Preferred Citation: Anagnostopoulos, Georgios. Aristotle on the Goals and Exactness of Ethics.

Berkeley: University of California Press, c1994 1994. ttp:!!ark.cdli".org!ark:!1#$#$!ft9t1n"%&k!

'o (yrtali, (ariana, Andreas, ' alia, and Apollo

Acknowledgments
' e various topics on e&actness and its relation to et ics t at ) discuss in t is "ook ave "een de"ated "y p ilosop ers at least since t e ti*e of +ocrates. A nu*"er of t inkers ave articulated t e pro"le*s, dra,n t e "oundaries of t e de"ate, and propounded i*portant p ilosop ical t eories a"out t ese topics. -or t is reason, any conte*porary discussion of e&actness inevita"ly o,es *uc to t e ,ork or ideas of *any ot ers. )n *y case, ) o,e *uc to t e ,ork of t ose , o ave produced translations or offered interpretations of Aristotle.s te&ts t roug out t e centuries. )n particular, t e /ustly fa*ous co**entaries on Aristotle.s et ical treatises t at ,ere ,ritten at t e end of t e nineteent century and t e "eginning of t e t,entiet century ave "een invalua"le guides. 0ecent years ave seen a renaissance of interest in Aristotle.s t oug t , ic as also resulted in a nu*"er of ne, translations and interpretations of Aristotle.s ,orks. +everal distinguis ed p ilosop ers and sc olars ave produced translations of or studies on Aristotle.s te&ts , ic ave aspired to t e ig est p ilosop ical and sc olarly standards and ave t ro,n *uc lig t on t e ,ork of one of t e great p ilosop ers. ) o,e *uc to t eir ,ork, even , en ) e&press disagree*ent ,it t eir vie,s or propose vie,s t at t ey *ay find unaccepta"le. As great as *y de"t is to t e *any students of Aristotle.s t oug t , o in a sense are re*ote in space or ti*e, it cannot e1ual t e de"t ) o,e to t ose , o are near to *e in space and , o s are *y ti*e. 2it out t e* t is ,ork ,ould not ave "een possi"le, nor ,ould it "e , at it is. ) a* grateful to Professor (arianne (c3onald for er perceptive co**ents on c apter 4 and for er constant encourage*ent. Professor Gerasi*os +antas as discussed ,it *e so*e of t e issues ) focus on in t is study and as offered invalua"le advice and constructive criticis*4 ) a* deeply grateful to i*, especially for is support. ) also o,e t anks to several 5 &ii 5 ot ers: to *y colleague Professor Avru* +troll for is co**ents on c apters 6 and 4 and for t e overall interest e as al,ays s o,n in *y ,ork4 to Professor C arles 7oung for is insig tful and constructive criticis*s of so*e of t e *ain ideas of t e "ook at t e University of California, )rvine, Conference on +cepticis*4 to +tep en +cales for suggesting nu*erous stylistic c anges t at resulted in a *ore reada"le te&t and for forcing *e, ,it is persistent 1uestions, to clarify so*e of *y t oug ts4 to t,o anony*ous referees fro* t e University of California Press for t eir careful reading and evaluation of *y *anuscript4 and to 3r. 8d,ard 3i*end"erg, +tep anie 8*erson, 0e"ecca -ra9ier, and (ic elle Bonnice at t e University of California Press for all t eir efforts to,ard t e pu"lication of *y *anuscript. ) find it *ost difficult to e&press in ,ords , at ) o,e to t e *e*"ers of *y fa*ily. :f course, eac one of t e* as "een a source of support to *e and as elped in is or er o,n ,ay. ) a* deeply grateful to t e* all: to *y ,ife (yrtali for "eing t ere and for re*inding *e, per aps not often enoug , t at no pro/ect is perfect and t at every pro/ect *ust co*e to an end4 to *y daug ter (ariana for s o,ing an interest in Aristotle and for suggesting so*e stylistic c anges4 to *y son Andreas for

also giving *e so*e advice on *atters of style, listening and pu99ling over *y 1uestions, and seeing a u*orous side even in a su"/ect as dry as e&actness4 to *y daug ter ' alia for "eing *y guide in *atters of spelling and for giving *e constant encourage*ent4 and lastly, to Apollo, a constant co*panion ,it a *ost independent *ind, for elping *e to see t ings in t eir proper perspective and for s o,ing *e t at Aristotle.s et ical treatises can "e used in 1uite different ,ays. But t is is not all t ey ave done for *e. ) ope t at , at ) ave failed to state or e&press ere ) can convey "y dedicating t is "ook to t e*. 5 &iii 5

Abbreviations of Aristotle's Works

Anim. Ath. Aud. Cael. Cat. E.E. G.A. Gen. et Corr. H.A. Interp. M.M. Mem. Met. Meteor. de Anima Athenian Constitution de Audibilibus de Caelo Categories Eudemian Ethics de Generatione Animalium de Generatione et Corruptione Historia Animalium de Interpretatione Magna Moralia de Memoria et Reminiscentia Metaphysics Meteorology

Mund. N.E. .A. hgn. hys. oet. olit. ost. Anal. r. Anal. robl. rotrept. Resp. Rhet. !omno #op.

de Mundo Nicomachean Ethics de artibus Animalium hysiognomica hysics oetics olitics osterior Analytics rior Analytics roblems rotrepticus de Respiratione Rhetoric de !omno et "igilia #opics

515

One Introduction
The Problems
+tudents of Aristotle.s t oug t ave, fro* anti1uity to t e present, pointed out t at e is 1uite

fre1uently concerned ,it 1uestions a"out e&actness or ine&actness. Aristotle often speaks, for e&a*ple, a"out t e level of e&actness is o,n investigations attain, t e level t at is desira"le, or t e level t at is possi"le in a certain kind of investigation or discipline. At ot er ti*es is concern is ,it t e e&actness!ine&actness of t e su"/ect *atter a discipline investigates and its relation to t e e&actness!ine&actness of t e discipline itself. At yet ot er ti*es is attention is directed to different 1uestions: Can ine&actness "e eli*inated fro* t e accounts a discipline gives of a certain su"/ect *atter; 2 at episte*ological conse1uences does ine&actness ave; 3oes it, for instance, affect t e de*onstrative c aracter of a discipline; 0e*arks t at touc on issues pertaining to e&actness!ine&actness are to "e found in all of Aristotle.s ,orks. But t ey figure *ost pro*inently in t e treatises on conduct, especially in t e N.E. Co**entators ave invaria"ly argued t at t e re*arks in t e N.E. , unlike t ose in ot er Aristotelian treatises, say so*et ing 1uite i*portant a"out Aristotle.s conception of t e nature of et ical in1uiry or its episte*ological c aracter. 'o so*e, t ese re*arks assert or i*ply t at et ics is an ine&act in1uiry, a discipline t at fails to attain t at ideal of e&actness ,e associate ,it t e *ost pure and rigorous disciplines. 'o ot ers, t ey assert or i*ply so*et ing even stronger: na*ely, t at et ics is not a de*onstrative discipline at all, t at it cannot even "e one of t e de*onstrative sciences t at Aristotle recogni9es. ' ese clai*s *ade "y t e co**entators regarding t e *eaning and 565 episte*ological i*plications of Aristotle.s re*arks on e&actness in t e N.E. *ay contain so*e trut . )t *ay very ,ell "e t at so*e types of ine&actness in a discipline or its su"/ect *atter i*ply t at t e discipline cannot "e as de*onstratively pure or rigorous as so*e ot er disciplines. )t *ay even "e t e case t at certain types of ine&actness in a discipline i*ply t at t e discipline is not de*onstrative at all. <o,ever, ot er types of ine&actness *ay ave no suc i*plication, or t ey *ay ave only *inor i*plications ,it respect to t e episte*ological c aracter of a discipline. )n ot er ,ords, it is difficult to say , et er t ere is any trut in t ese general clai*s a"out t e i*plications of Aristotle.s re*arks on e&actness. ' e pro"le* lies in part in t e fact t at e identifies several 1uite different types of e&actness=and, t erefore, ine&actness=and e attri"utes e&actness!ine&actness to various do*ains t at *ay consist of t ings t at are not necessarily of t e sa*e logical type. ' e ter* Aristotle uses *ost often , en e speaks of e&actness signifies a variety of t ings4 t e ter* is, if you like, ine&act. )ndeed, as ,e s all see, Aristotle uses a variety of ter*s to signify e&actness or ine&actness, and not all of t e* *ean t e sa*e t ing. ' e t ings t at Aristotle is ,illing to c aracteri9e as e&act!ine&act are not necessarily t e sorts of t ings ,e are ,illing to designate as suc . Aristotle see*s to ave no difficulty in applying is ter*s for e&actness! ine&actness to /ust a"out anyt ing. 2e tend to t ink of e&actness!ine&actness as "eing pri*arily features t at can c aracteri9e our language or any syste* ,e use to descri"e, e&plain, or represent t e ,orld. ' e ancients, o,ever, t oug t t at so*e of t ese features could c aracteri9e *any ot er t ings t at *ay not necessarily "e syste*s of representation. ' ey *ay, for instance, c aracteri9e t e ,orld itself or t e o"/ects ,e ai* at representing. )t is i*portant, t en, to recogni9e not only t at t e ancients designated a variety of features as "eing features of e&actness!ine&actness "ut also t at t ey took t ese features to apply to t ings ot er t an our syste*s of representation. ' e last point is of so*e significance. -or, alt oug t e sa*e feature *ay c aracteri9e "ot t e o"/ect represented and t e syste* "y , ic it is represented, t e reason , y t e

feature c aracteri9es t e syste* could "e t at it c aracteri9es t e o"/ect. At ti*es, our representations *ay "e ine&act "ecause t e t ings t ey represent are ine&act. At least, t e ancients, and especially Plato and Aristotle, t oug t so. ' is assu*ption on t eir part=na*ely, t at a certain relation of congruence olds "et,een t e e&actness!ine&actness of t e ,orld and t at of our syste*s of representation=*ay in part e&plain , y t ey t oug t t at certain types of ine&actness could not "e eli*inated fro* our accounts of t e ,orld. )f it is true t at Aristotle designates a variety of features as ine&actness >e&actness? and considers so*e to "e features of our representations of 5#5 t e ,orld, ot ers of t e ,orld itself, , ile still ot ers of "ot our representations and t e ,orld, t en it is 1uite possi"le t at t e episte*ological conse1uences of ine&actness t e*selves vary. )t is possi"le t at , ile so*e types of ine&actness ave i*portant episte*ological conse1uences, ot ers do not. )ndeed, as ) s all argue "elo,, in so*e cases t e episte*ological conse1uences t at ave "een of concern to students of t e N.E. are conse1uences of e&actness rat er t an of ine&actness. (y focus in t is study ,ill also "e on Aristotle.s re*arks on e&actness! ine&actness in t e N.E. 3espite t eir i*portance in t e sc olarly tradition, t ese re*arks fro* t e N.E. and t e rest of t e treatises on conduct ave not "een identified in t eir entirety. ' ey are collected ere for t e first ti*e and for* t e data of t e present investigation.@1A ' e investigation is, t us, dataBdriven4 it is guided "y t e *et odological principle of syste*atically collecting t e relevant data and using t e* as t e "asis for any conclusions to "e dra,n a"out t e issues pertaining to e&actness. An additional *et odological principle guiding t e present investigation is t at of providing t e strongest te&tual support possi"le for any t esis attri"uted to Aristotle in t e course of t is discussion. As a conse1uence, ) often give *any references fro* Aristotle.s ,orks in support of a clai*, t us assuring as *uc as possi"le t at t e clai* is an incontroverti"le co*ponent of Aristotle.s t oug t. -or, as students of Aristotle.s ,ritings kno,, it is often 1uite easy to *isconstrue is intentions "y relying on isolated te&tual evidence fro* is ,orks. ) ,ill, of course, use in *y discussion re*arks on e&actness *ade "y Aristotle in is ,orks t at are not concerned ,it *atters of conduct. ' ey ,ill "e very useful in t e effort to e&plicate t e *eaning of Aristotle.s re*arks in t e et ical treatises. )n addition, , at Aristotle says a"out e&actness!ine&actness in treatises ot er t an t ose dealing ,it *atters of conduct is of i*portance , en deter*ining , y e takes ine&actness to "e *ore pro"le*atic for t e disciplines dealing ,it *atters of conduct t an it is for t e ot er kinds of disciplines. ) ,is , nonet eless, to *ake clear at t e outset t at ) s all not discuss in detail all t e re*arks Aristotle *akes in is ,ritings on e&actness! ine&actness, nor s all ) "e concerned ,it every issue t e ancients associated ,it e&actness. (y concern ,ill "e al*ost e&clusively ,it t e kinds of 1uestions ) ave raised a"ove. ) ,ill "e focusing, t en, pri*arily on t ose 1uestions t at are of t e greatest p ilosop ical interest=t at is, 1uestions a"out t e various types of e&actness!ine&actness, t e sources of ine&actness, t e kinds of t ings t at can "e e&act!ine&act, t e relation "et,een t e e&actness!ine&actness of a t ing and of t e *eans ,e use to descri"e or e&plain or represent it >e.g., linguistic e&pressions, concepts, propositions?, t e episte*ological conse1uences of ine&actness, t e eli*iB 545 na"ility of ine&actness fro* our accounts or ot er *eans of description or representation, and so fort . )t is evident, o,ever, t at t ese are not t e only issues t e ancients associated ,it t e features of

e&actness!ine&actness. 'o t e*, t ese *atters ad a significance t at ,ent "eyond t e p ilosop ical concerns listed a"ove. ' ey ad, for e&a*ple, political significance. ' us, Cenop on associates e&actness or accuracy ,it t e aristocracy, i*plying per aps t at, in contrast to de*ocracy and t ose , o advocate it, t e aristocrats are guided "y a clear or e&act vision of t e *oral and political ideals and do not deviate in t eir actions fro* suc a vision.@6A )n t is sense, e&actness see*s to "e a trait of c aracter, a 1uality t at as *oral and political significance. As ,e s all see "elo,, "ot Plato and Aristotle at ti*es see t e pursuit of e&actness in certain conte&ts as indicative of an undesira"le 1uality in a person. )n t e ands of t e tragic poets e&actness even ac1uires a tragic di*ension. ' us, 8uripides in t e Hippolytus as P aedra.s nurse urging er not to set standards t at are too e&act and t erefore difficult to reali9e4 and e contrasts t e c orus of ,o*en >, o ,is not to ave an accurate opinion a"out , at is t e proper t ing to do in t e situation in , ic t e protagonists of t e play find t e*selves? to P aedra and <ippolytus , o ave accurate opinions=opinions t at prove in t e end catastrop ic.@#A ' ese political, et ical, or even tragic di*ensions associated ,it e&actness "y t e ancients are "y no *eans uni*portant. :n t e contrary, t ey are of considera"le i*portance, and per aps deserve a study of t eir o,n. +uc aspects, o,ever, need to "e distinguis ed fro* t e strictly p ilosop ical ones, enu*erated a"ove, t at ) ,ill focus on in t e present study. )n addition to t e kinds of p ilosop ical pro"le*s ) listed a"ove=t e kinds of pro"le*s t at Aristotle i*self recogni9es=t ere are a nu*"er of ot er 1uestions t at ) ,ill "e concerned ,it in t is study. ' ere are 1uestions, for e&a*ple, a"out >1? t e p ilosop ical significance of Aristotle.s vie,s on e&actness, >6? t e place of t ese vie,s in t e conte&t of t e p ilosop ical tradition t at for*s t e "ackground to Aristotle.s o,n t oug t, and >#? t e trut or plausi"ility of Aristotle.s clai*s a"out e&actness. 2it regard to 1uestions of t e first kind, ,e s all see t at Aristotle.s o"servations on e&actness are of considera"le p ilosop ical i*portance. (any of t e* are not very different fro* t e o"servations of so*e conte*porary p ilosop ers, and t e pro"le*s in response to , ic e develops so*e of is vie,s on e&actness are at t e center of *any conte*porary p ilosop ical discussions. ' is is especially true, for e&a*ple, of Aristotle.s discussion of t e indefiniteness or vagueness of *atters of conduct, of t e supposed failure of propositions a"out certain do*ains to "e 5%5 universally true, of t e pro"le* associated ,it constructing e&planations or de*onstrative syllogis*s ,it pre*ises t at are ine&act, or of is proposal for a prag*atic account of so*e types of ine&actness. ' e discussion of so*e of t ese pro"le*s for*s an al*ost continuous t read in t e 2estern p ilosop ical tradition t at e&tends fro* Plato and Aristotle to -rege, 0ussell, and 2ittgenstein, and *ore recently to Garet 8vans and +aul Dripke. )n general, Aristotle.s o"servations on e&actness in et ics constitute so*e of t e *ost i*portant criticis*s of an ideal of et ical kno,ledge t at as fascinated p ilosop ers fro* Plato to +pino9a, to so*e of t e utilitarians, and to 0a,ls. ' e ideal, of course, is t e one e*"odied in t e vie, t at et ics is or can "e as e&act a discipline as t ose t at are considered to "e t e paradig*s of e&actness and de*onstrative rigor: t e *at e*atical disciplines. )ndeed, as ,e s all see, so*e p ilosop ers even t ink t at et ics can "e *ore e&act and rigorous t an t e *at e*atical disciplines. Alt oug Aristotle i*self espouses t is ideal as strongly as anyone in relation to so*e do*ains or disciplines, is o"servations on t e e&actness of t e su"/ect *atter and accounts of et ics provide us ,it so*e of t e *ost perceptive criticis*s of t is ideal of et ical kno,ledge.

2it regard to t e second kind of 1uestion, ) s all argue t at Aristotle.s re*arks on e&actness raise so*e funda*ental 1uestions a"out certain vie,s t at are central to t e p ilosop ical tradition , ic e in erited or accepted. )n so*e of t e* Aristotle is 1uestioning so*e of t e deepest and *ost pervasive assu*ptions in +ocrates. and Plato.s as ,ell as is o,n t oug t=for e&a*ple, t at essentialis* can "e e&tended to all do*ains, or t at rigorous kno,ledge is possi"le in certain do*ains, or t at suc kno,ledge is needed for practical purposes. )n connection ,it 1uestions of t e t ird type, ,e are all a,are t at deter*ining t e trut or plausi"ility of any p ilosop ical t esis is, of course, not an easy *atter. )n so*e cases t ere are o"vious countere&a*ples to a t esis. )n ot ers t e task *ay prove *ore difficult. But often , at is of p ilosop ical interest in a t esis are t e assu*ptions t at lie "e ind it, t e assu*ptions t at *otivate it. Alt oug ) ,ill "e critically assessing t e various clai*s Aristotle *akes, often *y *ain concern ,ill "e ,it uncovering t e assu*ptions t at lie "e ind so*e of t ese Aristotelian clai*s.

An Overview
' e re*ainder of t e "ook is divided into nine c apters, eac dealing ,it so*e aspect of e&actness or a related topic. ' e argu*ent of eac c apter is at ti*es lengt y and co*ple&, as is t e overall argu*ent of t e "ook. 5E5 ' e "rief overvie, t at follo,s is offered in t e ope t at it ,ill "e of use to t e reader. ' e follo,ing c apter is devoted to an account of t e p ilosop ical "ackground to Aristotle.s t oug t, *y ai* "eing to isolate t ose features t at are necessary for understanding Aristotle.s re*arks on e&actness. ' e p ilosop ical "ackground in t is case is, of course, t e t oug t of +ocrates and Plato. +ocrates *akes certain assu*ptions a"out t e *etap ysical c aracter of *atters of conduct or of t e o"/ects e is trying to define, a"out t e nature and role of definitions, and a"out t e nature of kno,ledge. ' ese assu*ptions are also accepted "y Plato, , o considers t e -or*s t at are related to *atters of conduct to "e so*e of t e *ost perfect or e&act o"/ects, to "e t e sorts of t ings a"out , ic t ere can "e kno,ledge of t e *ost rigorous kind. Aristotle i*self at ti*es, especially , en e speaks as a logician, e*"races so*e of t ese assu*ptions=for e&a*ple, t e one concerning essentialis*. But in so*e of is re*arks on e&actness, Aristotle 1uestions , et er essentialis* of t e kind advocated "y +ocrates, Plato, and at ti*es i*self o"tains in t e case of *atters of conduct. +o*e, or per aps all, *atters of conduct lack a fi&ed and invaria"le essential structure4 t ey are indefinite. )n general, ) argue ere t at *any of Aristotle.s re*arks on e&actness are ai*ed at so*e of t ese assu*ptions a"out t e *etap ysical c aracter of t ings, t e defina"ility of certain t ings, or t e possi"ility of e&act kno,ledge in certain do*ains. )n c apter #, ) e&plore t e nature of t e goals Aristotle ascri"es to et ical in1uiry. ' is *atter is of i*portance in part "ecause Aristotle clai*s t at so*e types of ine&actness in et ics are due to t e nature of its goals. ' ere as "een *uc dispute in t e Aristotelian sc olarly tradition a"out t is *atter, ,it so*e sc olars clai*ing t at t e goals of et ics are purely cognitive and ot ers clai*ing t at t ey are al*ost indistinguis a"le fro* practice. ) argue ere t at t e strategy often used "y Plato to eli*inate certain goals=t at is, t e appeal to t e transitivity of desires and goals=cannot "e used to eli*inate t e cognitive goals of et ics. Aristotle i*self accepts t e transitivity of desires, pursuits, or goals, "ut e does not t ink t at it can "e used to eli*inate t e cognitive goals of et ics. ' e proper goals of et ics, like t ose of *edicine or of any ot er discipline, are cognitive, alt oug its ulti*ate goals are, according to Aristotle, practical. Aristotle, despite , at e at ti*es appears to "e saying,

assu*es t at et ics is an in1uiry ,it certain cognitive o"/ectives t at are su"ordinate to practical o"/ectives. ' is supposed su"ordination of t e cognitive goals of et ics to practical o"/ectives is, according to Aristotle, t e source of so*e types of ine&actness in et ics. )t also raises a 1uestion a"out t e e&tent to , ic suc su"ordinate cognitive o"/ectives rese*"le t e o"/ectives of t e t eoretical disciplines. ) argue ere t at in so*e respects t ey do, "ut not in all. 5F5 )n c apter 4, ) e&a*ine in dept so*e general issues a"out e&actness! ine&actness t at are presupposed "y t e discussion in t e re*aining c apters. ) discuss in so*e detail t e various ter*s Aristotle uses to designate t e features of e&actness or ine&actness e identifies, and ) argue t at not all t ese ter*s signify t e sa*e t ing, t at t ere are different features of e&actness or ine&actness. ) also s o, t at Aristotle attri"utes e&actness!ine&actness "ot at t e level of t e su"/ect *atter a discipline studies and at t e level of t e discipline itself. ) t en e&plore t e various sources of ine&actness at t e level of t e discipline itself, seeking to identify types of ine&actness , ic , on account of t e sources t at generate t e*, can "e eli*inated. ) also for*ulate and e&plore Aristotle.s t esis t at so*e kind of congruence olds "et,een t e e&actness!ine&actness of t e t,o levels. Alt oug ) argue against t is Aristotelian t esis, ) give so*e reasons t at *ig t ave *otivated Aristotle.s "elief in suc a t esis. ) also s o, t at in *any cases Aristotle t inks t at t e ine&actness of et ical accounts cannot "e eli*inated=t at is, t at any accounts of *atters of conduct, not only is o,n, ,ill "e ine&act. )n c apter %, ) e&plore t e kind of ine&actness Aristotle refers to as "eing in outline or lacking in detail. ) s o, t at t is is a kind of ine&actness t at can c aracteri9e only a discipline4 it is only for*al. ) furt er s o, t at, alt oug t is type of for*al ine&actness as *any sources, its pri*ary source is t e goals of et ics. Aristotle.s conception of t e >ulti*ate? goals of et ics as practical and is "elief t at practice deals ,it particulars lead i* to t e conclusion t at, if et ics is to reali9e its goals, it as to reac t e particulars. But t is, Aristotle argues, cannot "e done. ' erefore et ical accounts are essentially ine&act4 t eir ine&actness cannot "e eli*inated. 2it regard to t e episte*ological conse1uences of t is type of ine&actness, ) argue t at, contrary to , at co**entators ave al,ays assu*ed, , at proves *ore pro"le*atic is t e e&actness Aristotle t inks et ics s ould ac ieve rat er t an t e ine&actness e is ulti*ately re1uired to accept. )f t e e&actness Aristotle t inks is re1uired "y t e practical goals of et ics ,ere to "e attained, it ,ould introduce propositions t at could not function as pre*ises in Aristotelian syllogis*s. )n c apter E, ) discuss t e kind of ine&actness Aristotle c aracteri9es as fluctuation or G"eing for t e *ost part.G ' is type of ine&actness can apply to "ot t e su"/ect *atter of a discipline and to t e accounts t e discipline gives of its su"/ect *atter. Aristotle argues t at /ust as t e su"/ect *atter of et ics fluctuates or is for t e *ost part, so are t e propositions a"out it true for t e *ost part. ) e&a*ine t e scope of t is kind of ine&actness, according to Aristotle, and discuss t e contrasts Aristotle dra,s "et,een t e necessary, t at , ic is al,ays, t at , ic is for t e *ost part, and t e fortuitous. ) argue ere t at Aristotle takes t e for t e *ost part to "e contingent, "ut G"eing for t e *ost partG does not si*ply *ean 5H5 Gcontingent.G ' e fortuitous is also contingent, as is , at occurs "y c ance. 2 at is for t e *ost part is, according to Aristotle, a part of t e causal regularities of nature, and t erefore can "e t e su"/ect of e&planation or scientific understanding.

)n c apter F, ) e&a*ine , et er and o, de*onstration of , at is for t e *ost part is possi"le. (any sc olars ave, for a variety of reasons, argued t at t ere is no de*onstration of , at is for t e *ost part, t at t is type of ine&actness i*plies t at t e disciplines , ose su"/ect *atter is for t e *ost part fall outside t e class of de*onstrative disciplines. ) argue ere t at t is is not so, t at t e disciplines , ose su"/ect *atter is for t e *ost part *ay not "e de*onstrative for *any reasons, "ut not necessarily on account of t e fact t at t eir su"/ect *atter is for t e *ost part. ) give evidence t at s o,s Aristotle did not infer t at a discipline is nonde*onstrative fro* t e fact t at its su"/ect *atter is for t e *ost part. :n t e contrary, e insists t at t ere is de*onstration of , at is for t e *ost part. ' e pro"le* is, of course, to s o, o, de*onstration is possi"le in do*ains t at are for t e *ost part. ' at t ere is a pro"le* ,it de*onstration in do*ains t at are for t e *ost part ,as recogni9ed "y t e ancient co**entators, and t e pro"le* as never "een solved. ' is pro"le* is of i*portance not only in relation to et ics "ut also in relation to all t e disciplines investigating nature, since *ost of nature is, according to Aristotle, for t e *ost part. ) identify ere Aristotle.s ,ay of dealing ,it t e pro"le* of t e validity of forBt eB*ostBpart syllogis*s and assess its via"ility. ) argue first t at Aristotle enlarges t e conception of de*onstration to include, in addition to t e a"solute or strict de*onstration t at e and Plato associate ,it certain disciplines and do*ains, so*e ,eaker for*s of de*onstration. Aristotle accepts as de*onstrations proofs t at consist of syllogis*s , ose pre*ises are not necessary. ) t en e&plain o, Aristotle construes forBt eB*ostBpart syllogis*s in order to deal ,it t e pro"le* of validity. ) argue t at e assi*ilates suc syllogis*s into t ose t at e considers to "e unpro"le*atic ,it respect to t eir validity=na*ely, t e syllogis*s t at are a"out , at is al,ays or necessary=and relies on so*e nonfor*al *eans for re*inding us t at syllogis*s a"out , at is for t e *ost part are deficient or ine&act4 t ey are not as good as t ose t at are a"out , at is al,ays or necessary. Aristotle.s ,ay of dealing ,it t e pro"le* of t e validity of t ese nonstandard syllogi*s as, as ) point out, its li*itations. But t e condition of validity is not t e only one t at de*onstrative syllogis*s ave to *eet. ) argue t at t ere is no reason , y syllogis*s , ose pre*ises are true for t e *ost part cannot *eet t e ot er conditions Aristotle re1uires of de*onstrative syllogis*s. )f t ey do *eet t ese conB 595 ditions, t en t ey are de*onstrations of t e ,eaker or less e&act kind. ' is ,eaker or less e&act kind of de*onstration is not e*pty4 it is t e kind t at, according to Aristotle, ,e encounter in our e&planations in t e do*ain of nature. An e&planation, t erefore, of o, Aristotle conceives of de*onstration in t e do*ain of conduct is of t e greatest i*portance=it is at t e sa*e ti*e an e&planation of o, e conceives of de*onstration in t e do*ain of nature and t e disciplines dealing ,it it. -inally, ) e&a*ine , et er t e kind of ine&actness t at generates t e a"ove pro"le*s ,it de*onstration in certain do*ains can "e eli*inated fro* et ical accounts. ) consider ere t,o tec ni1ues Aristotle e*ploys for eli*inating t is type of ine&actness fro* accounts of natural p eno*ena=t at is, t e tec ni1ue of restricting t e scope of t e logical su"/ect of a proposition t at is true for t e *ost part and t e tec ni1ue of seeking e&ceptionless causal e&planations4 ) assess t e effectiveness of t ese tec ni1ues , en applied to propositions t at are a"out *atters of conduct. )n c apter H, ) discuss anot er type of ine&actness Aristotle attri"utes to *atters of conduct, na*ely, t at of vagueness or indefiniteness. ' is type of ine&actness c aracteri9es, according to Aristotle, t e do*ain of nature as ,ell. But *atters of conduct are supposedly affected *uc *ore "y t is kind of ine&actness t an natural p eno*ena. ' ey lack a fi&ed and ,ellBdefined nature or structure. ) s o, ere t at Aristotle, in insisting t at *atters of conduct are vague or indefinite, is 1uestioning +ocrates.

and Plato.s assu*ption t at strict essentialis* o"tains in every do*ain. )ndeed, t is is an assu*ption t at Aristotle i*self often accepts, especially , en e, as a logician, atte*pts to e&plain t e nature of definition and to deter*ine t e conditions t at *ust "e *et "y anyt ing t at is to "e defined. Io, t e feature of vagueness, , et er it c aracteri9es t e ,orld or our language, as al,ays "een considered to give rise to serious pro"le*s. Aristotle, of course, attri"utes t e feature to "ot t e ,orld and to our accounts of it. <e also recogni9es t e pro"le*s t e feature generates, na*ely, t e difficulty of defining vague or indefinite t ings or de*onstrating ,it pre*ises t at are vague. Aristotle, o,ever, does not go as far as 0ussell and -rege , en t ey clai* t at t e ,orld cannot "e vague, t at vague concepts are not concepts at all, or t at logic does not apply to anyt ing t at e*ploys vague sy*"ols. -inally, ) e&plore ere so*e tec ni1ues Aristotle e*ploys else, ere for dealing ,it vagueness, tec ni1ues t at see* to "e successful in avoiding to so*e e&tent vagueness in our definitions of natural p eno*ena. ) s o, ere t at t ere are so*e reasons for "eing, as Aristotle is, less opti*istic a"out t e success of t ese tec ni1ues , en applied to et ical accounts t an , en t ey are applied to accounts of natural p eno*ena. )n c apter 9, ) discuss Aristotle.s atte*pt to link so*e types of ine&B 5 1$ 5 actness to t e goals of a discipline. Aristotle.s atte*pt to do so parallels t e recent atte*pts to link e&planation to so*e prag*atic considerations. ) e&plore t e si*ilarities and differences "et,een t e t,o atte*pts and s o, t at t e ,ay Aristotle conceives of t e goals of a discipline to , ic e relativi9es e&actness is 1uite different fro* t e ,ay neoprag*atists conceive of t e goals or purposes to , ic t ey relativi9e e&planation. Aristotle takes t e goals of a discipline to "e fi&ed, to "e part of t e essence of a discipline. <e also t inks t at only a certain ,ellBdefined level of e&actness ,ill satisfy t e goals of eac discipline. ' us, e&actness itself cannot "e relativi9ed to any individual interest or purpose "ut only to t ose t at define t e discipline. Given t ese assu*ptions on Aristotle.s part, ,e can understand , y e insists t at in any discipline ,e *ust seek only t at level of e&actness re1uired "y t e discipline. And given t e assu*ption Aristotle *akes a"out et ics "eing practical, ,e can see , y e t inks t at t e e&actness Plato de*ands of et ics is not re1uired. But ) argue t at t ere are several pro"le*s ,it so*e of Aristotle.s clai*s. )t is difficult, for e&a*ple, to fi& t e appropriate level of e&actness for a discipline. (ore i*portantly, and in agree*ent ,it Plato, ) argue t at t ere are cases , ere practice *ay de*and t e ut*ost e&actness, even *ore t an re1uired "y t e *ost rigorous t eoretical disciplines. )n t e last c apter ) discuss in *ore detail , et er Aristotle, given t e kinds of ine&actness e attri"utes to *atters of conduct and to our accounts of t e*, leaves any place for universality or generality and trut in et ical t eory. ) argue ere t at, contrary to clai*s "y so*e recent p ilosop ers, Aristotle does not eli*inate t e role of universality or trut in et ical t eory. 8t ical t eory *ust ai* at t e universal and at trut , "ut it *ust also, "ecause of its ulti*ate practical goals, reac do,n to t e particular and recogni9e t at its propositions are not as true as t e propositions in so*e ot er do*ains presu*a"ly are.

The Question of Method

+everal of t e issues ) discuss in t is study to so*e e&tent "ear on t e 1uestion regarding Aristotle.s conception of t e *et od of et ics. ' is is, as is ,ell kno,n, a rat er perple&ing 1uestion in Aristotelian sc olars ip. ' ere is considera"le disagree*ent a*ong sc olars as to , at *et od Aristotle i*self uses in is et ical investigation or advocates as t e appropriate one for et ics.

+o*e interpreters of Aristotle.s ,ritings clai* t at Aristotle uses t e de*onstrative *et od. :t ers clai* t at e relies on t e inductive *et od. +till ot ers argue t at e uses or advocates t e dialectical *et od.@4A )nterest in t e last *et od as increased considera"ly in recent years as a result of t e ,ork of G. 8. J. :,en, , o as argued t at t e dialectical 5 11 5 *et od enco*passes not only t e use of esta"lis ed opinions in any in1uiry "ut also a for* of conceptual analysis or investigation.@%A ' ere is no dou"t t at t e dialectical *et od is i*portant to Aristotle. 2 et er it is t e *et od Aristotle i*self uses in is et ical investigations or one t at e identifies as t e *et od of et ics are *atters t at ave yet to "e settled.@EA -or, as :,en points out, all of Aristotle.s treatises, including t e scientific ones >e.g., t e hys. and t e "iological treatises?, rely to so*e e&tent on an e&a*ination of esta"lis ed opinions or of ordinary concepts4 t ey use to so*e e&tent t e dialectical *et od. Aristotle i*self in t e #op. advocates t e dialectical *et od as t e *et od "y , ic t e "asic principles of all sciences are o"tained or /ustified. <o,, t en, does et ics differ fro* t e rest of t e disciplines; <o,ever, *y ai* in t is study is not to deter*ine t e *et od Aristotle uses or advocates in et ical in1uiry. 0at er, *y concerns are t e ones ) listed earlier: na*ely, t e nature of t e e&actness!ine&actness in et ics and t eir episte*ological conse1uences. )n so*e cases, e&actness or ine&actness ,ill see* to "e *ore co*pati"le ,it one *et od t an anot er. -or instance, Aristotle.s de*and t at et ical in1uiry, in order to "e e&act, needs to reac t e individuals relevant to conduct ,ould see* to i*ply t at perception as a role to play in et ical in1uiry or kno,ledge, since t e individual is, according to Aristotle, kno,n t roug perception. 2it ot er types of e&actness!ine&actness, o,ever, so*et ing *ore t an perception of individuals *ay "e appropriate. -or instance, an e&a*ination of t e e&a*ples Aristotle gives of propositions t at are ine&act "y failing to "e necessary or "y "eing true for t e *ost part s o,s t at t e *a/ority of t e* can "est "e treated as e*pirical or inductive generali9ations. ' e i*portant point, o,ever, is to reali9e t at, in a ,ay, t e issues a"out e&actness!ine&actness t at Aristotle raises ,ill "e of i*portance regardless of , at ,e single out as t e *et od Aristotle uses or advocates for et ics. Consider, for e&a*ple, t e kind of ine&actness Aristotle attri"utes to *atters of conduct or to our accounts or concepts of t e* , ic e designates as indefiniteness or vagueness. ' e pro"le*s suc ine&actness raises ,ill "e, *ost likely, pro"le*s for any *et od. )f *atters of conduct are vague or indefinite, for*ulating definitions of t e* or assigning trut values to propositions a"out t e* ,ill "e pro"le*atic. )n ot er ,ords, all *et ods=de*onstration, induction, dialectic, perception =,ill encounter difficulties. +i*ilarly, if Aristotle is correct in clai*ing t at propositions a"out *atters of conduct are ine&act "ecause t ey are only true for t e *ost part, t en syllogis*s a"out *atters of conduct, , et er de*onstrative or dialectical, ,ill "e pro"le*atic. But since t e only *et od Aristotle identifies as t e *et od of scientific kno,ledge is t e de*onstrative one, and since t e kinds of ine&actness e attri"utes to et ics ave *ost often "een taken to i*ply t at de*onstration is not 5 16 5 possi"le in its case, ) ,ill focus *ainly on t e episte*ological i*plications of e&actness!ine&actness in relation to t e de*onstrative *et od. ' is, of course, does not *ean t at t ere are no i*plications in relation to ot er *et ods: ' ere are, "ut often t ey are 1uite o"vious. )t also does not *ean t at ) take Aristotle to use de*onstration in is o,n in1uiries into *atters of conduct or to advocate suc a

*et od for et ical in1uiry. Alt oug ) touc upon t e 1uestion of *et od>s? as it relates to t e issue of e&actness!ine&actness, ) do not clai* to ave settled t e pro"le*s concerning t e *et od>s? Aristotle uses or advocates in et ical in1uiry. ' ese pro"le*s go "eyond t e concerns of t e present investigation. 5 1# 5

Two The Philosophical ackground

Introduction
Aristotle ,as eir to a long and ric p ilosop ical tradition. Generations of t inkers "efore i* ad already forged ter*s and concepts t at t ey used in developing t eir p ilosop ical vie,s. <e t us in erited a p ilosop ical voca"ulary and a conceptual fra*e,ork ,it in , ic e for*ulated is o,n t eories=for e&a*ple, t e voca"ulary of cause, opposites, for*, universal and particular, and soul. But "eyond t is kind of in eritance, , ic *ay "e vie,ed as "eing inescapa"ly co**on to all , o use t e sa*e language and ,ork in t e sa*e tradition, Aristotle *ore t an any ot er of t e Greek t inkers ,as inde"ted to specific vie,s of is predecessors. <e ,as influenced "y t e content of t eir t eories and t e particular vie,s or solutions to various pro"le*s t ey put fort . )ndeed, at ti*es e is not only fully a,are of is de"t to t e p ilosop ical t eories of is predecessors, "ut goes as far as to advocate, as ,ell as to put into practice, a *et od of p ilosop ical investigation t at partly consists in t e critical or constructive ree&a*ination of t e vie,s a p ilosop er in erits. 'rut , e at ti*es argues, is to "e attained "y reflecting upon t e vie,s of our predecessors, separating , at is of value in t e*, and "uilding upon it.@1A ' us, Aristotle.s o,n *etap ysical vie,s are for*ulated "y /oining t e argu*ent ,it is predecessors. At ti*es e critici9es t eir accounts4 at ti*es e refines t eir clai*s and "uilds upon t e*4 at still ot er ti*es e develops is o,n ,ellBkno,n accounts of su"stance, *atter and for*, causality, and so fort , "y a"andoning t eir vie,s and striking out in ne, p ilosop ical directions. And, of course, e does t e sa*e in is et ical investigations: <e critici9es and "uilds upon t e t eories of t ose "efore 5 14 5 i*=including Ana&agoras, t e Cynics, +ocrates, Plato, and 8udo&us=as ,ell as develops vie,s 1uite different fro* t eirs. At ti*es, "ot Aristotle.s dialogue >constructive or ot er,ise? ,it is predecessors and t e influence t eir t eories ave on i* concern a su"stantive et ical vie,, so*e co*ponent of t eir respective nor*ative et ical t eories=for e&a*ple, t e nature of t e good, of virtue, of pleasure and its relation to t e good, or of *oral ,eakness. At ot er ti*es, o,ever, t ey relate to , at are likely to "e construed as *etaet ical *atters=for e&a*ple: )s GgoodG univocal; )s t ere a >Platonic? -or* of goodness; Understanding t e p ilosop ical conte&t and tradition ,it in , ic t e vie,s of any p ilosop er develop is al*ost al,ays of i*portance in understanding t e ,ork of t at p ilosop er. And it is of special i*portance in t e case of Aristotle, "ecause e, *ore t an any ot er p ilosop er in t e Greek

tradition, for*ulated *any of is vie,s "y arguing against or in confor*ity ,it t e in erited tradition. )ndeed, it *ay "e t e case t at so*e, if not all, of is vie,s or clai*s cannot really "e understood, or at least t eir significance cannot "e fully appreciated, unless t ey are seen against t e p ilosop ical positions t at do*inated Greek p ilosop ical t oug t "efore and during is ti*e. ' is is t e case ,it Aristotle.s re*arks on e&actness!ine&actness in et ics and related disciplines. ' e content of t ese re*arks as not "een fully understood and t eir significance as not "een appreciated. ' is is so despite t e fact t at fro* anti1uity co**entators on Aristotle.s te&ts ave insisted t at t e purported lack of e&actness in et ics poses pro"le*s for Aristotle.s conception of science.@6A (ore recent co**entators ave pointed to t ese sa*e pro"le*s t at ine&actness in et ics supposedly generates for Aristotle, "ut t e i*portance of Aristotle.s re*arks and t eir relation to is t oug t still re*ain unclear.@#A )n part, t is *ay "e due to t e fact t at Aristotle.s re*arks do not constitute a syste*atic and co*pre ensive treat*ent of t e su"/ect of e&actness!ine&actness "ut instead for* only a set of dis/ointed co**ents t at are dispersed t roug out Aristotle.s et ical treatises. 'o "e sure, t is frag*entation as not "een of elp in understanding and appreciating t e i*portance of t ese re*arks, "ut ) "elieve t is is not t e only source of difficulty. Anot er reason is t at t e relation of Aristotle.s re*arks on e&actness! ine&actness to t e +ocraticB Platonic conception of kno,ledge and its o"/ects, as ,ell as to is o,n vie,s a"out de*onstrative kno,ledge, as not "een fully seen. )n *ost cases , ere Aristotle argues t at ine&actness is to "e encountered in t e do*ain of et ics e is directly or indirectly raising dou"ts a"out t e +ocraticB Platonic conception of kno,ledge and its o"/ects t at is is o,n conception as ,ell. 'o see , at Aristotle *eans , en, for e&a*ple, e clai*s t at t ere is ine&actness or indefiniteness in *atters of conduct, and to grasp t e conse1uences of suc a clai*, one *ust vie, 5 1% 5 it against t e +ocraticBPlatonic and Aristotelian conception of essentialis* and against t e role suc essentialis* in turn plays in t ese p ilosop ers. conceptions of kno,ledge. Again, t e *eaning of Aristotle.s clai* t at t ings >or propositions? are ine&act "ecause t ey possess certain properties for t e *ost part "eco*es clear only , en it is seen against t e +ocraticBPlatonic and Aristotelian vie, t at t ings possess certain properties al,ays >or t at so*e propositions are al,ays true?. ' us, soley for t e purpose of providing t e necessary conte&t for understanding t e nature and significance of Aristotle.s re*arks on e&actness!ine&actness, ) ,is to "riefly discuss so*e aspects of +ocrates., Plato.s, and Aristotle.s t oug t. ' is discussion ,ill focus only on t ose aspects of t eir t oug t t at are relevant for t e present purposes and is not intended to "e an e& austive study of t eir vie,s. )t ,ill concentrate on so*e episte*ological and *etap ysical ele*ents of t eir t oug t=for e&a*ple, t eir vie,s on definition, its o"/ects, and its role in t ese t inkers. conception of kno,ledge= against , ic Aristotle.s clai*s a"out e&actness and its i*plications ,ill "e discussed.

!ocratic Theor" and Practice

+ocratic practice is focused pri*arily on 1uestions of conduct rat er t an on episte*ological or *etap ysical issues. -or t is reason, , atever interest +ocrates s o,s in t e nature of kno,ledge or reality as al,ays "een connected to is interests in *atters of conduct. 8piste*ological, *etap ysical, and ot er nonet ical types of interests are presu*a"ly su"ordinate to et ical interests. ' is traditional account of t e +ocratic practice *ay "e correct , en vie,ed as a ,ay of pointing to , at *otivates +ocrates. persistent and al*ost endless searc es for definitions or for kno,ledge of t e nature of certain t ings in t e do*ain of conduct. )t s ould not, o,ever, o"scure t e fact t at +ocrates is, after all,

searc ing for kno,ledge of t e nature or definitions of certain t ings, and t at e as so*e conception of t e type of kno,ledge e is searc ing for. )ndeed, *aking +ocrates. episte*ological concerns su"ordinate to is et ical interests does not e&clude suc concerns "ut, on t e contrary, ackno,ledges t e*. ' us, +ocrates, , ile interested pri*arily for practical purposes in deter*ining , at virtue is or , et er it is possi"le to act rig tly ,it out kno,ledge, develops t e ,ellBkno,n distinction "et,een kno,ledge and "elief in t e Euthyphro and t e Meno . )n saying, o,ever, t at +ocrates as so*e episte*ological interests, , et er su"ordinate to is interests in practical *atters or not, ) do not *ean to i*ply t at e propounds fully developed episte*ological t eories=only t at e operates ,it so*e conception of kno,ledge, of definition and its uses >"ot t eoretical and practical?, and of t e nature of 5 1E 5 t e o"/ects of definition and kno,ledge. ) s all argue "elo,, "ut ,it out going into detail or providing all t e relevant te&tual evidence, t at +ocrates puts fort or si*ply presupposes certain vie,s on kno,ledge, definitions, and t eir o"/ects , ic constitute a conception of et ical kno,ledge and its o"/ects. :n t is *atter ) ,ill "e follo,ing Aristotle.s o,n assess*ent of t e +ocratic practice!t eory, since e ,as t e first to propound t e vie, t at +ocrates. episte*ological interests ,ere su"ordinate to et ical concerns. But Aristotle ,as 1uick to point out t at +ocrates ad so*e kind of episte*ological picture in vie,, and in particular a picture of kno,ledge a"out *atters of conduct and t eir nature. ' e o"/ective ere is to single out so*e of t e central aspects or t eses in +ocrates. conception of t e nature of et ical kno,ledge and of its o"/ects. Ulti*ately, ) ,is to argue t at, alt oug Aristotle i*self at ti*es see*s to e*"race t ese very sa*e t eses, t e target of so*e of is clai*s on e&actness!ine&actness in et ics is none ot er t an certain co*ponents of t is +ocraticBPlatonic conception of et ical kno,ledge and its o"/ects. ',o preli*inaries are in order at t is point: -irst, , en speaking of +ocrates in t e present conte&t, ) *ean t e +ocrates t at Plato presents in t e +ocratic 3ialogues.@4A +econd, in speaking of "ot +ocratic t eory and practice, ) *ean to distinguis "et,een t e state*ents +ocrates *akes a"out t e nature of kno,ledge, definitions, t eir o"/ects, and so on=t at is, is vie,s or t eories a"out suc t ings=and , at e actually does in so*e of t ese dialogues. -or alt oug t ere *ay "e no ma$or differences "et,een +ocrates. t eoretical vie,s and is o,n actual practice, t ere *ay "e some . +ocrates could, for e&a*ple, espouse t e t eoretical clai* t at kno,ledge of t e definition of - is necessary for kno,ing t at - as so*e ot er property, and yet in is o,n practice proceed to clai* t at e kno,s t at so*e - >e.g., virtue? as so*e property >it is "eneficial? ,it out kno,ing its definition. ' at is, +ocrates. o,n practice *ay not "e consistent ,it so*e of is t eoretical pronounce*ents. :f course, , at is of i*portance in t e present conte&t is t e ,ay Aristotle vie,s +ocrates4 , et er Aristotle focuses on +ocrates. t eoretical state*ents instead of is actual practice, or on t e latter instead of t e for*er, or even , et er e distinguis es "et,een t e t,o at all.

!ocratiac #efinitions
' at definitions occupy a central place in +ocratic t eory and practice as "een recogni9ed "y al*ost everyone. ' is is in fact true, even t oug sc olars *ay still disagree a"out t e reasons for , ic +ocrates soug t definitions in is o,n practice or a"out t e role definitions play in +ocrates. o,n t eoretical fra*e,ork. After Plato, t e first to recogni9e t e centrality

5 1F 5 of definitions ,it in t e +ocratic t eory and practice ,as, of course, none ot er t an Aristotle i*self, , o also, as ) s all argue "elo,, identified t e nature of +ocratic definitions, t eir o"/ects, and in part t e role suc definitions play in t e +ocratic conception of kno,ledge. )t is fitting, t en, to "egin ,it Aristotle.s o,n co**ents on t e +ocratic t eory and practice, since it is, after all, is o,n assess*ent of +ocrates. vie,s t at "eco*es one of t e targets of is discussion on e&actness! ine&actness in et ics. And so, Aristotle ,rites in t e Met. , %.& But , en +ocrates ,as occupying i*self ,it t e e&cellences of c aracter, and in connection ,it t e* "eca*e t e first to raise t e pro"le* of universal definition . . . it ,as natural t at +ocrates s ould "e seeking t e essence, for e ,as seeking to syllogi9e, and G, at a t ing isG is t e starting point of syllogis*s . . . for t,o t ings *ay "e fairly ascri"ed to +ocrates=inductive argu*ents and universal definition, "ot of , ic are concerned ,it t e startingBpoint of science. >1$FH"lHB#$?

Aristotle.s accounts of t e t oug t of is predecessors ave "een looked at ,it considera"le skepticis* "y *any conte*porary istorians of p ilosop y. +uc istorians ave often clai*ed t at is accounts are not relia"le "ecause e tends to attri"ute to is predecessors is o,n p ilosop ical vie,s or, at least, to look at t eir p ilosop ical ac ieve*ents t roug is o,n p ilosop ical assu*ptions or doctrines. :f course, one s ould not assu*e t at Aristotle is infalli"le, as ,as at ti*es done in t e past. Iot everyt ing t at Aristotle says a"out is predecessors needs to "e true. But it need not "e false eit er. ) "elieve t at in t e a"ove assess*ent of +ocrates. t eory and practice Aristotle is correct, despite t e fact t at e does presuppose so*e of is o,n p ilosop ical vie,s. -or, at least in t is particular case, +ocrates. and Aristotle.s vie,s on t e nature of definition and kno,ledge and t e role definition plays in relation to kno,ledge are 1uite si*ilar. According to Aristotle, +ocrates soug t definitions, and is searc ,as su"ordinate to is interests in t e virtues or e&cellences of c aracter. ' at +ocrates soug t definitions can "e taken as one of t e fe, clai*s a"out +ocratic practice t at is "eyond dou"t. <o,ever, t ere are dou"ts a"out +ocrates. reasons for seeking definitions. +o*e sc olars ave raised 1uestions a"out t e purpose of t e +ocratic practice, often clai*ing t at +ocrates does not ulti*ately ai* at o"taining definitions "ut rat er at s o,ing t at ot ers are ignorant or at si*ply refuting t eir vie,s. 7et even t e *ost superficial reading of t e +ocratic 3ialogues ,ill convince anyone t at +ocrates soug t definitions and ad so*e reasons for doing so t at ,ent "eyond refuting ot ers or reducing t e* to ignorance.@%A ' ese reasons, as ) s all discuss "elo,, are "ot episte*ic and practical. 3efinitions, according to +ocrates, are to play a role in kno,ledge as ,ell 5 1H 5 as in practice. :ne episte*ic reason for seeking definitions is identified "y Aristotle , en e tells us t at +ocrates soug t definitions in order to syllogi9e. But, as s all "e seen, +ocrates i*self gives additional reasons for seeking definitions, reasons , ic ave little to do ,it refuting anyone or reducing anyone to ignorance. And alt oug t e latter *ay ave "een an ele*ent of +ocratic practice, definitions ,ere not soug t pri*arily for t e sake of refuting ot er persons.@EA ' ey ,ere rat er soug t for *ore constructive practical or episte*ic purposes. ' e i*portant point, o,ever, is to recogni9e t e pri*acy of definitions in t e +ocratic t eory!practice. +ocrates often insists t at arriving at a correct definition is not only of t e ut*ost i*portance for

episte*ic purposes in general "ut is also necessary for dealing ,it , atever practical pro"le* i**ediately confronts i* and is interlocutors >see t e opening sections of Euthyphro' (aches' Charmides , and Meno ?. <e insists and convinces is interlocutors t at t e i**ediate task is to o"tain a definition, and e t us elicits fro* t e* a nu*"er of definitions and also provides so*e i*self. )ndeed, *any of t e +ocratic 3ialogues are eit er partly or entirely concerned ,it t e searc for definitions, e&planations of t e nature of definitions, e&a*ination and testing of t e trut of definitions, revisions of definitions in lig t of criticis*, and so on. 8ven , en all atte*pts to reac a definition of so*e one t ing fail, +ocrates does not a"andon t e searc for definitions. :n t e contrary, e urges is interlocutors to rene, t eir efforts in searc of definitions >see t e closing sections of Euthyphro' (aches , and Charmides ?. ' ere is no evidence t at e t oug t definitions to "e i*possi"le or is p ilosop ical practice of searc ing for definitions nonvia"le.@FA Aristotle t en see*s to "e correct in singling out t e searc for definitions as constituting, toget er ,it inductive argu*ents, t e +ocratic practice. But e tells us in addition t at +ocrates ,as after a special kind of definition=t at is, a universal definition. ' e definitions +ocrates i*self gives, or t at ot ers put fort ,it is approval, ave 1uite different c aracteristics. But e leaves no dou"t t at e is not interested in definitions "y e&a*ple, or in ostensive definitions, "ut only in general accounts of nonparticulars.@HA <e ai*s at t e types of definitions t at presu*a"ly give an account of so*e c aracteristic, feature, kind, or property of a class of t ings=t at is, of t e sorts of t ings t at ave traditionally "een considered to "e universals. +uc definitions, t en, are vie,ed as "eing discursive accounts, e&plications, or analyses of t e nature of c aracteristics, features, kinds, or properties= Aristotle.s G, at a t ing is.G ' ey are considered to "e nonsingular propositions t at purport to give an account of t e nature of universals. ' us, +ocrates seeks and e&a*ines proposed definitions of piety >Euthyphro ?, courage >(aches ?, te*perance >Charmides ?, friends ip >(ysis ?, "eauty >Hippias Ma$or ?, virtue >Meno ?, and /ustice >Republic )?, and insists 5 19 5 t at in all suc cases e is after a definition of t e nature co**on to t e *any particulars t at are pious, te*perate, "eautiful, and so fort . <e conceives t ese definitions as applying to or "eing true of every instance of t e universal t at t ey define. Alt oug suc definitions are al*ost al,ays stated ,it out 1uantifiers, and t us are indefinite in for*=for e&a*ple, Gcourage is . . .G, Gvirtue is . . . G, Gt e "eautiful is Gand so on= e t inks of t e* as "eing or i*plying propositions t at are really universal in for*=GAll virtue is . . .G, GAll cases of courage are . . .G, GAll "eautiful t ings are . . .G <e vie,s t e* as "eing propositions t at are universal in for* and t at, , en successful, are universally true. ' e definition of piety is t oug t of as "eing true of every instance of piety.

!ocrates' $onception of %nowledge

Aristotle tells us not only t at +ocrates soug t definitions "ut also , y e did so: e ,as Gseeking to syllogi9e,G and t e definitions e soug t ,ere to "e used for at least t is purpose, as starting points of syllogi9ing or of kno,ledge >science?. ) s all focus in t is section on t e conception of +ocratic kno,ledge and s all argue t at , at Aristotle says a"out +ocrates on t is *atter is on t e , ole correct. :ne kind of kno,ledge t at +ocrates ,as seeking is a kind t at can aptly "e c aracteri9ed in ter*s of Aristotle.s ,ords: Gto syllogi9e.G ' ere are, of course, ot er kinds of kno,ledge. Aristotle is also correct in , at e says a"out one use of +ocratic definitions: na*ely, t at t ey ,ere vie,ed "y +ocrates as t e starting point of kno,ledge. But ) s all discuss t is *atter in t e ne&t section.

+o, ,as +ocrates seeking to syllogi9e; 'o "e sure, t e ter* Aristotle uses to c aracteri9e t e goals of +ocrates, Gsyllogi9e,G is a ter* t at ,e rig tly associate ,it Aristotle.s o,n p ilosop ical t oug t. ' e ter*, in its various for*s, as "eco*e t e la"el for Aristotle.s logical syste* or t eory= is syllogistic or t eory of deductive inference=and for t e account of scientific kno,ledge t at e e&plicates in ter*s of t is logical syste*. Co**entators ave, of course, focused on t is fact and ave used it as one *ore piece of evidence in support of t eir contention t at Aristotle is al,ays i*puting is o,n doctrines to is predecessors. ) dou"t, o,ever, t at t e particular instance under discussion provides evidence in support of t e general clai* t at Aristotle ,as not an o"/ective istorian of p ilosop y. -or alt oug +ocrates ardly uses t e ter* Gsyllogi9e,G or any of its for*s, and t oug t ere is no evidence t at e ad developed a t eory of t e syllogis*, t ere is no reason to "elieve t at Aristotle is attri"uting to i* suc a logical t eory , en e says t at +ocrates ,as seeking to syllogi9e.@9A ' e ter* is often used "y Aristotle i*self to signify si*ply t e *aking of an inference t at is logically valid=t e conclusion *ust "e true 5 6$ 5 if t e pre*ises are true=,it out reference to any particular logical t eory, syllogistic or ot er,ise.@1$A )n all pro"a"ility, , at Aristotle is attri"uting to +ocrates is t e vie, t at kno,ledge is in so*e sense de*onstrative=t at is, it consists of dra,ing valid inferences fro* so*e set of propositions t at ,e kno, to "e "asic and true and t us proving so*e propositions on t e "asis of ot ers. Aristotle does not need to attri"ute is o,n t eory of de*onstrative science to +ocrates in order to descri"e t e goals of +ocrates in t e ,ay e does. 2e do not need to do t at eit er. )s t e vie, t at Aristotle attri"utes to +ocrates supported "y t e evidence; 'o "e sure, t e de*onstrative vie, of kno,ledge is not fully articulated in t e +ocratic 3ialogues. But sufficient evidence can "e gat ered fro* t e +ocratic 3ialogues to s o, t at +ocrates ,as operating ,it a conception of kno,ledge very *uc like t e one Aristotle attri"utes to i*. As early as t e Euthyphro >11BB8, 1%BBC?, +ocrates ints at a difference "et,een kno,ledge and "elief. ' e state of *ind associated ,it t e latter rese*"les t e constantly *oving statues of 3aedalus, , ile t at associated ,it t e for*er is fi&ed and sta"le. ' us +ocrates ints at t e idea e develops in t e Meno t at kno,ledge consists in tying do,n t ings "y giving t eir causes or e&planations. <e furt er argues t ere t at t e difference "et,een t e t,o cognitive states cannot "e located solely on t e trut value of , at is kno,n or "elieved=for "ot , at ,e kno, and , at ,e "elieve can "e true. ' e difference, according to +ocrates, lies in t e fact t at only in t e case of kno,ledge do ,e ave t e reasons or causes >

? for , at ,e clai* to kno,=t e t ings, presu*a"ly, t at tie do,n , at ,e clai* to kno,.@11A (ost pro"a"ly , at +ocrates *eans , en e speaks of causes or reasons in t is conte&t are pre*ises fro* , ic a conclusion=, at ,e clai* to kno,=is deduced, /ust as Aristotle calls t e pre*ises t at guarantee t e trut of a deductive inference Gcauses.G@16A )ndeed, t e , ole discussion of kno,ledge in t e Meno *akes it une1uivocally clear t at +ocrates is t inking in ter*s of de*onstration. 2 en in is discussion of t e slave "oy e&a*ple +ocrates says t at, despite is success in ans,ering so*e of t e geo*etrical 1uestions correctly, t e slave "oy does not yet ave kno,ledge, +ocrates leaves no dou"t as to , at ,ill "e re1uired in order for t e slave "oy to ave kno,ledge: e ,ould ave to possess t e proofs or de*onstrations of t ose true propositions e no, "elieves.@1#A But per aps clearer evidence in support of *y clai* t at +ocrates. conception of kno,ledge is 1uite

si*ilar to t e Aristotelian conception of de*onstrative kno,ledge can "e found in is re*arks in t e Meno on t e use of t e *et od of ypot esis. <e t ere tells us t at %.% it see*s ,e *ust in1uire into a single property of so*et ing a"out , ose essential nature ,e are still in t e dark. . .. Allo, *e, in considering

5 61 5 )hether or not it *+irtue, can be taught' to ma-e use of a hypothesis.the sort of thing' I mean' that geometers often use in their in/uiries. . .. (et us do the same about +irtue. !ince )e don0t -no) )hat it is or )hat it resembles' let us use a hypothesis in in+estigating )hether it is teachable or not. 123E42567 2e need not concern ourselves at t e *o*ent ,it t e 1uestion of , et er +ocrates. account of t e use t at geo*eters *ake of ypot esis is correct, "ut s ould focus instead on t e use e i*self proposes to *ake of ypot esis in is atte*pt to deter*ine , et er virtue possesses t e property of "eing teac a"le or not. +o +ocrates proposes t,o ypot eses a"out t e nature of virtue= e assu*es t,o accounts or definitions of its nature=and "y adding so*e ot er pre*ises e derives so*e conclusions concerning t e teac a"ility of virtue. <e first proposes t e ypot esis t at virtue is a type of kno,ledge, and e t us constructs t e follo,ing syllogis*: P1 : Kirtue is a kind of kno,ledge P6 : All kno,ledge is teac a"le C: ' erefore, virtue is teac a"le -ro* is second ypot esis, t at virtue is not a kind of kno,ledge, e constructs a different argu*ent fro* , ic e derives t e opposite conclusion: P1 .: Kirtue is not a kind of kno,ledge P6 .: Iot ing e&cept kno,ledge is teac a"le C.: Kirtue is not teac a"le ' e ypot esis, t en, in +ocrates. illustration is to "e used as a pre*ise in a proof t at presu*a"ly ,ould de*onstrate , et er a property "elongs or does not "elong to virtue. )t is 1uite clear fro* t e a"ove illustration t at +ocrates takes kno,ledge to ave a certain structure or for*. ' e conclusions= t at is, t e propositions a"out virtue "eing teac a"le or not=t at t e in1uiry is trying to ascertain *ust follo, deductively fro* t e pre*ises >t e validity constraint?. )ndeed, t e particular illustration of an inference or proof +ocrates gives a"ove even fits so*e of Aristotle.s syllogistic for*s 1uite nicely.@14A But clearly t e validity constraint alone ,ould not "e sufficient for e&plicating kno,ledge, nor does it "y itself capture +ocrates. conception of kno,ledge. -or, even if t e conclusion a"out virtue ,ere to follo, fro* t e pre*ises +ocrates provides >t e for*al condition of validity ,ere to "e satisfied?, t e pre*ises could "e false >soundness ,ould not "e satisfied? or t e trut value of t e pre*ises *ig t not "e kno,n >t e episte*ological condition ,ould not "e satisfied?. +ocrates i*self sees t is 1uite clearly, and t us points to t e li*itation of t e *et od of ypot esis in t is parB 5 66 5

ticular conte&t.@1%A <e leaves no dou"t, o,ever, as to , at e takes for granted: na*ely, ,ere t e pre*ises to "e true and ,ere e to possess kno,ledge of t e pre*ises of is syllogis* a"out virtue, e ,ould "e a"le to infer deductively and t erefore kno, ot er propositions a"out virtue. <e ,ould "e a"le to prove, and t us kno,, t at propositions ot er t an t ose *aking up t e pre*ises are true. )n saying t at +ocrates as a conception of de*onstrative kno,ledge in *ind ) do not *ean to i*ply t at e as a fully developed t eory of suc kno,ledge "ut rat er t at e ,orks ,it suc a conception, t at e is guided "y suc a picture of kno,ledge. ' ose , o follo,ed i*, pri*arily Aristotle, developed t e +ocratic picture into a detailed t eory. ' ere is no evidence t at +ocrates did. )ndeed, as ) s all argue "elo,, it is not clear , at are t e do*ain and li*its of de*onstrative kno,ledge according to +ocrates. Ior do ) *ean to i*ply t at t e de*onstrative conception of kno,ledge e& austs is conception of kno,ledge. Aristotle i*self, *ost pro"a"ly, does not *ean t at +ocrates takes de*onstrative kno,ledge to "e t e , ole of kno,ledge. ' ere is no reason for t inking t at +ocratic definitions, for e&a*ple, are t e*selves kno,n "y "eing de*onstrated. 'o say t en t at +ocrates as a conception of de*onstrative kno,ledge is not to deny t at, for i*, t ere *ay "e ot er kinds of kno,ledge, t at so*e t ings *ay "e kno,n nonde*onstratively.@1EA

!ocrates on the &ole of #efinitions

Aristotle in t e passage 1uoted a"ove tells us t at Git ,as natural t at +ocrates s ould "e seeking t e essence, for e ,as seeking to syllogi9e and ., at a t ing is. is t e starting point of syllogis*s.G <ere Aristotle identifies a role t at presu*a"ly +ocratic definitions ,ere *eant to play: t e definitions t at captured t e essence or stated , at a t ing is=for e&a*ple, , at virtue, piety, figure, and so on, are= ,ere *eant to "e t e starting points of syllogis*s. Aristotle goes on to say suc definitions are t e starting points of kno,ledge or science. ' e role of definitions ,it in t e +ocratic t eory!practice t at Aristotle identifies co*ple*ents t e conception of kno,ledge t at e attri"utes to +ocrates. ' e latter ,as presu*a"ly seeking definitions t at ,ere to "e used as t e starting points of de*onstrative kno,ledge. ' e definitions ,ould specify t e essence of a kind=t ey ,ould tell us , at t e nature of t e kind is=and fro* suc definitions ot er properties ,ould "e s o,n to "elong to t e kind=ot er properties ,ould "e de*onstrated of t e kind.@1FA ) s all t erefore call t is role of definitions Gt e de*onstrative role.G@1HA ' at Aristotle s ould ave focused on t e de*onstrative use of definitions ,it in t e +ocratic t eory!practice is per aps not surprising given t e conception of kno,ledge e attri"utes to +ocrates. )f kno,ing t at 5 6# 5 so*e property P "elongs to a kind D is to "e e&plicated in ter*s of de*onstrating t at P "elongs to D, t en t e definition of D, , ic states , at D is, ,ill *ost likely play an i*portant role in de*onstrating t at D is P. Aristotle ,ould ave good as ,ell as o"vious reasons for t inking along t ese lines. -or t e de*onstrative role of definitions t at e identifies ,it in t e +ocratic t eory!practice is precisely t e role definitions play in is o,n conception of de*onstrative kno,ledge or science. 3efinitions in t e Aristotelian conception of kno,ledge are t oug t of as "eing a*ong t e starting points of kno,ledge. But , ile Aristotle *ay "e correct in identifying t e de*onstrative role definitions play ,it in t e +ocratic t eory!practice, definitions *ay play additional roles. And suc roles could "e eit er episte*ic or practical. 3efinitions *ay, for e&a*ple, figure in *ore t an one ,ay in +ocrates. t eoretical vie,s a"out t e nature of kno,ledge or in different ,ays in different kinds of kno,ledge. ' ey *ay also

ave a role to play in practice. +ocrates *ay consider definitions as eit er necessary or sufficient, or "ot , for *aking decisions or for acting. ' ey *ay, t us, ave practical uses. But if definitions in t e +ocratic t eory!practice ave *ore t an one use or role, it is i*portant to identify t e* all. -or t ere *ig t "e pro"le*s ,it all of t ese uses in relation to e&actness!ine&actness. )ndeed, as ,e s all see "elo,, so*e of t e 1uestions Aristotle raises a"out e&actness! ine&actness in et ics ave to do ,it t e role definitions are supposed to play in t e episte*ic and practical aspects of et ics. 2 en, for e&a*ple, Aristotle raises 1uestions a"out t e level of e&actness our accounts in et ics *ust reac , or t e kinds of conclusions t at can "e dra,n in our reasonings in et ics, e is in part concerned ,it t ese uses t at +ocrates assigns to definitions for et ical in1uiry and practice. Aristotle asks, for instance, , at level of e&actness *ust t e definition of a kind reac in order to function, as +ocrates insists it can or *ust, as a tool for deter*ining t at so*e t ing "elongs to t e kind; 2 at *ust its nature "e if conclusions of a certain type are to "e dra,n fro* it; 2 at level of e&actness *ust definitions or accounts of *atters of conduct reac in order for t e* to function as guides to practice or action; )n addition to t e de*onstrative use, at least t ree ot er uses of definitions can "e found in t e +ocratic 3ialogues t at are relevant for *y purposes. -ollo,ing +antas, ) s all call t e t,o additional episte*ic ones t e diagnostic and aitiological uses. ) s all refer to t e t ird as t e practical use. )n t e follo,ing sections ) ,ill discuss eac of t ese uses separately.

The #emonstrative &ole of #efinitions

Aristotle.s state*ent concerning t e de*onstrative role of definitions is "orne out "y , at +ocrates does and says. As Gerasi*os +antas as argued, +ocrates uses definitions as pre*ises in deductive argu*ents on several 5 64 5 occasions >(aches 19HB4 rotagoras #%H84 Gorgias 4F4CB4F%3?.@19A And , en +ocrates urges t e use of t e *et od of ypot esis in investigating , et er virtue can "e taug t, e *akes it clear t at e intends to use t e definition of virtue=, at virtue is=to infer or prove , et er it can "e taug t. At least one of t e accounts of virtue e uses as a pre*ise in is illustration of an inference or de*onstration clearly as t e for* of a +ocratic definition and is intended as suc .@6$A Ad*ittedly, +ocrates as no definition of virtue= ence t e use of ypot esis. All earlier atte*pts to o"tain a definition ave proved unsuccessful, and t e searc as "een te*porarily a"andoned. But t is does not affect , at +ocrates is saying a"out o, e ,ould like to use an actual definition if e ad one, or o, e proposes to use one t at is *erely assu*ed=one t at is only a ypot esis. 7et t e e&a*ples of t e de*onstrative use of definitions found in t e +ocratic 3ialogues do not really give a clear picture as to , at +ocrates as in *ind. ' ere are a nu*"er of 1uestions t at are difficult, or even i*possi"le, to ans,er "y relying solely on t e fe, actual uses of definition for de*onstrative purposes in t e 3ialogues. )s a definition of so*e - >e.g., virtue, courage, figure? sufficient for proving ot er properties of -; )s it necessary; And is t is so for all properties of - or only for so*e; But per aps t e e&a*ples of t e use of definitions for de*onstrative purposes in t e +ocratic 3ialogues can "e useful in ans,ering t ese 1uestions , en taken toget er ,it +ocrates. o,n *et odological re*arks on t e use of definitions as ,ell as Aristotle.s account of t e +ocratic t eory!practice. )n all likeli ood +ocrates does not t ink t at kno,ledge of t e definition of so*e - is "y itself sufficient for de*onstrating t at ot er properties "elong to -=for e&a*ple, t at kno,ledge of t e definition of virtue is sufficient for proving t at virtue is teac a"le. Alt oug at ti*es e speaks as if all

e needs for is de*onstration is t e definition of - >see, for e&a*ple, rotagoras #E1C?, e assu*es t at ot er propositions ,ill "e used as pre*ises in an inference or syllogis*, pre*ises t at per aps can "e easily recogni9ed to "e true or selfBevident. +o in t e illustration of t e syllogis* involving a ypot esis in t e Meno , +ocrates uses in addition to t e definition of virtue , at e pro"a"ly takes as a selfBevident proposition=na*ely, t at all kno,ledge can "e taug t.@61A And in all likeli ood, , en Aristotle says t at definitions are t e starting points of kno,ledge and +ocrates soug t definitions for /ust t is reason, e does not *ean t at definitions are sufficient for de*onstrations "ut only t at t ey are t e starting points. :f course, t is "y no *eans s o,s t at definitions are not sufficient. 2 et er or not t ey are depends in part on t e kinds of definitions one as and t e kinds of inferences one.s logical t eory allo,s. -or e&a*ple, fro* a definition consisting of a nu*"er of con/uncts one could detac , and ence infer, one of t e*. But t is ,ould not "e possi"le ,it in Aristotle.s syllogistic. 5 6% 5 But per aps , at is of greater i*portance in t e present conte&t is , et er t e definition of so*e - is necessary for kno,ing or proving t at ot er properties "elong to - as ,ell. )t is, o,ever, *uc *ore difficult to esta"lis , et er +ocrates accepts t is latter clai*=, et er e takes t e definition of - to "e a necessary condition for proving t at ot er t ings "elong to -. As +antas as pointed out, it is not clear , at conclusion one is /ustified in dra,ing fro* e&a*ining t e fe, instances , ere +ocrates uses definitions de*onstratively.@66A -urt er*ore, are ,e to suppose t at e *eant t at all properties of so*e kind are to "e de*onstrated, or only so*e; And, if t e latter, o, do ,e deter*ine , ic is t e set of properties t at can "e de*onstrated fro* t e definition of t e kind, and possi"ly fro* additional propositions; But falling "ack on t e scanty *et odological co**ents +ocrates *akes on t is *atter *ay not resolve t e issue in a decisive ,ay eit er. As +antas 1uite perceptively o"serves, in so*e of t e *ost crucial of t ese passages +ocrates is very cautious4 e does not even assert t e t esis t at t e definition of - is necessary for de*onstrating ot er properties of -. <e *erely puts it in t e for* of a 1uestion. ' is feature of t e te&ts >a 1uestion is raised and no t esis is asserted?, t e scarcity of actual uses of definitions for de*onstration on t e part of +ocrates, and +ocrates. un,illingness to generali9e fro* t ese fe, uses as led +antas to conclude t at +ocrates ,as putting fort a *uc *ore *odest vie,=t at is, definitions are useful for de*onstrating so*e properties, and one ,ould "enefit fro* aving definitions in one.s efforts to kno, ot er trut s.@6#A ' e *oderate vie, +antas attri"utes to +ocrates differs fro* t e interpretations of ot er sc olars@64A ) find *yself *ore in agree*ent ,it t ose sc olars , o understand +ocrates to put fort a strong and unrestricted t esis=t e definition of - is a necessary condition for de*onstrating or kno,ing , at ot er properties "elong to -. ' e fact t at +ocrates poses a 1uestion rat er t an states a t esis , en e introduces t e de*onstrative role of definitions does not see* to *e to i*ply t at e does not old suc a t esis. )n t e Meno e asks, G+o far ) a* fro* kno,ing , et er it @virtueA can "e taug t or not, t at ) actually do not even kno, , at t e t ing itself, virtue, is at all. . . . ' at , ic ) do not kno, , at it is, o, could ) kno, , at 1ualities it as;G >F1A?. )n t e (aches e again asks, G' en it is necessary t at t is e&ists, t e kno,ledge of , at is virtue; -or if ,e did not kno, at all , at virtue is, o, could ,e "eco*e consultants in t e ,ay one *ig t "est ac1uire it;G >19$B?. Clearly, t ese are r etorical 1uestions , ose ans,ers are *eant to "e apparent to all. ' e 1uestion in t e Meno and t e last one fro* t e (achts are *eant to "e ans,ered in t e negative=as indeed t ey are, in t e first case "y (eno and in t e second "y Jac es >+ocrates. interlocutors in t e t,o dialogues?. ' e r etorical 1uestion is used as a device for putting fort

5 6E 5 a t esis t at *ust ave see*ed o"vious ,it out asserting it. And , ereas t e t esis, as +antas correctly o"serves, is ,eakly stated in Book ) of t e Republic >G-or if ) don.t kno, , at t e /ust is, ) s all ardly kno, , et er it is virtue or not, and , et er its possessor is or is not appyG?, t e first 1uestion fro* t e 1uotation fro* t e (aches i*plies t at kno,ledge of t e definition is necessary. ' e ans,er to t e 1uestion, G' en it is necessary t at t is e&ists, t e kno,ledge of , at is virtue;G is *eant to "e affir*ative. ' e t esis is, o,ever, asserted ,it out any 1ualifications, in contrast to "eing posed only as a 1uestion, in t e rotagoras , en +ocrates says, G) s ould "e surprised if you kno, /ust , at a sop ist is. And yet if you don.t kno, t at, you don.t kno, to , o* you are entrusting your soul, nor , et er e represents so*et ing good or "adG >#16C?. Aristotle i*self, ) "elieve, attri"utes t e t esis to +ocrates in t e passage fro* t e Met. 1uoted earlier >9.1?. Alt oug not e&plicitly stated, , at Aristotle *ost likely *eans , en e says t at +ocrates soug t definitions in order to syllogi9e is t at +ocrates "elieved definitions to "e necessary for o"taining de*onstrative kno,ledge. And after all, Aristotle.s assess*ent is , at is of pri*ary i*portance in t e present conte&t. But , at is t e scope of t e +ocratic t esis concerning t e de*onstration of t e properties of - fro* t e definition of -; )s t e definition of a kind necessary for kno,ing any and every property of t e kind; Are all properties of a kind kno,n to "elong to t e kind "y "eing de*onstrated in so*e ,ay or ot er; ' ese are, unfortunately, difficult 1uestions to ans,er ,it certainty. ' e reason for t is is t at +ocrates *ost often focuses on so*e particular property of so*e one kind e is interested in and rarely speaks a"out t e general pro"le* of our kno,ledge of t e properties of a kind or t e use of definitions in our kno,ledge of properties in general. ' us, , en concerned ,it so*e particular property of a kind, +ocrates tells us e&plicitly t at t at property *ust "e de*onstrated fro* t e definition of t e kind, and e assu*es t at at least t at property is de*onstra"le. -or instance, e insists t at ,e need to de*onstrate , et er courage can "e ac1uired >(aches 19$B?, , et er t e sop ist is so*eone good or "ad > rotagoras #16C?, , et er virtue is teac a"le >#1EC?, , et er /ustice is a virtue and *akes its possessor appy >Republic )?, and so fort . But in at least one place +ocrates appears to "e ,illing to generali9e t e t esis to include all t e properties of a kind, and in fact e appears to generali9e t e t esis to include all kinds. -or, alt oug in t e Meno is concern is again ,it , et er so*e particular property "elongs to so*e specific kind=for e&a*ple, ,it , et er "eing teac a"le "elongs to virtue= at F1A of t at dialogue +ocrates asks, G' at , ic ) do not kno, , at it is o, could ) kno, , at 1ualities it as;G Ad*ittedly, t is is not a state*ent of t e t esis=it is not a state*ent at all, "ut a 1uestion. But 5 6F 5 it is, again, a r etorical 1uestion , ose ans,er +ocrates assu*es to "e o"vious=na*ely, t e definition of t e kind is necessary for kno,ing t e 1ualities of t e kind. And, as t e su"se1uent discussion of t e dialogue *akes clear, t e kno,ledge at issue is so*e for* of de*onstration of t e 1ualities of t e kind. But it is all t e 1ualities of a kind t at presu*a"ly can and *ust "e de*onstrated fro* its definition. ' ere is no reason to t ink t at +ocrates restricts t e t esis to only a su"set of t e properties of virtue, or for t at *atter t at e restricts t e t esis to a su"set of kinds. ' e t esis presu*a"ly applies to all t e properties of any and every kind. ' e sa*e vie, is, ) "elieve, e&pressed "y Aristotle in is account of t e +ocratic t eory!practice. Alt oug e does not e&plicitly state t at +ocrates t oug t t at all properties of a kind can or *ust "e de*onstrated fro* t e definition of t e kind, t e ,ay e ascri"es t e t esis of t e de*onstrative role of

definition to +ocrates suggests t at, according to Aristotle, +ocrates understood t e t esis in an unrestricted sense. +ocrates did not distinguis "et,een properties t at can "e de*onstrated and t ose t at cannot or "et,een properties t at *ust "e de*onstrated and t ose t at need not in order to "e kno,n. >Aristotle i*self, of course, later did distinguis "et,een properties t at can "e de*onstrated of a kind and t ose t at cannot.? ' e reason , y t e 1uestion concerning t e scope of t e +ocratic t esis a"out t e de*onstrative role of definition is i*portant is t is: )f t e de*onstrative t esis is correct, so*e or all of t e properties of a kind "elong to every *e*"er of t e kind. :r, so*e or all of t e propositions attri"uting properties to a kind are, if true, universally true. ' e ,ay +ocrates e&plicates our kno,ledge t at so*e property P "elongs to a kind D=t at is, "y ,ay of de*onstrating t at D is P fro* t e definition of D and ot er relevant propositions=i*plies t at P "elongs to D universally. )f, for e&a*ple, ,e can de*onstrate t at virtue is teac a"le fro* t e propositions GKirtue is kno,ledgeG >t e definition of virtue? and GAll kno,ledge is teac a"le,G t en t e property of "eing teac a"le ,ill apply to all virtue. )f, in ot er ,ords, t e pre*ises of a +ocratic syllogis* are universal in for* and true, and t e syllogis* is valid, t en t e conclusion t at asserts so*e property "elongs to a kind ,ill also "e universally true of t e kind. ' us, one i*plication of t e t esis concerning t e de*onstrative role of definitions is t is: Understood in a ,eak sense, at least so*e of t e properties of a kind are universally true of t e kind4 understood in a strong sense, all t e properties of a kind are universally true of t e kind. But t ese, as ,e s all see later, are so*e of t e assu*ptions, clai*s, or i*plications of t e +ocratic t eory!practice t at Aristotle calls into 1uestion , en e attri"utes a type of ine&actness to t e su"/ect *atter of et ics and to our reasonings a"out it. Io,, in speaking of t e de*onstrative role of definition in +ocratic 5 6H 5 t eory!practice, it is i*portant to re*e*"er , at ) said earlier=na*ely, ) do not *ean to i*ply t at +ocrates never in actual practice clai*s to kno, t at so*e property "elongs to a kind ,it out kno,ing t e definition of t e kind, for at ti*es e does clai* to kno,.@6%A )t is precisely "ecause suc a discrepancy "et,een t eory and practice is encountered at ti*es t at ) insisted a"ove t at a distinction "e *ade "et,een , at +ocrates says and , at e >at ti*es? does. Aristotle.s o,n focus see*s to "e +ocrates. t eoretical pronounce*ents rat er t an is actual practice, , ic *ay at ti*es violate is pronounce*ents.

The Aitiological and #iagnostic &oles of #efinition

As ) said a"ove, in addition to t e de*onstrative use of definitions, t ere are at least t,o ot er episte*ic uses t at can "e identified ,it in t e +ocratic t eory!practice: t e aitiological and diagnostic uses. ' e aitiological use of definitions is presented "y +ocrates at t e "eginning of t e Hippias Ma$or and at t e end of t e (ysis . As presented "y +ocrates, it consists in using t e definition of - to defend, or /ustify, a /udg*ent or a clai* to kno, t at so*e t ings are -.s. ' e definition t at tells us t e nature of -=, at it is to "e an -=is considered to "e "ot a sufficient and a necessary condition in defending or /ustifying any clai* to kno, t at so*e & is -. )t provides us, according to +ocrates, ,it a *eans of s o,ing t at a /udg*ent or clai* t at ,e kno, t at so*et ing "elongs to a kind is true. ' us, +ocrates argues in t e Hippias Ma$or t at kno,ledge of t e definition of t e "eautiful is necessary and sufficient for /ustifying is clai* to kno, t at so*e speec es are "eautiful4 si*ilarly, kno,ledge of t e definition of friends ip is necessary and sufficient for /ustifying t e /udg*ent t at e and is associates are

friends of one anot er >(ysis ?. As +antas o"serves, t e definition of - can "eco*e part of an argu*ent for s o,ing t at a /udg*ent t at so*e & is - is correct. )t provides one ,it t e reasons or causes for t e correctness of a clai* to kno, t at so*et ing is an -. ' e diagnostic use of definitions is descri"ed "y +ocrates at t e opening of t e Euthyphro , en e tells o, e intends to use t e definition of piety t at e is seeking: %.8 'ell *e t en , at t is for* @ideaA itself is, so t at "y looking at it and using it as a *odel @paradig*A, ) ,ill "e a"le to say t at anyt ing you or ot ers do t at is si*ilar to it is pious and t at , ic is not si*ilar ) ,ill "e a"le to say t at it is not. >E8?

' is description of a possi"le use of definitions is "y no *eans clear or precise. +ocrates, for e&a*ple, speaks of using t e definition of piety in order Gto tellG or Gto sayG , et er so*e particular action is a case of 5 69 5 piety. But , at does +ocrates *ean "y descri"ing is purpose in t is *anner; <o, is a general definition of so*et ing as a"stract as piety to "e used for telling , et er so*e particular act is a case of piety; And , at is involved in GtellingG or GsayingG t at so*e particular >an act? is of a certain kind >piety?; )n response to t e last 1uestion, +antas as argued t at ,e can distinguis at least t,o t ings +ocrates *ig t "e saying , en descri"ing t e use of definitions for diagnostic purposes: >a? a definition of a kind *ay "e used in order to for* a /udg*ent or "elief t at so*e particular is of t e kind4 and >"? t e definition of t e kind is to "e used for kno,ing t at so*e particular is of t e kind. 'raditionally, co**entators ave focused on t e second alternative as t e use t at e&plicates t e diagnostic role of definitions: t e definition of - is to "e used for kno,ing t at so*e & is -. ' ere are, per aps, good reasons for favoring t is alternative. ' e conte&t of t e Euthyphro , as ,ell as t at of ot er dialogues , ere definitions are soug t, *akes it *ost plausi"le t at +ocrates is t inking of t is alternative , en e e&plains t e diagnostic use of definitions in ter*s of using t e definition of a kind in order Gto tellG or Gto sayG t at so*e particular "elongs to t e kind. +uc conte&ts are invaria"ly conte&ts of disagree*ent and dispute, and *ost often of 1uite deep and pervasive disagree*ents and disputes@6EA )t is difficult to see , at use t e for*ing of anot er /udg*ent or "elief ,ould "e to +ocrates and is interlocutors given suc conte&ts ,it in , ic t e re1uests for definitions occur. Arriving at anot er "elief or for*ing anot er /udg*ent ,ould not resolve t e disputes or disagree*ents, unless of course a nu*"er of ot er assu*ptions are *ade@6FA 2 at +ocrates needs in t ese types of conte&ts is a *eans of deter*ining, and ence of kno,ing, t at so*e particular is truly of a certain kind. <e needs to kno, t at 8ut yp ro.s proposed action is an act of piety or t at it is not. <e needs to kno, , et er 8ut yp ro.s act as t e features t at constitute piety or, in +ocrates. language, , et er it is si*ilar to t e for* of piety. And t e definition t at gives us t e nature of piety is to "e used, according to +ocrates, as a *odel for distinguis ing correctly pious fro* i*pious actions >6.#?. ',o ot er considerations speak in favor of t e traditional interpretation of t e diagnostic use of definitions. 2 en +ocrates e&plains t e aitiological use of definitions e proposes to use a definition in order to /ustify a clai* to kno, t at so*e particular is of a certain kind. )t is t e clai* to ave kno,ledge t at +ocrates "elieves needs to "e /ustified. And, t erefore, , at e needs is t e *eans to o"tain kno,ledge=t at is, a diagnostic tool for kno,ing t at so*e particular is of a certain type. ' e definition ,ould presu*a"ly provide t e *eans for kno,ing rat er t an *erely for*ing a "elief or /udg*ent. ' ere is also a 1uestion a"out t e c aracter of +ocrates. insistence t at a definition is needed

for diagnostic purposes. )t is 5 #$ 5 difficult to see , y +ocrates ,ould "e insisting as strongly as e does on a definition of, for e&a*ple, piety for diagnostic purposes if is intention is to for* a "elief or /udg*ent a"out so*e particular action. ' e de*and see*s to "e rat er e&cessive if t e o"/ective is not one of o"taining kno,ledge. 7et, alt oug ) a* inclined, in agree*ent ,it *ost co**entators, to,ard t e vie, t at +ocrates takes t e diagnostic use of definition to "e t e use of t e definition of - for kno,ing t at so*e & is -, it *ust "e ad*itted t at t e te&ts do not provide une1uivocal support for t is vie,. +antas, ) t ink, is correct in insisting t at +ocrates. o,n ,ords can "est "e interpreted as putting fort eit er t e vie, t at t e definition of - is to "e used for for*ing a "elief or /udg*ent t at so*e & is - or t e vie, t at t e definition of - is to "e used for kno,ing t at so*e & is -. -ortunately, o,ever, it is not necessary for our purposes to c oose "et,een t ese t,o interpretations of t e diagnostic use of definitions ,it in t e +ocratic t eory!practice. As ) s all argue "elo,, t ere are pro"le*s "ot ,it using t e definition for for*ing a "elief and ,it using it to gain kno,ledge t at so*e particular is of a certain kind. )t is suc pro"le*s t at Aristotle focuses upon , en e raises 1uestions a"out t e e&actness of our accounts in et ics. <e is especially concerned ,it t e degree of detail, and conversely of generality, t at our accounts *ust possess in order to do t e various functions t ey are supposed to do. )t is nonet eless i*portant to distinguis "et,een t e t,o interpretations of t e diagnostic use of definition, for t ey are 1uite different and do not necessarily i*ply eac ot er. +o*et ing *ay "e sufficient for for*ing a "elief or /udg*ent t at & is - "ut *ay not "e sufficient for deter*ining or kno,ing t at it is -. +o*e p eno*enal property of ,ater, for e&a*ple, its "eing a colorless li1uid, *ay "e sufficient for for*ing a /udg*ent or "elief t at t is li1uid is ,ater, "ut it *ay not "e sufficient for deter*ining correctly or kno,ing t at it is ,ater. -or*ing a /udg*ent or "elief is ,eaker t an kno,ing, and t eir respective re1uire*ents are different. Presu*a"ly, , atever is sufficient for kno,ing is sufficient for for*ing a /udg*ent or "elief.@6HA 3istinguis ing "et,een t e t,o interpretations of t e diagnostic use is i*portant for anot er reason, a reason t at in part *otivates +antas.s ,is to keep t e t,o interpretations apart. )t is i*portant, after all, to deter*ine , et er t e definition of so*e - is needed not only for kno,ing t at so*e & is - "ut .also for "elieving or /udging t at & is -. )f indeed +ocrates t oug t t at t e definition is needed in "ot cases, t en t ere *ig t "e 1uite serious pro"le*s ,it is enterprise of searc ing after definitions >see "elo,?. ' is *uc , o,ever, is 1uite certain: +ocrates takes kno,ledge of t e definition of - to "e at least sufficient for for*ing a "elief or /udg*ent 5 #1 5 and for kno,ing t at & is -. <e insists, in ot er ,ords, t at kno,ledge of t e definition of a universal, c aracter, or kind is sufficient for kno,ing or for*ing t e "elief t at so*e particular is an instance of t e universal, as t e c aracter, or is a *e*"er of t e kind. +ocrates *ay not e&plain o, t e definition is e&actly to "e used, "ut t at e assu*es it can "e used for suc purposes is *ade 1uite clear. But does +ocrates take t e definition to "e a necessary condition for diagnostic purposes; ' is 1uestion is 1uite difficult to ans,er, for +ocrates does not e&plicitly state t at t e definition is a necessary condition for diagnostic purposes. )n t e a"ove 1uotation fro* t e Euthyphro +ocrates appears to "e pri*arily interested in /ustifying t e searc for a definition of piety in ter*s of its "eing a sufficient

condition for "elieving or kno,ing t at so*e particular action is pious or not. G'ell *e , at piety is,G +ocrates says, Gt at "y looking at it and using it as a *odel ) ,ill "e a"le. . . . GA definition of -, +ocrates is at least saying, can "e used, and is presu*a"ly sufficient, for deter*ining , et er any & is -. But e does not in t is passage say t at t e definition of - is necessary for doing so. ' e closest +ocrates co*es to stating t at t e definition is necessary for diagnostic purposes is in Hippias Ma$or >6HE3? , en e recounts o, e ,as interrogated , en e ,as /udging or ,as clai*ing to kno, so*e t ings to "e "eautiful or ugly: G<o,, if you please, do you kno,, +ocrates, , at t ings are "eautiful and , at ugly; -or, co*e no,, could you tell *e , at t e "eautiful is;G Again, +ocrates does not say t at t e definition is necessary, "ut it is clear t at t e ans,er to t e r etorical 1uestion t at is posed "y +ocrates. i*aginary interrogator is a negative one=na*ely, t at one cannot kno, , at t ings are "eautiful ,it out kno,ledge of t e definition of t e "eautiful. Dno,ledge of t e definition of "eauty, or of any -, is a necessary condition for kno,ing , at t ings are "eautiful, or are -. ' ere is additional evidence fro* +ocrates. o,n practice rat er t an fro* is utterances. ' e pro"le* in so*e cases is to deter*ine , et er so*e particular is of a certain c aracter or kind=for e&a*ple, , et er 8ut yp ro.s act is pious, , et er C ar*ides is te*perate, or , et er so*e of +ocrates. associates are friends ,it one anot er. +ocrates, o,ever, invaria"ly focuses on t e nature of t e c aracter or t e definition of t e kind=piety, te*perance, friends ip, and so on. ' is clearly suggests t at e vie,ed t e definition of a c aracter or kind as a necessary condition for kno,ing , et er so*e individual is of t at c aracter or kind. ' is type of evidence is "y no *eans conclusive, "ut , en it is taken toget er ,it +ocrates. o,n utterances on t e use of definitions for diagnostic purposes, it *akes *ost plausi"le t e clai* t at +ocrates took t e definition to "e a necessary condition for suc purposes. (any co**entators=including 0ic ard 0o"inson, 2. 3. 0oss, Peter Geac , and +antas= 5 #6 5 ave so understood +ocrates. re*arks and practice. )t is t e insistence on suc a re1uire*ent on t e part of +ocrates, t at is, t at kno,ledge of t e definition of - is necessary for kno,ing t at so*e & is -, t at, according to so*e sc olars, leads +ocrates into co**itting t e +ocratic -allacy@69A

The Practical &ole of #efinitions

' e uses of +ocratic definitions t at ave "een identified so far can "e descri"ed as "eing episte*ic. According to +ocrates, definitions are to "e used ,it in t e conte&t of kno,ledge=to de*onstrate propositions, to /ustify clai*s to kno,, or to deter*ine t at so*et ing is of a certain c aracter or kind. 3efinitions, o,ever, *ay ave ot er uses t at are not episte*ic. )ndeed, t e episte*ic uses t e*selves *ay "e su"ordinate to ot er kinds of purposes or uses. )n *ost cases +ocrates. 1uest for definitions is presented "y Plato ,it in a practical conte&t. )n suc a conte&t, a decision a"out conduct or action needs to "e *ade, and t e definition is to "e used as a *eans for *aking t e decision "y deter*ining t e action to "e done. ' us, in t e Euthyphro t e 1uestion is o, 8ut yp ro s ould act=s ould e prosecute is fat er or not;=given t e role is fat er as played in t e deat of one of t e ouse old ,orkers. )n t e (aches , t e i**ediate 1uestion facing +ocrates and is co*panions is o, and "y , o* can c ildren "e taug t courage. +i*ilarly, in t e rotagoras t e practical 1uestion concerning t e *erits of entrusting education to t e sop ists is t e pri*ary concern in t e atte*pt to define t e nature or give a definition of t e sop ist. ' e definitions are vie,ed as t e *eans of *aking practical decisions, as providing us ,it t e tools of deciding on particular *atters of conduct. ' e definitions of t e c aracters or kinds=for e&a*ple, of piety, courage

>or virtue in general?, or t e sop ist=are presu*a"ly t e *eans "y , ic t e practical 1uestions confronting +ocrates and is associates can "e ans,ered. )ndeed, in *ost cases t e episte*ic uses of definitions t at +ocrates identifies see* to "e ulti*ately of practical i*portance to i*. And it is 1uite plausi"le t at suc episte*ic uses are ulti*ately su"ordinate to practical concerns ,it in t e +ocratic t eory!practice. ' us, t e use of a definition diagnostically in order to deter*ine , et er so*e particular action is pious >Euthyphro ? is a step to,ard deter*ining , et er t e action s ould "e done or , ic action s ould "e done. +i*ilarly, t e de*onstrative use of t e definition of courage to deter*ine , et er courage can "e taug t >(aches ? is vie,ed "y +ocrates as a step to,ard acting correctly in connection ,it t e *oral education of one.s o,n c ildren. And again, t e de*onstrative use of t e definition of t e sop ist in order to deter*ine , et er t e effects of t e art of sop istry are "eneficial > rotagoras ? is a step to,ard deciding t e course of one.s conduct or, as +ocrates sees it, deciding 5 ## 5 , et er to co**it one.s soul to t e sop ists. ) do not ,is to insist ere t at t e episte*ic uses are al,ays su"ordinate to practical purposes, if t is *eans t at +ocrates ,ould ave no interest in t e for*er if t ey did not satisfy so*e practical o"/ectives. ' is is a difficult *atter to esta"lis ,it any degree of certainty. 2 at is i*portant, as ,ell as , at is sufficient for t e present purposes, is t e fact t at +ocrates sees definitions as sufficient, and per aps even necessary, for action or practice. -or +ocrates, definitions of t e *ost a"stract types of t ings=universals, c aracters, kinds, and so on=are *eans to *aking c oices a"out particular *atters of conduct. Dno,ledge a"out 1uite general and a"stract t ings is in a ,ay directly linked ,it particular and concrete actions or *atters of conduct. 3efinitions of suc t ings are all t at one presu*a"ly needs to resolve t e concrete and particular pro"le*s of action and conduct.

&eflections on the !ocratic Theor" and Practice

As ) said earlier, t e "rief discussion of t e +ocratic practice a"ove is not intended as an e& austive study of +ocrates. t oug t. ' e ai* is rat er to provide t e "ackground against , ic Aristotle.s re*arks on e&actness! ine&actness in et ics can "e "etter understood. 'o t is end, ) ,ould like to reflect "riefly upon t ose aspects of t e +ocratic t eory!practice discussed a"ove t at are t e target of Aristotle.s criticis*s in is re*arks on e&actness!ine&actness. +ocratic definitions are supposedly definitions of a set of entities. ' ey ai* at defining t e entities t at are designated "y suc a"stract nouns as Gpiety,G G"eauty,G Gsi9e,G Gfigure,G and so fort @#$A +uc nouns are vie,ed as "eing t e na*es of t e entities to "e defined. +ocrates does not dou"t t at t ese entities, t e o"/ects of is definitions, e&ist. ' is *ay "e called t e Gontological t esis.G ' e ontological t esis is accepted, in one for* or anot er, "y Plato and Aristotle as ,ell. :f course, t e t ree p ilosop ers differ in t eir vie,s a"out t e nature of t e e&istence of t ese entities. At least Aristotle t inks t at +ocrates did not suppose t at t e entities e ,as trying to define e&ist apart fro* t e o"/ects t ey c aracteri9e@#1A Plato on t e ot er and did "elieve t at suc entities e&ist apart >t e -or*s?. Aristotle t inks t at Plato is ,rong, and t at e i*self can say as *uc as e does say a"out t e -or*s and use t e* for is o,n p ilosop ical purposes ,it out "eing co**itted to a separate e&istence in t eir case. ' e ontological t esis, o,ever, is not a target of Aristotle.s re*arks on e&actness. )t is, o,ever, t e target of *any of is *etap ysical discussions. 8ven in is et ical treatises e raises dou"ts a"out t e Platonic -or*s and 1uestions , et er suc a -or* e&ists in t e case of goodness. <e even raises dou"ts a"out t e plausi"ility of t e +ocratic clai* t at t ere is a single universal in t e case of

goodness and , et er suc a universal, 5 #4 5 a Platonic -or*, or Plato.s a"solute Good is a goal of practice and ence , et er it is of any practical use@#6A But t e fact t at +ocrates takes t e entities , ic e ai*s at defining to e&ist does not raise 1uestions of e&actness for Aristotle. +ocrates vie,s t e ontological t esis as "eing true in t e case of all general ter*s=for e&a*ple, et ical ter*s, *at e*atical ter*s, or ter*s designating p ysical properties or natural kinds. ' e ontological t esis t en does not differentiate a*ong disciplines. )f t ere ,ere pro"le*s a"out e&actness ste**ing fro* t e ontological t esis, t ey ,ould "e co**on to all disciplines and ,ould not single out et ics or any ot er discipline. <o,ever, t e ,ay t ese supposed entities are and t e *anner t eir definitions are to "e used do, according to Aristotle, raise pro"le*s of e&actness t at differentiate et ics, and related disciplines, fro* so*e ot er disciplines. 2e sa, earlier t at +ocrates takes t e definitions e seeks of t ese entities to "e true in all cases. ' e definitions of piety, courage, virtue, and so fort , are, according to i*, true of all cases of piety, courage, virtue, and so fort . ' ey apply to all t e instances of t ese features irrespective of t e t ings suc features c aracteri9e=acts, persons, states, and so on. And e t inks t at t is is so ,it all entities =t e definition of any - is universally true of all instances of -. Jet us call t is +ocratic t esis Gt e universality of trut of definition t esis.G )t *ay appear t at +ocrates, in up olding suc a t esis in an unrestricted for*, is *otivated "y concerns t at could easily "e c aracteri9ed as "eing for*al or linguistic=t at is, concerns a"out t e *eaning of ter*s, t e nature of concepts or definitions, and so on. 2 at lies "e ind t e t esis of t e universality of trut of definitions are presu*a"ly assu*ptions like t e follo,ing: ' e *eaning of a ter* *ust "e t e sa*e in all its applications4 t e nature of our concepts is, or even *ust "e, suc t at t e definition of any - is true of all instances of -4 or definitions *ust apply to all instances of t e c aracter t ey define if t ey are to "e definitions or if t ey are to "e of any use. +o*eti*es +ocrates speaks as if e as so*e suc concerns in *ind, as, for instance, , en e insists t at if ,e apply t e sa*e ter* in a nu*"er of cases, t ey *ust ave so*et ing in co**on t at is designated "y t e ter* in all t e cases@##A 7et it is 1uite evident t at t e pri*ary *otivation of +ocrates ste*s fro* is conception of t e o"/ects e is trying to define. )t is a conception of strict *etap ysical essentialis*, coupled ,it a type of general *etap ysical realis*, t at pri*arily *otivates i*=t e o"/ects of definitions t e*selves possess certain c aracteristics or are of a certain nature, and it is not *erely our language, concepts, definitions, and so on, t at i*pose upon, or re1uire of t e ,orld t at it as, a nature or structure. <is concerns t en are pri*arily *aterial and only secondarily for*al. ' e o"/ects of definitions t e*selves, irrespective of , et er t ey are *at e*atical 5 #% 5 >t e geo*etrical figures in t e Meno ?, p ysical o"/ects or 1ualities >"ees, strengt , si9e in t e Meno ?, or et ical c aracteristics >piety, courage, virtue in t e Euthyphro' (aches , and Meno ? are t oug t of as possessing a fi&ed and invaria"le nature t at is to "e captured "y t e +ocratic definitions. Jet us call t is Gt e *etap ysical essentialis* t esis.G ' is t esis is, as is ,ell kno,n, stated t roug out t e +ocratic 3ialogues4 it is presupposed "y t e +ocratic practice of searc ing for definitions. ' e locus classicus of t e t esis is o,ever to "e found as early as t e Euthyphro , en +ocrates, in trying to e&plain , at kind of definitions e ,ants, asks t e r etorical 1uestion, G)s not piety al,ays t e sa*e ,it itself @

A in every action, and, on t e ot er and, is not i*piety t e opposite of all piety, al,ays t e sa*e ,it itself and , atever is to "e i*pious possessing t e sa*e for*;G >%3?. ' e ans,er to t is 1uestion is, of course, G(ost certainly, +ocrates.G ' is is essentialis* of t e strongest kind=piety, i*piety, and presu*a"ly all ot er t ings designated "y general ter*s ave a fi&ed and invariant nature or structure. ' is nature is, of course, t oug t of as "eing prior and independent of our t oug t=it is t ere to "e discovered. )t is 1uite evident t at t e t,o t eses=*etap ysical essentialis* and universality of definitions=are really insepara"le ,it in t e +ocratic t eory!practice, and go and in and ,it +ocrates. conception of de*onstrative kno,ledge. ' e first tells us , at t e nature of t e o"/ects to "e defined is or per aps *ust "e=t ey possess a fi&ed and invariant nature, an essence. )t is t is nature or essence t at is to "e given in t e definition, , ic clearly cannot, if ade1uate, fail to apply to all t e cases of , at is "eing defined. ' e nature of t e o"/ects to "e defined guarantees t at a +ocratic definition ,ill "e , en true, universally true. And it is in part t is conception of t e o"/ects t at e&plains , y +ocrates see*s to ave no dou"t t at definitions are possi"le=o"/ects ave a fi&ed nature and t us can "e defined. ' ere *ay, of course, "e ot er reasons , y definitions are difficult or even i*possi"le to o"tain,@#4A "ut at least t e nature of t e o"/ects to "e defined does not pose any pro"le*s. ' e t,o t eses are also an integral part of +ocrates. conception of de*onstrative kno,ledge, for t e idea t at a kind as an essential structure is partly t e idea t at t e rest of t e properties of t e kind are to "e e&plained "y reference to t is essential structure. <ence, to kno, t at certain properties "elong to a kind is to s o, t at t ey necessarily follo, fro* its nature or its essential structure4 it is to de*onstrate t e properties fro* t e essence of t e kind@#%A But t e ,ay t e essence of a kind figures in a de*onstration is via t e definition of t e kind. ' e definition captures t e essence and t us *ay function as t e starting point of de*onstration. A definition t at is conceived as capturing an invariant structure *ust "e universal in for*, and if true, *ust "e universally true. And all +ocratic 5 #E 5 definitions t at are of t e for* +ocrates approves are universal in for*@#EA )f, in addition, t e ot er pre*ises of a de*onstrative syllogis* are also universal in for*, as +ocrates supposes t e* to "e, t en t e conclusion of a valid syllogis* ,ill assert t at so*e property is universally true of a kind. -ro* a syllogis* of t is type t at as true pre*ises, one ,ould infer t at so*e property "elongs to every *e*"er of a kind, or t at so*e or all properties of a kind "elong to every *e*"er of t at kind ,it out e&ception. ' e vie, t at so*e or all properties of a kind "elong to it universally can "e looked upon as aving t,o sources. )t can "e t oug t of as "eing part of t e very intuitive idea ,e ave of , at it is to possess an essential structure=na*ely, t at suc a t ing as so*e or all its properties "ecause it as t e essential structure it as, and t erefore suc properties "elong to it ,it out e&ception. ' ere is no dou"t t at suc an intuitive idea underlies *uc of , at +ocrates says. )f virtue, courage, /ustice, and so fort , ave eac an essential structure t at e&plains , y eac as t e properties it as, t en t e properties eac as *ust "elong to t e* ,it out e&ception. ' e case of *atters of conduct and t eir properties ,ould not "e different fro* t e case of *at e*atical entities and t eir properties: )f a property "elongs to a s1uare "ecause t e s1uare as t e essential nature it as, t en t e property "elongs to all s1uares .,it out e&ception. Alternatively, ,e *ay look for t e "asis of t is vie, in t e *eans "y , ic properties are s o,n to

"elong to a kind, na*ely, in t e de*onstrative syllogis*. 2e *ay, t at is, e&a*ine t e syntactic and se*antic features of a typical +ocratic syllogis* or inference t at ai*s to s o, t at so*e property "elongs to a kind. +ocrates takes t e pre*ises of suc nonpractical syllogis*s to ave a certain syntactical for*=t ey are universal in for*. )n suc syllogis*s e does not use propositions t at contain proper na*es, *ake references to individuals, or use e&istential 1uantifiers. )f a +ocratic syllogis* is valid and as pre*ises t at are universal in for* >synta&? and true >se*antics?, t en t e conclusion de*onstrated fro* it ,ill also "e universally true. -ro* suc a syllogis* one ,ill "e a"le to s o, t at a property "elongs to all *e*"ers of a kind ,it out e&ception. ' e connection seen ,it in t e +ocratic t eory!practice a*ong +ocrates. conception of t e nature of t e entities e is trying to define >strict *etap ysical essentialis*?, t e nature of definitions >universally true?, and t e nature of kno,ledge >de*onstration of t e properties t at "elong to a kind? is to "e encountered again in "ot Plato >-or*s and kno,ledge? and Aristotle >essentialis*, definitions, and de*onstrative kno,ledge?. ' e connection plays a central role in t eir *etap ysical and episte*ological speculations and is never really 1uestioned.@#FA At ti*es, it is indeed difficult to separate t e t ree ele*ents, since t ey see* to al,ays go toget er. 7et it is i*portant to distinguis a*ong t e*=first, "ecause t ey are really 5 #F 5 1uite different ele*ents or t eses, and second, "ecause ,e can t en see t e interconnections a*ong t e*, t at is, , at appens to one or *ore of t e t eses , en ot ers are given up or *odified. )ndeed, in *ost cases , ere Aristotle is concerned ,it t e pro"le*s of e&actness!ine&actness in et ics and related disciplines e is *odifying or a"andoning so*e of t ese ele*ents. And, of course, *odifying or a"andoning any one of t ese ele*ents is *ost likely to ave conse1uences, , ic Aristotle, as s all "e seen, does not fail to notice. ' us, one pro"le* a"out e&actness!ine&actness in et ics t at Aristotle raises is t e pro"le* a"out t e nature of t e ele*ents of conduct. 3o t ey really possess t e fi&ed and invariant structure t at +ocrates assu*es; )s *etap ysical essentialis* to "e e&tended to t e ele*ents of conduct; +ocrates treats all o"/ects alike, , et er t ey are *at e*atical ones or ele*ents of conduct. 0egardless of , at t e o"/ect is=s1uare, figure, si9e, virtue, courage, piety, "eauty, and so fort =it is t oug t to possess a fi&ed and invariant nature=essentialis* is allBenco*passing. Aristotle t inks t at t is is not so. 8ssentialis* *ay not "e allBenco*passing. )t *ay "e true of so*e o"/ects=for e&a*ple, t e *at e*atical ones="ut it *ay not "e true of t e o"/ects dealt ,it "y et ics. ' ey, as ,ell as t e o"/ects of related disciplines, e& i"it a type of ine&actness t at e calls GvariationG4 t ey ave a kind of indefiniteness. But again, as +ocrates vie,s fi&ity or invariance of essential structure to "e features of t e ,orld, so does Aristotle consider variation or indefiniteness to "e features of t e o"/ects t e*selves. )f our language or concepts also possess corresponding features, t ey do so "ecause t e o"/ects t e*selves possess t ese features. Again, /ust as +ocrates couples is vie,s a"out definitions to is conception of t e nature of o"/ects, so does Aristotle. ' e +ocratic o"/ects ,it a fi&ed and ,ellBdefined nature can presu*a"ly "e defined, and t eir definitions ,ill "e true of all cases. 2 at are ,e to e&pect in t e case of *atters of conduct , ic , according to Aristotle, e& i"it variation and indefiniteness; Aristotle, follo,ing t e +ocratic line of coupling t e nature of definitions to t e nature of t e o"/ects t ey define, clai*s t at definitions of t e ele*ents of conduct are difficult or even i*possi"le to o"tain. +uc o"/ects *ay not "e defina"le precisely "ecause t ey lack a fi&ed essential structure4 t ey are indefinite. And , ere definitions are possi"le, t ey cannot "e like t e definitions +ocrates as in *ind=t ey are in so*e ,ay deficient. 3efinitions *ay not apply or "e true in all cases. ' ey are, in Aristotle.s vie,, ine&act.

Aristotle also calls into 1uestion t e +ocratic t esis t at so*e or all of t e properties of a kind "elong to every *e*"er of a kind. <e 1uestions, t at is, t e clai* t at so*e or all propositions asserting a property of a kind are universally true. <e insists t at *atters of conduct e& i"it eit er so*e or all of t eir properties for t e *ost part, and t at t e propositions 5 #H 5 asserting suc properties are not universally true4 t ey ave e&ceptions. At ti*es, Aristotle appears to dou"t even t e ,eak interpretation of t e +ocratic t esis=na*ely, t at so*e of t e properties of a kind "elong to every *e*"er of t at kind. <e dou"ts t at any property "elongs ,it out e&ception to every *e*"er of a kind or any state*ent asserting a property of a kind is universally true@#HA ' e p eno*ena of conduct and , at ,e say a"out t e* are, according to Aristotle, ine&act. But a"andoning or *odifying t e +ocratic conception of t e nature of *atters of conduct >*etap ysical essentialis*?, t eir definitions >universally true?, and t e propositions asserting properties of t e ele*ents of conduct >universally true or e&ceptionless? in t e ,ay Aristotle does is likely to ave conse1uences for t e kind of kno,ledge t at is possi"le in t e do*ain of conduct. ' is see*s al*ost certain , en ,e reflect upon t e pro*inent role and central position +ocrates assigns to definitions. )f *etap ysical essentialis* fails in *atters of conduct, it ,ill "e reflected in t eir definitions, and t is in turn ,ill *ost likely affect t e de*onstrative syllogis*s t at suc definitions in part constitute. Consider first t e de*onstrative use of definitions. +uppose a rat er e&tre*e case , ere if essentialis* fails in *atters of conduct, no definitions are possi"le. ' en, clearly, definitions could not play t e role +ocrates assigns to t e* as starting points of de*onstrative syllogis*s. But per aps definitions are i*possi"le only in t e case of so*e *atters of conduct=or t ey are not really i*possi"le, "ut *erely difficult to o"tain. Aristotle, o,ever, sees pro"le*s for definitions even in t is *ore *oderate vie, if t ey are e&pected to play t e de*onstrative role t at +ocrates assigns to t e*=for o, are definitions t at are not universally true to "e used for de*onstrative purposes; 2 at is t e logical for* of suc definitions and , at are t eir trut conditions; 2 et er valid de*onstrative syllogis*s are possi"le in t e case of *atters of conduct depends on t e logical for* of t e propositions t at constitute t e pre*ises of suc syllogis*s, including of course t at of t e +ocratic definitions stating t e nature of t e various kinds +ocrates is trying to define. But all or so*e of t ese propositions, Aristotle argues, *ay fail to "e universally true, t us raising t e 1uestion of o, or , et er syllogis*s consisting of suc pre*ises could "e valid. Aristotle see*s to "e 1uite certain t at syllogis*s a"out *atters of conduct ,it pre*ises t at are not universally true cannot produce t e kind of de*onstrations t at are possi"le else, ere. :ne cannot, e argues, de*onstrate t at a property "elongs to an ele*ent of conduct eit er in t e strict sense advocated "y +ocrates or in t e *anner presu*a"ly possi"le in different do*ains >for e&a*ple, t e *at e*atical do*ain?. )ne&act su"/ect *atter and ine&act pre*ises in our syllogis*s, e argues, ,ill generate ine&act reasonings, and ence ine&act conclusions, in t e do*ain of *atters of conduct. ' us, so*e of Aristotle.s re*arks 5 #9 5 on e&actness!ine&actness, , ic at ti*es appear rat er inconse1uential, constitute a po,erful attack on certain *etap ysical and episte*ological vie,s in +ocrates. t oug t, and, as s all "e seen, in Plato.s and is o,n t oug t. :f course, , at Aristotle says a"out t e supposed ine&actness of t e su"/ect *atter and t e propositions of et ics is likely to affect t e ot er uses t at definitions are assigned ,it in t e +ocratic

t eory!practice. ' ere are also pro"le*s, according to Aristotle, ,it t e uses of t e definitions +ocrates proposes t at ste* si*ply fro* t e a"stractness of +ocratic definitions. +uc definitions, e argues, cannot do , at +ocrates says t ey are to do if t ey re*ain at t e level of generality +ocrates is ,illing to accept. Consider, for e&a*ple, t e diagnostic use of definitions. :"viously, if definitions of *atters of conduct are not possi"le, t en t ere ,ill "e no definitions to carry out t e diagnostic function. ' e definition of so*e ele*ent of conduct >for e&a*ple, piety? cannot in t is case "e e&pected to "e of use in deter*ining >kno,ing? or /udging!"elieving t at so*e particular is an instance of t is ele*ent >for e&a*ple, t is act is pious?. +uppose, o,ever, t at definitions of *atters of conduct are possi"le, "ut t ey are ine&act in t e sense t at t ey are not universally true=t ey do not apply to all t e instances of a kind. Again, suc definitions could not for t is reason "e ade1uate diagnostic tools, if t ey are e&pected to ,ork in all cases. ' e situation, Aristotle t inks, ,ould not "e *uc "etter even if t ere ,ere +ocratic definitions of *atters of conduct t at did not suffer fro* t e a"ove ine&actness. +uc definitions ,ould fail, according to Aristotle, "ecause t ey are deficient in ot er ,ays=t ey are ine&act in ot er ,ays. +uppose, for instance, t at ,e ave a +ocratic definition of so*e ele*ent of conduct -. +ocrates presupposes t at t e definition of - is sufficient for deter*ining or /udging!"elieving t at so*e & is 8 :f course, t ere are *any pro"le*s ,it t e use of definitions in general and of definitions for diagnostic purposes in particular=for e&a*ple, pro"le*s of interpretation, understanding, or follo,ing a rule. -or t e *o*ent, o,ever, ) ,is to focus on /ust t is 1uestion: <o, can a +ocratic definition of a kind "e used to deter*ine t at so*e particular is of t at kind, given t e a"stractness or generality of suc a definition; +ocrates appears, on t e one and, to set no li*its to t e a"stractness or generality of definitions. :n t e ot er and, o,ever, e e&pects to use t e definition "y itself to deter*ine , et er a particular is or is not of a certain type. ' is clearly ,ould not "e as easy as +ocrates presents it. Assu*ing t at definitions are possi"le, kno,ledge of a definition of t e type +ocrates appears to "e after ,ould not "e sufficient for diagnostic purposes. Consider, for e&a*ple, 5 4$ 5 t e follo,ing definitions t at +ocrates finds to "e of t e proper for*: >a? ' at , ic t e gods love is pious >Euthyphro 93?4 >"? Courage is a certain endurance of t e soul >(aches 196B?4 >c? 'e*perance is a kind of 1uietness >Charmides 1%9B?4 and, a definition t at +ocrates i*self puts fort , >d? -ear is t e e&pectation of future evil >Meno 19HB?. ' ese definitions are, of course, infor*ative=in so*e of t e cases t ey at least identify t e genus to , ic so*e ele*ent of conduct "elongs="ut it is far fro* o"vious t at definition >a? is sufficient for deter*ining t at so*e act is pious, >"? for deter*ining t at so*e act or person is courageous, and so on. Aristotle insists t at t ese definitions lack t e kind of e&actness or specificity t at is re1uired if t ey are to do , at +ocrates ,ants t e* to do. +i*ilarly, definitions ,ill not easily play t e practical role +ocrates e&pects t e* to play if t ey re*ain at t e level of generality or a"stractness at , ic +ocratic definition see*s to re*ain. +ocrates e&pects t e definitions of piety, courage, or sop istry, o,ever a"stract t ey *ig t "e, to provide practical ans,ers to 1uestions suc as: 2 at *ust 8ut yp ro do no,; + ould t e c ildren "e sent for training to a sop ist; 7et t ese definitions e& i"it t e sa*e level of generality and a"stractness t at t e definitions of figure, s1uare, or color do. +ocrates sees no difference "et,een t e kind of definitions, and t erefore of kno,ledge, t at is re1uired in t e case of practice and t at , ic is re1uired for nonpractical purposes. Aristotle again insists t at t ere is a difference ere=definitions and kno,ledge in *atters of conduct cannot re*ain at t e level of a"stractness and generality t at is sufficient in t e conte&t of *at e*atics if t ey are to "e of use in practice. And t ey *ust "e of use=t is, e t inks, is t e

ulti*ate purpose for seeking kno,ledge in t e do*ain of conduct. 8t ics is, according to i*, a practical discipline, and for t is reason a certain level of e&actness is re1uired. Conversely, Aristotle argues, if et ical investigation, unlike *at e*atical investigation, as practice or action as its ulti*ate goal, , y s ould ,e de*and fro* it t e sa*e e&actness in ter*s of de*onstrative rigor t at ,e de*and fro* disciplines , ose goals are purely t eoretical; ' e +ocratic and, as ,e s all see, Platonic assu*ption t at kno,ledge need not differ across types of disciplines is so*et ing Aristotle 1uestions. <e *ay "e ,rong i*self in supposing t at t ere is a difference in e&actness a*ong disciplines t at is due to differences in t eir goals, "ut t e +ocratic assu*ption is not o"vious eit er. ' e a"ove considerations s o, t at often t e targets of Aristotle.s re*arks on e&actness are certain p ilosop ical positions central to +ocrates. t oug t and, to a considera"le e&tent, to Plato.s and Aristotle.s o,n as ,ell. )n t e su"se1uent discussion, ) ,ill e&plain in greater detail t e variety of t ings Aristotle as in *ind , en e speaks of e&actness!ine&actness, and t us *ake t e nature as ,ell as t e targets of is criticis*s *ore 5 41 5 perspicuous. Before concluding t is discussion of t e +ocratic t oug t, o,ever, ) ,is to *ake so*e general co**ents a"out +ocrates. conception of et ics as a discipline. )t is 1uite clear t at +ocrates does not provide a detailed account of de*onstrative kno,ledge, and it cannot "e said t at t e availa"le evidence s o,s t at e as a clear conception of a de*onstrative science or even of et ics as a discipline. )t is t erefore difficult at ti*es to find ans,ers to t e *any 1uestions t at arise a"out t e +ocratic conception of kno,ledge, science, and et ics. Consider, for e&a*ple, t e 1uestion touc ed upon earlier: 3oes +ocrates take t e definitions e is seeking to "e necessary trut s; <e does not say eit er t at t ey are or t at t ey are not. Conse1uently, it is not clear , et er e t inks t at de*onstrative kno,ledge consists only of necessary propositions. (ost pro"a"ly +ocrates does take definitions to "e necessary. ' ey state, according to i*, t e essences of t e various kinds, and t is ,ould "e, for Aristotle at least, sufficient to *ake definitions necessary. Aristotle t en ,ould ave reasons for taking t e +ocratic conception of de*onstrative kno,ledge to also enco*pass t e assu*ption t at de*onstrative kno,ledge consists of necessary trut s. At least so*e of its co*ponents ,ould "e necessary trut s. )t is also 1uite possi"le t at +ocrates takes universality of trut to i*ply necessity, as Aristotle i*self see*s to do >see c ap. E?. )n ot er ,ords, if definitions are universally true, t en t ey are necessary. 8ven if +ocrates takes is definitions to "e necessary trut s, ,e cannot conclude fro* t is t at e considers de*onstrative kno,ledge to "e necessary kno,ledge. 2 et er it is so depends on t e nature of t e ot er pre*ises of is de*onstrations or syllogis*s=it depends on , et er t ey are also necessary. 3oes +ocrates take t e* to "e so and does e dra, t e conclusion t at, since all t e pre*ises of de*onstrations are necessary, all de*onstrative kno,ledge is necessary kno,ledge; )t is difficult to respond to t ese 1uestions, since +ocrates not only gives us no ans,ers "ut does not even address t ese *atters. )t is true t at t e pre*ises e uses in t e proofs to illustrate t e use of ypot esis =t at is, t e t,o proofs in t e Meno a"out virtue "eing teac a"le or not=are pre*ises t at could easily "e taken as necessary. 8ac one of t e proofs uses as a pre*ise one of t e propositional co*ponents of t e "iconditional GC is kno,ledge if and only if C is teac a"le.G :ne could plausi"ly take t e "iconditional as stating a necessary trut . +ocrates considers t ese state*ents to "e universally true. And if e also takes universality of trut to i*ply necessity, t en it is reasona"le to assu*e t at e takes t ese state*ents to "e necessary too.

7et t e fact t at it is plausi"le to take t ese pre*ises to "e necessary does not s o, t at +ocrates did so. Ior can it "e assu*ed t at if +ocrates t oug t t e pre*ises to "e necessary, e inferred t at t e conclusions of 5 46 5 is de*onstration ,ere necessary=t at all de*onstrative kno,ledge is necessary. +ocrates *ay not ave dra,n t e conclusion. :f course, +ocrates *ay ave taken all de*onstrative kno,ledge to "e necessary for 1uite different reasons. )n a ,ay, ) a* arguing ere t at, given t e availa"le evidence, one s ould take a rat er agnostic attitude ,it regard to +ocrates. vie,s on t ese *atters. At t e sa*e ti*e, o,ever, it is easy to see o, so*eone, and in particular Aristotle, could take a positive stand and interpret t e +ocratic position in a straig tfor,ard fas ion=t at is, t at +ocrates takes t e definitions of kinds, t e additional pre*ises >nondefinitional ones? of is proofs, and all de*onstrative kno,ledge to "e necessary. -or clearly, t e intuitions constituting t e +ocratic vie, are /ust t ose intuitions t at ave al,ays led p ilosop ers to t e position t at kno,ledge is de*onstrative and t at it consists of necessary trut s=na*ely, t at kinds ave essences, properties of kinds can "e proven fro* t eir essences, and so on. Aristotle in particular ,ould see in t e +ocratic intuitions t e very sa*e intuitions t at led i* to is o,n vie,s a"out t e nature of kno,ledge, , et er +ocrates arrived at t e sa*e conclusions or not=and t e ,ay Aristotle sa, t e +ocratic position is , at is of pri*ary i*portance for our purposes. )f, indeed, e understood t at position to old t at so*e or all properties of et ical ele*ents are necessary, is e*p asi9ing t at properties "elong to *atters of conduct for t e *ost part is an atte*pt to undercut t is +ocratic position. -or, as s all "e seen, Aristotle takes , at is for t e *ost part to "e not necessary. ' ere are *any ot er 1uestions pertaining to +ocrates. vie,s on kno,ledge t at see* to "e e1ually difficult to ans,er in a definitive ,ay. 3oes +ocrates, for e&a*ple, ave a sufficiently clear idea of a de*onstrative science; 3oes e identify t e ele*ents t at a discipline *ust possess in order to "e a de*onstrative science; 3oes e give criteria for differentiating a*ong t e disciplines t ose t at are independent or autono*ous fro* t ose t at are su"ordinate; (ost often +ocrates see*s to "e content ,it piece*eal investigations. At ti*es is ai* is to o"tain a de*onstration t at could easily "e considered as for*ing a part of a de*onstrative science or at least of a ,ellBdefined discipline. But t ere is no real evidence t at +ocrates t inks t at suc de*onstrations are a part of a science or t at t ere is a discipline , ose do*ain is suc and suc and contains so*e particular de*onstration. -or e&a*ple, e concerns i*self ,it proving, or t inks t at one can prove, t at courage or virtue is teac a"le, /ustice is "eneficial, and so on, "ut t ere is no clear evidence t at e vie,s suc proofs as "eing a part of t e discipline of et ics t at as its o,n proper ele*ents. )t is true t at at ti*es e clai*s disciplines differ in respect of t eir su"/ect *atter and!or function, "ut , et er e t inks of t ese factors as providing ade1uate criteria for differentiating a*ong disciplines or for deter*ining , ic ones are independent is difficult to esta"lis @#9A )n one 5 4# 5 place, o,ever, e is presented "y Plato as olding t e vie, t at all kno,ledge for*s a continuous , ole4 all trut s or propositions for* an interconnected totality, so t at "y grasping one t ing ,e can co*e to kno, everyt ing else@4$A )s t ere really one de*onstrative science t at enco*passes all trut and kno,ledge; Are t e various disciplines in t e final analysis not autono*ous disciplines; ' ese are indeed i*portant 1uestions t at are to "e a central concern for Aristotle. But t e point t at needs to "e stressed ere is t at +ocrates sees no differences a*ong t e disciplines, or ,it in t e

do*ain of kno,ledge, ,it regard to t e nature of t eir o"/ects and t e type of kno,ledge t at is possi"le. (at e*atical and et ical ele*ents are treated as e& i"iting no differences t at are relevant to t eir "eing o"/ects of kno,ledge. ' ey are t oug t to possess an essential nature t at can "e captured "y definitions t at are of t e sa*e kind. )n addition, t e disciplines concerned ,it t e *at e*atical and et ical o"/ects, and per aps all ot er disciplines, ave t e sa*e structure and for*, /ust as t eir o"/ects e& i"it t e sa*e kind of *etap ysical essentialis*. Aristotle, as s all "e seen, ,ill 1uestion so*e of t ese e&plicit or i*plicit assu*ptions of +ocrates and ,ill insist t at t ere are differences in e&actness a*ong disciplines.

Plato on 'thical %nowledge and its Ob(ects

' e line separating Plato.s t oug t fro* +ocrates. is difficult to dra,. 2 ere it is to "e dra,n ,it regard to so*e aspects of t eir t oug t, and , et er t ere is a line to "e dra,n at all ,it regard to ot ers, ave "een *atters of controversy since anti1uity. Iaturally, t e controversy as "een greatest in connection ,it t ose ele*ents t at are central co*ponents of t e vie,s of "ot t inkers, suc as t e nature of t e soul, t e -or*s, kno,ledge, virtue, and so fort . ) s all not, o,ever, enter into t ese controversies ere, nor s all ) take sides on any of t e*. )nstead, ) ,ill *ake a fe, "rief co**ents on so*e issues t at "ear on t e *ain topics discussed in t is essay. Plato on several occasions in is ,orks touc es upon 1uestions pertaining to e&actness, and in so*e instances appears to anticipate so*e o"servations or clai*s t at Aristotle i*self later *akes. ' us, in t e #heaetetus >lE68? e suggests t at different disciplines call for different types of /ustification or proof 2e cannot, e argues, use pro"a"ilistic for*s of reasoning , en doing geo*etry, t us anticipating Aristotle.s ,ellBkno,n re*ark in t e N.E. >).iii?, , ere e argues t at t e type of reasoning t at is appropriate for a discipline is deter*ined "y t e nature of t e discipline itself and its su"/ect *atter.@41A Plato, o,ever, speaks in considera"ly greater detail a"out differences a*ong disciplines or arts and e&plicitly connects suc differences to e&B 5 44 5 actness or ine&actness in t e hilebus . <e argues t at so*e disciplines, t e *ost ine&act ones, do not rise a"ove t e level of con/ecture and e&perienceBfor e&a*ple, *usic, *edicine, agriculture, piloting, and strategy >%EAff.?. :t ers t at involve *easuring and t e use of instru*ents for *easuring are *ore e&act=for e&a*ple, s ip"uilding and ouse"uilding >%EB?. ' e *ost e&act, o,ever, are t e *at e*atical arts or disciplines=for e&a*ple, arit *etic and geo*etry >%EC?=, ic , Plato goes on to argue, can "e divided into t,o kinds: arit *etic and geo*etry of t e *any and arit *etic and geo*etry of t e p ilosop ers >%E3?. ' ere are t,o distinct disciplines in eac case, Plato clai*s, and t e discipline or art pursued "y t e p ilosop ers >pure *at e*atics? is *ore e&act t an t at pursued "y t e *any , en t ey reckon, *easure, or calculate in various conte&ts >applied *at e*atics, %FCB3?. ' ere is no dou"t t at at so*e point in is p ilosop ical career Plato ca*e to reflect upon so*e 1uestions a"out e&actness!ine&actness t at ,ere to concern Aristotle later. ' e evidence fro* t e hilebus s o,s clearly t at Plato ,as concerned ,it t e pro"le*s of t e variation of e&actness across disciplines. 7et t e hilebus , as ,ell as t e #heaetetus' are t oug t to "e a*ong Plato.s late dialogues. )t cannot, t erefore, "e concluded fro* t e evidence provided "y t ese dialogues t at Plato ,as al,ays concerned ,it t e kind of 1uestions a"out e&actness!ine&actness t at pu99led Aristotle. )ndeed, even in t ese dialogues Plato gives no indication t at e t oug t et ics to "e a pro"le*atic discipline ,it respect to its e&actness. <e does not single out et ics, or related disciplines, as posing any special

pro"le*s. ' e evidence fro* t ese late dialogues, t en, does not necessarily e&clude t e possi"ility t at Plato ad earlier taken et ics to "e as e&act as any ot er discipline or t at e did not see anyt ing pro"le*atic ,it t e nature of t e o"/ects ,it , ic it deals. ' ere is, indeed, evidence fro* t e (iddle 3ialogues t at supports t ese clai*s. )n so*e of t ese dialogues, Plato.s tendency is to vie, t e study of *atters of conduct as not "eing different fro* t e study of ot er do*ains and as not posing any peculiar pro"le*s ,it respect of its e&actness. )t is t e vie,s of Plato associated ,it *iddle Platonis* , ic *ost often for* t e target of t e criticis*s of Aristotle directed against Plato.s t oug t. Aristotle, t us, *ig t ave ad so*e reasons for targeting certain of is re*arks on e&actness!ine&actness in et ics against so*e vie,s of Plato. ) s all turn ne&t to a "rief discussion of t ese vie,s in *iddle Platonis* t at are e&plicitly or i*plicitly put fort in t e haedo and t e Republic@46A ' e centerpiece of *iddle Platonis* is, of course, t e t eory of -or*s. ' is t eory, as <arold C erniss as argued, is one of t e ric est and *ost econo*ical p ilosop ical t eories.@4#A Plato uses it to for*ulate is ans,ers to a variety of pro"le*s and to "uild upon it is vie,s on t e nature of kno,ledge, t e soul, causes, and so fort . ' e -or*s in t e haedo and 5 4% 5 t e Republic are conceived as t e o"/ects of kno,ledge par e&cellence. ' ey are at ti*es introduced as "eing si*ply t e only o"/ects t at are kno,a"le, t e only sort of entities t at fit Plato.s specifications of kno,ledge=t ey are fi&ed, invaria"le, unc anging, eternal, and so fort .@44A But , at does t e do*ain of t e -or*s enco*pass; Are t ere fi&ed, invaria"le, unc anging, and so fort , entities t at are t e o"/ects of et ical kno,ledge; 8&a*ples of -or*s t at Plato gives in t e haedo include: +i9e, <ealt , +trengt >E%8?4 t e 81ual >F4B?4 Bigness, +*allness >1$$8?4 ',oBness, :neness >1$1C?4 'allness >1$68?4 and :ddness, 8venness, t e <ot, and t e Cold >1$%A?. <o,ever, t e very first e&a*ples of -or*s Plato gives are actually ele*ents of et ical kno,ledge: t e Lust, t e Beautiful, and t e Good >E%3?. <e asserts again t e e&istence of t ese and adds to t e* t e Pious >F%CB3?, and e repeats t e clai* >FFA, 1$$B, 1$$C, and 1$$3?. ' at Plato refers to -or*s of *atters of conduct fre1uently s ould not, o,ever, "e surprising for t,o reasons=first, "ecause *ost often t e paradig* -or*s for +ocrates and Plato are t e ones t ey associate ,it *atters of conduct4 and second, "ecause Plato, like +ocrates, conceives of t e t eory of -or*s as a general t eory: G) a* speaking of all t ings suc as +i9e, <ealt , +trengt and, in a ,ord, t e reality of all ot er t ings, t at , ic eac of t e* essentially isG >E%8?. According to Plato, at least so*e part of et ical kno,ledge as as its o"/ects t ese fi&ed and invariant entities, for , atever t e re1uire*ents necessary for "eing an o"/ect of kno,ledge are, t e -or*s t at constitute t e et ical do*ain=t e Good, Lust, Pious, Beautiful, and so fort =presu*a"ly *eet t e*. ' e o"/ects of et ical kno,ledge do not differ fro* t e o"/ects of ot er kinds of kno,ledge as far as t eir episte*ological c aracter is concerned. A*ong t e -or*s t at are t e o"/ects of t e kind of kno,ledge Plato associates ,it t e pursuit of p ilosop ical in1uiry are t e -or*s of *atters of conduct=t at is, t e Good, Beautiful, Lust, and so fort >E%Aff.?. But , at is t e nature of t e kno,ledge t at as as its o"/ects t e -or*s; (ost often in t e haedo Plato speaks of t is kno,ledge in a ,ay t at *akes it very *uc like kno,ledge "y ac1uaintance. <is *odel is often t e *odel of perceptual kno,ledge: Lust as ,e "eco*e directly ac1uainted ,it so*e p ysical o"/ect , en it affects one of our sense organs, so ,e co*e to ave kno,ledge , en a -or* GaffectsG our soul >E%8, EEA?. Plato see*s to t ink t at all -or*s are kno,n in t is ,ay: 8ac -or* is grasped "y itself. )ndeed, at one point in t e haedo e argues t at t e -or*s are not co*posite t ings

>

?4 t ey ave a single c aracter > ?, and t us t ey do not undergo c ange or destruction "ecause t ey are si*ple >FHCB3?. )f indeed t e -or*s are suc nonco*posite, si*ple, or singleBc aracter entities, it is difficult to see o, t ey could "e kno,n e&cept "y so*e type of direct ac1uaintance. 5 4E 5 2 en, o,ever, Plato co*es to e&plain is ela"orate t eory of causes in t e haedo e speaks of necessary connections or relations a*ong -or*s. +o*e -or*s necessarily c aracteri9e ot er -or*s, , ile ot ers necessarily e&clude so*e ot er -or*s. +o*e of Plato.s ,ellBkno,n e&a*ples are t e follo,ing: :ddness necessarily c aracteri9es :neness and ' reeness, 8venness c aracteri9es ',oness, <eat c aracteri9es -ire4 :neness necessarily e&cludes 8venness, <eat e&cludes Coldness, and so fort . ' ere are, according to t is vie,, so*e propositions a"out -or*s t at are universally and necessarily true: -or*s ave so*e necessary c aracteristics. 2it respect to t e do*ain of t e -or*s, t en, t ere are la,s t at are universally true and necessary.@4%A And, as *any sc olars ave suggested, t is conception of t e relations a*ong -or*s *akes it possi"le for Plato to t ink of kno,ledge *ore in ter*s of t e de*onstrative *odel. )ndeed, t e *etap ysical superstructure of t e -or*s, ,it its essential attri"utes and necessary properties and its supposed relation to t e natural ,orld > inted at in t e haedo ?, *akes it possi"le for Plato to t ink t at so*e type of de*onstrative kno,ledge a"out t e natural ,orld is possi"le. At least t ose types of natural p eno*ena t at reflect t e relations e& i"ited "y t e corresponding -or*s t e*selves can "e kno,n de*onstratively. Are t ere, t en, also la,s t at pertain to t e -or*s associated ,it *atters of conduct; Are t ere universally true and necessary propositions t at state relations or c aracteristics of suc -or*s as Piety, Goodness, Lustice, 'e*perance, and so fort ; ' e e&a*ples Plato gives in order to illustrate t e supposed necessary connections a*ong -or*s are fro* t e *at e*atical do*ain >:neness, :ddness, 8venness, 81uality, and so fort ? and fro* t e do*ain of natural p eno*ena >-ire, +no,, Coldness, <eat, and so fort ?. Alt oug Plato e&plicitly refers to t e -or*s of t e Good and t e Beautiful , en e&plaining t e presuppositions of is t eory of causes >1$$B?, e does not give an e&a*ple of necessary connections a*ong -or*s of *atters of conduct. 7et t e t eory of causes is a general t eory. )t is *eant to apply to all -or*s. ' ere is no reason, t en, to suppose t at Plato restricts in any ,ay t e application of is t eory of causes, and in particular t at e t inks it does not apply to t e -or*s of *atters of conduct. (ost pro"a"ly Plato t inks t at t ere are necessary connections a*ong suc -or*s and t erefore t at t ere are universally true and necessary propositions t at state suc connections a*ong -or*s of *atters of conduct. 8&a*ples of suc propositions *ay per aps "e t e follo,ing: Lustice is a virtue4 Piety is good4 'e*perance is "eneficial. Plato.s pri*ary concern in t e Republic is ,it *atters of conduct, and it is t erefore not surprising t at considera"ly *ore is said in t is ,ork a"out kno,ledge of *atters of conduct and t e nature of its o"/ects t an is said in t e haedo .@4EA Plato, for e&a*ple, argues t at since *atters of 5 4F 5

conduct are of t e greatest i*portance, ,e s ould strive to attain t e *ost e&act accounts of t e*: %.9 G' ere is not only so*et ing greater,G ) said, G"ut of t ese very t ings @i.e., t e virtuesA ,e need not *erely to conte*plate an outline @

A as no,, "ut ,e *ust o*it not ing of t eir *ost perfect ela"oration. :r ,ould it not "e a"surd to strain every nerve to attain t e ut*ost e&actness @ A and clarity @ A of kno,ledge a"out ot er t ings of trifling *o*ent and not to de*and t e greatest e&actness @ A for t e greatest *atters;G G)t ,ould indeed,G e said. >Republic :;9E7 Plato, of course, t oug t t at t e de*and for t e Gut*ost e&actnessG in t e case of accounts of t e virtues is not a de*and for t e i*possi"le. <e t oug t t at suc e&actness could "e attained in t e case of *atters of conduct. )n Book )K of t e Republic , , ile e*"arking on is 1uest to provide definitions of t e virtues in t e individual, +ocrates *akes t e follo,ing ,ellBkno,n re*ark: GAnd let *e tell you, Glaukon, t at in *y opinion ,e s all never appre end t is *atter accurately @

A fro* suc *et ods as ,e are no, e*ploying in discussion. -or t ere is anot er longer and arder ,ay t at conducts to t is. 7et ,e *ay per aps discuss it on t e level of our previous state*ents and in1uiriesG >4#%3?. ' ere are, t en, according to Plato, ,ays "y , ic e&act kno,ledge a"out *atters of conduct can "e attained. +ocrates asserts again t at suc kno,ledge is possi"le , en e re*arks, G3o you t ink t at t ere is any difference "et,een t e "lind and t ose , o are really deprived of t e kno,ledge of every reality, , o ave no clear *odel of it in t eir soul and cannot, as painters can, look to t at , ic is *ost true, al,ays refer to it, conte*plate it as e&actly @ A as possi"le;G >4H4C?. ' e evidence, in *y /udg*ent, leaves no dou"t t at Plato t oug t t at kno,ledge of t e Gut*ost e&actnessG is possi"le in t e case of *atters of conduct. ' ere is a 1uestion, o,ever, as to , at Plato *eant , en e spoke of suc e&actness. +o*eti*es , at Plato see*s to ave ad in *ind , en speaking of e&actness ,it respect to accounts of so*e *atter of conduct is greater detail, ela"oration, or co*pleteness. ' is see*s to "e in part t e point of t e re*ark 1uoted a"ove >6.4?, , ere +ocrates clai*s t at ,e s ould not "e satisfied ,it a *ere outline of t e virtues "ut s ould seek an account of greater e&actness. )t is e&actness in t e for* of detail, ela"oration, or co*pleteness t at Plato also as in *ind , en +ocrates re*arks t at Gsuc appears to *e, Glaukon, t e account of t e selection and appoint*ent of rulers and guardians as sketc ed in outline @

A, "ut not dra,n out in detail @ AG >414A?. Plato, t en, t oug t t at e&actness in t e for* of detail or co*pleteness is possi"le in our accounts of *atters 5 4H 5 of conduct. )t is true t at e does not specify t e level or degree of detail or co*pleteness t at e is ai*ing at or t at is re1uired, "ut it is 1uite evident t at e t inks t at , atever is t e desired or re1uired level, it is attaina"le. <o,ever, at ot er ti*es, , en Plato speaks of e&actness e as in *ind so*et ing different fro* detail or co*pleteness. <e see*s to "e t inking of t e c aracter of our kno,ledge of *atters of conduct. 2 en Plato clai*s t at t e account of t e virtues given in Book )K is not e&act, and t at t e virtues cannot "e grasped accurately "y e*ploying t e *et ods e e*ploys t ere, e is distinguis ing "et,een types of ,ays of kno,ing. ' ere is, e argues in t at passage fro* Book )K >4#%3?, "esides t e type or ,ay of kno,ing t at as "een ac ieved or follo,ed in t e account of t e virtues given t ere, anot er longer and arder ,ay t at presu*a"ly produces e&act kno,ledge. 2 en Plato returns to t is *atter in Book K) and atte*pts to e&plain , at is t e arder, longer, and *ore e&act ,ay, e re*inds us t at , at ,as said earlier *ig t ave "een sufficient for t e purposes at and t en, "ut it nevert eless falls s ort of giving an e&act account of t e nature of t e virtues: G2e spoke as "est at t e ti*e, and ,e said t at for t e *ost perfect discern*ent of t ese t ings anot er longer ,ay ,as re1uisite , ic ,ould *ake t e* plain to one , o took it, "ut t at it ,as possi"le to deal ,it t e* on a level of proof co*pati"le ,it , at ad "een said up to t en. 7ou said t at t is ,as satisfactory4 o,ever, ) t oug t t at , at ,as said t en in t at ,ay ,as lacking in e&actness @

AG >%$4A?. )t is clear fro* t e passage 1uoted a"ove t at , at Plato finds deficient in t e accounts of t e virtues e gives in Book )K, or , ere e locates t eir supposed ine&actness, is t e nature of t e proofs t at are utili9ed t ere. ' ese are 1uasie*pirical and infor*al proofs. ' ey rely on so*e data of e&perience a"out t e classes of t e city and t e parts of t e soul, and clearly fall far s ort of even t e ordinary *at e*atical proofs ,e encounter in geo*etry and arit *etic. ' e kind of proof t at Plato t inks ,ill produce t e Gut*ost e&actnessG de*anded "y t e i*portance of t e virtues >%$48? is a proof t at relies solely on t e -or*s and as as its starting point t e greatest of all -or*s: t e Good. ' ese proofs or de*onstrations constitute , at Plato calls t e *et od of dialectic, and t ey are superior to t e proofs or de*onstrations of ordinary *at e*atics and produce a superior and *ore e&act kno,ledge. :rdinary *at e*atics, Plato argues in t e final sections of Book K), relies in its proofs on visi"le i*ages and on ypot eses. But dialectic relies neit er on sensi"le i*ages nor ulti*ately on ypot eses: %.: Understand also t at "y t e ot er section of t e intelligi"le ) *ean t at , ic reason itself grasps "y t e po,er of dialectic. )t does not consider its ypot eses as first principles, "ut as ypot eses in t e true sense of

5 49 5 stepping stones and starting points' in order to reach that )hich is beyond hypothesis' the first principle of all that exists. Ha+ing reached this and -eeping hold of )hat follo)s from it' it does come do)n to a conclusion )ithout ma-ing use of anything +isible at all' but proceeding by means of <orms and through <orms to its conclusions )hich are <orms. I understand' he said' but not completely' for you seem to be spea-ing of a mighty tas-.that you )ish to distinguish the intelligible reality contemplated by the science of dialectic as more exact *

,@4FAthan the ob$ects of the so4called sciences' for )hich their hypotheses are first principles. 1:&&E7 ' e a"ove is one of t ose Platonic passages t at see*s to defy su**ari9ing, parap rasing, or e&plaining, and to so*e it *ay even defy understanding. ) s all not try to su**ari9e, parap rase, or e&plain it at t is point. 0at er, ) s all si*ply *ake t e follo,ing o"servations: ' e kind of reasoning Plato designates as dialectical is t e *ost pure and rigorous, and ence it produces t e *ost e&act kno,ledge. )ts o"/ects, Plato clai*s, partake of t e greatest trut and reality and it is "ecause of t is t at dialectic is *ost e&act: G' ey @t e various kinds of cognitionA participate in e&actness @

A in t e sa*e degree as t eir o"/ects partake of trut and realityG >%118?. ' e -or*s are t e *ost perfect and e&act o"/ects, even *ore e&act t an t e eavenly "odies t at astrono*y studies, , ic are considered Gt e fairest and *ost e&act of *aterial t ingsG >%693?. A*ong t e o"/ects of dialectical reasoning are, of course, t e -or*s associated ,it *atters of conduct. )ndeed, it is e&clusively t ese -or*s t at Plato *entions in is discussion of t e role of t e Good in de*onstration and of t e nature of t e dialectic. ' ese -or*s are as e&act as any ot er -or*s, and t at of t e Good is t e *ost e&act. ' e kno,ledge t at is possi"le in t e case of t ese -or*s is also as e&act as t at of any ot er -or*s4 it is *ore e&act t an t at of ordinary *at e*atics. )ndeed, all disciplines , ose do*ain is a su"set of t e real* of t e -or*s e& i"it, according to Plato, t e de*onstrative rigor and purity e associates ,it dialectic, and t eir su"/ect *atter is c aracteri9ed "y t e sa*e kind of perfection and e&actness. 8t ics, t en, in its purest for* is as e&act as t e *ost rigorous disciplines. )ts proofs satisfy t e re1uire*ents of dialectic, and its o"/ects *eet t e stringent re1uire*ents Plato considers necessary for all o"/ects of kno,ledge=t at t ey are -or*s. ) ave so far focused on so*e of t e t eoretical concerns raised "y Plato.s investigations in t e Republic . ' e central 1uestion of t is ,ork, o,ever, is a"out t e nature of /ustice and t e ,ay it can "e reali9ed in society. )t is, t en, in part a practical investigation. )ts ai* is to infor* us a"out t e rig t or correct ,ay of acting and of structuring u*an society. )t is supposed to guide our conduct, "ot at t e individual and social levels. But o, does Plato see t e relation of is accounts of t e virtues >"ot 5 %$ 5 in t e soul and in t e city? to our conduct; <o, do t e rat er a"stract accounts of t e virtues relate to our practical concerns, to particular pro"le*s of conduct; Muite often Plato speaks as if t e relation is a

rat er strong and direct one, as if t e accounts e gives can "y t e*selves guide us in our conduct. Jet *e e&plore a "it *ore t is supposed direct link "et,een Plato.s accounts of so*e *atters of conduct and our conduct in particular circu*stances. Plato.s accounts of t e virtues are 1uite general and a"stract. 2 at e says a"out t e virtues in t e city in Book )K is clearly *uc *ore ela"orate and detailed t an , at e says a"out t e virtues in t e individual. Plato.s discussion on t e latter is 1uite general and very cursory4 it "arely touc es upon t e *ost generic and a"stract features of t e virtues. Plato.s account of t e structure of a /ust society, o,ever, is t e *ost detailed e&position of any topic given in t e Republic . But are t ese accounts sufficient guides to individual conduct or ade1uate *odels for structuring a society; Plato so*eti*es e&presses dou"ts as to , et er , at as "een said a"out t ese *atters is sufficient. <e at ti*es refers to is accounts as "eing *ere outlines >414A, %4HC? and t erefore as "eing in so*e sense inco*plete. 7et Plato does not appear to ave considered , et er a certain level of detail is needed in order t at t e practical o"/ectives of is in1uiry, or of any in1uiry into *atters of conduct, "e satisfied. And t ere is no evidence t at e considered t e 1uestion of , et er, if a certain level of detail is re1uired "y t e practical goals of t e discipline, t at level can or cannot "e attained. @4HA ' e pro"le* of t e relation of Plato.s accounts to t eir practical uses "eco*es clearer , en ,e consider , at e says a"out t e uses of t ose ideal accounts of *atters of conduct e t inks are possi"le: t at is, t e accounts t at utili9e only -or*s and t at are arrived at "y t e use of dialectic alone. Accounts of t is type in any discipline ,ill constitute a "ody of kno,ledge t at is not only *ost rigorous "ut also *ost a"stract, a kno,ledge t at as al*ost no contact , atsoever ,it t e ,orld of e&perience. 8t ical kno,ledge of t is type=one t at stays at t e level of t e -or*s, rests ulti*ately on our grasping of t e Good, and relies on dialectic=,ill also "e *ost rigorous and *ost a"stract, and it ,ill e&clude all ele*ents of t e ,orld of e&perience and of t e particulars t at see* to co*prise t e ,orld of action and u*an conduct. 7et again, even t is *ost a"stract type of kno,ledge t at is t e fart est re*oved fro* t e particular conte&t of action and conduct is supposed to "e a guide to action, to "e our *eans for structuring and reali9ing t e "est u*an association or city. )t is, after all, t e solution to one of t e central 1uestions of t e Republic , , ic tells us t at t e "est or *ost /ust society can "e reali9ed if and only if t e rulers are p ilosop ers and p ilosop ers are rulers. ' e p ilosop er is, according to Plato, distinguis ed 5 %1 5 fro* t e nonp ilosop er "y t e kind of kno,ledge e possesses. P ilosop ic kno,ledge is kno,ledge of t e -or*s4 it is t e rigorous and a"stract kno,ledge descri"ed a"ove. )n part, t en, Plato.s solution to t e 1uestion t at concerns t e possi"ility of t e reali9ation of t e ideal city asserts t at suc kno,ledge is a necessary condition for "ringing into e&istence, ruling, and functioning in suc a city. 2it out t is kind of kno,ledge t e ideal city cannot co*e into e&istence and continue to e&ist. ' us, after introducing t e Good and t e role it plays in our kno,ledge of t e ot er -or*s, Plato re*arks, %.3 Can ,e allo, a like "lindness and o"scurity in t ese "est citi9ens to , ose ands ,e are to entrust all t ings; 2 en it is not kno,n o, /ust and "eautiful t ings co*e to "e good, t ese t ings ,ill not find it *uc use to secure a guardian over t e*selves , o does not ave t is kno,ledge. And ) sur*ise t at no one ,ill understand t ose /ust and "eautiful t ings ade1uately "efore e kno,s t is. :ur constitution t en ,ill "e perfectly ordered

, en suc a *an looks after it=t at is, a *an , o as t is kno,ledge. >%$EABB? Again, in is discussion of t e allegory of t e cave, t e necessity of t is *ost a"stract kno,ledge for "ot t e private and pu"lic do*ain of conduct is *ost une1uivocally asserted. %.5 )n t e region of t e kno,n t e last t ing to "e seen and ardly seen is t e -or* of t e Good, . . . , en seen it ,ill necessarily point us to t e conclusion t at t is is indeed t e cause for all t ings of all t at is rig t and "eautiful . . . , ile in t e intelligi"le ,orld it is itself t e aut entic source of trut and reason, and . . . anyone , o is to act ,isely in private or pu"lic *ust ave caug t sig t of t is. >%1FBBC?

