno/led"e, it can serve as a /ay of keepin" track of ho/ the representations emer"e from interpretations: /ho created them in /hat conte+t and /here to look for clarification.

!on0*usion
.he '-estion of o-r title demands interpretation in a conte+t. 2s developed in this essay, it mi"ht !e form-lated more precisely, 12re /e machines of the kind that researchers are !-ildin" as 4thinkin"

machines4K1 )n askin" this kind of '-estion, /e en"a"e in a kind of pro3ectionC-nderstandin" h-manity !y pro3ectin" an ima"e of o-rselves onto the machine and the iam"e of the machine !ack onto o-rselves. )n the tradition of artificial intelli"ence, /e pro3ect an ima"e of o-r lan"-a"e activity onto the sym!olic manip-lations of the machine, then pro3ect that !ack onto the f-ll h-man mind. B-t these pro3ections are like the "eometric pro3ection of a threeAdimensional /orld onto a t/oA dimensional plane. *e systematically eliminate dimensions, there!y !oth simplifyin" and distortin". .he partic-lar dimensions /e eliminate or preserve in this e+ercise are not idiosyncratic accidents. .hey reflect a philosophy that precedes them and that they serve to amplify and e+tend. )n pro3ectin" lan"-a"e as a r-leA"overned manip-lation of sym!ols, /e all too easily dismiss the concerns of h-man meanin" that make -p the h-manities and indeed of any socially "ro-nded -nderstandin" of h-man lan"-a"e and action. )n pro3ectin" lan"-a"e !ack as the model for tho-"ht, /e lose si"ht of the tacit em!odied -nderstandin" that -nder"irds o-r intelli"ence. .hro-"h a !roader -nderstandin", /e can recapt-re o-r vie/ of these lost dimensions and in the process !etter -nderstand !oth o-rselves and o-r machines.

Referen0es
2thanasio-, .om. 1,i"hAtech Politics: .he Case of 2rtificial )ntelli"ence,1 Socialist 1e6ie/ D19%0E: 0A #J. 2-stin, J. ;. Ho/ to Do Things /ith %ords. Cam!rid"e: ,arvard University Press, 19L&. Bo!ro/, 5aniel, ed. Special )ss-e on @onmonotonic ;o"ic, Artificial &ntelligence 1#:1 DJan-ary 19%$E. Cl-! of 7ome, The 3imits to *ro/th . @e/ Iork: Universe !ooks, 190&. 5avis, Philip J., and 7e-!en ,ersh. Descartes, Dream: The %orld According to Mathematics . San 5ie"o: ,arco-rt Brace Jovanovich, 19%L. 5reyf-s, ,-!ert. 12lchemy and 27tificial )ntelli"ence,1 7and Corporation Paper, 5ecem!er 19LJ, #&FF. CCC. %hat Com#uters Can,t Do: A Criti'ue of Artificial 1eason. @e/ Iork: ,arper and 7o/, 190& D&d ed. /ith ne/ preface, 1909E. CCC. 1Makin" a Mind vers-s Modelin" the Brain: 2rtificial )ntelli"ence Back at a Branchpoint1 Daedalus 110:1 D*inter 19%%E: 1FAFF. 5reyf-s, ,-!ert ;., and St-art 8. 5reyf-s. Mind +6er Machine: The (o/er of Human &ntuition and -.#ertise in the -ra of the Com#uter. @e/ Iork: Macmillan .he (ree Press, 19%J. (ei"en!a-m, 8d/ard 2., and Pamela McCord-ck. The 0ifth *eneration: Artificial &ntellignece and Ja#an,s Com#uter Challenge to the %orld. 7eadin", Mass.: 2ddisonA*esley, 19%#. (lores, C. (ernando. 1Mana"ement and Comm-nication in the =ffice of the (-t-re,1 Ph.5. dissertation, University of California, Bereley, 19%&. 9ardner, ,o/ard. The Mind,s $e/ Science: A History of the Cogniti6e 1esolution. @e/ Iork: Basic Books, 19%J. ,a!ermas, J1-r"en. Communication and the -6olution of Society , trans. .homas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1909. ,a-"eland, John. Mind Design. Cam!rid"e: Bradford M). Press, 19%1. CCC. Artifical &ntelligence: The :ery &dea. Cam!rid"e: Bradford M). Press, 19%J.

,olt, 2natol. 17emarks Made at 27P2 Principal )nvesti"ators4 Conference,1 ;os 2n"eles, (e!r-ary LA %, 190F D-np-!l. ms.E. ,o/ard, 7o!ert. 1Systems 5esi"n and Social responsi!ility: .he Political )mplications of 4Comp-terA S-pported Cooperative *ork,41 address delivered at the (irst 2nn-al Conference on Comp-terA S-pported Cooperative *ork, 2-stin, .e+as, 5ecem!er 19%L. B &&# B ;aird, John, Pa-l 7osen!loom, and 2llen @e/ell. 9ni6ersal Su"goaling and Chunking: The Automatic *eneration and 3earning of *oal Hierarchies. ,in"ham, Mass.: 6l-mer, 19%L. ;ee, 7onald M. 1B-rea-cracy as 2rtifical )ntelli"ence,1 in ;. B. Methlie and 7. ,. Spra"-e, eds., =no/ledge 1e#resentation for Decision Su##ort Systems . @e/ Iork: 8lsevier D@orthA,ollandE, 19%J. 1&JA1#&. CCC. 12-tomatin" 7ed .ape: .he Performative vs. )nformation 7olse of B-rea-cratic 5oc-ments,1 +ffice: Technology and (eo#le & D19%FE: 1%0A&$F. ;enat, 5o-"las. 1CIC: Usin" Common Sense 6no/led"e to =vercome Brittleness and 6no/led"e 2c'-isition Bottlenecks,1 A& Maga)ine L:F D19%LE: LJA%J. March, James 9., and ,er!ert 2. Simon. +rgani)ations. @e/ Iork: *iley, 19J%. Mat-rana, ,-m!erto 7., and (rancisco >arela. The Tree of =no/ledge. Boston: @e/ Science ;i!rary, 19%0. Michie, 5onald, and 7ory Johnston. The Creati6e Com#uter. @e/ Iork: >ikin", 19%F. Minsky, Marvin. The Society of Mind. @e/ Iork: Simon and Sch-ster, 19%L. @e/ell, 2llen. 1.he 6no/led"e ;evel,1 Artificial &ntelligence 1% D19%&E: %0A1&0. @e/ell, 2llen, and ,er!ert Simon. 1Comp-ter Science as 8mpirical )n'-iry: Sym!ols and Search,1 Communications of the ACM 19 DMarch 190LE: 11#A1&L. 7eprinted in J. ,a-"eland, ed., Mind Design , #JALL. CCC. Human (ro"lem Sol6ing. 8n"le/ood Cliffs, @.J.: PrenticeA,all, 190&. @e/'-ist, ,arvey P., ))). 1.he Machinery of Medical 5ia"nosis,1 Ai -.#ert &:J DMay 19%0E: L9A01. Pylyshyn, Senon. Com#utation and Cognition: To/ard a 0oundation for Cogniti6e Science. Cam!rid"e: Bradford M). Press, 19%F. 7os<ak, .heodore. The Cult of &nformation: The 0olklore of Com#uters and the True Art of Thinking. @e/ Iork: Pantheon, 19%L. 7-melhart, 5avid, and James Mac;elland. (arallel Distri"uted (rocessing: -.#lorations in the Microstructures of Cognition. & vols. Cam!rid"e: Bradford M). Press, 19%L. 7-ssell, Bertrand. A History of %estern (hiloso#hy. @e/ Iork: Simon and Sch-ster, 19J&. Simon, ,er!ert. Models of Thought. @e/ ,aven: Iale University Press, 1909. .-rkle, Sherry. 17omantic 7eactions: Parado+ical 7esponses to the Comp-ter Presence,1 chap. 11, this vol-me. *aterman, 5onald. A *uide to -.#ert Systems. 7eadin", Mass.: 2ddisonA*esley, 19%L. *e!er, Ma+. -conomy and Society: An +utline of &nter#reti6e Sociology. Berkeley, ;os 2n"eles,

;ondon: University of California Press, 19L%. *ino"rad, .erry. 12 ;an"-a"e 2ction Perspective on the 5esi"n of Cooperative *ork,1 Human! Com#uter &nteraction #:1 D19%0A%%E: #A#$. *ino"rad, .erry, and (ernando (lores. 9nderstanding Com#uters and Cognition: A $e/ 0oundation for Design. @or/ood, @.J.: 2!le+, 19%L. B &&F B

E*e)en2 Romanti0 Rea0tions/ $arado5i0a* Res6onses to the !om6uter $resen0e

Sherry Tur1*e

E)o0ati)e ObAe0ts
)n the ei"hteenth cent-ry, @e/ton4s physics "ave rise to a clock/ork and rationalist vie/ of h-man nat-re.G1H )t also event-ally "ave rise to the opposite: a romantic reaction to considerin" reason as /hat made h-mans -ni'-e declared that sensi!ility /as more important than lo"ic, the heart more h-man than the mind. 7esponses in o-r contemporary c-lt-re to the comp-ter presence have a similar dialectical '-ality. Comp-ters and comp-tational ideas have entered pop-lar thinkin" to s-pport ima"es of mind as mechanism, as pro"ram, as information processor. Iet even as these ima"es have spread thro-"h the c-lt-re, they have provoked a ne/ romantic reaction. *hen people -se informationAprocessin" models to e+plain more and more of their !ehavior, they often feel compelled to isolate as 1their core1 somethin" they can think of as privile"ed and -ndetermined, somethin" f-ndamentally 1!eyond information.1 .he very '-alities of comp-ters that foster mechanistic vie/s of h-man nat-re also lead people to emphasi<e the importance of feelin"s, spontaneity, holism, sens-ality, and spirit-ality in definin" /hat is -ni'-ely h-man. (or some people, the appropriation and disavo/al of comp-tational ima"es of the self take the form of a pend-l-m s/in": for others, the competin" vie/s of the self e+ist sim-ltaneo-sly: there is no victory, only am!ivalence. ) have !een a st-dent of these pop-lar 1romantic reactions1 to the comp-ter for over a decade.G&H ) have reported that in the presence of the comp-ter, there is a tendency for people to define themselves as /hat comp-ters are not or cannot do. B-t definin" people too starkly as /hat comp-ters cannot do in terms of #erformance leaves one in a v-lnera!le B &&J B position, /ith definitions of /hat is -ni'-e in h-man nat-re tryin" to r-n ahead of /hat clever en"ineers mi"ht come -p /ith ne+t. .his happened Dto choose only one o-t of many e+amplesE /hen in the early 19L$s, philosopher ,-!ert 5reyf-s insisted that a comp-ter co-ld not !eat him at chess !eca-se chess re'-ired int-ition and e+perience, a 1kno/in" ho/1 rather than a 1kno/in" that.1 *hen a chess pro"ram /as a!le to tri-mph over him Dand other even more skilled playersE, 5reyf-s had to

retreat to the position that 1real chess1 /as the kind of chess comp-ters co-ld not play.G#H *ith many s-ch e+periences of comp-ter competency !ehind them, people have learned to look for a more mod-lated response. )n my st-dies, ) find that people !e"in !y admittin" that h-man minds are some kind of comp-ter and then "o on to find /ays to think of people as somethin" more as /ell. (aced /ith 1smart machines,1 professional philosophers respond !y catalo"in" principles of h-man -ni'-eness. .hey find them in h-man intentionality, emotion, and !iolo"y. (aced /ith a comp-ter that follo/s rules , philosophers see h-mans as -ni'-e !eca-se their kno/led"e is socially and physically sit-ated, not r-le !ased !-t em!odied, concrete, and e+periential.GFH .hese responses from a professional comm-nity are echoed in the pop-lar c-lt-re. *hen confronted /ith a comp-ter that in some /ays seems to think like a person, people -se everyday lan"-a"e to capt-re their sense of h-man -ni'-eness. .hey talk a!o-t feelin"s, flesh, int-ition, spark, direct e+perience, or, as Joseph *ei<en!a-m s-mmed it -p, the thin"s /e kno/ !-t cannot say, the /ordless "lance that a father and mother share over the !ed of their sleepin" child.GJH People analo"i<e mind to comp-ter !-t then take care to -ndermine the analo"y !y attri!-tin" to people /hat one ei"hteenAyearAold ) intervie/ed called 1a savin" "race.1 )n her mind, 1that savin" "race, the difference !et/een people and comp-ters, is emotion. 2nd that4s the line yo- can dra/. .hat4s /here yo- say, this thin" may !e a!le to do somethin" like thinkin", !-t it can4t love any!ody.1 ) have fo-nd this response /idespread. Since the midA190$s, the media have to-ted the pro/ess of e+pect systems, the lar"e comp-ter pro"rams that em!ody the information and r-les that professionals -se to make everyday decisions. *ith a "eneral c-lt-ral -nderstandin" that r-leA!ased, informationArich comp-ters can do ama<in" thin"s, many people have come to !elieve that there is s-ch a thin" as comp-ter 1co"nition1 and see information processin" as a model for an important aspect of h-man rationality.GLH B-t often, at the same time, almost in defense, their sense of identity !ecomes increasin"ly foc-sed on /hatever they define as 1not co"nition,1 1!eyond information.1 People concede to the r-leA!ased comp-ter some po/er of B &&L B reason and then t-rn their attention to the so-l and the spirit in the h-man machine. Most recently, ho/ever, the story of comp-ters and 1romantic reactions1 has taken a dramatic ne/ t-rn. 7omantic reations to the comp-ter are !ein" met !y a movement /ithin the technical comm-nity /hich re3ects pro"rams and r-les to foc-s on 1emer"ent1 intelli"ence. .his movement p-ts for/ard ne/ ima"es of machines that !rin" to"ether many of the characteristics the romantic reaction -sed to mark the !o-ndary !et/een people and mechanism. .hese ima"es are of comp-tation /itho-t pro"rammin", of machines that are -npredicta!le and -ndetermined. S-ch are the 1romantic machines1 of emer"ent artificial intelli"ence D2)E. 8mer"ent 2) insists that it does not teach the comp-ter !-t allo/s the machine to learn: it does not "ive the comp-ter r-les to follo/ !-t e+pects intelli"ence to emer"e from the interaction of a"ents or entities /ithin the comp-ter system. .he "-ildin" metaphors here are not lo"ical !-t !iolo"ical, not mechanistic !-t social. .heorists of a 1connectionist1 or 1ne-ral net1 school of 2) !elieve that if ne-ronlike entities in the machine are left to interact, they /ill or"ani<e themselves to prod-ce intelli"ent !ehavior. .hey treat the comp-ter as a !lack !o+ that ho-ses the emer"ent processes.G0H .heir /ay of approachin" comp-ters is more like the one /e -se to approach people in everyday life. *e do not need to kno/ the specific r-les of o-r h-man companions4 !ehavior: /e have a "eneral feelin" for ho/ they do thin"s and allo/ o-rselves the pleas-re of s-rprise. )n a 1society of mind1 model, Marvin Minsky and Seymo-r Papert descri!e an

inner /orld of 1d-m!1 interactin" a"ents. Comple+ity of !ehavior, emotion, and tho-"ht emer"es from the cacophony of their opposin" vie/s, their conflicts and their compromises.G%H 2 vision of emer"ent intelli"ence /as present from the earliest days of 2), !-t for many years it /ent -nder"ro-nd, leavin" the field to a more rationalistic and 1r-leAdriven1 tradition, sym!olic information processin".G9H B-t recently, the emer"ent tradition has res-rfaced, /ith a ven"eance. 2s Pa-l Smolensky p-t it, 1)n the past halfAdecade the connectionist approach to co"nitive modelin" has "ro/n from an o!sc-re c-lt claimin" a fe/ tr-e !elievers to a movement so vi"oro-s that recent meetin"s of the Co"nitive Science Society have !e"-n to look like connectionist pep rallies.1G1$H My st-dies sho/ that in the pop-lar c-lt-re, people are tryin" to descri!e h-man -ni'-eness in terms of /hat comp-ters cannot do, /hile in the professional comp-ter c-lt-re, scientists are startin" to talk a!o-t machines in ima"es ever closer to those /e -se to descri!e people. @o/, !oth people and comp-ters are presented as f-ndamentally 1!eyond information.1 .h-s, the scientists of emer"ent 2)Ca classification ) -se to incl-de B &&0 B connectionist Dne-ral netE and society of mind modelsCare themselves part of the romantic reaction. 2ssimilatin" their research to a romantic reaction does not challen"e the validity or importance of their mathematical methods. )t is, ho/ever, an assertion a!o-t the appeal of the pro!lem to /hich the mathematics is applied. *hile traditional 2) represented thro-"ht as an essentially lo"ical process, connectionism sees it as a nat-ral phenomenon "overned !y mathematical la/s in the same /ay that the rest of nat-re is. .he infl-ences that !ear on this constr-ction of the pro!lem are not 3-st technical !-t social, c-lt-ral, and psycholo"ical. *ith the res-r"ence of emer"ent approaches to 2), the story of romantic reactions to the comp-ter presence comes f-ll circle. )ma"es of the machine as -nstr-ct-red and -ndetermined meet ima"es of people as -nstr-ct-red and -ndetermined, some of these p-t forth in response to comp-ters in the first place. *ith this 1effet de reto-r,1 the story of romantic reactions to the comp-ter presence can no lon"er !e told from one side as the story of people respondin" to their reflection in the mirror of the machine. .here is movement thro-"h the lookin" "lass. .he comp-ter is a psycholo"ical machine, not only !eca-se it mi"ht !e side to have its o/n very primitive psycholo"y !-t also !eca-se it ca-ses -s to reflect on o-r o/n. Mar"inal o!3ects play important roles in theory constr-ction. =n the line !et/een cate"ories, they dra/ attention to ho/ /e have dra/n the lines and in the process call them into '-estion.G11H 8merson said that 1dreams and !easts are t/o keys !y /hich /e find o-t the secrets of o-r o/n nat-re. .hey are test o!3ects.1G1&H ;ike dreams and !easts, the comp-ter stands on the mar"ins. )t is mind and not yet mind: it is inanimate and yet interactive. )t does not think, yet neither is it e+ternal to tho-"ht. )t is poised !et/een the tho-"ht and the tho-"ht of. 2s !ehavin" systems, comp-ters sit on the !o-ndary !et/een the physical and the psycholo"ical. )n that position, they provoke thinkin" a!o-t the !o-ndaries !et/een matter, life, and mind. (rom this perspective, /hich takes the comp-ter as a test o!3ect, /hat ) have called an 1evocative o!3ect,1 the '-estion is not /hether /e /ill ever !-ild machines that think like people !-t /hether people have al/ays tho-"ht like machines.G1#H 2nd if this is the case, if /e see o-rselves as in some /ays kin to the comp-ter, are these the most important thin"s a!o-t -sK )s /hat /e share /ith the comp-ter /hat is most essential a!o-t !ein" h-manK S-ch '-estions have traditionally !een the province of philosophers and psycholo"ists. *ith the advent of personal comp-ters in the 190$s, these '-estions moved o-t into the c-lt-re at lar"e, carried !y

people4s relationships /ith an o!3ect they co-ld to-ch, -se, and o/n. Comp-ters !ecame 1o!3ects to think /ith,1 carrier o!3ects for thinkin" a!o-t the self, and this for t/o reasons.G1FH (irst, as ) have noted, comp-ters are at the B &&% B mar"ins. .he machines do thin"sClike interact and respond to '-eriesCthat provoke reflection on /hat it means to interact and respond. 2nd if one of the thin"s that makes yo- feel alive is 1) think therefore ) am,1 the comp-ter4s 1almost1 thinkin" is provocative. Second, altho-"h comp-ters en"a"e in comple+ !ehaviors, they present no simple /indo/ onto their inner str-ct-re. .hey are opa'-e. People -se comp-ters to reflect on the h-man. )n this process of -sin" machines to think a!o-t mind, /hat the machines can act-ally do is important, !-t ho/ people think a!o-t them is more so. .h-s, the story is !ein" played o-t on the !o-ndary, not !et/een minds and machines !-t !et/een ideas a!o-t minds and ideas a!o-t machines.

Trans6aren0y to O6a0ityB$hysi0s to $sy0ho*o(y

*hen scientists speak a!o-t their childhood e+periences, many refer to the intensity of their relationships /ith o!3ects. (or e+ample, an M). fac-lty mem!er ) shall call 1Sandy1 told of the many happy ho-rs he had spent /ith a !eloved !roken radio. ) had no idea /hat any of the parts did: capacitors and resistors and parts ) didn4t kno/ the names of, t-!es that pl-""ed in and thin"s like that. *hat ) did assimilate /as that it /as made of lots of pieces, and that the pieces /ere connected in special patterns, and that one can discover tr-th or somethin" like that !y lookin" thro-"h the patterns that connect this device. =!vio-sly, some kind of infl-ences flo/ed !et/een these connections, and they sort of comm-nicated. 2nd yo- co-ld see that the radio had lots of littler, simpler devices that comm-nicated /ith each other so that the /hole thin" co-ld /ork. 2 lot of the parts came in little "lass t-!es. ) co-ld see thro-"h the "lass. 2nd some of them had different patterns than the others. So ) co-ld fi"-re o-t that the parts came in different classes. 2nd the different patterns co-ld help yo- fi"-re o-t the arran"ements that they needed to comm-nicate /ith each other. 2nd it /as a "reat thrill to have tho-"ht of that. ) can remem!er that there /as this tremendo-s char"e ) "ot from that, and ) tho-"ht ) /o-ld spend the rest of my life lookin" for char"es 3-st like that one. 2ltho-"h Sandy never fi+ed the !roken radio, several thin"s happened to him in the co-rse of /orkin" on it. ,e came to see himself as a special sort of person, the kind of person /ho is "ood /ith 1thin"s1 and /ith 1fi"-rin" thin"s o-t.1 ,e came to -nderstand the importance of interconnections and of !reakin" thin"s do/n to simpler systems /ithin a more comple+ device. 2nd /hen he had s-ch insi"hts, Sandy felt an e+hilaration to /hich he !ecame addicted. Sandy4s char"es came not from e+ternal s-ccess !-t from his inner conviction that he had -nderA B &&9 B stood somethin" important. )n other /ords, /hen /e /atch Sandy /ith his radio, /e /atch Sandy the child developin" the intellect-al personality of Sandy the scientist. Scientists4 recollections of their yo-th are hi"hly s-!3ective data. B-t there is another so-rce of data for e+plorin" the developmental role of o!3ects as carriers of ideas: direct o!servation of children. ) have

o!served many children /ho remind me of ho/ Sandy descri!es himself at five.G1JH ;ike Sandy, they p-<<le a!o-t ho/ thin"s /ork: like him, they take thin"s apart and theori<e a!o-t their str-ct-re. .he o!3ects at the center of their play and theori<in" incl-de refri"erators Danother of Sandy4s childhood passions, the o!3ect to /hich he 1"rad-ated1 after radiosE, airAconditionin" machines, heaters, ;e"os, erector sets, model trains, motors, and !icycles. @ota!le for their a!sence are modern radios. .he favored o!3ects Dlet -s call them 1traditional o!3ects1E have a "reat deal in common /ith one another and /ith the fo-rAt-!e radio that offered itself -p to Sandy4s fascinated o!servation. .he most si"nificant thin" they have in common is 1transparency.1 2n o!3ect is transparent if it lets the /ay it /orks !e seen thro-"h its physical str-ct-re. .he insides of a modern radio do not provide a /indo/ onto the patterns and interconnections of parts that so impressed Sandy. Sandy4s porta!le fo-rA t-!e radio /as transparent. )ts solidAstate contemporary co-sin is opa'-e. *ith the /ords 1solidAstate,1 ) have invoked the most dramatic e+ample of the shift to opacity in the o!3ect /orld. Unlike Sandy4s radio, inte"rated circ-its have no easily visi!le 1parts1 from the point of vie/ of the c-rio-s eye and the pro!in" hand that are the only e'-ipment children !rin" to s-ch thin"s. .hey hide their str-ct-re /hile performin" miracles of comple+ity of f-nction. 2t five, Sandy co-ld look inside his radio and make eno-"h sense of /hat he sa/ to develop a fr-itf-l theory a!o-t ho/ it /orked. B-t /hen yo- take off the !ack of an electronic toy or comp-ter, all that the most persistently c-rio-s child finds is a chip or t/o, some !atteries, and some /ire. Sandy /as a!le to -se the radio to think /ith !y thinkin" a!o-t its physical str-ct-re. ,e co-ld make it his o/n not only !eca-se he co-ld see it !-t !eca-se he co-ld /ork it in his head, dra/in" on a coherent system of tho-"ht that /as part of his child kno/led"e. .his /as kno/led"e of physical movement. Sandy spoke of some -nkno/n 1st-ff1 movin" thro-"h the connections !et/een the different parts of the radio. ,e says he tho-"ht of the st-ff as infl-ences, and as he "ot older, he learned to think of the infl-ences as c-rrent. Comp-ters Dtaken as physical o!3ectsE present a scintillatin" s-rface, and the 1!ehavior1 they e+hi!it can !e e+citin" and comple+, !-t there is no simple, mechanical /ay to -nderstand ho/ they /ork. .hey are B &#$ B opa'-e. )f their 1!ehavior1 tempts one to anthropomorphi<e, there is no /ay to 1open the hood,1 to 1p-ll off the cover,1 and reass-re oneself that mechanism stands !ehind. *hen children try to think a!o-t the physical /orkin" of the comp-ter, they find themselves /ith little to say. D1)t4s the !atteries,1 they tell me, fr-strated at findin" themselves at a dead end.E *hen this happens, children t-rn to a /ay of -nderstandin" in /hich they have more to sayCa psycholo"ical /ay of -nderstandin". )n doin" so, they dra/ on another kind of child kno/led"e than that /hich Sandy -sed, kno/led"e not of the !ody and its motion !-t of the mind and its tho-"ht and emotion. Sandy /as a!le to -se the radio to approach the /ays of thinkin" of physical science thro-"h his kno/led"e of ho/ people move Dthe infl-ences and their connectionsE. Contact /ith comp-tational o!3ects leads children to approach psycholo"ical /ays of thinkin" thro-"h their int-itive kno/led"e a!o-t ho/ people think. )n s-m, children -se comp-ters as 1o!3ects to think /ith1 !y identifyin" /ith them as psycholo"ical machines. =ne nineAyearAold, .essa, made this point very s-ccinctly in a comment a!o-t the chip she had seen /hen her comp-ter /as !ein" serviced. 1)t4s very small, !-t that does not matter. )t doesn4t matter ho/ little it is, it only matters ho/ m-ch it can remem!er.1 .he physical o!3ect is dismissed. .he psycholo"ical o!3ect !ecomes the center of attention and ela!oration. .he development of this kind of disco-rse !e"ins /ith m-ch yo-n"er children. .here, the comp-ter enters into ho/ they sort o-t the