)t *ay, o,ever, "e said in defense of Plato t at taking kno,ledge of t e Good and t e rest of t e -or*s as a necessary condition for conduct in t e individual and social sp ere is really not t at controversial. ' is *ay "e to so*e e&tent true, alt oug it does raise so*e 1uestions t at s all "e discussed s ortly. But, of course, Plato does not only take kno,ledge of t e Good and t e rest of t e -or*s to "e necessary for acting in any sp ere of conduct4 e *ost often takes it to "e sufficient as ,ell. ' e clai* t at kno,ledge of t e kind under consideration ere is a sufficient condition for conduct for*s t e ot er alf of Plato.s solution to t e 1uestion of t e Republic *entioned a"ove: ' e ideal city is possi"le if and only if p ilosop ers are rulers. )t is t e possession of kno,ledge of t e -or*s, Plato argues, t at *akes it possi"le for t e p ilosop ers to "ring a"out and rule in t e ideal city. (ore precisely, t e picture Plato as of t e ,ay an agent uses kno,ledge of t e -or*s of *atters of conduct in actual conduct is t e ,ay a painter *oves fro* , at e o"serves in a *odel to producing a painting like it. 5 %6 5 2 at t e painter o"serves in t e *odel is presu*a"ly sufficient for guiding is activity4 it is sufficient for doing a particular ,ork of art. )n conduct, Plato see*s to t ink, t e -or*s t at constitute t e do*ain of et ical kno,ledge function like t e *odel of t e painter. :ur kno,ledge of t ese a"stract entities is presu*a"ly sufficient for doing , at is re1uired in particular circu*stances. %.2 3o you t ink, t en, t at t ere is any apprecia"le difference "et,een t e "lind and t ose , o are verita"ly deprived of t e kno,ledge of t e verita"le "eing of t ings, t ose , o ave no vivid *odel @

A in t eir souls and so cannot, as painters can, fi& t eir eyes on t e a"solute trut , and al,ays ,it reference to it and in t e *ost e&act conte*plation of it esta"lis in t is ,orld also t e la,s of t e "eautiful, t e /ust and t e good, , en t at is needful, or guard and preserve t ose t at are esta"lis ed; >4H43? ' e ans,er to t is 1uestion is, naturally, GIo, "y eaven, t ere is not *uc difference.G ' ere are, of course, a nu*"er of ot er passages , ere Plato puts fort t is sa*e picture. <e argues t at "y fi&ing our t oug ts on t e eternal realities ,e ,ill *ake ourselves like t e*: G' e *an , ose *ind is truly fi&ed on eternal realities . . . fi&es is ga9e upon t e t ings of t e eternal and unc anging order, and seeing t at t ey neit er ,rong nor are ,ronged "y one anot er . . . ,ill i*itate t e* and as far as

possi"le fas ion i*self in t eir likeness and assi*ilate i*self to t e*G >%$$C?. But t is need not "e t e , ole story, Plato argues. ' e one , o as seen t e eternal realities *ay try to use t e* to *old society: G)f so*e co*pulsion is laid upon i* to practice sta*ping on t e plastic *atter of u*an nature in pu"lic and private t e patterns t at e sees t ere, and not *erely to *ould and fas ion i*self, do you t ink e ,ill prove a poor crafts*an of te*perance and /ustice and all for*s of ordinary civic virtue;G >%$$3?. ' e sa*e picture is invoked again , en Plato speaks of t e p ilosop ers , o trace t e linea*ents of t e city like artists fro* a eavenly *odel >%$$8?, and , en e argues t at t e constitution is sketc ed "y fre1uently glancing at t e -or*s of /ustice, "eauty, te*perance, and so fort >%$1B?. -inally, , ile descri"ing t e course of studies for t e rulers, G2e s all re1uire t e* to turn up,ards t e vision of t eir souls and fi& t eir ga9e on t at , ic s eds lig t on all, and , en t ey ave t us "e eld t e Good itself t ey s all use it as a *odel for t e rig t ordering of t e city and t e citi9ens and t e*selves t roug out t e re*ainder of t eir livesG >%4$?. ' ere is no dou"t t at t e *etap or of t e *odel, t e artist, and is art,ork t at Plato uses to e&plain t e ,ay t e -or*s are used "y an agent in is conduct *ust ave see*ed irresisti"le to i*. ' ere are per aps si*ilarities or analogies "et,een t e artist.s use of t e *odel and t e 5 %# 5 agent.s use of t e -or*s. But t ere are also differences. -or , ereas t e *odel of t e artist is itself a particular, so*et ing t at "elongs to t e sa*e logical type as t e ,ork of art, t e -or*s and t e particular constituents of conduct=t at is, particular actions, constitutions, and social arrange*ents= are not of t e sa*e logical type. As a conse1uence, t ere see* to "e pro"le*s ere. Per aps it is not difficult to see o, one *oves fro* using +ocrates as a *odel to fas ioning a statue of +ocrates. But it is not o"vious at all o, one *oves directly fro* t e -or* of t e Good and related -or*s, given t at t ese are , at Plato says, to acting or ruling as t ese dictate.@49A And it is to t ese 1uestions in particular, as ,ell as to so*e *ore general 1uestions a"out Plato.s vie,s on et ical kno,ledge relating to t e issue of e&actness!ine&actness t at ) ,is to turn ne&t. Jet us focus first on one alf of t e relation t at Plato t inks olds "et,een et ical kno,ledge and conduct=na*ely, t at t e *ost pure and rigorous kno,ledge of t e -or*s is necessary for et ical conduct. Assu*ing t at suc kno,ledge is possi"le, do t e goals of et ical kno,ledge re1uire t at ,e attain t e purity and rigor Plato de*ands; 3o t e practical goals of t e discipline re1uire t at et ical kno,ledge "e *ore pure and rigorous, and ence *ore e&act, t an *at e*atical kno,ledge; :ne 1uestion Aristotle raises is t is: 3o t e ulti*ate goals of a discipline in so*e ,ay deter*ine t e e&actness t at is appropriate for t at discipline; Plato.s de*and for a level of e&actness in et ical kno,ledge t at surpasses t at of *at e*atics *ay "e e&cessive and inappropriate. Aristotle raises, in addition, 1uestions a"out t e ot er alf of Plato.s conception of t e relation of et ical kno,ledge and conduct=na*ely, t at t e *ost general and a"stract kno,ledge is "y itself sufficient for guiding our conduct. <e insists, again, t at if t e goals of et ical kno,ledge are practical, suc kno,ledge cannot re*ain at t e level of generality and a"stractness at , ic Plato t inks it can re*ain and still satisfy its practical goals. 8t ical kno,ledge, Aristotle argues, *ust reac a certain level of e&actness4 it *ust reac a certain level of detail and specificity if it is to "e of use in t e particular circu*stances of conduct. <e even finds ine&act, "ecause it lacks t e necessary detail, Plato.s o,n account of t e virtues in t e city and of t e structure of t e city, t e t,o topics t at are given t e *ost detailed treat*ent in t e Republic . )t is, t en, not surprising t at e 1uestions Plato.s clai* t at for private or pu"lic conduct it is sufficient to ave grasped t e Good and t e ot er -or*s. <o, is one to *ove fro* kno,ledge of suc entities to , at is re1uired to do in a particular conBte&t=t at is, to , at is proper to do in relation to +ocrates, at so*e particular ti*e, place, circu*stance, and so fort ;

)sn.t t ere so*et ing needed to "ridge t e gap t at separates t e a"stract and general -or*s of t e Good, Lustice, 'e*perance, and so fort , and , at ) *ust do in t is particular conte&t in relation to t is individual; Aristotle t inks t ere 5 %4 5 is. :ur kno,ledge of t e -or*s *ay "e e&act in t e sense t at it is pure and rigorous, "ut it *ay lack e&actness , en vie,ed=and it *ust, according to Aristotle, "e vie,ed=as kno,ledge ,it practical goals: )t *ay lack t e detail re1uired for satisfying its ulti*ate purposes.@%$A But it *ig t "e said in defense of t e Platonic position t at Plato i*self e&presses dou"ts as to , et er t e type of et ical kno,ledge e descri"es in t e Republic is possi"le, or , et er t e "est u*an society t at is *odeled on t is kno,ledge can "e reali9ed. )t does not see* to *e, o,ever, t at suc dou"ts on Plato.s part are intended to "ring into 1uestion is vie,s a"out t e relation of a"stract kno,ledge to conduct. ' ese are really dou"ts a"out t e possi"ility of t is kind of kno,ledge and a"out t e prospects of our success in *olding u*an "e avior in t e direction t is kno,ledge dictates. ' e type of kno,ledge Plato descri"es *ay "e "eyond u*an reac , or u*ans *ay "e suc t at , at t e Platonic kno,ledge of t e Geternal realitiesG dictates cannot "e reali9ed in t e*. Plato, t en, in raising t ese dou"ts is not necessarily 1uestioning , et er is ideal et ical kno,ledge provides us ,it t at level of detail or specificity t at is needed for practical purposes. 8lse, ere, o,ever, Plato *akes so*e re*arks t at see* to *e to "e *ore pertinent to t e issue concerning t e relation of is ideal et ical kno,ledge to conduct, alt oug even t ese do not ulti*ately under*ine is vie,s on t is issue t at ) sketc ed a"ove. :n a fe, occasions, for e&a*ple, e adds to t e kno,ledge of t e -or*s t e factor of e&perience as so*et ing t e rulers *ay use to carry out t eir function: G+ all ,e, t en, appoint t ese "lind souls @i.e., t ose , o ave no kno,ledge of t e -or*sA as our guardians, rat er t an t ose , o ave kno,ledge of every reality and are not inferior to t e ot ers in e&perience, or indeed in any ot er aspect of e&cellence; )t ,ould "e a"surd, e said, to c oose ot ers if t ese are not inferior in ot er respects, for in t is respect t ey are superior in , at is pro"a"ly t e *ost i*portant *atterG >4H43?. )s Plato, t en, ad*itting t at t e rat er a"stract kno,ledge of t e -or*s is not sufficient for practice; )s e saying t at t is a"stract kno,ledge *ust "e supple*ented "y kno,ledge of particulars t at is provided "y e&perience in order t at it can "e used in practice; ' is is "y no *eans clear. -or , en Plato returns to t is sa*e t e*e in is discussion of t e training of t e guardians >%#98?, t e role e appears to assign to e&perience is t at of testing or strengt ening t e c aracter of t e guardians rat er t an in aug*enting t e kno,ledge t ey presu*a"ly ave of t e -or*s. )ndeed, Plato goes on to argue t ere t at, after t ey ave gone t roug t e re1uired e&perience, t ey s all turn to t e -or*s for t e *odel to "e used in ruling. 5 %% 5 -or after t at you ,ill ave to send t e* do,n into t e cave again, and co*pel t e* to old co**ands in ,ar and t e ot er offices suita"le to yout , so t at t ey *ay not fail s ort of t e ot er type in e&perience eit er. And in t ese offices, too, t ey are tested to see , et er t ey ,ill re*ain steadfast under diverse solicitations or , et er t ey ,ill flinc and s,erve . . . and at t e age of fifty t ose , o ave survived t e tests . . . *ust "e "roug t at last to t e goal. 2e s all re1uire t e* to turn up,ards t e vision of t eir souls and fi& t eir ga9e on t at , ic s eds lig t on all, and , en t ey ave t us "e eld t e Good itself t ey s all use it as a *odel for t e rig t ordering of t e city and t e*selves.

%.=

>%#98? ' e closest Plato co*es to addressing t e issue of t e sufficiency!insufficiency of general and a"stract kno,ledge for practical purposes is in is discussion of la, in t e !tatesman . <e argues in t is ,ork, as ,ill Aristotle later, t at la, *ay not "e an ade1uate guide in dealing ,it particular circu*stances "ecause of its generality.@%1A Ja,, Plato clai*s, does not include or *ake reference to t e particular cases ,it , ic t e one , o applies t e la, is confronted4 it does not address t e peculiar circu*stances t at surround eac case, "ut instead speaks in general ter*s. +urprisingly, Plato even ere does not opt for supple*enting t e la, ,it *ore and *ore particular infor*ation, and t us for "ridging t e gap t at presu*a"ly e&ists "et,een t e generality of la, and t e particular circu*stances. <is preference is, rat er, for dispensing , enever possi"le ,it la, altoget er, so t at one is not a*pered "y t e infle&i"ility of t e la, in dealing ,it t e particulars "ut instead relies solely on t e a"stract and general kno,ledge of Gt e eternal realities.G@%6A Aristotle, t en, *ay ave ad good reasons for focusing on t e issue of t e generality and a"stractness of our accounts of *atters of conduct and t eir intended use as guides to practice. Bot +ocrates and Plato *ust ave see*ed to i* to ave eit er overlooked t e issue or assu*ed t e position ) sketc ed a"ove=na*ely, t at t e *ost a"stract and general kno,ledge is necessary and sufficient for practice. )t is clear, o,ever, t at t e 1uestion concerning t e relation of Plato.s type of et ical kno,ledge to practice is of i*portance on t e assu*ption t at t ere is kno,ledge of t e kind Plato descri"es in t e Republic =t at is, kno,ledge t at is *ost rigorous and de*onstratively pure, t at deals ,it fi&ed entities, and t at e&plains t e necessary connections a*ong suc entities. Aristotle found al*ost all t e clai*s t at Plato *akes a"out et ical kno,ledge pro"le*atic and, in so*e of is re*arks on e&actness! ine&actness, is target is *ost likely so*e of t ese clai*s of Plato a"out t e nature of et ical kno,ledge, its o"/ects, and t e connections a*ong t e*. )s t ere, t en, et ical kno,ledge t at is as rigorous and de*onstratively 5 %E 5 pure as Plato clai*s; +uc kno,ledge *ay not only "e unnecessary for t e purposes t at, according to Aristotle, are served "y t e discipline of et ics, "ut it *ay also not "e possi"le at all. 8t ics is not *ore rigorous and de*onstratively pure, and ence *ore e&act, t an *at e*atics4 it is not even, Aristotle argues, as e&act as *at e*atics. )ts su"/ect *atter, t e ele*ents of conduct, does not ave t e kind of nature t at Plato and +ocrates attri"ute to t e -or*s. (atters of conduct are not fi&ed and invariant4 t ey do not e& i"it t e kind of essential structure t at per aps t e do*ain of so*e ot er disciplines e& i"it.@%#A ' e su"/ect *atter of et ics, Aristotle clai*s, is ine&act, and t e necessary connections a*ong its ele*ents t at Plato speaks of in t e haedo and t e Republic are not to "e found. ' e propositions constituting et ical kno,ledge are not only ine&act "y lacking necessity4 t ey are even ine&act "y not "eing universally true.

Aristotle) #emonstrataive %nowledge) and 'ssentialism

) said at t e "eginning of t is c apter t at Aristotle.s re*arks on e&actness can "est "e understood against t e p ilosop ical "ackground t at occasioned t e*. +o far, ) ave e&a*ined "riefly a central co*ponent of t e p ilosop ical "ackground to Aristotle.s t oug t: +ocrates. and Plato.s t oug t. ) ,is to turn no, to an even *ore "rief discussion of so*e of Aristotle.s vie,s on t e nature of kno,ledge and its o"/ects. (ore ,ill "e said a"out t ese topics in t e course of t is study.

)t *ay see* so*e, at pu99ling t at a discussion of t e "ackground to Aristotle.s t oug t includes a discussion of Aristotle.s o,n t oug t. 7et it is not as odd as it *ay at first appear. (y strategy ere as "een to set out t ose ele*ents in +ocrates. and Plato.s t oug t to , ic Aristotle *ost often responds , en e speaks of e&actness!ine&actness in et ics. Aristotle i*self accepts so*e of t ese ele*ents or, at least, *odified versions of t ese ele*ents. <is vie,s on t e nature of kno,ledge, for e&a*ple, are so*et ing t at +ocrates and Plato ,ould ave easily recogni9ed as 1uite si*ilar to t eir o,n vie,s. ' ey ,ould ave felt, *ost pro"a"ly, t e sa*e a"out is essentialis*. ' us, if Aristotle is responding to t e episte*ological and *etap ysical vie,s of +ocrates and Plato , en speaking of e&actness!ine&actness, e is to so*e e&tent also responding to so*e ele*ents of is o,n t oug t. )n t e ost. Anal . Aristotle develops is ,ellBkno,n account of de*onstrative kno,ledge. )n Book ), c apter ii of t at ,ork, Aristotle clai*s t at ,e kno, so*et ing a"solutely or simpliciter , en ,e ave an e&planation for it, and, furt er, t at e&planation is to "e understood in ter*s of a syllogis* t at is a de*onstrative syllogis*. 2 en Aristotle speaks of a syllogis*, e often *eans si*ply a deductive inference, , ic e t inks 5 %F 5 can "e analy9ed >or for*ali9ed? according to t e logical t eory e ela"orates in is r. Anal .=a t eory t at provides us ,it t e valid for*s of reasoning "y , ic ,e can test t e validity of any deductive inference or argu*ent.@%4A ' us, t e +ocratic and Platonic intuition t at kno,ing in so*e cases consists in infering t at , ic ,e kno, fro* appropriate t ings is captured "y Aristotle.s syste*atic treat*ent of valid deductive inference in ter*s of is syllogistic for*s. But it is not t e case t at any deductive inference provides us ,it kno,ledge or is a de*onstrative syllogis*, even t oug it *ay "e valid. As s o,n earlier, +ocrates ad recogni9ed t is already. A deductive inference *ay satisfy t e condition of validity, and t us "e a syllogis*, "ut it ,ill not "e a de*onstrative syllogis*=it ,ill not provide us ,it kno,ledge. 'o do t e latter t e pre*ises of a deductive inference *ust *eet a set of conditions. %.&; Io, if kno,ledge is as ,e posited, de*onstrative kno,ledge @

A *ust proceed fro* pre*ises , ic are true, pri*itive, i**ediate, *ore fa*iliar t an, prior to and causative @ A of t e conclusion. . .. +yllogis* indeed ,ill "e possi"le ,it out t ese conditions, "ut not de*onstration @ A4 for t e result ,ill not "e kno,ledge @ A. > ost. Anal. 5&b%;7@%%A +o*e of t e conditions Aristotle lists a"ove *ay very ,ell look intuitive=for e&a*ple, t e trut condition. :t ers, o,ever, are less o"viously intuitive, and in fact raise a nu*"er of pro"le*s. But )

s all not discuss Aristotle.s conditions and t e pro"le*s t ey *ig t give rise to at t is point, e&cept to say , at t ey o*it.@%EA ' e list Aristotle gives of t e conditions to "e satisfied "y t e pre*ises of a de*onstrative syllogis* does not include anyt ing a"out t e *odality of t e pre*ises. Are t e pre*ises necessary, contingent, or even of so*e ot er *odality; 7et, , en Aristotle gives t e first account of de*onstrative kno,ledge, e insists t at , at is kno,n a"solutely or simpliciter cannot "e ot er,ise >

? F1"16? and Gt at of , ic t ere is kno,ledge a"solutely @simpliciter = A cannot "e ot er,ise @ AG >F1a1%?. 2e *ay "e inclined to t ink t at, , en Aristotle clai*s t at , at ,e kno, cannot "e ot er,ise, t e i*possi"ility e as in *ind is t e kind ,e associate ,it t e relation "et,een t e pre*ises and t e conclusion of a valid inference. )f t e pre*ises of a valid deductive inference are true, t en its conclusion *ust "e true4 it is i*possi"le for it to "e false. )n ot er ,ords, t e i*possi"ility, and ence t e necessity, ,e associate ,it validity of reasoning does not c aracteri9e eit er t e pre*ises or t e conclusion of a piece of reasoning. )t rat er c aracteri9es t e corresponding conditional clai* t at ,e can construct out of any argu*ent "y using t e con/unction of its pre*ises as an antecedent and 5 %H 5 its conclusion as a conse1uent. But fro* t is it does not follo, t at eit er t e pre*ises or t e conclusion is necessary or t at it is i*possi"le for t e* to "e ot er,ise. 7et t e necessity or t e i*possi"ility of "eing ot er,ise t at Aristotle see*s to ave in *ind is of t is last kind=a necessity t at attac es to t e pre*ises and t e conclusion of suc a syllogis*. Bot t e pre*ises and t e conclusion of suc a syllogis*, Aristotle argues, are necessary4 it is i*possi"le for t e* to "e ot er,ise. ' us, Aristotle argues as follo,s: G+ince it is i*possi"le for t at of , ic t ere is kno,ledge @

A in t e a"solute sense to "e ot er,ise, t at , ic can "e kno,n "y de*onstrative kno,ledge ,ill "e necessary @ A. . .. 3e*onstration, t erefore, is a deduction @ A fro* , at is necessary @ AG >F#a6$?. Aristotle.s argu*ent infers t e necessity of t e pre*ises of a de*onstrative syllogis* fro* t e supposed necessity of its conclusion, t e necessity of t at , ic is kno,n. ' is argu*ent, o,ever, *ay not prove , at Aristotle clai*s it proves. As Lonat an Barnes as argued recently, t e argu*ent is

not valid as is, and Aristotle see*s to ave recogni9ed t is else, ere.@%FA But , et er Aristotle.s argu*ent is valid is not our concern at t e *o*ent. 2 at is of i*portance is t at Aristotle takes t e pre*ises of de*onstrative syllogis* to "e necessary, and t at e t erefore takes t e do*ain of de*onstrative kno,ledge to "e t e do*ain of t e necessary. Aristotle reiterates t is point on several occasions=for e&a*ple, in t e ost. Anal .: GIo, if de*onstrative kno,ledge depends on necessary principles >for , at one kno,s cannot "e ot er,ise? . . . it is evident t at de*onstrative syllogis* ,ill depend on t ings of t is kind @i.e., necessary pre*isesAG >F4"%?. <e also argues t at t e difference "et,een opinion and kno,ledge is t at , ereas t e latter proceeds fro* necessary propositions, t e for*er does not: GDno,ledge and its o"/ect differ fro* opinion and its o"/ect in t at kno,ledge is of t e universal and proceeds "y necessary propositions4 and t at , ic is necessary cannot "e ot er,iseG >HH"#$?. ' e aspect of necessity, t en, , ic at ti*es is not e&plicitly identified "y +ocrates and Plato, is e&plicitly identified "y Aristotle as an essential aspect of kno,ledge. )n addition, Aristotle follo,s t e line esta"lis ed "y is predecessors ,it regard to t e role e assigns to definitions. ) argued a"ove t at one use definitions ave in t e +ocratic!Platonic conception of kno,ledge is as starting points of de*onstration. ' ere is no dou"t t at definitions play t e sa*e role in t e Aristotelian conception of de*onstrative kno,ledge. ' is is asserted t roug out t e ost. Anal . and else, ere in Aristotle.s ,ritings: 3efinitions are a*ong t e principles of de*onstration >F6a61?4 3efinitions are t e t ings fro* , ic de*onstrations proceed and are not kno,n "y de*onstration "ut in so*e ot er ,ay >F6"6$B6%?4 (at e*atical de*onstrations proceed fro* definitions >FHa1#?4 3e*onstrations are effected t roug definitions >H9a1F?4 ' e 5 %9 5 starting points of de*onstrations are definitions >9$"64?4 ' e pri*itive >principles? are nonde*onstra"le definitions >9$"6%?4 All sciences proceed t roug definitions >99a6#4 see also Met . 99H"%, 1$#4a6$4 N.E. 1146a6E, 114#a6E?4 and so fort .@%HA ' e Aristotelian definitions t at are pertinent to de*onstration are, like t eir +ocratic!Platonic counterparts, real definitions4 t ey define , at a t ing is or t e nature of a t ing. Aristotle dra,s a clear distinction "et,een no*inal and real definitions in t e ost. Anal ., and it is t e latter kind t at is of i*portance for de*onstration > ost. Anal . 96"F, 6E4 9#"#$ff.?.@%9A 0eal definitions for Aristotle, as for +ocrates and Plato, capture t e essence of , at t ey define. ' is Aristotelian clai* is to "e encountered t roug out Aristotle.s ,orks and it is certainly found in t e ost. Anal ., t us ig lig ting t e fact t at t e foundation of Aristotle.s vie,s on de*onstrative kno,ledge is a strict *etap ysical essentialis*: G3efinition is generally eld to "e of , at a t ing is @its nature,

AG >9$"4?4 G)f definition is t e ,ay to kno, t e essence @ A . . .G >9$"1H?4 G-or definition is of , at a t ing is and of its essence @ AG >9$"#1?.@E$A ' e "rief sketc a"ove of Aristotle.s vie,s on so*e episte*ological and *etap ysical issues s o,s un*istaka"ly o, strongly t ey parallel t e vie,s of +ocrates and Plato on t ese sa*e issues. And if

, at is said a"ove a"out t e targets of Aristotle.s re*arks on e&actness!ine&actness is correct, t en t ese re*arks ,ill also call into 1uestion so*e of Aristotle.s o,n clai*s a"out t e nature of kno,ledge, definitions, and t eir o"/ects. )f, for instance, Aristotle is 1uestioning t e +ocratic or Platonic vie, t at t ere is de*onstrative kno,ledge of t e *ost rigorous kind for *atters of conduct , en e argues t at kno,ledge of *atters of conduct is in so*e sense ine&act, e is also 1uestioning , et er t e strict type of de*onstrative kno,ledge t at e i*self ela"orates in t e ost. Anal . is possi"le in t e case of *atters of conduct. +i*ilarly, if +ocratic definitions or essentialis* raise 1uestions of e&actness!ine&actness, so ,ill Aristotelian definitions and essentialis* , en applied to *atters of conduct. Consider first t e *atter of definitions and t eir o"/ect. As noted a"ove, t e definitions re1uired for de*onstration are real definitions. According to Aristotle, suc definitions capture t e essence of a type of t ing "y specifying t e genus and specific differentiae of t e type. )n t e ost. Anal . Aristotle speaks of definitions of suc t ings as point, line, triangle, and so fort . <o,ever, e t inks t at t ese rat er paradig*atically ,ellBdefined entities are not t e only t ings t at ave an essential structure and can "e defined. <e also speaks of definitions of suc t ings as *an, ani*al, eclipse, deciduousness, t under, and so fort . )ndeed, , en Aristotle speaks as a logician or as so*eone atte*pting to e&plicate t e nature of kno,ledge or of definition, e see*s to t ink t at definitions of t e 5 E$ 5 strict kind are possi"le and t at essentialis* olds in every do*ain. )t is interesting to point out t at, , en Aristotle speaks in t is ,ay, e includes a*ong t e t ings t at can "e given e&act definitions and t at e& i"it essences sorts of t ings t at e i*self recogni9es as pro"le*atic. ' erefore, , en speaking as an investigator of *atters of conduct or of natural p eno*ena, t ese sa*e t ings see* to i* to "e difficult or i*possi"le to define precisely "ecause t ey lack a fi&ed essential structure. ' us, speaking as a logician concerned ,it t e essential features of a definition, Aristotle insists, in a passage fro* t e #op ., t at t e definition of a*"itiousness *ust specify t e 1uality and 1uantity of onor t at t e a*"itious *an desires4 t e definition of avariciousness *ust specify t e 1uantity of *oney t e avaricious *an desires4 t at of incontinence t e 1uality and 1uantity of pleasure4 t ose of nig t, eart 1uake, cloud, and ,ind t e 1uality and 1uantity of s ado,, *ove*ent of t e eart , condensation of air, and *ove*ent of air respectively. Aristotle concludes t at passage "y saying, Gand, si*ilarly, in all cases of t is kind4 for t e o*ission of. any differentia involves a failure to state t e essenceG >14E"6$?. <o,ever, t ese are precisely t e kinds of p eno*ena=for e&a*ple, virtues, vices, and in general t e various u*an states of c aracter, as ,ell a variety of p ysical >including "iological? p eno*ena=t at in t e et ical and scientific treatises e finds to "e lacking in e&actness. ' ese kinds of p eno*ena, e argues, are difficult or i*possi"le to define "ecause t ey are indefinite4 t ey lack a ,ellBdefined nature. ' e strict *etap ysical essentialis* t at Aristotle presupposes in is conception of definition *ay not o"tain in every do*ain.@E1A 8ven , en definitions are possi"le, suc definitions are ine&act. ' ey s o, t e sa*e deficiencies t at t e p eno*ena t ey define e& i"it. And t is is "ound to ave episte*ological conse1uences. -or if, as Aristotle clai*s, all science proceeds fro* definitions, eit er no de*onstrative kno,ledge is possi"le in t e case of t ese p eno*ena, or t e de*onstrative kno,ledge t at is possi"le in t eir case is deficient in t e ,ay t e p eno*ena and t eir definitions are deficient. ' ey are all ine&act, Aristotle insists. ' ere are, o,ever, additional pro"le*s , en ,e try to e&tend t e application of strict de*onstrative kno,ledge to *atters of conduct, or even to t e do*ain of "iological p eno*ena. Aristotle.s account of

strict de*onstration is *eant to e&plicate t e nature of kno,ledge4 it is *eant to apply to all do*ains t at are kno,a"le. ' e e&a*ples Aristotle gives in t e ost. Anal . of disciplines t at are de*onstrative include t e standard *at e*atical ones >geo*etry and arit *etic?, astrono*y >FE"11, FH"#9?, optics >F%"1%, FEa64?, ar*onics >F%"1E?, *ec anics >FEa64?, and *edicine >HH"1#?. Alt oug Aristotle does not say t at strict de*onstrative kno,ledge is possi"le in all do*ains, e does not say t at it is not possi"le in all do*ains eit er, nor does e identify any do*ains , ere it is not possi"le. 5 E1 5 But is every do*ain, or t e su"/ect *atter of every discipline, c aracteri9ed "y t e sort of universal and necessary connections t at strict de*onstration, according to Aristotle, re1uires; Aristotle 1uestions , et er suc connections are to "e found in *atters of conduct or t e su"/ect *atter of related disciplines >e.g., *edicine?. ' e su"/ect *atter of suc disciplines, e argues, is ine&act "y "eing for t e *ost part, "y not e& i"iting universal and necessary connections. And if *atters of conduct, or any do*ain, are not c aracteri9ed "y universal and necessary connections, t ey could not "e part of , at is de*onstra"le in t e strict sense. ' is need not i*ply, o,ever, t at t ey are not part of t e de*onstra"le at all, for t ey *ig t "e de*onstra"le in a sense t at is less strict t an a"solute de*onstration. )ndeed, despite t e fact t at strict or a"solute de*onstration is t e focus of and do*inates Aristotle.s discussion in t e ost. Anal ., ,e find even in t at ,ork reference to a less strict kind of de*onstration. Ad*ittedly, t e references are only fe, and t e e&planation Aristotle gives of o, t is kind of de*onstration is possi"le is al*ost none&istent. )n Book ), c apter &&& of t e ost. Anal ., Aristotle argues t at t ere are at least t,o kinds of de*onstrative syllogis*s: :ne kind as as pre*ises necessary propositions, and ence its conclusions are necessary also4 t e ot er as as pre*ises propositions t at are true for t e *ost part, and ence its conclusions are of t e sa*e kind. ' ese t,o types of de*onstrations are distinguis ed on several occasions t roug out Aristotle.s ,orks, and are invaria"ly presented as "eing t e only types of de*onstration t at are to "e used in understanding or e&plaining all t at is de*onstra"le. ) s all argue later t at, , en Aristotle speaks of ine&act reasoning or proof or kno,ledge in practical disciplines, , at e as in *ind is de*onstrations , ose pre*ises are true for t e *ost part. ) s all also argue t at e, t us, in t e end enlarges is conception of de*onstration so t at it is possi"le to speak of de*onstration of t ings t at neit er t e +ocratic!Platonic conception of de*onstrative kno,ledge nor is o,n conception of strict de*onstration considers as falling ,it in t e de*onstra"le. <e allo,s, t at is, for a less e&act de*onstrative kno,ledge t at can acco**odate do*ains , ic , like t at of et ics and related disciplines, *ay "e ine&act.

'*actness and the #evelopment of Aristotle's Thought

'o say, o,ever, t at in so*e of is re*arks on e&actness!ine&actness Aristotle is raising 1uestions a"out so*e of is o,n episte*ological and *etap ysical vie,s is to i*ply t at t ere is so*e c ange or evolution in is t oug t. -or to say , at ,as said a"ove is to ad*it t at t e re*arks on e&actness!ine&actness call into 1uestion, critici9e, or *odify vie,s t at 5 E6 5 Aristotle *ust ave eld prior to is 1uestioning, critici9ing, or *odifying t e*. :t er sc olars ave, indeed, looked at Aristotle.s re*arks on e&actness!ine&actness as a *eans of

deter*ining t e direction of c ange in Aristotle.s t oug t and possi"ly as a *eans of deter*ining t e c ronological order of so*e of Aristotle.s ,orks. 2erner Laeger, for instance, associates Aristotle.s concerns ,it e&actness!ine&actness ,it t e supposedly declining Platonis* and increasing e*piricis* in t e p ilosop er.s t oug t. Laeger sees t e E.E. as de*anding of et ics t e e&actitude t at in t e rotrept . Aristotle re1uires of t e *ost e&act kno,ledge, a conception of kno,ledge , ic , according to Laeger, is t oroug ly Platonic.@E6A :n t e ot er and, according to t is vie, t e N.E. *oves a,ay fro* t is Platonic conception of et ical kno,ledge, ackno,ledges t e ine&actness of our kno,ledge of *atters of conduct, and utili9es *et ods t at are clearly *ore e*pirical t an t e a&io*aticBde*onstrative approac of t e E.E. (ore recently, C ristop er 0o,e as ela"orated on and defended Laeger.s t esis t at t ere is a difference in *et odology in t e t,o Aristotelian et ical ,orks. @E#A <e as furt er argued t at t e recognition on Aristotle.s part in t e N.E. , t at et ical kno,ledge is not as e&act as t e al*ost Platonic de*onstrative kno,ledge supposedly advocated "y t e E.E. , indicates t at t e latter ,ork is c ronologically prior. ' e vie, t at t e E.E. sees et ical kno,ledge along t e lines of t e type of strict de*onstration ,e associate ,it *at e*atical kno,ledge as also "een defended "y 3onald L. Allan.@E4A Muestions concerning t e *atter of develop*ent in Aristotle.s t oug t=for e&a*ple, , et er t ere is develop*ent or , at is its direction= ave e&ercised t e *inds of Aristotelian sc olars since t e pu"lication of Laeger.s pioneering ,ork. ' ere is ardly anyone , o as not "een convinced t at Laeger.s "ook succeeded in laying to rest a vie, a"out Aristotle.s t oug t t at in t e first place appears to "e i*plausi"le=na*ely, t at Aristotle.s t oug t is a *onolit ic and static syste* t at under,ent no develop*ent. 7et t e specific t eses t at Laeger advanced a"out t e direction of Aristotle.s develop*ent ave co*e under strong criticis* "y *any sc olars. +o*e ave critici9ed is clai*s a"out t e c ronological ordering of so*e ,orks. :t ers ave 1uestioned is overall t esis t at Aristotle.s develop*ent can "e understood in ter*s of t e relation of is t oug t to Platonis*: t at is, t e t esis of t e t ree stages in Aristotle.s t oug t t at Laeger c aracteri9es as strict ad erence to Platonis*, develop*ent of t e key Aristotelian p ilosop ical doctrines >+u"stance, -our Causes?, and a period do*inated "y e*pirical researc es.@E%A :"viously, t e pro"le*s of t e stages or t e direction in Aristotle.s develop*ent are, as so*e sc olars ave "een arguing, rat er co*plicated *atters. Per aps t ere is no linear develop*ent of t e kind Laeger supB 5 E# 5 poses. And per aps it *ay "e i*possi"le to deter*ine t e direction, if t ere is one, of is develop*ent "y relying solely on t e different treat*ent so*e ite* receives t roug out is ,ork. :t er evidence ,ill "e needed to fi& t e direction, to deter*ine , ic treat*ent is prior and , ic co*es later. -or t ese reasons one as to "e cautious a"out t e particular ite* under consideration ere, t at is, e&actness!ine&actness, and its i*portance for resolving so*e of t ese t orny issues a"out Aristotle.s develop*ent. )n t is spirit ere are so*e rat er cursory o"servations. )n so*e of Aristotle.s ,orks t ere is little or no concern ,it t e issue of e&actness!ine&actness. )f ,e take as our *easure of Aristotle.s concern t e occurrence of so*e of t e key ter*s for e&actness!ine&actness, ,e o"serve t at t e key ter*

occurs only once in t e Cat . >H"16?, t,ice in t e r. Anal . >64"14, 4Ea69?, and not at all in Interp . )n

contrast it occurs nine ti*es in t e Anim ., ten in G.A. , fifteen in H.A. , and so fort . But it *ay "e difficult to "ase clai*s a"out develop*ent or t e direction of suc develop*ent "y si*ply looking at t is variation in t e occurrence of t e ter* for e&actness!ine&actness. )t *ay "e t at in part t e reason for t e a"sence of any or fre1uent references to e&actness in t e Cat.' r. Anal ., and Interp ., all supposedly early ,orks, as to do ,it t e kinds of topics discussed in t ese ,orks. But t e topics discussed in t e E.E. and N.E. are identical, and t e sa*e kind of topics are also discussed in t e olit . )n t ese ,orks ,e find t at t e key ter*

in its various gra**atical for*s occurs as follo,s: si& ti*es in t e E.E. , t,entyBfour ti*es in N.E. , and t,elve ti*es in t e olit . -urt er*ore, t,o ot er key ter*s Aristotle uses to speak of specific types of ine&actness t at pertain to t e su"/ect *atter of t e et ical treatises and our accounts of it s o, considera"le variation in t e fre1uency of t eir occurrences. ' e ter* >outline? does not occur at all in E.E. , as eleven occurrences in t e N.E. , and appears four ti*es in t e olit . ' e ter* Aristotle uses to signify "eing for t e *ost part, , is to "e found si& ti*es in t e E.E. , five in t e N.E. , and t,o in t e olit . 2 at conclusions s ould "e dra,n fro* t e a"ove o"servations; ) do not t ink t at "y t e*selves t ese o"servations settle t e 1uestion of t e c ronological order of t e treatises in a decisive ,ay.@EEA Alt oug ter*s for e&actness!ine&actness occur *ore fre1uently in t e N.E. t an in t e E.E. , ,e need to kno, independently of t is fact , at greater fre1uency in t e occurrence of t ese ter*s signifies. )t is not o"vious t at greater fre1uency in one ,ork signifies t at it is later t an anot er. ' e olit , after all, is t oug t to ave "een ,ritten later t an t e N.E. , and yet t ere see* to "e far fe,er occurrences of t e ter*s under consideration. ' e variation, o,ever, in t e fre1uency of t e occurrences of t ese ter*s see*s to *e to signify so*et ing a"out t e relation "et,een t e 5 E4 5 et ical treatises. ' e rat er "ig difference in t e fre1uency of t e occurrences of t e ter*s

and found "et,een t e E.E. and N.E. suggests t at Aristotle at so*e point ca*e to recogni9e t at is o,n accounts lacked t e re1uired e&actness, or t at t ey could not "e e&act, or t at no accounts of *atters of conduct could "e e&act, or t at no accounts of *atters of conduct need to "e e&act. <e ca*e, in ot er ,ords, to reali9e t at t e pro"le* of e&actness!ine&actness is *uc *ore centrally connected to et ics t an t e E.E. appears to indicate. But one can accept t e a"ove o"servations and still re*ain skeptical as to , at furt er conclusions s ould "e dra,n fro* t e* a"out t e *et ods Aristotle t oug t to "e appropriate in et ical

investigation. )n particular, one s ould "e cautious a"out *oving, on t e "asis of t e a"ove considerations, to t e conclusion t at Aristotle espouses so*e type of e*pirical investigation in t e case of et ics. :f course, Aristotle *ay espouse e*pirical investigation as t e ,ay of in1uiring in et ics for ot er reasons. <o,ever, t is ,ould not s o, t at suc a *et od is in so*e ,ay connected to Aristotle.s clai*s a"out e&actness!ine&actness in et ics. 'o s o, t at, one ,ould ave to s o, t at t e c aracteristics of e&actness!ine&actness Aristotle attri"utes to et ical accounts and t eir su"/ect *atter i*ply an e*piricist approac =or at least, t at Aristotle i*self took t ese c aracteristics to i*ply suc an approac . Iaturally, *y concerns ere are partly focused on t ese issues a"out t e i*plications of Aristotle.s re*arks on e&actness!ine&actness and a"out any i*plications t at Aristotle i*self *ig t ave dra,n fro* t e supposed ine&actness of et ical accounts and t eir su"/ect *atter. 5 E% 5

Three The +oals of 'thical In,uir"

Introduction
Understanding Aristotle.s conception of t e goals of et ical in1uiry *ay "e i*portant for a variety of reasons. )t *ay, for e&a*ple, "e i*portant si*ply for its o,n sake=for /ust seeing , at et ical in1uiry ai*s at, according to Aristotle, and o, its goals *ay differ fro* t e goals of ot er in1uiries. But it *ay also "e of i*portance in vie, of t e connection t at Aristotle t inks olds "et,een t e e&actness possi"le, desira"le, or necessary in a discipline and t e nature of t e goals of t at discipline. (uc of , at e says a"out e&actness!ine&actness in et ics rests on is conception of t e goals of t e discipline. Certain types of e&actness are, according to i*, re1uired "y t e goals of et ics, , ile certain levels of ine&actness are per*itted "y t e sa*e goals. )n addition, so*e of t e difficulties Aristotle sees ,it trying to eli*inate even t e types of ine&actness t at ave t eir sources in t ings ot er t an t e goals of et ics also ste* in part fro* is conception of t e goals of t e discipline. ' e relation t at Aristotle t inks olds "et,een t e goals and t e e&actness!ine&actness of a discipline ,ill "e discussed in several of t e su"se1uent c apters. )n t is c apter, ) ,is to focus only on t e 1uestion of t e nature of t e goals of et ical in1uiry. )n particular, ) ,is to e&a*ine t e ,ellBkno,n Aristotelian contention t at t e goals of et ics are practical, and to e&plore t e e&tent to , ic t is vie, of t e goals of t e discipline e&cludes any t eoretical interest in *atters of conduct. ' e ,ellBkno,n Aristotelian clai* t at et ics is practical as at ti*es "een understood as i*plying t at et ics ai*s only at action or practice and t erefore as no cognitive interests. ) argue t at, contrary to t is vie,, et ics *ay "e practical, "ut t is does not i*ply t at it as no cognitive 5 EE 5 interests. 3espite so*e state*ents Aristotle *akes in , ic e appears to deny t at in et ical in1uiry ,e ai* at kno,ledge and to assert t at ,e ai* instead at action or practice, et ics to a certain e&tent ai*s at kno,ledge. ) dra, t e distinction in t is connection "et,een t e ulti*ate and t e i**ediate or proper goals of a discipline and s o, t at in t e case of et ics, , ile t e for*er kind of goals *ay "e practical, t e latter kind are cognitive. ) furt er argue t at t e transitivity principle of desires, pursuits, or goals t at Plato uses to eli*inate su"ordinate desires, pursuits, or goals is not used "y Aristotle in t e

sa*e ,ay. ' erefore, even if et ics is su"ordinate to politics and t e goals of t e latter are practical or even if its o,n proper goals t at are cognitive are su"ordinate to practical goals, t e cognitive goals of et ics are not t us eli*inated. ' e 1uestion, o,ever, still re*ains as to t e c aracter of t e cognitive goals of et ics or t e kind of kno,ledge it ai*s at ac ieving. ' ere are t ose , o e1uate et ical kno,ledge ,it practical ,isdo* and understand t e latter very narro,ly to "e a type of deli"eration a"out particular practical affairs. ) argue t at Aristotle.s o,n in1uiry and is conception of et ical in1uiry in general cannot "e e1uated ,it t is narro, conception of practical kno,ledge. )f et ical in1uiry is to "e e1uated ,it any for* of practical kno,ledge it as to "e a for* of practical kno,ledge t at does /ustice to Aristotle.s o,n in1uiry and to is conception of et ical in1uiry in general. 'o do t at our conception of practical kno,ledge as to "e 1uite ,ide4 it as to rese*"le t e kno,ledge ,e seek in t e typical disciplines t at ai* at giving accounts of a certain do*ain or su"/ect *atter. -inally, ) e&plore Aristotle.s vie,s on t e differences "et,een t eoretical and practical kno,ledge. ) suggest t at Aristotle "ases t e distinction "et,een t eoretical and nont eoretical disciplines on a variety of factors. Alt oug t e *ost pro*inent of t ese factors is t e nature of t e goals of a discipline, t ere are also suc factors as t e degree of de*onstrative rigor of a discipline, its level of generality or a"stractness, its "eing an e&planatory, discipline, and so fort . ' us, a discipline *ay, indeed, ave as its ulti*ate goals practice, "ut it *ay not necessarily differ fro* t eoretical disciplines ,it respect to t e rest of t ese factors. 8t ics itself, like ot er practical disciplines, *ay t us "e 1uite si*ilar to t eoretical disciplines, and it *ay "e said to ave a t eoretical co*ponent.

The +oals of 'thical In,uir"

' ere is considera"le diversity of opinion in t e Aristotelian sc olarly tradition a"out t e ,ay Aristotle conceives of t e goals of et ical in1uiry. ' e opinions for* a kind of a spectru*, one end of , ic is occupied "y t e vie, t at et ics is practical in a 1uite narro, sense of t is ter* and t e ot er end "y t e vie, t at et ical in1uiry ai*s at a t eoretical unB 5 EF 5 derstanding of t e p eno*ena of conduct. Kie,s of t e for*er kind tend to *ini*i9e or eli*inate t e cognitive aspect fro* et ical in1uiry, , ile t ose of t e latter kind tend to *ini*i9e or eli*inate t e practical aspect. Consider first t e kind of vie, t at stresses t e practical nature of et ics. ' e sources of t is vie, are so*e of Aristotle.s o,n re*arks , ere e appears eit er to deny t at et ical in1uiry is ai*ing at kno,ledge or to assert t at it is ai*ing instead at action or practice. ' is interpretation of Aristotle.s conception of t e goals of et ics can "e found in t e ,orks of so*e of t e ancient co**entators, and it is, t erefore, t eir vie,s ) ,is to consider first. )n particular, ) ,ant to "riefly touc upon an analogy t ey sa, "et,een t e practical and t e productive disciplines or arts, , ic t ey used to deter*ine t e goals of et ics and to analy9e t e relation of e&actness in a discipline to its su"/ect *atter and its goals. As s all "e seen in later c apters, t e use of t is analogy ena"led t e ancient co**entators to see 1uite easily t at so*e types of ine&actness Aristotle associates ,it et ics are pri*arily features of t e su"/ect *atter of t e discipline and only secondarily of its accounts. ' e analogy ,ill, t us, "e of so*e i*portance for understanding t e various levels of e&actness Aristotle attri"utes to et ics and t e relations e t inks o"tain a*ong suc levels. ' e ancient co**entators found t e "asis for t e analogy "et,een productive and practical disciplines or arts@1A in , at Aristotle says in t e N.E.>

8.&

:ur treat*ent @of et ical and political *attersA ,ill "e ade1uate, if it ac ieves t at a*ount of precision t at "elongs to its su"/ect *atter. ' e sa*e e&actness *ust not "e soug t in all accounts, as it is not in all products of art. >1$94"1#?

' e *ost detailed discussion of t ese re*arks is to "e found in 8ustratius.s co**entary on t e N.E. , alt oug t e rest of t e ancient co**entators give 1uite si*ilar interpretations. 8ustratius argues t at "y focusing on a productive art ,e can see *ore clearly t e relation a*ong su"/ect *atter, goal, and e&actness, since t e ele*ents of t e relation in t e case of suc an art "eco*e easily apparent to us t roug t e senses.@6A ' e e&a*ple e c ooses is t at of t e art , ose task, goal, or end is si*ply to i*itate, or to produce i*itations of, t e u*an for*. <e divides suc an art into painting or dra,ing and sculpture, and e furt er su"divides t e latter into ,a& *olding and t e various kinds of carving= for e&a*ple, ,ood carving or stone carving. Io,, 8ustratius clai*s, t e e&actness ,e ai* at and , ic is possi"le in painting is greater t an t e one ,e ai* at in t e case of ,a& *olding, since t e *aterials used in t e for*er are "etter suited for t e purposes of t e art t an t ose used in t e latter. But t e e&actness possi"le in t e case of ,a& *olding is greater t an t at possi"le in t e various types of carving, since t e *aterial of t e for*er 5 EH 5 is *ore plia"le t an t e *aterial used "y t e latter. ' us, t e follo,ing clai*s in 8ustratius.s e&a*ple of t e productive arts can "e identified: ' e goal of t e a"ove kind of productive arts is i*itation of t e u*an for*=t at is, creating products t at i*itate t e u*an for*=and not kno,ledge or e&planation of o, to i*itate t e u*an for* or of t e u*an for* itself4 e&actness depends on t e *aterials an art uses >paint, ,a&, ,ood, stone, and so fort ? and on t e goals it as, and it ,ill t erefore vary fro* one art to t e ot er as t e *aterials and goals vary. Io,, if ,e ,ere to assu*e, as t e ancients did, t at t ere is an analogy "et,een t e productive arts and et ics, ,e ,ould conclude, as t ey did, t e follo,ing a"out et ics: ' e goal of et ics is practice=t at is, doing so*e t ing or action, and not kno,ledge or e&planation of practice4 e&actness in et ics depends on its su"/ect *atter >*aterials? and its goals. ) s all leave t e 1uestions of t e nature of e&actness, t e relation it "ears to goals and *aterials, and even t at of t e usefulness of t e analogy for understanding t ese *atters aside for t e *o*ent. ' e point ) ,is to stress is t at t e ,ay t e ancients understood t e analogy "et,een t e productive arts and et ics eli*inates t e cognitive co*ponent in "ot of t ese types of arts or disciplines, t at is, in "ot productive and practical ones. ' e pro"le* ,it t is ,ay of looking at t e goals of so*e disciplines is not t at it is too narro, or restrictive, t at it leaves out so*e ot er t ings t at oug t to "e included a*ong t e productive or practical goals of t ese disciplines. ' e pro"le*, for instance, ,it t e clai* t at t e goal of t e productive arts 8ustratius *entions is t e i*itation of t e u*an for* is not t at it e&cludes ot er t ings t at can "e i*itated. :f course, *any ot er t ings can "e i*itated, and can t erefore "e a part of t e goals of t ese arts, alt oug ,e can understand , y t e ancient co**entators focused on t e u*an for*. ' e pro"le* lies rat er in t e fact t at t is ,ay of looking at t e productive arts fails to recogni9e any nonproductive goal t at *ay "e associated ,it t e*4 it overlooks any cognitive goals or aspects t ese arts or disciplines *ay ave. )t looks, for e&a*ple, at t e discipline of *edicine as "eing si*ply , atever produces ealt . By analogy, t e difficulty ,it identifying t e goal of et ical in1uiry ,it action does not lie ,it t e fact t at suc an identification e&cludes several ot er t ings t at can reasona"ly "e included, along ,it action, a*ong its practical goals. )t is reasona"le, for instance, to argue t at action as no *ore of a

clai* to "eing t e goal of et ics t an states of c aracter >virtues?, states of affairs, kinds of ,ants or desires, *otives, purposes, interests, types of u*an association, and so fort . ' e ,is to enlarge t e list of t ings co*prising t e practical goals of et ics is per aps understanda"le, alt oug it is also understanda"le , y priority is given to 5 E9 5 action. ' e latter as often "een t oug t to "e essentially connected to et ics, as ealt is t oug t to "e connected to *edicine. <o,ever, even if ,e ,ere to grant t at all t e ot er practical t ings *entioned a"ove, t at is, states of affairs, virtues, *otives, and so fort , are to "e included a*ong t e goals of et ics, still t e difficulty ,ould not "e resolved. Again, t e difficulty lies ,it t e fact t at "y e1uating t e goals of et ics ,it so*e practical end or ot er, ,e "lur t e identity of t e discipline of et ics as ,e nor*ally understand it. ' e identity or nature of t e discipline is confused ,it so*e end or ends it *ig t serve. ) s all return to t is *atter and discuss t e reasons , y, in *y /udg*ent, t e goals of et ics cannot "e co*pletely e1uated ,it practice. -irst, o,ever, ) ,is to e&a*ine so*e of t e reasons t at ave led so*e students of Aristotle.s t oug t to co*pletely identify et ics ,it practice. ' e tendency to look at et ics as so*et ing t at lacks a cognitive co*ponent appears to ave a "asis in so*e re*arks Aristotle i*self *akes t roug out is treatises on conduct. <ere are so*e of t e*: 8.% ' e end of t is study @i.e., politicsA is not kno,ledge @

A "ut action. >N.E.&;=:a:7 #.# As t en our present study @

A, unlike t e ot er treatises, is not for t e sake of t eoretical kno,ledge @ A, for ,e are not investigating t e nature of virtue for t e sake of kno,ing , at it is, "ut in order to "eco*e good, ,it out , ic result our investigation ,ould "e of no "enefit, ,e *ust e&a*ine t e nature of actions, na*ely o, ,e oug t to do t e*. >11$#"6%? #.4 :r per aps, as ,e say, t e end of t e studies a"out t ings to "e done is not to study @or conte*plate, t eori9e a"out=

A and kno, @ A t e various t ings, "ut rat er to do t e*. >11F9"?

#.%

-or you ai* is not to kno, @

A , at courage is "ut to "e courageous, not to kno, , at /ustice is "ut to "e /ust, in t e sa*e ,ay as ,e ,ant to "e ealt y rat er t an to kno, , at ealt is, and to "e in good condition of "ody rat er t an to kno, , at good "odily condition is. >E.E.&%&3b%;7 )n addition, t ere are t e ,ellBkno,n re*arks , ere Aristotle argues t at et ics is su"ordinate to politics and , ere e distinguis es a*ong t eoretical, practical, and productive disciplines in ter*s of t eir goals: 8.3 )t ,ould see* @t e ig est good of *anA to "elong @as an o"/ect of studyA to t e *ost aut oritative science and t at , ic is *ost truly t e *aster art. And politics appears to "e of t is nature4 for it is t is t at ordains , ic of t e sciences s ould "e studied in a state. . .. Io, since politics uses t e rest of t e sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to , at ,e are to do and , at ,e are to a"stain fro*, t e end of t is science *ust include t ose of t e ot ers, so t at t is end *ust "e t e good of *an. >N.E.&;=9b7

8.5

5 F$ 5 -or t e end of t eoretical kno,ledge is trut , , ile t at of practical kno,ledge is action. >Met. ==8b%;7 But alt oug t is does appen in t e case of t e t eoretical sciences, inas*uc as astrono*y and natural science and geo*etry ave no ot er end e&cept to get to kno, and to conte*plate t e nature of t e t ings t at are t e su"/ects of t e sciences . . . yet t e end of t e productive sciences @

#.H

A is so*et ing different fro* science and kno,ledge, for e&a*ple t e end of *edicine is ealt and t at of political science ordered govern*ent, or so*et ing of t at sort, different fro* *ere kno,ledge of t e science. >E.E. &%&3b&%7 ' e a"ove re*arks *ay easily lead one to t e conclusion t at in t e case of et ics, as ,ell as ot er practical or productive disciplines, t ere is no roo* for t e pursuit of kno,ledge. ' is is so especially ,it re*arks #.6B#.%, , ere Aristotle appears at ti*es to deny t at ,e ai* at kno,ledge at all in et ics and politics and to assert e*p atically t at our ai* is action or practice. ' us, Allan as recently stated t at Gpractical reason differs fro* t eoretical reason "y its end4 its ai* is action , not kno,ledge of t e trut G@#A And Aristotle does not elp *atters "y su"ordinating et ics to politics and t us clai*ing t at ulti*ately t e goal of t e for*er is t e goal of t e latter, , ic according to #.6 and #.H is action or t e esta"lis ing of Gordered govern*ent, or so*et ing of t at sort.G ' e *ove of o"literating, so to speak, t e cognitive function of so*e disciplines per aps derives so*e support fro* a principle Aristotle enunciates in t e opening c apter of t e N.E. :

8.=

Io, in cases , ere several suc arts are su"ordinate to so*e single faculty=as "ridle *aking and t e ot er arts concerned ,it t e e1uip*ent of orses fall under t e art of riding, and t is and every *ilitary action under strategy, in t e sa*e ,ay ot er arts fall under yet ot ers=in all of t ese t e ends of t e *aster arts are to "e preferred to all t e su"ordinate ends4 for it is for t e sake of t e for*er t at t e latter are pursued. >1$94a1$?

2 ere arts, disciplines, or pursuits are su"ordinate to so*e *aster art or discipline or pursuit, t at is, , ere t ey for* an arc itectonic structure, t e end of t e su"ordinate ones is really t e end of t e *aster one. ' is *ay "e called t e transitivity principle, , ic states t at if A is desired for t e sake of >or as as its end? B, and B is desired for t e sake of >or as as its goal? C, t en A is desired for t e sake of >or as as its goal? C. ' e transitivity principle see*s to i*ply t at t e su"ordinate goals, t at is, B, drop out of t e picture altoget er. 2 en ,e apply t e principle to t e case of et ics it see*s to i*ply t at all ,e are left ,it is practice or action. -or, if et ics is, as Aristotle clai*s, su"ordinate to politics and t e goal of t e latter is action >#.6, #.H?, t en t e goal of et ics is action. But 5 F1 5 , en ,e apply t e transitivity principle in t is sa*e ,ay to politics itself, or to any ot er nont eoretical discipline, ,e also o"tain si*ilar results: , atever ot er goals politics *ig t ave drop out of t e picture, since t ey are su"ordinate to so*e practical end. :nly in t e case of t e t eoretical disciplines, , ere t e ulti*ate end is kno,ledge itself, ,ill t e application of t e transitivity principle yield a cognitive end for a discipline. But upon reflection, ,e see t at t is cannot "e t e ,ay to apply t e transitivity principle, and t at Aristotle did not apply it in t is ,ay, alt oug Plato clearly did. 'o apply t e principle in t is ,ay is to eli*inate all t e goals or ends of t e su"ordinate arts4 it is to eli*inate , at are clearly t e i**ediate or proper goals of t e arts , ic need to "e distinguis ed fro* any ot er ends t ese arts *ay serve. Consider, for instance, Aristotle.s o,n e&a*ple of t e art of "ridle *aking >#.9?. ' e i**ediate or proper end of t is art is "ridle *aking, alt oug t e activity itself *ay ave, "ecause it is su"ordinate to t e *ilitary arts, as its ulti*ate goal *ilitary victory. But even if its ulti*ate goal is t at of t e *aster art, its o,n peculiar end cannot "e eli*inated. 'o assu*e ot er,ise, to apply t e transitivity principle in t e ,ay ,e did a"ove, is to suppose not only t at desires or goals are transitive "ut also t at t e su"ordinate desire, pursuit, or goal is canceled out , enever t ere e&ists a ig er desire, pursuit, or goal. Plato clearly *ade suc a *ove: G' en isn.t it /ust t e sa*e in every case; )f everyone does so*et ing for t e sake of so*et ing, e doesn.t ,ant t e t ing e does, "ut t e t ing for t e sake of , ic e does itG >Gorgias 4EF3?.@4A But Plato.s *ove is clearly pro"le*atic, for it eli*inates t e desires or goals t at *ust "e t ere in order for t e transitivity principle to old or even in order for t e principle to "e stated. And t is, of course, is no accident. 2 at Aristotle intends to say "y t e transitivity principle is t at t e art of "ridle *aking as as its proper end t e *aking of "ridles, alt oug t e reason ,e ave suc an art ,it suc an end is "ecause ,e ave anot er end, t at is, *ilitary victory. But t e art of "ridle *aking is defined "y its o,n proper end, as is any ot er art , ic *ay "e su"ordinate to so*e *aster art. ' us, s ip"uilding is defined "y its o,n proper end, and so is strategy, *edicine, econo*ic *anage*ent, and so fort .@%A 2 at "ridle *aking does, t en=, at activity it is=is deter*ined "y its o,n proper goal and not "y t at of t e *aster art it ulti*ately *ig t serve. ' e identity and essential nature of an art is fi&ed "y its o,n proper goals and not "y , atever else it serves. ' e goals of t e su"ordinate and *aster arts can "e altoget er different="ridles are not *ilitary victories=and t e activities constituting t e t,o can also "e altoget er different=*aking "ridles is not fig ting or

,inning a "attle. )t is also clear t at, alt oug ,e *ay continue to pursue t e *aster art and its goals, ,e *ay cease to pursue t e su"ordinate activity and its goals. 2e *ay, for instance, continue to pursue *ilitary victory "ut not "ridle 5 F6 5 *aking, eit er "ecause ,e ave no need of orses for t e purpose of ,inning a "attle or "ecause ,e can control orses ,it out t e use of "ridles=for e&a*ple, "y re*ote control or "y training t e* to follo, ver"al co**ands. ' erefore, not every *eans of controlling cavalry orses is part of t e art of "ridle *aking. ' e latter as a nature t at is constituted "y its o,n peculiar activities and proper goal. But , at does t is tell us a"out et ics, politics, or *edicine and t eir goals; )t tells us t at, even t oug t ese disciplines *ay "e su"ordinate to so*e *aster discipline, and conse1uently t eir ulti*ate end *ay "e t at of a *aster discipline, t ey ave t eir o,n end and activity in ter*s of , ic t eir nature is defined. )f, for e&a*ple, econo*ics is, as Aristotle says, su"ordinate to politics, it is nonet eless t e case t at it as its o,n end and activity , ic define its nature. ' e sa*e is true ,it et ics, , ic Aristotle takes to "e su"ordinate to politics. Jet us leave aside, t en, t is *atter of t e su"ordination of one discipline to anot er and e&a*ine instead so*e of t ese disciplines "y t e*selves. Consider, for instance, *edicine, a discipline t at Aristotle often co*pares to et ics. ' ere is no dou"t t at Aristotle takes t e ulti*ate goals of *edicine to "e ealt , t at is, t e attain*ent, restoration, preservation, and so fort , of ealt , rat er t an t e conte*plation of it >#.F, N.E. 1$94a?. Ai*ing at ealt in part constitutes t e nature or essence of t e discipline=it defines in part , at *edicine is >#op . 14#a%?. But t is practical goal is not all t ere is to *edicine4 it is not sufficient for defining *edicine. Iot everyt ing t at ai*s at or attains ealt is *edicine. )f, for instance, gy*nastics also ai*s at or produces ealt , it is not necessarily to "e identified ,it *edicine. And if so*eone restores ealt accidentally or "y luck, or eals "y so*e super u*an po,er, e is not necessarily doing so t roug *edicine.@EA ' e reason , y not everyt ing t at produces, restores, or *aintains ealt is to "e identified ,it *edicine is t at, according to Aristotle, *edicine is a discipline4 it is an in1uiry or investigation t at ai*s at or o"tains a certain "ody of kno,ledge. Jike ot er disciplines, it as its o,n do*ain and principles.@FA )ts genus, t en, to use Aristotle.s language, is kno,ledge, since *edicine is a species of a cognitive activity. ' us Aristotle includes *edicine a*ong t e disciplines >sciences,

? t at investigate a certain do*ain and ave t eir o,n principles, for e&a*ple, arit *etic and geo*etry > ost. Anal . F9a1%, HH"1#?.@HA <e also includes it a*ong t e disciplines or sciences at Met . 1$E4a: G8very science @ A seeks certain principles and causes for eac of its o"/ects=e.g., *edicine and gy*nastics and eac of t e ot er sciences, , et er productive or *at e*atical.G And at Met . 1$6%a e ,rites, G-or , ile t ere is a cause of ealt and of good condition, and t e o"/ects of *at e*atics ave first principles and ele*ents and causes, and in general every t inking, or 5 F# 5 t oug tBpartaking, science deals ,it causes and principles, *ore or less precisely.G ' ere is no dou"t

t at , en Aristotle speaks of a discipline t at is concerned ,it t e cause of ealt and of good condition e as in *ind *edicine. -inally, e refers to *edicine as an in1uiry, discipline, or science >

? at N.E. 11H$"1$B#$, , ere e co*pares it ,it t e discipline t at studies *oral education and legislation. (edicine, t en, like t e ot er cognitive disciplines, ai*s in part at kno,ledge, at understanding or e&plaining a certain do*ain, t at is, t e causes of ealt and of good condition. 2e *ay identify, t en, in its case t e goal t at fi&es t e genus to , ic *edicine "elongs, t at tells us , at kind of t ing it is =t at is, t at it is a kind of kno,ledge or a cognitive discipline. And ,e *ay designate t e cognitive goals of *edicine as its i**ediate or proper goals and t us distinguis t e* fro* its ulti*ate practical goals=t at is, t e production, restoration, or *aintenance of ealt . (edicine, t en, ai*s at and attains its ulti*ate goals t roug a cognitive activity or discipline, t roug kno,ledge of its o,n special do*ain. ' e a"ove is, of course, true of all practical and productive disciplines, for t ey all "elong to t e genus discipline or in/uiry? t ey all are cognitive activities. ' eir proper or i**ediate goals are t erefore cognitive, , ile t eir ulti*ate ones are, according to Aristotle, practical or productive. ' is is , at Aristotle intends to say "y designating so*e disciplines as t eoretical, ot ers as practical, and still ot ers as productive. Iot t at practical and productive disciplines do not ai* at kno,ledge or are nonB cognitive4 rat er, t ey ave goals t at go "eyond t e cognitive ones and , ic are nonet eless attained t roug t e cognitive ones. ' is is *ade clear in , at Aristotle says in #.H, , en e states t at Gt e end of productive sciences is so*et ing different fro* science and kno,ledge, for e&a*ple t e end of *edicine is ealt . . . . @)t isA different fro* *ere kno,ledge of t e science.G ' us, Aristotle does not dou"t t at t e proper end of *edicine is kno,ledge= e takes it for granted t at it is. 2 at e ,is es to *ake certain is t at ,e do not *istake it for t e ulti*ate end, t at ,e recogni9e t at t e latter >t e ulti*ate end? is different fro* science or kno,ledge >t e proper end?. :nly in t e case of t eoretical disciplines, Aristotle argues, is t e proper or i**ediate end identical ,it t e ulti*ate end. 2 at Aristotle intends to say in #.F, , en e insists t at t e end of t eoretical kno,ledge is trut , ile t at of practical kno,ledge is action, is t at t e ulti*ate end of t e for*er is trut , ile t at of t e latter is action. <e is not identifying t e proper end of practical disciplines ,it action, "ut only t e ulti*ate one. )t is i*portant to recogni9e, t en, t at , ile a discipline *ay "e practical >or productive? in virtue of t e nature of its ulti*ate goals, t is does not rule out t at its i**ediate goals are cognitive. +i*ilarly, a discipline is t eoretical in virtue of its ulti*ate goals, "ut t is does not rule out t e 5 F4 5 possi"ility t at suc a t eoretical discipline >e.g., arit *etic? as practical uses >see "elo,?. 7et arit *etic, alt oug it as practical uses, differs fro* a practical discipline=its ulti*ate goals, t e ends for , ic it is pursued, are presu*a"ly purely cognitive. And alt oug Aristotle and ot ers classify disciplines on t e "asis of t eir ulti*ate goals=for e&a*ple, t eoretical, practical, productive=one *ust not overlook t eir i**ediate or proper goals, , ic *ay "e different fro* t e ulti*ate ones. Io, et ics is, according to Aristotle, a practical discipline and, t erefore, as is t e case ,it all productive and practical disciplines, its ulti*ate goal is so*et ing different fro* kno,ledge or science. As in t e case of politics, , ic , according to #.H, ai*s at so*et ing Gdifferent fro* *ere kno,ledgeG=t at is, it ai*s at t e reali9ation of Gordered govern*ent or so*et ing of t e sortG=

et ics ai*s at so*et ing "eyond kno,ledge. )ndeed, , en ,e e&a*ine closely #.6B#.%, ,e see t at in all t ese re*arks Aristotle.s intention is to underline is contention t at et ics as a goal t at is different fro* and goes "eyond kno,ledge, and not to deny t at its proper goal is a cognitive one. Consider, to "egin ,it , , at e says in #.6. 2 ile e insists t at t e >ulti*ate? end of politics is action and not kno,ledge, e also assu*es t at politics is a study, t at it is an in1uiry >

, N.E. 1$94"11?, t at it is one of t e sciences > , 1$94a6F?, t at it ai*s at t e kno,ledge of t e ig est good >1$94a6#?, and so fort . And , ile in #.# Aristotle denies t at is o,n endeavors in t e N.E. are for t e sake of t eoretical kno,ledge, e nevert eless c aracteri9es is o,n activity as an in1uiry or study > ?, as a discipline t at, alt oug Gnot investigating t e nature of virtue for t e sake of kno,ing , at it is,G is in+estigating it in order to "eco*e good. Again, in #.4 Aristotle is concerned ,it *aking clear , at are t e ulti*ate goals of studies of *atters of conduct: ' ey are studies for t e sake of action. -inally, in #.% Aristotle applies to et ics t e general t esis e propounds in #.H a"out t e difference "et,een t eoretical disciplines on t e one and and practical and productive ones on t e ot er= na*ely, t at t e for*er ai* ulti*ately at kno,ledge, , ereas t e latter ai* at action or production. )n et ics, according to #.H and #.%, as in *edicine and politics, ,e ai* at a kind of kno,ledge, for e&a*ple, kno,ledge of , at courage or /ustice is, "ut ,e do not stop t ere, for our ulti*ate goal is to "e courageous or /ust and do , at courage or /ustice re1uires. )ndeed, a careful e&a*ination of , at Aristotle says s o,s t at , at Allan asserts in t e re*ark 1uoted a"ove is ,rong , en said in t e ,ay it is said t ere. Practical reason or intellect does ai* at trut , G-or trut is t e function of every @kindA of intellectG >N.E. 11#9a#$? and G<ence t e function of "ot parts of t e intellect @i.e., practical and t eoreticalA is trut G >11#9"11?. :f course, Aristotle does not *ean in t ese re*arks 5 F% 5 to deny t at t e ulti*ate goal of practical t oug t is practice or action. <e distinguis es t eoretical t oug t fro* it "y saying t at t eoretical t oug t is not concerned ,it action or production >11#9a6H?, clearly i*plying t at practical t oug t is concerned ,it or ulti*ately ai*s at action or production. 2e *ust not, o,ever, overlook t e fact t at Aristotle takes practical t oug t to "e ai*ing at t e trut , t at its proper goal is cognitive. )f , at as "een said a"ove is correct, it is clear t at et ics cannot /ust "e , atever results in certain actions or produces certain states of c aracter. )t cannot, for e&a*ple, /ust "e a skill, knack, or good fortune t at results in t e correct action or t e proper state of c aracter. 8t ics, according to Aristotle, is practical kno,ledge or a type of discipline t at al*s at ac ieving so*e practical ends t roug its o,n cognitive activities. ' ese kinds of activities are necessary ele*ents of its nature4 t ey in part define , at et ics is. 'o recogni9e t at Aristotle takes et ics to "e an in1uiry or investigation, despite , at e at ti*es appears to "e saying, is no dou"t 1uite i*portant, for to do so is to identify correctly t e kind of t ing e assu*es et ics to "e4 it is to identify t e genus to , ic e assigns et ics and related disciplines. 7et

t is does not tell us everyt ing a"out et ics. )t does not tell us , at kind of kno,ledge et ical in1uiry attains=, et er, t at is, it differs in its c aracter or structure fro* t e kno,ledge t at t eoretical in1uiry attains. )t also does not ans,er t e 1uestion of , y t ere cannot "e t eoretical kno,ledge a"out *atters of conduct=, y ,e cannot, for e&a*ple, ave kno,ledge for t e sake of kno,ledge a"out *atters of conduct=or, if t eoretical kno,ledge differs in its structure or c aracter fro* practical and productive kno,ledge, , y t ere cannot "e kno,ledge a"out *atters of conduct t at as t e episte*ological nature of t eoretical kno,ledge. ' ese are t e 1uestions ) ,is to consider ne&t, and ) s all do so "y addressing first t e 1uestion concerning t e relation "et,een et ical in1uiry and practical ,isdo*.

'thical In,uir" and Practical Wisdom

) ave argued a"ove t at Aristotle takes et ics to "e an in1uiry or investigation , ose proper end is cognitive. 2e *ay furt er c aracteri9e Aristotle.s vie, in t e follo,ing ,ay: 8t ics is a study of a certain su"/ect *atter or do*ain, t at is, t at of *atters of conduct. +uc a c aracteri9ation *ay see* to "e too superficial or e*pty of content to "e sufficient for distinguis ing et ics fro* ot er in1uiries or investigations. But at t is point ) ,is to c aracteri9e Aristotle.s vie, in t e *ost neutral ,ay. 8ven t e clai* t at et ics is an in1uiry or investigation is a controversial one in Aristotelian sc olars ip, for it o"viously i*plies or assu*es t at Aristotle 5 FE 5 takes et ics to rese*"le to so*e e&tent=na*ely, to t e e&tent t at it as a su"/ect *atter t at it studies and seeks to understand or e&plain=t ose in1uiries or investigations t at e often vie,s as "eing ,ellB defined disciplines or sciences. ' ere are t ose in t e Aristotelian sc olars ip tradition , o are ,illing to accept t at et ics as so*e cognitive o"/ectives, t at it ai*s at so*e kno,ledge, or t at it ai*s at its ulti*ate practical ends t roug kno,ledge, "ut are un,illing to concede t at t e kno,ledge et ics seeks rese*"les at all t e kno,ledge ,e seek in t e ,ellBdefined disciplines or t at et ics itself rese*"les any of t ese ,ellB defined disciplines. ' is vie, as its "asis in Aristotle.s discussion of t e intellectual virtues in Book K) of N.E. and, in particular, in is account of practical ,isdo* or prudence >

?. :n t e assu*ption t at et ics is t e practical kno,ledge ,e attain "y t e e&cellence of practical ,isdo*, t ese sc olars ave argued t at t e kno,ledge ,e ai* at or attain in et ics consists pri*arily of t at associated ,it practical intellect or reason. 8t ical in1uiry, according to t is vie,, cannot "e t e activity of in1uiring or investigating t at Aristotle associates ,it t eoretical reason or intellect, t e activity presu*a"ly proper to t e disciplines t at are neit er practical nor productive. ' us, 2illia* 8 0. <ardie as recently insisted t at, alt oug Aristotle at ti*es *akes reference to et ical or political t eory in is ,ork, ,e s ould not "e *isled Ginto t inking t at Aristotle t oug t of t e Ethics and t e olitics , or indeed t e oetics , as e&ercises of t e .t eoretical. intellect. . . . -or Aristotle t e Ethics itself, "eing a political treatise >1$94"11?, is an e&ercise of t e practical intellect. . . . <is in1uiry is directed to finding out o, appiness can "e ac ieved. Analogously t e oetics is a *anual on play,riting.G@9A <ardie goes on to add, G)t is not, of course, to "e assu*ed t at , at Aristotle, or any ot er t inker, says e is doing is necessarily an accurate or ade1uate account of , at e ac ieves.G <e t us leaves roo* for *eeting t e o"vious o"/ection t at Aristotle.s o,n in1uiry in t e et ical treatises and olitics is *ore of a t eoretical investigation t an is o,n c aracteri9ation

of it ,ould see* to i*ply. 7et, as <ardie see*s to recogni9e, t ere are pro"le*s ,it t e practical interpretation of et ical in1uiry t at go "eyond t e discrepancy, if t ere is one, "et,een Aristotle.s o,n in1uiries and is o,n c aracteri9ation of t e*. Consider first t e pro"le* ,it appealing to t e distinction "et,een t eoretical and practical intellect in order to elucidate t e nature of et ical in1uiry. Aristotle, of course, speaks at ti*es of t ese t,o kinds of intellect, "ut t e disagree*ents a*ong sc olars as to , at t ese supposedly distinct intellects do are notorious. <ardie suggests t at in general t e practical intellect is concerned ,it t e finding or deter*ining of *eans, and in t e case of et ics it is concerned ,it Gfinding out o, appiness can "e 5 FF 5 ac ieved.G But is t ere a productive intellect t at is concerned ,it t e *eans of production, and is it different fro* practical intellect; Again, if ) a* seeking t e geo*etrical *eans of "isecting t e angle, , ic intellect a* ) using: t e t eoretical, practical, or productive one; )t is also not clear t at ,e succeed in elucidating t e nature of et ics "y insisting t at it is a *anual for practice in t e ,ay presu*a"ly Gt e oetics is a *anual for play,riting.G Geo*etry too is a *anual for dra,ing circles, "isecting angles, deter*ining areas of figures, and so fort , and arit *etic is a *anual for adding, su"tracting, *ultiplying, and so fort . )n a sense, any discipline can "e a *anual. ' e pro"le* see*s to *e to "e t is: )f ,e assu*e t at Aristotle identifies et ical in1uiry ,it practical ,isdo* >or reason, or prudence,

?, t en our vie, of t e nature of et ical in1uiry ,ill depend on , at ,e take practical ,isdo* >reason, prudence? to "e. )f, on t e one and, ,e interpret practical ,isdo* in suc a ,ay t at it is restricted to deli"erating a"out *eans >t e narro, vie,?, t en clearly et ical in1uiry ,ill ave little in co**on ,it t e typical disciplines. )f, on t e ot er and, ,e interpret practical ,isdo* in a ,ay t at goes far "eyond a kind of calculative or deli"erative activity=for e&a*ple, if it reasons a"out t e nature of t e ele*ents of conduct, it proves certain propositions a"out t e* or it e&plains certain t ings on t e "asis of ot ers >t e ,ide vie,?=t en per aps et ical in1uiry ,ill not "e very different fro* ot er disciplines. Io, t ere is evidence fro* Aristotle.s te&ts t at see*s to support t e narro, vie, of practical ,isdo*. As Allan re*arks, G' e fact is t at e @AristotleA *akes so*e state*ents , ic , to a superficial vie,, i*ply t at practical reason=or , at co*es to t e sa*e t ing, phronesis =deli"erates a"out *eans and does nothing more .G@1$A And Allan refers to Aristotle.s re*arks at N.E. 11#9a61, 1146"#1, and 11%6"1 as t e passages t at, to a superficial vie,, i*ply t e narro, vie, of practical reason. ' ere are, of course, *ore passages t an t e ones Allan cites suggesting t e narro, vie, of practical ,isdo*. A*ong t e* ,e ,ould include Aristotle.s account of deli"eration in Book ))), , ere practical reason is vie,ed pri*arily as deli"erating or calculating a"out *eans. And is discussion of practical reasoning in Book K).i., , ere e e1uates it ,it deli"eration, contrasts it to scientific reason, and argues t at it is calculative in nature: G' ese t,o faculties *ay "e designated t e scientific and t e calculative faculty respectively4 since calculation @

A is t e sa*e as deli"eration @

AG >11#9a16?. Again, Aristotle identifies, per aps even *ore e&plicitly, practical ,isdo* ,it kno,ledge of or deli"eration a"out t e *eans to an end: GAlso t e function of *an is ac ieved "y practical ,isdo* @ A and virtue4 for virtue *akes t e end rig t, , ile practical ,isdo* ensures t e correct *eansG >114EaE?.@11A )t is not surprising, t en, t at sc olars ave at ti*es accepted t e narro, 5 FH 5 vie, of practical ,isdo*. 2 enever t ey ave also assu*ed t at et ical in1uiry is to "e identified ,it practical ,isdo*, t ey ave concluded t at et ical in1uiry is 1uite different fro* ordinary disciplines. ' is see*s to "e t e case ,it t e accounts L. 3onald (onan gives of practical ,isdo* and et ical in1uiry.@16A Lo n Burnet also sides ,it t e narro, vie, of practical ,isdo* "ut e does not identify altoget er et ical in1uiry ,it practical ,isdo*.@1#A )n t is e ,as follo,ing t e Aristotelian sc olar Lulius 2alter of Lena, , o ,as t e first to introduce in recent ti*es t e narro, vie, of practical ,isdo*, "ut , o at t e sa*e ti*e refused to e1uate it ,it et ical in1uiry. According to Allan, in *uc of t e Aristotelian sc olars ip of t e previous century, and in particular in t e ,orks of Gustav 'eic *Nller, -riedric 'rendelen"urg, and 8duard Oeller, t e do*inant vie, of practical ,isdo* ,as t e ,ide one.@14A ' ese sc olars assigned to practical ,isdo* or reason a role *uc ,ider t an calculation or deli"eration a"out *eans. ' ey assigned to it t e role of grasping or understanding t e "asic principles and t e rest of t e propositions or /udg*ents of et ics. ' us practical ,isdo* or reason in t eir vie, ,as not *uc different fro* t eoretical reason. +ince t ey also e1uated et ical in1uiry ,it practical ,isdo*, et ical in1uiry itself ,as t oug t to "e 1uite si*ilar to all t e ot er disciplines t at investigate into t e nature of a particular do*ain=it ,as t oug t to "e not very different fro* t e t eoretical disciplines. 'o,ard t e end of t e nineteent century, o,ever, 2alter argued t at t e scope of practical ,isdo* in Aristotle is far *ore restricted t an t e sc olars *entioned a"ove take it to "e, and e t us introduced t e narro, vie,. ' e sp ere of practical ,isdo*, according to 2alter, is deli"eration, t e discovering of *eans to ends t at ave already "een esta"lis ed. +ince Aristotle.s o,n in1uiry is pri*arily a"out t e nature of ends, since it is al*ost t eoretical, e concluded t at et ical in1uiry cannot "e e1uated ,it practical ,isdo* or reason.@1%A Conse1uently, according to 2alter, et ical in1uiry does not differ essentially fro* ot er disciplines. ' is ti*e, o,ever, t e conclusion ,as reac ed not "y conceiving practical ,isdo* as so*et ing si*ilar to t eoretical reason and t en e1uating it to et ical in1uiry, "ut "y narro,ing t e scope of practical ,isdo* and dissociating it fro* et ical in1uiry. 2alter.s vie,, according to Allan, ,as very influential. )t affected eit er directly or indirectly *uc of t e su"se1uent sc olars ip on Aristotle.s et ics ,it regard to t e issues of t e nature of practical ,isdo* and et ical in1uiry. )t influenced Oeller directly and to suc an e&tent t at in t e t ird edition of is istory of Greek p ilosop y e a"andoned is earlier account of practical ,isdo* in ter*s of t e ,ide vie, and accepted 2alter.s vie,. Oeller.s vie,s, in turn, ad an i*pact on *any of t e i*portant co**entaries on Aristotle.s et ics in t e 8nglis language, especially t at of Burnet. 5 F9 5

But 2alter.s vie, itself ,as destined to *eet t e fate a,aiting every interpretation of a classical te&t= na*ely, "eing 1uestioned, critici9ed, and al*ost a"andoned "y Aristotelian sc olars in recent years. Criticis*s of 2alter.s vie,s, alt oug rat er *oderate ones, are to "e found in t e ,ork of Allan i*self and in 0ene A. Gaut ier and Lean 7. Lolif.s co**entary on t e N.E .@1EA +everal of t e *ost recent discussions of t ese issues can "e looked upon as atte*pts to correct , at is perceived to "e a *istaken account of practical ,isdo* given "y 2alter and accepted "y *any ot er sc olars. ' ey are atte*pts to enlarge 2alter.s conception of practical ,isdo* and, t erefore, to reinstate in a ,ay t e ,ide vie, t at ,as eld "y t e ot er nineteent Bcentury sc olars *entioned a"ove. ' us, 3avid 2iggins as argued t at deli"eration and practical reason are not only concerned ,it instru*ental *eans, t at t eir scope is ,ider t an t e narro, vie, *akes it out to "e.@1FA Lo n Cooper accepts t e interpretation t at deli"eration goes "eyond instru*ental *eans, "ut t inks it does not deter*ine "y itself t e ig est or ulti*ate end > appiness? Aristotle is concerned ,it in is o,n et ical in1uiry. ' is is done, Cooper clai*s, "y practical ,isdo*, , ic is *ore t an deli"eration since it includes dialectical reasoning and so*e kind of intellectual intuition "y , ic t e ulti*ate end >or ends? is >are? grasped.@1HA ' us, Cooper.s vie, is in one respect si*ilar to 2alter.s. Cooper argues t at t ere is so*e t eoretical co*ponent to et ical in1uiry t at cannot "e captured "y t e instru*ental conception of deli"eration, t e co*ponent t at consists of dialectical reasoning and t e grasping of so*e propositions "y intellectual intuition. 'erence )r,in as gone even furt er "y *aking dialectical reasoning a part of deli"eration.@19A Alt oug t is *ove appears to deny t at t ere is a t eoretical co*ponent to et ical in1uiry, it does so "y *aking deli"eration or practical ,isdo* as ,ide, and in a sense as t eoretical, as t e nineteent Bcentury sc olars *ade it out to "e. (y ai*, o,ever, is not to investigate t e nature of deli"eration or practical ,isdo*, if indeed t ey turn out to "e different. (y concern is rat er ,it Aristotle.s conception of et ical in1uiry. ) s all, t erefore, restrict *yself to giving so*e argu*ents in support of t e vie, t at et ical in1uiry cannot "e identified ,it t e narro, vie, of deli"eration or practical ,isdo*. ) ,ill t us "e partly in agree*ent ,it 2alter.s position: )f deli"eration or practical ,isdo* is interpreted narro,ly, it cannot "e e1uated ,it eit er Aristotle.s o,n et ical investigation or ,it et ical in1uiry in general. ' is is, in a sense, ackno,ledged "y t ose , o insist upon t e ,ide interpretation of deli"eration or practical ,isdo*. 3oes Aristotle identify is o,n in1uiry or et ical in1uiry in general ,it deli"eration or practical ,isdo*; )t is interesting to point out t at t e ter* for practical ,isdo* >

? occurs only t ree ti*es prior to Book K) of t e N.E. , and in none of t ese occurrences is it identified ,it 5 H$ 5 Aristotle.s o,n investigation or et ical in1uiry. Aristotle uses t e ter* to refer to ,isdo* in general in order to argue against Plato t at t ere is one -or* of goodness: GBut of onour, ,isdo* @

A, and pleasure, in respect of t eir goodness, t e accounts are distinct and diverseG >1$9E"6#?. 2 ile atte*pting to s o, t at is o,n account of appiness in ter*s of t e function of *an is consistent ,it *ost of t e opinions a"out it, e re*arks, Gfor so*e identify appiness ,it e&cellence @virtue,

A, so*e ,it practical ,isdo* @ A, ot ers ,it a kind of p ilosop ic ,isdo*, ot ers ,it t ese, or one of t ese, acco*panied "y pleasure or not ,it out pleasureG >1$9H"6#?. -inally, Aristotle uses t e ter* , en e offers e&a*ples of t e t,o kinds of e&cellences or virtues: G8&cellence @or virtueA too is distinguis ed into t,o kinds in accordance ,it t is difference4 for ,e say t at so*e e&cellences are intellectual and ot ers *oral, p ilosop ic ,isdo* and understanding and practical ,isdo* "eing intellectual, li"erality and te*perance *oralG >11$#a%?. ' e last t,o 1uotations s o, t at Aristotle takes practical ,isdo* to "e a virtue and a part of appiness. 'o e1uate et ical in1uiry ,it it ,ould i*ply t at et ical in1uiry is a virtue and a part of appiness, , ic is odd if not parado&ical. Alt oug Aristotle identifies appiness ,it conte*plation or *oral practice, e does not e1uate it ,it et ical in1uiry.@6$A ' e ter* for practical ,isdo* occurs *ost fre1uently in Book K), a Book devoted to a discussion of t e intellectual virtues. )ndeed, in its first occurrence in t at Book t e ter* is used to refer to one of t e intellectual virtues >11#9"1%?. ' e closest Aristotle co*es to identifying practical ,isdo* ,it et ical in1uiry is , en e e1uates at least so*e co*ponent of politics ,it practical ,isdo*. 8.&; Politics @or Political +cience,

A and practical ,isdo* @ A are t e sa*e state, t oug t eir essence is different. :f t e practical ,isdo* concerned ,it t e city, one part, t e one , ic is controlling, is legislative science4 t e ot er part, t e one dealing ,it particulars, as t e na*e Gpolitical scienceG t at "elongs to "ot parts in co**on. ' is part is concerned ,it action and deli"eration >for a decree is a t ing to "e done, "eing t e last step in a deli"eration?4 and t is is t e reason , y t ese people are t e only ones said to "e taking part in politics, for t ey alone do t ings as t e crafts*en do. >1141"6#? Io,, , ile it is clear t at in t is passage Aristotle is ,illing to identify politics ,it practical ,isdo*, it is also clear t at e *akes every effort to distinguis practical ,isdo* understood in t e narro, sense fro* , at is, strictly speaking, political science. <e insists t at t ere are t,o kinds of practical ,isdo*, eac of , ic e assigns to one of t e t,o parts of politics t at are often referred to "y t e sa*e na*e. ' e kind t at is concerned ,it particulars, actions, and deli"eration e assigns to political 5 H1 5 practice, so*et ing e e1uates ,it any practice in t e do*ain of crafts. ' e ot er kind of practical ,isdo* *ust "e t en , at is not concerned ,it actions, particulars, or deli"erations=t is is t e kind e assigns to t e controlling part of politics, legislative science, or political science or in1uiry.@61A But , y does Aristotle refer to "ot kinds as practical ,isdo*; ) t ink in t is conte&t e uses

in t e sense t e ter* as for i* in t e rotrept . and t e E.E. , as ,ell as in t e sense t e ter* as for

Plato=na*ely, t at of so*e type of t eoretical ,isdo* ,it , ic t ey identify political kno,ledge and in1uiry.@66A Aristotle is, t en, in t e N.E. enlarging t is notion of practical ,isdo* to also include t at , ic e assigns to political practice=t at is, t e activities concerned ,it particulars, actions, and deli"erations=practical ,isdo* in t e narro, sense. :ne *ay, t en, "e ,illing to accept t at Aristotle identifies political in1uiry ,it practical ,isdo*, provided one understands t at t e practical ,isdo* re1uired for suc an identification is not t at of t e narro, vie,=it is not deli"eration in t e conte&t of action or a"out particulars. )ndeed, if one follo,s Aristotle.s re*arks 1uoted a"ove, one ,ill "e /ustified in assu*ing t at t e re1uired practical ,isdo* is not deli"eration at all.@6#A ' is is , at Aristotle.s contrast "et,een t e t,o kinds of practical ,isdo* and t e t,o co*ponents of politics e associates ,it t e* see*s to i*ply. ' e sa*e can "e said a"out et ics. ' e practical ,isdo* associated ,it practice is t at of t e narro, kind=t at concerned ,it particulars, action, and deli"eration. )f ,e insist t at et ical in1uiry itself is a kind of practical ,isdo*, t en it *ust "e t at , ic Aristotle associates ,it political in1uiryBit cannot "e t at , ic is concerned ,it particulars, action, and deli"eration. )n a sense, 2alter.s o"servations a"out t e c aracter of Aristotle.s o,n in1uiry and a"out t e ,ay e conceives et ical in1uiry in general is "asically correct. Ieit er Aristotle.s o,n in1uiry nor , at e says a"out it can "e *ade to fit into t e narro, conception of practical ,isdo*. -or ,e see t at , at Aristotle does in t e N.E. is not an ordinary kind of deli"eration. )t is not, as <ardie says, si*ply t e Gfinding out o, appiness can "e ac ieved,G if it is *eant "y t is t at Aristotle is deli"erating a"out t e *eans to appiness. <is activity does not fit t e kind of reasoning t at e at ti*es c aracteri9es as practical and , ic *ust *eet certain conditions=for e&a*ple, its pre*ises include one t at is universal, one t at is particular, and one t at asserts a desire for so*e end =and , ic issues in an action. Alt oug Aristotle e&tends so*e, at t e scope of practical ,isdo* "y ad*itting t at it deals not only ,it t e particular "ut also ,it t e universal >1141"1%?, even t is e&tended notion of practical ,isdo* ,ill not "e sufficient for ade1uately c aracteri9ing is o,n activity.@64A ' e universal Aristotle as in *ind in t is conte&t see*s to fall 5 H6 5 s ort of t e kind of universality or generality found in is o,n investigation. ' e universal Aristotle as in *ind in t e conte&t of practical ,isdo* is *ost pro"a"ly t at , ic e associates ,it t e rat er *odest level of generality of so*e nor*ative principles. Alt oug is e&a*ples co*e fro* *edicine= for e&a*ple, lig t *eat is , oleso*e, c icken is , oleso*e >1141"6$?, eavy ,ater is un, oleso*e >1146a66?=,e can i*agine , at general et ical principles ,ould "e like=A son never oug t to diso,n is fat er >11E#"6$?, :ne oug t to pay "ack a de"t >11E%a#?, and so fort . )f t is is t e level of universality or generality Aristotle associates ,it practical ,isdo*, t en it is clear t at it cannot *atc t at , ic c aracteri9es *ost of is o,n o"/ectives or accounts in is et ical treatises. ' ere is no dou"t t at Aristotle.s concerns in is o,n et ical treatises are ,it t e *ost universal or general aspects of *atters of conduct. Consider, for e&a*ple, t e sorts of t ings t at Aristotle focuses upon in t e N.E. Beginning ,it a "rief e&planation of t e teleological structure of pursuit or action, e ela"orates on so*e for*al properties of t e good and distinguis es a*ong types of goods=perfect, *ore perfect, *ost perfect, selfBsufficient, and so fort . ' ese are clearly concerns ,it ig ly general or a"stract *atters, and so is is investigation a"out t e relation a*ong "eing an end >goal?, "eing good, and appiness. ' e ai* is, of course, to e&plicate t e nature of t e u*an good or appiness= t is is as specific or particular as Aristotle gets=and not t e good or appiness of so*e individual or so*e particular group. <is o,n account of t e u*an good and appiness is, as is ,ell kno,n, also

given "y relying on t e very general and a"stract notion of function. 81ually general and a"stract are Aristotle.s accounts of t e virtues, , ic are is focus in *ost of t e N.E. Io, it is true, as s all "e seen, t at Aristotle often considers is o,n accounts to "e inco*plete or lacking in detail and t at e fre1uently insists t at, since et ics is practical and practice and deli"eration deal ,it particulars, our et ical accounts *ust also reac t e particulars. 8ven if t e diagnosis of is o,n accounts as lacking in detail is correct and t e degree of specificity e re1uires for et ical accounts is /ustifia"le, t ey ,ould not i*ply t at Aristotle.s focus is not t e universal or a"stract aspects of conduct. By ad*itting t at is o,n accounts are not a"out particulars or t at t ey are lacking in detail, Aristotle correctly recogni9es t at , at e as "een dealing ,it all along are t e universal, general, or a"stract ele*ents of conduct. <is point is, of course, t at dealing ,it only suc ele*ents is not sufficient for t e purposes of et ics. According to i*, one as to reac do,n to t e particulars. But suppose ,e ,ere to do so4 suppose ,e ,ere to attain t e specificity Aristotle t inks is necessary for t e practical purposes of et ics. 8ven t en 5 H# 5 ,e ,ould not necessarily ave *ade all of et ics into so*et ing t at is concerned only ,it t e kind of t ing ,e are, according to Aristotle, concerned ,it in t e conte&t of action=t at is, particulars. ' ere ,ould still "e t e co*ponent of et ics t at deals ,it t ose aspects of *atters of conduct t at constitute t e focus of Aristotle.s o,n treatise=t at is, t e general or a"stract aspects. +i*ilarly, reac ing t e level of specificity Aristotle re1uires in et ics does not necessarily *ake et ics an activity like deli"eration of t e narro, kind. 2 at e as in *ind in t e conte&ts , ere e insists upon *aking our accounts *ore specific is not t at ,e deli"erate a"out particulars ,it regard to so*e action or ot er, "ut rat er t at ,e proceed ,it our investigation in order to attain *ore detailed or specific accounts. ' e account of virtue in general ,ill not "e sufficient, e argues4 ,e *ust give an account of eac one of t e virtues, and per aps ,e s ould reac even greater specificity t an t at. But ,e can do t e sa*e t ing in geo*etry or "iology: ,e can give accounts of t e kinds of triangle or +i+iparous , and ,e also can give accounts of t e species isosceles or dog , and per aps even of *ore narro, kinds. But t e accounts of t ese latter sorts of t ings are not necessarily deli"erations, at least t ey are no *ore deli"erations t an t e for*er. And ) see no point in *aking a deli"eration out of everyt ing.@6%A ' ere is no dou"t t at t ere are pro"le*s ,it , at Aristotle says ,it regard to attaining a level of specificity t at reac es t e particular or individual. As ) s all argue "elo,, e does at ti*es ave so*e suc level of e&actness in *ind. But, first, e does not say t at ,e reac suc a level of e&actness "y deli"erating in t e narro, sense of t is ter*.@6EA +econd, e t inks t at a level of specificity t at reac es t e narro, particulars or individuals cannot "e attained "y et ical in1uiry, and t erefore , et er it is to "e arrived at "y deli"eration or "y so*e ot er ,ay does not see* to affect t e nature of et ical investigation. ' e a"ove is true even t oug ,e *ay "e ,illing to accept , at Aristotle says in #.1 and #.6 a"out t e goals of et ical or political in1uiry. According to , at e says t ere, t e goals of politics is action >#.1?, and t e reason , y ,e pursue et ical investigation is in order to "eco*e good >#.6?. )t is 1uite possi"le t at, , ile t e reason for pursuing et ical >political? in1uiry is action or "eco*ing good=t is involves deli"eration or practical ,isdo* in t e narro, sense=et ical >political? in1uiry itself is not identical ,it or even part of practical ,isdo* in t at sense. Applied *ec anics *ay "e pursued for t e sake of "uilding structures, "ut it does not follo, fro* t is t at t e in1uiry of applied *ec anics itself is identical ,it t at for t e sake of , ic it is ulti*ately pursued. )t is not, o,ever, only , at Aristotle does in is o,n et ical treatises t at is different fro* practical

,isdo* in t e narro, sense. 2 at e says a"out is o,n et ical in1uiry, or t e ,ay e c aracteri9es it, s o,s t at 5 H4 5 e also t oug t of it, or of any et ical in1uiry, as "eing different fro* t is kind of practical ,isdo*. 2 at Aristotle does and , at e says e does need not, as <ardie o"serves, agree. But t ey need not disagree eit er. )n t is case t ey agree: Iot only , at e does "ut also , at e says a"out is o,n activities in t e N.E. do not fit t e narro, conception of practical ,isdo*. :n several occasions prior to Book K) >i.e., prior to , ere practical ,isdo* "eco*es t e focus of Aristotle.s concerns?, Aristotle refers to, descri"es, or c aracteri9es is o,n activities. )nvaria"ly on t ese occasions Aristotle does so "y using ter*s t at signify Gin1uiry,G Ginvestigation,G or Gdiscipline!scienceG=t at is, "y ter*s e often uses to c aracteri9e typical in1uiries or investigations t at *ay ave little to do ,it practical ,isdo*. ' us, Aristotle refers to is o,n activity as a

>1$94"1$, 1$9Ha6H?,@6FA >11$#"6%, 11$%a%, 11$%a1$?, >11$6a16, 1169a4, 11%%"H?=t at is, as an in1uiry or investigation into t e nature of a certain do*ain. )ndeed, in t e opening sections of t e N.E. Aristotle is ,illing to call et ics, along ,it politics, disciplines, or sciences, , t at is, t e in1uiries into, a*ong ot er t ings, t e nature of t e ig est good >1$94a6%, "#?. ' is is, of course, not surprising. As discussed earlier, e also considers *edicine to "e a discipline t at investigates a certain su"/ect *atter in t e ,ay ot er disciplines, for e&a*ple, geo*etry, p ysics, or optics, investigate a certain su"/ect *atter. ' e co*parison of et ics to *edicine is an i*portant one. Aristotle often sees t e t,o disciplines as "eing si*ilar in *any respects: ' eir respective su"/ect *atters e& i"it t e sa*e kinds of ine&actness4 t ey are "ot practical disciplines4 and t ey s are t e sa*e episte*ological c aracter.@6HA 2 at ,e say, t en, ,it regard to Aristotle.s conception of t e one discipline *ust also fit t e ot er. )f *edicine is not an in1uiry t at rese*"les t e typical disciplines, t en neit er is et ics, and vice versa. Conversely, if *edicine is an in1uiry t at rese*"les t e typical disciplines, so is et ics, and vice versa. )t is not surprising, t en, t at t ose , o tend to look at et ics as so*et ing t at falls far s ort of t e typical disciplines, as so*et ing t at is to "e e1uated ,it practical ,isdo* in t e narro, sense, tend also to look at *edicine along t e sa*e lines=t at is, as so*et ing t at is concerned pri*arily ,it practice or ,it kno,ledge only to t e e&tent t at is re1uired for dealing ,it t e particulars of practice. But t is is not supported "y t e te&ts. ' e pro"le* ,it , at Aristotle says a"out et ics and *edicine is not, ) s all argue ere, t at t ey are considered not to "e like t e ot er disciplines, "ut rat er t at t ey are t oug t to "e continuous ,it practice. ' ere are, indeed, ti*es , en Aristotle stresses t e practical aspect of *edicine and e*p asi9es t e need to kno, t e particulars or t e superiority of kno,ledge of particulars. And at ti*es e appears to

e&clude 5 H% 5 fro* et ics any co*ponent t at goes "eyond practice or kno,ledge of t e particulars ,it in a practical conte&t. 8.&& )n fact it does not appear t at t e p ysician studies even ealt in general, "ut t at of t e u*an "eing=or rat er of so*e individual u*an "eing, for it is individuals t at e as to cure. >1$9Fa1$? ' ese @*atters of conductA co*e under no art @or science,

#.16

A or professional tradition, "ut t e agents t e*selves ave to consider , at is suited to t e circu*stances on eac occasion, /ust as is t e case ,it *edicine and navigation. >11$4aE? <o,ever, as ,e sa, a"ove, Aristotle takes *edicine to "e a kind of discipline or science >

?, to ave its o,n su"/ect *atter and principles >"asic ele*ents?, and to prove or e&plain , atever pertains to ealt or disease. Being suc an activity, it is concerned ,it t e universal. 8.&8 Io art @or discipline,

A as t e particular in vie,, *edicine for instance , at is good for +ocrates or Callias, "ut , at is good for t is or t at class of persons >for t is is t e sort of t ing t at co*es ,it in t e province of an art?. . . . +i*ilarly, t erefore, r etoric ,ill not consider , at see*s pro"a"le in eac individual case, for instance to +ocrates or <ippias, "ut t at , ic see*s pro"a"le to t is or t at class of persons. >Rhet. &8:3b%=7 #.14 -or t e doctor does not say , at is ealt y in t e case of t e individual eye, "ut eit er of every eye, or deter*ining so*e sort @of eyeA. > ost. Anal. =5b%27

:f course, , at is true of *edicine is true of every discipline. 8very art or discipline deals ,it t e universal >see Met . 1$$#a14, 1$%9"64, 1$E$"194 ost. Anal . HF"#H, HH"#$?. As #.16 states, GIo art @or disciplineA as t e particular in vie,.G :"viously, t ere is a difficulty ere. )t cannot "e t e case "ot t at *edicine is concerned only ,it t e individual and t ere is no art or science dealing ,it *atters of ealt >#.11, #.16?, and t at t ere is a discipline or science dealing ,it t e general or universal aspects of *edical p eno*ena >#.1#, #.14?. ' ere are at least t,o ,ays out of t is difficulty. :ne ,ay is to argue t at , en Aristotle c aracteri9es *edicine as a discipline or science e uses t e ter*

rat er loosely and does not *ean to say t at it rese*"les in any significant ,ay t e typical disciplines or sciences.@69A Anot er ,ay is to argue t at t e ter* is not used loosely, "ut t at Aristotle applies it only to so*e t eoretical investigation of *edical p eno*ena and not to t e discipline ordinarily called *edicine. 2 en e t us says t at *edicine is a discipline or a science, e is not speaking a"out ordinary *edicine "ut a"out a kind of t eoretical study of *atters of ealt . 5 HE 5 7et despite t e fact t at eit er of t ese suggestions ,ould go a long ,ay to,ard resolving t e apparent difficulty *entioned a"ove, ) find little te&tual support for eit er one. Consider, to "egin ,it , t e first suggestion. )ndeed, Aristotle uses t e ter*

,and even *ore fre1uently t e ver" , rat er loosely at ti*es to si*ply *ean kno,ledge of t e ordinary kind t at *ay ave little or even not ing to do ,it scientific e&planation or de*onstration=t at is, kno,ledge t at e& i"its none of t ose features in ter*s of , ic e defines else, ere. ' is is, o,ever, not t e ,ay e uses t e ter* in t e re*arks 1uoted a"ove, , ere e c aracteri9es *edicine as a discipline or science. Al*ost all of t e a"ove re*arks occur in conte&ts , ere Aristotle is e&plicitly concerned ,it scientific kno,ledge, e&planation, or de*onstration, and , ere e uses t e ter* rat er strictly. -or e&a*ple, , en Aristotle includes *edicine a*ong t e sciences at ost. Anal . F9a1% and HH"1#, t e conte&t is one , ere t e ter*

is used in t e strict sense. ' e conte&t at Met . 1$6%, , ere Aristotle groups *edicine ,it *at e*atics as "eing a discipline t at ai*s at attaining kno,ledge of certain principles, ele*ents, and causes, is also one , ere t e ter* is applied to standard Aristotelian sciences, for e&a*ple, p ysics or ar*onics. )n addition, if it ,ere true t at Aristotle uses t e ter*

in relation to *edicine in suc a ,ay t at e does not *ean to say it is a discipline or a science, t e sa*e ,ould also ave to "e true in t e case of t e rest of t e practical or productive Gdisciplines.G )ndeed, it ,ould "e *ore so in t e latter case. As a result, not ing ot er t an t e t eoretical ones ,ould "e disciplines or sciences. But t is ,ould *ake it i*possi"le for Aristotle to distinguis "et,een t eoretical and nont eoretical disciplines and to dra, t e contrast a*ong t eoretical, practical, and productive disciplines or sciences.

2 at a"out t e suggestion t at Aristotle differentiates co*pletely "et,een a kind of t eoretical activity t at e c aracteri9es as t e science of *edicine and a practical activity t at re*ains solely at t e level of practice; Per aps t ere are good reasons for differentiating "et,een suc activities, and it is 1uite possi"le t at so*e of t e pro"le*s Aristotle raises a"out et ics and *edicine t at presu*a"ly ste* fro* t eir practical c aracter could "e avoided if ,e ,ere to distinguis s arply "et,een t eory and practice in et ical and *edical affairs. Aristotle does not, o,ever, t ink of *edicine as consisting of t,o totally different and distinct kinds of activities. ' ere are per aps good reasons for not doing so. -or e&a*ple, , en e insists t at t e su"/ect *atter of *edicine is, like t at of et ics and politics, c aracteri9ed "y ine&actness, e is not speaking a"out one of t ese activities and not t e ot er. ' e *edicine e as in *ind is so*et ing t at enco*passes "ot t e scientific or e&planatory 5 HF 5 accounts e associates ,it any ot er discipline as ,ell as t e concern ,it practice=t at is, restoring, producing, or *aintaining ealt in an individual. ' is is , at in part it *eans for i* to "e a practical discipline: )t is to "e a discipline t at reac es t e level of practice, and as a conse1uence never really to "eco*e disconnected fro* t e particular or t e kno,ledge t at is appropriate to t e particular. ' e discipline, t en, t at Aristotle calls G*edicineG includes "ot activities distinguis ed a"ove. )t is ard to see o, ,e could co*pletely divorce practice in *edicine fro* all kno,ledge t at goes "eyond t e particular case t at confronts us in a particular conte&t. Per aps it is easier to see o, ,e could ave t eoretical kno,ledge ,it out any connection to practice. <o,ever, for Aristotle t e reason ,e pursue kno,ledge of *edical *atters is for t e sake of practice. ' e ,ay Aristotle conceives of disciplines like *edicine, et ics, or politics is, of course, not ,it out its pro"le*s4 for looking at a discipline "y focusing pri*arily on its ulti*ate goals, , ic *ay appen to "e noncognitive, can easily lead to difficulties. As <ardie as o"served, G<e @AristotleA does not distinguis clearly, , en e says t at t e end is action, "et,een t e nature of t e in1uiry >*et odology? and our *otives for pursuing it >psyc ology?.G@#$A Alt oug ) re*ain so*e, at skeptical as to , et er Aristotle does not distinguis "et,een *et odology and psyc ology, it is clear t at is e*p asis on t e noncognitive ends of so*e disciplines leads i* often to vie, suc disciplines co*pletely fro* t e perspective of t ese kinds of ends, and t us to underesti*ate or overlook t eir cognitive o"/ectives. <e argues, for e&a*ple, t at since et ics is re1uired to reac a certain level of detail due to t e fact t at it is a practical discipline, t en every account of it is ine&act if it fails to reac t at level. ' us, e tends at ti*es to evaluate t e e&actness of a discipline solely fro* t e perspective of its noncognitive goals and to pronounce t e , ole discipline to "e e&act!ine&act ,it out considering its cognitive functions. As s all "e seen later, *any of t e t ings e says a"out t e pervasiveness of ine&actness in et ics follo, fro* is ,ay of looking at a discipline pri*arily t roug its ulti*ate goals. 8t ics is for Aristotle, as is *edicine, a discipline. )t as a cognitive co*ponent t at is, according to i*, su"ordinate to its practical ends. ' is cognitive co*ponent, ) ave argued, cannot "e identified ,it t e narro, conception of practical ,isdo* if ,e are to do /ustice to Aristotle.s conception of et ical in1uiry or to is activities in is o,n et ical treatises. But, as ) ave also said a"ove, t e 1uestion , et er et ical in1uiry is to "e identified ,it practical ,isdo* depends on , at ,e take t e nature of practical ,isdo* to "e. )f ,e take t e latter to "e t e sa*e as p ilosop ical in1uiry, t en clearly et ical in1uiry and practical ,isdo* could turn out to "e t e sa*e after all. 5 HH 5

Theoretical and Practical %nowledge

Jet us, t en, assu*e ,it Aristotle t at et ics is a practical discipline , ose ulti*ate goal is practice "ut , ose i**ediate or proper goal is kno,ledge. ' e 1uestion naturally arises as to t e kind of kno,ledge ,e s ould, can, or in fact do attain in et ical investigation or in any ot er investigation ,it goals si*ilar to t ose of et ics. 3oes t e kno,ledge ac1uired in suc disciplines differ fro* kno,ledge o"tained in t e t eoretical disciplines and, if so, o,; -inding ans,ers to t ese 1uestions *ay "e of so*e use in our efforts to understand , y Aristotle *ost often t inks t at t e only kind of kno,ledge ,e ave a"out *atters of conduct is practical. )n *any instances, sc olars, undou"tedly influenced "y Aristotle.s fre1uent re*arks on t e e&istence of t ree kinds of disciplines >t eoretical, practical, and productive?, assu*e t at t ere are differences a*ong t ese t ree kinds and t at t e differences are o"vious. But , en t ey atte*pt to specify t e differences t ey si*ply point to t e differences in t e goals of t ese t ree types of disciplines: Practical and productive ones ai* ulti*ately at so*et ing t at is different fro* kno,ledge=t at is, practice and production=, ile t eoretical ones ai* presu*a"ly at no ot er purpose t an kno,ledge itself. ' e ulti*ate goals of a discipline, t en, deter*ine , et er t e discipline "elongs to t e t eoretical, practical, or productive kind. ' ey provide us ,it a criterion for placing eac discipline in one of Aristotle.s t ree classes. But are t ese classes *utually e&clusive; Can a discipline "elong to t,o or *ore of t ese classes; )t see*s t at Aristotle takes t ese classes to "e *utually e&clusive, and t at, for i*, no discipline can "elong to *ore t an one class. 7et , et er a discipline "elongs to one of t ese t ree classes see*s to depend solely on , et er t ere is *ore t an one kind of goal in relation to t e su"/ect *atter , ic t at discipline studies. 2 et er, for e&a*ple, t ere could "e t eoretical kno,ledge in relation to *edical *atters ,ould see* to depend on , et er ,e could ai* at kno,ledge for its o,n sake a"out suc *atters. Could ,e ai* at kno,ledge for its o,n sake in relation to *atters of conduct; ) s all return to t is 1uestion s ortly. 8ven if ,e ,ere to agree ,it Aristotle t at in so*e cases in1uiry or kno,ledge is pursued for its o,n sake, , ereas in ot ers it is pursued for t e sake of so*et ing different fro* kno,ledge, it is not clear , at ,e s ould conclude fro* t is supposed difference in t e goals of our in1uiry4 for t e fa*iliar distinction Aristotle dra,s a*ong t ree types of kno,ledge t at differ ,it respect to t eir goals does not "y itself specify a difference in t e nature of t e disciplines t at "elong to t ese types. )t only specifies a difference in t eir goals or t e uses to , ic t ey are put. But differences in t e goals *ay or *ay not i*ply differences in t e nature or structure 5 H9 5 of t e kno,ledge a discipline attains. Conversely, it is not evident t at identity of goals i*plies episte*ological identity. )s all t eoretical kno,ledge episte*ologically identical;@#1A )s all practical kno,ledge of t e sa*e type; Are applied *ec anics and applied geo*etry episte*ologically identical and are "ot of t e* to "e taken as "eing t e sa*e types of kno,ledge as et ics and politics are; +o pointing only to t e different uses of kno,ledge does not tell us , at t e "asic or essential differences "et,een types of kno,ledge are or even , et er t ere are any episte*ologically significant differences "et,een t eoretical and nont eoretical kno,ledge. :ne naturally ,ants to kno, o, an ite* of t eoretical kno,ledge differs episte*ologically fro* one t at is a part of practical kno,ledge or , y so*e t ing t at is an ite* of t eoretical kno,ledge can.t ave a use "eyond itself.@#6A And if no suc difference in t e essential c aracter of t e t,o types of kno,ledge can "e found, t en t e distinction "et,een practical and t eoretical kno,ledge, , ic rests only on use, does not tell us *uc a"out t e kno,ledge ,e aspire to in et ical investigation. -or all ,e kno,, et ical kno,ledge *ay "e

practical "ut rigorous in t e ,ay geo*etry and optics are >"ot of , ic are de*onstrative, according to Aristotle?, or practical in *uc t e sa*e ,ay r etoric or ot er less rigorous types of kno,ledge are. )t *ay, nonet eless, "e t e case t at t e supposed difference a*ong t e uses or goals of practical, productive, and t eoretical kno,ledge itself rests on so*et ing *ore funda*ental. )t *ay, for e&a*ple, rest on differences in t e respective o"/ects or faculties of t ese types of kno,ledge, and it is per aps factors suc as t ese t at in turn i*ply so*e episte*ological differences: o"/ects or faculties affect t e nature or structure of kno,ledge itself. )ndeed, ,e find in t e Aristotelian ,ritings a nu*"er of re*arks pointing to so*e differences a*ong disciplines or types of disciplines. ' us on at least t,o different occasions t eoretical disciplines are distinguis ed fro* practical and productive ones not on t e "asis of t eir ulti*ate goals=kno,ledge, action, and production, respectively="ut on a supposed difference in t e o"/ects t ey study. ' e nont eoretical ones deal, according to Aristotle, ,it t ings , ic are suc t at t e principle of *ove*ent or c ange is not in t e* "ut in t e producer or agent. ' eoretical kno,ledge Gdeals ,it t e t ings t at ave in themsel+es a principle of *ove*ent.G@##A ' e atte*pt to differentiate types of disciplines on t e "asis of an internal or e&ternal source of *ove*ent in t eir o"/ects as its difficulties. 'o "egin ,it , as Aristotle i*self clearly sees, t ere is *at e*atics , ic is a t eoretical discipline dealing ,it , at as no *ove*ent or is at rest.@#4A ' is is also t e pro"le* ,it t e ig est t eoretical kno,ledge , ic , according to Aristotle, studies , at can e&ist apart and is i**ova"le.@#%A Anot er 1uestion arises a"out t e discipline t at studies t e 5 9$ 5 nature of t e *oral agent or agent in action. According to Aristotle.s distinction of t e sources of *ove*ent, t e discipline *ust "e a t eoretical one, since to "e an agent is to ave a source of *ove*ent fro* ,it in.@#EA )f one takes t e discipline t at studies t e nature of t e agent to "e et ics, t en et ics *ust "e, on t e "asis of t is distinction at least, a t eoretical discipline. +etting aside t e a"ove kinds of pro"le*s, it is clear t at t ere are additional ones , ic are *ore pertinent to our present purposes. +uppose ,e ,ere to assu*e t at t e distinction in ter*s of t e sources of *ove*ent is a *eaningful one=t at is, t at t ere are t,o classes of o"/ects , ic are to "e distinguis ed in ter*s of , et er t eir source of *otion is internal or e&ternal and t at indeed t ere are t,o types of disciplines >t eoretical and nont eoretical? t at correspond to t ese t,o classes. 2 at does t is tell us a"out t e episte*ological nature of t ese t,o types of disciplines; )t is not clear t at t is distinction, taken in t e si*plest possi"le ,ay to *erely signify a difference in t e source of *otion, as any i*portant episte*ological conse1uences or t at it as conse1uences t at are sufficient for distinguis ing "et,een t eoretical and nont eoretical disciplines in ter*s of t eir episte*ological nature. ' us, t e distinction in ter*s of t e kind of *otion!c ange in t e su"/ect *atter, like t e distinction in ter*s of t e goals of a discipline, fails to yield an episte*ological difference a*ong disciplines. 7et t ere *ay "e a ,ay of construing Aristotle.s distinction a"out internal and e&ternal sources of *ove*ent t at *akes it episte*ologically relevant. )t is pro"a"ly so*e suc construal Aristotle as in *ind in connecting t e source of *ove*ent >c ange? to t e t eoretical!nont eoretical division a*ong disciplines. 2e *ay, for e&a*ple, interpret Aristotle.s distinction as asserting t at in one class of o"/ects, or in t e case of t e su"/ect *atter of so*e disciplines, t e *ove*ent >c ange? is in erent in t e nature of t e o"/ects >su"/ect *atter?. )t is part of, or necessarily connected to, t eir essential nature, , ereas in t e case of t e ot ers it is not. ' us in N.E. :

8.&:

All art is concerned ,it co*ing into "eing, i.e., ,it pursuing or studying o, so*et ing *ay co*e into "eing , ic is capa"le of eit er "eing or not "eing, and , ose origin is in t e *aker and not in t e t ing *ade4 for art is concerned neit er ,it t ings t at are, or co*e into "eing, "y necessity, nor ,it t ings t at do so in accordance ,it nature >since t ese ave t eir origin in t e*selves?. . .. Bot @art and lack of artA are concerned ,it , at can "e ot er,ise. >114$a1%?

But et ics itself, and presu*a"ly all practical disciplines, are concerned ,it t ings t at can "e ot er,ise: G' e class of t ings t at can "e ot er,ise includes "ot t ings *ade and actions doneG >114$a4 see also 114$"#?. 5 91 5 )f indeed t ere are differences of t e kind Aristotle speaks "et,een t e t ings ,it , ic t eoretical and nont eoretical disciplines deal, t en per aps t ere is reason to t ink t at t ere are also episte*ological differences "et,een t eoretical and nont eoretical disciplines. At least, Aristotle.s "elief t at t ere are suc differences in t e su"/ect *atter of t eoretical and nont eoretical disciplines ,ould ave provided i* ,it good reasons for concluding t at t ere are episte*ological differences "et,een t eoretical and nont eoretical disciplines. ' e assu*ption t at t e nature of kno,ledge in so*e sense corresponds to t e nature of its o"/ect ,ould ave given i* sufficient reason for *oving fro* differences in t e su"/ect *atter to episte*ological differences in t e disciplines dealing ,it suc su"/ect *atter. ' e idea t at differences in t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter correspond to differences in types of cognition and even to differences in t e cognitive faculties goes at least as far "ack as Plato. As is ,ell kno,n, Plato in t e Republic atte*pts to differentiate t e various faculties of t e soul and types of cognition in ter*s of t e nature of t e o"/ects t ey appre end. Aristotle utili9es t is idea and often "ases is clai*s a"out supposed differences in t e nature of kno,ledge t at is attaina"le in t e various disciplines on differences in t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter t ey deal ,it . At ti*es e totally e*"races t e Platonic idea and goes as far as to assert t at differences in t e nature of t e o"/ects of cognition correspond to differences in t e parts >or faculties? of t e soul t at cogni9e t e*.@#FA 8.&3 And let it "e assu*ed t at t ere are t,o rational faculties, one , ere"y ,e conte*plate t ose t ings , ose first principles cannot "e ot er,ise, and one , ere"y ,e conte*plate t ose t ings , ic can "e ot er,ise: since, on t e assu*ption t at kno,ledge is "ased on a likeness or affinity of so*e sort "et,een su"/ect and o"/ect, t e parts of t e soul adopted to t e cognition of o"/ects t at are of different kinds *ust t e*selves differ in kind. >11#9a%?

Jet us, o,ever, set aside for t e *o*ent t is PlatonicBAristotelian idea of t e putative correspondence "et,een parts of t e soul >or cognitive faculties? and t e nature of t e o"/ects t ey cogni9e. Jet us focus instead on Plato.s and Aristotle.s clai* t at t e nature of kno,ledge , ic is possi"le in a do*ain corresponds in so*e ,ay to t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter of t is do*ain. ' is clai* can "e used to partly s o, , y t ere *ust "e so*e episte*ological differences a*ong t e various disciplines4 for Aristotle t inks t at t e su"/ect *atter of practical >and indeed of all nont eoretical? disciplines e& i"its so*e c aracteristics t at ave i*portant episte*ological conse1uences. <e t inks t at t e su"/ect *atter of et ics and si*ilar disciplines is c aracteri9ed "y or suffers fro* certain deficiencies4 it suffers fro* various kinds of ine&actness, , ic affects t e

5 96 5 kno,ledge t at is possi"le in suc nont eoretical do*ains. )t *ay very ,ell "e true t en t at t ere are i*portant episte*ological differences "et,een practical and t eoretical kno,ledge and not *erely differences in t eir goals. 2 et er t ere are in fact suc differences depends on , at t ese c aracteristics of t e su"/ect *atter Aristotle refers to as ine&actness are and , et er t ey do indeed affect t e nature of kno,ledge. Unfortunately, t e supposed ine&actness of t e su"/ect *atter of practical disciplines *ay not "e sufficient for t e purpose of distinguis ing t e* ,it respect to t eir episte*ological c aracter fro* t e t eoretical disciplines. Contrary to , at *any sc olars ave supposed, t ese features of ine&actness t at Aristotle attri"utes to t e su"/ect *atter of et ics, *edicine, and t e rest of t e practical disciplines e also attri"utes to t e su"/ect *atter of so*e t eoretical disciplines.@#HA As s all "e seen, e takes t e , ole of nature to "e c aracteri9ed "y t ese kinds of ine&actness. ' us, , atever episte*ological conse1uences t ese kinds of ine&actness ave, if t ey ave any, ,ill also affect t e disciplines t at study nature. ' ese disciplines are, according to Aristotle, t eoretical ones.@#9A 2e cannot, t erefore, assu*e t at t e supposed ine&actness of t e su"/ect *atter of practical disciplines and its episte*ological conse1uences are sufficient for setting apart t ese disciplines fro* t e t eoretical ones. At "est t ey *ay set apart only t eoretical ones , ose su"/ect *atter is not ine&act fro* all else=t at is, fro* t e t eoretical ones , ose su"/ect *atter is ine&act and t e practical and productive ones. :r per aps t e practical and productive ones are ine&act in a *uc *ore pervasive ,ay t an are t ose t eoretical ones t at deal ,it nature. )t *ay "e t e case t at t e practical and productive disciplines are even less e&act t an t e t eoretical ones dealing ,it nature or ine&act su"/ect *atter. 7et even if t is ,ere true ,e ,ould still "e left only ,it differences of degree, rat er t an of kind, a*ong t e various types of disciplines. ' is last point is of considera"le i*portance, for it 1uestions t e ,idespread assu*ption t at t e ine&actness Aristotle attri"utes to t e su"/ect *atter of et ics and ot er practical disciplines as suc drastic episte*ological conse1uences t at it *akes t e* altoget er different fro* t e t eoretical ones. )t 1uestions t e assu*ption t at t e *et od of t e disciplines , ose su"/ect *atter is ine&act is different fro* t at of t e t eoretical disciplines on account of t e ine&actness of t e su"/ect *atter of t e for*er kind of disciplines. ' e *et od of t e practical disciplines *ay very ,ell "e different, "ut it need not "e so "ecause of t e ine&actness of t eir su"/ect *atter. ) s all argue later t at t is assu*ption is not o"vious at all. Alt oug t e ine&actness of t e su"/ect *atter poses so*e pro"le*s, Aristotle does not conclude t at t e *et od of t e disciplines ,it ine&act su"/ect *atter is different in kind fro* t at of t e disciplines , ose su"/ect *atter is e&act. <ence, e does not infer fro* t e ine&actness of t e 5 9# 5 su"/ect *atter of t e practical disciplines t at t eir *et od is different in kind fro* t at of t e t eoretical disciplines. But if t eoretical and practical kno,ledge cannot "e ade1uately differentiated on t e "asis of t e c aracter of t eir goals, t e source of *ove*ent >c ange? in t eir su"/ect *atter, or t e e&actness!ine&actness of t eir su"/ect *atter, t en o, is it done; ) suspect t ere are no *a/or episte*ological differences "et,een t e types of kno,ledge Aristotle identifies, and t at *ay "e t e reason , y e does not offer any detailed e&planation of t is *atter. 7et t ere are so*e differences,

and t ey see* to ste* fro* t e goals of t e various kinds of kno,ledge Aristotle identifies. ' us, t e clai* ,e encounter al*ost t roug out t e Aristotelian sc olars ip traditionBt at differences in goals i*ply episte*ological differences=is to so*e e&tent correct. <o,ever, t e ,ay t e clai* is to "e understood and t e reasons /ustifying it ave never "een *ade clear, or even identified. ' us, alt oug pointing only to t e differences in t e goals of practical and t eoretical disciplines *ay not "y itself elp in identifying in , at ,ay t e c aracter of practical kno,ledge differs fro* t at of t eoretical, t e i*plications t e goals ave *ay do so. -or, as ) s all argue at so*e lengt in su"se1uent c apters, Aristotle t inks t at t e goals of practical disciplines i*pose certain conditions on t e kno,ledge t at is possi"le, desira"le, or re1uired in suc disciplines. ' ey re1uire, for instance, t at ,e reac a level of specificity or detail t at *ay "e far greater t an t at , ic t e t eoretical disciplines re1uire. :ne difference, t en, "et,een practical and t eoretical disciplines is t is: 2 ile t e latter kind of disciplines can "e solely constituted "y general or a"stract accounts, t ose of t e for*er kind *ust, in virtue of t eir goals, also include particular, specific, or detailed accounts. At least one difference, t en, ,ould "e in t eir generality!a"stractness and particularity!specificity. 2 et er t e introduction of particular!specific accounts in a discipline as any additional episte*ological conse1uences is a *uc *ore controversial *atter t at ) ,ill discuss later >c ap. %?. <o,ever, t e a"ove *ay not "e t e only ,ay t e goals of a discipline affect t e kno,ledge t e discipline ai*s at or o"tains. Aristotle argues t at t e goals also fi& or deter*ine t e degree of rigor t at is proper to a discipline4 t e rigor , ic is proper for disciplines , ose goals are practical is less t an t at , ic is proper for t ose , ose goals are purely t eoretical. ' e a"ove considerations t at connect t e re1uired level of specificity and t e desira"le rigor in a discipline to its goals provide, , en spelled out in detail, so*e e&planation as to o, and , y t e goals of a discipline affect its episte*ological c aracter. )n t e case at and, t ey ,ould provide so*e e&planation of o, and , y practical disciplines in general, and 5 94 5 et ics in particular, *ay differ episte*ologically fro* t eoretical disciplines. +till else, ere Aristotle takes t eoretical kno,ledge to "e t e sort of kno,ledge t at ai*s at or provides kno,ledge of causes or of t e G, yG >Met . A i, ii?. ' e t eoretical study of any field or t e p ilosop ical approac in any do*ain is t at , ic seeks to understand t e causes >E.E. 161E"#%?. 2e *ay su**ari9e, t en, Aristotle.s vie,s on t e differences "et,een practical and t eoretical kno,ledge as follo,s: >a? Practical kno,ledge ai*s ulti*ately at so*et ing "eyond kno,ledge, t at is, practice, , ile t eoretical kno,ledge ai*s ulti*ately at kno,ledge4 >"? Practical kno,ledge *ay use to a certain e&tent t e *et od t eoretical kno,ledge uses, "ut it *ay "e deficient in its de*onstrative rigor on account of t e ine&actness of its su"/ect *atter4 >c? Practical kno,ledge *ay "e *ore specific t an t eoretical kno,ledge on account of its goals4 and >d? Practical kno,ledge *ay not ai* at kno,ing t e causes. Deeping in *ind t e variety of features Aristotle uses for t e purpose of differentiating "et,een practical and t eoretical kno,ledge, ,e ,ant to ask , et er it is possi"le to ave t eoretical kno,ledge a"out *atters of conduct. As noted earlier, Plato t inks t ere is no difficulty in aving suc kno,ledge. )ndeed, *ost often e sees kno,ledge of *atters of conduct as occupying t e ig est place a*ong t e t eoretical disciplines. A*ong t ose , o ave s ared Plato.s conviction, Benedict de +pino9a is per aps t e "est kno,n. <is Ethics is t e "est e&a*ple ,e ave of a *oral geo*etry. (ore recently, Lo n 0a,ls as e&pressed sy*pat y ,it t e Platonic ideal and as assu*ed t at it can "e reali9ed: G:ne s ould note also t at t e acceptance of t ese principles @of /usticeA is not con/ectured on

a psyc ological la, of pro"a"ility. )deally any,ay, ) s ould like to s o, t at t eir ackno,ledge*ent is t e only c oice consistent ,it t e full description of t e original position. ' e argu*ent ai*s eventually to "e strictly deductive. . . . 2e s ould strive for a *oral geo*etry ,it all t e rigor , ic t is na*e connotes.G@4$A 2 at a"out Aristotle; As seen earlier, e takes t e interest or desire for kno,ledge of *atters of conduct to "e su"ordinate to our interest or desire for practice. 2 at does t is su"ordination relation i*ply; )t at least i*plies t at ,e desire or ave an interest in kno,ledge of *atters of conduct for t e sake of practice. Aristotle olds in addition t at t e relation of su"ordination is asy**etrical: )f A is desired for t e sake of B, t en B is not desired for t e sake of A.@41A Assu*ing asy**etry, if it is true t at t e ulti*ate goal of et ics is practice, if kno,ledge of *atters of conduct is pursued for t e sake of practice, t en practice is not pursued for t e sake of kno,ledge. Aristotle also olds t at t e su"ordination relation is not irrefle&ive: if A is desired for t e sake of B, t en it is not t e case t at 5 9% 5 A is not desired for t e sake of A. ' e "est kno,n e&a*ple Aristotle gives of t is is t at of t e su"ordination relation virtue as to appiness: virtue is desired or pursued for t e sake of appiness "ut it is also desired or pursued for t e sake of itself. 2e cannot conclude, t en, t at "ecause ,e desire or pursue A for t e sake of B ,e cannot desire or pursue A for t e sake of itself. 2e cannot, t at is, conclude t at "ecause ,e desire or pursue kno,ledge of *atters of conduct for t e sake of practice ,e cannot pursue kno,ledge a"out suc su"/ect *atters for its o,n sake, or t at t ere is no t eoretical kno,ledge a"out *atters of conduct. ' us, if , at lies "e ind t e difference "et,een practical and t eoretical kno,ledge is t at t e desire to kno, a"out *atters of conduct is su"ordinate to practice, t at is, our condition >a?, t en it does not follo, fro* t is su"ordination relation t at t ere is no desire for kno,ledge for its o,n sake a"out *atters of conduct. Aristotle, o,ever, see*s *ost often to t ink t at one does not, and per aps cannot, ai* at kno,ledge for its o,n sake a"out *atters of conduct and, t erefore, t at t ere is no t eoretical kno,ledge, in t e sense ,e are presently discussing, a"out t e do*ain t at consists of *atters of conduct. ' is see*s to "e t e intent of t e re*arks 1uoted earlier, especially #.#B#.% and #.H=t at is, to deny t at one ai*s at or desires kno,ledge for its o,n sake a"out *atters of conduct. ' e supposition is t at unless one ad an interest in action or in doing certain t ings, one ,ould not "e interested in kno,ing a"out t e*. )f one did not desire, ai* at, or need to "e /ust or act /ustly, one ,ould not desire, ai* at, or need to kno, , at /ustice is4 as presu*a"ly one ,ould not desire, ai* at, or need to kno, , at ealt is if one did not desire, ai* at, or need to "e ealt y >#.%?. -or Aristotle, t ere is not, and presu*a"ly cannot "e, a desire for kno,ledge a"out suc *atters t at is independent of practical goals. ' e e&a*ple of *edicine is, of course, t e e&a*ple used *ost often in t is connection. )t see*s o"vious to al*ost everyone t at our interest in kno,ing a"out ealt is solely practical4 it e&ists only insofar as ,e ave an interest in "eing ealt y. ' is co*pletely practical conception of *edical kno,ledge goes at least as far "ack as t e <ippocratic tradition, and it as "een preserved in 1uite une1uivocal language "y t e aut or of t e treatise #radition in Medicine : G)n t e first place, t e science of *edicine ,ould never ave "een discovered nor, indeed, soug t for, ,ere t ere no need of it. )f sick *en fared /ust as ,ell eating and drinking and living e&actly as ealt y *en do, and no "etter on so*e different regi*en, t ere ,ould "e little need for t e science.G@46A ' e assu*ption t at in t e case of *edicine and et ics our interest in kno,ledge can only "e su"ordinate to our interest in so*e practical goal or ot er is, o,ever, not o"vious. -or suppose t at ,e all ,ere to "eco*e ealt y. 2 y are ,e certain t at ,e ,ould t en ave no interest in *atters of

ealt , t at ,e ,ould not "e interested in kno,ing , at ealt is or 5 9E 5 , at produces it, *aintains it, and so fort ; But per aps it could "e said t at suc cognitive interests ,ould still "e su"ordinate to practical ones=,e ,ould "e interested to kno, t ese t ings "ecause ,e ,ould "e interested in *aintaining ealt or in so*e suc practical o"/ective. But suppose not only t at ,e ,ere ealt y, "ut t at in addition ,e ad reasons to "elieve t at ,e ,ould re*ain ealt y, t at t ere ,ould "e, as far as ,e kne,, no practical use for *edical kno,ledge. 2ould ,e, t en, cease to ave any interest in kno,ing o, t e u*an "ody ,orks, o, its parts function, o, t ey sustain t e*selves, o, t ey attain t eir e&cellence or opti*al state, and so fort ; 2 at is pu99ling a"out t e vie, t at denies t ere is or can "e any cognitive interest in *atters of *edicine or conduct t at goes "eyond so*e practical o"/ectives is t is: ' ose , o accept t e distinction "et,een t eoretical and practical kno,ledge on t e "asis of t e nature of t eir respective goals >and t is includes Aristotle i*self? are ,illing to ad*it t at ,e can ave a t eoretical interest in relation to /ust a"out anyt ing, e&cept to t ings suc as t e nature of t e virtues, of pleasure, of t e relation "et,een virtue and pleasure, of ealt , and ot er suc t ings. 2 y suc t ings fall outside t e do*ain of t eoretical interests is indeed pu99ling, if one considers t at t ey are as *uc a part of our ,orld as anyt ing is. ' e pu99ling c aracter of t e Aristotelian position t at denies t e possi"ility or t e value of a t eoretical interest in *atters of conduct ,as *ost forcefully descri"ed "y <arold <. Loac i*: And , y, finally, s ould a speculative in1uiry into t e p eno*ena of conduct "e re/ected as ,ort less; (ig t ,e not say to Aristotle: G)s not t e study of t e for*s of *oral consciousness, t e conception of t e *oral ideal >in s ort, t e gro,t and develop*ent of t e *oral structure of civili9ed society?, at least as valua"le=and at least as *uc entitled to a place in your su"division of t eoretical science=as t e study, for e&a*ple, of t e fa"ric of t e lo,er cos*os, or of t e .*eteorological. p eno*ena, or of t e species of ani*al and t eir properties;G@4#A ) suspect , at lies "e ind t e vie, t at denies any t eoretical interest in *edicine or et ics is t e undenia"ly great i*portance t at t e practical goals of t ese disciplines ave for us=t at is, t e i*portance of attaining, *aintaining, or restoring ealt >*edicine? or of doing t e correct t ing or reali9ing t e correct dispositions >et ics?. ' ese practical o"/ectives are of suc i*portance t at t ey overs ado, or al*ost eclipse any possi"le t eoretical interest in *atters of *edicine or of conduct. But it *ay "e a *istake to conclude fro* t e i*portance t at t e practical o"/ectives of *edicine or et ics ave t at t ere cannot "e any t eoretical interests in t e case of t ese disciplines. -or t e fact t at ,e pursue A for t e sake of B and B is of great i*portance does not i*ply t at ,e cannot pursue 5 9F 5 A for t e sake of A. According to Aristotle, ,e ai* at virtue for t e sake of appiness and t e latter is of t e greatest i*portance, "ut it does not follo, fro* t is t at virtue cannot "e pursued for its o,n sake. 2e s ould not, t erefore, conclude t at ,e cannot ave t eoretical interests in relation to t e su"/ect *atter of a discipline /ust "ecause t e practical goals of t at discipline are of great i*portance. Plato and, at ti*es, +ocrates do not dra, suc a conclusion. Alt oug t ey assign a great i*portance to practice, t ey do not t ere"y eli*inate t e t eoretical interest in kno,ing a"out *atters of conduct. )ndeed, as seen earlier, t ey often clai* t at our t eoretical interest in *atters of conduct is, or at least

s ould "e, as great or greater t an t e interest ,e ave or s ould ave in any ot er do*ain, and t is is so precisely "ecause of t e i*portance *atters of conduct ave for us. Aristotle, o,ever, is often critical of t e e*p asis +ocrates and Plato place upon our t eoretical interest in *atters of conduct. 7et even Aristotle does not ulti*ately deny t at t ere is suc an interest. <is criticis*s of t e +ocratic and Platonic positions are not so *uc criticis*s of t e i*possi"ility of a t eoretical interest a"out *atters of conduct as t ey are of t e usefulness or efficacy of suc interest or kno,ledge. According to Aristotle, to e*p asi9e t eoretical interest or kno,ledge a"out t e et ical do*ain to t e e&tent t at +ocrates and Plato do *ay lead to a failure to understand o, ,e act correctly or "eco*e good. 'o ave suc a t eoretical interest or kno,ledge a"out t e et ical do*ain, e argues, is neit er sufficient nor necessary for acting correctly or aving t e proper state of c aracter >N.E. 11$%"1%, 11F9"1$4 E.E. 161E"6$?. Aristotle at ti*es recogni9es t e t eoretical interest and kno,ledge t at +ocrates and Plato so often e*p asi9e. ' us, in t e rotrept ., a ,ork t at per aps reflects t e Platonic influence *ore t an ot ers, Aristotle speaks of t e t eoretical kno,ledge of t e e&cellences of t e soul >BF#?. )n t e E.E. e again asserts t e i*portance of t eoretical investigation in *atters of conduct: GAnd in every investigation, proofs stated in p ilosop ical for* are different fro* t ose t at are nonBp ilosop ical4 ence ,e *ust not t ink t at t eoretical study of suc a sort as to *ake *anifest not only t e nature of a t ing "ut also its cause is superfluous even for t e student of politics, since t at is t e p ilosop ic procedure in every fieldG >161E"#%?. )n olit . e distinguis es "et,een t e t eoretical and nonBt eoretical investigation into t e nature or /ustification of slavery >16%4a6$?. Jater in olit . e ,arns t e reader a"out t e dangers of a narro,, practical vie,: GBut it is necessary to say at a little greater lengt , at eac of t ese constitutions is4 for t e 1uestion involves certain difficulties, and it is t e special *ark of one , o investigates any su"/ect p ilosop ically, and not solely ,it regard to its practical aspect, t at e does not overlook or o*it any point, "ut "rings to lig t t e trut a"out 5 9H 5 eac G >16F9"1$?. -inally, Aristotle urges t at ,e s ould study *ost su"/ects not si*ply for t eir practical uses, for Gto seek utility every, ere is entirely unsuited to *en t at are greatBsouled and freeG >1##H"?. )t is clear t at Aristotle does not altoget er deny t at ,e can ave a t eoretical interest in *atters of conduct and t at t eoretical in1uiry a"out suc *atters *ay "e of so*e i*portance. 7et t ere is no dou"t, as ) noted earlier, t at e takes et ics to "e a practical discipline, and e takes t e cognitive goals of et ics to "e su"ordinate to its practical ones. <o,, t en, could ,e ave a t eoretical interest ,it in a discipline t at is practical, an interest to kno, for t e sake of kno,ledge ,it in a discipline , ere t e interest to kno, is su"ordinate to practice; ' ere is a pro"le* ere, for t e su"ordination of t e cognitive interests in *atters of conduct to practical ones i*plies, according to Aristotle, t,o t ings: >1? t e e&tent to , ic kno,ledge is pursued a"out *atters of conduct is deter*ined "y practical o"/ectives4 >6? t e practical goals of t e discipline define in part t e nature of t e discipline=t ey define et ics as a discipline pursued for t e sake of practice. ) s all discuss "ot of t ese t ings at so*e lengt later >c ap. 9?. ) only ,is to point out ere o, difficult it is for Aristotle to allot a place for t eoretical interests ,it in an in1uiry like et ics >or *edicine? , ic e construes as aving practical goals and , ose identity is al*ost deter*ined "y t ese goals. Per aps any t eoretical interests a"out *atters of conduct cannot even "e part of t e discipline of et ics as e *ost often understands it. :ne *ig t argue, o,ever, t at , at is of i*portance in t is conte&t is not , et er t ere is, or could "e, a t eoretical interest in relation to *atters of conduct, "ut , et er t e kno,ledge ,e o"tain a"out

*atters of conduct, regardless of its goals, *eets certain conditions t at t eoretical kno,ledge also *eets4 for, alt oug ,e s ould not *ini*i9e t e i*portance Aristotle attac es to t e nature of t e goals of a discipline for deter*ining , et er it is t eoretical, ,e often *ake suc deter*inations on t e "asis of , et er a discipline *eets t e sort of conditions ,e *entioned earlier=t at is, , et er it uses t e *et od or *et ods t eoretical disciplines use to a sufficient degree and ac ieves an ade1uate level of de*onstrative rigor, , et er it deals ,it its su"/ect *atter at a certain level of a"stractness or generality, or , et er it deals ,it t e "asic ele*ents or causes of a certain do*ain. ' ese are, of course, Aristotle.s o,n conditions in ter*s of , ic e at ti*es distinguis es t eoretical fro* nonB t eoretical disciplines4 t ey are conditions >"?, >c?, and >d? identified a"ove. 3oes et ical in1uiry, t en, *eet so*e or all of t ese conditions; )t is easier to ans,er t is 1uestion ,it respect to so*e of t ese conditions t an ,it respect to ot ers. )ndeed, our ans,er ,it respect to so*e of t ese conditions ,ill not e*erge until t e end of t is study. 'ake, for instance, condition >"?. 3oes t e *et od>s? of et ical in1uiry rese*"le 5 99 5 sufficiently t e *et od>s? of t eoretical disciplines; ' ere is a need to distinguis ere "et,een t,o t ings t is 1uestion *ay "e asking=na*ely, , et er t e *et od>s? of Aristotle.s o,n in1uiry, in contrast to t e *et od>s? of et ical in1uiry in general, rese*"le t ose of t eoretical disciplines. ' ere is, as is ,ell kno,n, *uc dispute as to , at *et od>s? Aristotle uses in is o,n in1uiry. )f t e *et od of t eoretical disciplines is, according to Aristotle, de*onstrative and if t e *et od of is o,n in1uiry is, as so*e sc olars insist, also de*onstrative, t en is o,n investigation *ay "e to so*e e&tent t eoretical. ' e e&tent or degree to , ic is in1uiry is or can "e de*onstrative partly depends on t e episte*ological i*plications of t e kinds of ine&actness Aristotle identifies in et ics. ' ese *atters ,ill "e focal points of discussion in su"se1uent c apters.. <o,ever, if t e *et ods Aristotle uses in is in1uiry are, as so*e sc olars insist, altoget er different fro* t at used "y t e t eoretical disciplines, t en Aristotle.s in1uiry ,ill not "e t eoretical. 2 atever ,e conclude a"out t e *et od>s? Aristotle uses in is o,n et ical in1uiry does not, o,ever, settle t e 1uestion a"out t e *et od>s? of et ical in1uiry or even t e *et od>s? Aristotle identifies as t e proper *et od>s? of et ical in1uiry. <ence, ,e cannot conclude fro* , at Aristotle does in is o,n investigation t at et ical in1uiry in general is nonBt eoretical. +c olars, o,ever, are not in agree*ent a"out t e *et od>s? Aristotle identifies for et ical in1uiry. But it can "e said at t is point t at , et er et ics is t eoretical depends in part on , at t e i*plications of t e ine&actness Aristotle attri"utes to *atters of conduct and our accounts of t e* are and , et er t ese kinds of ine&actness can "e eli*inated: -or, if t ese kinds of ine&actness i*ply, as so*e sc olars insist, t at et ics cannot "e de*onstrative, and if de*onstration is t e *et od of t eoretical disciplines, t en et ics falls outside t e class of t eoretical disciplines.@44A 2 et er t is is so, of course, re*ains to "e seen. (ost often, o,ever, t e c aracteristics in ter*s of , ic ,e /udge , et er a discipline is t eoretical are t ose captured "y Aristotle.s conditions >c? and >d?. Beginning ,it >c?, ,e consider a discipline to "e t eoretical if it is concerned ,it t ings t at are general, universal, or a"stract, if it ac ieves a certain level of generality or a"stractness in its accounts. By doing so, a discipline presu*a"ly goes "eyond , at is of practical interest, na*ely, t e specific or t e particular. ' us, despite possi"le differences in t eir *et ods or even t eir e&actness, ,e can and do vie, co*ponents of p ysics, econo*ics, or ant ropology as t eoretical. But as pointed out earlier, Aristotle.s o,n in1uiry is pri*arily concerned ,it t e *ost general or a"stract aspects of *atters of conduct. ' is is also t e ,ay e sees all in1uiry=, et er et ical,

political, *edical, and so fort =t at is, as "eing concerned ,it t e general or universal. ' is is true, despite Aristotle.s fre1uent pronounce*ents t at et ics or *edicine 5 1$$ 5 *ust reac a level of detail or specificity t at includes t e particular, for t e follo,ing reasons: first, "ecause t e prospects for reac ing suc a level of specificity are, according to Aristotle, not good4 second, "ecause even if suc a level of specificity ,ere to "e attained, it ,ould still leave intact t at part or co*ponent of et ical in1uiry t at deals ,it t e general or a"stract aspects of *atters of conduct in t e ,ay Aristotle.s in1uiry does. 8t ical in1uiry, t en, could not "e suc t at it ad no co*ponent t at ,as concerned ,it t e general or a"stract. +o*e part or co*ponent of it ,ould t us "e t eoretical "y dealing ,it t e general, universal, or a"stract aspects of *atters of conduct. 2 at of Aristotle.s condition >d?; 3oes et ics seek causes or e&planations in ter*s of causes, and is it t erefore t eoretical in t at sense; ' is is a rat er co*plicated *atter t at as "een discussed recently "y a nu*"er of p ilosop ers >e.g., Gil"ert <ar*an, Annette Baier, Bernard 2illia*s?. ) s all ave so*et ing to say a"out Aristotle.s vie,s on t is *atter as ,ell as t e vie,s of t ese recent p ilosop ers in su"se1uent c apters. All ) ,is to say at t is point is t at Aristotle does not take et ics to "e a discipline t at is not e&planatory or t at does not seek causes. <is vie,s on e&planations or causes *ay "e different fro* ours, "ut t ese sa*e vie,s also constitute is conception of a t eoretical discipline. ' us, et ical in1uiry *ust, according to Aristotle, e&plain , y t e end is t e good, , y t ere *ust "e so*e end t at is pursued for its o,n sake, , y a certain activity is t e good or appiness, , y a certain disposition is a virtue, and so fort . 8t ics, or at least a co*ponent of it, is t eoretical in t is sense. ' is is , at t e re*ark 1uoted earlier fro* E.E. *eans to assert=na*ely, t at G,e *ust not t ink t at t eoretical study of suc a sort as to *ake *anifest not only t e nature of a t ing "ut also its cause is superfluous even for t e study of politics.G ' e a"ove discussion s o,s t at t e e*p asis Aristotle, as ,ell as *any students of is ,orks, often places on t e nature of t e goals as t e *ark t at distinguis es t eoretical fro* nont eoretical disciplines o"scures t e fact t at e at ti*es dra,s t e t eoretical!nont eoretical distinction on ot er grounds. 2 en focusing on t ese grounds, disciplines t at are deter*ined to "e practical or productive, and ence nont eoretical, on t e "asis of t e nature of t eir goals ave *uc in co**on ,it t eoretical disciplines. )ndeed, , en /udged "y t ese ot er factors t ey are t eoretical, since t ey s are t e sa*e episte*ological c aracter despite t e fact t at t eir ulti*ate goals *ay not "e cognitive. 8t ics, t en, *ay "e practical in virtue of its goals, "ut t is does not i*ply t at it does not s are so*e i*portant features ,it t e disciplines , ose goals are t eoretical. ' us, it is, "y virtue of s aring t ese features, si*ilar in so*e i*portant respects to t e t eoretical disciplines=it is, as Aristotle re*inds us, a p ilosop ical discipline or a discipline using p iloB 5 1$1 5 sop ic *et od. 'o recogni9e t at et ics as, as Aristotle understands it, so*e t eoretical co*ponent is to recogni9e so*et ing t at *ay not "e trivial. -or e&a*ple, it *ay "e useful for assessing , et er so*e of t e features of e&actness!ine&actness t at Aristotle attri"utes to et ics apply to t e , ole of t e discipline, t at is, to t e *ost as ,ell as to t e least t eoretical aspects of it, or only to so*e aspects of it, t at is, to t ose aspects t at are t e closest to particular practical concerns.

5 1$6 5

-our '*actness. !ome asic Questions

Introduction
)n t is c apter, ) ,ill focus on a nu*"er of general issues a"out e&actness! ine&actness t at "ear on *ost of t e topics ) ,ill discuss in su"se1uent c apters. -irst, ) ,ill identify and e&a*ine in so*e detail t e various ter*s Aristotle uses to designate certain features as e&actness!ine&actness. ' ese ter*s, ) s all argue, do not necessarily signify t e sa*e t ing, alt oug at ti*es a nu*"er of t e* for* a group or cluster , ose *e*"ers signify al*ost t e sa*e t ing. +o*e of t e features t ese ter*s signify are 1uite i*portant in relation to so*e disciplines, "ut are not e1ually i*portant in relation to ot ers. ) ,ill e&plain , y t is is so. Anot er general issue concerns t e t ings t at can "e e&act or ine&act. ) s all argue ere t at Aristotle attri"utes features t at e designates as e&actness!ine&actness to "ot t e su"/ect *atter a discipline studies and t e accounts, descriptions, or e&planations a discipline gives. ) s all refer to t e for*er as *aterial and to t e latter as for*al e&actness!ine&actness. (aterial ine&actness as, presu*a"ly, its source in t e nature of t e ,orld, "ut t is need not "e t e case ,it for*al ine&actness. ' e sources of t e latter vary4 t ey *ay include our ,is to avoid t e "urdenso*e task of seeking e&act accounts, lacunae in classification, or our goals in seeking an account, e&planation, or description. Iaturally, a 1uestion arises a"out t e relation "et,een t ese t,o levels of e&actness!ine&actness: t e *aterial and t e for*al. Aristotle, ) ,ill argue ere, t inks t at a rat er strong relation olds "et,een t e t,o levels. <e t inks t at e&actness!ine&actness at one level i*plies or is i*plied "y e&actness!ine&actness at t e ot er level, t at t ere is so*e kind of congruence "et,een t ese kinds of features in t e su"/ect *atter of a 5 1$# 5 discipline and in t e accounts "y , ic a discipline descri"es, e&plains, or in general represents its su"/ect *atter. Jast, ) ,ill e&a*ine "riefly , at Aristotle says in t e N.E. a"out eli*inating ine&actness fro* et ical accounts. +o*eti*es Aristotle c aracteri9es an account as "eing ine&act, "ut suggests t at its ine&actness can "e eli*inated or reduced. At ot er ti*es, o,ever, e clai*s t at t e ine&actness cannot "e eli*inated eit er fro* t e accounts e i*self gives or fro* any possi"le accounts of *atters of conduct. +o*e accounts are essentially ine&act.

Terms of '*actness/Ine*actness
As ) *entioned earlier, Aristotle.s concern ,it e&actness is encountered practically t roug out all of is e&tant ,orks. ' e ter* e uses *ost often for t is purpose is

. )t occurs in a variety of gra**atical for*s and often as part of so*e standard p rases.@1A 2 en Aristotle ,is es to clai*, as e often does, t at e&actness is not possi"le, necessary, or desira"le, or t at

a kind of ine&actness is present, appropriate, or unavoida"le e again uses fre1uently one of t e for*s of ,it t e appropriate negative *odifier. ' ere are good reasons, t en, , y t e use of t is ter* in its various for*s as traditionally "een identified "y co**entators as t e ter* t at indicates Aristotle.s concern ,it e&actness and ine&actness. Aristotle, o,ever, uses a nu*"er of ot er ter*s , en e speaks of e&actness or ine&actness. :ne suc ter* is

>clarity, articulation, precision?. Again, Aristotle uses it in its various gra**atical for*s eit er to assert t at so*et ing e& i"its e&actness or ,it t e appropriate negative *odifier to assert t at so*et ing lacks e&actness or e& i"its ine&actness.@6A ' at Aristotle takes or any of its for*s to signify a type of e&actness is *ade clear in a nu*"er of passages. ' us in #op .: G(oreover, t ere is t e co**onplace of su"stituting for a ter* one t at is *ore fa*iliar, for e&a*ple, using

instead of

in speaking of a conceptionG >111aH?. Aristotle *ust vie, t e ter*s as "eing al*ost identical in *eaning, ot er,ise t is state*ent ,ould *ake little sense.@#A ' at t e t,o ter*s s are so*e co**on core of *eaning is "roug t out again in N.E. , ere Aristotle tells us t at Gour treat*ent ,ill "e ade1uate if it ac ieves t at degree of clarity @or precision, A , ic "elongs to t e su"/ect *atter, for t e sa*e e&actness @

A s all not "e soug t in all areasG >1$94"11?. )n Rhet . e contrasts "eing unclear >nonBprecise, ? to "eing e&act > ?: GAnd ,e *ust regard our definitions as sufficient in eac case, provided t ey are neit er unclear @

A nor too e&act @ AG >1#E9"#1?. ' e ter* in one of its for*s is also contrasted to t,o ot er ter*s t at signify ine&actness: 5 1$4 5

and > olit . 1#41"#94 Ath . 9.6.14 M.M. 1.4.1$.4, 1.16.1.%?. ' ese sa*e ter*s are also contrasted to . Aristotle uses t e ter*

rat er fre1uently to signify so*e type of ine&actness. At so*e ti*es e contrasts t is type of ine&actness to e&actness > ? and at ot ers e e1uates aving t is type of ine&actness to not aving e&actness >

?. <ere are so*e e&a*ples: 9.& But let it "e granted to "egin ,it t at every account of *atters of conduct is "ound to "e in outline @

A only and not e&act @

A. >N.E.&&;9a&7

4.6

Jet t is *uc distinction suffice for us, since ,e do not propose to give t e e&act @

A account of any of t e* "ut *erely ,is to descri"e t e* in outline @ A. >#op. &;&a%%7 4.# )f one supposes i* to "e speaking in outline @

A and not ,is

is ,ords to "e taken e&actly @

A . . . > robl. =&3a8:7 4.4 -or t e present t en ,e descri"e t ese 1ualities in outline @

A and su**arily @

A . . . "ut t ey ,ill "e *ore accurately @ A defined later. >N.E. &&;5b&97@4A )n t e first t ree passages >4.1, 4.6, 4.#? Aristotle see*s to e1uate t e ine&actness of an account t at e refers to as

to lack of . And in 4.4 "eing in is contrasted to "eing *ore e&act >

?.@%A Anot er ter* Aristotle uses to signify ine&actness is t e ter*

in t e appropriate gra**atical for* or p rase.@EA ' e ter* signifies so*et ing like Gsu**aryG and t us appears to "e related in its *eaning to . Alt oug Aristotle uses t is ter* less fre1uently t an e does , t ere is no 1uestion t at it is part of is voca"ulary for referring to ine&actness. ' is as ardly "een noticed in t e literature.@FA 7et in 4.4 a"ove Aristotle contrasts "ot and to , and e *akes a si*ilar contrast in Resp .: G' e position of t e eart relative to t e gills s ould "e studied visually fro* dissections and ,it e&actness @ A "y reference to t e Researches 4 "ut to speak in su**ary @

A for our present purpose, t e facts are as follo,sG >4FH"?.@HA ' ere are o,ever additional ter*s t at signify ine&actness. Alt oug Aristotle uses t ese less fre1uently t an t e ter*s ,e discussed a"ove, ,e s ould identify t e* at t is point. :ne suc ter* is

. ' is ter* in t e Aristotelian corpus is used pri*arily to signify t e universal in contrast to t e particular, "ut Aristotle uses it at ti*es to c aracteri9e an account t at stays at t e level of t e universal or consists in a general treat*ent. +uc an account is, according to Aristotle, ine&act and is contrasted to one t at is e&act. ' us in N.E. , , ile speaking of t e diversity of t e accidents of life, Aristotle says, G'o distinguis "et,een t e* in detail ,ould clearly "e a long and indeed endless undertaking, and a treatB

5 1$% 5 *ent t at is general @

A and in outline @ A, *ay per aps "e enoug G >11$1a6E?. ' e t,o types of ine&actness, general treat*ent and outline > , ?, are contrasted in t is passage to an account t at is *ore specific or in detail. Again, in olit . e tells us, GBut , ile ,e ave no, given a general account @ A of t ese various "ranc es @of industryA, yet a detailed account @ A of eac part, t oug useful for t e practice of industries, ,ould "e illi"eralG >16%H"#4?. <e again contrasts a general treat*ent to an e&act one , en speaking a"out t e ele*ents of a constitution: G)t is i*possi"le t at it @t e structure of t e stateA s ould ave "een fra*ed e&actly @ A in all its details4 for it *ust of necessity "e descri"ed generally @or in universal ter*s, A, "ut our actions deal ,it particular t ingsG >16E9"1$?.@9A +o*eti*es Aristotle contrasts

>*ore e&act? or >e&actly? to >softer? or >softly?. ' us in Met .: G:f t e sciences /ust *entioned eac deter*ines , at t e nature of so*e class of t ings is and tries to prove t e ot er trut s *ore or less e&actly @

AG >1$E4a%?. ' e t,o ter*s are contrasted again in Rhet . , ere Aristotle is also concerned ,it t e cogency of argu*ents or proofs >1#9Ea##?. )n Gen. et Corr . e contrasts t e adver"ial for*s of t e t,o ter*s as applied to proofs, definitions, or postulates >###"64?. ' e for* of e&actness Aristotle as in *ind in t ese conte&ts is clearly so*et ing t at can "e pri*arily applied to argu*ents or proofs, and *ost pro"a"ly e is t inking of e&actness in ter*s of cogency, certainty, or necessity. Anot er ter* signifying ine&actness t at Aristotle uses is

. ' e ter* *eans so*et ing like Gsi*pleG and in its various for*s is contrasted to "ot and . ' us in E.E. , after Aristotle gives definitions of a nu*"er of vices, e re*arks, GJet us t en define t e* si*ply @ A in t is *anner, and ,it greater e&actness @ A , en ,e are speaking a"out t e opposite dispositionsG >1661"H?. )n Met ., Aristotle contrasts a si*ple account >

? of t e *eaning of a na*e to a *ore e&act one > ? >1$#$a1%?, and e speaks of a science dealing ,it its causes and principles *ore or less precisely >

? >1$6%"F?. <e contrasts t e ter* to in olit . >1#41"#9? and Ath . >9.6.1? >see also M.M. 14.1$.4 and 1.16.1.%?. )n one passage Aristotle contrasts

to t e ter* : G2e ave spoken a"out t ese at t e "eginning "riefly @ A, "ut in t e Analytics ,it e&actness @

AG >E.E. 166Fa11?. ' is ter*, signifying so*et ing like G"eing "rief,G is 1uite si*ilar in *eaning to >concise, "rief? , ic Aristotle takes to "e al*ost synony*ous to : GConcisely @ A and su**arily @ A ,e ave revie,ed , at t ose "efore us ave saidG >Met . 9HHa1F?. -inally, Aristotle contrasts t e ter*

to : G' ese t inkers 5 1$E 5 . . . grasped t,o of t e causes . . . vaguely @or faintly or di*ly,

A and not clearly @or precisely, AG >Met . 9H%a16?. Also, e contrasts to

: G-ro* it @durationA derive t e "eing and life , ic ot er t ings, so*e *ore articulately @ A "ut ot ers o"scurely @ A, en/oyG >Cael . 6F9a69?. 2e *ay add ere t e ter*s and >Gto sketc ,G Gdra, in outlineG? , ic Aristotle at ti*es uses to *ean so*et ing like t e ine&actness e refers to "y using t e ter* >GoutlineG?=for e&a*ple, a sketc > ? of t e good , ic is an outline > , N.E. 1$9Ha19?, a sketc > ? of t e nature of t e soul , ic is an outline > , Anim . 41#a9?. ' e variety of t e ter*s Aristotle uses , en e speaks of e&actness or ine&actness raises t e 1uestion , et er a single feature is asserted or denied , en suc ter*s for e&actness or ine&actness are predicated of so*et ing. 2 et er, t at is, one c aracteristic is signified "y all t e ter*s for e&actness and one "y all t e ter*s for ine&actness. )t is logically possi"le t at all t e ter*s for e&actness or ine&actness are synony*ous and univocal, t at t ey all signify one and t e sa*e t ing. Alt oug t is is possi"le, it does see* unlikelyP )t appears even *ore unlikely , en ,e reali9e t at t ese ter*s of e&actness or ine&actness are applied "y Aristotle to *any and 1uite different types of t ings. ' us t e ter*

alone is applied in t e appropriate gra**atical for* to accounts > r. Anal . 64" 14, 4Ea694 N.E. 1$94"64?, proofs > ost. Anal . HEa1F4 Met . 1$E4aF?, definitions >Cael . 6F9a694 Met . 9HEa1#, 99$"1%, 1$#1aF?, sciences > ost. Anal . HFa#14 Anim . 4$6a#4 Met . 9H6a6F?, argu*ents >Rhet . 1#E9a##?, intellect > ost. Anal . 1$$"H4 #op . 141"1#?, units of *easure*ent >Met . 1$%#a1?, senses >Anim . 461a16, 664 H.A. 494"1E4 .A. E%E"4?, sounds >Aud . H$4a6H, a#1?, so*e ele*ents of t e eavenly "odies >Cael . 6HF"19?, t e la, > olit . 16H6"%?, and so fort .

' e variety of t ings to , ic Aristotle.s favorite ter* for e&actness is applied and its possi"le conse1uences ave "een recogni9ed "y Barnes, , o is per aps t e only one to ave done so in t e recent literature. <o,ever, e goes on to clai*,G .s arp,. .precise,. .e&act,. .rigorous. see*, in different conte&ts, to give an appropriate sense @of

A. . . . ' e different uses are per aps eld toget er "y t e notion t at , at is a-rib@s is unlikely to lead to error, and t at supposition e&plains *y c oice of .certain..G@1$A )s t ere a notion t at olds t e apparently different *eanings toget er; )s t ere a co**on t read running t roug all t e uses of t e ter* under discussion; ' e ter* see*s to "e used at ti*es "y Aristotle to signify so*et ing like certainty. But it is not al,ays used in t is sense=for e&a*ple, , en Aristotle calls an account dealing ,it particulars e&act and contrasts it to one dealing ,it universals >t e ine&act one?. )ndeed, according to Aristotle, it is t e latter account, t e one dealing ,it universals >t e ine&act one?, and not t e for*er, t at is *ore certain. 5 1$F 5 )t *ay "e possi"le to stretc t e notion of certainty to t e point , ere it *akes so*e sense to speak of certainty in relation to *ost t ings, for e&a*ple, t e la,, sounds, or p ysical ele*ents.@11A But t en it is not clear t at one is left ,it a notion of certainty t at is of *uc use. ) a* inclined to t ink t at it is prefera"le not to assu*e t at t ere is a co**on t read in all of t e uses, and t at in t e end it ,ill prove *ore profita"le to study eac use on its o,n and e&a*ine t e conse1uences it *ay ave. ) t us find *yself in partial agree*ent ,it Ale&ander Grant , o sa, clearly t at Aristotle.s favorite ter* for e&actness signifies 1uite different t ings "ut did not seek a co**on ele*ent t at runs t roug all of t e*. )n is nineteent Bcentury co**entary on t e N.E. , Grant points out t at t e ter*

signifies 1uite a variety of t ings: )t *ay signify *at e*atical e&actness, *etap ysical su"tlety, *inuteness of detail, definiteness of articulation, and in t e case of t e products of art, finis or delicacy.@16A ' ere is no dou"t t at Grant is correct in singling out t e a"ove *eanings signified "y Aristotle.s ter*4 and, as s all "e seen, t e aspects of *at e*atical e&actness, *inuteness of detail, and definiteness of articulation are of special i*portance in relation to t e discipline of et ics. 7et Aristotle.s ter* see*s to "e even ,ider in signification t an Grant takes it to "e=a fact t at in a ,ay s o,s t at Aristotle is concerned ,it a variety of differences a*ong o"/ects, descriptions, accounts, or disciplines. 2e cannot assu*e, o,ever, t at all, or even any, of t ese ot er *eanings of t e ter*

are relevant in t e case of et ics. ) ,ant t erefore to discuss "riefly so*e of t e* in order to see , et er any one of t e* is of particular i*portance in relation to et ics. -or instance, Aristotle says t at disciplines *ay differ, and t erefore "e *ore or less e&act, in respect of t e priority or si*plicity of t eir "asic principles. ' us e clai*s t at t e *ost e&act of t e sciences are t ose t at deal ,it t e first principles >Met . 9H6a6%?, aving in *ind in suc conte&ts pri*arily ,isdo* or t e ig est type of kno,ledge, , ose principles are presu*a"ly t e first. <e adds t at Gt ose , ic involve fe,er principles are *ore e&act t an t ose , ic involve additional principles, e.g., arit *etic t an geo*etryG >9H6a6E?. ' e difference "et,een arit *etic and geo*etry is again

"roug t out in ost. Anal . , en t e connection "et,een accuracy or precision and fe,er principles is reasserted: G:ne science is *ore accurate @

=Barnes translates it as .*ore certain.A t an anot er and prior to it . . . if it depends on fe,er principles @or factorsA and t e ot er on an additional factor, e.g., arit *etic and geo*etry. ) *ean "y an additional factor, e.g., a unit is a positionless reality, and a point a reality aving a position=t e latter depends on an additional factorG >).&&vii?. Aristotle is concerned ere ,it t e c aracteristic of si*plicity as it applies to t e nu*"er of t ose entities t at co*prise t e "asic ele*ents of a discipline, and per aps in so*e of t ese 5 1$H 5 cases to speak of t e accuracy of a discipline is tanta*ount to speaking of suc si*plicity. ' is feature of si*plicity is "roug t out rat er e&plicitly in anot er passage fro* t e Met . , ere Aristotle identifies si*plicity and e&actness: G)n proportion as ,e are dealing ,it t ings , ic are prior in definition and si*pler @

A, our kno,ledge as *ore accuracy @ A, i.e., si*plicity @ AG >1$FHa1$?. 8&actness ere is not *erely so*et ing t at results fro* si*plicity4 it is si*plicity. And e proceeds to e&plain t at a science t at a"stracts fro* spatial *agnitude is *ore precise t an one t at takes it into account4 and one t at a"stracts fro* *ove*ent is *ore precise t an one t at takes it into account. <o,ever, if t e science deals ,it *ove*ent, it is *ost precise if it deals ,it t e pri*ary *ove*ent, for t is is t e si*plest for*4 and again of t e various kinds of pri*ary *ove*ent, unifor* *ove*ent is t e si*plest for*. ' ere are o"viously different kinds of si*plicity involved ere, and it is 1uestiona"le , et er Aristotle distinguis es a*ong t e* or if e does so to a sufficient degree. <e applies t e kind of si*plicity or e&actness e associates ,it a"stracting fro* so*et ing to t e case of ar*onics and optics4 t e for*er discipline, e clai*s, does not treat of voice 1ua voice "ut rat er 1ua nu*"er, and t e latter does not treat of sig t 1ua sig t "ut 1ua lines >Met . 1$FHa1%?. ' e contrast is "roug t out again in t e passage fro* ost. Anal . 1uoted a"ove, , ere Aristotle co*pares sciences t at deal ,it , at is said of or in eres in an underlying su"/ect > ar*onics? ,it t ose t at deal ,it , at is not said of or does not in ere in an underlying su"/ect >arit *etic?. )n t e case of t is last co*parison, e pro"a"ly as in *ind applied ar*onics in contrast to pure ar*onics, t e latter of , ic , as t e Met . passage indicates, treats its o"/ects as "eing very *uc like t e o"/ects of arit *etic. Jast, in t e a"ove passage fro* t e ost. Anal ., Aristotle introduces anot er aspect t at affects t e accuracy >or certainty, as Barnes puts it? and priority of a discipline=na*ely, , et er t e discipline provides kno,ledge si*ultaneously of t e fact and reason , y and not of t e fact separately fro* t e reason , y. Aristotle *ost pro"a"ly as in *ind ere t e contrast "et,een e*pirical ar*onics >collection of data? and *at e*atical ar*onics, or even t e contrast "et,een t e latter and pure ar*onics >see "elo, for a discussion of t ese *atters?.

)t is clear t at t ese re*arks raise a nu*"er of interesting 1uestions a"out t e notion of e&actness or precision and its role or roles in science=1uestions t at touc upon aspects suc as t e si*plicity of a science, , et er it a"stracts , at it studies fro* certain su"/ects, , et er it is only concerned ,it facts and not e&planations of facts, and t e like. And t ey suggest t at Aristotle vie,s t e various disciplines as e& i"iting differences as ,ell as for*ing a kind of ierarc y, ,it t e sciences t at are *ost 5 1$9 5 si*ple, or a"stract, per aps occupying t e ig est positions. ' ese re*arks o"viously deserve to "e treated in detail and on t eir o,n *erits in t e interest of e&plaining , at Aristotle as in *ind , en e speaks of suc differences a*ong t e sciences, "ut our concerns ere are 1uite different. All ,e ,is to e&a*ine, if it can "e done ,it out discussing t ese re*arks in detail, is , at t ey tell us a"out t e kinds of e&actness or ine&actness t at are c aracteristic of et ics and , et er t ey ave any significant episte*ological conse1uences. ' e first aspect Aristotle singles out as "eing relevant in connection to t e e&actness of a discipline is its dealing ,it first principles. ' is aspect is not likely to "e found in et ics, unless ,e take et ical principles to apply to everyt ing, as Plato see*s to suggest at ti*es.@1#A ' e "asic principles of et ics need not >and pro"a"ly could not? "e t e first. Aristotle does not take t e* to "e t e first principles of all ot er disciplines or of t e su"/ect *atter of all ot er disciplines.@14A <e t inks t is is true of all of t e ordinary disciplines. 8t ics t en is not e&act or *ost e&act in t is sense: )ts "asic principles are not first. But alt oug suc e&actness singles out ,isdo*, *etap ysics or first p ilosop y=, ic in a sense are not ordinary sciences@1%A =it does not differentiate a*ong t e rest of t e sciences. ' us, alt oug et ics *ay not "e si*ilar to ,isdo*, or even arit *etic, it could nonet eless "e si*ilar to optics or *ec anics. Alt oug t e "asic principles of a discipline *ay not "e first, t ey *ay "e prior in relation to so*e ot er discipline. )t *ay t us "e t e case t at a discipline is not t e *ost e&act "ecause its principles are not first "ut it is nonet eless *ore e&act t an so*e ot er "ecause its principles are prior in relation to t ese ot er disciplines. +uc presu*a"ly is t e case , en so*e disciplines are, according to Aristotle, su"ordinate to anot er one. ' e latter discipline and its principles are prior in relation to t e su"ordinate disciplines "ecause t e principles or t eore*s of t e su"ordinate ones are e&plained "y t e principles of t e discipline to , ic t ey are su"ordinate. Arit *etic "ears t is relation to ar*onics and geo*etry to optics, according to Aristotle. Bot of t e *at e*atical sciences ,ould t en "e prior to and *ore e&act t an optics or ar*onics. ' ere is no evidence t at Aristotle takes et ics to "e prior to ot er disciplines or t at t ere are disciplines t at are su"ordinate to it. ' e *ore i*portant 1uestion is , et er et ics is su"ordinate to so*e ot er discipline or disciplines. ' is is especially so given Aristotle.s re*arks a"out t e relation of et ics to politics on t e one and and of et ics to psyc ology on t e ot er. Beginning ,it t e relation of et ics to psyc ology, Aristotle does not say t at t e for*er is su"ordinate to t e latter. Psyc ology does not prove t e principles or t eore*s of et ics and, of course, neit er does et ics prove t e t eore*s of psyc ology. 2 at e says rat er is t at et ics and politics use so*e propositions or t eore*s of psyc ology. Aristotle e&B 5 11$ 5 plicitly states t at t e student of politics studies *atters of psyc ology only to t e e&tent needed for is

purposes >N.E. ).&iii?. ' ese include t e nature of t e soul=its parts, faculties, activities, affects, and so on. Alt oug Aristotle vie,s t e teac ings of psyc ology as indispensa"le in giving an account of t e good, appiness, and virtue=all of t e* key ele*ents in is et ical t eory= e does not consider et ics to "e su"ordinate to psyc ology. 8ven t oug Aristotle does not assert t at et ics is su"ordinate to psyc ology, t e 1uestion still re*ains , et er it nonet eless as to "e vie,ed as "eing su"ordinate on account of t e ,ay Aristotle derives so*e of its "asic propositions. As )r,in as recently argued, t ere is a 1uestion as to , et er et ics is autono*ous given t e use Aristotle *akes of propositions fro* ot er disciplines, or fro* sources outside of et ics, in developing is accounts of t e good and of virtue.@1EA Aristotle, as is kno,n, relies on certain conceptions of, for e&a*ple, rationality, function, t e nature of t e soul, and t e teleological c aracter of action in developing is accounts of t e good and virtue. +uc conceptions are clearly part of is psyc ological, "iological, and p ysical t eories as ,ell as of is ,ider *etap ysical vie,s. ' e relation of et ics to politics is of course *ore co*ple&. Aristotle considers politics to "e t e *ost aut oritative >

? practical discipline, a sort of *aster science > ?. )t is t e discipline or art t at directs, according to i*, *any ot er disciplines and arts and its end includes t eir ends. ' e end of politics includes t e u*an good >N.E. ).iii?, "ut Aristotle does not say t at t e propositions of et ics are derived or proved fro* t e "asic principles of politics. ' e e*p asis is rat er on politics "eing t e *aster science or art t at utili9es so*e ot er disciplines or arts for t e sake of attaining t e ends of t e political association.@1FA 8ven if ,e ,ere to assu*e t at et ics is su"ordinate to psyc ology, or politics, or possi"ly to ot er disciplines, and t erefore t at it is ine&act, it is not clear , at episte*ological conse1uences suc ine&actness as. :"viously, *uc ,ould depend on t e episte*ological c aracter of t e discipline to , ic et ics is su"ordinate. )f et ics ,ere su"ordinate to arit *etic or geo*etry, if its propositions ,ere derived fro* t ose of arit *etic or geo*etry, its de*onstrative c aracter need not "e affected "y t is type of ine&actness, ot er t ings "eing e1ual. ' e propositions of psyc ology and even t ose t at are of greater generality=suc as t e propositions a"out t e nature of function >N.E. ).vii4 E.E. )).i?, t e teleological c aracter of all pursuit >N.E. ).i?, or t e divisi"ility of any continuu* >N.E. )).vi?=t at Aristotle uses in deriving so*e of t e "asic propositions a"out t e good and virtue ave as plausi"le a clai* to "eing necessary as any. -or e&a*ple, t e proposition t at e&plicates t e u*an function defines in 5 111 5 part t e essence of a species and t erefore is, according to Aristotle, necessary. Aristotle, o,ever, vie,s t e propositions of politics, like t ose of et ics, to "e not necessary >N.E. ).iii4 K).i, iii, iv, v?. ' is supposed feature of t e propositions of et ics is not due to t e fact t at et ics is su"ordinate to politics. :n t e contrary, Aristotle *akes clear t at it is due to t e nature of *atters of conduct, t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter et ics and politics deal ,it . )f t e propositions of et ics are not necessary, or if t e discipline e& i"its de*onstrative deficiencies, it is due to t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter and not to its "eing su"ordinate to politics. )ne&actness, t en, t at relates to "eing su"ordinate to anot er discipline need not al,ays affect or deter*ine "y itself t e episte*ological c aracter of a discipline,

and, *ore specifically, it need not affect negatively t e de*onstrative c aracter of a discipline. ' e sa*e *ay "e said of e&actness t at relates to si*plicity=its episte*ological conse1uences are "y no *eans o"vious. 8&actness understood in ter*s of si*plicity is really co*parative in nature, and t is see*s to "e , at is fore*ost in Aristotle.s *ind. 2e can of course t ink of an a"solutely e&act or si*ple discipline, one t at posits one "asic ele*ent or rests on a single principle >a&io*?. ' us Aristotle, as ,e sa, a"ove, clai*s t at , ereas arit *etic posits or deals ,it one ele*ent=t e unit, geo*etry posits or deals ,it *ore t an one=t e point and position > ost. Anal. HFa#%?. 2 et er arit *etic is indeed an a"solutely e&act >si*ple? discipline ,ould depend on , et er t e unit is a"solutely one ele*ent. And Aristotle t inks t at t is is so: GIo, , ere it is t oug t i*possi"le to take a,ay or to add, t ere t e *easure is e&act > ence t at of nu*"er is *ost e&act4 for ,e posit t e unit as indivisi"le in every respect?G >Met. 1$%#a?. Arit *etic ,ould see* t en to "e, at least according to Aristotle, an a"solutely si*ple >e&act? science. (ost often, Aristotle.s concern is ,it co*parative si*plicity or e&actBness=for e&a*ple, t e greater si*plicity or e&actness of arit *etic , en co*pared to geo*etry. ' e e*p asis is on arit *etic "eing *ore e&act >

? or aving fe,er > ? "asic ele*ents t an geo*etry >Met. 9H6a6F4 ost. Anal. HFa#F?. At ti*es e speaks as if e as in *ind so*e kind of co*parative ordering or ranking of t e disciplines in ter*s of t eir si*plicity , ic ,ill in turn yield a co*parative ordering in ter*s of t eir e&actness. 2 ere in suc a co*parative ordering of t e disciplines in ter*s of si*plicity ,ould ,e place et ics; 3oes its position in suc an ordering ave any significant episte*ological conse1uences; Geo*etry *ay involve *ore principles t an arit *etic, and per aps it is reasona"le to suppose t at et ics involves *ore principles t an geo*etry or even *ore principles t an *any disciplines aving a greater nu*"er of principles t an geo*etry in our ordering of disciplines "ased on si*plicity. )t is difficult to kno, 5 116 5 , ere et ics ,ould "e placed in suc an ordering. Aristotle does not provide suc an ordering and, alt oug e at ti*es insists t at et ics is not as e&act as so*e ot er disciplines, it is 1uite clear fro* t e conte&t t at t e reason et ics is less e&act t an t ese ot er disciplines is not due to its "eing less si*ple or to its aving a greater nu*"er of "asic ele*ents t an t ey do.@1HA ' us per aps t e position of et ics in our ypot etical ranking of t e disciplines in ter*s of si*plicity is not of great conse1uence >alt oug t is *ay not "e t e reason , y Aristotle does not give us suc a ranking specifying t e position of et ics?. 8ven t oug t ere *ay "e reasons for preferring or ranking ig er a si*pler discipline, si*plicity in t e ,ay Aristotle understands it does not affect t e episte*ological nature of t e discipline. +peaking ,it in t e Aristotelian fra*e,ork, si*plicity does not see* to essentially alter t e de*onstrative c aracter of a discipline. Geo*etry is as *uc a de*onstrative discipline as arit *etic and so are, according to Aristotle, ar*onics and optics. )f a discipline fails to "e de*onstrative, or its de*onstrative c aracter is in so*e sense inferior to t at of ot ers, t at is so not "ecause it is not si*ple or it is not as si*ple >and t erefore not as e&act? as t ese ot er disciplines, "ut "ecause of ot er reasons. ' ere *ust "e ot er factors, including per aps ot er kinds of ine&actness,

t at affect its de*onstrative c aracter. ' e situation is only partly si*ilar in t e case of e&actness understood in ter*s of a"straction. ' e *ere presence of a"straction *ay not "e sufficient for differentiating a*ong t e disciplines=for presu*a"ly all disciplines, according to Aristotle, can or s ould a"stract. ' e presence of a"straction t en ,ould not single out et ics or any ot er discipline. ' e degree o,ever to , ic a discipline does or can a"stract *ay differentiate a*ong disciplines and it *ay ave i*portant episte*ological conse1uences. )ndeed t e degree of a"stracting see*s to "e of special i*portance in t e case of et ics and all practical disciplines, precisely "ecause t ey are practical. Alt oug t ese disciplines, like all non*at e*atical ones, a"stract less t an t e *at e*atical disciplines, t ey *ay a"stract, according to Aristotle, less t an even t e rest of t e non*at e*atical ones "ecause t ey are practical. ' e goals of t ese practical disciplines i*pose so*e restrictions on t e degree to , ic one can a"stract in suc disciplines. )t is not clear, o,ever, , at Aristotle *eans , en e speaks of a"straction or of a science a"stracting fro* so*e su"/ect *atter. <ere are so*e of is e&a*ples: A science a"stracts fro* spatial *agnitude or *ove*ent4 optics does not treat of sig t 1ua sig t, "ut "y a"stracting treats it 1ua lines4 ar*onics does not treat of voice 1ua voice, "ut "y a"stracting studies it 1ua nu*"er >Met. 1$FHa1$ ff.?. )n t e case of optics and ar*onics, eac of t ese sciences a"stracts fro* its su"/ect *atter >optical p eno*ena and voice? t e *at e*atical attri"utes >lines and nu*"ers?, 5 11# 5 and Gt ose latter attri"utes,G Aristotle clai*s, Gare attri"utes proper to t e for*er @i.e., optical p eno*ena and voiceAG >Met. 1$FHa1E?. Aristotle atte*pts to e&plain furt er is *odel of a"straction "y descri"ing , at e takes *at e*aticians to do: G8ac 1uestion ,ill "e "est investigated in t is ,ay: "y setting up "y an act of separation , at is not separate as t e arit *etician and t e geo*eter doG >1$FHa61?. ' us t e arit *etician considers a *an to "e an indivisi"le t ing and studies , et er any attri"ute "elongs to a *an 1ua indivisi"le. ' e geo*eter on t e ot er and considers a *an neit er 1ua *an nor 1ua indivisi"le, "ut as a solid >Met. 1$FHa6$B6E?. ' e *at e*atician t en a"stracts or isolates fro* any o"/ect t e *at e*atical attri"utes and is concerned ,it t e*: <e in1uires, t at is, into t e properties t at t ings ave in virtue of possessing t e *at e*atical attri"utes, for Gt ere are also attri"utes , ic "elong to t ings *erely as lengt s or planesG >Met. 1$FHa9?. Aristotle.s use of t e supposed practice of t e *at e*aticians to illustrate a"straction in t e sciences *ay suggest t at all a"straction is *at e*atical a"straction: )n all instances of a"stracting, one isolates *at e*atical attri"utes fro* a kind in order to in1uire a"out t e ot er properties t at "elong to it in virtue of t ese *at e*atical attri"utes. ' is is not, o,ever, Aristotle.s intent. <is point is t at in investigating ,e s ould isolate t ose attri"utes t at, alt oug not separate, are proper to t e investigation at and /ust as t e *at e*aticians do , en t ey isolate and fi& upon t e attri"utes proper to t e *at e*atical disciplines.@19A ' e si*ilarity "et,een , at is done in *at e*atics and , at is "est to do in all investigations is in t e Gact of separationG rat er t an in t e o"/ect t at is separated. Iot all attri"utes t at are separated in t is *anner are *at e*atical. ' us, Aristotle clai*s, Git is true to say of t e ot er sciences too, ,it out 1ualification, t at t ey deal ,it suc and suc a su"/ect . . . ,it t e ealt y if it treats its o"/ect 1ua ealt y, ,it *an if 1ua *an. . . . (any properties attac to t ings in virtue of t eir o,n nature or possessed of eac said c aracter4 e.g., t ere are attri"utes peculiar to t e ani*al 1ua fe*ale or 1ua *ale >yet t ere is no .fe*ale. nor .*ale. separate fro* ani*als?G >Met. 1$FHa?. A"straction, t en, does not "y itself differentiate a*ong t e disciplines, for it see*s to "e present in all of t e*4 at least Aristotle reco**ends t at ,e follo, t e e&a*ple of t e *at e*aticians and practice

a"straction in all disciplines. ' ere is no reason to t ink t at et ics is different fro* t e ot er disciplines, t at it e&cludes a"straction altoget er. Aristotle does not suggest t at it does so. Biology, or so*e co*ponent of it, isolates for its study t e ani*al 1ua fe*ale and *ale, and *edicine t e ani*al 1ua ealt y. ' ere is no reason , y et ics is not like t ese disciplines, especially *edicine to , ic Aristotle often co*pares it. ' e t,o disciplines, et ics and *edicine, are often vie,ed as "eing episte*ologically identical as ,ell 5 114 5 as s aring analogous goals: t e study of t e e&cellences of t e "ody and t eir causes in t e case of *edicine and t e study of t e e&cellences of t e soul, t eir final ends and causes in t e case of et ics. 7et t ere is a difference a*ong t e disciplines in relation to a"stracting, na*ely, a difference in t e degree to , ic t ey a"stract. ' is could very ,ell ave so*e episte*ological conse1uences. All disciplines *ay, or per aps s ould, a"stract or isolate and fi& on t eir proper o"/ect of in1uiry, "ut t e *at e*atical ones a"stract or fi& upon a su"/ect *atter , ic is a"stract in nature: )t, as Aristotle says, does not in ere in or is not said of a su"strate4 it consists only of for*s > ost. Anal. F9a1$, HFa#64 Met. 1$FHa4?. ' us, "ot arit *etic and ar*onics a"stract >Met. 1$FHa1%?, "ut only arit *etic deals ,it *at e*atical attri"utes not in relation to any su"strate > ost. Anal. HFa64?. )t is t erefore, according to Aristotle, *ore e&act t an ar*onics. ' us t e degree of e&actness of a discipline depends on t e degree to , ic it isolates and deals ,it , at does not in ere in or is not said of a su"strate=t at is, of t e p ysical ,orld and its c aracteristics. ' us a discipline t at a"stracts fro* spatial *agnitude is, Aristotle clai*s, *ore e&act t an one t at does not and a discipline t at a"stracts fro* *otion is *ore e&act t an one , ic takes it into account.@6$A Aristotle.s contention t at t ere is a difference "et,een t e a"straction possi"le in or appropriate to t e *at e*atical sciences, on t e one and, and t e rest of t e disciplines, on t e ot er, provides i* ,it so*e "asis for differentiating a*ong t e sciences in ter*s of e&actness. ' ose , ic a"stract fro* a su"strate, t e *at e*atical ones, are t e *ost e&act4 t ose t at do not are less e&act. 2 at conse1uences does t is supposed difference in e&actness in ter*s of a"stractness ave; 3oes it ave any significant episte*ological i*plications; )t is "y no *eans easy to say. 2e ave Aristotle.s re*ark in Met. , ic suggests, alt oug not in une1uivocal ter*s, t at t ere is so*e episte*ological difference "et,een disciplines , ic a"stract fro* *atter and t ose , ic do not: G' e accuracy >

? of *at e*atics is not to "e de*anded in all cases, "ut only in t e case of t ings t at ave no *atter. <ence its *et od is not t at of natural science4 for presu*a"ly, t e , ole of nature as *atterG >99%a1%?. )n t is case, it is difficult to say , at accuracy consists in. .

*ay very ,ell *ean so*et ing like certainty, as Barnes suggests, "ut it could also *ean t e de*onstrative rigor, or t e necessity of de*onstration, or t e e&actness of definitions t at ,e encounter in *at e*atics.@61A ' e supposed difference in accuracy "et,een t e *at e*atical disciplines and t ose t at do not a"stract fro* *atter could rest on any one of t ese and per aps even additional c aracteristics. )t could rest on t ose kinds of c aracteristics invaria"ly associated ,it t e *at e*atical disciplines "ut not ,it t e disciplines a"out nature, or at least on t ose encountered

5 11% 5 to a greater degree in disciplines of t e for*er t an of t e latter kind. -urt er*ore, Aristotle does not in t e passage fro* Met. 1uoted a"ove identify a feature >or per aps *ore t an one? of *atter , ic presu*a"ly gives rise to so*e type of inaccuracy in t e accounts of t ose disciplines t at ave as t eir su"/ect *atter t e do*ain of nature or t at do not a"stract fro* *atter. )s t ere so*et ing a"out *atter or t e do*ain of nature t at gives rise to a kind of inaccuracy; )t *ay, for instance, "e t at propositions a"out t e do*ain of nature ave certain logical or episte*ological features and it is suc features t at give rise to t e episte*ological differences in t e disciplines dealing ,it nature.@66A ' e supposition is, of course, t at *at e*atical propositions do not ave suc features precisely "ecause t e do*ain of *at e*atics does not e& i"it t e deficiencies t at t e ,orld of nature or *atter e& i"it. ' ese 1uestions ,ill "e discussed later , en ) identify t e various levels of ine&actness and c aracteristics Aristotle attri"utes to t e su"/ect *atter of a discipline and to t e discipline itself. 2 atever it is t at Aristotle as in *ind , en e clai*s t at t ere is so*e episte*ological difference "et,een t e *at e*atical disciplines and t ose t at do not a"stract fro* *atter, it is clear t at et ics is not a *at e*atical discipline.@6#A ' is of course is true of all t e non*at e*atical disciplines suc as p ysics, "iology, optics, *edicine, and so fort .@64A 8t ics, as is presu*a"ly t e case ,it t ese ot er disciplines, does not a"stract fro* *atter. )f t ere are no reasons for t inking t at et ics a"stracts less t an t ese ot er disciplines do, t en it could "e a "ona fide discipline like t e*.@6%A Alt oug it *ay "e true t at et ics and t ese ot er disciplines differ fro* t e *at e*atical ones, t ey *ay not differ a*ong t e*selves episte*ologically on account of a"stracting. Aristotle see*s at ti*es to t ink t at et ics does not, or even cannot, a"stract fro* its su"/ect *atter in t e ,ay so*e ot er disciplines can and do. -or instance, e see*s to t ink t at it cannot a"stract to t e degree re1uired in order t at its accounts not "e affected "y t e features of ine&actness t at e t inks affect its su"/ect *atter. 2 ereas e takes t ese sa*e features of ine&actness to c aracteri9e t e su"/ect *atter of nonBpractical disciplines, for e&a*ple, t e "iological ones, e is confident t at in *ost cases suc disciplines can a"stract to t e point t at suc features are not pro"le*atic. 2 y does Aristotle t ink t at et ics is not a"le to a"stract a,ay fro* t ese features t at supposedly c aracteri9e its su"/ect *atter, , ereas t e "iological disciplines can; :ne reason *ay "e is "elief t at t ese features of ine&actness are *ost pervasive in t e case of t e su"/ect *atter of et ics. Anot er reason *ay "e is "elief t at t e goals of et ics i*pose a li*it on t e level of a"straction t at is possi"le. +uc li*its do not presu*a"ly 5 11E 5 restrict t e level of a"straction in t e case of "iological disciplines, since suc disciplines are presu*a"ly t eoretical and not practical. )n t e final analysis, t en, , at *atters in t e case of et ics is not so *uc t e 1uestion , et er it a"stracts fro* its su"/ect *atter as t e 1uestion of t e degree to , ic it can a"stract fro* its su"/ect *atter, , ic see*s to depend, according to Aristotle, on t e goals of t e discipline and t e nature of its su"/ect *atter. )f t ere are episte*ological differences "et,een it and t e rest of t e non*at e*atical disciplines, and if indeed it is less accurate or e&act, t is, as s all "e seen, rests on t e supposed nature of its su"/ect *atter and its goals. -inally, t e type of e&actness Aristotle attri"utes to a discipline needs to "e considered in lig t of t e kind of kno,ledge it o"tains: kno,ledge of t e fact and t e reason , y, in contrast to kno,ledge of t e fact only. )t see*s t at Aristotle ,is es to distinguis "et,een disciplines t at ai* e&clusively at collecting data and disciplines t at ai* at giving e&planations. )f suc a distinction is a *eaningful one,

t en t e type of e&actness Aristotle associates ,it it could ave i*portant episte*ological conse1uences. )f one e1uates t e giving of reasons or e&planations ,it t e giving of de*onstrations, as Aristotle does, t en is distinction "et,een e&planatory and dataBcollecting disciplines reduces to a distinction "et,een de*onstrative and nonde*onstrative disciplines.@6EA ' e e&act or *ore e&act disciplines ,ill "e t ose t at give e&planations or de*onstrations and t ey ,ill t erefore "e episte*ologically different fro* t ose t at consist solely in t e collecting of data. )s Aristotle.s distinction "et,een e&planatory and dataBcollecting disciplines a *eaningful one; )s et ics ine&act "ecause it is e&clusively a dataBcollecting discipline; 2 en in ost. Anal. Aristotle atte*pts to e&plain o, so*e sciences provide kno,ledge of t e fact , ile ot ers provide kno,ledge of t e reason , y and , at t e relation "et,een suc sciences is, e identifies t ree kinds of disciplines >).&iii?. At t e lo,est level are t e disciplines , ic only collect data. )n t is class Aristotle includes acoustical ar*onics >F9a6?, starga9ing >F9a?, nautical astrono*y >F9a6?, t e study of t e rain"o, >F9a1$?,@6FA and *edicine >F$a1%?. ' e practitioners of t ese disciplines, according to Aristotle, kno, t e facts, , ile t e practitioners of ot er, alt oug at ti*es related, disciplines kno, t e reasons or e&planations. ' us in connection ,it t e first t ree disciplines: G)n t ese cases it is for t e collectors of data to kno, t e fact, and for t e *at e*atician to esta"lis t e reasonG >F9a4?. )n connection ,it t e fourt discipline: G'o kno, t e facts @a"out rain"o,sA is for t e natural scientist4 to kno, t e reason , y is for t e optician, eit er si*ply as suc or as a *at e*aticalG >F9a1#?. )n relation to *edicine: G)t is for t e doctor to 5 11F 5 kno, t e fact t at circular ,ounds eal *ore slo,ly, "ut it is for t e geo*etrician to kno, t e reason for t e factG >F9a1%?. ' e distinguis ing feature of t ese disciplines, t en, is t at t ey do not provide t e reasons , y or e&planations, "ut instead are concerned ,it t e collection of e*pirical or o"servational data. Per aps t e clearest e&a*ple ,e ave fro* t e surviving Aristotelian treatises of , at a dataBcollecting discipline *ay look like is Aristotle.s H.A. ' is treatise is pri*arily concerned ,it t e collection of data a"out ani*als, and Aristotle descri"es its nature and goals in a ,ay t at places it s1uarely into t e class of disciplines , ic , according to t e ost. Anal. , are concerned ,it t e collection of facts a"out a certain su"/ect *atter: G:ur o"/ect @isA to deter*ine first of all t e differences t at e&ist @a*ong kinds of ani*alsA and t e actual facts in t e case of all of t e*. <aving done t is, ,e *ust atte*pt to discover t e causesG >H.A. 491a1$?.@6HA 2 en speaking of data or facts in t is conte&t, Aristotle does not of course *ean t at t ese disciplines collect facts a"out so*e particular. As t e e&a*ple a"out *edicine clearly s o,s, t e p ysician kno,s t e general state*ent or fact t at circular ,ounds eal *ore slo,ly. ' is is also , at Aristotle does in is o,n dataBcollecting treatise: )n t e H.A. e collects data a"out t e various ani*al species >lion, deer, orse, etc.? and even ,ider classes >vivipara, ovipara, etc.?. ' ese disciplines t en, alt oug presu*a"ly none&planatory, *ay arrive at e*pirical generali9ations a"out a su"/ect *atter. ' e ot er t,o classes of disciplines are e&planatory. ' ey deal, according to Aristotle, ,it t e causes of t e facts4 t ey provide de*onstrations of t e facts and t eir causes. Alt oug "ot of t ese classes consist of e&planatory disciplines, t ey are nonet eless to "e distinguis ed fro* eac ot er. :ne class consists, according to Aristotle, of t ose disciplines t at treat of t eir su"/ect *atter as *at e*atical o"/ects=for e&a*ple, arit *etic treats acoustical p eno*ena >e.g., voice? 1ua nu*"er and geo*etry treats optical p eno*ena 1ua lines. ' ese are purely *at e*atical disciplines t at give e&planations or de*onstrations of acoustical or optical t eore*s. ' e ot er class of e&planatory disciplines consists of t e sciences t at ,e *ay "est c aracteri9e as "eing applied *at e*atical disciplines. 0oss, follo,ing

' o*as <eat , descri"es t ese as "orro,ing t eir *a/or pre*ises fro* t e purely *at e*atical disciplines and t eir *inor pre*ises fro* t e dataBcollecting disciplines to e&plain t e facts t e latter disciplines discover.@69A ' us, Aristotle recogni9es in addition to geo*etry and t e e*pirical study of optical p eno*ena t e discipline of *at e*atical optics > ost. Anal. FH"#F, F9a1$?. +i*ilarly, "esides arit *etic and acoustical ar*onics t ere is *at e*atical ar*onics >FHE#H, F9a6, HFa#H?. -ollo,ing Barnes, ,e *ay represent sc e*atically so*e of t e e&a*ples Aristotle gives fro* t e t ree classes of disciplines.@#$A 5 11H 5 Nonexplanatory Acoustical <ar*onics 8*pirical :ptics 8*pirical Astrono*y 8&planatory (at e*atical <ar*onics (at e*atical :ptics (at e*atical Astrono*y (ec anics (edicine >(edicine? Arit *etic Geo*etry +olid Geo*etrya +olid Geo*etry Geo*etry"

a ' ere are so*e pro"le*s ,it deter*ining t e t ree levels or types of discipline in t e case of Astrono*y. ' e t ree levels presented ere are t e ones 0oss identifies. Barnes points to so*e pro"le*s ,it , at Aristotle says a"out t e first and t ird levels. " ' is is indeed a pro"le*atic case. Aristotle speaks as if t ere is a purely *at e*atical proof of t e supposed *edical fact t at circular ,ounds eal slo,ly. But, as Barnes points out, a de*onstration needs an e*pirical pre*ise t at connects t e speed of ealing ,it so*e *at e*atical property of circular ,ounds. ' e introduction of suc pre*ises, o,ever, violates Aristotle.s restriction against kindB crossing >see Barnes, op. cit. , p. 1%#?. ) place *edicine in "ot t e e&planatory and none&planatory groups in order to indicate t e a*"iguity in Artistotle.s o,n state*ents. According to Aristotle, t e disciplines in t e first class t en are less e&act t an t e disciplines in t e ot er t,o classes. -or t ey are presu*a"ly none&planatory4 t ey do not give t e reason , y, , ereas t ose in t e latter classes presu*a"ly do. )t is evident t at t is type of e&actness as clear episte*ological conse1uences, for , ere a discipline is one of t e less e&act or ine&act disciplines in t e a"ove sense of t e ter* Ge&act,G it is a none&planatory or nonde*onstrative discipline. Conse1uently it as an episte*ological nature or structure t at is essentially different fro* t e nature of t ose disciplines t at possess t e de*onstrative!e&planatory structure t at Aristotle takes to "e an essential feature of scientific kno,ledge.

' ese rat er drastic conse1uences of t e a"ove type of ine&actness s ould *ake us pause. )f a discipline is ine&act on account of "eing nonBe&planatory, it is not *erely t e case t at it e& i"its to a lesser degree so*e c aracteristic t at t e *ore e&act of t e disciplines possess >e.g., detail, clarity, certainty?. 0at er, it see*s to lack altoget er t e c aracteristic t at all disciplines t at ave a clai* to "eing scientific *ust, according to Aristotle, possess=na*ely, t eir giving causal e&planations or de*onstrations. )t see*s as if t ere is not sufficient si*ilarity "et,een none&planatory and e&planatory disciplines on t e "asis of , ic ,e can co*pare t e* in ter*s of t eir e&actness!ine&actness. 2 at is after all t e status of t ese none&planatory disciplines; ) ave so far a"stained fro* referring to t ese disciplines as sciences precisely "ecause t eir status is unclear and "ecause ) did not ,is to pre/udge t e issue. Aristotle, o,ever, sees no difficulty in referring to t e* as sciences and does not see* to "e concerned a"out , et er t ere is sufficient si*ilarity "et,een t e* and t e e&planatory disciplines for 5 119 5 t e purposes of co*parison: GBut t ere is anot er ,ay in , ic t e fact and t e reason , y differ, +iA. , in eac "eing studied "y a different science @

AG >FHE#%?. A*ong t e e&a*ples of sciences t at study t e fact or t e reason , y and are so related t at t e one is su"ordinate to t e ot er e includes starga9ing and astrono*y. Bot are referred to as sciences. <e goes on to add t at Gso*e of t ese sciences @ A ave practically t e sa*e na*e4 e.g., "ot *at e*atical and nautical astrono*y are called astrono*y and "ot *at e*atical and acoustic ar*onics are called ar*onicsG >F9a?. +i*ilarly e sees no difficulty in referring to "ot *edicine and *at e*atical *edicine >or per aps geo*etry? as sciences and in co*paring t e* ,it respect to t eir e&actness: G(any of t e sciences @ A , ic are not strictly su"ordinate stand in t is relation4 e.g., *edicine to geo*etryG >F9a1%?. ' ere is o"viously a pro"le* ere t at casts dou"t on Aristotle.s distinction "et,een none&planatory and e&planatory sciences. )f , at *akes t e latter disciplines sciences is, as Aristotle insists, t eir giving e&planations!de*onstrations, t en t e for*er cannot "e sciences. 0oss sees t is clearly in is co**entary on t e ost. Anal. , en e ,rites a"out t e none&planatory disciplines: G' e t ird @class of disciplinesA , ic is only "y courtesy called a science, collects certain e*pirical facts.G@#1A Barnes, on t e ot er and, per aps follo,ing Aristotle closely, /ust re*arks t at Gt e o"servational sciences "ring for,ard propositions "ased upon perception and induction >e.g., .' e rain"o, contains si& ues.?.G@#6A ' us, Aristotle.s distinction "et,een e&planatory and none&planatory sciences >on , ic one type of e&actness rests? is pro"le*atic ,it in is o,n fra*e,ork, , ic vie,s science as "eing essentially e&planatory in nature. 0egardless of , et er t e none&planatory disciplines are sciences or not, t e 1uestion still re*ains as to , et er Aristotle t inks t at et ics is suc a none&planatory discipline. )s et ics like t e H.A. ; )s it a dataBcollecting discipline; ' ere is no evidence t at Aristotle t inks of et ics as "eing a discipline t at is concerned only ,it t e collection of data a"out conduct. Ieit er is t ere evidence t at e takes is goal in is o,n et ical treatise to "e solely t e gat ering of data a"out conduct. ' is of course is not

inconsistent ,it t e idea t at data are at ti*es gat ered, "ut t ey are data presented in order to "e e&plained. ' us Aristotle points out, for e&a*ple, t at co,ardice, , ic is a vice of deficiency, is *ore opposed to courage t an is ras ness, , ic is a vice of e&cess. )n general, e clai*s t at Gin so*e cases t e defect, in ot ers t e e&cess, is *ore opposed to t e *eanG >N.E. 11$9a?. <is task is not *erely to report t is supposed fact, "ut rat er to e&plain it4 indeed, e goes on to argue t at Gt is results fro* eit er of t,o causes @

AG >11$9a%? and proceeds to spell out t e t,o causes. +i*ilarly, Aristotle t inks t at t e supposed fact t at c ildren cannot "e appy is in need of an e&planation and e goes 5 16$ 5 on to offer t e GcauseG @

A , y t ey cannot "e appy >11$$a?.@##A (ost i*portant for t e purposes at and is t e overall picture t at guides Aristotle in is et ical treatises. ' is picture is essentially t at of an e&planatory discipline =t at is, t e goal is to e&plain , y appiness is t e ulti*ate goal, , y it is t e only ulti*ate goal, , y so*e dispositions are virtues and ot ers vices, , y and o, ,eakness of t e ,ill is possi"le, and so fort . )ndeed in relation to t e last case, Aristotle sees is task as clearly "eing t at of providing an e&planation in ter*s of t e causes of t e occurrence of t e p eno*ena of ,eakness of t e ,ill: GAgain, one *ay study t e cause @ A of ,eakness of t e ,ill scientificallyG >114Fa64?. )n general, Aristotle in t e N.E. distinguis es clearly "et,een kno,ing certain facts=kno,ing Gt e t atG=a"out *atters of conduct in contrast to kno,ing t eir reasons or causes=kno,ing Gt e , yG or Gt e "ecause.G Alt oug e allo,s for t e possi"ility of an agent kno,ing only Gt e t at,G e sees is o,n task as "eing pri*arily one of providing Gt e , yG or Gt e "ecauseG >1$9%E6?.@#4A :f course to say t at et ics is to "e included a*ong t e e&planatory disciplines is not to say t at it is one of t e *at e*atical disciplines. )t *ay not even ave a *at e*atical counterpart in t e ,ay acoustical ar*onics as *at e*atical ar*onics and t e study of t e rain"o, as *at e*atical optics. Alt oug Aristotle does speak in at least one instance of t ere "eing a purely *at e*atical study of aspects of et ics >traces of Platonis*;?,@#%A /ust like e speaks of geo*etry proving *atters of *edicine, t ere is no reason to introduce *at e*atics in order to introduce e&planations into a discipline. 8t ics *ay not "e *at e*atical "ut nonet eless "e e&planatory in t e ,ay Aristotle takes t e "iological disciplines as presented in is o,n treatises >e.g., G.A.' .A. ? to "e non*at e*atical "ut e&planatory. ' e situation is t e sa*e in t e case of *edicine, Aristotle.s re*ark in t e ost. Anal. a"out t e relation "et,een *edicine and geo*etry not,it standing. )n t at re*ark e gives t e i*pression t at *edicine is none&planatory, t at facts like t e one Aristotle cites, for e&a*ple, t at circular ,ounds eal *ore slo,ly, and presu*a"ly ot ers as ,ell, are e&plained "y a discipline altoget er different fro* *edicine =geo*etry. 7et e presents 1uite a different picture else, ere. As ,e sa, in t e previous c apter, in Met. e includes *edicine a*ong t e disciplines t at seek causes: G2 ile t ere is a cause of ealt and of good condition . . . and in general every t inking, or t oug tBpartaking, science deals ,it causes

and principlesG >1$6%"?. Again e tells us t at Gevery science seeks certain principles and causes for eac of its o"/ects=e.g., *edicine and gy*nastics and eac of t e ot er sciences, , et er productive or *at e*aticalG >1$E4a?. )t is indeed difficult to see o, Aristotle vie,s *edicine , en e re*arks t at it studies t e fact t at circular ,ounds eal *ore slo,ly, "ut 5 161 5 geo*etry proves t e cause. )t is per aps even *ore difficult to see o, t e none&planatory vie, of *edicine t at see*s to "e i*plied "y t is re*ark is consistent ,it t e vie, presented in t e a"ove 1uotations fro* Met. , "ut per aps no suc vie, is i*plied. Aristotle *ay not ,is to assert t at *edicine is none&planatory, "ut rat er t at so*e *edical facts can "e e&plained "y anot er science. 8&trapolating fro* t e e&a*ple of t e ealing ,ounds e cites, so*e *edical facts presu*a"ly can "e e&plained geo*etrically. <e *ay t ink t at suc *edical facts can "e e&plained "y certain geo*etrical properties of t e p ysical o"/ects=in t e case of t e ealing of t e circular ,ounds t e e&planation *ig t "e given in ter*s of t e ratio of t e area to t e perip ery of t e ,ound. ' e rest of t e *edical facts o,ever are to "e e&plained "y *edicine. ) ave raised dou"ts ere as to , et er Aristotle.s distinction "et,een e&planatory and none&planatory sciences is a *eaningful one given is o,n understanding of , at a science is. 81ually i*portant, ) ave argued t at et ics, like *edicine, is not a none&planatory discipline. +o even if Aristotle.s distinction "et,een t,o types of sciences is to "e accepted, it s ould not raise any special pro"le*s as far as t e e&actness of et ics is concerned. -or et ics need not "e considered an ine&act discipline on account of its "eing none&planatory. ' is type of e&actness, alt oug it as t e *ost drastic episte*ological conse1uences, does not differentiate et ics fro* t ose disciplines t at Aristotle takes to "e de*onstrative. -or e&a*ple, it does not differentiate et ics fro* t e disciplines t at study t e natural p eno*ena, and in particular t ose t at study t e "iological p eno*ena, all of , ic are disciplines Aristotle considers to "elong to t e class of t eoretical sciences. ' e ai* of t e a"ove discussion ,as in part to isolate certain types of e&actness!ine&actness for t e purpose of finding out , et er any one of t e* is of i*portance in t e case of et ics. +o*e of t e* are of little i*portance to et ics. :t ers o,ever are of so*e i*portance to et ics=for e&a*ple, t e type Aristotle associates ,it t e relation of su"ordination a discipline *ay ave to anot er discipline, or t e level to , ic a discipline a"stracts fro* its su"/ect *atter, or t e e&planatory versus t e dataB collecting c aracter of a discipline. +o*e of t ese s ed lig t on Aristotle.s ,ay of seeing t e pro"le* of e&actness!ine&actness and its "roader i*plications for all disciplines, including et ics. Co**entators ave "een ,rong in e&cluding all of t e*. ' e a"ove discussion also ai*ed at giving an indication of t e variety of t ings Aristotle *eans , en e speaks of e&actness or ine&actness. )t is indeed so*e, at ironic t at Aristotle e&presses is concerns a"out e&actness "y using a ter* or several ter*s t at see* to "e t e*selves ine&act. 2 y t is is so, and , et er it s ould "e so, are *atters t at are difficult to ans,er and ) do not ,is to speculate a"out t e* at t is point. )t *ig t 5 166 5 "e useful , en t inking a"out suc *atters to "egin "y seeking to identify t e sorts of t ings in a discipline t at can "e, according to Aristotle, e&act or ine&act: to seek to identify, t at is, t e various co*ponents or levels of a discipline to , ic Aristotle attri"utes e&actness or ine&actness. ' is is t e *atter ) ,is to discuss ne&t.

0evels of '*actness/Ine*actness
2 en ,e speak of e&actness in relation to a discipline, ,e tend to t ink pri*arily of a set of features t at can c aracteri9e t at discipline.s co*ponents=for e&a*ple, its definitions, propositions, e&planations, and proofs. 2e tend, t at is, to t ink of t ese features as "eing for*al in contrast to *aterial, and ,e take t e* to c aracteri9e t e co*ponents of a discipline in contrast to , at t e discipline is a"out=t e accounts or propositions t at *ake up t e discipline in contrast to , at t ese accounts or propositions are a"out. ' us, e&actness is t oug t of as "eing a property not of t e su"/ect *atter of a discipline "ut rat er of a ,ay or *eans of descri"ing, defining, e&plaining, and so on, t e su"/ect *atter. )t is not a property of plants, ani*als, or nu*"ers, "ut of , at is said a"out t e*. Iaturally ,e t ink t e sa*e is true in t e case of ine&actness: it is also a for*al feature. ' is is not surprising, for it is precisely t ose t ings t at can "e e&act t at can also "e ine&act. ' is vie,, t at e&actness and ine&actness are for*al features, is aptly captured in Gottlo" -rege.s /ustly fa*ous re*ark t at e as never seen a vague pea. Aristotle o,ever as a different vie,: e&actness and ine&actness can "e eit er *aterial or for*al features. ' ey can c aracteri9e eit er t e su"/ect *atter of a discipline or , at ,e say a"out t e su"/ect *atter. ' ey *ay, t at is, "e properties of eit er t e o"/ects a discipline studies and t eir attri"utes=for e&a*ple, of ani*als or nu*"ers and t eir attri"utes=or of t e *eans a discipline uses to define, descri"e, or e&plain suc o"/ects and t eir attri"utes. ' us, , en Aristotle speaks of e&actness!ine&actness in relation to a discipline at ti*es e is speaking of a for*al feature , ile at ot er ti*es e is speaking of a *aterial one. ' ese different levels of e&actness!ine&actness ave not "een distinguis ed "y t e co**entators. But it is, as s all "e seen, i*portant to do so. )n part "ecause , at e&actness!ine&actness is in a certain case depends on , et er it is a for*al or *aterial c aracteristic. )t is also i*portant "ecause Aristotle "elieves t at a relation olds "et,een t e t,o levels: e&actness!ine&actness at one level *ay i*ply e&actness!ine&actness at t e ot er level. ' e distinction "et,een for*al and *aterial e&actness!ine&actness in a discipline is *ost clearly seen in t e case , ere t e su"/ect *atter of t e discipline=for e&a*ple, ani*als, psyc ological p eno*ena, nu*"ers, geo*etrical figures=is of a different logical type t an t e constitutive 5 16# 5 ele*ents of t e discipline=t at is, its ter*s, definitions, a&io*s, t eore*s, proofs, e&planations, and so on. ' ere are instances, o,ever, , ere "ot t e su"/ect *atter and t e constitutive co*ponents of a discipline are of t e sa*e logical type. ' at t is can "e so is easily seen , en ,e consider secondB order disciplines, for t e su"/ect *atter of suc secondBorder disciplines is t e constitutive co*ponents of firstBorder disciplines=t e for*er study t e ter*s, propositions, t eore*s, and so fort , of t e latter. <o,ever, t e secondBorder discipline itself consists of suc t ings as ter*s, state*ents, t eore*s, e&planations, and so fort . )n suc cases, one often distinguis es "et,een o"/ect language and *etalanguage, even t oug "ot are of t e sa*e logical type. ' us, it is clear t at one can differentiate "et,een t e t,o levels, even in t e case of t ose disciplines , ose su"/ect *atter and constituents are of t e sa*e logical type. )t is also evident t at t e distinction "et,een levels of e&actness!ine&actness is not necessarily a distinction "et,een types of e&actness!ine&actness. ' e sa*e type of e&actness!ine&actness *ay c aracteri9e "ot levels of a discipline >"ot its su"/ect *atter and its constitutive ele*ents?, and ence t ere *ay "e no difference in t e type of e&actness!ine&actness "ut t ere *ay "e a difference of levels. ' e disciplines t at Aristotle is concerned ,it and in connection ,it , ic e raises t e pro"le* of e&actness!ine&actness are *ostly firstBorder disciplines.@#EA ' ey are t e disciplines t at investigate

"iological, p ysical, and psyc ological p eno*ena, disciplines t at study *at e*atical properties, disciplines t at in1uire into *atters of conduct, and so fort . 8t ics is suc a firstBorder discipline. ) cannot discuss ere t e various pro"le*s connected ,it t e identity of t e su"/ect *atter of et ics, "ut t ere is no dou"t t at Aristotle takes it to consist of t e p eno*ena of conduct. )n N.E. Aristotle clearly indicates t at t e accounts of et ics are accounts of actions and e*otions. ' e su"/ect *atter of et ics, t e o"/ects it investigates, are suc t ings as actions and e*otions: G<ence, as as "een fre1uently re*arked already, discussions @or accountsA a"out e*otions and actions only ad*it suc degree of definiteness as "elongs to t e *atters ,it , ic t ey deal @

AG >11E%a1#?. 2 ere Aristotle is concerned ,it t e e&actness possi"le in our accounts given t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter of et ics, t e su"/ect *atter is taken to consist of suc t ings as ,ealt and courage >1$94"1#?. )n t e case of et ics t en, as in t e case of t e ot er firstBorder disciplines, t,o levels of different logical types t at *ay "e c aracteri9ed "y e&actness!ine&actness can "e easily identified. )ndeed Aristotle speaks of "ot for*al and *aterial e&actness!ine&actness in connection ,it several disciplines and, as to "e e&pected, speaks of t e for*er type in connection ,it al*ost all of t e disciplines. ' us e speaks of t e for*al e&actness!ine&actness of a discipline, kno,ledge, 5 164 5 or science > ost. Anal. HFa#1, 99"6F4 Anim. 4$6a#4 Met. 9H6a1%, 6%, 1$6%"1$, 1$FHa1$?, of an account > r. Anal. 64"1%, 4Ea#$4 Cael. 6E9"6#4 G.A. F1EE#6, F6H"14, F%#"1%, FH4"#F4 H.A. 4HH"6H, 491aH, 49#", %$9"6#, %11a1#4 Met. 9HEa1#?, of argu*ents or proofs > ost. Anal. HEa1F4 Cael. 6HHa4 Met. 1$E4a%, 1$F9a1#, 1$H$a1$4 Rhet. 1#9Ea#4?, of definitions >Met. 1$#$a1E, 1$#%a1#4 Rhet. 1#E9"#6?, and so fort . ' e concern, o,ever, is different in ot er passages , ere Aristotle is focusing not upon so*e for*al features of a discipline, "ut rat er upon features of its su"/ect *atter=, ere e is concerned ,it *aterial e&actness!ine&actness. ' us e speaks of t e o"/ects t e p ilosop er studies as "eing e&act > rotrept. B4H?,@#FA of sounds "eing e&act >Aud. H$4a#$?, of t e ele*ents of eart "eing not capa"le of t e e&actness of t ose of eaven >Cael. 6HFE6$?, of t e *enstrual period not "eing accurately fi&ed >G.A. F#Ha1H?, of t e unit, and in particular t at of nu*"er, "eing e&act >Met. 1$%#a?, of "ea*s of lig t not "eing e&act > robl. 916E6%?, of t e lack of e&actness in t e periods of gestation of ani*als due to t e indefiniteness of *atter >G.A. FFHaE?, and in general of t e ine&actness t at attends everyt ing t at as *atter >Met. 99%a1%?. ' e situation is si*ilar ,it respect to t e disciplines , ose su"/ect *atter is t e do*ain of conduct: in so*e cases Aristotle takes e&actness! ine&actness to "e for*al , ile at ot ers *aterial. ' us e speaks of for*al e&actness!ine&actness in relation to our accounts >N.E. 1$94"1#, 14, 1$9Ha6F, 11$4a, 11$F"1%, 11F4E44 E.E. 1666"4$, 166Fa1$, 16#E"1%4 olit. 16%H"#9, 1##1"19, 1#41"#$?, our definitions >N.E. 11%9a#, 11E4"6H4 E.E. 1661"9, 16#1"4 olit. 16FE"6%?, our la,s or rules > olit. 16E%"#, 16F4"H, 16H6"%?, and so fort . <e also speaks of *aterial e&actness!ine&actness of t e p eno*ena of conduct. ' us Aristotle tells us t at virtue is *ore e&act t an any art >N.E. 11$E"14?, t at a certain kind of fluctuation or ine&actness is e& i"ited "y t e good t ings >for e&a*ple, ,ealt and courage, 1$94"1#? and t at *atters of conduct and t at , ic is "eneficial ave no fi&ity or e&actness any *ore t an *atters of ealt >11$4a?. <e insists t at for*al e&actness in *atters of conduct s ould correspond to *aterial e&actness: G<ence, as as "een fre1uently re*arked already, accounts of our e*otions and actions ad*it only of suc degree of definiteness as "elongs to t e *atters ,it , ic t ey dealG >11E%a1#4 see also 1$94"1#, 11$4a?. +i*ilarly, for*al ine&actness in t e

case of t e la, is related to *aterial ine&actness=t e c aracteristics of t e t ings la, is a"out. ' e deficiencies or pro"le*s of t e la,, Aristotle argues, do not lie so *uc ,it t e la, as ,it Gt e nature of t e t ing: t e *aterial of conduct is essentially irregularG >11#F"1%?. ' e indefiniteness of t e la,, e insists, lies ,it t e indefiniteness of its su"/ect *atter: G-or t at , ic is itself indefinite, t ere is also an indefinite rule, like t e leaden rule used "y Jes"ian "uildersG >11#F"#$?. 5 16% 5 )t is evident t at, contrary to *odern conventional t oug t, Aristotle sees no pro"le*s in speaking of *aterial e&actness!ine&actness. )t is i*portant to recogni9e t at in *any instances Aristotle is concerned ,it suc e&actness!ine&actness, a fact t at as "een altoget er overlooked "y recent co**entators. )t as not "een ade1uately recogni9ed or appreciated t at often it is *aterial e&actness!ine&actness t at is pri*ary and t at for*al e&actness!ine&actness is due to it. Clearly t ese t,o levels of e&actness are different and cannot "e reduced to eac ot er, for, as s all "e seen, it is possi"le to ave t e one ,it out t e ot er. -ailure to recogni9e t at Aristotle t inks in ter*s of t,o levels of e&actness!ine&actness *ay partly e&plain , y is reasons for taking et ics to "e essentially ine&act ave not "een understood, for, as s all "e seen, e t inks t at so*e kinds of for*al ine&actness cannot "e eli*inated "ecause t ey are i*plied "y *aterial ine&actness4 t ey are i*plied "y t e very nature of t e su"/ect *atter of et ics. ' e ancient co**entators, o,ever, ad no difficulty in recogni9ing and indeed e*p asi9ing t e idea of *aterial e&actness!ine&actness in Aristotle.s t oug t. )n t is t ey *ay ave "een aided "y t e analogy ,e *entioned earlier=na*ely, t e analogy t ey t oug t to old "et,een et ics, its su"/ect *atter, and e&actness on t e one and, and t e productive arts, t eir *aterials, and e&actness on t e ot er=an analogy t ey attri"uted to Aristotle. 2 et er Aristotle accepts t e analogy is not really i*portant. 2 at is i*portant is , et er t e analogy is instructive. )t clearly is instructive and t e ancients concurred. )t *akes clear or al*ost forces one to recogni9e so*et ing t at one *ay "e rat er strongly inclined to overlook or *isinterpret despite t e fact t at Aristotle speaks 1uite e*p atically a"out it=na*ely, t at in so*e cases t e pri*ary e&actness!ine&actness lies ,it t e *aterial of an art or discipline. ' e ancients t oug t t at it ,as easy to see "y using t e senses t at t e *aterials of t e various productive arts >suc as ,ood, stone, and *ar"le? e& i"it different c aracteristics, t at t ey vary in t eir Ge&actness,G and t erefore t at t e products created "y using t e* also vary in t eir e&actness or precision. ' e analogy also elped t e* to see *ore clearly Aristotle.s clai* t at so*e instances of for*al ine&actness cannot "e eli*inated, for t ey are "y analogy like t e ine&actness of t e products of art , ic t e ancients t oug t could not "e eli*inated if t e source *aterials possessed t e different c aracteristics t ey possessed. ' is does not, of course, i*ply t at t e ancient co**entators or Aristotle is correct. )n so*e cases per aps for*al ine&actness can "e eli*inated. )t is i*portant, o,ever, to recogni9e t at Aristotle speaks of features of e&actness!ine&actness at "ot t e *aterial and for*al levels and t at e t inks t at t e features of t e t,o levels are related. 5 16E 5

!ome !ources of -ormal Ine*actness

' e re*arks a"ove *ake it evident t at Aristotle not only t inks t at features of e&actness!ine&actness can c aracteri9e "ot t e for*al and *aterial levels of a discipline "ut also t at in so*e cases suc features at t e for*al level are due to si*ilar ones at t e *aterial level. At t is point ) ,is only to state Aristotle.s position t at so*e kinds of for*al ine&actness result fro* *aterial ine&actness and proceed

to identify so*e ot er factors t at Aristotle t inks give rise to for*al ine&actness. ) s all e&plore t e relation "et,een for*al and *aterial e&actness!ine&actness in t e ne&t section. Aristotle identifies a nu*"er of sources of for*al ine&actness "y singling out so*e factors t at e t inks can, s ould, or *ust produce it. Iot all of t e* are e1ually significant "ut it is nonet eless i*portant to "riefly touc upon t e* for at least t,o reasons. -irst, so*e of t ese sources ,ill "e encountered later , en ) discuss in so*e detail Aristotle.s re*arks on e&actness in t e N.E. +econd, kno,ing t e source of a particular type of for*al ine&actness is at ti*es i*portant in deter*ining , et er suc a type is a necessary feature of a discipline and t erefore cannot "e eli*inated, or , et er it is not necessary and t erefore can "e eli*inated. <ere t en are t e sources of ine&actness Aristotle i*self identifies.

The urdensome Task of !eeking '*actness

)n several places Aristotle considers so*e degree of ine&actness as accepta"le or appropriate for t e purpose of avoiding t e "urdenso*e task of seeking e&actness. <e tends in t ese passages to vie, e&actness as so*et ing toilso*e and as so*et ing t at reflects t e kind of pettiness or *eanness t at e else, ere associates ,it t e "e avior of t e illi"eral person. ' us in olit. : G:f t e several divisions of ,ealt Bgetting ) no, speak generally4 a *inute consideration @

A of t e* *ig t "e useful in practice, "ut it ,ould "e tireso*e @or toilso*e= A to d,ell upon in studyG >16%HE#H?.@#HA )n N.E. e clai*s t at to pursue t e su"/ect under investigation ,it greater e&actness ,ould "e a *ore la"orious task > ? >11$6a6E?. -inally, in Met. e descri"es e&actness as aving so*et ing in its nature t at approac es t e *ean or illi"eral: G:t ers are annoyed "y e&actness eit er "ecause t ey cannot follo, t e connection of t oug t or "ecause t ey regard it as *ean @or petty= A. -or e&actness as so*et ing of t is c aracter, so t at as in trade so in argu*ent so*e people t ink it illi"eral @ AG >99%a?.@#9A Aristotle.s "elief t at e&actness possesses suc c aracteristics=concern ,it *inutiae, pettiness, illi"erality=*ay very ,ell *otivate is calling t e "e avior opposite to t at of t e *agnificent person a for* of : G(oreover e @t e *agnificent personA ,ill spend gladly and 5 16F 5 lavis ly, since *inute calculations @

A is a petty t ing. . . e ,ill t erefore "e a li"eral personG >N.E. 1166"H?.

Ine*actness and 0acunae in $lassification

' roug out is ,orks Aristotle often o"serves t at t ere are gaps in our classifications. )n *any instances t ings lack na*es, so*et ing , ic is *ost apparent , ere t ere is a principle of classification t at is not fully applied=only so*e of t e t ings to , ic t e principle applies ave na*es, t e ot ers re*aining na*eless >

?. <ence, alt oug Aristotle speaks of t ings ,it out na*es in practically all is ,orks, t e concern ,it na*eless t ings is *ost pro*inent in t e practical and "iological disciplines=disciplines , ere classification plays an i*portant role or , ere na*e giving is often "ased on o"vious principles of classification. ' us Aristotle finds t at is principle of classification of t e virtues and vices , ic rest on is conception of virtue as a *ean disposition "et,een t e t,o e&tre*es of e&cess and deficiency >vices? encounters *any instances , ere one or *ore of t e follo,ing is t e case: >a? t e *ean disposition or t e e&tre*e ones are na*eless4 >"? t e c aracter of t e person , o e& i"its eit er t e virtue or t e vices is na*eless.@4$A -or e&a*ple, in E.E. >1661a#? e o"serves t at in relation to t e virtue of rig teous indignation only one of t e e&tre*es as a na*e >envy?, "ut t e ot er does not.@41A +i*ilarly, ,it t e virtue of te*perance=one e&tre*e is na*ed >profligacy?, "ut t e ot er not >16#1a#9?.@46A ' e c aracter of t e person , o can endure all pain >one of t e e&tre*es related to t e virtue of ardiness? is strictly speaking na*eless, "ut "y *etap or is called ard, patient, or enduring >1661a69?. +i*ilarly, t ere is no na*e for t e c aracter of t e person , o spends to e&cess >one of t e e&tre*es related to t e virtue of *agnificence, 16##a#9?. Aristotle.s discussion of t e virtues and vices in t e N.E. s o,s t at gaps in classification are even *ore pervasive= e points to *ore instances , ere is sc e*e for classifying virtues, vices, and t eir corresponding c aracters encounters difficulties "ecause t e disposition or t e c aracter i*plied "y t e principle of classification is na*eless. Aristotle e*"races t e general principle stating t at G, ere t ere is e&cess and deficiency t ere *ust also "e a *eanG >116%"1H?.@4#A 7et t e *ean state >t e virtue?, t e e&tre*es >vices?, or t e corresponding c aracters *ay ave no na*es. ' us t e *ean >t e virtue? and one of t e e&tre*es relating to t e seeking of onor as ,ell as t e c aracter corresponding to t e virtue ave no na*e >11$F"69, 116%"6%?. )n connection ,it t e e*otion of anger, Gvirtually all dispositions are na*eless, "ut as ,e call a person of t e *iddle c aracter gentle, let us na*e t e *ean gentleness, , ile of t e e&tre*es e t at e&ceeds *ay "e styled irasci"le and is vice irasci"ility, and e t at is deficient, inirasci"le, and t e deficiency inirasci"ilityG >11$Ha%?. 7et, ArB 5 16H 5 istotle finds t e proposed ter*s not altoget er satisfactory, for , en discussing t e dispositions and corresponding c aracters in relation to anger e re*arks, G' ere is as a *atter of fact no recogni9ed na*e for t e *ean, as ,ell as t e e&tre*es, so ,e apply t e ter* gentleness to t e *ean t oug really it inclines to,ard deficiency, , ic as no na*e. ' e e&cess *ay "e called a sort of irasci"ility, for t e e*otion is anger, , ile its causes are *any and variousG >116%"6E?. ' e sa*e is true, according to Aristotle, of t e dispositions relating to trut fulness in speec and in action >11$Ha1E? and of

"oastfulness >116Fa1%?4 and of t e c aracters in relation to fear >11$F"1, 111%"6%?, to pleasure >11$F"E?, and to social agreea"leness >116E"6$?=t e *ean or t e e&tre*es lack na*es. ' is, Aristotle clai*s, Gis true in t e case of *any @virtues, vices, and corresponding c aractersAG >11$F"#, 111%"6%?. As ) pointed out earlier, Aristotle finds t at gaps in classification occur as fre1uently in relation to t e "iological do*ain as t ey occur in relation to t e do*ain of conduct. <e points out in t e "iological treatises, and in particular in H.A. , *any instances , ere t ere are no na*es.@44A 2 at sorts of pro"le*s does t e e&istence of t ese gaps in classification pose; ' ere are several pro"le*s t at Aristotle recogni9es, alt oug it is not clear t at t ese are pro"le*s of e&actness or t at e takes t e* to "e so. ' us, in .A. Aristotle re*arks t at G' ere is no co**on na*e , ic is applied to all ani*als t at ave lungs. But t ere oug t to "e: "ecause t e possession of a lung is one of t eir essential c aracteristicsG >EE9"1$?. ' e lack of a na*e for all ani*als ,it lungs is, according to Aristotle, not trivial, for classification in t is instance fails to provide a *arker for a kind , ose *e*"ers s are an essential feature. :ur classification fails to represent accurately t e natural groupings of ani*als according to t eir essential attri"utes. ' e lack of na*es for so*e of t e virtues or corresponding c aracters poses different pro"le*s. )t raises pro"le*s in connection ,it t,o central ele*ents in Aristotle.s t eory of virtue. ' e first ele*ent is t e fa*iliar Aristotelian t esis ,e *entioned earlier=na*ely, t at *oral virtues are *ean states or dispositions "et,een t,o e&tre*e states or dispositions, and t e sa*e relation presu*a"ly olds "et,een t e corresponding c aracters. ' e second ele*ent, , ic . ,e *ay call Gt e opposition t esis,G posits an additional relation a*ong t e *ean and e&tre*e dispositions as ,ell as a*ong t e *ean and e&tre*e c aracters: )t clai*s t at t e *ean and e&tre*e dispositions are all opposed to eac ot er, and a relation of opposition presu*a"ly olds "et,een t e *ean and e&tre*e c aracters. )n N.E. Aristotle su**ari9es t e doctrine of t e opposition of eac virtue to its t,o related vices and of eac vice to t e ot er as follo,s: G' ere are t en t ree dispositions=t,o vices, one of e&cess and one of deficiency, and one virtue , ic is t e *ean4 and eac of t e* is in a certain ,ay 5 169 5 opposed to "ot t e ot ers. -or t e e&tre*e states are t e opposite "ot of t e *iddle state and of eac ot er, and t e *iddle state is t e opposite of t e e&tre*esG >11$H"1$?. ' e lack of na*es for so*e virtues *ay lead us to t e un,arranted conclusion t at t e Aristotelian t esis t at virtue is a *ean is false. Also "ecause of t e fact t at so*e virtue >or vice? is na*eless, t e opposition "et,een it and t e vices >or virtue? relating to it ,ill not "e represented at t e for*al level and t is *ay even ave practical conse1uences at ti*es. Consider first t e pro"le*s generated "y t e lack of na*es for t e Aristotelian t esis t at virtue is a *ean "et,een t,o e&tre*es. Aristotle is clearly a,are of o, i*portant t e e&a*ination of t e na*eless virtues, as ,ell as t e na*eless e&tre*es, is for t e purpose of saving t e validity of is t esis t at virtue is a *ean "et,een t,o e&tre*es.@4%A G2e s all do as ,ell to e&a*ine t e unna*ed virtues . . . since ,e s all also confir* our "elief t at t e virtues are *eans, if ,e notice o, t is olds good in every instanceG >116Fa1E?. -or despite , at t e linguistic representation tells us a"out t e facts concerning t e virtues or e&cellences and t e vices, t ere are indeed a *ean and t,o e&tre*es even in t e case , ere t e *ean or t e e&tre*es ave no na*es. ' e for*al or linguistic representation of t e facts "y ,ay of classification or na*ing does not represent t e facts accurately. ' ere are also pro"le*s, according to Aristotle, t at relate specifically to t e t esis of t e opposition "et,een eac of t e e&tre*es on t e one and and t e e&tre*es and t e *ean on t e ot er: ' ese

pro"le*s *ay "e eit er t eoretical or practical. ' us, co**enting on t e fact t at in t e case of social agreea"leness t e *ean as no na*e "ut t e e&tre*es do, Aristotle says, G<o,ever, t e e&tre*es see* to "e opposite @onlyA to eac ot er, "ecause t e *ean as no na*eG >116Fa11?.@4EA <ere again t e e&isting linguistic data or actual na*es do not give an accurate representation of t e facts, for t e opposition is t,ofold: ' ere is opposition "et,een eac one of t e e&tre*es and t e ot er, "ut also "et,een eac of t e e&tre*es and t e *ean. )t is t is latter opposition t at separates virtue fro* vice. But in addition to t is t eoretical pro"le*, Aristotle sees a practical one. ' us, co**enting on t e fact t at t e *ean disposition and c aracters in relation to seeking onor ave no na*e, e re*arks, GBut t e *iddle c aracter as no na*e and t e dispositions of t ese persons are also unna*ed, e&cept t at t at of t e a*"itious *an is called .a*"itiousness.. Conse1uently, t e e&tre*e c aracters put in a clai* to t e *iddle disposition, and in fact ,e ourselves so*eti*es call t e *iddle person a*"itious and so*eti*es una*"itious: ,e so*eti*es praise a person for "eing a*"itious, so*eti*es for "eing una*"itiousG >11$Ha?. )n t is case ,e are *isled, according to Aristotle, "ecause t ere is no na*e for t e virtue or t e virtuous c aracter. 2e *istake t e e&tre*e dispoB 5 1#$ 5 sitions and c aracters for t e virtuous ones and ,e t erefore praise nonBvirtuous dispositions and c aracters. 7et doing so is surely a *istake.@4FA Aristotle offers a *ore ela"orate e&planation of t e tendency to "e *isled in t is case. 9.: But , ere t ere is e&cess and deficiency t ere *ust "e a *ean. . . . )t is t erefore t is na*eless *ean in regard to onor t at ,e praise. Co*pared ,it a*"ition it appears una*"itiousness, and co*pared ,it una*"itiousness it appears a*"ition: co*pared ,it "ot , it appears in a sense to "e "ot . ' is see*s to "e true of t e ot er virtues also4 "ut in t e present case t e e&tre*es appear to "e opposed only to one anot er, "ecause t e *iddle c aracter as no na*e. >116%E6$?

2e are *isled ere not "ecause t e *ean rese*"les eit er one of t e t,o e&tre*es , en co*pared to t e ot er one=t is is, Aristotle clai*s, true of all t e virtues@4HA ="ut rat er "ecause t e *ean is unna*ed, t e facts are *isrepresented: )t appears as if t e e&tre*es are only opposed to eac ot er, t us eac taking t e place of t e *ean, , ereas t e facts are ot er,ise. )t ,ould not "e true o,ever to say t at Aristotle i*self speaks of t e a"ove e&a*ples of na*eless entities in t e "iological and et ical treatises in ter*s of e&actness or ine&actness. <e doesn.t actually use any of t e ter*s t at signify e&actness or ine&actness for i* in connection ,it t ese e&a*ples of gaps in classification. )t is clear t at t e lacunae in na*ing pose pro"le*s of e&actness t at are 1uite si*ilar to ones Aristotle discusses else, ere and t at e as no esitation in designating as cases of e&actness! ine&actness. As s all "e seen, t ese are pro"le*s concerning t e representation of t e et ical >and "iological? p eno*ena in ter*s of propositions t at do not e&actly fit t e*. ' ere is o,ever at least one place , ere Aristotle see*s to *e to co*e close to designating t e lacunae in na*ing and t e pro"le*s t ey give rise to as p eno*ena of e&actness!ine&actness. 2 ile discussing t e dispositions and c aracters associated ,it trut fulness of speec and "e avior in N.E. e re*arks: G(ost of t ese are also unna*ed, "ut in t ese as in ot er cases ,e *ust atte*pt to *ake na*es for t e* ourselves, for t e sake of clarity @

A and easiness of co*pre ensionG >11$HalE?. ' e ter*

Aristotle uses in e&plaining is purposes for coining na*es for t e unna*ed dispositions and c aracters as "een rendered as GclarityG "y al*ost all translators.@49A ' ere is no dou"t t at t is is one of t e *eanings of t e ter* and at ti*es Aristotle i*self uses it to *ean so*et ing like clarity. But, as ) pointed out earlier, t e ter* and t ose t at s are t e sa*e root > ? are at ti*es used t roug out Aristotle.s ,orks to signify *ore or less t e sa*e t ings >in its various for*s? signifies. And Plato see*s to ave no pro"le* in speaking 5 1#1 5 of t e differences in

a*ong sciences , ere t e conte&t *akes it clear t at e *eans accuracy or e&actness and indeed interc anges t e ter* ,it > hilebus %FCB8?. Io, clarity itself can "e taken to "e a for* of e&actness, "ut since GclarityG is 1uite a vague ter* ) ,is to point out t at t e conte&t in , ic Aristotle supposedly speaks a"out coining na*es for t e unna*ed ele*ents of conduct for t e purpose of clarity is suc t at e cannot *ean si*ply for t e purpose of *aking a ter* clear. ' ese ele*ents of conduct do not ave na*es, ence it cannot "e t e case t at t e ter*s denoting t e* are unclear. <is purposes include at least , at ,e spoke of a"ove: Giving >correct? na*es ,ould "e a ,ay of representing t e facts accurately, differentiating precisely "et,een virtues and vices, and s o,ing t e opposition "et,een t e *ean and t e e&tre*es accurately and clearly, and so fort .@%$A

Ine*actness and &hetorical or Methodological Purposes

)n several instances Aristotle speaks of types of ine&actness t at are due eit er to is o,n ,ay or to , at is considered to "e t e "est ,ay of proceeding ,it t e investigation in a certain do*ain, organi9ing a su"/ect, or presenting *aterial for instructional purposes. <e often vie,s is o,n treatises as "eing instru*ents for teac ing and e is at ti*es *otivated "y pedagogical considerations.@%1A )t is t erefore understanda"le t at e ,ould raise 1uestions a"out t e for* of our accounts if t ey are to fulfill t eir instructional function. All of t ese concerns=t e ,ay of investigating, organi9ing, or presenting *aterial=*ay give rise to certain types of ine&actness. At least Aristotle see*s to t ink t at t ey do. ' us, in at least t e follo,ing instances Aristotle speaks of suc sources of ine&actness: 9.3 Jet t is account t en serve to descri"e t e good in outline=for ,e *ust presu*a"ly @

A "egin "y *aking a roug sketc and t en to fill it in after,ards. )f a ,ork as "een ,ell laid do,n in outline, to carry it on and co*plete it in detail *ay "e supposed to "e ,it in t e capacity of any"ody4 and in t is ,orking out of details ti*e see*s to "e a good inventor or at all events coB,orker. ' is indeed is o, advances in t e arts ave actually co*e a"out, since anyone can add , at is lacking. >N.E. &;=2a%;7 4.F :ur *et od of in1uiry t en *ust "e t at e*ployed "y all people in ot er *atters , en t ey ave so*et ing in and to start ,it =,e *ust endeavor "y *eans of state*ents t at are true "ut not precise to arrive at a result t at is "ot true and precise. >E.E. &%%;a&:7 Jet us descri"e t ese @differences a*ong ani*alsA first in general outline, and t en ,e ,ill go on to speak of t e various kinds, giving special attention to it. >H.A.925a&;7

4.H

9.=

5 1#6 5 2 at as /ust "een said as "een stated t us "y ,ay of outline, so as to give a foretaste of t e *atters and su"/ects , ic ,e ave to e&a*ine4 detailed state*ents ,ill follo, later. >H.A.9=&a57

)n 4.E Aristotle appears to "e saying t at giving an ine&act account of t e good like t e one e i*self presu*a"ly gives is t e ,ay one *ust proceed in t is investigation. Ad*ittedly, is ,ords are so*e, at tentative >

?, "ut e does say G,e *ust first sketc @ ... A.G Giving an ine&act account, one t at is a *ere sketc or outline, is t e ,ay one *ust proceed, according to Aristotle. ' e considerations Aristotle "rings fort do not o,ever s o, t at t is is so. ' e clai*s t at if a ,ork as "een ,ell laid do,n in outline it is easy to co*plete, t at ti*e is a good inventor and elper, and t at in t e arts advances are *ade "y co*pleting an inco*plete "eginning, do not "y any *eans prove t at one *ust start ,it so*et ing ine&act and i*prove upon it later. ' e language of necessity *ay /ust "e a "it of r etorical e&cess. )n any case, it is not clear , et er Aristotle intends t ese considerations to "e taken as t e reasons for accepting t e necessity of ine&actness at t e outset of an investigation. ' ey *ay /ust ave "een given as reasons for s o,ing t e plausi"ility, rat er t an t e necessity, of t is type of r etorical or *et odological ine&actness. -urt er*ore, Aristotle see*s to vie, t is type of ine&actness as not "eing peculiar to is investigation at and, as not "eing restricted to et ical investigation only, "ut rat er as "eing a *et odological strategy t at presu*a"ly can "e applied to any investigation. )n 4.F, o,ever, Aristotle opts for *et odological ine&actness for so*e, at different reasons. Iotice again t e use of t e language of necessity t,ice in t is passage: G:ur *et od of in1uiry *ust @

A "e t at e*ployed "y all people in ot er *atters , en t ey ave so*et ing at andG and G,e *ust @ A endeavor "y state*ents t at are true "ut not precise to arrive at a result t at is "ot true and precise.G )n fact Aristotle see*s to "e *aking t,o 1uite different clai*s ere. ' e first is a general t esis to t e effect t at ,e *ust proceed in investigation in t e ,ay all t ose , o ave so*et ing at and do=t at is, t ey start fro* , at t ey ave at and. )t is a general *et odological principle t at prescri"es o, one is to proceed in any investigation , en one as so*et ing t at can "e used as a starting point. At least t,o 1uestions arise in connection ,it t is *et odological principle: )s t e procedure t at t e *et odological principle prescri"es a necessary one; 2 at is t e relation "et,een t e *et odological principle and e&actness!ine&actness; )t *ay very ,ell "e t e case t at Aristotle does not really intend to assert t at t e procedure of starting ,it , at is at and is necessary. All e per aps intends to say is t at ,e s ould follo, t e co**on practice of doing so. )t see*s to *e 1uite possi"le t at Aristotle as only t is *uc 5 1## 5 in *ind, "ut if e really intends to assert t at it is necessary to do so, t e necessity e as in *ind pro"a"ly derives fro* t e t esis e e&pounds in various places t at all teac ing, learning, and investigating proceeds fro* so*e preBe&isting kno,ledge >see ost. Anal. ).i?. )t is clear, o,ever, t at Aristotle.s first clai*, t e *et odological principle prescri"ing t at ,e "egin investigating ,it , at is at and, as, pri*a facie at least, no connection to e&actness!ine&actness. ' at one starts an investigation ,it , at is availa"le or ,it , at one kno,s does not necessarily *ake t e investigation e&act or ine&act. 2 et er e&actness! ine&actness is introduced depends in part on t e nature of t e *aterial t at is at and. >-or t ere are ot er factors as ,ell t at can introduce e&actness!ine&actness, e.g., , at one does ,it t e *aterial at and.? -ocusing only on t e nature of t e *aterial at t is point, clearly if t e *aterial at and ,ere not lacking in precision=for e&a*ple, so*e a&io*s or definitions of geo*etry=t e *et odological ine&actness Aristotle is concerned ,it in t is conte&t ,ould not arise. )ne&actness, t en, *ay "e introduced into t e accounts of an investigation "y t e lack of e&actness in , at is used as t e starting point of t at investigation, "y t e ine&actness of , at is at and. )ndeed, Aristotle t inks t at , at e as at and for is o,n investigation in t e et ics is so*et ing t at lacks precision or e&actness >t e second clai*?. )t consists of so*e 1uite a"stract and sc e*atic state*ents a"out appiness, for e&a*ple, t at appiness is t e greatest and "est of u*an goals >E.E. 161Fa66?. +uc state*ents, Aristotle insists, *ay "e true, "ut are not precise >E.E. 161EE##, 166$a1E4 N.E. 11#HE6%?. ' at Aristotle finds , at e as at and for is o,n et ical investigation to "e lacking in precision is per aps not surprising, for e see*s to t ink t at lack of precision c aracteri9es all t ose t ings t at function as t e starting points of investigation. )ne&actness of one for* or anot er c aracteri9es, according to i*, all our preanalytic kno,ledge t at *ay consist of o"servations, co**on "eliefs, opinions of t e ,ise, and so fort >see Met. 9H%al6, 9HE"4, 9HHa#44 Anita . 41#a1$?. (ost pro"a"ly it is t e "elief t at preanalytic or prep ilosop ic kno,ledge in general lacks e&actness t at lies "e ind Aristotle.s second clai* t at G,e *ust endeavor "y *eans of state*ents t at are true "ut not precise to arrive at a result t at is "ot true and precise.G +uc a "elief ,ould e&plain , y Aristotle t inks ,e need to start ,it , at is not precise in our investigation and, if successful, arrive at , at is precise.@%6A

)n 4.H and 4.9 t ere is no talk a"out any necessity of ine&actness. Aristotle.s concerns see* to "e *ore pedagogical or r etorical. )ne&actness is accepted as a ,ay of giving an introduction to t e field, giving a foretaste of , at is to co*e. )t looks *ore like a conse1uence of a r etorical device of presenting t e *aterial of a discipline: giving a general 5 1#4 5 introduction or painting a roug picture at t e outset and filling in t e details later. Aristotle does not tell us ere, in contrast to "ot 4.E and 4.F, t at t is approac is a necessary one. )t is put fort as "eing is preferred ,ay of organi9ing and presenting t e *aterial rat er t an as so*et ing necessitated "y so*e ot er deeper considerations. ' e a"ove discussion s o,s t at alt oug r etorical or *et odological ine&actness *ay take in *ost cases t e sa*e for*=in 4.E, 4.H, and 4.9 it consists of so*e type of outline=it can "e generated "y different considerations. ' is fact could "e of so*e i*portance , en ,e ,is to deter*ine , et er and at , at stage r etorical or *et odological ine&actness can "e eli*inated fro* our accounts.

Ine*actness and the Immediate Purpose of the In,uir"

)n nu*erous places t roug out is ,orks Aristotle speaks of ine&actness in connection to so*e specific topic and at a certain stage of an in1uiry t at as its source in t e follo,ing: Given t e purpose or o"/ectives of t e investigation at t is stage, an e&act account of t e topic is not necessary or appropriate. An ine&act treat*ent of t e topic ,ill "e sufficient for t e i**ediate purpose. )n *ost cases Aristotle pro*ises a fuller or *ore e&act account of t e topic at a later or *ore appropriate stage of t e in1uiry. ' us Aristotle tells us in Rhet. >1#E1E#4? t at a *inute e&a*ination >

? of t e ingredients of a appy old age is not needed for t e i**ediate purpose. )n Anim . >414"1#? e re*arks t at, concerning t e faculties of t e soul possessed "y living organis*s, ,e *ust "e precise later > ?, "ut for t e *o*ent let it suffice to say t at t ose ani*als , ic ave a sense of touc ave also appetite. >Aristotle gives a fuller treat*ent of t is @41#"#6ff.A. +ee also is re*arks on is ine&act treat*ent of potentiality and actuality in senseBperception @41FE6FA and t e fuller treat*ent of t is @469al$B4#$a6%A.? Also in Cael . >6E9E66? e says t at ,e *ust discuss t e nature of earing and of lig t only so far as it is necessary for t e purpose in and "ut later ,it *ore precision > ? , en ,e co*e to investigate t e essential nature of t e t,o. >Aristotle gives a fuller treat*ent of t is in Cael . @)K.iBivA4 see also Cael . @6HEE4A4 H.A. @4HHE6H, 49#"A4 hys . @61#a4A.? )n at least t ree places in t e treatises on conduct, Aristotle speaks of t e a"ove kind of ine&actness. )n olit . >1#6EE#4?, speaking of t e li*itations to "e i*posed on t e si9e of t e land ade1uate for a city, e says t at it *ust "e considered *ore precisely later on >

? , en ,e co*e to raise t e general su"/ect of property and ,ealt >t is pro*ise is not fulfilled in t e e&tant ,orks?. )n E.E. >16#1"?, , ile trying to esta"lis t at te*perance is a *ean in relation to so*e pleasures, e says t at ,e ,ill ave to define later on t e class of pleasures concerned 5 1#% 5 *ore e&actly >

? in our discussion of selfBcontrol and ,eakness of t e ,ill. >Aristotle does t is in Book K)) , ic is co**on to E.E. and N.E. ? -inally, in N.E. after giving so*e illustrations or instances of is t esis t at virtue is a *ean "et,een t,o e&tre*es=na*ely, t ose of t e virtues of courage, te*perance, and li"erality="e re*arks: G-or t e present t en ,e descri"e @t ese dispositionsA in outline @ A and su**arily @ A, , ic is sufficient for t e purpose at and4 "ut t ey ,ill "e *ore accurately @ A defined laterG >11$F"1%?. Aristotle fulfills is pro*ise , en e discusses at lengt eac of t e virtues separately= courage >))).viBi&?4 te*perance >))).&B&ii?4 and li"erality >)K.i?. )t s ould "e clear fro* t e a"ove t at t e source of t e ine&actness under discussion ere is not t e purpose or purposes of a discipline as a , ole, "ut rat er so*e conte&tual purpose one *ay ave ,it in a discipline. ' e source of ine&actness in relation to so*e topic of conduct is not t e purpose or goal of t e disciplines of conduct. )t is t e i**ediate purpose one *ay ave at so*e point of t e investigation or of t e giving of e&planations t at is t e source. ' e sa*e is true in t e case of t e "iological disciplines >H.A. ?, t e psyc ological ones >Anim. ?, and t e p ysical ones > hys.' Cael .?. ' e goals of t ese disciplines are not practical. ' ey are, according to Aristotle, t eoretical. +uc ine&actness appears to "e disciplineBneutral. )t can arise ,it in any discipline, irrespective of its goals. ' is is an i*portant point to keep in *ind, since t ere are types of ine&actness t at ave t eir source, according to Aristotle, in t e nature of t e purposes or goals of t e discipline. ' is is especially so in t e case of t ose disciplines , ose goals are practical, like t ose of et ics. )t is also clear t at t e a"ove ine&actness is topicBspecific. )t is not t e case t at t e , ole discipline is ine&act, "ut rat er so*e specific part of it is. ' e , ole of Anim . or Cael . *ay not "e affected "y ine&actness4 only t e specific discussions, accounts, or e&planations of t e faculties of t e soul and t e nature of t e eaven and t e lig t are affected "y it. )ndeed, t is type of ine&actness is not only topicB specific, "ut *ost often is also stageBspecific. ' e account of a topic ' need not "e ine&act t roug out a discipline, "ut only at so*e specific stage + of t e investigation. ' us t e accounts of t e topics in Anita . and Cael . /ust *entioned are ine&act only at so*e particular point in t ese treatises. Aristotle i*self gives *ore e&act ones at later stages of t ese investigations. As discussed a"ove, t is is in general is strategy: to re*ove or at least to i*prove upon ine&actness at a later stage. ' ese are i*portant considerations. -or ine&actness is not al,ays topicB and stageBspecific: , et er it is depends on its source. -or e&a*ple, ine&actness t at is due to t e goals or t e su"/ect *atter of a discipline *ay not "e eit er topicB or stageBspecific.

5 1#E 5

Ine*actness and Inappropriateness of #iscipline

Aristotle speaks 1uite often of a factor t at gives rise to a kind of ine&actness , ic "ears so*e rese*"lance to t e kind /ust discussed a"ove "ut is nonet eless different. ' e rese*"lance "et,een t e t,o types lies in t e fact t at in "ot of t e* Aristotle c aracteri9es an account e gives of so*e topic ' ,it in so*e discipline 3 as ine&act and pro*ises to give a *ore e&act one, or stipulates t at a *ore e&act one s ould "e given later. ' e si*ilarity ends ere, o,ever, for in t e case /ust discussed t e *ore e&act account is given or is pro*ised to "e given ,it in t e sa*e discipline t at includes t e ine&act one also. )n t e present case o,ever t e *ore e&act one is actually given or is pro*ised to "e given in a discipline t at is different fro* t e one in , ic t e ine&act account occurs. ' is is clearly due to t e fact t at Aristotle as in *ind t,o different sources or factors of ine&actness. Unlike t e earlier case, t e present source of ine&actness in t e treat*ent of a topic ' is not so*e i**ediate purpose in t e process of in1uiry t at *ay re1uire a postpone*ent of an e&act treat*ent of '. 0at er, t e source of ine&actness lies in t e fact t at a topic or su"/ect t at *ay "e touc ed upon in one discipline is "est treated or can only "e treated "y anot er discipline: ' e topic really "elongs else, ere. Io,, it is *ost often t e case t at for t e i**ediate purpose t e ine&act account of a su"/ect ,ill do, "ut t e fact still re*ains t at ' is ine&actly treated in discipline 3 and t e ine&actness is not and per aps cannot "e re*oved in 3 precisely "ecause t e topic "elongs to a discipline ot er t an 3. ' us, in t e follo,ing passages fro* t e group of Aristotelian treatises t at ,e *ay designate as t e p ysical sciences, Aristotle speaks of an ine&act treat*ent of a topic "ecause it "elongs to anot er discipline. )n hys . >191E69?, , ile discussing t e distinction "et,een potentiality and actuality, e re*arks t at it is defined *ore e&actly >

? else, ere. <e pro"a"ly as in *ind t e *ore ela"orate discussion in Gen. et Corr . >A#? and Met . >O, viiBi& and B ?. <e also insists t at t e study of t e first principle>s? of t ings does not "elong in p ysics: G'o deter*ine ,it accuracy @ A t e first principle in respect of for*, , et er it is one or *any and , at it is or , at t ey are is t e function of -irst p ilosop y4 so let t ese 1uestions "e deferred till t en. )t is ,it natural and peris a"le for*s only t at ,e s all deal in , at follo,sG >196a#%?. >3iscussion of t ese 1uestions is, as is ,ell kno,n, to "e found in Met . O, B , and ( .? )n Gen. et Corr . Aristotle e&pounds is antiBPlatonist t eory t at t e ele*ents as ,ell as percepti"le "odies consist of *atter: GA *ore accurate @ A account of t ese t ings as "een given else, ere @i.e., hys . ).vi, viiAG >#69a6F?. -inally in t is connection, in Meteor .: GA separate and e&act @ A account of t e eat generated "y t e sun.s action ,ould "e *ore appropriate in a treatise on sensation 5 1#F 5

for eat is a sensi"le 1ualityG >#41a16?. >But no suc discussion is to "e found in t e e&tant treatises.? 'urning to t e "iological treatises, Aristotle *akes several references to ine&actness t at is due to t e inappropriateness of discipline. ' us, , ile discussing t e differences in *et ods of reproduction in H.A. , e says, G2e s all speak of t ese *atters ,it *ore accuracy later in t e treatise on generationG >4H9"1F?. ' is topic is, of course, one of t e central pro"le*s discussed in t e G.A. ' ere are a nu*"er of references to t e sa*e type of ine&actness in .A .4 for e&a*ple, e refers to Ganot er ,ork , ere ) ave stated ,it greater e&actness , at t ings can "e solidified and t e causes t at are responsi"le for itG >E49a##? >t e *ore e&act treat*ent occurs in Meteor . #H6"#1ff. and #HH"1$ff.?. At EEHE69 e refers us to t e treatises on Anatomy and t e Researches on Animals for a *ore e&act account of t e "lood vessels >see H.A. %11"11B%1%a? and at E69a1% to t e treatise on Generation for a *ore e&act account of t e production of *ilk and analogous su"stances in ani*als >see G.A. F%6"1Eff.?. 8lse, ere >E9E"1%? e assures t e reader t at t e *ec anis*s for respiration are treated ,it greater e&actness in t e anato*ical treatises and t e Researches on Animals >see H.A. %$4E6H?. +i*ilarly in G.A. >F%#"1%?, e clai*s t at for an e&act account of so*e *atters relating to t e *ec anis*s of reproduction of t e ovipara ,e *ust turn to t e Researches on Animals >see H.A. %E1a#B%E6"?, "ut for t e purposes at and , at as "een said is sufficient. Again in Resp . >4FFaF? e refers t e reader to a *ore e&act account of t e "reat ing *ec anis*s of ani*als t at live in ,ater in t e Researches on Animals >see H.A. %6#a#$?. <e is ,illing to accept a su**ary concerning t e connection "et,een eart and lung >4FH"?, "ut e *akes it clear t at suc *atters s ould "e studied visually fro* dissections and ,it greater e&actness in t e Researches on Animals >see H.A. %$F"#?. -inally, ,e *ay include in t is group a so*e, at controversial passage in t e Anim . , ere Aristotle appears to "e *aking a reference to t e type of ine&actness ,e are discussing ere. 2 ile concluding is "rief discussion of t e nature of food in connection ,it is account of nutritive soul, Aristotle re*arks, G' e nature of nutrition @or foodA as no, "een descri"ed in outline4 later on ,e *ust "e *ore precise a"out it in a treatise of its o,n @

AG >41EE#$?. +ince no suc treatise on food as co*e do,n to us, so*e sc olars dou"t t at Aristotle is referring to any treatise dealing e&clusively ,it food. (ost likely o,ever Aristotle.s ,ords > ? do refer to suc a treatise, to t e sa*e treatise referred to in !omno : G' ese ave "een discussed in :n Nutrition @

AG >4%EE6?.@%#A )n any case, t e issue ere is , et er t e discussion on food is proper to Anim . ' e ans,er is clearly negative. Anim . is not t e investigation to , ic t e su"/ect of food "elongs. ' e proper discipline for t e study of food, its , is so*e study ot er 5 1#H 5 t an t e one dealing ,it t e soul. After all, soul and food are 1uite different *atters, and t is is , at is

i*portant for our purposes, regardless , et er Aristotle produced suc a treatise. )n t e logical treatises ,e also find t at Aristotle *akes a reference to t e type of ine&actness under discussion, for e&a*ple, in #op .: G+econdly, ,e *ust reali9e t at it "elongs to anot er in1uiry to lay do,n accurately "ot , at a definition is and o, ,e *ust fra*e it, and t at for t e *o*ent ,e need only go as far as is re1uisite for our present taskG >1%#a16?. ' e ot er in1uiry referred to ere is, of course, t e ost. Anal . , ere Aristotle takes up t e 1uestions e raises a"ove. 'urning no, to t e treatises on conduct, ,e find several references to t e ine&actness of a topic due to t e fact t at treat*ent of suc a topic "elongs in anot er discipline. 2 ile discussing t e effects of *usic and its place in education in olit ., Aristotle says t at in t ese su"/ects t ere are e&perts and t erefore, G2e ,ill leave t e precise discussion for any , o ,is it to seek it fro* t ese e&perts, , ile for t e present let us lay do,n general rules, *erely stating t e outlines of t e su"/ectG >1#41E#$?. At t,o instances in t e E.E. >1666E#H, 166Fa1$? e tells us t at t e topics concerning t e relation of t eore*s to essential attri"utes and to postulates ,ill "e treated "riefly, since t e e&act accounts of t ese ave "een given in ost. Anal . )n t e N.E. e *akes reference to t e a"ove type of ine&actness at several places. Concerning t e 1uestion of o, different t ings are called good, GPer aps o,ever t e 1uestion *ust "e set aside for no,, since a detailed investigation of it "elongs *ore properly to anot er "ranc of p ilosop yG >1$9E"#$?. Concerning t e nature of enco*ia >laudatory orations? t at, according to Aristotle, are fitting for t e ig est deeds, GBut a detailed @or e&actA treat*ent of t is *atter is per aps rat er t e "usiness of t ose , o ave *ade a study of enco*iaG >11$6a?.@%4A 2 en Aristotle atte*pts to provide a t eory of pleasure in ter*s of t e nature of *otion, e tells us t at G o,ever ) ave given an e&act treat*ent of *otion in anot er ,orkG >114EE#?. -inally, in connection ,it t e appiness t at e t inks "elongs to t e intellect and is separate fro* t at "elonging to virtuous action, Gso *uc *ay "e said a"out it ere, for an e&act treat*ent of t e *atter is "eyond our present pro/ectG >11FHa6#?.@%%A As ,it t e previous source of ine&actness, t at is, t e i**ediate purpose, t e present source gives rise to an ine&actness t at is also topicBspecific. ' e present source of ine&actness need not render t e , ole of a discipline ine&act4 it *ay affect only so*e specific topic or su"/ect of a discipline. :nly t ose topics of a discipline t at do not properly "elong to it are treated ine&actly ,it in t at discipline. )t is clear o,ever t at t is type of ine&actness is not stageBspecific ,it in t e discipline. A topic ' t at does not properly "elong to a discipline 3 is treated ine&actly and no e&act account of ' is given any, ere else in 3. Io e&act account of 5 1#9 5 *otion is given in t e et ical treatises. ' can ave and Aristotle often provides or at least t inks t at e does an e&act account of it in a discipline ot er t an 3=t at is, in t e proper discipline of '. )t is also clear t at t is source of ine&actness is disciplineBneutral. )nappropriateness of discipline can "e a source of ine&actness in relation to any discipline. As seen a"ove, Aristotle gives instances fro* al*ost all groups of disciplines, and t ere is no reason to t ink t at t is source of ine&actness could not "e present in t e *at e*atical disciplines: a *at e*atical discipline *ay use a t eore* of anot er t at can "e de*onstrated or treated e&actly only "y t is second discipline. Geo*etry, for e&a*ple, uses t e t eore*s of arit *etic. )ndeed, it is 1uite o"vious t at all t e sources of ine&actness ,e ave discussed so far are disciplineB neutral=t ey could affect any discipline. )f Aristotle is correct in clai*ing t at t ere is so*et ing la"orious and illi"eral in t e c aracter of e&actness and is t erefore ,illing to accept so*e ine&actness in order to avoid suc undesira"le conse1uences, t en e s ould "e prepared to do so in any discipline.

And if lacunae in classification give rise to ine&actness, ) see no reason for saying a priori t at no suc lacunae can e&ist in so*e disciplines. ' e case is si*ilar ,it r etorical or *et odological ine&actness. ' ere is no reason , y ,e *ay not c oose to present at t e outset an ine&act account of a *at e*atical topic t at is to "e treated *ore e&actly later on. ' is is not o,ever true of all sources of ine&actness: +o*e sources give rise to for*al ine&actness only in relation to certain disciplines. ' ese sources are not disciplineBneutral. ) s all ne&t "riefly discuss t,o suc sources of for*al ine&actness t at are of special i*portance to et ics and per aps to all practical and productive disciplines. ' ese sources of ine&actness are connected to t e goals of a discipline. ' ey could not t erefore apply to disciplines t at do not ave t e sa*e kinds of goals. (y ai* in t is rat er lengt y and per aps illi"eral account of t e various sources of for*al ine&actness and t e detailed presentation of t e evidence as "een partly to s o, t at so*e sources of ine&actness can "e encountered in any discipline, , ile ot ers can "e *et only in certain disciplines, and also to s o, t at Aristotle i*self is fully a,are of t is: <e speaks of so*e sources of ine&actness in relation to *any or al*ost all of t e disciplines "ut of so*e ot ers only in relation to certain disciplines.

Ine*actness Permitted b" the +oals of a #iscipline

8&actness *ay not "e e1ually i*portant to all disciplines. ' e i*portance it as in relation to a discipline depends on t e goals of t e discipline. )t depends on t e ulti*ate goals of t e investigation. )n t e case of et ics and t e rest of t e practical and productive disciplines t e goals are, generally speaking, action and production. +o Aristotle tells us in N.E. , 5 14$ 5 G2e *ust not seek t e sa*e degree of e&actness in all areas, "ut only suc as fit t e su"/ect *atter and is proper to t e investigationG >1$9Ha6F?. <e goes on to argue t at , ere t e goals of investigation differ=for e&a*ple, in t e case of t e geo*etrician and t e "uilder , o "ot study t e rig t angle=so does t e degree of e&actness t at is appropriate for ac ieving t e goals. 2 ere t e goal is action ,e need only t at degree of e&actness t at is sufficient for acting. 'o de*and *ore e&actness t an is re1uired is a ,aste of ti*e > olit . 1##1E6$?. Aristotle t en is ,illing to accept a degree of ine&actness if t e goals of t e discipline /ustify it.

Ine*actness 1ecessitated b" the +oals of a #iscipline

)n so*e cases, o,ever, t e goals of a discipline are suc t at a kind of ine&actness is inevita"le. -or instance, Aristotle t inks t at since t e goals of et ics are practical and action is concerned ,it particulars, our accounts *ust reac t e level of t e particular, "ut suc a degree of specificity or e&actness t at is re1uired "y t e goals is al*ost i*possi"le. As Aristotle says in connection ,it t e task of giving an account of t e accidents of life, G'o distinguis "et,een t e* in detail ,ould clearly "e a long and indeed endless undertaking, and general treat*ent in outline @

A *ay per aps "e enoug G >N.E. 11$1a6F?4 and in olit . e re*arks t at, G-or /ust as in t e ot er arts as ,ell, so ,it t e structure of t e state it is i*possi"le t at it s ould ave "een fra*ed arig t in all its details @

A4 for it *ust of necessity "e couc ed in general ter*s, "ut our actions deal ,it particularsG >16E9a1$?. ) s all "e discussing t ese last t,o sources of ine&actness=t at is, t e accepta"ility and inevita"ility of ine&actness given t e goals of a discipline=in so*e detail later >in c ap. % t e latter and in c ap. 9 t e for*er?. )t is i*portant o,ever to *ention t e* ere toget er ,it t e ot er sources of for*al ine&actness. ' is is so in part for t e reason ) *entioned earlier=na*ely, t at t ese t,o are, unlike t e ot ers, restricted only to certain disciplines="ut also "ecause ) s all s ortly "e raising t e 1uestion of t e ineli*ina"ility of ine&actness. And, as s all "e seen, , et er so*e type of ine&actness can "e eli*inated depends at ti*es on t e source t at generates it.

The $ongruence Thesis

2e distinguis ed earlier "et,een for*al and *aterial e&actness!ine&actness. 2 at is t e relation "et,een t ese t,o levels of e&actness!ine&actness; 3o t ey i*ply eac ot er, does only one level i*ply t e ot er, or does per aps neit er i*ply t e ot er; Aristotle so*eti*es speaks of a kind of congruence t at e takes to old "et,een c aracteristics of our accounts >or of t e disciplines? and c aracteristics of t e o"/ects t ey are a"out >or 5 141 5 of t e su"/ect *atter?. <e speaks, t at is, of a congruence "et,een for*al and *aterial features: GAnd , en t e sciences are no"ler and *ore dignified, t e no"ler and *ore dignified are t eir su"/ects4 for as is t e science, so is t e trut , and eac science prescri"es t at , ic properly "elongs to it4 and, "y analogy, t e no"ler and *ore dignified t e o"/ects of a science, t e no"ler and *ore dignified is t e science itself, for t e sa*e reasonsG >Rhet . 1#E4EF?.@%EA At least t en in t e case of t e c aracteristics of "eing no"le and dignified ,e ave, according to Aristotle, a congruence "et,een for*al and *aterial levels: no"le o"/ects i*ply no"le science, and vice versa. Aristotle is, of course, not alone in assu*ing t at suc a congruence olds. Plato does t e sa*e.@%FA ' e application of t e congruence t esis to for*al and *aterial e&actness!ine&actness yields t e follo,ing possi"ilities: >a? (aterial e&actness i*plies or is i*plied "y for*al e&actness >"? (aterial ine&actness i*plies or is i*plied "y for*al ine&actness >c? (aterial e&actness i*plies or is i*plied "y for*al ine&actness >d? (aterial ine&actness i*plies or is i*plied "y for*al e&actness 2 ic one of t ese, if any, does Aristotle take to "e true; ' e last t,o can easily "e ruled out: ' ey see* *ost unlikely, and t ere is no evidence t at Aristotle takes eit er of t e* to "e true. (ost pro"a"ly Aristotle takes >a? to "e true: (aterial e&actness i*plies or is i*plied "y for*al e&actness. ' at t e *ost e&act disciplines are t ose t at deal ,it t e *ost e&act o"/ects and t at t e *ost e&act o"/ects result in t e *ost e&act disciplines is a Platonic idea t at Aristotle see*s to e*"race. <e, like Plato, vie,s t e *at e*atical disciplines as "eing e&act on account of t eir o"/ects >Cael . #$Ea6F?. 7et >a? *ay not "e true4 t ere *ay not "e a relation of t e kind Plato and Aristotle ave in *ind "et,een *aterial and for*al e&actness. -ro* t e fact t at t e su"/ect + of a discipline 3 is e&act, one cannot conclude t at 3 itself is e&act4 one cannot infer for*al e&actness fro* *aterial e&actness, for our discussion of for*al ine&actness a"ove as s o,n t at t ere are *any reasons for , ic 3 can "e ine&act despite t e fact t at its su"/ect *atter + is e&act. At "est t e e&actness of + i*plies t at 3 can "e e&act. )t is also not t e case t at t e ot er alf of >a? is true=for*al e&actness need not i*ply

*aterial e&actness. -or instance, ,e cannot infer fro* t e fact t at an account is e&act "y "eing in detail t at , at t e account is a"out is also in detail. ' e relation "et,een for*al and *aterial e&actness, >a?, is not as central to our present concerns as is t e relation "et,een for*al and *aterial ine&actness, >"?. 'o "egin ,it , does for*al ine&actness i*ply *aterial ine&actness; )s any c aracteristic C , ic , en present *akes a discipline 3 ine&act also true of t e su"/ect *atter + of t e discipline; 'o ask o,ever 5 146 5 , et er a c aracteristic C is true of "ot t e for*al and *aterial level presupposes t at it *akes sense, or it is *eaningful, to apply C to "ot levels. :r at least t at it *akes sense to apply so*et ing like C to "ot levels. +o*eti*es it is *eaningful to do so, "ut so*eti*es it is not. Consider, for e&a*ple, t e c aracteristics of "eing in outline or lacking in detail t at can *ake a discipline for*ally ine&act: t ey *ay "e true of its accounts, descriptions, definitions, e&planations, and so fort . <o,ever, t ese c aracteristics cannot, strictly speaking, "e asserted of t e o"/ects t e*selves. An o"/ect or a p eno*enon is not t e kind of t ing t at can eit er "e in outline >or in detail? or not, "ut an account, description, e&planation, and so fort , of an o"/ect or p eno*enon can "e in outline or detail. ' e reason for t is is t at accounts, descriptions, or e&planations are in a sense representations of an o"/ect or p eno*enon and t erefore can eit er possess or lack detail, "e in outline or not. 7et t ere are special o"/ects t at can ave or lack detail: A picture is suc an o"/ect. )t is "ecause a picture is at ti*es a representation t at it can "e in outline or lack detail, and so fort . )n t e case of firstBorder disciplines at least it is dou"tful t at t e c aracteristics of "eing in outline or in detail can "e asserted of t eir su"/ect *atter. :f course t e su"/ect *atter of a discipline *ay "e t e constituents of anot er discipline=t at is, t e su"/ect *atter of a ig er discipline are t e ter*s, accounts, e&planations, proofs, and so fort , of a lo,er discipline. )n suc ig erBorder disciplines t e su"/ect *atter is t e sort of t ing t at can "e in outline or possess detail. ' us at least in t e case of t e secondB order disciplines, so*e features can "e *eaningfully asserted of "ot t e su"/ect *atter of a discipline and of t e discipline itself. ' ere is, of course, t e Platonist tradition t at vie,s all t ings as "eing in a sense i*itations or copies of t e -or*s, and it is a part of t is tradition to vie, all t ings or p eno*ena of t e natural ,orld as falling s ort of or failing to *atc t e perfection of t e -or*s, as ine&act. Plato o,ever t inks t e o"/ects or su"/ect *atter of kno,ledge are t e -or*s t e*selves, and t ey cannot, as Aristotle often argues, "e *ade to represent or i*itate anyt ing. 'o do so ,ould lead into an infinite regress. )n any case, t e o"/ects t at constitute t e su"/ect *atter of t e ordinary Aristotelian disciplines are neit er Plato.s -or*s nor ine&act copies of t e -or*s. <o,ever, ,e do not need to assu*e t e Platonic conception of t e relation "et,een t ings and -or*s in order to attri"ute e&actness or ine&actness to t e t ings ordinary disciplines study. ' ere are c aracteristics , ic constitute e&actness!ine&actness at t e for*al level t at can at t e sa*e ti*e "e *eaningfully asserted or denied of t e su"/ect *atter of firstBorder disciplines=for e&a*ple, t e e&actness of a discipline t at Aristotle associates ,it si*plicity: a discipline *ay "e e&act, or *ore e&act t an anot er, "ecause it utili9es only a fe, a&io*s >"asic ele*ents?, or 5 14# 5 fe,er t an t e ot er one does. :ne can also *eaningfully speak of t e nu*"er of t e *ost funda*ental ele*ents of t e do*ain t at constitutes t e su"/ect *atter of a discipline. -or e&a*ple, one can speak, as Aristotle i*self does, of t e nu*"er of ele*ents of t e do*ain of arit *etic and geo*etry. 2 ere

it is *eaningful to speak of nu*"er it is also *eaningful to speak of fe, >*any? or fe,er >*ore?. Aristotle clai*s t at t ere is /ust one ele*ent in t e case of arit *etic >t e unit?, "ut t ere are at least t,o in t e case of geo*etry >point and position?. ' us, t e su"/ect *atter of arit *etic as fe,er "asic ele*ents, and it is t erefore si*pler or *ore e&act t an t at of geo*etry. 7et it s ould "e evident fro* t e a"ove discussion t at for*al ine&actness does not i*ply *aterial ine&actness. )n so*e cases it is not even *eaningful to assert or deny t e feature t at constitutes ine&actness at t e for*al level of t e su"/ect *atter of a discipline. 8ven , ere it is *eaningful to do so, ,e cannot infer *aterial ine&actness fro* for*al ine&actness. Consider, for e&a*ple, t e type of ine&actness at t e for*al level t at Aristotle associates ,it gaps in classification. +o*et ing analogous to gaps at t e for*al level *ay e&ist at t e *aterial level. ' us, Aristotle points out t at , ereas in *ost actions or e*otions t ere is a *ean and t,o e&tre*es, t ere are so*e actions or e*otions , ere t is is not so. ' e pattern of e&cessB*eanBdeficiency t at c aracteri9es *ost actions or e*otions is a"sent in t e case of *alice, adultery, t eft, or *urder >11$Fa16?. ' ere is no na*e for a *ean in relation to stealing "ecause t ere is no suc *ean, "ut it s ould "e clear fro* , at Aristotle says in connection ,it *ost of t e occurrences of classification gaps t at lack of na*e does not i*ply lack of t ing to "e na*ed. -or*al ine&actness e&ists in relation to classification precisely "ecause *ost of t e ti*e t ere is no na*e "ut t ere is a t ing to "e na*ed. ' e reason , y for*al ine&actness does not i*ply *aterial ine&actness s ould also "e o"vious fro* our earlier discussion of t e sources of for*al ine&actness, for t e sources of for*al ine&actness are *any, and *ost of t e* ave not ing to do ,it t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter of a discipline. As seen earlier, t e sources of for*al ine&actness *ay vary. ' ey *ay, according to Aristotle, range fro* one.s ,is to avoid "eing illi"eral "y insisting on detail, to accidental gaps in classification, and so fort , to t e purposes of a discipline. ' ese factors or si*ilar ones do not affect t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter of a discipline. ' ere is no evidence t at Aristotle olds t at for*al ine&actness i*plies *aterial ine&actness. <e does not assert t at t is part of t e congruence t esis or t at t is alf of >"? is true. Aristotle t inks t at t e ot er alf of >"? does old: t at *aterial ine&actness i*plies for*al ine&actness. )ndeed, e is 1uite certain t at t is part of t e congruence t esis is true. ' e evidence on t is is 1uite clear and une1uivocal. 5 144 5 :ur treat*ent ,ill "e ade1uate if it ac ieves t at a*ount of precision , ic "elongs to its su"/ect *atter. ' e sa*e e&actness *ust not "e soug t in all accounts. . . . 2e *ust "e content, t en, in dealing ,it suc su"/ects and fro* suc pre*ises to indicate t e trut roug ly and in outline. . . . )t is t e *ark of an educated person to look for precision in eac class of t ings /ust so far as t e nature of t e su"/ect ad*its. >N.E.&;=9b&8? see also &;=2a%:7 ' e , ole account of *atters of conduct *ust "e given in outline only and not precisely, as ,e said in t e "eginning t e accounts ,e de*and *ust "e in accordance ,it t e su"/ect *atter. >11$4a? Accounts of our e*otions and actions ad*it only of suc degree of definiteness as "elongs to t e *atters ,it , ic t ey deal. >11E%a1#?

9.&;

4.11

4.16

4.1#

-or , at is itself indefinite can only "e *easured "y an indefinite standard, like t e leaden rule used "y Jes"ian "uilders4 /ust as t at rule is not rigid "ut can "e "ent to t e s ape of t e stone. >11#F"#$?

Aristotle leaves no dou"t t at e takes *aterial ine&actness to i*ply for*al ine&actness. <e speaks of a correspondence "et,een t e level of for*al e&actness and e&actness of t e su"/ect *atter. 2e *ust "e content, e argues, in ac ieving in our accounts t e level of e&actness t at t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter per*its. Alt oug t ere is no dou"t t at Aristotle olds t at *aterial ine&actness i*plies for*al ine&actness, t ere is dou"t t at even t is part of t e congruence t esis is true. 'o "egin ,it , a 1uestion ,e raised earlier also arises ere: )s it *eaningful to assert or deny of t e for*al level every c aracteristic t at can "elong to t e su"/ect *atter; +o*eti*es it is *eaningful to do so, "ut at ot ers it is not. +uppose, for e&a*ple, -rege not,it standing, t at Aristotle is correct in clai*ing t at *atters of conduct are indefinite. A c aracteristic suc as indefiniteness *ay "e *eaningfully asserted or denied of t e for*al ele*ents of a discipline=its ter*s, propositions, definitions, la,s, and so fort . Again, suppose, as Aristotle does, t at t e su"/ect *atter of so*e disciplines is suc t at so*e kind D possesses a property P only for t e *ost part. :ne can also speak of t e analogue of t is c aracteristic at t e for*al level: Propositions or la,s asserting t at D as P can "e c aracteri9ed, , en t ey ave t e appropriate logical for*, as "eing true only for t e *ost part. )t is not o,ever t e case t at every c aracteristic of t e su"/ect *atter can "e *eaningfully asserted or denied at t e for*al level. +uppose t e su"/ect *atter consists of infinitesi*ally s*all particles, or suppose t at , at a discipline studies is c aracteri9ed "y a type of *otion. )s it *eaningful to speak of our accounts as "eing eit er infinitesi*ally s*all or in *otion, or not; ) t ink not. 8ven , ere it is *eaningful to assert t at a c aracteristic C "elongs to "ot t e *aterial and for*al level it is not 5 14% 5 necessarily t e case t at if t e *aterial level as C, t en t e for*al does also. ' us, "eing poetic is a c aracteristic t at can "e *eaningfully asserted "ot of t e su"/ect *atter >e.g., t e <o*eric poe*s? and of our accounts of a su"/ect *atter,@%HA "ut it does not follo, fro* t e fact t at t e su"/ect *atter is poetic t at our accounts of it are also poetic, alt oug t ey *ay very ,ell "e so. ' e 1uestion naturally arises as to , y Aristotle is convinced t at at least t is part of t e congruence t esis is true. ' is is a difficult 1uestion to ans,er since Aristotle gives no argu*ents or reasons in support of is clai* t at *aterial ine&actness i*plies for*al ine&actness. At "est , at can "e done ere is to try to reconstruct t e fra*e,ork ,it in , ic Aristotle t inks in t e ope of finding so*e reasons t at *ake t e a"ove clai* a plausi"le one. :ne *ust try to uncover, t at is, so*e of t e assu*ptions e *akes t at *ay very ,ell provide t e reasons for is contention t at part of t e congruence t esis is true. ' e first t ing to point out is t e rat er strong realistic line Aristotle takes t roug out is ,ritings. <e considers t e entities or p eno*ena t at constitute t e su"/ect *atter of a discipline to for* a kind, to ave a nature t at is not deter*ined "y t e ,ay ,e speak and t ink a"out t e* or t e *anner ,e descri"e t e*. ' e c aracteristics of a kind are deter*ined "y and are to "e e&plained in ter*s of t e nature of t e kind or t e ot er causes t at Aristotle recogni9es. )n no case are t ey deter*ined "y or are e&plained in ter*s of t e ,ay ,e descri"e t e* or speak and t ink a"out t e*. ' ere is no evidence t at Aristotle t inks t at t e situation is any different ,it t e c aracteristics , ic constitute *aterial ine&actness. ' ere is no evidence, in ot er ,ords, t at e t inks of t e* as not "eing a part of t e

nature of t e su"/ect *atter "ut instead as t e result of t e ,ay t e su"/ect *atter is descri"ed. :n t e contrary, t e availa"le evidence indicates t at e t inks of t ese c aracteristics as "elonging to t e su"/ect *atter itself. ' us, it is *atters of conduct and of ealt t e*selves t at are ine&act >N.E. 11$4a?. )t is c aracteristics of *atter itself t at give rise to ine&actness in non*at e*atical disciplines >Met. 99%a1%? and it is *atter itself t at suffers fro* indefiniteness >G.A. FFHaF?. Coupled ,it t is realistic line t ere are t,o additional Aristotelian t eses concerning t e logical role of a pre*ise and t e ai* of an account or e&planation. 2 en all t ese t ree factors are taken toget er, Aristotle.s clai* t at *aterial ine&actness i*plies for*al ine&actness see*s plausi"le. Aristotle takes a pre*ise to assert so*et ing >an attri"ute or property? of t e su"/ect > r. Anal. 6%a?, and t e ai* of an account or e&planation is to s o, t e trut >

? a"out t e su"/ect *atter, to represent t e p eno*ena as t ey are >N.E. 1$94E6$?. +uppose, t en, t at an attri"ute or property P "elongs to so*e su"/ect *atter + only for t e 5 14E 5 *ost part. ' e congruence t esis re1uires t at t is feature of t e su"/ect *atter=+ "eing P only for t e *ost part="e reflected in our propositions. )t see*s t at it ,ould ave to "e if t e nature of a pre*ise or proposition and t e ai* of a discipline or account are , at Aristotle takes t e* to "e. )f in so*e pre*ise or proposition ,e assert P of +, and if ,e are to s o, t e trut and represent t e relation "et,een + and P as it is, t en our proposition ,ould ave to "e true for t e *ost part. +uppose t at an attri"ute P is indefinite or vague: Io, our pre*ise t at consists in asserting P of + ,ill itself "e indefinite or vague if ,e are to satisfy Aristotle.s conditions. :ur task presu*a"ly is to s o, t e ,ay t ings are. )f t e p eno*ena are indefinite or vague, t en our accounts cannot "e precise if t ey are to represent t e*. :ur accounts ,ould not fit t e p eno*ena. Aristotle *ost pro"a"ly t inks t at t ere is a uni1ue description or account t at is true or fits t e nature of t e p eno*ena. (aterial ine&actness does not i*ply for*al ine&actness, o,ever. ' e assu*ptions ,e ave /ust discussed *ake t e congruence t esis ,it regard to so*e types of ine&actness appear *ore plausi"le "y identifying t e sort of considerations t at *otivate Aristotle.s clai*. But , at t ese considerations s o, at "est is t at t ere is so*e description or account of t e p eno*ena t at reflects t eir ine&actness. ' ey do not s o, t at t e p eno*ena cannot "e descri"ed, represented, or depicted in suc a ,ay t at t e features of ine&actness t at presu*a"ly c aracteri9e t e *aterial level do not appear at t e for*al level. )n fact, t is is possi"le. )t is "ot interesting as ,ell as so*e, at pu99ling t at Aristotle i*self utili9es tec ni1ues for representing p eno*ena t at are presu*a"ly ine&act in a ,ay t at t e for*al level does not suffer fro* t e sa*e kind of ine&actness t at c aracteri9es t e *aterial level. Consider, for instance, our earlier sc e*atic e&a*ple , ere a property P "elongs to so*e su"/ect + only for t e *ost part. Io, t ere is so*e proposition t at as t e appropriate logical for* and asserts P of + t at is true for t e *ost part. Aristotle o,ever uses t e tec ni1ue of restricting t e su"/ect in order to provide descriptions t at are not true only for t e *ost part. Briefly put, t e tec ni1ue generates a proposition t at is universally true "y narro,ing t e do*ain of t e su"/ect to only t ose t ings to , ic P applies universally. Aristotle uses t is tec ni1ue rat er effectively and e&tensively in is "iological treatises. ' ey too deal ,it p eno*ena t at e& i"it to a considera"le degree t e type of ine&actness Aristotle associates ,it "eing for t e *ost part. ' us, , et er *aterial ine&actness is reflected at t e for*al level does depend after all on t e ,ay t e p eno*ena are descri"ed.

Consider again t e type of ine&actness Aristotle associates ,it variation. +uc ine&actness c aracteri9es, according to Aristotle, t e "iological p eno*ena as ,ell as t e p eno*ena of conduct. 7et Aristotle sees no 5 14F 5 pro"le* in t e case of t e "iological p eno*ena in giving accounts t at do not e& i"it t is type of ine&actness. <e does t is "y *oving to a level of a"straction suc t at accounts, descriptions, or definitions of p eno*ena t at e& i"it variation are not t e*selves affected "y variation. ' en, t e part of t e congruence t esis stating t at in all cases *aterial ine&actness i*plies for*al ine&actness is false. Any successful application of t e a"ove tec ni1ues for eli*inating for*al ine&actness ,ould s o, t at alt oug so*e su"/ect *atter *ay "e ine&act, not every account of it need "e also ine&act. 7et Aristotle insists t at our accounts in et ics *ust "e, like its su"/ect *atter, ine&act or t at t e congruence t esis under discussion ere olds. Per aps Aristotle as reasons for insisting t at t is part of t e congruence t esis olds in t e case of disciplines dealing ,it *atters of conduct. Per aps e t inks t at t ese tec ni1ues ,ill not ,ork in et ics=neit er restricting t e su"/ect nor a"stracting fro* variation ,ill prove successful in producing accounts t at are free of ine&actness in *atters of conduct. +uc reasons *ay ave to do ,it t e e&tent to , ic ine&actness pervades t e su"/ect *atter of et ics or ,it t e nature of t e goals of t e discipline. ) s all return to t ese *atters later , en ) e&a*ine in detail t e various types of ine&actness in et ics.

Ineliminabilit" and the &emarks on '*actness in the 12'2

' e a"ove discussion on t e congruence t esis as touc ed on t e 1uestion of , et er ine&actness can "e eli*inated, and ,e sa, t at in so*e cases Aristotle t inks t at even t oug t e su"/ect *atter *ay "e c aracteri9ed "y ine&actness ,e can give accounts t at avoid ine&actness. )n ot er cases, e t inks t at t is cannot "e done. +o*e for*al ine&actness t at is due to *aterial ine&actness presu*a"ly cannot "e eli*inated. But , at a"out for*al ine&actness t at is not due to *aterial ine&actness; )t *ay at first appear t at all suc ine&actness can "e eli*inated. )t *ay not "e so, o,ever. 2 et er suc ine&actness is eli*ina"le at ti*es depends on t e source t at generates it. As seen earlier, t ere are, in addition to *aterial ine&actness, several ot er sources of for*al ine&actness. Io, if t e sole source of for*al ine&actness is one.s ,is to avoid t e supposed pettiness or illi"erality of e&actness, t en *ost likely ine&actness can "e eli*inated at t e cost of "eing petty or illi"eral. ' e case is si*ilar ,it for*al ine&actness t at as its source in classification gaps, *et odological or r etorical strategies, or t e i**ediate purpose at a particular point of an in1uiry. Ia*es can "e provided to eli*inate t e classification gaps and t e attendant ine&actness. :ne *ay adapt different strategies of investigation, presentation, or teac ing suc t at t e ine&actness resulting fro* our *et od of investigating, presenting t e *aB 5 14H 5 terial, or teac ing does not arise. An ine&act treat*ent of a topic due to t e i**ediate purposes of t e investigation can "e eli*inated "y giving an e&act one at t e appropriate stage of t e investigation. As seen earlier, Aristotle i*self eli*inates, or at least t inks t at e does, for*al ine&actness due to t e i**ediate purpose 1uite often t roug out is ,ritings. 8li*inating for*al ine&actness *ay prove *uc *ore difficult or even i*possi"le , ere t e sources t at generate it are different fro* t e ones ,e /ust discussed. ' us, , en a topic ' is treated ine&actly

in a discipline 31 "ecause it properly "elongs in discipline 36 , it *ay "e i*possi"le to re*ove suc ine&actness, for to e&plain or prove t e t eore*s or propositions a"out ' one needs t e a&io*s, postulates, or "asic propositions of 36 . )n order to e&plain t e nature of t e intellect, t e e*otions, or *at e*atical proportions=topics t at Aristotle touc es upon in is et ics for t e purpose of giving an account of t e good, t e virtues, and /ustice= one *ust utili9e t e "asic propositions or a&io*s of psyc ology or arit *etic. 2e *ay of course ,is to incorporate arit *etic into et ics and t us *ake t e treat*ent of an arit *etical topic e&act ,it in et ics, "ut it is clear t at et ics and arit *etic are t,o distinct disciplines. ' ey ave different su"/ect *atters, different a&io*s, and t e t eore*s or propositions of eit er one are not proven "y using t e a&io*s of t e ot er. Ieit er of t ese disciplines is, in Aristotelian language, su"ordinate to t e ot er. +uppose t at for*al ine&actness is due to t e goals of a discipline=t at is, t at in order to satisfy t e goals of a discipline, one needs to reac a certain level of specificity or detail. )t *ay ,ell "e t at suc a level of specificity cannot "e attained. ' is is indeed t e case ,it t e level of specificity Aristotle t inks is de*anded "y t e goals of et ics and in fact "y t e goals of all disciplines of conduct. +i*ilarly, if ,e are re1uired to eli*inate vagueness or indefiniteness fro* our accounts, so t at t ey ,ould not "e ine&act, t e possi"ility of doing so ,ill depend on t e degree to , ic ,e are re1uired to do so=for it is not evident t at all vagueness can "e eli*inated, t at one can, in ot er ,ords, produce accounts t at are free of all and every vagueness. )ndeed, , et er ine&actness can "e reduced or eli*inated or , et er e&actness can "e attained ,ill often depend on t e standard of e&actness set or re1uired. )f t e standard set or re1uired is suc t at it cannot "e attained, t en for*al ine&actness, regardless of its source, ,ill "e i*possi"le to eli*inate. 2 at t en do t e re*arks on ine&actness in t e N.E. say a"out t e possi"ility of eli*inating ine&actness fro* et ical accounts; )t can "e and as so*eti*es "een argued t at , en Aristotle speaks of ine&actness in t e N.E. e is pri*arily speaking a"out t e c aracter of is o,n accounts. <e is, t at is, c aracteri9ing only t e accounts e gives or is interested in giving and does not intend to assert anyt ing a"out t e nature of et ical 5 149 5 accounts in general. <is re*arks in t e N.E. can "est "e understood as attri"uting ine&actness t at is due to is o,n *et odological or r etorical strategies or i**ediate purposes to is et ical accounts. ' is assess*ent of Aristotle.s re*arks is 1uestiona"le. ) s all discuss in detail in su"se1uent c apters, , ere ) e&a*ine t e various types of ine&actness, , et er Aristotle.s clai*s a"out t e e&tent of ineli*ina"ility of ine&actness in et ical accounts are correct or not. )t is i*portant at t is point to take an overvie, of t e re*arks on e&actness in order to see t at is concern ,it ine&actness goes far "eyond t at of is o,n accounts. 2e *ay for t e purposes at and distinguis "et,een t e follo,ing: >a? )ne&actness t at Aristotle attri"utes to is o,n accounts: t e accounts e gives or e proposes to give >"? )ne&actness t at Aristotle attri"utes to all possi"le accounts in et ics )t is clear t at >a? does not i*ply >"?, "ut >"? i*plies >a?. +o if Aristotle attri"utes ine&actness to is o,n accounts only, it ,ould not follo, fro* t is t at e t inks all accounts in et ics are ine&act. (any of Aristotle.s re*arks on ine&actness properly "elong in >a?. 2e s ould certainly include in t is class t e follo,ing: is proposing to give an outline of t e nature of t e good >1$94a6%?4 is c aracteri9ing of t e account of t e good e gives as an outline and roug sketc >1$9H"6$?4 is

descri"ing is o,n accounts of t e virtues >11$F"14, 1114"6E, 111%a4?, of courage >111F"6$?, of appiness and friends ip and pleasure >11F9a##?, and of c oice >111#a14? as "eing in outline and ine&act. +o*e of is re*arks "elong in >"?, o,ever, for in t ese Aristotle speaks of ine&actness t at c aracteri9es any account of *atters of conduct. )n t is class "elong is re*arks t at connect ine&actness of a discipline ,it ine&actness of its su"/ect *atter. +o Aristotle tells us t at Gaccounts of our actions and e*otions ad*it only of suc definiteness as "elongs to t e *atters ,it , ic t ey dealG >11E%a1#?, and Gevery account of *atters of conduct @

A *ust "e given in outline and not precisely. . . . ' e accounts ,e de*and *ust "e in accordance ,it t e su"/ect *atterG >11$4a4 see also 1$94"1#, 1$9Ha6%?. )n t ese re*arks Aristotle is not restricting ine&actness to is o,n accounts only. :n t e contrary, e is c aracteri9ing all accounts of *atters of conduct as ine&act=Gevery account of *atters of conductG=including, of course, is o,n. 2e s ould include in t is class is re*arks concerning t e difficulty or i*possi"ility of giving an e&act rule or definition of so*e *atters of conduct "ecause t ey e& i"it variation or indefiniteness >11%9a#, 11E4a6#, 11F1a?. +o*e ine&actness Aristotle recogni9es as "elonging only to is o,n accounts. At ti*es e does indeed opt for *et odological or r etorical 5 1%$ 5 ine&actness, or is ,illing to accept ine&actness given is i**ediate purposes in t e process of t e investigation. ' is concern of Aristotle ,it t e ine&actness pertaining to is o,n accounts neit er e&cludes nor s ould it overs ado, is *ore general concern ,it t e nature of all possi"le accounts of *atters of conduct and t eir supposed ine&actness, for t is latter concern is clearly of greater i*portance. +i*ilarly, t e fact t at Aristotle is at ti*es concerned ,it kinds of ine&actness t at e i*self takes to "e, and in fact are, eli*ina"le s ould not lead us to conclude t at e takes all ine&actness to "e eli*ina"le, for in so*e cases e t inks t at it is not. <is o,n re*arks do indeed differ ,idely on , et er ine&actness is eli*ina"le. )t *ig t "e "est to divide t e* into t ree "road classes. )n t e first class ,e *ay include t ose re*arks , ere Aristotle si*ply c aracteri9es t e accounts e ai*s at or succeeds in giving as "eing ine&act, "ut e gives no indication at all as to , et er t eir ine&actness can "e eli*inated. ' us, in Book ), c . ii, as soon as Aristotle concludes t at per aps t ere is a ig est good for *an=so*et ing t at is pursued only for its o,n sake and t at *ay "e t e end of everyt ing t at u*ans do or pursue= e re*arks t at ,e s ould try to e&plain in outline , at its nature is and , at t e science is t at studies it. <e c aracteri9es in t e sa*e *anner t e account e gives of c oice=t at is, as "eing si*ply ine&act=,it out indicating , et er or not t e ine&actness can "e eli*inated >11FEa#$?. At t e end of t e N.E. e assesses t e accounts e as given of several aspects of conduct in t e sa*e ter*s and in t e sa*e fas ion: G)f t en ,e ave sufficiently discussed in t eir outlines t e su"/ects of appiness, virtue and also of friends ip and pleasure, our proposed investigation can "e vie,ed as co*pleteG >11F9a##?. )n t ese and si*ilar re*arks, Aristotle does not tell us *uc a"out , y t e accounts e ai*s at or succeeds in giving possess t e ine&actness t ey presu*a"ly do. <e certainly does not state e&plicitly , et er suc ine&actness can "e reduced or eli*inated. ' e first re*ark, in , ic e says t at is o,n o"/ective is to give an account of t e good in outline, certainly raises t e 1uestion: 2 y not ave as an

o"/ective t e giving of a precise or e&act account of t e good; 3oes Aristotle "elieve or kno, fro* t e start t at only a certain kind of account of t e good is possi"le; ' e last 1uotation a"ove, in , ic Aristotle clai*s t at is ine&act accounts of appiness, virtue, friends ip, and pleasure ave co*pleted is investigation, also suggests so*et ing 1uite si*ilar. )t suggests eit er t at e as all along "een ai*ing at accounts t at ave certain features, and t at , at e as ac ieved satisfies is goals or purposes, or t at ine&act accounts are t e only accounts ,e can e&pect in relation to *atters of conduct. ' ese 1uestions *ake it 1uite clear t at it is not o"vious at all , at ,e s ould infer a"out t e ineli*ina"ility of ine&actness fro* re*arks suc as t e a"ove , ere Aristotle si*ply c aracteri9es so*et ing as ine&act. 5 1%1 5 :ne certainly cannot infer t at e t inks it can "e eli*inated, for after careful e&a*ination one *ay very ,ell conclude t at even in t ese re*arks , ere e does not even suggest t at ine&actness is ineli*ina"le, Aristotle assu*es t at it is. :t er,ise is re*arks ,ould *ake little sense. And of course fro* looking at t ese re*arks in isolation ,e cannot infer t at it is eli*ina"le. )n order to dra, any inferences a"out eli*ina"ility, one needs to ans,er t e kinds of 1uestions raised a"ove and to consider t e larger conte&t in , ic t ese re*arks occur. As s all "e seen, , en t at is done, one finds t at in so*e cases Aristotle t inks ine&actness to "e ineli*ina"le even t oug e does not e&plicitly state t at e t inks so. But t ere is anot er group of re*arks, our second class, in , ic Aristotle tells us e&plicitly o, e vie,s t e ine&actness e attri"utes to is accounts=na*ely, t at it can "e reduced or even eli*inated. ' us i**ediately after giving a definition, account, or e&planation of t e good >and appiness? in ter*s of t e u*an function, e tells us t at t e account is only an outline "ut Gt e proper procedure is to "egin a roug sketc and to fill it in after,ards. )f a ,ork as "een laid do,n in outline, to carry it on and co*plete it in detail *ay "e supposed to "e ,it in t e capacity of any"odyG >1$9Ha6$?. A si*ilar senti*ent is e&pressed in t e passage in , ic Aristotle pro*ises a *ore e&act account of t e virtues. After pointing out t at t e specific differentia of several of t e virtues is, as is t eory re1uires, a *ean, e says, G-or t e present t en ,e descri"e t ese @virtuesA in outline and su**arily . . . "ut t ey ,ill "e *ore accurately defined laterG >11$F"14?. )n t ese cases Aristotle clearly speaks of reducing ine&actness and possi"ly eli*inating it. )n t e second re*ark e does not rule out eli*ination of ine&actness, alt oug is point see*s to "e t at of i*proving upon it >

=*ore e&act?. 7et in t e first re*ark is language suggests t at ine&actness can "e eli*inated: Gto "egin ,it a roug sketc and fill it in after,ards . . . to co*plete it in detail.G )n contrast to t ese t,o classes of re*arks=t at is, t e class , ere Aristotle gives no indication , et er eli*ination or i*prove*ent of ine&actness is possi"le and t e class , ere e states rat er e&plicitly t at ine&actness can "e reduced or even eli*inated=t ere is a t ird class. )n t is t ird class "elong t ose re*arks in , ic Aristotle says or i*plies t at no i*prove*ent is possi"le or t at ine&actness is ineli*ina"le fro* accounts of *atters of conduct. ' is class consists pri*arily of t ose re*arks in , ic Aristotle connects for*al ine&actness to t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter of et ics. ' us Aristotle states categorically t at, G)n suc cases @, ere t ere are differences of *eritA it is not possi"le to give an e&act definition @

A up to , at point persons can still re*ain friendsG >11%9a#?. After e states t at good t ings >suc as ,ealt and "ravery? fluctuate greatly, e re*arks, G,e *ust t erefore "e content, in dealing ,it suc t ings and fro* suc pre*ises, to indicate t e trut 5 1%6 5 roug ly and in outlineG >1$94E6$?. Jater, e ,rites, GBut let it "e agreed at t e start t at every account of *atters of conduct is "ound to @or as to, or is re1uired to=

A "e only in outline and not ,it any e&actness, as ,e said in t e "eginning accounts *ust correspond to t e su"/ect *atterG >11$4a?. )t is evident t at in t ese re*arks Aristotle e&cludes t e possi"ility of eli*inating ine&actness. 2e s ould presu*a"ly "e content ,it t e ine&act accounts "ecause t ey are t e only ones possi"le. Accounts of *atters of conduct are "ound to "e ine&act. Alt oug t ere *ay "e so*e roo* for i*prove*ent, t e re*arks i*ply t at t ere is a li*it "eyond , ic reduction of ine&actness is i*possi"le. Accounts of *atters of conduct ,ill re*ain ine&act "ecause , at t ey deal ,it possesses certain features. ' e a"ove discussion *akes it clear t at Aristotle vie,s so*e for*s of ine&actness to c aracteri9e all accounts of *atters of conduct and to "e i*possi"le to eli*inate. ' e fact t at so*eti*es e speaks of only is o,n accounts as "eing ine&act or suggests t at ine&actness can "e reduced, or even eli*inated, s ould not *islead us into t inking t at e attri"utes ine&actness only to is o,n accounts or t at e t inks all ine&actness can "e eli*inated. 2 et er Aristotle is correct in vie,ing all accounts of *atters of conduct as possessing ine&actness and in treating so*e types of ine&actness as ineli*ina"le are 1uestions to "e discussed later. 5 1%# 5

-ive Outline) '*actness) and the Particular

Introduction
) ave suggested in t e previous c apter t at t e ter*s Aristotle uses , en e speaks of e&actness!ine&actness signify a variety of t ings. )n ot er ,ords, Aristotle recogni9es different types of e&actness!ine&actness. ) ave in addition argued t at e recogni9es different sources of for*al ine&actness. And ,e sa, fro* t e evidence presented in our discussion of t e various sources of for*al ine&actness t at Aristotle takes *ost of t ese sources to "e present in is o,n accounts as ,ell as in any possi"le accounts of *atters of conduct. Aristotle.s re*arks on e&actness!ine&actness in t e et ical treatises can, t en, "e vie,ed fro* at least t ese t,o perspectives=t at of t e sources of e&actness!ine&actness t ey single out and t at of t e types of e&actness! ine&actness t ey identify. ' ese t,o ,ays of vie,ing Aristotle.s re*arks o,ever cut across eac ot er: 3ifferent sources *ay give rise to t e sa*e type of e&actness!ine&actness, and different types of e&actness!ine&actness *ay "e generated "y t e sa*e source.

)n t is c apter and su"se1uent c apters ) s all vie, Aristotle.s re*arks fro* t ese t,o perspectives. ) s all focus in t is c apter on a group of re*arks , ere Aristotle speaks of a type of e&actness!ine&actness t at e t inks c aracteri9es et ical accounts for a variety of reasons=it as *any different sources. )n t e su"se1uent c apters ) s all treat t e re*aining re*arks "y again dividing t e* in groups on t e "asis of t ese t,o factors: t e types and sources of e&actness!ine&actness. )n so*e cases, of course, t e type of e&actness!ine&actness is t e sa*e despite t e difference in t e sources, "ut in *ost cases it is not. Alt oug t is ,ay of dividing up Aristotle.s re*arks *ay not al,ays produce groups t at ave no co**on 5 1%4 5 *e*"ers, it often does. )n any case, t ere is no reason to insist t at eac re*ark "e placed in one grouping only. +o*eti*es t e focus of our attention *ay "e t e type of e&actness!ine&actness Aristotle as in *ind, , ile at ot ers it *ay "e t e source t at generates it, and of course at still ot ers t e focus *ay "e "ot t e sources and types of ine&actness! e&actness. ) s all distinguis in t is c apter a type of ine&actness t at Aristotle speaks of rat er fre1uently in connection ,it is o,n as ,ell as any possi"le investigation of *atters of conduct. -ollo,ing Aristotle, ) s all refer *ost often to t is type of ine&actness "y c aracteri9ing an account as "eing in outline or lacking in detail, recogni9ing of course t at t e variety of ter*s Aristotle uses signify so*e, at different t ings=for e&a*ple, "eing in outline, lacking in detail, "eing in general ter*s, "eing a su**ary, "eing "rief or inco*plete. 8&actness ,ill, of course, "e t e opposite of t ese. But despite t e variety of ter*s for ine&actness and e&actness Aristotle uses t roug out t ese re*arks, it is correct to group t e* toget er4 for alt oug t e ter*s for ine&actness do not signify e&actly t e sa*e t ing, t ey signify so*et ing 1uite si*ilar=lack of detail or specificity. ' e sa*e can "e said a"out t e ter*s for e&actness. )n t is instance at least t ere see*s to "e a co**on t read unifying t e various t ings Aristotle as in *ind , en e speaks of ine&actness!e&actness. :ur first task t en ,ill "e to present t e evidence fro* t e treatises on conduct "y giving t e passages , ere Aristotle speaks of suc e&actness!ine&actness and to try to identify as ,ell as interpret t e ter*s e uses in connection ,it it. :ur ne&t task ,ill "e to identify t e source or sources of t is type of ine&actness. ) s all argue t at t e type of ine&actness as ,ell as t e type of e&actness under discussion is a for*al and not a *aterial feature=it c aracteri9es t e accounts, definitions, e&planations, and so fort , and not t e su"/ect *atter, of a discipline. )t is t e accounts, definitions, e&planations, and so fort of et ics t at are ine&act "y "eing in outline and not its su"/ect *atter or *atters of conduct. And it is t ese sa*e t ings t at can or cannot "e e&act in t e sense ,e are discussing ere. )ndeed, it ,ill "eco*e clear t at t e type of ine&actness under discussion is not a reflection at t e for*al level of any c aracteristic of t e *aterial level. )t is not caused "y so*e feature of t e su"/ect *atter. :n t e contrary, t e sources of t is ine&actness are t e sorts of t ings ,e identified in t e previous c apter as so*e of t e sources of for*al ine&actness t at Aristotle i*self recogni9es=*et odological or r etorical strategies, t e "urdenso*e c aracter of e&actness, i**ediate purposes at certain stages of is o,n in1uiry, inappropriateness of discipline, or t e goals of t e discipline of et ics. ' e last source is clearly t e *ost i*portant. -or , ereas *ost of t e 5 1%% 5 ot ers *ay "e peculiar to Aristotle.s o,n et ical investigation and could possi"ly "e eli*inated, t e

ine&actness , ose source is t e very goals of t e discipline of et ics is likely to "e present in any et ical investigation and *ay not "e eli*ina"le. )t is per aps t e recognition of t is on t e part of Aristotle t at e&plains "ot , y e at ti*es takes t is kind of ine&actness to c aracteri9e any et ical in1uiry, not only is o,n, as ,ell as , y e insists t at t e ine&actness at issue cannot "e eli*inated. )t s all "e seen t at e takes t e fact t at t e goals of et ics are practical instead of t eoretical to i*ply a level of e&actness t at e considers to "e unattaina"le. ' e level of e&actness re1uired "y t e goals of et ics cannot "e reac ed. <ence, et ical accounts *ust re*ain ine&act. ) s all t en turn to an e&a*ination of t e possi"le episte*ological conse1uences suc ine&actness *ay ave=in particular, , et er t is type of ine&actness affects in any ,ay t e de*onstrative nature of t ose disciplines it c aracteri9es or , et er it *akes de*onstration i*possi"le. )t is assu*ed universally "y co**entators fro* t e ancient ti*es to t e present t at it is ine&actness t at poses pro"le*s for an Aristotelian science: )ne&actness affects negatively t e de*onstrative rigor or purity of a science or even *akes it nonde*onstrative. ) s all argue t at contrary to t e accepted opinion, in t e case of t e type of e&actness!ine&actness under discussion, t e *ost pro"le*atic episte*ological conse1uences, , ic *ay even affect t e de*onstrative c aracter of a discipline, are not t e result of ine&actness "ut rat er of t e e&actness Aristotle considers necessary for practical disciplines. ' at is, it is not t eir lacking in detail or t eir "eing in outline t at raises t e i*portant episte*ological pro"le*s for suc disciplines "ut rat er t eir reac ing t at level of e&actness t at Aristotle t inks t ey *ust reac given t e practical nature of t eir goals. 2ere suc practical disciplines to "eco*e e&act to t e degree Aristotle re1uires, t eir e&actness ,ould ave so*e i*portant episte*ological conse1uences, especially ,it in t e Aristotelian fra*e,ork of a de*onstrative science. ' us, t e discussion ,ill confir* t e opinion universally eld "y co**entators on Aristotle.s ,orks a"out t e supposed difference "et,een practical and t eoretical kno,ledge=na*ely, t at practical kno,ledge is, according to Aristotle, different fro* t eoretical kno,ledge "ecause its goals are different. )nstead of *erely pointing to t e differences in t e goals of t ese t,o types of kno,ledge, ) ,ill try to identify t e ,ays in , ic , according to Aristotle, t e goals of t e various types of disciplines affect t eir episte*ological c aracter=for e&a*ple, t at t e practical goals of so*e disciplines re1uire a certain level of e&actness t at *ay not "e re1uired "y nonpractical >and nonproductive? disciplines. )f t e re1uired level is not ac ieved, t e practical disciplines ,ill e& i"it a type of ine&actness t at nonpractical >and nonproductive? disciplines *ay not e& i"it. 5 1%E 5 But if t e re1uired level is ac ieved, t en t e episte*ological conse1uences *entioned a"ove *ay introduce i*portant differences "et,een practical and t eoretical disciplines. -inally, ) ,ill offer so*e reflections on several of Aristotle.s clai*s. ) ,ill, for e&a*ple, raise so*e 1uestions a"out Aristotle.s clai* t at t e goals of et ics i*ply t e level of e&actness e says t ey do or t at accounts in et ics are ine&act to t e e&tent e insists t ey are "y virtue of not reac ing t is level of e&actness. +o*e of t ese clai*s *ay *ake sense , en t ey are seen as reactions against so*e fa*iliar +ocratic and Platonic doctrines a"out t e rat er a"stract c aracter of et ics, "ut t ey are nonet eless pro"le*atic.