metaphysically char"ed '-estions to /hich childhood m-st "ive a response. *hen, in the 19&$s, S/iss psycholo"ist Jean Pia"et first st-died /hat children tho-"ht /as alive and not alive, he fo-nd that children home in on the concept of life !y makin" finer and finer distinctions a!o-t the kind of physical activity that is evidence of life. (or the very yo-n" child, said Pia"et, everythin" active may !e alive: the s-n, the moon, a car, the clo-ds. ;ater, only thin"s that seem to move on their o/n /itho-t any!ody "ivin" them a p-sh or a p-ll can !e seen as alive. 2nd finally, the concept of 1motion from /ithin1 is refined to incl-de a notion of s-!tle life activity: "r/oth, meta!olism, and !reathin" !ecome the ne/ criteria.G1LH Children !-ild their theories of /hat is alive and /hat is not alive as they !-ild all other theories. .hey -se the thin"s aro-nd them: toys, people, technolo"y, the nat-ral environment. Children today are confronted /ith hi"hly interactive comp-ter o!3ects that talk, teach, play, and /in. Children are not al/ays s-re /hether these sho-ld !e called alive or not alive. B-t it is clear, even to the yo-n"est children, that physical movement is not the key to the p-<<le. .he child perceives the relevant criteria not as physical or mechanical !-t as psycholo"ical. (or e+ample, in the case of a comp-ter "ame that plays ticAtacAtoe, is it a/are, is it conscio-s, does it have feelin"s, even, does it cheatKG10H B &#1 B Children -se psycholo"y to talk a!o-t the aliveness of inanimate thin"s other than comp-ters. =ne fiveA yearAold told me that the s-n is alive 1!eca-se it has smiles.1 2nother said that a clo-d is alive 1!eca-se it "ets sad. )t cries /hen it rains.1 B-t if an ei"htAyearAold ar"-es that clo-ds or the s-n are alive, the reasons "iven are almost al/ays related to their motionCtheir /ay of movin" across the sky or the fact that they seem to do so of their o/n accord. )n contrast, as children !ecome older and as they !ecome more sophisticated a!o-t comp-ters, their ar"-ments a!o-t the comp-ter4s aliveness or lack of aliveness !ecome foc-sed on increasin"ly refined psycholo"ical distinctions. .he machines are 1sort of alive1 !eca-se they think !-t do not feel, !eca-se they learn !-t do not decide /hat to learn, !eca-se they cheat !-t do not kno/ they are cheatin". Pia"et told a relatively simple story that acco-nted for increasin" sophistication a!o-t the '-estion of aliveness thro-"h the development of notions of physical ca-sality. My o!servations of children disc-ssin" the aliveness of comp-ters a"ree /ith those of many investi"ators /ho stress the "reater comple+ity of children4s animistic 3-d"ments. (or e+ample, in Conce#tual Change in Childhood , S-san Carey demonstrates that alon"side the development Pia"et traces, somethin" else is "oin" on: the development of !iolo"ical kno/led"e.G1%H Children4s enco-nters /ith comp-ters -nderscore the importance of a third area of relevant kno/led"e: psycholo"ical kno/led"e and the a!ility to make psycholo"ical distinctions. Carey disc-sses ho/ children develop an int-itive psycholo"y that is pre!iolo"ical, a /ay of interpretin" !iolo"ical aspects of life as aspects of h-man !ehavior. D2s /hen a child ans/ers the '-estion, 1*hy do animals eatK1 !y sayin" that 1they /ant to1 rather than they m-st 1eat to live.1E *hen ) refer to children4s responses a!o-t the nat-re of the comp-ter4s aliveness as psycholo"ical, ) am talkin" a!o-t somethin" elseCaspects of psycholo"y that /ill not !e replaced !y a !iolo"ical disco-rse !-t /ill "ro/ into mat-re psycholo"ical distinctions, most si"nificantly, the distinction !et/een tho-"ht and feelin". .he comp-ter evokes an increasin"ly sophisticated psycholo"ical disco-rse 3-st as Carey points o-t that involvement /ith and disc-ssion a!o-t animals evokes a more developed !iolo"ical disco-rse. @oncomp-tational machinesCfor e+ample, cars and telephonesCentered into children4s thinkin" !-t in essence did not dist-r! the 1traditional1 pattern. Co"nitive psycholo"ists 7ochel 9elman and 8li<a!eth Spelke say /hy. .here is a "reat difference !et/een 1traditional machines1 and comp-ters.

12 machine may -nder"o comple+ transformations of states that are internal and -nseen. B-t it lacks the capacity for mental transformations and processes.1 )n their /ork, 1for p-rposes of e+position,1 they 1disre"ard or set aside modern manAmade machines that mimic in one B &#& B /ay or more the characteristics of man.1G19H .heir int-ition that the comp-ter /o-ld !e disr-ptive to their e+pository cate"ories is correct. .he mar"inal comp-ter does -pset the child4s constr-cted !o-ndaries !et/een thin" and person. 2 lon" tradition of *estern science has dra/n a line !et/een the /orlds of psycholo"y and physics and has tried, at least pro"rammatically, to take the la/s of motion of matter as the f-ndamental handle for "raspin" the thin"s it fo-nd in the physical /orld. Sandy4s investi"ation of the radio and Pia"et4s reports of ho/ children -sed motion to sort o-t the '-estion of /hat is alive in the /orld of traditional o!3ects sho/ed them conformin" to this /ay of thinkin". .essa4s s-mmary comment of /hat 1matters1 /hen yo- try to -nderstand a chip D1that it remem!ers1E does not conform. @or do scenes of children disc-ssin" /hether a comp-ter is alive !y catalo"in" its '-alities of conscio-sness, its de"ree of intentionality, /hether or not it 1cheats.1G&$H )n the present conte+t, /hat is most important is that the ne/ psycholo"i<ed lan"-a"e for talkin" a!o-t the machine /orld infl-ences ho/ children think a!o-t people. .he disc-ssion of the comp-ter4s cheatin" leads them into a disc-ssion of intentions: people have them, comp-ters do not. 5isc-ssion a!o-t the comp-ter4s ori"ins leads them to distinctions !et/een free /ill and pro"rammin": people think their o/n ideas, comp-ter ideas are p-t in !y their makers. Some children move from this distinction to another !et/een rote thinkin", /hich comp-ters are said to do, and creative thinkin", /hich they do not. 2mon" s-ch distinctions, perhaps the most important is ho/ children isolate the co"nitive from the rest of psycholo"y. *hile yo-n" children tend to thro/ to"ether s-ch -ndifferentiated o!servations as that a comp-ter toy is happy, smart, or "ets an"ry, !y the a"es of nine and ten, children comforta!ly manip-late s-ch ideas as 1the comp-ter thinks like a personCdoes the math thin"s yo- kno/C!-t it doesn4t have feelin"s,1 or 1the comp-ter can4t dream, only people can,1 or 1the comp-ter only does thin"s that can come o-t in typin".1 .he position to/ard /hich children tend as they develop their thinkin" a!o-t people in relation to comp-ters is to split psycholo"y into the co"nitive and the affective: the psycholo"y of tho-"ht and of feelin". )t is no lon"er that somethin" has a psycholo"y or it does not. *hile yo-n"er children often say that a comp-ter or comp-ter toy is alive 1!eca-se it has feelin"s,1 older children tend to "rant that the machine is intelli"ence and is th-s 1sort of alive1 !-t then distin"-ish it from people !eca-se of its lack of feelin"s. Confronted !y a personlike machine, a machine that plays on the !o-ndary, people /ant to make the !o-ndary firmer. B &## B

Romanti0 Se*)es
.raditionally, children came todefine /hat /as special a!o-t people in contrast to /hat they sa/ as their nearest nei"h!ors, the animals: their pet do"s, cats, and horses. Pets have desires, !-t /hat stands o-t dramatically a!o-t people is ho/ intelli"ent they re, their "ifts of speech and reason. Comp-ters -pset this distinction. .he machine presents itself to the child as a thin" that is not '-ite a thin", a mind

that is not '-ite a mind. 2s s-ch, it chan"es the /ay children think a!o-t /ho are their nearest nei"h!ors. .he 2ristotelian definition of man as a 1rational antimal1 Dpo/erf-l even for children /hen it defined people in contrast to their nearest nei"h!ors, the animalsE "ives /ay to a different distinction. .oday4s children appropriate comp-ters thro-"h identification /ith them as psycholo"ical entities and come to see them as their ne/ nearst nei"h!ors. 2nd they are nei"h!ors that seem to share in or Dfrom the child4s point of vie/E even e+cel in o-r rationality. Children stress the machines4 pro/ess at "ames, spellin", and math. People are still defined in contrast to their nei"h!ors. B-t no/, people are special !eca-se they feel. Many children "rant that the comp-ter is a!le to have a 1kind of life,1 or a 1sort of life,1 !-t /hat makes people -ni'-e is the kind of life that comp-ters do not have, an emotional life. )f people /ere once rational animals, no/ they are emotional machines. .his is their romantic reaction. 2s children tell it, /e are distin"-ished from machine intelli"ence !y love and affection, !y spirit-al -r"es and sens-al ones, and !y the /armth and familiarity of domesticity. )n the /ords of t/elveAyearA old 5avid, 1*hen there are comp-ters /ho are 3-st as smart as people, the comp-ters /ill do a lot of the 3o!s, !-t there /ill still !e thin"s for the people to do. .hey /ill r-n the resta-rants, taste the food, and they /ill !e the ones /ho /ill love each other, have families and love each other. ) "-ess they4ll still !e the ones /ho "o to ch-rch.1 =r /e are distin"-ished from the machines !y a 1spark,1 a mysterio-s element of h-man "eni-s. .hirteenAyearAold 2le+ plays daily /ith a chess comp-ter named Boris /hich allo/s its h-man -ser to set its level of play. 2ltho-"h 2le+ al/ays loses if he asks the comp-ter to play its !est "ame, 2le+ claims that 1it doesn4t feel like )4m really losin".1 *hyK Beca-se as 2le+ sees it, chess /ith Boris is like chess /ith a 1cheater.1 Boris has 1all the most famo-s, all the !est chess "ames ri"ht there to look at. ) mean, they are inside of him.1 ale+ kno/s he can st-dy -p on his "ame, !-t Boris /ill al/ays have an -nfair advanta"e. 1)t4s like in !et/een every move Boris co-ld read all the chess !ooks in the /orld.1 ,ere, 2le+ defines /hat is special a!o-t !ein" a person not in terms of stren"ths !-t in terms of a certain frailty. B &#F B (or this child, honest chess is chess played /ithin the !o-ndaries of h-man limitations. ,is heroes are the "reat chess masters /hose skill depends not only on 1memori<in" "ames1 !-t on 1havin" a spark,1 a -ni'-ely h-man creativity. )n my st-dies of ad-lts in the comp-ter c-lt-re, ) have fo-nd that many follo/ essentially the same path as do children /hen they talk a!o-t h-man !ein"s in relation to the ne/ psycholo"ical machines. .his path leads to allo/in" the possi!ility of -nlimited rationality to comp-ters /hile maintainin" a sharp line !et/een comp-ters and people !y takin" the essence of h-man nat-re to !e /hat comp-ters cannot do. .he child4s version: the h-man is the emotional. .he ad-lt4s version, already foreshado/ed in 2le+4s form-lation of the h-man 1spark1: the h-man is the -npro"ramma!le. (e/ ad-lts find it s-fficient to say, as did 5avid, that machines are reason and people are sens-ality, spirit-ality, and emotion. Most split the h-man capacity for reason. .hen, the dichotomy that 5avid -sed to separate comp-ters and people !ecomes a /ay to separate aspects of h-man psycholo"y. =ne st-dent speaks of his 1technolo"y self1 and his 1feelin"s self,1 another of her 1machine part1 and her 1animal part.1 =r, people talk a!o-t those parts of the psyche that can !e sim-lated vers-s those parts that are not s-!3ect to sim-lation, fre'-ently co-pled /ith the ar"-ment that sim-lated thinkin" is real thinkin", !-t sim-lated feelin" is not real feelin". Sim-lated love is never love. 2"ain, this is a romantic response, /ith the comp-ter makin" a ne/ contri!-tion to o-r form-las for descri!in" the divided self. *e have

had reason and passion, e"o and id. @o/, on one side is placed /hat is sim-la!le: on the other, that /hich cannot !e sim-lated, that /hich is 1!eyond information.1

The Romanti0 Ma0hines of Emer(ent "I

.his, of co-rse, is /here ne/ directions in artificial intelli"ence !ecome central to o-r story. Beca-se emer"ent 2) presents an ima"e of the comp-ter as fundamentally "eyond information . (or years, 2) /as /idely identified /ith the intellect-al philsoophy and methodolo"y of information processin". )nformationAprocessin" 2) has roots in mathematician 9eor"e Boole4s intellect-al /orld, in lo"ic.G&1H )t relies on the manip-lation of propositions to o!tain ne/ propositions and the com!ination of concepts to o!tain ne/ concepts. B-t artificial intelli"ence is not a -nitary enterprise. )t is a st-ff o-t of /hich many theories can !e fashioned. 2nd !eyond information processin", there is emer"ent 2). 8mer"ent 2) is indissocia!le from parallel comp-tation. )n a traditional, serial comp-ter, millions of -nits of information sit in memory B &#J B doin" nothin" as they /ait for the central processor to act on them, one at a time. )mpatient /ith this limitation, the "oal of emer"ent 2) is 1p-re1 comp-tation. .he /hole system is dynamic, /ith no distinction !et/een processors and the information they process. )n some versions of emer"ent 2), the processors are ne-ronlike entities connected in net/orks: in others, they are anthropomorphi<ed societies of s-!minds. )n all cases, they are in sim-ltaneo-s interaction. .he "oal, no less mythic in its proportions than the creation of a strand of 5@2, is the "eneration of a fra"ment of mind. (rom the perspective of emer"ent 2), a r-le is not somethin" yo- "ive a comp-ter !-t a pattern yo- infer /hen yo- o!serve the machine4s !ehavior, m-ch as yo- /o-ld o!serve a person4s. .he t/o 2)s have f-eled very different fantasies of ho/ to !-ild mind o-t of machine. )f informationA processin" 2) is capt-red !y the ima"e of the kno/led"e en"ineer, h-n"ry for r-les, de!riefin" the h-man e+pert to em!ody that e+pert4s methods in al"orithms and hard/are, emer"ent 2) is capt-red in the ima"e of the comp-ter scientist, 1his yo-n" feat-res re!ellin", slippin" into a "rin not -nlike that of a father /atchin" his child4s first performance on the violin,1 r-nnin" his comp-ter system overni"ht so that the a"ent /ithin the machine /ill create intelli"ence.G&&H .he pop-lar disco-rse a!o-t emer"ent intelli"ence tends to stress that the 2) scientists /ho /ork in this paradi"m set -p e+periments in the comp-ter and let them r-n, not kno/in" in advance /hat the interactions of a"ents /ithin the system /ill prod-ce. .hey stress the drama and the s-spense. .o train @8.alk to read alo-d, Se3no/ski had "iven his machine a tho-sand/ord transcription of a child4s conversation to practice on. .he machine /as readin" the te+t over and over, e+perimentin" /ith different /ays of matchin" the /ritten te+t to the so-nd of spoken /ord. )f it "ot a sylla!le ri"ht, @8.alk /o-ld remem!er that. )f it /as /ron". @8.alk /o-ld ad3-st the connections !et/een its artificial ne-rons, tryin" ne/ com!inations to make a !etter fit. . . . @8.alk ram!les on, talkin" nonsense. )ts voice is still incoherent, !-t no/ the rhythm is some/hat familiar: short and lon" !-rsts of vo/els packed inside consonants. )t4s not 8n"lish, !-t it so-nds somethin" like it, a cr-de version of the nonsense poem 1.he Ja!!er/ocky.1 Se3no/ski stops the tape. @8.alk /as a "ood st-dent. ;earnin" more and more /ith each pass thro-"h the trainin" te+t, the voice evolved from a /ailin" !anshee to a mechanical ;e/is Carroll.G&#H S-ch descriptions of ne-ral net 1e+periments1 reflect the 2) scientists4 e+citement in doin" /hat feels

like 1real1 la!oratory science rather than r-nnin" sim-lations. B-t at the same time that they are e+cited !y the idea of 2) as an e+perimental science, they are dra/n to the mystery and -npredicta!ility of /hat is "oin" on inside of the machine. )t makes their material seem more lifelike. B &#L B *e are far from the lan"-a"e of data and r-les that /as -sed to descri!e the lar"e e+pert systems of the 190$s. .he a"ents and actors of emer"ent 2) pro"rams are most easily descri!ed thro-"h anthropomorphi<ation. .ake, for e+ample, a very simple case of emer"ent intelli"ence, the perceptron, a patternAreco"nition machine desi"ned in the late 19J$s. )n the perceptron, inner a"ents, each of /hom has a very narro/ decision r-le and access to a very small amo-nt of data, essentially 1vote.1 .he perceptron /ei"hts their voices accordin" to each a"ent4s past record of s-ccess. )t is a!le to take advanta"e of si"nals sayin" /hether it has "-essed ri"ht or /ron" to create a votin" system /here a"ents /ho have "-essed ri"ht "et more /ei"ht. Perceptrons are not pro"rammed !-t learn from their o/n 1e+periences.1 )n an informationAprocessin" system, !ehavior follo/s from fi+ed r-les. .he perceptron has none. *hat is important is not /hat an a"ent kno/s !-t /ho it kno/s, its place in a net/ork, its interactions and connections. *hile information processin" !e"ins /ith formal sym!ols, perceptrons operate on a s-!sym!olic and s-!formal level. )n the !rain, dama"e seldom leads to complete !reakdo/n. )t -s-ally leads to a de"radation of performance proportional to its e+tent. Perceptrons sho/ the "racef-l de"radation of performance that characteri<es the !rain. *ith disa!led 1voterAa"ents,1 the system still /orks, altho-"h not as /ell as !efore. .his connection /ith the !rain is decisive for the theorists of the most s-ccessf-l of the trends in emer"ent 2): connectionism or ne-ral nets. )n the early 19L$s, the atmosphere in 2) la!oratories /as heady. 7esearchers /ere thinkin" a!o-t the -ltimate nat-re of intelli"ence. .he "oal ahead /as almost mythic: mind creatin" mind. Perceptrons and perceptronlike systems had their s-ccesses and their adherents as did informationAprocessin" approaches /ith their attmepts to specify the r-les !ehind intelli"ence, or in Boole4s lan"-a"e, the 1la/s of tho-"ht.1 B-t for almost a '-arter of a cent-ry, the pend-l-m s/-n" a/ay from one comp-tational aesthetic and to/ard another, to/ard r-les and a/ay from emer"ence. )n its infl-ence on spcyholo"y, 2) !ecame almost symonymo-s /ith information processin". 2llen @e/ell and ,er!ert Simon posited that the h-man !rain and the di"ital comp-ter shared a level of common f-nctional description. 12t this level, !oth the h-mna !rain and the appropriately pro"rammed di"ital comp-ter co-ld !e seen as t/o different instantiations of a sin"le species of deviceCa device that "enerated intellin" !ehavior !y manip-latin" sym!ols !y means of formal r-les.1G&FH @e/ell and Simon developed r-leA!ased systems in their p-rest form, systems that sim-lated the !ehavior of people /orkin" on a variety B &#0 B of lo"ical pro!lems. .he method nd its promise /ere spelled o-t in the @e/ell and Simon physical sym!ol system hypothesis: 2 physical sym!ol system has the necessary and s-fficient means for "eneral intelli"ent action. By necessary /e meant that any system that e+hi!its "eneral intelli"ence /ill prove -pon analysis to !e a physical sym!ol system. By s-fficient /e meant that any physical sym!ol system of s-fficient si<e can !e or"ani<ed f-rther to e+hi!it "eneral intelli"ence. G&JH

.h-s, sim-lations of /hat came to !e called 1toy pro!lems1 promised more: that mind co-ld !e !-ilt o-t of r-les. B-t the ideas of information processin" /ere most s-ccessf-l in an area /here they fell far short of !-ildin" mind. .his /as in the domain of e+pert systems. *ith the /orldly s-ccess of e+pert systems in the 190$s, the emphasis /as taken off /hat had !een most mythic a!o-t the 2) of the 19J$s and early 19L$s and placed on /hat comp-ter scientists had learned ho/ to do /ith craftsman4s confidenceC"ather r-les from e+perts and code them in comp-ter pro"rams. ,o/ever, ) have noted that in the late 190$s and early 19%$s, the pend-l-m s/-n" a"ain. .here /as ne/, po/erf-l, parallel hard/are and ne/ ideas a!o-t ho/ to pro"ram it. .he metaphors !ehind pro"rammin" lan"-a"es shifted. .hey /ere no lon"er a!o-t lists and varia!les !-t a!o-t actors and o!3ects. Io- co-ld think a!o-t traditional pro"rammin" !y analo"ies to the stepA!yAstep instr-ction of a recipe in a cookA!ook. .o think a!o-t the ne/ o!3ectAoriented pro"rammin", the analo"ie had to !e more dynamic: actors on a sta"e. *ith these chan"es came a re!irth of interest in the concept of ne-ral nets, re!orn /ith a ne/ capt-rin" mnemonic, connectionism. More than anyone else, 5o-"las ,ofstadter capt-red the aesthetic of the ne/ movement /hen he spoke a!o-t comp-tation 1/akin" -p from the Boolean dream.1G&LH (or connectionists, that dream had !een more like a ni"htmare. ;ike the romantics, connectionists so-"ht to li!erate themselves from a constrainin" rationalism of pro"ram and r-les. .hey take pride in the idea that the artificial minds they are tryin" to !-ild have an aspect that, if not mystical, is at the very least presented as mysterio-s. (rom the point of vie/ of the connectionists, a certain amo-nt of mystery fits the facts of the case. *e cannot teach an informationAprocessin" comp-ter the r-les for most aspects of h-man intelli"ence that people take for "ranted !eca-se /e simply do not kno/ them. .here is no al"orithm for reco"ni<in" a face in a cro/d. .he connectionists approach this state of affairs /ith a strate"y made possi!le !y the ne/ availa!ility of massively parallel comp-tin": !-ild a comp-ter that at least in some /ay looks like a !rain and B &#% B make it learn !y itself. Unlike sym!olic information processin", /hich looked to pro"rams and specified locations for information stora"e, the connectionists do not see information as !ein" stored 1any/here1 in partic-lar. 7ather, it is stored every/here. )nformation is !etter tho-"ht of as 1evoked1 than 1fo-nd.1G&0H .he comp-ter is treated as a !lack !o+ that ho-ses emer"ent processes. .here is an irony here. .he comp-ter presence /as an important infl-ence to/ard endin" the !ehaviorist he"emony in 2merican psycholo"y in the late 190$s. Behaviorism for!ade the disc-ssion of inner states or entities. =ne co-ld not talk a!o-t memory, only the !ehavior of 1remem!erin".1 B-t the fact that comp-ters had memory and inner states provided le"itimation for disc-ssin" people as havin" them as /ell. Behaviorism presented mind as a !lack !o+. )nformation processin" opened the !o+ and filled it /ith r-les, tryin" to ally itself as closely as possi!le /ith commonsense -nderstandin"s. B-t this /as a v-lnera!ility from the point of vie/ of nonprofessionals /ho /ere then e+posed to these -nderstandin"s. .hey seemed too commonsense. People had to !e more than information and r-les. @o/ connectionism closes the !o+ a"ain. *hat is inside these more opa'-e systems can once a"ain !e tho-"ht of as mysterio-s and indeterminate. Philosopher John Searle e+ploited the v-lnera!ility of informationAprocessin" models /hen he p-rs-ed a tho-"ht e+periment that took as its startin" point the '-estion of /hat mi"ht !e "oin" on in a comp-ter that co-ld 1speak Chinese.1 Searle, /ho ass-res -s that he does not kno/ the Chinese lan"-a"e, asks -s to ima"ine that he is locked in a room /ith stacks and stacks of paper, say, inde+ cards. ,e is "iven a story /ritten in Chinese and then is passed slips of paper on /hich are /ritten