The 'vidence and its Meaning

Aristotle rat er fre1uently c aracteri9es accounts of conduct as ine&act "ecause t ey are or *ust "e in outline or lacking in detail. <e uses in t is connection a nu*"er of different ter*s t at despite so*e *inor differences see* to signify for i* t is type of ine&actness. -ollo,ing are all t e re*arks , ere

Aristotle speaks of t is for* of ine&actness in t e et ical treatises and t e olitics : :.& )f t is is so @t at t ere is so*e one t ing t at is t e end of all actionA, ,e oug t to *ake an atte*pt to deter*ine at all events in outline @

A , at t e good is and , ic science or capacity is concerned ,it it. >N.E.&;=9a%:7 %.6 Per aps, o,ever t is 1uestion @t at is, o, are different t ings called goodA *ust "e set aside for no,, since a detailed investigation @

A of it "elongs *ore properly to anot er "ranc of p ilosop y. >1$9EE#$? %.# ' us t e argu*ent as reac ed t e sa*e result @t at is, t at t e ig est end is t e goodA4 ,e *ust try o,ever to *ake t is still *ore precise @or clear=

A. >1$9Fa64? %.4 Jet t is account t en serve to descri"e t e good in outline @

A=for ,e *ust presu*a"ly "egin "y *aking a roug sketc @ A and t en to fill it in after,ards. )f a ,ork as "een ,ell laid do,n in outline @ A, to carry it out and co*plete it in detail *ay "e supposed to "e ,it in t e capacity of anyone. >1$9Ha6$? %.% But t e accidents of life are *any and e& i"it all kinds of differences and so*e affect us *ore t an ot ers. 'o distinguis "et,een t e* in detail @

A ,ould clearly "e a long and endless @

A undertaking, and a treat*ent , ic is general and in outline @

A, *ay per aps "e enoug . >11$1a6%? %.E But a detailed @or e&actA treat*ent @

A of t is *atter @t at is, , et er praise or enco*ia "elongs to appinessA is per aps rat er t e

5 1%F 5 business of those )ho ha+e made a study of encomia. <or our purpose )e may dra) the conclusion from the foregoing remar-s' that happiness is a thing honored and perfect. 1I &;%a7 %.F -or t e present t en ,e descri"e t ese @t at is, so*e dispositions as *eans >virtues? and ot ers as e&tre*es >vices?A in outline @

A and su**arily @ A , ic is sufficient for no,4 "ut t ey ,ill "e *ore accurately @ A defined later. >11$F" 14?

%.H

Jet t is serve as a description in outline @

A of c oice, and of t e nature of its o"/ects, and t e fact t at it deals ,it *eans to ends. >111#a14? %.9 2e ave no, discussed t e virtues in general and stated t eir genus in outline @

A, +iA.that they are means and dispositions' and ha+e sho)n that they render us apt to do the same actions as those by )hich they are produced' and to do them in the )ay in )hich right reason may en$oin? and that they depend on oursel+es and are +oluntary 1&&&93%37. 6ut to resume' let us no) discuss the +irtues se+erally' defining the nature of each' the class of ob$ects to )hich it is related' and the )ay in )hich it is related to them. 1&&&:a97 %.1$ Jet t is @t at is, t e account of courage as stipulated in %.9A suffice as an account of courage: fro* , at as "een said it ,ill not "e difficult to grasp in outline @

A at least , at its nature is. >111FE6$? %.11 Io, ,e o"serve t at every"ody *eans "y /ustice t at disposition , ic renders *en apt to do /ust t ings, and , ic causes t e* to act /ustly and to ,is , at is /ust4 and si*ilarly "y in/ustice t at disposition , ic *akes *en act un/ustly and ,is , at is un/ust. Jet us also, t en, start "y assu*ing t is in outline @

A. >1169a11? %.16 'o say t is @t at is, t at in t e case of all dispositions t ere is a *ean to ai* at and t ere is a definition of t e *ean , ic lies "et,een t,o e&tre*es and is in confor*ity ,it reasonA is surely true, "ut it is not at all precise @

A. -or in ot er pursuits , ere t ere is a science it is indeed true to say t at effort oug t to "e e&erted and rela&ed neit er too *uc nor too little, "ut to an inter*ediate a*ount prescri"ed "y reason. But if one kne, only t is e ,ould "e no ,iser t an "efore: for e&a*ple, e ,ill not kno, , at *edicines to apply to t e "ody *erely fro* "eing told to apply t ose *edicines prescri"ed and in t e ,ay a *edical e&pert does. <ence it is necessary ,it regard to t e dispositions of t e soul also not only t is true state*ent

s ould "e *ade, "ut t at it s ould in addition "e deter*ined , at correct reason is and , at is t e standard t at deter*ines it. >11#HE6%? %.1# Io, virtue *akes t e c oice rig t4 "ut t e t ings t at are naturally to "e done to carry out our c oice are t e concern not of virtue, "ut of anot er capacity. 2e *ust d,ell on t is point in order to *ake it *ore precise @

A. ' ere is a certain capacity called cleverness, , ic

5 1%H 5 is such as to be able to do the things that tend to)ards the goal )e ha+e set and to achie+e it. 1&&99a%&7 %.14 <o,ever ) ave given an e&act treat*ent @

A of *otion in anot er ,ork. >11F4E#? %.1% <aving no, discussed t e various kinds of virtue, of friends ip and of pleasure, it re*ains for us to treat in outline @

A of appiness, inas*uc as ,e count t is to "e t e end of u*an life. >11FEa#$? %.1E 2 ereas t e appiness t at "elongs to t e intellect is separate: so *uc *ay "e said a"out it ere, for an e&act treat*ent @

A of t e *atter is "eyond our present pro/ect. >11FHa6#? %.1F )f t en ,e ave sufficiently discussed in t eir outlines @

A t e su"/ects of appiness and of virtue in its various for*s, and also of friends ip and pleasure, *ay ,e assu*e t at t e investigation ,e proposed is no, co*plete; :r

per aps, as ,e say, t e end of studies a"out t ings to "e done is not to study and kno, t e various t ings, "ut rat er to do t e*. >11F9a#6? %.1H Io, a t oroug e&a*ination of t is opinion @t at t e for* of good is t e a"solute goodA "elongs to anot er study. . . . But if ,e are to speak a"out it "riefly @

A, ,e say t at . . . >E.E. &%&5b&27 %.19 2e *ust endeavor "y *eans of state*ents t at are true "ut not precise @

A to arrive at a result t at is "ot true and precise. -or our present state is as if ,e kne, t at ealt is t e "est disposition of t e "ody and t at Coriscus is t e darkest *an in t e *arketBplace4 for t at is not to kno, , at ealt is and , o Coriscus is, "ut nevert eless to "e in t at state is a elp to,ards kno,ing eac of t ese t ings. >166$a1%? %.6$ Jet us t en define t e* @t e vicesA si*ply @

A in t is *anner, and ,it greater e&actness @ A , en ,e are speaking a"out t e opposite dispositions. >1661EH? %.61 ' e necessity of , at ,e are arguing @t at necessary t ings follo, fro* necessary and contingent fro* contingent onesA is clear fro* t e Analytics? at present )e cannot either deny or affirm anything exactly *

, except $ust this. 1&%%%3827 %.66 2e ave spoken a"out t is @t at t e end in deli"eration is like t e postulates of t e t eoretic sciencesA "riefly @

A at t e "eginning of t is discourse, and in detail @

A in t e Analytics. 1&%%5a&;7 %.6# )t as t en "een stated in general ter*s @

A t at t ere are *iddle states in t e virtues and t at t ese are purposive, and also t at t e opposite dispositions are vices and , at t ese are. But let us take eac one of t e* and discuss t e* in se1uence. And first let us discuss courage. >166Ha64?

:.%9

5 1%9 5 2e s all ave to define t e class of pleasures concerned @,it te*perance and t e related vicesA *ore e&actly @

A in our discussion of selfBcontrol and ,eakness of t e ,ill later on. >16#1"? %.6% Io, in , at preceded ,e stated t e standard .as reason directs.4 "ut t is is as if in *atters of diet one ,ere to say .as *edical science and its principles direct,. and t is t oug true is not precise @

A. >1649E%? %.6E :f t e several divisions of ,ealt Bgetting ) no, speak generally @

A4 a *inute consideration @ A of t e* *ig t "e useful in practice, "ut it ,ould "e tireso*e to d,ell upon in study. > olit. &%:23827 %.6F -or /ust as in t e ot er arts @or disciplinesA as ,ell, so ,it t e structure of t e state it is i*possi"le t at it s ould ave "een fra*ed e&actly @

A in all its details4 for it *ust of necessity "e descri"ed generally @or in universal ter*s, A, "ut our actions deal ,it particular t ings. >16E9a1$? %.6H <o,ever, if t is point @t at is, , et er t e e&cellence of a good person is t e sa*e as t e e&cellence of a good citi9enA really is to receive investigation, ,e *ust first ascertain in so*e sort of outline @

A , at constitutes t e e&cellence of a citi9en. >16FE"19? %.69 And alt oug sailors differ fro* eac ot er in function . . . and so clearly t e *ost e&act @

A definition of t eir e&cellence ,ill "e special to eac , yet t ere ,ill also "e a co**on definition of e&cellence t at ,ill apply alike to all of t e*. >16FEE64? %.#$ And since ,e are considering , at circu*stances give rise to party fractions and revolutions in constitutions, ,e *ust first ascertain t eir origins and causes generally. ' ey are, speaking roug ly @

A, t ree in nu*"er , ic ,e *ust first define in outline @ A separately. -or ,e *ust ascertain , at state of affairs gives rise to party strife, and for , at o"/ects it is ,aged, and t irdly , at are t e origins of political disorders and internal party struggles. >1#$6a19? %.#1 2e ave no, t erefore spoken in outline @

A a"out al*ost all t e offices of state. >1#6#a1$? %.#6 )n e&tent and *agnitude t e land @of t e stateA oug t to "e of a site t at ,ill ena"le t e in a"itants to live a life of li"eral and at t e sa*e ti*e te*perate leisure. 2 et er t is

li*iting principle is rig tly or ,rongly stated *ust "e considered *ore precisely @

A later on, , en ,e co*e to raise t e general su"/ect of property and o,ners ip of ,ealt . >1#6EE##? %.## But to linger at t is point over t e detailed state*ent @

A and discussion of 1uestions of t is kind is a ,aste of ti*e. ' e difficulty ,it suc t ings @te*ples and pu"lic "uildingsA is not so *uc in understanding @or e&plaining= A t e*, "ut in doing t e*. . . . <ence ,e

5 1E$ 5 )ill relin/uish for the present the further consideration of matters of this sort. 1&88&b&27 %.#4 ' e particular kind of "odily constitution in t e parents t at ,ill "e *ost "eneficial for t e offspring *ust "e studied furt er in our discussion of t e *anage*ent of c ildren4 it is sufficient to speak of it in outline @

A no,. >1##%E%? %.#% 2e ,ill leave t e precise discussion @

A as to eac of t ese *atters @effects of *usic and its place in educationA for any , o ,is it to seek it fro* t ose teac ers, , ile for t e present let us lay do,n general principles, *erely stating t e outlines @

A of t e su"/ects. >1#41E#$? %.#E And as ,e say t at *usic oug t to "e e*ployed not for t e purpose of one "enefit t at

it confers "ut on account of several >for it serves t e purpose "ot of education and of cat arsis=,e speak of cat arsis at present ,it out e&planation @

A, "ut ,e ,ill return to discuss it in detail @ A in our treatise on poetry. >1#41E4$?@1A ' e a"ove re*arks fro* t e treatises on conduct *ake it 1uite clear t at Aristotle takes t e type of ine&actness ,e ave provisionally designated as lacking in detail or "eing in outline to "e rat er pervasive in accounts of *atters of conduct. ' ey also *ake evident t e fact t at Aristotle.s favored ter* for e&pressing t is type of ine&actness is

>%.1, %.4, %.F, %.H, %.9, %.1$, %.11, %.1%, %.1F, %.6$, %.#$, %.#1, %.#4, %.#%?.@6A ' e ter* originally *eant an i*pression or i*print of an o"/ect4 t e outline of an o"/ect t at is i*pressed or i*printed. ' us Aristotle speaks of t e i*print > ? of a sti*ulus t at presu*a"ly is si*ilar to t e i*print *ade , en ,e seal ,it a signet ring >Mem. 4%$a#1, "%? and of t e outline of a scar >

G.A. F61E#6?. ' e original *eaning of t is ter* is in part preserved , en Aristotle uses it to c aracteri9e t e nature of accounts, descriptions, e&planations, and so fort =suc t ings are at ti*es only outlines or sketc es4 t ey give only a general idea or t ey lack detail.@#A And so Aristotle speaks in %.4 of giving a roug sketc > ? of t e good t at is a description of it in outline > ?.@4A ' is latter ter* literally *eans to dra, a line around so*et ing, ence to dra, an outline, trace, sketc , or delineate.@%A 8ven t oug Aristotle uses ter*s t at are different fro* t e ones /ust discussed in so*e of t e re*arks 1uoted a"ove, is concern is ,it t e sa*e type of ine&actness. ' roug out t ese re*arks, e is invaria"ly concerned ,it suc features of an account as its lack of detail, its "eing in outline, its not giving a co*plete description or e&planation of so*e aspect of conduct, and so fort . ' is see*s to "e t e case even , en Aristotle uses t e ter* >

? in its various for*s, despite t e fact t at it as al*ost al,ays "een taken to *ean .clear.. -or it is evident fro* t e conte&t 5 1E1 5 t at , at Aristotle as in *ind , en e c aracteri9es an account as not "eing

is its lack of detail or its "eing sketc y. And , at e proposes or actually does in order to *ake suc an account *ore is to *ake it *ore detailed or co*plete, and in t is sense to *ake it *ore clear >see %.11, %.1F, %.6$, %.#1?. +i*ilarly, Aristotle speaks of an account or treat*ent t at is lacking in detail "ecause it is in general ter*s > , %.%, %.6#, %.6E, %.6F?, "ecause it is "rief > , %.1H4 , %.66?, or a su**ary > , %.F?. And it is e&actness or ine&actness in t is sense of possessing or lacking detail t at Aristotle as in *ind , en e uses t e ter*

in several of its for*s. ' us, Aristotle uses t is ter* , en e speaks of a detailed investigation of so*e topic t at "elongs to anot er "ranc of p ilosop y or discipline >%.6, %.14, %.1E, %.61?, of various topics t at re1uire a treat*ent in greater detail >%.F, %.6$, %.69, %.#6?, and of so*e , ic eit er cannot "e treated in detail >%.6F? or for , ic it ,ould "e tireso*e to do so >%.6E?. )t is clear t at t is type of e&actness!ine&actness can c aracteri9e only a discipline and its constitutive ele*ents=it can c aracteri9e definitions, descriptions, e&planations, accounts, and so fort . ' ese are t e kinds of t ings t at can ave or lack detail, can "e presented in outline, "riefly, in general ter*s, or su**arily, and so fort . )t is a kind of e&actness!ine&actness t at can apply only at t e for*al level=it is a for*al feature. And it is evident fro* t e re*arks 1uoted a"ove t at Aristotle i*self vie,s t is type of e&actness!ine&actness as "eing a for*al feature. )n none of t ese re*arks does e attri"ute "eing in outline, "eing "rief, or lacking in detail=and of course t eir opposites=to t e su"/ect *atter of et ics and politics or *atters of conduct in general. <e restricts t is type of ine&actness to t e for*al level

only, "ut , et er t ere is nonet eless so*e feature of t e su"/ect *atter, of t e ele*ents of conduct t e*selves, t at generates or causes t is type of e&actness!ine&actness at t e for*al level re*ains to "e e&a*ined. 2 at are Aristotle.s intentions , en e speaks rat er fre1uently of t is type of e&actness!ine&actness; 2 at do is re*arks tell us a"out t e sources and i*plications of t is type of ine&actness; Muestions clearly arise as to , at ,ould satisfy Aristotle.s 1uest for e&actness and , at level of detail or specificity ,ould need to "e attained for et ical accounts to "e co*plete. Muestions also arise as to , et er Aristotle considers t e kind of ine&actness under discussion ere to "e eli*ina"le and to affect t e episte*ological nature of t e disciplines of conduct. :r, in general and independently of , at Aristotle t inks, t e 1uestion arises , et er suc ine&actness can "e eli*inated and , et er it as any episte*ological conse1uences. 5 1E6 5

Aristotle's Intentions
)n so*e of t e re*arks 1uoted a"ove Aristotle i*self proposes or sets out to give accounts, e&planations, or descriptions t at are only in outline or lack detail. 7et in ot ers e appears to "e saying t at ine&actness in is o,n and per aps all accounts of *atters of conduct is inevita"le. Again, in so*e cases is reasons for proposing to give ine&act accounts, settling for ine&act accounts, or clai*ing t at suc ine&act accounts are inevita"le are 1uite transparent. )n ot er cases, o,ever, t ey are not so transparent. -or e&a*ple, is reasons are transparent , en in so*e of is re*arks Aristotle proposes or is prepared to accept in so*e discipline 3 an ine&act treat*ent of so*e topic ' "ecause ' does not "elong to t e proper do*ain 3 studies. )t presu*a"ly "elongs in t e do*ain of so*e discipline ot er t an 3, and in so*e instances Aristotle refers e&plicitly to t e proper discipline of ' , ere an e&act treat*ent is or s ould "e given. ' is source of ine&actness is t e one ,e identified earlier as inappropriateness of discipline. )t is t is source t at generates accounts t at are in outline or lack detail of t e follo,ing: ' e e&planation of o, different t ings are called good >%.6?, of , et er praise or enco*ia "elongs to appiness >%.E?, of *otion >%.14?, of t e appiness t at "elongs to t e intellect >%.1E?, of , et er t e for* of good is t e A"solute Good >%.1H?, of , et er necessary t ings follo, fro* necessary and contingent fro* contingent ones >%.61?, of t e si*ilarity "et,een t e end in deli"eration and t e postulates in t e sciences >%.66?, of t e effect of *usic and its place in education >%.#%?, and of t e nature of cat arsis >%.#E?. )n t e case of so*e of t ese topics Aristotle offers *ore e&act or detailed accounts in t e disciplines to , ic e t inks t ese topics "elong=for e&a*ple, of enco*ia in Rhet. , of *otion in hys. , and of cat arsis in oet . 2 at can "e said a"out ine&actness t at results fro* inappropriateness of discipline; 2 at are its scope and i*plications; )t see*s, as ) pointed out in t e previous c apter, t at t e scope of ine&actness resulting fro* inappropriateness of discipline can "e rat er li*ited. -ro* t e fact t at so*e topic ' is ine&actly treated in discipline 3 "ecause it "elongs in anot er discipline need not i*ply t at every topic of 3 is ine&actly treated=t at t e , ole of 3 is ine&act. ' us, t e fact t at enco*ia, *otion, *usic, or cat arsis are and per aps can only "e ine&actly treated in t e N.E. or olit. , need not i*ply t at virtue, t e good, t e state, or citi9ens ip are ine&actly treated in t ese investigations. 7et t e scope of ine&actness ste**ing fro* inappropriateness of discipline *ay. not "e so li*ited in all cases. At t e least, 1uestions re*ain a"out t e cases , ere t e topic t at "elongs in anot er discipline, and is t erefore ine&actly treated in 3, is of funda*ental i*portance for e&plicating or

understanding t e "asic ele*ents of 3. ' us, , ereas treating 5 1E# 5 t e *atters of enco*ia or cat arsis "riefly or only in outline in et ics or politics *ay not affect t e e&actness of t e accounts of t e good, of virtue, or of t e state, treating t e topics of t e nature of t e soul, of t e intellect, of function, or t e nu*"er and nature of t e t ings t at can "e in t e soul ine&actly *ay very ,ell affect t e accounts of t e "asic ele*ents of et ics and politics. +o t e rat er cursory treat*ent Aristotle gives in Book ) of t e N.E. to t e nature of function, t e soul, and its faculties does affect t e account of t e good and appiness e gives in ter*s of t e faculties and functions of t e soul. As co**entators often point out, *any issues relating to t ese topics, in particular t at of function, are eit er not treated at all or only touc ed upon "y Aristotle, and t is affects is account of t e u*an good and appiness. +i*ilarly, is cursory treat*ent of t e intellect leaves is account of appiness in Book C as a for* of conte*plation lacking in detail. ' e sa*e can "e said a"out is treat*ent of dispositions or states of c aracter >

? >in contrast to faculties or a"its?, , ic is crucial for is account of virtue in Book )). ' us t e scope of t is type of ine&actness *ay not "e so li*ited in so*e cases. 2 et er it is see*s to depend on t e relation a topic ' t at is treated ine&actly in discipline 3 "ecause of inappropriateness of discipline as to t e central ele*ents of 3. Can ine&actness due to t e inappropriateness of discipline "e eli*inated; As ) said in t e previous c apter, it *ay not "e possi"le, for in order to eli*inate ine&actness fro* t e treat*ent of topic ' in discipline 3 it *ay "e re1uired t at considera"le portions of t e discipline to , ic ' "elongs "e incorporated into 3. -or e&a*ple, it *ay "e re1uired to incorporate *a/or portions of psyc ology and p ysics into et ics in order to eli*inate t e ine&act treat*ent Aristotle gives of *otion and intellect in t e et ics >%.14, %.1E?. 8ven t is rat er drastic *ove of incorporating one discipline into anot er *ay not result in t e eli*ination of ine&actness in our treat*ent of topic '. )t all depends on , et er ' is or can "e treated e&actly in its proper discipline, for if ' is not or cannot "e treated e&actly in its proper discipline, incorporating portions of suc a discipline into anot er ,ould not eli*inate t e ine&actness of ' in t e latter discipline. ' us, if *otion is not or cannot "e treated e&actly in p ysics, incorporating t e account of *otion fro* p ysics into et ics ,ould not eli*inate ine&actness fro* t e treat*ent of *otion in et ics. And ,e cannot assu*e t at all t ings can "e treated e&actly even in t eir o,n disciplines. As s all "e seen, Aristotle i*self t inks t at at least so*e *atters of conduct are resistant to e&act treat*ent, "ut t is need not "e restricted to *atters of conduct. Aristotle t inks t at so*e "iological p eno*ena, for e&a*ple, t e gestation periods in ani*als, are e1ually resistant to e&act treat*ent in t eir proper discipline. But , et er t e ine&actness t at is due to inappropriateness of disciB 5 1E4 5 pline can "e eli*inated depends also on t e standard of e&actness t at is de*anded or re1uired in t e various disciplines. ' at is, , et er a topic ' t at is ine&actly treated in so*e discipline 3 "ecause it "elongs in anot er discipline can "e treated e&actly in part depends on t e level of e&actness de*anded in or re1uired "y 3. ' us, , et er ine&actness fro* t e treat*ent of *otion in et ics can "e eli*inated in part depends on t e standard of e&actness appropriate for et ics. )f et ics re1uires a lo, level of

e&actness, t en per aps providing an account of *otion t at is even *arginally *ore co*plete or in greater detail t an t e one Aristotle gives *ay "e sufficient for eli*inating ine&actness fro* t e account of *otion. )ndeed, , et er *otion can "e treated ,it e&actness in its o,n proper discipline, or , et er any e&isting ine&actness fro* its accounts in its proper discipline can "e eli*inated, ,ould depend on t e standard of e&actness appropriate for or re1uired "y t e proper discipline of *otion. Aristotle.s intentions are also clear in %.6E , ere e see*s ,illing to accept an ine&act treat*ent of a topic "ecause it ,ould "e tireso*e to seek a detailed account of it. <e is ,illing to accept a treat*ent of t e various types of ,ealt t at is only in general ter*s and is lacking in detail in order to avoid t e tireso*e or "urdenso*e task of seeking an e&act one. Aristotle does not say t at t e ine&actness in is account of t e types of ,ealt t at is due to t e "urdenso*e c aracter of e&actness cannot "e eli*inated. :n t e contrary, , at e says a"out t e usefulness of an e&act account of t e types of ,ealt suggests t at per aps an e&act account is possi"le, alt oug tireso*e. )ndeed, ine&actness t at as its source in our desire to avoid t e "urdenso*e task of seeking e&actness need not i*ply t at it cannot "e eli*inated. ' e nature of t e source t at generates it see*s, on t e contrary, to i*ply t at it can "e eli*inated=if our desire, for e&a*ple, for e&actness out,eig ed our ,is to avoid t e irkso*e task of attaining it, t en per aps e&actness ,ould "e reali9ed. But again , et er ine&actness t at is due to t ese rat er psyc ological factors can "e eli*inated depends in part on t e level of e&actness t at is desired or re1uired. )f an e&tre*ely ig level of co*pleteness, detail, or specificity is re1uired, t en t e *ere desire to attain e&actness despite t e irkso*eness and pettiness of doing so *ay not guarantee t e attain*ent of e&actness. +uc an e&tre*e level *ay very ,ell "e unattaina"le. As s all "e seen "elo,, Aristotle does at ti*es set suc an unattaina"le level of e&actness for et ics and ot er practical disciplines. ' e sa*e *ay "e said a"out t e ine&actness Aristotle is ,illing to accept , en in %.## e clai*s t at to seek an e&act treat*ent of so*e topics *ay "e a ,aste of ti*e. 2 at is pro"le*atic ,it so*e *atters of conduct, e clai*s t ere, lies not ,it t e understanding "ut ,it t e doing of t e*. Again, Aristotle does not address t e 1uestion of , et er ine&actness due 5 1E% 5 to suc factors can "e eli*inated, "ut %.## "y itself i*plies t at it can. ' ere is not ing said t ere t at e&cludes attaining e&act accounts if ,e ,ere to decide to ,aste our ti*e in order to reali9e suc accounts. 2 et er ,e ,ill succeed in o"taining e&act accounts and t us in eli*inating ine&actness ,ill, o,ever, again depend on t e level of e&actness , ic ,e set or , ic is re1uired.@EA ' e pro"le* ,it t e level or standard of e&actness desired or re1uired in a discipline "eco*es apparent , en ,e focus on t ose re*arks , ere Aristotle speaks of ine&actness consisting in inco*pleteness or lack of detail t at is due to *et odological or r etorical strategies, i**ediate purposes at a certain stage of t e in1uiry, or t e goals of t e discipline. Aristotle does not often state e&plicitly t e standard of e&actness t at e uses in deter*ining t at et ical accounts are or *ust "e ine&act. <ence it is not clear at ti*es , y e c aracteri9es so*e accounts as lacking in e&actness and , at is needed in order to i*prove upon or re*ove t eir ine&actness. 7et Aristotle as so*e standard of e&actness in *ind=a standard e takes to "e re1uired "y t e discipline of et ics and si*ilar disciplines of conBduct=, en e insists t at so*e or all accounts of *atters of conduct are or can only "e ine&act. -or e&a*ple, consider %.1 , ere Aristotle proposes to seek an account of t e good t at is in outline. 2 y seek an account t at is only in outline and ence ine&act; 2 y set suc an o"/ective; Per aps it is

only Aristotle.s i**ediate purpose or per aps it is part of is r etorical or *et odological strategy. All e needs at t is stage of t e in1uiry, all t at is re1uired for t e purpose of presenting t e results of is investigation, is an account of t e good t at is in outline and inco*plete, a roug sketc . But per aps t e *eaning of t is re*ark, , ic sets t e tone and indicates t e o"/ectives of Aristotle.s in1uiry, is *ore co*ple& as ,ell as unclear. )t *ay, for instance, "e t e case t at Aristotle as reasons for t inking t at an ine&act account of t e good is all t at e can o"tain. ' at is, e as reasons for t inking not only t at an ine&act account of t e good is sufficient for is needs=for e&a*ple, for t e practical goals of t e in1uiry, is i**ediate or *et odological purposes="ut also t at an ine&act account is all t at can "e e&pected in t e case of t e good. ' e standard of e&actness is suc t at t ere is no possi"ility of attaining an e&act account of t e good. 2 at does Aristotle ,ant fro* our accounts of t e good, and , at ,ould ena"le us to transcend t e outline for* in t e*; )n %.4 e c aracteri9es t e result of is o,n investigation into t e nature of appiness and t e good as "eing ine&act. ' is is understanda"le, since t e only conclusions t e investigation as produced so far do not tell us , at t e nature of t e good is. ' ey only tell us so*e relational and 1uite a"stract properties of t e good, t at is, t at t e u*an good is so*et ing t at is pursued for its o,n sake, t at it is not pursued for t e sake of anyt ing 5 1EE 5 else, t at everyt ing t at is pursued is pursued for t e sake of it, t at it is selfBsufficient, and so on. )t is clear t at t ese properties do not specify t e nature of t e good, and t erefore of appiness, and Aristotle is fully a,are t at t ey do not. <e is a,are t at is o,n c aracteri9ation of t e good so far does not specify its nature sufficiently: )t does not identify t e good. ' at t is is so and t at Aristotle clearly recogni9es t is can "e easily seen fro* , at e says in %.19: 'o kno, t at appiness and t e good is t e ig est end is like kno,ing Gt at ealt is t e "est disposition of t e "ody and t at Coriscus is t e darkest *an in t e *arketBplace4 for t at is not to kno, , at ealt is and , o Coriscus is, "ut nevert eless to "e in t at state is a elp to,ards kno,ing eac of t ese t ings.G +i*ilarly, e finds t e definition of /ustice in %.11=, at renders *en apt to do /ust t ings and act /ustly=correct "ut ine&act: )t does not tell us , at /ustice is4 it does not identify t e nature of actions t at are /ust or t e o"/ects to , ic /ustice relates. ' e sa*e, Aristotle o"serves in %.16 and %.6%, is true of a definition of virtue as a disposition t at lies "et,een t,o e&tre*es and is as reason prescri"es. +uc a definition is, according to Aristotle, as infor*ative as t e state*ent t at purports to specify , at *edicines to apply to t e "ody "y telling us to apply t ose t at *edicine prescri"es and in t e ,ay a *edical e&pert does. Aristotle does not deny t at suc definitions or accounts provide us ,it infor*ation. As e says, to "e in Gt at state @of kno,ing , at suc definitions tell usA is a elp to,ards eac of t ese t ings.G But it is clear t at t e definitions of virtue as a *ean disposition t at is in confor*ity ,it rig t reason and of t e good as t e ig est end do not specify ade1uately t e nature of virtue and do not identify t e good. Aristotle clearly recogni9es t at one needs to deter*ine , at correct reason is in t e case of virtue >%.16? and to *ake *ore precise , at t e ig est end of u*an pursuits >t e good? is >%.4?. +etting t e concerns ,it t e definition of virtue aside for t e *o*ent, let us focus on Aristotle.s atte*pts to *ake is account of t e good *ore precise. ' e first atte*pt is *ade in N.E. >).vii?, , ere e gives is ,ellBkno,n e&planation of t e u*an good and appiness in ter*s of t e u*an function. )n t e sa*e c apter Aristotle identifies t e good and appiness ,it t at activity of t e soul t at constitutes t e u*an function and is perfor*ed in accordance ,it virtue >1$9Ha1%?. But Aristotle finds even t is account ine&act, lacking in detail, for i**ediately follo,ing t is account of appiness and t e good in ter*s of t e u*an function, e c aracteri9es t e account as "eing a roug sketc or an outline >%.4?. )t is per aps natural and understanda"le for Aristotle to find t is last account of t e good

to "e a *ere outline. Alt oug e as identified t e good ,it t e u*an function, e as not yet e&plained , at t e function really is=specifically, e as not yet given us is account of intellectual activity or conte*plation, or is account of t e virtues and t eir connection to 5 1EF 5 t e u*an function >t e topics t at occupy t e "ulk of t e discussion in t e N.E .?.@FA <ence, after giving t e account of t e good and appiness in ter*s of t e u*an function, Aristotle sees is or anyone.s task as "eing t at of filling in a roug sketc >

? or adding , at is *issing fro* a sketc >

? t at gives t e correct outline >1$9Ha6$?. ' e task is to fill in or add to t e a"stract fra*e,ork and general account of t e good and appiness t at as "een given in ter*s of t e u*an function. :ne needs to provide greater detail or specificity t an t e argu*ent fro* function provided in order to o"tain an account of t e good and appiness t at can "e called e&act. )n at least t is instance, Aristotle speaks as if t e sketc of t e good e as given can "e filled in or co*pleted, as if details can "e provided and an e&act account attained. )t see*s, o,ever, t at t is is not all t at Aristotle as in *ind ere, or at least t at t e level of detail or specificity Aristotle as in *ind is *uc ig er t an %.4 appears to suggest. ' e contrast "et,een an account of C in outline and one t at is not see*s not to "e *erely t e difference "et,een identifying C in a"stract, general ter*s >for e&a*ple, t e account of t e u*an good in ter*s of t e function of *an? and giving a furt er detailed e&planation of t is a"stract, general c aracteri9ation >for e&a*ple, t e detailed accounts of conte*plation and of t e *oral virtues?. -or in t e very last "ook of t e N.E. >Book C.vi?, , en Aristotle returns to t e discussion of t e good and appiness, e clai*s t at Git re*ains for us to treat in outline of appinessG >%.1%?. <e t en proceeds to e&plain intellectual activity and co*pare a u*an life t at attains t e ig est for* of appiness t roug intellectual activity to one t at is concerned pri*arily ,it t e e&ercise of t e et ical e&cellences and action. 7et t is is not sufficient eit er, for after e co*pletes t is discussion, e adds t at t e accounts e as given of t e good > appiness?, virtue, friends ip, and pleasure are only in outline: G)f t en ,e ave sufficiently discussed in t eir outlines t e su"/ects of appiness, virtue and also of friends ip and pleasure, *ay ,e assu*e t at t e investigation ,e proposed is no, co*plete @or finis edA;G >%.1F?. ' e place*ent of t e last c apters of t e N.E. as often "een su"/ect to de"ate, and dou"ts ave "een raised as to , et er t ese c apters s ould "e placed , ere t ey are at present. But it is a so*e, at surprising fact a"out t e N.E. , , ic is a rat er loosely organi9ed treatise, t at at t e end, or at least at , at ,e take to "e t e end, Aristotle returns to c aracteri9e is o,n investigations and accounts >see %.1F? in e&actly t e sa*e ,ay t at e c aracteri9ed is o,n o"/ectives at t e "eginning of t e treatise=to give an account of t e good in outline >see %.1?. 2 erever t e last c apters of t e N.E. are placed, t e inclusion of virtue a*ong t e t ings t at Aristotle considers to ave "een treated only in outline is indeed a pu99le. -or after e co*pletes is discussion

of t e 5 1EH 5 nature of *oral virtue >Book ))? "y offering a definition of it in ter*s of its genus >disposition, state of c aracter? and specific differentia >t e notion of t e *ean? and s o,s t at t e ordinary virtues of courage, te*perance, and li"erality neatly fit is definition "ecause t ey are *ean states of c aracter "et,een e&tre*es >t e vices?, e re*arks: G-or t e present t en ,e descri"e t ese 1ualities in outline @

A and su**arily @ A , ic is sufficient for no,4 "ut t ey ,ill "e *ore accurately defined laterG >%.F?. ' e ine&act treat*ent of virtue in t is case is due to Aristotle.s o,n i**ediate purposes. As seen earlier, in *ost of t ese cases Aristotle pro*ises and often gives a *ore e&act treat*ent of t e topic t at as "een treated ine&actly at a later stage of t e investigation. <e pro*ises and gives a *ore detailed account in t e present case as ,ell. 2 en e pro*ises t at t e virtues ,ill "e *ore accurately defined later, Aristotle is referring to t e accounts e gives later of t e individual *oral virtues >Book ))).v?, , ic accounts e prefaces ,it t e re*arks, G2e ave no, discussed t e virtues in general and stated t eir genus in outline @ A, +iA. t at t ey are *eans and dispositions. . . . But to resu*e, let us no, discuss t e virtues severally, defining t e nature of eac @ A, t e class of o"/ects to , ic it is related and t e ,ay it is related to t e* @

AG >%.9?. ' e general account of virtue indeed does not identify t e virtues individually or specify t e types of o"/ects to , ic t ey are related. )t does not tell us, for e&a*ple, , at courage is, , at t e e*otions are t at *ake up its essential nature=suc as fear and confidence=or , at kinds of t ings are to "e feared or not to "e feared. ' e general account of virtue is not even sufficient for distinguis ing one virtue fro* anot er, since , at t e general account tells us is supposedly true of all t e virtues=t at is, an e&planation of t eir co**on features. +i*ilarly, Aristotle clai*s in %.69 t at t e definition of t e virtue >e&cellence? peculiar to eac class of sailors is *ore e&act t an t e one , ic is of t e co**on e&cellence to all and applies to all of t e*. +o Aristotle e*"arks on an investigation of t e individual virtues, turning is attention to courage first.

2 at e says in Book ))), c apters viBi& *ay not "e altoget er correct "ut e does ela"orate in considera"le detail on t e nature of courage, t e e*otions to , ic it is related, and t e o"/ects in relation to , ic courage is displayed. 7et e concludes t is discussion of courage "y re*arking, G-ro* , at as "een said it ,ill not "e difficult to for* a conception in outline of its natureG >%.1$?. +i*ilarly, e concludes is rat er ela"orate discussion of c oice=a discussion t at e i*self assu*es as provided an e&planation of its nature, of t e types of o"/ects ,it , ic it is concerned, and of t e fact t at it deals ,it t e *eans to t e various ends="y c aracteri9ing is account as "eing in outline >%.H?. 5 1E9 5 Iaturally, 1uestions *ay "e raised as to , at Aristotle as in *ind ere. :ne *ay ,onder , y t e e&planation or account of eac individual virtue, given in ter*s of its proper nature and t e o"/ects related to it, is still an e&planation, description, or account , ic is roug or in outline. 2 at does Aristotle t ink ,e could add to it, or do ,e in fact need to add anyt ing to it at all; And ,ould an e&planation of so*e natural p eno*enon, , ic is analogous to t e e&planation of t e individual virtues, ave t e sa*e ine&act c aracter, or is t is true only in t e case of et ical accounts; Per aps t is is a peculiarity of et ics t at can "e attri"uted to its goals or so*e ot er factor. Again, one *ay "e pu99led , y after all an account, e&planation, or description of a certain kind, species, or genus need "e considered roug or in outline , en it includes a clear definition of t e kind=especially , en t e definition satisfies Aristotle.s o,n conditions and is given in ter*s of genus and specific differentia, as is t e definition of *oral virtue. +uppose, for e&a*ple, ,e ,ere to define triangle "y giving its essential nature in t e ,ay Aristotle considers to "e correct. 2 y s ould ,e t en vie, suc a definition to "e in outline or inco*plete in any ,ay si*ply "ecause t ere are different kinds of triangles= isosceles, e1uilateral, rig t, and so fort =/ust as t ere are different kinds of virtue, and eac one as its o,n specific nature; )s , at Aristotle says a"out is o,n accounts of t e good, virtue, c oice, and t e like true of all accounts of kinds, species, and genera, regardless of t e su"/ect *atter; )f so, is t eory of t e structure of science faces considera"le difficulties, since t e definitions of suc t ings as kinds, species, and genera occupy a central place in t is t eory.@HA Per aps Aristotle.s c aracteri9ation of all of is accounts as "eing in outline or ine&act is to an e&tent understanda"le: 2e can see t at c aracteri9ing an account, e&planation, or description as "eing in outline, or roug , or in so*e ,ay inco*plete, is to c aracteri9e it in ter*s of so*et ing t at ad*its of degrees or t at is relative. ' us an account B of C *ay "e *ore co*plete t an account A, "ut less co*plete t an C. +o t e account of t e general features of virtue *ay "e *ore in outline and less co*plete t an t e accounts of t e virtues severally, "ut a t ird account *ay "e *ore co*plete and less in outline t an t e second, alt oug , at precise for* t e t ird one ,ould take as yet to "e specified. 8ven t is does not see* to "e t e , ole story, for Aristotle at ti*es appears to specify , at for* t e accounts s ould take, , at kinds of e&planations of t e ele*ents of conduct e ,ants, and , at degree of detail or specificity t ey s ould attain. )n %.9, for instance, e esta"lis es as is goals in relation to virtue, Gdefining t e nature of eac , t e class of o"/ects to , ic it is related, and t e ,ay in , ic it is related to t e*.G 7et t e ela"orate account of courage e gives, , ic satisfies t ese conditions of %.9, is ter*ed an outline >%.1$?4 and so are all t e individual 5 1F$ 5 accounts of t e virtues >%.1F?, as ,ell as t e account of c oice >%.H?, , ic also see*s to satisfy conditions si*ilar to t ose stipulated for t e virtues in %.9. ' is see*s to "e no accident=for Aristotle

c aracteri9es in t is *anner al*ost all t e central accounts in t e N.E. : t e accounts of t e good >%.1, %.#, %.4?, appiness >%.1%, %.1F?, virtue >%.F, %.9, %.1$, %.1F?, c oice >%.H?, friends ip >%.1%, %.1F?, and pleasure >%.1%, %.1F?. ' e sa*e is true in t e case of several accounts Aristotle gives in t e E.E. and olit. <e is at ti*es ,illing to accept an account t at alt oug ine&act is sufficient for is i**ediate purposes. 7et , en e ela"orates upon it, e&actness is still not attained. ' us in %.6$ Aristotle clai*s t at is account of t e vices is ine&act and a *ore e&act one is to "e given later , en t e virtues are discussed. At %.6# e clai*s t at t e account of t e virtues e as given so far as "een only in general ter*s and t ey need to "e discussed individually. But at t e conclusion of is discussion of t e individual virtues e re*arks t at, G2e ave spoken roug ly a"out t e ot er praise,ort y virtues, and *ust no, speak a"out /usticeG >16#4"?. At %.64 e ter*s is discussion of pleasure ine&act and pro*ises a *ore e&act account of it in is discussion of ,eakness of t e ,ill, "ut t ere is no evidence t at e t inks t at t e discussion of pleasure t ere is sufficiently e&act. ' e sa*e is true of t e discussions in olit. of party factions and revolutions >%.#$? and t e si9e of t e land re1uired for t e state >%.#6?. 0eturning to t e N.E. , t ere is t e 1uestion ) raised previously a"out t e *eaning of %.1 .: 2 y does Aristotle at t e outset of is investigation esta"lis as is goal t e attain*ent of ine&act accounts; )t could "e, as ) inted earlier, t at t ese are t e kinds of accounts e is interested in4 t ey are per aps sufficient for is purposes. <e *ay "elieve t at e as no need, or in fact t at t ere is no need, for a level of e&actness t at is ig er t an t e one e ac ieves in is o,n investigation.@9A 7et t is *ay not "e t e , ole story, for it could also "e t e case t at e t inks ine&act accounts are t e only possi"le accounts in et ics and si*ilar disciplines. <o,ever ard ,e try to refine t e* "y *oving a,ay fro* general or a"stract c aracteri9ations and *aking t e* *ore specific or detailed, t ey ,ill al,ays re*ain in outline, ine&act, and inco*plete. )t is *ost likely t at a "elief in t e i*possi"ility of e&actness in et ical accounts is in part , at *otivates %.1. A "elief on Aristotle.s part t at t e only accounts possi"le in et ics are ine&act, at least in t e sense of "eing in outline or lacking in detail, ,ould e&plain , y at t e outset e sets o"taining ine&act accounts as is goal. +uc a "elief also suggests t at is c aracteri9ation of al*ost all t e accounts e i*self gives or proposes to give of t e central ele*ents of et ics as ine&act is not a vacuous, insignificant e&pression or a *ere figure of speec . :n t e contrary, it is a significant assess*ent of t e nature of is o,n accounts as ,ell as of all possi"le accounts. ) also "elieve t at t e assess*ent is a plausi"le one given 5 1F1 5 t e reasons on , ic it is "ased. Aristotle.s reasons for t inking t at is o,n as ,ell as all accounts in et ics are ine&act "y "eing in outline or lacking in detail ,ill "e our ne&t topic of discussion.

Outline) 0ack of #etail) and the +oals of 'thics

A int as to , y Aristotle finds is o,n as ,ell as all possi"le accounts of t e central ele*ents of conduct to "e ine&act "y lacking in detail is given in %.1F. )n t at passage, , ic occurs in t e final sections of t e N.E. , e 1uestions , et er is investigation is co*plete no, t at e as discussed in t eir outlines t e su"/ects of appiness, virtue, friends ip, and pleasure. <is response is as follo,s: G:r per aps, as ,e say, t e end of studies a"out t ings to "e done is not to study and kno, t e various t ings, "ut rat er to do t e*.G 2 et er t e investigation is co*plete or not is deter*ined, according to Aristotle, "y its goals. )n t e case of et ics t e ulti*ate goals are presu*a"ly not cognitive "ut practical and t ey deter*ine t e level of e&actness in t e sense of detail, specificity, or co*pleteness t at is

re1uired. Aristotle i*self proceeds to argue in t e last pages of t e N.E. t at ,e *ust investigate o, to put et ical t eory into practice, o, virtue is reali9ed, , at t e role of t e state is in educating t e young, and so fort . )n t is ,ay, e t inks, ,e s all ave co*e closer to co*pleting t e investigation, for ,e s all ave s o,n o, et ical kno,ledge can "e put into practice. After all, t is is t e ulti*ate goal of et ical investigation according to i*. ) s all argue in t is section t at , en t is clai* a"out t e practical goals of et ics is understood=as it is understood "y Aristotle=to i*ply t at et ical accounts *ust deal ,it , at practice deals ,it , t en it *ay "e i*possi"le for Aristotle or anyone else to o"tain et ical accounts t at are e&act in t e sense under discussion ere. ' e clearest state*ent regarding t e i*plications t at t e goals of practical disciplines ave for t e e&actness possi"le in suc disciplines is given in a passage fro* t e olit. 1uoted a"ove >%.6F?. Aristotle clai*s t ere t at it is i*possi"le t at t e structure of t e state s ould ave "een fra*ed e&actly in all its details >

?, for it *ust of necessity be descri"ed > ? in general ter*s, , ereas our actions deal ,it particular t ings > ?. Aristotle in t is passage *akes at least t e follo,ing clai*s: >a? ine&actness in so*e instances consists in t e fact t at so*e account or description is given only in general ter*s and is lacking in detail4 >"? in accounts or descriptions relating to action, e&actness or detail consists in reac ing t e level of t e particular, since practice or action deals ,it particulars4 and >c? e&actness of t is kind is i*possi"le to attain, and conse1uently, ine&actness in accounts of conduct is necessary or unavoida"le. ' us Aristotle t inks t e practical goals of t e discipline t at studies t e nature and 5 1F6 5 structure of t e state >politics? de*and t at our accounts reac a level of detail t at cannot "e ac ieved. 2e s ould naturally e&pect t e sa*e to "e true in t e case of all t ose disciplines , ose goals are si*ilar to t e goals of politics. ' e goals of all practical disciplines and per aps all t e productive ones as ,ell s ould de*and t e kind of e&actness , ic Aristotle t inks t e goals of politics de*and. And ,e s ould also e&pect Aristotle to vie, t is type of e&actness, , ic is i*posed on t e accounts of a practical discipline "y t e nature of its ulti*ate goals, to "e, as is presu*a"ly t e case ,it politics, unattaina"le in t e case of et ics and every ot er practical discipline. ' ere is o,ever no state*ent in Aristotle.s et ical treatises t at asserts une1uivocally for et ical accounts , at t e passage fro* t e olit. >%.6F? asserts for any account of t e structure of t e state= na*ely, t at if accounts in et ics are to "e e&act t ey *ust reac t e level of t e particular and t at suc e&actness cannot "e attained. Alt oug e speaks on at least t,o occasions of accounts of t e particulars >11$4aE, 11$Fa69?, e does not assert t at ,e *ust reac t e level of t e particulars if our accounts are to "e e&act. :n t e first occasion e is concerned ,it t e difference "et,een t e e&actness possi"le in accounts of t e general or universal aspects >

? and t e e&actness possi"le in accounts of t e particulars > ? of *atters of conduct.@1$A :n t e second occasion e is concerned ,it applying t e general accounts to t e particulars for t e purpose of testing t e trut of t e general accounts: G2e *ust, o,ever, not only give general accounts, "ut also apply t e* to t e particulars. -or a*ong accounts of *atters of conduct t e general ones ave a ,ider application "ut t ose t at are *ore specific are *ore true, since actions deal ,it particulars and our accounts *ust agree ,it t e*.G ' e concern in t is conte&t is ,it t e trut of is general t esis t at virtue is a *ean and is ai* is to s o, t e trut of t is t esis "y e&a*ining , et er it applies to t e particular virtues >courage, li"erality, te*perance, and so fort ?. But t e application of a general t eory to specific cases for t e purpose of deter*ining t e trut of t e t eory is a re1uire*ent any general t eory as to *eet: )t is not peculiar to et ics or to practical disciplines. Per aps t e practical goals of et ics and t erefore of all practical disciplines de*and t at ,e reac a certain level of specificity in order to deter*ine t e trut of a general t eory a"out practical *atters. ' ey de*and, as Aristotle clai*s, t at ,e reac t e level of t e particulars, since actions deal presu*a"ly ,it particulars. Alt oug Aristotle *ay ave so*et ing like t is in *ind , en e speaks of t e need to reac t e particular in order to test t e trut of an account, it still is not certain t at t ere is a real difference "et,een practical and nonpractical disciplines ,it respect to t is *atter. A clai* a"out viviB 5 1F# 5 parous ani*als needs to "e tested "y considering t e particulars, t e *e*"ers of t e class of vivipara. But despite t e fact t at ,e ave no state*ent in t e et ical treatises t at asserts une1uivocally for et ical accounts , at %.6F fro* t e olit. asserts for political accounts, it can "e s o,n t at t e considerations t at lead Aristotle to insist upon t e necessary ine&actness of t e fra*ing of a political constitution >political accounts? are also t e ones t at lead i* to insist upon t e ine&actness of et ical accounts. )n ot er ,ords, it is considerations concerning t e goals of practical disciplines, t e e&actness suc goals de*and, and t e nature of , at practice deals ,it t at *otivate Aristotle.s c aracteri9ation of all of is and per aps all possi"le accounts in et ics as ine&act "y lacking in detail. ' e si*ilarity e takes to e&ist "et,een et ics and politics ,it regard to t eir goals as at least t is conse1uence: 2 atever i*plications t e goals ave in relation to e&actness in one discipline t ey s ould, ceteris paribus , ave in t e ot er as ,ell. )f political accounts *ust reac t e particular in order to "e e&act "ecause action deals ,it particulars and suc a level of e&actness cannot "e attained, t en t e sa*e s ould "e true in t e case of et ical accounts. ' ere is no 1uestion t at Aristotle takes t e goals of et ics to "e si*ilar to t ose of politics. 8t ics, as ,e sa, earlier, is considered to "e a practical discipline: )ts ulti*ate ai* is practice or action >

?. And it is t is goal t at deter*ines t e kind of e&actness t at is appropriate in t e case of political accounts. ' e 1uestion, t en, is , et er Aristotle vie,s action in t e et ical conte&t to "e like action in t e political conte&t=as dealing ,it particulars. )f e does, t en t e de*and of reac ing a certain level of detail and specificity >e&actness? t at Aristotle takes to "e i*posed on political accounts "ecause of t eir practical goals and t e nature of praxis ,ould also "e i*posed on et ical accounts. Lust as t ere is no dou"t t at Aristotle takes t e goals of et ics to "e practical, t ere is no dou"t t at e takes action in t e et ical conte&t to deal ,it particulars. )ndeed t is see*s to "e an aspect e

attri"utes to action in general4 it is a c aracteristic of all action. As t e passage fro* t e olit. discussed a"ove >%.6F? *akes clear, , en Aristotle speaks of action dealing ,it particulars e *eans all action or is t inking of action in general=Gactions deal ,it particulars.G <e does not restrict is clai* to actions in t e political do*ain. )ndeed, in Met. e states categorically t at dealing ,it t e particular is a feature of all actions: GAnd actions and productions are all @

A concerned ,it t e particular @ AG >9H1a1%?. )n any case, Aristotle speaks in t e N.E. itself of t is supposed c aracter of action or practice: GActions deal ,it particulars @ AG >11$Fa#1, 111$"##, 1141"1E, 114#a#6, 114EaE, 114Fa6?. )f t e concern ,it t e particular t en is a universal feature of action, it s ould ave t e sa*e i*plications ,it regard to 5 1F4 5 e&actness for t e accounts of all t e disciplines , ose goals are practical. According to Aristotle, et ics is one suc discipline. ' e ter* >

? t at Aristotle uses to indicate , at action deals ,it or , at level of specificity accounts of *atters of conduct *ust reac is, o,ever, used "y i* to signify at least t,o different t ings. +o*eti*es e uses it to signify a kind or sort t at is narro,er t an anot er kind, for e&a*ple, so*et ing t at is a species falling under so*e genus, , ile at ot ers e uses it to *ean t e individual. ' us Aristotle speaks of t e pleasure t at corresponds to eac > ? faculty of perception >1141"6%?, i*plying ere not ing *ore t an a reference to t e kinds of perceptual faculties=for e&a*ple, vision, earing, touc . <e also speaks of t e no"le and pleasant t ings t at correspond to eac type of c aracter > ?, eac one kind > ? of study >1$94"6#? or of ani*al >G.A. F1%a#?. At ti*es, t en, , en Aristotle contrasts accounts, descriptions, or rules t at are general to t ose t at are of t e particulars, t e contrast e as in *ind *ay "e *erely of t,o levels of generality: +o*e accounts, descriptions, or rules are *ore specific t an ot ers "y "eing a"out t e various species falling under a genus or a"out so*e kinds t at are narro,er t an so*e ot er kinds. ' is see*s to "e , at Aristotle as in *ind in is discussion of practical ,isdo* or prudence.

:.85

Ior is practical ,isdo* kno,ledge of universals @or of t e general=

A only, "ut it needs to kno, t e particulars @ A also, since it is concerned ,it action, and action deals ,it particulars @ A. ' is is , y *en , o are ignorant of general principles are so*eti*es *ore successful in action t an ot ers , o kno, t e*: for instance, if a *an kno,s t at lig t *eat is easily digested and t erefore , oleso*e, "ut does not kno, , at kinds @ A of *eat are lig t, e ,ill not "e so likely to restore you to ealt as a *an , o *erely kno,s t at c icken is , oleso*e. >1141"1%? Aristotle.s e&a*ple of , at t e person , o is likely to restore one to ealt kno,s *akes it clear t at e is t inking of kno,ledge of so*et ing t at is a *ore specific or narro, type t an so*et ing else= kno,ledge t at c icken is , oleso*e in contrast to kno,ledge t at lig t *eats are , oleso*e. Dno,ing t e particular in t is case is kno,ing t e *ore specific type.@11A )t is less clear , at Aristotle *eans , en, in trying to /ustify , y practical ,isdo* re1uires kno,ledge of t e particulars in addition to t e universal, e says t at action deals ,it t e particular. )s action concerned ,it t e particular in t e sense of *ore specific or is it concerned ,it t e particular in t e strict sense=t e individual; ) ,ill return to t is 1uestion s ortly. <o,ever, at t e *o*ent it is i*portant to recogni9e t at at ti*es , en 5 1F% 5 Aristotle speaks of our accounts reac ing t e particulars or of t e need to kno, t e particulars e only *eans arriving at or kno,ing *ore specific accounts or rules. )n t e case of practical ,isdo*, kno,ledge of t e particulars *ay si*ply "e kno,ledge of t e various kinds t at fall under a ,ider kind =for e&a*ple, c icken falls under lig t *eatBor kno,ledge of *ore specific or narro, principles=for e&a*ple, Gc icken is lig t *eatG >%.#F?. Per aps t e clearest e&a*ple of t is is Aristotle.s re*ark , ere e says t at ,e *ust not only give an account of virtue in general ter*s, G"ut ,e *ust also apply it to t e particulars @

AG >11$Fa6H?. 2 at Aristotle *eans ere, as is *ade evident "y , at e proceeds to do, is to apply t e doctrine of t e *ean to eac one of t e species of virtue or even to classes of virtue t at ave *ore t an one *e*"er. ' at is, e proceeds to apply t e t esis of t e *ean to virtues like courage, te*perance, and li"erality=all of t e* species of virtue4 or to apply it to a class t at consists of a nu*"er of virtues t at s are a co**on c aracteristic=for e&a*ple, virtues relating to passion, virtues relating to *aterial goods, and virtues relating to social life. )n all of t ese cases to reac t e particulars is *erely to provide *ore specific accounts t at *ay re*ain at t e level of t e universal or general.

Aristotle, o,ever, uses t e ter*

*ost often to *ean Gt e particularG or GindividualG=a usage t at reflects t e fa*iliar contrast ,it t e universal or general > ? and at ti*es ,it t e species or genus under , ic an individual falls. ' us in Met : G-or ,e say t at t ere is no difference "et,een "eing nu*erically one and an individual @ A4 for t is is , at ,e call an individual, t at , ic is nu*erically one, and universal t at , ic is predica"le of *any individualsG >999"#4?. And in G.A. t e individual is contrasted to t e genus: GIo, "ot t e individual > ? and t e genus to , ic it "elongs are at ,ork in t e act of generation4 "ut of t e t,o t e individual takes t e leading part, "ecause t is is t e really e&istent t ing. . . "y individual ) *ean Coriscus or +ocratesG >FEF"##?. +i*ilarly, t e individual *an is contrasted to t e species man : G-or it is t e individual t at is t e originative principle of t e individuals. -or , ile *an is t e originative principle of *an universally, t ere is no universal *an, "ut Peleus is t e originative principle of Ac illes, and your fat er of youG >Met. 1$F1a6$?. ' is use of t e ter* to *ean t e particular in t e strict sense is encountered rat er fre1uently in t e N.E. At ti*es Aristotle uses t e ter* in con/unction ,it so*e de*onstrative and t us *akes it clear t at e *eans t e individual or particular in t e strict sense. ' us, Gin addition deli"eration *ay "e in error a"out eit er t e universal @

A or t e particular @ A. -or instance, @in assertingA eit er t at all eavy ,ater is un, oleso*e or t at t is @ A ,ater is eavyG >1146a61?. +i*ilarly, , en e&plaining t e nature of t e pre*ises of t e practical 5 1FE 5 syllogis* in is discussion of *oral ,eakness, Aristotle clai*s t at t ere are t,o kinds of pre*ises, t e universal and t e particular, and t at it is possi"le for a person to act against kno,ledge , en s e kno,s "ot pre*ises "ut is e&ercising only er kno,ledge of t e universal pre*ise and not t at of t e particular. -or, Aristotle e&plains, GAction deals ,it particulars. . . . -or e&a*ple, e *ay kno, t at dry food is good for every *an and t at e i*self is a *an or even t at food of a certain kind is dry, "ut eit er not possess or e&ercise t e kno,ledge t at t is particular @

A food is of t is kindG >114Fa%?. +i*ilarly, , en e says t at actions deal ,it particulars, e often *eans t e particular in t e strict sense=t at is, t e individual. -or instance, e clai*s t at action deals ,it or consists of particulars in t e strict sense in is discussion of t e voluntary and involuntary: GActions consist of particulars @

AG >111$"F, 111$E#6, 1111a64?. )t is t e particular in t e strict sense t at Aristotle as in *ind in t e passage fro* Met. partly 1uoted a"ove: GAnd actions and productions are all concerned ,it t e particular4 for it is not man t at t e p ysician cures, e&cept incidentally, "ut Callias or +ocrates or so*e individual called "y suc a na*eG >9H1a1%?. Aristotle.s clai* a"out t e relation of action and t e particular in t e strict sense *ust "e distinguis ed fro* a different clai* concerning t e ontological status of actions t e*selves, for e also considers actions t e*selves to "e particulars in t e strict sense. As <arris 0ack a*, follo,ing Burnet, puts it in e&plicating Aristotle.s position, Gt ere is no suc t ing as an act , ic is not t is particular act in t ese particular circu*stances.G@16A )t is not t en *erely t e case t at actions are concerned ,it t is or t at individual=for e&a*ple, t is ,ater, t is lig t *eat, t is sick perBson="ut in addition t e acts of drinking, eating, curing, and so fort are t e*selves individuals. ' e clearest state*ent of t is is to "e found in N.E. : G8ac type @

A of /ust and la,ful @actionA relates as a universal to t e particulars @ A4 for t e actions @i.e., t e particularsA are *any, "ut eac type is one, since it is a universal @ AG >11#%a%?. Aristotle ,is es to distinguis tokens or , at is done > ere "et,een actionBtypes >t e universals? and actionB

=t e particulars or instances of t e universals?. <e ,is es to distinguis , for e&a*ple, "et,een t e actionBtype eating and t e various acts of eating >instances or tokens of t e type?, t e latter "eing individuals. But clearly t e clai* concerning t e ontological status of actions=na*ely, t at t ey are individuals=does not necessarily i*ply t at t e o"/ects of action or , at t ey deal ,it are also individuals. )t is rat er unfortunate t at Aristotle uses t e sa*e ter* to designate "ot t e individual and t e narro, universal, calling "ot of t e* particulars. ' is clearly co*plicates *atters unnecessarily and see*s to o"scure a clear difference "et,een t,o types of particulars. Aristotle i*self 5 1FF 5 sees t e difference 1uite clearly: G-or t is is , at ,e call an individual, t at , ic is nu*erically one, and universal, t at , ic is predica"le of *any individualsG >Met. 999"#%?. )n G.A. e again contrasts "eing u*an, , ic is a narro, universal , en co*pared to "eing an ani*al or a *a**al or viviparous, to an individual: G+ince . u*an "eing. is general, , ereas +ocrates , o is t e fat er, and t e *ot er , oever s e *ay "e, are to "e classed as particulars @individuals,

AG >FEH"1#?. A narro, universal is a universal and not an individual4 it is predica"le of *any t ings. Per aps is reason for calling "ot t e individual and narro, universals particulars is t at "ot fall under or are instances of universals. )ndividual virtuous acts are instances of virtue, as are courage, te*perance, or /ustice >narro, universals?. ' us, ,e *ay t ink of t e particulars in t e case of virtue as "eing t e individual virtuous acts or t e various kinds of virtue, for e&a*ple, courage, /ustice, and te*perance. )n any case, t e only reasona"le t ing to do in t is conte&t is to *ark t e distinction "et,een narro, universals and individuals, keep t e t,o *eanings of GparticularG clearly apart, and e&plore t e i*plications e&actness *ig t ave in ter*s of reac ing eit er kind of particular. 2 en Aristotle insists t at actions deal ,it particulars, , ic kind of particulars does e ave in *ind; +o*eti*es e see*s to "e saying t at so*e actions ave as t eir o"/ects particulars t at are narro, universals. ' is appears to "e t e case ,it t e passage ,e discussed earlier , ere Aristotle e&plains t e nature of practical ,isdo* or prudence: GIor is practical ,isdo* kno,ledge of universals @

A only, "ut it needs to kno, t e particulars @ A also, since it is concerned ,it action, and action deals ,it particulars @ AG >%.#F?. But, as seen a"ove, , at Aristotle proceeds to do "y ,ay of e&plaining or illustrating is t esis is to argue t at t e person , o kno,s t at c icken is , oleso*e >t e particular? is *ore likely to succeed in restoring one.s ealt t an t e person , o kno,s t at lig t *eats are , oleso*e >t e universal? "ut does not kno, , at kinds of *eat are lig t. ' e particular in t is conte&t is clearly not an individual, "ut so*et ing t at is itself general or universal, alt oug *ore specific t an , at Aristotle takes to "e t e universal. 3oes Aristotle t en ad*it t at t ere are actions t at deal ,it , at is a particular "ut not in t e strict sense; 2 en e says t at actions deal ,it particulars and identifies in t at conte&t t e particular ,it t e *ore specific universal, does e *ean to say t at t ere are actions t at deal ,it suc relatively specific universals; )f t ere ,ere suc actions, t en actions ,ould "e at least of t,o types: t ose t at deal ,it individuals and t ose t at deal ,it nonindividuals. Bot types of actions are presu*a"ly individuals and t us satisfy Aristotle.s condition regarding t e ontological status of actions: All actions are individuals.@1#A ) t ink, o,ever, t at Aristotle 5 1FH 5 does not ad*it actions t at deal ,it nonindividuals. 3espite t e rat er a*"iguous c aracter of is re*arks concerning t e relation of practical ,isdo*, particulars, and actions, t e evidence indicates t at e ad*its of one type of actions only=t ose t at deal ,it individuals. ' e e&a*ple Aristotle uses in is discussion of practical ,isdo* and t e particulars is *ost pro"a"ly not an e&a*ple of an action involving particulars t at are not individuals. 0at er it is an e&a*ple of o, practical kno,ledge of t e specific and t erefore particular fact t at c icken is a lig t *eat is *ore useful t an kno,ledge of t e *ore general fact t at lig t *eats are , oleso*e in producing or

restoring ealt . ' e relevant act in t is connection is t e act of producing or restoring ealt , and t ere is no evidence Aristotle takes t is to "e an act dealing ,it nonindividuals. ' e act of course *ay involve use of kno,ledge of *ore specific properties or kinds or is likely to "e *ore successful if it ,ere to use suc kno,ledge, "ut it need not "e t e case t at t e act deals ,it nonindividuals=t at is, t at t e person doing t e act is restoring t e ealt of so*et ing t at is not an individual. )ndeed, t e very e&a*ple of producing or restoring ealt t at Aristotle uses in is so*e, at a*"iguous discussion of practical ,isdo* provides t e "est evidence t at e is not t inking of acts t at deal ,it nonindividuals, for it is practically t e sa*e e&a*ple e uses in at least t,o ot er occasions for t e purpose of s o,ing t at actions deal ,it t e particular in t e strict sense, t e first occurring in N.E. : G<e @t e p ysicianA studies t e ealt of u*ans@14A =or rat er of so*e particular u*an "eing, for it is individuals @

A t at e curesG >1$9Fa16?. :n t e ot er occasion , ere Aristotle uses t is e&a*ple e provides us ,it even stronger evidence for concluding t at e t inks all actions deal ,it individuals. Iot only does e outrig tly say so "ut in addition e uses t e e&a*ple on t is occasion to illustrate t e sa*e point t at t e e&a*ple illustrates in t e pro"le*atic passage on practical ,isdo* fro* t e N.E. =na*ely, t e greater usefulness of kno,ledge of t e particulars in contrast to t at of universals, since actions deal ,it particulars. But in t is case Aristotle goes on to e&plicitly identify t e o"/ect t e action deals ,it as ,ell as to e&plain in , at ,ay one *ay "e said to do an act , ose o"/ect is not an individual. :.82 And actions and productions are all concerned ,it t e particular4 for it is not manthat the physician cures' except incidentally' but Callias or !ocrates or some indi+idual called by such a name )ho happens to be a man. If' then' a man has the theory )ithout the experience' and recogniAes the uni+ersal but does not -no) the indi+idual included in this' he )ill often fail to cure? for it is the indi+idual that is to be cured. 1 Met.=2&a&:7

5 1F9 5 Aristotle.s concerns in t e a"ove passage are t e sa*e concerns t at *otivate is discussion of practical ,isdo* in t e N.E. : to fi& t e relative i*portance of t e kinds of kno,ledge for action. But in t e Met. passage t ere is no a*"iguity left as to , at are t e o"/ects ,it , ic actions deal. <e goes "eyond stressing t e greater i*portance of kno,ledge of t e particular in relation to action=so*et ing e also does in is discussion of practical ,isdo* in N.E. =to clearly identify t e o"/ect an action deals ,it as t e particular in t e strict sense: t at is, t e individual. Unlike cognition, , ic can deal eit er ,it t e universal, t e particular >i.e., t e *ore specific?, or t e individual, action deals only ,it t e individual. Aristotle.s e&planation of t e ,ay an action can "e said to deal ,it t e nonindividual *akes is vie, concerning t e o"/ects action deals ,it even *ore clear. +uppose ,e ,ere to ask, Can t e p ysician cure man ; >Io, man , t e species, is a particular in t e sense ,e discussed a"ove. )t is *ore specific t an a ,ider kind, e.g., animal , "ut it is not an individual. )t is not a particular in t e strict sense. )t is general or a universal.? ' e ans,er, according to Aristotle, is clearly negative. 2e can say t at t e p ysician cures man only incidentally, , ic *eans t at e really cures +ocrates or Callias or so*e ot er individual t at appens to "e a *e*"er of t e species man . )f any dou"ts re*ain a"out Aristotle.s vie, on t e o"/ects actions deal ,it , t ey s ould "e dispelled "y t e categorical and universal state*ent at t e "eginning of t e a"ove passage: GAnd actions and productions are all concerned ,it t e particular.G <e *akes it a"solutely clear t at e *eans t e particular in t e strict sense=t at is, +ocrates or Callias.

' is rat er lengt y discussion of Aristotle.s vie,s on t e ontological status of actions, t e nature of t e o"/ects t ey deal ,it , and t e kinds of particulars relevant to practical kno,ledge and action is i*portant for t e purpose of discussing t e issues at and: Aristotle.s c aracteri9ation of practically all t e *a/or accounts e gives as "eing only outlines4 is de*and for ever greater e&actness "y ,ay of greater detail4 and is contention t at t e e&actness re1uired in suc practical conte&ts cannot "e attained. Clearly, if , at Aristotle as in *ind , en e speaks of e&actness in et ical accounts is t at suc accounts *ust deal ,it , atever actions deal ,it in order to "e e&act, t en , et er suc e&actness can "e attained depends on t e nature of actions and on t e nature of t eir o"/ects. )t s ould "e apparent fro* t e discussion so far t at if actions deal ,it particulars in t e strict sense and et ical accounts are supposed to attain a level of e&actness t at reac es t e particulars in t e strict sense, t en attaining suc a level of e&actness ,ould "e difficult and per aps i*possi"le. )ndeed, ) s all argue ere t at even if one ,ere to take t e particulars to "e only narro, universals, so t at et ical accounts are only re1uired to arrive at rat er deter*inate principles or rules specifying actionBtypes, 5 1H$ 5 t ere ,ould still "e pro"le*s for attaining e&act accounts in et ics. ' ese are t e *atters ) ,is to turn to ne&t.

The Possibilit" of Attaining '*act Accounts

Consider again Aristotle.s state*ent in t e olit. t at t e structure of t e state *ust of necessity "e descri"ed in general ter*s and t erefore ine&actly, , ereas actions deal ,it particulars >%.6F?. <o, ,ould our accounts of t e structure of t e state "eco*e e&act; 2 at sort of particulars *ust t ey reac in order to attain t e level of detail Aristotle ,ants; 2e *ay take as an e&a*ple Aristotle.s o,n discussion of t e offices and officers of t e state in olit. Book K). <e descri"es and gives "rief accounts t ere of t e functions of t e follo,ing officers and t eir respective offices , ic e t inks a state *ust ave: superintendents of *arkets, pu"lic and private properties, and far*s4 la,, revenue, *ilitary, penal, and religious officers4 and recorders, auditors, and council*en. Iot surprisingly, e concludes is discussion of t ese *atters "y c aracteri9ing is accounts of t e* as "eing in outline >%.#1?. Aristotle is correct in so c aracteri9ing is accounts of t e offices and officers of t e state, for , at e does in *ost cases is provide so*e argu*ents purporting to s o, , y t ese offices or officers are needed and touc upon t e actions eac is concerned ,it in t e *ost general ter*s: for e&a*ple, one officer is descri"ed "y saying t at e supervises contracts and good order >superintendent of *arket?, anot er "y asserting t at e receives a state*ent and su"/ects it to an audit >auditor?. ' e accounts of t ese offices and officers consist solely of identifications at t e *ost general level of so*e actionBtypes t at presu*a"ly define suc offices or officers. )n so*e cases, o,ever, Aristotle is *ore specific "y descri"ing t e functions of so*e offices in ter*s of less general or *ore narro, actionBtypes and!or "y enu*erating t e types of t ings ,it , ic t e actionBtypes deal: for e&a*ple, t e superintendent of pu"lic and private officers is in c arge of t e "eautification, preservation, and rectification of falling "uildings and roads, and of t e "oundaries "et,een different person.s estates4 and t e penal officer is concerned ,it t e e&ecution of /udg*ent upon persons cast in suits and t ose posted as defaulters according to t e lists, and ,it t e custody of prisoners. +i*ilarly, Aristotle gives at first a very general account of /ustice ,it regard to t e distri"ution of po,er in t e state=/ustice is e1uality for t ose , o are e1ual and ine1uality for t ose , o are une1ual >16H$a16?=and t en proceeds to specify is principle furt er. +ince t e political fello,s ip e&ists for

t e sake of no"le action, e argues t at Gt ose , o contri"ute *ost to suc fello,s ip ave a larger part in t e state t an t ose , o are t eir e1uals or superiors in freedo* and "irt "ut not t eir 5 1H1 5 e1uals in civic virtue, or t ose , o surpass t e* in ,ealt "ut are surpassed "y t e* in virtueG >16H1a%?. )f t e level of detail Aristotle attains , en e e&plains t e functions of so*e of t e offices of t e state in ter*s of actionBtypes t at are of lesser generality is not sufficient, and if t e levels of specificity e reac es , en e e&plains t e kinds of e1uality and ine1uality involved in is principle of political /ustice is not ade1uate, t en o, s all ,e proceed in order to attain e&act accounts; )f , at ,as said earlier a"out Aristotle.s understanding of , at action deals ,it and its supposed i*plications for accounts of *atters of conduct is true, t e options are 1uite li*ited: 8it er ,e re*ain at t e level of t e general "ut persist in narro,ing t e universals or actionBtypes furt er and furt er4 or ,e go do,n to t e level of t e particular in t e strict sense=reac ing t e level of individuals or actionBtokens. ' e options for attaining e&actness in t e sense discussed ere ,ould "e t e sa*e in t e case of et ics. 2e ,ill ave to give accounts t at eit er re*ain at t e level of t e general "ut are in ter*s of rat er narro, universals or ,e ,ill ave to reac t e level of t e individuals. -or e&a*ple, ,e *ay "egin ,it et ical state*ents or principles suc as G<onor is goodG and G2ealt is goodG >G3ry food is goodG or GJig t *eats are ealt yG ,ould "e analogues in *edicine?. :r ,it state*ents t at specify actionB types: GGiving to one.s friends is rig tG >G2alking is goodG ,ould "e an analogue in *edicine?. 'o ac ieve greater e&actness, ,e ,ould ave to narro, t e universals or actionBtypes "y specifying, for instance, t e types of ,ealt : ,ealt fro* land possessions, structures, ani*als, *oney, gold, in erited, a*assed, ,on, and so fort >si*ilarly, t e types of dry food and lig t *eats?4 or t e types of giving >for e&a*ple, giving gifts, s aring ,ealt , providing in ti*e of need4 and si*ilarly, t e types of ,alking?. But if t is level of detail is not sufficient, ,e ,ould ave to "e *ore specific "y *aking references to individuals=G' is gold is goodG or G' is dry food is ealt yG=or "y identifying actionBtokens =GCallias.s giving t is gift to +ocrates at a particular ti*e is rig t.G Can eit er of t ese levels of e&actness or detail "e reali9ed; Aristotle t inks t at neit er level can, ence is "elief t at political as ,ell as et ical accounts are necessarily ine&act. ' e evidence for t e i*possi"ility of attaining e&act accounts t at are in ter*s of narro, universals is not as clear as one ,ould ave liked. ' ere are, o,ever, "ot t eoretical and te&tual considerations t at can "e used in support of t e clai* t at Aristotle t oug t suc e&actness to "e unattaina"le. ' e pro"le* is due in part to t e fact t at , en Aristotle speaks of narro,ing t e universal or reac ing *ore specific universals, e does not set a li*it as to o, narro, or specific t e universals *ust "e. -or it see*s t at given any account in ter*s of universals of t e kind ,e encounter in 5 1H6 5 t e do*ain of conduct, it is possi"le to t ink of even *ore narro, or specific ones. +ince no li*it is set on t e specificity of t e universals any account could clearly "e ine&act "y co*parison to so*e ot er, for it ,ould al,ays "e possi"le to t ink of a universal t at is *ore specific t an t e one ,e already ave, and t us to t ink of a *ore e&act account, description, principle, and so fort . -or e&a*ple, consider t e principle t at ,ealt is good. 2e *ay proceed along t e lines suggested a"ove and narro, t e universal "y specifying t e types of ,ealt , "ut it is clear t at given any type, ,e can t ink of an even *ore specific one.

)f indeed Aristotle is t inking at ti*es of t e ever *ore specific universal , en e speaks of t e particular in relation to action and to our accounts in et ics >and politics?, t en it is considerations suc as t e a"ove t at lead i* to t e conclusion t at accounts in et ics >and politics? cannot "e e&act. ' at is, te&tual evidence e&ists indicating e t inks t at t e process of seeking *ore and *ore specific universals in our accounts of practical *atters *ay "e endless. ' us, Aristotle clai*s t at t ose , o for*ulate la,s fra*e t e* in general ter*s "ecause at ti*es Git is difficult to provide a rule o,ing to t e infinite @

A nu*"er of cases, as for instance, t e si9e and kind of an iron instru*ent used in ,ounding4 for life ,ould not "e long enoug to reckon all t e possi"ilities. )f t en no e&act rule is possi"le, "ut legislation is necessary, one *ust speak in general ter*sG >Rhet . 1#F4a#%?. ' e la, or t e legislator cannot provide rules t at specify t e si9e and kinds of iron instru*ents used in ,ounding.@1%A ' ey cannot reac t at level of specificity , ere"y using specific universals t ey cover all t e si9es and kinds of iron instru*ents. ' e la, re*ains at a ig er level of generality, *aking reference presu*a"ly only to iron instru*ents used in ,ounding and not to *ore specific kinds or si9es. 'o include t e latter ,ould, according to Aristotle, "e i*possi"le since life is not long enoug . ' is suggests t at e is t inking t at to give a co*plete account in ter*s of all t e specific kinds and si9es of iron instru*ents ,ould "e a p ysical i*possi"ility=life ,ould not "e long enoug . Aristotle.s clai* at t e "eginning of t is passage, t at t e types and si9es of iron instru*ents are infinite, points rat er to a logical i*possi"ility4 it ,ould "e logically i*possi"le to specify all t e narro, types of an infinite series. )t is for e&actly t ese sa*e reasons t at Aristotle t inks t at no co*plete account t at specifies t e types of t e accidents t at "efall u*ans can "e given, "ut instead a general one is all t at ,e can e&pect: GBut t e accidents of life are *any and e& i"it all kinds of differences and so*e affect us *ore t an ot ers. 'o distinguis "et,een t e* in detail ,ould clearly "e a long and endless @

A undertaking, and a treat*ent , ic is general and in outline @ A, *ay per aps "e enoug G >%.%?.@1EA ' e task of giving an e&act treat*ent of t e accidents of life "y specifying t eir types >identifying t e *ore specific 5 1H# 5 universals? is endless, according to Aristotle. ' e types into , ic t ey su"divide, t e specific universals, are presu*a"ly endless: types of *agnitude >Gt e accidents vary in *agnitude,G 11$$"6#?4 types of effects t ey ave on us >Gso*e affect us *ore t an ot ers,G 11$1a6%?4 types of effects on our friends, t e dead, our descendants >11$1aff.?4 and so fort . But if attaining e&act accounts "y reac ing specific universals proves to "e an endless and i*possi"le task, t e prospects of doing so "y reac ing t e particular in t e strict sense are not likely to "e "etter. )n order to o"tain e&act accounts "y descending to t e level of t e individual, ,e ,ould ave to specify actionBtokens or individuals t at fall under various kinds: t e individual agents, ti*es, places, and t ings. 2e ,ould ave to specify, for e&a*ple, all t e individual acts of courage t at +ocrates, Callias, and all ot er agents are re1uired to do, or ,e ,ould need to deter*ine all t e individual t ings t at +ocrates *ust give and , en to give t e* to Alci"iades, and in general all t e t ings eac agent *ust

give to any ot er agent. <o,ever, Aristotle t inks t at t is level of e&actness cannot "e attained eit er, for again ,e ,ould "e atte*pting to co*plete an endless task, since t e individuals, e t inks, are infinite >

, Rhet . 1#%E"#64 Met. 999a6F, 1$E$a4?. ' e a"ove considerations e&plain , y Aristotle t inks t at is o,n accounts of t e *ain ele*ents of conduct do not and cannot reac t e level of detail and t erefore t e level of one type of e&actness t at e re1uires. )f e re1uires t at et ical accounts reac t e level of t e particular and e also t inks t at t e particulars, eit er as t e narro, universals or t e individuals, are endless or infinite, t en clearly et ical accounts cannot "ut re*ain ine&act. ' ese considerations also e&plain , y Aristotle speaks at ti*es of et ical accounts in general, not only of is o,n, as "eing ine&act=t at is, , y e speaks of any possi"le account in et ics as "eing ine&act in t e sense of lacking in detail. ' ese considerations s o, at t e sa*e ti*e t at given t e standards of e&actness Aristotle sets for et ical accounts, ine&actness cannot "e eli*inated fro* an et ical account t at is ine&act. )ndeed, t e source of t e for*al ine&actness under consideration ere does not see* to *atter, if t e standard of e&actness t at needs to "e *et in order for ine&actness to "e eli*inated is t e one Aristotle identifies. 8ven , ere t e source of ine&actness is, for instance, one.s i**ediate purpose or r etorical strategies, suc ine&actness could not "e eli*inated if in order to do so one as to reac t e level of detail Aristotle re1uires. ' e sa*e see*s to "e t e case ,it for*al ine&actness t at is due to one.s ,is to avoid t e tireso*e or "urdenso*e task of seeking e&actness. ) said earlier t e ine&actness t at as its source in suc a ,is need not i*ply t at it is ineli*ina"le. :n t e contrary, it see*s to "e /ust t e sort of ine&actness t at can "e eli*inated since it is generated "y our un,illB 5 1H4 5 ingness to seek e&actness. 7et, as ) also re*arked earlier, t is need not "e so, for a"andoning t e ,is to avoid t e "urdenso*e task of seeking e&actness and putting in its place a desire to attain e&act accounts does not guarantee t at suc accounts can "e o"tained. ' e possi"ility of attaining e&act accounts depends at least on t e standard of e&actness t at as to "e *et. )f t e standard is t e level of detail, specificity, or co*pleteness Aristotle clai*s, t en clearly even ine&actness t at as its original source in t e ,is to avoid t e irkso*e c aracter of e&actness could not "e eli*inated. ' e standard of e&actness is also i*portant in trying to deter*ine , et er ine&actness t at is due to inappropriateness of discipline can "e eli*inated. ' ere is an additional consideration ere t at raises an interesting 1uestion. 2 at standard of e&actness is relevant in trying to decide , et er t e ine&actness due to inappropriateness of discipline of an account of a topic ' in so*e discipline 3 can "e eli*inated; )s it t e standard of e&actness for 3 or t e standard of e&actness for t e discipline t at is t e proper discipline of '; )t is not clear, for e&a*ple, , at level of detail, specificity, or co*pleteness ,ould "e re1uired to *ake t e accounts of *otion or of t e intellect t at Aristotle gives in t e N.E. e&act. )s it t e level Aristotle says is re1uired for et ics or is it t e one appropriate for p ysics or psyc ology, t e disciplines to , ic t ese topics properly "elong; )f it is t at re1uired for et ics, t en even t e inclusion of e&act accounts of *otion and t e intellect fro* p ysics and psyc ology into et ics ,ould not necessarily *ake t e treat*ent of t ese topics in et ics e&act4 p ysics and psyc ology are, according to Aristotle, t eoretical disciplines and t erefore do not need to reac t at level of detail t at is presu*a"ly re1uired "y t e practical disciplines. But it is *ost likely t at Aristotle t inks t at

t e relevant standard of e&actness is t at of t e proper discipline to , ic a topic ' "elongs, ence e often refers us for an e&act treat*ent of ' to its proper discipline. Before ,e turn to a discussion of any possi"le episte*ological conse1uences t is type of ine&actness *ig t ave, ) ,is to stress t e fact t at t is for* of ine&actness, as ,ell as t e standard of e&actness Aristotle sets for et ics, is due pri*arily to t e goals of t e discipline of et ics. )n speaking of detail or e&actness t at reac es t e particular, Aristotle is not *otivated "y so*e a"stract or universal ideal of e&actness. ' ere is no evidence t at is insistence on e&actness in t e a"ove sense ste*s fro* a "elief t at a certain level of ideal e&actness *ust "e attained in our accounts in order for t e* to "e una*"iguously understood or used in t e conte&ts of inference and proof=t e *ain o"/ectives of t e recent atte*pts to develop ideal languages t at ai* at reali9ing a certain level of perspicuousness. Ieit er is t ere evidence t at Aristotle.s insistence ste*s fro* 5 1H% 5 so*e ar"itrary decision to ac ieve a particular level of detail in all or in so*e group of disciplines. )t *ay "e argued in t is conte&t t at , at e&plains Aristotle.s insistence on attaining e&act accounts in et ics "y reac ing t e particular is is "elief t at t e su"/ect *atter of et ics consists of particulars. ' ere is, o,ever, no reason for t inking nor does Aristotle t ink of t e su"/ect *atter of et ics as "eing different in ter*s of its level of generality fro* t e su"/ect *atter of ot er disciplines. Action, e*otion, desire, and t eir goals or o"/ects are as general as ani*al, *otion, point, or line. )n all cases t ere are individuals t at fall under t e universal or general=t ere are individual ani*als as t ere are instances of e*otion or individual actions. ' e difference, according to Aristotle, lies in t e fact t at in t e disciplines concerned ,it suc t ings as ani*al, *otion, point, or line our goals are e&clusively cognitive. ' ese disciplines t erefore stay at t e level of t e universal or general. But in et ics our goals are, Aristotle insists, ulti*ately practical. ' ey are practical not in t e sense t at ,e ai* at t e study of action, "ut in t e sense t at ,e ai* at doing or acting. 2 en t is clai* is coupled ,it Aristotle.s assu*ption t at acting or practice deal ,it individuals, ,e can understand is insistence on t e need to kno, t e individual: t is t ing is s,eet or t is is lig t *eat. )f t e practical goals are to "e satisfied, t e accounts *ust presu*a"ly tell , at particular t ing is to "e eaten or in general done. ' eoretical disciplines, o,ever, do not deal ,it or ave as t eir goal action or *aking or producing anyt ing, and t erefore t ey do not ave to reac t e level of detail or specificity , ic et ics as ,ell as all ot er practical and productive disciplines presu*a"ly re1uire. ' us geo*etry does not need to discuss t e individual point, line, or triangle. As Aristotle often insists, discussions or proofs in geo*etry are not a"out t e individual points, lines, or triangles dra,n and used in our proofs "ut a"out point, line, and triangle in general. +i*ilarly, pure or *at e*atical astrono*y gives an account of t e eclipse "ut not of so*e particular eclipse or of t e eclipse in respect to so*e particular eavenly "ody. @1FA )t is interesting to point out ere t at, alt oug Aristotle in t e "iological ,orks speaks of accounts t at are ine&act in t e sense under discussion ere, e does not vie, "iological accounts as essentially lacking in detail, specificity, or co*pleteness. :ften e gives accounts of "iological p eno*ena t at e vie,s as ine&act "ecause t ey are not detailed and e refers to treat*ents of t ese *atters , ic e gives else, ere and , ic e considers to "e detailed or co*plete. And, unlike t e N.E. , ere e often finds all treat*ents of a topic ine&act, e gives no indication in t e "iological ,orks t at t e treat*ents to , ic e refers are deficient in t eir e&actness. ' is is so despite t e fact t at often t e difference in detail, specificity, or co*pleteness "et,een t e ine&act and supposedly e&act treat*ent of so*e 5 1HE 5

topic is negligi"le or none&istent.@1HA ' e e&actness re1uired in t ese t eoretical disciplines as presu*a"ly "een *et. Alt oug any discipline can "e ine&act in t e sense presently discussed, only so*e disciplines appear to "e essentially ine&act. -or e&a*ple, geo*etry can "e ine&act "y not reac ing a certain level of specificity or detail for a variety of reasons, and so can "iology, "ut t e level of specificity or detail re1uired in order t at geo*etry or "iology "e e&act can presu*a"ly "e *et. )n contrast, t e level of e&actness Aristotle de*ands in t e case of practical disciplines *akes suc disciplines in general and et ics in particular essentially ine&act: ' e standard t at needs to "e *et in t eir case cannot presu*a"ly "e *et. But it could still "e argued in t is conte&t t at it nonet eless is t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter of et ics t at *akes it i*possi"le to eli*inate fro* our accounts t e kind of ine&actness presently under discussion. ' ere is so*e *erit to t is clai*, especially as it pertains to t e possi"ility of eli*inating ine&actness "y giving accounts in ter*s of *ore and *ore specific or narro, universals. ' ere see*s to "e so*et ing in t e nature of *atters of conduct t at *akes t e task of attaining e&actness "y seeking ever *ore specific or narro, universals an endless one. But even in t is case, ) s all argue, , at co*pels us, in Aristotle.s vie,, to seek ever *ore specific universals need not necessarily "e t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter. 2 at i*poses t e de*and of seeking narro, universals need not "e t e nature of *atters of conduct. ' e de*and of reac ing t e particular in t e strict sense ,ould see* to "e e1ually pro"le*atic for all disciplines, regardless of t e nature of t eir su"/ect *atter. )f geo*etry ,ere re1uired not only to prove so*e t eore* a"out all triangles or so*e class of triangles=for e&a*ple, isosceles ones="ut also to prove t at t eore* for eac individual triangle "y *aking e&plicit reference to eac one of t e*, t en clearly it ,ould re*ain inco*plete and lack detail. ' e sa*e ,ould "e true of t e discipline t at studies t e generation of ani*als if it ,ere re1uired not only to e&plain t e *odes of generation of t e various classes=for e&a*ple, vivipara and ovipara="ut to give an account of t e generation of eac individual ani*al "y *aking specific reference to eac individual. )nco*pleteness ,ill c aracteri9e any discipline t at is re1uired to reac a level of detail t at includes reac ing t e individual and , ose su"/ect *atter is not nu*erically li*ited. ' ere see*s, o,ever, to "e a difference in t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter of practical and t eoretical disciplines t at *ay deter*ine , et er e&actness in t e sense ,e are discussing ere is attaina"le. ) ave in *ind t e apparent difference in t e ,ay in , ic t e su"/ect *atter of so*e disciplines divides into a s*all nu*"er of classes, , ereas t e su"/ect *atter of ot er disciplines does not. ' us it ,ould see* t at , en ,e try to give *ore e&act accounts "y producing progressively *ore narro, or 5 1HF 5 specific universals ,e ,ould "e likely to succeed in ac ieving e&act accounts in so*e disciplines instead of in so*e ot ers. )n t ose disciplines , ose su"/ect *atter divides into a s*all nu*"er of classes ,e could per aps attain co*plete accounts "y including in our accounts all t e *ore specific universals. )n t ose disciplines , ere t e su"/ect *atter divides into an indefinite nu*"er of classes t ere ,ould "e an indefinite nu*"er of specific universals and ence detail or co*pleteness *ay "e i*possi"le to attain. Consider, for e&a*ple, t e universal fissipede , ic deter*ines t e natural kind to , ic t e dog, t e ,olf, t e elep ant, and so fort "elong. )f ,e ,ere interested in giving a *ore detailed account of t e "iological la,=G-issipedes produce *any offspringG >G.A. FF1a6%, "#?=,e could proceed "y specifying t e various species of ani*als t at are fissipedes: t e dog, t e ,olf, t e elep ant, and so

fort . ' e *ore narro, or specific universals related to fissipede for* a finite dis/unctive set4 t ey constitute t e infi*a species associated ,it it. ' e sa*e is true ,it t e *ore narro, universals related to triangle . ' e de*and t en to attain e&act accounts in "iology or geo*etry can presu*a"ly "e *et "y reac ing do,n to t e infi*a species or to a finite set of rat er narro, universals. ' e su"/ect *atter supposedly in t ese cases can "e su"divided into a s*all nu*"er of ,ellBdefined classes and t us detail or co*pleteness in our accounts of suc su"/ect *atter can "e attained. )n contrast, t ere see*s to "e no li*it in t e ,ay a universal t at applies to *atters of conduct divides into narro,er ones. Unlike t e natural kind fissipede t at divides into t e finite set of t e types of fissipedes, a universal like )ealth divides into an indefinite nu*"er of *ore specific ones. 2e can t ink in t e case of ,ealt of an indefinite nu*"er of specific universals t at c aracteri9e it in ter*s of , o possesses it, , o *anages it, o, is it *anaged, , o uses it, o, is it used, o, as it "een ac1uired, and so fort . An indefinite nu*"er of differences in t e case of ,ealt introduces an endless series of ever *ore specific universals. <ence, t e pro"le* of attaining e&act or co*plete accounts in *atters of conduct "y ,ay of reac ing t e specific universal=,it out setting so*e li*it to t e degree of specificity re1uired in practical accounts, t ere ,ill al,ays "e *ore specific universals t an t e ones ,e ave already reac ed. Actually t e differences in t e su"/ect *atter of t e practical disciplines on t e one and and t e t eoretical on t e ot er *ay not "e as drastic as ,e ave /ust descri"ed t e*. And it is dou"tful t at t e ulti*ate reason , y in t e case of practical *atters e&actness cannot "e attained or ine&actness cannot "e eli*inated rests ,it suc differences, , atever t ey *ay turn out to "e. -or it is not true t at , en ,e seek narro,er universals relating to t e kind fissipede ,e *ust stop at t e level of species: dog, elep ant, ,olf, and so on. ' ere are su"divisions ,it in t e species. ArB 5 1HH 5 istotle speaks in connection ,it t e species dog of Jaconian ounds >G.A. FH1"1$4 H.A. %F4a1E? and in connection to t e kind of fo)l of Adrianic fo,ls >G.A. F49E6H?. )n general, e speaks of differences in feeding patterns, a"itat, *ating, and so fort a*ong various groups ,it in a species t at need to "e accounted for "y t e appropriate disciplines. ' ese differences *ay not constitute differences in species =t ey are differences ,it in species and t erefore result in narro,er universals="ut t ey need to "e e&plained. Aristotle *ay "e correct , en e says, GAnd so paleness in a *an, or darkness, does not *ake for one @difference in speciesA, nor is t ere a difference in species "et,een t e pale *an and t e dark *an, not even if eac of t e* is denoted "y one ,ordG >Met. 1$%H"6?. <o,ever, differences in color result in su"divisions ,it in species or t ey generate narro,er universals t at our accounts *ust reac if t ey are to "e co*plete. 3espite t e fact t at t ere *ay "e universals t at are *ore narro, t an t e species and t e fact t at a greater specificity or e&actness can "e attained in t eoretical disciplines, it see*s t at t ere is a li*it ,it regard to suc specificity. :ne *ay argue t at at so*e point a level is reac ed "elo, , ic eit er t ere is no narro,er type or, if t ere are differences t at generate narro,er types, t e differences are not relevant for t e t eoretical purposes of a discipline=t ey do not generate t eoretically relevant su"groups or narro,er universals. Accounts do not ave to reac t e* in order to "e in detail, co*plete, or e&act. ' us, to use an e&a*ple Aristotle i*self uses in t e Met. , GIeit er do a "ra9en and a ,ooden circle, t en differ in speciesG >1$%H"1#?. )t is not *erely t e case t at "eing "ra9en or ,ooden do not *ark different species of circles. ' ey do not even *ark off s*aller classes of circles or narro,er universals t at are relevant to geo*etry. Geo*etry does not need to reac t at level of detail or specificity

, ere"y it deals ,it any difference t at *ay "e e& i"ited "y a geo*etrical figure, for e&a*ple, t e difference "et,een "ra9en and ,ooden circles. +i*ilarly, it is not t eoretically relevant to t e study of t e generation of dogs t at so*e dogs are o,ned "y so*e , o received t e* as gifts, or t at so*e dogs ave *ore t an one o,ner , ereas ot ers ave only one. +uc differences do not give rise to t eoretically relevant su"groups or narro,er universals and t erefore t e t eoretical study of t e generation of dogs does not need to account for t e*. <o,ever, , en ,e turn to *atters of conduct, not only is it not evident , at t e narro,er universals are into , ic a ,ider universal su"divides, "ut also, and *ost i*portantly, it see*s t at al*ost any difference in *atters of conduct *ay "e of relevance for practice and t erefore it *ay need to "e taken into account. )t is not evident, t at is, t at ,e can identify in t e case, for e&a*ple, of ,ealt a nu*"er of species in t e sa*e ,ay 5 1H9 5 ,e can identify t e species of fissipedes. ' ere is no o"vious set of narro,er universals t at relates to )ealth in t e ,ay t e narro,er universals co*prising t e infi*a species relate to fissipede . :ne *ig t say t at t is is not suc a serious pro"le*: ,e need to deter*ine suc a set4 ,e need to find t e narro,er universals related to )ealth and give an account of t e* in t e sa*e ,ay ,e find t at a su"group of dogs is t e Jaconian ound and ,e give an account of its attri"utes. ' e pro"le* of t e relevancy of differences in *atters of conduct to practice is a real one, o,ever. 'o "e sure, t ere are differences in any su"/ect *atter. Alt oug it *ay not "e true t at all differences in *atters of conduct are relevant to any particular 1uestion of practice, one cannot easily rule out t e relevance of *ost suc differences. ' us, clearly t e fe, differences or narro,er universals identified earlier in t e case of ,ealt are relevant in *aking practical decisions in *atters relating to ,ealt . :f course, t ere are *any *ore differences t an t e ones isolated ere. Aristotle i*self insists t at differences in t e *anner of "eing angry, in t e person to,ard , o* one is angry, t e grounds one as for "eing angry, and t e lengt of ti*e t at is proper to "e angry are all relevant in deciding , et er one is /ustified in "eing angry on a certain occasion. +uc differences are relevant in deter*ining , et er a person is "e aving virtuously and t erefore is to "e praised or , et er e is not and t erefore is to "e "la*ed >11$9"1%?. +i*ilarly, t e endless differences a*ong t e *isfortunes of life are, according to Aristotle, relevant in settling t e 1uestion , et er t e appiness of so*eone is affected "y t e *isfortunes t at "efall er descendants >11$1a#$?. Again, t e *any differences in t e circu*stances are relevant in deter*ining , at kind of respect and o"edience one o,es to one.s fat er on a particular occasion >11E4"6%?. )t is t erefore t e practical goals of t e discipline of et ics t at, according to Aristotle, dictate t at ,e reac a level of e&actness t at in turn cannot "e ac ieved. ' e assu*ption on is part t at action deals ,it t e particular leads i* to t e conclusion t at our accounts *ust also reac t e particular. ' ey *ust reac t e individual or t ey at least *ust reac ever *ore narro, universals. And t e supposed need to reac t e ever *ore narro, universals, to take into account all t e differences in *atters of conduct, is due to t e fact t at t ese differences *ay "e of great relevance to practice. ' ey *ay at ti*es deter*ine , et er ,e act virtuously.

'pistemological $onse,uences of '*act/Ine*act Accounts

2 at are t e episte*ological conse1uences, if any, of Aristotle.s re1uire*ent t at et ical accounts attain t e particular and of t e ine&actness t at *ay result fro* failing to reac suc level of detail; )s de*onstrative

5 19$ 5 kno,ledge ruled out; )s inductive or so*e ot er type of kno,ledge i*plied or *ore appropriate; )f et ical accounts do not reac t e level of specificity or detail t at Aristotle t inks is necessary=t e level of t e particular=t en clearly t ey re*ain ine&act in t e a"ove sense and t erefore are in a ,ay deficient or inco*plete, "ut it is not evident t at t is for* of ine&actness necessarily affects t e de*onstrative c aracter of a discipline. )f a discipline is de*onstrative, t e fact t at it does not reac a certain level of detail or specificity need not alter its episte*ological c aracter. +uppose, for instance, t at geo*etry does not reac t e level of specificity , ere it proves t ose t eore*s t at are true only of isosceles triangles "ut re*ains instead at a ig er level of generality "y proving only t ose t eore*s t at apply to all triangles. )n ot er ,ords, our accounts of triangles ,ould not reac t e level of t e *ore specific universals suc as isosceles, scalene, e1uilateral, and so fort , "ut it is o"vious t at geo*etry ,ould not "e on account of t is a less de*onstrative discipline. 7et t e pro"le*s ,it accounts t at are ine&act "y lacking in detail or "y "eing inco*plete s ould not "e totally dis*issed4 alt oug suc ine&actness *ay not affect t e episte*ological c aracter of a discipline in a drastic ,ay, it *ay nonet eless affect t e discipline to so*e e&tent. :f course, t e e&tent to , ic t e discipline is affected ,ould depend at ti*es on o, pervasive t e ine&actness is. )f, for e&a*ple, every topic of a discipline ,ere to or could only "e treated ine&actly, t en our kno,ledge in t at discipline ,ould or could only "e inco*plete. And alt oug suc a conse1uence need not alter t e episte*ological nature of a discipline it *ay nonet eless affect it. -or instance, if t e discipline is a de*onstrative one, t e ine&act treat*ent of every topic could very ,ell affect t e de*onstrative rigor of t e discipline. 3e*onstrations or proofs in suc a discipline could very ,ell depend on tacit, suppressed, or unproven pre*ises precisely "ecause all topics in t e discipline ave "een given an inco*plete treat*ent. ' us, t e de*onstrative rigor of t e discipline *ay not reac t e level it could ave reac ed if t e discipline treated its topics ,it greater detail or co*pleteness. 8ven if ,e ,ere to ad*it t at t e type of ine&actness ,e are discussing ere can affect t e de*onstrative rigor of a discipline, t e real episte*ological pro"le* ,ould still "e e&actness itself. ' e *ost i*portant episte*ological conse1uences are t ose t at ste* fro* e&actness, if it ,ere ever attained4 for if t e re1uire*ent of e&actness in t e sense of detail t at reac es t e particular ,ere to "e satisfied, an ele*ent t at Aristotle takes to fall outside t e real* of de*onstration could "e introduced into our accounts. <ence, t ey could not "e purely de*onstrative4 t ey could contain at least so*e if not all nonde*onstrative co*ponents and t erefore t ey could lack de*onstrative purity. 5 191 5 ' e episte*ological conse1uences of eit er ac ieving or failing to attain t e level of specificity or detail Aristotle de*ands, and , ic *ay affect t e de*onstrative c aracter of a discipline, are t e*selves a type of ine&actness. 3eficiency in de*onstrative rigor or lack of de*onstrative purity constitutes a lack of e&actness t at all t e non*at e*atical disciplines, according to Aristotle, e& i"it. ' ey presu*a"ly lack t e kind of e&actness , ic Grant, as as "een s o,n, in e&plicating Aristotle.s key ter* for e&actness, calls G*at e*atical e&actness.G ' us, a rat er curious situation presents itself: )f t e degree of detail or specificity Aristotle de*ands is not attained, our accounts re*ain ine&act and per aps t e de*onstrative rigor of t e discipline is affected to so*e e&tent4 "ut if t e re1uired level of detail or specificity is attained, t en t e de*onstrative c aracter of t e discipline *ay "e affected in an even *ore drastic ,ay "ecause nonBde*onstrative ele*ents are introduced, and t us t e discipline *ay

"eco*e ine&act in anot er sense. ' erefore, it need not al,ays "e t e case, as it as "een assu*ed "y everyone, t at it is ine&actness t at as t e pro"le*atic conse1uences. At least it does not see* to "e t e case t at only ine&actness as suc conse1uences or t at it as t e *ost pro"le*atic conse1uences. 2 en e&actness >ine&actness? consists in detail >lack of detail?, *ost episte*ological pro"le*s lie ,it e&actness, at least ,it in t e Aristotelian fra*e,ork. ' e episte*ological conse1uences of attaining e&actness, of reac ing a level of detail t at includes t e particular, can "est "e seen , en ,e consider t e particular in t e strict sense. 0eac ing t e individual in our accounts ,ould raise at least t,o types of pro"le*s for Aristotle. ' e first is really for*al in nature and as to do ,it t e 1uestion of , et er Aristotle takes propositions a"out individuals to ave t e logical for* t at is appropriate for functioning as syllogistic pre*ises and t erefore as co*ponents of de*onstrative syllogis*s. But t e second is a su"stantive one and as to do ,it a nu*"er of 1uestions concerning t e *odality of propositions a"out individuals and t e nature of our kno,ledge of individuals. 2 en Aristotle enu*erates t e valid syllogistic for*s in r . Anal. , e does not identify one t at includes singular state*ents a*ong its pre*ises. As Lan Jukasie,ic9 pointed out so*e ti*e ago, t e valid argu*ent t at as invaria"ly "een offered as t e paradig*atic Aristotelian syllogis* is not a syllogis* Aristotle recogni9es: GAll Greeks are *ortal, +ocrates is a Greek, t erefore +ocrates is *ortalG is not an instantation of any syllogistic for* Aristotle identifies.@19A <ence argu*ents t at ave so*e singular state*ents as t eir co*ponents ,ould not satisfy Aristotle.s for*al re1uire*ents for "eing syllogis*s and t erefore for "eing de*onstrative syllogis*s as ,ell. But if ,e ,ere ever to attain e&actness "y reac ing t e level of t e 5 196 5 individual, t en so*e propositions in our accounts >potential pre*ises or conclusions of de*onstrative syllogis*s? ,ould "e singular4 t ey ,ill include na*es of individuals or inde&icals: GCallias *ust return , at e o,es to +ocrates,G G' is is s,eet,G G' at is pleasant,G and so fort . ' erefore, t ese propositions ,ill not possess t e logical for* t at, according to Aristotle, propositions *ust ave in order to function as co*ponents of syllogis*s. At least so*e part of a discipline t at attained t e ig est level of e&actness and reac ed t e level of t e individual ,ould t en "e nonde*onstrative. -or it ,ould consist of singular state*ents. ' e introduction of particulars in t e strict sense into et ical accounts ,ill, o,ever, pose additional pro"le*s for Aristotle, for e insists t at t ere is no de*onstration of t e particular >Met. 999a6%, "6, 1$#9E6F?, "ut only of t e universal > ost. Anal. HFE#F4 (et. 999a6H, 1$$#a1#?. Aristotle clai*s particulars in t e strict sense and , at is true a"out t e* are contingent and can "e ot er,ise >Met. 1$#9E#$? and are kno,n "y perception > ost. Anal. H1"%4 Met. 999"6?. ' e picture is less clear, o,ever, if ,e take t e particular to "e *erely t e *ore specific or narro, universal. ' e episte*ological conse1uences of reac ing t is level of e&actness, , ere a certain degree of detail or specificity is attained "ut still re*ains at t e level of t e universal, ,ould depend in part on t e nature of t e state*ents t at contain suc specific or narro, universals. 2e cannot say in general , et er or not state*ents containing suc universals ,ill "e suita"le pre*ises or conclusions of syllogis*s t at ,ill yield de*onstrative kno,ledge. 2e can say, o,ever, t at state*ents containing specific or narro, universals can satisfy Aristotle.s for*al conditions for "eing co*ponents of de*onstrative syllogis*s. +ince suc state*ents are not

singular, t ey do not pose t e pro"le*s t at state*ents containing inde&icals or na*es pose. ' e state*ent a"out t e narro,er universal e/uilateral is of t e sa*e logical for* as t e one a"out t e ,ider universal triangle . ' e sa*e is true in t e case of t e state*ents a"out chic-en and light meat or a"out courage and +irtue . Alt oug state*ents a"out specific or narro, universals *ay possess t e logical for* Aristotle re1uires of state*ents t at are co*ponents of de*onstrative syllogis*s, t e 1uestion still re*ains , et er t ey satisfy all t e ot er conditions Aristotle re1uires of t e pre*ises of suc syllogis*s. )f t ey do satisfy t ese conditions, t en t ey can function as co*ponents of de*onstrative syllogis*s. )f t ey don.t, t en t ey ,ould fall outside t e de*onstrative do*ain. )n t at case, reac ing state*ents or accounts t at are e&act "y "eing a"out suc narro, or specific universals ,ould ave episte*ological conse1uences=at least so*e part of any discipline t at contains suc e&act accounts ,ill fall outside t e de*onstrative real*. 5 19# 5 ' e *ost i*portant of t ese conditions is t at t e pre*ises and t erefore t e conclusions of a de*onstrative syllogis* are necessary. )f state*ents a"out narro, or specific universals fall to "e necessary, t ey can not "e co*ponents of de*onstrations in t e strict sense. But are suc state*ents not necessary; )s it possi"le to deter*ine in general , et er t ey are; )t *ay see* t at , et er state*ents a"out narro, universals are necessary depends on t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter suc universals c aracteri9e. )n t e case of t e su"/ect *atter of geo*etry, for e&a*ple, ,e s ould e&pect state*ents a"out scalene triangles to "e if true, necessary. ' us, ,e *ay conclude t at introducing narro, or specific universals in a discipline , ose su"/ect *atter is like t at of geo*etry need not affect t e de*onstrative c aracter of a discipline. +tate*ents a"out suc universals ,ill presu*a"ly "e necessary. But even in t e case of t e *ost paradig*atic de*onstrative disciplines it ,ould not "e correct to ans,er in an un1ualified ,ay t at all state*ents are necessary, , et er t ey are a"out narro, universals or not. -or even in connection ,it t e su"/ect *atter of geo*etry, one *ay encounter state*ents t at assert t e sort of t ing t at Aristotle calls GaccidentalG=for e&a*ple, t at scalene triangles see* irregular or circles are pleasing. 2e *ay, o,ever, follo, Aristotle and dis*iss suc state*ents as not "eing state*ents of geo*etry.@6$A But o, a"out narro, universals in disciplines t at fail to reac t e de*onstrative purity of t e *at e*atical sciences; Are t ey episte*ologically pro"le*atic "y introducing nonnecessary propositions; Consider, for e&a*ple, t e disciplines dealing ,it "iological p eno*ena: 2e *ig t t ink t at in contrast to t e state*ents a"out t e "roadest universals=for e&a*ple, ani*als ave sensation, 1uadrupedal ovipara lay perfect eggs >G.A . F1H"1E?, all aired ani*als are vivipara >G.A . F1H"#$?=t at are presu*a"ly necessary, t ose a"out narro, or specific ones=for e&a*ple, Jaconian ounds are keen scented >G.A. FH1"1$?, Adrianic fo,ls are e&tre*ely prolific >G.A . F49"6H?, t e cuckoo lays fe, eggs >G.A. F%$a16?, cattle ave dark eyes >G.A . FF9a#1?=are not. ' is is "y no *eans o"vious, o,ever. -or instance, Aristotle t inks t at t ere are e&planations for t e p eno*ena descri"ed "y t e state*ents a"out narro, universals or t at suc state*ents can "e derived fro* ot ers. ' us, e e&plains , y t e Jaconian ounds are keen scented "y pointing out t at >a? ani*als t at ave long nostrils are keen scented and >"? Jaconian ounds ave long nostrils. ' ere in turn is an e&planation or derivation for >a? >G.A . FH1"%?. +i*ilarly, Aristotle offers an e&planation of t e fact t at cattle ave dark eyes. <e clai*s t at eyes t at contain a large a*ount of fluid are dark and t is is e&plained in turn "y t e nontransparency of large volu*es of fluid >G.A . FF9"69?.

2 et er state*ents a"out narro, universals are necessary ,ill depend 5 194 5 on t e nature of t e propositions fro* , ic t ey are derived=t at is, on t e nature of t e propositions t at function as pre*ises of syllogis*s t at ave suc state*ents a"out narro, universals as t eir conclusions. Aristotle takes t e a"ove propositions to "e necessary and clearly t inks t at at least so*e state*ents a"out narro, universals can "e necessary. <e considers, for e&a*ple, t e state*ent t at s eep ave eyes to "e necessary, since aving eyes is included in t e essence of suc an ani*al >G.A. FFH"1F?. +i*ilarly, e t inks t at a state*ent a"out circular ,ounds can "e necessary=t at circular ,ounds eal slo,ly can supposedly "e de*onstrated "y t e geo*etrician.@61A But if t e pre*ises >eit er, all, or so*e? fro* , ic suc state*ents a"out narro, universals are derived are not necessary or t e state*ents t e*selves are si*ply e*pirical generali9ations, t ey *ig t not "e necessary. ' is ,ould clearly "e so if , at Aristotle often says a"out t e do*ains of nature, conduct, and art is correct=na*ely, t ey consist, eit er , olly or partly, in t ings or p eno*ena t at are not necessary. )f all *atters of conduct and of art are, as Aristotle says in N.E. Book K) >114$a1%?, not necessary, t en clearly not only ,ill state*ents a"out narro, universals "e nonnecessary "ut so ,ill all state*ents a"out suc *atters. )t see*s, t en, t at reac ing t e level of rat er narro, universals for t e sake of e&actness in a discipline t at is nonde*onstrative on account of t e nature of its su"/ect *atter ,ould not necessarily alter t e episte*ological c aracter of suc a discipline. Per aps Aristotle is not correct in placing t e , ole of t e do*ain of conduct or art outside t e real* of t e necessary and ence of t e de*onstrative in t e strict sense. Part of t e do*ain of conduct could "e necessary and ence also de*onstrative=possi"ly t e part dealing ,it t e ,idest universals, for e&a*ple, t e nature of goodness, t e nature of virtue, so*e properties of desire or preference. And it *ay "e t at only t ings of t e lo,est generality or state*ents a"out narro, universals are outside t e necessary. +o t at one ,ould *ore likely e&pect state*ents a"out t e nature of virtue >e.g., virtue is a disposition? or desire >e.g., desire is transitive? to "e necessary, , ereas state*ents a"out rat er specific universals >e.g., a"out giving to one.s parents, repaying de"ts to friends, etc.? are *ore likely to "e pro"le*atic in t eir *odality. +tate*ents of t e latter type *ay "e only e*pirical generali9ations. 8ven if state*ents a"out narro, universals ,ere *ere e*pirical generali9ations, t e episte*ological conse1uences t is *ig t ave need not "e so radical t at t ey c ange t e de*onstrative c aracter of a discipline, if indeed it is de*onstrative. -or if suc state*ents are on t e , ole true, or true for t e *ost part=to use Aristotle.s ,ay of speaking=t ey could "e co*ponents of less strict or ,eaker de*onstrations. <o, and , et er suc de*onstrations are possi"le is indeed a pro"le* t at ,ill "e e&a*ined 5 19% 5 later4 "ut t ere is no 1uestion t at Aristotle speaks of suc ,eaker types of de*onstration. Per aps, o,ever, state*ents a"out narro, universals are not even e*pirical generali9ations4 per aps t ey are not even true for t e *ost part. <ence it is not only t at t eir necessity is 1uestiona"le, "ut t eir trut *ay "e also. )f t is ,ere so, it ,ould surely violate t e trut condition Aristotle re1uires for "eing a pre*ise in a de*onstrative syllogis*=t e pre*ises ave to "e true=and t erefore suc state*ents could not "e co*ponents of any type of de*onstrative reasoning. )n t is case, t e de*and of attaining e&act accounts "y reac ing *ore narro, universals ,ould ave i*portant episte*ological conse1uences. Alt oug Aristotle speaks at ti*es a"out our *ore specific accounts "eing *ore ine&act

t an t e general ones, it is "y no *eans certain t at e goes as far as to deny t e trut of t e specific accounts.@66A ) s all address t is pro"le* later , en ) discuss Aristotle.s re*arks on t e ine&actness t at results fro* t e purported variation of t e p eno*ena of conduct. )t appears, t en, t at it is t e de*and for attaining e&actness in et ical accounts "y reac ing t e individual t at ,ould ave t e greater and *ost significant episte*ological conse1uences. Attaining suc e&actness *ay introduce ele*ents in our accounts t at ,ould, according to Aristotle, fall outside t e de*onstrative. ' en, at last a difference "et,een t e episte*ological nature of a practical discipline and t e nature of a t eoretical discipline as "een found. ' is difference is ulti*ately tied to t e different goals Aristotle assigns to t e t,o types of disciplines, and in a sense s o,s t e co**on "elief in t e Aristotelian tradition=t at t ere is a difference "et,een t ese types of disciplines=to "e correct. <o,ever, t e reasons for t e supposed difference ave not "een *ade clear in t e past. <ere ,e ave uncovered at least one reason. )f Aristotle is correct in taking t e goal of et ics to "e practice, in taking t is in turn to i*ply t at our accounts in et ics *ust reac t e particular, and in vie,ing t e particular in t e strict sense as falling outside t e real* of de*onstration, t en et ics ,ill e& i"it so*e differences fro* t e paradig*atic de*onstrative sciences=t e pure t eoretic disciplines. -or ine&actness in one of t e t,o senses discussed ere=eit er lack of detail or t e introduction of nonde*onstrative ele*ents=,ill c aracteri9e it and ot er practical disciplines "ut not t e t eoretical ones. 7et t ese assu*ptions are "y no *eans selfBevident4 t ey surely invite furt er reflection.

Aristotle's Assumptions
' ere is little dou"t t at Aristotle sees is o,n de*and t at et ical accounts reac a certain level of detail or specificity as a corrective *easure against , at e perceives to "e +ocrates. and Plato.s tendency of treating 5 19E 5 *atters of conduct rat er a"stractly or in general ter*s. ' us Aristotle clai*s in t e olit. t at G*oreover, t e ,orking of t e constitution @of t e Republic A as a , ole ,it regard to t e *e*"ers of t e state as also not "een descri"ed "y +ocrates nor is it easy to say , at it ,ill "eG >16E4a11?. (ore specifically, Aristotle argues: G)n t e Republic +ocrates as laid do,n details a"out very fe, *atters= regulations a"out co**unity of ,ives and c ildren and a"out property, and t e structure of t e constitutionG >16E4E#$? "ut t at Ga"out t e far*ers and t e artisans, , et er t ey are e&cluded fro* govern*ent or ave so*e part in it, and , et er t ese classes are also to possess ar*s and to serve in ,ar ,it ot ers or not, on t ese points +ocrates as *ade no decisionG >16E4"#%?. 2 ereas in t e (a)s Plato provides us ,it a considera"le "ody of la,s >or statutes?, according to Aristotle, Plato G as said a little a"out t e for* of t e constitutionG >16E%a?. Aristotle.s criticis*s of +ocrates and Plato *ay "e unfounded, "ut t is is not our concern at t e *o*ent. Given t e assu*ptions Aristotle *akes a"out t e goals of et ics and t e nature of t e t ings practice deals ,it and given t e conclusions e dra,s fro* t ese assu*ptions, e is per aps /ustified in designating certain +ocratic and Platonic accounts as ine&act. 7et "ot is assu*ptions and conclusions *ay "e pro"le*atic. )n particular, it is dou"tful t at t e conclusions Aristotle dra,s fro* so*e of is assu*ptions follo, necessarily fro* t e*. :f t e assu*ptions Aristotle *akes in t e present conte&t, t e follo,ing appear as t e *ost plausi"le: >a? Actions deal ,it particulars4 and >"? ' e goals of et ics are practical. Alt oug t ese see* to *e to "e t e *ost plausi"le of Aristotle.s assu*ptions, even t ese are not true. 2it regard to assu*ption >a?, for e&a*ple, one *ay concede t at *any or per aps even *ost actions deal ,it particulars. ' is is

certainly t e case ,it t e e&a*ples of actions Aristotle i*self gives=for e&a*ple, eating t is food, drinking t is ,ater, curing t is person, and repaying t is loan. Per aps Aristotle generali9es fro* t ese kinds of actions, , ic are denoted "y transitive ver"s and paradig*atically take as t eir o"/ect concrete particulars, to t e conclusion t at all actions deal ,it suc particulars, "ut t is need not "e so. ' ere *ay "e actions t at do not deal ,it anyt ing at all or if t ey deal ,it so*et ing, it need not "e a particular, for t ere are actions denoted "y intransitive ver"s >e.g., Gto ,alk,G Gto rise,G Gto pray,G?, *ental acts, speec acts, and so fort . -or instance, if ) *ake a pro*ise, , at does *y act deal ,it ; And if ,e insist in saying t at even in t is case t ere is an o"/ect ,it , ic *y act deals >i.e., t e soB called internal o"/ect=t e pro*ise?, it *ay "e so*et ing 1uite general=for e&a*ple, to o"ey t e la,. +i*ilarly, t ere are dou"ts a"out assu*ption >"?. )n so*e sense et ics is practical. But, as ) argued in c apter # and ,ill argue in greater detail in c apter 9, it *ig t "e ,rong to conclude fro* 5 19F 5 t is t at et ics as no cognitive or t eoretical co*ponent=a co*ponent t at *ay also i*pose certain re1uire*ents on t e e&actness of t e discipline. Jet us, for t e *o*ent, grant t ese t,o assu*ptions to Aristotle. ' e 1uestion is , et er e is /ustified in dra,ing t e conclusions e does. )s et ics re1uired to reac t e particulars "ecause its goal is practice and t e latter presu*a"ly deals ,it particulars; 3oes et ics need to reac t e level of specificity Aristotle re1uires if it is to "e a guide for practice; ' is is dou"tful. ' e rules of *ultiplication are a guide to carrying out particular *ultiplications. 2 en ,e ordinarily *ultiply, ,e *ultiply so*e particular nu*"ers4 our actions deal ,it so*e particular nu*"ers. (ust t e rules t en reac t e level of t e particulars; (ust t ey spell out e&plicitly all t e particular *ultiplications ,it all t e particular nu*"ers; ' is is not only unlikely, it is i*possi"le. ' e nu*"ers are infinite. +i*ilarly, la, is a guide to action or *ay ave practice as its goal. Alt oug t ere can "e la,s dealing ,it particulars or individuals, is it necessary t at la, reac es t e level of specificity Aristotle re1uires in order for it to do its function; ' is need not "e so. As Aristotle i*self repeatedly o"serves, la, cannot reac t e particulars4 t ey are infinite. ' e la,, e insists, is general. But t e fact t at t e la, does function as a guide to action >even t oug it *ay fail in so*e cases? s o,s t at t e ig degree of specificity Aristotle de*ands of t e la, is not necessary. ' e sa*e *ay "e true in t e case of et ics. @6#A At least so*e general *oral principles can "e guides to action. +o it see*s t at t e conclusion Aristotle dra,s fro* is t,o assu*ptions concerning t e nature of t e goals of et ics and t e nature of t e o"/ects of practice *ay not "e necessary=t e ig degree of specificity e re1uires fro* all accounts of et ics *ay not "e needed for practice. 7et Aristotle /udges t e , ole of t e discipline of et ics to "e ine&act "ecause it fails to *eet suc a ig degree of specificity. <e t us pronounces every account of et ics to "e ine&act "y /udging it solely on t e "asis of t e standard of e&actness e t inks is dictated "y t e practical goals of t e discipline. By doing so, Aristotle overlooks co*pletely t e cognitive goals of et ics, and t is *ay "e a *istake. -or it is possi"le t at so*e of t e accounts e deter*ines to "e ine&act "y /udging t e* on t e "asis of t e practical goals of et ics are e&act or as e&act as t ey s ould "e , en t ey are /udged on t e "asis of t e cognitive goals t ey serve. )t is t e general or universal, for e&a*ple, GLustice is "eneficial,G t at is of greater i*portance for cognitive purposes and not t e particular, for e&a*ple, G+ocrates as "enefited fro* doing t is /ust act.G ' e for*er and not t e latter is , at is needed for t e purposes of e&planation and understanding. )t *ay even "e t e case t at , at is needed for so*e practical purposes is t e general or universal rat er t an t e particular. +uppose,

5 19H 5 for e&a*ple, t at ) ,is to *otivate so*eone to "e ave /ustly "y convincing i* t at /ustice is "eneficial or t at it as so*e ot er conse1uences. :"viously, , at ) need to do is to s o, t at /ustice is of suc a nature or so*et ing of t at sort and not t at doing t is act at a particular ti*e ,ill "e "eneficial or ,ill ave suc conse1uences. 2 at one needs to do is , at +ocrates and Plato atte*pt to do in t e Republic =t at is, prove t at /ustice is "eneficial. 5 199 5

!i* eing for the Most Part. Its Meaning) !cope) and 1ature
Introduction
)n t is c apter, ) s all focus on t e type of ine&actness t at Aristotle associates ,it "eing for t e *ost part or fluctuation. ' is type of ine&actness is altoget er different fro* t e one ,e discussed in t e previous c apter and it raises 1uite different episte*ological 1uestions. ) s all, o,ever, defer t e discussion of any episte*ological conse1uences suc ine&actness *ig t ave until t e ne&t c apter. (y o"/ective at present ,ill "e to elucidate t e *eaning, scope, and nature of t e ine&actness Aristotle associates ,it "eing for t e *ost part. ) s all "egin "y presenting t e evidence fro* t e treatises on conduct , ere Aristotle speaks of t e type of ine&actness presently under consideration. ) s all argue ere t at unlike t e ine&actness discussed in t e previous c apter, , ic ,as found to "e suc t at it can c aracteri9e only accounts, t e ine&actness Aristotle associates ,it "eing for t e *ost part can c aracteri9e "ot t e accounts of *atters of conduct and *atters of conduct t e*selves. ' is type of ine&actness, Aristotle clai*s, is "ot *aterial and for*al. ) s all e&plain in , at ,ays it can affect "ot t e su"/ect *atter of t e disciplines on conduct and , at is said a"out it, and s all also touc upon Aristotle.s contention t at so*e kind of congruence e&ists "et,een t e ine&actness of t e *aterial and for*al levels. Anot er 1uestion a"out t e ine&actness under consideration concerns its scope. According to Aristotle, , at is t e e&tent of t is kind of ine&actness; Are all or only so*e *atters of conduct affected "y it and are all or only so*e of our propositions a"out t e* c aracteri9ed "y it; ) s all argue ere t at despite t e fact t at Aristotle at ti*es speaks as if t e scope of t is ine&actness is 1uite e&tensive "ut nonet eless li*ited, *ost 5 6$$ 5 often e speaks as if its scope is allBenco*passing=all *atters of conduct are for t e *ost part and all propositions a"out t e* are ine&act. <o,ever, t e assu*ption t at t e scope of t is type of ine&actness is allBenco*passing raises in turn a nu*"er of 1uestions. -or e&a*ple, , at does it really *ean to say t at all *atters of conduct are for t e *ost part; And does fluctuation affect "ot t e nonessential and essential attri"utes of *atters of conduct; 2 at t e ans,ers are or even , et er t ere are any ans,ers to suc 1uestions is "y no *eans o"vious. 2e s all see in connection ,it t e first 1uestion t at in order for Aristotle.s clai*s a"out all *atters of conduct "eing for t e *ost part and all propositions a"out t e* "eing true for t e *ost part

to "e correct, it is not sufficient t at every *atter of conduct fluctuates in so*e respect or ot er. ' at is, it is not sufficient t at ,ealt fluctuates in respect to t e property of "eing "eneficial, "ravery in respect to t e sa*e or different property, /ustice in respect of so*e one property, li"erality in respect of anot er or t e sa*e property, and so fort ,it all t e virtues, vices, actions, c oices=in s ort, ,it all *atters of conduct. An even greater fluctuation t an t is is re1uired if Aristotle.s clai* t at all propositions a"out *atters of conduct are true for t e *ost part is to "e correct. A special pro"le* arises , en ,e include t e essential attri"utes of a kind a*ong t ose t at fluctuate or "elong to t e kind for t e *ost part. )f ,e ,ere to do so as t e allBenco*passing assu*ption of t e scope of t is type of ine&actness re1uires, t en even t e propositions attri"uting to a kind t e essential attri"utes of t at kind ,ould "e true for t e *ost part. But suc a conse1uence ,ould surely pose pro"le*s for t e distinction "et,een essential and nonessential attri"utes, for t e for*er are precisely t ose attri"utes t at are t oug t to "elong to all *e*"ers of a kind. Alt oug in t is c apter, ) s all focus on t e fluctuation of nonessential attri"utes, in a later c apter it ,ill "e seen t at Aristotle as reasons for e&tending fluctuation even to essential attri"utes. ' e *ore one reflects upon t e 1uestion of t e scope of t e ine&actness Aristotle associates ,it "eing for t e *ost part, t e *ore one reali9es t at it cannot really "e separated fro* t e 1uestion of t e eli*ina"ility of t is type of ine&actness at t e for*al level, for , et er all propositions a"out *atters of conduct are ine&act "y "eing true for t e *ost part depends on , et er t ey can or cannot "e replaced "y ot ers t at are not true only for t e *ost part. )t depends, t at is, on , et er t e ine&actness at t e for*al level can or cannot "e eli*inated altoget er or in part. ) s all discuss "elo, in greater detail , y t is 1uestion regarding t e scope of t e ine&actness under consideration cannot really "e e&a*ined independently of t e 1uestion of eli*ina"ility. Ie&t, ) s all turn to a discussion of t e nature of "eing for t e *ost 5 6$1 5 part and of t e ,ay Aristotle differentiates it fro* "eing necessarily, al,ays, fortuitously, and so fort . ) s all argue ere t at e takes , at is for t e *ost part to "e contingent, and t at t erefore e distinguis es it fro* , at is necessarily. But "eing for t e *ost part is not to "e identified ,it "eing contingently, for t e latter includes *ore t an , at is for t e *ost part. )t includes, for e&a*ple, t e fortuitous. And , at distinguis es, according to Aristotle, t at , ic is for t e *ost part fro* t e fortuitous is t e fact t at t e for*er falls ,it in t e causal regularities of nature , ereas t e latter presu*a"ly does not. Because t at , ic is for t e *ost part is a co*ponent of t e causal regularities of nature, Aristotle argues, it falls ,it in t e scientifically de*onstra"le. )n t e last section of t is c apter, ) atte*pt to identify t e proper contrast of "eing for t e *ost part. Aristotle *ost often contrasts , at is for t e *ost part to , at is "y necessity or , at is al,ays. ) argue t at strictly speaking , at is for t e *ost part or a proposition t at is true for t e *ost part is to "e contrasted to , at is ,it out e&ception or to a proposition t at is true universally. ' e relevant contrast, in ot er ,ords, is not so *uc "et,een "eing - necessarily and "eing - for t e *ost part "ut "et,een "eing - in all cases and "eing - for t e *ost part4 or "et,een a proposition t at is true universally and one t at is true for t e *ost part. ) e&plore ere t e 1uestion , et er Aristotle recogni9es p eno*ena t at e& i"it certain properties in all t eir occurrences and are descri"ed "y propositions t at are universally true, and t ey t us constitute t e proper contrast to , at e& i"its a property or is true for t e *ost part. 2 et er Aristotle does or does not recogni9e suc p eno*ena or propositions ,it t e appropriate logical for* is an i*portant 1uestion on , ic so*e of *y later argu*ents inge=na*ely, t at if t e p eno*ena t at are for t e *ost part are to "e, as Aristotle clai*s

t ey are, represented ine&actly, t en t e propositions a"out t e* *ust ave a certain logical for*. ) s all argue in t e ne&t c apter t at t is logical for* is none ot er t an t e for* t ose propositions , ic are t e proper contrast of t e propositions t at are true for t e *ost part ave.

The 'vidence and its Meaning

Aristotle speaks of t e type of ine&actness t at e associates ,it "eing for t e *ost part in t e follo,ing instances: 3.& :ur treat*ent @of et ical and political *attersA ,ill "e ade1uate, if it ac ieves t at a*ount of precision t at "elongs to its su"/ect *atter @

A. ' e sa*e e&actness @ A *ust not "e soug t in all accounts @ A, as it is not in all products of art. >N.E.&;=9b&87

5 6$6 5 3.% ' e no"le @

A and /ust @ A t ings, , ic political science studies, e& i"it *uc difference @ A and fluctuation @ A, so t at it see*s t at t ey are only "y convention and not "y nature. ' e sa*e kind of fluctuation @ A is e& i"ited "y t e good t ings @ A, "ecause ar* appens to *any fro* t e*4 "efore no, so*e ave "een destroyed "y ,ealt , , ile ot ers "y courage. 2e *ust "e content, t en, in dealing ,it suc t ings and starting fro* suc pre*ises, to indicate t e trut @

A roug ly @ A and in outline @ A, and in dealing ,it t ings t at are only for t e *ost part @ A and fro* pre*ises like t e*, our conclusions ,ill "e of t e sa*e kind. )n t e sa*e spirit, t erefore, s ould eac type of state*ent "e received4 for it is t e *ark of t e educated *an to seek t at a*ount of precision @ A in eac class of t ings , ic t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter ad*its @ A4 it is evidently e1ually foolis to accept pro"a"le reasoning fro* a *at e*atician and to de*and de*onstrations fro* t e r etorician. >1$94"1%B6F? E.# Also ,e *ust re*e*"er , at ,as said earlier4 ,e *ust not look for t e sa*e e&actness @

A in everyt ing, "ut only suc as "elongs to t e su"/ect *atter @ A. >1$9Ha6%? ' ere are additional passages in t e N.E. , ere Aristotle c aracteri9es certain t ings as "eing for t e *ost part >1116"9, 1169a64, 11E1a6F, 11E4"#1?. <o,ever, e does not in t ese passages connect t e c aracteristic of "eing for t e *ost part to e&actness!ine&actness, nor does e speak of any episte*ological conse1uences suc a c aracteristic *ig t ave. +i*ilarly, Aristotle in t e ot er treatises on conduct identifies on a fe, occasions so*e t ings as "eing for t e *ost part "ut ,it out connecting "eing for t e *ost part to e&actness or ine&actness >E.E. 166$"1#, 166H"4, 16#1a6H, 164Fa#6, 164Fa#%, 164F"6H4 olit. 1691"9, 1##E"414 M.M. 1.##.6$.F, 1.##.61.4, 6.H.6.4?. ) s all discuss t ese passages in a later section , ere ) s all e&a*ine Aristotle.s atte*pt to differentiate a*ong , at e&ists "y necessity, al,ays, "y luck, or for t e *ost part. ' ere is no 1uestion, o,ever, t at in t e passages 1uoted a"ove Aristotle associates t e c aracteristic of "eing for t e *ost part ,it e&actness!ine&actness and also clai*s t at suc e&actness!ine&actness as so*e episte*ological conse1uences. ' is is clearly e&pressed in E.6 , en Aristotle clai*s t at "ecause *atters of conduct and propositions a"out t e* are for t e *ost part, our conclusions ,ill also "e of t e sa*e kind and our accounts ,ill e& i"it an e&actness t at is co**ensurate ,it t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter. ' e sa*e clai*s are *ade in E.# , ic refers "ack to and reiterates t e vie,s

e&pressed in E.1 and E.6. But , at is t e nature of t e e&actness!ine&actness Aristotle speaks of in t e a"ove passages and , at does it c aracteri9e; )s it a feature of t e 5 6$# 5 su"/ect *atter of et ics, of its propositions, or of "ot ; )s it, in ot er ,ords, a for*al or a *aterial feature, or is it "ot for*al and *aterial; )n all t ree passages 1uoted a"ove Aristotle speaks of "ot t e su"/ect *atter of et ics and our accounts of it as e& i"iting certain c aracteristics t at e associates ,it e&actness!ine&actness. ' e su"/ect *atter of et ics, t e good t ings, as ,ell as t at of politics, t e no"le and /ust t ings, e& i"it fluctuation or are for t e *ost part. But , at ,e say a"out t e* also, our propositions a"out t e good, no"le, or /ust t ings t at function as pre*ises , en ,e reason a"out suc t ings, e& i"it fluctuation or are for t e *ost part. Bot t e su"/ect *atter and our accounts of it are ine&act in t is particular sense and t erefore t e corresponding e&actness could also apply to "ot . Aristotle speaks of "ot t ings and , at ,e say a"out suc t ings as "eing for t e *ost part in treatises ot er t an t ose dealing ,it *atters of conduct. <e t us speaks of t e t ings t at appen or are for t e *ost part in G.A. >F6F"69, FF$"16, FFFa61?, hys. >199"64?, and so fort . And e speaks of sentences or propositions >

? and conclusions > ? as "eing for t e *ost part in r. Anal. >4#"#%?, ost. Anal. >HF"6E?, hys. >19H"E?, and so fort . <ence, e&actness!ine&actness of t is type is "ot a for*al and *aterial feature. According to Aristotle, t e "asic ine&actness is t at of t e su"/ect *atterBt e ine&actness of t e no"le, /ust, and good t ings. )t is t e ine&actness of t e t ings politics and et ics study t at generates t e ine&actness at t e for*al level. ' e level of e&actness in t e accounts reflects t at of t e su"/ect *atter >E.1? and t e ine&actness in t e pre*ises and conclusions used , en reasoning a"out *atters of conduct is due to t e nature of *atters of conduct t e*selves >E.6?. Aristotle.s clai* a"out t e relation "et,een *aterial and for*al e&actness!ine&actness in t e present case is si*ply t e application of t e congruence t esis ,e identified earlier to t e disciplines of conduct =na*ely, t e t esis , ic asserts t at so*e kind of congruence olds "et,een t e e&actness!ine&actness of our accounts >t e for*al level? and t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter >t e *aterial level?. ' at Aristotle takes t e congruence t esis to "e a general one is evident fro* , at e says in E.6 and E.#. Congruence ,it respect to e&actness or ine&actness presu*a"ly olds "et,een eac and any su"/ect *atter and its accounts, and it is t e presu*ed trut of t is general t esis of congruence t at Aristotle invokes in order to /ustify is clai* t at e&actness in our accounts of *atters of conduct depends on t e nature of *atters of conduct t e*selves >E.1, E.6, E.#?. )n t e case of et ics and politics, congruence olds, according to Aristotle, at least in t e follo,ing cases: e&actness at t e *aterial level i*plies e&actness at t e for*al level4 ine&actness at t e *aterial level i*plies ine&actness at t e for*al level. 2 et er *aterial e&actness of t e kind under 5 6$4 5

discussion ere i*plies for*al e&actness is not i*portant, since Aristotle takes t e su"/ect *atter of et ics to "e ine&act. But , et er *aterial ine&actness of t e kind ,e are presently considering i*plies for*al ine&act ess is clearly 1uite i*portant, for Aristotle.s "elief t at suc congruence olds "et,een *aterial and for*al ine&actness goes a long ,ay to,ard e&plaining , y e see*s to t ink t at t is kind of ine&actness at t e for*al level *ust "e accepted as inevita"le4 it is so*et ing ,e *ust learn to live ,it in disciplines of conduct. ' us Aristotle, using at ti*es a rat er strong language of necessity, insists t at t e e&actness appropriate in so*e do*ains *ust not "e soug t @

A in t e case of t e disciplines of conduct given t e nature of t eir su"/ect *atter >E.1?.@1A :ne , o olds t at t e su"/ect *atter of et ics and politics is ine&act, and t at suc ine&actness at t e *aterial level i*plies ine&actness at t e for*al level, as, pri*a facie at least, good reasons for t inking t at ine&actness at t e for*al level is inevita"le. ) ave in an earlier c apter raised dou"ts a"out t e validity of t is general t esis of congruence. ) s all not repeat t e earlier discussion at t is point "ut ,ill rat er focus on t e case of et ics. )t ,ill "e i*portant to e&a*ine , et er indeed t e supposed ine&actness of *atters of conduct i*plies ine&actness at t e for*al level and , et er ine&actness at t is latter level cannot "e eli*inated. But "efore ,e do anyt ing else, it is necessary to understand *ore clearly t e nature of t e ine&actness t at is presently under discussion. 2 at, t en, is t is feature of *atters of conduct or of t e su"/ect *atter of et ics t at affects t e level and deter*ines t e degree of e&actness in et ical accounts; )n E.6 Aristotle clai*s t at t e t ings political science studies, t e no"le and /ust t ings, e& i"it *uc difference@6A and fluctuation. <e goes on to add t at t e sa*e kind of fluctuation is e& i"ited "y t e t ings et ics studies=t e good t ings=and proceeds to give e&a*ples of t,o t ings t at presu*a"ly e& i"it suc fluctuation=,ealt and courage. ' e ter*

>GfluctuationG? t at Aristotle uses ere pri*arily signifies c ange in location=,andering, roa*ing, s ifting=and t is is t e *eaning t e ter* as in its only ot er occurrence in t e , ole Aristotelian corpus.@#A )n t e present conte&t, it signifies t e c ange or s ifting of t ings in respect to so*e or all of t eir properties or c aracteristics t at are relevant to conduct. ' us, according to Aristotle, ,ealt and "ravery so*eti*es are "eneficial and at ot er ti*es ar*ful.@4A ' ese c aracteristics t at are relevant to conduct=for e&a*ple, "eing "eneficial or ar*ful=are not fi&ed, t en, in relation to ,ealt or "ravery in t e ,ay Aristotle t inks t e c aracteristic of "eing ot is fi&ed in relation to fire, or t e ,ay t e property of "eing a figure , ose interior angles total 1H$ degrees is fi&ed in relation to t e triangle. @%A 2 ereas presu*a"ly fire and triangle do not fluctuate or s ift in e& i"iting t e c aracteristic of "eing ot and aving t e su* of its 5 6$% 5 interior angles e1ual to 1H$ degrees respectively, ,ealt and "ravery fluctuate in e& i"iting t e c aracteristic of "eing "eneficial. 2ealt and "ravery are not in every instance "eneficial. )n so*e instances t ey are ar*ful. -or *any, according to Aristotle, ave "een ar*ed or destroyed "y eit er ,ealt or courage. Alt oug Aristotle clai*s t at t e t ings politics and et ics study e& i"it *uc fluctuation, e i*self does not infer fro* t is t at t e c aracteristics in relation to , ic so*et ing can "e said to e& i"it fluctuation "elong to it "y convention only and not "y nature. ' at is, e does not infer fro* t e

supposed fact t at ,ealt e& i"its fluctuation in relation to "eing "eneficial t at ,ealt is "eneficial only "y convention and not "y nature. All Aristotle is saying is t at "ecause so*e t ings e& i"it fluctuation t ey seem to "e only "y convention and not "y nature, t at t e degree of fluctuation as per aps led so*e to infer t at *atters of conduct do not possess certain c aracteristics "y nature "ut only "y convention. Aristotle is correct in not inferring conventionality fro* fluctuation. ' e fact t at in so*e cases pneu*onia is not acco*panied "y fever does not necessarily i*ply t at fever c aracteri9es pneu*onia "y convention only. Bot t e presence and a"sence of fever in cases of pneu*onia can "e e&plained causally4 reasons can "e given t at s o, o, t e presence or a"sence of fever is related to t e nature of t ings=t e type of pneu*onia, t e i**une syste* of t e patient, t e stage of t e illness, and so fort . ' is, as s all "e seen later, is an i*portant point. -or "y not inferring conventionality fro* fluctuation, Aristotle does not e&clude t e possi"ility t at t e p eno*ena t at e& i"it fluctuation are su"/ect to e&planations=for t ey are part of t e do*ain of nature and not t at of convention. <e t us leaves open t e possi"ility t at t ey can "e e&plained, t at so*e type of de*onstration can "e given in t eir case. ' e idea t at *atters of conduct e& i"it fluctuation in relation to so*e or all of t eir c aracteristics is *ade *ore e&plicit , en Aristotle speaks of t ings t at are for t e *ost part >E.6?. ' e p rase e uses for t is purpose,

is no dou"t a tec nical ter* for i*, one e uses in al*ost all of is ,orks , en e ,is es eit er to c aracteri9e so*e t ings as "eing for t e *ost part or to e&plain t e nature of "eing for t e *ost part and o, it differs fro* ot er ,ays of "eing.@EA )n t e present conte&t, Aristotle uses it to c aracteri9e ,ealt and courage as "eing "eneficial for t e *ost part. ' ey are not in all of t eir instances "eneficial, "ut only in *ost. ' ey fluctuate, at least ,it respect to t e property of "eing "eneficial. But if ine&actness consists in fluctuating or e& i"iting a property for t e *ost part, t en e&actness ,ould consist in not fluctuating or in e& i"iting a property in every instance. :f course, t ere ,ould "e degrees of e&actness or ine&actness. As E.1, E.6, and E.# clearly suggest, Aristotle 5 6$E 5 conceives of e&actness and ine&actness as aving degrees, t e degree varying across t e various su"/ect *atters. 2e *ust not seek t e sa*e degree of e&actness in all do*ains, e clai*s, "ut t at , ic is appropriate to eac do*ain. <e o"viously t inks t at fluctuation is rat er pervasive in *atters of conduct. And , at e says in E.6, , en contrasting t e e&actness , ic is proper for a *at e*atician to seek to t at , ic is proper for a r etorician, indicates t at t e paradig*atically e&act do*ain is t e *at e*atical one, for it consists of o"/ects t at are presu*a"ly suc t at t ey do not fluctuate "ut instead e& i"it t eir properties in all cases. <o,ever, as ,e sa, a"ove, Aristotle t inks not only t at *atters of conduct t e*selves are ine&act "y fluctuating or "y "eing for t e *ost part "ut also t at , at ,e say a"out t e* or our accounts of t e* are ine&act. At t e level of our accounts of or propositions a"out *atters of conduct=t e for*al level =t e ine&actness at issue ere as to do ,it t e trut of our accounts or propositions. ' ey are fluctuating or are for t e *ost part in relation to t eir trut .@FA ' e proposition t at attri"utes t e property of "eing "eneficial to courage and t e one t at attri"utes t e sa*e property to ,ealt are true of courage and ,ealt only in *ost instances. ' ere are occasions , en t ey are not true. ' us, t ey fluctuate in relation to trut in t e ,ay t at t e o"/ects t ese propositions are a"out >courage and ,ealt ? presu*a"ly fluctuate in relation to t e property of "eing "eneficial. ' e proposition t at ,ealt

>or courage? is "eneficial is not true on so*e occasions, /ust as t e property of "eing "eneficial does not "elong to ,ealt on so*e occasions. ' at t e relevant property of propositions, pre*ises, or conclusions in relation to , ic suc t ings fluctuate or are for t e *ost part is t e property of trut and not so*e ot er property=for e&a*ple, a syntactic feature=is *ade clear "y Aristotle.s clai* in E.6 t at ,e *ust "e content , en dealing ,it t ings t at e& i"it t e kind of ine&actness under discussion to indicate t e trut roug ly >

? and in outline > ?. :ur accounts of t ings t at fluctuate or are for t e *ost part are or per aps can only "e roug representations4 t ey give only an outline. ' ey do not give an e&act representation of t e p eno*ena4 t ey do not *atc or fit precisely t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter. ' e trut a"out t e su"/ect *atter is or can only "e roug ly represented. -inally, our accounts *ay "e ine&act "y lacking t e de*onstrative purity, rigor, or per aps even c aracter of *at e*atics. )n t e concluding sentences of E.6 Aristotle clai*s t at t e conclusions of our reasonings a"out *atters of conduct are t e*selves true for t e *ost part. <e goes on to insist t at ,e s ould de*and only t at level of e&actness t at is co**ensurate ,it t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter >see also E.#?. ' e e&actness at issue ere as to do ,it t e nature of t e reasoning or proofs a discipline utili9es. ' e reasoning or proof *ust, according to Aristotle, fit 5 6$F 5 t e su"/ect *atter of t e discipline4 it can only "e as e&act as its su"/ect *atter is. +o*e disciplines are *ore e&act t an ot ers "y utili9ing proofs or reasoning t at are *ore rigorous or pure t an t ose utili9ed "y disciplines , ose su"/ect *atter is ine&act. ' us Aristotle identifies an ine&actness at t e level of t e su"/ect *atter of et ics=t e su"/ect *atter presu*a"ly fluctuates or is for t e *ost part. <e also attri"utes t e sa*e ine&actness to t e propositions a"out *atters of conduct=t ey are true for t e *ost part. ' e propositions are ine&act "y giving only a roug representation of *atters of conduct. Jast, e finds an ine&actness in t e reasoning or proofs et ics utili9es. ' e reasoning or proofs it uses or can use cannot *atc t ose used "y *at e*atics in so*e respect or ot er. ' e kind utili9ed "y et ics suffers fro* so*e deficiencies, and t ese deficiencies, Aristotle t inks, are a conse1uence of t e nature of t e *atters of conduct. 2 at t ese deficiencies are, , at t e ine&actness pertaining to t e proofs or reasoning of et ics are, is "y no *eans o"vious. ' ey are t e 1uestions t at ,ill "e t e focus of t e discussion in t e ne&t c apter, , ere ) ,ill atte*pt to e&plicate t e nature of t e deficiencies in t e proofs et ics uses and e&plain o, proofs a"out *atters t at are for t e *ost part are at all possi"le.

The !cope of -luctuation or eing for the Most Part

2 at is t e scope of fluctuation or of "eing for t e *ost part; Are all t e t ings et ics studies fluctuating; Are all t e properties of everyt ing t at "elongs to t e su"/ect *atter of et ics fluctuating or are all et ical propositions true for t e *ost part; Aristotle does not address e&plicitly t e 1uestion of t e scope of "eing for t e *ost part, and e does not identify for us a set of t ings fro* t e do*ain of *atters of conduct or of t eir properties t at fluctuate or a set of propositions a"out t e* t at are

true for t e *ost part. ' e t,o e&a*ples e gives in E.6 of t ings t at fluctuate, t ose of ,ealt and courage, are too fe, and cannot "y t e*selves provide us ,it a "asis fro* , ic to generali9e. )t is not o"vious t at all e&ternal goods, like ,ealt , and all states of c aracter, like courage, are fluctuating. ' e situation does not c ange *uc if ,e include t e fe, ot er e&a*ples of t ings t at are for t e *ost part e gives else, ere in t e N.E. >see ne&t section?. Adding t ese to courage and ,ealt does not provide us ,it an inductive "ase t at is significantly "etter. +i*ilarly, Aristotle in E.6 gives one e&a*ple of a property t at fluctuates or "elongs for t e *ost part to ,ealt and courage=t e property of "eing "eneficial. But are ,e to suppose t at all properties of ,ealt and courage fluctuate or t at all propositions a"out t ese t ings are true for t e *ost part; Are ,e to assu*e, for e&a*ple, t at all t e nonessential as ,ell as all t e essential attri"utes of ,ealt and courage fluctuate; 5 6$H 5 Again, t e fe, e&a*ples of t ings t at are for t e *ost part Aristotle gives else, ere do not ans,er suc 1uestions une1uivocally and do not provide any *eaningful inductive "ase fro* , ic to generali9e. (ost pro"a"ly, Aristotle does not offer t e fe, e&a*ples e gives ,it t e purpose of providing an inductive "ase fro* , ic ,e ,ill "e a"le to dra, so*e inductive conclusion. (ost often, suc e&a*ples are illustrations of a general principle t at is eld on t e "asis of noninductive considerations. ' is is certainly t e case ,it t e t,o e&a*ples of ,ealt and courage Aristotle gives in E.6=t ey illustrate or provide concrete instances of t e general t esis t at t e no"le, /ust, and good t ings fluctuate. ' e t,o e&a*ples do not function as inductive evidence for t e t esis t at , at politics and et ics study fluctuates, "ut t ey illustrate it. Alt oug Aristotle does not address e&plicitly t e 1uestion of t e scope of fluctuation and does not provide us ,it ade1uate inductive evidence for dra,ing our o,n inductive conclusions, it does not follo, fro* t is t at e does not ave a vie, on t is issue. <e *akes several state*ents a"out related *atters t at indicate e does ave a position. ' ese state*ents suggest t at e takes t e scope of fluctuation to "e 1uite ,ide, per aps to "e so ,ide t at it enco*passes all *atters of conduct and all of t eir attri"utes. -or instance, Aristotle clai*s t at *atters of politics e& i"it *uc >

? fluctuation and t e sa*e is also true of , at et ics studies >E.6?, and alt oug it *ay "e argued t at to speak of *uc fluctuation is not to i*ply t at everyt ing is fluctuating,@HA , at Aristotle says points in t e ot er direction: All *atters of conduct fluctuate or all of t eir properties "elong to t e* for t e *ost part. 'o "egin ,it , e speaks of t e no"le, /ust, and good t ings as fluctuating ,it out e&cluding anyt ing t at is no"le, /ust, or good. )t is true t at Aristotle.s assertions concerning t e supposed fluctuation of t e no"le, /ust, and good t ings consist of sentences t at are strictly speaking indefinite4 t ey lack 1uantifiers and t us do not e&plicitly state t at all *atters of politics and et ics fluctuate. But indefinite sentences are al*ost invaria"ly understood as universal state*ents, as state*ents , ose universal 1uantifiers, alt oug o*itted, are taken for granted. Again, , en Aristotle c aracteri9es t e pre*ises and conclusions t at constitute t e co*ponents of our reasonings a"out *atters of conduct as "eing true for t e *ost part, e does not e&clude any state*ents t at are not true for t e *ost part.@9A All propositions a"out *atters of conduct are presu*a"ly true for t e *ost part "ecause t ey are a"out t ings t at fluctuate. )ndeed, if all propositions a"out *atters of conduct are to "e true for t e *ost part it is not sufficient t at all t e good, /ust, or no"le t ings

fluctuate *erely in t e sense t at eac good, /ust, or no"le t ing fluctuates in respect to so*e property. )n order t at all propositions a"out 5 6$9 5 suc t ings "e true for t e *ost part, all of t eir properties *ust "elong to t e* for t e *ost part4 suc t ings *ust fluctuate in respect to all t eir properties. -or if t ere is a property P of so*e good or no"le t ing ' suc t at all '.s ave P, or ' does not fluctuate in respect to P, t en t e proposition G'.s are PG ,ill not "e true for t e *ost part "ut in all cases. -or e&a*ple, if in contrast to t e ,ay t e property of "eing "eneficial attac es to ,ealt , t e property of "eing desired "elongs to ,ealt al,ays, t en t e proposition G2ealt is desiredG ,ill not "e true for t e *ost part "ut in all cases. An additional and per aps a decisive consideration in support of t e clai* t at Aristotle vie,s all *atters of conduct as fluctuating or all of t eir properties as "elonging to t e* for t e *ost part is t e follo,ing. Aristotle takes *atters of conduct to "e suc t at t ey can "e ot er,ise. ' is feature, e argues in N.E. Book K), sets *atters of conduct apart fro* t e do*ains of ot er disciplines , ic consist in t ings t at are necessary. 2it regard to t is feature of "eing a"le to "e ot er,ise, t e feature of contingency, Aristotle see*s to old t at it is true of all *atters of conduct: GAll @*atters of conductA can "e ot er,ise @

AG >N.E. 114$"?. And as s all "e seen "elo,, e also takes universality of trut in a proposition or t e e& i"iting of a property "y all instances of a kind to i*ply necessity. )f all *atters of conduct can, according to Aristotle, "e ot er,ise, if t ey are not necessary, t en t e propositions a"out t e* ,ill not "e universally true and *atters of conduct ,ill fluctuate4 t ey ,ill at "est "e only for t e *ost part. )t is reasona"le to suppose, t en, t at Aristotle includes all *atters of conduct and all of t eir properties ="ot t e essential and nonessential ones=a*ong , at can fluctuate or can "e for t e *ost part. 'o include, o,ever, t e essential attri"utes of a kind a*ong t ose t at can fluctuate or can "e for t e *ost part is "ound to "e 1uite pro"le*atic for Aristotle, for e t inks t at t e essential attri"utes of any kind D "elong to all t e *e*"ers of D. ' ey are t e attri"utes t at define t e kind4 t ey deter*ine , et er so*et ing "elongs to t e kind or not. But if essential attri"utes can fluctuate or "elong to a kind only for t e *ost part, t en t ere could "e *e*"ers of a kind t at could lack so*e of its essential attri"utes. )f, for e&a*ple, "eing an ani*al and "eing rational are essential attri"utes of u*ans, t ere could "e u*ans t at failed to "e ani*als or rational, if suc properties ,ere to fluctuate or to "elong to t e kind human only for t e *ost part. +i*ilarly, if "eing a disposition fluctuates in relation to virtue >or vice? t ere could "e instances of virtue or >vice? , ic are not dispositions. ) s all discuss t e nature of t is ine&actness t at, according to Aristotle, affects t e essential structure of *atters of conduct, is reasons in support of t is clai*, and any episte*ological conse1uences suc ine&actness *ig t 5 61$ 5 ave in a later c apter. -or t e *o*ent ) ,is to set aside any possi"le fluctuation of essential attri"utes and focus instead on t e supposed fluctuation of nonessential ones. )t needs to "e recogni9ed t at t ere *ay "e properties t at fluctuate or "elong for t e *ost part to so*e C ,it out t ere "eing anyt ing pro"le*atic a"out t e essence of C. ' us, Aristotle clai*s t at t e property of "eco*ing greyB aired "elongs to *an for t e *ost part > r. Anal. #6a%?, "ut t ere is no evidence t at e takes t e

essence of *an to "e ine&act or its definition to "e true for t e *ost part. +i*ilarly, *ales e& i"it t e property of aving a "eard for t e *ost part > ost. Anal. 9Ea16?, *ales rese*"le t eir fat ers for t e *ost part >G.A. FEHa64?, and oneyB,ater is "eneficial for so*eone ,it fever for t e *ost part >Met. 1$6Fa66?, "ut again t ere is no evidence t at Aristotle takes t e essence of *ale or oneyB,ater to "e pro"le*atic. -ocusing on t e e&a*ple Aristotle uses in E.6, one does not need to suppose t at t e essential nature of ,ealt is pro"le*atic in order for t e property of "eing "eneficial to "elong to ,ealt for t e *ost part or to fluctuate. ' e supposed fluctuation *ay /ust "e t e ,ay t is property relates to ,ealt . Aristotle i*self does not clai* t at ,ealt fluctuates in its essential structure. :n t e contrary, e offers a definition of its essential c aracter ,it out any int t at t ere is anyt ing pro"le*atic a"out it.@1$A )f ,e can distinguis "et,een t e fluctuation of essential and nonessential attri"utes, ,e *ay consider t e follo,ing 1uestion concerning Aristotle.s clai*s a"out t e fluctuation of *atters of conduct: 3o all *atters of conduct fluctuate in relation to t eir nonessential attri"utes; ' e significance of Aristotle.s clai* a"out t e pervasiveness of fluctuation in t e case of nonessential attri"utes can "est "e understood , en vie,ed against , at +ocrates and Plato say on t ese *atters. As ) said earlier, t ey often speak or assu*e t at *ost if not all nonessential attri"utes of any kind D in t e do*ain of conduct c aracteri9e all instances of D. ' ey *ost often take a proposition asserting a nonessential attri"ute of so*e kind of *atter of conduct to "e universally true of t e kind, to "e true of all its instances. ' is t esis of universality is i*plicit in t eir conception of t e proof or de*onstration of t e nonessential attri"utes of so*e *atter of conduct fro* its essential attri"utes and ot er relevant propositions. +ocrates and Plato vie, t e propositions t at constitute t e pre*ises of suc proofs to "e universally true and t erefore t e conclusions to "e universally true as ,ell. )n t e e&a*ple +ocrates gives in t e Meno , t e definition of virtue as a kind of kno,ledge and t e >universal? proposition t at kno,ledge is teac a"le ,ill, if true, i*ply t e >universal? proposition t at all virtue is teac a"le. +uc a proof or de*onstration ,ill s o, t at t e property of "eing teac a"le does not fluctuate in relation to virtue4 it is not true of it for t e *ost part "ut in all instances. (ost pro"a"ly, t e target of Aristotle.s criticis* , en insisting t at all 5 611 5 *atters of conduct fluctuate in relation to t eir nonessential attri"utes is t e +ocraticBPlatonic t esis of t e universality of suc attri"utes. )n contrast to , at t e universality t esis states, Aristotle is insisting t at nonessential attri"utes "elong to *atters of conduct only for t e *ost part. Against t e i*plicit assu*ption of +ocrates and Plato, e clai*s t at t e propositions , ic assert nonessential attri"utes of so*e su"/ect, and , ic constitute t e pre*ises of syllogis*s a"out *atters of conduct, are not universally true. ' e pre*ises are true for t e *ost part "ecause *atters of conduct fluctuate. As e insists in E.6 against t e +ocraticBPlatonic progra* of de*onstrating universally true propositions a"out *atters of conduct, if t e pre*ises a"out *atters of conduct are true for t e *ost part, t e conclusions ,ill "e also true for t e *ost part. 0egardless of , et er t e +ocraticBPlatonic t esis is true, Aristotle see*s to overstate *atters in is response to it. All one needs to s o, in order to argue successfully against t e universality t esis is t at so*e *atters of conduct fluctuate, t at so*e nonessential attri"utes "elong to *atters of conduct for t e *ost part or t at t e corresponding propositions are true for t e *ost part. :ne does not need to s o, or assert t at all nonessential attri"utes fluctuate or deny t at any proposition asserting of a su"/ect a nonessential attri"ute is universally true in order to refute or deny t e universality t esis. Pointing to so*e instances , ere t e t esis fails to old ,ould "e sufficient for refuting t e universality t esis. )ndeed, ,e can see t at Aristotle does not need all of t e pre*ises of a syllogis*

a"out so*e *atter of conduct to "e true for t e *ost part in order for t e conclusion also to "e true for t e *ost part. -or even if only so*e of t e pre*ises are true for t e *ost part, t e conclusion *ay very ,ell "e true for t e *ost part.@11A ' e tendency of going over"oard , en critici9ing Plato or , en proposing a position as an alternative to one proposed "y Plato is rat er typical ,it Aristotle. )t is to so*e e&tent t en not surprising to find t at despite is pronounce*ents against Plato, Aristotle i*self recogni9es so*e t ings as not e& i"iting fluctuation in relation to so*e of t eir nonessential properties or t at so*e propositions a"out suc properties are not true only for t e *ost part. ' us e takes t e property of "eing "eneficial to "elong to ealt in all instances, and t erefore t e proposition t at ealt is "eneficial to "e true in all cases. +i*ilarly, e takes t e properties of "eing "la*e,ort y and ,rong to "elong to all instances of *alice, s a*elessness, envy, adultery, t eft, and *urder: GAll t ese @

A are "la*ed as "eing "ad in t e*selvesG >11$Fa16?. <e takes t e propositions t at our *oral dispositions are for*ed as a result of t e corresponding activities >11$#"66? and t at suc dispositions are destroyed "y e&cess and deficiency >11$4a16? to "e true in all cases. ' e sa*e kind of discrepancy "et,een general state*ents and actual 5 616 5 practice is to "e o"served in , at Aristotle says a"out t e ine&actness of natural p eno*ena and is o,n specific o"servations or conclusions , en investigating nature. -or despite is general pronounce*ents t at all of nature is ine&act "ecause t e , ole of it as *atter >Met. 99%a1%? and despite t e plet ora of e&a*ples e gives in t e "iological ,orks of t ings t at are for t e *ost part, e nonet eless identifies *any t ings t at e& i"it no suc c aracteristic or so*e properties t at do not "elong only for t e *ost part to , atever as t e*. ' us, Aristotle o"serves t at all ani*als ave t eir uterus inside >G.A. F19"?, fe*ales do not generate on t eir o,n >F#$a#$?, in all ani*als t at *ove, *ale and fe*ale are separate >F#$E##?, all *ules are infertile >F4Fa64?, all viviparous ani*als are "looded >F#6"1$?, all "irds lay eggs >H.A. %%H"1$?, and so on. 8ven t e restricted 1uestion a"out t e scope of fluctuation ,e are discussing ere is less clear and *ore co*ple& t an it at first appears. 2 en t e 1uestion: G3o all *atters of conduct fluctuate in relation to t eir nonessential attri"utes;G is posed in a certain ,ay it see*s to presuppose t at t ere is a ,ay of finding an ans,er to it. )t see*s to presuppose t at t ere is a ,ay of deter*ining , et er all *atters of conduct fluctuate "y e&a*ining t e various ele*ents of conduct "y running so*e sort of inventory and c ecking , et er eac ele*ent fluctuates. :r it per aps assu*es t at ,e can identify so*e feature or set of features of *atters of conduct , ic i*plies t at all of t e* e& i"it fluctuation in relation to t eir nonessential attri"utes. Aristotle i*self, as seen a"ove, identifies suc a feature of all nature= na*ely, its possessing *atter. Per aps t is sa*e feature or even a different one is t e reason , y *atters of conduct fluctuate. +uc a feature ,ould e&plain , y all *atters of conduct fluctuate. Clearly, o,ever, running an inventory ,ill not "y itself do as an ans,er to our 1uestion. -or even t oug so*e *atter of conduct *ay turn out to fluctuate , en descri"ed in one ,ay or , en t e do*ain is parsed in a particular ,ay, it is not o"vious t at t is sa*e *atter of conduct cannot "e descri"ed or t e do*ain "e parsed in suc a ,ay t at it is not fluctuating. 8ven if ,e ,ere successful in singling out so*e feature as t e source of fluctuation, our 1uestion could still "e difficult to ans,er in

t e ,ay Aristotle does=in t e affir*ative. 2 at is re1uired in order to ans,er t e 1uestion in t e ,ay Aristotle does is not *erely to single out so*e feature as t e cause of fluctuation. :ne as to s o, in addition t at t ere is no ,ay of descri"ing or parsing t e p eno*ena suc t at fluctuation is eli*inated fro* so*e of t e* or in relation to so*e of t eir properties. )t is clear t at our 1uestion a"out t e scope of fluctuation cannot "e ans,ered ,it out resolving t e pro"le* of , et er fluctuation or "eing true for t e *ost part can "e eli*inated fro* our accounts, for clearly t e 1uestion a"out t e scope of fluctuation is not , et er t ere is so*e 5 61# 5 description under , ic t e p eno*ena e& i"it fluctuation. 8ven if t ere ,ere suc a description, it alone ,ould not s o, t at so*e p eno*ena cannot "e descri"ed in a ,ay t at fluctuation or "eing true for t e *ost part is eli*inated. 2ealt *ay e& i"it fluctuation in relation to t e property of "eing "eneficial , en ,e descri"e t e p eno*ena "y t e state*ent G2ealt is "eneficial,G "ut fluctuation *ay "e eli*inated if ,e succeed in isolating t e kind of ,ealt t at is in all instances "eneficial and t e a"ove state*ent is *odified so t at it attri"utes t e property of "eing "eneficial only to t is kind of ,ealt . <ence, t e issue concerning t e scope of fluctuation raises t e follo,ing 1uestion: )s t ere no description under , ic t e p eno*ena of conduct do not fluctuate; ' is is a 1uestion a"out t e eli*ina"ility of fluctuation or of "eing true for t e *ost part fro* our accounts. ) s all return to it later.

The 1ature of eing for the Most Part

2 at precisely is t e nature of "eing for t e *ost part and o, does it differ fro* ot er ,ays of "eing; Muestions arise in t is connection a"out t e ,ay Aristotle distinguis es a*ong t ings t at are "y necessity, for t e *ost part, "y c ance, and so fort , or a*ong propositions t at are true necessarily, universally, or for t e *ost part. -ortunately, Aristotle gives so*e e&a*ples of t ings t at e takes to "e for t e *ost part and e also atte*pts to e&plicate t e nature of "eing for t e *ost part, often "y dra,ing a contrast "et,een "eing for t e *ost part and ot er ,ays of "eing=for e&a*ple, "eing "y necessity or "eing "y c ance. ) s all first e&a*ine so*e of t e e&a*ples Aristotle i*self gives of t ings t at are for t e *ost part and ne&t discuss is o,n o"servations a"out t e nature of "eing for t e *ost part and o, it differs fro* ot er ,ays of "eing. ' e follo,ing is a list of all t e e&a*ples Aristotle gives in t e treatises on conduct of t ings t at are presu*a"ly for t e *ost part: 3.9 E.% E.E E.F ' e no"le and /ust t ings e& i"it fluctuation. >N.E.&;=9bl:7 ' e good t ings e& i"it fluctuation. >1$94"1F? 2ealt and "ravery e& i"it fluctuation. >1$94"1H? -or t e *ost part in suc situations @, ere ,e are co*pelled "y t reat to act dis onora"lyA t e penalty t reatened is painful and t e act forced upon us is dis onora"le. >111$a#6? of one of t,o correlative ter*s as several senses, it follo,s for t e *ost part t at t e

E.H

ot er is used in several senses too. >1169a64? E.9 Co*rades are si*ilar in t eir feelings and c aracter for t e *ost part. >11E1a6%?

3.&;

5 614 5 :ne oug t for t e *ost part to return services rendered rat er t an do favors to co*rades. >11E4E##? @-or t e *ost partA one oug t to pay "ack a loan to a creditor rat er t an give t e *oney to a friend. >11E4E#4, 11E%a#? 0est and fasting are "eneficial for so*eone ,it fever. >11H$"1$?@16A ) call passions suc t ings as anger, fear . . . and in general t ose t ings , ic are for t e *ost part acco*panied "y sensory pleasure or pain. >E.E.&%%;b&87 )t see*s t at t e "rave *an is for t e *ost part fearless, and t e co,ard lia"le to fear. >166HE%? ' e person . . . deficient in all t e en/oy*ents , ic for t e *ost part everyone *ust s are and en/oy is insensitive. >16#1a6F? (en @, o ave good natures, "utA lack reason, are for t e *ost part successful. >164FE6H? -or t e *ost part t e ric are fe, and t e poor are *any in a state. > olit. &%=&b=7 ' ose , o divide t e ages @of c ildrenA "y periods of seven years are for t e *ost part correct. >1##EE41?@1#A

E.11

E.16 3.&8

E.14

E.1%

E.1E

E.1F E.1H

' e e&a*ples Aristotle gives in t e rest of t e treatises of t ings t at are for t e *ost part are altoget er too nu*erous to "e included ere. ' is is especially so in t e case of t e "iological treatises, in particular in H.A. , , ere Aristotle gives *any e&a*ples of t ings t at are presu*a"ly for t e *ost part. ) s all t erefore select a fe, of t e* fro* t ose re*aining treatises to present ere, focusing on t ose t at see* to *e to raise so*e i*portant 1uestions. Consider t e follo,ing e&a*ples fro* t e logical or 1uasilogical treatises: 3.&= E.6$ (en for t e *ost part "eco*e greyB aired or gro, or ,aste a,ay. > r. Anal. 8%3:7 -or t e *ost part t e envious are ateful. >F$a4?

E.61

Iot every u*an *ale gro,s air on t e c in, "ut for t e *ost part. > ost. Anal. =3a&%7 8&ercise for t e *ost part produces ealt . >Rhet.&83%a897 ' ose t ings t at give us pleasure , en present for t e *ost part also give us pleasure , en ,e ope for or re*e*"er t e*. >1#F$"1$? Jearning and ad*iring are for t e *ost part pleasant. >1#F1a#6?

E.66 E.6#

E.64

3.%: E.6E

5 61% 5 All t ings akin and like are for t e *ost part pleasant to eac ot er. >1#F1"14? (en are fond for t e *ost part of t ose , o flatter and love t e*. >1#F1"6#?@14A

)n t e Met. Aristotle says *uc a"out t e differences t at presu*a"ly e&ist a*ong t ings t at are "y necessity, al,ays, or for t e *ost part, "ut e gives only t,o e&a*ples of t ings t at are for t e *ost part: 3.%5 E.6H +ultry eat occurs during t e dogBdays al,ays or for t e *ost part. >1$6EE#E? <oneyB,ater is for t e *ost part "eneficial for so*eone ,it fever. >1$6Fa6%?

:f t e nu*erous e&a*ples Aristotle gives in t e "iological treatises of t ings t at are for t e *ost part, ere are /ust a fe, representative e&a*ples fro* H.A. : 3.%= E.#$ E.#1 E.#6 ' e skull of *en as for t e *ost part t,o sutures. >491E4? ' e , ite of t e eye is for t e *ost part t e sa*e in all ani*als. >496a1? People ,it s ort upper ar*s ave for t e *ost part s ort t ig s. >49#E64? Ani*als ,it *ore teet for t e *ost part live longer. >%$1E6#?@1%A

)t is evident t at t e e&a*ples Aristotle gives are diverse. ' ere *ay "e si*ilarities a*ong t e*, "ut t ere are also differences. ' e latter is per aps to "e e&pected, since t e e&a*ples co*e fro* 1uite different do*ains4 t ey "elong to t e su"/ect *atter of 1uite different disciplines. ' e first t,o re*arks >E.4 and E.%? do not really give any specific e&a*ples4 t ey do not identify any particular t ings t at are for t e *ost part. ' ey are rat er general state*ents a"out t e nature of *atters of conduct, t e t ings

politics and et ics investigate. :f t e rest of t e state*ents 1uoted a"ove, so*e are "est treated as e*pirical generali9ations stating t at so*e t ings e& i"it so*e specific property for t e *ost part. ' is see*s to "e t e case ,it E.E , ic asserts t at ,ealt and "ravery fluctuate in respect to "eing "eneficial. ' e sa*e can "e said a"out t e assertion concerning certain *oral dile**as and t e nature of t e penalty t reatened and of t e act t at is forced upon so*eone >E.F?, t e relation a*ong correlative ter*s ,it respect to aving several senses >E.H?, t e relation a*ong co*rades ,it respect to si*ilarity of feelings and c aracter >E.9?, rest and fasting in respect of "eing "eneficial >E.16?, not "eing insensitive and e&periencing certain pleasures >E.1%?, *en ,it a good nature and success >E.1E?, ric and poor citi9ens in respect of t eir nu*"ers in t e state >E.1F?, 5 61E 5 and t e division of t e ages of c ildren in ter*s of periods of seven years >E.1H?. ' e sa*e see*s also to "e t e case ,it al*ost all t e state*ents fro* t e treatises t at do not deal ,it *atters of conduct. ' at, for e&a*ple, *en gro, greyB aired >E.19? or t at *ales gro, air in t eir c in >E.61? are "est treated as e*pirical generali9ations. )n general, t e sa*e treat*ent see*s *ost appropriate for al*ost all of t e re*aining state*ents, especially t e ones fro* H.A. >E.6$, E.66, E.6#, E.64, E.6%, E.6E, E.6H, E.69, E.#$, E.#1, E.#6?. +o*e of Aristotle.s state*ents asserting t at so*et ing e& i"its a property for t e *ost part are *ore pro"le*atic, o,ever. Consider, for e&a*ple, t e dis/uncts of E.19 asserting t at *en for t e *ost part gro, or ,aste a,ay. -irst, t e properties at issue, gro,ing or ,asting a,ay, are true of all *en4 t ey "elong to *en in all cases. +econd, t ese assertions see* to involve so*et ing *ore t an , at is involved in e*pirical generali9ations. ' ey see* to involve at least p ysical necessity=gro,t and corruption appear to "e p ysically necessary attri"utes of all living t ings. Aristotle, o,ever, treats t ese attri"utes in t e sa*e ,ay e treats t e attri"ute of "eco*ing greyB aired= e treats all of t e* as "elonging to t eir corresponding su"/ects for t e *ost part and contingently. As s all "e seen "elo,, Aristotle takes , at is for t e *ost part to "e contingent "ut t e t,o are not t e sa*e t ing. )n E.19, o,ever, it see*s t at t e aspect of contingency is , at is upper*ost in is *ind and t is is per aps , at e&plains is state*ent t at *en for t e *ost part gro, or ,aste a,ay. A different pro"le* is raised "y E.6F. 2 y does Aristotle say t ere t at sultry eat occurs during t e dog days al,ays >

? or for t e *ost part; Can it occur "ot al,ays and for t e *ost part; :r does e use t e dis/unction in t e e&clusive sense; ' ere are ,ays of reading E.6F t at *ake eit er of t e dis/uncts plausi"le. :ne could, for instance, take dog days to /ust *ean Gdays of sultry eat,G , ic ,ould *ake t e first dis/unct true: G+ultry eat occurs during t e dog daysG ,ill al,ays "e true4 it ,ill "e analytically true. But t en it could not "e true only for t e *ost part. 7et it is *ost certain t at Aristotle takes t e proposition a"out sultry eat during t e dog days to "e true for t e *ost part. (ost co**only, Gdog daysG is taken to designate t e unusually ot days "et,een early Luly and August=t e period , en t e rising of t e 3og +tar >+irius? occurs. ' e relation "et,een dog days and sultry eat ,ould "e si*ilar to t e one , ic Aristotle takes to old "et,een t e seven days preceding and follo,ing t e ,inter solstice and cal* ,eat er > alcyon days?: G<ence , en cal* ,eat er occurs at t is period @,inter solsticeA, t e na*e . alcyon days. is given to t e seven days preceding and t e seven days follo,ing t e solstice. . . . And t ese days are cal* , en it so appens t at sout erly ,inds "lo, at t e solstice. . . . )n our part of t e ,orld, it is true, it does

5 61F 5 not appen at all ti*es t at alcyon days occur at t e solstice, "ut in t e +icilian sea t ey occur al*ost al,aysG >H.A. %46E%?. ' us, , ereas Aristotle takes G alcyon daysG and Gcal* ,eat er preceding and follo,ing t e ,inter solsticeG to "e analytically connected, t ere is no suc connection "et,een Gcal* ,eat erG and Gt e days preceding and follo,ing t e ,inter solstice.G Cal* ,eat er occurs for t e *ost part >Gal*ost al,aysG? during t e ,inter solstice days, "ut t is is, according to Aristotle, an e*pirical fact. +i*ilarly, sultry eat occurs for t e *ost part , en t e rising of t e 3og +tar occurs. <o,ever, t e pro"le* t at E.6F raises, , ic can "e dealt ,it easily in its case, is also raised "y al*ost all of t e re*aining e&a*ples, and it see*s t at it is *ore difficult to deal ,it it in t eir case. -or , at E.1$ and E.11 state a"out our o"ligation to return services rendered and our o"ligation to pay "ack a loan appears to "e *ore t an a *ere e*pirical generali9ation. :ne *ay agree ,it Aristotle t at t ere are e&ceptions to t e general rules a"out o"ligation to return services rat er t an do favors for co*rades and to pay "ack a loan to t e creditor rat er t an give t e *oney to a friend, "ut it is clear t at t ese general state*ents are different fro* t e purely e*pirical generali9ations, discussed a"ove, t at also ave e&ceptions or old for t e *ost part. -or in t e case of E.11 at least, t e o"ligation to pay "ack a loan is part of t e practice or institution of "orro,ing.@1EA ' e sa*e kind of difficulty is raised "y t,o e&a*ples fro* t e E.E. Consider, for instance, , at Aristotle says a"out t e "rave person and t e co,ard in E.14. ' e relation "et,een t e e*otion of fear and "eing "rave or "eing a co,ard as to "e *ore t an a contingent one ,it in t e Aristotelian fra*e,ork, for t e e*otion of fear is, according to Aristotle, part of t e definition of t e "rave person >and of "ravery? and of t e co,ard >and of co,ardice?. ' e co,ard!s t e person , o is lia"le to fear. -or t e sa*e reasons, E.1# is also pro"le*atic. 3oes t e property of "eing acco*panied "y pleasure or pain "elong to passion only for t e *ost part; )n N.E. Book )), c apter v, "eing follo,ed "y pleasure or pain is included in , at is offered t ere as t e definition of a passion, "ut of course ,it out t e Gfor t e *ost partG locution, and it see*s t at E.1# itself is given as a kind of stipulative definition=G) call passions suc t ings as. . . . G' e relation "et,een "eing a passion and "eing acco*panied "y pleasure or pain see*s to "e necessary eit er "ecause it is a stipulative!analytic or an essential one. )n , at ,ay, t en, do t e properties t at a su"/ect possesses only for t e *ost part "elong to it; 3o t ey "elong to it necessarily or contingently; :r do so*e of t e* "elong necessarily, , ereas ot ers do so contingently; As ,e ave /ust seen in t e t,o last e&a*ples fro* E.E. , so*e properties t at are included in t e definition of a su"/ect and t erefore so*e essential 5 61H 5 properties "elong to it only for t e *ost part. But if essential attri"utes are, as Aristotle invaria"ly clai*s, necessary attri"utes, t en so*e attri"utes of a su"/ect t at "elong to it for t e *ost part *ust "elong to it necessarily. ' ere is so*et ing 1uite pu99ling a"out t e a"ove conclusion, o,ever, for, as noted earlier, t e essential attri"utes of a kind D "elong, according to Aristotle, to D necessarily and universally=every *e*"er of D as t e sa*e essential attri"utes. +o o, can essential attri"utes "elong to a kind only for t e *ost part; Can t ere "e *e*"ers of a kind t at do not e& i"it t e essential attri"utes of t at kind; And o, can a property t at "elongs to a kind only for t e *ost part "e a necessary property of t at kind; 2 at Aristotle says a"out t e nature of "eing for t e *ost part and a"out t e *anner it differs fro* ot er ,ays of "eing *ay not ans,er all of t e a"ove 1uestions, or it *ay not do so satisfactorily,

"ut t e logical step is to e&a*ine ne&t , at e actually says a"out t ese issues. Aristotle speaks at ti*es a"out t e nature of "eing for t e *ost part , en trying to dra, t e "oundaries of , at is kno,a"le or de*onstra"le. )n several passages , ere e is concerned ,it deter*ining t e li*its of scientific kno,ledge, e clai*s t at t e do*ain of t e scientifically kno,a"le or of t e de*onstra"le consists of t at , ic is necessary >

, ?, al,ays > ?, and for t e *ost part, , ile t at , ic is accidentally > ? or "y luck >t e fortuitous, falls outside t e de*onstra"le > ost. Anal. HFE6$4 Met. 1$6Fa6%, 1$E4"1%, 1$E%a%4 hys. 19Ea, "19?. Alt oug Aristotle.s focus in t ese passages is t e contrast "et,een t e nonde*onstra"le and t e de*onstra"le, or "et,een t e accidental or fortuitous and all else, one s ould not overlook t e contrast e is also dra,ing ,it in t e de*onstra"le or kno,a"le itself. )t can easily "e seen t at Aristotle is as *uc concerned ,it distinguis ing "et,een t e nonde*onstra"le and t e de*onstra"le as e is ,it keeping t e co*ponents of t e de*onstra"le apart and distinct4 for in every instance , ere e contrasts t e nonde*onstra"le to t e de*onstra"le, e also identifies as distinct co*ponents of t e de*onstra"le t,o or *ore types of t ings or "eing. ' us, Aristotle speaks of >a? , at is al,ays and of necessity on t e one and >
?

? and , at is for t e *ost part on t e ot er > =Met. 1$6EE#$, 1$E4E##, #%, #E, #F, 1$E%a6?4 >"? , at is al,ays and , at is for t e *ost part >Met. 1$6EE#6, #E, 1$6Fa1H, 6%, 1$E%a%4 hys. 19E"1$, 19Fa19, #1, 199E64?4 and >c? , at is of necessity and , at is for t e *ost part > hys. 19EE6$, #%4 r. Anal. #6"F?. ' e contrast Aristotle dra,s in t e passages referred to a"ove indicates 1uite clearly t at e takes , at is for t e *ost part not to "e necessary. )n addition, it indicates t at e also takes , at is for t e *ost part to "e distinct fro* , at is al,ays. )t see*s 1uite natural to distinguis "et,een , at is for t e *ost part on t e one and and , at is necessary or al,ays 5 619 5 on t e ot er. 2e consider , at is necessary or al,ays to "e, unlike , at is for t e *ost part, ,it out e&ceptions or incapa"le to "e ot er,ise. ' is is part of our intuitive understanding of , at it is to "e al,ays in a certain ,ay or "y necessity. <o,ever, it *ay "e said in t is conte&t t at , at is for t e

*ost part is necessary or al,ays save in t e cases , ere ,e ave e&ceptions.@1FA And it is suc a conception of "eing for t e *ost part t at can "est account for t e cases *entioned earlier , ere so*e kind D e& i"its a certain property - for t e *ost part, , ile at t e sa*e ti*e ,e tend to vie, - as an essential property of D or at least as "elonging to D necessarily or al,ays. ' e *ove of incorporating , at is for t e *ost part into , at is necessary or al,ays is not ,it out its difficulties, o,ever. -irst, it see*s to "e in conflict ,it t e intuition ) alluded to a"ove=na*ely, t at unlike t at , ic is for t e *ost part, t at , ic is "y necessity or al,ays is t oug t to ave no e&ceptions, or to o"tain in all cases >t e universal?, or to "e incapa"le of "eing ot er,ise. )t is to suc an intuition t at p ilosop ers often appeal in order to /ustify t eir contention t at , at is for t e *ost part is not a co*ponent of t e necessary. Aristotle i*self, as s all "e seen, *ost often links t ese t ree ,ays of possessing a property: necessarily, al,ays, and in all cases >universally?. +econd, setting aside t e appeal to intuitions for t e *o*ent, t ere is a*ple te&tual evidence t at Aristotle does not incorporate , at is for t e *ost part into t e necessary. ' e evidence ) ave in *ind ere goes "eyond t e nu*erous instances ) presented a"ove , ere Aristotle *erely contrasts , at is necessary or al,ays on t e one and to , at is for t e *ost part on t e ot er. ' e evidence includes e&plicit state*ents "y Aristotle t at , at is for t e *ost part, unlike , at is necessary, can "e ot er,ise4 it is contingent. )t is true t at at ti*es Aristotle speaks of t ings t at occur regularly in a certain ,ay if nature is not t ,arted or prevented. <e also speaks of ot er t ings t at ,ould not ave occurred if t e order of nature ad not "een t ,arted or prevented. ' us e clai*s in G.A. t at t e natural position of t e uterus is lo, do,n Gunless t ere is so*e ot er "usiness of nature t at prevents itG >F1H"6E?. )n Book )K, c apter iv of t e sa*e treatise, e speaks of a nu*"er of t ings relating to t e generation of ani*als t at occur "ecause nature is prevented or t ,arted. Aristotle does not dra, t e conclusion t at , at is not prevented fro* occurring, , at appens for t e *ost part, is necessary. :n t e contrary, e insists t at , at is necessary or al,ays cannot "e prevented fro* occurring and t at , ic can "e prevented is , at is for t e *ost part and , at can "e ot er,ise: G+o far as concerns t e Iature , ic is al,ays and is "y necessity, not ing occurs contrary to t at4 unnatural occurrences are found only a*ong t ose t ings , ic occur as t ey do for t e *ost part, "ut , ic *ay occur ot er,ise @

AG >G.A. FF$"16?. 5 66$ 5 +i*ilarly, e re*arks: GAnd t at @sa*e violence , ic is contrary to , at is for t e *ost partA ipso facto *eans so*et ing contrary to Iature, "ecause in t e case of t ings , ic ad*it and do not e&clude t e possi"ility of "eing ot er,ise @

A t at , ic is in accordance ,it nature @naturalA is t at , ic is for t e *ost part @ AG >FFFa6$?. Aristotle.s position t at , at is for t e *ost part cannot "e included in , at is necessary is also *ade clear in a conte&t t at is 1uite different fro* t at of t e "iological treatises. )n 'op., , ile discussing

strategies of ,inning argu*ents, Aristotle ,rites, 3.88 +eeing t at so*e t ings appen of necessity, ot ers for t e *ost part, ot ers as c ance dictates, t e assertion t at a necessary occurrence is a for t e *ost part occurrence or a for t e *ost part occurrence . . . is a necessary occurrence, al,ays gives an occasion for attack. -or if a necessary occurrence is asserted to "e a for t e *ost part occurrence, it is o"vious t at , oever *akes t e assertion is stating t at t at , ic o"tains in all cases @

A does not o"tain in all cases, and t erefore e is in error4 and t e sa*e is true if e as stated t at a for t e *ost part attri"ute is necessary, for e as stated t at it o"tains in all cases, , en it does not. >116"? ' e fact t at t is state*ent occurs in a conte&t , ere Aristotle is concerned ,it t e tec ni1ues of eristic argu*entation or refutation s ould not affect t e point e is *aking: na*ely, t at to assert t at , at is for t e *ost part is necessary and vice versa is ,rong. ' is clai* is independent of t e particular use Aristotle t inks it as ,it in eristic argu*entation or refutation. )t is evident fro* t e a"ove t at Aristotle does not include , at is for t e *ost part in , at is al,ays or "y necessity. 2 et er Aristotle is rig t a"out t is is of course anot er *atter. But assu*ing for t e *o*ent t at Aristotle is correct a"out t e supposed relation "et,een "eing for t e *ost part and "eing contingent, a nu*"er of 1uestions naturally arise: 3oes Aristotle t ink t at t ere are different ,ays of "eing contingent; 3oes e identify a kind of contingency t at is associated only ,it "eing for t e *ost part; And is t erefore , at is for t e *ost part only a co*ponent of t e contingent; ' e contrast t at Aristotle often e*p asi9es "et,een , at is necessary or al,ays on t e one and and , at is for t e *ost part on t e ot er "rings clearly into focus t e aspect of contingency e associates ,it "eing for t e *ost part. ' is e*p asis tends at ti*es to overs ado, t e e1ually i*portant contrast e ,is es to dra, "et,een , at is for t e *ost part and , at is "y c ance or luck >t e fortuitous?. -or despite t eir si*ilarity "y virtue of t e fact t at t ey can "ot "e ot er,ise and t erefore "ot 5 661 5 can "e set against , at is al,ays or necessary, t ey are clearly to "e distinguis ed. Aristotle distinguis es clearly "et,een t e* "y insisting, as seen earlier, t at , ereas , at is for t e *ost part falls ,it in t e de*onstra"le, t e fortuitous does not > ost. Anal. HFE6$, 6E4 Met. 1$6%a1%, a61, 1$6EE#6, "#E, 1$6Fa1H, 1$E4"#%?. ' e si*ilarities and differences "et,een , at is for t e *ost part and t e fortuitous are "est "roug t out in a passage fro* t e r. Anal. Aristotle clai*s t at ,e speak of t ings as "eing contingent in t,o senses >

?: G>1? to descri"e , at is for t e *ost part "ut falls s ort of "eing necessary, for e&a*ple, a *an.s "eco*ing greyB aired or gro,ing or ,asting a,ay, or in general t at , ic is "y nature applica"le to a su"/ect4 and >6? to descri"e t e indeter*inate, , ic is capa"le of appening, "ot in a given ,ay and ot er,ise, for e&a*ple, t e ,alking of an ani*al or t e appening of an eart 1uake , ile it is ,alking

or in general a c ance occurrenceG >#6"%?. Co**entators ave often pointed to t is passage as providing sufficient evidence t at Aristotle failed to distinguis clearly several 1uite different t ings and t e relations a*ong t e*=for e&a*ple, t e necessary, t e possi"le, t e i*possi"le, t e pro"a"le, t e i*pro"a"le=and ave argued t at t e "est ,ay of conveying , at e is trying to e&press in t e a"ove passage is to say t at "ot kinds of p eno*ena e discusses t ere are not necessary and t erefore are contingent >possi"le to "e ot er,ise?, "ut t e one kind is pro"a"le >, at is for t e *ost part? , ereas t e ot er is i*pro"a"le >t e indefinite, t e c ance occurrence?. ' is *ay very ,ell "e so= Aristotle *ay ave failed to distinguis as clearly as e s ould t e t ings t e co**entators identify. But , et er it is, it is not as i*portant as t e point Aristotle ,is es to *ake a"out t e t,o ,ays so*et ing can "e contingent=na*ely, "y "eing accidental and "y "eing for t e *ost part. Bot t e accidental and , at is for t e *ost part are contingent. Alt oug saying of so*et ing t at it is for t e *ost part i*plies, according to Aristotle, t at it is contingent, it is not t e case t at G"eing contingentG is t e *eaning of G"eing for t e *ost part.G )f it ,ere, one could derive fro* Git is contingent t at an eart 1uake appens , en an ani*al ,alksG >t e accidental?, t at Gfor t e *ost part an eart 1uake appens , en an ani*al ,alks.G ' is is clearly not so: G-or a c ance occurrence does not appen eit er necessarily or for t e *ost partG >#op. 116"1%?. GBeing for t e *ost partG signifies so*et ing *ore t an , at G"eing contingentG does=it signifies t at so*et ing "elongs to so*e su"/ect not fortuitously, "ut "y nature. ' is last point, t at , at "elongs to so*e su"/ect for t e *ost part "elongs to it "y nature and t erefore cannot "e identified ,it t e *erely contingent, is one Aristotle *akes repeatedly. -or e&a*ple, in trying to e&plain o, contingent propositions convert e adds to t e passage fro* t e r. Anal. 1uoted a"ove, G' e contingent in eac of t ese t,o cases, 5 666 5 t en, is converti"le ,it its opposite4 not, o,ever, in t e sa*e ,ay. ' at , ic is "y nature @

A so converts "ecause it does not necessarily apply >for it is in t is sense possi"le for a *an not to "eco*e greyB aired?4 "ut t e indeter*inate converts "ecause it appens no *ore in one ,ay t an in anot erG >#6"l%?. <e again speaks of Gt e t ings , ic are said to "e contingent "y "eing for t e *ost part and "y nature @ AG >6%"14?. +i*ilarly in G.A. Aristotle clai*s t at Git is , at occurs for t e *ost part t at is *ost in accord ,it t e course of nature @ AG >F6FE#$? and t at Gt at , ic is in accordance ,it nature is t at , ic is for t e *ost part @ AG >FFFa6$4 see also Gen. et Corr. ###EH4 .A. EE#"#$4 Rhet. 1#E9"14 hys. 19H"#E?. ' e t ings t at are for t e *ost part co*prise, t en, according to Aristotle, only a co*ponent of t e contingent. Unlike t e ot er co*ponent >t e accidental?, t ey are a part of t e do*ain consisting of t e causal regularities of nature. ' ese regularities *ay not "e perfect=t e t ings t at occur for t e *ost part do not occur al,ays in t e sa*e ,ay="ut t ey are nonet eless regularities. ' ey are i*perfect and in a sense deficient , en co*pared to t ose t at occur al,ays in t e sa*e ,ay or t at are

necessary, "ut t ey are clearly to "e set apart fro* c ance occurrences, for t ey are part of t e causal regularities of nature. 2 at Aristotle says a"out t e nature of "eing for t e *ost part places t e p eno*ena t at are for t e *ost part ,it in t e t ings t at can "e e&plained, for t ey ave causes in t e order of nature and t ey are t erefore candidates for de*onstrative e&planations. +uc e&planations *ay not *eet all of t e conditions Aristotle re1uires of t e *ost rigorous of de*onstrative e&planations=t e p eno*ena are not necessary or al,ays="ut t ey *eet so*e of t e*: According to Aristotle, t ey *eet t e causal re1uire*ent. 2 et er t ey *eet a sufficient nu*"er of t e conditions t at Aristotle re1uires of de*onstrative e&planations or , et er Aristotle is /ustified in including suc p eno*ena ,it in t e do*ain of t e de*onstra"le is to "e e&a*ined later.

eing for the Most Part and its Proper $ontrast

Aristotle.s discussion of t e nature of "eing for t e *ost part raises an interesting 1uestion. )n t is discussion Aristotle invaria"ly co*pares or contrasts , at is for t e *ost part to , at is necessarily, al,ays, or "y c ance >luck or accident=t e fortuitous?. )t see*s intuitive to suppose t at t e *ore appropriate co*parison or contrast is "et,een e& i"iting so*e property - for t e *ost part and e& i"iting - in all instances or "et,een a proposition "eing true for t e *ost part and "eing true universally. )ntuitively, t e contrast see*s to "e, for e&a*ple, "et,een people ,it s ort ar*s aving for t e *ost part s ort t ig s >E.#1? and people 5 66# 5 ,it s ort ar*s aving in every case s ort t ig s or "et,een t e proposition GPeople ,it s ort ar*s ave s ort t ig sG "eing true for t e *ost part and "eing true universally. ' e contrast is not, in ot er ,ords, so *uc "et,een a property "elonging necessarily instead of contingently to so*et ing or "et,een a proposition "eing necessary instead of contingent, as it is "et,een a property "elonging to so*et ing >or to so*e kind? in every instance instead of in *ost instances or a proposition "eing true universally instead of in *ost cases. 7et Aristotle, as seen earlier, *ost often contrasts , at is for t e *ost part to t at , ic is necessary or al,ays on t e one and and t e fortuitous on t e ot er. )t see*s as if e fails to recogni9e t e possi"ility t at so*e properties "elong contingently to so*e kind "ut do so in every instance, or t at so*e contingent propositions are universally true. )t is not, o,ever, o"vious t at one s ould accuse Aristotle of suc a failure. ' erefore, it is te*pting to vie, , at Aristotle designates as t at , ic is al,ays as "eing t at , ic truly contrasts ,it , at is for t e *ost part. )n ot er ,ords, it is te*pting to dissociate , at is al,ays fro* , at is necessary and to vie, , at is al,ays as t at , ic "elongs to so*e kind in every instance >universally true?, t us providing t e proper contrast to , at "elongs to a kind for t e *ost part >true for t e *ost part?. ' e *ove of dissociating , at is al,ays fro* t e necessary and *aking it t e proper contrast to , at is for t e *ost part is a pro"le*atic one, for as several co**entators ave pointed out recently, Aristotle tends to include , at is al,ays in , at is necessary.@1HA ' ere are, indeed, several passages , ere Aristotle appears to "e doing so, t e clearest and strongest "eing in Gen. et Corr. : G-or necessarily @

A and al,ays @

A go toget er >since , at necessarily is, cannot not "e?, so t at if it is necessarily, it is eternal @ A, and if it is eternal, it is necessarilyG >##FE#%?. ' ere are ot er passages as ,ell, especially in Cael. Book ), c apter &ii, and r. Anal. Book ), c apter &iii, , ere Aristotle speaks of a connection "et,een "eing al,ays and "eing necessarily. A closer look at t e passages , ere Aristotle speaks of suc a connection "et,een , at is al,ays and , at is necessarily s o,s t at *ost often t ey occur in conte&ts , ere e is pri*arily concerned ,it t e eternal *otions of t e eternal eavenly "odies. ' is is clearly so in t e a"ove passage fro* Gen. et Corr. But can ,e generali9e fro* t ese conte&ts and infer t at Aristotle identifies , at is al,ays ,it , at is necessary in all ot er conte&ts; 0ic ard +ora"/i as raised e&actly t is 1uestion recently and as in *y /udg*ent provided so*e good reasons for not e&tending Aristotle.s clai*s a"out t e supposed identity of , at is al,ays and , at is necessary "eyond t ose conte&ts in , ic e *ost clearly is concerned ,it t e eternal properties of eternal "odies.@19A 7et t ere are pro"le*s ,it trying to deter*ine ,it any degree of 5 664 5 certainty , et er in so*e cases , ere Aristotle speaks of t ings t at are al,ays e is not speaking of t ings t at are eternal or necessary. ' ere are passages suggesting t at e does so, "ut t ey do not see* in *ost cases to settle t e *atter in a decisive ,ay. ' ey do not do so precisely "ecause in *ost cases it is 1uite difficult to deter*ine ,it certainty t at even in t ese passages e is not speaking of t ings t at are eternal or necessary , en e speaks of t ings t at are al,ays. ) ,is , t en, to consider so*e of t ese pro"le*atic passages in order to point to t e difficulties t at t ey raise. +o*e passages o,ever see* less pro"le*atic t an ot ers, and it is per aps reasona"le to infer fro* t e* t at in so*e conte&ts Aristotle separates , at is al,ays fro* t e necessary. Consider, for e&a*ple, a "rief passage in t e E.E. , ere Aristotle is once *ore contrasting , at is al,ays and , at is for t e *ost part to , at is "y accident or fortune. ' e 1uestion at and is , et er t e success or t e doing ,ell of so*e persons is due to t eir state of c aracter or to fortune. )n connection ,it t is, Aristotle says, 3.89 But again, nature of course is t e cause @

A of a t ing t at appens eit er al,ays in t e sa*e ,ay @ A or for t e *ost part @ A, , ereas fortune is t e opposite . . . . if a *an is faring ,ell o,ing to fortune, it ,ould see* t at t e cause is not of suc a sort as to produce t e sa*e result al,ays @

A or for t e *ost part. >164Fa##? )t *ig t "e argued t at , at Aristotle ,is es to assert in t e a"ove passage , en e says of so*e C t at it is al,ays is si*ply t at C is in t e sa*e ,ay >

?. +i*ilarly, , en e dra,s a contrast "et,een C.s "eing al,ays and C.s "eing for t e *ost part, e is /ust pointing to t e contrast "et,een C.s "eing in t e sa*e ,ay at all ti*es and C.s "eing in t e sa*e ,ay for t e *ost part. ' ere is no *ention ere of a contrast "et,een so*e C.s "eing of necessity on t e one and and of its "eing for t e *ost part on t e ot er. )ndeed, one *ay argue t at t e ,ay Aristotle differentiates , at is al,ays and , at is for t e *ost part fro* , at is "y fortune and t e "asis e gives for differentiating "et,een t e* in t e ,ay e does s o,s t at , at is al,ays cannot "e reasona"ly identified ,it , at is necessary. ' e difference "et,een , at is al,ays and , at is for t e *ost part on t e one and and , at is "y fortune on t e ot er is t at t e for*er ave nature as t eir cause=Gnature is t e cause of a t ing t at appens eit er al,ays in t e sa*e ,ay or for t e *ost partG=, ereas t e latter presu*a"ly does not. ' is analysis of , at is al,ays in ter*s of causal connections in nature t at occur in t e sa*e ,ay is not an ade1uate account of t e necessary4 it is not sufficient for *aking , at is al,ays a 5 66% 5 part of t e necessary. Per aps, t en, t ey are to "e distinguis ed fro* eac ot er. ' e a"ove line of argu*ent faces a nu*"er of pro"le*s, o,ever, for it is possi"le t at , en in t e a"ove passage >E.#4? Aristotle gives an analysis of t at , ic is al,ays in ter*s of causal connections t at occur in t e sa*e ,ay, e is giving only part of t e analysis. <e is per aps giving only a necessary condition. Consider, for e&a*ple, t e account e gives in 'op. of a property t at "elongs to so*et ing al,ays: 3.8: A property "elongs to so*et ing al,ays @

A , en it is true at all ti*es @ A and never @ A fails4 for e&a*ple, t at of an ani*al t at it is co*posed of "ody and soul. >169a? Io, t e property of "eing co*posed of "ody and soul is, according to Aristotle, a necessary property of an ani*al. )n all pro"a"ility , en Aristotle says t at suc a property, in addition to "elonging to an ani*al at all ti*es, never fails, e *eans to say t at it is necessary. -or , en e proceeds to e&plain o, t e properties t at "elong to so*et ing al,ays differ fro* t ose t at "elong to it at so*e one ti*e

or te*porarily e says: 3.83 A te*porary property @

A is one , ic is true at a particular ti*e and does not "y necessity al,ays @ A follo,, for e&a*ple t at of a particular *an t at e is ,alking in t e *arketBplace. >169a#? :ne *ay respond t at Aristotle does not need to introduce necessity in order to contrast , at is al,ays to , at is for t e *ost part or "ot of t ese to , at is "y c ance in t e a"ove passage fro* E.E. >E.#4?. All t at is re1uired "y t e conte&t of t e a"ove passage, and all Aristotle is giving, is a contrast "et,een t,o kinds of nonnecessary t ings >, at is al,ays and , at is for t e *ost part? t at ave causes in nature and anot er >, at is "y c ance? t at presu*a"ly does not ave causes in nature. <e can differentiate "et,een t e t ings t at ave causes in nature "y insisting t at one is t e sa*e at all ti*es or in all instances or in all cases >, at is al,ays? , ereas t e ot er is so for t e *ost part. ' e a"ove kind of response ,ould "e effective in esta"lis ing t at , at is al,ays need not to "e necessary, and t at it can t us provide t e proper contrast to , at is for t e *ost part, if t ere ,ere evidence t at Aristotle differentiates "et,een , at is t e sa*e at all ti*es or in all cases and , at is eternal or necessary. )f t ere ,ere, in ot er ,ords, clear evidence t at Aristotle takes t e *ini*al c aracteri9ation given in t e previous paragrap of t at , ic is al,ays >i.e., as t at , ic is t e sa*e at all ti*es, or in all instances or cases? not to i*ply necessity. ' e evidence see*s in *ost cases to point in t e ot er direction, o,ever. 2 en ,e e&a*ine so*e of t e passages ,e 1uoted a"ove, as ,ell as so*e ot ers, t e conclusion t at Aristotle does not differentiate "et,een 5 66E 5 , at is t e sa*e at all ti*es or in all instances or cases and t e necessary see*s 1uite plausi"le. )t is *ost likely, for e&a*ple, t at , en Aristotle in E.#% says t at a property "elongs to so*et ing al,ays if it is true of t at t ing at all ti*es e does not differentiate "et,een C.s "eing - al,ays and C.s "eing - at all ti*es. )t is also *ost likely t at e does not differentiate "ot of t ese fro* t e necessary. <is e&a*ple of a property t at is true of so*et ing at all ti*es, t at of ani*al "eing co*posed of "ody and soul, surely confir*s t is interpretation. :ne can also see in E.#E t at Aristotle *ost often recogni9es only te*porary properties >+ocrates ,alking to t e *arketplace? and properties t at "elong to so*et ing "y necessity or al,ays. <e does not recogni9e an inter*ediate kind of property t at, alt oug not necessary, "elongs to so*et ing at all ti*es. ' ere are, o,ever, so*e passages , ere it see*s 1uite plausi"le to assu*e t at Aristotle uses

to si*ply *ean Gat every ti*e.G ' is is *ost evident in t ose passages , ere e couples t e ter* ,it anot er e&pression for t e purpose of asserting t at so*et ing occurs almost at every ti*e or almost in every case, t us suggesting t at so*e t ings t at are or could "e al,ays need not "e eternal, i**uta"le,

or necessary. Aristotle says, for e&a*ple, t at Gt e fluids already *entioned are al*ost in all instances @or al*ost al,ays, A connate in ani*alsG >H.A. %61 " 1E?4 G)n our part of t e ,orld . . . it does not appen at all ti*es @ A t at alcyon days occur at t e solstice, "ut in t e +icilian sea t ey occur al*ost al,ays @ AG >H.A. %46"1#?4 G)n t ose "irds t at are prone to pairing and do so at all ti*es @ A . . .G >H.A. %E4"1$?4 G' ey @, ite "eesA do not do t is @produce oneyA t roug out t e year @ A, "ut only in ,interG >H.A. %%4"16?4 G:t er @testaceaA do not ave t e* @GeggsGA at all ti*es @ A, "ut only in t e springG >G.A. FE#EH?, and so fort >see also G.A. F%1aH, "H, "#6, F%#a#6?. ' ese passages s o, t at Aristotle.s use of t e ter* under discussion is so*e, at "roader t an as often "een assu*ed. At ti*es its use e&tends "eyond t e do*ain of t e strictly eternal or necessary and enco*passes , at occurs *erely at all ti*es. ' us Aristotle can speak of t ings t at occur al*ost al,ays and , ic are clearly neit er eternal nor i**uta"le. ' en does Aristotle use

to signify t at , ic *erely occurs at all t e ti*es or in all instances and does e t erefore take it to for* t e proper contrast to , at is or occurs for t e *ost part; ' e t,o clearest e&a*ples ) kno, of t at support t e vie, t at e does so co*e fro* t e Rhet . ' e first is Gand it is e1uita"le to pardon ,eaknesses, and to look . . . not to , at a *an is no,, "ut to , at e as "een al,ays or for t e *ost part @ AG >1#F4"1E?. 2 at Aristotle is speaking of in t is conte&t is "e avior t at is t e sa*e at all ti*es "ut , ic , according to t e vie,s e&pressed in t e N.E. , is not eternal, i**uta"le, or necessary. ' e contrast e ,is es to dra, is "et,een "e avior t at is 5 66F 5 al,ays t e sa*e and t at , ic is for t e *ost part t e sa*e. ' e ot er e&a*ple occurs earlier in Rhet. : G' e opposite of , at our ene*ies desire or of t at in , ic t ey re/oice, appears to "e advantageous . . . . ' is is not al,ays so, "ut only for t e *ost part @

A, for t ere is not ing to prevent one and t e sa*e t ing "eing advantageous to t,o opposite partiesG

>1#E6E#F?. 2 at Aristotle *eans to say , en e clai*s t at , at our ene*ies desire or re/oice in is not al,ays advantageous is t at it is not so in all cases or instances. ' ere are e&ceptions to t e general clai*, G2 at our ene*ies desire or re/oice in is not advantageous.G )t is true only for t e *ost part. ' ere is no reason to t ink t at Aristotle takes t e relation "et,een "eing an o"/ect , ic our ene*ies desire or re/oice in and "eing advantageous as an eternal, i**uta"le, or necessary one. As e says, t ere is not ing to prevent one and t e sa*e t ing "eing advantageous to t,o opposite parties. At least in t ese cases, t en, Aristotle see*s to take , at is al,ays to "e *erely t at , ic occurs at all instances or cases and to treat it, especially in t e second e&a*ple, as t e proper contrast to , at is for t e *ost part. )n t ese e&a*ples e see*s, t at is, to contrast , at *erely is or occurs in t e sa*e ,ay in all cases or instances to , at does not, t e e&ceptionless to t at , ic as e&ceptions. ' ese e&a*ples appear to "e t e e&ception rat er t an t e rule, o,ever. (ost often Aristotle clearly links t e possessing of a property al,ays to "eing necessary. +i*ilarly, , en Aristotle speaks of properties t at "elong to all instances or cases of a kind, e see*s to take suc properties to "e necessary. (ost often e tends to link , at is true in all cases ,it , at is al,ays, and t e e&a*ples e gives indicate t at e t inks t at , at is true in all cases is necessary. ' us: GAs an e&a*ple of a difference t at is true in all cases @

A and al,ays ,e *ay take t e property of *an in relation to a orse, t at e is "iped, , ereas no orse is ever a "ipedG >#op. 169a9?. ' e property of "eing a "iped "elongs, according to Aristotle, necessarily to *an. ' e sa*e is t e case ,it , at Aristotle says on one of t e fe, occasions , ere e contrasts , at is for t e *ost part to , at is in all instances: G'o study Iature ,e ave to consider t e *a/ority of cases, for it is eit er , at is universal @in all cases, A or , at is for t e *ost part @ A t at is according to Iature. Io, all t e "one in ani*als. "odies consists of eart y *atterG > A. EE#E6F?. As Aristotle *akes clear, t e property at issue t at is true in all instances, t at is, t e property of consisting of eart y *aterial t at is true of all "one, is a necessary property of "ones > .A. EE#E6F?. ' e sa*e is t e case ,it ot er e&a*ples of properties t at Aristotle takes to "e true in all instances of a kind, for e&a*ple, t e property of "eing "looded t at is true of all viviparous ani*als >G.A. F#6"1$? or t e property of laying eggs t at c aracteri9es all "irds >H.A. %%H"1$?. 5 66H 5 ' e reason ,e find no clear cases , ere Aristotle dissociates , at is al,ays, in every case, or universally true fro* t e necessary is, of course, t at e "elieves t ese t ings to "e interconnected, to "e in so*e ,ay all linked toget er. ' e intuition supporting suc a "elief is per aps t e vie, t at , at e&plains , y so*et ing as a property al,ays or , y a property is possessed "y all t e instances of a kind is t e fact t at t e t ings or kind are so "y necessity. )t is presu*a"ly t e fact t at a property "elongs to D necessarily t at guarantees t at D is al,ays or in all its instances -. ' e idea t at universality of trut or e& i"iting of a property universally is linked to necessity as "een e*"raced "y *any p ilosop ers, including Dant.@6$A <ere are so*e instances , ere Aristotle links , at is al,ays, , at is in every case, or t e universal ,it eac ot er and ,it , at is "y necessity: G) say t at so*et ing olds of every case @

A if it does not old in so*e cases and not ot ers, nor at so*e ti*es and not at ot ers4 e.g., if ani*al olds of every *an, t en if it is true to call t is a *an, it is true to call i* an ani*al too4 and if e is no, t e one, e is t e ot er tooG > ost. Anal. F#a6H?. Again, t e properties Aristotle uses to illustrate , at e *eans "y saying t at so*et ing olds in every case are properties t at "elong to a su"/ect necessarily. Aristotle goes on to re*ark, G) call an attri"ute universal @ A , atever "elongs to @so*et ingA "ot of every case @ A and in itself and as suc . )t is evident, t erefore, t at , atever is universal "elongs "y necessity to its su"/ectG >F#E6E?. )n t,o ot er passages, Aristotle connects , at is universally true, , at is in every ti*e, , at is every, ere, and , at is al,ays: GAnd it is i*possi"le to perceive , at is universal @ A and olds in every case @ A4 for t at is not an individual nor at one ti*e4 for t en it ,ould not "e universal=for it is , at is al,ays @ A and every, ere @ A t at ,e call universalG >HFE#6?4 G+o*e t ings co*e a"out universally @ A >for al,ays @ A and in every case @ A eit er it olds or it co*es a"out in t is ,ay?, ot ers not al,ays "ut for t e *ost part . . . for t at is , at t e universal is=, at olds in every case and al,aysG >9Eal$ff.?. 7et t e trut of t e intuition linking necessity and universality is "y no *eans o"vious4 or since t e trut of intuitions is supposed to "e o"vious, t e GintuitionG is not really an intuition, for it is not o"vious t at , at is for t e *ost part cannot "e necessary. )t is not clear t at given a do*ain 3 , ic e& i"its a property - for t e *ost part, t e proposition G-or t e *ost part 3 is -G is not necessary, or t at t ose *e*"ers of 3 t at are - are not so necessarily, or even t at t ose *e*"ers of 3 t at are not - are not so necessarily. Consider, for e&a*ple, t e do*ain consisting of t e pri*e nu*"ers.@61A )t is true in its case t at for t e *ost part pri*e nu*"ers are not divisi"le "y t,o. But t is is clearly necessary=it can "e derived fro* ot er necessary propositions of arit *etic. )t is also t e case

5 669 5 t at t ose pri*e nu*"ers , ic are not divisi"le "y t,o are not so necessarily and t at t e pri*e nu*"er , ic is divisi"le "y t,o is so necessarily. ' e sa*e *ay "e true in t e case of natural p eno*ena or t e do*ain of conduct. -ro* t e fact t at a property - c aracteri9es a class C for t e *ost part ,e cannot infer t at - c aracteri9es C contingently, for suc a fact *ay "e i*plied "y ot er necessary facts a"out C or -. ' us Aristotle argues in G.A. Book )K, c apter iii, t at t e offspring of u*ans rese*"le t eir parents or at least so*e u*an "eing in *ost cases and t at suc facts a"out u*ans or si*ilar ones a"out any ot er ani*al species are necessary. Per aps t ere are reasons for t inking t at t ere is no necessity in t e do*ain of nature, t at everyt ing in nature is contingent. ' is *ay "e so. But it cannot "e inferred "y relying solely on a supposed link "et,een "eing for t e *ost part and contingency or "et,een necessity and universality. 0egardless of , at Aristotle.s reasons are for assu*ing t ere is a link "et,een necessity and universality, it is clear fro* t e passages discussed earlier , ere e contrasts t at , ic is al,ays, necessary, or for t e *ost part on t e one and and t at , ic is fortuitous on t e ot er t at e does not e&plicitly identify any ot er do*ain t at is distinct fro* t e*. <e does not, in particular, recogni9e a do*ain of t ings or p eno*ena , ose properties are suc t at , ile t ey do not "elong to t e* necessarily or al,ays, t ey c aracteri9e t e* universally or t e propositions a"out t e* are si*ply universally true. Aristotle does not include suc a do*ain a*ong t ose t at e takes to constitute t e real* of de*onstrative kno,ledge. ' us, , en on several occasions e identifies t e co*ponents of t e de*onstra"le, e speaks of , at is necessary, , at is al,ays, and , at is for t e *ost part: GIo, de*onstration is concerned only ,it one or t e ot er of t ese t,o @t e necessary or , at is for t e *ost partA4 for all reasoning proceeds fro* pre*ises t at are eit er necessary or for t e *ost partG > ost. Anal. HFE6$?. ' e co*ponents are , at is al,ays and , at is for t e *ost part: G-or all science is eit er of t at , ic is al,ays or for t e *ost partG >Met. 1$6Fa6$?. <e t us *oves fro* t at , ic is necessary or al,ays to t at , ic is for t e *ost part ,it out leaving roo* for , at is not necessary "ut e& i"its properties universally. :r e *oves fro* de*onstrative reasoning t at consists of pre*ises and conclusions t at are necessary to t at , ic consists of pre*ises and conclusions t at are true for t e *ost part ,it out leaving roo* for de*onstrative reasoning , ose pre*ises and conclusions, , ile not necessary, are universally true: GAnd if t e pre*ises are necessary, t e conclusion is necessary too4 and if t ey are for t e *ost part, t e conclusion is t e sa*eG > ost. Anal. HFE6#?. Alt oug Aristotle does not identify a do*ain of p eno*ena or t ings t at falls "et,een t e necessary and , at is for t e *ost part=t e do*ain 5 6#$ 5 of t ings , ose properties "elong to t e* universally "ut contingently=and does not recogni9e suc a do*ain as "eing a co*ponent of t e de*onstra"le4 e does identify e&plicitly propositions t at are universal in for* "ut not necessary, and e states e&plicitly , at t e trut conditions of suc propositions are. ' ese are t e universal assertoric propositions Aristotle identifies in r. Anal . Book ), c apter ii, t e propositions t at constitute t e pre*ises of so*e assertoric syllogis*s. <e contrasts suc propositions to universal apodeictic ones, and gives t eir trut conditions: GBy universal ) *ean a state*ent , ic applies to all, or none, of t e su"/ectG >64a1H?. ' is is an i*portant point, for it s o,s t at Aristotle recogni9ed t at t ere can "e reasoning or syllogis*s , ose pre*ises are universal assertoric state*ents. <e recogni9ed, t at is, t at syllogis*s ,it suc nonnecessary state*ents *eet t e for*al conditions of validity.@66A ) s all argue in t e ne&t c apter t at Aristotle vie,s t e

de*onstrative syllogis*s pertaining to , at is for t e *ost part to "e constituted "y pre*ises and conclusions t at ave t e logical for* of universal assertoric state*ents. 2 en t ey are vie,ed in t is ,ay t ey *eet t e for*al re1uire*ents of validity4 t ey are valid syllogis*s. )f in addition t ey *eet t e ot er conditions Aristotle re1uires of de*onstration, t ey ,ill not *erely "e valid syllogis*s, t ey ,ill "e de*onstrative syllogis*s. 'aking t e logical for* of propositions t at are true for t e *ost part or are a"out t ings t at are for t e *ost part to "e t at of universal assertoric state*ents elps to solve so*e additional pro"le*s or understand so*e of Aristotle.s re*arks t at see* ot er,ise 1uite pu99ling. ) s all, for instance, s o, t at it is only , en t e logical for* of suc state*ents is understood as "eing t at of universal assertoric state*ents t at one can understand o, state*ents a"out t ings t at are for t e *ost part are true for t e *ost part or o, our accounts of t ings t at are for t e *ost part are ine&act or reveal t e trut a"out t e* roug ly. Alt oug Aristotle vie,s t e state*ents at issue to ave t e logical for* of universal assertoric state*ents, e clai*s t at due to t e ine&actness of t e p eno*ena, t e trut conditions of t e universal assertoric state*ents are not *et "y state*ents , ic are a"out t ings t at are for t e *ost part. ' e state*ents a"out suc ine&act su"/ect *atter ave e&ceptions4 t ey are true only for t e *ost part. 5 6#1 5

!even #emonstration and What Is for the Most Part

Introduction
) ave argued in t e previous c apter t at Aristotle takes , at is for t e *ost part to "e a co*ponent of t e do*ain of t ings t at according to i* e& i"it natural regularities. -or t is reason, e includes t e t ings t at are for t e *ost part a*ong t ose t at can "e de*onstratively e&plained, and e t inks t at propositions a"out suc t ings, propositions t at are true for t e *ost part, can "e t e constituents= pre*ises or conclusions=of de*onstrative syllogis*s t at e&plain certain features of suc t ings. ' ese last clai*s are *ade e*p atically "y Aristotle on several occasions: 5.& ' ere can "e no de*onstrative kno,ledge @

A of t e fortuitous. 2 at appens "y c ance is neit er necessary nor for t e *ost part, "ut so*et ing t at appens in a different ,ay fro* eit er4 , ereas de*onstration @ A is concerned ,it one or t e ot er of t e*. 8very syllogis* proceeds t roug pre*ises , ic are eit er necessary or for t e *ost part4 if t e pre*ises are necessary, t e conclusion is necessary too4 and if t e pre*ises are for t e *ost part, so is t e conclusion. <ence, if t e fortuitous is neit er for t e *ost part nor necessary, t ere can "e no de*onstration of it. > ost. Anal. 253%;7

F.6

But t at t ere is no science of t e accidental is o"vious4 for all science is eit er of t at , ic is al,ays or for t e *ost part. >-or o, is one to learn or teac anot er; ' e t ing *ust "e deter*ined as occurring eit er al,ays or for t e *ost part, e.g., t at oneyB ,ater is "eneficial for so*eone ,it fever for t e *ost part?. >Met. &;%5a%:7 ' e accidental, t en, is , at occurs, "ut not al,ays, nor of necessity, nor for t e *ost part. Io, ,e ave said , at t e accidental is, and it is

F.#

5 6#6 5 ob+ious )hy there is no science of such a tiling? for all science is of that )hich is al)ays or for the most part' but the accidental is neither of these classes. 1&;3:a7 <o,ever, sc olars ave at ti*es argued t at Aristotle, "y taking et ics to ave a su"/ect *atter t at is for t e *ost part and to consist of propositions t at are true for t e *ost part, places it and si*ilar disciplines outside t e class of disciplines t at can "e de*onstrative.@1A :t ers ave concluded t at t ese supposed c aracteristics of t e su"/ect *atter and of t e propositions of et ics do not e&clude t e discipline fro* t e set of t e de*onstrative disciplines4 t ey only *ake it, in Aristotle.s sc e*e of t ings, not a strict de*onstrative or e&act discipline.@6A ' ose , o clai* t at t e type of ine&actness Aristotle attri"utes to t e su"/ect *atter and to t e propositions of et ics places t e discipline outside t e de*onstra"le ave *ost pro"a"ly "een influenced "y so*e re*arks Aristotle i*self *akes. )n t ese re*arks e stresses, at ti*es rat er e*p atically, t e supposed differences in rigor a*ong disciplines and t e differences "et,een practical ,isdo* and t eoretical kno,ledge, differences , ic e t inks result fro* t e nature of t e o"/ects ,it , ic t e various disciplines or faculties deal. As seen in t e previous c apter, Aristotle connects t e e&actness of t e su"/ect *atter of a discipline and of our accounts of it to t e e&actness of t e proofs of t at discipline. )n t e passage 1uoted in E.6 e clai*s t at if t e su"/ect *atter is for t e *ost part, t e pre*ises in our reasoning a"out it are true for t e *ost part, and t erefore our conclusions fro* suc pre*ises and a"out suc su"/ect *atter are also true for t e *ost part. <e concludes t at passage ,it t e follo,ing re*ark: 5.9 )n t e sa*e spirit, t erefore, s ould eac type of state*ent @or accountA "e received4 for it is t e *ark of t e educated *an to seek t e a*ount of precision @

A in eac class of t ings , ic t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter ad*its @ A4 it is evidently e1ually foolis to accept pro"a"le reasoning fro* a *at e*atician and to de*and de*onstrations fro* t e r etorician. >N.E. &;=93%97 ' e a"ove re*ark can lead so*eone to t e vie, t at at least one of t e episte*ological conse1uences of t e supposed ine&actness of t e su"/ect *atter of et ics is t at it falls outside of t e do*ain of t e de*onstrative4 t ere is no de*onstration in *atters of conduct.@#A -or presu*a"ly, t e nature of t e

su"/ect *atter of et ics, of *atters of conduct t e*selves, is suc t at it e&cludes de*onstration. ' e disciplines of *atters of conduct are presu*a"ly a*ong t ose disciplines , ere it ,ould "e foolis to de*and de*onstration=t e nature of t eir su"/ect *atter e&cludes it. +i*ilarly, Aristotle in N.E. Book K) contrasts practical ,isdo* or prudence >et ical kno,ledge? to t eoretical kno,ledge >de*onstrative kno,lB 5 6## 5 edge? and even insists t at t ese t,o different types of cognition correspond to t,o distinct faculties: 5.: Jet us no, si*ilarly divide t e rational part, and let it "e assu*ed t at t ere are t,o rational faculties, one , ere"y ,e conte*plate t ose t ings , ose first principles cannot "e ot er,ise, and one , ere ,e conte*plate t ose t ings , ic can "e ot er,ise: since, on t e assu*ption t at kno,ledge is "ased on a likeness or affinity of so*e sort "et,een su"/ect and o"/ect, t e parts of t e soul adapted to t e cognition of o"/ects t at are of different kinds *ust t e*selves differ in kind. >11#9a%? <ence inas*uc as scientific kno,ledge involves de*onstration, , ereas of t ings , ose principles can "e ot er,ise t ere is no de*onstration, "ecause everyt ing a"out t e* can "e ot er,ise, and inas*uc as one cannot deli"erate a"out t ings t at are of necessity, it follo,s t at practical ,isdo* @or prudence=

F.E

A is not t e sa*e as science. >114$a#6? F.F +cientific kno,ledge is an understanding of universals and of t ings t at are of necessity. . . . -or so*et ing to "e an o"/ect of scientific kno,ledge it *ust "e de*onstrated, , ile t ey @art and practical ,isdo*A are concerned only ,it , at can "e ot er,ise. >1141a?

)ndeed, t ere are occasions , en Aristotle appears to e&clude fro* t e do*ain of t e de*onstra"le not only *atters of conduct "ut t e , ole of nature: 5.2 ' e accuracy @e&actness,

A of *at e*atics is not to "e de*anded in all cases, "ut only in t e case of t ings t at ave no *atter. <ence its *et od is not t at of natural science4 for presu*a"ly, t e , ole of nature as *atter. >Met. ==:a&:7 ' ese re*arks can also easily lead to t e conclusion t at et ics falls outside t e de*onstra"le "ecause its su"/ect *atter is suc t at it can "e ot er,ise. +ince Aristotle takes , at is for t e *ost part to "e in addition t e kind of t ing t at can "e ot er,ise, one can conclude t at one episte*ological conse1uence of t e kind of ine&actness of t e su"/ect *atter or of t e accounts of a discipline t at

Aristotle e1uates ,it "eing for t e *ost part is t at suc a discipline is nonde*onstrative. 3espite , at Aristotle says in t ese latter re*arks >F.4BF.H?, , ere e appears to "e denying t at de*onstration is possi"le of t ings t at are for t e *ost part in general and of *atters of conduct in particular, ,e *ust, in *y /udg*ent, ulti*ately conclude t at e does not *ean to deny altoget er t at de*onstration is possi"le in t e case of suc t ings. 2e *ust assu*e, t at is, t at t e do*ain of t e de*onstra"le enco*passes , at is for t e *ost part. ' us, ) a* urging t at ,e take , at is asserted in F.1BF.# to e&press Aristotle.s opinion on t ese *atters. 5 6#4 5 <o,ever, to say t at Aristotle includes , at is for t e *ost part in t e class of t ings t at are de*onstra"le raises a nu*"er of 1uestions t at need to "e addressed. -irst, it raises a 1uestion t at as pu99led students of Aristotle.s t oug t fro* t e earliest ti*es. ' e 1uestion concerns t e very possi"ility of de*onstrations , ose syllogistic pre*ises are true for t e *ost part. As s all "e seen, syllogis*s ,it suc pre*ises appear to "e not valid, and t erefore syllogistic inferences ,it suc pre*ises even fail to *eet t e for*al constraints Aristotle re1uires of de*onstrative reasoning. ' erefore, it needs to "e s o,n o, t is kind of syllogistic inference=a"out , at is for t e *ost part or , ose pre*ises consists of propositions t at are true for t e *ost part=can "e construed so t at t e condition of validity is in so*e ,ay satisfied. +econd, if de*onstrations a"out , at is for t e *ost part are, as Aristotle says, in so*e sense ine&act or t e disciplines dealing ,it suc su"/ect *atter are not as e&act or cogent as ot er disciplines are, it needs to "e s o,n o, t ey are ine&act or less cogent. )n ot er ,ords, an e&planation is needed as to , ere t e supposed ine&actness lies or in , at sense t eir de*onstrative c aracter is deficient. ' ird, one , o advances t e clai* t at Aristotle does not e&clude , at is for t e *ost part fro* t e do*ain of t e de*onstra"le *ust s o, o, t is clai* is consistent ,it t ose re*arks ,e 1uoted a"ove >F.4BF.H? , ere Aristotle appears to deny t e trut of suc a clai*. :ne *ust, in ot er ,ords, s o, t at t e apparent disagree*ent "et,een t ese re*arks and t e earlier ones >F.1BF.#, , ere Aristotle insists upon t e inclusion of , at is for t e *ost part into t e de*onstra"le? can "e e&plained a,ay. ' e overall argu*ent of t is c apter, , ic ai*s at acco*plis ing all of t e a"ove t ings, is rat er long and co*ple&. )t atte*pts to s o, at first t at Aristotle distinguis es "et,een t,o types of de*onstration or de*onstrative kno,ledge: t e strict, un1ualified, or Platonist de*onstration and t e soft or ,eak de*onstration. ) argue furt er t at , en Aristotle speaks of suc soft or ,eak de*onstrations , at e pri*arily as in *ind are de*onstrations , ose pre*ises are propositions t at are true for t e *ost part. ' us t e nature of ,eak or soft de*onstration is *ade clear. )n addition ) give so*e argu*ents in support of t e vie, t at , en Aristotle speaks of so*e disciplines as "eing less e&act t an ot ers ,it respect to so*e of t eir de*onstrative c aracteristics, e is t inking of disciplines , ose su"/ect *atter is for t e *ost part or , ose de*onstrations consist of pre*ises and conclusions t at are true for t e *ost part. ' us, an e&plication is provided of t e nature of ine&actness Aristotle attri"utes to t e accounts of so*e disciplines , en e clai*s t at "ecause of t e ine&actness of t eir su"/ect *atter, t ey cannot "e as e&act in t eir de*onstrations as so*e ot er disciplines , ose su"/ect *atter does not e& i"it suc ine&actness. 5 6#% 5 2 ereas t ere is clear evidence t at Aristotle distinguis es "et,een strict or un1ualified and ,eak or

soft de*onstrations, t e evidence ,it regard to t e nature of ,eak or soft de*onstration and its relation to t e ine&actness of disciplines , ose su"/ect *atter is for t e *ost part is far fro* clear. (y strategy, t en, ,ill "e to first delineate t e t,o lines of argu*ent ,e encounter in Aristotle a"out de*onstration: one line insisting t at de*onstration consists of syllogis*s , ose pre*ises are necessary=t e strict, un1ualified, or Platonist conception of de*onstration4 t e ot er line identifying de*onstrations t at do not *eet all t e conditions t at t e syllogis*s of strict or un1ualified de*onstration *eet=t e soft or ,eak de*onstrations. Clearly, t e pro"le* is to locate t e conditions t at soft or ,eak de*onstration fails to *eet, to identify , ere t e difference "et,een it and strict de*onstration lies. But since t e evidence for t is is, as ) said, rat er scanty ) ,ill support *y conclusions "y relying in part on an argu*ent "y eli*ination. ) consider, t at is, various conditions t at *ay ,eaken or soften a de*onstrative syllogis*, and e&a*ine , et er any one of t e* is t e condition t at Aristotle singles out as "eing t e one t at *akes a de*onstrative syllogis* ,eak or soft. +o*e of t ese conditions are *ore relevant or plausi"le t an ot ers and a discussion of t e* raises so*e i*portant 1uestions a"out t e nature of de*onstration and t e differences a*ong disciplines ,it respect to t eir de*onstrative purity, rigor, certainty, and so fort . ) s all conclude t at t e *ost likely candidate t at e&plains t e difference Aristotle t inks e&ists "et,een strict or un1ualified and ,eak or soft de*onstration is t e fact t at , ereas t e pre*ises of t e for*er type of de*onstrations are necessary and universally true, t ose of t e latter are contingent and true for t e *ost part. Using si*ilar kinds of argu*ents ) s o, t at t e de*onstrative ine&actness t at Aristotle takes to c aracteri9e so*e disciplines is due pri*arily to t e fact t at t eir syllogis*s consist of pre*ises t at are true for t e *ost part and t erefore contingent. ) t en proceed to e&plain o, Aristotle sees de*onstration in t e case of , at is for t e *ost part. ' e *ain difficulty ,it de*onstrations of suc t ings is t at t e syllogis*s a"out t e* appear to "e not valid. (y strategy ere is to identify t e logical for* t at t e pre*ises of suc syllogis*s *ust ave in order to avoid invalidity. ' eoretically, ) argue, one *ust treat t e pre*ises of suc syllogis*s as aving t e logical for* of universal propositions. 2 en one does so=, en one construes t e pre*ises as "eing universal in for*=t en Aristotle.s syllogis*s can "e valid. ) also give te&tual evidence t at Aristotle i*self takes t e logical for* of t e pre*ises of is syllogis*s to "e t at of universal propositions. <e t us assi*ilates syllogis*s , ose pre*ises are for t e *ost part into is paradig*atic de*onstrative syllogis*s , ose pre*ises are universal in for*, and relies on so*e prag*atic features =features t at are not part 5 6#E 5 of t e logical for* of t e syllogistic pre*ises=for distinguis ing "et,een t e t,o types of syllogis*s. ' e ypot esis t at Aristotle treats forBt eB*ostBpart propositions as "eing universal in for* e&plains several of is clai*s or re*arks t at ot er,ise see* odd. )t e&plains, for e&a*ple, is clai* t at t e propositions t at constitute t e pre*ises of suc syllogis*s are true for t e *ost part. -or in order for t e* to "e true for t e *ost part t ey *ust ave a certain logical for*: ' ey *ust "e universal. )t also e&plains , y Aristotle clai*s t at t e propositions of et ics , ic are a"out t ings t at are for t e *ost part represent t e trut a"out suc t ings only roug ly and in outline, and , y e often ,arns us not to forget t at our accounts are not e&act. ' ese clai*s of Aristotle *ake sense , en vie,ed as presupposing t at t e logical for* of et ical propositions is t at of universal state*ents. :nly , en et ical propositions are vie,ed as "eing universal in for*, , ile ex hypothesi t ey are true for t e *ost part, can ,e see , y t ey represent t ings roug ly or in outline, , y t ey are not e&act representations of t e p eno*ena. 2e can also see , y Aristotle.s ,arnings a"out t e e&actness of et ical accounts or propositions are appropriate: ' e for* of t e propositions *ay *islead us into taking t e* as "eing

universally true. ' e e&planation of o, Aristotle construes de*onstration of , at is for t e *ost part s eds lig t on a pro"le* in Aristotelian sc olars ip t at as defied solution since ancient ti*es=na*ely, t e pro"le* concerning t e validity of syllogis*s a"out , at is for t e *ost part. ' is pro"le* and its solution are of significance not only in connection ,it Aristotle.s vie,s on et ics and t e kno,ledge appropriate for or possi"le in it "ut also in connection ,it is vie,s on t e , ole do*ain of nature and t e kno,ledge appropriate for or possi"le in it. -or e takes *ost if not all of t e p eno*ena of nature to "e, like t e p eno*ena of conduct, for t e *ost part >Met . 1$6Fa11?. )f t ere is no de*onstration in t e case of *atters of conduct "ecause t ey are for t e *ost part, t en t ere ,ill "e no de*onstration in t e case of natural p eno*ena.@4A 7et t e ,ay Aristotle deals ,it t e 1uestion of t e validity of t ese pro"le*atic syllogis*s as its li*itations. Given t e constraints i*posed "y is o,n de*onstrative fra*e,ork, is andling of t is pro"le* per aps *akes good sense, "ut it cannot "e said t at it really solves t e pro"le*. )f , at is needed is a general t eory , ic e&plains o, for t e *ost part syllogis*s t e*selves are valid, t en Aristotle does not provide one. Per aps t ere is no solution of t is pro"le* ,it out recourse to inductive logic, so*et ing Aristotle does not ave. Alt oug assi*ilating syllogis*s a"out , at is for t e *ost part into standard ones *ay see* ulti*ately to sidestep t e pro"le* rat er t an to solve it, Aristotle.s ,ay of dealing ,it t ese pro"le*atic syllogis*s *erits a careful e&a*ination. 5 6#F 5 :"viously t e condition of logical validity, alt oug *ost i*portant, is not t e only condition t at a syllogis* *ust *eet in order to "e a de*onstrative syllogis*. According to Aristotle, it as to *eet ot er conditions as ,ell. ) t erefore e&a*ine , et er syllogis*s a"out *atters of conduct can *eet any of t e ot er conditions Aristotle re1uires of de*onstrative syllogis*s. ) conclude t at t ere is no reason to deny t at syllogis*s a"out *atters of conduct *eet to so*e e&tent t ese ot er conditions t at Aristotle re1uires. :f course, "y essentially clai*ing t at Aristotle takes t e do*ain of t e de*onstra"le to include , at is for t e *ost part, ) appear to "e contradicting , at e says in so*e of t e re*arks 1uoted a"ove >F.%BF.H?. <e gives t e i*pression of denying t at de*onstration of , at is for t e *ost part is possi"le. Bot of t ese clai*s cannot "e attri"uted to Aristotle as t ey stand. ' e principle of c arity re1uires us to give up one of t e t,o or s o, t at t ere is no inconsistency "et,een t e*. ) see no reason for giving up altoget er eit er of t ese clai*s. Aristotle is e&plicit enoug in is state*ent t at t e de*onstra"le includes , at is for t e *ost part >F.1BF.#?. )f ,e are not ,illing to dis*iss totally t e second clai*, t e only re*aining option is to try to s o, t at t ere is a ,ay of interpreting t e t,o clai*s so t at t ey are not inconsistent, and t is can "e done. )t can "e s o,n t at t ere is a ,ay of reading t ose re*arks , ere Aristotle appears to "e denying t at t ere is de*onstration in t e case of , at is for t e *ost part so t at t ey are not inconsistent ,it t ose re*arks , ere e includes , at is for t e *ost part in t e do*ain of t e de*onstra"le. ) s all argue t at t e conte&t in , ic t e re*arks t at appear to "e denying t e possi"ility of de*onstration in t e case of , at is for t e *ost part occur *akes it clear t at Aristotle as in *ind t e strict, un1ualified, or Platonist conception of de*onstration. <is ai* in t ese conte&ts is to deny t at in *atters of conduct ,e can ave t e strict or un1ualified de*onstration or kno,ledge t at Plato often speaks of in relation to suc *atters. But t is of course does not e&clude t e possi"ility t at t ere is ,eak or soft de*onstration in t e case of *atters of conduct. )ndeed, , en Aristotle includes , at is for t e *ost part in t e do*ain of t e de*onstra"le e as in *ind t e enlarged vie, of de*onstration , ic includes "ot t e strict and t e soft type of de*onstration, and it is t e latter type t at applies to , atever is for t e *ost part.

Again, , en in F.4 Aristotle says t at t e e&actness possi"le in a discipline corresponds to t e nature of its su"/ect *atter and t at for t is reason ,e *ust not de*and t e sa*e e&actness in all disciplines, e need not necessarily "e saying t at t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter of t e disciplines of conduct *akes t e* nonde*onstrative. Per aps t is is, as Aristotle suggests, true of r etoric, "ut , et er it is true of t e disciplines of conduct cannot "e inferred fro* , at F.4 asserts. 5 6#H 5 ' roug out our discussion in t is c apter, ) ,ill "e concerned ,it t e episte*ological conse1uences of t e ine&actness Aristotle associates ,it "eing for t e *ost part. And in particular, ) ,ill "e concerned ,it t e 1uestion , et er de*onstration is possi"le in t e case of , at is for t e *ost part. ' is 1uestion, o,ever, presupposes to so*e e&tent t at t e ine&actness at issue cannot "e eli*inated fro* t e accounts of so*e disciplines. -or clearly if it ,ere possi"le to eli*inate it, t en t e 1uestion regarding its episte*ological conse1uences ,ould "e of no great significance. ) t erefore ,is to e&a*ine , et er t e ine&actness at issue can "e eli*inated fro* t e accounts of et ics. )n particular, ) ,ould like to consider , et er t e devices Aristotle uses in ot er disciplines for t e purpose of eli*inating ine&actness of t e kind ,e are presently discussing can "e applied in t e case of et ics. )f Aristotle t inks t at suc devices cannot "e applied in t e case of et ics, it ,ill "e i*portant to e&a*ine , y e t inks t ey cannot. )t ,ould "e i*portant to kno, , at it is a"out t e su"/ect *atter of et ics t at *akes eli*ination of ine&actness i*possi"le.

The $ore Meaning of #emonstration

At ti*es, , ile concerned ,it e&plaining t e nature of de*onstrative kno,ledge or of t e various disciplines t at ai* at suc kno,ledge, Aristotle speaks as if not all de*onstrative kno,ledge is e&actly t e sa*e, not all disciplines ai* at or attain kno,ledge t at is co*pletely identical. ' us in t e ost. Anal . Aristotle often c aracteri9es is task as "eing t at of e&plaining , at it is to kno, a"solutely or simpliciter >

, F1a9, F6"1%?, , at a"solute kno,ledge is > , F#a66?, or , at a"solute de*onstration is > , F%E64?. )n so doing, e is indicating t at alt oug is *ain concern is ,it e&plicating t e for* of a"solute, ig est, or *ost perfect de*onstrative kno,ledge, e t inks t ere are less perfect for*s of it t at nonet eless 1ualify as for*s of de*onstration. )n t e sa*e vein Aristotle re*arks in t e N.E. , 5.= ' e nature of scientific kno,ledge @or de*onstration,

A, , en ,e speak precisely @

A and disregard cases of si*ilarity @or analogy, A *ay "e *ade clear as follo,s. 2e all conceive t at a t ing , ic ,e kno, cannot "e ot er,ise. >11#9"1H? At ot er ti*es Aristotle contrasts disciplines or proofs t at are *ore cogent, necessary, or e&act to t ose t at are soft or less e&act: 5.&; <e @8*pedoclesA oug t, t en, to ave defined, or to ave postulated, or to ave de*onstrated @

A t e* @t e t,o causes of *otion, Jove and +trifeA e&actly @ A or less cogently @Gsoftly,G A or in so*e ot er ,ay. >Gen. et Corr. 888b%97

5.&&

5 6#9 5 )n general every t inking, or t oug tBpartaking, science deals ,it causes and principles ,it greater or less e&actness @

A. >Met . &;%:b57 F.16 But starting fro* t e essence=so*e @sciencesA *aking it plain to t e senses, ot ers assu*ing it as a ypot esis=t ey t en de*onstrate @

A ,it greater or less necessity @*ore or less cogently= A t ose t ings t at "elong "y t e*selves to t e genus. >1$6%"16? F.1# :f t e sciences *entioned @*edicine, gy*nastics, and all productive or *at e*atical onesA eac for*ulates t e essence in eac genus and tries to prove t e ot er t ings *ore or less e&actly @

A. >1$E4a%? F.14 ' erefore, since it is evident t at all *en follo, t is procedure in de*onstration @or proof,

A, , et er t ey reason ,it greater or lesser e&actness @ A . . . it is evidently necessary to ave on eac su"/ect a selection of argu*ents. >Rhet. &8=3b7 ' e a"ove re*arks s o, t at Aristotle distinguis es "et,een *ore and less perfect for*s of kno,ledge or de*onstration=kno,ledge or de*onstration t at is so a"solutely or simpliciter and t at , ic is not so. <e also distinguis es "et,een disciplines or proofs t at de*onstrate ,it greater necessity, or greater e&actness, or *ore cogency and t ose , ic do so ,it less e&actness or cogency =t ey de*onstrate *ore Gsoftly.G )t is far fro* o"vious o,ever , at Aristotle as in *ind , en e identifies so*e kno,ledge as "eing so a"solutely or simpliciter and so*e disciplines or de*onstrations as proving ,it greater necessity, cogency, or e&actness. (y o"/ective, t en, ,ill "e to e&plain , at Aristotle as in *ind , ere e *akes t e a"ove distinctions. )n particular, ) ,ill try to s o, t at a"solute kno,ledge and *ost cogent or e&act de*onstrations or disciplines are t ose t at *eet all t ose conditions t at Aristotle re1uires of strict de*onstrative e&planations. ' e soft, less cogent or less e&act disciplines or de*onstrations are t ose t at fail to *eet one or *ore of t ese conditions, "ut "ot t e *ost cogent or e&act and t e less cogent or e&act kinds are, according to Aristotle, de*onstrations. -irst, t en, ) ,ant to s o, t at t e de*onstrations or disciplines , ic are less cogent or e&act are de*onstrations or disciplines in a significant ,ay, t at Aristotle does not ,eaken is notion of de*onstration to t e point t at anyt ing is a de*onstration or a de*onstrative discipline. :n t e contrary, e t inks t at t ere is a set of features t at all de*onstrations s are. As pointed out earlier, Aristotle takes de*onstration to "e a deductive inference , ose pre*ises satisfy certain conditions, and de*onstrative kno,ledge is t e kno,ledge produced "y suc deductive inferences >deB 5 64$ 5 *onstrative syllogis*s?. )t is not t e case t at every deductive inference or everyt ing t at produces kno,ledge is de*onstration. ' ere are deductive inferences t at are not de*onstrations and t ere *ay "e so*e kinds of kno,ledge t at are produced "y *eans t at are different fro* de*onstrative syllogis*s. ' us Aristotle considers , et er circular proofs can provide de*onstrative kno,ledge. +uc proofs, according to i*, infer t at , ic is episte*ologically prior=t at is, t at , ic is *ore kno,a"le a"solutely "ut not necessarily in relation to us=fro* t at , ic is episte*ologically posterior=t at is, *ore kno,a"le relative to us "ut not necessarily *ore kno,a"le a"solutely. But if ,e ,ere to ad*it suc inferences as de*onstrative proofs, Gour definition of a"solute kno,ledge @

A ,ould "e unsatisfactory "ecause it ,ill ave a dou"le *eaning @or ,ill "e e1uivocal, A. But presu*a"ly t e ot er de*onstration @ A, proceeding fro* t at , ic is "etter kno,n to us, is not de*onstration in t e a"solute sense @ AG > ost. Anal . F6"#$?. )t *ay see* fro* t e a"ove t at Aristotle accepts circular proofs as "eing de*onstrations "ut not a"solute ones, t at e t us e&tends t e notion of de*onstration to include at least circular proofs. Actually Aristotle does not accept circular proofs as "eing de*onstrations, for it can "e seen t at in t is , ole discussion Aristotle is arguing against opponents , o clai* t at t ere are circular de*onstrations, and ence e i*self la"els suc proofs, , ic ai* at proving , at is logically prior "y , at is not, as is opponent ,ould, t at is, as de*onstrations. )t can also "e seen t at Aristotle does not assert suc proofs *ust "e accepted as de*onstrations, "ut rat er t at if t ey ,ere accepted certain t ings ,ould follo,, Gper aps our definition @of a"solute kno,ledgeA ,ould "e unsatisfactory, for it ,ould "e e1uivocal.G )ndeed, Aristotle goes on to argue t at suc GproofsG are not de*onstrations precisely "ecause t ey fail to *eet a condition t at de*onstration *ust, according to i*, *eet= na*ely, it *ust prove t e episte*ologically posterior fro* t e episte*ologically prior. +i*ilarly, Aristotle re/ects as de*onstrations GproofsG t at fail to *eet t e causality condition. :ne *ay, according to i*, produce a syllogis* ,it true pre*ises t at validly infers t e cause fro* t e effect. :ne *ay, for e&a*ple, infer fro* a valid syllogis* ,it true pre*ises t at t e planets are near fro* t e fact t at t ey do not t,inkle or t at t e *oon is sp erical fro* t e fact t at it as p ases > ost. Anal . ).&iii?. +uc GproofsG are not de*onstrations, according to Aristotle, for t ey fail to derive t e effects fro* t eir causes.@%A 7et, one *ig t argue, , et er t e t,o conditions ,e identified a"ove= t ose of t e episte*ological and causal priority of t e pre*ises=are satisfied is not t e i*portant 1uestion in t e present conte&t. 2 at is i*B 5 641 5 portant is , et er Aristotle is ,illing to consider as de*onstrations ot er kinds of reasoning, for e&a*ple, induction. Aristotle recogni9es inductive reasoning or argu*ents as "eing along ,it deductive argu*ents a *eans for teac ing: Bot proceed fro* preBe&isting kno,ledge fro* , ic t ey infer so*et ing else > ost. Anal . F1a%?. 7et induction is not de*onstration. ' is is *ade clear in t e contrast Aristotle dra,s "et,een t e t,o in ost. Anal . , en e argues t at t ere are t,o ,ays of learning >or investigating=

?: G+ince ,e learn eit er "y induction @

A or de*onstration @ A and de*onstration proceeds fro* universals and induction fro* particularsG >H1a4$?. ' ere is not t e slig test int ere t at induction is a kind of de*onstration, t at de*onstrative kno,ledge can result fro* induction as it presu*a"ly does fro* de*onstration. :n t e contrary, it is assu*ed t at t e t,o for*s of reasoning=inductive and de*onstrative=are altoget er different.@EA But per aps t e difference "et,een de*onstrative and inductive reasoning can "e seen *ore clearly fro* , at Aristotle says else, ere. 2 ile discussing t e nature of t e *et od of division and its use for arriving at definitions, e says t at Gat no stage @of t e progress of divisionA does it result necessarily @

A t at, given certain t ings, t e o"/ect *ust ave t e re1uired definition, /ust as t e one , o uses induction does not de*onstrate @ AG >91"14?.@FA Bot induction and division fail to *eet t e condition of necessity, for "ot fail to *eet at least t e necessity associated ,it t e validity of a deductive inference=t e conclusion *ust "e true if t e pre*ises are true. 3ivision is not even an inference > =91"##?, and t e trut of t e conclusion of an inductive inference does not follo, logically fro* t e trut of t e pre*ises. 7et Aristotle does not ,is to deny t at induction or division convey so*e kno,ledge, "ut t ey do so "y a ,ay t at is different fro* t at of de*onstration >

?: G' ere is not ing a"nor*al in t is @in t e fact t at induction and division convey kno,ledgeA, since presu*a"ly neit er does e , o uses induction prove anyt ing @ A, "ut nevert eless e s o,s @reveals= A so*et ingG >91"#%?. 2 at precisely t e difference "et,een proving > ? and s o,ing or revealing > ? is *ay not "e altoget er clear, "ut neit er induction nor division is a for* of de*onstration. According to Aristotle, t e sa*e is true ,it perception. )t does not provide us ,it de*onstrative kno,ledge, alt oug it does provide us ,it so*e type of kno,ledge. Perception is kno,ledge of particulars and t erefore not of causes, for it is t e universal t at reveals t e cause >H%"6%, HHa%?. ' us, t e pro"le* ,it perception is not, as Plato often insists, *erely t at its o"/ects are p ysical ones. )t is

rat er t at it is not de*onstration. -or, Aristotle argues, Gif it ,ere possi"le to perceive "y t e 5 646 5 senses t at t e su* of t e angles of a triangle is e1ual to t,o rig t angles, ,e s ould still re1uire a proof @

A of t is4 ,e ,ould not >as so*e *aintain? kno, t at it is soG >HF"#%?. ' e sa*e is true ,it our perceptions of p ysical p eno*ena=t ey do not constitute de*onstrative kno,ledge: G<ence if ,e ,ere on t e *oon and sa, t e eart intercepting t e lig t of t e sun, ,e s ould not kno, t e cause of t e eclipse. 2e s ould only perceive t at an eclipse ,as taking place at t at *o*ent and not t e reason , y, "ecause senseBperception does not tell us anyt ing a"out universalsG >HF"#H, and see also Aristotle.s discussion of t e e&a*ple of t e "urning glass at HHa1%?. ' e a"ove evidence s o,s t at Aristotle does not ,eaken t e notion of de*onstration, as so*e ave suggested recently, to t e point t at anyt ing can "e a de*onstration, t at , atever s o,s or reveals so*et ing can "e a de*onstrative proof.@HA ' ere are differences "et,een de*onstrating and s o,ing or revealing. ' e for*er *eets conditions t e latter does not, and , atever is to count as a de*onstration *ust *eet so*e if not all of t ese conditions. ' is is an i*portant point, for, if one accepts t at Aristotle ulti*ately enlarges is conception of de*onstration to include t e do*ain of t ings t at are for t e *ost part, t e clai* t at e does so ,ill "e of any significance only if not everyt ing is a case of de*onstration. )n ot er ,ords, only if de*onstration is distinct fro* t e *et od of division, induction, perception, or ot er for*s of reasoning and kno,ing ,ill our clai* a"out Aristotle.s enlarged conception of de*onstration "e asserting so*et ing significant. At least it ,ill "e asserting t at so*e type of proof t at is different fro* induction, division, perception, and so fort is possi"le in t e case of , at is for t e *ost part.

The 0imits of the !pectrum of #emonstration

But, , ile it *ay "e true t at Aristotle as so*e rat er ,ellBdefined notion of de*onstration in *ind , en e speaks of so*e kind of spectru* t at enco*passes t e *ost e&act, as ,ell as t e GsoftG type, one needs to kno, , at t e li*its or "oundaries of t is spectru* of Aristotelian de*onstration are. ' e upper li*it can "e identified easily and ,it certainty: ' e *ost cogent or e&act de*onstrations are t e ones , ose pre*ises are necessary. ' ey or t e disciplines to , ic t ey "elong de*onstrate ,it greater necessity >F.16?. According to F.9, kno,ledge in t e strict sense of t e ter* is a"out o"/ects t at cannot "e ot er,ise4 t eir properties "elong to t e* necessarily, or it is a"out t ings G, ose principles cannot "e ot er,iseG >F.%, F.E?, Git is an understanding of universals and of t ings t at are of necessityG >F.F?. Dno,ledge or de*onstration t at is a"solute or simpliciter is t at , ose o"/ects e& i"it necessity or , ose pre*ises are necessary. )t is t e de*onstration t at s o,s t at a t ing cannot "e ot erB 5 64# 5 ,ise > ost. Anal . F1"1#?. 2 at is de*onstrated in t is ,ay cannot "e ot er,ise not only in t e sense t at it follo,s fro* t e pre*ises of a valid inference "ut also a"solutely=it follo,s fro* necessary pre*ises: GIo, kno,ledge is de*onstrative , en ,e possess it in virtue of aving a de*onstration4 t erefore t e pre*ises of de*onstration are necessaryG > ost. Anal . F#a6%4 see also F#a6$, F#"1E,

F4"%, F%a6H?.@9A :f course, in addition to t e condition of necessity, an inference or syllogis* *ust *eet all t e ot er conditions Aristotle re1uires of a syllogis* in order for it to "e an e&act de*onstration or to result in a"solute kno,ledge. ' ese are t e conditions ,e *entioned earlier >c ap. 6?, t e ones Aristotle identifies at ost. Anal . F1"6$=na*ely, t e pre*ises of suc a syllogis* *ust "e true, pri*itive, i**ediate, *ore fa*iliar t an, prior to, and causative of t e conclusion. ' ese are no dou"t i*portant conditions, "ut it is 1uite clear t at t e condition t at is essential to a"solute kno,ledge or *ost e&act de*onstration is t at of t e necessity of t e o"/ects of kno,ledge or of t e pre*ises of t e de*onstrative syllogis*. ' is is t e condition t at al*ost defines a"solute de*onstrative kno,ledge for Aristotle. ' at , at is kno,n in t is sense cannot "e ot er,ise is introduced in t e very first for*ulation Aristotle gives of a"solute kno,ledge in ost. Anal . >F1"1$?, and *uc of , at e says in t at treatise can "e vie,ed as an atte*pt to fles out in ter*s of t e se*antic and syntactic properties of t e de*onstrative syllogis* t is feature of kno,ledge. ' is line of t oug t in Aristotle.s account of de*onstrative kno,ledge, , ic re1uires t at t e o"/ects of kno,ledge e& i"it necessary properties or t at t e propositions , ic constitute our proofs are necessary, is un*istaka"ly Platonic. -or Plato, kno,ledge as as its o"/ects only t ose t ings t at cannot "e ot er,ise. ' erefore, ) s all at ti*es refer to Aristotle.s account of a"solute or strict kno,ledge as t e Platonist account. 2 ereas t e only conception of kno,ledge Plato ad ,as t at e*"odied in t e Platonist account= kno,ledge as as its o"/ects only t e t ings t at cannot "e ot er,ise=Aristotle, as seen a"ove, recogni9es also kno,ledge or de*onstration t at is less e&act or t at is not a"solute. 2 at, t en, is t is kno,ledge or de*onstration t at is not a"solute or t at is lacking in e&actness; 2 at is t e lo,er li*it in t e Aristotelian spectru* of de*onstrative kno,ledge; +pecifying t is li*it is not easy. )t see*s *ost likely t at t e de*onstrations t at are lacking in cogency or e&actness, or t at fall s ort of producing a"solute kno,ledge, differ fro* t ose t at produce suc kno,ledge ,it respect to t e condition of necessity. Aristotle, o,ever, does not state e&plicitly , at gives rise to t e difference "et,een a"solute kno,ledge or de*onstration and t at , ic is not. )nstead e speaks of GsoftG or less e&act de*onstrations, or of a kind of cognition t at is not kno,ledge in t e strict sense "ut only "y si*ilarity, and so on. But, if Aristotle does not state e&plicitly o, an e&act or a"solute de*B 5 644 5 onstration differs fro* an ine&act or GsoftG one, *ig t it not "e t e case t at t e spectru* of Aristotelian de*onstration is really rat er narro,, t at t e lo,er li*it of t e spectru* does not differ *uc fro* t e upper li*it; Per aps e&act or a"solute de*onstration does not differ *uc fro* t at , ic is not a"solute or e&act and t ere is really only one kind of de*onstration=t at of t e Platonist conception=and , atever differences t ere are "et,een t e t,o li*its of t e Aristotelian spectru* of de*onstration t ey are not differences t at take us outside t is Platonist conception of de*onstration. ' us, one *ig t argue, t ere is really one line of t oug t in Aristotle.s account of de*onstration, t e Platonist one, and , atever differences Aristotle identifies a*ong de*onstrations *ust "e suc t at one al,ays re*ains ,it in t is conception of a"solute kno,ledge. ' e a"ove line of argu*ent fails to capture Aristotle.s intentions. ) t ink t at Aristotle enlarges t e conception of de*onstration in a significant ,ay, t at t e lo,er "oundary of is de*onstrative spectru* differs fro* t e upper one to suc a degree t at it falls outside t e Platonist conception of kno,ledge. +ince Aristotle does not e&plain t e differences "et,een t e t,o "oundaries, ) ,is to s o, t at t e atte*pt to e&plain t e differences Aristotle as in *ind >, en e speaks of *ore and less

e&act or cogent or soft de*onstrations? ,it in t e "oundaries of a"solute de*onstration ,ill not "e successful. )t is true t at t ere are so*e i*portant differences a*ong de*onstrations or disciplines t at affect in a ,ay t eir de*onstrative rigor "ut not to t e e&tent t at t ey cease to "e de*onstrations or disciplines t at produce a"solute kno,ledge. 8&a*ining t ese differences is indeed i*portant, for in *any instances it "rings to lig t t e rat er e&tensive variation in t e de*onstrative rigor or purity t at e&ists a*ong t e various disciplines. 7et t ese differences t at allo, us to re*ain ,it in t e Platonist conception of kno,ledge are not sufficient for e&plaining t e differences a*ong de*onstrations or disciplines t at Aristotle cites. 8ventually, it ,ill "e necessary to get out of t e circle of a"solute or Platonist kno,ledge in order to account for Aristotle.s differences. ' us, t ose , o refuse to recogni9e t at t ere is de*onstration or kno,ledge t at is not of t e Platonist kind=t ey refuse to ad*it t at Aristotle enlarges t e conception of de*onstration=,ill not "e a"le to account for t ese differences. )f t is is so, it ,ill also strengt en t e interpretation ) ,is to offer=na*ely, t at ine&act or soft de*onstration or kno,ledge is t at , ic Aristotle associates ,it do*ains t at are for t e *ost part, do*ains t at can "e ot er,ise. ' is is denied "y all t ose , o t ink t at et ics falls outside t e de*onstra"le on account of its ine&actness. :ne , o takes t e strict or Platonist conception of de*onstrative kno,ledge as "eing t e only conception of de*onstrative kno,ledge ArB 5 64% 5 istotle as ,ill naturally "e *otivated to interpret is re*arks a"out t e differences in de*onstration, kno,ledge, or disciplines in a ,ay t at is consistent ,it t is Platonist conception. :ne ,ill try to find so*e features , ic , alt oug t ey vary across de*onstrations or disciplines, do not affect t e condition of necessity t at see*s to "e at t e core of t e Platonist conception of de*onstrative kno,ledge, or one *ay look for so*e features t at can affect to so*e e&tent t e rigor of de*onstration "ut ,it out altering t e de*onstrative c aracter of a discipline. As Barnes as argued, alt oug it is possi"le to speak of degrees of rigor, it *akes no sense to speak of degrees of de*onstration.@1$A 3ifferences in rigor can "e looked upon as "eing nonper*anent features of t e various disciplines, as "eing so*et ing t at can "e eli*inated. Alt oug eli*inating suc differences in rigor *ay prove to "e 1uite difficult and, as ) s all argue "elo,, , at *ay appear to "e *erely a *atter of rigor could at ti*es affect t e de*onstrative c aracter of a discipline in a *ore funda*ental ,ay, t e *ove of focusing on differences in rigor is a reasona"le one. -ollo,ing are so*e *oves t e defender of t e a"solute conception of de*onstration or kno,ledge *ig t *ake. :ne *ove ,ould "e to focus on so*e differences a*ong disciplines , ic Aristotle i*self identifies and , ic ,e discussed earlier >c ap. 4?=for e&a*ple, so*e disciplines deal ,it so*et ing as in ering in a su"strate > ar*onics? , ereas ot ers do not >arit *etic? or so*e use fe,er factors in t eir de*onstrations >arit *etic? t an so*e ot ers >geo*etry=see ost. Anal . ).&&vii?. Anot er *ove ,ould "e to point to t e supposed difference in our kno,ledge of t e "asic principles of t e various disciplines. ' e principles of so*e are per aps "etter kno,n=for e&a*ple, t ose of *at e*atics=and ence de*onstration in suc disciplines is in so*e respect "etter. -or instance, t e necessity or cogency of suc disciplines is *ore transparent, for one can see clearly t e necessity of t e conclusions of its de*onstrations >t e necessity of its t eore*s?, since t e starting points in suc disciplines are also transparent. )ndeed, t is concern ,it t e nature and t e kno,ledge one as of t e principles or starting points of de*onstration runs t roug t e , ole of t e ost. Anal ., and it 1uickly "eco*es evident t at Aristotle takes t e 1uality of our de*onstrations to depend on t e nature of t e principles of a discipline and our kno,ledge of t e*. +o Aristotle clai*s t at in order for t ere to "e Gde*onstrative kno,ledge one *ust not only kno, "etter, and "e *ore convinced of, t e first principles t an , at e

proves fro* t e*, "ut also t at not ing , ic is opposed to t e first principles . . . *ust "e *ore credi"le or "etter kno,n to i* t an t ose principles4 since one , o as a"solute kno,ledge @

A s ould "e uns akea"le in is convictionG >F6"?. )f one does not kno, "etter t at fro* , ic de*onstration proceeds, Git ,ill not "e possi"le to ave kno,ledge of anyt ing 5 64E 5 a"solutely t roug de*onstration @

is

A, "ut only ypot eticallyG >H4a%?. ' e idea t at of t e t ings ,e kno, so*e are kno,n *ore or "etter t an ot ers is not a clear one. Per aps , at Aristotle ,ants to say is t at of so*e t ings ,e are *ore convinced4 ,e ave, as e puts it, an uns akea"le conviction or ,e are *ore certain. ' us understood, e is pointing to t e nature of our cognitive state or attitude in relation to so*e t ings or propositions, rat er t an to so*e for*al features of t e propositions of a de*onstration. ' ere is no 1uestion t at , en Aristotle speaks of de*onstration or kno,ledge, t ese aspects of our cognitive states are 1uite i*portant=if t ey are not satisfied, t ere ,ould "e no a"solute proof even t oug t e for*al ele*ents are satisfied, for e&a*ple, if ,e are not certain or convinced of t e trut of t e "asic ele*ents of our de*onstration ,e ,ould not "e certain of our inferences. Are t ere disciplines t en , ose "asic ele*ents are less ,ell kno,n; )t is not clear t at t e feature Aristotle pro"a"ly as in *ind in t is conte&t is *ore peculiar to so*e disciplines t an to ot ers. Per aps e t inks it is4 per aps e t inks it is *ore co**on, for e&a*ple, to so*e disciplines , ose "asic ele*ents are *ore strongly connected to e&perience >see "elo,?. +o t at alt oug t e principles of all disciplines are necessary, t e principles of so*e are *ore or "etter kno,n t an t ose of ot ers. But if t is is t e reason , y so*e disciplines are not as e&act as ot ers, t en t e resulting differences in e&actness a*ong disciplines are differences t at ,e *ay "e ,illing to live ,it . ' ey are clearly not t e sort of differences t at ,ould /ustify t e dra,ing of s arp distinctions a*ong t e disciplines, at least not to t e e&tent t at ,e ,ould call so*e of t e* less cogent, soft, or ine&act and consider t e kno,ledge t ey produce to "e kno,ledge only "y si*ilarity. )n addition, it is not clear t at suc episte*ological c aracteristics cannot "e eli*inated fro* or reduced in all or *ost of t e disciplines. ' us, it ,ould "e ard to see o, one could de*onstrate ,it less or greater cogency if one ,ere to *ove fro* necessary pre*ises to necessary conclusions, assu*ing t at one is using valid rules of inference. Per aps one could also include ere as a ,ay of e&plaining t e differences a*ong de*onstrations Aristotle.s concern ,it t e difference "et,een de*onstrations t at proceed fro* universal in contrast to nonBuniversal or affir*ative in contrast to negative pre*ises. )n de*onstration , ic proceeds fro* universal pre*ises one as greater or "etter kno,ledge >

, H%"9?, t e de*onstration is "etter > , H%"1%, "6F, HEa1$? t an , en t e pre*ises are not universal4 and since t e de*onstration of t ings , ic are G*ore de*onstra"le is *ore truly de*onstration @

A. . . . t e universal de*onstration is superior, inas*uc as it is *ore truly de*onstrationG >9EaH?. )n a si*ilar ,ay one *ay argue t at a de*onstration t at uses affir*ative 5 64F 5 pre*ises is "etter t an one t at uses negative ones: G)f t e *eans of proof is *ore kno,a"le and *ore certain t an t e t ing proved, and negative is proved "y affir*ative de*onstration, "ut not affir*ative "y negative, t e affir*ative, "eing prior and *ore kno,a"le and *ore certain, *ust "e superiorG >HE"6H?. ' ere is no reason to "elieve, o,ever, t at so*e disciplines ave *ore de*onstrations of t e kind t at Aristotle considers inferior t an ot ers. )t ,ould "e difficult to differentiate a*ong disciplines on t e "asis of t is feature. Alt oug it *ay "e possi"le to account for so*e differences of purity, clarity, episte*ological superiority, and so on in de*onstrations in ter*s of t e a"ove considerations, t e 1uestion still re*ains , et er suc considerations account for a difference in cogency or necessity. 3o t ey /ustify t e type of difference Aristotle is pointing at; )t is dou"tful, for it does not see* t at t ese are t e sort of differences and considerations t at can account for t e contrast Aristotle dra,s "et,een disciplines t at de*onstrate *ore cogently and ot ers t at do so less cogently. -or in all t e a"ove cases, despite t e differences, one stays inside t e circle of necessity=t e condition of necessity is preserved, for t e differences are located in various ot er factors and not in t at of necessity. +o*e of t ese factors can per aps "e eli*inated, "ut even t ose t at cannot do not see* to /ustify a differentiation a*ong t e disciplines in ter*s of cogency of de*onstration. Per aps t e difference t at Aristotle speaks of in t e necessity or cogency of de*onstration is to "e found in , at *akes up a de*onstration: its pre*ises. ' ere *ig t "e, t at is, so*e features of t e pre*ises of de*onstration t at affect its rigor or t e rigor of any discipline t at consists in de*onstrations , ose pre*ises are c aracteri9ed "y suc features. 'o "egin ,it , suppose t at so*e pre*ises are suppressed in a proof=t us, generating a nonperspicuous de*onstration , ose cogency can "e 1uestioned. +uc types of reasoning ,ould fall into t e class of ent y*e*es t at Aristotle discusses rat er e&tensively in t e #op . and Rhet . )t see*s t at suc a feature of proofs could "e looked upon as giving rise to so*e type of difference in t e cogency of syllogistic reasoning in general and de*onstrative reasoning in particular. -or one *ay 1uestion , et er , at as "een concluded really follo,s or can "e inferred fro* , at as "een asserted=t e necessity of t e conclusion as not "een *ade clear. :ne cannot say ,it certainty t at t is is , at Aristotle as in *ind, for e tends to restrict ent y*e*es and related types of reasoning to , at e often vie,s as dialectical or r etorical purposes=t us putting t e* outside t e real* of t e de*onstrative disciplines. )n addition, it is not clear t at t ere are certain disciplines , ere suc features of proofs are to "e *et *ore fre1uently t an in ot ers. 2e often t ink of t e *at e*atical disciplines as possessing perfect or ideal proofs= 5 64H 5 t at is, proofs , ic are suc t at anyt ing t at plays an inferential role is *ade e&plicit, and not ing t at is not e&plicitly stated plays suc a role. ' is is not al,ays t e case even in t e *at e*atical disciplines, "ut t e non*at e*atical ones are presu*a"ly *ore affected "y t is. 7et it is not o"vious t at t e disciplines t at supposedly contain proofs suffering fro* suc deficiencies cannot "e "roug t

up to t e level of t e *at e*atical ones. Assu*ing t at t ey are de*onstrative, , y can.t t eir suppressed pre*ises "e *ade e&plicit and t us t eir necessity "e *ade perspicuous and t eir proofs as cogent as t ose of t e *at e*atical ones; ' ese types of features of proofs see* to "e t e type t at can "e corrected. )n any case, in order to locate so*e "asic difference in t e de*onstrative cogency or necessity of so*e of t e disciplines in suc a feature of t eir proofs, one ,ould ave to s o, t at t ese disciplines do indeed suffer fro* proofs t at e& i"it suc features and t at in turn suc features cannot "e eli*inated eit er in principle or in practice. )t is 1uite possi"le t at t is is indeed t e case=and *ost i*portantly t at t e last clai* is true: +uc features cannot "e eli*inated fro* t e proofs of so*e disciplines. )n so*e cases pre*ises cannot "e *ade e&plicit. ' is ,ould "e pro"le*atic for an a&io*atic vie, of de*onstrative kno,ledge or science, suc as Aristotle.s. ' e pro"le* ,ould "e especially acute if t e "asic principles of a particular discipline on , ic all of its de*onstrations depend could not "e *ade e&plicit. Are t ere t en disciplines , ic syste*atically rely on suppressed pre*ises eit er "ecause suc pre*ises ave not "een *ade e&plicit or "ecause t ey cannot "e *ade e&plicit; ' ere is no dou"t t at considera"le parts of Aristotle.s discussion in t e various treatises rest on suppressed pre*ises. Consider, for e&a*ple, t e opening seg*ents of t e N.E. 3oes t e first clai* t at Aristotle *akes a"out every action, pursuit, art, and so fort , ai*ing at so*e good stand on its o,n or does it presuppose a *ore general "ut unstated principle a"out t e nature of u*an action; Per aps Aristotle presupposes a rat er general principle , ic connects t e notions of purpose or end and of t e good4 per aps e presupposes so*e vie, a"out t e nature of rationality or a"out t e nature of e&planation or understanding of u*an action. Possi"ly, e presupposes so*e even ,ider *etap ysical principle t at all t ings ai*, in so*e ,ay or ot er, at t e good. Consider again t e clai*s e *akes a"out t e arc itectonic structure of desires and pursuits and t e use e *akes of t ese clai*s in proving t at if anyt ing is desired at all, t en t ere *ust "e at least so*et ing t at is desired for its o,n sake. ' ese clai*s a"out t e arc itectonic structure of pursuits and desires rest on so*e general principles e presupposes "ut does not state e&plicitly as general principles, a"out t e nature of desires or pursuits= na*ely, t at t ey ave ends or goals, t at t ey are transitive, t at t ey are asy**etrical, and so fort . @11A 5 649 5 ' e a"ove are /ust t,o instances of t e use of suppressed pre*ises in t e N.E. )n a ,ay, t ey illustrate an i*portant difference "et,een general principles t at are often used ,it out "eing stated in deriving or /ustifying ot er principles or propositions=a difference t at could "e vie,ed as e&plaining , y so*e disciplines unavoida"ly depend on suppressed pre*ises and t erefore lack cogent de*onstration. -or t e unstated principles on , ic t e arc itectonic nature of desire and t e e&istence of so*et ing , ic is desired for its o,n sake rest can "e grasped and *ade e&plicit rat er easily. :ne ,ay of for*ulating t e* is t e follo,ing: >a? )f & is desired, t en t ere is a y suc t at & is desired for t e sake of y >, ere it *ay "e t e case t at & Q y=t e teleological aspect of desire? >"? )f & is desired for t e sake of y and y for t e sake of 9 t en & is desired for t e sake of 9 >relativi9ed of course to agent, ti*e, place, etc.=t e transitivity of desire? >c? )f & is desired for t e sake of y and & C y, t en y is not desired for t e sake of & >again, relativi9ed in t e appropriate *anner=t e asy**etry of desire? 2 en, o,ever, ,e turn to t e general principles t at see* to "e presupposed in Aristotle.s clai*s t at t e good is in so*e ,ay connected ,it desire and its ends or goals, *atters "eco*e *uc *ore

co*ple&. )t is *uc *ore difficult to grasp , at t e connection is, and it is not clear o, t ese general principles are to "e stated. )s t ere a connection of *eaning "et,een G"eing goodG and G"eing desiredG or G"eing an endG; :r is t e connection a ,eaker or a stronger one and of , at kind; )f, in addition, it is true t at "e ind Aristotle.s t eoretical principle connecting t e good, desire, and its ends lies a particular vie, a"out t e nature of e&planation, understanding, and rationality of u*an action, t en grasping and stating e&plicitly suc a principle is not likely to "e easy. 7et suc a principle plays a central role in is reasoning a"out t e good.@16A Plato see*s to ave pu99led over t e difficulty in for*ulating an account of t e good. 3espite t e t eoretical and practical i*portance it as, t e good, Plato argues, is so*et ing , ose nature "affles or poses a c allenge for t e understanding: G' at, t en, , ic every soul pursues and for its sake does all t at it does, ,it an intuition of its reality, "ut yet "affled and una"le to appre end its nature ade1uately, or to attain to any sta"le "elief a"out it as a"out ot er t ings, and for t at reason failing of any possi"le "enefit fro* ot er t ingsG >Republic %$%8?. )n a ,ellBkno,n passage Plato descri"es +ocrates as s ying a,ay fro* atte*pting to offer a definition of t e good: G3o not stand off as if you @+ocratesA ad co*e to t e end. 2e s all "e satisfied if you discuss t e Good. . . ' at, *y friend, ) said, ,ould also 1uite satisfy *e, "ut ) fear ) s all not "e a"le 5 6%$ 5 to do so, and t at in *y eagerness ) s all disgrace *yself and *ake *yself ridiculous. But . . . let us a"andon for t e *o*ent t e 1uest for t e nature of t e Good itselfG >%$E3?. ) a* in a ,ay suggesting t at t e clai* t at so*e disciplines de*onstrate less cogently t an ot ers "ecause t ey rely on suppressed pre*ises s ould "e taken seriously, for 1uite often pre*ises t at play a role in our reasoning are not stated, and per aps so*e disciplines rely on suc pre*ises *ore t an ot ers. ' ese see* to "e t e disciplines t at rely in t eir reasoning on so*e rat er "asic concepts , ic cannot "e easily stated in t e for* of general principles. ) ave in *ind in t is conte&t not only t e disciplines of conduct "ut also t e disciplines , ic investigate , at Aristotle i*self investigates in so*e of is o,n treatises=t at is, t e psyc ological, p ysical, and "iological p eno*ena e investigates in t e hys.' Anim.' G.A ., and so fort . Consider, for e&a*ple, t e difficulties and pro"le*s Aristotle encounters in trying to for*ulate general accounts of ti*e, space, place, purpose, and cause. 7et *uc of , at ,e reason a"out in disciplines suc as t e a"ove presupposes or rests on certain accounts of t ese concepts or features t at see* to "e t e *ost funda*ental ele*ents of our t oug t or of t e ,orld, regardless of , et er or not suc accounts are *ade e&plicit in our reasoning. ' us +t. Augustine is pu99led "y e&actly t is pro"le* , en e says, G2 at, t en, is ti*e; )f no one asks *e, ) kno,4 "ut if ) ,is to e&plain it to one , o asket , ) kno, not.G )f +t. Augustine.s pro"le* ,it ti*e cannot "e solved, if no definition can "e provided, t en ,e can per aps see o, a discipline t at re1uires a definition of ti*e can fail to ac ieve a certain level of de*onstrative rigor. -or if so*e of its de*onstrations depend on a definition of ti*e, t ey ,ill ave to rely on tacit or i*plicit pre*ises=t e pre*ises e&plaining t e nature of ti*e t at +t. Augustine clai*s to kno, only , en no one is asking. 8ven a concept suc as t at of potentiality see*s to ave "een pro"le*atic for Aristotle. )n Met . e re*arks in connection ,it is efforts to define or e&plain t e nature of potentiality: G:ur *eaning can "e seen in t e particular cases "y induction, and ,e *ust not seek a definition of everyt ing "ut "e content to grasp t e analogy, t at it is as t at , ic is "uilding is to t at , ic is capa"le of "uilding, and t e ,aking to t e sleeping. . .. Jet actuality "e defined "y one *e*"er of t is antit esis, and t e potential "y t e ot erG >1$4Ha#%?. Io, potentiality plays, according to Aristotle, a *a/or role in understanding or e&plaining c ange4 it is even indispensa"le in e&plaining o, c ange is possi"le and t us in avoiding t e difficulties earlier t inkers ad ,it accepting t e

possi"ility of c ange. Potentiality is a concept t at, alt oug difficult to define or articulate, plays a *a/or role in t e reasonings of *any disciplines, and t e disciplines t at rely on it ,ould appear to rely on suppressed pre*ises. )ndeed one *ay say t at t e disciplines t at ave al,ays "een taken to "e 5 6%1 5 t e *odels of de*onstrative science, t e ones t at possess a perspicuous a&io*atic structure , ere t e "asic ele*ents fro* , ic all ot er propositions are inferred are *ade e&plicit=for e&a*ple, t e *at e*atical sciences=*ay very ,ell "e /ust t e disciplines , ic rely less on t ose kinds of concepts t at, alt oug t ey affect our reasoning, 1uite often function as suppressed pre*ises. ' is last re*ark is not o"viously true, o,ever. ' e *at e*atical disciplines t e*selves do not see* to "e e&e*pt fro* t is pro"le* of suppressed pre*ises, for t ey also presuppose and use a nu*"er of concepts t at *ay not "e any easier to define t an potentiality is: GAnd for t is reason it does not "elong to t e geo*eter to in1uire , at is contrariety or co*pleteness or unity or "eing or t e sa*e or t e ot er, "ut only to presuppose t ese and reason fro* t is starting pointG >(et. 1$$%a11?. But, one *ig t say, t ese are concepts presupposed "y every discipline, t ey are not peculiar to t e *at e*atical ones. +o t e *at e*atical disciplines *ay differ fro* t e ot ers in t e sense t at t ey do not use specifically *at e*atical propositions as suppressed pre*ises. ' is is not o"vious, and as s all "e seen "elo,, it *ost likely is not true. But do t ese considerations s o, or i*ply t at so*e disciplines are necessarily less cogent "ecause t ey reason at ti*es fro* suppressed pre*ises; ' ey ,ould only if it could "e s o,n t at suc pre*ises cannot in principle "e *ade e&plicit, t at t ese kinds of deficiencies in t e reasoning of certain disciplines cannot in fact e re*edied. <o,ever, it is not clear , at sorts of considerations are relevant in s o,ing t at so*e pre*ises can or cannot "e *ade e&plicit. 0ecent p ilosop y as e*p asi9ed t e e&istence and i*portance of tacit or i*plicit kno,ledge=kno,ledge of concepts, general rules of language, and so on. But can all suc t ings t at ,e supposedly kno, tacitly or i*plicitly and t at play a role in our reasoning "e *ade e&plicit and stated in t e for* of pre*ises for our reasoning; ' e +ocraticBPlatonic practice and searc for definitions rests on t e assu*ption t at t e ans,er to t is 1uestion is affir*ative. ' ere is no 1uestion t at +ocrates and Plato assu*e t at , at is kno,n can "e *ade e&plicit, t at it can "e for*ulated in e&plicit definitions of t e kind +ocrates de*ands. )t is t is assu*ption , ic leads +ocrates to say often t at one cannot kno, , at one clai*s to kno,, since t e atte*pts to produce an e&plicit definition ave failed. Plato i*self in t e haedo states t e assu*ption in t e follo,ing ,ay: G2 en a *an kno,s, can e give an account of , at e kno,s or not; Certainly e can, +ocratesG >FEB?. )ndeed, t e su"se1uent discussion in t e haedo *akes it clear t at +ocrates as no dou"t a"out t e assu*ption, , ic for r etorical reasons is put in t e for* of a 1uestion in t e 1uotation a"ove. )n fact, as Plato.s ,ords *ake clear, e not only clai*s t at ,e can give an account of , at is kno,n, t at it can "e for*ulated e&plicitly, "ut even t at t e very sa*e 5 6%6 5 person , o as t e kno,ledge can do t is. (ore recently, t is assu*ption as "een taken for granted "y *uc of linguistic t eory, especially t at , ic derives fro* t e ,ork of Ioa* C o*sky. )t is t us not only assu*ed t at t ere are 1uite general or even universal rules t at e&plain our linguistic perfor*ance and capacity or a"ility "ut also t at t ese rules are in so*e sense kno,n to us and t at t ey can "e e&plicitly for*ulated. >2 ic one of t ese assu*ptions is *ore pro"le*atic is left for t e reader to ponder.?

(ost i*portant for our present purposes is t e fact t at t e assu*ption concerning our a"ility to *ake e&plicit our kno,ledge is taken for granted "y t ose , o vie, kno,ledge as aving an a&io*aticB deductive or de*onstrative for*, for t ey assu*e t at t e propositions one clai*s to kno, are ulti*ately to "e proved fro* t e e&plicitly stated a&io*s only. )f no suc "asic propositions can "e for*ulated or articulated, t en clearly t e prospects for giving a de*onstrative account of , at is kno,n are not good. 7et it is not clear , at sorts of argu*ents can "e given to /ustify t is assu*ption. Are ,e to e&a*ine cases of reasoning and s o, t at in eac case , at is tacitly kno,n can "e *ade e&plicit, t us providing an inductive /ustification for t e assu*ption; As s all "e seen "elo,, t ere are pro"le*atic cases t at cast dou"ts on suc a procedure. But t e argu*ents in support of t e vie, t at so*e disciplines are necessarily less cogent "ecause t ey involve suppressed or none&plicit pre*ises are not any *ore clear, for again it is not o"vious , at sort of argu*ents can "e "roug t fort or even , at kind of argu*ents are needed in order to s o, t at so*e ele*ents t at play a part in t e inferences of certain disciplines cannot "e *ade e&plicit and t eir role in suc inferences *ade perspicuous. :ne *ay suggest, to "egin ,it , t at so*e ele*ents are indefina"le4 "ut o, or , y are t ey so; 2ould pri*itive or a"solutely si*ple notions or o"/ects "e t e sort of t ing t at one as in *ind; -or e&a*ple, t e intuitionists ave clai*ed t at eit er t e good or t e rig t or "ot are pri*itive, "ut t ere are pro"le*s ere. -or it is not clear , at role pri*itive notions play=, et er and o, t ey could function as suppressed pre*ises. Assu*ing t at t ere are suc pri*itive notions >predicates, o"/ects?, t ey *ay not "y t e*selves "e pre*ises in our reasoning, "ut t ey could nonet eless appear as ele*ents of pre*ises t at need not "e suppressed or tacit. -or e&a*ple, assu*ing t at point is a pri*itive notion in geo*etry, t e definition of line in ter*s of t is notion need not pose any particular pro"le*s, can "e e&plicitly stated, and can play an i*portant role in geo*etrical inferences. But, as so*e p ilosop ers ave argued >e.g., Ielson Good*an and 2. K. :. Muine?, it cannot "e taken for granted t at t ere are suc pri*itive ter*s, *uc less t at so*e particular ter*s *ust "e pri*itive. -or , at *ay "e taken as a pri*itive notion in one syste* or in one particular 5 6%# 5 arrange*ent of t e propositions of a discipline, *ay "e capa"le of definition relative to anot er syste* or a different arrange*ent of t e propositions of t e sa*e discipline. +o one *ay define GpointG in ter*s of GlineG and Gline,G in turn, "y an alge"raic e1uation, t us giving definitions of t e supposed pri*itive notions of one discipline "y notions of anot er. Alt oug ,e ave to stop so*e, ere, t is e&ercise s o,s t at no one ter* need "e singled out as t e pri*itive and no one discipline as necessarily containing pri*itive ter*s , ic are indefina"le. Aristotle does not accept t ese vie,s t at relativi9e pri*itives or ele*ents to a syste*. <e at ti*es argues t at so*e t ings are "asic or pri*itive "y nature and t at proper definitions *ust "e in ter*s of suc "asic or pri*itive t ings=t at is, in ter*s of t ose , ic are ele*ents "y nature >#op . 141"1%, "6%, 146a 6H?. 8ven if Aristotle ,ere to "e correct in clai*ing t at t ere are suc a"solute pri*itives, t ere is no reason to "elieve t at t ey are to "e encountered *ore in one discipline rat er t an anot er. )f t ey pose any pro"le*s in relation to t e de*onstrative c aracter of a discipline, t ey ,ould pose t e sa*e pro"le*s for all disciplines , ose definitions are in ter*s of suc pri*itives, including t e *at e*atical ones. ' e geo*etrical point is, according to Aristotle, suc a pri*itive "y nature and ot er t ings in geo*etry are defined in ter*s of it. )ntuitionists, again, ave at ti*es argued t at certain notions or entities are si*ple and t erefore indefina"le. G. 8. (oore.s argu*ents for t e si*plicity and indefina"ility of t e good are per aps t e *ost ,ell kno,n, "ut t e clai* t at t ere are suc notions or entities goes "ack at least as far as Plato.

@1#A ' e process of definition or analysis, Plato argues in #heaetetus >6$18ff.?, leads us to t e recognition t at t ere *ust "e logically si*ple o"/ects. Aristotle i*self considers t e position Plato discusses in t e #heaetetus in Met ., a position e also attri"utes to t e follo,ers of Antist enes: G<ence t e difficulty , ic t e follo,ers of Antist enes and ot er uneducated people raised carries so*e ,eig t. ' ey said t at t e ., at. cannot "e defined. . . . But of , at sort a t ing, e.g., silver, is t ey t oug t it possi"le actually to e&plain, not saying , at it is, "ut t at it is like tin. ' erefore one kind of su"stance can "e defined and for*ulated, i.e., t e co*posite kind, , et er it "e percepti"le or intelligi"le4 "ut t e pri*ary parts of , ic t is consists cannot "e definedG >1$4#E6%?. Alt oug Aristotle e&presses so*e sy*pat y ,it Antist enes. point of vie,, e does not argue t at t ere are si*ple or indefina"le entities. ' ere is no evidence , ere Aristotle clai*s t at any constituents of t e su"/ect *atter of et ics or of so*e group of disciplines are a"solutely si*ple or si*ple in a ,ay t at is different fro* , at ,e find in t e rest of t e disciplines. But suppose ,e ,ere to assu*e t at t ere are suc a"solutely si*ple ingredients of our kno,ledge and t e ,orld, , at follo,s fro* t is a"out 5 6%4 5 t e e&istence of disciplines ,it suppressed pre*ises; Kery little follo,s t at is of any conse1uence, for suc supposedly si*ple ele*ents ,ill necessarily "e co*ponents of propositions if t ey are to function at all as pre*ises in inferences. +uc propositions need not "e suppressed, nonBe&plicit, or tacit /ust "ecause t ey contain co*ponents t at are supposedly a"solutely si*ple. After all, (oore defines t e rig t >or o"ligation? in ter*s of t e good, and is definition is an e&plicit one t at is used in ot er inferences e *akes. P ilosop ers and nonp ilosop ers, o,ever, ave 1uite fre1uently argued for or si*ply clai*ed t at t ere are kinds of kno,ledge or o"/ects of cognition t at cannot "e articulated=, et er si*ple or pri*itive="ut nonet eless play an i*portant role in our reasoning. (ystical e&perience and kno,ledge are t e *ost fa*iliar e&a*ples in t is connection, especially t ose types of nonordinary e&perience or kno,ledge t at presu*a"ly succeed in co*pre ending , at appears in ordinary *odes of cognition to "e contradictory, and t erefore incapa"le of "eing articulated ,it out asserting a contradiction. :f course, not all nonordinary cognition need involve t e contradictory in order to defy articulation. Plato in t e Republic suggests at ti*es t at t e good is "eyond ordinary and even a"ove , at e considers to "e ideal cognition and articulation. 7et, despite t e fact t at it *ay "e difficult or i*possi"le to *ake its nature e&plicit, t e good plays, according to Plato at least, a central role in our kno,ledge. 2e are often inclined not to accept t ese types of argu*ents in support of t e clai* t at so*e disciplines inevita"ly use suppressed or none&plicit pre*ises. 2 at *otivates t is attitude is not so *uc t e fact t at *ystical kno,ledge and in general nonordinary types of cognition do not e&ist or are i*possi"le=t is as yet to "e s o,n="ut rat er our tendency to t ink t at suc cognitions or e&periences s ould not and per aps cannot play any role in , at ,e ordinarily call kno,ledge, o,ever great t eir role and i*portance *ay "e in different conte&ts. -or t ey are invaria"ly vie,ed as failing to satisfy so*e conditions t at are taken to "e necessary in order for a cognition to provide an ite* of kno,ledge=t ey are not easily repeata"le, are not s ared "y ordinary cognitive su"/ects, see* to lack criteria of verification, violate t e la,s of logic >e.g., t e la, of contradiction?, and so fort . )t is per aps reasona"le to "e skeptical a"out clai*s of ineffa"le or contradictory e&periences and cognitions. :ne s ould "e dou"tful of clai*s insisting t at, t oug suc e&periences or cognitions provide trut s t at cannot "e articulated, t ey nonet eless play an i*portant role in inferences. )t *ay

also "e reasona"le to "e skeptical a"out invoking kno,ledge "y intuition in an indiscri*inate and ad oc fas ion. 7et, t oug suc skepticis* appears to "e reasona"le, one *ust "e careful not to overlook a nu*"er of interesting cases t at ave "een vie,ed as involving 5 6%% 5 suc cognitions or intuitions and possi"ly suppressed pre*ises t at cannot "e *ade e&plicit. Parado&ically, al*ost all of t ese cases or at least t e *ost interesting ones are fro* *at e*atics, t e discipline t at is supposed to proceed fro* a set of e&plicit propositions >a&io*s? and to prove all ot er propositions >t eore*s? ,it out utili9ing any ot er suppressed or none&plicit pre*ises. ) ave in *ind in t is connection pri*arily <enri PoincarR.s classic discussions of t e roles of intuition and logical proof in *at e*atics. PoincarR gives a nu*"er of e&a*ples fro* geo*etry , ere, contrary to , at 3avid <il"ert clai*s, one kno,s >"y intuition;? t at certain propositions are true ,it out any proof. @14A :ne , o olds on to t e a&io*atic *et od at all costs ,ould ave to insist t at t ere are tacit pre*ises fro* , ic suc propositions follo,. 7et t ere are pro"le*s ere, and t e "est ,ay to see t e* is to consider PoincarR.s discussion of t e principle of *at e*atical induction. +uc a principle is not prova"le4 it is not a t eore* in *at e*atics. )n fact, it cannot "e stated in full generality, for all properties. )t is 1uite clear t at it is not an a&io* of t e kind t at ,ould "e ad*itted "y t e logicists >, o* PoincarR calls GlogisticiansG?, "ut if one is not ,illing to accept kno,ledge "y intuition, as t e logicists are not, t en one ,ill ave to insist t at t ere are pre*ises involved , ic are suppressed or tacit and fro* , ic t e principle of *at e*atical induction follo,s. ' us, t ose , o up old t e a&io*atic *et od and for*al proof as t e *odel of *at e*atical kno,ledge and refuse to accept t at any ele*ents t at are not *ade e&plicit play any role in *at e*atical proof are forced to insist t at if one is to avoid aving recourse to intuitions, t ere *ust "e so*e pre*ises t at are suppressed. ' e case of t e principle of *at e*atical induction is of course not an isolated case. :ne *ay include ere PoincarR.s o,n con/ecture of reducing t e volu*e of a solid to a point. PoincarR con/ectured=and it is generally accepted t at e is correct=t at t is is so of a t reeBdi*ensional o"/ect, alt oug e ,as not a"le to give any proof of it. Proofs ,ere first given for o"/ects of *ore t an four di*ensions and recently a proof ,as constructed for a fourBdi*ensional o"/ect, "ut PoincarR.s o,n con/ecture as not "een proven yet. :ne *ay add to t e list of suc cases Gold"ac .s con/ecture and -er*at.s last t eore*.@1%A But one *ay argue t at if t ere are suppressed pre*ises in t ese cases, t en t ey are so until a proof is provided or until t ey are *ade e&plicit. ' is *ay very ,ell "e true, alt oug t e case of t e principle of *at e*atical induction is likely to "e a difficult one. ' ere is a case o,ever t at ,ould not give *uc ope and co*fort to a logicist, for it can "e vie,ed fro* t e logicist.s o,n perspective as s o,ing t at if t ere are pre*ises for proving so*e t eore*s, t en t ey certainly cannot "e stated e&plicitly. ) a* of course t inking of GSdel.s t eore*. GSdel.s results s o, t at given any set of a&io*s 5 6%E 5 for arit *etic t ere is a proposition of arit *etic , ic is true "ut is not a t eore* >it is not prova"le fro* t e a&io* set?. )f t e logicist is not to accept kno,ledge "y intuition=and it is unlikely t at e ,ould take suc an option= e ,ould ave to insist t at suc propositions t at are not t eore*s of t e given a&io* set *ust nonet eless follo, fro* so*e pre*ises t at cannot "e stated. But even if one ,ere to set GSdel.s t eore* aside and instead focus only on t e cases t at could, in principle, "e given proofs, t is discussion *akes an i*portant point: Kie,ing *at e*atics in ter*s of t e a&io*aticB deductive *odel of t e logicists t at is supposed to eli*inate intuitions as ,ell as any proofs t at are

not of t e for*al kind as t e odd conse1uence of forcing us to argue for t e e&istence of suppressed pre*ises to account for t e a"ove cases. ' us=and t is is *ost i*portant for our purposes=if t e logicists are rig t, one could encounter even in *at e*atics kinds of reasoning fro* suppressed pre*ises t at ,ould not satisfy t e standards of a"solute or un1ualified de*onstrations of Aristotle and t e for*al proofs of t e logicists. )t is likely t at suc types of reasoning are to "e *et *ore fre1uently in t ose disciplines , ose principles are *ore difficult to for*ulate and articulate. ) do not kno, of any general t eory t at can tell us t at so*e disciplines necessarily involve suppressed pre*ises , ereas ot ers do not. )t is not easy to s o, t at eit er everyt ing can "e *ade e&plicit or t at so*e t ings cannot "e *ade so. Per aps t e "est one can ope for is to e&a*ine t e ele*ents of eac discipline individually and see , et er t ey can "e articulated e&plicitly. )t *ay "e t at so*e cannot. :ne *ay t us s o, t at +t. Augustine.s pro"le* is a genuine one and t at is pu99le cannot "e eli*inated. 0ic ard Gale as developed an argu*ent to t is effect=t at ti*e is indefina"le "ecause te*poral notions are involved in all of t e "asic concepts t at one uses to t ink and talk a"out t e ,orld.@1EA <e is not t en surprised to find t at *ost proposed definitions of ti*e=including Aristotle.s=are circular. ' e e&a*ples fro* *at e*atics also point out "ot t at t e feature of suppressed pre*ises *ay affect so*e of t e *ost paradig*atic of t e sciences as ,ell as t e fact t at t is feature *ay prove *uc arder to eli*inate t an is often t oug t. )t is often t oug t of as affecting *erely t e rigor of t ese sciences and not t eir de*onstrative nature. )f one ,is es to insist on so*e rat er strict notion of de*onstration or proof, t e failure to produce t e suppressed pre*ises indicates a pro"le* , ic affects t e de*onstration or proof itself and , ic *ay not "e possi"le to eli*inate. 2 at evidence is t ere t at Aristotle is concerned at all ,it reasoning or de*onstration t at involves suppressed pre*ises; At least t ree different 1uestions *ay "e distinguis ed: 3oes Aristotle recogni9e for*s of reasoning t at involve suppressed pre*ises; 3oes e associate t ese for*s of reasoning ,it de*onstration in t e disciplines in general or only ,it 5 6%F 5 so*e specific group of disciplines; And does e locate t e difference e speaks of "et,een softer or less cogent and *ore cogent or e&act de*onstrations in so*e disciplines in t e fact t at t e for*er disciplines involve suppressed pre*ises in t eir de*onstrations , ereas t e latter do not; ' e first 1uestion is per aps t e easiest to ans,er, for t ere is no dou"t t at e distinguis es in t e logical treatises rat er clearly "et,een syllogis*s t at ave all t e pre*ises t at are necessary for proving t eir conclusions and t ose t at lack so*e of t e pre*ises t at are re1uired for t eir conclusions.@1FA But does e associate t is latter kind of syllogis*s or reasonings ,it certain de*onstrations or any particular group of disciplines; Aristotle tends to associate reasoning of t is kind ,it nonscientific or nonde*onstrative purposes. <e co**only t inks of it as "eing t e type of reasoning appropriate for dialectical or r etorical purposes=t at is, t e reasoning t at consists of t e kind of syllogis*s t at e designates as ent y*e*es.@1HA )t can easily "e seen fro* t e e&a*ples Aristotle gives in suc dialectical or r etorical conte&ts t at t e pre*ises t at are suppressed or none&plicit are so only "ecause t ey are kno,n and can easily "e supplied "y t ose , o participate in dialectical or r etorical activities=G' e ent y*e*e is a kind of syllogis*, using a fe, pre*ises, often fe,er t an t e ordinary syllogis*4 for if any one of t ese is ,ell kno,n, t ere is no need to *ention it, for t e earer can add it for i*selfG >Rhet . ).ii.1#?. ) kno, of only t,o passages , ere Aristotle appears to connect for*s of reasoning t at involve suppressed or none&plicit pre*ises ,it t e standard disciplines, "ut t e evidence supplied "y t ese t,o passages see*s to *e to "e inconclusive at "est. )n ost. Anal ., Aristotle distinguis es t e t ree

ele*ents t at every de*onstrative discipline possesses: t e genus or kind , ose attri"utes it studies, t e co**on a&io*s, and t e attri"utes. But e adds, 5.&: Iot ing, o,ever, prevents so*e sciences fro* overlooking so*e of t ese=e.g., fro* not supposing t at its kind is, if it is evident t at it is >for it is not e1ually clear t at nu*"er is and t at ot and cold are?, and fro* not assu*ing , at t e attri"utes signify, if t ey are clear=/ust as in t e case of t e co**on ite*s it does not assu*e , at to take e1uals fro* e1uals signifies, "ecause it is fa*iliar. But nonet eless t ere are "y nature t ese t ree t ings, t at a"out , ic @t e scienceA proves, , at it proves, and t e t ings fro* , ic @it provesA. >FE"1%?

' e assertion t at a discipline *ay overlook so*e of t e t ree ele*ents t at are necessary ingredients of every discipline see*s to "e, as Barnes as put it, Ga "o, to t e ent y*e*atic nature of actual scientific reasoning.G Barnes is also correct , en e goes on to add t at, Gfor ."y 5 6%H 5 nature. >i.e., , en presented in t eir full, una""reviated for*? de*onstrative argu*ents ,ill s o, all t ree ele*ents.G@19A Aristotle *akes it clear t at so*e of t e disciplines *ay overlook one of t e ele*ents of de*onstration only "ecause Git is evident t at it isG >nu*"ers vs. ot and cold? or Git is clear or fa*iliar , at it signifiesG >taking e1uals fro* e1uals?. ' ese re*arks t en provide us ,it no evidence t at e t inks t ere are so*e disciplines t at involve essentially suppressed or none&plicit pre*ises t at cannot "e *ade e&plicit. :n t e contrary, t e nature of t e suppressed or none&plicit pre*ises in de*onstrative argu*ents and in t ose disciplines t at use t e* see*s to "e 1uite si*ilar to t e nature of none&plicit pre*ises in ent y*e*es ,it in t e conte&t of dialectical or r etorical activity, for in "ot cases t e pre*ises are *issing "ecause t ey are evident, fa*iliar, or can "e easily supplied. 7et even in t e a"ove passage, Aristotle see*s to "e inting at so*e possi"le differences a*ong t e disciplines. +o*e deal ,it a kind , ose e&istence or even nature is evident , ereas ot ers do not =Gfor it is not e1ually clear t at nu*"er is and t at ot and cold are.G +o*e disciplines t en *ay deal ,it a kind , ose e&istence *ay not "e at all o"vious. +ince t e e&istence of t e kind *ust "e posited, a discipline t at deals ,it suc a kind could conceiva"ly encounter so*e difficulties in *aking its pre*ises e&plicit=for, as Aristotle.s o,n discussion in t e Met . s o,s, it is indeed difficult to e&plain o, t e *at e*atical o"/ects e&ist. )f Platonis* is to "e avoided, it is not clear in , at *anner nu*"ers e&ist, if t ey e&ist at all. But Aristotle see*s to t ink t at t ere are difficulties not only in connection ,it t e e&istence of t e kind ,it , ic a discipline deals "ut also ,it t e nature or essence of so*e of t e t ings a science studies. +o in N.E ., , ere e is concerned to point out t e difference "et,een practical ,isdo* or prudence and scientific kno,ledge, e re*arks parent etically: G)ndeed one *ig t ask t is 1uestion too, , y a "oy *ay "eco*e a *at e*atician, "ut not a p ilosop er or a p ysicist. )s it "ecause t e o"/ects of *at e*atics e&ist "y a"straction, , ile t e first principles of t ese ot er su"/ects co*e fro* e&perience, and "ecause young *en ave no conviction a"out t e latter "ut *erely use t e proper language, , ile t e essence of *at e*atical o"/ects is plain enoug to t e*;G >1146a1%?. Ad*ittedly, t is is *erely a parent etical 1uestion, "ut it is really a r etorical one t at is presu*a"ly *eant to "e ans,ered in t e affir*ative. )n addition t en to t e pro"le*s t at *ay "e generated "y t e difficulties concerning t e e&istence of t e o"/ects a discipline studies, t ere could "e pro"le*s t at ste* fro* t e difficulty of giving definitions of t e nature or essence of t ese o"/ects. Aristotle vie,s *at e*atics as posing pro"le*s of t e first kind and not of t e latter. 2 ereas t e ontological status of

its o"/ects is pro"le*atic, t e nature or essence of its o"/ects is presu*a"ly transparent. <e takes t e reverse to "e t e case ,it so*e p ysical o"/ects 5 6%9 5 or entities. ' e nature of so*e p ysical entities, for e&a*ple, ot and cold, t under, deciduousness, *ay "e pro"le*atic in so*e ,ay or ot er, or it *ay "e t e case t at t e definitions of suc entities are difficult to for*ulate "ecause one *ust give a causal account of t e* and suc causal accounts are "y no *eans easy to o"tain. )t s all "e seen later t at e t inks t e o"/ects of et ics are difficult or i*possi"le to define ,it any degree of precision "ecause t ey are t e*selves indefinite=a feature t at e at ti*es attri"utes to all t ings kno,n "y perception. ) do not ,is at t is point to raise 1uestions a"out t e reasons Aristotle gives for clai*ing t at t e essence of *at e*atical o"/ects is transparent >i.e., t ey e&ist "y a"straction?, , ereas t at of t e o"/ects of p ysics and p ilosop y is not >i.e., t eir nature is kno,n t roug e&perience?. 2 at ) rat er ,is to point out is t at if t e nature of t e o"/ects of so*e discipline is difficult to grasp or for*ulate and if so*e of t e "asic principles of any discipline are accounts of t e nature of its o"/ects, t en t ere are likely to "e so*e pro"le*s ,it t e "asic pre*ises of suc a discipline. +o*e of t e "asic principles of a discipline could not "e for*ulated or *ade e&plicit. :ne *ay o"/ect t at if suc principles are not kno,n or for*ulated, t en o, could t ey play any role in de*onstration, , ic t ey *ust do if t ey are to "e vie,ed as pre*ises at all; ' is can, of course, "e so=at least in t e cases , ere t e o"/ects are not deficient in t e ,ay Aristotle says t ey are, and t us it is not i*possi"le to kno, t e* in so*e ,ay. -or so*e principles *ay "e difficult to for*ulate e&plicitly, per aps for t e reasons Aristotle gives, and yet play a role in de*onstrative reasoning. ) *entioned t e principle of *at e*atical induction and t e conception of ti*e earlier, "ut t ere could "e ot ers as ,ell. )f ,e ,ere to vie, et ics as a discipline , ose principles are kno,n t roug e&perience, t en it is per aps possi"le t at so*e of its principles are su"/ect to t ese pro"le*s. :ne could, for e&a*ple, argue t at alt oug t e nature of t e good and virtue play an i*portant role in our reasonings in et ics, nonet eless t eir nature is 1uite difficult to for*ulate, state, or *ake e&plicit. Alt oug ) see t is as a plausi"le line of argu*ent t at can "e used to distinguis cogent or e&act fro* soft or ine&act disciplines on t e "asis of t e use t ey *ake of de*onstrations t at involve suppressed or nonBe&plicit pre*ises, ) ave so*e dou"ts t at Aristotle uses suc a line=for e does not 1uite say t at t e principles of so*e disciplines, unlike t ose of t e *at e*atical ones, cannot "e kno,n, grasped, or for*ulated, "ut rat er t at it is difficult to do so or t at e&perience is re1uired. )ndeed, e clearly suggests t at t ey can "e kno,n and for*ulated and ence function as t e "asic pre*ises of t ese disciplines. <ence t ere is no evidence t at e t inks t ere are disciplines , ose "asic pre*ises are in principle i*possi"le to for*ulate or state, and t erefore *ust re*ain 5 6E$ 5 suppressed or tacit. Alt oug et ics ,ould "e as good a candidate as any ot er discipline for aving principles t at are difficult to kno, or for*ulate "ecause t ey depend on e&perience, it is not clear t at Aristotle as et ics in *ind as an intellectual discipline , en e is dra,ing a contrast "et,een disciplines , ose su"/ect *atter is kno,n t roug e&perience and t ose , ere it is not. -or e see*s to "e talking pri*arily of practical ,isdo* or prudence or so*et ing like practical et ical kno,ledge and not of et ics as a discipline t at ai*s at e&plaining certain t ings fro* a set of "asic principles. 2 at is of *ore i*portance is t e fact t at t ere see*s to "e no une1uivocal evidence t at Aristotle locates t e difference "et,een disciplines t at de*onstrate less cogently or use GsofterG de*onstrations

and t ose t at presu*a"ly de*onstrate ,it greater necessity in t e fact t at t e for*er utili9e suppressed or tacit pre*ises , ereas t e latter do not. :f t e fe, passages t at ) kno, of , ere e dra,s a contrast "et,een types of de*onstrations or argu*ents, none of t e* clearly s o,s t at e vie,s t e supposed difference in de*onstration to rest on t is sort of feature, alt oug t is and related features are 1uite i*portant to Aristotle , en e is t inking of t e de*onstrative structure and practice of t e various disciplines. :ne *ay also ,is to consider an additional and different possi"ility=na*ely, t at instead of suppressed pre*ises, so*e disciplines *ay introduce pre*ises in t eir de*onstrations t at are not included in t eir a&io*s or are not t eore*s derived fro* t ese a&io*s. ' us so*e disciplines *ay depend *ore t an ot ers on , at *ay "e called e&traneous pre*ises. +o Aristotle.s co*plaint against 8*pedocles , en e introduces Jove and +trife as t e cause of *otion: G<e oug t, t en, to ave defined or to ave postulated or to ave de*onstrated t e* @t e t,o causes of *otionAG >F.1$?. And et ics could "e a discipline t at relies on or introduces propositions t at it does not include in its a&io*s or does not prove. ' ey *ay "e propositions fro* anot er discipline, for e&a*ple, fro* t e discipline of psyc ology. 2 et er t e introduction of e&traneous propositions ,ill pose any pro"le*s in relation to t e de*onstrative c aracter of a discipline ,ould see* to depend on t e nature of suc propositions. -or suc propositions *ay "e prova"le in so*e discipline or ot er and t erefore t eir necessity *ay not "e 1uestiona"le at all, even t oug t ey are used in sciences t at do not prove t eir necessity=for e&a*ple, t eore*s of arit *etic are used in geo*etry and t e t eore*s of "ot are, as Aristotle is fully a,are, used "y al*ost all t e disciplines. At "est t en, if a discipline ,ere to use propositions , ic it does not de*onstrate and does not contain in its a&io*s, it ,ould generate de*onstrations of lesser cogency only "ecause suc propositions ave not "een de*onstrated. )f 8*pedocles ad done , at Aristotle says e oug t to ave done=defined, postulated, or de*onstrated t e nature or attri"utes of Jove and +trife= 5 6E1 5 presu*a"ly is de*onstrations ,ould not ave "een affected, and t ere is no reason to t ink t at , at Aristotle suggests cannot "e done. ' e cogency or necessity of de*onstration need not "e affected "y introducing pre*ises t at for certain reasons do not "elong to a discipline unless t ey are propositions t at ave not "een or cannot "e de*onstrated. )t is also clear t at t e introduction of pre*ises t at do not properly "elong to a discipline is 1uite co**on and see*s to affect al*ost all disciplines. ' e defender of t e Platonist conception of kno,ledge *ay "e prepared to *ake an even *ore drastic *ove=to rela& so*e, at t e notion of strict kno,ledge or de*onstration "y a"andoning t e idea t at necessity is t e sa*e in all disciplines. Ad*ittedly, t is still preserves necessity "ut it *akes it less o*ogeneous. +o one *ay, to "egin ,it , consider t e possi"ility of t ere "eing different kinds of necessity, or per aps=and t is ,ill *ake *ore sense of Aristotle.s clai* t at so*e sciences de*onstrate ,it greater necessity t an ot ers=t at t ere are degrees of necessity. +o*e propositions, one *ay argue, are *ore necessary t an ot ers and t erefore it is possi"le t at so*e disciplines contain propositions t at are *ore necessary t an t ose of ot ers. )s Aristotle pointing ere to degrees of necessity; )s t ere suc a t ing; +o*e vie,s of t e necessary do leave t e possi"ility of degrees of necessity open. )f one ,ere to t ink, along t e lines suggested "y Muine, of t e necessity of a proposition in ter*s of t e likeli ood of giving up suc a proposition, t en t ere *ig t "e degrees of necessity. +i*ilarly, if one ,ere to connect, along t e lines suggested "y <ilary Putna*, so*e types of necessity ,it analyticity and take t e latter to ave degrees, t en per aps t ere could "e degrees of necessity.@6$A ' ese conceptions of necessity , ic allo, for degrees rat er easily ave very little in co**on ,it

Aristotle.s conception of necessity. Aristotle i*self distinguis es a*ong t e properties of a t ing t at are necessary "y singling out t ose , ic *ake up t e essence of it fro* t ose , ic necessarily "elong to it "ut are not part of its essence, so one *ay say t at Aristotle recogni9es degrees or at least types of necessity. But it is not o"vious t at t is ,ould really "e ade1uate for introducing degrees or types of necessity in de*onstration. -irst, it is not clear , et er t ere is indeed a difference in t e necessity a*ong suc properties or propositions t at assert suc properties of an o"/ect, for t e difference *ay lie else, ere. )t *ay "e, for e&a*ple, t at essential properties are t ose t at one *ust refer to in ans,ers to certain 1uestions, , ereas t e ot er necessary properties are not. As Aristotle often says, essential c aracteristics are t e c aracteristics t at *ust "e *entioned as an ans,er to t e 1uestion of , at so*et ing is, , ereas ot er necessary properties are not. +econd, de*onstration is pri*arily or al*ost e&clusively concerned ,it properties or propositions t at assert properties of a su"/ect, , ic are necessary "ut not a part of t e essence of a certain kind >genus?. -or t is reason 5 6E6 5 alone one ,ould not "e a"le to *ake any distinction "et,een disciplines t at de*onstrate *ore cogently t an ot ers on t e "asis of distinguis ing "et,een essentially necessary and *erely necessary properties or propositions, for all de*onstration deals ,it t e latter type of properties or propositions. @61A And, as pointed out earlier, Aristotle does not differentiate s arply "et,een *etap ysical, logical, or p ysical necessity. As a final *ove in t is conte&t, one *ay consider , et er t e necessity or cogency of de*onstrations is affected "y t e rules one uses to *ake inferences. Could t ere "e a difference in t e necessity of proofs t at result fro* using different >valid? rules of deduction; 3oes it *ake any difference ,it respect to t e necessity of a proof , ic rule one uses; 3oes one valid rule generate greater or a different type of necessity or cogency t an anot er; >Consider, e.g., t e case of using t e e1uivalences t at o"tain a*ong t e connectives to translate t e pre*ises of a proof into e1uivalent for*s and t en use as our rule of inference t e rule of detac *ent instead of modus ponens.7 It is hard to see ho) there could be any such differences in the necessity of proofs resulting from the use of different +alid rules of inference if )e )ere to use only truth4preser+ing rules of inference. It is possible' of course' that there could be a difference in the ease )ith )hich the necessity of proofs )hich use different rules could be grasped.a difference in the sense of necessity they con+ey. Although this /uasipsychological factor could be of interest to Aristotle' it is not )hat primarily concerns him in the context under discussion. In any case' it seems that the feature of necessity is not affected by using e/ui+alent +alid rules of inference.lesser necessity or different types of necessity do not result by such use. ' e possi"ilities considered so far are 1uite i*portant to Aristotle, especially , en e is concerned ,it so*e 1uasipsyc ological or nonfor*al aspects of de*onstration or *ore co**only , en e, in is c aracteristic ,ay, *oves i*percepti"ly fro* t e for*al to suc nonfor*al aspects. ) ave no dou"t t at in part , at e *eans , en e insists t at so*e disciplines de*onstrate ,it greater cogency or e&actness t an ot ers is t at t e de*onstrations of t e latter kind of disciplines possess so*e of t e features *entioned=for e&a*ple, t ey proceed fro* principles a"out t e trut of , ic one is not as convinced as one is a"out t at of t e principles of so*e ot ers4 t ey introduce e&traneous pre*ises4 t ey do not *ake all of t eir pre*ises e&plicit. ) a* not convinced t at t is is t e , ole story, for t ere is no clear te&tual evidence t at e takes t ese features to constitute "y t e*selves t e de*onstrative differences cited earlier. ' ese features do not capture , at appears to "e t e intent of is re*arks a"out t e differences in cogency or necessity in de*onstration and t e contrast "et,een kno,ledge in t e strict sense and kno,ledge "y analogy or si*ilarity. )t t erefore see*s t at t e atte*pt to e&plain

5 6E# 5 t e supposed differences in cogency or e&actness a*ong disciplines ,it in t e Platonist conception of kno,ledge or de*onstration is not altoget er successful. )t appears t at one ,ould ave to ,eaken so*e of t e conditions of de*onstration *ore t an t e defenders of t e Platonist conception are ,illing to do.