'-estions a!o-t the story, also in Chinese. =f co-rse, he does not kno/ he has a story, and he does not kno/ that the slips of paper contain '-estions a!o-t the story. *hat he does kno/ is that 1clever pro"ramers1 have "iven him a set of r-les for /hat to do /ith the little pieces of paper he is passed. .he r-les tell him ho/ to match them -p /ith other little pieces of paper that have Chinese characters on them, /hich he passes o-t of the room. .he r-les say s-ch thin"s as 1.he s'-i""leAs'-i""le si"n is to !e follo/ed !y the s'-o""leAs'-o""le si"n.1G&%H ,e !ecomes e+traordinarily skillf-l at follo/in" these r-les, at manip-latin" the cards in his collection. *e are to s-ppose that his instr-ctions are s-fficiently complete to ena!le him to 1o-tp-t1 chinese characters that are in fact the correct ans/ers to the '-estions a!o-t the story. 2ll of this is set -p for the sake of ar"-ment in order to ask one rhetorical '-estion in plain 8n"lish: 5oes the fact that he sends o-t the correct ans/ers prove that he -nderstands ChineseK (or Searle, it is clear that the ans/er is no. B &#9 B . . . ) can pass the .-rin" test for -nderstandin" Chinese. B-t all the same ) still don4t -nderstand a /ord of Chinese and neither does any other di"ital comp-ter !eca-se all the comp-ter has is /hat ) have: a formal pro"ram that attaches no meanin", interpretation, or content to any of the sym!ols.G&9H )n the end, for Searle, the system is only a 1paper sh-ffler.1 ,e descri!ed the innards of the machine in terms so deeply alien to the /ays most people e+perience the inner /orkin"s of their minds that they felt a shock of 1nonreco"nition.1 (or may people, it f-eled a sense that Searle had capt-red /hat al/ays seemed /ron" /ith 2). .he disparity !et/een the description of the paper sh-ffler and one4s sense of self s-pported the vie/ that s-ch a systme co-ld not possi!ly -nderstand the meanin" of chinese in the same sense that a person does. Connectionism is less v-lnera!le to the Searlean ar"-ment. )ts models post-late emer"ence of tho-"ht from 1f-<<y1 process, so openin" -p the !o+ does not reveal a crisply defined mechanism that a critic can isolate and make to seem psycholo"ically impla-si!le. Connectionsits only admit 3-st eno-"h of a vie/ onto the inside of their system to create a "eneral feelin" for its shape. 2nd for many people, that shape feels ri"htCin the /ay that Searle made r-leAdriven systems feel /ron". .hat shape is resonant /ith !rainlike processes: associations and net/orks. Perhaps for these "ro/nA-p 2) scientists, ne-ral nets have somethin" of the feel that the fo-rAt-!e radio had for Sandy the child. .he theoretical o!3ects 1feel ri"ht,1 and the theory does not re'-ire that they !e pinned do/n to a hi"h de"ree of specificity. 2nd similar to Sandy, these scientists4 1char"es,1 their sense of e+citement and achievement, depends not only on instr-mental s-ccess !-t on the sense of !ein" in to-ch /ith f-ndamental tr-ths. )n this, the connectionists, like Sandy, are romanticsAinApractice. *ino"rad /orked as a yo-n" scientist in a very different intellect-al c-lt-re, the c-lt-re of sym!olic 2). .his is the c-l-re of /hich 5reyf-s co-ld say, 1any domain m-st !e formali<a!le.1 2nd the /ay to do 2) is to 1find the conte+tAfree elements and principles and to !ase a formal, sym!olic representation on this theoretical analysis.1G#$H )n other /ords, the "oal is a limpid science, modeled on the physical sciences, or as *ino"rad p-t it, 1*e are concerned /ith developin" a formalism, or 4representation,4 /ith /hich to descri!e . . . kno/eld"e. *e seek the 4atoms4 and 4particles4 of /hich it is !-ilt, and the 4forces4 that act on it.1G#1H (rom the point of vie/ of this intellect-al aesthetic of transparency, the connectionist !lack !o+ is alien and -naccepta!le. )n other terms, the classic confronts the romantic. )ndeed, referrin" to the connectionist4s opa'-e systems, *ino"rad has said that people are dra/n to connectionism !eca-se it has a hi"h percenta"e of 1/ishf-l thinkin".1G#&H Perhaps one co-ld "o

f-rther. (or B &F$ B connectionism, /ishf-l thinkin" is a point of method. .hey assert that pro"ress does not depend on the a!ility to specify process. )n other /ords, for connectionists, comp-ters can have the same 1opacity1 as the !rain. ;ike the !rain, they are !o+es that can remain closed: this does not interfere /ith their f-nctionin" as models of mind.

So0ieties of Mind
*ino"rad has made a similar point a!o-t the /ishf-l thinkin" in another !ranch of emer"ent 2) that has come to !e kno/n as the 1society theory1 of mind.G##H Marvin Minsky and Seymo-r Papert have !-ilt a comp-tational model that sees the mind as a society of interactin" a"ents that are hi"hly anthropomorphi<ed, disc-ssed in the terms one -s-ally reserves for a /hole person. B-t their a"ents do not have the comple+ity of people. )nstead, the society theory is !ased Das is the idea of perceptronsE on these a"ents !ein" 1d-m!.1 8ach a"ent has a severely limited point of vie/. ;ike the votin" a"ents in a perceptron model, this narro/ness of vision leads them to different opinions. )ntelli"ence emer"es from their interactions and ne"otiations. )n its constr-ction of a hi"hly anthropomorphi<ed inner /orld, society theory -ses a lan"-a"e a!o-t mind that is resonant /ith the o!3ectArelations tradition in psychoanalytic thinkin".G#FH )n classical psychoanalytic theory, a fe/ po/erf-l inner str-ct-res De.", the s-pere"oE act on memories, tho-"hts, and /ishes. =!3ect relations theory posits a dynamic system in /hich the distinction !et/een processed and processor !reaks do/n.G#JH .he parallel /ith comp-tation is clear: in !oth cases, there is movement a/ay from a sit-ation in /hich a fe/ inner str-ct-res act on more passive st-ff. Psychoanalyst *. 7. 5. (air!airn replaced the (re-dian dichotomy of e"o and id, str-ct-re and drive ener"y /ith independent a"encies /ithin the mind /ho think, /ish, and "enerate meanin" in interaction /ith one another. .he MinskyAPapert comp-tational model evokes the /orld of (air!airn. )n the case of !oth psychoanalysis and society theory, a static model Don the one hand, !ased on drive and on the other, !ased on informationE is replaced !y an active one. 2 model that seems mechanistic and overly specified as somethin" that co-ld encompass the h-man psyche is replaced !y a model /ith a certain mystery, a model of almost chaotic interactions. .he most ela!orated presentation of the society model is Minksy4s The Society of Mind .G#LH .here, instead of /hat *ino"rad descri!es as the 1finely t-ned clock/ork1 of informationAprocessin" 2), /e "et an 1impressionistic pastiche of metaphors.1 )n a micro/orld of toy !locks, Minsky descri!es ho/ a"ents that at first !l-sh seem like simple comp-tational s-!ro-tines /ork to"ether to perform /ellAdefined tasks like !-ildin" B &F1 B to/ers and tearin" them do/n. B-t then comes the /ishf-l thinkin", /hat *in"orad here calls the 1slei"ht of hand.1G#0H Minsky spec-lates ho/, /ithin an act-al child, the a"ents responsi!le for BU);5)@9 and *78C6)@9 mi"ht !ecome versatile eno-"h to offer s-pport for one another4s "oals. )n Minsky4s ima"inative te+t, they -tter sentences like, 1Please *78C687, /ait a moment more till BU);587 adds 3-st one more !lock: it4s /orth it for a lo-der crash.1G#%H /ino"rad points o-t that Minsky has moved from descri!in" the a"ents as s-!ro-tines to speakin" of them as entities /ith conscio-sness and intention. 2nd his reaction is sharp:

*ith a simple 1mi"ht indeed !ecome versatile,1 /e have slipped from a technically feasi!le !-t limited notion of a"ents as s-!ro-tines, to an impressionistic description of a society of hom-nc-li, conversin" /ith one another in ordinary lan"-a"e. .his slei"ht of hand is at the center of the theory. )t takes an almost childish leap of faith to ass-me the modes of e+planation that /ork for the details of !lock manip-lation /ill !e ade'-ate for -nderstandin" conflict conscio-sness, "eni-s, and freedom of /ill. =ne cannot dismiss this as an isolated fantasy. Minsky is one of the ma3or fi"-res in artificial intelli"ence and he is only statin" in a simplistic form a vie/ that permeates the field.G#9H *ino"rad attri!-tes the slei"ht of hand o Minsky4s faith that since /e are no more than 1protoplasmA !ased physical sym!ol systems, the red-ction m-st !e possi!le and only o-r c-rrent lack of kno/led"e prevents -s from e+plicatin" it in detail, all /ay from BU);5874s clever play do/n to the lo"ical circ-itry.1 )n other /ords, *ino"rad attri!-tes the slei"ht of hand to Minsky4s !elief in the physical sym!ol system hypothesis. )n interpret it some/hat differently. Minsky4s leap of faith, his confidence in the po/er of the a"ents, is !ased on his !eliefCone that ) see at the core of the romantic reaction in artificial intelli"enceCthat the interaction of a"ents ca-ses somethin" to emer"e "eyond /hat is possi!le thro-"h the manip-lation of sym!ols alone. *ino"rad4s criti'-e reflects his model of /hat Minsky4s a-dience /ants to hear, of the c-lt-re Minsky is /ritin" to. *ino"rad !leieves that they /ant to hear a vindication of physical sym!ols, that they /ant to hear that sym!ols and r-les /ill -ltimately tell the story. .he /ay ) see it, Minsky4s a-dience, like thea-dience for connctionism, /ants to hear precisely the opposite. )n the 190$s, the c-lt-re of 2) enth-siasts /as committed to a r-leA!ased model, !-t no/ thin"s have chan"ed. Both professionals and the lay p-!lic are dra/n to soceity theory and to connectionism not !eca-se they promise specificity !-t !eca-se they like B &F& B their lack of specificity. *e. 5aniel ,ills, desi"ner of the 1Connection Machine,1 a massively parallel comp-ter, p-ts the point /ell: )t /o-ld !e very convenient if intelli"ence /ere an emer"ent !ehavior of randomly connected ne-rons in the same sense that sno/flakes and /hirlpools are emer"ent !ehaviors of /ater molec-les. )t mi"ht then !e possi!le to !-ild a thinki"n machine !y simply hookin" to"ether a s-fficiently lar"e net/ork of artificial ne-rons. .he notion of emer"ence /o-ld s-""est that s-ch a net/ork, once it reached some critical mass, /o-ld spontaneo-sly !e"in to think. This is a seducti6e idea "ecause it allo/s for the #ossi"ility of constructing intelligence /ithout first understanding it . Understandin" intelli"ence is diffic-lt and pro!a!ly a lon" /ay off, so the possi!ility that it mi"ht spontaneo-sly emer"e from the interactions of a lar"e collection of simple parts has considera!le appeal to the /o-ldA!e !-ilder of thinkin" machines. . . . )ronically, the apparent inscri-ti!ility of the idea of intelli"ence as an emer"ent !ehavior acco-nts for m-ch of its contin-in" pop-larity.GF$H .he stren"th of o!3ect theories in !oth psychoanalysis and artificial intelli"ence is a concept-al frame/ork that offers rich possi!ilities for models of interactive process: the /eakness, /hich is of co-rse /hat *in"orad is pointin" to, is that the frame/ork may !e too rich. .he post-lated o!3ects may

!e too po/erf-l /hen they ep+lain the mind !y post-latin" many minds /ithin it.GF1H =!3ect theory confronts !oth fields /ith the pro!lem of infinite re"ress, !-t Minsky is /ritin" to a professional a-dience that has sensiti<ed itself to its heady possi!ilities. Comp-ter scientists are -sed to relyin" on rec-rison, a controlled form of circ-lar reasonin": it /o-ld not !e "oin" too far to say that some have t-rned it into a transcendent val-e. (or do-"las ,ofstadter, comp-tation and the po/er of selfAreference /eave to"ether art, m-sic, and mathematics into an eternal "olden !raid that !rin"s coherency and a shared aesthetic to the sciences and the arts. ,is vision is, to say the least, rmantic. )n *Edel, -scher, Bach , he speaks of it as a kind of reli"ion.GF&H ,ofstadter4s !rilliant and accessi!le /ritin" has done a "reat deal to le"itimate the circ-larity implicit in acco-ntin" for the entities that are then to acoc-nt for tho-"ht in the /ider c-lt-re. )n the 190$s, Minsky said, 1.he mind is a meant machine.1 the phrase !ecame famo-s. 5-rin" my research pro"ram in the late 190$s and early 19%$s, ) intervie/ed h-ndreds of people in !oth the technical and lay c-lt-res a!o-t their !eliefs a!o-t comp-ters, a!o-t ho/ smart the machines /ere then and ho/ smart they mi"ht someday !e. )n these conversations, Minsky4s /ords /ere often cited as an e+ample of 1/hat /as /ron"1 /ith 2). .hey provoked irritaiton, even dis"-st. ) !elieve they seemed -naccepta!le not so m-ch !eca-se of their s-!stance !-t !eca-se of thenAprevalent ima"es of /hat kind of machine the mind4s meat maA B &F# B chine mi"ht !e. .hese ima"es /ere mechanistic. B-t no/, a so-rce of connectionism4s appeal is precisely that it proposes an artificial meat machine, a comp-tational machine made of !iolo"ical resonant components. 2nd /ith a chan"ed ima"e of the machine, the idea that the mind is one !ecomes far less pro!lematic. 8ven those /ho /ere most critical of r-leAdriven 2) are some/hat disarmed !y emer"ent models that t-rn a/ay from r-les and to/ard !iolo"y. 5reyf-s, for e+ample, had critici<ed smy!olic informationA processin" 2) in terms of a !roader criti'-e of a p-rely syntactic, representational vie/ of the relation of mind to reality. Pointin" to the /ork of Martin ,eide""er and the later ;-d/i" *itt"enstein, he made the point that 1Both these thinkers had called into '-estion the very tradition on /hich sym!olic information processin" /as !ased. Both /ere holists, !oth /ere str-ck !y the importance of everyday practices, and !oth held that one co-ld not have a theory of the everyday /orld.1GF#H @o/, he sees ne-ral net/orks in a position to prove them ri"ht and him as /ell: )f m-ltilayered net/orks s-cceed in f-lfillin" their promise, researchers /ill have to "ive -p the conviction of 5escartes, ,-sserl, and early *itt"enstein that the only /ay to prod-ce intelli"ent !ehavior is to mirror the /orld /ith a formal theory in mind. . . . @e-ral net/orks may sho/ that ,eide""er, later *itt"enstein and 7osen!latt Gan early ne-ral net theoristH /ere ri"ht in thinkin" that /e !ehave intelli"ently in the /orld /itho-t havin" a theory of that /orld.GFFH *hile ca-tion-s, 5reyf-s is receptive to the technical possi!ilities and philosophical importance of connectionist research in a /ay that he never /as to/ard traditional 2). Similarly, c-lt-ral critics s-ch as ;eo Mar+, lon" skeptical a!o-t the impact of technolo"y on li!eral and h-manistic val-es, have fo-nd the 1conte+t-al, "estaltist, or holistic theory of kno/led"e implicit in the connectinist research pro"ram1 to !e 1partic-larly cond-ctive to ac'-irin" comple+ c-lt-ral -nderstandin", a vital form of li!eral kno/led"e.1GFJH 2ltho-"h the sympathetic response here is less to connectionism than to its metaphors, his /arm feelin"s, like those of 5reyf-s, sho/ ho/ connectionism has ne/ possi!ilities for intellect-al imperialism. Connectionism has received "ood press as a more 1h-manistic1 form of 2)

endeavor, /ith the stress on its respect for the comple+ity and mystery of mind.

Thin1in( of Yourse* "s an "nti;#o)e*a0e Ma0hine

)n a memoir she /rote in 1%F&, ;ady 2da ;ovelace, a friend and patroness of Charles Ba!!a"e, inventor of the 1analytical en"ine,1 /as the first person to "o on record /ith a variant of the oftenA '-oted phrase, 1.he B &FF B comp-ter only does /hat yo- tell it to do, nothin" more, nothin" less.1GFLH Most people are -sed to thinkin" of comp-ters /ith the 1;ovelace1 model. )t cap-tres the aesthetic of information processin". GF0H B-t it does not speak to emer"ent 2). (or emer"ent 2), the point is precisely to make comp-ters do more than they /ere pro"rammed to do, indeed, in a certain sense, not to have to pro"ram them at all. )t has !ecome commonplace to '-ote ;ovelace to o!3ect to the possi!ility of 2). 1People are not comp-ters. .he don4t follo/ r-les. .hey learn. .hey "ro/.1 B-t to the de"ree that emer"ent 2) is characteri<ed !y 1antiA;ovelace1 representations of the comp-ter, it !reaks do/n resistance to seein" contin-ity !et/een comp-ters and people !y descri!in" comp-ters that learn and "ro/. 2nd it descri!es comp-ters /hose /orkin" are mysterio-s. )n emer"ent 2), the effort is to have s-rprin" "lo!al comple+ity emer"e from local simplicity. 8ven in the small ne-ral net pro"rams that can r-n on standard personal comp-ters, /atchin" s-ch phenomena emer"e can have the 1feel1 of /atchin" life. )ndeed, one of the first comp-ter demonstrations that played on this idea /as a pro"ram called the 192M8 =( ;)(8.1 Patterns "ro/, chan"e, and evolve !efore the eye of the !eholder. )t is not s-rprisin" that 2) scientists -se s-ch system to st-dy evol-tionary phenomena. .his kind of evolvin", 1-nfoldin"1 machine does not seem to 1offend1 in the same /ay as did its pro"rammed co-sin. =ne M). hacker ) intervi/ed told me that if yo- make the system complicated eno-"h, for e+ample, the sim-ltaneo-s operation of a society of millions of interactin" pro"rams, yo- mi"ht !e a!le to create in a machine 1that sense of s-rprisin" onself . . . that makes most people feel that they have free /ill, perhaps even . . . a so-l.1 2nother told me that 1/ith the idea of mind as society, Minsky is tryin" to create a comp-ter comple+ eno-"h, indeed !ea-tif-l eno-"h, that a so-l mi"ht /ant to live in it.1 )f yo- romantici<e the machine in this /ay, yo- have a ne/ chance to see the machine as like the h-man and the h-man as like the machine. )f yo- see comp-ters as ;ovelace machines, people are the opposite of comp-ters, or if they are to !e analo"i<ed /ith comp-ters, the h-man psycholo"y that emer"es is resol-tely mechanistic. B-t connectionists insist that comp-tation sho-ld not !e red-ced to specifications, and altho-"h the adherents of society models are more committed to one day !ein" a!le to specify /hat is /ithin the !lack !o+, that day is far off and the theory need not /ait. 8mer"ence offers an appealin" retort to the ;ovelace o!3ection. (or ,ills, 1emer"ence offers a /ay to !elieve in physical ca-sality /hile sim-ltaneo-sly maintainin" the impossi!ility of a red-ctionist e+planation of tho-"ht. (or those /ho fear mechanistic e+planations of the h-man mind, o-r i"norance of ho/ local interactions prod-ce emer"ent !ehavior offers a reass-rin" fo" in /hich to hide the so-ld.1GF%H B &FJ B Connectionist machines, romantic machines /hose emer"ent properties can 1hide the so-l,1 have a c-lt-ral resonance in o-r time of /ideAspread disaffection /ith instr-mental reason. (or Papert, spec-latin" on the identity of the 1Prince Charmin"1 /ho a/oke the sleepin" connectionism, a shift of

c-lt-ral val-es has created a more /elcomin" milie- for connectionist ideas. .he ne/ resonance depends on a 1"enerali<ed t-rn a/ay from the hardAed"ed rationalism of the time connectionism last /ent into eclipse and a res-r"ent attraction to more holistic /ays of thinkin".1GF9H (or years ) have doc-mented ho/ people constr-ct romantic ima"es of mind /hen confronted /ith the ima"e of the comp-ter as an informationAprocessin" machine. .oday there is a more comple+ pict-re as people also confront increasin"ly romantic ima"es of the machine. *hen socio!iolo"y presents an ima"e of the h-man as a 1!-ndle of "enes,1 people re!el. .hey listen to the theory, and they say that is 1not me.1 *hen 2) presents an ima"e of the h-man as a 1!-ndle of pro"rams,1 there is the same 1not me1 response, the same reaction that /as e+ploited !y Searle /ith po/erf-l rhetorical effect. *hen pro"rams !ecame refined as 1he-ristic1 Ddefined !y r-les of th-m! rather than r-lesE, the response softens, !-t the idea of people as a 1!-ndle of he-ristics1 does not "o far eno-"h for people to accept s-ch systems as a reflection of /ho they are. B-t the idea that 1)1 am a !-ndle of ne-ronlike a"ents that comm-nicate /ith one another and /hose intelli"ence emer"es from their interactions so-nds eno-"h like ho/ /e have al/ays tho-"ht a!o-t the !rain to start to feel comforta!le, like 1me.1 .he mathematical theory of connectionism mi"ht not !e any more accessi!le to lay thinkin" than technical papers on information processin": indeed, their advanced mathematics -s-ally makes them less so. B-t /hen o!3ectA and a"entAoriented theories are pop-lari<ed and move o-t into the "eneral c-lt-re, they have special appeal, the direct appeal of actors on a sta"e. 2t one time or another, /e all have the sense of not feelin" 1at one1 /ith o-rselves: inner voices offer conflictin" advice, reass-rance, and chastisements. .hese e+periences are easily and satisfyin"ly translated into a drama of inner o!3ects. .he o!3ects and a"ents of emer"ent 2) are en"a"in" !eca-se they are concrete: it is easy to 1play1 /ith them. .hey are resonant /ith pop-lar -nderstandin" of (re-d that represent e"o, s-pere"o, and id as competin" inner actors. ;ike (re-d4s trio, the a"ents provide a /ay to interpret o-r common e+periences of inner conflict. .he rational !ias of o-r c-lt-re presents consistency and coherency as nat-ral, !-t, of co-rse, feelin"s of fra"mentation a!o-nd. )ndeed, it has !een ar"-ed that they characteri<e contemporary psycholo"ical life.GJ$H 2nd so, theories that speak to the e+perience of a divided self have partic-lar po/er. B &FL B .h-s, emer"ent 2) is a sed-ctive theory for many reasons. )t presents itself as escapin" the narro/ determinism of information processin". )ts ima"es are !iolo"ically resonant. .he lan"-a"e of 1ne-ral nets1 is ine+act !-t metaphorically effective, presentin" mind processes as the kinds of thin"s that co-ld !e "oin" on in a !rain. )ts constit-ent a"ents offer a theory for the felt e+perience of m-ltiple inner voices. ;ike 1f-<<y lo"ic1 or 1chaos,1 t/o other ideas that have capt-red the pop-lar and professional ima"ination, emer"ent 2) speaks to o-r technolo"ical society4s disappointments /ith the cold, sharp ed"es of formal lo"ic. )t is resonant /ith a "eneral t-rn to 1softer1 epistemolo"ies that emphasi<e concrete methodolo"ies over al"orithmic ones in the sciences as /ell as the arts.GJ1H )t is resonant /ith a criticism of traditional *estern philosophy, /hich, for ,eide""er, is defined from the start !y its foc-sin" on facts in the /orld /hile 1passin" over1 the /orld as s-ch.GJ&H 2nd finally, to come f-ll circle, the constit-ent a"ents of emer"ent 2) offer almost tan"i!le 1o!3ects to think /ith.1 )n a parado+ical !-t comfortin" /ay, they "et one !ack to a version of Sandy4s e+perience /ith the fo-rAt-!e radio. .hey try to e+plain the /orld to -s in terms of familiar interactive systems, in terms of 1parts1 that do this or that to one another, and in terms of physics. .he connection stren"ths that are posited !et/een the ne-ronlike entities can !e translated into the simple physics of movin"

thin"s closer to"ether and farther apart. (re-dian ideas a!o-t slips of the ton"-e !ecame /ell kno/n and "ained acceptance for reasons that had little to do /ith assessments of their scientific validity. Slips are almost tan"i!le ideas. .hey are manip-la!le. Slips are appealin" as o!3ects to think /ith. Io- can analy<e yo-r o/n slips and those of yo-r friends. 2s /e look for slips and start to manip-late them, !oth serio-sly and playf-lly, psychoanalytic ideas, at the very least the idea that there is an -nconscio-s, start to feel more nat-ral. .he theory of slips allo/ed psychoanalytic ideas to /eave themselves into the fa!ric of everyday life. .hey made the theory more concrete and appropria!le. Similarly, people like to think a!o-t the ideas !ehind mind as connection and mind as society. .o take the simplest case D/hich is the only case that matters /hen yo- look for the 1/hys1 !ehind a theory4s c-lt-ral pop-larityE, yo- can ima"ine and play /ith Minsky4s ideas of a"ents !y takin" on their personae. 2s in the case of psychoanalytic models, yocan ima"ine yo-rself in the role of the psychic entities, and actin" o-t these roles feels eno-"h like an actin" o-t of the theory to "ive a sense of -nderstandin" it. =ne may for"et the details of each theory, !-t they offer e+periences of theoretical play that !reak do/n resistance to seein" mind as irrational or seein" mind as machine. 7omantic machines pave the /ay for the idea of mind as machine to !ecome an accepta!le part of everyday thinkin". B &F0 B )n their reaction to ne/ science and technolo"y, the romantics split passion from reason, the sens-o-s from the analytic. .. S. 8liot, reflectin" on the loss of the a!ility to inte"rate 1states of mind and states of feelin",1 called it the 1dissociation of sensi!ility.1GJ#H )nformation processin" led to the position that if comp-ters closely rese!le people in their thinkin", they differ from them in their lack of feelin". )t, too, set the sta"e for a dissociation of sensi!ility. .he informationAprocessin" paradi"m and the conse'-ent reaction to it deepened the "-lf !et/een affect and co"nition. *ithin the academic /orld, this movement /as !oth reflected and reinforced in the emer"ence of a ne/, comp-tationally inspired, !ranch of psycholo"y: co"nitive science. .he (re-dian e+perience has lon" a"o ta-"ht -s that resistance to a theory is part of its c-lt-ral impact. 7esistance to psychoanalysis /ith its emphasis on the -nconscio-s led to an emphasis on the rational aspect of h-man nat-re, to an emphasis on people as lo"ical !ein"s. 7esistance to a comp-tational model of people as pro"rammed information systems led to a ne/ artic-lation of the position that /hat is essential in people is /hat cannot !e capt-red in lan"-a"e, r-les, and formalism. .his resistance, in a form that ) have called 1romantic,1 p-t positive emphasis on the importance of aspects of h-man nat-re that are not sim-la!leCon love, h-man connection, and sens-alityCand on the importance of the em!odiment of h-man kno/led"e /ithin individ-als and social "ro-ps. B-t it tended to reinforce a tooA radical split !et/een affect and co"nition, !et/een the psycholo"y of tho-"ht and the psycholo"y of feelin". *hen tho-"ht and feelin" are torn from their comple+ relationship /ith each other, the co"nitive can !ecome red-ced to mere lo"ical process and the affective to the visceral. *hat /as most po/erf-l a!o-t (re-d4s psycholo"ical vision /as its aspiration to look at tho-"ht and feelin" as al/ays e+istin" to"ether, at the same time and in interaction /ith each other. )n psychoanalytic /ork, the effort is to e+plore the passion in the mathematician4s theorem and the reason !ehind the most primitive fantasy. .he -nconscio-s has its o/n, hi"hly str-ct-red lan"-a"e that can !e deciphered and analy<ed. ;o"ic has an effective side, and affect has a lo"ic. .he tooAeasy acceptance of the idea that comp-ters closely resem!le people in their thinkin" and differ only in their lack of feelin" s-pports a dichotomi<ed and oversimplified vie/ of h-man psycholo"y. *e mi"ht hope that the theorists of emer"ent machine intelli"ence /ill f-rther o-r appreciation and -nderstandin" of the h-man inte"ration of tho-"ht and feelin". *e m-st fear that they are not. )ndeed,