!oft) Weak) or Ine*act #emonstrations

<o,ever, , ic condition are ,e to ,eaken, and o,; )t is difficult to ans,er t is 1uestion ,it any certainty. ' e pro"le* lies in deter*ining , at Aristotle *eans , en e speaks of de*onstrations t at are soft >

? or disciplines t at de*onstrate *ore softly > ? t an ot ers. ' ese ter*s t at Aristotle applies to so*e de*onstrations or disciplines *ean, , en used literally, GsoftG or Gsofter,G t eir opposites "eing G ardG or G arder.G Aristotle i*self uses t e* 1uite fre1uently in t eir literal sense and often contrasts t e* to t eir literal opposites > , ?.@66A 2 at is a soft or softer de*onstration and o, does a discipline de*onstrate softly or *ore softly; ' e e&a*ples Aristotle gives of soft de*onstrations and even t e conte&ts in , ic t e a"ove ter*s occur do not tell us very *uc a"out t e features t at *ake a de*onstration or a discipline soft or softer. )n Met . >1$9$EH?, for instance, e c aracteri9es an argu*ent as very soft >

? "ecause it rests on pre*ises t at are, according to i*, false or a"surd. And , en in t e Rhet . e speaks of de*onstrating cogently or softly >F.14?, e goes on to clai* t at in order to do so one *ust use as pre*ises only t ose facts t at "ear on , at e is trying to prove. ' ese ,ays of ,eakening t e conditions of de*onstrations go too far, for one needs at least to suppose t at t e pre*ises of a de*onstration are not a"surd, are not altoget er false, and are relevant to , at ,e ai* at de*onstrating. ' e condition of trut , o,ever, is one of t e conditions t at *ay "e looked upon as a plausi"le candidate for distinguis ing "et,een soft or ,eak and cogent or e&act de*onstrations. After all, it is one of t e conditions Aristotle re1uires of t e pre*ises of a de*onstration. 2it out a"andoning it altoget er, ,it out *aking t e pre*ises outrig t false, it can per aps "e ,eakened so*e, at. ' us t ere can "e de*onstrations , ose pre*ises are strictly true >t e e&act or cogent ones? and ot ers , ose pre*ises, alt oug not strictly true, are al*ost true >t e soft or ine&act ones?. +uc pre*ises could "e /ust t ose propositions t at Aristotle takes to "e true for t e *ost part=t e propositions a"out

*atters of conduct and t e ,orld of nature. As seen earlier, t ese propositions are not false, "ut t ey are not strictly true eit er. ' oug t ey ave e&ceptions, t ey are al*ost true. 2eakening t e condition of trut ,ould ave provided Aristotle ,it 5 6E4 5 so*e /ustification for clai*ing t at t ere are differences a*ong de*onstrations or disciplines. -or, after all, de*onstrations ,it pre*ises t at are not strictly true could not de*onstrate=if t ey de*onstrate at all=as cogently or e&actly or ,it t e sa*e necessity as t ose , ose pre*ises are strictly true. 8ven t e necessity or cogency ,e associate ,it t e relation t e conclusion "ears to t e pre*ises of a valid syllogis*=t e conclusion *ust "e true if t e pre*ises are true=*ay "e affected "y t e fact t e pre*ises are not strictly true. )f t e pre*ises of a syllogis* ave e&ceptions, its cogency is likely to "e deficient. ' us one could say t at t e disciplines , ic de*onstrate less cogently or softly are t ose t at consist of syllogis*s ,it pre*ises t at are not strictly true. (ost pro"a"ly Aristotle is partly t inking of suc deficiencies in t e trut of t e pre*ises of so*e syllogis*s , en e speaks of deficiencies in e&actness a*ong de*onstrations or disciplines. 7et t e failure of t e pre*ises of so*e syllogis*s to "e strictly true is not is sole or even pri*ary focus , en e co*pares de*onstrations in ter*s of t eir cogency, necessity, e&actness, or softness. <is pri*ary concern is instead ,it t e condition of necessity=t at is, ,it t e condition t at constitutes t e core of t e Platonist and Aristotelian conception of strict or a"solute kno,ledge or de*onstration. ' e condition t at is *ost relevant for e&plaining t e differences in cogency a*ong de*onstrations t at Aristotle cites is t at of t e necessity of t eir pre*ises. ' e ,eaker, softer, or ine&act types of de*onstrations or t e less strict or a"solute kno,ledge are pri*arily t ose t at de*onstrate fro* pre*ises t at fail to *eet t e condition of necessity. 2 en Aristotle c aracteri9es so*e types of kno,ledge or de*onstration as "eing so a"solutely, strictly, or simpliciter , , at e as in *ind is t at t ese types prove or e&plain t at so*et ing cannot "e ot er,ise. An a"solute de*onstration s o,s t at so*et ing cannot "e ot er,ise "y deriving it fro* necessary pre*ises, t at is, fro* pre*ises t at t e*selves cannot "e ot er,ise. 3e*onstrations consisting of suc pre*ises s o, t at so*et ing cannot "e ot er,ise a"solutely or simpliciter and not *erely t at it follo,s fro* pre*ises t at are true. And as seen in t e previous c apter, Aristotle sees t e do*ain of t e de*onstra"le to "e constituted in part "y t at , ic is necessary and in part "y t at , ic is not. <e al*ost invaria"ly contrasts t at , ic is "y necessity to t at , ic is not, de*onstrations t at deal ,it t at , ic is necessary to t ose t at deal ,it t at , ic can "e ot er,ise, and de*onstrations a"out t at , ic is al,ays to t ose a"out t at , ic is for t e *ost part. ' is is precisely t e contrast Aristotle dra,s in F.1BF.#. Again, , en e speaks of kno,ledge in t e strict sense in F.4 and contrasts it to t at , ic is "y si*ilarity or analogy, e identifies t e o"/ect of t e for*er as t at , ic cannot "e ot er,ise. ' e o"/ects of t e latter presu*a"ly are t e t ings t at can "e ot er,ise, t at is, t ey are part of t e do*ain consisting of t ings t at 5 6E% 5 lack necessity. <e tends to focus on t e supposed failure of t at , ic is for t e *ost part to *eet t e condition of necessity rat er t an on its failure to e& i"it properties in every instance, or e e*p asi9es t e failure of propositions t at are true for t e *ost part to *eet t e condition of necessity rat er t an t e condition of "eing true universally. 2 et er t is is so "ecause e assu*es t at propositions t at are true for t e *ost part *ust nonet eless "e treated for de*onstrative purposes as if t ey are universal in

for* and as if t ey are universally true is so*et ing t at needs to "e e&a*ined furt er. )f it is true, as Aristotle clai*s, t at ,e consider t at ,e ave a"solute or un1ualified kno,ledge only of t at , ic cannot "e ot er,ise, t en kno,ledge t at is not a"solute or un1ualified ,ill "e of t at , ic can "e ot er,ise. ' is is t e kno,ledge t at is, according to Aristotle, less e&act or soft. -or in E.6 Aristotle c aracteri9es t e kno,ledge t at as as pre*ises propositions t at are true for t e *ost part or t at are a"out t ings t at are for t e *ost part as "eing ine&act, "ut Aristotle.s language in E.6 is al*ost identical to t e language e uses in F.1: )n "ot cases is concern is to re*ind us t at propositions t at are not necessary or t at are for t e *ost part ,ill yield, , en used as pre*ises, conclusions t at are also not necessary, or t at ine&act pre*ises ,ill yield ine&act conclusions. )t is easy to see , y Aristotle ,ould vie, de*onstrations , ose pre*ises failed to *eet t e condition of necessity as "eing not a"solute de*onstrations, as "eing soft or less cogent. -or, as pointed out earlier, t e de*onstrations , ose pre*ises *eet t e necessity conditions prove a"solutely t at so*et ing *ust "e t e case, or t ey s o, t at so*et ing t at is cannot "e ot er,ise. ' eir conclusions stand fast and ard, for t ey are necessary and t eir necessity is *ade perspicuous. Unlike t ese de*onstrations, t e ones , ose pre*ises fail to *eet t e necessity condition ,ill not produce conclusions t at stand e1ually fast and ard. ' ey ,ill not s o, or prove t at so*et ing is so necessarily or t at it cannot "e ot er,ise. ' e only necessity one could ascri"e to t e conclusions of suc de*onstrations is t at , ic one associates ,it t e relation "et,een t e pre*ises and t e conclusion of a valid and sound deductive inference. -or t e failure of t e pre*ises to *eet t e necessity condition allo,s for t e possi"ility t at , at as "een de*onstrated or e&plained "y t e* is ot er,ise, since t e pre*ises t e*selves could "e ot er,ise. ' is is a less cogent de*onstration4 it gives us kno,ledge t at is not un1ualified or a"solute. (atters "eco*e even *ore co*plicated , en, follo,ing Aristotle, one takes t e pre*ises of suc syllogis*s not only as failing to *eet t e necessity condition "ut in a ,ay also t e trut condition. +trictly speaking, t e pre*ises of t ese syllogis*s are true only for t e *ost part. >But *ore a"out t is pro"le* later.? )t is also easy to see t at "y ad*itting de*onstrations , ose pre*ises 5 6EE 5 do not *eet t e necessity condition, Aristotle enlarges t e do*ain of t e de*onstra"le as ,ell as our conception of de*onstrative kno,ledge. <e does t e latter "y including ,eaker for*s of de*onstration=less e&act, less cogent, or softer ones. <e does t e for*er "y incorporating into t e de*onstra"le t at , ic is not part of t e do*ain of t e necessary. ' e nonnecessary co*ponent of t e de*onstra"le consists, according to Aristotle, in *ost of nature as ,ell as of t e t ings , ic practical and productive disciplines study. ' ere is no dou"t t at Aristotle.s *ove of enlarging t e conception and do*ain of t e de*onstra"le is a *a/or one and t at it as farBreac ing conse1uences, for it allo,s for t e possi"ility of kno,ledge a"out do*ains t at t e Platonist or strict conception of de*onstrative kno,ledge considers as falling outside t e do*ain of t e kno,a"le. )t e&pands t e do*ain of t e kno,a"le. )t allots at least a place ,it in t e de*onstra"le to t e order of nature or to natural p eno*ena=t ings t at Plato, , o ,as al*ost e&clusively guided "y t e Platonist conception of t e de*onstra"le, often tends to dis*iss fro* t e do*ain of kno,ledge.@6#A 7et t ere are pro"le*s ,it Aristotle.s *ove. 2 ile it is easy to see t at t e enlarged vie, of de*onstration is *ore fitting for Aristotle.s purposes, , ic include a*ong ot er t ings t e rescuing of t e ,orld of nature fro* t e Platonic disparage*ents and re a"ilitating it ,it in t e do*ain of kno,ledge, it is not easy to see o, or , et er t is can "e done. )t is not o"vious t at de*onstration in

t e case of t at , ic is for t e *ost part is possi"le, and it is not o"vious t at t e enlarged conception of de*onstration is really a unified conception of de*onstration or scientific kno,ledge, t at t e kno,ledge Aristotle says is possi"le in t e case of t at , ic can "e ot er,ise or is for t e *ost part is not really de*onstrative kno,ledge "y analogy only. )f t e latter is indeed t e case, if kno,ledge of t e order of nature or of *atters of conduct is only kno,ledge "y analogy, it ,ould indirectly s o, t at Plato is after all rig t in taking t e vie, e takes a"out t e possi"ility of kno,ing t e sensi"le ,orld and t at , ic is not necessary. ' ese are t e pro"le*s ) ,is to discuss ne&t.

3alidit" and !"llogisms about what is for the Most Part

' e enlarged conception of de*onstration or of t e de*onstra"le t at ) sketc ed a"ove presupposes t at de*onstration in t e do*ain t at fails to *eet t e condition of necessity is possi"le. )t presupposes t at syllogis*s , ose pre*ises are true for t e *ost part constitute de*onstrations. -or t at to "e t e case, syllogis*s ,it suc pre*ises *ust *eet all or *ost of t e conditions=e&cluding t at of necessity=t at Aristotle re1uires of de*onstrative syllogis*s. ' e *ost funda*ental condition is of course 5 6EF 5 t at of t e validity of t e inference , ic clai*s to "e a de*onstrative syllogis*: A de*onstrative syllogis* is, for Aristotle, a deductive inference, and t erefore as to *eet t e for*al re1uire*ent of validity. )f syllogistic inferences t at ave as pre*ises forBt eB*ostBpart propositions cannot "e valid, t en t ey cannot "e de*onstrations. Unfortunately, t e validity of syllogis*s ,it pre*ises t at are true for t e *ost part as al,ays "een in dou"t. A*ong t e ancients, Ale&ander of Ap rodisias considered suc syllogis*s to "e useless and t oug t t at Aristotle i*self ,as of t e sa*e opinion, taking suc Gsyllogis*sG not to "e really syllogis*s. Ale&ander.s vie, ,as endorsed "y Jukasie,ic9.@64A (ore recently, Barnes as argued t at suc syllogis*s are indeed pro"le*atic, for fro* G-or t e *ost part C.s are BG and G-or t e *ost part B.s are AG it does not follo, t at G-or t e *ost part C.s are A.G According to Barnes, GAristotle i*self never ,orked out a satisfactory logic for .for t e *ost part. propositions.G@6%A ' ere is no dou"t t at "ot of t e clai*s Barnes *akes are correct: forBt eB*ostBpart syllogis*s see* not to "e valid and Aristotle does not appear to ave ,orked out a logic for forBt eB*ostBpart propositions. 7et, as seen a"ove, e insists t at t ere are suc syllogis*s and t at *ost of t e propositions a"out nature are forBt eB*ostBpart propositions. <o, does Aristotle construe suc syllogis*s; :r, per aps, o, s ould e construe t e* in order to deal ,it t e pro"le* of validity; )t is reasona"le to assu*e t at e does not ,is to ad*it syllogis*s t at are outrig tly invalid or to use nonvalid rules of inference in de*onstration. :ne ,ay of *aking suc syllogis*s valid is to interpret t e forBt eB*ostBpart locution in a ,ay t at it does not affect t e logical for* of t e propositions t at it appears to *odify. 2e can interpret it, for e&a*ple, as "eing episte*ic, as si*ply e&pressing our ignorance of o, t ings really are. )nterpreting it so, ,e ,ill "e clai*ing t at t e correct analysis of propositions of t e sort G-or t e *ost part AaBG is really GAs far as ,e kno, AaB.G )n ot er ,ords, it can "e treated as e&pressing a feature of our kno,ledge and not of t e propositions , ose surface structure it *odifies or of t e p eno*ena t e*selves. +o treated, t e forBt eB*ostBpart locution does not affect t e validity of a syllogis*. )f t e syllogis* is of t e rig t logical for*, it ,ill "e valid. ' us, ,e can avoid introducing nonvalid syllogis*s into de*onstration. ) kno, of no evidence , ere Aristotle pursues t is line of argu*ent eit er in general or specifically for

t e purpose of *aking syllogis*s , ose pre*ises are *odified "y t e forBt eB*ostBpart locution valid. @6EA <e nonet eless see*s to "e fa*iliar ,it t e *ove of interpreting certain locutions as "eing episte*ic. <e considers, for e&a*ple, t e possi"ility t at t e locutions Gfro* fortuneG or G"y luckG could "e treated episte*ically: 5 6EH 5 G2 ereas if fortune is to "e eli*inated altoget er, t en not ing *ust "e said to co*e a"out fro* fortune, in spite of t e fact t at, alt oug t ere is anot er cause, "ecause ,e do not kno, it ,e say t at fortune is a causeG >E.E . 164FE%?4 GAnd so luck is o"scure to u*an calculation and is a cause "y accident, "ut in t e un1ualified sense a cause of not ingG >Met . 1$E%a#4?. ' e episte*ic interpretation of t ese kinds of locutions see*s not to ave "een unco**on. )t reflects per aps t e rat er prevalent vie, of t e unreality of c ance or of t e fortuitous. ' us, t e aut or of G' e +cience of (edicineG in t e <ippocratic ,ritings re*arks, G)ndeed, upon e&a*ination, t e reality of c ance disappears. 8very p eno*enon ,ill "e found to ave so*e cause, and if it as a cause, c ance can "e no *ore t an an e*pty na*e.G@6FA Upon reflection, t e *ove of treating t e Gfor t e *ost partG episte*ically is not open to Aristotle. -irst, "ecause e takes "eing for t e *ost part to "e t e sort of feature t at can "e a feature of t e ,orld, a feature of t e t ings t e*selves4 and second, "ecause e t inks t at ,e -no) t at t e ,orld is c aracteri9ed "y suc a feature. As seen earlier, Aristotle as no difficulty in speaking of t e su"/ect *atter of disciplines, or of *atters of conduct, or of t e do*ain of nature as "eing for t e *ost part. ' is feature can "e as *uc a feature of t e ,orld as it can of our accounts of t e ,orld. And Aristotle clai*s t at ,e kno, it is a feature of t e ,orld=*atters of conduct, p eno*ena of *edicine, or *ost of nature are for t e *ost part. Anot er ,ay of treating t e Gfor t e *ost partG is to e1uate it ,it t e *odal operator Git is contingent,G "ut Barnes points out, t is *ove ,ill not *ake valid syllogis*s out of inferences t at consist of pre*ises *odified "y t e locution Gfor t e *ost part.G@6HA ' ere is, o,ever, so*et ing to "e learned fro* "ot t e episte*ic and *odal *ove. ' e for*er, in atte*pting to s ift t e feature of "eing for t e *ost part fro* our propositions to our kno,ledge, in a ,ay recogni9es t at if suc syllogis*s a"out t e do*ain t at is for t e *ost part are to "e valid, t en suc a feature cannot "e an ulti*ate constituent of t e propositions in , ose surface structure it appears. But t e episte*ic *ove goes ,rong in failing to recogni9e t at Aristotle considers t e feature of "eing for t e *ost part as c aracteri9ing pri*arily t e p eno*ena or t ings t e*selves. ' e *odal one recogni9es t e connection t at Aristotle takes to old "et,een "eing for t e *ost part and "eing contingent, "ut it goes ,rong in taking t e t,o not to "e *erely connected "ut to "e identical. As ) argued in t e previous c apter, t e t,o cannot "e, at least as far as Aristotle is concerned, so identified. 2 ereas "eing contingent signifies *erely t at so*et ing is possi"le, "eing for t e *ost part signifies t at so*et ing is a co*ponent of t e causal structure of nature, t at it is a regularity or a la, of nature. +uc causal connections, regularities, or la,s are not as perfect as t ose t at old al,ays or "y necessity, for t ey 5 6E9 5 ave e&ceptions. But t ey are al*ost like t e perfect ones and play presu*a"ly t e sa*e role in syllogistic inferences. Io, Aristotle does not ave inductive logic, or at least does not consider inductive reasoning to "e a

*eans of giving e&planations or proofs in t e ,ay deductive reasoning does.@69A ' e option, t en, of treating syllogis*s , ose pre*ises are true for t e *ost part as inductive inferences, as inferring t e pro"a"ility of t e conclusion fro* t e pro"a"ilities of t e pre*ises, is not open to i*. ' ere is only one option open to so*eone , o, like Aristotle, accepts t at >1? scientific kno,ledge, e&planation, de*onstration, proof, or understanding is essentially a deductive syllogis*, and >6? t ere is scientific kno,ledge, e&planation, and so fort of , at is for t e *ost part. ' at option is to construe propositions a"out t e do*ain of , at is for t e *ost part as aving t e logical for* of propositions a"out t e do*ain of , at is al,ays or "y necessity, or to treat la,s t at ave e&ceptions as "eing like t ose t at do not, and to ensure "y so*e nonfor*al device t at ,e are not *isled "y t e identical treat*ent of t e t,o types of propositions or la,s. ' e only alternative open to Aristotle is t at of treating forBt eB*ostBpart propositions and syllogis*s as if t ey are standard ones , ile keeping t eir deficiences in focus in a ,ay t at does not affect t eir logical for*. ) ,is to suggest, t en, t at Aristotle does not vie, propositions a"out , at is for t e *ost part as "eing *odified ulti*ately "y an operator like Gfor t e *ost part,G , atever its nature *ay turn out to "e. +uc propositions are free of any operator, including t e *odal one, t at could affect t e validity of t e syllogis*s , ose pre*ises t ey *odify. Aristotle treats suc propositions in t e sa*e ,ay e treats t ose t at are a"out , at is al,ays or "y necessity=na*ely, ,it out any *odifiers.@#$A +ince e t inks t at t e syllogistic *ood *ost appropriate for de*onstrative purposes is t at of 6arbara >AaB, BaC

AaC?, e takes t e for* of suc propositions to "e t at of affir*ative universal state*ents.@#1A ' e a"ove suggestion for treating syllogis*s , ose pre*ises and conclusions are a"out , at is for t e *ost part s ould "e taken seriously. )t identifies at least one ,ay of treating suc syllogis*s so t at t e condition of validity is in so*e ,ay *et, and t erefore it points to so*e e&planation of , y Aristotle t inks t at t ere is de*onstration of , at is for t e *ost part. )t also e&plains so*e ot er t ings Aristotle says a"out t e e&actness! ine&actness of t e do*ain of conduct or of natural p eno*ena and t e propositions a"out t e*. ' eoretically, t en, t ere are reasons for taking it seriously. But t ere is also te&tual evidence t at s o,s t at Aristotle actually takes forBt eB*ostBpart propositions to "e >affir*ative? universal in for* and t us assi*ilates syllogis*s ,it suc propositions into standard syllogis*s. Propositions a"out , at is for t e *ost part *ust "e universal in for* 5 6F$ 5 in order for t eir trut value to "e , at Aristotle says it is and in order for t e* to "e ine&act in t e ,ay Aristotle clai*s t ey are. As seen in t e previous c apter, Aristotle takes t e feature of "eing for t e *ost part to "e fore*ost and pri*arily a material feature=it is a feature of t e su"/ect *atter of so*e disciplines, for e&a*ple, of et ics, *edicine, natural sciences, and t us c aracteri9es *atters of conduct, *edical p eno*ena, natural p eno*ena, and so fort . <e also takes t e propositions a"out suc su"/ect *atter to "e true for t e *ost part and to "e ine&act, to represent t e su"/ect *atter t at is for t e *ost part only roug ly. )f t e a"ove is correct, propositions a"out , at is for t e *ost part cannot ave t e for* G-or t e *ost part P,G if t ey are to "e true for t e *ost part. )f indeed *atters of conduct are suc t at "rave *en are for t e *ost part fearless, t en t e proposition G-or t e *ost part "rave *en are fearlessG cannot "e true for t e *ost part of *atters of conduct. ' e proposition t at can "e true for t e *ost part of suc a su"/ect *atter is t e one t at is eit er e&plicitly or i*plicitly universal in for*. )t is eit er t e universal

proposition GAll "rave *en are fearlessG or t e indefinite "ut i*plicitly universal GBrave *en are fearlessG t at can "e true for t e *ost part. )f Aristotle.s clai* a"out t e trut value of propositions a"out , at is for t e *ost part is to *ake any sense, ,e need to assu*e t at suc propositions are universal in for*. ' is is , at Aristotle assu*es. -or al*ost every, ere Aristotle speaks of propositions t at are for t e *ost part or states t at suc B andBsuc is for t e *ost part is concern is to point out t at suc propositions are true for t e *ost part or t at t e p eno*ena are for t e *ost part. <e is not, t at is, concerned ,it t e for* of suc propositions, and e is certainly not saying t at t e Gfor t e *ost partG is a constituent of t eir logical for*. ' us Aristotle argues in E.6 t at t e propositions a"out *atters of conduct t at fluctuate are also true for t e *ost part4 t ey t e*selves fluctuate. ' e sa*e is t e case ,it , at Aristotle says in F.1= t e concern is ,it t e ,ay t ings are and t e trut of our propositions a"out t e*. )ndeed, in all t e passages , ere Aristotle speaks of suc propositions and of t eir role in inferences or de*onstrations t e concern is ,it t e c aracter of t e t ings t ey are a"out or t eir trut value and not ,it t eir logical for* >see r. Anal . #Ea1$, 4E"##4 Rhet . ).ii.14?. )n all t e e&a*ples of t ings t at are for t e *ost part ) gave in t e previous c apter, including t ose fro* t e logical treatises, Aristotle no, ere clai*s t at t e logical for* of t e propositions e asserts of suc t ings is G-or t e *ost part P.G Propositions a"out , at is for t e *ost part do not, t en, necessarily differ fro* t ose a"out , at is al,ays or "y necessity in t eir synta&, "ut in t eir se*antics=t ey differ in t eir trut or *odality. ' e clearest evidence in support of t e vie, ) sketc ed a"ove co*es fro* , at Aristotle says a"out la, in N.E. >11#F"1%?. All la, is, according 5 6F1 5 to i*, universal in for*, "ut it does not apply in all cases. ' e *atters ,it , ic t e la, deals e& i"it t e sa*e types of ine&actness t at t e rest of *atters of conduct e& i"it. <ence t e propositions or rules of la, apply only for t e *ost part, "ut t ey are universal: 5.&3 All la, is universal @

A "ut a"out so*e t ings it is not possi"le to *ake a universal state*ent , ic ,ill "e correct. )n t ose cases, t en, in , ic it is necessary to speak universally, "ut not possi"le to do so correctly, t e la, takes into account t at , ic is for t e *ost part @ A, t oug it is not ignorant of t e possi"ility of error. And t is does not *ake it a ,rong la,4 for t e error is not in t e la, nor in t e la,giver, "ut in t e nature of t e t ing, since t e *atter of practical affairs is of t is kind fro* t e start. 2 en t e la, speaks universally @ A, t en, and a case arises to , ic t e universal state*ent does not apply . . . it is rig t to rectify t e defect . . . ' is is t e essential nature of t e e1uita"le: it is a rectification of la, , ere la, is defective "ecause of its universality @

A. ' e a"ove s o,s "eyond any reasona"le dou"t t at Aristotle takes t e forBt eB*ostBpart propositions to "e universal in for*. ' e a"ove state*ent is not an isolated case. Aristotle *akes t e sa*e clai* on at least t,o ot er occasions. )n olit . >16H6"6? e argues t at, , ile t e rig t la,s s ould "e sovereign, t e rulers *ust ave t e po,er to deal ,it t e cases to , ic t e la,, "eing universal, fails to apply: 5.&5 But t e difficulty first *entioned @i.e., a"out sovereignty in t e stateA proves not ing else so clearly as t at it is proper for t e la,s to "e sovereign, , ile t e ruler or rulers in office s ould ave supre*e po,ers over t ings a"out , ic t e la,s are una"le to pronounce ,it e&actness @

A o,ing to t e difficulty of any general state*ent covering all cases @ A. And in Rhet . >1#F4a6H?, concerned again ,it t e failure of t e la, to cover all cases, Aristotle ,rites: 5.&2 -or t at , ic is e1uita"le see*s to "e /ust, and e1uity is /ustice t at goes "eyond t e ,ritten la,. ' ese o*issions are so*eti*es involuntary, so*eti*es voluntary, on t e part of t e legislators4 involuntary , en it *ig t ave escaped t eir notice, voluntary , en, "eing una"le to define for all cases, t ey are o"liged to *ake a universal state*ent @

A, , ic is not applica"le to all cases "ut only for t e *ost part @ A. )n addition Aristotle takes *a&i*s to "e universal in for* alt oug t ey, like *ost state*ents used in r etorical conte&ts, are true only for t e *ost part: 5.&= Io,, a *a&i* is a state*ent, not o,ever concerning particulars, as, for instance, , at sort of a *an )p icrates ,as, "ut universal @

A4 it

5 6F6 5

does not e+en deal )ith all uni+ersals' as for instance that the straight is the opposite of the croo-ed' but only )ith those pertaining to actions' and )ith )hat should be chosen or a+oided )ith reference to them. And as the enthymeme is' )e may say' the syllogism dealing )ith such things' maxims are premises or conclusions of enthymemes )ithout the syllogisms. 1&8=9a%87 An e&a*ple of a *a&i* t at is part of an ent y*e*e is GIo *an is freeG >1#94"#?. -or, Aristotle clai*s, , en it is taken ,it t e state*ent G-or e is t e slave of eit er ,ealt or fortuneG it for*s an ent y*e*e >1#94"%?.@#6A ' ese t,o state*ents toget er constitute a r etorical syllogis* or an ent y*e*e t at can "e *ade a co*plete syllogis* in t e follo,ing ,ay: G8very *an is t e slave of eit er ,ealt or fortune. Io *an , o is a slave is free. ' erefore, no *an is free.G ' is is a valid syllogis*. But Aristotle tells us t at Gt e *aterials fro* , ic ent y*e*es are derived ,ill "e so*eti*es necessary, "ut in *ost cases @

A only for t e *ost part @ AG >Rhet . 1#%Fa#1?. )n t e a"ove ent y*e*e t e second pre*ise, GIo *an , o is a slave is free,G *ay "e vie,ed as an analytic and t erefore as a necessary state*ent. ' e ot er t,o are t e sort of propositions t at, according to Aristotle, are true for t e *ost part. 7et Aristotle construes all of t e* as "eing state*ents t at are universal in for*, and t us as guaranteeing t e validity of t e r etorical syllogis* , ose pre*ises >eit er i*plicit or e&plicit? and conclusion t ey constitute. 2 at is true in t e case of *a&i*s and r etorical syllogis*s is also true of scientific pre*ises and de*onstrative syllogis*s. ' at is, syllogis*s are found in Aristotle.s scientific treatises, , ose pre*ises=at least so*e of t e*=are identified as "eing true for t e *ost part, "ut t ey are treated as "eing universal in for*. Aristotle, for instance, argues in G.A. >F#4a#4? t at t e are Gproduces nu*erous offspring, since it is a fissepede, and fissepede ani*als produce nu*erous offspring.G Aristotle.s syllogis* can "e reconstructed as follo,s: >a? -issepede ani*als produce nu*erous offspring >"? ' e are is a fissepede ani*al >c? ' erefore, t e are produces *any offspring Pre*ise >a? is, according to Aristotle, true for t e *ost part4 t ere are e&ceptions to it: G-or t e *ost part @

A it is t e solidB oofed ani*als , ic produce a single offspring, t e clovenB oofed ani*als , ic produce fe,, and t e fissepede ani*als , ic produce *anyG >G.A. FF1"#?. :ne of t e e&ceptions to t e clai* *ade "y pre*ise >a? is t e case of t e elep ant, , ic is a fissepede "ut produces only one offspring >FF1a6$, FF1"1$?. 7et Aristotle states all t e pre*ises as universal affir*ative propositions. ' ere is no indication at all in t e for* of t ese propositions t at so*e are forBt eB*ostBpart propositions. 5 6F# 5

But Aristotle gives a syllogis* , ere at least one of t e pre*ises is stated as a forBt eB*ostBpart proposition. )n G.A. >FF4"%? e argues as follo,s: >a? Kivipara ,it one or t,o offspring produce perfect offspring >"? G' e clovenB oofed ani*als produce eit er one or t,o for t e *ost partG >FF4"9? >c? ' erefore, clovenB oofed ani*als produce perfect offspring 7et, despite t e fact >"? is stated as "eing *odified "y t e forBt eB*ostBpart locution, Aristotle nonet eless treats it in t e conte&t of *aking an inference as if it as t e for* of a universal state*ent. )n addition, Aristotle takes "ot >a? and >c? to "e, despite t e fact e states t e* as universal propositions, true for t e *ost part only. 2it regard to >a?, u*ans produce, according to Aristotle, G*ost naturally and nor*ally oneG >FF6"#?, yet at ti*es t e offspring is i*perfect >FF%a? and Gt e perfecting of @t e u*anA fe*ale e*"ryos is inferior in condition . . . t oug once "irt as taken place everyt ing reac es its perfection sooner in fe*ales t an in *alesG >FF%a1$ff.?. As far as >c? is concerned, Aristotle gives an e&planation of , y offspring are at ti*es "orn "efore t eir for*ation is perfected: t at is, t e ina"ility of "ringing t eir nouris ing to co*pletion >FF4"#%?. And t ere is no reason , y t e clovenB oofed ani*als ,ill "e altoget er e&e*pted fro* t is condition , ic according to Aristotle causes i*perfection in offspring. ) said earlier t at taking t e propositions t at are a"out , at is for t e *ost part to "e universal in for* also elps to understand "ot t e ,ay in , ic accounts in et ics are ine&act and t e *eaning of Aristotle.s re*inders t at one *ust not forget t at t ey are so. Aristotle argues in E.1BE.# t at accounts in et ics fluctuate or are true for t e *ost part, /ust as t e t ings t ey are a"out fluctuate or are for t e *ost part, "ut, "eyond t is ine&actness, Aristotle also argues t at one *ust "e content , en dealing ,it suc t ings to indicate t e trut roug ly and in outline. ' e accounts of et ics and related disciplines *ust "e ine&act "ecause t ey fail to indicate co*pletely t e trut a"out a certain su"/ect *atter. <e often re*arks t at it *ust not "e forgotten t at et ical accounts do not fit or represent accurately t e su"/ect *atter of t e discipline. 'o e&plain o, propositions a"out , at is for t e *ost part are true for t e *ost part one needs to assu*e t at suc propositions are universal in for*. ) ,ant to argue no, t at one needs to *ake t e sa*e assu*ption in order to e&plain o, propositions a"out *atters of conduct or a"out any ot er su"/ect *atter t at is for t e *ost part indicate t e trut roug ly or are only outlines, o, t ey fail to represent accurately t e trut a"out suc *atters. -or if *atters of conduct are, as Aristotle clai*s, for t e *ost part and propositions a"out t e* ,ere to include in t eir synta&, 5 6F4 5 deep structure, or logical for* so*e linguistic co*ponent signifying "eing for t e *ost part, t en t ey ,ould "e accurate representations of *atters of conduct. ' ey ,ould represent t e nature of *atters of conduct as it is, t at is, as "eing for t e *ost part, and conse1uently t ey ,ould not represent t e trut a"out suc *atters roug ly, "ut co*pletely or accurately. But t e propositions of et ics are, Aristotle insists, ine&act. 2 at Aristotle as in *ind ere is t at t e logical for* of suc propositions and ence , at t ey assert does not *atc or fit accurately t e nature of *atters of conduct. ' e propositions are universal in for*, and t erefore any one of t e* asserts t at so*e property P "elongs to all *e*"ers of a kind D, "ut "ecause *atters of conduct are only for t e *ost part, P applies only to *ost D.s. +uc propositions are not total *isrepresentations of t e facts, "ut nonet eless t ey do not fit t e facts e&actly=t ey are roug pictures or outlines. ' e proposition G2ealt is "eneficialG asserts t at all ,ealt is "eneficial, "ut t is is not true in all cases. )t is true only

in *ost cases4 it is roug ly true. +i*ilarly, t e proposition G-issepedes produce nu*erous offspringG is roug ly true. )t is true of al*ost all t e fissepedes=t e elep ant "eing t e e&ception. ' e i*plicitly universal proposition a"out fissepedes is, t en, a roug ly accurate representation of t e trut a"out t is kind of ani*al4 it gives us a sort of outline of t e facts ,it out t e details and certainly ,it out t e e&ceptions. )t does not indicate t at t ere are e&ceptions to , at t e proposition asserts nor does it identify t e kinds of fissepedes of , ic it is true or t e one kind of , ic it is not true. Because of t eir logical for*, t en, propositions a"out su"/ect *atters t at are for t e *ost part do not e&actly fit , at t ey are a"out. ' e a"ove assu*ption a"out t e logical for* of t ese propositions also e&plains , y Aristotle re*inds or ,arns to keep in *ind t at accounts, propositions, or syllogis*s a"out *atters of conduct are ine&act, /ust as t e su"/ect *atter ,it , ic t ey deal is ine&act. <e is re*inding or ,arning t at t e for* of our propositions does not e&actly fit t e nature of *atters of conduct, t at ,e s ould not "e *isled "y t e for* of our propositions and conclude t at in *atters of conduct properties old necessarily, or al,ays, or in every case, or t at syllogis*s prove strictly t eir conclusions. )n particular, if, as Aristotle clai*s, universality of trut i*plies necessity, ,e *ust keep in *ind t at despite t eir for*, our pre*ises are neit er necessary nor universally true. )n ot er ,ords, e is calling our attention to so*et ing t at is not in t e for* of our propositions, and ence in t e pre*ises of our syllogis*s a"out *atters of conduct. )f a su"/ect *atter is, for e&a*ple, pro"a"le and our propositions a"out it ave t e for* GPro"a"ly P,G t en t e propositions fit t e nature 5 6F% 5 of t e su"/ect *atter and t eir ine&actness is transparent. ' e sa*e ,ould "e true of syllogis*s ,it suc pre*ises. ' ere ,ould "e no need for re*inders or ,arnings. But re*inders or ,arnings are in order if t e propositions are universal in for* and t e su"/ect *atter is for t e *ost part. :ne needs to "e re*inded t at alt oug ,e assert t e proposition G2ealt is "eneficialG and use it in our inferences, t ere are e&ceptions to it and t e conclusions of our inferences also ave e&ceptions: ' e for* of our propositions and of our syllogis*s s ould not *islead us. And t ese ,arnings and re*inders are t e nonfor*al *eans Aristotle e*ploys for t e purpose of *aking us a,are of t e gap t at e&ists "et,een t e for* of accounts and t e nature of t at t ey are a"out. Aristotle.s *ove of assi*ilating forBt eB*ostBpart syllogis*s into standard ones can "e looked upon as a ,ay of ackno,ledging t at suc syllogis*s are pro"le*atic, t at t ey can "e valid only if t ey are represented as standard syllogis*s. A syllogis* construed in t is ,ay ,ill "e valid if it is an instance of a valid syllogistic for*. ' e pro"le*, Aristotle clai*s, ,it syllogis*s a"out *atters of conduct and natural p eno*ena is t at t eir pre*ises are neit er strictly true nor necessary4 t eir soundness and *odality are deficient. But Aristotle speaks at ti*es as if forBt eB*ostBpart syllogis*s t e*selves can "e valid, as if t ey preserve t e *odality or trut of t eir pre*ises= t at is, t e contingency or t e trut for t e *ost part of t eir pre*ises guarantees t e contingency or t e trut for t e *ost part of t eir conclusions. ' us Aristotle clai*s in %.61 t at fro* necessary t ings follo, necessary ones and fro* contingent t ings contingent ones4 or in a syllogis* , ose pre*ises are necessary necessity is preserved and in one , ose pre*ises are contingent contingency is preserved. (ost pro"a"ly, t is is , at Aristotle is also asserting in F.1 , en e clai*s t at Gevery syllogis* proceeds t roug pre*ises , ic are eit er necessary or for t e *ost part4 if t e pre*ises are necessary, t e conclusion is necessary too4 and if t e pre*ises are for t e *ost part, so is t e conclusion.G -or, as noted earlier, 1uite often , en speaking of , at is for t e *ost part e is pri*arily t inking of t e contingent and e contrasts "ot to t e necessary. 2 ereas Aristotle *ay "e correct in saying t at t e necessity of t e pre*ises in a valid

syllogis* guarantees t e necessity of its conclusion, t e ot er alf of is clai* is not true: ' e contingency of t e pre*ises of a valid syllogis* does not guarantee t e contingency of its conclusion. :ne /ust cannot deter*ine t e *odality of t e conclusion of a syllogis* fro* t e contingency of its pre*ises. )s trut BforBt eB*ostBpart preserved; Aristotle see*s to "e saying t at it is. )n E.6 and F.1 e appears to "e clai*ing t at if t e pre*ises of a syllogis* are true for t e *ost part, so is its conclusion. But if Aristotle 5 6FE 5 is *aking suc a clai*, e is ,rong. )n a standard syllogis* t at is an instance of t e syllogistic for* 6arbara >AaB, BaC

AaC? trut is preserved, "ut if "ot pre*ises of suc a syllogis* are true for t e *ost part, t e conclusion is not necessarily true for t e *ost part. 'o use an e&a*ple suggested "y Barnes, alt oug t e pre*ises of t e syllogis*, GCentenarians are ,o*en4 ,o*en are under seventy4 t erefore, centenarians are under seventy,G are true for t e *ost part, t e conclusion is not. ' is of course does not *ean t at t ere are no syllogis*s , ose pre*ises and conclusions are true for t e *ost part. Aristotle.s o,n syllogis* stated earlier a"out vivipara and clovenB oofed ani*als producing perfect offspring is suc a syllogis*. But t e trut for t e *ost part of t e conclusion of t is syllogis* is not necessarily a conse1uence of t e trut for t e *ost part of its pre*ises. :ne *ay nonet eless "e certain of t e trut value of t e conclusion "ecause one kno,s t ings t at go "eyond t e for*al relations t at o"tain a*ong t e ter*s of t e propositions constituting a forBt eB*ostBpart syllogis*. -or e&a*ple, one *ay kno, certain facts a"out t e classes denoted "y t e ter*s and t e relations a*ong t e*, or one *ay kno, , at t e e&ceptions are to t e pre*ises t at are true for t e *ost part=for e&a*ple, t at t e elep ant is t e only fissepede t at does not produce *any offspring, and t erefore *ay recogni9e t at t e conclusion of t e forBt eB*ostBpart syllogis* t at ai*s to prove t at t e are produces *any offspring "ecause it is a fissepede is for t e *ost part true. )t is clear, o,ever, t at t e trut for t e *ost part of t e conclusions of suc pro"le*atic syllogis*s is not guaranteed "y t e trut for t e *ost part of t eir pre*ises4 it is not i*plied "y t e for* of t e pre*ises alone. )f it ,ere, Barnes.s syllogis* a"out centenarian ,o*en ,ould "e valid4 t e trut for t e *ost part of its conclusion ,ould "e guaranteed4 and so ,ould t at of t e syllogis* a"out t e elep ant t at s ares t e identical for* ,it Aristotle.s syllogis* a"out t e are: >a? -or t e *ost part fissepedes produce *any offspring >"? ' e elep ant is a fissepede >c? ' erefore, for t e *ost part t e elep ant produces *any offspring ' e conclusion of t is syllogis* does not follo, fro* t e pre*ises4 it is outrig tly false. )ndeed, one can see t at as long as t e *a/or pre*ise >AaB? in suc a syllogis* is only true for t e *ost part, it is possi"le t at t e su"/ect ter* >C? of t e *inor pre*ise >BaC? denotes /ust t ose t ings or *ost of t e t ings t at are B "ut not A4 it denotes all or *ost of t e e&ceptions of t e *a/or pre*ise. As t e syllogis* a"out t e elep ant s o,s, validity is not o"tained even if t e *inor pre*ise is universally true. ' e pre*ise G' e elep ant is a fissepedeG is universally true, and yet t e

5 6FF 5 a"ove syllogis* is not valid. 2 at is re1uired for validity is t e eli*ination of e&ceptions in t e *a/or pre*ise4 it needs to "e universally true. 2 en t e *a/or pre*ise is universally true and t e *inor one is true for t e *ost part, t e conclusion is true for t e *ost part=trut for t e *ost part is preserved in t is case. ' e last o"servation indicates t at as t e *a/or pre*ise in a forBt eB*ostBpart syllogis* co*es close to "eing e&ceptionless or universally true, t e *ore likely it ,ill "e t at trut for t e *ost part is preserved. As t e *a/or pre*ise approac es "eing universally true, so ,ill our syllogis* co*e closer to preserving trut for t e *ost part. Aristotle t inks t at *ost propositions a"out natural p eno*ena and so*e a"out *atters of conduct do appro&i*ate universally true propositions. )t is suc propositions t at *ake up is forBt eB*ostBpart syllogis*s. +o*e of t e e&a*ples listed in t e previous c apter of t ings t at Aristotle takes to "e for t e *ost part indicate clearly t at t is is so >see E.19, E.6$, E.61, E.6F, E.69, E.#$?. +o t e propositions G<u*an *ales gro, a "eardG and GBeards gro, greyG are al*ost universally true, and one can easily see o, Aristotle *ig t ave considered t ese propositions as pre*ises of a syllogis* , ose conclusion G<u*an *ales "eco*e greyB airedG is for t e *ost part true. (any of Aristotle.s e&a*ples of t ings t at are for t e *ost part indicate t at G-or t e *ost part B.s are AG is not to "e e1uated ,it G(ost B.s are A.G 0at er it is to "e e1uated ,it GAl*ost all B.s are A.G ' erefore t e *ove of assi*ilating forBt eB*ostBpart propositions into universally true ones and forB t eB*ostBpart syllogis*s into standard ones *ay not only ave see*ed necessary to so*eone , o lacked inductive logic "ut also 1uite plausi"le. But de*onstration is not *erely a valid syllogis*4 ot er conditions ave to "e satisfied. ' erefore syllogis*s a"out , at is for t e *ost part ,ill "e de*onstrations only if all or so*e of t ese ot er conditions can also "e *et or at least can "e *et to a sufficient e&tent. But t ere are no o"vious reasons for denying altoget er t at syllogis*s a"out , at is for t e *ost part can satisfy t ese ot er conditions. +uc syllogis*s, for instance, can provide causal e&planations in t e ,ay ot er syllogis*s provide, according to Aristotle, causal e&planations of , at is necessary or al,ays. After all, , at is for t e *ost part is, according to Aristotle, a co*ponent of t e regularities of nature. Aristotle considers *ost of nature to "e for t e *ost part, and e also considers e&planations of natural p eno*ena to "e causal e&planations. +i*ilarly, t ere is no apparent reason , y so*e ele*ents of a certain do*ain t at is for t e *ost part are not episte*ologically prior to ot er aspects of t at do*ain. Aristotle clearly t inks t at t is is so in t e case 5 6FH 5 of natural p eno*ena. But t is could also "e true in t e case of *atters of conduct: ' e good is considered to "e a "asic principle and so*et ing t at is episte*ologically prior to t e ot er aspects of conduct. <ence t e condition of t e episte*ological priority of t e principles Aristotle re1uires could "e satisfied, and per aps t e sa*e could "e said a"out t e ot er conditions. 7et t ere is a pro"le*, at least an apparent one, a"out t e condition of trut . -or fro* , at ,as said so far it is clear t at t e pre*ises of syllogis*s a"out , at is for t e *ost part are not strictly true. A universal proposition t at as e&ceptions is not strictly true. )ndeed, even one e&ception to t e proposition G2ealt is "eneficialG ,ill *ake it not true. But Aristotle does not consider suc propositions to "e si*ply false. As ) s all argue later, e does not a"andon t e re1uire*ent of trut for e&planation or de*onstration as so*e recent p ilosop ers ave done. 7et is vie,s on t e trut of general principles are not very different fro* t ose of so*e conte*porary p ilosop ers , o also argue

t at suc general principles or la,s are not universally true. 2 ereas t ey conclude fro* t is supposed fact t at t e e&planatory function of suc principles or la,s cannot "e preserved, Aristotle see*s to t ink t at it can. 2 et er Aristotle can old "ot t at principles or la,s ave e&ceptions and t at t ey provide causal e&planations is to "e discussed later >c ap. 1$?. But is t e enlarged conception of de*onstration a unified conception or are ,e ulti*ately left ,it distinctly different types of Gde*onstrationG; ' e ans,er to t is 1uestion ,ill depend partly on o, *uc e*p asis is placed upon t e condition of necessity and partly on t e i*portance assigned to t e ot er conditions of de*onstration. )f one takes necessity to "e an essential feature of de*onstration, to al*ost define de*onstration, t en inferences t at fail to *eet t e condition of necessity ,ill "e at "est de*onstrations "y analogy. )f one ,ere to take necessity to "e suc a feature of de*onstration, t en t e enlarged conception of de*onstration ,ould fail to "e a unified conception. ' ere is no dou"t t at Aristotle tends at ti*es to single out t e condition of necessity fro* t e rest of t e conditions of de*onstration, to e*p asi9e it a"ove all ot ers. 7et t e a"ove discussion as s o,n t at t ese ot er conditions ,ere also 1uite i*portant to i*. ' e conditions of t e causal order, pri*itiveness, and episte*ological priority of t e pre*ises are indispensa"le to de*onstration. )n t e enlarged vie, of de*onstration t ese ot er conditions "eco*e t e essential features. And it is clear t at as t e role of necessity is *ini*i9ed and t at of t e ot er conditions "eco*es do*inant, t e *ore unified our conception of de*onstration "eco*es. ' is is t e case ,it Aristotle.s o,n conception. )t is after all t e conception of de*onstration t at can acco**odate t e ,orld of nature, a *atter t at ,as of great i*portance to Aristotle. 5 6F9 5

Making Aristotle's &emarks $onsistent

' e clai* t at Aristotle t inks t ere can "e de*onstration in t e case of , at is for t e *ost part in general, and of *atters of conduct in particular, appears, as indicated earlier, to "e inconsistent ,it so*e of is re*arks 1uoted at t e very "eginning of t is c apter. ' ere is no dou"t t at t ese re*arks ave led so*e sc olars to t e conclusion t at Aristotle t inks t ere is no de*onstration in t e case of t ings t at are for t e *ost part. ) s all argue, o,ever, t at t ese re*arks do not necessarily assert or i*ply anyt ing of t e sort. At least, t ey do not assert or i*ply t at t ere is no de*onstration of t e kind t at ,e identified as "eing appropriate for do*ains t at are for t e *ost part. Consider , at Aristotle says in F.H , ere e appears to deny t at de*onstration is possi"le in t e case of t e , ole of nature. -or suppose, as Aristotle does, t at t e *et od of *at e*atics is t e de*onstrative *et od and t at *ost of nature is for t e *ost part. ' en Aristotle.s clai*s t at t e e&actness of *at e*atics is not to "e de*anded in t e study of nature and t at its *et od is not t at of t e study of nature, for t e G, ole of nature as *atter,G@##A see*s to i*ply t at de*onstration is not possi"le or appropriate in t e study of nature or in any do*ain t at appens to "e for t e *ost part. 7et Aristotle is not, in fact cannot "e, asserting t at t e , ole of nature falls outside t e de*onstra"le. ' e conte&t in , ic F.H occurs is one , ere Aristotle is speaking a"out t e correct ,ay of giving lectures and is discussing t e *et od or approac to "e used in teac ing: G+o*e people do not listen to a speaker unless e speaks *at e*atically @

A, ot ers do not listen to a speaker unless e speaks using e&a*ples @

A, , ile ot ers e&pect i* to cite a poet as a ,itnessG >Met. 99%aE?. :ne ,ay of understanding t e a"ove passage is t e ,ay 0oss does=na*ely, t at so*e de*and *at e*atical proofs, ot ers de*and e&a*ples, and so fort .@#4A Anot er ,ay ,ould "e to understand Aristotle to "e saying t at so*e use t e *at e*atical language or take everyt ing to "e a *at e*atical o"/ect. Assu*ing t at 0oss *eans only t at so*e use de*onstrative proofs of t e rigor of *at e*atics and not proofs , ose pre*ises are *at e*atical propositions or are a"out *at e*atical o"/ects, t e second interpretation of Aristotle.s ,ords is really 1uite different. )t is o"viously *uc stronger, for it does not *erely assert t at so*e use de*onstrative proofs of a certain rigor in every do*ain, "ut t at t ey *ake every do*ain into a *at e*atical one or t at t ey use t e *at e*atical language every, ere. ' is stronger interpretation is t e *ost appropriate one for interpreting t e only ot er occurrence of t is p rase Gspeaking *at e*aticallyG in t e Aristotelian corpus.@#%A )ndeed, , at Aristotle says 5 6H$ 5 in F.H=na*ely, t at t e *et od or *anner of *at e*atics is not appropriate , ere t e su"/ect is so*et ing t at as *atter=suggests t at e is ,orried a"out introducing *at e*atical o"/ects or language , ere t ey do not "elong= e is ,orried a"out *at e*ati9ing nature. And t is is an issue t at concerns i* rat er strongly, especially in t e criticis*s e develops in t e Met. of t e Pyt agoreans and of Plato i*self, for e takes t e for*er to ave propounded t e t esis t at all t ings are nu*"ers and t e latter t at at least t e -or*s are nu*"ers. 'radition as, in addition, ascri"ed to Plato t e t esis t at t e Good itself can "e e&plained or defined only *at e*atically. 7et ) do not ,is to insist t at t e strong interpretation is t e one Aristotle intends, for t e contrast "et,een giving e&a*ples and using de*onstrative proofs t at attain t e rigor of *at e*atical proofs can "e at ti*es understood as "eing "et,een t,o kinds of proving or s o,ing. <ence, ,e *ay speak of t,o *et ods, t e one used in *at e*atics >t e de*onstrative one? and t e ot er >t e nonde*onstrative one? used else, ere or for different purposes. 8ven if Aristotle as so*et ing like t is in *ind in t e present conte&t, it does not follo, fro* t is t at e e&cluded all of nature fro* de*onstration. -or Aristotle.s *a/or concern in t is conte&t is ,it de*anding t e e&actness of *at e*atics in every do*ain and for every purpose, especially , en lecturing to an audience and presenting *aterial in a ,ay t at can "e understood. +o e clai*s t at Gso*e ,ant to ave everyt ing done ,it e&actness, , ile ot ers are annoyed "y e&actness, eit er "ecause t ey cannot follo, t e conne&ion of t oug t or "ecause t ey regard it as pettifoggery. -or e&actness as so*et ing of t is c aracter, so t at as in trade so in argu*ent so*e people t ink it *eanG >99%aH?. 2 at Aristotle identifies as t e peculiar *et odology of *at e*atics t at is presu*a"ly not to "e e&tended to ot er t ings is its minute e&actness or accuracy >

? and not t e de*onstrative *et od itself. )f e is speaking a"out t e de*onstrative *et od at all, it is t e ,ay *at e*atics uses it t at concerns i* in t is connection. )n ot er ,ords, t e concern is ,it t e transferring of t e *inute e&actness of *at e*atical de*onstrations to t e do*ain of nature. ' ese are, for Aristotle, do*ains t at e& i"it different e&actness, and t erefore t eir corresponding investigations cannot attain t e sa*e levels of e&actness, for t e do*ain of nature or at least *ost of it is for t e *ost part. )t can t erefore "e only su"/ect to t e ,eaker or softer de*onstration identified

a"ove. But t e point t at needs to "e stressed is t at Aristotle cannot "e saying in F.H t at t e study of t e , ole of nature falls outside of t e class of de*onstrative disciplines, for t ere is no dou"t t at e takes p ysics to "e a t eoretical and a de*onstrative discipline.@#EA But one still as to contend ,it t e re*arks fro* N.E. Book K) 1uoted 5 6H1 5 earlier >F.%BF.F?. ' ese single out specifically *atters of conduct and contrast t e* to t e o"/ects t at constitute t e do*ain of de*onstrative kno,ledge. ' ey clearly identify t e latter ,it , at is necessary or , at cannot "e ot er,ise and t e for*er ,it , at is not necessary or , at can "e ot er,ise. ' ere is no dou"t t at t ese re*arks can easily "e vie,ed as placing *atters of conduct outside t e do*ain of t e de*onstra"le and t e kind of kno,ledge one as of t e*=t at is, practical ,isdo* or prudence=outside t e class of de*onstrative disciplines >see, in particular, F.E and F.F?. +uc a conclusion *ay not "e inevita"le, o,ever. 'o "egin, in t e , ole discussion of N. E. Book K), Aristotle is concerned ,it practical ,isdo* or prudence and t e o"/ects e contrasts to t e o"/ects of de*onstration are t e particulars t at are dealt ,it in particular practical conte&ts of deli"eration or practical reasoning. But, as ) argued in c apter #, it is not o"vious t at Aristotle e1uates t e kno,ledge of p ilosop ical et ics ,it t at of practical ,isdo* or prudence , en t ese are understood in a narro, sense. 8ven if one ,ere to take practical ,isdo* in t e ,ide sense=t at is, as "eing not any different fro* ordinary disciplines=and e1uate it ,it p ilosop ical et ics or et ical in1uiry, still it is not o"vious t at Aristotle e&cludes *atters of conduct fro* de*onstration altoget er. -or t roug out t e discussion of N.E. Book K), , ere Aristotle contrasts scientific kno,ledge or de*onstration to practical kno,ledge and t e o"/ects of t e for*er to t ose of t e latter, e as in *ind t e strict or a"solute conception of de*onstration. By Gde*onstrationG in t is conte&t Aristotle *eans only t e strict, a"solute, or Platonist kind. ' at t is is so is evident fro* all t e re*arks 1uoted a"ove >F.%BF.F?, "ut it is *ade *ost clear "y , at Aristotle says in F.9 and i**ediately after. After e says t ere t at t e o"/ect of strict scientific kno,ledge cannot "e ot er,ise, e adds: G' e o"/ect of scientific kno,ledge, t erefore, e&ists of necessity. )t is t erefore eternal, for everyt ing e&isting of a"solute necessity is eternal4 and , at is eternal does not co*e into e&istence or peris G >11#9"66?. ' is is clearly t e Platonist conception of kno,ledge or de*onstration4 t is is Platonis* at its "est >or at its ,orst?. 2 at Aristotle is contrasting, t en, in t is conte&t are o"/ects , ic are a"solutely necessary, invaria"le, and eternal, and can "e de*onstrated in t e a"solute, strict, or un1ualified sense of t is ter* to o"/ects t at presu*a"ly do not satisfy t ese conditions >*atters of conduct? and t erefore fall outside t is Platonist kind of de*onstration or conception of t e de*onstra"le. But one *ay grant t e contrast Aristotle is eager to esta"lis =t at is, grant at least for t e *o*ent t at *atters of conduct are not like t e necessary, invaria"le, and eternal o"/ects t at t e ig est or *ost pure disciplines investigate=assu*ing of course t at t ere is anyt ing t at corresponds to Plato.s and Aristotle.s conception of t e o"/ects of t e ig est 5 6H6 5 kno,ledge. And one *ay "e ,illing to grant Aristotle t at kno,ledge in et ics is not t e sa*e as t e kno,ledge t at e considers to "e of t e ig est order, t e *ost pure or a"solute de*onstrations of t e eternal o"/ects and t eir eternal properties. But t is is o"viously not t e end of t e *atter, for it does not i*ply t at t e o"/ects of et ics do not ad*it of de*onstration of any sort or t at kno,ledge of t e*

cannot "e de*onstrative in any ,ay , atsoever. )t clearly leaves open t e possi"ility t at et ics, given t e nature of its su"/ect *atter, is one of t e disciplines t at uses softer or ,eaker de*onstrations4 its su"/ect *atter is part of t e de*onstra"le in t e enlarged conception of de*onstration discussed a"ove. )t is easy to see , at Aristotle.s target is in t e N.E. Book K). ' e ,ords e uses to descri"e t e o"/ects of a"solute kno,ledge, as ,ell as t e al*ost Platonic fervor and lyricis* ,it , ic e e&pounds t e nature of t e ig est kno,ledge and its o"/ects, un*istaka"ly reveal t at is target is none ot er t an Plato i*self. Aristotle is attacking t e Platonic vie, t at et ical kno,ledge and its o"/ects are of t e sa*e order as or even of ig er order t an t e kno,ledge and o"/ects of t e *ost pure t eoretical disciplines. <e is attacking t e vie, t at *atters of conduct are necessary, invaria"le, and eternal. 'o deny Plato.s vie, a"out t e o"/ects of et ics is, ,it in t e fra*e,ork of ancient p ilosop y >see c ap. 6?, to deny as ,ell t at t e kno,ledge e associates ,it et ics is possi"le. )ndeed, as ) pointed out earlier, to descri"e t e o"/ects of et ics in t e ,ay Aristotle does=t at is, as "eing ine&act, as "eing for t e *ost part, or as fluctuating=is really to attack t e +ocratic and Platonic vie, t at t e o"/ects of all disciplines are of t e sa*e order. All Aristotle does in t e re*arks fro* N.E. Book K) 1uoted at t e "eginning of t is c apter is to dra, out t e episte*ological conse1uences of t e supposed ine&actness of *atters of conduct, and t us to critici9e Plato on is conception of et ical kno,ledge. )t is 1uite c aracteristic for Aristotle, , en e is attacking Platonis*, to go over"oard and to speak as t oug t e Platonic *odel as no ele*ent of trut . 7et, as is ,ell kno,n, , en is o,n vie,s are finally developed, t ey often turn out to ave *uc in co**on ,it t ose of Plato. ' e *ost accurate ,ay, t en, of c aracteri9ing is *ore developed vie,, in contrast to t e one e enunciates , en critici9ing Platonis*, is as ,eakening and not as a"andoning t e Platonic *odel. ' e o"/ects of et ics *ay not "e necessary, invaria"le, or eternal, "ut t ey are not suc t at t ey do not e& i"it regularities. ' ey are al*ost like , at is al,ays or in t e sa*e ,ay4 t ey are for t e *ost part. And t e kno,ledge possi"le in et ics *ay not "e , at is ac ieved in t e *ost rigorous or pure of t e disciplines >if t ere are any?, "ut it *ay not "e altoget er different eit er. -or si*ilar reasons, , at Aristotle says in F.4 does not necessarily i*ply 5 6H# 5 t at *atters of conduct fall outside t e de*onstra"le. <is concern t ere is to re*ind us t at only t e e&actness t at fits t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter can "e ac ieved and t erefore it ,ould "e unreasona"le to ai* at de*onstrations t at fit t e *at e*atical do*ain in r etorical *atters and vice versa. But Aristotle does not say, as so*e sc olars ave urged, t at it is inappropriate to ai* at de*onstrations in *atters of conduct.@#FA <e is rat er pointing to t e variation in de*onstrative rigor across disciplines, ,it r etoric occupying presu*a"ly t e lo,est end of a spectru*, per aps even falling outside of suc a spectru* of de*onstration. ' is variation in e&actness, e argues, rests in part ,it t e supposed differences in t e e&actness of t e su"/ect *atter of t e disciplines. Aristotle is t us co*paring t e *ost e&act disciplines ,it t e *ost e&act su"/ect *atter to t ose t at are less e&act "ecause t eir su"/ect *atter is less e&act. <is *ain point is t at t e kno,ledge and o"/ects of et ics are not as e&act as t e kno,ledge and o"/ects of *at e*atics. A co*parison suc as t is *akes sense to t e e&tent t at t ere can "e de*onstration in et ics. ' e co*parison presupposes t at *at e*atics, et ics, and *ost ot er disciplines are disciplines of al*ost t e sa*e kind.

'liminating -ormal Ine*actness

All of t e a"ove aving "een said, t e 1uestion still re*ains , et er t e su"/ect *atter of et ics is as ine&act as Aristotle says it is or , et er t e supposed ine&actness cannot "e eli*inated fro* our

accounts. ) pointed out in t e previous c apter t at not all *atters of conduct are for t e *ost part, t at Aristotle i*self identifies so*e t at are not so. ' e sa*e is true in t e case of nature, despite , at Aristotle i*self at ti*es says , en e attri"utes ine&actness to t e , ole of nature on account of its aving *atter. <e recogni9es, t at is, *any t ings in nature t at are not only for t e *ost part, "ut "y necessity, or al,ays, or in every case. )ndeed, it is not o"vious at all t at t ere is no necessity in *atters of conduct. Aristotle, , en arguing against Plato, often contrasts *atters of conduct to t ose t ings t at are al,ays or of necessity and insists t at *atters of conduct are not al,ays t e sa*e or t at t ey lack necessity4 t ey can "e ot er,ise. At ti*es e goes as far as to clai* t at everyt ing a"out *atters of conduct can "e ot er,ise >F.E?. 7et Aristotle i*self argues t at Ga *ost perfect t ing is t at , ic is al,ays @

A desired for its o,n sake and never @ A for t e sake of so*et ing else. Io, appiness a"ove all else appears to "e *ost perfect, since ,e al,ays @ A c oose it for its o,n sake and never @ A as a *eans to so*et ing elseG >N.E. 1$9F"?.@#HA )n t e class of necessary t ings one ,ill ave to include t e follo,ing: t e properties of asy**etry and transitivity Aristotle ascri"es to desires, pursuits, or goals >N.E. ).i?4 t e supposed connection 5 6H4 5 Aristotle takes to old "et,een t e e&cellence of an - and t e function of - >1$9F"6%, 11$Ea1%?4 t e connection "et,een "eing an e&cellence and "eing a disposition or state of c aracter=t e latter is part of t e definition and ence of t e essence of t e for*er >11$Fa?, and so fort . )ndeed, in E.E. Aristotle argues, G-or e&cellence @virtue,

A is of t e soul, it is not accidental @ AG >1619"6E?, , ere t e accidental is to "e contrasted to t at , ic "elongs essentially or necessarily. ' at u*an e&cellence is a c aracteristic of t e soul is, according to Aristotle, necessary. But suppose one ,as to agree ,it Aristotle t at at least *atters of conduct are ine&act "ecause t ey are for t e *ost part. 2 y can.t t e supposed ine&actness fro* our accounts of t ose *atters of conduct t at are for t e *ost part "e eli*inated; As ) said a"ove, Aristotle takes t e propositions a"out , at is for t e *ost part to "e universal in for*, even , en suc propositions are indefinite. :nly t en can t ey "e true for t e *ost part, and t us "e ine&act "y failing to "e universally true and "y indicating t e trut a"out *atters of conduct roug ly. )t *ay see*, t en, t at t e ine&actness in our et ical accounts cannot "e eli*inated as long as ,e are

un,illing to give up eit er of t e t,o ele*ents of t e relation: t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter of et ics "eing , at Aristotle says it is, t at is, for t e *ost part4 and t e for* of our propositions in et ics "eing , at e takes it to "e, t at is, universal. -or if ,e insist, as Aristotle does, t at, for instance, ,ealt e& i"its t e property of "eing "eneficial for t e *ost part and also t at our proposition a"out suc property "elonging to ,ealt *ust "e universal, t en ,e ,ill ave t e congruence Aristotle "elieves olds "et,een t e ine&actness of t e su"/ect *atter of et ics and our accounts of it. Aristotle is, of course, not ,illing to give up eit er of t ese co*ponents=t e su"/ect *atter is for t e *ost part and t e propositions are universal in for*. 7et t is *ay not "e t e end of t e *atter. As seen in an earlier c apter, it is not o"vious t at t ere is no ,ay of descri"ing t e p eno*ena t at eli*inates ine&actness fro* our accounts of t e*. )t is not o"vious t at t is cannot "e done even , en our propositions ave t e for* Aristotle says t ey *ust ave=t ey re*ain universal in t eir for*. Aristotle i*self recogni9es t at "y restricting t e universal ter* t at refers to , atever is for t e *ost part, ,e can o"tain propositions t at are universal in for* and true in all cases.@#9A ' us, , ereas t e proposition G)ll people are cured "y taking oneyB,aterG *ay "e true for t e *ost part, t e one t at singles out t e class , ose *e*"ers are suc t at everyone is cured "y t is su"stance ,ill "e true in all cases4 it ,ill "e e&act. +o Aristotle ,rites, GBut to /udge t at it @so*e *edicationA as done good to all persons of a certain constitution, *arked off in one class, , en t ey ,ere ill of t is disease, e.g., to p leg*atic or "ilious people , en "urning ,it fever . . .G >Met. 5 6H% 5 9H1a1$?. +i*ilarly, e argues t at t e p ysician says , at is ealt y for t e eye in general or G e deter*ines so*e sort @of eyeAG and says , at is ealt y for t is sort of eye > ost. Anal. 9F"6H?. Aristotle uses t is tec ni1ue of narro,ing t e universal t roug out t e scientific treatises. 2 at lies "e ind t e tec ni1ue of restricting t e universal is t e recognition t at ine&actness *ay at ti*es depend on t e ,ay t ings are descri"ed or t e ,ay t e ,orld is represented. <ence, t ere *ay "e no do*ain t at is i**une to ine&actness t at as its source in t e *anner in , ic t ings are descri"ed or represented. ' us t e proposition GPri*e nu*"ers are oddG is true for t e *ost part. And t e sa*e is t e case ,it t e proposition & T n U &, , ere & and n are positive integers, for t e proposition is not true , enever n Q $. 7et one tends to t ink t at "y descri"ing t ings in t e proper ,ay our propositions can "e *ade e&act4 t ey can "e true in all instances. Per aps, t en, t e tec ni1ue of restricting t e universal t at succeeds in eli*inating ine&actness in *any do*ains can "e used in t e do*ain of et ics. )t *ay, for instance, "e t e case t at only one sort of ,ealt is not "eneficial or only so*e specific kind of "ravery is ar*ful. )f one e&cludes t ese fro* t e universal, if one restricts t e universals to pick out only t e sort of ,ealt or "ravery t at is "eneficial, t en our propositions ,ill "e true in all cases. -or e&a*ple, it *ay "e t at only e&cessive ,ealt is not "eneficial or t at only t oug tless "ravery is ar*ful. +o t at t e propositions G(oderate ,ealt is "eneficialG or G' oug tful "ravery is "eneficial,G *ay "e true in all cases. +o Aristotle narro,s t e universal +irtue to arrive at t e proposition G(oral virtue is a *eanG t at is true in all cases, , ereas GKirtue is a *eanG is not, since intellectual virtues are not, according to i*, *eans. But Aristotle.s insistence t at ine&actness cannot "e eli*inated fro* et ical accounts suggests t at e pro"a"ly t oug t t at t e tec ni1ue of restricting t e universal ,ould not succeed >at least not al,ays? in t e do*ain of et ics. 0egardless of o, one tries to narro, t e universal, t e propositions o"tained ,ill still "e true only for t e *ost part4 t ey ,ould still ave e&ceptions. Aristotle is per aps rig t a"out t is. <is kno,ledge of *edical p eno*ena *ay ave convinced i* t at t ere are do*ains, for

e&a*ple, t at of *edicine, , ere t e results of t e tec ni1ue of narro,ing t e universal are 1uestiona"le. 3espite t e advances in *edicine and its incorporating t e discoveries of c e*istry, "iology, and related disciplines, its propositions al,ays see* to suffer fro* e&ceptions. )t *ig t not "e possi"le to deter*ine t e Gsort of eyeG for , ic a certain treat*ent produces t e sa*e result in every case, ence, Aristotle.s fre1uent clai* t at *atters of *edicine are essentially ine&act. 'o see t e pro"le*s t at t e do*ain of et ics and *edicine *ig t ave posed for Aristotle, consider t e follo,ing propositions fro* t e do*ains 5 6HE 5 of 1uite different disciplines: G8vergreens do not s ed t eir leaves,G GA produce *any offspring,G GPri*e nu*"ers are odd.G All of t ese are, as stated, true for t e *ost part. 8ac as, as far as ,e kno,, one e&ception: ' e species of t e evergreen da,n red,ood, Metase/uoia Glyptostrophoides , s eds its leaves in t e ,inter4 t e elep ant is a fissepede "ut produces only one offspring4 and t e nu*"er t,o is pri*e "ut not odd. ' ere is an easy ,ay out in t ese cases. )ne&actness can "e eli*inated "y using t e a"ove tec ni1ue of restricting t e universal, "y narro,ing t e universal in a ,ay t at it e&cludes t e sole e&ception in eac case: G8vergreens ot er t an t e da,n red,ood do not s ed t eir leaves,G G-issepedes ot er t an t e elep ant produce *any offspring,G and GPri*es ot er t an t,o are odd.G But , en ,e look at t e do*ains of et ics and *edicine, t e picture appears 1uite different. ' e e&ceptions to general propositions in t ese do*ains see* to "e *uc *ore pervasive t an t e rat er neat ,ay in , ic t e propositions in t e previous paragrap eac ca*e to ave one clearly recogni9a"le e&ception. Per aps ,e ,ould "e giving up too easily if ,e ,ere to conclude fro* t ese considerations t at ine&actness in et ics cannot "e eli*inated, for t ere *ay "e, in addition to t e tec ni1ue of restricting t e universal, ot er ,ays of eli*inating ine&actness. )ndeed, Aristotle i*self see*s to ave ad anot er and per aps *ore po,erful and effective tec ni1ue for eli*inating ine&actness. Consider, for e&a*ple, Aristotle.s ,ay of eli*inating t e ine&actness fro* suc propositions as GClovenB oofed ani*als produce one or t,o offspringG and G-issepedes produce nu*erous offspring,G "ot of , ic are true for t e *ost part, ,it t e pig "eing t e e&ception to t e first and t e elep ant to t e second. ' ere is, Aristotle argues, a causal *ec anis* t at e&plains , y t ere are e&ceptions to t ese propositions, or , y t e elep ant produces only one offspring and t e pig *any, a *ec anis* t at allo,s us to descri"e t e p eno*ena in a ,ay t at is not in ter*s of t e universals Clo+en4hoofed or <issepede t at ave e&ceptions. ' e reason, Aristotle clai*s, t at so*e ani*als are Gproducing fe, or *any offspring is t e si9e, great or s*all, of t eir "odies, not t e fact t at t at particular kind of ani*al is clovenB or solidB oofed or is fissepedeG >G.A. FF1EE?.@4$A :ne can descri"e t e p eno*ena t en "y using t e universal large animal and small animal , a *ove t at *ay not only produce universally true propositions "ut also *ay allo, one to see a causal *ec anis* operating far "eyond t e species *entioned a"ove: GAnd it is not only a*ong t e ani*als t at ,alk "ut also a*ong t ose t at fly and s,i* t at t e "ig ones produce fe, offspring and t e s*all ones produce *any4 and t e cause is t e sa*e. +i*ilarly, too, it is not t e "iggest plants t at "ear t e *ost fruitG >G.A. FF1"11?. Can t is tec ni1ue of identifying a causal *ec anis* and t en using it 5 6HF 5 to redescri"e t e p eno*ena in ter*s of e&ceptionless universals eli*inate ine&actness fro* our accounts of nature; As ) said earlier, Aristotle even see*s resigned to t e ine&actness of our disciplines

t at study nature. 2 et er e arrives at t is conclusion "y recogni9ing t e insufficiency of "ot t e tec ni1ue of restricting t e universal and t at of identifying a causal *ec anis* t at e&plains e&ceptions is not clear. Per aps e t oug t t at regardless of o, far t e universal is restricted, t ere ,ill al,ays "e e&ceptions, and t at t e *ove of s ifting to different universals t at identify causal *ec anis*s ,ill not eli*inate t e e&ceptions. Per aps, to use t e e&a*ple Aristotle i*self uses, t ere is so*e large ani*al t at produces *any offspring or a large plant t at produces *uc fruit. Can t e tec ni1ue of identifying a causal *ec anis* t at e&plains e&ceptions "e used in order to eli*inate ine&actness fro* et ical propositions; Per aps it can in so*e cases, "ut t ere is no evidence t at Aristotle considers t e effectiveness, or lack of it, of t is tec ni1ue in relation to *atters of conduct. <is conviction t at ine&actness cannot "e eli*inated fro* our accounts of *atters of conduct *ay ste* fro* is assu*ption t at *atters of conduct are ine&act in t e *ost pervasive ,ay as far as t eir nonessential properties are concerned. Ieit er restricting t e universal nor *oving to universals t at identify "road causal *ec anis*s ,ill eli*inate ine&actness fro* our accounts of *atters of conduct. <is conviction *ig t also ste* fro* is "elief t at *atters of conduct are ine&act even in t eir essential structure. <e *ig t ave t oug t, t at is, t at even t e *ost "asic ele*ents of et ics, for e&a*ple, goodness, t e u*an good, appiness, and virtue suffer fro* certain features of ine&actness t at affect even t eir essential properties. ' us, t e very "asic principles of et ics >its a&io*s?, t ose fro* , ic ot er propositions a"out *atters of conduct are derived or proved, *ay "e ine&act in a ,ay t at cannot "e eli*inated, and t erefore all else t at rests on t e* is also ine&act. Are t ere types of ine&actness , ic affect t e essential properties or structure of *atters of conduct and can t ey "e eli*inated fro* our accounts; ' ese are t e 1uestions ) ,is to consider ne&t. 5 6HH 5

'ight 3ariation) Indefiniteness) and '*actness

Introduction
)n t is c apter, ) ,is to e&a*ine in so*e detail t e types of ine&actness Aristotle designates as variation or indefiniteness. As ,it so*e of t e ot er kinds of ine&actness discussed so far, t ese are also attri"uted to "ot t e su"/ect *atter of et ics and t e accounts of it. And as e does in ot er cases, Aristotle invokes t e congruence t esis in connection ,it t ese kinds of ine&actness also. ) s all follo, ere t e strategy ) ave follo,ed in so*e previous c apters: ) ,ill present t e te&tual evidence and discuss its *eaning, e&a*ine Aristotle.s target, discuss t e conse1uences t ese kinds of ine&actness ave and, finally, consider t e possi"ility of eli*inating or reducing suc ine&actness fro* t e accounts of *atters of conduct. ' e features of *atters of conduct and of t e accounts of t e* t at Aristotle identifies in t e re*arks 1uoted "elo, are of considera"le i*portance. Alt oug t ey do not appear to "e uni1ue to et ics and its su"/ect *atter, t ey nonet eless are of special significance to et ics "ecause of t e considera"le e&tent or ig degree to , ic t ey appear to affect *atters of conduct and t e accounts of t e*. )f Aristotle is, indeed, correct in clai*ing t at variation or indefiniteness c aracteri9es *atters of conduct, t en e as succeeded in under*ining t e +ocraticBPlatonic essentialis* t at e also at ti*es advocates. ' e features of variation or indefiniteness ave i*portant conse1uences. ' ey *ake it difficult or even

i*possi"le to use definitions of *atters of conduct for so*e of t e purposes for , ic +ocrates and Plato soug t definitions. Bot t e diagnostic and de*onstrative uses of definition "eco*e 1uestiona"le. At t e sa*e ti*e, t ese features *ay "e 1uite 5 6H9 5 difficult to eli*inate. Alt oug Aristotle as so*e tec ni1ues for reducing or "ypassing t ese pro"le*atic features, it is not clear t at t ese tec ni1ues ulti*ately succeed.

The 'vidence and its Meaning

<ere t en are Aristotle.s re*arks in , ic e speaks of a kind of ine&actness in *atters of conduct t at presu*a"ly poses pro"le*s for for*ulating general rules a"out t e* or providing definitions of t e*: 2.& ' e no"le and /ust t ings, , ic political science studies, e& i"it *uc difference @or variation,

A. >N.E. &;=9b&:7 H.6 But let it "e agreed at t e outset t at every account of *atters of conduct @

A is "ound to "e in outline only and not e&act @ A, in accordance ,it , at ,as said at t e "eginning, t at accounts *ust correspond to t e su"/ect *atter4 and t ose concerned ,it conduct and t e e&pedient ave not ing fi&ed @ A, as is t e case also ,it t ose concerned ,it *atters of ealt . And if our general accounts are of t is nature, t e accounts dealing ,it particulars ,ill "e even *ore lacking in e&actness4 for t ese co*e under no art @or scienceA or professional tradition, "ut t e agents t e*selves ave to consider , at is suited to t e circu*stances on eac occasion, /ust as is t e case ,it *edicine and navigation. But alt oug our present discussion is t us ine&act, ,e *ust give , atever elp ,e can. >11$4a? H.# )t is "y doing t is, to su* up t e *atter, t at ,e ,ill "e "est a"le to it t e *ean. But no dou"t it is a difficult t ing to do, especially in particular cases: for it is not easy to define @

A in , at *anner and ,it , at people and on , at sort of grounds and o, long one

oug t to "e angry4 and in fact so*eti*es ,e praise t ose , o err on t e side of t e defect on t is *atter and call t e* gentle, so*eti*es t ose , o are 1uick to anger and call t e* *anly. <o,ever, ,e do not "la*e one , o diverges a little, "ut one , o diverges *ore ,idely, for is error does not fail to "e noticed. But to , at point and to , at e&tent a *an *ust deviate "efore e "eco*es "la*e,ort y is not easy to define in an account @ A4 for not ing percepti"le is @easily definedA and suc t ings depend on particular circu*stances and t e decision rests ,it perception. >11$9"1#? H.4 ' ey @actions intrinsically involuntary "ut in so*e circu*stances c oice,ort yA appro&i*ate o,ever rat er voluntary actions, since actions involve particulars, and t e particulars are voluntary. But , at sort of t ings are to "e c osen and in return for , at, it is not easy to state @

A, since t ere are *any differences in t e particular cases @ A. >111$"F?

2.:

5 69$ 5 But , at ,as said a"ove is also clear fro* , at ,e are no, saying4 it is not easy to define @

A in , at *anner and ,it , o* and on , at grounds and o, long one oug t to "e angry, and up to , at point one does rig t in so doing and , ere error "egins. -or e , o deviates a little is not "la*ed, , et er e errs on t e side of e&cess or deficiency. . . . )t is t erefore not easy to state in a @generalA account @ A o, far and in , at *anner one *ust deviate in order to "e "la*e,ort y, since t ese are particular circu*stances and /udg*ent rests ,it perception. >116Ea#6? H.E Io, s ould ,e define t e person , o /okes ,ell as "eing t e person , o *akes re*arks not unsuita"le for a ,ellB"red person, or as t e one , o does not give pain, or even gives pleasure, to t e earer; :r is t is definition itself indefinite @

A, since different t ings are ateful or pleasant to different people; >116Ha6%? H.F ' is is t e essential nature of t e e1uita"le: it is a rectification of la, , ere la, is defective "ecause of its universality. )n fact t is is t e reason , y t ings are not all deter*ined "y la,: it is "ecause t ere are so*e cases for , ic it is i*possi"le to lay do,n a la, @

A, so t at a special ordinance "eco*es necessary. -or , at is itself indefinite @ A can only "e *easured "y an indefinite standard @ A, like t e leaden rule used "y Jes"ian "uilders4 /ust as t at rule is not rigid "ut can "e "ent to t e s ape of t e stone, so a special ordinance is *ade to fit t e facts. >11#FE6F? H.H )n suc cases @, ere t ere are differences of *eritA it is not possi"le to give an e&act definition @

A up to , at point persons re*ain friends4 for *uc can "e taken a,ay and t e friends ip still re*ain, "ut , en one party is re*oved to a great distance, as God is, t e possi"ility of friends ip ceases. >11%9a#? H.9 3oes a *an o,e is fat er unli*ited respect and o"edience, or oug t e , en ill to take t e advice of a p ysician, and , en electing a general to vote for t e "est soldier; And si*ilarly, oug t e to do service to a friend rat er t an to a virtuous *an, and oug t e to repay is o"ligation to a "enefactor rat er t an *ake a present to a co*rade, , en e is not in a position to do "ot ; Io, per aps ,it all t ese *atters it is not easy to define e&actly @

A, "ecause t e cases ad*it of every kind of variation @ A in respect of i*portance and uni*portance and of no"ility and necessity. >11E4"6%? H.1$ <ence, as as "een fre1uently re*arked already, accounts of our e*otions and actions ad*it t e sa*e degree of definiteness @

A t at "elongs to t e *atters ,it , ic t ey deal. >11E%a1#? H.11 But s ould one ave as *any good friends as possi"le, or is t ere a li*it of si9e for a circle of friends, as t ere is for t e population of a city; 'en people ,ill not *ake a city, and ,it a undred t ousand it is a city no

5 691 5 longer? though perhaps the proper siAe is not one particular number' but any number bet)een certain limits. !o also the number of one0s friends must be limited' and should perhaps be the largest number )ith )hom one can constantly associate. 1&&5;b%;7 H.16 +i*ilarly a state consisting of too fe, people ,ill not "e selfBsufficient >, ic is an essential 1uality of a state?, and one consisting of too *any, t oug selfBsufficient in t e *ere necessaries. . . )t follo,s t at t e lo,est li*it for t e e&istence of a state is , en it consists of a population t at reac es t e *ini*u* nu*"er t at is selfBsufficient for t e purpose of living t e good life after t e *anner of a political co**unity. )t is possi"le also for one t at e&ceeds t is one in nu*"er to "e a greater state, "ut, as ,e said, t is possi"ility of increase is not ,it out li*it, and , at t e li*it of t e state.s e&pansion is can easily "e seen fro* practical considerations. > olit. &8%3b7

)n so*e of t e a"ove re*arks Aristotle.s concern see*s to "e ,it t e feature of ine&actness discussed in t e t,o previous c apters=na*ely, ,it t e feature of "eing for t e *ost part or "eing true for t e *ost part. ' us, in H.F Aristotle is e*p asi9ing t at la, as e&ceptions, t at it does not cover all cases "ut only *ost. +i*ilarly, in H.9 e suggests t at any general principle stating , en ,e oug t to pay "ack a de"t or , en c ildren are o"ligated to o"ey t eir fat er ,ill not apply in all cases. 7et t is is not all Aristotle is concerned ,it in t ese re*arks, for ,e see t at in al*ost all of t e* e points to so*e features t at *atters of conduct or our accounts of t e* e& i"it t at on t e surface at least appear to "e different fro* t e ones discussed so far. ' us, Aristotle tells us t at *atters of conduct e& i"it variation >H.1, H.4, H.9?, *atters of conduct and our accounts of t e* are not fi&ed >H.6? or are indefinite >H.E, H.F, H.1$?, *atters of conduct are not easy to define >H.#, H.%, H.9? or cannot "e defined e&actly >H.#, H.H?. Io, t ese features, , atever t ey *ig t turn out to "e, *ay very ,ell presuppose or i*ply t e feature of "eing for t e *ost part or "eing true for t e *ost part. ' at is, t ey *ay i*ply t at if, for e&a*ple, virtue is indefinite, it is also for t e *ost part, or t at if an account of virtue is indefinite or is not fi&ed, t e account is also true for t e *ost part. But t e feature Aristotle identifies in t e a"ove re*arks *ay nonet eless "e different fro* t e feature of "eing for t e *ost part or "eing true for t e *ost part. ' us, not all t ings t at are for t e *ost part or are true for t e *ost part are also indefinite. Pri*e nu*"ers are for t e *ost part odd or t e proposition stating t is fact is true for t e *ost part, "ut t ere is not ing indefinite a"out oddness >or GoddG or t e concept odd ? or "eing a pri*e >or Gpri*eG or t e concept prime ?. ' e features Aristotle identifies in t e present conte&t *ay "e *ore "asic t an t at of "eing for t e *ost part, since t ey *ay e&plain in so*e cases , y t ings are for t e *ost 5 696 5

part or , y t e relevant propositions a"out t e* are true for t e *ost part. ' erefore t ey deserve to "e e&a*ined in detail, so t at t eir nature and i*plications can "e clearly understood. ' e first t ing to notice is t at Aristotle attri"utes t ese features "ot to t e *atters of conduct t e*selves and to t e accounts of t e*. ' us, it is t e no"le and /ust t ings t e*selves, t e t ings to "e c osen, or t e o"ligations one as in relation to lenders or to one.s fat er t at e& i"it variation or differences >H.1, H.4, H.9?4 t e t ings t e la, is concerned ,it are indefinite >H.F?4 or "ot *atters of conduct and our accounts of t e* lack fi&ity >H.6? or ad*it of t e sa*e degree of definiteness >H.1$?. 2 atever t ese features *ig t turn out to "e, Aristotle takes t e* to c aracteri9e "ot t e su"/ect *atter of et ics and its accounts, to "e "ot *aterial and for*al features. )ndeed, as H.6, H.F, and H.1$ *ake clear, Aristotle t inks t at a congruence e&ists "et,een t e ine&actness of t e su"/ect *atter and t at of our accounts of it: ' e indefiniteness of our accounts corresponds to t e indefiniteness of t e su"/ect *atter. 2 en t e assu*ption t at t e su"/ect *atter of et ics is ine&act is taken toget er ,it t e assu*ption t at t ere is a congruence "et,een *aterial and for*al ine&actness, t e prospects for eli*inating for*al ine&actness do not appear pro*ising. And so, Aristotle i*self suggests t at for*al ine&actness cannot "e eli*inated: :ur accounts are "ound to "e ine&act >H.6? or in certain cases it is not possi"le to give an e&act definition >H.H?. 2 at, t en, are t e features t at, according to Aristotle, are pro"le*atic for "ot t e su"/ect *atter and t e accounts of et ics; )n so*e of t e a"ove re*arks Aristotle appears to "e concerned ,it t e pro"le* of for*ulating a general state*ent or rule , ic , "y singling out so*e one feature or a deter*inate set of features, provides an ans,er to a 1uestion suc as G, at sorts of t ings are c oice,ort y in a situation , ere ,e ave to c oose "et,een doing so*et ing t at ,e ,ould not nor*ally c oose and suffering so*e penalty;G >H.4?4 G, en s ould one repay an o"ligation or s o, respect and o"edience to one.s fat er;G >H.9?4 G o, *any friends s ould one ave;G >H.11?4 or G, at is t e li*it of e&pansion in a state;G >H.16? :ne pro"le* Aristotle finds ,it suc 1uestions is t at t eir ans,ers ad*it of e&ceptions4 t ey apply only to so*e cases. 2 atever class of t ings, for instance, is singled out as "eing t e class of c oice,ort y t ings, or , atever feature is identified as deter*ining c oice,ort iness, ,ill not capture all t e cases. +i*ilarly, alt oug one *ay accept t e general rule t at one oug t to pay "ack a de"t and one *ay even consider c ildren to "e inde"ted to t eir parents,@1A t e rule does not cover all of our o"ligations to pay "ack de"ts or t ose t at c ildren ave to t eir parents: GBut it is clear t at no one is entitled to unli*ited consideration . . . . As a general 5 69# 5 rule t en, as as "een said, one oug t to pay "ack a de"t, "ut if t e "alance of no"ility or necessity is on t e side of e*ploying t e *oney for a gift, t en one oug t to decide in favour of t e gift. -or t ere are occasions , en it ,ould "e actually unfair to return t e original serviceG >N.E. 11E%a?. Any general state*ent t at singles out so*e set of conditions as "eing necessary and sufficient for deter*ining, for instance, , at actions are c oice,ort y in t e conte&t of *oral dile**as or , en ,e are o"ligated to o"ey our parents, ,ill t en "e defeasi"le. Any set of suc conditions ,ill ave e&ceptions. 7et t e pro"le* Aristotle is pri*arily concerned ,it is not t at of e&ceptions to general state*ents, for t e pro"le* regarding e&ceptions arises , ere one at least as or is a"le to for*ulate general state*ents. But t e pro"le* ,it t e a"ove cases lies ,it t e difficulty or per aps even t e i*possi"ility of providing rules or for*ulating general state*ents t at cover t e *a/ority of cases. Aristotle see*s to t ink t at ,it so*e p eno*ena it is difficult or per aps i*possi"le, to fi& any necessary or sufficient conditions, for t e factors are *any, or t ey vary fro* conte&t to conte&t, and

even t eir relevance or i*portance varies fro* case to case. ' ere *ay "e, in t e case of t ese kinds of p eno*ena, no strand or core of co**on relevant factors one can isolate as t e necessary and sufficient conditions t at can "e used to ans,er t e kinds of 1uestions *entioned a"ove. ' e p eno*ena, Aristotle argues, e& i"it *uc or every kind of difference or variation. <ence, it is not easy, e insists, to articulate general state*ents a"out suc p eno*ena or to ans,er in general ter*s certain 1uestions a"out t e*. But per aps, one *ay argue, our ans,ers or general state*ents could "e in a dis/unctive for* so t at t ey include all possi"le relevant features. By doing so, ,e ,ill not single out any features as "eing t e necessary and sufficient ones, a process t at *ay easily result in t e o*itting of ot er ones t at are also relevant, "ut instead all t e relevant factors ,ill appear as dis/uncts in our ans,er or general state*ent. ' e pro"le*, o,ever, ,it suc a proposal is t at it presupposes t at ,e can deter*ine all t e relevant factors, t at ,e can fi& t e degree to , ic so*e factors are relevant, or t at ,e can rank t e various factors ,it respect to i*portance, uni*portance, no"ility, necessity, and so fort . )n any case, it is not clear of , at practical use suc a dis/unctive state*ent is likely to "e, for given t e kinds of differences or variation t at presu*a"ly c aracteri9e suc p eno*ena, t e general dis/unctive state*ent *ay contain inco*pati"le factors. )f t ere is no general rule for deter*ining , ic is t e relevant factor in so*e particular conte&t, aving an inco*plete list of dis/uncts ,ill not "e of *uc elp. And suc a general rule is presu*a"ly not easy to o"tain. Per aps, o,ever, on so*e occasions Aristotle.s difficulties ,it t e 5 694 5 variation e attri"utes to certain p eno*ena can "e overco*e "y finding or fi&ing t e li*its ,it in , ic variation e&ists. +o t at even if one ,ere to ave recourse to dis/unctive state*ents t at list t e relevant factors or features, t e dis/unctive lists ,ill "e co*plete. )n H.11 Aristotle suggests t at one can ans,er t e 1uestion a"out t e nu*"er of good friends one needs "y saying t at it is t e largest nu*"er of persons ,it , o* one can constantly associate. ' is *ay give an upper li*it and per aps t ere is a lo,er one as ,ell. Alt oug t e nu*"er of friends one needs *ay vary, t e variations occur ,it in so*e li*its. But t ere are pro"le*s ,it finding or fi&ing li*its=t ere *ay "e none. -or in so*e cases t e p eno*ena *ay e& i"it no li*its4 t ey *ay "e indefinite. 2e notice, for instance, t at Aristotle e&presses reservations a"out is atte*pts to articulate a li*it on t e nu*"er of friends one needs. :n t e t,o occasions , ere e gives an ans,er, e prefaces it "y saying Gper aps @

A t e nu*"er is . . .G >11F1a, aH?. (ost i*portantly, Aristotle recogni9es t at is ans,er is not a definite one4 it only stipulates t at, as in t e case of t e nu*"er of people re1uired to *ake a city, t ere are li*its. <e does not even identify , at t e li*its are, eit er t e ig or t e lo, one. 'o say t at t e ig li*it is t e largest nu*"er of persons one can constantly associate ,it is not to specify a li*it, for t e nu*"er of persons one can constantly associate ,it could vary fro* person to person or conte&t to conte&t. ' is is, *ost pro"a"ly, , at Aristotle assu*es=t e li*it cannot "e fi&ed ,it any degree of precision, for t e nu*"er of friends re1uired for any one person or in any conte&t cannot "e fi&ed4 it is not so*e one nu*"er. ' e p eno*ena are "asically indefinite. ' e sa*e is true ,it , at Aristotle says in H.16 ,it regard to specifying t e nu*"er of citi9ens re1uired for aving an ideal state. Again, one cannot give a specific nu*"er. ' e "est t at can "e done is specify a lo,est and ig est li*it, "ut , en Aristotle atte*pts to specify t e lo,est li*it, , at e

tells us is not a specific nu*"er "ut rat er t at Git follo,s t at t e lo,est li*it for t e e&istence of a state is , en it consists of a population t at reac es t e *ini*u* nu*"er t at is selfBsufficient for t e purpose of living t e good life after t e *anner of a political co**unityG >H.16?. ' is is clearly a rat er i*precise ,ay of specifying a li*it. ' ings are of course no different ,it , at Aristotle says a"out t e ig est li*it. <e insists t at t e Gpossi"ility of increase is not ,it out li*it, and , at t e li*it of t e state.s e&pansion is can easily "e seen fro* practical considerations.G 7et t e li*it *ay "e so*et ing 1uite indefinite and, contrary to , at Aristotle says, it *ay "e so*et ing t at is ard to specify even fro* practical considerations. ' e "est Aristotle i*self is a"le to do is to state t at Git is clear t erefore t at t e "est li*iting principle for a state is t e largest e&pansion of t e population ,it a vie, to selfBsufficiency 5 69% 5 t at can ,ell "e taken in at one vie,G > olit . 1#6E"6#?. But t is principle *ay not yield an e&act li*it, so*e one *at e*atical 1uantity, t at states t e *a&i*u* nu*"er of citi9ens. ' ere *ay "e no ,ellB defined or e&act li*it in t is case. Are t ese pro"le*s peculiar to *atters of conduct and t eir accounts or are t ey also to "e *et in ot er do*ains and t eir accounts; Aristotle does not t ink t at t e kind of ine&actness under discussion is uni1ue to *atters of conduct and t eir accounts. <e t inks t at it also c aracteri9es t e do*ain of nature and its accounts. ' us, Aristotle argues t at Ga*ong u*an "eings, a *an can, at t e longest generate up to t e age of seventy, a ,o*an up to fifty4 "ut "ot occur infre1uently. -e, people at t ese ages produce c ildren. -or t e *ost part t e li*it for *en is si&tyBfive, for ,o*en fortyBfiveG >H.A. %4%"6F?. +i*ilarly, Aristotle clai*s, G)n ,o*en t e period is not accurately fi&edG >G.A. F#Ha1E? and t e period of gestation in so*e ani*als is not single or e&act, "ut varies considera"ly and cannot "e precisely fi&ed >G.A. FFHa%?. )t is *ost indefinite in t e case of u*ans , ere it varies fro* seven to ten *ont s >G.A. FF6"H, FFEa6#? and at ti*es up to eleven *ont s >H.A. %H4a#%?. ' e si9e of a perfected e*"ryo varies, "ut for eac kind of ani*al it lies ,it in an interval "ounded "y a ig er or lo,er li*it >G.A. FF1"#%?. )n general, Aristotle clai*s t at several processes or p eno*ena do not ave e&act periods4 t ey are not as *easured as t ose of t e eavenly "odies "ecause of t e indefiniteness of *atter: 2.&8 )n all cases, as ,e s ould e&pect, t e ti*es of gestation or for*ation of a lifespan ai*, according to nature, at "eing *easured "y Gperiods.G By a GperiodG ) *ean day and nig t and *ont and year and t e ti*es , ic are *easured "y t ese . . . . Iature.s ai* is, t en, to *easure t e generations and endings of t ings "y t e *easures of t ese @ eavenlyA "odies, "ut s e cannot "ring t is a"out e&actly @

A on account of t e indeter*inateness @ A of *atter and t e e&istence of a plurality of principles , ic i*pede t e natural processes of generation and dissolution and so are often t e causes of t ings occurring contrary to Iature. >G.A.555b&3ff.7 ' e indefiniteness Aristotle attri"utes to *atters of conduct, t en, e also attri"utes to t e do*ain of

nature. And our accounts of t e latter at ti*es are indefinite4 t ey only specify certain li*its. Alt oug Aristotle insists on t ere "eing li*its to t e processes or p eno*ena t at e finds indefinite, e nonet eless takes t ese li*its to "e ine&act=t ey ave e&ceptions. +o t e upper li*it for generating in t e case of *en *ay "e si&tyBfive, "ut t is is, according to Aristotle, only for t e *ost part. -or so*e *en generate up to t e age of seventy. ' ere is, t en, variation and indefiniteness outside t e do*ain of conduct. But , y are t e a"ove p eno*ena indefinite=for e&a*ple, t e nu*"er 5 69E 5 of friends one can ave, t e li*it of e&pansion in t e state, t e gestation period of so*e ani*als; :ne *ay "e te*pted to assu*e t at t e reason , y t e period of gestation in so*e ani*als is indefinite or cannot "e fi&ed e&actly is t at gestation itself is indefinite or t at t e concept gestation is indefinite. +i*ilarly, one *ay "e te*pted to assu*e t at friends ip or state, or t e corresponding concepts, are indefinite or difficult to define. And t us to suppose t at t e difficulty ,it fi&ing t e period of gestation, t e nu*"er of friends one needs, or t e li*it of e&pansion in t e state ste*s fro* t e difficulty of defining t e state, friends ip, or gestation. 7et t is *ay not "e so. Aristotle, for e&a*ple, as no difficulty in deter*ining , at a state is: GAnd a state is t e partners ip of clans and villages for t e sake of a co*plete and selfBsufficient life, , ic in our vie, constitutes a appy and no"le lifeG > olit . 16H1a4 see also 16H$"#4?. +i*ilarly, Aristotle see*s to ave no special difficulty in defining , at friends ip is: GJet friends ip, t en, "e defined as ,is ing for anyone t e t ings , ic ,e "elieve to "e good, for is sake "ut not for our o,n, and procuring t e* for i* as far as lies in our po,erG >Rhet . 1#H1a?. )ndeed, Aristotle goes a step furt er "y giving an account of , at it is to ave nu*erous and ,ort y friends: G<aving nu*erous and good friends is not difficult to understand, once t e definition of "eing a friend as "een given. A friend is one , o e&erts i*self to do for t e sake of anot er , at e t inks is good for i*. A person to , o* *any persons are so disposed, as *any friends4 if t ey are ,ort y, e as good friendsG >Rhet . 1#E1"#%?. Io,, are t e a"ove definitions pro"le*atic; Are t ey indefinite; And do t ey t us s o, t at t e state or friends ip or t e corresponding concepts are t e*selves indefinite; ' is is not o"vious and Aristotle does not say t at t ey are. 7et, as s all "e seen, e does argue else, ere t at friends ip is itself indefinite and difficult to define. But as H.1# *akes clear, Aristotle does not t ink it is necessary for friends ip, state, or gestation to "e indefinite in order for t e nu*"er of good friends, t e li*it of e&pansion of t e state, or t e period of gestation to "e indefinite. -or according to , at e says t ere t e indefiniteness of t e period of gestation is not due to t e indefiniteness of gestation itself "ut rat er to t e indefiniteness of *atter and t e co*petition a*ong t e nu*erous principles t at affect gestation. +i*ilarly, it *ay not "e t e nature of friends ip or of t e state t at gives rise to t e indefiniteness of t e 1uestions a"out t e nu*"er of good friends or t e e&pansion of t e state, "ut ot er factors=for e&a*ple, t e nature of our ai* in seeking nu*erous friends.@6A <o,ever, in so*e cases 1uestions *ay "e difficult to ans,er or *ay ad*it only of ine&act or indefinite ans,ers "ecause t ey are a"out or *ake reference to t ings t at are t e*selves ine&act or indefinite. ' ey are a"out t ings t at are difficult to define or , ose nature and definition 5 69F 5 are ine&act or indefinite. 8&a*ples of suc t ings, Aristotle clai*s, are gentleness, irasci"ility, "eing c oice,ort y, or "eing a person , o /okes ,ell. -or suc t ings e& i"it not only variation, "ut t ey are

also not definite or ,ell defined, and as a conse1uence t ey cannot "e defined easily or e&actly >H.#, H.4, H.%, H.E?. ' e situation, Aristotle clai*s, is t e sa*e ,it t e nature of friends ip or of t e city, for t ey also include so*e factors t at see* to "e indefinite >H.H, H.11?. But , at precisely is pro"le*atic ,it t e nature of *atters of conduct or ,it t e definitions t at ai* at capturing suc natures; )t is te*pting to suppose in t is conte&t t at , at Aristotle finds pro"le*atic ,it t e definitions of *atters of conduct is , at -riedric 2ais*ann as called t e open te&ture of our concepts@#A )n is ,ellBkno,n paper, 2ais*ann argues t at *ost concepts are al*ost totally indefinite or indeter*inate as to , at decisions one ,ould *ake in applying t e* or t e ter*s of t e language t at signify t e*, if t e t ings to , ic one nor*ally applies t ese concepts or ter*s ,ere to c ange drastically. 2 at ,ould one say, for e&a*ple, if a cat gradually gre, to "e si& feet tail or a s,allo, slo,ly reac ed t e si9e of an ostric ; ' ere are clearly pro"le*s ere, for alt oug a concept *ay ave ,ellBdefined "oundaries in relation to so*e conditions, it *ay ave illBdefined ones or even no "oundaries at all in relation to ot ers. )s Aristotle.s pro"le* t at of t e open te&ture of our concepts; ) t ink not. -or ,e see t at Aristotle is not really concerned ,it t e e&traordinary situations 2ais*ann is concerned ,it =t e situations a"out , ic our concepts see* to fail to give any definite ans,ers.@4A Aristotle.s pro"le* presu*a"ly arises even , en t e circu*stances are ordinary=it is t e ordinary cases of gentleness or irasci"ility t at are pro"le*atic. )n a ,ay, it is o"vious t at it could not "e t e c aracteristic of open te&ture t at pu99les Aristotle, for t e latter is only a for*al feature4 it is a feature of concepts. -or 2ais*ann is not suggesting t at t ings t e*selves possess open te&ture=a cat or a s,allo, is a rat er ,ellBdefined t ing=and it is per aps "ecause t ey are so t at t e concepts of t ese t ings are indefinite in relation to 2ais*ann.s e&traordinary conditions t at alt oug possi"le, do not o"tain. )f cats ,ere to "egin to regularly undergo rat er drastic c anges of t e kind 2ais*ann descri"es, t en per aps so*e conceptual decisions ,ould ave to "e *ade. ' us, so*e ne, conditions ,ould ave to "e incorporated into t e concept cat in t e sa*e ,ay so*e features are part of t e present concept, conditions t at give rat er definite ans,ers in nor*al circu*stances. But , atever it is t at Aristotle considers to "e pro"le*atic, it is as *uc a *aterial feature as it is a for*al one=it is as *uc a de re c aracteristic as it is a de dicto one. )ndeed, for Aristotle it is pri*arily a de re feature. Aristotle.s concerns see* to "e pri*arily a"out t e vagueness or inB 5 69H 5 definiteness of *atters of conduct. :f course not everyone accepts t e vie, t at vagueness or indefiniteness is a *aterial or de re feature. -rege.s denial of t e e&istence of vague o"/ects, aptly captured in is fa*ous re*ark G) confess t at ) ave not yet seen an indeter*inate pea,G is per aps t e *ost ,ell kno,n.@%A But *any ot ers ave recently argued in support of -rege.s positions, for e&a*ple, 8vans, Iat an +al*on, Peter Unger, and +a*uel C. 2 eeler.@EA ' e last t,o p ilosop ers ave in fact denied t at *any ordinary o"/ects=for e&a*ple, ta"les, c airs, tall people=e&ist at all, since t e predicates Gta"le,G Gc air,G or Gtall personG are vague and t erefore true of not ing. ' us, 2 eeler ,rites, :n reflection t oug , t e propertyBsorites argu*ent s ould convince one t at t e only o"/ects t at e&ist are ones ,it a precise essence. :nly precise essences can constitute t e "eing of a genuine logical su"/ect or of real properties of logical su"/ects. And o"/ects ,it precise essences see* to e&clude persons, ta"les, c airs, etc.@FA -rege, o,ever, ,ent a step furt er. Iot only did e deny vague o"/ects "ut also vague concepts: ' e concept *ust ave a s arp "oundary. . . . 'o a concept ,it out a s arp "oundary t ere

,ould correspond an area t at ad not a s arp "oundaryBline all round, "ut in places /ust vaguely faded a,ay into t e "ackground. ' is ,ould not really "e an area at all4 and like,ise a concept t at is not s arply defined is ,rongly ter*ed a concept. +uc 1uasiB conceptual constructions cannot "e recogni9ed as concepts "y logic.@HA But ot ers ave concluded t at, contrary to , at -rege says, at least all e*pirical concepts are vague or Gloose.G@9A ) cannot o,ever discuss ere t ese differing vie,s on t e nature or e&istence of vague o"/ects or concepts. ' e concern is ,it , at Aristotle says, and it is 1uite clear fro* t e re*arks 1uoted at t e very "eginning of t is c apter t at e takes so*e o"/ects and concepts to "e ine&act "y "eing vague or indefinite. +o Aristotle argues t at it is difficult to fi& ,it any precision t e various factors involved in t e definition or nature of t e virtue of gentleness: for e&a*ple, in , at *anner and ,it , at people and on , at sort of grounds and o, long one oug t to "e angry >H.#?. ' is is as good an e&a*ple of a vague or indefinite o"/ect or concept as any. )t is not very different fro* t e e&a*ples of G eapG or G"aldG t at p ilosop ers often appeal to in t is connection. )n t e case of eaps one cannot fi& t e nu*"er of grains re1uired for aving a eap and any li*it one c ooses as defining t e concept heap is s o,n not to "e t e li*it "y t e fact t at s*all additions to or su"tractions fro* t e li*it do not *ake t e concept inapplica"le. :ne cannot fi& t e various factors t at constitute t e essential nature of t e virtue of gentleness, and alt oug at ti*es persons err on eit er side of , atever one takes to "e t e li*it, t ey *ay 5 699 5 nonet eless "e praised as doing t e virtuous t ing. ' e concept gentleness is still applica"le. ' e deviation fro* t e li*it *ust "e ,ide in order for one to notice it and "la*e t e person >H.#, H.%?. +i*ilarly, Aristotle argues t at t e nature of friends ip and our concept friendship are indefinite. ' ere is no e&act point up to , ic people differing in *erit can still "e friends. )t is kno,n, Aristotle argues, t at t e difference in *erit "et,een u*ans and Gods e&cludes t e possi"ility t at t e Gods are our friends. But leaving t e Gods aside, t e li*it, if t ere is one, is indefinite: (uc can "e taken a,ay fro* t e *erit of persons , o are friends, "ut t e friends ip still re*ains >H.H?. ' e essence of friends ip is vague or indefinite. :ne.s concept or account of it is also, according to Aristotle, ine&act or indefinite: )t cannot specify an e&act point up to , ic people , o differ in *erit can "e friends. ' e sa*e is true, according to Aristotle, ,it t e city or t e concept city : t e nu*"er of people re1uired for *aking a city is not any particular nu*"er, "ut any nu*"er "et,een certain li*its >H.11?. Presu*a"ly, t e situation is si*ilar ,it t e nature of t e c oice,ort y >H.4? and /oking ,ell >H.E?. But are t e t ings ,e /ust *entioned a"ove t e only *atters of conduct t at e& i"it indefiniteness or variation; 2 at, according to Aristotle, is t e scope of t ese types of ine&actness; Alt oug e does not state e&plicitly is vie, on t is *atter, , at Aristotle says in t e re*arks 1uoted a"ove suggests t at e takes all *atters of conduct as ,ell as o"/ects of perception to "e c aracteri9ed "y t ese types of ine&actness. ' us e tells us t at all t e no"le and /ust t ings e& i"it *uc variation >H.1?, t at t e su"/ect *atter of et ics and *atters of ealt ave not ing fi&ed a"out t e* >H.6?. Again, Aristotle.s re*inder in H.1$ of t e correspondence "et,een t e definiteness of *atters of conduct and of t e accounts of t e* suggests t at e takes all *atters of conduct >at least e*otions and actions? to "e lacking in definiteness. )ndeed, is clai* in H.# t at Gnot ing percepti"le is @easily definedAG i*plies t at t e scope of t ese types of ine&actness is indeed very ,ide. <e certainly does not identify any *atters of conduct or any accounts of t e* t at are not su"/ect to variation or indefiniteness. 3oes Aristotle in t ese re*arks assert t at definitions of *atters of conduct are altoget er i*possi"le;

<e does not do so outrig tly. (ost often is concern is to point to t e difficulties in giving a definition or giving an e&act definition. )n H.#, H.4, and H.% Aristotle repeats "y using t e sa*e p rase t at *atters of conduct are not easy to define >

?. )n H.H and H.9 is ai* is to point out t at e&act definitions of *atters of conduct are difficult or i*possi"le. )n H.1$ e re*inds us of t e congruence t esis, t at t e e&actness of our definitions *ust correspond to t e e&actness of *atters of conduct, clearly i*plying t at t e accounts *ust "e ine&act since t e su"/ect *atter is ine&act. Aristotle does 5 #$$ 5 not assert t at no definitions are possi"le. ' e closest e co*es to suggesting t e i*possi"ility of definitions is in H.6 , ere e says t at so*e particular *atters of conduct co*e under no art or science. 8ven ere , at Aristotle *eans to say is t at t e accounts of t ese rat er particular t ings are so ine&act t at one as to rely on t e particular circu*stances of eac occasion, "ut to say t is is not to say t at definitions are not possi"le. )t is clearly not to say t at no definitions of anyt ing at all are possi"le.

Aristotle's Target
' e i*portance of Aristotle.s clai*s a"out t e supposed indefiniteness of t e ele*ents of conduct and of our concepts or accounts of t e* can "est "e seen , en vie,ed against +ocrates. and Plato.s position on t ese *atters as ,ell as Aristotle.s o,n position on essence and essential definitions. -or to deny t at p eno*ena suc as friends ip, gentleness, or irasci"ility, and in general all or *ost *atters of conduct, e& i"it a fi&ed essential structure or pattern is to deny , at +ocrates and Plato presuppose in t eir searc for definitions or accounts of suc p eno*ena. As seen earlier >c ap. 6?, t ey presuppose t at all *e*"ers of a kind s are t e identical essential structure or pattern, t at suc a structure or pattern does not c ange fro* one *e*"er or instance of t e kind to t e ne&t, and t at it does not e& i"it any variation "ut is instead fi&ed and ,ell defined. ' us, +ocrates and Plato clai* t at piety is t e sa*e in all cases and identical ,it itself, and of course t e sa*e is true of i*piety >Euthyphro ?4 courage is t e sa*e in all its instances >(aches ? and so is friends ip >(ysis ?4 and t e -or* of or , at it is to "e a virtue, *an, figure, "ee, and so fort is t e sa*e in all t e instances of eac one of t ese kinds. Bees or figures *ay vary in *any ,ays fro* instance to instance, "ut t ey do not, according to +ocrates, vary in t ose factors t at *ake t e* instances of "ees or figures4 t e essential structure of t e kind 6ee or <igure re*ains fi&ed and identical to itself. ' e -or* is al,ays t e sa*e. )t ,as also seen earlier t at Aristotle i*self e*"races essentialis*. ' e *e*"ers of a kind e& i"it, according to i*, t e sa*e essence. <u*ans do not differ a*ong t e*selves ,it respect to "eing u*an, t at is, ,it respect to t eir essence, nor do triangles differ ,it respect to "eing triangles. )t is suc fi&ed and invaria"le essences t at Aristotelian definitions supposedly capture, and it is essential definitions t at partly for* t e Aristotelian conception of de*onstrative kno,ledge. +trict essentialis* and t e conception of definition as capturing t e essence of a kind go and in and in +ocrates., Plato.s, and Aristotle.s conceptions of kno,ledge. )ndeed, in so*e of is logical ,orks , ere Aristotle is concerned ,it 5 #$1 5

t e nature of definition, e e&tends strict essentialis* to al*ost everyt ing. <e even e&tends it to t e sorts of t ings t at e else, ere vie,s as lacking a fi&ed essential structure or as e& i"iting *uc variation. ' ings, for instance, like avariciousness, a*"ition, incontinence, ,ind, or nig t are t oug t of as e& i"iting ,ellBdefined essential structures , ose differentiae *ust "e precisely captured in t eir respective definitions. ' us: 2.&9 Cases occur , en one as failed to define t e 1uantity or 1uality or place, or t e ot er differentiae , ic are involved, for e&a*ple, , at is t e 1uality and 1uantity of t e onour , ic e desires t at *akes a *an a*"itious4 for all *en desire onour, and so it is not enoug to say t at t e *an , o desires onour is a*"itious, "ut t e a"oveB *entioned differentiae *ust "e added. +i*ilarly, too, ,e *ust state , at 1uantity of *oney , ic e desires *akes a *an avaricious and , at 1uality of pleasures , ic e desires *akes a *an incontinent4 for a *an is not called incontinent , o is t e slave of any kind of pleasure , atsoever, "ut only if e is t e slave of a particular kind. :r, again, , en people define nig t as a s ado, over t e eart , or an eart 1uake as *ove*ent of t e eart , or cloud as condensation of air, or ,ind as *ove*ent of t e air, t e 1uality and 1uantity and cause *ust "e added. And, si*ilarly, in all cases of t is kind4 for t e o*ission of any differentia , atever involves a failure to state t e essence. >#op. &93b%;7

)s it possi"le to o"tain t e kind of definitions Aristotle descri"es a"ove in t e case of a*"ition, avariciousness, incontinence, ,ind, and so fort ; Can one fi& t e differentiae in eac case in t e ,ay Aristotle t inks is necessary in order to ave a definition; Alt oug it *ay "e possi"le to identify ,it so*e degree of e&actness t e type of pleasures t at are essential to incontinence=Aristotle argues in t e N.E. t at t e relevant pleasures are "odily ones=it is not o"vious t at one can specify ,it any degree of e&actness t e /uantity , for t e 1uantity is likely to vary as t at of anger varies in t e case of gentleness, and in neit er case is t ere an o"vious fi&ed point , ere gentleness or incontinence "egins or ends. 2 ere does ,ind or nig t "egin or end e&actly; +i*ilarly, it is not at all o"vious t at one can specify in t e ,ay Aristotle appears to ,ant t e 1uality and 1uantity of onor or ,ealt t at are necessary to *ake a person a*"itious or avaricious, for t ese are precisely t e type of p eno*ena , ic in t e N.E. Aristotle considers to "e ine&act "y "eing indefinite and "y e& i"iting variation, "y lacking a fi&ed essential pattern or structure t at is identical in all cases. +o t e 1uantity or 1uality of onor ,ill vary and t erefore ,ill not "e t e sa*e in all t e instances of a*"ition, and so ,ill "e t e 1uantity and 1uality of ,ealt in t e instances of avariciousness. ' ere is no e&act point in t e 1uantity of onor or ,ealt , ere a*"ition or avariciousness "egins or ends. 'o deny invaria"ility or a fi&ed and ,ellBdefined pattern or structure 5 #$6 5 to *atters of conduct is to undercut t e strict essentialis* t at +ocrates, Plato, and at ti*es Aristotle i*self see* to de*and of everyt ing. -or in t e case of so*e kinds of t ings t ere is per aps no ,ellB defined structure. And t ere *ay not "e strictly identical conditions or differentiae t at are to "e found in all t e instances of a group of t ings or p eno*ena t at nonet eless fall in t e sa*e class or are *e*"ers of t e sa*e kind. +o*e of t e differentiae could "e identical in all instances of a kind, "ut t ere could "e cases , ere none is. Aristotle t inks t at in t e case of so*e differentiae of certain kinds, t e variation in t e 1uantity, 1uality, i*portance, and so fort can "e e&tre*e. Iot all instances

of friends ip need e& i"it t e identical conditions and it ,ould t erefore "e a *istake to insist t at friends ip is nonet eless t e sa*e in every instance or is, as +ocrates insists, t e sa*e ,it itself. )s Aristotle in t is conte&t pointing to , at 2ittgenstein as c aracteri9ed as fa*ily rese*"lances a*ong t ings or p eno*ena , ic fall under t e sa*e class or concept "ut nonet eless lack a strictly identical essence of t e kind +ocrates, Plato, and Aristotle at ti*es de*and; ' e p eno*ena or t ings t at Aristotle descri"es and t e ,ay e descri"es t e* *ake 1uite appropriate e&a*ples of t ings t at e& i"it t e logical features , ic 2ittgenstein as identified. (atters of conduct, according to Aristotle, e& i"it *uc variation in t eir structure and t ey lack t e kind of fi&ed and ,ellBdefined nature t at +ocrates, Plato, as ,ell as i*self, often assign to t e*. )f t e a"ove interpretation captures t e *eaning of Aristotle.s re*arks 1uoted earlier, t en Aristotle t oug t t at *atters of conduct are ine&act not only "ecause so*e or all of t eir nonessential properties fluctuate or are for t e *ost part "ut also "ecause t ey are indefinite in t eir essential structure or nature. ' erefore, even t eir essential features, eit er all or so*e, ,ill fluctuate or ,ill "e for t e *ost part: ' e level of anger or onor ,ill not "e t e sa*e in every instance of gentleness or a*"ition, nor t e difference in *erit "et,een friends in every instance of friends ip. Conse1uently, not only ,ill general state*ents attri"uting so*e property to a kind "e ine&act "y fluctuating or "y "eing true for t e *ost part, "ut also t e definitions of so*e or all *atters of conduct ,ill "e ine&act in t e sa*e ,ay. -or e&a*ple, t e "est definition ,e could give of gentleness ,ill presu*a"ly apply to *ost instances of it, for t ere ,ill "e so*e instances t at deviate fro* suc a definition. ' us, t e +ocratic t esis concerning t e universality of trut of definitions cannot "e *et "y so*e or all definitions of *atters of conduct. All or so*e of our definitions in et ics ,ill "e defeasi"le or indefinite, reflecting presu*a"ly t e ine&actness of t e su"/ect *atter of t e discipline. 0e/ecting t e +ocratic t esis concerning t e trut of definitions, or accepting t at essential attri"utes of a kind *ay fluctuate or "elong to it for t e *ost part, as so*e un,elco*e conse1uences for Aristotle. -or 5 #$# 5 e also assu*es t at "eing for t e *ost part i*plies "eing contingent, and t ese t,o clai*s i*ply t at so*e of t e essential attri"utes of a kind ,ill "e contingent. But t is runs counter to t e ,ellBkno,n Aristotelian t esis t at essential attri"utes are necessary attri"utes. Consider, for e&a*ple, t e case of t e virtue of gentleness. ' e definition of t is virtue, like t at of any ot er virtue, ,ill include, according to Aristotle, t e essential attri"ute of "eing a disposition >its genus?. )f Aristotle is correct in clai*ing t at t is is t e genus of virtue, t en it ,ill "e necessarily true of all t e virtues. But , en ,e atte*pt to specify t e *ean in relation to anger t at, according to Aristotle, gives t e specific differentia of gentleness, t e features of ine&actness Aristotle attri"utes to so*e *atters of conduct co*e into play. Any one specification of t e *ean ,ill, according to Aristotle, "e defeasi"le4 t ere ,ill "e cases of gentleness t at are not instances of t e *ean as specified in our definition. +o one *ig t say t at given any e&act specification of t e *ean, it is possi"le t at so*et ing is an instance of gentleness and not an instance of t e specified *ean, or t at it is not necessary in order for so*et ing to "e an instance of gentleness t at it *eets t is e&act specification of t e *ean. Given t e kind of indefiniteness Aristotle attri"utes to gentleness, it see*s t at no e&act specification of t e *ean ,ill capture anyt ing t at "elongs to gentleness necessarily. Per aps Aristotle can save is strict *etap ysical essentialis* "y avoiding an e&act specification of t e *ean and "y giving instead only t e upper and lo,er li*its of t e a*ount of anger ,it in , ic all t e instances of gentleness fall, so one could say t at it is necessary t at every instance of gentleness e& i"its an a*ount of anger t at falls "et,een t ese li*its. ' is *ay "e one of t e reasons , y Aristotle, , ile

recogni9ing t at suc li*its are difficult or i*possi"le to fi&, insists at ti*es t at ,e need to specify suc li*its. As ) argued in previous c apters, definitions ave a central place in t e t oug t of +ocrates, Plato, and Aristotle. ' ese t inkers assign to definitions several i*portant roles, and t erefore t e 1uestion naturally arises , et er definitions t at supposedly are as ine&act as Aristotle clai*s can play t e roles assigned to t e*. 3oes t e ine&actness Aristotle attri"utes to t e definitions of *atters of conduct ave any significant conse1uences; 3oes it affect t e episte*ic and practical uses t at are often assigned to t e*; ' ese are t e *atters ) ,is to e&a*ine ne&t.

$onse,uences of Indefiniteness or 3ariation

) ,ill "egin "y e&a*ining first t e i*plications t e ine&actness under consideration *ig t ave for t e diagnostic role of definitions. ) argued in c apter 6 t at t e +ocrates of Plato.s 8arly 3ialogues takes t e definition of a kind - to "e necessary and sufficient for deter*ining , et er so*e 5 #$4 5 particular is a *e*"er of t at kind, , et er it is an -. Alt oug Aristotle does not see* to take t is +ocraticBPlatonic t esis to "e universally true >as +ocrates and Plato do?, e argues t at a restricted version of it is true=at least ,it so*e *atters of conduct definitions are indispensa"le. ' ere *ust "e definitions, e clai*s, of t ose t ings a"out , ic t ere are disagree*ents or disputes: 2.&: But since it often appens t at a *an, , ile ad*itting t e fact, denies t e c arge or t e point on , ic it turns=for instance, ad*its t at e took so*et ing, "ut did not steal it4 t at e ,as t e first to strike, "ut co**itted no outrage4 t at e ad relations, "ut did not co**it adultery4 or t at e stole so*et ing "ut ,as not guilty of sacrilege, since t e o"/ect in 1uestion ,as not consecrated4 or t at e trespassed, "ut on pu"lic land4 or t at e co**unicated ,it t e ene*y, "ut ,as not guilty of treason=for t is reason it ,ill "e necessary to define @

A , at is t eft, outrage, or adultery, in order t at, if ,e desire to prove t at an offence as or as not "een co**itted, ,e *ay "e a"le to put t e case in its true lig t. >Rhet. &859a7 ' ere are several pro"le*s ,it accepting t e general +ocraticBPlatonic or even t e *ore restricted Aristotelian t esis t at t e definition of - is necessary and sufficient for kno,ing t at so*e particular is -. :ne *ay, for e&a*ple, deny t at kno,ledge of t e definition of - is re1uired for deter*ining , et er so*e & is -.@1$A :ne *ay argue t at e&plicit kno,ledge of t e definition of - is not re1uired, "ut only an i*plicit or tacit one,@11A or t at regardless of o, e&act our definition of - is, it is not sufficient for deter*ining t at any & is -.@16A ' e a"ove pro"le*s ,it t e +ocraticBPlatonic t esis regarding t e diagnostic use of definitions are not t e pro"le*s ) ,is to discuss ere, o,ever. -or t e concern is ,it , at follo,s ,it regard to t e use of definitions fro* Aristotle.s clai*s t at t e strict essentialis* of +ocrates, Plato, and at ti*es Aristotle i*self does not apply to so*e or all *atters of conduct, or t at definitions of suc *atters are ine&act. Jet us assu*e for t e *o*ent t at t e +ocraticBPlatonic t esis of t e diagnostic use of

definitions is correct: Dno,ledge of t e definition of - is "ot necessary and sufficient for deter*ining t at so*e particular is -. ' e pro"le* is ,it using definitions t at are ine&act or indefinite or defeasi"le for diagnostic purposes. )n t e e&tre*e case , ere no definitions at all are possi"le t ere ,ould, of course, "e not ing to serve t e diagnostic purposes +ocrates and Plato assign to definitions. )n t is sense, per aps, Aristotle.s clai*s a"out t e ine&actness of *atters of conduct can "e looked upon as "eing indirectly an argu*ent against t e general +ocraticBPlatonic t esis t at t e definition of - is necessary for deter*ining t at any & is -. -or if Aristotle ,ere to *ake t e rat er e&tre*e clai* t at no definition of - is at all possi"le 5 #$% 5 and t e clai* ,ere to "e correct, it ,ould ave provided i*, , en taken toget er ,it t e rat er noncontroversial assu*ption t at one kno,s t at so*e particular & is -, ,it an indirect argu*ent against t e +ocraticBPlatonic t esis t at t e definition of - is necessary for kno,ing t at & is -. )t is dou"tful, o,ever, t at Aristotle *akes suc an e&tre*e clai*, t at e denies t at definitions of *atters of conduct are possi"le at all. 8ven , ere definitions can, ,it t e associated difficulties Aristotle i*self *entions, "e attained, t ey could not function as diagnostic tools in t e ,ay +ocrates and Plato e&pect. -or consider t e +ocratic vie, of t e diagnostic use of definition t at is stated "y +ocrates in 6.#, , ere e says t at t e definition is to "e used as a *odel, as so*et ing "y , ic ,e ,ill G"e a"le to say t at anyt ing you @8ut yp roA or ot ers do t at is si*ilar to it is pious and t at , ic is not si*ilar ) @+ocratesA ,ill "e a"le to say t at it is not.G Consider also o, Plato ,is es to use t e -or*s or our accounts of t eir nature as *odels for *aking correct /udg*ents a"out t ings and for reali9ing t e proper political association >6.E, 6.F?. But if Aristotle is correct, if t e definition of so*e - is true only for t e *ost part, if it is defeasi"le, it could not "e a *eans, as +ocrates says it can "e, for deter*ining all t e t ings t at are -. ' ere ,ill "e t ings to , ic t e definition does not apply or, to use +ocrates. ,ay of putting it, t ere ,ill "e t ings t at do not agree ,it t e *odel of -, "ut , ic are -. Per aps, t en, one can say t at t e definition of - ,ill "e at "est useful for diagnostic purposes in *ost cases. But suppose, in addition, t at a definition is, as Aristotle clai*s, vague or indefinite. ' ere ,ill "e furt er pro"le*s , en one atte*pts to use suc a definition as a diagnostic tool. A definition t at does not single out a set of ,ellBdefined properties, a strict structure or essence, for a kind - ,ill not "e as effective a tool as +ocrates and Plato assu*e it ,ill "e for deter*ining t e *e*"ers ip of -. Consider, for instance, Aristotle.s account of gentleness in N.E. : GGentleness is t e o"servance of t e *ean in relation to anger . . . . Io, ,e praise a *an , o feels anger on t e rig t grounds and against t e rig t persons, and also in t e rig t *anner and t e rig t *o*ent and for t e rig t lengt of ti*e. <e *ay t en "e called gentleBte*pered, if ,e take gentleness to "e a praise,ort y 1ualityG >116%"6Eff.?. A definition suc as t e one Aristotle gives ere *ay ave its uses, and ) do not *ean to clai* t at it gives us no infor*ation a"out gentleness. :f course it does, "ut it is o"vious t at t is account of gentleness cannot "e t e *odel t at +ocrates and Plato e&pect it to "e for deter*ining , at is an instance of gentleness and , at is not. 2 en Aristotle finds it difficult to define t ings t at e& i"it variation or indefiniteness e argues t at decisions in suc t ings rests ,it perception >H.#, H.%?. ' us, e could "e construed as s ifting t e role +ocrates and Plato assign to t e definition of - >or to universal features? for kno,ing 5 #$E 5

t at so*e particulars are - to perception of t e particulars t e*selves. 7et t ere are undou"tedly pro"le*s ,it t e *ove of s ifting t e diagnostic role to perception. )n so*e cases perception *ay *ake t e difference "y revealing features t at one ad overlooked and , ic *ay very ,ell deter*ine , et er so*et ing is an instance of a particular kind=for e&a*ple, perception of t e particulars *ay "e sufficient for deter*ining t at a certain act of co**unicating ,it t e ene*y is or is not an instance of treason >H.%?. But t ere ,ill also "e pro"le*atic cases t at t e *ove of falling "ack on perception *ay not "e a"le to andle. )f t e p eno*ena e& i"it t e degree of variation or indefiniteness, if t ey lack an essential pattern to t e e&tent Aristotle at ti*es t inks t ey do, o, is one to decide t at so*et ing "elongs to a certain kind "y falling "ack on perception; -or , at are ,e supposed to perceive or recogni9e "y perceiving t e particulars; Iot t e essence of t e kind, for e&a*ple, of gentleness or friends ip, for t is is precisely , ere, according to Aristotle, t e pro"le*s lie. ' ere *ay "e cases, t en, , ere perception of t e particulars could "e as ineffective as indefinite, vague, or defeasi"le definitions can "e. )f one cannot *ake deter*inations ,it regard to eaps or "aldness "y falling "ack upon perception, o, likely is it t at one ,ill in t e case of gentleness, irasci"ility, a*"itiousness, and so fort ; ' e sa*e sorts of pro"le*s ,ill "e encountered if ,e ,ere to fall "ack upon perception as a *eans of arriving at definitions of t e kinds of t ings t at Aristotle finds difficult to define. Aristotle tends to t ink t at in t e act of perceiving t e particular ,e also co*e to kno, t e universal, t at alt oug ,e can distinguis t ese t,o ele*ents of cognition t ey are insepara"le in t e act of perception.@1#A ' us, t e *ove of relying on perception of so*e particular "elonging to a kind - as a *eans of arriving at t e definition of - *ig t ave appeared plausi"le to Aristotle, "ut if t e p eno*ena lack a ,ellBdefined nature or structure, it is not o"vious t at perception can "e of any elp in attaining definitions. -or if t ere are no ,ellBdefined "oundaries or t e "oundaries are too indefinite, one s ould not e&pect to find any or to find definite ones "y falling "ack on perception. Per aps, t en, one *ay ave to ad*it t at on so*e occasions one *ig t not "e a"le to discover a clear ans,er to t e 1uestion , et er so*et ing is an instance of a kind - or to produce an e&act definition of - t at supposedly e&plicates t e nature of -. Per aps one *ay ave to ad*it t at in so*e cases an ans,er or definition as to "e given and not discovered "y perception or any ot er *eans. A decision rat er t an a discovery as to "e *ade. ' us, Aristotle i*self argues in H.F t at , ere t ings are indeter*inate and no general la, can "e for*ulated to cover all cases a special ordinance "eco*es necessary. +i*ilarly, one *ay need to decide or set t e "oundaries or li*its t at Aristotle speaks of in t e case of concepts like friendship , 5 #$F 5 gentleness' irascibility , or city . But, as t e fa*iliar argu*ents a"out vague concepts or t ings fro* ancient ti*es to t e present ave s o,n, it is 1uite difficult to set suc "oundaries or li*its. Argu*ents suc as t ose of t e GsoritesG and GfalakrosG ave pointed out t at , ereas it is clear t at fifty t ousand grains *ake a eap or t at t e person ,it a t ousand airs is not "ald, fi&ing t e upper or lo,er li*its of suc concepts is pro"le*atic. As Aristotle points out in H.H, one can say t at if t e difference in *erit "et,een t,o persons is t at , ic e&ists "et,een Gods and u*ans t en t ese t,o persons cannot "e friends. ' e pro"le* is in fi&ing t e lo,er or upper li*its in t e difference of *erit ,it in , ic friends ip o"tains. As Aristotle says, in t e case of friends ip or gentleness or irasci"ility, t is is difficult or i*possi"le to do. ' ere is no o"vious "oundary in t e p eno*ena t e*selves, and if ,e ,ant or need a "oundary, ,e ,ill ave to decide on one.@14A 7et, alt oug Aristotle appears to recogni9e t e difficulties ,it fi&ing any li*its or "oundaries in t e case of vague or indefinite concepts and e i*self fails to provide any suc li*its or "oundaries for t e concepts or t ings e cites, it is o"vious t at e places *uc ,eig t in t e e&istence of suc li*its.

Per aps e as reasons for doing so. As recent p ilosop ers ave argued, vague concepts or o"/ects pose *any pro"le*s. 'o so*e, identity state*ents a"out vague o"/ects are pro"le*atic, for at least t e transitivity of identity appears to fail.@1%A But to ot ers t e pro"le*s of e*"racing vague o"/ects or concepts are even greater. 0ussell and -rege argued t at suc o"/ects or concepts violate t e la, of t e e&cluded *iddle, , ic according to t e* is indispensa"le to logic.@1EA <ence, t ey concluded t at if t e ,orld consists of vague o"/ects or is descri"ed "y vague concepts, t en logic cannot "e a"out t is ,orld. )n t e fa*ous ,ords of 0ussell, GAll traditional logic a"itually assu*es t at precise sy*"ols are "eing e*ployed. )t is t erefore not applica"le to t is terrestrial life, "ut only to an i*agined celestial e&istence.G@1FA Aristotle, as is ,ell kno,n, took t e la, of t e e&cluded *iddle and t e la, of noncontradiction to "e t e universal la,s of "eing and t oug t. )t is possi"le t at it is t is kind of assu*ption t at partly *otivates is insistence t at "oundaries or li*its need to "e given even for vague o"/ects or concepts. As it as "een argued recently, t e se*antics of is logical t eory al*ost rules out vague predicates. @1HA )f one ,ere successful in dra,ing a "oundary or in fi&ing a li*it for a vague concept, one ,ould ave at least *ade a step to,ard eli*inating its fu99y area t at as traditionally "een looked upon as posing pro"le*s for t e applica"ility of t e t,o la,s of classical logic. 2 et er t e li*its Aristotle insists upon are sufficient for resolving t e pro"le*s of trut associated ,it vague concepts is to "e e&a*ined later. But , at are t e i*plications of t e ine&actness under consideration 5 #$H 5 for t e de*onstrative use of definitions; As ) said earlier >c ap. 6?, Aristotle, like +ocrates and Plato "efore i*, assigns a central role to definitions in is conception of de*onstrative science or kno,ledge: 3efinitions are a*ong t e principles of de*onstration > ost. Anal . F6a61? and all sciences proceed t roug definitions > ost. Anal . 99a6#?. )f definitions are necessary ingredients of de*onstration and if t ere are do*ains consisting of t ings t at cannot "e defined, t en it ,ould see* t at no de*onstrations ,ould "e possi"le in suc do*ains. Aristotle.s *a/or concern ,it *atters of conduct is t at t ey are difficult and not necessarily i*possi"le to define on account of t eir supposed ine&actness, and t at t eir definitions are ine&act "y "eing true for t e *ost part or "y "eing indefinite or vague. ' e feature of "eing true for t e *ost part t at Aristotle attri"utes to definitions of *atters of conduct ,ould not pose pro"le*s ,it regard to t e de*onstrative use of suc definitions t at are any different fro* t e ones discussed in t e previous c apter. 3efinitions of *atters of conduct ,ill function as pre*ises of de*onstrations of t e less rigorous, softer, or ,eaker type. ' e feature of indefiniteness or vagueness t at Aristotle attri"utes to definitions of *atters of conduct *ay ave different, as ,ell as *ore pro"le*atic, conse1uences ,it regard to t eir de*onstrative uses, o,ever. )f 0ussell and -rege are rig t, traditional logic is not applica"le to vague o"/ects >terrestrial life? or to propositions using i*precise sy*"ols "ut only to an i*agined celestial e&istence or propositions t at use only precise sy*"ols. ' e pro"le*, according to t ese p ilosop ers, ,it atte*pting to apply traditional logic to a vague ,orld or to propositions using i*precise sy*"ols is t at validity as no place in reasoning a"out suc a ,orld or ,it suc propositions. ' ere is no evidence, o,ever, t at Aristotle dre, t e conclusion t at 0ussell and -rege dre,. Alt oug e recogni9es vague or indefinite o"/ects, e does not deny t at ,e can reason a"out t e* or t at de*onstrative inferences are possi"le in t eir case. <is concern is *ost often to re*ind us of t e ine&actness of certain t ings and our accounts of t e*, to re*ind us of t e deficiencies of our inferences, rat er t an to deny t at ,e

can *ake inferences.@19A Per aps e *ig t ave t oug t t at one can avoid t e conclusion t at -rege and 0ussell dre, "y assu*ing t at "oundaries or li*its can "e dra,n so*e, ere.

'liminating Indefiniteness or 3ariation

As ) said earlier, one cannot assu*e t at "ecause so*e accounts or descriptions of a certain do*ain are ine&act, ine&actness cannot "e eli*inated fro* t e*, or different accounts cannot "e given t at are e&act or at least t at are *ore e&act t an t e original ones. Can t e ine&actness under consideration ere "e eli*inated fro* t e accounts of *atters of conduct 5 #$9 5 or can it at least "e reduced; ' e last possi"ility is of i*portance given Aristotle.s clai* t at nature or natural p eno*ena are, as *atters of conduct presu*a"ly are, c aracteri9ed "y t e sa*e kinds of ine&actness. )f accounts of ot er do*ains t at are su"/ect to t e sa*e kinds of ine&actness can ac ieve a reasona"le level of e&actness, , y not t ose a"out t e do*ain consisting of *atters of conduct; Can t e tec ni1ues t at are elpful in reducing t e ine&actness of accounts of "iological p eno*ena, for e&a*ple, "e useful for reducing ine&actness in t e case of et ical accounts; ) gave so*e evidence a"ove t at Aristotle takes t e features of variation and indefiniteness to c aracteri9e so*e natural p eno*ena=for e&a*ple, e t inks t at t e periods of generation and gestation in *any ani*als e& i"it *uc variation and cannot "e accurately fi&ed. ' ese e&a*ples are not isolated instances, o,ever. ' e e&tent of t ese kinds of ine&actBness in t e order of nature is, according to Aristotle, considera"le: 2.&3 ' e Ascidians differ very little in t eir nature fro* plants, "ut t ey are *ore akin to ani*als t an t e +ponges are, , ic are co*pletely plants. Iature passes in a continuous gradation @

A fro* lifeless t ings to ani*als, and on t e ,ay t ere are living t ings , ic are not actually ani*als, ,it t e result t at one class is so close to t e ne&t t at t e difference see*s infinitesi*al. Io, a sponge, as ) said /ust no,, is in all respects like a plant: it lives only , ile it is gro,ing on to so*et ing, and , en it is pulled off it dies. 2 at are called <olot uria and t e +eaBlungs and ot er si*ilar seaBani*als differ only slig tly fro* t e sponges in "eing unattac ed. ' ey ave no po,er of sensation, "ut t ey live /ust as if t ey ,ere plants unattac ed to soil. . . . +o*eti*es it is dou"tful , et er t ese Ascidians and any ot er suc group of creatures oug t to "e classed as plants or as ani*als: )n so far as t ey live only "y gro,ing on to so*e ot er o"/ect t ey approac t e status of a plant4 "ut yet t ey ave so*e fles y su"stances and t erefore pro"a"ly are capa"le of sensation of a kind. > .A.32&al%7 Iature, according to Aristotle, as no s arp or clear "oundaries: G)t passes in a continuous gradation fro* lifeless t ings to ani*als.G )t is difficult or even i*possi"le to deter*ine e&actly , ere plants end and ani*als "egin or , et er t e sponge and t e Ascidians are plants or ani*als. Concerning t e sponge, Aristotle, despite is clai* a"ove t at it is in all respects like a plant, cannot deter*ine to is satisfaction , et er it is a plant or an ani*al. )n H.A. >%4H"1$? e reports t e co**on disputes as to , et er sponges ave sensation, "ut e goes on to argue t at t ey do ave sensation and t erefore are

ani*als >%49aH, 4HF"1$?. ' ere are *any groups of ani*als t at, according to Aristotle, Gduali9eG4 t ey straddle t e divisions of plants and ani*als "y Ginclining to,ards t e plants on one side and t e ani*als on t e ot erG > .A. EH1"#?. A*ong t ese Aristotle includes t e knides, seaBane*ones, starfis , and testacea > .A. EH1"1$?. 5 #1$ 5 :t er ani*als Gduali9eG ,it respect to different divisions: for e&a*ple, t e er*itBcra" "et,een t e crustacea and testacea >H.A. %69E64?, t e pig "et,een solidB oofed and clovenB oofed >H.A. 499"16, "61?, t e ape "et,een *an and 1uadrupeds >H.A. %$6a1E? or "et,een "iped and 1uadruped > .A. EH9E#6?, t e ostric "et,een "ird and 1uadruped > .A. E9F"14?. ) s ould add to t e a"ove list t e p eno*ena Aristotle lists in t e passage fro* t e #op. 1uoted a"ove >H.14?, for e&a*ple, nig t, s ado,, eart 1uake, cloud, and ,ind. -or t ese are, again, t ings t at lack definite or clear "oundaries. ' e sa*e is true ,it t e p eno*ena of eclipse, t under, or deciduousness t at Aristotle discusses in t e ost. Anal. >9#a6$, 9H"?. Again, t roug out t e "iological treatises Aristotle speaks of t e e&tensive variation t at e&ists in *ost ani*al c aracteristics. ' us, t ere is considera"le variation in t e parts of ani*als=for e&a*ple, t ere are *any differences in t e lung > .A. EE9a6%?, ears vary considera"ly fro* one species to t e ot er >H.A. 496a6%?, so does air >%1F"1$?, t e ead and t e neck >49F"1%?, t e reproductive organs >%$$E6$?, t e teet >%$1aH?, t e *out >%$6aE?, t e tongue in "irds >%$4a#%?, and in general all internal parts >%$9a6F?. ' e a"ove e&a*ples of natural p eno*ena t at presu*a"ly e& i"it variation or indefiniteness s o, t e e&tent to , ic nature is, according to Aristotle, ine&act. 0ecogni9ing t is is i*portant for t e purpose of co*paring o, e deals ,it t e supposed ine&actness of t e do*ain of nature and t at of *atters of conduct. Consider, for instance, Aristotle.s treat*ent of t e p eno*ena of eclipse, t under, and deciduousness in t e ost. Anal. <e first proposes in t at treatise t e follo,ing definitions of t e*: G' under is a noise in t e clouds,G G8clipse is a privation of lig t,G and G3eciduousness is leafB s eddingG >9#a6$, 9H"?. ' ese 1uasiBconceptual or ver"al definitions reflect *ost clearly t e vagueness or inBdefiniteness ,e tend to associate ,it t ese p eno*ena. -or , at 1uality or 1uantity of noise, privation of lig t, or leafBs edding constitutes t ese p eno*ena; Iot every noise in t e sky is t under, or every privation of lig t an eclipse, and t ere is difficulty in fi&ing, as Aristotle ,ould say, t e e&act differentiae of t ese p eno*ena. 8ven deciduousness, , ic as often "een taken as "eing reasona"ly ,ell defined, is pro"le*atic. Iot all types or 1uantities of leafBs edding are cases of deciduousness. )s a tree t at s eds its leaves in t e spring=for e&a*ple, Erythrina caffra =deciduous; :r is one t at s eds its leaves "ut replaces t e* si*ultaneously or al*ost si*ultaneously; ' e differentiae t ese sorts of definitions use cannot "e fi&ed precisely. ' e vagueness of t ese ver"al definitions can per aps "e reduced or eli*inated "y replacing t e* ,it definitions t at state t e causes of t e 5 #11 5 relevant p eno*ena. +uc a *ove is 1uite fa*iliar to Aristotle. <e offers t e follo,ing causal definitions of t ese sa*e p eno*ena: G8clipse @of t e *oonA is t e o"struction "y t e eart of t e *oon.s lig t,G G' under is an e&tinction of fire in a cloud,G G3eciduousness is t e coagulation of t e sap at t e /unction of t e leafBstalkG >9#"%B1$, 99a69?. ' e advantage of suc causal definitions is t at t ey succeed to so*e e&tent in *oving a,ay fro* ter*s or concepts t at see* to "e in erently loose, vague, or indefinite. ' us, "y defining t under as t e e&tinction of fire in a cloud, one avoids t e

looseness or vagueness of t e ter* Gnoise,G "ut pro"le*s still re*ain. -or even t is definition uses t e ter* Gcloud,G , ic is, like G,indG or Gnig tG or Gs ado,,G vague or indefinite. ' e sa*e is per aps true ,it t e ot er causal definitions Aristotle gives, and pro"a"ly is true ,it any causal definition. Aristotle is, of course, ready to ad*it t at no o"/ect of perception can "e defined e&actly or t at t ose disciplines dealing ,it t ings as in ering in *atter are less e&act t an t ose t at deal ,it t ings as not in ering in *atter.@6$A 7et t e causal definitions Aristotle gives are less ine&act t an t e ver"al ones. Again, in dealing ,it t e considera"le variation of t e do*ain of nature, Aristotle.s strategy is to offer definitions t at ai* at leaving "e ind suc variation or differences. )n defining t e parts of ani*als, for e&a*ple, e opts al,ays for a functional definition of a part. ' us, despite t e differences or variation in t e lungs of ani*als=t ey can "e s*all, large, spongy, dry, full of "lood, "loodless, and so fort = t e lung is si*ply t e organ of "reat ing > .A. EE9a1%? or it is t at , ose function is al,ays "reat ing >EE9"H?. Aristotle succeeds in t is ,ay in "ypassing, so to speak, t e variations , ic natural p eno*ena e& i"it4 e succeeds in *oving to a level of generality or a"straction t at is al*ost free of t e pro"le*s e attri"utes to t e p eno*ena. Iaturally, t e 1uestion arises , y Aristotle.s strategies for dealing ,it vagueness or variation in t e do*ain of nature cannot "e applied to *atters of conduct. :ne *ay concede to Aristotle t at t e accounts of *atters of conduct cannot "e as e&act as t ose of *at e*atical o"/ects, "ut go on to argue t at if our accounts of *atters of conduct could "e *ade as e&act as t ose of t e disciplines studying t e order of nature, it ,ill "e sufficient. 2 y do t e pro"le*s of vagueness or variation not concern Aristotle as *uc in relation to t e study of t e order of nature as t ey do in relation to t e study of *atters of conduct; Are t ere reasons for t inking t at our accounts of t e do*ain of et ics *ust "e *ore ine&act t an t ose of t e do*ain of t e disciplines studying nature; :ne *ay, for e&a*ple, argue t at *atters of conduct e& i"it t ese types of ine&actness to a *uc greater degree t an natural p eno*ena do. Alt oug t is is "y no *eans o"vious, t ere *ay "e reasons for taking it seriously. -or a considera"le co*ponent of t e do*ain of conduct consists 5 #16 5 of t e various virtues and vices, , ic , according to Aristotle, are dispositions or states of c aracter, or so*et ing akin to t ese. But dispositions ave al,ays "een considered to "e paradig*s of indefiniteness or vagueness. )f t is assu*ption is correct, it is not surprising t at Aristotle.s efforts to give ade1uate definitions of gentleness, li"erality, irasci"ility, a*"itiousness, and so fort produce little in ter*s of e&act definitions. )t is also not surprising t at e co*es to t e conclusion t at suc ele*ents of conduct cannot "e defined e&actly. <o,ever, not all ele*ents of conduct are dispositions. Aristotle clai*s t at appiness, t e good, and pleasure are not. Also, nature itself includes *any dispositions, and one *ust not forget p eno*ena suc as ,ind, nig t, s ado,, eaps, and so fort . 8ven if *atters of conduct ,ere to "e ine&act to a greater degree t an natural p eno*ena are, it is not clear , y t e ine&actness in t e accounts given of t e for*er cannot "e reduced in t e ,ay it can in t e accounts given of t e latter. )t is not o"vious, t at is, t at t ere is a pro"le* in applying, for e&a*ple, Aristotle.s strategy of replacing ver"al definitions ,it causalBe&planatory ones in t e case of *atters of conduct. :ne *ay, for instance, succeed in reducing t e ine&actness of our account of gentleness "y *oving fro* a ver"al definition of it to a causal one as Aristotle does in t e case of t under. ' us, Aristotle gives a causalBe&planatory definition of fear: G-ear is a process of cooling produced t roug scantiness of "lood and insufficiency of eatG > .A. E96a6#?. ' is definition can "e used, in turn, to give a causalBe&planatory account of co,ardice t at *ay avoid so*e of t e indefiniteness of a ver"al

definition of it: G' ose @ani*alsA, o,ever, t at ave e&cessively ,atery "lood are so*e, at co,ardly. ' is is "ecause ,ater is congealed "y cold4 and coldness also acco*panies fear4 t erefore in t ose creatures , ose eart contains a predo*inantly ,atery "lend, t e ,ay is already prepared for a co,ardly dispositionG > .A. E%$"6F?. 8lse, ere Aristotle associates fear, co,ardice, and courage in an ani*al ,it t e si9e of its eart, "ut again t e causal or e&planatory *ec anis* is t at of eat: G' ose @ani*alsA ,it a large eart are co,ardly, t ose ,it s*all or *oderateBsi9ed ones, courageous >t is is "ecause in t e for*er class t e affection , ic is nor*ally produced "y fear is present to "egin ,it , as t eir eat is not proportionate to t e si9e of t e eart, "ut is s*all and t erefore ardly noticea"le in t e enor*ous space t at it occupies4 so t at t eir "lood is co*paratively cold?G >EEFa1%?.@61A ) do not *ean to suggest t at all causalBe&planatory accounts ave to "e like t e ones Aristotle gives of fear, co,ardice, or courage=t at is, p ysicalistic. Aristotle.s strategy of replacing ver"al definitions ,it causalBe&planatory ones does not specify t at definitions of t e latter type *ust "e in p ysicalistic ter*s, alt oug *any of Aristotle.s o,n definitions are p ysicalistic. Also, it is not certain t at suc definitions are al,ays an i*prove*ent over ver"al ones ,it regard to indefiniteness. 3efinitions 5 #1# 5 or e&planations t at use suc ter*s as Gcold,G G eat,G G,atery "lend,G Glarge,G or Gs*allG are likely to face t eir s are of indefiniteness or vagueness. But it is clear t at Aristotle.s strategy of replacing ver"al definitions "y causalBe&planatory ones need not "e e&cluded fro* application in t e case of *atters of conduct, and Aristotle does not say t at it is e&cluded. :ne cannot assu*e t at causalBe&planatory definitions are possi"le in t e case of every *atter of conduct or t at t e indefiniteness of any account is due to its not "eing a causalBe&planatory one. 2 at kind of causal account, for e&a*ple, is one likely to give of t e city t at is of any relevance to t e issue of indefiniteness or vagueness;@66A +i*ilarly, t e pro"le* of indefiniteness in t e case of eaps or "aldness as not *uc to do ,it t e causes of t ese t ings or p eno*ena. 2 atever t e causes of "aldness, t e pro"le* is one of dra,ing t e "oundaries or li*its of t e p eno*ena or t e relevant concept. )f, indeed, t e pro"le* is in *ost cases t at of dra,ing "oundaries or li*its, one can see , y *atters of conduct *ay pose greater pro"le*s t an natural p eno*ena. 3ra,ing "oundaries of indefinite p eno*ena or concepts is not, as ) said a"ove and as Aristotle recogni9es, easy in any do*ain. 7et , ere one dra,s t e "oundary in t e case of "aldness, ,ind, or s ado, is per aps not very i*portant4 not *uc *ay depend on it. 2it suc p eno*ena ,e *ay decide to ave recourse to Aristotle.s special ordinance and dra, t e "oundary at so*e point. But in *atters of conduct *uc depends on , ere one dra,s t e line. )t *ay *ean t e difference "et,een virtue and vice, good and "ad, no"le and "ase, "la*e,ort y and praise,ort y, and so on. ' e reason Aristotle finds it difficult to si*ply decide on t e li*its of gentleness is t at t e line "et,een it and irasci"ility is t e "oundary "et,een virtue and vice and ence t e "oundary "et,een an agent.s "eing praise,ort y and "la*e,ort y. 7et it is not certain t at t e difference "et,een dra,ing "oundaries in t e ,orld of nature and *atters of conduct is as large as it at first appears. ' e scientist , o ,is es to kno, , ere life "egins cannot /ust dra, t e "oundary any, ere, and of course , ere ,e dra, t e line in t e case of concepts suc as animal' life' fear' and so fort *ay "e of great i*portance to et ics. :ur *oral positions on a"ortion, eut anasia, or co,ardice *ay partly rest on , ere suc "oundaries are dra,n. :ne *ig t also argue t at it ,ould "e difficult to deal ,it t e pro"le* of variation in *atters of conduct in t e ,ay Aristotle deals ,it it in t e case of natural p eno*ena=t at is, "y disregarding suc variations and "y *oving to a ig er plane of generality or a"straction. ' us, , at *atters in t e

case of t e lung is its function and not t e *any differences a*ong lungs. )t is *uc arder to disregard t e differences or variation in *atters of conduct, for t ey see* to "e essential: 3ifferences in t e circu*stances, ti*e, e*otion, persons, *erit of persons, no"ility, necesB 5 #14 5 sity, and so fort , are relevant in giving an account of c oice, o"ligations to our parents, t e nature of gentleness, friends ip. ' ey are certainly of great relevance in t e conte&t of action=in *aking a c oice, in deciding , et er to o"ey our parents, or to "e so*eone.s friend. Per aps in so*e cases t e variation in t e order of nature *ay "e easy to disregard, alt oug t is cannot "e generali9ed. But one *ay "e ,illing to concede t at variation in *atters of conduct cannot "e disregarded. Alt oug one *ay "e ,illing to recogni9e t e a"ove considerations as providing so*e reasons for t inking t at t e ine&actness under discussion ere poses *ore pro"le*s for *atters of conduct t an it does for natural p eno*ena, t is *ay not "e t e end of t e *atter. Iot all natural p eno*ena are, after all, alike. Alt oug "eing an ani*al is, as Aristotle points out, to so*e e&tent ine&act, "eing "ald or "eing a eap is clearly *uc *ore so. +o*e t ings or p eno*ena are less indefinite t an ot ers, or at least so*e are definite enoug t at accepta"le definitions or accounts can "e given of t e*. )t *ig t "e possi"le, t en, to distinguis ,it in t e do*ain of conduct *atters , ic e& i"it t e ine&actness Aristotle cites to a *uc ig er degree t an ot ers, and of t e latter class of t ings ade1uate definitions or accounts can per aps "e given. Aristotle o,ever tends at ti*es, and ,it out furt er argu*ent, to vie, all *atters of conduct as "eing e1ually ine&act and *ore ine&act t an t e o"/ects *at e*atics and t e scientific disciplines investigate. ' is tendency is due to t e e*p asis e places on t e *ore particular or practical concerns of t e discipline of et ics in contrast to t e general or a"stract concerns t at are t e focus of ot er disciplines. Aristotle takes et ics to "e a practical discipline, to ave practice or action as its ulti*ate goals. <e also insists t at t ese practical goals of t e discipline re1uire t at it reac es t e particulars, t at its pri*ary concerns are ,it t e particular or specific rat er t an ,it t e general or a"stract aspects of conduct. Unlike t eoretical disciplines t at supposedly stay at t e level of t e general or a"stract, practical disciplines need to reac t e level of t e particular or specific, "ut so*e features of e&actness!ine&actness *ay "e *ore prevalent or pervasive at one level t an t ey are at t e ot er. )n addition, so*e of t ese features *ay pose greater >or lesser? pro"le*s , en present at one level t an , en present at t e ot er. At t e level of t e particulars, for e&a*ple, *atters of conduct *ay e& i"it considera"le variation and suc variation *ay "e of great i*portance in *aking decisions, c oosing a course of action, deter*ining , et er "la*e or praise is due, and so fort . But t is does not rule out t e possi"ility t at ot er *atters or at least aspects of t e* do not e& i"it suc variation or t at t ey do so to a far lesser e&tent, for, per aps, t e *oral virtues are su"/ect to variation "ut t e intellectual ones are not, or , ile t e cases 5 #1% 5 of courage, li"erality, or gentleness *ay e& i"it considera"le variation, virtue itself *ay not. ' us virtue, "ot *oral and intellectual, *ay "e defined as t at , ic *akes so*et ing good and causes it to perfor* its function ,ell >N.E. 11$Ea1%?. +uc a definition appears to succeed, as t e functional definitions of t e parts of ani*als do, in "ypassing variation and giving a *ore general or a"stract account.

Aristotle gives a nu*"er of definitions , ic , "y "eing ig ly general or a"stract, see* to deal successfully ,it t e feature of variation e attri"utes to *atters of conduct. +o e defines *agnani*ity as intolerance of dis onor or "eing unaffected "y good and "ad fortune > ost. Anal. 9F"6$?. )n si*ilar fas ion e defines *ost of t e virtues and vices in E.E >)).iii?. ' e sa*e can "e said of t e account of appiness as t at , ic can "e only an end in itself and of t e good of - in ter*s of t e function of -. ' ese accounts *ay "e lacking in detail, "ut t is is clearly anot er *atter. :ne cannot, in ot er ,ords, rule out t e possi"ility t at so*e ele*ents or aspects of *atters of conduct can "e treated at a level of generality or a"stractness t at is sufficient for avoiding or at least *ini*i9ing t e pro"le*s of ine&actness t at concern Aristotle. Grant *ay, t erefore, ave "een correct in suggesting t at Aristotle tends to overstate t e scope and degree of ine&actness under consideration ere in relation to *atters of conduct, an overstate*ent t at appears to ave "een accepted "y t e ancient co**entators.@6#A :nce one distinguis es so*e, at *ore s arply t an Aristotle is ,illing to do "et,een t e t eoretical concerns of p ilosop ical et ics and t ose of practice t at e often stresses, one sees t at so*e ele*ents of conduct and so*e accounts of t e* >t e *ost a"stract and general ones? *ay "e less su"/ect to t e ine&actness t at concerns Aristotle. ' us, Aristotle i*self recogni9es in H.6 t at accounts dealing ,it particulars are likely to "e *ore lacking in e&actness t an t e general ones. Aristotle is correct on t is point. )t is 1uite possi"le t at t e individual virtues e& i"it greater variation or indefiniteness t an virtue itself does. )t *ay t erefore "e *ore difficult to define , at gentleness or irasci"ility is t an , at virtue is. Aristotle.s o,n discussion "ears t is out. +i*ilarly, it appears t at t e concept art is less pro"le*atic ,it respect to t e types of ine&actness under consideration ere t an t e concept tragedy . ' e latter concept as resisted any and every atte*pt to articulate a reasona"ly precise definition of it.@64A 7et Aristotle *ay ave ad so*e reasons for insisting t at *atters of conduct or our accounts of t e* pose greater pro"le*s t an natural p eno*ena and our accounts of t e*, and t ese reasons *ay ulti*ately ave so*et ing to do ,it t e specific accounts e i*self gives of t e "asic ele*ents of conduct and ,it is o,n conception of et ical t eory. 5 #1E 5 -or if t e "asic ele*ents of t e su"/ect *atter of et ics and its principles or a&io*s e& i"it t e kind of ine&actness Aristotle clai*s t at t ey do, t en all t e ot er t ings t at are derived, proved, or de*onstrated fro* t e* ,ill *ost likely also "e affected "y t ese sa*e features. )f, for instance, t e good or virtue and our accounts of t e* ,ere to e& i"it t ese features of ine&actness, t en t e rest of our accounts in et ics ,ould pro"a"ly also "e ine&act. But , y is t e case of et ics different fro* t at of t e investigation of, for e&a*ple, t e "iological p eno*ena; After all, Aristotle defines ani*al as t at , ic is capa"le of sensation > .A. E%#"6#, EEEa#%?, and clearly sensation is not free of indefiniteness or vagueness. As seen earlier, so*e living t ings occupy t e fu99y area "et,een ani*al and plant4 t ey, as Aristotle says, Gduali9e.G Alt oug one can accept, as Aristotle does, t at nature e& i"its indefiniteness, t e pro"le*s *atters of conduct pose *ay nonet eless "e far greater t an t ose natural p eno*ena pose. Consider, for e&a*ple, t e pro"le*s Aristotle encounters ,it giving an account of virtue. ' ere is, as ) said a"ove, so*e account of virtue t at see*s, on t e surface at least, not to "e affected "y variation or indefiniteness=na*ely, t at virtue is t at , ic *akes so*et ing good and causes it to perfor* its function ,ell. 7et t e definition of virtue t at Aristotle relies upon in order to e&plain or define t e nature of t e individual virtues, t e definition t at does *ost of t e ,ork in t e N.E. , is a classic e&a*ple of an account suffering fro* ine&actness for , ic t ere see*s to "e no o"vious re*edy. ' e

definition, of course, is none ot er t an t e one Aristotle gives at N.E. in ter*s of a notion t at is a paradig* of ine&actness=na*ely, t e notion of t e *ean. )ndeed, not only does Aristotle insist t at t e differentia of virtue is t e *ean, e argues t at t e *ean relevant to virtue is not so*e e&act 1uantity t at can "e deter*ined *at e*atically "y a *at e*atical operation on so*e ot er *at e*atical 1uantity or 1uantities, "ut so*et ing t at is relative to t e agent and t e practical circu*stances. But t is non*at e*atical ,ay of e&plicating t e *ean introduces so *any indefinite or indeter*inate factors t at t e differentia of virtue re*ains, for all practical purposes, intracta"le. Kirtue is, o,ever, one of t e "asic ele*ents of Aristotle.s et ical t eory. )t as a role to play in t e e&plication of ot er co*ponents of is t eory. ' e definition of virtue Aristotle gives is to "e used in e&plicating t e nature of t e individual virtues as ,ell as vices=for e&a*ple, t e nature of courage, te*perance, gentleness, irasci"ility. All of t e* are eit er instances of virtue or vice4 t ey are eit er instances of t e *ean or of deviation fro* it. ' us, t e pro"le*s ,it Aristotle.s account of virtue or vice t at result fro* t e ine&actness of t e notion of t e *ean ,ill "e encountered again in our e&plication of t e particular virtues or vices in ter*s of t is sa*e notion. 5 #1F 5 Consider, for instance, so*e of t e accounts of t e virtues or vices Aristotle gives in t e E.E. )n trying to define irasci"ility or t e irasci"le person, Aristotle ,rites, G' e *an t at gets *ore angry and *ore 1uickly and ,it *ore people t an e oug t is irasci"leG >1661a1%?. ' is account, , ic Aristotle takes to e&e*plify t e use of t e *ean in e&plaining t e virtues or vices, is, like t e accounts of all t e ot er virtues and vices e gives in t is conte&t >see in particular t ose of co,ardice, insensitivity, and /ealousy?, as indefinite as one is likely to *eet. -or , at e&actly is asserted "y clai*ing t at t e irasci"le person gets G*ore angry and *ore 1uicklyG; Aristotle, of course, recogni9es t e vagueness of suc accounts and concludes is discussion of t e virtues "y re*arking, GJet us t en accept t ese si*ple definitions, and let us *ake t e* *ore precise , en ,e are speaking a"out t e opposite dispositionsG >1661"H?. 2 en, o,ever, Aristotle returns to an e&a*ination of t e virtues t at is supposed to produce accounts of t e* t at are *ore e&act, t ings are not any different. Jet *e give as an e&a*ple part of , at e says a"out gentleness in is *ore e&act account of it: 2.&5 And since as ,e said in t e ot er cases, so ere also t ere is e&cess and deficiency >for t e ars *an is t e sort of *an t at feels t is e*otion too 1uickly, too long, at t e ,rong ti*e, ,it t e ,rong kind of people, and ,it *any people , ile t e slo,is *an is t e opposite?, it is clear t at t ere is also so*e"ody , o is at t e *iddle point in t e ine1uality. +ince, t erefore, "ot t ese s ades of c aracter are ,rong, it is clear t at t e state *id,ay "et,een t e* is rig t, for it is neit er too asty nor too slo,B te*pered, nor does it get angry ,it t e people ,it , o* it oug t not nor fail to get angry ,it t ose ,it , o* it oug t. >16#1"16?

) do not ,is to insist ere t at for definitions to ,ork t ey *ust "e e&act, as Aristotle i*self often says in t e logical treatises4 t at t ey *ust specify t e 1uantity and 1uality of t e differentiae, t at suc specifications *ust "e nu*erical, or even t at nu*erical specifications are possi"le.@6%A 2 at ) ,is to point out, or , at is i*portant to recogni9e, is t at if t e "asic ele*ents of *atters of conduct e&e*plify t e a"ove kind of vagueness or if t e ig est definiteness our accounts can attain is t at e&e*plified "y Aristotle.s discussion of gentleness, t en t ere is *ore reason to "e concerned a"out t e ine&actness of et ics t an a"out t at of t e disciplines investigating natural p eno*ena, for alt oug animal *ay not "e altoget er definite, it is not as indefinite as +irtue see*s to "e. ' e indefiniteness of animal appears to affect not every ani*al, "ut only a fe, at t e fringes=for e&a*ple, t e sponges, seaB

ane*ones. But t e ine&actness of virtue affects every virtue and vice=all of t e* are al*ost e1ually pro"le*atic. ' e ine&actness of virtue, a "asic ele*ent in Aristotle.s et ical 5 #1H 5 t eory, filters do,n, so to speak, to every one of t e particular virtues and vices. +uppose, in addition, t at t e Good itself, t e good of an -, or a good - are to "e e&plicated ulti*ately in a ,ay t at involves t e notion of virtue. ' is is clearly t e case in Aristotle.s et ical t eory. ' e notion of a good - is, according to Aristotle, to "e understood in ter*s of t e virtue of -. +i*ilarly, , at t e good of an - consists of is to "e e&plained in ter*s of t e function and virtue of -.@6EA )f t is is so, t en t e ine&actness of virtue ,ill *ost likely filter do,n to every i*portant aspect of Aristotle.s t eory. ' e pro"le*s of ine&actness Aristotle encounters in is o,n t eory and t e ,ay t e ine&actness of t e "asic ele*ents affects ot er co*ponents of is t eory are likely to "e found in any t eory t at relies on t ese sa*e ele*ents. ' us 0a,ls offers a definition of a good - t at is not very different ,it respect to definiteness fro* so*e of Aristotle.s accounts: A is a good C if and only if A as t e properties >to a ig er degree t an t e average or standard C? , ic is rational to ,ant in an C, given , at C.s are used for or are e&pected to do, and t e like >, atever rider is appropriate?.@6FA An account t at faces si*ilar pro"le*s is t e one given "y 0oss, alt oug difficulties: e see*s to "e a,are of t e

And Ggood of its kindG is relative in a furt er sense, vi9. t at it is co*parative. 2e ave in *ind , at ,e suppose to "e a roug average of t e e&cellence of t e *e*"ers of t e kind, and ,e call anyt ing "etter t an t is good anyt ing ,orse t an it "ad, not i*plying t at t ere any fi&ed neutral point at , ic , at is good ends and , at is "ad "egins. GGoodG in t is usage *eans G"etter t an averageG or per aps Gconsidera"ly "etter t an t e average,G G"ad G,orse t an averageG or per aps Gconsidera"ly ,orse t an t e average.G@6HA ' ese accounts of Ggood of its kindG are, ,it regard to t eir definiteness, as pro"le*atic as Aristotle.s o,n account of virtue or of "eing a good -. ' e notions of Gaverage,G Gstandard,G Grational to ,ant,G and so fort are notorious for t eir lack of any clear or definite "oundaries. 0oss recogni9es t is and e does not ,is to "e taken as Gi*plying t at t ere is any fi&ed neutral point at , ic , at is good ends and , at is "ad "egins.G )t is 1uite possi"le, t en, t at Aristotle.s reasons for taking *atters of conduct and our accounts of t e* to "e *ore pro"le*atic ,it respect to t eir ine&actness t an natural p eno*ena and our accounts of t e* ste* in part fro* is conception of et ical t eory and t e particular accounts e gives of so*e of t e "asic ele*ents of conduct in is o,n t eory. A different t eory t at assigns a lesser, or no role at all, to virtue *ay per aps fare "etter as far as e&actness is concerned t an Aristotle.s o,n t eory. does. 8ven an et ical t eory t at takes virtue as a "asic ele*ent 5 #19 5 "ut nonet eless succeeds in treating it not as a disposition ,ill ave *ade anot er step to,ard reducing t e kinds of ine&actness t at concern Aristotle. But *ost i*portantly, a t eory t at succeeds in e&plicating virtue ,it out reference to t e *ean or at least ,it out reference to t e kind of *ean Aristotle.s t eory relies upon ,ill ave *ade t e *ost significant step to,ard reducing ine&actness.

Given t e kind of et ical t eory e puts fort , t ese options are not open to Aristotle. 5 #6$ 5

1ine '*actness and Pragmatics

Introduction
)t re*ains to e&a*ine so*e re*arks "y Aristotle in , ic e connects e&actness!ine&actness to t e *et od or to t e nature of a discipline. ) s all at t e *o*ent speak of an e&actness!ine&actness t at could "e related eit er to t e *et od or t e nature of a discipline or per aps to "ot . )n t is ,ay, ) ,ill "e reflecting an a*"iguity t at is present in Aristotle.s o,n re*arks , ic *akes it difficult to deter*ine , et er t e e&actness!ine&actness at issue attac es to t e *et od a discipline utili9es or to t e nature of t e discipline itself. By G*et odG in t is conte&t ) s all understand , at is ordinarily *eant "y t is ter* , en it is used to identify or descri"e t e *et odology of a discipline=na*ely, t e ,ay, *anner, or procedure a discipline utili9es for t e purpose of supporting, /ustifying, or proving t e propositions it puts fort as true >its Gt eore*sG?. ' us, a discipline *ay utili9e de*onstration, induction, analogical reasoning, e*pirical o"servation, and so fort , in order to support, /ustify, or prove its propositions. And t ese are different *et ods. By t e Gnature of a discipline,G ) s all understand , at Aristotle *ost often as in *ind , en e distinguis es "et,een t eoretical and practical disciplines=na*ely, t e supposed difference in t e goals of t e various disciplines. ' e a*"iguity in Aristotle.s ,ords, t en, is t is: ' e e&actness!ine&actness at issue *ay "e t e result of eit er t e *et od a discipline utili9es or t e nature of a discipline. A discipline, for e&a*ple, t at utili9es de*onstration as t e *eans of /ustifying its t eore*s *ay "e said to "e *ore e&act t an one , ic relies on induction or e*pirical o"servation. <o,ever, a discipline , ose goals are practical and , ose cognitive interests are su"ordinate to practical ends, is per aps eit er incapa"le of reac ing 5 #61 5 t e level of e&actness ,e associate ,it t eoretical disciplines or does not need to reac suc a level. )t *ay t us "e t e case t at its goals *ake a certain kind or level of ine&actness necessary or accepta"le. ' e difficulty of deter*ining , ere t e e&actness!ine&actness ste*s fro* lies ,it t e fact t at a ter* Aristotle uses in t is connection can *ean eit er t e *et od a discipline uses or t e discipline, or in1uiry itself. )t is t us possi"le to take as t e source of e&actness!ine&actness eit er t e *et od or t e nature of a discipline. )ndeed, it is not only possi"le "ut also 1uite plausi"le t at eit er of t ese t,o alternatives is t e source of e&actness!ine&actness. Alt oug eit er t e *et od or t e nature of a discipline can "e and per aps is t e source of t e e&actness!ine&actness under discussion, and t erefore co**entators are /ustified in c oosing eit er one of t ese as "eing t e source, ) s all argue ere t at Aristotle is concerned ,it t e nature of a discipline and not its *et od. <e does not in t is conte&t identify a *et od for practical disciplines in general, or for et ics in particular, t at is different fro* t e *et od of disciplines ,it different goals, and does not attri"ute t e supposed ine&actness of practical disciplines to suc a *et od t at t ese disciplines presu*a"ly s are. <is ai* instead is to link t e level of e&actness t at is desira"le or attaina"le in suc disciplines to t eir practical goals. Aristotle.s atte*pt to link a type of e&actness!ine&actness to t e goals of a discipline "rings to *ind

*uc of t e recent discussion on t e nature of e&planation t at as atte*pted to link e&planation to so*e prag*atic considerations , ic are invaria"ly understood in ter*s of t e goals e&planation serves in various conte&ts. ' e proponents of t e prag*atic conception of e&planation are not al,ays in agree*ent a"out t e role prag*atic considerations play or t e i*portance t ey ave in deter*ining t e nature of e&planation. +o*e argue t at suc considerations deter*ine only t e kinds of 1uestions or pro"le*s t at are asked ,it in a certain conte&t=t ey do not affect t e nature of e&planation, , ic is taken to "e deter*ined "y episte*ic considerations. :t ers take a *uc stronger vie,. ' ey argue t at prag*atic considerations also deter*ine t e nature of e&planation t at is appropriate in a given conte&t. At ti*es, t ey relativi9e e&planation not *erely to so*e fi&ed and possi"ly ,ellBdefined goals t at e&planation *ay serve, "ut to t e individual , o re1uests or seeks an e&planation. ' ey relativi9e it to t e particular goals, o"/ectives, or purposes of any one individual. ' ey t us deny t at t ere is one unified conception of e&planation t at is appropriate in all conte&ts. )n clai*ing t at t e level of e&actness under consideration ere is deter*ined "y t e goals of a discipline, Aristotle is linking e&actness to , at apparently are prag*atic considerations. <e is, as s all "e seen, connecting certain aspects of t e proofs t at a discipline utili9es to so*e goals or purposes. 3oes Aristotle t ink t at t e goals or purposes of a discipline 5 #66 5 deter*ine t e 1uestions or pro"le*s of t at discipline or t at t ey affect t e c aracter of its proofs or e&planations, or "ot ; At ti*es Aristotle speaks as if "ot t e 1uestions a discipline asks and t e c aracter of its proofs or e&planations are in so*e ,ay deter*ined "y its goals. But , et er t is is really so re*ains to "e seen. Anot er 1uestion t at arises in t is conte&t is t e one concerning t e status of t e goals , ic presu*a"ly deter*ine t e level of e&actness t at is appropriate in a discipline. 2 ose goals are t ey; Are t ey t e goals of any one individual, as t e advocates of t e prag*atic t eory of e&planation at ti*es clai*; 3oes Aristotle, in ot er ,ords, relativi9e e&actness to t e goals, purposes, or o"/ectives of any individual; Aristotle.s vie, on t is *atter is *ore cautious t an t e rat er e&tre*e vie, /ust *entioned. (ost often e takes t e goals to "e pri*arily t e goals of t e discipline, in1uiry, or art and only secondarily t ose of so*e individual or ot er. ' e goals, according to Aristotle, define a discipline or an art4 t ey are part of its essential definition, and t erefore cannot "e altered "y t e interests or o"/ectives of so*e individual, and per aps t ey cannot "e altered at all. )n t is sense, one *ig t conclude, t e considerations to , ic Aristotle relativi9es e&actness are not really prag*atic ones. :r, if ,e insist in calling t e* so, one needs to keep in *ind t at t ey are considera"ly *ore fi&ed t an t e goals prag*atists often ave in *ind. Understanding Aristotle.s conception of t e relation "et,een a discipline and its goals is i*portant for understanding , y e often speaks as if t e ine&actness t at presu*a"ly results fro* t e goals of a discipline cannot "e eli*inated. )f, for instance, a type of ine&actness is due to t e practical goals of a discipline, it cannot "e eli*inated "y *aking t e goals less practical and *ore t eoretical. +uc a c ange in t e goals of a discipline, Aristotle see*s to t ink, is ruled out "y t e nature of t e discipline. But if our conception of goals is t e one advocated "y t ose , o propound t e rat er e&tre*e prag*atic vie, of e&planation=na*ely, t e one t at relativi9es goals to any individual=t en t ere is no reason , y goals cannot "e altered for t e sake of eli*inating so*e types of ine&actness. )f a c ange of goals ,ere possi"le, t en t e eli*ination of ine&actness due to t e goals of a discipline *ig t also "e possi"le in so*e cases.

The 'vidence and its Meaning

Aristotle connects e&actness!ine&actness to t e *et od or t e nature of an in1uiry in t e follo,ing passages: =.& 2e *ust also keep in *ind , at ,as said earlier and not seek e&actness @

A in t e sa*e ,ay in all cases, "ut in eac case in accordance ,it t e su"/ect *atter and in suc a degree as is appropriate to t e

5 #6# 5 particular in/uiry *or method.

,. 1N.E.&;=2a%:7 9.6 -or a carpenter @or "uilder=

A and a geo*etrician investigate @or seek after= A t e fig t angle differently @or in different ,ays= A4 t e for*er does so insofar as is useful for is ,ork @ A , ile t e latter @in1uiresA , at it is @ A and , at properties it as @ A4 for e @t e geo*etricianA is a spectator of trut @ A. 2e *ust act in t e sa*e ,ay, t en, in ot er cases, so t at our goal @or task= A ,ill not "e out,eig ed "y secondary *atters @

A. >1$9Ha#$? 9.# But to linger over t e detailed state*ent @

A and discussion of 1uestions of t is kind @p ysical plan of t e cityA is a ,aste of ti*e. ' e difficulty ,it suc t ings is not so *uc in understanding t e*, "ut in doing t e*. > olit.&88&b%;7 )t is easy to see t at t ere are different ,ays of reading 9.1 and 9.6 , ic *ay in t e end ave different conse1uences ,it respect to t e source and nature of t e e&actness!ine&actness Aristotle speaks of in t is conte&t, for if one ,ere to focus on t e opening sentence of 9.6, one *ig t conclude t at Aristotle.s pri*ary concern is to point out t at different disciplines raise and deal ,it different pro"le*s or 1uestions. Lust as presu*a"ly t e "uilder asks different 1uestions a"out t e *at e*atical o"/ects e encounters in is ,ork fro* t e ones t e *at e*atician does, so does t e *oral p ilosop er ask different 1uestions fro* t e ones asked "y so*e ot er investigator of *atters of conduct. 3ifferent 1uestions, one *ay argue, do not necessarily i*ply different *et ods, "ut t ey supposedly i*ply differences in e&actness. )f one ,ere to focus on t e closing sentence of 9.1, one *ig t conclude >"y selecting one reading of

? t at Aristotle is saying so*et ing *uc stronger. <e is saying t at different disciplines *ay utili9e different *et ods, and differences in *et od result in differences in e&actness across disciplines. -or different *et ods, one *ay argue, produce different types of kno,ledge t at can vary in t eir e&actness. ' e ,ay t e "uilder co*es to kno, so*et ing a"out so*e geo*etrical o"/ect is funda*entally different fro* t e ,ay a geo*etrician does, and t is e&plains , y t e one as e&act kno,ledge and t e ot er does not. Per aps, t en, Aristotle is clai*ing t at t ere is a ,ay or *et od, and t erefore a level of e&actness t at suc a *et od i*plies, t at is appropriate in et ical in1uiry. +uc a *et od *ay "e very different fro* t e de*onstrative *et od t at e associates ,it t e t eoretical disciplines. Per aps e as in *ind so*e type of induction or /ust si*ply an e*pirical investigation t at relies rat er strongly on, and per aps re*ains at t e level of, t e ac1uisition of data fro* e&perience.@1A Aristotle.s fre1uent co*parisons of et ics to *edicine 5 #64 5 *akes t is option a possi"le or even a plausi"le one. Per aps e is pointing to t e dialectical *et od , ere presu*a"ly one relies *ore on accepted opinions rat er t an on eit er e*pirical generali9ations or t e types of propositions t at are appropriate in de*onstration. :r possi"ly, and going "eyond t e traditional list of *et ods, e is t inking of an altoget er different *et od. -or /ust as t ere *ig t per aps "e no si*ilarity "et,een , at t e "uilder does and , at t e geo*etrician does, one *ig t conclude t at t ere is really no si*ilarity "et,een , at ,e do in et ics and , at ,e do in a de*onstrative discipline. ' us , en t e "uilder ,is es to s o, t at t,o t ings are e1ual or so*et ing is straig t e *akes so*e *easure*ents or uses a stretc ed string as is standard of straig tness or for

s o,ing t at so*et ing is straig t. But t ese sorts of t ings are not at all t e kinds of proof t e geo*etrician uses, and presu*a"ly different types or levels of e&actness ,ould "e re1uired for or correspond to all t ese different *et ods. 2 en one looks at Aristotle.s re*arks 1uoted a"ove in t eir entirety, o,ever, it is *ore likely t at one ,ill conclude t at Aristotle does not outrig tly and ,it out any reference to t e nature of et ical in1uiry identify a *et od, and ence a level or type of e&actness, t at is proper for it. -or e see*s rat er to "e concerned in t ese re*arks ,it t e follo,ing aspects of an investigation: its nature, goals, *et ods, e&actness, and so fort , and t e relation a*ong t e*. <e appears to accept so*e general principle t at specifies t e connection, or t at captures t e relation, a*ong t e* t at can "est "e descri"ed as a kind of prag*atic principle. Provisionally, t is general prag*atic principle can "e understood as asserting t at t e goals of a discipline deter*ine, in so*e ,ay or ot er, t e *et od, type of e&actness, level of e&actness, and so fort t at is re1uired or is appropriate for a discipline. ' is is presu*a"ly a general principle, one t at is applica"le to all disciplines or arts. 2 en it is applied to et ics it ,ill i*ply t at t e goals of t e discipline fi& t e *et od and e&actness t at are re1uired or "est fit t e nature or goals of t e investigation into *atters of conduct. ' e a"ove prag*atic principle see*s to su**ari9e an interesting line of argu*ent t at can "e "ased on t e rat er fa*iliar t e*e ,e find in Aristotle.s ,orks a"out t e relation "et,een disciplines or arts and t eir goals=a t e*e t at ,as recogni9ed "y t e ancient co**entators. ' erefore *uc can per aps "e learned "y taking it seriously and e&a*ining it against t e te&ts. +uc an e&a*ination *ay, for e&a*ple, tell us so*et ing a"out t e sorts of t ings Aristotle is ,illing to consider as accepta"le *eans >*et ods? of investigation and t eir relation to t e nature of t e various disciplines or arts. But t is interpretation need not disagree altoget er ,it t e earlier one t at insists t at Aristotle outrig tly identifies so*e 5 #6% 5 *et od for et ics and t at *ost likely t is *et od is different fro* t e one used in t e t eoretical disciplines. 8ven if one ,ere to assu*e Aristotle.s prag*atic principle, one cannot rule out t at t e *et od dictated "y t e goals of et ical in1uiry is not one of t e nonde*onstrative *et ods identified earlier, t at is, induction, data gat ering, e&a*ination of opinions, and so fort . 2 at t en does t e application of t e prag*atic principle to t e case of et ical in1uiry tell us a"out its *et od and e&actness; ' ere are, it see*s to *e, t,o alternatives t at ave so*e "asis in Aristotle.s re*arks and t at ave at ti*es "een identified in t e Aristotelian sc olars ip tradition. ' e first, and certainly t e strongest, is t at Aristotle identifies or t at is prag*atic principle i*plies a *et od for et ical in1uiry t at is different fro* t e one utili9ed "y t e t eoretical disciplines precisely "ecause et ics is practical. ' e goals of et ics, according to t is alternative, i*ply t at its *et od is not de*onstrative,@6A <ence, t e e&actness t at is appropriate in et ical investigation cannot "e understood in ter*s of so*e features of de*onstration. +uc e&actness cannot presu*a"ly "e e&plicated in ter*s of t e degree to , ic a discipline *eets t e conditions of de*onstration, since t e goals of t e discipline dictate a *et od t at is different fro* de*onstration. Jet us call t is t e strong prag*atic t esis. ' e second alternative takes Aristotle.s re*arks to "e saying t at t e application of t e prag*atic principle to et ical in1uiry does not result in a *et od t at is different in kind fro* t at e*ployed "y de*onstrative disciplines, "ut t at t e degree of e&actness is different. )n ot er ,ords, t e *et od appropriate for et ical in1uiry is not different fro* t at e*ployed in t e t eoretical ones. -or t e i**ediate goals of et ics are t e attain*ent of so*e type of kno,ledge, t at is, t ey are episte*ic, and

it is t ese i**ediate episte*ic goals t at dictate t e *et od. But t e ulti*ate goals in t e case of et ics are practical, and it is t ese Gprag*aticG goals t at dictate t e level of e&actness t at is appropriate. ' ey deter*ine t e degree to , ic et ical in1uiry needs to satisfy t e conditions of de*onstration. 2e *ay designate t is t e ,eak prag*atic principle. ' e difficulty of deciding ,it certainty , ic one of t ese alternatives "est captures t e *eaning of Aristotle.s re*arks 1uoted a"ove rests partly ,it t e a*"iguity of t e ter*

. ' e ter* is used at ti*es, t oug not very fre1uently, to *ean G*et odG in our sense of t is ter*= na*ely, t e ,ay or *anner of an in1uiry or investigation, t e kinds of proof or /ustification it uses. Aristotle really does not ave a single or tec nical ter* t at e consistently uses to speak of *et od. Muite fre1uently e avails i*self to t e use of =,ay or *anner=a ter* t at as a rat er "road application "ut is used to distinguis ,ays of investigating or provB 5 #6E 5 ing: for e&a*ple, de*onstration fro* dialectical proof or "ot of t ese fro* t e *et od of collection and division.@#A And at ti*es e /ust uses

=pat , road, ,ay=, ic is of course one of t e constituents of t e co*pound ter* and is even less precise t an .@4A )t is used in t is i*precise sense in , at see*s to "e its only occurrence in t e N.E. , ere Aristotle is concerned ,it , et er t e pat , ,ay, or *et od > ? of investigation is fro* t e "asic principles or to t e* as ,ell >1$94a##?.@%A ' ere are o,ever occurrences of t e ter* itself , ere it is clearly used to signify t e *et od or ,ay of investigation or proof in certain conte&ts. ' us, t e opening c apter of t e Anim. raises t e 1uestion , et er t ere is a single *et od > ? for investigating into, and supporting our clai*s to kno,, t e essential nature of all t ings, /ust as de*onstration > ? is t e *et od "y , ic ,e kno, t e necessary attri"utes in all cases. )t goes on to argue t at if t ere

is no Gsingle and co**on *et od @ A a"out essence our treat*ent of t e su"/ect ,ill "e *ore difficult. -or ,e *ust esta"lis , at t e *et od @ A is in eac case4 and even if it is o"vious , et er a for* of de*onstration, or division or so*e ot er *et od @ A is t e rig t oneG >4$6a1%?. Aristotle also uses t e ter* to *ean G*et odG or GprocedureG in N.E. : G:ur investigation @in1uiry= A *ay follo, t e sa*e *et od @course, procedure= A as t e preceding discussionsG >1169aE?. And t e sa*e is also true in olit. >16%6a1F?, , ere Aristotle urges t at ,e investigate t e nature of t e state "y follo,ing Gour regular *et od,G t at is, "y analy9ing, a co*posite , ole into its unco*pounded ele*ents. ' e ter* is, o,ever, *ost fre1uently used, along ,it a nu*"er of ot er ter*s suc as

, or , to si*ply *ean in1uiry or investigation=for e&a*ple, an in1uiry into t e nature of t e syllogis*, of de*onstration, or of t e soul.@EA And t is see*s to "e t e *eaning it as in t,o of its four occurrences in N.E. )t *eans in1uiry or investigation , ere Aristotle tells us t at every art and every in1uiry > ? see*s to ai* at so*e good >1$94a?. ' e sa*e see*s also to "e t e case ,it t e occurrence of t e ter* at 1$94"1$ , ere Aristotle re*arks t at Gsince it ai*s at suc t ings our present in1uiry @ A is a sort of political science.G ' e ter* as t e sa*e use in all of its t ree occurrences in t e E.E. , alt oug t,o of t e* >161E"#%, "#9? are so*e, at less clearly so t an t e re*aining one >1614a14?. @FA )n t e olit. , t e ter* occurs ten ti*es, and it *eans in1uiry or investigation in all of t e* e&cept in t e one occurrence ) *entioned a"ove.@HA Clearly , at ,e conclude a"out t e nature or source>s? of e&actness! ine&actness t at Aristotle is concerned ,it in t e re*arks 1uoted a"ove in part depends on o, ,e understand t e ter*

. ) s all, t erefore, turn ne&t to an e&a*ination of t e alternatives ) outlined earlier. 5 #6F 5

Questions) Methods) and '*actness

As ) said a"ove, one ,ay of looking at Aristotle.s concerns ,it t e variation of e&actness across disciplines is to see it as "eing analogous to t e concerns t at ave "een raised recently a"out t e variation in e&planation, and ence in *et od, across disciplines or purposes. +o*e, especially ' o*as Du n, Paul -eyera"end, and Bas van -raassen, ave at ti*es gone as far as to deny t at one can identify one for* of e&planation or *et od for all disciplines or purposes. An e&planation or *et od, according to t e*, is appropriate as long as it *eets t e prag*atic considerations t at give rise to t e de*and for e&planation or in1uiry. :t ers, o,ever, recogni9e t e role t at prag*atic considerations *ay play in e&planation, "ut t ey deny t at t ey play t e allBi*portant role t at is so*eti*es assigned to t e*. (atti +intonen as, for instance, recently argued t at t e prag*atic considerations pri*arily deter*ine t e 1uestions t at are asked and not t e for* of t e e&planation t at *ust "e used in order to ans,er t e 1uestions.@9A -or e&a*ple, t e difference in t e particular concerns or o"/ectives t e c e*ist and t e dietician ave deter*ine , at 1uestions eac one asks a"out, say, *ilk. Presu*a"ly "ot use t e sa*e *et od in trying to ans,er t e*. Muestions, in ot er ,ords, *ay vary due to different goals or purposes >prag*atic considerations?, "ut e&planation or *et od re*ains fi&ed. -ollo,ing +intonen.s argu*ent, one *ig t say t at , at Aristotle is clai*ing in 9.1 and 9.6 is t at 1uestions vary , ile *et ods stay t e sa*e. )n 9.6 Aristotle see*s to "e at least saying t at 1uestions vary. -or, e t ere clai*s, t e 1uestions t e geo*etrician asks a"out t e rig t angle are not t ose t e "uilder asks. ' ey ave t,o different goals or purposes, and t erefore t ey ask different 1uestions. ' e geo*etrician is interested in t e trut a"out geo*etrical figures, and e t erefore asks 1uestions a"out t e nature of t e rig t angle and its properties. ' e "uilder is interested in reali9ing so*e practical goals, and t erefore is 1uestions are not concerned ,it t e trut a"out geo*etrical figures. +i*ilarly, Aristotle clai*s else, ere, fis er*en do not o"serve fis for t e sake of pure kno,ledge, , ile presu*a"ly scientists do >G.A. F%Ea#4?. And so, again, since t eir goals are different fro* t ose , o are interested in a t eoretical understanding of t e p eno*ena of *arine life, t e 1uestions t ey ask are different. Alt oug t is line of argu*ent raises an i*portant point, it does not see* to *e to fully e&plain , at Aristotle says in 9.1 and 9.6 ,it out furt er ela"oration. -or even if ,e ,ere to assu*e t at t e geo*etrician and t e "uilder ask different 1uestions, t e pro"le* still re*ains o, t is affects t e e&actness of t eir respective enterprises since t e *et od of in1uiry is supposed to "e t e sa*e. 2 y does t e fact t at t e "uilder 5 #6H 5 asks and ans,ers different 1uestions fro* t ose t e geo*etrician asks and ans,ers give rise to a difference in t e e&actness of t eir disciplines if t ey "ot utili9e t e sa*e *et od to ans,er t eir 1uestions; ' ere *ust "e so*e factor ot er t an t e fact t at t e one asks 1uestion A and t e ot er asks 1uestion B , ic e&plains , y t eir respective disciplines attain or re1uire different levels of e&actness. ' ere is, in addition, t e difficulty of o, t e "uilderBgeo*etrician analogy is to "e applied in t e case of et ics. ' e "uilder and t e geo*etrician are supposedly asking 1uestions a"out t e sa*e su"/ect, for e&a*ple, t e rig t angle, and eac could "e said to o"tain kno,ledge a"out t e sa*e t ing

t at varies in e&actness fro* t at o"tained "y t e ot er. But to , o* is one supposed to co*pare t e 1uestions and t e e&actness of t e one , o in1uires into t e nature of *atters of conduct; )s t ere a purely t eoretical in1uiry in *atters of conduct as t ere is in t e case of geo*etrical figures or t e p eno*ena of *arine life, and is one to co*pare Aristotle.s practical in1uiry into *atters of conduct to t at t eoretical one; :r does Aristotle.s o,n practical in1uiry differ in its e&actness fro* ot er disciplines "y si*ply asking different 1uestions t an t ey do, since it deals ,it a su"/ect *atter t at is different fro* t eirs; )n t at case eac discipline ,ill differ in e&actness fro* any ot er t at as a different su"/ect *atter si*ply "ecause eac one ,ill necessarily "e asking different 1uestions. Io t,o disciplines t at differ in su"/ect *atter could "e e1ually e&act, not even all t e *at e*atical ones. )t see*s, t erefore, t at so*et ing as to "e added to t is line of argu*ent if ,e are to e&plain o, and , ere differences in e&actness enter t e picture. Per aps t e *et ods used "y t e "uilder and geo*etrician are, on account of t e 1uestions t ey ask, essentially different, and t is is , at introduces differences in e&actness.@1$A Per aps t ere is so*et ing in t e 1uestions t at eac asks t at in so*e ,ay or to so*e degree affects t e *et od t ey use. ' e *et od *ay not "e different, "ut it *ay not "e applied in t e sa*e *anner across disciplines. ' e 1uestions asked, in ot er ,ords, affect in so*e ,ay t e episte*ological c aracter of t e discipline. ' e last supposition appears to ave so*e plausi"ility. -or Aristotle in 9.6 is not *erely saying t at t e "uilder asks one 1uestion and t e geo*etrician anot er a"out t e rig t angle=for e&a*ple, o, can ) *ake t is angle rig t vs. o, can ) "isect t e rig t angle geo*etrically; 0at er, t e geo*etrician is asking 1uestions a"out t e essential nature of a certain kind of geo*etrical figure and t e properties it as in virtue of suc an essential nature. +ince e is interested in discovering t e trut a"out suc a geo*etrical kind, is 1uestions can "e only ans,ered "y t e *et od t at can attain t e trut a"out t is type of su"/ect *atter. But t e "uilder.s 1uestions are presu*a"ly not a"out t e nature of t is geo*etrical kind, 5 #69 5 its attri"utes, and t e relations a*ong t e*. +ince e is not ai*ing at t e syste*atic trut a"out suc *atters, is 1uestions do not re1uire t e application of t e *et od t e geo*etrician uses and in t e ,ay e uses it=t at is, t e fully a&io*aticBde*onstrative ,ay of t e *at e*atician t at starts fro* t e a&io*s, co**on principles, and definitions of t e essential nature of so*e geo*etrical kind. ' us, t e nature of t e 1uestions asked "y a discipline *ay affect at so*e level its episte*ological c aracter, in t is case its de*onstrative c aracter. ' e conte&t in , ic 9.1 and 9.6 occur see*s to *e to lend so*e support to t e a"ove, for Aristotle.s re*arks occur rig t after e as offered is account of t e u*an good or appiness in ter*s of t e function argu*ent. As seen earlier, e finds t is account to "e lacking in detail, to "e only an outline t at needs to "e co*pleted >see c ap. %?. <e furt er cautions us not to seek t e sa*e e&actness every, ere >9.1? and proceeds to give t e illustration of t e "uilder and t e geo*etrician >9.6?. But Aristotle goes on to argue t at ,e s ould not *ake t e sa*e de*and for an e&planation in all cases, for in so*e cases=for e&a*ple, in t e case of t e principles=it is enoug to s o, t at so*et ing is true ,it out e&plaining it >1$9H"?.@11A Aristotle, t en, *ay ave looked upon t e results is o,n in1uiry ad ac ieved so far as "eing t e results of a practical in1uiry t at ad not fully addressed t e 1uestion of t e essential nature of goodness. And ence , at as "een said a"out t e u*an good, alt oug it can "e furt er e&plained "y reference to t e nature of goodness and possi"ly ot er t ings, is sufficient4 a furt er e&planation in ter*s of t e nature of goodness is not re1uired "y t e practical goals of t e in1uiry. 2e can ad*it, e *ig t "e saying, t e account of t e good given so far, /ust as ,e ad*it ,it out e&planation t e first principles. -or t e 1uestions of t e practical discipline ,e are engaged in

are not t ose a"out t e nature of goodness, t at is, t e kinds of 1uestions t at e&ercised Plato, "ut rat er, as in t e case of t e "uilder, t e 1uestions a"out t e good of *an and is e&cellences. )f ,e only raise t e 1uestions t at t e goals of our in1uiry dictate, t en ,e cannot e&pect t e e&actness t at can "e attained "y t e in1uiry t at proceeds in a fully a&io*aticBde*onstrative fas ion fro* t e essential nature of t e su"/ect *atter. An in1uiry suc as t e latter ,ill per aps "e t e counterpart to t e in1uiry of t e geo*etrician in t e ,ay t at of t e "uilder can "e looked upon as t e counterpart to t e practical investigation in *atters of conduct. )t ,ill "e t e in1uiry t at, as seen earlier >c ap. #?, Aristotle ints at in t e E.E. and olit. )t is o"vious, o,ever, t at t e easiest ,ay of e&plaining , y Aristotle t inks t ere are differences in e&actness across disciplines is to suppose t at e takes suc differences to ste* fro* t e differences in t e *et ods t at t ey e*ploy. 'o read, t at is,

in 9.1 to *ean *et od, and conse1uently to take Aristotle as asserting t at different *et ods call for 5 ##$ 5 different e&actness. And t us to interpret is re*arks as saying t at , atever *et od t e "uilder uses it is different fro* t at t e geo*etrician uses. )f ,e ,ere to assu*e in addition t at et ics uses a *et od , ic is *ore like t at of t e "uilder rat er t an t at of t e geo*etrician, t en ,e ,ill ave an e&planation of , y et ics and t e "uilding art are in so*e ,ay ine&act, for presu*a"ly different *et ods i*ply or re1uire different levels of e&actness. :ne *et od *ay result in certain kno,ledge , ereas t e ot er *ay produce only pro"a"le kno,ledge. 7et Aristotle does not identify in t e present conte&t any *et od for t e "uilder and, *ore i*portantly, e does not identify any *et od for in1uiring into *atters of conduct. But t ose , o are convinced t at Aristotle takes differences in e&actness to ste* fro* differences in *et od are not deterred "y t is. ' ey are *ost pro"a"ly convinced "y t e very e&a*ple Aristotle uses and per aps so*e t ings Plato says a"out related *atters, for, after all, one *ay easily argue t at , at t e "uilder does is not , at t e geo*etrician does. ' e art of t e for*er is ine&act "ecause it does so*et ing 1uite different fro* , at t e discipline of t e latter does: )t e*ploys a different *et od. +o*e of t e ancient co**entators sa, *atters in t is ,ay. 8ustratius, in particular, tends to favor t is vie,. Accordingly, e gives a rat er ela"orate interpretation of Aristotle.s re*arks >9.6? , ic atte*pts to s o, t at t e tools or *eans t e "uilder uses and t e ,ay e investigates or constructs t e rig t angle are funda*entally different fro* t e t ings t e geo*etrician uses and t e ,ay e investigates t is geo*etrical figure.@16A ' e ancient co**entators *ost pro"a"ly found support for t eir vie, t at t e differences in e&actness across disciplines are due to t e different *et ods e*ployed "y t e* in Plato.s discussion of t ese issues in t e hilebus t at ) alluded to earlier >c ap. 6?. Plato argues in t at dialogue t at differences in *et ods give rise to differences in e&actness. +o*e arts or disciplines rely, according to i*, on con/ecture and e&perience, for e&a*ple, *usic, *edicine, agriculture. ' ese are t e arts t at Plato descri"es as , at ,ould "e left Gif arit *etic and t e sciences of *easure*ent and ,eig ing ,ere taken a,ay fro* all artsG >%%8?. But t e art of "uilding is unlike t e* "ecause it e*ploys *easure*ent and a nu*"er of instru*ents, and t erefore is *ore e&act t an t ey are: GBut t e art of "uilding, ) "elieve, e*ploys t e greatest nu*"er of *easures and instru*ents , ic give it great accuracy @

A and *ake it *ore scientific t an *ost arts. )n , at ,ay; )n s ipB"uilding and ouseB"uilding, and

*any ot er "ranc es of ,oodB,orking. -or t ey use a rule, ) i*agine, a lat e, co*passes, a c alkBline, and an ingenious instru*ent called a viceG >%EB?. Plato, t en, see*s to anticipate t e t esis of t e ancient co**entators t at t e source of ine&actness across disciplines is due to different 5 ##1 5 *et ods, and *ost certainly anticipates t e list of instru*ents 8ustratius gives t at presu*a"ly define t e *et od of t e "uilder. 7et Plato is *uc *ore cautious t an so*e of t e ancient co**entators see* to "e. <e is *uc *ore cautious in , at e says a"out t e *et ods of t e various disciplines or arts. ' e differences in e&actness across disciplines do not necessarily ste* fro* or i*ply differences in *et ods. +o t at , en e distinguis es "et,een t,o geo*etries, one pure and *ost e&act and t e ot er applied and less e&act, e is not saying t at t ese t,o disciplines use t,o different *et ods. Bot disciplines are, according to i*, geo*etries t at differ in e&actness, as are t e t,o arit *etics. P ilosop ical geo*etry is purer >

? t an t e reckoning and *easuring of t e "uilding art >%FABB?4 it possesses a ig er degree of e&actness and purity >%FC?. +i*ilarly, p ilosop ical arit *etic is i**easura"ly superior in e&actness and trut a"out *easures and nu*"ers t an t e applied arit *etical arts >%F3?. Plato.s e*p asis is on t e differences in t e degree to , ic t ese disciplines do t e sa*e kind of t ing rat er t an on eac doing so*et ing different in kind fro* , at t e ot er does. ' e variation in e&actness in t e a"ove disciplines ste*s, according to Plato, pri*arily fro* t e nature of t e o"/ects t ey deal ,it . Applied arit *etic reckons "y using as a unit t e o& or t e ar*y, , ereas t e p ilosop ical one "y using t e true unit t at does not Gdiffer at all fro* eac and every ot er unit.G Plato goes on to argue t at dialectic is even *ore e&act t an t e pure *at e*atical disciplines for Gt e kno,ledge , ic as to do ,it "eing, reality, and eternal i**uta"ility is t e truest kind of kno,ledgeG >%HA?. But t e disciplines t at deal ,it t e t ings of t e p ysical ,orld cannot attain any e&actness for G o, can ,e gain any certainty , atsoever a"out t ings t at ave no certainty , atsoever;G >%9B?. )t is true, as seen a"ove, t at Plato takes certain arts like *usic and agriculture to rely on con/ecture, perception, or guessing, and t us per aps on different *et ods. But t ese kinds of arts t at rely on suc G*et odsG are for i* , at is left after Garit *etic and t e disciplines of *easure*ent and ,eig ing ,ere taken a,ay fro* all arts, , at ,as left of any of t e* ,ould "e, so to speak, ,ort lessG >%%3?. ' e co*parisons of e&actness Plato presents are "et,een disciplines t at s are to so*e degree a co**on *et od: "ot kinds of arit *etic use co*putations and "ot geo*etries use reckoning and *easuring.@1#A ' e differences in e&actness a*ong suc disciplines ste* fro* t e differences in t eir o"/ects, purity, rigor, and so fort , and not fro* different *et ods. Plato.s concern is ,it t e relation of e&actness to t e goals of a discipline. Alt oug e does not connect t e t,o as e&plicitly as Aristotle appears to do, t ere is no dou"t t at e t inks t at t e goals affect t e e&actness of a discipline.@14A ' us, dialectic is for i* t e *ost e&act in part 5 ##6 5 "ecause its goals are purely t eoretical, its ai* solely t at of attaining t e trut , co*pletely disregarding any concern ,it usefulness >%H3?. Aristotle.s o,n re*arks can "e understood along t e lines suggested "y Plato.s discussion. ' at is,

Aristotle i*self, in contrast to t e interpretation offered "y so*e of t e ancient co**entators, is not saying t at t e "uilder uses a *et od t at is altoget er different fro* t at of t e geo*etrician. <e is not arguing t at differences in e&actness are t e result of different *et ods. 0at er, e t inks of suc differences in e&actness as "eing a conse1uence of t e fact t at t e sa*e *et od is differently used "y various disciplines. 3egrees of e&actness *ay correspond to t e levels to , ic t e various disciplines *ake use of a co**on *et od, ,it t e levels "eing fi&ed "y t e nature of t e disciplines t e*selves. )f, for e&a*ple, t e co**on *et od is t e de*onstrative one, t ere ,ill "e disciplines , ose su"/ect *atter per*its and , ose goals re1uire t e use of de*onstration of t e *ost rigorous and pure kind. ' ere *ay "e ot ers , ic are suc t at, , ile t eir su"/ect *atter *ay eit er per*it or not per*it rigorous or e&act de*onstration, t eir goals do not re1uire it. ' is ,ay of reading Aristotle.s re*arks takes

in 9.1 to *ean discipline, investigation, or in1uiry, and connects t e e&actness Aristotle speaks of in 9.1 and 9.6 to t e nature or goals of an in1uiry. )t can "e seen, to "egin ,it , t at 9.1 refers "ack to , at ,as said earlier=G,e *ust also keep in *ind , at ,as said earlier @

AG=and t is reference *ust "e, as t e translators agree, to N.E. ).iii, 1B4, >E.6?. And as seen earlier, Aristotle discusses in t at passage t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter of et ics and argues t at t e e&actness to "e soug t in et ical investigation s ould "e co**ensurate to a su"/ect *atter t at is fluctuating and is only for t e *ost part. And no, e asks us in 9.1 Gto keep in *ind , at ,as said earlier and not seek e&actness in t e sa*e ,ay in all cases, "ut in eac case in accordance ,it t e su"/ect *atter and in suc a degree as is appropriate to t e particular .G ' e only t ing ,e find t ere t at *ay "e taken as a discussion of t e connection "et,een e&actness and procedure, ,ay, or *et od is t e re*ark, touc ed upon earlier, t at Git is t e *ark of an educated *ind to e&pect t at a*ount of e&actness in eac kind @genus= A , ic t e nature of t e su"/ect ad*its. )t is e1ually unreasona"le to accept *erely pro"a"ly conclusions fro* a *at e*atician and to de*and de*onstrations fro* a r etoricianG >E.6?. :"viously t ere is a difference "et,een , at t e *at e*atician and r etorician do and per aps a different type of e&actness is relevant to t eir different procedures or ,ays, "ut it is apparent t at Aristotle is pri*arily concerned ,it t e e&actness in relation to t e su"/ect *atter and t e nature or goals of t e discipline. ' e goals of *at e*atics ,ould not "e satisfied and t e su"/ect *atter ,ould not "e ade1uately treated if t e *at e*atician ,ere to produce con/ectures. 5 ### 5 And conversely, neit er t e goals of r etoric nor its su"/ect *atter de*and proofs. +o it is e1ually unreasona"le to de*and proofs fro* t e latter and accept con/ectures fro* t e for*er. ' e case is si*ilar ,it t e passage at and , ere Aristotle contrasts , at t e geo*etrician does to , at t e "uilder or carpenter does >9.6?. ' e e*p asis is on , at t e goal, task, purpose, or ,ork >

? of eac one is. ' e goals t at define eac of t e t,o disciplines are different and different investigations ,ould satisfy t e*. ' e "uilder investigates into t e rig t angle only to t e e&tent t at it satisfies t e goals of is discipline or art4 and t e *at e*atician to t e e&tent t at it satisfies is: not ing s ort of grasping t e essential nature of t e rig t angle and de*onstrating t e attri"utes t at follo, fro* it. <ere, t en, are t,o different disciplines t at in a sense deal ,it t e sa*e su"/ect=t e rig t angle="ut t e goals are different and t erefore , at ,ould satisfy t e goals of eac are different kinds of investigation. +o t at one ,ould "e dealing ,it secondary *atters to t e goal > ? if one ,ere to investigate into t e essential nature of t e rig t angle in t e conte&t of t e art of "uilding or into t e pro"le* of reproducing a rig t angle in different parts of a structure in t e conte&t of geo*etry. ' e goal of t e one discipline is t e study of t e nature or essence of geo*etrical o"/ects and t e causes or reasons for aving t e ot er necessary properties t at t ey ave.@1%A But t e goals of t e ot er discipline are practical and t erefore it seeks kno,ledge of so*e geo*etrical facts only insofar as it is needed in order to construct a "uilding, or anyt ing else of t e kind, t at as certain geo*etrical c aracteristics. )t need not, t erefore, concern itself ,it grasping t e essential nature or giving perspicuous proofs of t e necessary properties of geo*etrical figures. +i*ilarly, Aristotle argues in 9.#, e&actness "eyond a certain level a"out t e p ysical plan of a city ,ill "e a ,aste of ti*e. +o a discipline, , ic is to "e in part understood in ter*s of its goals, re1uires so*e particular degree of e&actness in order to reali9e its goals. )t *ay re1uire a rat er ig level of e&actness, as presu*a"ly geo*etry does, or it *ay need a rat er lo, level, as "uilding supposedly does. 2e also see t at , at ,e translate, follo,ing al*ost all t e translators, as Gt e "uilder @or carpenterA and geo*etrician in1uire into @seek afterA t e rig t angle differently @in different ,ays=

AG is so*e, at less straig tfor,ard t an it appears in our translations. -or suc translations o"viously e*p asi9e differences a*ong types of procedures or ,ays=*et ods in t e narro, sense=of investigation. But t is ter* , as Jiddel and +cott point out, *ay *ean eit er Gin different ,aysG or Gin different degrees.G According to t e*, it *eans Gin different degreesG in its occurrence in t e passage under discussion. +o t at t e difference "et,een t e "uilder and t e geo*etrician is not really to "e found in t e different ,ays or *et ods t ey use to investigate t e rig t angle, "ut in 5 ##4 5 t e different degrees t ey investigate it. ' e one , ose goals are t eoretical and , o ai*s at t e trut , t e geo*etrician, investigates its nature and necessary attri"utes , ereas t e ot er , ose goals are practical, t e "uilder, is concerned ,it t ese sorts of t ings to a far lesser degree. And it is t e language of degrees t at Aristotle uses ere , en e insists t at ,e *ust not seek e&actness in t e sa*e ,ay >

? in all cases, "ut in eac , at is appropriate to t e su"/ect *atter and Gas *uc as @in suc a degree=

A is appropriate to t e in1uiry @or *et od= A.G <is o,n e*p asis t en, in contrast to t at of t e translators, *ay per aps "e on t e different degrees rat er t an on t e ,ays t e geo*etrician and t e "uilder investigate t e rig t angle or any ot er geo*etrical o"/ect or fact. ' e degree to , ic eac discipline investigates so*et ing, t e degree to , ic it /ustifies or proves , at it clai*s as "eing true, is fi&ed "y t e nature or goals of eac discipline. 2e ave ere not different *et ods, t en, "ut different applications of t e sa*e *et od. ' us, Aristotle.s re*arks can "e understood in ter*s of t e ,eaker prag*atic t esis stated earlier: 3ifferences of e&actness *ay ste* fro* differences in t e goals of t e various disciplines. ' is, of course, does not s o, t at t e strong prag*atic t esis t at connects e&actness to *et od is false, for differences in *et od *ay also i*ply differences in e&actness. 2 at it does s o, is t at it is not necessary t at t ere "e different *et ods in order for t ere to "e variation in e&actness. ' e strong prag*atic t esis, t en, is not needed in order to account for t e p eno*ena of e&actness!ine&actness Aristotle as in *ind. All e needs in order to e&plain t e variation in e&actness is to clai* t at t ere are differences in t e goals of disciplines and it is t e goals t at deter*ine t e re1uired level of e&actness. ' is is t e ,eaker prag*atic principle, , ic is also intended as a general principle, as so*et ing t at is true in all cases. Aristotle insists t at t ere is a level of e&actness t at is appropriate for eac and every discipline and t at t e level is relative to its goals. ' e level can range fro* t at re1uired in t e case of geo*etry to t at appropriate for t e art or discipline of "uilding or to t at proper to r etoric. ' e e&a*ples Aristotle gives in 9.6 of t e geo*etrician and t e "uilder and in E.6 of t e *at e*atician and r etorician are *eant to illustrate not t e range of *et ods, "ut rat er t at of t e different levels of e&actness t at correspond to disciplines ,it different goals or in so*e cases to disciplines ,it ine&act su"/ect *atter. ' e range, as t e contrast "et,een *at e*atics and r etoric suggests, is 1uite ,ide according to Aristotle. Aristotle.s intention in asserting a general prag*atic principle t at relativi9es e&actness to goals is o"vious. ' e trut of t e principle is taken for granted. 2e ave, strictly speaking, no proof or /ustification for it in t e present conte&t. ' e sole e&a*ple of t e "uilder and t e geo*etrician Aristotle gives is *ore an illustration of t e principle t an a proof or 5 ##% 5 /ustification of it. )ndeed, it could ardly offer "y itself a proof or /ustification of a t esis t at is intended to ave t e scope of application of t e prag*atic t esis. But once t e trut of suc a t esis is accepted, Aristotle can use it to offer so*e /ustification for is specific clai* a"out et ics=na*ely, t at t ere is so*e proper level of e&actness for et ics t at is fi&ed "y its goals and t at is different fro* t at proper to t eoretical disciplines. ' e level for et ics, and per aps for ot er disciplines ,it si*ilar goals, ,ill fall so*e, ere on t e spectru* of e&actness t at is defined at one end "y geo*etry >or *at e*atics? and at t e ot er "y r etoric.@1EA Understanding Aristotle.s re*arks in ter*s of t e ,eak prag*atic t esis ackno,ledges is insistence t at prag*atic considerations affect or even deter*ine so*e aspects of a discipline, "ut it also leaves open t e possi"ility t at different considerations *ay deter*ine ot er aspects of a discipline. -or t e ,eak t esis relativi9es e&actness, "ut not t e nature of t e *et od, e&planation, or proof, to prag*atic considerations. ' ese latter aspects could "e invariant across disciplines, for t ey could "e deter*ined "y identical nonprag*atic considerations, for e&a*ple, episte*ic ones. ' is see*s to *e 1uite

plausi"le given t e fact t at Aristotle does not identify any ot er *et od t an t e de*onstrative one@1FA and t at e considers disciplines , ic , according to i*, differ considera"ly a*ong t e*selves ,it respect to e&actness to "e sciences >

?, for e&a*ple, *at e*atics, *edicine, and gy*nastics.@1HA

+oals and Proofs

Alt oug ) find t is line of interpretation 1uite plausi"le and in agree*ent ,it *uc of , at Aristotle says else, ere a"out t e nature of et ics as a practical discipline, it is clear t at it does not "y itself rule out t e earlier interpretation , ic clai*s t at Aristotle identifies a *et od for et ics t at in so*e ,ay or ot er i*plies a type of ine&actness. )t does not rule out t e strong prag*atic t esis. 8it er one of t ese interpretations *ay "e , at Aristotle as in *ind in t e present conte&t, and "ot of t e* could "e applica"le in certain circu*stances. ' ere could "e a case , ere a discipline is ine&act "y virtue of t e *et od it e*ploys as ,ell as on account of t e fact t at its goals can "e satisfied "y a rat er lo, level of e&actness. Bot t e strong and ,eak prag*atic principles *ay "e applica"le to t e sa*e discipline in so*e cases. (edicine, for e&a*ple, *ay consist to a considera"le e&tent of e*pirical generali9ations, and t us "e less e&act "ecause of its *et od t an t ose disciplines , ic are purely de*onstrative. But it *ay also "e less e&act t an ot er disciplines "ecause it is practical, and t erefore its goals can "e satisfied ,it out reac ing t e level of e&actness t at is re1uired "y t e goals of a t eoretical discipline. +i*ilarly, t e arts of "uilding and geo*etry *ay "e taken to differ ,it 5 ##E 5 respect to e&actness for at least t,o reasons: first, "ecause t eir different goals presu*a"ly de*and different levels of e&actness, and second "ecause t ey e*ploy different *et ods. -or one *ay very ,ell argue t at "uilding and geo*etry do not *erely differ in t eir goals4 t ey use different *et ods. 2 ereas de*onstration is needed to kno, , at t e geo*etrician ai*s at=t e essence and necessary properties of a geo*etrical figure=no de*onstration of t e kind t e geo*etrician uses is re1uired in order to kno, , at t e "uilder needs to kno, for is purposes. )ndeed, ,e can easily see , y so*e of t e ancient co**entators opted for t e line of interpretation t at assigns different *et ods to t e art of "uilding and geo*etry, and it is t erefore difficult to dis*iss t is line of interpretation altoget er. -or one ,onders, and for precisely t e sa*e reasons so*e of t e ancient co**entators pro"a"ly ,ondered, , et er t e art of "uilding and geo*etry s are a co**on ground: 2 at, after all, is t e si*ilarity "et,een t e *et od t e geo*etrician uses and t e one t e "uilder uses; )s , at t e "uilder does , en e as recourse to geo*etry for is practical purposes a kind of de*onstration; 3oes anyt ing and everyt ing 1ualify as an instance, or an application, of t e de*onstrative *et od or is t ere a cutBoff point; ' e sa*e can "e t e case ,it et ics. :ne strand of ine&actness *ay "e due to its practical goals, anot er to t e *et od it uses. Per aps, et ics, like t e art of "uilding, does not involve de*onstration at all. 8t ics *ay very ,ell "e a discipline , ere eit er t e strong or ,eak prag*atic t esis applies or per aps "ot . Alt oug "ot interpretations ) sketc ed a"ove are possi"le and to so*e e&tent plausi"le, ) do not t ink Aristotle puts fort t e strong prag*atic t esis t at is favored "y 8ustratius and ot ers. 3espite t e a*"iguity in is ,ords, t ere are reasons t at tilt t e "alance in favor of t e ,eak prag*atic t esis. ' e reasons include , at as "een said so far in considering t e various interpretations of Aristotle.s

re*arks=na*ely, t at , en Aristotle in t e present conte&t speaks of

e *ost pro"a"ly *eans in1uiry rat er t an *et od4 e does not identify a *et od for et ics or for t e art of t e "uilder4 t e language of degrees e uses suggests t at e as in *ind differences of degree in t e application of one *et od rat er t an differences of kind. 2e *ay also add , at Plato says a"out t ese *atters. <e ,as, as seen a"ove, ,illing to accept in t e hilebus t,o arit *etics and t,o geo*etries. ' e t,o arit *etics differ "et,een t e*selves in t e level of e&actness t ey attain, and so do t e t,o geo*etries. But all t ese disciplines=t at is, t e counting or calculating , ile using Ginco*para"ly large unitsG >t,o ar*ies and t,o o&en? vs. t e unit of pure arit *etic4 t e reckoning and *easuring in t e art of "uilding vs. t at in pure geo*etry=are, according to i*, *at e*atical ones. ' ere is, despite t e differences in e&actness, a co**on core of *et od or proof. 5 ##F 5 )ndeed, additional reasons can "e adduced on "e alf of attri"uting t e ,eaker prag*atic t esis to Aristotle "y follo,ing t e Platonic line. -or Aristotle, as ) argued in previous c apters, is ,illing to rela& so*e, at is conception of de*onstration or proof. )n t is case, t e 1uestion is , et er e is ,illing to accept so*e co**on ground "et,een , at t e "uilder does and , at t e geo*etrician does. :r, in ot er ,ords, does is enlarged vie, of de*onstration also acco**odate disciplines , ose goals *ay re1uire a lo, level of e&actness in order to "e satisfied; Aristotle looks at de*onstration as co*prising a spectru* of activities or conditions. )t includes t e *ost rigorous and pure proofs of t e *ost e&act disciplines and it also reac es do,n to t e less rigorous and i*pure proofs of t e least e&act ones. But t ere is so*e core t at all t ese disciplines ave, a core t at need not "e trivial or e*pty. )n t is vein one *ay argue, as Plato does in t e hilebus , t at even t e case of t e "uilder.s art is a for* of de*onstrative discipline. As <ippocrates G. Apostle as suggested,@19A in t e e&a*ple Aristotle gives "ot t e geo*etrician and t e "uilder ai* at t e construction of t e rig t angle, and t ere ,ould "e *any *ore si*ilarities in t e concerns of t e t,o= t e geo*etrical construction of ot er figures, t e "isection of a line, of an arc, and so on. ' is is per aps to "e e&pected fro* a geo*etry , ic is vie,ed as a&io*ati9ed "ut not for*ali9ed and fro* an art like t at of "uilding , ic , like structural *ec anics and dyna*ics, involves a considera"le a*ount of geo*etrical facts, constructions, and secondary proofs. )t is arts like t ese, toget er ,it t e art of land *easuring, t at provided t e first sources of geo*etrical proofs and constructions. )t is 1uite possi"le, t en, t at Aristotle vie,s t e e&a*ple of t e "uilder as an e&a*ple of so*eone , o is pursuing a lo,er for* of a de*onstrative science, so*eone , o investigates into t e rig t angle and is not e&clusively concerned, or not as *uc as 8ustratius suggests, ,it t e *anual aspects of reali9ing a structure. )n t is sense, t e art t at Aristotle as in *ind ere ,ould "e a practical or productive discipline, one t at uses so*e type of de*onstration. ' e de*onstrations it uses *ay not "e as pure and perspicuous as t e ones t e geo*eter uses=for t ey *ay not derive fro* t e ulti*ate principles of t e genus t at geo*etry studies=t ey *ay include constructions of geo*etrical figures, proofs "y transposition and superposition of figures, and so fort ="ut t ey ,ould nonet eless fall ,it in t e ,ider spectru* of de*onstration spoken of earlier. As seen in t at earlier discussion, Aristotle.s conception of ideal, a"solute, or un1ualified de*onstration is as good as Plato.s. But, as ,as also seen, e ,as ,illing to ad*it ,eaker for*s of it. ' e contrast "et,een i* and t e Plato of (iddle Platonis* on t is point can "est "e seen "y 1uoting t e fa*ous passage fro* t e Republic , ere Plato "anis es ordinary proofs of geo*etry fro* t e science of geo*etry:

=.9

5 ##H 5 G' is at least,G said ), G,ill not "e disputed "y t ose , o ave even a slig t ac1uaintance ,it geo*etry, t at t is science is in direct contradiction ,it t e language e*ployed in it "y its adepts.G G<o, so;G e said. G' eir language is *ost ludicrous,@6$Athough they cannot help it' for they spea- as if they )ere doing something and as if all their )ords )ere directed to)ards action. <or all their tal- is of s/uaring and applying and adding and the li-e' )hereas in fact the real ob$ect of the entire study is pure -no)ledge.D 1:%5A7

)t *ay very ,ell "e t at ideally one s ould dispense ,it suc *eans in geo*etry, or it *ay "e true t at one does not ave a"solute kno,ledge unless one kno,s t e reasons for , ic suc geo*etrical constructions are possi"le.@61A But t is does not rule out t at one *ay ave so*e for* of kno,ledge and proof even , en staying at t e level of t e adepts Plato ridicules a"ove, or at least t at one *ay co*e to reali9e suc geo*etrical trut s as Plato as in *ind "y doing geo*etrical constructions. Aristotle, alt oug strongly pulled "y Plato.s vie,s, *ost pro"a"ly finds t e e&clusion of typical geo*etrical proofs fro* geo*etry difficult to accept: G)t is "y an activity also t at geo*etrical constructions are discovered4 for ,e find t e* "y dividing. )f t e figures ad "een already divided, t e construction ,ould ave "een o"vious4 "ut as it is t ey are present only potentially . . . it is "y *aking constructions t at people co*e to kno, t e*G >Met. 1$%1a66?.@66A But not only is Aristotle ,illing to accept suc *eans as constructions for co*ing to kno, trut s like t ose of geo*etry , ic are taken to "e t e *odels of a"solute or un1ualified trut or kno,ledge, "ut, as as "een seen, e is ,illing to accept less perfect types of trut and kno,ledge and t e *eans >types of de*onstrations? t at lead to t e*. 3e*onstrations can "e less e&act "y consisting , olly or partially of pre*ises t at are not necessary, or t at are not universally true. :r t ey *ay "e less e&act "ecause t e discipline to , ic t ey "elong does not a"stract sufficiently fro* *atter >see c ap. 4?, or "ecause our kno,ledge of t e "asic principles fro* , ic de*onstrations proceeds *ay not "e of t e kind t at Aristotle re1uires of t e "asic principles of a discipline.@6#A )ndeed, ,e can see t at t e pre*ises *ay "e, or , at one studies *ay e& i"it properties t at are, necessary and yet t e de*onstrations suc pre*ises produce in so*e conte&ts *ay not "e e&act. +o*e of t e pre*ises t e "uilder uses in is calculations or inferences *ay "e necessary, "ut t is *ay not "e kno,n to i*. -or e *ay lack t e perspicuous a&io*atic structure t at reveals t e necessity of suc pre*ises. <e presu*a"ly as no need to kno, suc an a&io*atic structure, since is goals can "e satisfied ,it out it. )f , at as "een said so far is correct, ,e ave uncovered anot er ,ay in , ic a practical discipline *ay "e less e&act t an or differ fro* a 5 ##9 5 t eoretical one. And t is ,ay, like t e one discussed earlier, as to do ,it t e nature of t e goals of a discipline. But , ereas in t e earlier case Aristotle ,as arguing t at t e goals of a practical discipline re1uire it to reac a level of e&actness t at surpasses t at of t eoretical disciplines, in t e present case e is arguing t at a ig level of e&actness *ay not "e re1uired. )n t e for*er case, Aristotle clai*s, t e goals de*and ever greater detail, t ey dictate t at ,e reac t e particular. And ine&actness results fro* failing to do so. )n t e latter case, t ey see* to pus in t e opposite direction, a,ay fro* e&actness. -or t ey do not re1uire t e de*onstrative rigor or purity t at t eoretical goals re1uire in order to "e

satisfied. ' ese t,o types of ine&actness are clearly different despite t e fact t at t ey ste* fro* t e sa*e considerations: t e supposed practical goals of et ics. ' e one is t e failure to reac t e ever greater detail or specificity t at, according to Aristotle, is re1uired "y t e practical goals of et ics. ' e ot er is t e lack of de*onstrative rigor or purity t at is per*itted or re1uired "y t ese sa*e goals, since, Aristotle clai*s, t e cognitive goals of et ics are su"ordinate to its practical goals, and it is t e latter t at dictate t e level of e&actness proper to t e discipline. But , at does t e su"ordination of kno,ledge to practice in nont eoretical disciplines i*ply; And can t e ine&actness t at Aristotle associates ,it suc a su"ordinate role of kno,ledge "e eli*inated fro* practical disciplines; ' ese are so*e of t e 1uestions ) ,ant to turn to ne&t.

+oals and the Proper #egree of '*actness

' e types of ine&actness and t eir sources e&a*ined in previous c apters can, ,it so*e /ustification, "e looked upon as "eing difficult or i*possi"le to eli*inate. Aristotle, as seen a"ove, often vie,s t e* as "eing suc . )n t is e ,as *ost pro"a"ly influenced "y t e assu*ptions t at so*e of t ese types of ine&actness are c aracteristics of t e su"/ect *atter et ics studies and t at t ere is so*e kind of congruence "et,een t e *aterial and for*al level of a discipline. 3ou"ts ,ere raised earlier a"out t e trut of t e congruence t esis as a general t esis, "ut even so t e types of ine&actness Aristotle attri"utes to t e su"/ect *atter provided i* ,it good reasons for clai*ing t at certain kinds of ine&actness at t e for*al level *ay "e difficult or i*possi"le to eli*inate. ' us t e assu*ption t at t e su"/ect *atter of et ics e& i"its nonnecessary properties leads Aristotle to t e conclusion t at *atters of conduct and our accounts of t e* are essentially ine&act "y "eing contingent. )f *atters of conduct are in addition only for t e *ost part and our accounts of t e* are true for t e *ost part, t en our de*onstrations in et ics are also ine&act for t e reasons discussed a"ove. ' e assu*ption t at *atters of conduct t e*selves suffer fro* vagueness leads i* to t e conclusion 5 #4$ 5 t at t e sa*e type of ine&actness at t e for*al level is *ore difficult to deal ,it . 8ven in t e case of t e ine&actness discussed in c apter %, , ic Aristotle associates ,it t e goals of et ics, e as good reasons for taking it to "e difficult or i*possi"le to eli*inate. -or if ,e assu*e t at et ics is practical, t at action deals ,it particulars, and t at et ics needs to reac t e level of t e particular in order to reali9e its goals, t en t e possi"ility of producing accounts t at are e&act in t e sense t at t ey reac t e particulars is likely to "e out of reac . But , en ,e turn our attention to t e ine&actness under discussion in t is c apter ,e *ay feel t at t ings are so*e, at different: )ne&actness in t is case does not see* to "e as per*anent a feature of et ics as in t e ot er cases. -irst, it does not reside in nor is it caused "y so*e feature of t e su"/ect *atter. 'o use Aristotle.s illustration, , at t e "uilder investigates ,it out attaining e&actness, can in fact "e investigated e&actly or at least *ore e&actly. ' e geo*etrical figures e investigates ine&actly can "e investigated in t e ,ay geo*etry does, and t us t eir nature and attri"utes can "e given t e kind of rigorous de*onstration associated ,it geo*etry. )f ,e take Aristotle.s analogy seriously, ,e ,ill ave to say t at t e sa*e *ay "e true in t e case of t at , ic a practical et ical in1uiry investigates. ' ere *ig t "e, in ot er ,ords, an even *ore e&act account of t at , ic et ics investigates. -or, after all, , at is t ere in t e case of et ics, ot er t an t e sorts of t ings discussed in earlier c apters, t at rules out t e possi"ility of giving de*onstrations in *atters of conduct t at are *ore e&act t an t ose encountered in a practical et ical in1uiry;

+econd, and per aps *ost i*portant, is t e fact t at t e ,ay Aristotle descri"es in t e present conte&t t e relation of e&actness to t e goals of a discipline see*s to lead to t e sa*e conclusion: alt oug a ig level of e&actness *ay not "e needed in so*e disciplines, it *ay not "e i*possi"le. ' e deficiency in e&actness in t e case of t e "uilder or is discipline is due to t e fact t at is or t e discipline.s goals can "e satisfied ,it out reac ing accounts or e&planations of t e ideal type soug t or needed else, ere. +uc ideal types of e&planation are inappropriate, "eside t e point, or not needed for is ,ork. 'o seek suc ideal e&planation in t e discipline of "uilding is to "e concerned ,it *atters t at are secondary, *atters t at *ay "e outside t e function >

? of t e discipline. But t is of course does not s o, t at e&planations of a ig level of e&actness are i*possi"le. )ndeed, as 9.# suggests, t e pro"le* ,it ig ly e&act accounts in political *atters is not t eir i*possi"ility "ut rat er t eir alleged uselessness. ' e sa*e could "e said a"out et ics. ' us, t is argu*ent *ay not rule out as i*possi"le +pino9a.s or 0a,ls.s vision of a *oral geo*etry, nor Plato.s vision of a discipline even *ore rigorous t an geo*etry t at studies *atters of conduct and s o,s de*onstratively t eir necessary structure fro* t at of t e Good. And, of course, it does 5 #41 5 not rule out as i*possi"le Aristotle.s o,n conception of a *ore t eoretical investigation of *atters of conduct t at e ints at in t e rotrept.' E.E.' and olit. Aristotle.s argu*ent e*p asi9ing t e connection "et,een t e proper e&actness for a discipline and its goals, and is clai* t at in practical disciplines t e level of e&actness *ay "e lo,er t an t at , ic is re1uired in t eoretical ones, are understanda"le , en seen against t e Platonic tradition. ' at tradition raises et ics and politics to t e level, and even a"ove t e level, of t e *ost rigorous of t e disciplines. Plato argues in t e Republic t at t e greatest e&actness is de*anded in our study of *atters of conduct "ecause suc *atters are of t e greatest i*portance: G:r ,ould it not "e a"surd to strain every nerve to attain to t e ut*ost e&actness and clarity of kno,ledge a"out ot er t ings of trifling *o*ent and not to de*and t e greatest e&actness for t e greatest *atters;G >%$48?. And, alt oug in t e hilebus e co*es 1uite close to e*"racing t e vie, t at e&actness is relative to t e goals of a discipline, e conspicuously o*its et ics and politics fro* t e list of t e disciplines t at e& i"it or re1uire lo,er levels of e&actness. Plato see*s not to ave c anged is *ind a"out t e level of e&actness t at is re1uired for t e disciplines concerned ,it *atters of conduct. ' e political discipline or art in t e !tatesman is descri"ed "y i* as ai*ing at kno,ledge of t e *ost e&act kind. But t is level of e&actness, Aristotle argues, is not re1uired "y t ese disciplines. 2e do not need to surpass, nor even e1ual, t e level of e&actness of t e *at e*atical disciplines in our investigations into *atters of conduct in order for suc investigations to satisfy t eir purposes. )f t e practical goals of t ese kinds of in1uiries can "e ac ieved ,it out kno,ledge t at as t e e&actness Plato re1uires, t en kno,ledge of suc e&actness is "eside t e point. 7et Aristotle is saying so*et ing *ore t an *erely t at t e e&actness Plato re1uires in in1uiries a"out *atters of conduct is not needed. -or t is does not undercut co*pletely t e Platonic position. Plato can retort t at, alt oug t e Platonic level of e&actness *ay not "e needed, kno,ledge of *atters of conduct t at as t at level of e&actness can nonet eless "e used in t e conte&t of practice. )t *ay not "e necessary, Plato *ig t argue, "ut it *ig t "e sufficient, or at least useful. Aristotle.s argu*ent in 9.1 and 9.6 is also, ) t ink, partly ai*ing to undercut t e clai* t at kno,ledge possessing t e e&actness Plato re1uires is sufficient or useful in t e conte&t of practice.

Consider, to "egin ,it , so*e of t e ter*s t at figure pro*inently in Aristotle.s argu*ent a"out t e relation of e&actness to t e goals of a discipline. )n 9.6 Aristotle c aracteri9es t e e&act kno,ledge geo*etry attains as "eing a secondary *atter or "eside t e point >

? in relation to t e purposes of t e "uilder. ' is ter* occurs rat er 5 #46 5 rarely in t e Aristotelian corpus, "ut in at least one occurrence in t e olit. t e ter* is used to signify , at its ety*ology i*plies=t at is, so*et ing t at is "eside, or falls outside, t e function of so*et ing. At 1#64a1# Aristotle raises t,o 1uestions t at see* to "e t e types of 1uestions political in1uiry as to ans,er: >a? 2 ic *ode of life is *ost desira"le >i.e., t e life of participation in politics or t at of detac *ent fro* political activity?;4 >"? 2 at constitution or , at organi9ation of a state is t e "est; <e t en re*arks: GBut as it is t e latter 1uestion t at is t e function @

A of political study and conte*plation, and not t e 1uestion of , at is desira"le for t e individual, and as it is t e political investigation t at ,e ave no, taken up, t e for*er 1uestion ,ould "e "eside t e function @ A, and t e latter is t e function @ A of t is investigation.G )f t e function, purpose, or end of political in1uiry is t e specification of t e "est for* of political association, and ulti*ately t e practical reali9ation of suc for*, t en its function ,ill not "e served "y in1uiring into 1uestions of different *atters. )t is not part of t e function of t is in1uiry to investigate into , ic life is desira"le for t e individual and its function ,ill not "e reali9ed "y doing so. ' e connection "et,een t e function of so*et ing and t e activities and conditions t at reali9e it is, according to Aristotle, a strong one. ' e function can "e reali9ed only "y a uni1ue activity and only , en certain conditions are present. ' e function of a "uilder can "e reali9ed only "y t e activity of "uilding and "y using t ose skills re1uired for suc activity. )f t e "uilder is in addition a *usician and possesses t e 1ualifications re1uired for t e latter activity, it does not follo, fro* t is t at t e *usical activity and 1ualifications reali9e t e function of t e "uilder. ' ese are necessary and sufficient for reali9ing a different function and are t erefore "eside t e point , en considered in relation to t e function of t e "uilder.@64A But Aristotle is not *erely clai*ing t at so*e conditions need to "e satisfied in order for t e function to "e reali9ed. <e often insists t at t ese conditions *ust "e satisfied in a rat er precise ,ay. ' us, alt oug t e function of t e "rain cannot "e reali9ed if t e condition of fluidity is not satisfied, not any degree of fluidity ,ill do: G)f t e "rain "eco*es unduly fluid or unduly solid, it ,ill not perfor* its proper function, "ut ,ill eit er fail to cool t e "lood or else ,ill *ake it set fast, t us producing various for*s of disease, *adness, and deat G > .A. E%#"#?.@6%A Iot only *ust t e organ of t e sense of s*ell "e constituted "y t e appropriate *atter "ut it *ust also "e located in t e

appropriate part of t e "ody if it is to do its function > .A. E%Fa%?. ' e eye, Aristotle argues, *ust "e fluid to a certain degree in order to do its function, and it needs protective coverings "ecause of its fluidity. But t e solidity of t e eye cannot "e increased in order to i*prove its safety: G)f t e eye ad "een constructed ,it a ard skin it ,ould of course ave "een less lia"le to in/ury "y i*pact fro* ,it out, "ut its vision ,ould 5 #4# 5 ave "een dullerG > .A. E%Fa#$?. Kision or t e function of t e eye, Aristotle clai*s, is G"ound to "e di**ed "y t e ardness of t e eyeG > .A. E%F"#%?. ' e a"ove e&a*ples s o, t at Aristotle often vie,s t e conditions needed for reali9ing t e function of so*et ing as aving a rat er specific c aracter. )f, for instance, t ey ad*it of degrees, t e degree re1uired for perfor*ing t e function falls ,it in a specific range. A fluidity or solidity t at is outside a certain range ,ill *ake it i*possi"le for t e "rain to do its function. +i*ilarly, an undue ardness of t e eye ,ill certainly perfor* so*e function ,ell=it ,ill protect t e eye. But it ,ill i*pede, and in so*e cases *ake i*possi"le, t e perfor*ance of t e function of t e eye, t at is, t e purpose for , ic t is organ e&ists. ' us, increasing to t e ut*ost degree a condition re1uired for doing so*e function < does not necessarily i*ply t at t e function can "e perfor*ed. :n t e ot er and, t ere *ig t "e t ings t at, alt oug not necessary for t e perfor*ance of so*e function < , *ay not i*pede its perfor*ance or *ay even "e sufficient. -is , according to Aristotle, ave no eyelids "ecause t ey do not need protective coverings of t e eyes, since t e *ediu* in , ic t ey live does not contain o"/ects t at can strike t e eye > .A. E%HaH?. But if t ey ad eyelids, it ,ould not i*pede t eir vision. +i*ilarly, overdesigning a "uilding against eart 1uakes of a *agnitude t at ,ill never occur *ay not "e necessary, "ut it is sufficient to protect t e "uilding against eart 1uakes of t e kinds of *agnitude t at usually occur. But , at *ay "e neit er necessary nor sufficient for doing so*e function < *ay "e necessary or sufficient for perfor*ing so*e ot er function E . 2 at Aristotle says a"out t e relation "et,een t e level of e&actness and t e goals of a discipline is to "e understood along t e sa*e lines. )t is not, in ot er ,ords, *erely t e case t at t e e&actness of geo*etry is not necessary for t e goals of t e "uilder. )t *ay also not "e sufficient or useful for , at e does. ' at kind of e&actness is necessary and sufficient for ac ieving , at t e geo*etrician ai*s at. But ,e s ould not assu*e t at if ,e ,ere to raise t e level of e&actness in t e "uilder.s investigation, or ,ere to ac ieve t at of t e geo*etrician, or, to follo, Plato, ,ere to surpass t e level of t e geo*etrician ,e ,ould "e a"le to ac ieve t e goals of t e "uilding discipline. -or t e "uilder, Aristotle argues, to pursue t at level of e&actness is to get sidetracked4 it is to pursue so*et ing t at *ay reali9e t e goals of t e geo*etrician "ut not necessarily is o,n goals. <e ,ill i*pede or *ake i*possi"le t e reali9ation of is goals /ust as continuous ardening of t e eye ,ill i*pede or *ake i*possi"le t e reali9ation of t e goals of t e eye, alt oug it ,ill certainly protect t e eye fro* in/ury. And /ust as t e conditions re1uired for t e function of t e eye *ust "e ,it in a certain range, t e e&actness for t e reali9ation of t e practical goals of t e "uilder *ust re*ain ,it in a certain range. ' e vie, t at e&actness surpassing a certain level *ay not "e sufficient 5 #44 5 or useful in attaining so*e practical goals is stated clearly "y Aristotle in t,o passages fro* t e Rhet. At 1#E9"#6, and ,it regard to t e definitions of t e pleasant and t e "eneficial, Aristotle re*arks: GAnd ,e *ust regard our definitions as sufficient, if in eac case t ey are neit er o"scure nor too

precise @

A.G 3efinitions in r etorical conte&ts are soug t after for practical purposes. And for t ese purposes, Aristotle clai*s, t e appropriate definitions *ust *eet so*e level of e&actness, "ut t ey need not and cannot "e of an e&actness t at surpasses a certain level if t ey are to function in practical conte&ts. ' is is "roug t out even *ore clearly in , at Aristotle says at 1414aH , ere e is concerned, a*ong ot er t ings, ,it t e level of e&actness re1uired "y various r etorical styles in order t at t ey ac ieve t e goals for , ic t ey ave "een devised: G' e style of pu"lic oratory is in every respect like a roug sketc @sceneBpainting, A, for t e greater t e cro,d, t e *ore distant is t e point of vie,: , erefore, in "ot of t e* too *uc e&actness @detail, A is superfluous @ A and a disadvantage @ A.G )f one.s goal is to convey a scene fro* a distance, one ,ill not ac ieve it "y producing t e *ost detailed painting. ' e detail or e&actness, for e&a*ple, of a pen and ink dra,ing is not t e sort of t ing t at ,ill succeed in conveying an i*age fro* a distance. +i*ilarly, t e practical o"/ectives of pu"lic speaking ,ill not necessarily "e ac ieved "y *aking one.s speec *ore and *ore precise. ' ere is presu*a"ly so*e definite range of e&actness t at is necessary and sufficient if t e goals of t ese practical pursuits are to "e reali9ed. ' e idea t at so*e level of e&actness fits a discipline in t e ,ay descri"ed ere is , at lies "e ind Aristotle.s re*ark in 9.1 t at ,e *ust seek t e e&actness appropriate >

? to a particular discipline. -or t is ter* is often used "y i* to c aracteri9e a rat er strong and uni1ue connection t at *ay o"tain "et,een certain t ings. ' us, Aristotle often c aracteri9es in t is fas ion t e function of a t ing >N.E. 11#9a1F, 11EF"#4, 11F%a#E, 11FEa%?.@6EA ' e function of t e eye is proper to t e eye, t at of t e and proper to t e and, and so fort . )n eac case t e function is essentially connected to t e nature of t e t ing of , ic it is a function. +i*ilarly, Aristotle c aracteri9es t e e&cellence of so*et ing as "eing proper to it. ' e e&cellence of so*et ing is t e set of t ose conditions t at are necessary and sufficient for doing t e proper function of t e t ing ,ell: GA function is perfor*ed ,ell , en it is perfor*ed in accordance ,it its proper @ A e&cellenceG >1$9Ha1%?4 G@t e e&cellence of anyt ingA renders t e t ing good and *akes it to perfor* its function ,ell. -or e&a*ple, t e e&cellence of t e eye renders it good, and *akes it perfor* its

function >since it is "y t e e&cellence of t e eye t at ,e see ,ell?G >11$Ea1E4 see also 11FFa1F, Met. 1$61"61?. ' e e&cellence of t e eye=t at is, t e re1uired degree of fluidity, softness, roundness, 5 #4% 5 and so fort =is, t en, proper to it and to its function "ecause it co*prises t ose conditions t at, , en present in t e appropriate degree, are necessary and sufficient for perfor*ing t e function of t e eye. ' ese conditions *ust "e present if t e function is to "e perfor*ed ,ell. )n t e sa*e ,ay t e e&actness Aristotle c aracteri9es as "eing proper to a discipline is part of t e set of conditions t at are necessary and sufficient for perfor*ing t e function of t e discipline. ' e function of t e "uilding art and of t e "uilder is, Aristotle clai*s, different fro* t at of geo*etry and t e geo*etrician. And corresponding to t ese functions are, presu*a"ly, different proper e&cellences. ' e e&actness proper in eac case, "eing so*e co*ponent of t e e&cellence re1uired for reali9ing t e function in eac case, cannot "e t e sa*e for "ot disciplines. 2 en in 9.1 Aristotle speaks of an e&actness t at is proper to a discipline or its goals, e *eans to say t at t e o"/ectives of t e discipline cannot "e reali9ed ,it out it. ' ey cannot "e reali9ed "y an e&actness t at is eit er a"ove or "elo, t at range , ic t e discipline clai*s as its proper e&actness. ' e range of e&actness for t e "uilding art, and per aps for all practical disciplines, cannot *atc , let alone surpass, t at of geo*etry. And if et ics is suc a discipline, t en , at is re1uired and is sufficient for t e reali9ation of its goals is so*et ing less t an t e e&actness of t e t eoretical disciplines. Aristotle.s contention t at a certain level of e&actness *ay not *erely "e useless for so*e practical purpose >i.e., in t e sense t at ,e can reali9e our purpose ,it out suc a level? "ut it *ay also not "e sufficient >i.e., in t e sense t at ,e cannot reali9e our purpose ,it it? ,ill undou"tedly see* odd. But upon reflection it see*s t at Aristotle is pointing to so*et ing i*portant a"out practice and t e *eans for successfully reali9ing it. Aristotle.s e&a*ple a"out scene painting s o,s t at not all practical goals can "e reali9ed "y raising t e level of e&actness ig er and ig er. And ,e s ould not assu*e t at t is is peculiar to so*e arts like painting or r etoric. )t *ay also "e true in relation to practice t at re1uires t eoretical kno,ledge in order to "ring a"out its goals. + ould ,e assu*e t at t e *ost e&act kno,ledge ,ill ena"le us to reali9e our goals; )t is not o"vious t at ,e ,ill succeed, for e&a*ple, in counting t e apples in a "asket "y using t e a&io*s and t eore*s of t e rincipia Mathematica. :r, to adopt an e&a*ple t at Putna* as given, t e *ost ela"orate description in ter*s of 1uantu* *ec anics of t e structure of a syste* consisting of a "oard ,it oles and pegs of different geo*etrical s apes need not "e t e description t at ,ill elp to put t e appropriate pegs t roug t e oles on t e "oard. @6FA As 2ittgenstein says in t e hilosophical In+estigations , G)s an indistinct p otograp a picture of a person at all; )s it even al,ays an advantage to replace an indistinct picture "y a s arp one; )sn.t t e indistinct one often e&actly , at ,e need;G >), F1?. 5 #4E 5 )f our interpretation of Aristotle.s vie,s on t e e&actness t at is proper to a discipline is correct, ,e see , y e *ig t ave vie,ed even t e ine&actness under discussion in t e present conte&t as "eing difficult or i*possi"le to eli*inate. -or /ust as t e "rain.s fluidity cannot "e eli*inated if it is to perfor* its function and t e eye.s softness cannot "e eli*inated if it is to perfor* its function, so in t e case of a practical discipline, its ine&actness cannot "e eli*inated if its goals are to "e attained. 2 at Aristotle says in 9.1 and 9.6 gives no indication t at e took t e ine&actness due to t e goals of et ics or t e "uilding art to "e eli*ina"le. :n t e contrary, is urging us not to seek an e&actness t at is ig er t an is proper and is re*inding us of t e ine&actness t at e spoke of earlier and t at e also

assu*ed to "e ineli*ina"le indicates t at e took t e ine&actness resulting fro* t e goals of et ics to "e ineli*ina"le. )t is o"vious t at Aristotle understood t e relation "et,een e&actness and t e goals of et ics to "e rat er strong. )t is also clear t at is clai* t at only so*e specific range of e&actness in so*e sense fits t e goals of a discipline assu*es t at t e goals are fi&ed. ' ese are "y no *eans o"vious assu*ptions, and ) ,is to offer ne&t so*e furt er o"servations a"out t e*.

Proper '*actness and the -i*it" of +oals

As ) said earlier, Aristotle.s atte*pts to relativi9e e&actness to t e goals of a discipline ave t eir analogue in t e recent atte*pts to relativi9e e&planation to t e goals t at it serves. Per aps Aristotle.s vie,s on t e nature of t e relation "et,een e&actness and goals, on t e alleged ineli*ina"ility of ine&actness t at as its sources in t e goals of a discipline, and on t e nature of t e goals of a discipline can "e "etter understood , en seen against t ese recent discussions of e&planation. (any p ilosop ers ave recently atte*pted to give an account of e&planation t at incorporates its supposed prag*atic aspects. ' ese p ilosop ers *ay "e referred to as neoBprag*atists, alt oug t ey do not all speak ,it t e sa*e voice. +o*e see t e prag*atic aspects as indispensa"le "ut not at t e e&clusion of t e for*al features t at are fi&ed "y episte*ic considerations and t at are t e central focus of any account of e&planation. :t ers, o,ever, tend to e*p asi9e t e prag*atic aspects to t e e&tent t at t ey call into 1uestion t e vie, t at t ere is an account of e&planation in ter*s of so*e set of for*al features t at captures t e core of t e notion of e&planation. <ere are so*e representative vie,s t at see* to *e to reflect t e differences a*ong t e neoBprag*atists. Jet us "egin ,it t,o rat er *oderate vie,s, t ose of +intonen and Putna*. )n is #he ragmatics of !cientific Explanation , +intonen ,rites: 5 #4F 5 +everal prag*aticallyB*inded p ilosop ers ave stressed t at t e accepta"ility or at least acceptance of e&planations and t eories is contingent on straig tfor,ardly nonBcognitive values. ' is is one of t e *ost s,eeping clai*s *ade in recent p ilosop y of science, for it c allenges t e *ost "asic and t e *ost deeply c eris ed assu*ption of t e prevailing analytic tradition, vi9. o"/ectivity. ) s all argue . . . t at t is furt er step oug t not to "e taken. . .. Briefly, ) old t at alt oug nonBcognitive, practical and even ideological, values influence t e c oice of t e pro"le*s >esB1uestions?, t ey do not enter into t e assess*ent of t e solutions >seBans,ers?.@6HA ' is vie, does not dis*iss t e prag*atic features of e&planation. :n t e contrary, +intonen argues t at t ey *ust "e included in any co*plete account of e&planation, and t at t ese features can even "e treated, like t e syntactic and se*antic ones, for*ally. 7et it restricts t e i*pact of t e prag*atic considerations on t e kinds of 1uestions asked. ' e c aracter of e&planation is deter*ined "y episte*ic or *et odological considerations. ' us, t e prag*atic considerations *ay vary, even fro* one individual to t e ot er, ,it out necessarily affecting t e c aracter of e&planation. A vie, si*ilar to t e a"ove as "een put fort on several occasions "y Putna*. Consider , at e ,rites a"out t,o kinds of e&planation ,e *ig t give of t e follo,ing: +uppose ,e ave a very si*ple p ysical syste*=a "oard in , ic t ere are t,o oles, a circle one inc in dia*eter and a s1uare one inc ig , and a cu"ical peg oneBsi&teent of an inc less t an one inc ig . 2e ave t e follo,ing very si*ple fact to e&plain: #he peg passes through the s/uare hole' and it does not pass through the round hole .@69A

:ne kind of e&planation ,e *ay give of t is fact is in ter*s of t e *icrostructure of t e syste* and its properties=for e&a*ple, t at t e peg and t e "oard are rigid lattices of ato*s t at ave certain properties t at are to "e e&plained "y 1uantu* *ec anics. )t ,ill also co*pute all possi"le tra/ectories of t e peg, and ,ill deduce fro* t e la,s of particle *ec anics or 1uantu* electrodyna*ics t at t e peg goes t roug t e s1uare ole and not t roug t e round one. But t ere is, Putna* argues, a *uc si*pler e&planation: ' e e&planation is t at t e "oard is rigid, t e peg is rigid, and as a *atter of geo*etrical fact, t e round ole is s*aller t an t e peg, t e s1uare ole is "igger t an t e crossBsection of t e peg. ' e peg passes t roug t e ole t at is large enoug to take its crossBsection and does not pass t roug t e ole t at is too s*all to take its crossBsection.@#$A Putna* goes on to argue t at t e last e&planation, t e one in ter*s of t e structural features, is t e correct e&planation and not t e one in ter*s of t e *icrostructure of t e syste*: G) t ink t at in ter*s of t e purposes 5 #4H 5 for )hich )e use the notion of explanation , it @t e *icrostructural oneA is not an e&planation. )f you ,ant to, let us say t at t e deduction is an e&planation, it is /ust a terri"le e&planation, and , y look for terri"le e&planations , en good ones are availa"le;G But clai*ing t at t e *acrostructural e&planation is superior to t e *icrostructural one is, according to Putna*, not a su"/ective *atter: GGoodness is not a su"/ective *atter. . .. 8&planation is superior not /ust su"/ectively, "ut methodologically' in ter*s of facilitating t e ai*s of scientific in1uiry, if it "rings out relevant la,s. An e&planation is superior if it is *ore general.G@#1A 2 ile discussing t is sa*e e&a*ple, as ,ell as ot er ones, in is Meaning and the Moral !ciences' Putna* ela"orates furt er on t e *et odological o"/ectives or purposes of scientific in1uiry: ' at is , y ) count suc Vprag*atic. features of e&planation as t e ones illustrated as of methodological interest and not merely Vpsyc ological. interest. But it does not follo, t at any e&planation at all >even one t at is Vco*plete. in t e sense of <e*pel.s *odel? canbe good gi+en suitable interests. -or given our normati+e outlook, ,e are only interested in e&planations , ic are co*pati"le ,it suc ai*s of in1uiry as stating truths' unco+ering errors' stating la)s >in t e case of scientific in1uiry?, finding out )hat can possibly happen and )hat is impossible' describing +arious important -inds of processes' aiding technology and control of nature in general' etc.@#6A ' us, Putna* takes t e goals, o"/ectives, or purposes of scientific in1uiry to "e pri*arily episte*ic >*et odological?, alt oug t ere are so*e practical >prag*atic? ones as ,ell, for e&a*ple, t ose of aiding tec nology and control of nature. And t ey are not /ust *y or so*e"ody else.s goals4 t ey constitute t e goals of scientific investigation. An e&planation, in turn, as to *eet certain standards4 it as to "e *easured against t e goals of scientific in1uiry. <ence, t e goodness of an e&planation, Putna* clai*s, is not a su"/ective *atter. Putna*.s position, like t at of +intonen, assigns so*e fi&ity and o"/ectivity to t e goals of scientific in1uiry, and t erefore to t e conditions t at e&planation *ust *eet. ' e goals of in1uiry and t e conditions of e&planation are not, according to t ese vie,s, relativi9ed to /ust any"ody. ' e *ore radical proponents of t e prag*atic conception of e&planation ave, o,ever, argued t at e&planation is conte&tB"ound and t erefore is al,ays relative to so*eone. (ic ael +criven as defended t e vie, t at e&planation cannot "e given a purely for*al treat*ent since it is not conte&tB free, "ut is instead a Gdescription , ic fills in a particular gap in t e understanding of t e person or

people to , o* t e e&planation is directed.G@##A A si*ilar line of argu*ent as "een syste*atically defended "y van -raassen, , o also insists t at t ere are no conte&tBfree necessary and sufficient conditions for e&plaining. As e as recently ,ritten, G) 5 #49 5 t ink al*ost any "it of infor*ation could play t e crucial role of allo,ing a 1uestioner to co*plete is understanding in t e particular respect in , ic e ,ants to "e co*plete.G@#4A )t is clear t at t ese less *oderate prag*atic conceptions of e&planation a"andon t e vie, t at t ere is so*e set of goals t at can "e identified as t e goals of e&planation. ' ey often speak of t e su"/ective or psyc ological purposes, in contrast to t e episte*ic ones, e&planation serves, , ic of course are not conte&tBfree. +uc purposes are to "e relativi9ed to a particular situation or agent. ' ese p ilosop ers also a"andon t e idea t at t ere are so*e conditions an e&planation *ust *eet in order to satisfy t ose relativi9ed goals. )f so*et ing Gfills in a particular gap in t e understandingG of so*e person, t en it is an e&planation. ' us, not only do t ey relativi9e t e goals to so*e particular conte&t, t ey also relativi9e to an e1ually particular conte&t t e relation anyt ing t at in t eir vie, counts as an e&planation as to t e goals. Iot only can t e goals vary fro* one conte&t to t e ot er "ut also , at satisfies a given goal can vary fro* conte&t to conte&t. ' e de"ate "et,een t ose , o assign a rat er *odest role to prag*atic considerations in e&planation and t ose , o assign a rat er radical one as not "een settled. But ) s all not take sides in t is de"ate ere. -or *y concerns are ,it Aristotle.s conception of e&actness and t e ,ay certain prag*atic considerations affect it. )f , at ,as said a"ove is correct, Aristotle.s vie,s on t e nature of e&planation or *et od are si*ilar to t ose of t e *oderate prag*atists: its c aracter is deter*ined "y episte*ic considerations. )ts nature does not vary fro* conte&t to conte&t. )n addition, t e discussion a"ove suggests t at Aristotle.s vie,s on t e relation of e&actness to goals are also closer to t e *oderate vie,s on t e relation of e&planation to goals t an to t e radical ones. Jeaving aside t e status of t e goals at t e *o*ent, e&actness is constrained and deter*ined, according to Aristotle, "y t e goals it serves, /ust as e&planation is constrained and deter*ined, according to Putna* and +intonen, "y t e goals it serves. Bot e&actness and e&planation *ay "e relativi9ed to goals "ut t is does not i*ply t at any level of e&actness *ig t do or anyt ing *ay count as an e&planation. :nce t e goals are given, t e level of e&actness or t e c aracter of e&planation is fi&ed. 7et t e analogy "et,een e&actness and its goals on t e one and and e&planation and its goals on t e ot er *ay "e so*e, at *ore pro"le*atic t an it at first appears. -or , ereas, one *ig t argue, it is easy to see o, t e goals e&planation serves fi& its nature=t ey deter*ine so*e set of conditions t at need to "e satisfied "y , atever is to "e an e&planation=it is difficult to see o, ,e can identify an analogous set of conditions for e&actness. Aristotle, of course, is not necessarily speaking of a narro,ly defined level of e&actness relative to so*e goals. As ) said earlier, e is 5 #%$ 5 *ost likely t inking of so*e range in t e level of e&actness relative to so*e goals. But is t is sufficient; Can ,e specify t e range of e&actness appropriate for practical disciplines; )s t ere a co**on range for "uilding, *edicine, et ics, applied *ec anics, and so fort ; Aristotle, o,ever, is not saying t at t ere is one range of e&actness for all practical disciplines. ' e e&actness appropriate to practical disciplines, e insists, differs fro* t at appropriate to t eoretical ones, "ut also t e e&actness appropriate for one practical discipline *ay differ fro* t at appropriate for anot er practical discipline.

Practical disciplines differ not only fro* t eoretical ones ,it respect to e&actness "ut also a*ong t e*selves. 2 at 9.1 and 9.6 are insisting upon is /ust t at: 2e *ust seek t e e&actness proper to eac in1uiry, t e one , ic is appropriate to its goals. ' e range of e&actness, t en, is to "e fi&ed not relative to so*et ing generic, for e&a*ple, practical goals, "ut rat er to t e specific goals of a discipline=for e&a*ple, producing or restoring ealt >*edicine?, producing or *aintaining strengt >gy*nastics?, "uilding a structure >t e art of "uilding?. But is t e relativi9ing of e&actness to t e specific goals of a discipline sufficient for fi&ing so*e range as t e appropriate range for t e discipline; Could ,e, for e&a*ple, set a lo,er and upper li*it for t e level of e&actness appropriate in *edicine; ' e level of e&actness in our understanding of , atever is re1uired for t e purposes of repairing fractured "ones *ay "e 1uite lo, , en co*pared to t at re1uired for doing gene t erapy or *edical treat*ent at, or "elo,, t e cellular level. ' e e&actness re1uired for t e latter sort of t ings is 1uite ig . ' ere are, it see*s to *e, t,o options open to so*eone , o, like Aristotle, insists t at so*e reasona"ly ,ellBdefined range of e&actness can "e correlated ,it a discipline: 8it er e ,ill "e dividing a discipline into su"disciplines, t us oping to *ake t e range of e&actness *ore ,ellBdefined4 or e ,ill "e raising t e upper li*it of e&actness to t e point t at it approac es t e level of t e *ost e&act disciplines and ,ill "e lo,ering t e lo,er li*it to t e point it approac es t e level of t e least e&act ones. ' us, one ,ill not "e ai*ing to fi& t e range of e&actness for *edicine in general, "ut t at for, let us say, ort opedics, gene t erapy, or cell grafting. But "y su"dividing disciplines into narro,er ones ,e ,ill not necessarily "e *ore successful in fi&ing t e range of e&actness appropriate to eac su"division. -or it is not o"vious t at t e *ost e&act kind of understanding *ay not "e re1uired for so*e aspects of ort opedics, , ile for so*e ot er aspects even t e lo,est level of e&actness ,ill "e sufficient. And, t us, ,e *ig t opt for t e second option: ,idening t e range of e&actness ,e correlate ,it a discipline so t at it enco*passes t e ig est as ,ell as t e lo,est levels. 'o opt for t e second alternative is to considera"ly ,eaken Aristotle.s clai* t at ,e can speak significantly of a range of e&actness proper to a 5 #%1 5 discipline. -irst, "ecause if *ost disciplines could turn out to re1uire "ot ig and lo, levels of e&actness, roug ly t e sa*e range of e&actness ,ould "e proper for all of t e*. +econd, "ecause if a practical discipline like *edicine can re1uire and use e&actness of t e ig est kind, , at sense can ,e t en *ake of Aristotle.s insistence t at t e "uilder as no use for t e e&act kno,ledge of t e geo*etrician; Can t is clai* a"out geo*etrical kno,ledge "e asserted in relation to t e "uilding art in general or a"out all practical disciplines, for e&a*ple, applied *ec anics or ydrodyna*ics; ' e assu*ption t at geo*etrical kno,ledge possessing t e e&actness t at t e geo*etrician ai*s at is of no use to t e "uilding art, or any ot er practical art=an assu*ption t at for*s t e "asis of Aristotle.s clai* t at in practical disciplines ,e do not need and s ould not ai* at suc e&actBness=is "y no *eans o"vious. )t surely does not follo, fro* t e ,ellBkno,n Platonic and Aristotelian assu*ption t at t e geo*etrician, as ,ell as any ot er t eoretical in1uirer, pursues geo*etrical investigation, or any ot er t eoretical in1uiry, for t e sake of kno,ledge itself and not for its uses. ' us even Plato, t e p ilosop er , o tried t e ardest to disassociate pure geo*etry, as ,ell as all t eoretical disciplines, fro* any practical o"/ectives, ad*its t at it *ay ave its practical uses. 2 ile geo*etry is not, according to i*, to ave any connection ,it t e e*pirical ,orld and is not to ad*it any de*onstrations t at rese*"le , at ordinary geo*etricians do, it nonet eless *ay "e used to satisfy so*e practical o"/ectives: G-or even t e "yBproducts of suc study @of pure geo*etryA are not slig t.... 2e *entioned its uses in ,ar, and also ,e are a,are t at for t e "etter reception of all studies t ere

,ill "e i**easura"le difference "et,een t e student , o as "een co*"ined ,it geo*etry and t e one , o as not=s all ,e t en, lay t is do,n as a second "ranc of study for our lads;G >Republic %6FC?. Aristotle i*self, despite t e fact e is concerned as *uc as Plato is to disassociate t eoretical disciplines fro* practical goals, also agrees ,it i* t at t eoretical kno,ledge as practical uses: G)nas*uc as astrono*y and t e study of nature and geo*etry ave no ot er end e&cept to get to kno, and to conte*plate t e nature of t e t ings t at are t e su"/ects of t ese disciplines, alt oug it is true t at not ing prevents t e* fro* "eing useful to us accidentally for *any of our necessary re1uire*entsG >E.E. 161E"16?. But if kno,ledge of t e ig est e&actness *ay "e re1uired and *ay "e used for practical purposes, t e 1uestion arises , et er kno,ledge of lesser e&actness can "e used for t eoretical purposes. 2 y is *at e*atics t oug t to re1uire t e ig est e&actness; 3oes it really re1uire it; )t *ay, of course, "e true t at no one ever attains t e ig est e&actness in *at e*atics, t at every proof is in so*e sense deficient. )t could also "e t e case t at no one is even actually trying to attain suc e&actness. 7et t ere is no dou"t t at in part our conception of *at e*atics is constituted "y 5 #%6 5 t e assu*ption t at *at e*atical kno,ledge ai*s or s ould ai* at t e ig est e&actness. At least, t ere is no dou"t t at Plato.s and Aristotle.s, as ,ell as *any ot er p ilosop ers., conception of *at e*atics is so constituted. ' e sources, nature, and significance of t e a"ove assu*ption deserve a study in t eir o,n rig t. ) s all, t erefore, restrict *yself to only a fe, co**ents t at pertain to t e topics of t is "ook. :ne reason, per aps, Plato and Aristotle associate t e ig est e&actness ,it *at e*atics is t eir "elief t at its o"/ects are t e *ost e&act. But it is clear t at t is does not "y itself i*ply t at ,e s ould ai* at o"taining kno,ledge of t e ig est e&actness a"out suc o"/ects. At "est , at it i*plies is t at kno,ledge of t e ig est e&actness *ay "e possi"le in relation to suc o"/ects, assu*ing t at t ere are no ot er factors t at *ake it i*possi"le. 2 at is needed in addition is an assu*ption a"out t e goals and nature of t eoretical kno,ledge: -or e&a*ple, t at t e *at e*atician ai*s at t e understanding of t e essential structure of t e o"/ects e studies >9.6?, at e&plaining or representing t e necessary nature of t ese entities, and t at suc understanding, e&plaining, or representating is in ter*s of a"solute de*onstrative inference. ' e *at e*atician ai*s solely at kno,ledge and kno,ledge as, presu*a"ly, t e nature Aristotle says it as: it is de*onstrative. Io ot er consideration or goal outside t at of kno,ledge *otivates, and ence influences, is in1uiry. <is goals are t en purely episte*ic. )f t ese are t e *at e*atician.s goals, and if t e nature of t e o"/ects e studies is , at Plato and Aristotle say it is, t en t ey can "e satisfied only if e o"tains in is accounts t e e&actness t at fits t at of t e o"/ects e studies. )f, t at is, e represents t e *ost e&act o"/ects "y accounts t at are e1ually e&act in ter*s of t eir de*onstrative rigor, and t us ac ieves t e congruence "et,een t e e&actness of t e *aterial and t at of t e for*al level spoken of earlier. )t is clear t at t is /ustification of , y *at e*atics ai*s or s ould ai* at t e ig est e&actness can "e 1uestioned in a variety of ,ays. :ne *ay, for e&a*ple, 1uestion , et er t e o"/ects t e *at e*atician studies are as Plato and Aristotle say t ey are. -or if t ey are not as e&act as t ey say, if t e ig est de*onstrative rigor is not possi"le in t eir case, t en it ,ould "e at least unreasona"le to de*and or ai* at suc e&actness. Anot er ,ay of 1uestioning t is *odel of t e ideal e&actness of *at e*atics is to leave t e issue of t e nature of t e o"/ects *at e*atics studies aside, and to focus instead on t e goals and t e nature of *at e*atical kno,ledge, understanding, or e&planation. ' ose , o advocate t e radical prag*atic accounts of e&planation 1uestion t at t e goals of in1uiry are nonBprag*atic and conte&tBfree, in t e sa*e ,ay t ey 1uestion t at , at ,e designate as kno,ing, understanding, or

e&plaining is ulti*ately *otivated "y cognitive and conte&tBfree considerations. ' e radical prag*atist insists t at t e goals of in1uiry are conte&tB 5 #%# 5 "ound, /ust as e&planation is conte&tB"ound. ' e goals or o"/ectives , ic e&planation and in1uiry satisfy are relative to so*e conte&t, relative to t ose , o in1uire or seek e&planations, and t ey *ay "e relative even to a single in1uirer or e&planationBseeker. 2 y, t en, can.t t e "uilder ave as is goal a rat er ig ly e&act kno,ledge, especially since , at e at ti*es investigates, for e&a*ple, so*e *at e*atical constructions, can "e given a ig ly e&act account; And , y can.t ,e in et ics ai* at t e *ost e&act kno,ledge, , y not seek to reali9e t e *oral geo*etry 0a,ls as in *ind; 2 y, in ot er ,ords, can ,e not set aside t e practical goals t at *ay re1uire only a lo, level of e&actness in order to "e satisfied and si*ply ai* at a *ore e&act understanding of *atters of conduct or *oral p eno*ena; By doing so, one *ig t argue, ,e can eli*inate ine&actness fro* et ics. Conversely, t e radical prag*atist ,onders, , at rules out t e possi"ility t at a *at e*atician ai*s at pro"a"le conclusions or *ostBlikely e&planations, t at is, t e kind of inferences, e&planations, or e&actness t at "ot Plato and Aristotle rule out categorically in t e case of *at e*atics.@#%A ' ere is no fi&ed goal *at e*atics as, according to t e*, it all depends , o t e in1uirer is and , at is goals are. ' ere is no dou"t t at Aristotle does not s are t e vie,s of t e radical prag*atists ,it regard to t e status of t e goals of a discipline. +uc goals are not, according to i*, *erely t e goals of so*e individual or individuals, "ut literally t e goals of t e discipline. And t ey, t us, cannot vary fro* conte&t to conte&t "ut are fi&ed. ' e invaria"ility of goals is in part , at allo,s Aristotle to speak of a proper e&actness for a discipline, "y , ic e *eans of course t e proper e&actness for a discipline. -or if t e goals do not vary, ,e ,ill not *erely ave an e&actness t at is appropriate in eac case to t e particular goals of t e in1uirer, "ut t e e&actness t at is proper for t e in1uiry in all conte&ts. ' e goals of a discipline are, according to Aristotle, at least as fi&ed as t e goals t at, according to Putna* and +intonen, e&planation serves. )ndeed, t ey are *ore fi&ed t an t e cognitive or *et odological goals t at e&planation supposedly serves according to t ese p ilosop ers. 'rue, t e *et odological goals t e *oderate prag*atists assign to e&planation or in1uiry are not *ere psyc ological interests. 7et t e goals Aristotle assigns to an in1uiry appear to "e even *ore strictly fi&ed t an t ese *et odological goals of e&planation, , atever t eir nature *ig t turn out to "e. Aristotle vie,s t e goals of a discipline as "eing its function, and t erefore t e purpose for t e sake of , ic it e&ists. And so*eti*es e refers to t e goals in ter*s of t e specific purposes of a discipline= for e&a*ple, producing ealt in t e case of *edicine=, ile at ot er ti*es in ter*s of t e generic purposes=for e&a*ple, t eoretical or practical. ' us Aristotle speaks of t e function of t e "uilding art as "eing t e *aking of a ouse, t at of *edicine ealt , and t at of t e *at e*atical disciplines 5 #%4 5 t eori9ing >E.E. 1619a1%?. And e olds t at if a t ing as a function its definition is in ter*s of its function. ' e function of a t ing constitutes its nature or essence. ' us, t e respective functions of t e eye and of t e a&e constitute t e essence of eac of t ese functional t ings and give t eir definitions as ,ell >Anim . 416"6$?.@#EA 'o say, t en, t at t e *at e*atical disciplines ave as t eir function t eori9ing a"out t eir proper o"/ects is to provide an essential c aracteri9ation of t e*. +i*ilarly, to say t at t e function of t e "uilding art is t e production of "uildings is to give t e essence of it. -or t e sa*e reason, Aristotle clai*s, producing ealt "elongs to *edicine essentially >#op. 14#a4?.

)f, indeed, Aristotle takes t e relation "et,een a discipline and its goals to "e , at as /ust "een descri"ed, it "eco*es clear , y e t inks t at t e goals cannot "e c anged, for t ey are not *erely psyc ological, su"/ective, even intersu"/ective, or contingently connected to t e discipline..@#FA ' ey are not *erely t e goals of so*eone or ot er, "ut for* instead t e essence of an activity or in1uiry. ' ey are part of t e necessary and sufficient conditions t at define a discipline. ' ey cannot t erefore "e c anged ,it out c anging t e activity or in1uiry , ic t ey define. ' e "uilder , o pursues t e t eoretical activities of t e geo*etrician is not pursuing t e goals of is discipline and is t erefore doing so*et ing , ic is not part of t e discipline of "uilding. )n a passage fro* t e Rhet. , Aristotle ponders , at ,ould appen if ,e ,ere to c ange t e goals of r etoric or dialectic fro* t ose of a practical art or skill to t ose of a t eoretical activity. 'o do so, e argues, ,ould c ange t e c aracter of t ese activities altoget er: GBut in proportion as anyone endeavours to *ake of dialectic or r etoric, not , at t ey are, faculties @or skills=

A. "ut sciences @ A, to t at e&tent e ,ill, ,it out kno,ing it, destroy t eir real nature, in t us altering t eir c aracter, "y crossing over into t e do*ain of sciences, , ose su"/ects are certain definite t ings, not *erely ,ordsG >1#%9"16?. And if et ics is, like r etoric, a practical discipline or art, t en its goals cannot "e altered ,it out altering its nature. But if Aristotle vie,s t e goals of a discipline to "e related to t e discipline in t e *anner descri"ed a"ove, in , at ,ay can t ey "e considered to "e prag*atic; :"viously, not in t e ,ay t e radical prag*atists speak of interests, o"/ectives, or goals as "eing prag*atic factors. -or t ese, as ) said earlier, are totally conte&tB"ound and are relativi9ed to t e individual. Aristotle.s goals are t e goals of a species4 t ey are fi&ed in relation to t eir corresponding disciplines, faculties, or capacities. ' ey serve so*e interest, "ut it is t e interest of a certain kind of ani*al. And if t is last consideration provides a reason for taking t e* to "e prag*atic, it is i*portant to keep in *ind t e differences "et,een is conception of goals and t at of t e radical prag*atists. -or Aristotle t e goals of a discipline are essentially related to it4 t ey define its nature. 5 #%% 5 )t can no, "e seen o, Aristotle.s assu*ptions a"out t e nature of t e goals of a discipline and t e e&istence of a level of e&actness t at is proper to a discipline i*ply t at even t e ine&actness t at is a conse1uence of t e goals of a discipline *ay "e i*possi"le to eli*inate. Consider, for e&a*ple, a practical discipline like et ics for , ic t ere is presu*a"ly a level of e&actness t at can satisfy its goals and , ic falls "elo, t e level re1uired for t e goals of t eoretical disciplines.@#HA +uc a discipline ,ould "e ine&act on account of its goals. But if t ere is, as Aristotle clai*s, a proper level of e&actness relative to its goals, t en t e level cannot "e c anged4 ine&actness cannot "e reduced "eyond a certain point or eli*inated, if t e goals of et ics re*ain t e sa*e. But t e ot er Aristotelian assu*ption a"out t e fi&ity of goals or t eir essential connection to a discipline rules out t e possi"ility of c anging t e goals of a discipline. )f et ics, t en, is ine&act on account of its goals, it is so essentially. )ts presu*ed ine&actness cannot "e eli*inated , ile t e discipline re*ains , at it is4 it cannot "e eli*inated fro* et ics , en conceived as a practical discipline. 2 at conclusions, t en, can "e dra,n a"out t e level of e&actness t at is possi"le, proper, or desira"le in et ics; Can it "e concluded t at kno,ledge of *atters of conduct *ust re*ain less e&act t an

kno,ledge of so*e ot er do*ains on account of t e fact t at et ics is practical; )f t is is so, t en Plato.s, +pino9a.s, and 0a,ls.s vision of a *oral geo*etry is an i*possi"le or useless one. Io investigation into *atters of conduct t at as t e e&actness of t eoretical disciplines ,ould "e possi"le or useful. -urt er*ore, can t ere "e a t eoretical study of *atters of conduct in t e sense t at it is *otivated "y an interest to kno, for t e sake of kno,ledge; ' e a"ove 1uestions cannot "e ans,ered easily. ' e difficulty of doing so ste*s in part fro* , at ,as said earlier a"out t e pro"le* of fi&ing t e proper level of e&actness for et ics. But pri*arily it ste*s fro* t e ,ay Aristotle *ost often c aracteri9es t e nature of et ical investigation: na*ely, as an in1uiry t at as practical goals. And t is c aracteri9ation of et ical in1uiry leads Aristotle to conceive of t e investigation into *atters of conduct in a ,ay t at overlooks or undervalues t e cognitive goals of t e in1uiry or to su"ordinate totally its cognitive o"/ectives to t e practical ones. At ti*es, o,ever, "ot o"/ectives are e1ually pro*inent and co*pete against eac ot er in Aristotle.s o,n conception of et ical in1uiry. Aristotle *ay ave, to a certain e&tent, good reasons for arguing against Plato t at ,e do not need t e e&actness of *at e*atics for et ical practice. <e *ay t us ave reasons for re*inding us t at ,e *ust not lose sig t of t e fact t at our practical concerns can "e satisfied ,it a kno,ledge , ic , for various reasons, falls s ort of t e e&actness of *at e*atical kno,ledge. 7et, if t e previous discussion is correct, even t is Aristotelian 5 #%E 5 line of argu*ent *ay not succeed in s o,ing t at a ig level of e&actness is not needed in an investigation into *atters of conduct. -or ,e cannot rule out a priori t at so*e conte&t of practice *ay not re1uire kno,ledge of a rat er ig e&actness. ' e practice, for instance, of distri"uting goods *ay re1uire a rat er precise account of distri"utive /ustice, so*et ing like , at Aristotle i*self gives in t e N.E. in ter*s of t e *at e*atical relations ips "et,een t e ,ort of t e relevant agents and t e value of t e goods to "e distri"uted..@#9A Practice, itself, t en, *ay de*and considera"le e&actness if its o"/ectives are to "e satisfied. )t *ay re1uire t e e&actness ,e seek in t eoretical investigations. )ndeed, after reflecting upon t e concerns t at *otivate Plato.s clai* t at it ,ould "e a"surd not to strain every nerve in order to attain kno,ledge of t e ig est e&actness a"out *atters of conduct, ,e *ig t conclude t at Aristotle did not 1uite see t e significance of Plato.s point. -or, like Plato, ,e *ay argue t at it is *ore i*portant to kno, e&actly o, t ings are a"out *atters of conduct, a"out , at ,e *ust do or "e, t an a"out so*e su"/ect t at "ot Plato and Aristotle assign to t eoretical disciplines. ' e conse1uences of aving ine&act kno,ledge a"out *atters of conduct can, as +ocrates and Plato often argue, "e grave: ,e *ay "e led astray and ar*ed. +uppose, for e&a*ple, t at t e use of u*ans as slaves is of great practical i*portance. + ould ,e accept any /ustification of slavery t at is sufficient for our practical purposes; :"viously, ,e s ould not. As Plato ,ould insist, t e i*portance of t e *atter de*ands possession of kno,ledge of t e greatest e&actness and clarity, for t e treat*ent of *any *e*"ers of our society depends on suc kno,ledge. )ronically, , en Aristotle offers a defense of slavery in olit. ), e does not offer a /ustification of it t at is e&act only to t e degree re1uired for our practical purposes. :n t e contrary, e atte*pts a rigorous proof of it on t e "asis of t e nature of u*an faculties, t eir functions, and so*e universal principles or la,s a"out t e ierarc ical structure of all nature ,it respect to "eing a ruling and a ruled ele*ent. )ndeed, e considers is o,n argu*ents in defense of slavery to constitute a t eoretical /ustification or proof >

? of it > olit. 16%4a66?. 2 et er e succeeds in t is pro/ect is, of course, anot er *atter. +i*ilarly, ,e *ay insist, ,it Plato, t at our account of t e ideal or /ust society s ould "e *ost e&act, for it is t e pattern "y , ic ,e organi9e our lives. )f our pattern fails to represent t e correct ,ay of structuring our society, if it is ine&act, t en ,e *ay "e led astray. -or t e sa*e reasons, ,e can understand 0a,ls.s de*and t at t e principles of /ustice e is proposing s ould "e deductively derived fro* propositions , ic it is rational to accept as true. )n t e sa*e vein ,e *ay argue t at it ,ould "e ,rong not to strain every nerve to attain e&act kno,ledge a"out t e 5 #%F 5 effects food additives or conta*inants ave on our ealt . 2e s ould not "e satisfied "y *ere guesses, generalities, or ap a9ard studying of t ese i*portant *atters. -or our ealt , and even our lives, *ay depend on possessing e&act kno,ledge a"out t e*.@4$A +o practice *ay, after all, place greater de*ands on e&actness, and not *erely in t e sense of reac ing do,n to t e particulars, t an t eori9ing itself does. :r, at least, t ere *ay "e no difference ,it regard to e&actness "et,een t e t,o. ' us, t e level of e&actness Aristotle associates ,it t eoretical disciplines or ,it certain do*ains *ay "e neit er useless nor undesira"le in practice. +o t at even if ,e ,ere to insist t at t e cognitive goals of et ical in1uiry are su"ordinate to its practical o"/ectives, t at t e degree of its e&actness is deter*ined "y t ese practical o"/ectives, ,e cannot rule out t at t e level of e&actness re1uired for suc o"/ectives ,ill "e t e sa*e, or even ig er t an, t at re1uired for t eoretical purposes. But Aristotle i*self appears to "e of a divided *ind a"out t e need of an understanding of *atters of conduct or practical *atters t at rese*"les t at , ic ,e seek in t e t eoretical disciplines. -or e see*s to recogni9e t at practical or productive disciplines are in1uiries or investigations into t e nature of certain do*ains4 t ey t erefore are guided "y certain cognitive principles. )t is true t at e is often concerned ,it avoiding t e Platonist tendency of *aking every discipline a t eoretical one t at aspires of t e ig est e&actness. Against t is for* of Platonis* e e*p asi9es t e practical o"/ectives of t e et ical in1uiry and tends to assign a do*inant role to t e*. 7et e is fully a,are of, and is i*self attracted to, t e vie, t at any in1uiry, including t at into *atters of conduct, as cognitive o"/ectives. ' e Platonist line , ic insists t at certain episte*ic conditions *ust "e *et in our investigations into *atters of conduct "ecause suc an investigation as cognitive goals cannot "e dis*issed. Aristotle i*self is in is o,n investigation guided pri*arily "y cognitive considerations. 2 at e ai*s at and , at e does is guided *ost often "y t e considerations t at guide any in1uiry into a certain do*ain. ' ere is no dou"t t at e is often attracted "y t e antiBPlatonist line t at e*p asi9es t e practical side of et ics at t e e&pense of t e cognitive or t eoretical one, "ut t e latter is never really a"andoned. Per aps Aristotle.s divided *ind or predica*ent a"out et ical in1uiry can "est "e seen in connection ,it is vie, of t e study concerned ,it r etorical p eno*ena. As s o,n in t e passage fro* t e Rhet. 1uoted a"ove, Aristotle ,as concerned ,it preserving t e c aracter of r etoric as a practical discipline or art, and t us saving it fro* "eing assi*ilated or transfor*ed into so*et ing t at as t e c aracter of a t eoretical discipline. <e ,as interested in saving it, t at is, fro* "eco*ing a rigorous discipline t at ai*s at t e study and understanding of t e r etorical p eno*ena. But, as Lac1ueline de 0o*illy as rat er convincingly s o,n, 5 #%H 5

Aristotle ,as continuously struggling ,it t ese t,o conceptions of r etoric: t at of t e r etorical practice and t at of Plato , o in t e Gorgias presents a picture of p ilosop ical r etoric as a rigorous and a"stract discipline..@41A Against Plato, Aristotle often urges us to re*ain fait ful to t e conception of r etoric as an activity ,it practical goals. But , at e i*self does in t e Rhet . and t e ,ay e often sees is o,n investigation is 1uite often *uc closer to Plato.s picture. Aristotle in t e process of is o,n in1uiry in t e Rhet . co*es to recogni9e t at t e investigation of t e r etorical p eno*ena e is pursuing is not a "it of r etorical practice. <e is not trying to persuade anyone "y r etorical *eans, "ut is instead investigating t e nature of t ese p eno*ena and trying to convince ot ers "y nonr etorical *eans t at r etorical p eno*ena are soBandBso, t at t eir essential c aracter is suc BandB suc . ' e sa*e is, of course, true in t e case of et ics and ot er practical disciplines. 3espite t e pronounce*ents concerning t e overriding role of practice in t e case of et ics, politics, or *edicine, Aristotle is strongly pulled "y t e cognitive concerns of t ese disciplines. Aristotle.s, as ,ell as our o,n, i**ediate goals in t e p ilosop ical in1uiries a"out et ical or r etorical p eno*ena are cognitive. 2e are interested, as Aristotle i*self is, in our et ical or r etorical in1uiries in understanding t e nature of goodness, t e nature of t e u*an good, t e nature of virtue and so fort , or t e c aracter of persuasion, its *eans and t eir effectiveness, and so fort . 2 at Aristotle does or ai*s at in is o,n et ical investigation is not practical in t e sense of "eing a "it of practice or of practical t inking concerned ,it so*e particular action or ot er. +i*ilarly, , at e does in Rhet . is not an instance of r etorical speaking. )t is possi"le t at Aristotle is in so*e conte&ts influenced "y t e e&a*ples e often gives to illustrate t e c aracter of et ics and t e degree of e&actness it re1uires. 8&a*ples suc as t at of "uilding, s oe *aking, or r etorical speaking tend to e*p asi9e practice , ic is, of course, to "e contrasted to t eoretical disciplines or activities. And if one ,ere to focus on suc e&a*ples one *ig t easily overlook t e differences "et,een t e practical and cognitive concerns in et ical practice and p ilosop ical et ics. But ,e need to distinguis "et,een practice and t e kno,ledge, understanding, or e&planation of t e ele*ents of conduct t at ,e seek in our p ilosop ical endeavors. Alt oug t e "oundaries "et,een t e t,o *ay not "e s arp, t ere are differences. 2 en 0a,ls speaks of a *oral geo*etry of *atters of conduct, e is o"viously speaking of p ilosop ical et ics and not of practice. Aristotle.s o,n p ilosop ical activities ,it respect to conduct e& i"it t is t eoretical c aracter. Loac i* is, ) t ink, in so*e respects correct , en e descri"es Aristotle.s endeavors in t e follo,ing ,ay: GBut in fact is @Aristotle.sA o,n intelligence is actively engaged in t e t eoretical study of conduct and in t at study it is free 5 #%9 5 and unperverted "y e*otion or "y t e ai*s of action: and very fe, t inkers ave contri"uted so *uc to t e t eoretical investigation of t e facts of conduct as Aristotle i*self as done in t e Nicomachean Ethics and t e olitics .G.@46A Loac i* is correct in pointing out t at Aristotle.s activities in is o,n et ical investigations are not different fro* t ose in ot er investigations, including t eoretical ones. <e is, in ot er ,ords, doing in t e et ical investigations , at e does in ot er disciplines: e&plaining t e nature or giving accounts of a certain su"/ect *atter. )n t is sense, is activities could "e descri"ed as t eoretical. -or alt oug Aristotle une1uivocally asserts t at et ics is practical, and t erefore t at its cognitive concerns are su"ordinate to practice, and alt oug e at ti*es insists t at is o,n in1uiry ai*s at *aking is listeners good, t ese pronounce*ents or supposed practical o"/ectives do not really affect t e c aracter of is investigation. 2e *ay not ,is to call is investigation Gunperverted "y e*otion or "y t e ai*s

of action,G for t ere is not ing perverse a"out su"ordinating kno,ledge to action or e*otion, "ut Loac i* as a point: Aristotle.s endeavors in t e et ical treatises are si*ilar to t ose in is ot er treatises. 7et t ere are pro"le*s ,it any effort to construe an Aristotelian investigation into *atters of conduct as a t eoretical discipline, if , at is *eant "y t is is t at t e investigation *eets Aristotle.s o,n re1uire*ents for "eing a t eoretical discipline. -or, first, t ere are t e pro"le*s discussed in previous c apters t at concern t e ine&actness Aristotle associates ,it disciplines like et ics. +uc disciplines are re1uired, according to i*, to also include accounts of particulars, , ereas t eoretical ones do not. But per aps ,e could focus on t at part of et ics t at is concerned only ,it t e general or universal aspects of conduct, as Aristotle.s o,n in1uiry does, and t us point to t e si*ilarities "et,een et ical and t eoretical disciplines. Aristotle, o,ever, insists t at our accounts in et ics are, in addition, ine&act for all t e ot er reasons discussed earlier: t ey presu*a"ly fail to reac t e de*onstrative rigor of t e purely t eoretical disciplines "ecause of t e ine&actness of *atters of conduct. 7et even t is *ay not s o, t at et ics is funda*entally different fro* t e t eoretical disciplines. -or it *ay "e, as ,as seen, not very different fro* t ose t eoretical disciplines , ose su"/ect *atter is also ine&act, t at is, all t ose t eoretical ones , ose do*ains consist of so*e part of t e natural ,orld. ' e difficulty is, o,ever, far greater , en ,e atte*pt to construe Aristotle.s o,n investigation, as ,ell as is conception of any investigation, into *atters of conduct as a t eoretical discipline, if ,e *ean "y t is t at t e investigation ai*s at kno,ledge for t e sake of kno,ledge: t at its cognitive goals are not su"ordinate to practical ends, "ut t at t ey constitute instead its ulti*ate goals. ' ere is no dou"t t at t is is t e peculiarly Aristotelian ,ay of understanding t e notion of a t eoretical discipline, 5 #E$ 5 and it is 1uite certain t at t is is in part , at Loac i* as in *ind , en e says t at Aristotle.s in1uiry is free of t e ai*s of action. Aristotle.s study is, according to Loac i*, t eoretical not only "ecause it deals ,it t e general or a"stract aspects of conduct or attains a certain level of de*onstrative or e&planatory rigor "ut also, and per aps pri*arily, "ecause it ai*s at t e attain*ent of kno,ledge for its o,n sake4 it is *otivated "y a t eoretical interest. +uc a t eoretical interest into *atters of conduct is taken for granted "y Plato and recogni9ed "y 0a,ls as "eing t e interest t at guides et ical in1uiry. ' e pro"le* ,it t e a"ove construal of Aristotle.s o,n investigation and is conception of any investigation into *atters of conduct is t e one ) alluded to earlier >c ap. #?=na*ely, t e pro"le* of seeing o, an in1uiry into *atters of conduct t at is guided "y a t eoretical interest can "e fitted into Aristotle.s o,n conception of et ics as a practical discipline. )t is not o"vious t at t is can "e done ,it out a"andoning suc a conception of t e nature of et ics, ,it out c anging t e goals of t e discipline. -or to say, as Aristotle does, t at et ics is practical is to say t at its ulti*ate goals are noncognitive and t at , atever cognitive goals it as are su"ordinate to t e noncognitive ones. Aristotle vie,s is o,n investigation in ter*s of t is conception: t at is, as an investigation , ose ulti*ate goals are practical =for e&a*ple, to *ake us good=and , ose cognitive o"/ectives are su"ordinated to t e practical goals=t e latter ones deter*ine t e level of detail, de*onstrative rigor, and so fort . And t ese noncognitive goals or interests in part define, according to i*, t e nature of t e discipline. But to construe et ics in general, or Aristotle.s o,n investigation in particular, as t eoretical is to take its ulti*ate goals to "e cognitive. )t is to assign to t e in1uiry a t eoretical interest4 it is to assu*e t at in *atters of conduct ,e ai* at kno,ledge for t e sake of kno,ledge. ' ere is clearly a pro"le* ere:

t e ulti*ate goals of one and t e sa*e discipline cannot "e "ot practical and cognitive. As ) said earlier, t ere is not ing t at rules out t e possi"ility of t ere "eing a t eoretical interest in *atters of conduct, of our ai*ing at attaining kno,ledge a"out t e* for t e sake of kno,ledge. ' e pro"le* is ,it fitting suc t eoretical interest or ai* into a discipline t at is defined as "eing nont eoretical, as aving ulti*ate goals t at are noncognitive. Again, t e difficulty is not t at of *aking practice su"ordinate to cognitive goals "y ad*itting t at t ere is a t eoretical interest in *atters of conduct. 2e do not need to do t at a"out *atters of conduct as ,e do not need to do it a"out ot er kinds of su"/ect *atter. -or e&a*ple, ,e do not *ake econo*ic practice su"ordinate to econo*ic t eory, in t e sense t at t e for*er is not pursued for t e sake of t e latter. Ior ,ill our practice involving geo*etrical or *easuring operations "e *ade su"ordinate to 5 #E1 5 our t eoretical interests if ,e ,ere to ad*it t at geo*etry ai*s at kno,ledge for t e sake of kno,ledge=suc practice ,ill not "e pursued for t e sake of kno,ledge. 3o ,e need, t en, to c ange t e goals of et ics fro* t e ,ay Aristotle conceives t e* in order to say, ,it Loac i*, t at et ics is t eoretical; ' is is, ) "elieve, to so*e e&tent true, "ut not necessarily "ecause it is re1uired in order to *ake et ics t eoretical in t e sense of assigning to it t e sa*e de*onstrative rigor or e&actness so*e t eoretical disciplines ave. -or t is *ay "e re1uired "y t e practical goals t e*selves, and t us t ere *ay "e no need to c ange t e goals of et ics fro* t e ,ay Aristotle conceives t e* in order to ai* at t e e&actness or rigor of t eoretical disciplines. But if ,e ,ere to ascri"e to et ical in1uiry a t eoretical interest ,e ,ill "e facing t e pro"le*s Aristotle i*self ,as confronted ,it in relation to t e investigation of t e r etorical p eno*ena: na*ely, is pro"le* of deciding , at t e in1uiry into r etorical p eno*ena is. )s it t e in1uiry t at as, as t e Platonists say, kno,ledge as its ulti*ate goal or is it t e in1uiry t at as r etorical practice as its ulti*ate goal; Plato.s purely t eoretical interest a"out r etorical p eno*ena could not "e *ade to fit into a discipline t at ,as conceived as ai*ing ulti*ately at practice. ' e sa*e see*s to "e t e case ,it t e t eoretical interest a"out *atters of conduct and t e discipline of et ics as Aristotle conceives it: t e for*er cannot "e *ade to fit into t e latter. Aristotle recogni9es our t eoretical interest in *atters of conduct. <e ackno,ledges t at in our investigation into *atters of conduct ,e can ai* at attaining t e kind of e&planations ,e seek in t eoretical disciplines as ,ell as seek kno,ledge a"out t e do*ain of conduct t at is *otivated "y our t eoretical interests >see c ap. #?. 7et it cannot "e said t at e e&plains o, suc t eoretical interests can "e acco**odated into et ics as e *ost often conceives it. Per aps e reali9ed t at it cannot "e done ,it out *aking t,o disciplines out of et ics, one , ose ulti*ate goals are practical and one , ose ulti*ate goals are t eoretical. By creating, t at is, t,o distinct disciplines t at in1uire into *atters of conduct: practical et ics and t eoretical et ics. But if ,e are not ,illing, as Aristotle is not, to do t at, t e only ,ay ) see of acco**odating our t eoretical interests into t e one discipline of et ics Aristotle advocates is to follo, is o,n ad*onition a"out t e i*portance of seeing "eyond utility in all "ranc es of kno,ledge: =.: And it is also clear t at so*e of t e useful su"/ects as ,ell oug t to "e studied "y t e young not only "ecause of t eir utility, like t e study of reading and ,riting, "ut also "ecause t ey *ay lead on to *any ot er "ranc es of kno,ledge4 and si*ilarly t ey s ould study dra,ing not in order t at t ey *ay not go ,rong in t eir private purc ases and *ay avoid "eing c eated in "uying and selling furniture, "ut rat er "ecause

5 #E6 5 this study ma-es a person able of contemplating bodily beauty' and to see- utility e+ery)here is entirely unsuited to persons that are great4souled and free. 1 olit.&882a857 But to apply Aristotle.s ad*onition to et ics is to ad*it t at t e cognitive interests in it need not "e su"ordinate to practical ends or utility. )t is to ad*it t at, , atever uses t e kno,ledge ,e ac1uire fro* an investigation into *atters of conduct *ig t ave, our investigation itself is guided "y a t eoretical interest t at also dictates t e c aracter of t e kno,ledge ,e seek. Plato ,ould ave agreed. 5 #E# 5

Ten '*actness) 4niversalit") and Truth

Introduction
' e c aracteristics of ine&actness , ic Aristotle attri"utes to et ical accounts, , et er t ey ste* fro* t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter of et ics, t e goals of t e discipline, or even ot er sources, raise at least t,o 1uestions t at ave occupied a pro*inent place in recent et ical t eory: t at of t e necessity, desira"ility, or even possi"ility of general or universal principles or propositions in nor*ative t eory and t at of t e possi"ility of trut in et ics. <is clai*, for instance, t at *atters of conduct are indefinite or vague, and t at t is *akes it difficult to give definitions of *atters of conduct or to provide general principles a"out t e*, *ay "e taken to i*ply t at et ics can do ,it out definitions or general principles..@1A +i*ilarly, is contention t at our concerns in et ics are practical, and t at t erefore our focus s ould ulti*ately "e ,it t e particular, *ay "e taken to i*ply t at general definitions or principles are undesira"le or dispensa"le for practical purposes. ' ey *ay "e of no use in et ical conte&ts. Again, if Aristotle is correct in saying t at et ical propositions are lacking in definiteness, t e 1uestion arises , et er trut values can "e assigned to t e*. )n ot er ,ords, ,e face in et ics t e pro"le* associated ,it any vague propositions=na*ely, t at neit er trut nor falsity can "e deter*ined in t eir case. ' ere is, in addition, t e pro"le* of dealing ,it propositions t at are true for t e *ost part. )f logic re1uires t at suc propositions ave t e logical for* of universal propositions, t ey are, strictly speaking, false. Could t ere "e a discipline , ic is suc t at its t eore*s, or even its "asic principles, are false; And is t is uni1ue to et ics or is it co**on to *ost disciplines; 3ifferent et ical t eories vary in t eir vie,s of t e role generality or 5 #E4 5 universality plays in conduct or in a nor*ative et ical syste*. +o*e of t e* assign an i*portant, and at ti*es t e *ost i*portant, role to it=for e&a*ple, t e t eories of Dant, 0ic ard <are, and of rule utilitarianis*. :t ers, o,ever, assign a *arginal role to it or e&clude it altoget er fro* eit er conduct or any nor*ative accounts or "ot . Act utilitarians, for instance, are ,illing at ti*es to ad*it t at

general principles or rules play a role in nor*ative et ics and conduct, "ut t e role t ey ave in *ind is clearly *arginal. ' ose , o are convinced t at et ics is essentially situational deny altoget er t at general principles ave any role to play in et ics. )n t is last group ,e *ay include LeanBPaul +artre, since e at ti*es denies "ot t at general principles or rules can "e of any use in deter*ining a course of action in a particular conte&t=for e&a*ple, in deli"erating a"out and c oosing , at to do=and t at t ere are any suc rules, eit er of , at e takes to "e t e Dantian a priori type or of any ot er type.@6A ' e task of nor*ative et ics, according to t ese vie,s, could not "e to provide general principles or rules, since, presu*a"ly, t ere aren.t any. :r, if t ere ,ere so*e, t ey ,ould not "e of any use in conduct. ' e +artrcan position as, in one for* or anot er, "een defended recently "y a nu*"er of p ilosop ers for a variety of reasons, so*e of , ic are attri"uted to Aristotle. ' us, Lo n (c3o,ell as argued t at ,e cannot reduce t e kno,ledge of , at virtue is to a set of generali9ations: As Aristotle consistently says, t e "est generali9ations a"out o, one s ould "e ave old only for t e *ost part. )f one atte*pted to reduce one.s conception of , at virtue re1uires to a set of rules, t en o,ever su"tle and t oug tful one ,as in dra,ing up t e code, cases ,ould inevita"ly turn up in , ic a *ec anical application of t e rules ,ould strike one as ,rong=and not necessarily "ecause one ad c anged is *ind4 rat er, one.s *ind on t e *atter ,as not suscepti"le of capture in any universal for*ula.@#A And t e supposed uncodifia"ility of universal principles as, according to (c3o,ell, rat er farB reac ing conse1uences a"out understanding virtuous action and /ustifying or e&plaining so*e key ele*ents of et ics. +o, (c3o,ell argues, t e application of t e Aristotelian practical syllogis* to e&plaining virtuous action produces an e&planation , ose *a/or pre*ise is a proposition stating Gt e virtuous person.s conception of t e sort of life a u*an "eing s ould lead.G@4A And if suc a conception ,ere codifia"le ,e ,ill ave a deductive e&planation or /ustification of virtuous action. GBut t e t esis of uncodifia"ility,G (c3o,ell clai*s, G*eans t at t e envisaged *a/or pre*ise, in a virtue syllogis*, cannot "e definitely ,ritten do,n.G@%A (ore recently, Baler, influenced per aps *ore "y <u*e t an "y Aristotle, as defended vie,s si*ilar to t ose of (c3o,ell. :ne ,ay of looking at virtues, s e argues, is as fi&ed dispositions to "e ave in acB 5 #E% 5 cordance ,it certain ,ellBdefined principles. But t is vie, does not do /ustice to t ose virtues t at are not, and per aps cannot "e, correlated ,it any principles. 3ispositions suc as kindness, u*ility, or gentleness are not associated ,it principles t at specify kind, u*"le, or gentle "e avior, yet t ey are virtues. ' ere are no principles in t ese cases, Baler argues, t at /ustify or e&plain , y suc dispositions are virtues.@EA But Baler also 1uestions t e role general rules or principles play even , ere t ey see* to "e availa"le. +uc rules cannot perfor* t e function traditional *oral t eory assigns to t e*=na*ely, t e function of pre*ises in deductive e&planations or /ustifications="ecause t ey are "y t e*selves vague or e*pty. A code consisting of general principles is not, according to Baler, "y itself capa"le of giving us any definite directions or generating any specific conclusions in deductive argu*ents. 8it er it @a set of general rulesA is a purely for*al code, not yet pro i"iting or en/oining anyt ing, or else t e for* gets its deter*inate filling, in , ic case ,e are co**itted not *erely to t ese GnegativeG rules "ut to t e rules of "ackground institutions and ,ays of life t at supply t e deter*inate content to t ese pro i"itions.@FA

' us, according to Baler, ,e ave t e pri*acy of practice over t eory in et ics. 'raditional *oral t eory ai*s at /ustifying or e&plaining certain *atters of conduct "y deductively deriving t e* fro* so*e "asic principles. )t t us presupposes t at so*e principles can "e precisely stated. But if t ey cannot "e so stated, if t ey cannot "e for*ulated ,it out reference to t e net,ork of our institutions and practices t e*selves, t en clearly t ey cannot e&plain or /ustify our practices. Baier.s vie, of t e priority of practice over t eory is also s ared to a considera"le e&tent "y 2illia*s. 2illia*s as tended to *ini*i9e t e role et ical t eory plays on t e grounds t at, unlike scientific t eory, it does not descri"e so*e real structure t at can t en "e used to e&plain *oral practice. ' us, e arrives at t e vie,, antecedents of , ic e also finds in Aristotle, t at t e task of et ical t eory cannot "e t e for*ulation of general or universal principles t at play t e role t at la,s play in scientific e&planation.@HA 7et ot ers concentrate *ore on t e role particular kno,ledge plays and tend to e*p asi9e t e pri*acy of t e particular in et ics. (art a Iuss"au*, alt oug ackno,ledging t e role general principles play in Aristotle.s et ical t eory, assigns a central role to t e particular.@9A )r,in finds an ele*ent of casuistry in Aristotle.s et ical t eory,@1$A , ile +tep en 'oul*in and Al"ert Lonsen take t e t eory of t e N.E. to "e a t eory t at defends and advocates casuistry.@11A ' e vie,s t at ) ave "riefly sketc ed a"ove are 1uite i*portant, and so*e raise foundational 1uestions a"out t e discipline of et ics. ' ey 5 #EE 5 clearly deserve in t eir o,n rig t t e *ost serious consideration. But t is is so*et ing t at cannot "e done ere. (y purpose is t e *ore li*ited one of seeing , et er Aristotle.s vie,s on e&actness!ine&actness i*ply anyt ing like , at t ese t eories clai* or at ti*es attri"ute to i* ,it respect to t e *atter of general principles, or , et er e i*self took positions t at are si*ilar to t ose of t e a"ove t eories. -ro* , at ) said in previous c apters, it s ould "e apparent t at so*e of is concerns , en speaking a"out e&actness!ine&actness in et ics are si*ilar to t e concerns raised in t e recent t eories sketc ed a"ove. But it re*ains to "e seen , et er e is ,illing to go as far as t e recent t eorists in denying t e i*portance of t e general or universal for et ical t eory and practice. )n order not to "eg any 1uestions, ) s all not "egin "y e&a*ining t e role universal or general principles play in Aristotle.s o,n t eory or t e role e assigns to suc principles in et ical t eory in general. -or t ose , o see Aristotle as so*eone , o e*p asi9ed practice over t eory, or t e particular at t e e&pense of t e universal, *ay 1uestion , et er Aristotle as a t eory or t at e assigns any role to t e universal or general.@16A ' erefore, ) "egin ,it , at Aristotle says a"out practice and practical kno,ledge. )f Aristotle t inks t at general principles or kno,ledge of suc principles is re1uired for acting in a certain ,ay or for e&plaining so*eone.s acting or failing to act in a certain ,ay, t en et ical t eory *ust in so*e ,ay concern itself ,it general or universal principles.