/hile /e feared !efore that the h-man /o-ld !e red-ced to the analytic thro-"h ne"lect of feelin"s, the incl-sion of feelin"s in 2) models raises its o/n pro!lems. .he point is dramati<ed !y the /ay Minsky appropriates =edip-s. )n The Society of Mind , Minsky looks at the =edip-s comA B &F% B ple+ thro-"h its comp-tational prism: 1)f a developin" identity is !ased -pon that of another person, it m-st !ecome conf-sin" to !e attached to t/o dissimilar ad-lt 4models.41GJFH .h-s, 1=edip-s1 intervenes, a mechanism desi"ned to facilitate the constr-ction of a simpleAeno-"h a"ent !y removin" 1one Gof the modelsH from the scene.1GJJH *ith this scenario, Minsky has entered a domain of h-man e+perience /here p-re information processin" did not often care to /ander. .he tenor of his theoryCromantic, loose, emer"entCmakes him confident that he can !-ild a"ents that represent comple+ h-man attri!-tes. B-t /hen he does so, he t-rns the =edipal moment Dtraditionally tho-"ht of in terms of 3ealo-sy, se+-ality, and m-rdero-s emotionE into a pro!lem closer to co"nitive dissonance. 2 disc-ssion of primitive feelin"s is t-rned into a disc-ssion of a kind of thinkin". )nformation processin" left affect dissociated: emer"ent 2) may !e"in to inte"rate it only to leave it red-ced. *e m-st ackno/led"e a profo-nd chan"e in o-r c-lt-ral ima"es of the machine. .he '-estion remains: *hat /ill its effect !e on o-r ima"es of peopleK .hro-"h the midA19%$s, many /ho critici<ed the comp-ter as the em!odiment of rationality feared that it /o-ld lead people to a vie/ of themselves as cold mechanism. )n fact, /e have seen that resistance to ima"es of comp-tation as information processin" led to a res-r"ence of romantic ideas a!o-t people: /hat made them special /as all that the analytical en"ine /as not. @o/ /e face an increasin"ly comple+ sit-ation. (or the foreseea!le f-t-re, emer"ent machine intelli"ence /ill e+ist in only the most limited form. B-t already, there is /idespread confidence in its intellect-al and economic importance and familiarity /ith elements of its lan"-a"e, its /ay of talkin" a!o-t the pro!lem of mind. .his lan"-a"e provides a /ay to talk a!o-t machines /hich makes them seem more like people. )t serves as a mediator !et/een the comp-ter c-lt-re and the c-lt-re of mind in a /ay that the lan"-a"e of information processin" never co-ld. .he lan"-a"e of ne-rons, connections, associations, a"ents, and actors makes it easier to talk a!o-t oneself as 1that kind1 of a machine. .he similarities in the lan"-a"e of comp-tational 1society1 models and o!3ectArelations psychoanalysis makes the ne/ models seem resonant /ith the concerns of a professional c-lt-re /idely perceived as least hide!o-nd !y narro/ lo"icism. 2nd finally, ) have noted that /ith the move a/ay from r-les and to/ard !iolo"y, philosophical critics seem disarmed in their traditional o!3ections. )n its simplest form, ar"-in" that people do not think 1linearly1 is no lon"er an ar"-ment for /hy parallel machines are not 1really1 thinkin". .hro-"h s-ch intellect-al deto-rs, romantic machines may have the B &F9 B effect that critics feared from rational ones. 7esistance to the rational machines fostered a romantic vie/ of people. .he romantic machines offer a /ay for people to accept the idea of the h-man as a meat machine. B-t this acceptance comes at a hi"h cost. John Searle has ar"-ed that tho-"ht is a prod-ct of o-r specific !iolo"y, the prod-ct of a h-man !rain.GJLH *hen Searle talks a!o-t h-man !iolo"y, he means ne-rons and the chemistry of the synapse, as /hen he spec-lates that 1as far as /e kno/, the f-nctional aspect of the ne-ron is the nondi"ital variation in HitsH rate of firin".1GJ0H B-t o-r

specific !iolo"y means more than havin" a !rain 3-st as it means more than !ein" made of meat. =-r specific !iolo"y places -s in the h-man life cycle: /e are !orn, n-rt-red !y parents, "ro/, develop se+-ally, !ecome parents in o-r t-rn. 2nd /e die. .his cycle !rin"s -s the kno/led"e that comes from -nderstandin" the certainty of loss, that those /e love /ill die and so /ill /e. )n these /ays, /e are alien to a !ein" that is not !orn of a mother, that does not feel the v-lnera!ility of childhood, that does not kno/ se+-ality or anticipate death. *e may !e machines, !-t these e+perienced aspects of o-r !iolo"y Dthe conse'-ences of there !ein" meat in o-r meat machinesE compel a search for transcendence. People look for it in reli"ion, history, art, the relationships thro-"h /hich /e hope to live on. 8mer"ent 2) does not offer -s minds that are !orn of mothers, "ro/ -p in families, or kno/ the fear of death. *hen 2) offered a rational and r-leAdriven machine, it led to a romantic reaction. C-rrent romantici<ations of the machine may lead to a rationalistic one: a tooAeasy acceptance of the idea that /hat is essential a!o-t h-man !ein"s can !e capt-red in /hat makes -s kin to mechanism.

T3e*)e2 Bio*o(y9 Ma0hines9 and Humanity

Stuart Ham6shire )n addressin" the s-!3ects of !iolo"y and h-manity as /ell as machines and h-manity, ) feel the necessity of mentionin" h-man !odies, /hich often "et lfet o-t altho-"h they are amon" the rather conspic-o-s facts a!o-t h-man !ein"s, that they possess them. .he philosophy in /hich ) /as lar"ely !ro-"ht -p, 2n"loA2merican empiricist philosophy, sometimes seems a prolon"ed conspiracy to overlook the fact that h-man !ein"s have !odies and that /e live in them and, ost important of all, that /e e+ist !eca-se of them. *e often kno/ /hat o-r !odies are doin" and /hat is "oin" on inside them from so-rces other than the five senses that /e -se to o!serve o!3ects other than o-r o/n !odies. .hese so-rces of kno/led"e a!o-t !odily movement and action are more intimate, !eca-se internal, so-rces. )f /e did not kno/ /itho-t o!servation that /e /ere movin" o-r eyes and o-r hands, /e /o-ld not kno/ !y o!servation a!o-t e+ternal thin"s. ) said all this some years a"o in Thought and ActionG1H !-t not s-fficiently a""ressively, ) no/ think. .he over/helmin" and o!vio-s lack of any si"nificant similarity !et/een machines of any kind, as far as /e kno/, and h-man !ein"s, is d-e to the fact that machines do not have !odies. ) !elieve they have frames or mainframes. .his limits their minds. .he more the intellect4s calc-lative a!ilities and the memories of machines are developed and increased, the less, in certain respects, they !ecome like h-man !ein"s. .hat is /hy they are sometimes spoken of, not -nreasona!ly, as inh-man. *hen ) hear that they are re"-larly defeatin" the h-man "rand masters at chess Dand /e have !een /aitin" for some years for this to happenE, ) shall kno/ that they have !ecome even less h-man. Io- may remem!er a very !rilliant novel !y @a!okov a!o-t chess masters that !ro-"ht -p the h-man aspects of s-ccessf-l chess playin". 2n increase in machines4 intellect-al po/ers B &JF B and their po/rs of coherent memory mi"ht correctly !e descri!ed, in s-mmary fashion, as an increase in their po/ers of mind. .here is nothin" incorrect a!o-t that. B-t these /ords mi"ht !e misleadin" if they /ere taken to imply that their minds as a /hole had !een developed and their total po/ers of mind increased.

.he fact is that 3-st t/o commonly distin"-ished po/ers of mind, distin"-ished for practical and social p-rposes, /o-ld have !een a!stracted from the h-"e amal"am that constit-tes the mind and then !een f-rther developed and increased. 2s /as stressed, !oth !y .erry *ino"rad and Sherry .-rkle, all sorts of h-manly interestin" mental po/ers and dispositions /o-ld remain at <ero. ) am thinkin" of the dispositions and po/es associated /ith se+-ality, /ith all that se+-ality entails in family relationships and emotional attachments, the en3oyment of sports and of "ames of skill that are played o-tside and are less a!stract than chess, of sc-lpt-re, of dancin", of mimicry Das opposed to reprod-ctionE, of dramatic performance, of inappropriate and s-dden la-"hter, or "roans and sco/ls o-t of season and not on c-e, of tones of voice in speech and in sin"in". =!vio-sly, ) co-ld contin-e this list indefinitely. ) have not mentioned the pleas-res of thirst, c-ltivated thirst and controlled into+ication, of conviviality and of oldAfashioned "reed, /hich /as once mentioned charmin"ly !y one of Sherry .-rkle4s t/elveA yearAold s-!3ects. =ne co-ld "o on. Iet the competition !et/een man and machines remains. .he important thin" a!o-t machines is that they have remarka!ly copio-s and definite memoriesC efficient, clear, and -nconf-sedC/hich /e do not. .o"ether, this makes -p a fairly small part of /hat /e sho-ld properly incl-de -nder the title of mind and not necessarily the most interestin" or prod-ctive part. )f /e take a lon" historical vie/ of c-lt-re, and of a person4s individ-ality, it is a matter of the e+pression in an eye or the /ay a person /alks or stands or speaks: it is half physical. @o one /ho has seen it /ill for"et the /ay that a certain dancer4s neck, a 7-ssian dancer, Ulanova, fitted on to her head /hen she danced. )t /as '-ite -nfor"etta!le. .he style and e+pression D) do not mean feelin"E /ere -ni'-e. .hink of the tainted history of the /ord reason, pict-red as master to slave, as in Plato, or -pside do/n, as in ,-me, /here it is s-!3ect to another total and hopeless a!straction called feelin", reason !ein" the slave. .he history of the /ord reason is tainted !eca-se 2ristotle !e"an !y associatin" po/ers of reason /ith the doctrine of the Scala Universi, the "reat Chain of Bein", /hich p-ts reason at the top, near to 9od the (ather, or 9od the ,oly 9host in the sky, o-r animal nat-re lo/er do/n the scale of !ein", and the 1trancelike life of plants1 3-st a!ove the sticks and stones. .his pict-re of the "reat Chain of Bein" is 3-st a pleasin" and rather selfA"lorifyin" fiction, /hich models 9od4s creation, as has !een several times remarked, on a properly stratified social order, and the social order is B &JJ B indeed a h-man creation. .his pict-re is a denial of comple+ity of livin" thin"s and of the many different po/ers of development that can !e traced in nat-re, all in the interest of some form of social tidiness. )f there is no clear vie/ of 9od at the top of the ladder, or perhaps a little a!ove it, it is not clear /hat is hi"her and lo/er in the order of h-man po/ers and dispositions. @or is it clear /hy /e sho-ld think in terms of scales at all. .here is no valid reason, it seems to me, to place the noncomp-tational, or nonstora"e, or nonlo"ical, aspects of the mind lo/er than soAcalled p-re reason, apart from the dreams of the disem!odied s-rvival of the so-l, /hich the myth of p-re reason preserves. )f /e for"et this rec-rrin", ha-ntin" dream of an ideal Manichaeanism, /e can insist on the e'-al priority in the h-man mind of ima"ination, of physical play, of poetry, paintin", and the performin" arts, in the definition of h-manity. *e can think of individ-ality in hand/ritin" and script. *e o-"ht not, it seems to me, to have this academic competition of hi"her or lo/er. May!e, for some -lterior moral ar"-ment, one picks o-t distinctive h-man po/ers and dispositions /here /e co-ld pro!a!ly look !etter, compared /ith other animal species, or /e may think of the s-prprisin"ly varia!le and -nstr-ct-red nat-re of h-man se+-ality, /hich leads to vario-s family str-ct-res. Second, since /e learn an enormo-s variety of nat-ral lan"-a"es, variety /ithin the species is important and distinctive, as is the pec-liarly conf-sed store of o-r memories.

;et me also address memories, !eca-se they came -p in 7o"er ,ahn4s essay and else/here. =-rs are conf-sed in comparison /ith the machine4s. )n an interestin" and prod-ctive /ay, h-man !ein"s, compared /ith other animals, are o!sessed /ith their past, as Bernard *illiams has remarked. @ot merely their c/n past !-t their family4s past, the tri!e4s and nation4s past. .hese vario-s pasts are lod"ed in their minds !oth as individ-als and as tri!es or nations, as a mi+t-re of history and myth, tr-th and falsity. Memories are !l-rred Dat any rate, mine isE, sm-d"ed /ith the vast complicated net/ork of -planned, -ni/-e, and lar"ely -nconscio-s associations in the process of condensation of memory. 2ss-min" an individ-al4s memories are an ine+trica!le and innovative m-ddle, an interf-sion of elements, formin" and reformin" as e+perience "oes on in a person4s life. *hen the m-ddle !ecomes s-fficiently rich and many layered, like a compost heap, and /hen reason has !een kept in its place, /e call the m-ddled memory 1ima"ination.1 ,o/ever, /hen machines have impaired memories, they !ecome 1defective,1 and /e are st-ck /ith them, and they do not !reed as compost does. ,ahn proposed a certain revision of standard histories of science in relation to the scientific revol-tion. ,e dre/ a contrast !et/een the role of mechanical devices, partic-larly in the si+teenth and seventeenth cent-ries, /hich are plentif-lly ill-strated in the !ooks of the time Dthe ill-sA B &JL B trated ne/ concepts of physical -nderstandin"E, and, e'-ally important, a ne/ confidence in h-man a!ilities. )f yo- -nderstand it, yo- can make it, and often yo- can convert that proposition and say yocan make it if yo- can -nderstand it. .his principle is referred to as the 6erum factum principle. it introd-ced a notion of ca-sality connected /ith e+perimental action, /ith doin" somethin" in contrast to mere o!servation: the recordin" in theeye, of /hat the eye sees or receives. @o/ the Platonic and hence Peripatetic traditional had p-t the recordin" eye, not the in"enio-s manip-lator, on top of the scale of val-e, and Plato, as is often remarked, had al/ays -sed metaphors of vision to e+plain /hat the ac'-isition of kno/led"e is. .he in"enio-s manip-lator /as a craftsman, lo/er on the social scale. 2s 6eller points o-t, the terms that /e -se, s-ch as competition, are derived from ne/ social realities. .here is an interestin" difference that ,ahn !ro-"ht o-t, !eca-se the eye is, accordin" to ,e"el, the most ideal of the h-man senses, /hich means it is the least !odily part of the !ody, the least, as it /ere, closely material, the most e+pressive, the nearest to the mind thro-"h !ein" nearest to the !rain. *e have this interestin" vie/ of tr-e empiricism as !ein" the doctrine that /e can reconstr-ct nat-ral creat-es, and to reconstr-ct is to -nderstand. )t is not to have a map of a possi!le reconstr-ction !-t an act-al reconstr-ction that is most enli"htenin" a!o-t the nat-re of -nderstandin".

$"RT THREE2 !O-"

B &J9 B

!oda
James J. Sheehan @ever !efore have the concept-al !o-ndaries of h-manity !een less sec-re. Perhaps, as 2nthony (le/ has recently ar"-ed, /e are no/ at a point /here a pers-asive definition of /hat it means to !e h-man is impossi!le. .here is no "-arantee, (le/ maintains, 1.hat in every case /hich /e may in the f-t-re meet, /e shall !e a!leConce "iven all the relevant factorsCto ret-rn an -nhesitatin"ly correct ans/er to the '-estion: 4)s this a h-man !ein" or notK41 )t may !e, as *alter B-rkert has s-""ested, that the definition of h-man nat-re has collapsed into its o/n history: 1*hat has !een ass-med to constit-te 4h-man nat-re4 t-rns o-t to !e 3-st the tradition of mankind as developed in a -ni'-e historical process -p to the present day.1 .his /o-ld make h-manity the !est ill-stration of @iet<sche4s dict-m that 1only that /hich has no history is defina!le.1G1H (rom the very !e"innin", people have tried to define h-manity !y clarifyin" the differences !et/een h-mans and those creat-res and thin"s /ith /hich /e share this planet. 2"ain and a"ain in the *estern tradition, /e h-mans have ass-red o-rselves that /e are -ni'-e, separated from everythin" else !y special "ifts and '-alities. Made in 9od4s ima"e, possessors of a so-l, spirit-al as /ell as corporeal, h-mans stood apart from and a!ove the rest of the earth. B-t ho/ever firmly they may have !elieved in these anthropocentric !arriers, people have al/ays !een fascinated !y the tho-"ht of crossin" them. Since ancient times, poets have /ritten a!o-t h-mans /ho take on animal form and animals that seem to act like h-mans. .here is a special place in the literat-re of horror for creat-res d/ellin" in an intermediate <one !et/een the speciesC/ere/olves, vampires, and !easts in h-man shape. People have also /ondered a!o-t the creatin" of h-man life from nonlivin" thin"s, the task Py"malion accomplished /ith art and, cent-ries later, 5r. (rankenstein achieved /ith sciA B &L$ B ence. )n recent times, machines that ass-me the "-ise of h-mans have taken their place alon"side !iolo"ical monsters in the /orld of fantasy.G&H 2s lon" as the frontiers protectin" h-manity4s -ni'-eness /ere "-aranteed !y divine a-thority, ima"es of h-man e+ile and nonh-man infiltration co-ld remain in the realm of metaphor or ima"ination. B-t /hen h-mans lost their heavenly patron, the !o-ndaries of h-manity !ecame m-ch more pro!lematic. .he mechanistic cosmolo"ies that developed in the seventeenth and ei"hteenth cent-ries offered e+planations of the entire material /orld, incl-din" h-man !ein"s. )n the nineteenth cent-ry, 5ar/in and his follo/ers demonstrated that h-man evol-tion /as part ofCand s-!3ect to the same la/s asC the rest of nat-re. ;ookin" !ack on this process in 19&J, 2lfred @orth *hitehead /rote, 1Man, /ho at times dreamt of himself as a little lo/er than the an"els, has s-!mitted to !ecome the servant and minister of nat-re. . . . )t still remains to !e seen /hether the same actor can play !oth parts.1 @either part !ecame easier to play in the s-cceedin" decades as the scientific assa-lt on h-man -ni'-eness steadily intensified. 1.he t-rf separatin" animal and machine is shrinkin",1 Melvin 6onner recently /rote, 1and it is only h-man to /onder /hether there /ill al/ays !e a place for -s, and -s alone, to stand.1G#H 2s /e have seen in this vol-me, !oth socio!iolo"y and artificial intelli"ence directly challen"e the concept of h-man -ni'-eness. *hile neither '-estions that there are important differences !et/een h-mans and animals and h-mans and machines, each insists that h-mans can !est !e -nderstood if /e ackno/led"e o-r essential kinship /ith these other entities. 1Homo sa#iens ,1 accordin" to 8d/ard *ilson, 1is a conventional animal species.1 )n a parallel statement, 2llen @e/ell ar"-es that 1o-r minds

are a technolo"yClike other technolo"ies in !ein" a set of mechanisms for the ro-tine sol-tion of a class of pro!lems.1 .o the socio!iolo"ist, animals can !e sho/n to possess many of those '-alities traditionally held to !e distinctively h-manClan"-a"e, emotions, social str-ct-re. *ilson !elieves that 1civili<ation is not intrinsically limited to h-manoids. =nly !y accident /as it linked to the anatomy of !areskinned, !ipedal mammals and the pec-liar '-alities of h-man nat-re.1GFH Similarly, some advocates of artificial intelli"ence !elieve that it /ill !e possi!le to create machines at least e'-al and very likely s-perior to h-man intelli"ence. =f co-rse, not everyone is s-re that this /ill !e alto"ether a "ood thin": =nce artificial intelli"ences start "ettin" smart, they are "oin" to "et smart very fast. *hat4s taken h-mans and their society tens of tho-sands of years is "oin" to !e a matter of ho-rs /ith artificial intelli"ences. )f that happens at Stanford, say, the Stanford 2) la! may have immense po/er all of a B &L1 B s-dden. )t4s not that the United States mi"ht take over the /orld, it4s that Stanford4s 2l ;a! mi"ht.GJH .h-s, 8d/ard (redkin, of M).. (redkin4s some/hat facetio-s remark -nderscores the fact that socio!iolo"y and artificial intelli"ence have instit-tional locations, internal politics, and distinctive disciplinary c-lt-res. .he profo-nd conflicts that these enterprises have "neeratedCconflicts /ithin the disciplines themselves, as /ell as !et/een their advocates and criticsCare sim-ltaneo-sly scientific and personal, empirical and philosophical, methodolo"ical and ideolo"ical. S-ch conflicts may !e especially characteristic of scientific disciplines d-rin" their formative period, /hen internal str-""les for intellect-al leadership often coincide /ith e+ternal str-""les for reco"nition and le"itimacy. @or sho-ld /e overlook the fact that there is a "reat deal at stake in these str-""les: research s-pport and fac-lty !illets, scholarly presti"e and p-!lic infl-ence.GLH 2t the core of socio!iolo"y and 2) are po/erf-lly comple+ and re/ardin" pro"rams for empirical research. .hese pro"rams are connected /ith and s-stained !y some of the most important theoretical and technolo"cial discoveries made in the past fifty years: sociolo"y, as /e have seen, dra/s on "enetics, pop-lation !iolo"y, and animal !ehavior: 2), on comp-ter science and co"nitive psycholo"y. 9iven the t/o disciplines4 accomplishments and connections, it is not s-rprisin" that some of their practitioners have developed am!itions /ell !eyond the empirical limits of their research pro"rams. *ilson, for e+ample, ima"ines socio!iolo"y as a 1ne/ synthesis,1 /hich /ill provide 1the most direct !rid"e from the nat-ral sciences to the st-dy of h-man nat-re and thence to the social sciences.1 2t times, *ilson has /ritten as if he /ere prepared to coloni<e not only psycholo"y and sociolo"y !-t also s-ch normative disciplines as moral philosophy: 1Scientists and h-manists sho-ld consider to"ether the s-""estion that the time has come for ethics to !e removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and !iolo"i<ed.1 )n his essay for this vol-me, 2llen @e/ell seems to approach a similar position from a different direction. 2 -nified, mechanistic science is !ecomin" increasin"ly possi!le, he !elieves, !eca-se of 1the ama<in" emer"ence of !iolo"y to match in po/er and ele"ance the older physical sciences1 and the parallel a!ility of artifical intelli"ence to create a theory of mind.G0H )n makin" these claims, scientists liek *ilson and @e/ell seem to !e operatin" /ithin t/o po/erf-l modern traditions. .he first, /hich "oes !ack at least to the ei"hteenth cent-ry, incl-des thinkers like ;a Mettrie, (e-er!ach, Mar+, @iet<sche, and (re-d, all of /hom so-"ht to reveal h-manity4s tr-e nat-ral essence !y strippin" a/ay the final resid-es of

B &L& B spirit-al ill-sion. .he fervor /ith /hich some modern researchers insist on the !iolo"ical !asis of !ehavior or the technolo"ical character of tho-"ht reminds -s that they are still locked in a lon", t/ili"ht str-""le a"ainst the so-l. @o less important than this str-""le, ho/ever, has !een the desire to replace spirit-al ill-sions /ith scientifically !ased val-es. .his, too, is a tradition that reaches !ack to the 8nli"htenment, /hen thinkers !e"an to t-rn to o-r apparently certain kno/led"e a!o-t nat-re for models to replace o-r manifestly imperfect -nderstandin" of h-manity. Since the ei"hteenth cent-ry, science has increasin"ly !ecome the most si"nificant so-rce of o-r 1s-stainin" myths,1 /hich are no/, in Stephen .o-lmin4s phrase, 1not so m-ch anthropomorphic as mechanomorphic.1 >ie/ed historically, socio!iolo"y and 2) appear to !e the most recent in a lon" series of attempts to create a synthesis of science and val-e that /o-ld at once e+plain the nat-ral /orld and "-ide h-man affairs.G%H 8ven many of those /ho appla-d socio!iolo"y and 2) as research pro"rams '-estion their partisans4 am!itions to provide a ne/ scientific synthesis. Stephen Jay 9o-ld, for instance, does not do-!t the -sef-lness of socio!iolo"ical st-dies of nonh-man animals, !-t he is skeptical that socio!iolo"y can say anythin" very 1interestin"1 a!o-t h-man !ehavior. )nstead, the 1/orst e+cesses1 of socio!iolo"y appear /hen it is applied to h-mans, in part !eca-se 1/e have so little data a!o-t a slo/A!reedin" species that cannot !e overtly manip-lated for e+perimental p-rposes,1 in part !eca-se 1the non"enetic process of c-lt-ral evol-tion often mimics $he res-lts of 5ar/inian D"eneticE adaptation.1 B-t despite these inherent methodolo"ical diffic-lties, 1o-r inordinate interest in Homo sa#iens 1 tempts -s to accept socio!iolo"y4s cr-de spec-lations /itho-t demandin" the same scientific ri"or /e /o-ld e+pect in the st-dy of other species.G9H Critics of 2) are e'-ally dist-r!ed !y the inflated am!itions of some of the discipline4s spokesmen. Seymo-r Ppaert, himself a distin"-ished researcher in the field, /arns his collea"-es a!o-t 3-mpin" from an analysis of one sort of mental activity to an analysis of the 1mind1 as a /hole. .his is, he !elieves, 1a cate"ory error1 !eca-se it s-pposes 1that the e+istence of a common mechanism provides !oth an e+planation and a -nification of all systems, ho/ever comple+, in /hich this mechanism mi"ht play a central role.1 C. S. Peirce made a similar point in more "eneral terms /hen he noted, 1.here is no "reater nor more fre'-ent mistake in practical lo"ic than to s-ppose that thin"s that resem!le one another stron"ly in some respects are any more likely for that to !e alike in others.1 .he fact that !oth h-mans and machines can learn to play chess may s-""est a n-m!er of interestin" thin"s a!o-t the h-man !rain and mechanical intelli"ence, !-t it does not s-""est that the t/o are necessarily alike in any other /ays.G1$H B &L# B )n an ast-te and lar"ely sympathetic e+amination of comp-ters and c-lt-re, 5avid Bolter points o-t that it is /ron" to e'-ate 2) models of mind /ith physicists4 models of nat-re. .he pro!lem here is that the artificial intelli"ence specialist has nothin" !-t a model. ,avin" a!andoned the idea tha telectronic circ-its can !e made to mirror the or"ani<ation of h-man ne-rons, he has no nat-ral phenomena left to st-dy. . . . G*Hhat can the comp-ter pro"rammer find in the !rain or the mind of /hich his !inary coded instr-ctions are a modelK .here can !e no science of mind compara!le to physics, Bolter maintains. .here can only !e 1metaphors that capt-re more or less aptly o-r mental e+periences.1 5espite their claims to model or

mimic the mind, comp-ter scientists have done no more than create a richly s-""estive and c-lt-rally resonant metaphor that can help -s to thinka !o-t /hat it means to think.G11H 7ichard ;e/ontin ar"-es that socio!iolo"y also rests on a metaphorical fo-ndation. .o talk a!o-t animal !ehavior in h-man terms characteristically involves /hat he calls 1a process of !ack/ard etymolo"y1 thro-"h /hich 1h-man social instit-tions are laid on animals, metaphorically, and then the h-man !ehavior is rederived from the animals as if it /ere a special case of a "eneral phenomenon that had !een independently discovered in other species.1 .his !ack/ard etymolo"y can lead in some very odd directions. (or e+ample, after readin" 2nne (a-stoASterlin"4s analysis of 5avid Barash4s description of 1rape1 amon" d-cks, it is diffic-lt not to a"ree /ith her concl-sion that 1socio!iolo"ists do stran"e thin"s /ith lan"-a"e.1 B-t /hile the case of the rapist d-ck may !e an e+treme instance of socio!iolo"ists4 lin"-istic eccentricity, it does can to o-r attention an endemic diffic-lty in the discipline: socio!iolo"ists can only descri!e the kind of animal !ehavior in /hich they are interested !y -sin" the lan"-a"e of h-man social action. 2nd !eca-se this lan"-a"e is f-ndamentally anthropocentric, it inevita!ly imposes h-man cate"ories on nonh-man actions. .his is /hy 9o-ld is correct to insist that 1/e cannot /rite, st-dy, or even conceive of other creat-res, e+cept in overt or implied comparison /ith o-rselves.1 J-st as specialists in 2) cannot find a 1mind1 /ith /hich to test their model, so sociolo"ists cannot create an alternative voca!-lary /ith /hich to test their assertion that h-man and animal !ehaviors are alike.G1&H *. >. O-ine once o!served that metaphorical thinkin" is especially apparent alon" 1the philosophical frin"es of science,1 /here 1old idioms are !o-nd to fail . . . and only metaphor can !e"in to limn the ne/ order.1 .he history of science s-""ests that these metaphors can develop in t/o directions. Sometimes, they can !e a!sor!ed !y the research pro"rams they helped to stim-late: they are then replaced !y empirically B &LF B !ased models e+pressed in /hat O-ine calls a 1literalistic idiom.1 .his is /hat happened to the metaphor of the !ody as a 1heat en"ine.1 B-t some scientific metaphors develop a life of their o/n, ne+t to or separate from a disciplinary research pro"ram. S-stained !y political, social, and c-lt-ral forces, the most important of these !ecome /hat Stephen Pepper named 1root metaphors,1 ima"es of s-ch scope and a-thority that they provide the !asis for -niversally applica!le e+planations of the /orld. )n !oth its nineteenthA and t/entiethAcent-ry form-lations, 5ar/inism !eca-se s-ch a root metaphor. .he same thin" seems to !e happenin" to the comp-ter, the machine that has replaced clock and en"ine as o-r most potent technolo"ical metaphor.G1#H Socio!iolo"y and artificial intelli"ence are still on 1the philosophical frin"es of science,1 /here they make t/o very different claims to o-r attention. 2s research pro"rams, they prod-ce important information and hypotheses a!o-t the nat-ral /orld. 2s metaphors, they dra/ on and help to shape o-r ans/ers to the persistent '-estion of /hat it means to !e h-man.

Notes
.ENER"# INTRO-U!TION
1. 7o!ert ;o-is Stevenson, The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde D=+ford and @e/ Iork: =+ford University Press, 19%0E, LJAL0. =n the dichotomi<in" tendency /hich >ictorian c-lt-re, see *alter 8. ,o-"hton, The :ictorian 0rame of Mind, >?FG!>?@G D@e/ ,aven and ;ondon: Iale

University Press, 19J0E, 1L&, and 5aniel Joseph Sin"al, The %ar %ithin: 0rom :ictorian to Modernist Thought in the South, >A>A!>AHD DChapel ,ill: University of @orth Carolina PressE, J, &LA&9. &. Stephen 7. 9ra-!ard, 1Preface to the )ss-e, 42rtificial )ntelli"ence,41 Daedalus 110 D*inter 19%%E: v. !reak

$RO#O.UE/ M"+IN. SENSE O HUM"NITY

1. See Patrick Bateson, 1Biolo"ical 2pproaches to the St-dy of Behavio-ral 5evelopment,1 &nternational Journal of Beha6ioural De6elo#ment 1$ D19%0E, to /hich ) o/e the e+ample of the t-rtle e""s. &. See 7ichard M. Smith, 1.ransfer )ncomes, 7isk and Sec-rity: .he 7oles of the (amily and the Collectivity and 7ecent .heories of (ertility Chan"e,1 in 5avid Coleman and 7o"er Schofield, eds., The State of (o#ulation Theory: 0or/ard from Malthus D=+ford: Black/ell, 19%LE. #. John Searle has s-""ested this in Minds, Brains and Science DCam!rid"e: ,arvard University Press, 19%JE. !reak F. .his ar"-ment has !een forcef-lly developed !y Charles .aylor in articles collected in his Human Agency and 3anguage DCam!rid"e and @e/ Iork: Cam!rid"e University Press, 19%JE. J. 2dvocates of this kind of research often claim that the only alternative to their pro"ram lies in s-perstition and mystification: Marvin Minsky4s !ook The Society of Mind D@e/ Iork: Simon and Sch-ster, 19%LE provides some Drelatively mildE e+amples of this rhetoric. L. .he most e+treme of these !elievers are Pa-l Ch-rchland and Patricia Ch-rchland, /ho once said that folk psycholo"y 1is a sta"nant or de"eneratin" research pro"ram, and has !een for millennia.1 2n e+tended statement may !e fo-nd in Patricia Ch-rchland, $euro#hiloso#hy DCam!rid"e: M). Press, 19%LE. 2 more moderate line is taken !y Stephen Stich in his !ook 0rom 0olk (sychology to Cogniti6e Science DCam!irid"e: M). Press, 19%#E. 0. 2 related point is central to 5onald 5avidson4s treatment of ca-sality: see -ssays on Actions and -6ents D=+ford: Clarendon Press, 19%$E. %. 2 detailed and very effective ar"-ment is provided !y Jennifer ,orns!y4s 1Physicalist .hinkin" and Concepts of Behavio-r,1 in Philip Pettit and John Mc5o/ell, eds., Su"2ect, Thought and Conte.t D=+ford: Clarendon Press, 19%LE. 9. 7ecent disc-ssion has !een shaped !y ,ilary P-tnam4s important article, 1.he Meanin" of 4Meanin".41 reprinted in his Mind, 3anguage and 1eality DCam!rid"e: Cam!rid"e University Press, 190JE. .he iss-es are set o-t in the introd-ction to Pettit and Mc5o/ell, Su"2ect, Thought and Conte.t . 1$. .he doctrine is /eaker than several that co-ld !e e+pressed in those /ords. ) have "iven some acco-nt of it in 1(ormal and S-!stantial )ndivid-alism,1 (roceedings of the Aristotelian Society %J D19%F %JE. 11. 2r"-ments on these points are /ell deployed in 5avid ,illelA7-!en, The Meta#hysics of the Social %orld D;ondon: 7o-tled"e U 6e"an Pa-l, 19%JE !reak

One2 Introdu0tion
1. (or an analysis of this paintin", see 7o!ert 8ssick, %illiam Blake and the 3anguage of Adam D=+ford: Clarendon Press, 19%9E. &. .here iss-es are treated in John Passmore, Man,s 1es#onsi"ility for $ature: -cological (ro"lems

and %estern Traditions D;ondon: Charles Scri!ner4s Sons, 190FE. #. =n the role of animals in 9reek reli"ion, see *alter B-rkert, Structure and History in *reek Mythology and 1itual DBerkeley, ;os 2n"eles, ;ondon: University of California Press, 1909E and J. P. >ernant, 1Bet/een the Beasts and the 9ods,1 in Myth and Society in Ancient *reece D,assocks, S-sse+: 19%$E. .here is a fine analysis of 2ristotle in 9. 8. 7. ;loyd, Science, 0olklore, and &deology: Studies in the 3ife Sciences in Ancient *reece DCam!rid"e: Cam!rid"e University Press, 19%#E. F. 6eith .homas, Man and the $atural %orld: A History of the Modern Sensi"ility D@e/ Iork: Pantheon Books, 19%#E, &1: Clarence 9lacken, Traces on the rhodian Shore: $ature and Culture from Ancient Times to the -nd of the -ighteen Century DBerkeley and ;os 2n"eles: University of California Press, 19L0E, FL#. J. .homas, Man and the $atural %orld, 9, 1F$. L. )!id., %9. 2s ,arriet 7itvo4s contri!-tion to this vol-me makes clear, in the nineteenth cent-ry this tendency to anthropomorphi<e nat-re /as translated into a more appropriate voca!-lary. J. .homas, Man and the $atural %orld, 9, 1F$. L. )!id., %9. 2s ,arriet 7itvo4s contri!-tion to this vol-me makes clear, in the nineteenth cent-ry this tendency to anthropomorphi<e nat-re /as translated into a more appropriate voca!-lary. 0. Mary Mid"ley, Beast and Man: The 1oots of Human $ature D)thaca: Cornell University Press, 190%E, &1$: J.AJ. 7o-ssea-, A Discourse on &ne'uality D@e/ Iork: Pen"-in Books, 19%FE, %0. %. 2. =. ;ove3oy, The *reat Chain of Being DCam!rid"e: ,arvard University Press, 19#LE, 19JA19L, 199. 9. See ;ove3oy, *reat Chain of Being, Chap. @ine, and 5. 9. Charlton, $e/ &mages of the $atural in 0rance: A Study in -uro#ean Cultural History, >@DG!>?GG DCam!rid"e: Cam!rid"e University Press, 19%FE, esp. 00 ff. 1$. 5onald *orster, $ature,s -conomy: A History of -cological &deas DCam!rid"e: Cam!rid"e University Press, 1900E, 1%$: Philip 2ppeleman, ed., Dar/in: A $orton Critical -dition D@e/ Iork: @orton, 1909E, 1&%, 1#$. !reak 11. .here is a -sef-l collection of 5ar/in4s /ritin" on this s-!3ect edited !y 2le+ander 2lland, Human $ature: Dar/in,s :ie/ D@e/ Iork: Col-m!ia University Press, 19%JE. .he '-ottion is from p. 1J#. 1&. 2ppleman, Dar/in, &$%. 1#. .here is a sympathetic disc-ssion of etholo"y in Melvin 6onner, The Tangled %ing: Biological Constraint on the Human S#irit D@e/ Iork: ,olt, 7inehart, and *inston, 19%&E, 1F# ff. .he ;oren< '-otation is from 2rth-r ;. Caplan, ed., The Socio"iology De"ate: 1eadings on -thical and Scientific &ssues D@e/ Iork: ,arper and 7o/, 190%E, 0&. 1F. 8d/ard =. *ilson, +n Human $ature D@e/ Iork: Bantam Books, 1909E, &#$. .he Caplan collection 3-st cited provides a "ood introd-ction to the discipline and its critics. 1J. 6onner, Tangled %ing, 1L: 2ppeleman, Dar/in, &$%. !reak \ 2mon" the many people /ho have offered comments and s-""estions on earlier versions of this chapter, ) am especially "ratef-l to 5aniel Br-dney, @ancy Cart/ri"ht, J-stice Cassell, Stanley Cavell, ;orraine 5aston, Peter 9alison, Jan 9oldstein, Joel Snyder, 5avid *ell!ery, and the editors of this vol-me.

T3o2 The Horror of Monsters4

1. ;-cien (e!vre, 1Sensi!ility and ,istory: ,o/ to 7econstit-te the 8motional ;ife of the Past,1 in A $e/ =ind of History D;ondon: 7o-tled"e and 6e"an Pa-l, 190#E, &F. &. .his chapter is a fra"ment of a m-ch lon"er man-script entitled 1.he ,istory of ,orror: 2!ominations, Monsters, and the Unnat-ral.1 .hat man-script is a comparative historical analysis of the three concepts mentioned in the title, linkin" each of them to the reaction of horror and th-s takin" a first step to/ard /ritin" a history of horror. ) then -se this comparative history to consider !oth the phenomenolo"y of horror and its moral analysis, interlacin" historical and philosophical concerns thro-"ho-t. #. Jean 5el-mea-, 3a (eur en +ccident: 9ne citi5 assiegi5 DParis: (ayard, 190%E, and 3e (5ch5 et la #eur: 3a cul#a"ilisation en +ccident DParis: (ayard, 19%#E. F. (or -sef-l disc-ssion, see, amon" many others, Jac'-es ;e 9off, 1Mentalities: 2 ,istory of 2m!i"-ities,1 in Jac'-es ;e 9off and Pierre @ora, eds., Constructing the (ast DCam!rid"e: Cam!rid"e University Press, 19%JE: 7o!ert Mandro-, 1;4histoire des mentalit?s,1 in the article 1,istories,1 -ncyclo#edia 9ni6ersalis DParis: 8ncyclopedia Universalis (rance, 19L%E: Jean 5el-mea-, 15?christiani<ation o- no-vea- modVle de christianisme,1 Archi6es de Science sociales des 1eligion F$ DJ-illetAA5?cem!re 190JE: and Carlo 9in<!-r", The Cheese and the %orms D@e/ Iork: Pen"-in Books, 19%$E, 1Preface to the )talian 8dition.1 J. .his is emphasi<ed !y 2lphonse 5-pront in his seminal essay, 1Pro!l?mes et m?thodes d4-ne histoire de la psycholo"ie collective,1 Annales DJanvierAA(evrier 19L1E. L. ) have tried to do this for the history of se+-ality in 1,o/ to 5o the ,istory of Psychoanalysis: 2 7eadin" of (re-d4s Three -ssays on the Theory of contin-e Se.uality,C Critical &n'uiry D*inter 19%LE: 1Se+ and the 8mer"ence of Se+-ality,1 Critical &n'uiry D2-t-mn 19%0E: and 1Closin" Up the Corpses: 5iseases of Se+-ality and the 8mer"ence of the Psychiatric Style of 7easonin",1 forthcomin" in 9eor"e Boolos, ed., Mind, Method, and Meaning: -ssays in Honor of Hilary (utnam DCam!rid"e: Cam!rid"e University PressE. 0. See 5-pront, 1Pro!l?mes et m?thodes,1 9. %. Martin ;-ther, %erke D*eimar: ,. B]hla-, 19#$A19%JE, R):#0$A#%J. 9. )n my interpretation of this pamphlet, ) follo/ Jean C?ard, 3a $ature et les #rodiges D9eneva: ;i!rarie 5ro<, 1900E, 09A%F. 1$. Martin ;-ther and Phillip Melancthon, +f T/o %onderful (o#ish Monsters , trans. John Brooke. D)mprinted at ;ondon: Colophon, 1J09.E ) have moderni<ed spellin" and p-nct-ation. .he '-otation comes from the first pa"e of Brooke4s preface, /hich is -npa"inated in the 1J09 edition of the pamphlet. 11. )!id. 1&. )!id. .he '-otation comes from the second pa"e of Brooke4s preface. 1$. Martin ;-ther and Phillip Melancthon, +f T/o %onderful (o#ish Monsters , trans. John Brooke. D)mprinted at ;ondon: Colophon, 1J09.E ) have moderni<ed spellin" and p-nct-ation. .he '-otation comes from the first pa"e of Brooke4s preface, /hich is -npa"inated in the 1J09 edition of the pamphlet. 11. )!id. 1&. )!id. .he '-otation comes from the second pa"e of Brooke4s preface.

1$. Martin ;-ther and Phillip Melancthon, +f T/o %onderful (o#ish Monsters , trans. John Brooke. D)mprinted at ;ondon: Colophon, 1J09.E ) have moderni<ed spellin" and p-nct-ation. .he '-otation comes from the first pa"e of Brooke4s preface, /hich is -npa"inated in the 1J09 edition of the pamphlet. 11. )!id. 1&. )!id. .he '-otation comes from the second pa"e of Brooke4s preface. 1#. Jean 5el-mea-, 3e (5ch5 et la #eur , 1J#. 1F. ) am follo/in" 5el-mea-4s acco-nt here. )!id., 1J&A1J%. B-t chap. F as a /hole sho-ld !e read in this conte+t. 1J. O-oted in 5el-mea-, 3a (5ch5 et la #eur , 1JJ. 1L. 2m!roise Par?, Des monstres et #rodiges D8dition Criti'-e et comment?e par Jean C?ardE D9eneva: ;i!rarie 5ro<, 1901E. .here is an 8n"lish translation -nder the title +n Monsters and Mar6els DChica"o: University of Chica"o Press, 19%&E. ) have tried to follo/ the 8n"lish translation in my '-otations, !-t ) have altered in /henver ) felt it /as necessary to preserve Par?4s meanin". (or some ine+plica!le reason, the 8n"lish renders #rodiges as 1marvels1 rather than 1prodi"ies,1 a translation that cannot help !-t res-lt in o!f-scation. 10. Jean C?ard, 3a $ature et les #rodiges . 1%. 6atharine Park and ;orraine J. 5aston, 1Unnat-ral Conceptions: .he St-dy of Monsters in Si+teenthA and SeventeenthACent-ry (rance and 8n"land,1 (ast and (resent 9& D2-"-st 19%1E. (or some premedieval treatments of monsters, see Br-ce MacBain, (rodigy and -.#iation: A Study in 1eligion and (olitics in 1e#u"lican 1ome DCollection ;atom-s: Br-ssels, 19%&E: 7aymond Bloch, 3es #rodiges dans l,anti'uit5 classi'ue DParis: Presses Universitaire de (rance, 19L#E: and 8. ;eichty, 1.eratolo"ical =mens,1 in 3a Di6ination en M5so#otamine ancienne et dans les r5gions 6oisines DParis: Presses Universitaire de (rance, 19LLE. 19. .homas 2'-inas, The Summa Theologica Dliterally translated !y the (athers of the 8n"lish 5ominican ProvinceE D@e/ Iork: Ben<i"er BrothersE, Second Part of the Second Part, O-estion J# Second 2rticle. ) have "enerally follo/ed this translation, altho-"h in paraphrasin" 2'-inas, ) have also cons-lted the ;atin and facin"Apa"e 8n"lish translation of the Summa !y the Blackfrairs D@e/ Iork: Mc9ra/A,ill, 19LFA19%$E. ) have appropriated terminolo"y from each of the translations /hen ) tho-"ht it appropriate. &$. )!id., 1J0A1J%. &1. )!id., ))A)), O. 1JF, 2rt. 1&, 7eply. &&. )!id., 1L1. &#. )!id., ))A)), O. 1JF, 2rt. 1&, 7ep. =!3. F !reak &F. )!id., 1L$. 2 -sef-l disc-ssion of this part of 2'-inas can !e fo-nd in John Bos/ell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homose.uality DChica"o: University of Chica"o Press, 19%$E. See esp. chap. 11. 19. .homas 2'-inas, The Summa Theologica Dliterally translated !y the (athers of the 8n"lish 5ominican ProvinceE D@e/ Iork: Ben<i"er BrothersE, Second Part of the Second Part, O-estion J# Second 2rticle. ) have "enerally follo/ed this translation, altho-"h in paraphrasin" 2'-inas, ) have also cons-lted the ;atin and facin"Apa"e 8n"lish translation of the Summa !y the Blackfrairs D@e/ Iork: Mc9ra/A,ill, 19LFA19%$E. ) have appropriated terminolo"y from each of the translations /hen ) tho-"ht it appropriate.

&$. )!id., 1J0A1J%. &1. )!id., ))A)), O. 1JF, 2rt. 1&, 7eply. &&. )!id., 1L1. &#. )!id., ))A)), O. 1JF, 2rt. 1&, 7ep. =!3. F !reak &F. )!id., 1L$. 2 -sef-l disc-ssion of this part of 2'-inas can !e fo-nd in John Bos/ell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homose.uality DChica"o: University of Chica"o Press, 19%$E. See esp. chap. 11. 19. .homas 2'-inas, The Summa Theologica Dliterally translated !y the (athers of the 8n"lish 5ominican ProvinceE D@e/ Iork: Ben<i"er BrothersE, Second Part of the Second Part, O-estion J# Second 2rticle. ) have "enerally follo/ed this translation, altho-"h in paraphrasin" 2'-inas, ) have also cons-lted the ;atin and facin"Apa"e 8n"lish translation of the Summa !y the Blackfrairs D@e/ Iork: Mc9ra/A,ill, 19LFA19%$E. ) have appropriated terminolo"y from each of the translations /hen ) tho-"ht it appropriate. &$. )!id., 1J0A1J%. &1. )!id., ))A)), O. 1JF, 2rt. 1&, 7eply. &&. )!id., 1L1. &#. )!id., ))A)), O. 1JF, 2rt. 1&, 7ep. =!3. F !reak &F. )!id., 1L$. 2 -sef-l disc-ssion of this part of 2'-inas can !e fo-nd in John Bos/ell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homose.uality DChica"o: University of Chica"o Press, 19%$E. See esp. chap. 11. 19. .homas 2'-inas, The Summa Theologica Dliterally translated !y the (athers of the 8n"lish 5ominican ProvinceE D@e/ Iork: Ben<i"er BrothersE, Second Part of the Second Part, O-estion J# Second 2rticle. ) have "enerally follo/ed this translation, altho-"h in paraphrasin" 2'-inas, ) have also cons-lted the ;atin and facin"Apa"e 8n"lish translation of the Summa !y the Blackfrairs D@e/ Iork: Mc9ra/A,ill, 19LFA19%$E. ) have appropriated terminolo"y from each of the translations /hen ) tho-"ht it appropriate. &$. )!id., 1J0A1J%. &1. )!id., ))A)), O. 1JF, 2rt. 1&, 7eply. &&. )!id., 1L1. &#. )!id., ))A)), O. 1JF, 2rt. 1&, 7ep. =!3. F !reak &F. )!id., 1L$. 2 -sef-l disc-ssion of this part of 2'-inas can !e fo-nd in John Bos/ell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homose.uality DChica"o: University of Chica"o Press, 19%$E. See esp. chap. 11. 19. .homas 2'-inas, The Summa Theologica Dliterally translated !y the (athers of the 8n"lish 5ominican ProvinceE D@e/ Iork: Ben<i"er BrothersE, Second Part of the Second Part, O-estion J# Second 2rticle. ) have "enerally follo/ed this translation, altho-"h in paraphrasin" 2'-inas, ) have also cons-lted the ;atin and facin"Apa"e 8n"lish translation of the Summa !y the Blackfrairs D@e/ Iork: Mc9ra/A,ill, 19LFA19%$E. ) have appropriated terminolo"y from each of the translations /hen ) tho-"ht it appropriate. &$. )!id., 1J0A1J%. &1. )!id., ))A)), O. 1JF, 2rt. 1&, 7eply. &&. )!id., 1L1. &#. )!id., ))A)), O. 1JF, 2rt. 1&, 7ep. =!3. F !reak

&F. )!id., 1L$. 2 -sef-l disc-ssion of this part of 2'-inas can !e fo-nd in John Bos/ell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homose.uality DChica"o: University of Chica"o Press, 19%$E. See esp. chap. 11. 19. .homas 2'-inas, The Summa Theologica Dliterally translated !y the (athers of the 8n"lish 5ominican ProvinceE D@e/ Iork: Ben<i"er BrothersE, Second Part of the Second Part, O-estion J# Second 2rticle. ) have "enerally follo/ed this translation, altho-"h in paraphrasin" 2'-inas, ) have also cons-lted the ;atin and facin"Apa"e 8n"lish translation of the Summa !y the Blackfrairs D@e/ Iork: Mc9ra/A,ill, 19LFA19%$E. ) have appropriated terminolo"y from each of the translations /hen ) tho-"ht it appropriate. &$. )!id., 1J0A1J%. &1. )!id., ))A)), O. 1JF, 2rt. 1&, 7eply. &&. )!id., 1L1. &#. )!id., ))A)), O. 1JF, 2rt. 1&, 7ep. =!3. F !reak &F. )!id., 1L$. 2 -sef-l disc-ssion of this part of 2'-inas can !e fo-nd in John Bos/ell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homose.uality DChica"o: University of Chica"o Press, 19%$E. See esp. chap. 11. &J. 2m!roise Par?, +n Monsters and Mar6els , #. )@ 1J09, Par? added a third cate"ory to that of monsters and marvels, namely, the maimed D les multile) E. ) shall not disc-ss this cate"ory, since, as C?ard notes, after the preface, Par? no lon"er -ses the concept of the maimed. See 2m!roise Par?, Des monstres et #rodiges , 1J1. &L. Jean C?ard, 3a $ature et les #rodiges , #$FA#$J. &0. =n this topic, see St-art Clark, 1.he Scientific Stat-s of 5emonolo"y,1 in Brian >ickers, ed., +ccult and Scientific Mentalities in the 1enaissance DCam!rid"e: Cam!rid"e University Press, 19%FE. &%. Par?, +n Monsters , 1J&. &9. C?ard, 3a $ature et les #rodiges , &9#A&9J. #$. Par?, +n Monsters , J. )n this chapter, Par? also considers the monsters that are prod-ced /hen a man cop-lates /ith a /oman d-rin" her period: he analo"i<es s-ch activitiy to !estiality, since 1it is a filthy and !r-tish thin" to have dealin"s /ith a /oman /hile she is p-rin" herself.1 *itho-t disc-ssin" this important topic here, ) simply note that the same chapte of ;evitic-s /hich prohi!its !estiality also prohi!its interco-rse /ith a /oman d-rin" her period Dthe relevant chapter is ;evitic-s 1%, not 1L as Par? statesE. #1. Par?, Des monstres , chap. )R. .his chapter appears as chap. RR in the 8n"lish translation. #&. Par?, +n Monsters , L0. ##. )!id., 0#. #&. Par?, +n Monsters , L0. ##. )!id., 0#. #F. See 5el-mea-, 3a (5ch5 et la #eur , 1JL. #J. O-oted in John Block (riedman, The Monstrous 1aces in Medie6al Art and Thought DCam!rid"e: ,arvard University Press, 19%1E, 1%&. (riedman4s !ook is a -sef-l introd-ction to the topic of monstro-s races, a topic ) shall not disc-ss here. #L. Par?, +n Monsters , %. #0. (or an 8n"lish e+ample, see John Sadler4s The Sicke %oman,s (ri6ate 3ooking!*lasse , relevant

portions of /hich are e+cerpted in Par?, +n Monsters , 10FA10L. #%. ;orraine 5aston, 1.he 5ecline of Miracles.1 Unp-!. ms., 1&. #9. Par?, +n Monsters , L9. .he practice of killin" !oth the h-man !ein" and the !east involved in !estial cop-lation has a lon" history that "oes !ack to the la/ of ;evitic-s &$: 1JA1L. ) have !een a!le to find a fe/ e+ceptions /here the !east /as spared. .he most interestin" of these e+ceptions is reported as follo/s: 8. P. 8vans states that at >anvres in 1J0$ one Jac'-es >errons /as h-n" for cop-latin" /ith a sheAass. .he animal /as ac'-itted on the "ro-nds that she /as in a victim of violence and had not participated of her o/n free /ill. .he prior of the local convent and several citi<ens of the to/n si"ned a certificate sayin" that they had kno/n said sheAass for fo-r years, and that she had al/ays sho/n herself to !e virt-o-s !oth at home and a!road and had never "iven occasion of scandal to anyone. .his doc-ment /as prod-ced at the trial and is said to have e+erted a decisive infl-ence -pon the 3-d"ment of the co-rt. O-oted in ,arry ,offner, 1)ncest, Sodomy and Bestiality in the 2ncient @ear 8ast,1 ,arry ,offner, ed., +rient and +ccident , Band && of Alter +rient und Altes contin-e Testament D9ermany: >erla" B-t<on U Bercker 6evelaer, 190#E, %#, fn. 1#. .his e+ceptional case sho-ld not misdirect one to think that trials for !estiality re'-ired the ascription of normal responsi!ility to animals. (or disc-ssion, see J. J. (inkelstein, The +. that *ored , esp. L9A0&. F$. 8d/ard .yson, 12 7elation of t/o Monstro-s Pi"s, /ith the 7esem!lance of ,-man (aces, and t/o yo-n" .-rkeys 3oined !y the Breast,1 (hiloso#hical Transactions of the 1oyal Society RR) D1LL9E: F#1. ) have moderni<ed spellin" and p-nct-ation. F1. )!id., F#F. F$. 8d/ard .yson, 12 7elation of t/o Monstro-s Pi"s, /ith the 7esem!lance of ,-man (aces, and t/o yo-n" .-rkeys 3oined !y the Breast,1 (hiloso#hical Transactions of the 1oyal Society RR) D1LL9E: F#1. ) have moderni<ed spellin" and p-nct-ation. F1. )!id., F#F. F&. Both .reves4s memoir and the relevant medical reports are reprinted in 2shley Monta"-, The -le#hant Man D@e/ Iork: 8. P. 5-tton, 1909E. F#. See 2'-inas4s disc-ssion in Summa Theologica , )A)), O. 91, 2rt. &, and O. 9F. FF. ) have taken my list from 2rt. ), Sect. F, of S. .issot, 3,+nanisme, Dissertation sur les maladies #roduites #ar la mastur"ation , Jth ed. D;a-sanne: Marc Chap-is, 10%$E. .issot4s list is entirely representative of other ei"hteenthAcent-ry disc-ssions. 2n 8n"lish translation of .issot4s !ook appeared in 1%#&: Treatise on the Diseases (roduced "y +nanism D@e/ Iork: Collins and ,ennay, 1%#&E. ) have often fo-nd it necessary to modify the 8n"lish translation. (or disc-ssions of the mast-r!ation literat-re, see .. .arc<ylo, 1;4 +nanisme de .issot,1 Di.!huitiIme SiIcle 1& D19%$E, and Se.e et li"ert5 au siIcle des 3umiIres DParis: Presses de la 7enaissance, 19%#E: J. Sten"ers and 2. >an @eck, Histoire d,une grande #eur: 3a mastur"ation DBr-ssels: 8ditions de l4Universite de Br-+elles, 19%FE. FJ. 2 representative e+ample is 2lfred ,itchcock, 1)nsanity and 5eath from Mast-r!ation,1 Boston Medical and Surgical Journal &L D1%F&E. FL. .issot, 3,+nanisme , ##. F0. See, e."., the last para"raph of the introd-ction to 3,+nanisme . F%. )!id., #.

F9. )!id., 1&1. F0. See, e."., the last para"raph of the introd-ction to 3,+nanisme . F%. )!id., #. F9. )!id., 1&1. F0. See, e."., the last para"raph of the introd-ction to 3,+nanisme . F%. )!id., #. F9. )!id., 1&1. J$. Pierre 9-ira-d, Dictionnaire histori'ue, stylisti'ue, rh5tori'ue, 5tymologi'ue, de la litt5rature 5roti'ue DParis: Payot, 190%E, 0L. J1. )!id., &1J. J$. Pierre 9-ira-d, Dictionnaire histori'ue, stylisti'ue, rh5tori'ue, 5tymologi'ue, de la litt5rature 5roti'ue DParis: Payot, 190%E, 0L. J1. )!id., &1J. J&. 2m!roise .ardie-, tude m5dico!l5gale sur les attentats au. moeurs , SeptiVme ?d. DParis: J. B. BalliVre, 1%0%E, 19%. .he cate"ory of sodomy has proven notorio-sly fle+i!le and has !een -sed to encompass a variety of activities. ,o/ever, despite the fle+i!ility, ) !elieve that this cate"ory has more concept-al -nity than has sometimes !een attri!-ted to it. ) disc-ss this iss-e in the man-script of /hich this chapter is an e+cerpt. J#. )!id., &JJ. JF. )!id., 19J. JJ. )!id., &#0. JL. )!id., &#L. J0. )!id., &J%. J%. )!id., &L$. J&. 2m!roise .ardie-, tude m5dico!l5gale sur les attentats au. moeurs , SeptiVme ?d. DParis: J. B. BalliVre, 1%0%E, 19%. .he cate"ory of sodomy has proven notorio-sly fle+i!le and has !een -sed to encompass a variety of activities. ,o/ever, despite the fle+i!ility, ) !elieve that this cate"ory has more concept-al -nity than has sometimes !een attri!-ted to it. ) disc-ss this iss-e in the man-script of /hich this chapter is an e+cerpt. J#. )!id., &JJ. JF. )!id., 19J. JJ. )!id., &#0. JL. )!id., &#L. J0. )!id., &J%. J%. )!id., &L$. J&. 2m!roise .ardie-, tude m5dico!l5gale sur les attentats au. moeurs , SeptiVme ?d. DParis: J. B. BalliVre, 1%0%E, 19%. .he cate"ory of sodomy has proven notorio-sly fle+i!le and has !een -sed to encompass a variety of activities. ,o/ever, despite the fle+i!ility, ) !elieve that this cate"ory has more

concept-al -nity than has sometimes !een attri!-ted to it. ) disc-ss this iss-e in the man-script of /hich this chapter is an e+cerpt. J#. )!id., &JJ. JF. )!id., 19J. JJ. )!id., &#0. JL. )!id., &#L. J0. )!id., &J%. J%. )!id., &L$. J&. 2m!roise .ardie-, tude m5dico!l5gale sur les attentats au. moeurs , SeptiVme ?d. DParis: J. B. BalliVre, 1%0%E, 19%. .he cate"ory of sodomy has proven notorio-sly fle+i!le and has !een -sed to encompass a variety of activities. ,o/ever, despite the fle+i!ility, ) !elieve that this cate"ory has more concept-al -nity than has sometimes !een attri!-ted to it. ) disc-ss this iss-e in the man-script of /hich this chapter is an e+cerpt. J#. )!id., &JJ. JF. )!id., 19J. JJ. )!id., &#0. JL. )!id., &#L. J0. )!id., &J%. J%. )!id., &L$. J&. 2m!roise .ardie-, tude m5dico!l5gale sur les attentats au. moeurs , SeptiVme ?d. DParis: J. B. BalliVre, 1%0%E, 19%. .he cate"ory of sodomy has proven notorio-sly fle+i!le and has !een -sed to encompass a variety of activities. ,o/ever, despite the fle+i!ility, ) !elieve that this cate"ory has more concept-al -nity than has sometimes !een attri!-ted to it. ) disc-ss this iss-e in the man-script of /hich this chapter is an e+cerpt. J#. )!id., &JJ. JF. )!id., 19J. JJ. )!id., &#0. JL. )!id., &#L. J0. )!id., &J%. J%. )!id., &L$. J&. 2m!roise .ardie-, tude m5dico!l5gale sur les attentats au. moeurs , SeptiVme ?d. DParis: J. B. BalliVre, 1%0%E, 19%. .he cate"ory of sodomy has proven notorio-sly fle+i!le and has !een -sed to encompass a variety of activities. ,o/ever, despite the fle+i!ility, ) !elieve that this cate"ory has more concept-al -nity than has sometimes !een attri!-ted to it. ) disc-ss this iss-e in the man-script of /hich this chapter is an e+cerpt. J#. )!id., &JJ. JF. )!id., 19J. JJ. )!id., &#0.

JL. )!id., &#L. J0. )!id., &J%. J%. )!id., &L$. J&. 2m!roise .ardie-, tude m5dico!l5gale sur les attentats au. moeurs , SeptiVme ?d. DParis: J. B. BalliVre, 1%0%E, 19%. .he cate"ory of sodomy has proven notorio-sly fle+i!le and has !een -sed to encompass a variety of activities. ,o/ever, despite the fle+i!ility, ) !elieve that this cate"ory has more concept-al -nity than has sometimes !een attri!-ted to it. ) disc-ss this iss-e in the man-script of /hich this chapter is an e+cerpt. J#. )!id., &JJ. JF. )!id., 19J. JJ. )!id., &#0. JL. )!id., &#L. J0. )!id., &J%. J%. )!id., &L$. J9. Michael Mitchell, Monsters of the *uilded Age: The (hotogra#hs of Charles -isenmann D.oronto: 9a-"e P-!lishin" ;imited, 1909E, &%, #$. ) am inde!ted to )an ,ackin" for providin" me /ith this !ook. !reak \ ) /o-ld like to thank 7osemarie Bodenheimer, Jonathan 5e/ald, 7ita 9old!er", )lona 6armel, 6athleen 6ete, Jessica Marc-s, and John Maynard for their helpf-l comments on earlier versions of this chapter.

Three2 The "nima* !onne0tion4

1. 9enesis &:&$A&&. !reak &. (or an overvie/ of attit-des to/ard animals in *estern philosophy and theolo"y, see John Passmore, 1.he .reatment of 2nimals,1 Journal of the History of &deas #L D190JE: 19JA&1%. Marc Shell offers an idiosyncratic and !eni"n interpretation of those attit-des in 1.he (amily Pet,1 1e#resentations 1J D19%LE: 1&1A1J#. (or another interpreation of the si"nificance of pets, see ,arriet 7itvo, 1.he 8mer"ence of Modern PetAkeepin",1 in 2ndre/ 7o/an, ed., Animals and (eo#le Sharing the %orld D,anover, @.,.: @e/ 8n"land University Press, 19%%E, 1#A#&. #. *illiam S/ainson, +n the Ho"its and &nstincts of Animals D;ondon: ;on"man, Bro/n, 9reen, and ;on"mans, 1%F$E, 0F. F. Charles ,amilton Smith, &ntroduction to the Mammalia D8din!-r"h: *.,. ;i<ars, 1%F&E, 0F. J. 9eor"e John 7omanes, Mental -6olution in Animals D;ondo@: 6e"an Pa-l, .rench, 1%%#E, inset. L. 5onald 7. 9riffin, Animal Thinking DCam!rid"e, Mass.: ,arvard University Press, 19%FE, viiAviii. 0. 7o!ert @o<ick, 12!o-t Mammals and People,1 $e/ 7ork Times Book 1e6ie/ , @ov. &0, 19%#: .om 7e"an, The Case for Animal 1ights DBerkeley, ;os 2n"eles, ;ondon: University of California Press, 19%#E. %. Stephen 6ellert has has /orked o-t a typolo"y of ten !asic attit-des to/ard animalsAAnat-ralistic, ecolo"istic, h-manistic, moralistic, scientistic, aesthetic, -tilitarian, dominionistic, ne"ativistic, and ne-tralistic. =nly the first fo-r admit the possi!ility of a cate"ori<ation not !ased on the a+iomatic

division !et/een h-mans and animals, and they !y no means re'-ire s-ch a reversal. (or an overvie/ of his analysis and the reserach that s-pport it, see Stephen 7. 6ellert, 1,-manA2nimal )nteractions: 2 7evie/ of 2merican 2ttit-des to *ild and 5omestic 2nimals in the ./entieth Cent-ry,1 in 7o/an, Animals and (eo#le Sharing the %orld , 1#0A10L. 9. 5onna ,ara/ay, 12nimal Sociolo"y and @at-ral 8conomy of the Body Politic, Part )): .he Past )s the Contested Sone: ,-man @t-re and .heories of Prod-ction and 7eprod-ction in Primate Behavior St-dies,1 Signs: Journal of %omen in Culture and Society F D190%E: JJAJL: Sarah Blaffer ,rdy, 18mpathy, Polyandry, and the Myth of the Coy (emale,1 in 7-th Bleier, ed., 0eminist A##roaches to Science D@e/ Iork: Per"amon, 19%LE, 119A1FL. 1$. (or an e+ploration of the relationship of t/entiethAcent-ry paleoanthropolo"y to t/entiethAcent-ry c-lt-ral history, see 7o"er ;e/in, Bones of Contention: Contro6ersies in the Search for Human +rigins D@e/ Iork: Simon and Sch-ster, 19%0E. 11. M. 9odine, 1Comparative )nfl-ence of the Male and (emale in Breedin",1 0arrier and $aturalist 1 D1%&%E: FL%. 1&. *illiam Io-att, Cattle: Their Breeds, Management, and Diseases D;ondon: Blad/in and Craddock, 1%#FE, J&#. )t sho-ld !e remem!ered that o+en are castrated animals. 1#. J-dith @eville ;ytton, Toy Dogs and Their Ancestors, &ncluding the History and Management of Toy S#aniels, (ekingese, Ja#anese and (omeranians D@e/ Iork: 5. 2ppleton, 1911E, 19FA19J. !reak 1F. .he str-""les of !reeders to determine the ideal form of the pi" is ela!orately chronicled in J-lian *iseman, The History of the British (ig D;ondon: 5-ck/orth, 19%LE. 1J. (or a thoro-"h revie/ of the !reedin" practices of ei"hteenthAcent-ry improvers in comparison /ith those of their predecessors, see @icholas 7-ssell, 3ike -ngend,ring 3ike: Heredity and Animal Breeding in -arly Modern -ngland DCam!rid"e: Cam!rid"e University Press, 19%LE. ;ess revisionist overvie/s incl-de 7. .ro/ASmith. A History of British 3i6estock Hus"andry, >@GG!>AGG D;ondon: 7o-tled"e and 6e"an Pa-l, 19J9E, and Stephen J. 9. ,all and J-liet Cl-ttonABrock, T/o Hundred 7ears of British 0arm 3i6estock D;ondon: British M-se-m G@at-ral ,istoryH, 19%9E. 1L. 2m!rose Blacklock, A Treatise on Shee# D9las"o/: *.7. McPh-n, 1%#%E, L0: John ;a/rence, A *eneral Treatise on Cattle, the +., the Shee#, and the S/ine D;ondon: ,.5. Symonds, 1%$JE, #$A#1. 10. ,arrison *eir, +ur Cats and All A"out Them DBoston: ,o-"hton Mifflin, 1%%9E, 9L. 1%. )!id., 9L. 10. ,arrison *eir, +ur Cats and All A"out Them DBoston: ,o-"hton Mifflin, 1%%9E, 9L. 1%. )!id., 9L. 19. John (arley, *ametes and S#ores: &deas A"out Se.ual 1e#roduction >@DG!>A>H DBaltimore: Johns ,opkins University Press, 19%&E, chaps. 1 and &. See also (rederick B. Ch-rchill, 1Se+ and the Sin"le =r"anism: Biolo"ical .heories of Se+-ality in MidA@ineteenth Cent-ry,1 Studies in the History of Biology # D1909E: 1#9A100. &$. James 2. Secord has disc-ssed the contri!-tion of pi"eon fancyin" to 5ar/in4s theory of evol-tion in 14@at-re4s (ancy4: Chrles 5ar/in and the Breedin" of Pi"eons,1 &sis 0& D19%1E: 1L#A1%L. 5ar/in contin-ed to make -se of information s-pplied !y animal !reeders after he /rote +n the +rigin of S#ecies , most nota!ly, in The :ariation of Animals and (lants under Domestication D1%L%E. &1. 8+pos-re to scientific data and theory /o-ld not necessarily have made any difference. 2t least some >ictorian scientists shared !reeders4 inclination to identify /omen /ith other mammalian

females, ea"erly !-t /itho-t m-ch evidence conflatin" the h-man menstr-al cycle /ith the oestr-s cycle of do"s and cattle. .homas ;a'-e-r, 1=r"asm, 9eneration, and the Politics of 7eprod-ctive Biolo"y,1 in Catherine 9alla"her and .homas ;a'-er, eds., The Making of the Modern Body: Se.uality and Society in the $ineteenth Century DBerkeley, ;os 2n"eles, ;ondon: University of California Press, 19%0E, &FA#J. &&. 1.he Physiolo"y of Breedin",1 The Agricultural Maga)ine, (lough, and 0armer,s Journal DJ-ne 1%JJE: 10. &#. *illiam M4Com!ie, Cattle and Cattle!Breeders D8din!-r"h: *illiam Black/ood, 1%L0E, 1J#. &F. Io-att, Cattle , J&F. &J. John Bos/ell, 18ssay -pon the Breedin" of ;ive Stock, and on the Comparative )nfl-ence of the Male and (emale Parents in )mpressin" the =ffsprin",1 0armer,s Maga)ine ), @S D1%#%E: &F%. &L. *illiam M4Com!ie, Cattle and Cattle!Breeders , 11%A119, 7o!ert =liphant Prin"le, The 3i6estock of the 0arm , ed. and rev. James Mac5onald D8din!-r"h: *illiam Black/ood, 1%%LE, 1$1A1$&. !reak &0. John Jennin"s, Domestic and 0ancy Cats: A (ractical Treatise on Their :arieties, Breeding, Management, and Diseases D;ondon: ;. Upcott 9ill, n.d.E, FJ. &%. 8verett Millais, 1)nfl-ence: /ith special reference to that of the sire,1 in The Dog +/ners, Annual for >?AH D;ondon: 5eanE, 1J#. &9. >ero Sha/, The &llustrated Book of the Dog D;ondon: Cassell, 1%%1E, J&J. #$. ,-"h 5al<iel, The Collie: As a Sho/ Dog, Com#anion, and %orker , rev. J. Ma+tee D;ondon: ;. Upcott 9ill, 19$FE, F%. #1. 5al<iel, British Dogs: Their :arieties, History, Characteristics, Breeding, Management, and -.hi"ition D;ondon: 1Ba<aar,1 1%09A1%%$E, FL&AFL#. #&. 9ordon Sta!les, The (ractical =ennel *uide4 /ith (lain &nstructions Ho/ to 1ear and Breed Dogs for (leasure, Sho/, and (rofit D;ondon: Cassell Petter and 9alpin, 1%00E, 1&1. ##. Millais, 1)nfl-ence,1 1J#. 2t an earlier period, this theory /as occasionally applied to h-man matin"s as /ell. .h-s, accordin" to John 2-!rey, the distin"-ished seventeenthAcent-ry doctor, *illiam ,arvey claimed that 1he that marries a /ido/ makes himself C-ckold.1 O-oted in 2lan Mac(arlane, Marriage and 3o6e in -ngland, >FGG!>?HG D=+ford: Basil Black/ell, 19%LE, &#&. #F. 9. ,. 2ndre/s, Modern Hus"andry: A (ractical and Scientific Treatise on Agriculture D;ondon: 1%J#E, 1L#. #J. Millais, 1)nfl-ence,1 1J#. #L. (rances Simpson, Cats and All A"out Them D;ondon: )s!ister, 19$&E. LF. #0. ;ytton, Toy Dogs , 19J. Scientists took the notion of tele"ony more serio-sly than the scantly evidence /o-ld seem to 3-stify, perhaps for the same reasons that made it appealin" to animal !reeders. 7ichard B-rkhardt, Jr., 1Closin" the 5oor on ;ord Morton4s Mare: .he 7ise and (all of .ele"ony,1 Studies in the History of Biology # D1909E: 1LA10. #%. 5al<iel, Collie , F1. #9. *illiam .aplin, The S#ortsman,s Ca"inet, or, A correct delineation of the 6arious dogs used in the s#orts of the field D;ondon, 1%$#E, ): &0A&%. F$. Sha/, &llustrated Book of the Dog= , J&F.

F1. 5al<iel, Collie , F%. F&. John Mills, A Treatise on Cattle D;ondon: J. Johnson, 100LE, &01, #1$, F$1. F#. )!id., #%0. F&. John Mills, A Treatise on Cattle D;ondon: J. Johnson, 100LE, &01, #1$, F$1. F#. )!id., #%0. FF. 9eor"e ,an"er, Cononel *eorge Hanger, to All S#ortsmen, and (articularly to 0armers, and *ame =ee#ers D;ondo@: 9eor"e ,an"er, 1%1FE, F0. FJ. Sta!les, (ractical =ennel *uide , 1&J. FL. )!id., 1&#A1&F. FJ. Sta!les, (ractical =ennel *uide , 1&J. FL. )!id., 1&#A1&F. F0. Sha/, &llustrated Book of the Dog , J&#. F%. C. J. 5avies, The =ennel Hand"ook D;ondon: John ;ane, 19$JE, LL. !reak

our2 #an(ua(e and Ideo*o(y in E)o*utionary Theory/ Readin( !u*tura* Norms into Natura* #a3
1. .he !asic claim of atomic individ-alism can !e schematically e+pressed as follo/s:

Ds-ccessive orders of interaction are represented !y the terms .i2, .i2k, .i2kl , etc. .he act-al implementation of this methodolo"y depends, ho/ever, on three implicit ass-mptions: 1. .he first term in the series is primary: &. 2ll relevant interactions are incl-ded in the s-!se'-ent s-mmations: and finally, that #. .he series conver"es Di.e., there are no -e+pected effects from ne"lected hi"her order termsE. Ultimately, it seems to me that the application of all three of these ass-mptions to evol-tionary theory is s-!3ect to serio-s '-estion. My partic-lar foc-s here, ho/ever, is one the ade'-acy of the first t/o ass-mptions. &. 2ltho-"h the act-al /ords here are ne-tral eno-"h, Monod4s "ivea/ay is in his -se of the 1"ypsy1 simile, for the /orld on the mar"ins of /hich the "ypsy lives is first and foremost a h-man /orld, a society, /hose indifference is, in fact, re3ection. #. Mid"ley4s manifestly psycholo"ical e+planation is at least con"r-ent /ith my o/n more e+plicitly psycholo"ical acco-nt of another, perhaps related, rhetorical and concept-ral conflationAAnamely, that !et/een o!3ectivity and domination seen in a n-m!er of traditional attempts to descri!e Dand prescri!eE relations of mind to nat-re Dsee 6eller 19%J, chap. LE. F. See 6eller D19%%E for a disc-ssion of ,ardin4s -se of the same slippa"e in ar"-in" for the -niversality of the 1competitive e+cl-sion principle1 D19L$E. J. 5o-"las Bo-cher D19%JE has even s-""ested a ne/ metaphor: in place of 1nat-re red in tooth and cla/.1 he offers 1nat-re "reen in root and !loom.1

L. .hat is, it raises a '-estion a!o-t the ade'-acy of the third ass-mption of my schematic acco-nt of the methodolo"y of individ-alismAAthat in /hich the essential Dor e+istentialE a-tonomy of the individ-al or"anism is ass-med. 0. *hich is, in fact, the sit-ation of pop-lation "enetics. %. )ncl-din" !oth pop-lation "enetics and mathematical ecolo"y. 9. (or e+ample, in the a!sence of other or"anisms, the fitness of a se+-ally reprod-cin" or"anism is, strictly speakin", <ero. !reak 1$. 5ar/in ori"inally introd-ced the idea of se+-al selectionAAal/ays in clear contradistinction to nat-ral selectionAAin an effort to take acco-nt of at least certain aspects of reprod-ctive selection. (or many years thereafter, the idea /as ne"lected. )ts recent revival in the theoretical literat-re is of interest, !-t it o-"ht not !e taken to indicate an inte"ration of reprod-ctive dynamics into the central pro3ect of evol-tionary theory. 7ather, it indicates a shift in that pro3ect. )n my vie/, the recent interest in se+-al selection amon" socio!iolo"ists is a direct conse'-ence of the final, and complete, a!andonment of the individ-al or"anism as a theoretical entity. 9enic selection theories, it co-ld !e said, complete the shift of attention a/ay from or"anisms !e"-n !y the ,ardyA*ein!er" calc-l-s. Se+-al reprod-ction is a pro!lem in this disco-rse only to the e+tent that individ-al or"anisms remain, some/here, an important Deven if shiftin"E foc-s of concept-al interest. 11. See 6eller D19%0E for details.

Si52 Ref*e0tions on Bio*o(y and !u*ture

1. 7ed-ctionism, in the relevant sense, is descri!ed and defended at len"th !y 7. ;. Ca-sey in The 9nity of Science D5ordrecht: 5. 7eidel, 1900E. (or f-rther disc-ssion and criticism, see my paper, 1.he 5is-nity of Science,1 Mind 9& D19%#E:#&1A#FL. &. .he c-rrently definitive and most detailed demolition of h-man socio!iolo"y is Philip 6itcher4s :aulting Am"ition: Socio"iology and the 8uest for Human $ature DCam!rid"e: Bradford Books M). Press, 19%JE. 2 "ood sense of the c-rrent state of scientific de!ate on the s-!3ect can !e "leaned from the vario-s comments on this /ork and 6itcher4s replies in Brain and Beha6ioral Sciences 1$ DMarch 19%0E. .his also incl-des a pr?cis of 6itcher4s !ook. #. .he locus classicus for the defense of takin" this slo"an serio-sly is 7ichard 5a/kins, The Selfish *ene D=+ford: =+ford University Press, 190LE. F. (or the comple+ity of "enetic interactions and the si"nificance of this comple+ity, see 7ichard ;e/ontin, The *enetic Basis of -6olutionary Change D@e/ Iork: Col-m!ia University Press, 190FE. J. (or a criti'-e of 1"enetic selectionism,1 the idea that evol-tion sho-ld !e conceived of as f-ndamentally concerned only /ith differential selection of "enes, see 8. So!er and 7. C. ;e/ontin, 12rtifact, Ca-se, and 9enic Selection,1 (hiloso#hy of Science F0D19%&E:1J0A1%$. !reak L. 2s his more e+tended presentation in The Tangled %ing: Biological Constraints on the Human S#irit D@e/ Iork: ,olt, 7inehart, *inston, 19%&E makes clear, 6onner is perfectly /ell a/are of the facts of c-lt-ral variation. =-r disa"reement, ) s-ppose, has to do entirely /ith ho/ s-ch facts are to !e interpreted. 0. See, especially, 5avid Barash, The %his#erings %ithin D;ondon: Pen"-in, 1909E. (or a devastatin" criti'-e of these ar"-ments, see 2nne (a-stoASterlin", Myths of *ender: Biological theories a"out Men and %omen D@e/ Iork: Basic Books, 19%JE, esp. chap. L. %. 2"ain, 6onner4s !ook The Tangled %ing confirms that his vie/s on this topic are '-ite comple+ and

sophisticated. B-t !oth here and there, he seems inclined to dra/ "eneral concl-sions that, to my mind, are entirely -n/arranted !y the kinds of facts the add-ces. 9. See, e."., 5avid ;. ,-ll, 1.he 8ffect of 8ssentialism on .a+onomy: &$$$ Iears of Stasis,1 British Journal for (hiloso#hy of Sciences 1J D19LJE:#1FA#&L, 1L D19LJE:1A1%: for a more "eneral criti'-e of essentialism, see my 1Se+, 9ender, and 8ssence,1 Mid/est Studies in (hiloso#hy , 11 D19%LE:FF1AFJ0. 1$. .his s-""estion is developed in more detail in my paper, 1,-man 6inds,1 in J. 5-pr?, ed., The 3atest on the Best: -ssays on -6olution and +#timality DCam!rid"e: Bradford Books M). Press, 19%0E. !reak

Se)en2 Introdu0tion
1. J. 5avid Bolter, Turing,s Man: %estern Culture in the Com#uter Age DChapel ,ill: University of @orth Carolina Press, 19%FE, 11, &&. &. 2nthony 6enny, Descartes: A Study of his (hiloso#hy D@e/ Iork: 9arland, 19L%E, &$$A&$1. #. 2ram >artanian, 3a Mettrie,s ,3,homme machine,: A Study in the +rigins of an &dea DPrinceton: Princeton University Press, 19L$E, 1F, 1L, &&, &J. !reak F. Cynthia 7-ssett, Se.ual Science: The :ictorian Construction of %omanhood DCam!rid"e: ,arvard University Press, 19%9E, 1$LA1$0. J. Bolter, Turing,s Man , ##. L. >artanian, 3a Mettrie,s ,3,hoome machine ,4 1#&A1#F. 0. ,o/ard 9ardner, The Mind,s $e/ Science: A History of the Cogniti6e 1e6olution D@e/ Iork: Basic Books, 19%0E, &$. %. Bolter, Turing,s Man , 1#. 9. 9ardner, Mind,s $e/ Science , L: Miller '-oted !y Sherry .-rkle, 12rtificial )ntelli"ence and Psychoanalysis: 2 @e/ 2lliance,1 in Stephen 9ra-!ard, ed., The Artificial &ntelligence De"ate: 0alse Starts, 1eal 0oundations DCam!rid"e: M). Press, 19%%E, &F&. 1$. ,-!ert ;. 5reyf-s and St-art 8. 5reyf-s, 1Makin" a Mind vers-s Modelin" the Brain: 2rtificial )ntelli"ence Back at a Branchpoint,1 in 9ra-!ard, ed., Artificial &ntelligence De"ate , 19. 11. 9ardner, Mind,s $e/ Science , 1F1. =n shiftin" trends /ithin 2), see the essays in 9ra-!ard. 1&. 2nya ,-rl!ert and .omaso Po""io, 1Makin" Machines Dand 2rtificial )ntelli"enceE See,1 in 9ra-!ard, ed., Artificial &ntelligence De"ate , &#%. 1#. 6onner, 1=n ,-man @at-re: ;ove 2mon" the 7o!ots,1 The Sciences &0 D19%0E: 1F. !reak

Ei(ht2 The Meanin( of the Me0hanisti0 "(e

1. See Pierre Ma+ime Sch-hl, Machinisme et (hiloso#hie D#d ed.: Paris: Presses Universitaires de (rance, 19L9E. Jean Pierre >ernant, 17emar'-es s-r les formes et les limits de la pens?e techni'-e che< les 9recs,1 1e6ue d,Histoire des Sciences et de leurs A##lications 1& D19J0E: &$JA&&J Dtranslated in his Myth and Thought Among the *reeks G;ondon: 7o-tled"e U 6e"an Pa-l, 19%#HE: and Bertrand 9ille, 3es M5caniciens *recs: 3a $aissance de la Technologie DParis: Se-il, 19%$E. &. 2le+ 6eller, 1Mathematical .echnolo"ies and the 9ro/th of the )dea of .echnical Pro"ress in the Si+teenth Cent-ry,1 Science, Medicine and Society in the 1enaissance: -ssays to Honor %alter (agel

D@e/ Iork: @eal *atson, 190&E, 11A&0. #. *illiam 8amon, 1.echnolo"y as Ma"ic in the Middle 2"es and the 7enaissance,1 Janus 0$ D19%#E: 101A&1&. F. *illiam 9i!lert, De Magnete G=n the Ma"netH, trans. Silvan-s P. .hompson D;ondon: Chist/ick Press, 19$$E, ii, verso. J. John ;. ,ei!ron, -lements of -arly Modern (hysics DBerkeley, ;os 2n"eles, ;ondon: University of California Press, 19%&E, 10 et se' . L. 9?rard Simon, 1;es machines a- R>))e siVcle: Usa"e, typolo"ie, r?sonances sym!oli'-es,1 1e6ue des Sciences Humaines J% D19%&E: 9A#1. 0. ;?n Br-nschvic", 3,-.#5rience Humaine et la Causalit5 (hysi'ue DParis: (?li+ 2lcan, 19&&E: and ;es<ek 6olako/ski, The Alienation of 1eason: A History of (ositi6ist Thought D9arden City, @.I.: 5o-!leday, 19L%E. %. ;avoisier and ;aplace, Memoir on Heat , trans. ,enry 9-erlac D@e/ Iork: @eal *atson, 19%&E. 9. (rederic ;a/rence ,olmes, 3a6oisier and the Chemistry of 3ife: An -.#loration of the Scientific Creati6ity DMadison: University of *isconsin Press, 19%JE. 1$. 7o"er ,ahn, 1;aplace and the Mechanistic Universe,1 in *od and $ature: Historical -ssays on the -ncounter "et/een Christianity and Science DBerkeley, ;os 2n"eles, ;ondon: University of California Press, 19%LE, &JLA&0L. 11. See ;aplace4s -np-!lished correspondence /ith ;e Sa"e and Pr?vost listed in 7o"er ,ahn, Calendar of the Corres#ondence of (ierre Simon 3a#lace DBerkeley: =ffice for ,istory of Science and .echnolo"y, 19%&E. 1&. '-oted in ,ahan, 1;aplace and the Mechanistic Universe,1 &L%A&L9. 1#. 9. J-ne 9oodfield, The *ro/th of Scientific (hysiology D;ondon: ,-tchinson, 19L$E. 1F. 7o"er ,ahn, 1Science in the 8arly 19th Cent-ry: 2nother >ie/s,1 Acta Historiae 1erum $aturalium $ecnon Technicarum , special iss-e 1# D19%1E: J9A0F: (rederick 9re"ory, Scientific Materialism in $ineteenth!Century *ermany D5ordrecht: 5. 7eidel, 1900E: .imothy ;enoir, The Strategy of 3ife: Teleology and Machanics in $ineteenth!Century *erman Biology D5ordrecht: 5. 7eidel, 19%&E: and John 8. ;esch, Science and Medicine in 0rance: The -mergence of -.#erimental (hysiology, >@AG!>?DD DCam!rid"e: ,arvard University Press, 19%FE !reak 1J. @ikhil Bhattacharya, 16no/led"e 4per ca-ssas4: >ico4s .heory of @at-ral Science,1 in 9ior"io .a"liaco<<o, ed., :ico: (ast and (resent D2tlantic ,i"hlands, @.J.: ,-manities Press, 19%1E, ): 1%&A 190: and the articles !y Badaloni, Belaval, and Berlin in 9ior"io .a"liaco<<o and ,ayden v. *hite, eds., *iam"attista :ico: An &nternational Sym#osium DBaltimore: Johns ,opkins Press, 19L9E. 1L. 8mil 5- BoisA7eymond, 9e"er die *ren)en des $aturerkennens: Die sie"en %eltrJthesel D&d ed.: ;eip<i": >on >eit, 1%%FE: aslo in his :ortrJage K"er (hiloso#hie und *esellschaft , ed. Sie"fried *oll"ast DBerlin: 2kademie >erla", 190FE. !reak

Nine2 Meta6hors for Mind9 Theories of Mind/ Shou*d the Humanities Mind:
1. 2ct-ally, of co-rse, Soar is reali<ed as a set of pro"rams in vario-s pro"rammin" lan"-a"es D;isp and CE that r-n on a /ide ran"e of standard comp-ters. &. .his and other times are asserted of h-man con"ition: they are not the time for r-nnin" Soar on a

comp-ter /ork station. #. .here is "ood reason that it sho-ld not: the -pper reaches of capa!ility are not het /ell charted empirically. F. 2ct-ally, the c-rrent Soar has a more "eneral attri!-teAval-e representation D;aird, @e/ell, and 7osen!loom 19%0E, !-t /e posit that h-mans represent e+ternal sit-ations !y formin" models in this more !asic representation. J. Prod-ction systems are often referred to as rule!"ased systems . )n many systems, they f-nction as r-les /ith a r-le interpreter. )n Soar, prod-ctions f-nction as an associative reco"nition memory and not as r-les, as that term is -sed in philosophical disc-ssions of r-le follo/in". L. .here need not !e a -ni'-e !attle"ro-nd: consider soci!iolo"y. 0. .his "raph is a variant of the storeAvers-sAcomp-te tradeAoff familiar in comp-ter science. .his partic-lar version is adapted from Berliner and 8!elin" 19%%. %. .he analo"o-s in'-iry for ,itechAlike systems is not -sef-l yet, !eca-se fe/ e+ist and !eca-se they arise from a research comm-nity that val-es e+ploration for its o/n sake. 9. .he slo/ ne-ral technolo"y D/hich r-ns at ms speedsE mi"ht !e con3ect-red to !e relevant. ,o/ever, animals Dincl-din" manE mostly m-st respond to other or"anisms, as predator, prey, and rival. Since all are constr-cted in the same technolo"y, its a!sol-te speed is pro!a!ly not stron"ly relevant. !reak 1$. )t does not, !y the /ay, claim completeness of c-rrent co"nitive theory, only that /hat is missin" is as relevant to m-ndane as to creative co"nition.

Ten2 Thin(in( Ma0hines/ !an There Be: "re ,e:

1. ,o!!es, 3e6iathan , '-oted in ,a-"eland, Artificial &ntelligence: The :ery &dea , &F. &. 7-ssell, A History of %estern (hiloso#hy , J9&. #. See chap. &, *ino"rad and (lores, 9nderstanding Com#uters and Cognition . F. =ne lar"eAscale and '-ite controversial e+ample /as the M). Cl-! of 7ome sim-lations of the /orld social and economic f-t-re D The 3imits of *ro/th E. 7ome sim-lation of the /orld social and economic f-t-re D The 3imits of *ro/th E. J. See, e."., the disc-sions in 5avis and ,ersh, Descartes, Dream . L. See 9ardner, The Mind,s $e/ Science , for an overvie/ of the historical conte+t. 0. .hese are amon" the section headin"s in Minsky, The Society of Mind . !reak %. See, e."., @e/ell and Simon, Human (ro"lem Sol6ing , and ;aird et al., 9ni6ersal Su"goaling and Chunking . 9. (ei"en!a-m and McCord-ck, The 0ifth *eneration , %L, 9J, 1J&. 1$. Minsky, The Society of Mind , 1%0. 2ltho-"h Minsky4s vie/ is prevalent amon" 2) researchers, not all of his collea"-es a"ree that tho-"ht is so openendedly nonlo"ical. McCarthy Dcofo-nder /ith Minsky of the M). 2) la!E, for e+ample, is e+plorin" ne/ forms of lo"ic that attempt to preserve the ri"or of ordinary ded-ction, /hile dealin" /ith some of the properties of commonsense reasonin", as descri!ed in the parpers in Bo!ro/, ed., Special )ss-e on @onmonotonic ;o"ic. 11. @e/ell and Simon, 1Comp-ter Science as 8mpirical )n'-iry1 Dtheir speech acceptin" the 2CM .-rin" 2/ard, the comp-ter science e'-ivalent of the @o!el Pri<eE.

1&. @e/ell, 1.he 6no/led"e ;evel,1 %%. 1#. @e/ell and Simon, 1Comp-ter Science as 8mpirical )n'-iry,1 1&1. 1F. Michie and Johnston, The Creati6e Com#uter , #J. 1J. Minsky, The Society of Mind , 10. 1L. )!id., L0. 10. )!id., ##. 1J. Minsky, The Society of Mind , 10. 1L. )!id., L0. 10. )!id., ##. 1J. Minsky, The Society of Mind , 10. 1L. )!id., L0. 10. )!id., ##. 1%. *aterman, A *uide to -.#ert Systems , F. 19. Michie and Johnston, The Creati6e Com#uter , 1&9. &$. (ei"en!a-m and McCord-ck, The 0ifth *eneration , 1&, F$. &1. )!id., &&9. &$. (ei"en!a-m and McCord-ck, The 0ifth *eneration , 1&, F$. &1. )!id., &&9. &&. ;enat, 1CIC,1 0J. &#. Pylyshyn, Com#utation and Cognition , +v. &F. @e/'-ist, 1.he Machinery of Medical 5ia"nosis,1 0$. &J. See the disc-ssion in ,. 5reyf-s and S. 5reyf-s, Mind +6er Machine . &L. See, e."., ,. 5reyf-s, %hat Com#uters Can,t Do , and *ino"rad and (lores, 9nderstanding Com#uters and Cognition . &0. ,olt, 17emarks Made at 27P2 Principal )nvesti"ators4 Conference,1 1. &%. See the disc-ssion of the B=7)S pro"ram in *ino"rad and (lores, 9nderstanding Com#uters and Cognition , 1&1 ff. &9. See 2thanasio-, 1,i"hAtech Politics: .he Case of 2rtificial )ntelli"ence,1 &F. #$. ;ee, 1B-rea-cracy as 2rtificial )ntelli"nece,1 1&0. #1. *e!er, -conomy and Society , 1$$&. #&. )!id., 90J. ##. )!id., 90#. #1. *e!er, -conomy and Society , 1$$&. #&. )!id., 90J. ##. )!id., 90#.

#1. *e!er, -conomy and Society , 1$$&. #&. )!id., 90J. ##. )!id., 90#. #F. March and Simon, +rgani)ations , #%. #J. (or a historical acco-nt and analysis of the c-rrent de!ates, see ,. 5reyf-s, 1Makin" a Mind vs. Modelin" the Brain.1 (or a technical vie/, see 7-melhart and Mc;elland, (arallel Distri"uted (rocessing . Mat-rana and >arela, in The Tree of =no/ledge , offer a !road philosophy of co"nition on this !asis. #L. .-rkle, 17omantic 7eactions.1 #0. ,. 5ryef-s, 12lchemy and 27tificial )ntelli"ence.1 #%. See chap. Jof *ino"rad and (lores, 9nderstanding Com#uters and Cognition , for an overvie/. !reak #9. ,a!ermas, Communication and the -6olution of Society , L1. F$. 7os<ak, The Cult of &nformation . F1. @e/'-iest, 1.he Machinery of Medical 5ia"nosis,1 0$. F&. See (lores, 1Mana"ement and Comm-nication in the =ffice of the (-t-re1: *ino"rad and (lores, 9nderstanding Com#uters and Cognition4 and *ino"rad, 12 ;an"-a"e 2ction Perspective on the 5esi"n of Cooperative *ork.1 F#. ,o/ard, 1Systems 5esi"n and Social responsi!ility.1

E*e)en2 Romanti0 Rea0tions/ $arado5i0a* Res6onses to the !om6uter $resen0e

1. .his article "re/ o-t of many lon" ho-rs of conversation /ith Seymo-r Papert. ) am inde!ted to him as a dialo"-e partner and critical reader. &. My /ork on romantic reactions in the comp-ter c-lt-re amon" children and ad-lts is ethno"raphic and clinical. See Sherry .-rkle, The Secound Self: Com#uters and The Human S#irit D@e/ Iork: Simon and Sch-ster, 19%FE, esp. chap. 1, 1Child Philosophers: 2re Smart Machines 2live,1 &9AL#: chap. %, 1.hinkin" of Io-rself as a Machine,1 &01A#$J: and 1=n Method: 2 Sociolo"y of Sciences of Mind,1 #1JA#&#. #. .-rkle, The Second Self , &#9A&F$. F. See John Searle, 1Minds, Brains, and Pro"rams,1 The Beha6ioral and Brain Sciences # D19%$E: F10A F&F, for an emphasis on !iolo"y: ,-!ert ;. 5reyf-s, %hat Com#uters Can,t Do: The 3imits of Artificial &ntelligence , &d ed. D@e/ Iork: ,arper and 7o/, 1909E, for an emphasis on 1em!odiment1 and sit-ated kno/led"e D16no/in" ho/ vs. kno/in" that1E: and Joseph *ei<en!a-m, Com#uter (o/er and Human 1eason: 0rom Judgment to Calculation DSan (rancisco: *. ,. (reeman, contin-e 190LE, for an emphasis on the ineffa!le, on kno/led"e that cannot !e formally e+pressed. J. *ei<en!a-m, Com#uter (o/er and Human 1eason , &$1. L. .-rkle, The Second Self , chap. %. 0. See 5avid 8. 7-melhart, James ;. McClelland, and the P5P 7esearch 9ro-p, (arallel Distri"uted (rocessing: -.#lorations in the Microstructure of Cognition , vol. 1 DCam!rid"e: Bradford Books M). Press, 19%LE.

%. Marvin Minsky, The Society of Mind D@e/ Iork: Simon and Sch-ster, 19%0E, and Seymo-r Papert, Mindstorms: Children, Com#uters, and (o/erful &deas D@e/ Iork: Basic Books, 19%1E, 1L0A10$. 9. (or a more etailed disc-ssion of the dichotomy !et/een emer"ent and informationAprocessin" 2), see Seymo-r Papert, 1=ne 2) or ManyK1 and Sherry .-rkle, 12rtificial )ntelli"ence and Psychoanalysis: 2 @e/ 2lliance,1 in Daedalus 110, 1 D*inter 19%%E: 1A1F, &F1A&L%. 1$. Cited in ,-!ert ;. 5reyf-s and St-art 8. 5reyf-s, 1Makin" a Mind vers-s Modelin" the Brain: )ntelli"ence Back at a Branchpoint,1 Daedalus 110, 1 D*inter 19%%E: #J. 11. My disc-ssion of the evocative properties of 1!et/i+t and !et/een1 o!3ects o/es m-ch to the /ork of >ictor .-rner on liminal o!3ects and Mary 5o-"las on cate"ory maintenance. See, for e+ample, >ictor .-rner, The 1itual (rocess DChica"o: 2ldine, 19LLE, and Mary 5o-"las, (urity and Danger D;ondon: 7o-tled"e and 6e"an Pa-l, 19LLE. 1&. *. ,. 2-den and ;o-is 6ronen!er"er, eds., The :iking Book of A#horisms D@e/ Iork: Pen"-in, 19%1E, &F. 1#. .-rkle, The Second Self , &F. 1F. My -se of the idea of 1o!3ects to think /ith1 o/es m-ch to Cla-de ;eviAStra-ss4s notion of 1!ricola"e,1 the -se of concrete materials to think thro-"h scientific pro!lems. See Cla-de ;eviA Stra-ss, The Sa6age Mind DChica"o: University of Chica"o Press, 19L%E. 1J. )n the field st-dies for The Second Self , ) /orked /ith over &$$ children and adolescents, a"es F to 1L. My first form-lation of ho/ children -se 1o!3ects to think /ith1 came o-t of that research e+perience. Since 19%F, my research /ith children has t-rned more directly to differences of personal style in relationships /ith o!3ects, !oth comp-tational and traditional: my ne/ st-dies incl-de clinical, pro3ective, and o!servational materials on a closely st-died "ro-p of &$ fifthA"raders. 1L. Jean Pia"et, The Child,s Construction of the %orld D.oto/a, @.J.: ;ittlefield, 2dams, 19L$E. 10. (or e+ample, in a sample of %% children, a"es F thro-"h 1F, L%^ -sed physical criteria and 11^ psycholo"ical criteria to disc-ss the 1aliveness1 of noncomp-tational or 1traditional1 o!3ects, !-t /hen they t-rned to comp-tational o!3ects, the proportions /ere reversed. .hen, 10^ -sed physical criteria, and L0^ -sed psycholo"ical criteria. See .-rkle, The Second Self , 1Children4s Psycholo"ical 5isco-rse: Methods and 5ata S-mmary,1 #&FA##&. 1%. S-san Carey, Conce#tual Change in Childhood DCam!rid"e: M). Press, 19%JE. !reak 19. 7ochel 9elamn and 8li<a!eth Spelke, 1.he 5evelopment of .ho-"hts 2!o-t 2nimate and )nanimate =3!ects: )mplications for 7esearch on Social Co"nition,1 in John ,. (lavell and ;ee 7oss, eds., Social Cognit6e De6elo#ment: 0rontiers and (ossi"le Choices DCam!rid"e: Cam!rid"e University Press, 19%1E. &$. See .-rkle, The Second Self, chap. 1, for detailed descriptions of children in 1psycholo"ical1 disc-ssions a!o-t comp-tational o!3ects. &1. 9eor"e Boole, The 3a/s of Thought, vol. & of Collected %orks D;a Salle, )ll.: =pen Co-rt P-!lishin" Company, 19J&E. &&. *illiam (. 2llman, A##rentices of %onder: &nside the $eural $et/ork 1e6olution D@e/ Iork:Bantam, 19%9E, 1. &#. )!id., &. &&. *illiam (. 2llman, A##rentices of %onder: &nside the $eural $et/ork 1e6olution D@e/ Iork:Bantam, 19%9E, 1.

&#. )!id., &. &F. 5reyf-s and 5reyf-s, 1Makin" Mind vs. Modelin" the Brain,1 1L. &J. 2llen @e/ell and ,er!ert Simon, 1Comp-ter Science as 8mpirical )n'-iry: Sym!ols and Search,1 reprinted in John ,a-"eland, ed., Mind Design DCam!rid"e: M). Press, 19%1E, F1. &L. 5o-"las r. ,ofstadter, Metamagical Themes: 8uesting for the -ssence of Mind and (atter D@e/ Iork: Basic Books, 19%JE. &0. 5avid 8. 7-melhart and 5onald 2. @orman, 12 Comparison of Models,1 in 9eoffrey ,inton and James 2nderson, eds., (arallel Models of Associati6e Memory D,illsdale, @.J.: ;a/rence 8rl!a-m 2ssociates, 19%1E, #. )n 7-melhart, McClelland, and the P5P 7esearch 9ro-p, (arallel Distri"uted (rocessing, the P5P model of learnin" is contrasted /ith that of traditional 2): )n most models, kno/led"e is stored as a static copy of a pattern. . . . )n P5P models, thro-"h, this is not the case. )n these models the patterns themselves are not stored. 7ather, /hat is stored is the connection strengths !et/een -nits that allo/ these patterns to !e recreated. . . . ;earnin" m-st !e a matter of findin" the ri"ht connection stren"ths so that the ri"ht patterns of activation /ill !e prod-ced -nder the ri"ht circ-mstances. .his is an e+tremely important property of this class of models, for it opens -p the possi!ility that an information processin" mechanism co-ld learn, as a res-lt of t-nin" its connections, to capt-re the interdependencies !et/een activations that it is e+posed to in the co-rse of processin". D#1A#&E &%. John Searle, 1.he Myth of the Comp-ter,1 The $e/ 7ork 1e6ie/ of Books, 2pril &9, 19%&, J. &9. )!id. &%. John Searle, 1.he Myth of the Comp-ter,1 The $e/ 7ork 1e6ie/ of Books, 2pril &9, 19%&, J. &9. )!id. #$. 5reyf-s and 5reyf-s, 1Makin" a Mind vs. Modelin" the Brain,1 &J. #1. Cited in )!id., &J. #$. 5reyf-s and 5reyf-s, 1Makin" a Mind vs. Modelin" the Brain,1 &J. #1. Cited in )!id., &J. #&. Science ?L DMay 19%LE: &0. ##. .erry *ino"rad, 1.hinkin" Machines: Can .here BeK 2re *eK1 See chap. 1$, this vol. #F. See .-rkle, 12rtificial )ntelli"ence and Psychoanalysis.1 #J. (or a presentation of psychoanalytic theory in terms of the dichotomy !et/een a drive and an o!3ect model, see Jay 7. 9reen!er" and Stephen 2. Mitchell, +"2ect 1elations in (sychoanalytic Theory DCam!rid"e: ,arvard University Press, 19%#E. #L. Minsky, The Society of Mind . #0. *ino"rad, 1.hinkin" Machines,1 chap. 1$, this vol. !reak #%. )!id. #9. )!id. #0. *ino"rad, 1.hinkin" Machines,1 chap. 1$, this vol. !reak #%. )!id.

#9. )!id. #0. *ino"rad, 1.hinkin" Machines,1 chap. 1$, this vol. !reak #%. )!id. #9. )!id. F$. *. 5aniel ,illis, 1)ntelli"ence as an 8mer"ent Behavior,1 Daedalus 110, 1 D*inter 19%%E: 10JA10L. )talics mine. F1. Psychoanalytic /riters have taken o!3ectArelations theorists to task on this point. See, e."., 7oy Schafer, A $e/ 3anguage for (sychoanalysis D@e/ ,aven: Iale University Press, 190LE, and .homas ,. ="den, 1.he Concept of )nternal =!3ect 7elations,1 The &nternational Journal of (sychoanalysis LF D19%#E. F&. 5o-"las ,ofstadter, *Edel, -scher, Bach: An -ternal golden Braid D@e/ Iork: Basic Books, 190%E. F#. 5reyf-s and 5reyf-s, 1Makin" a Mind vs. Modelin" the Brain,1 &L. FF. )!id., #J. F#. 5reyf-s and 5reyf-s, 1Makin" a Mind vs. Modelin" the Brain,1 &L. FF. )!id., #J. FJ. ;eo Mar+, 1)s ;i!eral 6no/led"e *orth ,avin"K1 2ddress to the Conference of the 2ssociation of 9rad-ate ;i!eral St-dies Pro"rams, 5ePa-l University, Chica"o, =cto!er 0, 19%%, -np-!. ms., 1$A11. FL. ;ovelace p-t it like this: 1.he analytical 8n"ine has no pretensions /hatever to ori"inate anythin". )t can do /hatever /e kno/ ho/ to order it to perform.1 F0. 2ltho-"h this statement is tr-e in spirit, lar"e and comple+ pro"rams are not peedicta!le in any simple sense. F%. ,illis, 1)ntelli"ence as an 8mer"ent Behavior,1 10L. F9. Papert, 1=ne 2) or ManyK1 1F. J$. Christopher ;asch, The Culture of $arcissism D@e/ Iork: @orton, 1909E. J1. (or a disc-ssion of the t-rn to the concrete and a/ay from al"orithm, see Sherry .-rkle and Seymo-r Papert, 18pistemolo"ical Pl-ralism: Styles and >oices *ithin the Comp-ter C-lt-re,1 in Signs: Journal of %omen in Culture and Society 1L, 1 DSept. 199$E. J&. Cited in 5reyf-s and 5reyf-s, 1Makin" a Mind vs. Modelin" the Brain,1 &FA&J. J#. .. S. 8liot, 1.he Metaphysical Poets,1 in Selected -ssays >A>@!>AF; D@e/ Iork: ,arco-rt Brace and Co., 19#&E, &F1A&J$. JF. Minsky, The Society of Mind, 1%&. JJ. )!id. JF. Minsky, The Society of Mind, 1%&. JJ. )!id. JL. Searle, 1Minds, Brains, and Pro"rams.1 J0. John Searle, 1Minds and Brains *itho-t Pro"rams,1 in Colin Blakemore and S-san 9reenfield, eds., Mind/a6es: Thoughts on &ntelligence, &dentity and Consciousness D@e/ Iork: Basil Black/ell,

19%0E, &19. !reak

T3e*)e2 Bio*o(y9 Ma0hines9 and Humanity

1. St-art ,ampshire, Thought and Action D@e/ Iork: >ikin" Press, 19L$E. !reak

!oda
1. 2nthony (le/, A 1ational Animal and +ther (hiloso#hical -ssays on the $ature of Man D=+ford: Clarendon Press, 190%E, &#: *alter B-rkert, Structure and History in *reek Mythology and 1itual DBerkeley and ;os 2n"eles: University of California Press, 1909E, +iii: (riedrich @iet<sche, +n the *enealogy of Morals D@e/ Iork: >inta"e Books, 19L0E, %$. &. J. 5avid Bolter, Turing,s Man: %estern Culture in the Com#uter Age DChapel ,ill: University of @orth Carolina Press, 19%FE, e+plores these vario-s metaphors. #. 2lfred @orth *hitehead, Science and the Modern %orld DMentor ed., @e/ Iork, 19J%E: Melvin 6onner, 1=n ,-man @at-re: ;ove 2mon" the 7o!ots,1 The Sciences &0, & D19%0E: 1#. F. 8. =. *ilson, +n Human $ature D@e/ Iork: Bantam Books, 1909E, &F, F%. J. Pamela McCord-ck, Machines %ho Think: A (ersonal &n'uiry into the History and (ros#ects of Artificial &ntelligence DSan (rancisco: *. ,. (reeman, 1909E, #J1. L. (or an introd-ction to the disciplinary histories of socio!iolo"y and artificial intelli"ence, see 2rth-r Caplan, ed., The Socio"iology De"ate: 1eadings on -thical and Scientific &ssues D@e/ Iork: ,arper and 7o, 190%E, and ,o/ard 9ardner, The Mind,s $e/ Science: A History of the Cogniti6e 1e6olution D@e/ Iork: Basic Books, 19%0E. 0. *ilson, in his introd-ction to Caplan, The Sociology De"ate , +iii: Mary Mid"ley, Beast and Man: The 1oots of Human $ature D)thaca: Cornell University Press, 190%E, 1L9. %. .his point is developed in ,o/ard 6aye, The Social Meaning of Modern Biology: 0rom Social Dar/inism to Socio"iology D@e/ ,aven: Iale University Press, 19%LE. See also .o-lmin4s The 1eturn to Cosmology: (ostmodern Science and the contin-e Theology of $ature DBerkeley, ;os 2n"eles, ;ondon: University of California Press, 19%&E. 9. The $e/ 7ork 1e6ie/ of Books , Sept. &J, 19%L. 1$. Seymo-r Papert, 1=ne 2) or ManyK1 in Stephen 9ra-!ard, ed., The Artificial &ntelligence De"ate: 0alse Starts, 1eal 0oundations DCam!rid"e: M). Press, 19%%E, &. Peirce, '-oted in Michael Cro/e, The -.traterrestrical 3ife De"ate, >@DG!>AGG D@e/ Iork: Cam!rid"e University Press, 19%LE, JJ&. 11. Bolter, Turing,s Man , &$0. 1&. 7. C. ;e/ontin, Steven 7ose, and ;eon 6amin, $ot in +ur *enes: Biology, &deology, and Human $ature D@e/ Iork: Pantheon Books, 19%FE, &F9: 2nne (a-stoASterlin", Myths of *ender: Biological Theories a"out %omen and Men D@e/ Iork: Basic Books, 19%JE, 1L$: 9o-ld, in The $e/ 7ork 1e6ie/ of Books , J-ne &J, 19%0. (or more on these iss-es, see 8velyn (o+ 6eller4s essay in Part ). 1#. *. >. O-ine, 12 Postscript on Metaphor,1 in Sheldon Sacks, ed., +n Meta#hor DChica"o and ;ondon: University of Chica"o Press, 190%E, 1J9: Stephen Pepper, %orld Hy#otheses DBerkeley and ;os 2n"eles: University of California Press, 19F&E. !reak

!ONTRIBUTORS
"rno*d I. -a)idson is 2sociate Professor of Philosophy and a mem!er of the Committee on the Concept-al (o-ndations of Sicence and the Committee on 9eneral St-dies in the ,-manities at the University of Chica"o. ,e is also the 8+ec-tive 8ditor of Critical &n'uiry . ,e has p-!lished articles on the history of psychiatry and medicine, moral and political philosophy, and contemporary continental philosophy. ,e is c-rrently /orkin" on the history of horror as it relates to the epistemolo"y of norms and deviations. John -u6rC is 2ssociate Professor of Philosphy at Stanford University. ,is interest is the philosophy of science, especially the philosophy of evol-tionary theory. ,e is editor of The 3atest on the Best: -ssays and -6olution and +#timality DCam!rid"e: M). Press, 19%0E. Ro(er Hahn is Professor of ,)story at the University of California, Berkeley. ,is interest is the history of science and technolo"y, partic-larly in the ei"hteenth cent-ry. ,is !ooks incl-de 3a#lace as a $e/tonian Scientist D;os 2n"eles: Clark ;i!rary, 19L0E and The Anatomy of a Scientific &nstitution: The (aris Academy of Sciences, >LLLM>?GF DBerkeley and ;os 2n"eles: University of California Press, 1901: p!. ed. 19%LE. Stuart Ham6hire is Professor 8merit-s of Philosophy at Stanford University. ,e has /ritten e+tensively on moral philosophy, philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of the 8-ropean 8nli"htenment. ,e is a (ello/ of !oth the British 2cademy and the 2merican 2cademy of 2rts and Sciences. B &L% B E)e*yn o5 +e**er is, since 19%%, Professor of *omen4s St-dies and 7hetoric, University of California, Berkeley. (ormerly Professor of Mathematics and ,-manities at @ortheastern University and >isitin" Professor in the Pro"ram in Science, .echnolo"y, and Society at the Massach-setts )nstit-te of .echnolo"y, she is the a-thor of A 0eeling for the +rganism: The 3ife and %ork of Bar"ara McClintock DSan (rancisco: *. 2. (reeman, 19%#E and 1eflections on *ender and Science D@e/ ,aven: Iale University Press, 19%JE. Me*)in +onner , an anthropolo"ist and M.5., is Sam-el 5o!!s Professor of 2nthropolo"y, 2ssociate Professor of Psychiatry, and 2ffiliate Scientist at the Ierkes 7e"ional Primate 7esearch Center, 8mory University. ,e is the a-thor of Becoming a Doctor D@e/ Iork: >ikin", 19%0E and The Tangled %ing: Biological Constraints on the Human S#irit D@e/ Iork: ,olt, 7inehart, and *inston, 19%#E. "**en Ne3e** is University Professor of Comp-ter Science at Carne"ie Mellon University. 2 leadin" theorist of co"nitive science, his !ooks incl-de Human (ro"lem So6ling D8n"le/ood Cliffs, @.J.: PrenticeA,all, 190&E and Com#uter Structures D@e/ Iork: Mc9ra/A,ill, 19%LE. )n 19%L, he delivered the *illiam James ;ect-res at ,arvard University. Harriet Rit)o is 2ssociate Professor in the 5epartment of ,-manities, Massach-setts )nstit-te of .echnolo"y. ,er primary interest is the c-lt-ral history of >ictorian 8n"land. She is the a-thor of The Animal -state: The -nglish and +ther Creatures in the :ictorian Age DCam!rid"e: ,arvard University Press, 19%0E. James J. Sheehan is 5ickason Professor of ,-manities and Professor of ,istory, Stanforcd University. 2 specialist in modern 8-ropean history, he is the a-thor of *erman 3i"eralism in te $ineteenth Century DChica"o and ;ondon: University of Chica"o Press, 190%E and *erman History, >@@GM>?LL D=+ford: =+ford University Press, 19%9E.

MOrton Sosna is a (ello/ of the ,-manities Center and ;ect-rer in 2merican St-dies, Stanford University. ,e is the a-thor of &n Search of the Silent South: Southern 3i"erals and the 1ace &ssue D@e/ Iork: Col-m!ia University Press, 1900E and coAeditor of 1econstructing &ndi6idualism: Autonomy, &ndi6iduality and the Self in %estern Thought DStanford: Stanford University Press, 19%LE. Sherry Tur1*e is 2ssociate Professor of Sociolo"y in the Pro"ram in Science, .echnolo"y, and Society, Massach-setts )nstit-te of .echnolo"y. B &L9 B ,er c-rrent interest is in the relationship !et/een artificial intelli"ence and psychoanalysis. She is the a-thor of (sychoanalytic (olitics D@e/ Iork: Basic Books, 190%E and The Second Self: Com#uters and the Human S#irit D@e/ Iork: Simon and Sch-ster, 19%FE. Bernard ,i**iams , formerly Provost of 6in"4s Colle"e, Cam!rid"e, 8n"land, is no/ Monroe 5e-tsch Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. ,is many philosophical /ritin"s incl-de -thics and the 3imits of (hiloso#hy DCam!rid"e: ,arvard University Press, 19%JE: Morality D@e/ Iork: ,arper and 7o/, 190&E: Descartes: The (ro2ect of (ure -n'uiry D=+ford: Pen"-in, 190%E. Terry ,ino(rad , 2ssociate Professor of Comp-ter Science, Stanford University, /rote an early artifical intellli"ence pro"ram, 9nderstanding $atural 3anguage D@e/ Iork: 2cademic Press, 190&E, and has done e+tensive research and /ritin" on comp-ter models of h-man lan"-a"e: 3anguage as a Cogniti6e (rocess D@e/ Iork: 2ddisonA*esley, 19%#E. ,e has colla!orated /ith (ernando (lores in a criti'-e of /ork in artificial intelli"ence and in developin" a theory of lan"-a"e that serves as a !asic for the desi"n of comp-ter systems: 9nderstanding Com#uters and Cognition D@e/ Iork: 2ddisonA *esley, 19%0E. ,e is also a fo-ndin" mem!er and c-rrent national president of Comp-ter Professionals for Social 7esponsi!ility. B &01 B

IN-ED
"
2"ricola, 9eor"i-s, 1FL Q1F0 2lchemy, 1FJ 2lem!ert, Jean ;e7ond d4, 1J$ Q1J1 2ltr-ism, 11$ 2l<heimer4s disease, 11L Q110 2nimal !reedin", # , 01 Q%1 passim 2nimal ri"hts, L9 Q0$ 2nimals: Christian vie/, &% Q&9: 9reek vie/, &0 Q&%:

as machines, &9 , 1#L 2'-inas, .homas of, F1 QF&, FL , J$ , J0 2rchimedes, 1FF 2ristotle, &% , 1J$ , 10$ , &## , &JF 2rtificial intelli"ence D2)E, 1 Q&, 0 Q%, 1#% Q1F$, 1J% Q19J passim, 19% Q&&1, &&L Q&F9, &L$ Q&LF: and the h-manities, 1 , 1J% Q1L$, 1%$ Q19J: and psychoanalysis, &F$ Q&F9. See also 8mer"ent 2): 8+pert systems 2-"-stine, &% 2-stin, J. ;., &10 2+elrod, 7o!ert, 9#

B
Ba!!a"e, Charles, 1#0 , &F# Bacon, (rancis, 1F# , 1F0 Barash, 5avid, &L# Barn-m, P. .., L$ Behaviorism, 19 , 1#0 Q1#%, &#% Belleforest, (ranNais, F1 Bernard, Cla-de, 1J$ , 1JF Besson, Jac'-es, 1FL Bestiality, &% , F& QF#, FJ QFL, J1 QJ&, J0 , L$ Bi!le, J1 , JF Birch, ;. C., 9F Birin"-ccio, >annoccio, 1FL Blaine, 5ela!ere, 00 Blake, *illiam, &0 Boaist-a-, Pierre, FF , FL Boas, Marie, 1F# Bolin"!roke, ;ord, #$ Bolter, 5avid, 1#J , &L# Boole, 9eor"e, &#F , &#L Q&#0 Boolean lo"ic, 199 Bo/l!y, John, 1$%

Boyle, 7o!ert, 1%9 Brooke, John, F$ B-ffon, 9eor"esA;o-is, 1J$ Q1J1 B-rkert, *alter, &J9 B-tterfield, ,er!ert, 1F#

!
Calvin, John, #0 Carey, S-san, &#1 Casini, Paolo, 1F# C?ard, Jean, #% , F1 , F# Childs, 2very Dthe 1fro" !oy1E, L& Co"nitive science, 1J Q19, 1#% , 1L# Cohen, ). B., 1F# Colinva-+, Pa-l, 91 Q9& Competition, 9$ , 11$ Q111 Comp-ters, 0 Q9, 1#% Q1F$, 1J% Q19J passim, &&F Q&#1, &L# Co-p, *illiam Cameron, L$ Creativity, 10 , 1%9 Q191 Cy!ernetics, 1#% , &1J Q&1L B &0& B

5al<iel, ,-"h, 00 , 09 5ar/in, Charles, # , #1 Q##, L% , 0# , 0J , %0 , 91 , 9F , 11$ , 119 , 1%J , &L$ , &LF . See also 8vol-tionary theory: @at-ral selection 5aston, ;oraine, F1 , J1 5avidson, 2rnold, # , &% , 1&J Q1&L 5a/kins, 7ichard, %J , 9L 5ella Porta, 9iam!attista, 1FL 5el-mea-, Jean, #L , F$ 5escartes, 7en?, 1% , &9 , %J , 1#L , 1#% Q1#9, 1F& Q1F#, 1F0 Q1F%, 1J9 , 199 Q&$$, &$& , &10 , &F# 5e >ore, )rven, 0$ 5iderot, 5enis, &$%

5i3ksterh-is, 8d/ard, 1F& Q1F# 5ionys-s, &% 5@2, 0 , %J , 11% , &#J 5reyf-s, ,-!ert, &1L , &&J , &#9 , &F# 5-BoisA7eymond, 8mil, 1J$ , 1JF Q1JJ 5-pr?, Joh, J , 9 , #F , %L

E
8isenmann, Charles, L& 18lephant Man.1 See Merrick, John 8liot, .. S., &F0 8mer"ent 2), 1#9 Q1F$, &1J , &&L Q&&%, &#F Q&F9 8merson, 7alph *aldo, &&0 8n"els, (riedrich, 9F 8rcker, ;a<ar-s, 1FL 8tholo"y, 1# Q1J, &1 , #& Q## 8-clid, &$$ 8vol-tionary theory, F QJ, #$ Q#1, L% , %L Q%0, &L$ . See also 5ar/in, Charles: @at-ral selection 8+pert systems, &$& , &$% Q&11, &1F , &#L Q&#0

(air!airn, *. 7. 5., &F$ (a-stoASterlin", 2nne, &L# (e!vre, ;-cien, #L (ei"en!a-m, 8d/ard, &$% (e-er!ach, ;-d/i", &L1 (icino, &% (le/, 2nthony, &J9 0rankenstein , # , 1JJ , &J9 (reak sho/s, L$ QLF (redkin, 8d/ard, &L$ Q&L1 (ree /ill, &9 (re-d, Si"m-nd, # , 11F Q11J, 1%J , 19# Q19F, &FJ Q&F0, &L1

.
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Sonca, >ittorio, 1FL B &0J B 5esi"ner U.C Compositor: .e+t: 5isplay: Printer: Binder: U.C.Press Staff ,-ron >alley 9raphics 1$ 1& Baskerville Baskerville Bookcrafters, )nc. Bookcrafters, )nc.

Preferred Citation: Sheehan, James J., and Morton Sosna, editors The Boundaries of Humanity: Humans, Animals, Machines. Berkeley: University of California Press, c1991 1991. http: ark.cdli!.or" ark: 1#$#$ ft##%n!&$'