The 4niversal) Practice) and Practical %nowledge

Consider first t e role of t e universal or general in practical kno,ledge. ' e reason for doing so is t is: if, as so*e clai*, et ics is to "e identified ,it practical kno,ledge or ,isdo*, t us denying t at t ere is any roo* for et ical t eory, t en it is i*portant to deter*ine , et er kno,ledge of general or universal principles is in part , at ,e o"tain "y practical ,isdo*. 2 at sorts of t ings, according to Aristotle, does practical ,isdo* kno,; Aristotle clai*s t at t ere is a faculty or capacity, t at of practical kno,ledge or ,isdo*, "y , ic ,e

co*e to kno, t e trut a"out *atters of conduct >N.E. K).ii?. <e at ti*es considers t is faculty to "e so*et ing like a calculative capacity , ose activity rese*"les t e activity of deli"eration >N.E. K).i?. Aristotle takes it for granted t at practical ,isdo* ai*s at kno,ledge of t e general or universal. ' is is to i* "eyond dou"t4 it is not 1uestioned. :n t e contrary, , at e feels ,e need to "e re*inded of, or , at e feels co*pelled to assert as a corrective *easure is t at practical kno,ledge deals, or *ust deal, ,it t e particular as ,ell: GIor is practical ,isdo* concerned only ,it t e universal @or general princiB 5 #EF 5 pies,

A "ut *ust also kno, t e particulars since it is concerned ,it action and action deals ,it t e particularsG >1141"l%?.@1#A +i*ilarly, according to Aristotle, a certain role *ust "e assigned to t e general in relation to t e activity of deli"eration as ,ell, since ,e are told t at t ere is a dou"le possi"ility of error in suc activity =G7ou *ay go ,rong eit er in your general principle or in your particular fact: for instance, eit er in asserting t at all eavy ,ater is un, oleso*e, or t at t e particular ,ater in 1uestion is eavyG >1146a6$?. ' e role of t e general or universal is again e*p asi9ed in relation to deli"eration and to t e practical syllogis* , en Aristotle atte*pts to e&plain *oral ,eakness, , ere indeed t e e&planation is given in ter*s of failing to ave kno,ledge of t e particular , ile one as kno,ledge of t e universal only >114Fa4 see also Aristotle.s discussion of t e relation "et,een voluntary or involuntary and ignorance of t e general or universal at 1111a?. ' ese failures in deli"eration and action clearly point to t e conclusion t at kno,ledge of t e general or universal ,it out kno,ledge of t e particular is not sufficient for doing , at is rig t or correct, even t oug t e ot er conditions for doing , at is correct are satisfied.@14A ' is *ay co*e a"out in at least t,o different ,ays: :ne kno,s t e general "ut does not kno, t at a certain particular is an instance of t e general, alt oug t e rule does indeed apply to t e present particular=for e&a*ple, one kno,s t at eavy ,ater is un, oleso*e "ut does not kno, t at , at is in front of i* is eavy ,ater4 "ut also in t e sense t at a general rule one kno,s a"out a type of action *ay nonet eless fail to apply to a particular case of t is type on account of t e kind of ine&actness spoken of earlier=for e&a*ple, one *ay kno, t e general rule stating t at one oug t to pay "ack de"ts, "ut fail to reali9e t at t e present case, alt oug si*ilar to t e cases t at fall under t e general rule, nonet eless possesses *any features , ic place it outside t e rule >11EHa?. But alt oug kno,ledge of t e appropriate universal or general principle *ay not "e sufficient for acting correctly, it *ay nonet eless "e necessary. 3espite t e fact t at Aristotle gives a nu*"er of e&a*ples , ic suggest t at e does not t ink t at suc kno,ledge is necessary, , en e atte*pts to dra, a distinction "et,een *erely doing an action t at is re1uired "y so*e particular virtue=for e&a*ple, /ustice, courage, or te*peranceBand acting fro* suc a virtue, e appears to "e pointing to t e necessity of kno,ing t e general or universal. )n t e passage on practical ,isdo* 1uoted a"ove, for e&a*ple, e says, &;.& Ior is practical ,isdo* concerned only ,it t e universal, "ut *ust also kno, t e particular since it is concerned ,it action and action deals ,it particulars. ' at is , y *en , o are ignorant of general principles are so*eti*es *ore successful in

action t an ot ers , o kno, t e*: for

5 #EH 5 instance if a man -no)s that light meat is easily digested and therefore )holesome' but does not -no) )hat -inds of meat are light' he )ill not be so li-ely to restore you to health as a man )ho merely -no)s that chic-en is )holesome? and in other matters men of experience are more successful than theorists. 1&&9&b&:7 ' e contrast "et,een kno,ledge of t e universal and kno,ledge of t e particular is per aps not dra,n s arply enoug ere, and one *ig t even say t at kno,ing t at c icken is , oleso*e is itself a general or universal principle. )t is nonet eless clear t at t is principle is less general t an t e one Aristotle takes to "e t e universal: Jig t *eats are easily digested and t erefore , oleso*e. GC icken is , oleso*eG is, according to Aristotle, particular , en co*pared to a *ore general principle. ' ere are unfortunately too *any te&tual 1uestions ,it t is part of t e te&t, and so *any e*endations ave "een proposed t at it is indeed difficult to speak ,it any certainty a"out Aristotle.s intentions. 2e can o,ever as a start take t e ,eaker reading of it=na*ely, t at Aristotle does not *ean to say t at kno,ledge of t e universal alone ,ill never "e sufficient to do , at is correct, "ut is instead only saying t at kno,ledge of t e particular alone is *ore likely to "e successful t an kno,ledge of t e universal alone. -or alt oug e pro"a"ly olds t e for*er as ,ell, since kno,ledge of t e particular circu*stances are vie,ed "y i* as crucial to action >see N.E. ))).i?, it is t e latter t at is i*portant ere. -or even if t ere is only one instance , ere kno,ledge of t e particular alone succeeds, t en clearly kno,ledge of t e universal is not necessary. But is Aristotle actually allo,ing for t e possi"ility of acting correctly ,it out kno,ledge of t e universal; <e i**ediately proceeds to say t at Gpractical ,isdo* is concerned ,it action @

A, so t at ,e *ust ave @ A "ot for*s @of kno,ledgeA, or indeed kno,ledge of t e particulars *ore t an t e ot er.G And t is see*s to "e saying t at kno,ledge of t e universal is necessary, alt oug kno,ledge of t e particular as greater i*portance for action, for action deals ,it t e particular and is t erefore *ore i**ediately and directly in need of suc kno,ledge of particulars. Alt oug t e te&tual pro"le*s cast dou"ts on any and every interpretation of t is passage, it is 1uite possi"le t at Aristotle does indeed take t e vie, t at kno,ledge of t e universal is necessary and t at e only intends to e*p asi9e t e greater role kno,ledge of t e particular plays in action, "ut ,it out i*plying t at t e latter "y itself is sufficient. ' e conte&t of t is passage *akes t is reading plausi"le: Aristotle takes it for granted t at practical ,isdo* deals ,it t e universal, so is task could "e to s o, t at kno,ledge of t e particular is part of practical ,isdo* and is in fact *ore i*portant, "ut not t at eit er of t e* alone is sufficient: GIor is practical ,isdo* concerned ,it t e universal only, "ut *ust also kno, t e parB 5 #E9 5 ticular.G Again, , en in Met. >9H1a1%? Aristotle is once *ore concerned ,it t e role kno,ledge of t e

particular or individual plays in practice, e does not say t at kno,ledge of t e universal is not re1uired: G)f, t en, a *an as t e t eory ,it out t e e&perience, and recogni9es t e universal "ut does not kno, t e individual included in t is, e ,ill often fail to cure4 for it is t e individual t at is to "e cured.G +o one ,ould ave to provide additional evidence in order to s o, t at Aristotle t inks kno,ledge of t e universal is not necessary. :ne *ay look for additional evidence "y considering , at Aristotle says , en e uses al*ost t e identical e&a*ple in a different conte&t. )n N.E. >C.i&?, , ere e is concerned ,it t e proper ,ay of educating t e citi9ens, e argues t at Ga p ysician or trainer can "est treat a particular person if e as general kno,ledge of , at is good for every"ody or for people of t e sa*e kind: for t e sciences deal ,it t e universal.G But o"viously , at is necessary >kno,ledge of t e general? for doing C "est >treating people? *ay not "e necessary for si*ply doing C, or per aps for doing C in relation to so*eone or in so*e particular conte&t. And so Aristotle re*arks, GIot "ut , at it is possi"le no dou"t for a particular individual to "e successfully treated "y so*eone , o is not a scientific e&pert @

A, "ut as an e*pirical kno,ledge "ased on careful o"servation of t e effects of various for*s of treat*ent upon t e person in 1uestion4 /ust as so*e people appear to "e t eir o,n "est doctors, t oug t ey could not do any good to so*eone elseG >11H$"1%?. ' e present ealer see*s to "e *ore appropriately descri"ed as not kno,ing t e universal or general t an t e previous one, , o kno,s t at so*e type of food >c icken? as a certain property >, oleso*eness?, for e presu*a"ly only kno,s t at so*e treat*ent as t is or t at effect , en applied to t is individual or , en applied to i*self. ' ere is, one *ig t say, a total lack of universal kno,ledge ere=Aristotle.s ealer does not kno, t at t e treat*ent as suc effects or properties in general, and *ost likely e does not even kno, , y it as suc effects in t is particular case. ' is *ay "e a true instance of one , o lacks general kno,ledge and can yet "ring a"out or do t e correct t ing. ' is is a case, according to Aristotle, , ere it is possi"le to act correctly ,it out t e use of general or universal kno,ledge=and ence suc kno,ledge is not necessary. And t is conclusion does not see* to "e affected "y , at Aristotle proceeds to add: GBut nevert eless it ,ould dou"tless "e agreed t at anyone , o ,is es to *ake i*self *aster of an art @

A and of a science @ A *ust advance to general principles, and ac1uaint i*self ,it t ese "y t e proper *et od: for science, as ,e said, deals ,it t e universal.G -or even if one ,ere to s t e a"ove situation and to insist t at in order to cure *ore t an one person >fe, or *any? kno,ledge of t e universal is necessary or is reB 5 #F$ 5 1uired=since our ine&pert ,ould not kno, o, to treat any additional persons=it is nonet eless true t at in one case e succeeds. And t is need not "e an accident: Aristotle descri"es t e case as "eing one , ere our ine&pert , o as e*pirical kno,ledge "ased on careful o"servations of t e particular effects >

?4 e as particular kno,ledge and can repeat t e treat*ent to i*self or to t e sa*e individual. But s ould ,e still insist t at e ,ould not "e a"le to treat anyone else; ' is is not o"vious. 2 y can.t our e&pert on c icken *eat, t e one , o kno,s t e particular >c icken is , oleso*e? "ut not t e universal >lig t *eats are , oleso*e?, treat *ore t an one person; And o, *uc kno,ledge is re1uired ere; :ne *ay argue t at our ine&pert ealer a"ove can apply t e treat*ent e successfully applied to i*self or to one individual to ot ers. 2 y s ould one need to kno, t e cause >universal? to do so*et ing correctly or successfully; Ieed one kno, t e causal ,orkings of aspirin >t e universal? in order to treat anyone successfully ,it it for t e condition of fever; +ocrates and Plato speak at ti*es as if ,e needed kno,ledge of t e universal to do al*ost anyt ing, "ut per aps t ere is no suc need. And Aristotle i*self, alt oug e allo,s acting correctly ,it only kno,ledge of t e particular, see*s reluctant to do so and ,ants to restrict suc acting only to a single case. ' at kno,ledge of t e universal is not necessary for doing t e correct t ing see*s clear if ,e are to speak of actions , ere t ere appears to "e no suc kno,ledge involved. 2 at s all ,e say, for e&a*ple, in t e case of c ildren=a class of "eings t at *ay not occupy a place in Aristotle.s list far a"ove t e ani*als, "ut do nonet eless participate in action, , ereas, according to i*, ani*als do not; Ieed ,e attri"ute kno,ledge of t e universal to t e*; ' ere is also ere t e 1uestion of actions fro* a"it , ic nonet eless can "e t e correct actions. Ieed ,e ascri"e kno,ledge of t e universal or any kno,ledge at all in suc cases; And, of course, one can do t e correct t ing "y c ance, accident, *istake, inadvertently, and so on, alt oug in suc cases it is unclear not only , at sorts of kno,ledge it is necessary to ascri"e "ut also , et er ,e can ascri"e actions to anyone. But t ere is a class of actions, so*e, at si*ilar to t e a"ove types, t at Aristotle clearly accepts as cases , ere one does t e rig t or correct t ing ,it out aving kno,ledge of t e universal. ' ese are t e actions t at e descri"es in N.E . >)).i, ii, and iv? as a *eans of ac1uiring t e virtues or e&cellences. ' ese types of actions, and in particular t e ones "y *eans of , ic ,e ac1uire t e virtues, are i*portant "ecause t ey "ring to t e surface a 1uestion t at al,ays arises in t is conte&t: + ould ,e ask for kno,ledge at all or kno,ledge of t e universal in all actions or only in connection ,it certain types , ere indeed it *ay "e necessary; -or one *ay argue t at of course it is possi"le to do t e rig t or correct t ing "y accident, 5 #F1 5 "y c ance, fro* a"it, in ignorance, fro* ignorance, and so on. ' e point is, o,ever, not only t at , at is done is t e correct t ing, "ut t at t e ,ay it is done satisfies so*e conditions and it is t ese latter conditions t at are relevant to t e et ical di*ension of an action or of an agent. +o, as Aristotle often says, , at one does *ay "e t e /ust t ing or , at /ustice prescri"es, "ut t e action itself does not spring fro* a certain disposition t at ,e identify as t e disposition >virtue? of /ustice. And it *ay ,ell "e t at kno,ledge of t e general or universal is a necessary condition for acting /ustly, and in general correctly or rig tly, in contrast to *erely doing so*et ing t at appens to "e t e rig t or correct t ing to do. )ndeed, ,e see t at Aristotle is t inking along t ese lines and appears to vie, kno,ledge of t e universal as indispensa"le if ,e are to ascri"e to agents virtuous actions in t e et ical do*ain and e&cellence of perfor*ance in t e do*ain of t e arts and sciences. -or , en in N.E . )).iv, e atte*pts to provide t e conditions t at differentiate an act t at is done fro* virtue fro* one , ic is si*ply re1uired "y virtue >t e rig t or correct one?, one of t e conditions e includes t ere is t at t e agent *ust ave kno,ledge >

?. Unfortunately, Aristotle does not e&plain , at type of kno,ledge e as in *ind, and for t is reason co**entators are divided "et,een t ose , o t ink t at it is pri*arily kno,ledge of t e general or universal principle t at specifies t e proper conduct in relation to a virtue and t ose , o t ink t at it is kno,ledge of t e particulars pertaining to so*e one act.@1%A ' ere are, ) "elieve, several considerations t at tilt t e scale in favor of t e first vie,, or at least of t e vie, t at kno,ledge of t e general or universal principle *ust "e included in , at t e agent kno,s. Aristotle could not "y Gkno,ledgeG *ean only kno,ledge of t e circu*stances of an act t at e lists at 1111a% in is discussion of t e voluntary, , ere e atte*pts to dra, a distinction "et,een acting fro* and t roug ignorance=t at is, kno,ledge of t e agent, t e act, t e t ing affected, t e instru*ent, t e effect of t e act, and t e *anner of doing >e.g., gently or violently?. -or all t ese conditions could "e satisfied "y actions , ic are not done fro* virtue and *ost of t e* could "e satisfied "y so*et ing , ic is done correctly "y c ance =for not all of t ese conditions ave to "e satisfied >1111aF?. Per aps all t at is needed in addition to t e a"ove conditions is to introduce t e re1uire*ent t at t e agent as kno,ledge t at t e particular act at and is rig t or correct, and t us avoid introducing kno,ledge of t e universal=for e&a*ple, one *ay kno, t at repaying t is de"t is rig t "ut not kno, t at t e general principle of paying de"ts is rig t. )s suc kno,ledge, o,ever, syste*atically possi"le; )f so, o,; And if it ,ere possi"le, ,ould it "e sufficient for t e distinction Aristotle ,ants to dra, "et,een acting fro* virtue and doing an act t at is t e correct one to do; +uc kno,ledge ,ould ave to "e syste*atically possi"le and not only in 5 #F6 5 isolated cases, for it is supposed to satisfy t e cognitive re1uire*ent for acting fro* virtue=in all cases , ere ,e act fro* virtue kno,ledge is supposedly of t e particular only. But o, does one kno, t at it is rig t to repay /ust t is de"t; As <are and ot ers ave pointed out, ,e need to kno, , y suc a clai* of kno,ledge is *ade ere4 ,e need to kno, t e reasons for t e *oral /udg*ent. And , en pressed for reasons, ,e are likely to point out t at an agree*ent or pro*ise or contract ,as *ade to return t e *oney, t us su"su*ing t e case to t e general principle of t e rig tness of acts of fulfilling pro*ises, agree*ents, or contracts. -or unless ,e are ,illing to allo, for so*e sort of /ustification of our clai* to kno, t at t is particular act is rig t, ,e ,ill "e inevita"ly led into t e *ost e&tre*e for* of intuitionis*: t at t e correctness of every particular ele*ent of conduct is kno,n intuitively. )ntuitionis* of general principles is, as is ,ell kno,n, pro"le*atic, "ut intuitionis* t at is *eant to apply to every individual case is certainly *ore pro"le*atic. And ) see no evidence t at Aristotle advocates suc a for* of intuitionis*. 2 atever t e ans,er to t e 1uestion of t e possi"ility of syste*atic kno,ledge of t e particular, t e 1uestion still re*ains , et er, assu*ing suc kno,ledge to "e possi"le, it is , at Aristotle as in *ind and , et er it can satisfy t e cognitive condition of acting fro* virtue in contrast to *erely doing , at appens to "e t e rig t t ing. -or , en Aristotle contrasts t e t,o ,ays of acting e speaks of t e agent as "eing in Ga certain stateG or Gcertain state of *indG >

? in t e case , ere e acts fro* virtue "ut not in t e ot er.@1EA And t is Gstate of *indG in t e case of virtue as its analogue in t e case of doing ,ell in t e various sciences, arts, skills, or activities. -or one can spell a ,ord correctly "y c ance or "ecause so*eone else pro*pts i*4 in suc a case one *ay even "e said to kno,, "ecause e as "een told "y so*eone else, o, to spell a ,ord, "ut G e ,ould "e

an e&pert gra**arian, only if e as "ot done so*et ing gra**atical and done it gra**atically4 and t is *eans doing it in accordance ,it t e gra**atical kno,ledge in i*selfG >11$%a6%?. A perfor*ance t en ,ould not "e gra**atical > ? unless it "ot satisfied t e rules of gra**ar and ste**ed fro* t e kno,ledge of gra**ar in t e perfor*er, /ust as a perfor*ance of an act ,ould not presu*a"ly "e virtuous unless it ste**ed fro* virtue. But t e kno,ledge of gra**ar ere is t e kno,ledge of t e general principles of t e discipline of gra**ar , ic are applied to a particular case=for e&a*ple, in spelling a particular ,ord=and t is is , at sets t e e&pert , o perfor*s fro* kno,ledge of gra**ar apart fro* t e one , o does it "y c ance or , o is repeating , at so*eone tells i*. ' ere is no dou"t t at t is is t e sort of kno,ledge involved in gra**ar or *edicine or t e arts in general. As s o,n earlier, it is t is kno,ledge t at distinguis es t e e&pert fro* t e none&pert: G, oever ,is es to *ake 5 #F# 5 i*self a person of science *ust advance to general principlesG >11H$E6#?. And again at 11#Fa%B6% t e si*ilarity is pointed out "et,een acting fro* virtue and perfor*ing fro* t e appropriate kno,ledge of an art: one ele*ent of t e si*ilarity is t at "ot cases *ust involve t e e&ercise of a certain kno,ledge. )n relation to /ustice one *ust kno, o, a distri"ution *ust "e *ade in order to "e /ust, , ile in relation to *edicine o, and , en and to , o* to apply certain drugs, surgery, and so on. And t ese are general trut s. )ndeed, , en Aristotle co*pares t e case of acting fro* virtue and perfor*ing fro* gra**ar, e speaks of kno,ledge in "ot cases and contrasts t e roles t at suc kno,ledge plays in t e case of virtue and t e arts, "ut ,it out inting t at different kinds of kno,ledge are involved in t e t,o cases: G-or t e possession of an art, none of t ese conditions is included, e&cept t e condition of kno,ledge @

A4 "ut for t e possession of virtues, kno,ledge @ A is of little or no avail, , ereas t e ot er conditions . . .G >11$%"?. :ne ,ould ave to assu*e ere t at Aristotle is talking a"out t e sa*e kind of kno,ledge in is co*parison. And t e supposed relative uni*portance kno,ledge as in relation to virtue, , ic Aristotle contrasts to t at it as in relation to t e arts, does not affect t e point. <aving kno,ledge of t e general, or universal principles, of , at is /ust, te*perate, or "rave *ay not "e t e sa*e as aving t e virtue of /ustice, te*perance, or courage. -or, unlike t e arts, , ere presu*a"ly t e possession of t e appropriate kno,ledge is t e sa*e as t e possession of t e art=for e&a*ple, kno,ledge of gra**ar is t e sa*e as aving t e art of gra**ar= possessing a virtue includes so*et ing *ore t an kno,ledge4 it includes possessing a state of c aracter or a disposition. Ievert eless, t e appropriate universal kno,ledge as to "e present if one is to act virtuously. :ddly enoug , *ore evidence a"out t e nature of kno,ledge re1uired for acting virtuously is to "e found , ere Aristotle tries to e&plain o, ,e at ti*es fail to act so, despite t e fact t at ,e kno, , at is t e virtuous t ing to do=, ere, t at is, e tries to e&plain t e p eno*ena of ,eakness of t e ,ill or incontinence. But t is *ay not "e so odd after all. -or in order to e&plain suc p eno*ena, one as to s o, o, t e continent agent differs fro* t e incontinent one. Aristotle, as is ,ell kno,n, does t is "y

co*paring t e practical reasoning used "y, or re1uired for e&plaining t e "e avior of, t e continent and incontinent agent. +o*e of t e pre*ises of suc practical reasonings or syllogis*s represent t e types of kno,ledge t e agent as or t at can "e attri"uted to i*. Aristotle leaves no dou"t t at one of t e pre*ises in suc practical syllogis*s represents kno,ledge of t e universal or general kind >N.E . K)).iii?. +uc kno,ledge >or "elief? *ust "e present for ascri"ing eit er continence or incontinence to an agent. )t is re1uired for setting up t e appropriate practical syllogis*s for continent and incontinent action, for e& i"iting 5 #F4 5 t e conflict ,it in t e incontinent agent, and for identifying t e cause of t e final "reakdo,n of suc a syllogis* in t e case of incontinent action. 2 ere t ere can "e no universal kno,ledge, Aristotle t inks, t ere can "e no incontinence eit er. +o, e re*arks t at Glo,er ani*als cannot "e called incontinent, if only for t e reason t at t ey ave no po,er of for*ing universal /udg*ents @or concepts =

A "ut only *ental i*ages and *e*ories of particular t ingsG >114FE%?.@1FA ' e a"ove considerations s o, "eyond any reasona"le dou"t t at Aristotle takes general principles to "e an indispensa"le ele*ent of practical kno,ledge and virtuous action. Bot of t e* *ay need to take account of t e particulars, "ut it does not follo, fro* t is t at t ey are concerned only ,it t e particulars. Aristotle.s vie,s on t ese *atters are not of t e kind t at it ,ould "e correct to c aracteri9e as "eing t ose of casuistry. But, it *ig t "e o"/ected, Aristotle is not entitled to appeal to universal principles, t at is o,n diagnosis of ine&actness in et ics casts dou"t on t e usefulness of universal principles in et ical t eory and conduct. ' is, o,ever, is a separate *atter to , ic ) s all return after ) discuss t e role universal principles play in is conception of et ical in1uiry. ) s all ave so*et ing to say t en a"out t e pro"le*s of uncodifia"ility and vagueness in connection ,it general principles. +o*et ing, o,ever, needs to "e said at t is point a"out (c3o,ell.s ,orries concerning t e e&planation of virtuous action. (c3o,ell concedes t at Aristotle.s e&planatory sc e*a of virtuous action, t e one t at as a deductive structure ,it a universal proposition as its *a/or pre*ise, is at least part of t e e&planation of suc action. <e ,rites, G)t is not ,rong to t ink of t e virtuous person.s /udg*ents a"out , at to do, or is actions, as e&plica"le "y interaction "et,een kno,ledge of o, to live and particular kno,ledge a"out t e situation at and . . . . But t e t oug t needs a *ore su"tle construal t an t e deductive paradig* allo,s.G@1HA (c3o,ell *ay "e rig t "ot in clai*ing t at t e Aristotelian e&planatory sc e*a needs to "e supple*ented and in identifying t e ,ay in , ic it *ust "e supple*ented. But if t e Aristotelian e&planatory sc e*a is part of t e e&planation of virtuous action, t en ,e cannot get a,ay fro* general principles t at for*ulate t e correct "e avior correlated ,it eac one of t e virtues. )f ,e could for*ulate general principles t at state , at virtuous "e avior is or o, ,e s ould live our lives, ,e ,ould t us, (c3o,ell clai*s, "e under*ining t e i*portance virtue as in *oral p ilosop y: G)f t e 1uestion .<o, s ould one live;. could "e given a direct ans,er in universal ter*s, t e concept of virtue ,ould ave only a secondary place in *oral p ilosop y. But t e t esis of uncodifia"ility e&cludes a eadBon approac to t e 1uestion , ose urgency gives et ics its interest.G@19A Jeaving aside t e 1uestion of uncodifia"ility for t e *o*ent, t e clai* t at t e i*porB

5 #F% 5 tance of t e concept of virtue in *oral p ilosop y ,ill "e di*inis ed if ,e ,ere to for*ulate general principles is not o"vious. -or t e general t esis t at Gif so*e concept C of so*e discipline 3 can "e defined in universal ter*s, t en C cannot "e of pri*ary i*portance in 3G is not selfBevident. 'ake, for instance, t e capacity to speak gra**atically or to recBogui9e gra**aticality and t e universal rules of gra**ar. ' at t ere are suc rules does not necessarily affect t e i*portance t is capacity as for linguistic t eory. But per aps t e capacity for gra**ar is not like virtue.@6$A 'ake, t en, ealt , , ic Aristotle treats very *uc like virtue: ealt is to t e "ody , at virtue is to t e soul. Io, t ere are rules as to , at ealt is and , at t ings or activities generate it or *aintain it, and "eing ealt y is not t e sa*e as kno,ing t e principles of ealt . 7et t at t ere are suc principles a"out ealt does not *ake t e concept of ealt of secondary i*portance in *edicine. Again, c oice is of great i*portance to et ics. But if t ere are or could "e general principles a"out c oice, as c oice t eory *aintains, t e i*portance c oice as for et ics ,ill not "e di*inis ed "ecause of t at. +i*ilarly, if t ere ,ere general rules specifying virtuous "e avior, t is ,ould not necessarily *ake t e concept of virtue of secondary i*portance for et ical t eory, for t e latter *ay "e concerned as *uc ,it o, ,e s ould do as ,it , at ,e s ould "e, or as *uc ,it t e principles specifying , at is correct to do as ,it t e kind of persons or c aracters ,e s ould "e.

4niversalit" and 'thical Theor"

)f ) a* correct in distinguis ing a*ong practice, practical kno,ledge, and et ical t eory, t en t e 1uestion arises as to , et er Aristotle, in spite of t e ine&actness e attri"utes to t e su"/ect *atter of et ics and t e accounts of it, nonet eless takes general principles to "e indispensa"le to et ical t eory. ) argued earlier >c ap. #? t at is o,n investigation in t e N.E . is e&clusively concerned ,it t e general or universal aspects of conduct and not ,it t e particulars. )t is concerned a"ove all ,it t e "asic ele*ents of t e discipline, t at is, t e t ings t at are principles in t e sense t at Aristotle understands t e ter*. And so Aristotle puts fort a nu*"er of universal propositions t at co*prise t e "asic ele*ents and principles of t e discipline: ' e good is t e end, appiness is t e end t at is and can only "e pursued for its o,n sake, appiness is t e *ost perfect end, virtue is a disposition or state of c aracter, virtue is related to a *ean, and so fort . Aristotle.s investigation is also concerned ,it t e specific virtues, ,it for*ulating t e universal principles t at define t e nature of eac of t e virtues= for e&a*ple, t e one defining distri"utive /ustice: GLustice is t erefore a sort of proportion, for proportion is not a property of nu*erical 1uantity only, "ut of 1uantity in general, proportion "eing 5 #FE 5 e1uality of ratios, and involving four ter*s at leastG >N.E . 11#1a#$?. And so*e of t ese general propositions could "e construed as "eing nor*ative: t ey tell us , at /ustice, courage, gentleness, and so on are or , at /ust, courageous, gentle, and so on "e avior is. But t ere is also t e concern ,it general or universal principles in our sense of t e ter* Gprinciple,G t at is, general propositions t at are une1uivocally nor*ative: All *alice, s a*elessness, envy, adultery, t eft, and *urder are "ad >11$Fal $?4 a*ong friends , o are une1ual, t e one , o is "enefited in possessions or e&cellence *ust repay , at e can, na*ely onor >11E#"16?4 a son never oug t to diso,n is fat er >11E#"1H?4 a de"tor oug t to pay , at e o,es >11E#E6$?4 for t e *ost part one oug t to return services rendered >11E4E#6?4 and so fort . 7et t e fact, if it is one, t at Aristotle in is o,n investigation soug t general principles does not s o, t at e considered et ics to necessarily ai* at t e universal or general. )t does not s o, "y itself t at e

considered principles, eit er in is or in our sense of t is ter*, of t e general or universal type to "e indispensa"le in et ics. 3ifferent considerations, o,ever, s o, t at Aristotle did t ink et ics to "e essentially concerned ,it t e universal. -or it is a syste*atic investigation4 it is a discipline, and every discipline is, according to i*, concerned ,it t e universal. ' at scientific kno,ledge or t at any discipline >

? is essentially concerned ,it t e universal is, of course, never dou"ted "y Aristotle >see Met . 1$$#a14, 1$%9"64, 1$E$"194 ost. Anal . HFE#H, HHE#$?. But does e also take t is to "e true of practical disciplines like et ics, politics, t e legislative discipline, *edicine, r etoric, and so fort ; ' ere is no 1uestion t at Aristotle does so. )n Rhet . >1#%E"69? e re*arks a"out *edicine and r etoric: Gno art as t e particular in vie,, *edicine for instance , at is good for +ocrates or Callias, "ut , at is good for t is or t at class of person >for t is is a *atter t at co*es ,it in t e province of an art...?4 si*ilarly, t erefore, r etoric ,ill not consider , at see*s pro"a"le in eac individual case, for instance to +ocrates or <ippias, "ut t at , ic see*s pro"a"le to t is or t at class of person.G And in N.E . >11H$"1%?, , ere Aristotle is concerned ,it t e pro"le* of t e *oral education of t e citi9ens "y *eans of t e appropriate la,s and constitution, e insists again t at t e legislative or political art ai*s, like *edicine, at t e universal: Gfor t e sciences @ A "ot are said to "e, and are, concerned ,it , at is co**on.G ' e person , o lacks kno,ledge of t e universal in *edicine, alt oug e *ig t "e a"le to treat so*eone successfully, is nonet eless ,it out t e science or art > 11H$"lF?. And so, Aristotle concludes, t at anyone in *edicine or t e legislative and political art , o ,is es to *ake i*self a *aster of t e art or discipline G*ust advance to general principles, and ac1uaint i*self ,it t ese "y t e proper *et od: for science, as ,e said, deals ,it t e universal. +o preB 5 #FF 5 su*a"ly , oever ,is es to *ake ot er people "etter >, et er fe, or *any? "y is care, *ust endeavor to ac1uire t e science of legislation=assu*ing t at it is possi"le to *ake us good "y la,sG >11H$"6#?. And la,, t at , ic t e political or legislative art studies or ai*s at, is al,ays or in all cases universal >

, 11#F"1#?. But et ics is, according to Aristotle, a practical discipline like *edicine or politics, and, t erefore, at least in part, its concerns s ould also "e ,it t e universal. Aristotle takes it for granted t at t is is indeed t e pri*ary task of et ics: to provide general accounts or rules. ' is is assu*ed to "e so*et ing t at is o"vious, so*et ing t at needs no furt er discussion or e&planation. :n t e contrary, it is t e concern of et ics ,it t e particular t at ,e need to "e re*inded of or t at re1uires e&planation. +o*e types of for*al ine&actness are discussed pri*arily in relation to universal or general accounts, and ,e need to "e re*inded, t erefore, t at t ey apply, and per aps *ore so, to less general or *ore specific

accounts >see H.6?. Aristotle re*inds us again >11$Fa6F? t at ,e *ust not stop at t e general account of virtue, "ut *ust proceed do,n to t e individual treat*ent of eac one of t e virtues and give details of t e particulars. But, unlike t e concern of et ics ,it t e universal , ic Aristotle takes to need no e&planation, e feels co*pelled to e&plain , y ,e need to reac t e level of t e particulars: 2e need to do so, according to i*, "ecause conduct deals ,it t e particulars. 2 at Aristotle does in is o,n investigation, t at is, focusing on general or universal accounts, is, t en, no accident. )t is for i* a necessary conse1uence of t e assu*ptions t at et ics is a discipline and t at a discipline is essentially concerned ,it t e universal. As ) said at t e "eginning of t is c apter, t e role assigned to generality or universality *ay vary fro* one et ical t eory to anot er. +o*e rule utilitarians, for e&a*ple, introduce general rules in order to avoid t e ,ellBkno,n pro"le*s raised "y act utilitarianis* , en it insists t at utility calculations for deter*ining rig tness or ,rongness *ust "e done for eac individual action. 3oing so, t e critics argue, leads easily to situations , ere an action t at as a certain *oral property >e.g., "eing rig t or ,rong? "ecause of its relation to a general rule *ay ave t e opposite property "ecause of t e outco*e of a particular utility calculation in a particular conte&t. <ence, t e *ove of rule utilitarians to calculate t e utility of general rules , ic are t en used to deter*ine t e *oral properties of particular actions. 'o so*e, o,ever, universality is itself a su"stantive *oral *a&i*4 it is a nor*atire principle i*plying parity of treat*ent. But to ot ers, for e&a*ple, to prescriptivists like <are, it is a for*al feature of *orality, a logical, and ence defining, c aracteristic of *oral /udg*ents. )t is not altoget er clear o, Aristotle construes t e universality or 5 #FH 5 generality of et ical principles t at presu*a"ly t eory ai*s at and action re1uires. 8ven if universal principles ,ere to "e considered necessary for acting virtuously, t is "y itself ,ould not "e sufficient for distinguis ing, and t erefore for defining, et ical actions fro* actions pertaining to t e various skills, co*petences, or arts. -or speaking gra**atically in t e strict sense re1uires, according to i*, kno,ledge of t e general rules of gra**ar, and t ere is no clear evidence t at Aristotle t oug t t at every *oral /udg*ent i*plies a universal, and t at t is is a logical feature of *oral discourse. 7et Aristotle insists t at *a&i*s are universal >Rhet . 1#94a#1? and t at la, is general >N.E . 11#F"1#?. But , at is t e status of t e universality or generality of *a&i*s or la,; )s Aristotle *aking an e*pirical o"servation a"out *a&i*s , en e says Ga *a&i* is a state*ent, not o,ever a"out particulars, as, for instance, , at sort of *an )p icrates ,as, "ut generalG; ' is *ay not "e altoget er i*plausi"le. Per aps e is asserting an e*pirical generali9ation a"out *a&i*s=na*ely, t at as a *atter of fact *a&i*s are general. ' e sa*e, of course, could "e said a"out t e generality of la,. 7et t ere see*s to "e so*et ing *ore to t e relation "et,een universality and la, or *a&i*s t an is conveyed "y t e e*pirical generali9ation vie,. Ad*ittedly, t ere can "e la,s dealing ,it particulars, for e&a*ple, a la, decreeing t at Pericles is to "e onored on suc and suc a day or t at Aristeides is to "e ostraci9ed on a specific day. But la,s and *a&i*s cannot "e syste*atically particular if t ey are to "e guides to practice. ' ere cannot "e a la, or *a&i* for eac particular for, as Aristotle o"serves, t e particulars are infinite >Rhet . 1#F4a#$?. But t e fact t at generality see*s to "e al*ost an essential feature of la, and *a&i*s s o,s t at it cannot "y itself define , at is essential to *orality, for it appears to "e a c aracteristic of anyt ing t at can "e a guide to practice, for e&a*ple, of prudential *a&i*s or rules of eti1uette, and not only of prescriptive /udg*ents or language. )n a ,ay any /udg*ent can "e a guide to action. )f, for e&a*ple, ) infor* you t at your car is on fire , ile you are driving, ) a* telling you so*et ing ,it t e intent of

guiding your action. And suc nonprescriptive guides to action are often general, for e&a*ple, G' ere is no *an , o is appy in everyt ingG >Rhet . 1#94"? or GCrocodiles ,ill attack u*ans , en ungry.G But for Aristotle t e relation universality as to et ics see*s to rest as *uc on is supposition t at universal kno,ledge is a necessary ele*ent of practice as it does on is assu*ption t at et ical in1uiry is a discipline. ' e universal is, according to i*, t e goal of every discipline. 'o perfor* an action or produce so*et ing "y using t e practical or productive disBciplines=since t ese are, after all, t eir goals=is to do or *ake so*et ing fro* a cognitive state t at is in part c aracteri9ed "y kno,ledge of uniB 5 #F9 5 versal principles. But t is also i*plies t at universality so understood cannot "e t e distinctive feature of et ics, since it is , at all disciplines ai* at and is presu*a"ly re1uired in order to act, *ake, or t eori9e "y using any and every practical, productive, or t eoretical discipline. -or e&a*ple, to act correctly, to "uild properly, or to solve a geo*etrical pro"le* one *ust presu*a"ly rely upon t e appropriate practical, productive, or t eoretical discipline or art and t e kno,ledge of universal principles t at are proper to it. 7et t e 1uestion raised earlier still re*ains: )s Aristotle entitled to appeal to universality given , at e says a"out e&actness!ine&actness in et ics; And are not t ose p ilosop ers correct , o ave recently argued t at t e 1uest for universality in et ics *ust "e a"andoned "ecause of t e supposed ine&actness of t e discipline; As noted in earlier c apters, Aristotle is rat er cautious ,it regard to t e conclusions e dra,s fro* t e supposed ine&actness in et ics. 'ake, for instance, t e *atter of e&ceptions in et ical principles or t e uncodifia"ility issue. )n spite of , at e at ti*es says a"out t e pervasiveness of ine&actness in et ics, e recogni9es so*e propositions as aving no e&ceptions, for e&a*ple, t at appiness is al,ays desired for its o,n sake or t at *urder is ,rong. And t e supposition t at *any, or even *ost, propositions in et ics ave e&ceptions does not for Aristotle i*ply t at universal propositions are useless in practice or t eory. And e as good reasons for taking suc a position. -or e&ceptions are, as Aristotle o"serves, to "e encountered in la,, t e propositions of *edicine, and t e propositions of t e disciplines studying natural p eno*ena. )f e&ceptions i*ply an uncodifia"ility for et ics of t e kind (c3o,ell speaks of=t at is, t ere are no general propositions or t at suc propositions are of no use in practice or t eory=t en t e sa*e ,ould "e true for la,, *edicine, and natural sciences. But t ere are general propositions4 t ere are general legal principles, general *edical rules, and natural la,s. ' ere is, in ot er ,ords, codification of , at is legal, , at is proper in *edicine, or , at is true in nature. )t is, indeed, "ecause ,e ave suc codification t at ,e can speak of e&ceptions. ' e correct t ing to do , en ,e recogni9e t at et ical, legal, *edical, or scientific propositions are ine&act "ecause t ey ave e&ceptions is not, according to Aristotle, to a"andon universal propositions, "ut rat er to pay eed to t e e&ceptions. -or e&a*ple, ,e need to e&a*ine , et er a particular legal case is really a case t at can "e andled "y t e la,: ' e la,*aker is, Aristotle argues, Go"liged to *ake a universal state*ent, , ic is not applica"le to all, "ut only to *ost, cases4 . . . one *ust ave recourse to general state*ents4 so t at, if a *an ,earing a ring lifts up is and to strike or actually strikes, according to t e ,ritten la, e is guilty of ,rongdoing, "ut in reality e is not4 and t is is a case of e1uityG >Rhet . 1#F4a#$?. ' e sa*e is true in *edicine. ' ere are, per aps, e&B 5 #H$ 5

ceptions to every *edical rule or general state*ent, "ut t is does not *ean t at , at pertains to *edicine is not codifia"le or t at general propositions are useless in *edical practice or t eory. General propositions are indispensa"le for t e purpose of e&planation in any field. 8&planations in *edicine or et ics *ay not "e as e&act as t ose in *at e*atics, for t eir de*onstrations are ine&act, and for t e reasons discussed earlier, "ut t ey are e&planations nonet eless. ' at c icken is , oleso*e, for e&a*ple, is e&plained "y s o,ing t at it can "e deductively inferred fro* propositions stating t at lig t *eats are , oleso*e and c icken is a lig t *eat. ' e general proposition provides, according to Aristotle, part of t e causal e&planation of t e property of , oleso*eness in c icken.@61A ' e sa*e is true in t e case of t e la, and et ics=*ore general propositions can "e used to e&plain or /ustify less general ones. But are e&planations in et ics or la, e&planations at all if t e general propositions in t ese disciplines do not descri"e or represent so*e real structure in t e ,ay scientific la,s presu*a"ly do; (ig t not general propositions in suc disciplines "e, after all, t eoretically useless; ' is is clearly a difficult and co*ple& *atter, and cannot "e discussed in any detail ere. But t e contrast dra,n "et,een scientific la,s and universal propositions in et ics presupposes t at a *etap ysical realis* o"tains in t e do*ain of science=la,s descri"e a real structure="ut not in t e do*ain of et ics. ) do not ,is to defend *etap ysical realis* eit er in science or in *orals, "ut t ose , o accept it in science o,e an e&planation of , y it is not true in *orals. Aristotle, of course, accepted *etap ysical realis* across t e "oard, and t erefore for i* general propositions and e&planations in et ics do not pose t e pro"le*s t at t ey pose for t e *oral antirealists. +uppose, o,ever, t at t e *oral antirealists are correct, and t at universal propositions in et ics, unlike la,s of nature, do not represent a real structure. 2 at, t en, appens to e&planations outside of science; ' ere is e&planation after *etap ysical realis*. -or suc realis* as not "een s o,n to o"tain any, ere, and t erefore it cannot "e said t at t e possi"ility of e&planation in any do*ain as "een esta"lis ed on t e "asis of t e trut of suc a realis*. 3o ,e kno, t at a deductive inference in p ysics t at uses as one of its pre*ises Ie,ton.s first la, of *otion is an e&planation "ecause ,e kno, t at t is la, captures t e *etap ysical structure of t e ,orld; And do ,e kno, t at a deductive inference in 8uclidean geo*etry is a proof or e&planation of t e Pyt agorean t eore* "ecause ,e kno, t at 8uclidean a&io*s represent t e *etap ysical geo*etrical structure of t e ,orld; Aristotle e*"raced *etap ysical realis*, and t erefore t e dou"ts a"out e&planation t e antirealists raise did not concern i*. ' e i*portant point to keep in *indV o,ever, is t at ,e can speak of e&planation, and 5 #H1 5 ence of t e universal propositions re1uired for it, even if ,e set suc realis* aside. 2e can speak of e&planations fro* propositions t at are si*ply true or even fro* propositions t at stipulate , at is legal, correct, or rig t and, of course, t e opposite of t ese. ' e *ost general of suc propositions can e&plain t e less general ones. Io, suc e&planations *ay not reveal t e ulti*ate structure of t e ,orld, "ut t ey *ay reveal t e structure of a syste* of rules or "eliefs. ' ey *ig t s o, o, a syste* angs toget er, o, so*e of its ele*ents are su"ordinate to and /ustified "y ot ers. Iot all e&planations are, after all, alike. ' ey need not all invoke or presuppose a vie, a"out t e underlying structure of reality.@66A ' us, ,e appeal to t e Addition Property of 81uality=if t e sa*e nu*"er is added to e1uals, t e su*s ,ill "e e1ual=in order to e&plain , y t,o tea*s t at are tied at alfti*e ,ill also "e tied at t e end of t e ga*e if t ey score t e sa*e nu*"er of points during t e rest of t e ga*e.

But , at a"out t e conse1uences of vagueness for universality; ' e vagueness t at Aristotle associates ,it et ics is not necessarily t e vagueness Baier attri"utes to *oral rules or principles. Baier is pri*arily concerned ,it t e lack of deter*inate content of *oral rules, t eir supposed e*ptiness or vagueness , en t ey are vie,ed independently of t e net,ork of cultural practices and institutions t at provide t e necessary content. Baler ,rites: Be ind t e s ort pro i"ition G' ou s alt not killG lie as *any tacitly understood 1ualifications and cultural and legal discri*inations as lie "e ind G' ou s alt not love t y neig "or.s ,ife.G Lust as t e latter presupposes deter*inate institutions of *arriage, deter*ining individual *arital rig ts, so G' ou s alt not *urderG presupposes a co*ple& set of culturally specific rig ts, po,ers, and prerogatives ... Any popular version of a s ort set of *oral don.ts, suc as Gdon.t kill,G Gdon.t steal,G Gdon.t "reak pro*ises,G Gunless you are an official don.t coerce,G "rings ,it it a very ric cultural "aggage, if it is to ave any content at all.@6#A ' e pro"le* for Aristotle is not t at t ere is a rule , ic is e*pty , en it is detac ed fro* t e practices and institutions t at give it content, "ut rat er t at t ere are difficulties ,it providing precise rules a"out , at is presu*a"ly ine&act. ' us, it is difficult, Aristotle t inks, to provide a rule t at specifies , en ,e are re1uired to return a favor to a "enefactor rat er t an to give a gift to a co*panion, assu*ing t at ,e cannot do "ot >N.E . 11E4E6%?. Any rule a"out suc *atters is, Aristotle t inks, defeasi"le, and even if t ere are institutions or practices=for e&a*ple, t ose of "enefiting people, doing favors, or giving gifts=it is not clear o, and , et er t eir e&istence solves Aristotle.s pro"le*. ' e p eno*ena e& i"it suc variation t at an institution or a practice need not necessarily fare "etter t an a rule. 5 #H6 5 Baier *ay "e correct in pointing out t at a rule presupposes a ,ay or for* of life, and t erefore cannot really "e understood independently of t e t ings it rests upon or presupposes. But, if 2ittgenstein is correct, t is is true of every rule and of all language. Janguage is, according to i*, itself a practice, an institution, or a for* of life, and a linguistic e&pression as , atever *eaning or content it as "y virtue of its "eing part of suc a practice, institution, or for* of life. A si*ple rule like t at of t e directional arro, rests on a practice t at gives it t e content or *eaning it as for us. But so does a rule or la, of p ysics, for e&a*ple, t at - Q *a. ' is la, cannot "e understood ,it out presupposing a , ole syste* of t oug t and practice. But t ese facts, if t ey are facts, a"out t e ,ay rules ac1uire content or *eaning do not necessarily s o, or i*ply t at general rules ave no place in a discipline or t at t ey cannot guide actions. ' e la, t at - Q *a is a co*ponent of a t eory and t e rule of t e directional arro, is a guide to action. Io, it *ay "e t at et ical rules or principles are *ore dependent on institutions or practices t an ot er rules. And it *ay "e, if Aristotle is correct, t at t ey also are *ore difficult to arrive at or t at t ey ave *ore e&ceptions t an ot er rules. 7et general rules need not "e useless "ecause of suc c aracteristics. ' ey could play t e role t ey can play as long as ,e are a,are of t eir li*itations. And t is is, ) "elieve, Aristotle.s o,n conclusion. <e does not urge t at ,e a"andon general rules, "ut t at ,e keep in *ind t eir ine&actness and t at ,e are a,are of t e conse1uences suc ine&actness as for t e episte*ic and practical functions general rules or principles ave.

Ine*actness and Truth

' e issue of t e relation of trut to et ical /udg*ents as figured pro*inently in *any of t e recent

et ical t eories, "ot nor*arive and *etaet ical. )n *ost cases, t ese t eories ave clai*ed t at et ical /udg*ents in particular, and value /udg*ents in general, lack trut values. ' e reasons given for denying trut values to et ical /udg*ents ave not al,ays "een t e sa*e. )n so*e t eories t e t esis t at et ical /udg*ents lack trut values is assu*ed or in so*e ,ay esta"lis ed prior to giving an account of t e nature or logic of et ical discourse or language. ' e ne&t task for suc t eories is to produce an account of t e nature or logic of et ical discourse t at e&plains t e t esis or t at is not inconsistent ,it it. :t er t eories, o,ever, proceed "y giving an analysis of et ical discourse , ic i*plies t e t esis t at et ical /udg*ents do not ave a trut value.@64A )n "ot types of t eory t e result is t e sa*e: et ical /udg*ents are construed as aving, strictly speaking, no cognitive significance, as not "eing state*ents or asB 5 #H# 5 serting propositions. ' e function of et ical /udg*ents, according to t ese noncognitivist t eories, is to e&press or evince so*et ing >e.g., an attitude or a feeling? and not to assert or state anyt ing t at can ave a trut value. 2 at function, or functions, do et ical /udg*ents ave for Aristotle; Muite fre1uently in t e N.E . Aristotle points out t at ,e praise t e virtuous person as ,ell as t e dispositions or states of c aracter t at are virtues and ,e "la*e t e person of vice as ,ell as t e dispositions t at are vices >11$1"14, "69, 11$#aF, 11$Eal, 11$E"6%, 11$F"##, 11$9"6#, 1119"66, etc.?. Alt oug Aristotle does not say o,, or "y , at linguistic *eans, ,e praise or "la*e agents or dispositions, it is reasona"le to suppose t at e takes t e utterance of /udg*ents suc as GA is "rave,G GB is /ust,G or GPettiness is not no"leG to "e, a*ong ot er t ings, *eans of praising agents A and B and disapproving of petty "e avior. :ne of t e functions, t en, so*e et ical /udg*ents *ay ave for Aristotle is t at of e&pressing praise or "la*e. ' ere is, o,ever, no evidence t at Aristotle segregates co*pletely, as t e noncognitivists often do, t e functions of linguistic e&pressions. ' ere is no evidence, in ot er ,ords, t at e t inks t at t ere are t,o totally distinct sets of /udg*ents, eac set aving a different function: one set consisting of t ose /udg*ents , ose function is cognitive >t ey assert or state a proposition? and t e ot er consisting of t ose /udg*ents , ose function is noncognitive >t ey e&press or evince so*et ing?. Ioncognitivists, especially t e e*otivists, ave invaria"ly accepted or argued for suc a segregation of t e function of /udg*ents or linguistic e&pressions, "ut no convincing reasons ave "een given in support of suc a vie,. )n any case, Aristotle does not say t at if an et ical /udg*ent is used to e&press an attitude or to praise or "la*e so*eone or so*et ing, it t erefore does not state or assert so*et ing and conse1uently cannot ave trut values. +o*e p ilosop ers ave, o,ever, argued t at certain /udg*ents *ay lack trut values for reasons t at are different fro* t ose t e noncognitivists give. 3ispositional /udg*ents are, according to t ese p ilosop ers, suc a kind of /udg*ent. ' us, Gil"ert 0yle argued t at a /udg*ent suc as G+ugar is solu"leG is not really a state*ent asserting t at sugar as a property, "ut rat er it is a *eans or ,ay of licensing an inference a"out sugar=t at is, it licenses us to infer t at sugar ,ill dissolve under certain conditions@6%A Io, Aristotle gives a dispositional analysis of t e virtues and vices, and t erefore *any et ical /udg*ents ,ill, in is t eory, turn out to "e dispositional ones. But, again, t ere is no evidence t at Aristotle considers dispositional /udg*ents not to "e state*ents asserting >or denying? t at a su"/ect as a property, and t erefore not to ave a trut value. )n general, Aristotle does not say t at et ical /udg*ents lack trut values. :n t e contrary, e often speaks of propositions or principles as

5 #H4 5 "eing true or false, of our accounts as agreeing or not agreeing ,it t e facts, of accounts t at are correct or *istaken, and so fort . ' us, Aristotle clai*s t at is account of virtue in ter*s of t e *ean *ust "e tested for its trut and t at particular or specific accounts are *ore true t an general ones >11$Fa#$?, t at t e principle of t e *ean is true >11#HE6%?, t at accounts in et ics *ust agree ,it t e facts of conduct >11FFa19?, t at t e t esis t at all t ings ai* at t e sa*e good is not true >E.E . 161Ha#$?, t at t e clai* t at t e appy *an needs no friends is not true >N.E . 11E9E6%?, t at selfBlove is ,rong does not agree ,it t e facts >11EHa#$?, t at pleasure is t e good is *istaken >11F6a6%?, t at t e ig est good or appiness is conte*plation agrees ,it t e trut >11FFal 9?, and so on. But is Aristotle entitled to clai* t at et ical /udg*ents ave trut values in vie, of , at e says a"out t e ine&actness of t e do*ain of et ics and our accounts of it; 'o "egin ,it , not all types of ine&actness need i*ply t at trut values are i*possi"le. Aristotle correctly points out t at certain accounts are ine&act "ut true. ' us, accounts or et ical state*ents t at are ine&act "y lacking in detail or specificity can, nonet eless, "e true. +o, Aristotle says, t e t esis t at t e virtues are *eans "et,een e&cess and deficiency Galt oug true, is not preciseG >11#HE6%4 see also E.E . 161E"#6, 166$a1E, 1649"%4 Met . 1$#%"#4 ol . 1#41"#9?. )ne&actness, t en, in t e for* of lack of detail or specificity does not i*ply a lack of trut values. )ndeed, t e fact t at an account is general and lacks detail does not even affect t e kind of trut value it as4 it does not affect , et er t e account is true or false. ' e trut value it as ,ill depend on ot er factors. But , ile it is per aps easy to see t at ine&actness in t e for* of lack of detail or specificity in a state*ent + does not pose any particular pro"le*s ,it respect to assigning trut values to +, or ,it respect to +.s "eing true, ot er types of ine&actness *ay "e *ore pro"le*atic. Consider first t e *atter of indefiniteness or vagueness. ' e *oderate vie, olds t at state*ents ,it vague predicates can "e assigned trut values only in certain cases=t at is, in t ose cases , ere it is possi"le to deter*ine , et er t e property signified "y t e vague predicate o"tains or not: t e clearBcut or ,ellBdefined cases. But t ere are cases of state*ents ,it vague predicates , ere, according to t is vie,, ,e cannot assign trut values=t at is, in t ose cases , ere it is i*possi"le to deter*ine , et er t e property signified "y t e predicate o"tains or not: t e cases t at are not ,ellBdefined or fall at t e fringes. ' e *ore e&tre*e vie,, on t e ot er and, clai*s t at no trut values can "e assigned to any state*ent containing a vague predicate. -rege.s clai* t at t e la, of t e e&cluded *iddle fails , enever state*ents contain vague predicates is suc a vie,. (ore recently, +. C. 2 eeler as argued t at vague predicates purport to signify properties t at are not true of anyt ing. <e ,rites: 5 #H% 5 ) "egin ,it a pair of pre*ises: >a?)f a putative property is a real property, t en it is a *atter of fact , et er an o"/ect as t at property or lacks it. >"?2 et er a purported o"/ect e&ists or not is a *atter of fact. A purported o"/ect eit er e&ists or doesn.t e&ist. ) take t ese to "e "asic GrealisticG principles of ontology, , ic state , at is to "e and to ave a property.... +ince ,e are very sure t at any precise "orderline "et,een aving t is purported property @of "eing a tall personA and lacking it is a"solutely ar"itrary, it see*s clear t at t ere is no property of "eing a tall person. +ince it is up to us, it is not a *atter of any fact a"out t e ,orld. +ince t ere is no property not ing as it. ' ere are no tall persons.

@6EA )n a ,ay, 2 eeler.s rat er drastic conclusion does not deny t at vague state*ents can ave trut values, "ut it does deny t at so*e or *any vague state*ents are true=na*ely, t ose t at assert t at so*et ing as a property t at is supposedly signified "y a vague predicate. ' us 2 eeler takes t e state*ents Ga is tallG or G" is a ta"leG to "e false, , ile e takes Ga is not a ta"leG or G' ere are no tall personsG to "e true. )f et ical accounts or concepts are as vague as Aristotle clai*s, t en 2 eeler.s t esis i*plies t at *any propositions in et ics are false. -or e&a*ple, all t ose containing any of t e predicates purporting to signify any of t e virtues and t at assert of anyt ing t at it is an instance of a virtue ,ill "e false. 'o assert t at Ga is "raveG or G" is /ustG is, presu*a"ly, to assert so*et ing t at is false, since t e predicates G"raveG or G/ustG do not signify any real properties, t ere is no "ravery or /ustice. 2 eeler.s argu*ent is intriguing, "ut its conclusion is clearly unpalata"le. As e points out, if t e argu*ent is valid t ere are no ordinary o"/ects. But 2 eeler.s *ove fro* GP is a vague predicateG to GP signifies no propertyG or fro* G+o*e t ings are "orderline cases of PG to G' ere are no P.sG is not o"vious. )t see*s to dis*iss t e possi"ility t at t ere are vague properties t at ave "ot a ,ellBdefined region and a not ,ellBdefined region. As 0ussell argued so*e ti*e ago, a vague predicate, alt oug it as fu99y "oundaries, *ay signify any *e*"er of a set of ,ellBdefined properties. -or e&a*ple, t e predicate G"eing tallG *ay signify any one *e*"er of t e dis/unctive set G"eing E feet 6 inc es, E feet # inc es, and so on.G@6FA ' is is, essentially, Aristotle.s o,n solution to t e pro"le* of t e trut of so*e vague predicates. -or as e says in N.E . >11F$"#$?, t e predicate GcityG *ay "e vague and per aps t e proper si9e for a city Gis not one particular nu*"er, "ut any nu*"er "et,een certain li*itsG >see H.11?. +i*ilarly, , ile it *ay "e difficult to dra, t e e&act "oundaries of gentleness or irasci"ility, t ere is nonet eless a range of "e avior e& i"iting anger , ic is clearly gentle or irasci"le "e avior. Aristotle is not ,illing to accept t at, since t e predicate Gani*alG as 5 #HE 5 "orderline cases >e.g., t e +ponges?, t ere are no clearBcut cases, t ere are no ani*als. <e see*s even un,illing to concede t e *oderate vie, stated a"ove=na*ely, t at t ere are no trut values for t e "orderline cases. -or *ost often , at e stresses is t e difficulty of deter*ining t e trut value= deter*ining, for instance, , et er t e +ponges or t e Ascidians are ani*als or not. :f course, t ings *ay "e suc >t ey *ay e& i"it t e kind of Gcontinuous gradationG Aristotle speaks of? t at it is i*possi"le to deter*ine , at t e trut values of so*e state*ents are. 7et Aristotle does not e*"race t e e&tre*e vie, concerning trut values of vague state*ents, and e does not even see* to "e concerned ,it , and e certainly does not address, t e pro"le* a"out t e trut values in t e "orderline cases t at t e *oderate vie, raises. ' e kind of ine&actness in et ical accounts t at Aristotle identifies ,it "eing true for t e *ost part as, o,ever, so*e interesting conse1uences. A universal proposition t at fails to apply in so*e cases is, strictly speaking, false, alt oug it *ay "e true of *ost t ings denoted "y t e su"/ectBp rase of t e proposition. +o, t e proposition G<oneyB,ater is "eneficial , en sick ,it feverG is false, alt oug it *ay "e true t at in *ost cases of "eing sick ,it fever oneyB,ater is "eneficial. ' us, Jukasie,ic9 re*arks in is study of Aristotle.s syllogistic t eory t at G)f t ere is no general la, t at every old *an s ould go grey, "ecause t is is *erely .usual. @for t e *ost partA, and so*e old *en do not go grey, t en, of course, t e latter proposition is true and t erefore possi"le, "ut t e for*er is si*ply false.G@6HA Io,, if Aristotle is correct in clai*ing t at all or *ost state*ents in et ics are true for t e *ost part, t en clearly all or *ost state*ents in et ics ,ill "e si*ply false. But of , at value is a t eory a"out a certain do*ain if all or *ost of t e propositions t at constitute t e t eory are false; 3oes trut *atter

for t eories, la,s, or e&planations; +o*e p ilosop ers, *otivated "y a variety of reasons, ave argued recently t at trut is not or s ould not "e a goal of scientific investigation or t at trut does not really *atter as far as e&planation is concerned. Du n as, for e&a*ple, put fort t e vie, t at trut drops out of t e picture as a goal of science, and t at t eories *ust not "e /udged in ter*s of o, true t ey are or o, ,ell t ey approac t e trut , "ut rat er o, t ey are a"le to solve pu99les. Kan -raassen as argued against t e idea t at e&planation re1uires true t eories, alt oug e t inks t at t e trut of t e o"servational contents of t eories are needed for e&planation. But Cart,rig t as defended t e vie, t at trut does not *atter at all for e&planation, since all la,s are, strictly speaking, false and la,s are indispensa"le for e&planation.@69A Cart,rig t.s vie, rests on a clai* a"out t e trut of general state*ents , ic is identical to Aristotle.s clai* t at general state*ents a"out t e do*ains of conduct and of nature are true for t e *ost part and t erefore, strictly speaking, false. 7et Aristotle does not dra, t e conclusion t at 5 #HF 5 Cart,rig t dra,s. ) kno, of no evidence , ere Aristotle argues t at trut does not *atter in any do*ain of investigation "ecause t e general state*ents a"out t e do*ain ave e&ceptions or are true for t e *ost part. And ) kno, of no evidence , ere Aristotle defends, or si*ply adopts, t e vie, t at trut is not needed for e&planation or is not , at ,e ai* at in our investigation. ' e trut of t e propositions a"out so*e do*ains *ay "e deficient, t e propositions a"out t ese do*ains *ay "e ine&act, "ut t e task, according to Aristotle, of anyone investigating t ese do*ains is t e attain*ent of trut , t e discovery of o, t ings are. Aristotle looks at t e deficient or ine&act propositions not as t e logician often does=Aristotle, of course, does e&actly t is in is ,orks on logic=t at is, as si*ply false, "ut as reasona"le appro&i*ations of t e trut a"out do*ains t at are t e*selves deficient or ine&act. 7et t ere is a pro"le* ere. -or , ile it is true t at if our propositions are al*ost true t ey provide us ,it good reasons for t e trut of t e conclusions ,e dra, fro* t e*, Aristotle e&pects *uc *ore. <e e&pects propositions t at are al*ost, "ut not strictly, true to give syllogistic e&planations or to reveal t e causes of t ings. But consider again t e t,o syllogis*s a"out t e are and t e elep ant >G' e are is a fissepede and -issepedes produce *any offspring, t erefore t e are produces *any offspringG and G' e elep ant is a fissepede and -issepedes produce *any offspring, t erefore t e elep ant produces *any offspringG?. ' ese syllogis*s ave t e sa*e logical for* and t eir pre*ises are al*ost true >t ey are true for t e *ost part?, , ile only t e conclusion of t e first is true for t e *ost part. Aristotle ,ants to say t at t e first syllogis* gives an e&planation or t e causes of , at is stated in t e conclusion. But if t e facts t at t e are is a fissepede and fissepedes produce *any offspring provide us ,it t e e&planation or t e cause , y t e are produces *any offspring, , y don.t t e corresponding facts a"out t e elep ant give us t e e&planation or t e cause of t e nu*"er of offspring in its case; )t is clear t at , at is needed in order to avoid t ese pro"le*s is to ave as pre*ises of causal or e&planatory syllogis*s propositions t at are strictly true. As Aristotle o"serves, one needs to *ove a,ay fro* t e c aracteristic of "eing a fissepede and seek t e c aracteristic t at is t e cause , y so*e living t ings produce *any offspring, t at is, t e c aracteristic of "eing s*all >see c ap. F?. )s t en Aristotle.s syllogis* a"out t e are, , ic uses propositions t at are true for t e *ost part >i.e., G-issepedes produce *any offspringG?, altoget er useless; 3oesn.t it tell anyt ing a"out t e reasons , y t e are produces *any offspring; Aristotle pro"a"ly looks at it as a first appro&i*ation, as so*et ing t at applies to al*ost all t e fissepedes. And "y focusing on t ose to , ic it applies ,e can per aps identify an even "etter appro&i*ation to t e trut . +ince t e fissepedes

5 #HH 5 to , ic our syllogis* applies are t e s*all ones, ,e are led to correlate t e nu*"er of offspring of a kind to its si9e and t us to o"tain *ore relia"le syllogis*s and causes. By suc steps ,e co*e closer to identifying causes t at, t oug t ey *ay not "e universal, are very close to "eing so. ' ey lead us along t e ,ay to finding universal causes, , ic is, after all, t e ai* of in1uiry. 5 #H9 5

1otes
One Introduction
1. ) s all follo, t e practice of listing at t e "eginning of t e appropriate c apters all t e relevant re*arks Aristotle *akes on e&actness in t e et ical treatises, starting ,it t ose fro* t e N.E . ) ,ill also append any relevant re*arks fro* M.M ., alt oug ) s all not dra, any conclusions t at are "ased solely on t e* since t e aut enticity of t is treatise re*ains in dou"t. ) s all nu*"er Aristotle.s re*arks "y using a syste* t at indicates "y t e first digit of t e nu*"er assigned to a re*ark t e c apter in , ic t e re*ark occurs. ' is syste* ,ill *ake it easier to refer to Aristotle.s re*arks t roug out t e various c apters of t is study. At ti*es, ) ,ill also nu*"er so*e ot er passages t at ) 1uote fro* Aristotle and Plato in order to facilitate su"se1uent reference to t e*. -ollo,ing standard practice, ) s all refer to passages in Aristotle.s ,orks "y identifying t e appropriate Aristotelian treatise follo,ed "y a Bekker page >e.g., N.E . 1$9Fa1%?. :ccasionally, ) refer to a portion of Aristotle.s te&t "y identifying t e appropriate Aristotelian treatise follo,ed "y t e "ook and c apter of t at treatise , ic contains t e te&t >e.g., N.E . 1.&?. 2 ere t e identity of an Aristotelian treatise is o"vious fro* t e conte&t, ) o*it identification of t e treatise in referring to a passage. Again follo,ing standard practice, ) refer to passages in Plato.s ,orks "y identifying t e appropriate Platonic ,ork follo,ed "y a +tep anus page >e.g., Republic E$6B?. 6. Cenop on, Atheniensium Respublica , 1.%.#. #. 8uripides, Hippolytus , 4E$ff., 111%. -or a discussion of t e different aspects t e ancients associated ,it e&actness, see 3. Dur9, AFRI6EIA >Goppingen: Kerlag Alfred Du**erle, 19F$?. 4. A. Grant argues in is co**entary on t e N.E . t at its *et od is de*onstrative, t at t e investigation proceeds "y giving deductions fro* a priori principles=see is #he Ethics of Aristotle >Ie, 7ork: Arno Press, 19F#?, pp. #9EB#9F. (ore recently, '. Upton in is GAristotle.s (oral 8piste*ology,G #he Ne) !cholasticism %E >19H6?, pp. 1E9B1H4, and A.(. 2iles in er G(et od in ' e Iico*aB chean Ethics'D #he Ne) !cholasticism %E >19H6?, pp. 6#9B64#, defend a vie, , ic is 1uite si*ilar to t at of Grant. 3. Deyt.s reconstruction of Aristotle.s derivation of t e u*an good in t e N.E. provides t e "est evidence for t e use of t e deductive *et od4 see is G)ntellectualis* in Aristotle,G in L. P. Anton and A. Preuss >eds.?, Essays in Ancient Gree- hilosophy , vol. 6 >Al"any: +tate University of Ie, 7ork Press, 19H#?, pp. #E4B#HF. <. 3. P. Jee, in is GGeo*etrical (et od and Aristotle.s Account of -irst Principles,G Classical Buarterly 69 >19#%?, pp. 11#B164, argues t at Aristotle.s episte*ological *odel is t at of t e a&io*aticBdeductive *et od ,e encounter in 8uclid.s ,orks and t at Aristotle.s vie,s influenced 8uclid. ' at t e inductive *et od is t e *et od of Aristotle.s o,n et ical investigation as "een advocated "y L. A. +te,art, Notes on the Nicomachean

Ethics of Aristotle >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 1H96?, vol. 1, p. 4H, and *ore recently "y 0. A. Gaut ier and L. 7. Lolif, Aristote> (0Ethi/ue a Nicoma/ue >Jouvain: Pu"licationes Universitaires, 19F$?, vol. 6, pp. 19B6$, and I. :. 3a l, ractical Reason' Aristotle' and Gea-ness of the Gill >(inneapolis: University of (innesota Press, 19H4?, pp. F$ff. And t at t e *et od is dialectical as "een advocated "y L. Burnet in is te&t of and co**entary on t e N.E.' #he Ethics of Aristotle >Jondon: (et uen, 19$$?, p. v, J. <. G. Green,ood, Aristotle> Nicomachean Ethics' 6oo- "I >Ca*"ridge: Ca*"ridge University Press, 19$9?, pp. 1#1B1##, and <. <. Loac i*, Aristotle' #he Nicomachean Ethics >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 19E6?, p. #. (ore recently, so*e version of t e dialectical *et od as "een defended "y '. )r,in in is GAristotle.s (et ods in 8t ics,G in 3. L. :.(eara >ed.?, !tudies in Aristotle >2as ington: Cat olic University of A*erica Press, 19H1?, is ..-irst Principles in Aristotle.s 8t ics,G Mid)est !tudies in hilosophy , vol. # >19FH?, is translation and co**entary of t e N.E. >)ndianapolis: <ackett, 19H%?, and is Aristotle0s <irst rinciples >:&ford: :&ford University Press, 19HH?, as ,ell as "y L. Barnes, GAristotle and t e (et ods of 8t ics,G Re+ue Internationale de hilosophie #4 >19H$?, pp. 49$B%11. -or so*e critical co**ents on t e vie, t at t e *et od of et ics is dialectical, see 2. -. 0. <ardie, Aristotle0s Ethical #heory >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 19EH?, pp. #6B 4%. %. G. 8. J. :,en, G #ithenai ta hainomena ,G in Aristote et les roblemes de Methode >Jouvain: Pu"licationes Universitaires, 19E1?, pp. H#B1$#. -or furt er discussion on t e issues :,en raises, see (. Iuss"au*, #he <ragility of Goodness >Ca*"ridge: Ca*"ridge University Press, 19HE?, c . H, and '. )r,in, Aristotle0s <irst rinciples >:&ford: :&ford University Press, 19HH?. )r,in in t e latter ,ork distinguis es "et,een strong and ,eak dialectic. E. :f course, as <ardie, op. cit. , p. #E, as suggested, it is not o"vious t at ,e s ould "e speaking of the *et od in et ics.

Two The Philosophical ackground

1. Aristotle advocates, as ,ell as uses, t is approac in is o,n investigations in Met. A and Anim. ). 6. +ee <eliodorus, In Ethica Nicomachea araphrasis , in G. <eyl"ut >ed.?, Heliodori in Ethica Nicomachea Commentaria >Berlin: 0ei*er, 1HH9?4 Aspasii , In Ethica Nicomachea Commentaria , in G. <eyl"ut >ed.?, Aspasii in Ethica Nicomachea Ethica Commentaria >Berlin: 0ei*er, 1HH9?4 8ustratius, In Ethica Nicomachea I Commentaria , in G. <eyl"ut >ed.?, Eustratii et Michaelis et Anonyma in Ethica Nicomaehea Commentaria >Berlin: 0ei*er, 1H96?4 L. Burnet, #he Ethics of Aristotle >Jondon: (et uen, 19$$?4 J. <. G. Green,ood, Aristotle> Nicomachean Ethics' 6oo- "I >Ca*"ridge: Ca*"ridge University Press, 19$9?. #. +ee, for e&a*ple, 2. Laeger, Aristotle> <undamentals of the History of His He+elopment >:&ford: :&ford University Press, 194H?, especially c s. 9 and 1$4 2. -. 0. <ardie, Aristotle0s Ethical #heory >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 19EH?, especially c . #4 G. 8. 0. Jloyd, Aristotle> #he Gro)th and !tructure of HI! #hought >Ca*"ridge: Ca*"ridge University Press, 19EH?, pp. #EB#F4 C. L. 0o,e, #he Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics >Ca*"ridge: Proceedings of t e Ca*"ridge P ilological +ociety, 19F1?4 '. )r,in, Nicomachean Ethics >)ndianapolis: <ackett, 19H%?. 4. ) follo, tradition ere and consider t e follo,ing of Plato.s dialogues to "e a*ong t e 8arly or +ocratic ones: Apology' Crito' Ion' Hippias Minor' Hippias Ma$or' Charmides' Euthydemus' Euthyphro' Gorgias' (aches' (ysis' rotagoras' Meno . -or a discussion of so*e of t e pro"le*s a"out t e dating and ordering of t e Platonic 3ialogues, see C. <. Da n, G3id Plato 2rite +ocratic 3ialogues;G Classical Buarterly #1 >19H1?, pp. #$%B#6$. %. +ee, for e&a*ple, t e discussion in ). (. Cro*"ie, lato> #he Mid)ife0s Apprentice >Jondon:

0outledge W D. Paul, 19E4?. )t is difficult to see o, t ere could "e any dou"t a"out +ocrates. interest in o"taining definitions , en ,e consider t e nu*"er of definitions t at +ocrates and is interlocutors put fort , e&a*ine, a*end, and utili9e in t eir discussions. ' e "est account of t ese *atters is to "e found in G. C. +antas, !ocrates >Jondon: 0outledge W D. Paul, 19F9?. +antas gives a list of all t e definitions presented "y +ocrates. interlocutors and "y +ocrates i*self, and s o,s t at *any are clarified and used in su"se1uent discussions >see especially c . 4?. (uc of , at ) say ere on +ocrates follo,s +antas.s line of argu*ent. E. )ndeed, t e refutations of definitions t e*selves *ay serve purposes t at go "eyond refutation. As +antas points out, op. cit. , p. 1$$, refutations *ay serve t e purpose of s o,ing t at +ocrates o"/ected to so*e do*inant et ical ideas, of s o,ing t at is conte*poraries ad unclear ideas a"out certain et ical ideals, of *aking clear t e conditions t at *ust "e *et "y definitions, and so fort . F. +antas co*es to t e sa*e conclusion on t is *atter: G+ocrates t oug t t at t e searc for definitions is a via"le and fruitful p ilosop ical enterprise,G op. cit. , p. 1$1. H. ' e definitions t at are presented or e&a*ined in t e +ocratic 3ialogues are not all of t e sa*e type. -or a discussion of t e differences a*ong t e*, see +antas, op. cit. , and 0. 8. Allen, lato0s DEuthyphroD and the Earlier #heory of <orms >Ie, 7ork: <u*anities Press, 19F$?. ' at +ocrates is not interested in ostensive definitions or definitions "y e&a*ple is *ade clear , en in t e Euthyphro e re/ects as an ans,er to is re1uest for a definition of piety 8ut yp ro.s reply t at piety is , at e is doing no,. Ione of t e definitions t at are given "y ot ers and t at ave t e for* +ocrates approves of, and none of t e definitions t at +ocrates i*self gives, are ostensive or definitions "y e&a*ple. +ee on t ese *atters t e discussions "y L. Beversluis, G3oes +ocrates Co**it t e +ocratic -allacy;G American hilosophical Buarterly 64 >19HF?, pp. 611B66#, and A. Ie a*as, GConfusing Universals and Particulars in Plato.s 8arly 3ialogues,.. Re+ie) of Metaphysics 69 >19F%?, pp. 6HFB#$E. Ic a*as in fact argues t at even t ose definitions offered "y so*e of +ocrates interlocutors t at see* to "e definitions "y e&a*ple are not really in ter*s of concrete particulars "ut in ter*s of narro, universals. ) do not of course *ean to i*ply t at +ocrates does not use e&a*ples at all =e.g., in illustrating or testing definitions. -or +ocrates. use of e&a*ples, see G. C. +antas, G' e +ocratic -allacy,G Iournal of the History of hilosophy 1$ >19F6?, pp. 16FB1414 (. -. Burnyeat, G8&a*ples in 8piste*ology: +ocrates, ' eaetetus, and G. 8. (oore,G hilosophy %6 >19FF?, pp. #H1B #9H4 and L. Beversluis, op. cit. 9. +ocrates uses at Charmides 1E$3, , ere e asks is interlocutor to take into account , at as "een said and derive, or arrive at, a definition of te*perance. Alt oug it is clear t at +ocrates as no t eory of t e syllogis*, e is nonet eless using t e ter* to signify so*et ing like t e dra,ing of a conclusion fro* so*e ot er facts or propositions=and t is is t e ordinary *eaning of t e ter*. 1$. ' us at #op . 1$$a6% Aristotle ,rites, GA syllogis* is an argu*ent in , ic , certain t ings aving "een laid do,n, so*et ing ot er t an t ese t ings necessarily results t roug t e*.G +ee also so*e co**ents on t is issue "y L. Barnes in is GProof and t e +yllogis*,G in 8. Berti, Aristotle on !cience >Padova: 8ditrice Antenore, 19H1?. 11. ' e pro"le* of distinguis ing "et,een kno,ledge and "elief is *ore co*ple& t an t e ,ay +ocrates presents it in t e Meno . But even in t is discussion, +ocrates ints t at at least t,o issues can "e distinguis ed: one concerns t e state of *ind or cognitive state of t e person , o kno,s in contrast to t e state of t e one , o "elieves4 t e ot er concerns a possi"le difference in t e contents of t e t,o cognitive states. +o*eti*es Plato uses t e latter distinction as a ,ay of s o,ing t at t ere is a difference in cognitive states. +ocrates, o,ever, in t e Meno is not saying t at t e o"/ects of t e t,o

states are different, in t e sense t at , at is "elieved cannot "e kno,n and vice versa. 7et e is pointing to so*e difference: t e structure of t e contents of t e t,o cognitive states is different=in t e case of kno,ledge t e contents ave t e structure of causal e&planations , ile in t e case of "elief t ey don.t. 2 et er t e distinction "et,een kno,ledge and "elief s ould "e attri"uted to +ocrates instead of Plato is still a *atter of dispute a*ong sc olars of Plato.s ,ritings. ' e Meno is considered "y so*e to "e a transitional dialogue , ose contents per aps reflect t e vie,s of Plato rat er t an +ocrates. But t e fact t at +ocrates ints at t e sa*e distinction in t e Euthyphro suggests t at +ocrates. vie,s *ay not differ fro* t ose of Plato. 16. Klastos *akes t is point in is G0easons and Causes in t e haedo ,G in G. Klastos >ed.?, lato , vol. ) >Garden City, I.L.: Anc or Books, 19F1?. 1#. +ee also Klastos.s co**ents on t is *atter in is G Anamnesis in t e Meno ,G Hialogue 4 >19E%?, pp. 14#B1EF. Klastos argues else, ere t at ,e find in t e Platonic dialogues t,o different p ilosop ers t at can "e identified as +ocrates. ' e one is a *oral p ilosop er , o as ardly any interest in any "ranc of kno,ledge or in t e nature of kno,ledge >episte*ology?. ' e ot er is so*eone ,it strong interests in certain "ranc es of kno,ledge >e.g., *at e*atics? as ,ell as t e nature of kno,ledge itself4 see is G+ocrates,G roceedings of the 6ritish Academy F4 >19HH?. P. 2oodruff as argued t at +ocrates is represented "y Plato as G*aking a distinction in use "et,een t,o conceptions of kno,ledge ,it different episte*ic standards.G ' e one is co**on or none&pert kno,ledge. ' e ot er is e&pert kno,ledge, t e kind t at as to *eet 1uite ig episte*ic standards4 see is GPlato.s 8arly ' eory of Dno,ledge,G in +. 8verson >ed.?, Epistemology >Ca*"ridge: Ca*"ridge University Press, 199$?. 14. ' e argu*ent using t e first ypot esis can "e represented as an instance of t e Aristotelian syllogistic for* AaB, BaC instance of AeB, AaC AaC > 6arbara ? and t e one using t e second ypot esis as an CeB.

1%. +o*e of t ese conditions for aving a proof or de*onstration are, of course, t e conditions t at Aristotle i*self discusses in t e opening sections of t e ost. Anal . ' at +ocrates sees t e li*itations of t e *et od of ypot esis is *ade clear at Meno H9, , ere e recogni9es t at a ypot esis used in a proof *ust "e true and ,e *ust kno, it to "e so in order to accept t e conclusion. ' e i*portance of kno,ing t e trut of t e pre*ises of a de*onstrative argu*ent along t e lines +ocrates suggests is also discussed e&tensively "y Aristotle. )n ost. Anal . >H4a%? e says t at, , en ,e do not kno, t e pre*ises of a de*onstrative argu*ent "etter t an ,e kno, t e conclusion, ,e ,ill not ave kno,ledge a"solutely, G"ut only "y ypot esis @ A.G :f course, t e ter* G ypot esisG as *any ot er uses in "ot Plato and Aristotle t at *ay "e different fro* t e one ,e are discussing ere. 1E. Aristotle, in , ose p ilosop ical t oug t de*onstrative kno,ledge figures *ore pro*inently t an any ot er kind of kno,ledge, argues t at t ere are ot er kinds, and indeed t at t ere *ust "e, if t ere is to "e de*onstrative kno,ledge. ' e "asic principles of t e various disciplines cannot, according to Aristotle, "e kno,n "y de*onstration4 t ey are instead kno,n "y intuitive induction or rational intuition. <is argu*ents for t e i*possi"ility of kno,ing de*onstratively t e "asic principles of t e various disciplines are to "e found in t e opening c apters of ost. Anal. ) and is account of t e nature of nonde*onstrative kno,ledge in t e last c apter of ost. Anal. )). )f P. 2oodruff is correct > op. cit. ?, +ocratic co**on or none&pert kno,ledge is not kno,ledge "y de*onstration. 1F. 2 en speaking of kinds in t e present conte&t ) a* using t e ter* GkindG to *ean , at it ordinarily

*eans, i.e., a kind or type of t ing, and do not *ean to i*ply t at *atters of conduct constitute natural kinds. 1H. +antas, op. cit. , designates t is use of definitions as Gepiste*ic useG and differentiates it fro* , at e calls t e Gdiagnostic useG >see "elo, for a discussion of t is use?. )n its diagnostic use a definition of - is to "e used for deter*ining , et er so*e & is - , ereas in its episte*ic use it is a *eans for deter*ining , et er , atever is - is also G or , et er -Bness itself is also G. ' us "ot t ese uses are episte*ic in c aracter and t erefore designating one as episte*ic does not really differentiate it fro* t e ot er. 3esignating t e use under discussion in t e present conte&t as de*onstrative see*s to *e to "etter capture t is role of definitions t at Aristotle identifies in t e +ocratic t eory!practice=na*ely, t at t ey function as ele*ents of de*onstration. 19. +antas, op. cit. , pp. 16%B16E. 6$. +ocrates says, G)f virtue is a kind of kno,ledge. . .G >HEC?, t us *aking a ypot esis a"out t e nature of virtue. ' e for* of t e assu*ed definition of virtue is t at used else, ere "y +ocrates, e.g., GCourage is a kind of endurance of t e soulG > (athes 196B? or G'e*perance is a kind of 1uietnessG > Charmides 1%9B?. 61. 8ven at rotagoras #E1, , ere +ocrates gives t e i*pression t at t e definition of virtue ,ill "e sufficient for kno,ing , et er virtue is teac a"le, is strategy *akes it clear t at e presupposes additional pre*ises t at e considers to "e selfBevident=i.e., t at all kno,ledge is teac a"le and , atever is not kno,ledge is not teac a"le: G)f virtue ,ere so*et ing ot er t an kno,ledge, as Protagoras tried to prove, o"viously it could not "e taug t. But if it turns out to "e, as a single , ole, kno,ledge . . . t en it ,ill "e *ost surprising if it cannot "e taug tG >#E1C?. 66. +antas, op. cit. , p. 16#. 66. +antas, op. cit. , p. 16#. 6#. Ibid. , p. 16E. L. Beversluis, op. cit. , argues t at +ocrates does not take t e definition of - to "e a necessary condition for kno,ing ot er t ings a"out -. 64. +ee, for e&a*ple, 0. 0o"inson, lato0s Earlier Hialectic >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 19%#?4 2. 3. 0oss, lato0s #heory of Ideas >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 19%1?4 I. Gulley, #he hilosophy of !ocrates >Jondon: +t. (artin.s Press, 19EH?. 6%. +ocrates, for e&a*ple, clai*s at Apology 69B t at acting un/ustly is "ad and s a*eful alt oug e does not give nor is t ere evidence t at e as a definition of /ustice or in/ustice. ' is *ay very ,ell "e t e kind of kno,ledge P. 2oodruff designates as none&pert, ordinry, or co**on kno,ledge. 6E. L. Beversluis, op. cit. , recogni9es t is, "ut contends t at +ocrates does not old t e general t esis t at t e definition is necessary for diagnostic purposes. )t is 1uite possi"le, o,ever, t at +ocrates generali9es fro* t e conte&ts of disagree*ent and dispute to t e general diagnostic t esis t at *akes t e definition necessary for -no)ing t at so*e particular is of a certain kind. 6F. )f for*ing a "elief t at so*e & is - "y using t e definition of - is to "e of use in settling disputes a"out & "eing -, ,e *ust assu*e t at t ose disputing a"out & at least agree on t e definition of -. 2e *ust also assu*e t at t ey agree on t e relation t e definition "ears to t e "elief t at & is -, t at suc relation /ustifies "elieving t at & is -, and so fort . ' ese assu*ptions *ay not "e unreasona"le to *ake, "ut it is not clear t at, once t ey are *ade, , at ,e ave is only a "elief and not kno,ledge, or , et er anyt ing less t an kno,ledge ,ill "e sufficient. 6H. ' is, of course, *ay not "e so si*ple. -or , atever is sufficient for kno,ing *ay "e said to provide o"/ective reasons t at are sufficient for "elieving. 7et t ere could "e su"/ective factors t at

*ig t render t ese reasons insufficient for "elieving. 69. ' e strongest argu*ent supporting t e vie, t at +ocrates co**its t e +ocratic -allacy is *ade "y P. Geac , GPlato.s Euthyphro : Analysis and Co**entary,G #he Monist %$ >19EE?, pp. #E9B#H6. +antas ad argued earlier >G' e +ocratic -allacy,G Iournal of the History of hilosophy 1$ >19F6?, pp. 16FB 141? t at +ocrates does not co**it t e +ocratic -allacy, "ut in is !ocrates e clai*s t at *ost likely +ocrates did co**it t e -allacy. But +antas argues t at +ocrates does not old t at t e definition of is necessary for for*ing a "elief or /udging t at so*e & is -. <ence, e argues, +ocrates does not *ake it i*possi"le to proceed ,it t e searc for definitions "y re1uiring kno,ledge of t e definition of - in order to ave a "elief or /udg*ent t at so*e & is -. <e does not re1uire kno,ledge of t e definition of - in order to "elieve or /udge t at so*et ing is a sa*ple of - t at can in turn "e used as a "asis for for*ulating a definition of - >see pp. 16$B166 and #11B#16?. -or criticis*s of t e vie,s of Geac and +antas, see L. Beversluis, op. cit. #$. +ocrates and Plato at ti*es refer to t e entities t ey are trying to define "y using t e a"stract noun, e.g., Lustice > ?, or t e neuter of t e ad/ectival for*, e.g., t e /ust > ?.

#1. ' us, Aristotle ,rites, GBut +ocrates did not *ake t e universals or t e definitions e&ist apart4 t ey @t e PlatonistsA, o,ever, gave t e* separate e&istence, and t is ,as t e kind of t ing t ey called -or*sG > Met. 1$FH"#$?. #6. N.E. ).vi and E.E. ).viii. ##. Meno F43. #4. ) *ean t at t ere could "e factors ot er t an t e nature of t e o"/ects of definition t at *ake it difficult or i*possi"le to define suc o"/ects. +uc reasons *ay, for e&a*ple, include our ina"ility to e&press or for*ulate certain t ings, our ignorance, and so fort . #%. 2 et er , at ,e de*onstrate does not only follo, necessarily fro* so*e ot er t ings "ut is also necessary is, of course, anot er *atter >see "elo,?. #E. As ) said earlier, *ost often +ocratic definitions are indefinite "ut are *eant to "e universal in for*. +ee t e list of +ocratic definitions in +antas, !ocrates , c . 4. #F. +ee on t is *atter L. <intikka, G'i*e, 'rut and Dno,ledge in Ancient Greek P ilosop y,G American hilosophical Buarterly 4 >19EF?, pp. 1B14, and A. 2ed"erg, G' e ' eory of )deas,G in G. Klastos >ed.?, lato , vol. 1 >Garden City, I.L.: Anc or Books, 19F1?. #H. )t is true t at +ocrates speaks at ti*es precisely a"out t is feature of so*e *atters of conduct, t at so*e properties of *atters of conduct do not "elong to t e* in all cases. ' us +ocrates at (athes 196C argues t at endurance is not in all cases so*et ing no"le, at Meno HF8 t at ,ealt is not al,ays "eneficial >see also t e Euthydemus ?. But in spite of t is, it cannot "e said t at +ocrates recogni9es so*e feature of *atters of conduct t at ot er do*ains of in1uiry do not presu*a"ly possess in t e ,ay Aristotle does. +ocrates does not argne, in t e ,ay Aristotle does, t at t ere is so*et ing pro"le*atic ,it t e su"/ect *atter of et ics. Per aps e did not see t e i*plications of so*e of is o"servations or e did not generali9e is isolated findings. #9. ) ave in *ind ere +ocrates. re*arks a"out t e various arts or disciplines in t e Charmides and Gorgias t at focus on t eir su"/ect *atter and t eir goals. 4$. ' us +ocrates re*arks at Meno H1ABB: G' us t e soul, since it is i**ortal and as "een "orn *any ti*es, and as seen all t ings "ot ere and in t e ot er ,orld, as learned everyt ing t at is. +o ,e need not "e surprised if it can recall t e kno,ledge of virtue or anyt ing else , ic , as ,e see, it once

possessed. All nature is akin, and t e soul as learned everyt ing, so t at , en a *an as recalled a single piece of kno,ledge . . . t ere is no reason , y e s ould not find out all t e rest.G Considera"le controversy, as is ,ell kno,n, surrounds t e vie, presented "y +ocrates in t e a"ove ,ords, and t ere is even dou"t as to , et er +ocrates accepts t e vie, e&pressed "y t e* or only Plato does, or , et er eit er of t e* does. 41. Plato, o,ever, does not e&plicitly connect is clai*s t at /ustification or proof *ay vary across disciplines to e&actness, , ereas Aristotle does. 46. ) s all discuss Plato.s re*arks in t e hilebus concerning t e variation of e&actness across disciplines in later c apters. 4#. <. C erniss, G' e P ilosop ical 8cono*y of t e ' eory of )deas,G in G. Klastos >ed.?, lato , vol. ) >Garden City, I.L.: Anc or Books, 19F1?. 44. +ee in t is connection t e discussion "y L. <intikka, G'i*e, 'rut and Dno,ledge in Ancient Greek P ilosop y,G American hilosophical Buarterly 4 >19EF?, pp. 1B144 and is GDno,ledge and )ts :"/ects in Plato,G and t e co**ents of G. +antas, G<intikka on Dno,ledge and )ts :"/ects in Plato,G "ot in L. (. 8. (oravcsik >ed.?, atterns in lato0s #hought >3ordrec t: 3. 0eidel, 19F#?4 also, I. P. 2 ite, lato on Fno)ledge and Reality >)ndianapolis: <ackett, 19FE?. 4%. +ee t e discussion "y G. Klastos, G0easons and Causes in t e haedo G in G. Klastos >ed.?, lato , vol. 1 >Garden City, I.L.: Anc or Books, 19F1?. 4E. (y discussion on t e Republic dra,s fro* recent co**entaries on t at ,ork "y I. P. 2 ite, A Companion to lato0s DRepublicD >:&ford: Black,ell, 19F9?, and L. Annas, An Introduction to lato0s DRepublicD >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 19H1?. 4F. ' e ter* >or , often *eans *ore clear, "ut so*eti*es it *eans *ore e&act or precise. Practically all translations take it to *ean t e latter in t is passage. -or *ore discussion on t is ter* and its relation to ot er ter*s t at signify e&actness, see c apters 4 and %. 4H. At %4HC, o,ever, Plato ,rites: G+uc , t en, ,ould "e t e origin and nature of t is polity if ,e *ay *erely outline @ A t e s ape of a constitution in ,ords and not ela"orate it precisely @

A, since even t e sketc ,ill suffice to s o, us t e *ost /ust and t e *ost un/ust type of *an, and it ,ould "e an i*practica"le @ A task to set fort all for*s of govern*ent ,it out o*itting any, and all custo*s and 1ualities of *en.G <ere Plato appears to "e saying t at t e *ost e&act >detailed? description is not needed, and t at t e difficulties ,it attaining t e *ost e&act ones are practical rat er t an logical. But even t is passage s ould not "e taken as clear evidence t at Plato ,as concerned ,it t e pro"le*s of t e level of e&actness re1uired in disciplines , ose goals are practical or t e attaina"ility of suc levels. -or in t is passage e is *ore concerned ,it descri"ing t e degenerate for*s of govern*ent t an ,it providing a guide to action. 49. )t is often said a"out Plato t at t e -or*s are treated as if t ey are individuals. But t is does not solve t e difficulty at issue. )t rat er *erely ackno,ledges t at t ere is a difficulty in Plato.s conception of t e -or*s, a conception t at see*s at ti*es to treat -or*s as "eing "ot universals and individuals. %$. Aristotle raises a nu*"er of o"/ections against Plato.s vie,s of t e Good in N.E. ).vi. ' e o"/ections ) a* speaking of in relation to e&actness!ine&actness are t ose concerning t e efficacy of kno,ledge of

t e Platonic Good for action, , ic ,e need to distinguis fro* t e *any ot er criticis*s Aristotle raises against Plato.s vie,s. )n particular, ,e need to distinguis Aristotle.s 1uestion a"out t e efficacy of our kno,ledge of t e Platonic Good fro* t e ot er 1uestion Aristotle often raises as to , et er Plato.s Good is t e goal of anyone.s practice. %1. !tatesman 694Bff. %6. !tatesman 69%B, 69FAff. %#. )t *ig t "e said in t is connection t at t e pro"le*s Aristotle raises ste* fro* t e fact t at e denies t e e&istence of Platonic -or*s. ' is is not, o,ever, t e pro"le* -or Aristotle denies Platonic -or*s of everyt ing, including t ose of *at e*atical o"/ects, and yet so*e disciplines deal, according to i*, ,it su"/ect *atter t at does e& i"it essential structures. %4. Actually, *uc in Aristotle.s account of de*onstrative kno,ledge can, as L. Barnes as argued, "e for*ulated independently of Aristotle.s o,n logical t eory4 see is translation and co**entary of t e ost. Anal.' Aristotle0s osterior Analytics >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 19F%?, pp. &ivB&v. %%. ) a* follo,ing tradition ere and translate as kno,ledge. L. Barnes in is recent translation as, for good reasons, translated t e ter* as understanding. ' is as allo,ed Barnes to differentiate easily "et,een , at is produced "y de*onstration, i.e., understanding, and , at is produced "y ot er *odes of cognition, e.g., intuition. At ti*es, o,ever, Aristotle uses to refer to t e various disciplines in general or to t e various de*onstrative disciplines, e.g., at 99a6#. %E. ) ,ill return to so*e of t ese issues later. %F. +ee ost. Anal. F%a and L. Barnes.s co**ents on t is passage in is translation and co**entary of t is ,ork. %H. -or t e role of definitions in Aristotle.s conception of de*onstrative science see t e discussion of L. Barnes, op. cit. , pp. &i, 1$#, 1$94 (. -ete/o n, G3efinition and t e ',o +tages of Aristotelian 3e*onstration,G Re+ie) of Metaphysics #% >19H6B19H#?, pp. #F%B#9%4 and 0. Bolton, G3efinition and +cientific (et od in Aristotle.s osterior Analytics and Generation of Animals ,G in A. Gott ef and L. Jenno& >eds.?, hilosophical Issues in Aristotle0s 6iology >Ca*"ridge: Ca*"ridge University Press, 19HF?, pp. 16$B1EE. %9. +ee on t is *atter t e perceptive discussion of 0. Bolton in is G8ssentialis* and +e*antic ' eory in Aristotle,G #he hilosophical Re+ie) F% >19FE?, pp. %14B%44. E$. +ee in t is connection t e co**entary of L. Barnes on t e ost. Anal. as ,ell as is introduction, p. &i. ' e sa*e vie, is put fort "y (. -. Burnyeat in is GAristotle on Understanding and Dno,ledge,G in 8. Berti, op. cit. , pp. 9FB14$. E1. Muestions a"out t e scope of Aristotelian essentialis* ave recendy "een raised "y 2. Jes9l, GDno,ledge of t e Universal and Dno,ledge of t e Particular in Aristotle,G Re+ie) of Metaphysics 6E >19F6B19F#?, pp. 6FHB#1#, and I. P. 2 ite, G:rigins of Aristotle.s 8ssentialis*,G Re+ie) of Metaphysics 6E >19F6B19F#?, pp. %FBH%. 3. (. Bal*e, GAristotle.s Biology 2as Iot 8ssentialist,G in A. Gott ell and L. Jenno& >eds.?, hilosophical Issues in Aristotle0s 6iology >Ca*"ridge: Ca*"ridge University Press, 19HF?, pp. 691B#16, as also argued t at Aristotelian e&planations in "iology, especially t ose concerning t e develop*ent of an ani*al, do not depend on essentialist vie,s. ' e evidence ) give fro* t e treatises on conduct provides additional support for t e vie, t at Aristotle at

so*e point "egan to 1uestion t e scope of t e kind of essentialis* t at +ocrates, Plato, and at ti*es e i*self advocated. E6. +ee 2. Laeger, Aristotle >:&ford: :&ford University Press, 194H?, pp. 66HB6%H. ' e rotrept. , of , ic only frag*ents re*ain, is considered to "e an early Aristotelian dialogue *odeled after Plato.s o,n dialogues. E#. C.L. 0o,e, op. cit. , especially pp. E#BFE. E4. 3.L. Allan, GMuasiB*at e*atical (et od in t e Eudemian Ethics'D in Aristote et les roblemes de Metbode >Jouvain: Pu"lications Universitaires, 19E1?, pp. #$#B#1H. E%. +ee <. 3. P. Jee, GPlaceBna*es and t e 3ate of Aristotle.s Biological 2orks,G Classical Buarterly 1# >194H?, pp. E1BEF, and G' e -is es of Jes"os,G in A. Gott elf >ed.?, Aristotle on Nature and (i+ing #hings >Pitts"urg : (at esis Pu"lications, 19H%?, pp. #BH4 (. Greene, A ortrait of Aristotle >C icago: University of C icago Press, 19E#?4 G. 8. 0. Jloyd, Aristotle> #he Gro)th and !tructure of His #hought >Ca*"ridge: Ca*"ridge University Press, 19EH?, pp. 19B414 G. 8. J. :,en, G' e Platonis* of Aristotle,G in P. 8 +tra,son >ed.?, !tudies in the hilosophy of #hought and Action >:&ford: :&ford University Press, 19EH?. EE. ) assu*e ere t at, contrary to Burnet.s clai*s, t e E.E. is a ,ork of Aristotle. ' e c ronological order of t e Aristotelian et ical treatises as not, o,ever, "een settled to everyone.s satisfaction. A*ong t ose , o take t e E.E. to precede t e N.E. are Case, Laeger, 3irl*eier, Gaut ier, and *ore recently L. Cooper. But ot ers, a*ong t e* +c ac er, Ker"eke, and *ore recently A. Denny, ave argued t at t e N.E. precedes t e E.E

Three The +oals of 'thical In,uir"

1. -or t e differences a*ong practical, productive, and t eoretical disciplines, see "elo,. 6. +ee 8ustratius, In Ethica Nicomachea I Commentaria , in G. <eyl"ut >ed.?, Eustratii et Michaelis et Anonyma in Ethica Nicomachea Commentaria >Berlin: 0ei*er, 1H96?, p. 194 Aspasius, In Ethica Nicomachea Commentaria , in G. <eyl"ut >ed.?, Aspasii in Ethica Nicomachea Commentaria >Berlin: 0ei*er, 1HH9?, p. F4 and <eliodorus, In Ethica Nicornachea araphrasis , in G. <eyl"ut >ed.?, Heliodori in Ethica Nicomachea araphrasis >Berlin: 0ei*er, 1HH9?, pp. 4B%. +ee also t e co**ents on t ese *atters "y L. A. +te,art, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 1H96?, vol. 1, pp. 6EB6F4 L. Burner, #he Ethics of Aristotle >Jondon: (et uen, 19$$?, p. 114 A. Grant, #he Ethics of Aristotle >Ie, 7ork: Arno Press, 19F#?, p. 46F. #. 3.L. Allan, GAristotle.s Account of t e :rigin of (oral Principles,G Actes du Jle Congress Internationale de hilosophie C)) >19%#?, p. 164. By Gpractical reasonG Allan understands et ics and, alt oug e goes on to argue t at practical reason is a type of kno,ledge, , en e atte*pts to e&plain t e difference "et,een t eoretical and nont eoretical disciplines e see*s to disregard altoget er t e cognitive goals of et ics, , ic , Aristotle clai*s, are not any different fro* t e cognitive goals of any ot er discipline=i.e., t e attain*ent of trut >see "elo,?. 4. ' at Plato understands t e transitivity principle in t is ,ay is also *ade evident in is discussion of friends ip and love in t e (ysis and t e !ymposium , , ere e again argues t at ,e desire or love only t e final o"/ect and t at t e only desire ,e ave is t at for t e final o"/ect. %. +ee N.E. 1$94a , ere Aristotle states t at t e end of *edicine is ealt , of s ip"uilding a vessel, of econo*ic *anage*ent ,ealt , of strategy victory, and so fort >see also 1$9Fa1% for si*ilar clai*s?. All of t ese arts are, according to Aristotle, su"ordinate to t e political art or science=G+trategy,

econo*ic *anage*ent, oratory, are su"ordinate to political scienceG >1$94"#?. E. +ee Met. >1$6Fa? , ere Aristotle argues t at, alt oug so*eone can produce ealt accidentally, t ere is a faculty or art >*edicine? t at is productive of ealt . Aristotle.s vie,s on t is *atter ec o t ose of Plato in t e Gorgias >4E48B4E%8? and t e 0epu"lic >4#HCB4#9?. ' e vie, t at *edicine is to "e differentiated fro* all ot er ,ays of producing or restoring ealt is defended in t e treatise G' e +cience of (edicineG t at is part of t e <ippocratic ,ritings. And as G. 8. 0. Jloyd o"serves, t is vie, of *edicine as a specific art or discipline evolved rat er slo,ly in t e Greek tradition. +ee is introduction to is edition of t e Hippocratic Gritings >Jondon: Penguin Books, 19FH?, pp. 1#B14. F. ) s all use t e ter* GdisciplineG in t e present conte&t in order to avoid any co**it*ent to a particular vie, of t e episte*ological c aracter of *edicine. ) do not, for e&a*ple, ,is to assu*e t at *edicine is a de*onstrative science like geo*etry. H. +ee also #op. >141a1$? , ere t e definition of *edicine as Gscience @ A of *atters of ealt for ani*als and u*ansG is critici9ed only on t e grounds t at t e inclusion of u*ans in t e definition is redundant since , at t e ter* G u*anG designates falls under or is included in , at Gani*alG designates. ' at *edicine is a science ,as t e prevalent vie, in anti1uity as "een recently defended "y (. -rede4 see is ..P ilosop y and (edicine in Anti1uity,G in A. 3onagan, A. Perovic , Lr., and (. K. 2edin >eds.?, Human Nature and Natural Fno)ledge >3ordrec t: 3. 0eidel, 19HE?, pp. 611B 6#6. 9. 2. -. 0. <ardie, Aristotle0s Ethical #heory >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 19EH?, p. #$. 1$. 3.L. Allan, op. cit. , p. FE. Allan in t is discussion is 1uite critical of Laeger.s vie,s on practical ,isdo*. Laeger took Aristotle to "e advocating t e vie, t at practical ,isdo* is solely concerned ,it t e *eans and t e particulars4 see Laeger, op. cit. , pp. H#, H4, HH, 646. 11. +ee also 1141"H: GPractical ,isdo*, on t e ot er and, is concerned ,it t ings u*an and t ings a"out , ic it is possi"le to deli"erate4 ,e say t is is a"ove all t e ,ork of t e *an of practical ,isdo*, to deli"erate ,ell.G 16. +ee L. 3. (onan, Moral Fno)ledge and Its Methodology in Aristotle >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 19EH?. (onan argues t at t e vie, of *oral kno,ledge as t eoretic in c aracter is to "e found in t e rotrept. and t at, ,it t e e&ception of a fe, isolated passages in N.E. ) and C, it is not to "e found in t e later treatises on conduct. (onan.s discussion of t e pro"le*s a"out practical ,isdo* and t e vie,s of Laeger and Allan on its nature is *ost infor*ative. 1#. +ee is introduction to is co**entary on t e N.E.' op. cit. 14. +ee 3.L. Allan, op. cit. , pp. F#BF%4 also, 2. -. 0. <ardie, op. cit. , p. #$, and '. Ando, Aristotle0s #heory of ractical Cognition 1#he <ague: (artinus Ii/ of, 19F1?, especially pp. 61 :ff., and L. 3. (onan, op. cit. , pp. 4HB%9. 1%. Lulius 2alter argues for t e position outlined ere in is Hie (ehre yon der pra-tischen "ernunft in der Griechischen hilosophie >Lena, 1HF4?, especially pp. 1H9B19$, %#FB%%%. 1E. +ee 0. A. Gaut ier and L. 7. Lolif, Aristote> (0Ethi/ue a Nicoma/ue >Jouvain: Pu"licationes Universitaires, 19F$?, vol. 1, pp. 6EFB6H#. 1F. 3. 2iggins, G3eli"eration and Practical 0eason,G roceedings of the Aristo4 telian !ociety FE >19F%B19FE?, pp. 69B%14 also 0. +ora"/i, GAristotle on t e 0ole of )ntellect in Kirtue,G roceedings of the Aristotelian !ociety F4 >19F#B19F4?, pp. 1$FB1694 (. Iuss"au*, Aristotle0s DHe Motu AnimaliumD >Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19FH?, pp. 1F$ff.4 and I. :. 3a l, ractical

Reason' Aristotle' and Gea-ness of the Gill >(inneapolis: University of (innesota Press, 19H4?, pp. F#BH#. 1H. L. Cooper, Reason and the Human Good in Aristotle >Ca*"ridge: <arvard University Press, 19F%?, pp. 19B66, %HBF6. 19. '. )r,in, G-irst Principles in Aristotle.s 8t ics,G Mid)est !tudies in hilosophy # >19FH?, pp. 6%6B 6F6, especially 6E6B6E#. +ee also is co**ents in is translation of t e N.E. )r,in, in fact, translates as GintelligenceG instead of as Gpractical ,isdo*,.. Gpractical t oug t,G Gpractical reason,G or Gprudence,G and t us *akes t e connection to t eoretical t oug t even closer. 6$. N.E. C.viBi&. 61. 2. -. 0. <ardie, op. cit. , p. #$, uses t e passage /ust 1uoted >#.1$? to support t e vie, t at Aristotle takes et ics and politics to "e Gan e&ercise of practical intellect.G ' is, o,ever, does not e&plain eit er , at t e nature of et ical in1uiry is or o, ,e are supposed to distinguis "et,een t e t,o kinds of practical ,isdo* Aristotle i*self identifies in t is passage. 66. -or a discussion of t is, see C.L. 0o,e, #he Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics> A !tudy in the He+elopment of Aristotle0s #hought >Ca*"ridge: Proceedings of t e Ca*"ridge P ilological +ociety, 19F1?, especially pp. E#BF#. 6#. :r ,e *ake all deli"eration si*ilar to t eoretical in1uiry. ' is is done to so*e e&tent "y '. )r,in , o *oves in t is direction "y *aking , at e takes to "e t e type of reasoning et ical in1uiry uses >i.e., dialectical? a part of deli"eration >see '. )r,in, op. cit. , p. 6E6?. But doing so, ) t ink, o"scures t e contrast Aristotle ,is es to dra, "et,een t e t,o kinds of practical ,isdo*. 64. ' at practical ,isdo* is concerned ,it t e universal is one of t e reasons 'eic *Nller gives for e1uating it ,it et ical in1uiry. But e understood practical ,isdo* in t e ,ide sense4 e took it to "e not *uc different fro* t eoretical in1uiry. +ee G. 'eic *Nller, G3ie praktisc e Kernunft "ei Aristoteles,G Neue !tudien Aur Geschichte der 6egriffe , vol. # >Got a, 1HF9?. 6%. -or alt oug deli"eration rese*"les ot er kinds of reasoning, even t eoretical reasoning, it is i*portant not to o"scure t e difference. 6E. :n at least t,o occasions >1146a6%, 114#"%? Aristotle argues t at t e particulars are kno,n "y perception or intuition > ?. But even if ,e ,ere to construe t e reac ing of particulars as a kind of deli"eration, t ere still ,ould "e t e parts of et ics dealing ,it t e universal aspects of conduct. 6F. ' is ter* *ay *ean eit er Gin1uiryG or G*et od.G Alt oug in t e passages ) cite ere it *eans t e for*er, Aristotle uses it at ti*es to *ean t e latter >see c ap. 9 for a discussion of t is *atter?. 6H. Concerning t e si*ilarities "et,een *edicine and et ics, see 3. +. <utc inson, G3octrines of t e (ean and t e 3e"ate Concerning +kills in -ourt BCentury (edicine, 0 etoric and 8t ics,G in 0.L. <ankinson >ed.?, Method' Medicine and Metaphysics> !tudies in the hilosophy of Ancient !cience >8d*onton: Acade*ic Printing and Pu"lis ing, 19HH?. 69. ' is line of argu*ent as "een taken "y several co**entators. ' us, Burnet, op. cit. , p. 6%F, and +te,art, op. cit. , vol. 6, p. #%, take Aristotle to "e restricting t e application of t e ter* Gkno,ledgeG only to disciplines t at deal ,it t at , ic is necessary. And , en e applies it to disciplines like *edicine Aristotle is, according to t is vie,, using t e ter* rat er loosely. A si*ilar position is put fort "y Green,ood, op. cit. , pp. 1%$B1%6, , ere e argues t at t e ter* Gkno,ledgeG

or GscienceG is used in t e N.E. Gin t e loose sense of .art., .practical science., so*eti*es al*ost .profession., , ic is t e popular usage... And e refers to 11#H"6E , ere Aristotle calls *edicine a science, "ut clai*s t at G #$. 2. -. 0. <ardie, op. cit. , p. #1. #1. +ee Aristotle.s re*arks on t e ig est science a*ong t eoretical sciences, i.e., t e one t at deals ,it t e ig est genus, as ,ell as is clai*, G-or not even t e *at e*atical sciences are all alike in t is respect=geo*etry and astrono*y deal ,it a certain particular kind of t ing, , ile universal *at e*atics applies alike to allG > Met. 1$6Ea4 see also 1$E4"?. #6. +ee, for e&a*ple, t e uses t at, according to Plato, pure geo*etry as in ,arfare and t e up"ringing of t e young > Republic %6FB?. ##. +ee Aristotle.s discussion at Met. 1$6%"6%ff. and 1$E4a1$. 2 en Aristotle speaks of *ove*ent *ost often e *eans c ange in general and not only loco*otion. #4. G(at e*atics also, o,ever, is t eoretical4 "ut , et er its o"/ects are i**ova"le and separa"le fro* *atter, is not at present clear4 still, it is clear t at some *at e*atical t eore*s consider t e* /ua separa"le fro* *atterG > Met. 1$6EaF?. But at 1$E4a#6 ,e are told: G(at e*atics is t eoretical, and is a science t at deals ,it t ings t at are at rest, "ut its su"/ects cannot e&ist apart.G #%. ' us, Aristotle ,rites at Met. 1$E4a##, G' erefore a"out t at , ic can e&ist apart and is un*ova"le t ere is a science different fro* "ot of t ese @i.e., fro* p ysics and *at e*aticsA, if t ere is a su"stance of t is nature >) *ean separa"le and un*ova"le?, as ,e s all try to prove t ere is.G #E. G2 ile in t e case of t ings done it @*ove*ent or restA is in t e doerG > Met. 1$6%"6%4 see also E.E. 166#a% and t e rat er ela"orate discussion of t e differences in t e sources of *otion or c ange t at is due to nature and is internal, and of c ange t at is in so*et ing e&ternal to , at *oves or c anges at hys. )).i?. #F. Plato, as is ,ell kno,n, insists t at t ere are different faculties t at correspond to different types of cognitive activities and o"/ects. ' e distinction "et,een kno,ledge and "elief in t e Republic rests partly on suc a clai*. #H. +ee Met. 99%a1% and t e discussion in c apters E and F "elo,. #9. ' us, Aristotle clai*s t at t e su"/ect *atter of p ysics is ine&act "ut p ysics is nonet eless a t eoretical discipline > Met. 1$6%"6E, 1$6EaF, 1$E4"?. 4$. L. 0a,is, A #heory of Iustice >Ca*"ridge: <arvard University Press, 19F1?, p. 161, also p. 16E. ) take 0a,ls in t is conte&t to "e saying t at t e interest in a *oral geo*etry is a t eoretical one. <e certainly gives no indication t at *oral geo*etry is re1uired "y or is to "e used for so*e practical end. :f course, ot ers ave denied t at t ere is any kno,ledge , ose goals are purely t eoretical in t e ,ay Plato, Aristotle, and possi"ly 0a,ls clai* t ey are. 41. +ee Aristotle.s discussion of t e arc itectonic structure of desires or pursuits at N.E. ).i. 2e need to assu*e ere t at A is different fro* B and t at t e relation is relativi9ed to so*e one agent, since it is 1uite possi"le t at, , ile so*e agent desires A for t e sake of B, so*e ot er agent desires B for t e sake of A. +ee on t is last point t e discussion "y B. 2illia*s, GAristotle on t e Good: A -or*al +ketc ,G #he hilosophical Buarterly , vol. 16, no. 4$ >19E6?, pp. 6H9B69E. :f course, ) a* not ere endorsing Aristotle.s clai* concerning t e supposed asy**etry of t e relation of su"ordination. in t e strict sense as not ing to do ,it it.G

46. G. 8. 0. Jloyd >ed.?, Hippocratic Gritings >Jondon: Penguin Books, 19FH?, p. F1. 4#. <. <. Loac i*, op. cit. , p. 1E. 44. ' is ,ould, of course, i*ply t at several t eoretical disciplines , ose su"/ect *atter or accounts e& i"it t e kind of ine&actness t at et ics and its su"/ect *atter e& i"it ,ill also "e nonde*onstrative.

-our '*actness. !ome asic Questions

1. ' e for*s t at are *ost fre1uently used are t e follo,ing: for*, N.E. 1$94"1#, "64, Met. 1$%#a?4 , , >ad/ectival

>t e co*parative and superlative of >adver", N.E.

t e ad/ectival for*, E.E. 16#1"6, N.E. 11$E"14, 11$F"1%, 1141a9, a1E?4 11$4a6, 114E"6%, 11E4"6H, 11H$"1F?4 co*pound ver" for*s

>ver" for*, G.A. FFHaE, Meteor. #E#"#6?. Also t e > N.E. 1$9E"#$, > N.E. 11#9"1F, Cael.

> E.E. 166Fa1, N.E. 11FHa6#?,

11$1"#4, 11$6a6%, 11F%a#1, "14, 11H$"11, H.A. %H#a#$? and #$E"6F, olit. 16%H"#4, Rhet. 1#E9"1?. -inally, 1#41"#$, Rhet. 1#E1"#4?. 6. +ee , N.E. 11$Ha1F, #op. 1%Fa144

> H.A. %1#a9, Met. 9%9a1%, olit.

, G.A. FE9a#%4

, Anim. , Met. 9HE"69,

41#a1$, hgn. 61#a44

, Met. 9HE"4, 99#a66, Cael. #$#a94

1$#%"#, Cael. 6HE"%, A. E96a1%, N.E. 1144a614 9HE"664 , Anim. 414"69, 41E"69, N.E. 11$Ha1H.

, .A. E4Fa##, #K . 14$"%, Met.

#. L. Barnes in is co**entary on t e ost. Anal. >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 19F%? refers to t e a"ove passage fro* t e #op. and clai*s t at Aristotle glosses t e ter* "y >p. 1H6?. ) assu*e t at Barnes *eans t at Aristotle takes t e t,o ter*s to "e used at ti*es to signify t e sa*e t ing>s?. ' at is, t at t e gloss is a proper one. 4. +ee also olit. 1#41"#1, #op. 1$1a66, Mund. #9F"16 for si*ilar contrasts. %. ' e ter* occurs *ost fre1uently in t e dative as : Anim. 41#a9, 41E"#$, 464a1E, N.E. 1$94a6%, "6$, 11$1a6F, 11$4a1, 11$F"14, 111#a1#, 1114"6F, 111F"61, 11FEa#1, H.A. 4HFa16, Met. 1$69aF, olit. 16FE"19, 1#$6a19, 1##%"%, #op. 1$1a66, 1$#a1. But also in t e follo,ing for*s: , N.E. 11F9a#44 , olit. 1#41"#14 , .A. EFE"94 , Cat.

1"6H, 11"6$, robl. 91Ea#%, #op. 1$1a1H, 1$#aF, 1$%"194 olit. 1#6#a1$.

, N.E. 1169a11, H.A. 491aH,

E. ' e ter* occurs pri*arily in t e p rase >to speak in su**ary?: Anim. 4##"6$, N.E. 11$9"11, hys. 61EaF, olit. 1#16"#4, robl. 9%%a6H, Rhet. 1#E$"%. )n a fe, instances it occurs as an adver", >su**arily?: Met. 9%Ha1F, Rhet. 141%"F, 1419"#1.

F. But Jidell and +cott, A Gree-4English (exicon >:&ford: Clarendon Press?, correctly point out t at t e ter* is used at ti*es as opposite of H. +ee also Mund. #9F"1$. 9. +ee also M.M. 6.1.1.%, Gt ose t ings t e la, giver is una"le to define e&actly @ case, "ut lays do,n general rules @ A.G A for eac .

1$. L. Barnes, Aristotle0s osterior Analytics >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 19F%?, p. 1H6. 11. ' e idea of certainty t at Barnes takes to "e t e co**on ele*ent uniting t e various uses of see*s to "e *ore related to and t e older adver"ial for* >clearly,

plainly, assuredly?. 2 en used ,it ver"s of kno,ing or speaking signifies so*et ing like GclearlyG or G,it certaintyG >see <o*er, :dyssey )).#14 Pindar, Klympian. H.4E?. Aristotle i*self uses t e adver"ial for* ,it ver"s of speaking or saying > Met. 9H9"1H, 99#a66? "ut t e conte&t

*akes it clear t at *ost often certainty is not , at is at issue in suc cases. . is *ost likely used to *ean so*et ing like GcertaintyG , ere Aristotle contrasts t e ter* in one of its gra**atical for*s to . As pointed out earlier, t e ter* see*s to *ean so*et ing like GcertaintyG or Gnecessity.. , en used in relation to proofs or argu*ents. 16. +ee Grant.s discussion, #he Ethics of Aristotle >Ie, 7ork: Arno Press, 19F#?, pp. #96B#9#, 4%6. 1#. ) ave in *ind ere Plato.s discussion of t e Good in t e Republic , ere e see*s to suggest t at t e Good is t e cause of t e e&istence and essence of all t ere is and t at all kno,ledge depends in a ,ay on kno,ledge of t e Good. 'o "e sure, t ese are so*e of t e *ost cryptic re*arks in t e Platonic corpus and see* to defy any interpretation. ' e *ost i*portant recent discussion on t e Good in t e Republic is to "e found in G. +antas, G' e -or* of t e Good in Plato.s Republic'D hilosophical In/uiry , vol. 6, no. 1 >19H$?. +antas concentrates on , at e considers to "e one function of t e Good in Plato.s account=e.g., t at its nature deter*ines so*e for*al features of t e -or*s. But it is not clear t at t is is t e sole function t e Good as in Plato.s sc e*e of t ings. 14. 7et at Met. 9H6"% Aristotle re*arks: GAnd t e science , ic kno,s to , at end eac t ing *ust "e done is t e *ost aut oritative of t e sciences, and *ore aut oritative t an any ancillary science4 and

t is end is t e good of t at t ing, and in general t e supre*e good in t e , ole of nature. Ludged "y all t e tests ,e ave *entioned, t en, t e na*e in 1uestion falls to t e sa*e science4 t is *ust "e a science t at investigates t e first principles and causes4 for t e good, i.e., t e end, is one of t e causes.G ' e science o,ever , ic , according to Aristotle, is *ost aut oritative and investigates t e first principles and causes is not et ics. )t is *etap ysics or first p ilosop y. ' e good t is science investigates is not anyt ing practica"le, "ut it is , at pertains to action on t e ot er and t at et ics investigates. 1%. 'raditionally, *etap ysics or first p ilosop y as "een t oug t to "e not like t e ordinary Aristotelian disciplines or sciences. But (. -rede as recently argued t at t e study of "eing 1ua "eing and t e study of t e supre*e "eing for* a discipline or science t at does not differ *uc fro* t e typical Aristotelian disciplines, e.g., *at e*atics or p ysics4 see is Essays in Ancient hilosophy >(inneapolis: University of (innesota Press, 19HF?, c . E. 1E. +ee '. )r,in.s discussion of t ese *atters in is G' e (etap ysical and Psyc ological Basis of Aristotle.s 8t ics,G in A. 0orty >ed.?, Essays on Aristotle0s Ethics >Berkeley and Jos Angeles: University of California Press, 19H$?, and G-irst Principles in Aristotle.s 8t ics,G Mid)est !tudies in hilosophy , vol. # >19FH?, p. 6E1. 1F. -or a recent discussion of t e relation of et ics to politics, see L. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle >Ca*"ridge: <arvard University Press, 19F%?, especially p. 1$H. +ee also J. <. C. Green,ood, Aristotle> Nicomachean Ethics' 6oo- "I >Ca*"ridge: Ca*"ridge University Press, 19$9?, pp. E$ff., and '. )r,in, G-irst Principles in Aristotle.s 8t ics,G op. cit. , p. 6%H. 1H. ) ave in *ind ere Aristotle.s re*arks at N.E. 1$94"6% , ere e clai*s t at t ere are differences in e&actness "et,een *at e*atics and r etoric, t e rest of t e disciplines falling so*e, ere "et,een t ese t,o4 and t e re*arks at 1$9Ha6F , ere e indicates t at t ere is an e&actness appropriate to t e in1uiry. ' e supposed ine&actness of et ics is not o,ever connected to t e nu*"er of "asic ele*ents *aking up t e su"/ect *atter of et ics. )t is not connected to its si*plicity or lack of it. 19. Aristotle.s language *akes it clear t at ,e s ould in all cases do as > ? t e arit *etician and geo*eter do. 2e s ould use t e *at e*aticians as e&a*ples of t e ,ay to a"stract rat er t an of , at to a"stract. 6$. 0oss in is co**entary on t e Met. >:&ford: :&ford University Press, 19%H?, vol. 6, p. 41F, says t at since geo*etry a"stracts fro* *aguituide, it is a"ove solid geo*etry, solid geo*etry is a"ove all sciences of *otion, astrono*y is a"ove su"lunary kinetics, , ic studies noncircular *ove*ent, and still *ore a"ove "iology, , ic studies generation and corruption. 61. +ee Barnes, op. cit. , p. 1H6. ' e ter* occurs in t ree ot er places in Aristotle.s ,ritings, leaving aside t e occurrence at N.E. 1166"F , ere it is used to signify a type of vice t at is contrasted to *agnificience. )n all t ese t ree occurrences it see*s to *ean so*et ing like GdetailedG or Gela"orateG treat*ent of a su"/ect: e.g., a detailed treat*ent of t e nature of "lood vessels > H.A. %1#a9?, a detailed discussion of t e study of *usic > olit. 1#41"69?, a *inute e&a*ination of , at constitutes a appy old age > Rhet. 1#E1"##?. Co**enting on t e passage fro* t e Met. t at speaks of , Ale&ander of Ap rodisias in is co**entary on t e Met. takes t e ter* to signify so*et ing like concern ,it detail, or *inutiae > , see In Aristotelis Metaphysica

Commentaria 1EH.#?. 66. ' us, at Met. 1$#9"6F Aristotle clai*s t at Gt ere is neit er definition nor de*onstration a"out sensi"le individual su"stances, "ecause t ey ave *atter , ose nature is suc t at t ey are capa"le "ot of "eing and of not "eing . . . . )f t en de*onstration is of necessary trut s and definition is a scientific process=clearly t ere can neit er "e definition of nor de*onstration a"out sensi"le individuals.G 6#. But see "elo, for Aristotle.s clai* t at so*e properties of t e good are to "e proven "y t e *at e*atical sciences. 64. )n t e case of so*e of t ese disciplines, e.g., optics, Aristotle identifies a level t at is purely *at e*atical. But e identifies no suc level in t e case of "iology. +ee "elo, for a discussion of t ese *atters. 6%. And t ese disciplines >i.e., p ysics, "iology, and optics? are, according to Aristotle, "ona fide sciences. 6E. ' at kno,ledge or understanding consists in giving e&planations and deter*ining t e causes of t ings and t at t ese in turn are e&plicated in ter*s of de*onstration is argued for in ost. Anal. ).ii4 see also hys. 194"6$, Met. 1$6%", 1$E4a%. Aristotle of course recogni9es ot er types of kno,ledge, e.g., intuition. But e restricts intuition to a grasp of t e first principles of science , ic cannot "e de*onstrated. )ntuition is not scientific or de*onstrative kno,ledge4 see for a discussion of t ese *atters, (. -. Burnyeat, GAristotle on Understanding Dno,ledge,G in 8. Berti >ed.?, Aristotle on !cience >Padova: 8ditrice Antenore, 19H1?, pp. 9FB1#9. 6F. But as Barnes, op. cit. , p. 1%4, as pointed out, Aristotle.s o,n treat*ent of t e rain"o, is one of t e *ost *at e*atically sop isticated parts of is corpus. ' is vie, is s ared "y '. J. <eat , Mathematics in Aristotle >:&ford: :&ford University Press, 1949?, pp. 1H$B19$. 6H. Aristotle c aracteri9es again H.A. as a desciptive discipline t at is not concerned ,it causes at .A. E4EaH , en e ,rites, G) ave already descri"ed ,it considera"le detail in *y Researches on Animals , at and o, *any are t e parts of , ic t e various ani*als are co*posed. 2e *ust no, leave on one side , at ,as said t ere, as our present task is to consider , at are t e causes t roug , ic eac ani*al is as ) t ere descri"ed it.G 3. (. Bal*e, o,ever, as recently 1uestioned t e vie, t at t e H.A. is a purely descriptive or none&planatory in1uiry. Alt oug e clai*s t at it is Aristotle.s Gnearest approac to a descriptive collection of data, and it is very ,ide and perceptive,G t is is not t e only ai* of Aristotle.s treatise. Bal*e clai*s t at it is in part concerned ,it causes and t ere is evidence t at portions, or per aps all, of H.A. is later t an t e ot er "iological treatises , ic ave al,ays "een taken to provide t e e&planations of t e p eno*ena descri"ed in it4 see is GAristotle.s Use of 3ifferentiae in Ooology,G in L. Barnes, (. +c ofield, and 0. +ora"/i >eds.?, Articles on Aristotle >Jondon: 3uck,ort , 19F%?, vol. 1, pp. 1H#B19#. Bal*e *ay "e rig t a"out t e nature of H.A. , "ut t is does not affect t e point ) ,is to *ake: na*ely, t at Aristotle distinguis es "et,een descriptive and e&planatory disciplines, and in fact c aracteri9es so*e of is o,n investigations as "eing purely descriptive. 69. +ee 2. 3. 0oss.s co**entary on t e ost. Anal. >:&ford: :&ford University Press, 19E%?, p. %%%, and <eat , op. cit. , pp. %HBE1. +ee also Barnes.s co**ents, op. cit. , p. 1%4, for an e&a*ple of o, pre*ises fro* purely *at e*atical and o"servational disciplines are used to produce a de*onstrative syllogis*. #$. ' e "est recent discussion of Aristotle.s vie,s on t e relation of su"ordination a*ong sciences is to "e found in Barnes.s co**entary, pp. 1%1B1%%. #1. 2. 3. 0oss, co**entary on ost. Anal. , p. %%%.

#6. +ee Barnes, op. cit. , p. 1%4. ' e pro"le* ere ste*s partly fro* t e fact t at Aristotle recogni9es no ot er type of e&planation t an t e de*onstrative one. ' ere are no inductive e&planations. But even if t ere ,ere ot er types of e&planations, it ,ould not resolve t e pro"le*. -or Aristotle.s distinction see*s to "e "et,een e&planatory and none&planatory disciplines. )t is not t e case t at t e latter disciplines offer e&planations t at are different fro* t e de*onstrative ones. ' ey offer no e&planations at all. ##. 2e are likely to disagree ,it Aristotle.s clai*s a"out t e possi"ility of c ildren, as ,ell as ani*als, "eing appy. :ur disagree*ent ste*s partly fro* t e fact t at our conception of appiness is not e&actly Aristotle.s conception. But t is, of course, does not affect t e point under discussion: na*ely, t at Aristotle sees is task as "eing partly to give e&planations of , at e takes t e facts to "e. #4. +ee for a discussion of t is *atter (. -. Burnyeat.s re*arks in GAristotle on Jearning to Be Good,G in A. 0orty >ed.?, op. cit. , pp. F1BF6, and '. )r,in.s co**ents in is translation of t e N.E. 2 ile it is true t at Aristotle clai*s at 1$9%"4BH t at t e starting point of our investigation is t e fact and , at is kno,n to us, t is is not t e end of et ical in1uiry. )ts ai* is to e&plain t e facts or to give t e Gcauses.G )n speaking of causes in t e present conte&t, ) do not *ean to assert t at Aristotelian causes are e&actly t e sorts of t ings ,e designate as causes. ' is as "een pointed out "y several sc olars recently= Barnes, Burnyeat, (oravcsik, +ora"/i. But t is, of course, does not e&clude t e possi"ility t at so*e Aristotelian causes are causes in t e ,ay ,e *ost often understand causes=na*ely, as efficient causes. #%. ' us, Aristotle re*arks at Met. 1$FHa#1: GIo, since t e good and t e "eautiful are different >for t e for*er al,ays i*plies conduct as its su"/ect, , ile t e "eautiful is found also in *otionless t ings?, t ose , o assert t at t e *at e*atical sciences say not ing of t e "eautiful or t e good are in error. -or t ese sciences say and prove a great deal a"out t e*4 if t ey do not e&pressly *ention t e*, "ut prove attri"utes , ic are t eir results or t eir definitions, it is not true to say t at t ey tell us not ing a"out t e*. ' e c ief for*s of "eauty are order and sy**etry and definiteness, , ic t e *at e*atical sciences de*onstrate in a special degree.G #E. ' is is of course not to say t at Aristotle does not raise t e 1uestion of e&actness!ine&actness in relation to secondBorder disciplines. <e does raise suc 1uestions in t e case of t e logical treatises, including Rhet. and #op. 3isciplines suc as t e logical ones ave often "een vie,ed as not "eing firstB order disciplines. #F. Plato also speaks of t e fairest and *ost e&act > ?of *aterial t ings > Republic %693?.

#H. ' e root of t is ter* *eans GloadG or G"urden.G Alt oug it retains in part t is *eaning, Aristotle uses it often to signify t e Gcoarse,G Gco**on,G or Gvulgar.. >see olit. 1#4$"H, 1#41"114 Rhet. 1#9%"14 oet. 14E6a4?. #9. ' us, Ale&ander of Ap rodisias in is co**entary on t e Met. : G)t even see*s to so*e illi"eral to de*and in argu*ents @or accountsA e&actness in e&cess and e&a*ination of little t ings, as is t e case in e&c angesG > In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria , 1EH.9?. 4$. Aristotle uses distinct ter*s to na*e t e disposition and t e person , o as t e disposition or corresponding c aracter=for e&a*ple, irasci"ility > ras ness > ? vs. ras person > ?, and ? vs. irasci"le person > ?,

41. At E.E. 16##"6$ Aristotle says t at t e e*otion corresponding to t e unB na*ed e&tre*e is also unna*ed. But t e c aracter is given as t at of t e *alicious person > ?. At N.E. 11$H"6 G*aliceG > na*eless. ? is given as t e na*e of t e e&tre*e t at in t e E.E. is

46. Aristotle gives t e na*e GinsensitivenessG >

? to t is unna*ed e&tre*e >1661a? and calls

t e corresponding c aracter, , ic e says appens to ave no na*e, GinsensitiveG > =I.8. 11$F"F?. But e pro"a"ly finds t ese na*es too ,ide, for t ey suggest lack of sensation in general and not only in relation to pleasures. 4#. +ee also E.E. 16#1a#% for a state*ent of t e sa*e clai*. 44. +ee H.A. , ere Aristotle says t at t e follo,ing lack na*es: t e part in , ic touc as its natural place >4H9a1F?4 t e groups t at ave der*atous or *e*"ranous ,ings >49$a16?4 t e softBs elled ani*als >49$"1$?4 so*e kinds included in t e group of viviparous 1uadrupeds >49$"#1?4 one part of t e ear >496a14?4 t e outer surface of t e and >494a6?4 t e upper part of t e foot >494a6?4 and for *ore unna*ed t ings see %$%"69, %1%"9, %6%"%, %%6"#$, %%#a1, E6#"%. )n t e .A. see E46"1%, E44"4, EE9"1$, EFHa9, EH$a14, EH#"6#. 4%. A*ong recent translators and co**entators, '. )r,in as *ost clearly recogni9ed t e i*portance of Aristotle.s re*arks on t e na*eless dispositions. <e correctly recogni9es t at an e&a*ination of t e na*eless dispositions is necessary for saving t e validity of Aristotle.s t esis even in t e cases , ere t e lack of na*es *ay suggest t at t e t esis is false=see '. )r,in, Aristotle> Nicomachean Ethics >)ndianapolis: <ackett, 19H%?, p. #1%. 2e *ust keep in *ind, o,ever, t at Aristotle i*self recogni9es t at Gnot every action or e*otion o,ever ad*its of t e o"servance of a due *ean.G Aristotle gives t e cases of *alice, s a*elessness, envy, adultery, t eft, and *urder as cases t at do not ad*it of t e *ean >11$Fa1$4 see also E.E. 1661"6$?. 4E. ) agree ,it )r,in in adding GonlyG to t e te&t, for ,it out it Aristotle.s state*ent *akes little sense. (ost translations *ake no suc addition. 4F. Aristotle insists t at in all cases t e *ean is to "e praised: G)n order to discern "etter t at in all t ings t e o"servance of t e *ean is to "e praised, , ile t e e&tre*es are neit er rig t nor praise,ort y, "ut repre ensi"leG >11$Ha1%?, Git is t e *ean disposition t at is to "e praisedG >11$9"6#?, Gt e *ean disposition is praise,ort y . . . , ile t e various for*s of e&cess and defect are "la*e,ort yG >116E"%, also 116E"1F?. 4H. At 11$H"1% e ,rites concerning t e apparent opposition "et,een t e *ean and t e t,o e&tre*es: G+o t e *iddle states of c aracter are in e&cess as co*pared ,it t e defective states and defective as co*pared ,it t e e&cessive states, , et er in t e case of feelings or actions. -or instance, a "rave *an appears ras in contrast ,it a co,ard and co,ardly in contrast ,it a ras *an4 si*ilarly a te*perate *an appears profligate in contrast ,it a *an insensi"le to pleasure and pain, "ut insensi"le in contrast ,it a profligate4 and a li"eral *an see*s prodigal in contrast ,it a *ean *an, *ean in contrast ,it one , o is prodigal.G 49. Bonit9 goes a step furt er and clai*s t at in t is occurrence is synony*ous ,it

>easiness of co*pre ension?. ' is see*s unlikely to *e. %$. )n a *ore pro"le*atic passage at Anim. 41Ha Aristotle ,rites, GBut since t ere are no na*es @ A for t e differences @in potentialityA, and ,e ave no, e&plained t at t ere are differences and o, t ey differ, ,e *ust continue to use .to "e acted upon. and .altered. as t oug t ey ,ere ordinary @ A na*es.G +o*e translations, e.g., 2. +. <ett in t e Joe"

Classical +eries, take to *ean so*et ing like GpreciseG and Aristotle to "e concerned ,it using nonprecise ter*s to *ake a difference t at is not *arked. )t is true t at t e ter*s, as Aristotle points out, do not *ark t e t,o types of potentiality e distinguis es. )n t at sense t ey are i*precise. But t is ter* , as *ost translators recogni9e, , en applied to na*es signifies so*et ing like Gactual,G Gcurrent,.. or Gordinary.G %1. ' e instructional role of t e Aristotelian treatises and of t e de*onstrative *et od in general as "een *ost clearly recogni9ed "y L. Barnes. <e gives so*e of t e strongest argu*ents in support of t e position t at not only as t e de*onstrative *et od instructional uses "ut t at instructional use is its sole purpose. ) find Barnes.s argu*ents 1uite convincing as far as t e for*er clai* is concerned "ut ) re*ain unconvinced a"out t e latter4 see L. Barnes, GAristotle.s ' eory of 3e*onstration,G hronesis 14 >19E9?, pp. 16#B1%6. %6. ' e passages 1uoted a"ove, stressing t e role t at t e data fa*iliar to us > ? play in relation to investigation or in1uiry, e*p asi9e t e *et od of in1uiry t at Aristotle at ti*es refers to as t e dialectical *et od. ' ese passages raise i*portant su"stantive issues a"out t e ele*ents used as starting points of investigation. ' is and related *atters ave "een discussed recently "y L. Barnes, GAristotle and t e (et ods of 8t ics,G Re+ue Internationale de hilosophie 1##B1#4 >19H$?, pp. 49$B %114 '. )r,in, G-irst Principles in Aristotle.s 8t ics,G in op. cit. , pp. 6%FB6%9, GAristotle.s (et ods in 8t ics,G in 3.L. :.(eara >ed.?, !tudies in Aristotle >2as ington: Cat olic University of A*erica Press, 19H1?, pp. 194B6$1, and is translation of and co**entary on t e N.E. , p. #9H. %#. +o*e translators and co**entators dou"t t at Aristotle is referring to a separate treatise on food. 0. 3. <icks in is co**entary on t e Anim. >A*sterda*: A. (. <akkert, 19E%?, p. #49, argues t at *ost pro"a"ly Aristotle is referring to suc a treatise. A reference to suc a treatise is also *ade at G.A. FH4a6 , en Aristotle ,rites, GA *ore detailed account of t is cause @foodA ,ill "e given in t e treatise Kf Gro)th and Nutrition @ A.G

%4. -or Aristotle.s o,n discussion of enco*ia, see Rhet. ).&&&iii, &&&iv. %%. +ee also 11$6a6%: G' e student of politics t erefore as ,ell as t e psyc ologist *ust study t e nature of t e soul, t oug e ,ill do so as an aid to politics, and only so far as is re1uisite for t e o"/ects of in1uiry t at e as in vie,: to pursue t e su"/ect in greater detail ,ould dou"tless "e *ore la"orious t an is necessary for is purpose.G %E. +ee also Anim. 4$6a for t e clai* t at so*e kno,ledge is *ore valua"le "ecause it is of "etter and *ore ,onderful t ings and N.E. 1141" for t e clai* t at ,isdo*, t e *ost e&act kno,ledge, is kno,ledge of t e t ings t at are *ost onora"le in nature.

%F. ' us, Plato ,rites at #imaeus 69 BBC: G:ur ,orld *ust necessarily "e a likeness of so*et ing . . . concerning a likeness, t en, and its *odel ,e *ust *ake t is distinction: an account is of t e sa*e order as t e t ings , ic it sets fort =an account of t at , ic is a"iding and sta"le and discovera"le "y t e aid of reason ,ill itself "e a"iding and unc angea"le . . . , ile an account of , at is *ade in t e i*age of t at ot er, "ut is only a likeness, ,ill itself "e "ut likelyG >translated "y -. (. Cornford?4 see also Republic %118. %H. ) o,e t is e&a*ple to Professor C arles 7oung.

-ive Outline) '*actness) and the Particular

1. +ee also M.M. 1.%.1.#, 1.#4.#.6, 1.4.1$.4, 1.16.1.%, 1.1#.4.4. 6. ' ere are t,o *ore occurrences of t e ter* in t e N.E. >1$94"6$ and 11$4a1?, , ic ) ,ill discuss in later c apters. -or even t oug t e ter* is used in t ese occurrences to *ean in part so*et ing like lack of detail or "eing only an outline, it also *eans so*et ing different. #. ' e ter* , in a variety of for*s and e*"edded in different p rases, is also used 1uite fre1uently "y Plato >0epu"lic 4$#8, 414A, 491C4 Ja,s F1HC? to *ean t e sa*e t ing it *eans in Aristotle. )ts original *eaning >i.e., an i*pression or i*print? is also in part preserved in t e ,ay Plato uses it >see also Jiddell and +cott, A Gree-4English (exicon ?. 4. +ee Jiddell and +cott, op. cit. , for t e *eaning of .

%. )t is ,ort noting ere t at t e ter* does not occur at all in t e E.E. And ,e also see t at t e nu*"er of ti*es t e ot er ter*s t at signify t e sa*e kind of ine&actness occur in t e E.E. is considera"ly lo,er t an t at of t eir occurrences in t e N.E. or olit. )s t ere any significance to t is; Per aps t ere is. )t *ay indicate t at Aristotle places a greater e*p asis on t e practical nature of et ics. As ,e s all see "elo,, in *any cases Aristotle locates t e source of t e ine&actness under consideration ere in t e goals of et ics. <e, t us, often c aracteri9es is accounts as ine&act "ecause t ey fail to *eet t e level of detail or specificity t at e t inks is re1uired "y t e practical goals of t e discipline. ' e difference, t en, "et,een t e nu*"er of occurrences of t e ter*s signifying t is type of ine&actness in t e E.E. and t at in t e N.E. *ay very ,ell indicate a difference "et,een a predo*inantly t eoretical and a *ore practical conception of et ical in1uiry. E. 2 at Aristotle says in t is re*ark see*s to "e so*e, at pu99ling. )ts conte&t, "eing t at of descri"ing various aspects of t e p ysical plan of t e ideal city, suggests t at t e e&actness Aristotle considers useless is detail in t e description of t ese aspects. <is use of =detail, concern ,it *inutiae=supports t is. 7et Aristotle, in clai*ing t at suc e&actness is useless, contrasts t e difficulty of practice relating to t e p ysical plant to t e presu*ed easiness of understanding or e&plaining > ? , atever relates to it. ' us <. 0ack a*, in is translation of t e olit. , sees t e contrast as "eing "et,een t eory and practice >Joe" Classical Ji"rary, p. %9%?. )s t e ine&actness Aristotle is ,illing to forego a deficiency in descriptive detail or in >t eoretical;? e&planation and understanding;

F. ' us Aristotle anticipates L. Cooper.s co*plaint , en t e latter critici9es t e functional account of t e good in t e follo,ing ,ay: GIo, , at is disappointing a"out t is argu*ent . . . is t at it is too a"stract to "e infor*ative. )t tells at *ost only t at t e e&cellences, , atever t ese *ay turn out to "e, are t e essential condition of a flouris ing life, "ut if one is in dou"t . . . t en t e a"stract state*ent in Aristotle.s conclusion is not very interesting or elpful,G Reason and Human Good in Aristotle >Ca*"ridge: <arvard University Press, 19F%?, p. 14%. Aristotle see*s to "e 1uite clear a"out t e purposes and li*itations of is account of t e good fro* function and t e relation a*ong function, t e good, and t e e&cellences. But t ese li*itations of Aristotle.s argu*ent fro* function and its conclusions do not render t e argu*ent of no interest or elp. -or t e argu*ent ai*s at providing t e t eoretical account of t e good and its relation to t e e&cellences t at for*s t e foundation of t e su"se1uent discussion in t e N.E. ' is t eoretical fra*e,ork needs to "e ela"orated upon, "ut it is "y no *eans of no interest or elp. H. -or t e role definitions play in Aristotelian de*onstrations, see ost. Anal. and our discussion in c apter 6: 3efinitions are so*e of t e "asic propositions fro* , ic , toget er ,it t e a&io*s and co**on principles, t e various properties t at "elong to a kind are de*onstrated or proved to "elong to t e kind. 9. ' e use of ge to *odify at 1$94a6% >%.1? adds support to t e idea t at ine&act accounts *ay "e sufficient for Aristotle.s purposes: ,e s ould try to attain accounts t at are at least in outline. But it also suggests t at t is is all t at can "e e&pected in suc conte&ts: ,e s ould try to attain an account of t e good even t oug it ,ill "e ine&act. 1$. ' is is a rat er o"scure passage in , ic Aristotle clai*s t at accounts of t e particulars are *ore ine&act t an t ose of t e *ore general or universal aspects of conduct. ) s all discuss t is *atter in a later c apter >H?, "ut it is clear t at t e type of e&actness!ine&actness Aristotle as in *ind in t is passage cannot "e t e one ,e ave isolated in t is c apter=detail or specificity!lack of detail or generality. -or Aristotle says t at t e accounts of particulars are *ore ine&act t an t e ones of t e general or universal aspects of *atters of conduct. 11. ' e e&a*ple Aristotle uses can "e very easily interpreted as *eaning t e particular in t e strict sense. )t is t e sort of t ing one can learn fro* e&perience of particular instances. ) agree, o,ever, ,it )r,in ere t at , at Aristotle contrasts in t is passage is kno,ledge of general types to kno,ledge of *ore deter*inate types >see )r,in.s co**ents on t is passage in is translation of N.E. , p. #4#?. But t ere are, as )r,in points out, passages , ere it is not clear , at Aristotle *eans , en e speaks of particulars >p. 41H?. 16. Aristotle> #he Nicomachean Ethics >Ca*"ridge: Joe" Classical Ji"rary, 19E6?, p. 16$. ' e "est discussion on Aristotle.s vie,s regarding t e ontology of actions is to "e found in 3. C arles, Aristotle0s hilosophy of Action >)t aca, I.7.: Cornell University Press, 19HE?. 1#. Alt oug Aristotle does not e&plicitly discuss t is, "ot types of actions consist of actionBtokens or spatioBte*porally located individuals. -or ,it "ot types, and regardless of , at t ey deal ,it , ,e can at least specify t e agent, place, and ti*e. 14. Actually, , at Aristotle ,rites ere is t at t e p ysician does not study t e ealt of t e species man > ?, "ut t at of t e individual.

1%. Aristotle, as Plato did earlier, is at ti*es concerned a"out t e difficulty la, presu*a"ly as in reac ing , at e considers to "e t e re1uired level of detail. +ee, for e&a*ple, N.E. K.&, olit. )).vii,

and Rhet. ).&iii. 11B14. Plato discusses t is pro"le* in "ot t e Republic and !tatesman . 1E. ' ere is so*e, at of a pro"le* in deter*ining ,it certainty , at Aristotle *eans , en e says a"out t e accidents of life t at Gto distinguis "et,een t e* in detail @ A . . .G +o*e translators take i* to "e concerned ,it distinguis ing eac individual accident, , ile ot ers ,it distinguis ing t e various types of accidents. ' us, 2. 3. 0oss, Gto discuss eac @eventA in detail . . .,G <. G. Apostle, ..to discuss eac @fortuneA of t e* individually. . .G4 "ut <. 0ack a*, Gto distinguis "et,een t e* @t e accidentsA in detail . . .,G '. )r,in, Gto differentiate all t e particular cases @of fortunesA . . .G )n all pro"a"ility Aristotle is not speaking of t e individual accidents, events, or *isfortunes. ' e ter* in t is occurrence pro"a"ly *eans t e *ore specific.

And t e use of >divide, distinguis ? *akes it *ore likely t at e is t inking of distinguis ing t e various types of accidents, dividing t e* into s*aller classes in ter*s of so*e distinguis ing feature t at eac class possesses. A discussion of t e accidents of life t at distinguis ed t e various types or divided t e* into s*aller classes ,ould "e less general and in outline t an one t at did not "ut instead spoke in general a"out t e*, or did not distinguis t e various types at all or sufficiently, or did not divide t e* into classes at all or not far enoug . 2 at Aristotle goes on to do after e tells us t at a detailed account of t e accidents of life is not possi"le, and t at one t at is in outline *ay "e sufficient, confir*s t is interpretation. Aristotle proceeds to distinguis t e various *isfortunes or divide t e* into s*aller classes in ter*s of so*e of t eir features: for e&a*ple, t eir ,eig t and influence on our lives, t e relation t e person to , o* t ey appen as to us >e.g., , et er t ey appen to our friends?, and so fort . +uc an account can, o,ever, fail to "e e&act "y not reac ing so*e desired level of specificity= ence Aristotle is correct in vie,ing is o,n account as one t at is in outline only. 1F. +ee ost. Anal. ).viii and t e co**ents of 2. 3. 0oss and L. Barnes on t is c apter in t eir respective co**entaries. 0oss takes Aristotle to "e saying t at G,e do not strictly prove t at or e&plain , y t e *oon is eclipsed, "ecause it is not an eternal fact t at t e *oon is eclipsed "ut only t at , ic as an opa1ue "ody interposed "et,een it and its source lig t is eclipsed4 t e *oon so*eti*es incidentally as t e latter attri"ute "ecause it so*eti*es incidentally as t e for*er.G 7et in is co**ents on ).&&&i, , ere Aristotle argues t at perception does not give us de*onstrative kno,ledge, 0oss ,rites G"ut t e principles t us grasped @"y intuitive inductionA *ay "eco*e pre*ises fro* , ic t e particular facts *ay "e deduced.G But Aristotle need not necessarily "e speaking ere of de*onstration of particular facts, if , at is *eant are individual occurrences. 2 at e see*s rat er to "e concerned ,it is proving or s o,ing t at t e nature of t e p eno*enon of t e eclipse of t e *oon in general is suc and suc , , ic is of course a *ore particular case of t e even *ore general p eno*enon of interposing an opa1ue o"/ect "et,een anot er o"/ect and t e latter.s source of lig t. And kno,ledge of t e ,ider universal >kno,ledge of t e eclipse? *ay provide us ,it t e *eans of s o,ing , at t e nature of t e narro,er universal >t e eclipse of t e *oon? is. 1H. Aristotle often concludes a topic of discussion in t e "iological treatises "y indicating t at t e account e as /ust given is co*plete, and t us ,it out suggesting t at it is in so*e ,ay or ot er ine&act: G) ave no, descri"ed t e arrangeB *ent of t e e&ternal partsG > H.A. 494"6$?, G2e ave no, given a description of t e parts, "ot internal and e&ternal, of *an . . .G >49F"?, G2e ave no, descri"ed "loodBvessel, sine,, and skin4 fi"res and *e*"rane . . .G >%19"6%4 see also %6Fa#%, %6F"#%, %#H"6H, and so on?. And , ere e indicates t at is account of so*e p eno*enon is ine&act and refers us to anot er treat*ent t at is presu*a"ly *ore

e&act t e latter *ay not provide any greater detail. +ee, for e&a*ple, is treat*ent of *enstruation at G.A. ).&&, , ic Aristotle finds ine&act >F6H"1#?. <e refers us t ere to a *ore e&act treat*ent of t e topic in H.A. But t e treat*ent of t is topic at H.A. %F6"69ff. does not provide an account t at is significantly *ore e&act. 19. L. Jukasie,ic9, Aristotle0s !yllogistic >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 19EF?, p. 6 6$. Met. 1$6E"1$. At ost. Anal. F%"1% Aristotle ,rites a"out accidental attri"utes of geo*etrical o"/ects: GIor can geo*etry prove t at anyt ing "elongs to lines not as lines and as fro* t eir proper principles=e.g., , et er t e straig t line is t e *ost "eautiful of lines or , et er it is t e contrary to t e curved.G 61. +ee ost. Anal. F9a1%. As ) said earlier, it is not clear t at t ere is a geo*etrical proof of t is proposition. 66. As ,e sa, a"ove, at N.E. 11$Fa#$ Aristotle clai*s t at t e accounts Gt at are *ore specific are *ore true, since actions deal ,it particulars and our accounts *ust agree ,it t e*.G 6# ) a* not, of course, saying t at t ere are no pro"le*s ,it follo,ing rules or applying general state*ents to particulars. As 2ittgenstein as pointed out, t ere are *any pro"le*s ,it t e *ost co**on e&planations ,e give of o, ,e understand, follo,, or apply any rule. 7et ) a* not convinced t at Aristotle.s pro"le*s are, as L. (c3o,ell as argued, t e skeptical pro"le*s 2ittgenstein as raised a"out ruleBfollo,ing4 see L. (c3o,ell, GKirtue and 0eason,G #he Monist , vol. E6, no. # >19F9?.

!i* eing for the Most Part. Its Meaning) !cope) and 1ature
1. )n E.6 Aristotle says t at ,e s ould "e content > ?, , en dealing ,it su"/ect *atter t at is for t e *ost part, ,it conclusions t at are of t e sa*e kind. Aristotle does not *ean *erely t at ,e s ould "e satisfied , en ,e reac a certain level of e&actness, "ut rat er t at, given t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter, a ig degree of e&actness is not possi"le. 2e s ould t erefore "e satisfied , en ,e reac t at level t at is co**ensurate ,it t e nature of t e su"/ect *atter. 6. ) s all discuss t e nature and i*plications of difference or variations > ? in c apter H.

#. ' e ter* occurs at N.E. 11%%a6$ , ere Aristotle ,rites: G2e *ay see even in our travels @ A o, near and dear every *an is to every *an.G 4. 2 en Aristotle speaks of "ravery in t is conte&t e pro"a"ly *eans so*et ing like t e psyc ological trait of fearlessness rat er t an t e virtue of courage as e defines it. ' is use of t e ter* is rat er co**on in Greek, and indeed +ocrates uses it in t is *anner in so*e of t e +ocratic 3ialogues. At Meno HH, for e&a*ple, e speaks of t e ar* t at co*es at ti*es fro* "ravery or 1uickness of *ind. % +ee N.E. 11#4"6%: G2 at is "y nature is i**uta"le and as t e sa*e validity any, ere, as fire "urns "ot ere and in Persia, "ut , at is /ust is seen to vary.G E. ' is p rase, , is "est rendered in 8nglis as Gfor t e *ost partG or Gin *ost casesG and not, as is so*eti*es rendered, as Gin generality,G Gin general,G or Gspeaking in general.. >Grant, 0ack a*?. -or Aristotle is clearly concerned ,it , at does not old in all cases or is in a certain ,ay in *ost cases. <e is not concerned ,it , at is a generality , ic is often contrasted to , at is in

detail or possesses specificity. )t certainly s ould not "e rendered as Gspeaking in generalG or Ggenerally speakingG if ,e *ean "y t is Gspeaking ,it out kno,ledge of specifics or details.G -or , at Aristotle ,is es to say is t at ,e kno, o, t ings are and certain t ings are suc t at t ey e& i"it so*e property for t e *ost part. As ,e s all see later, , en Aristotle c aracteri9es so*et ing as "eing for t e *ost part e is not *aking an episte*ic clai*. F. )n clai*ing t at t e e&actness!ine&actness under consideration ere is a for*al feature and t at it pertains to t e trut of an account, ) do not *ean to assert t at trut itself is a for*al property, if ,e *ean "y t is t at it is a syntactic feature. 'rut is considered to "e a se*antic property, and Aristotle i*self conceives of it as a relation "et,een an account and , at t e account is a"out. But an account can "e e&act or ine&act in virtue of t e ,ay it satisfies t is relation, e.g., in all cases, for t e *ost part, roug ly, and so fort . H. +ee also Met. 1$6Fa11 , ere Aristotle says t at, outside t e do*ain of *atters of conduct as ,ell, *ost t ings are for t e *ost part 9. As a *atter of fact Aristotle does not need to assu*e t at all of t e pre*ises of a syllogis* ave to "e for t e *ost part in order t at its conclusion "e also for t e *ost part >see "elo, for t is point? 1$. Aristotle defines ,ealt at N.E. 1119"6E as follo,s: GBy ,ealt ,e *ean everyt ing , ose value is *easured "y *oney.G <e gives no evidence in t is conte&t t at e t inks t ere is so*e pro"le* ,it t e nature or essence of ,ealt . ' e definition is clearly intended as olding true in all cases. )n c apter H, ) s all discuss in so*e detail several e&a*ples of t ings , ose definitions are, according to Aristotle, pro"le*atic "ecause t eir nature is pro"le*atic. ' e concept beard , for e&a*ple, *ay "e vague and t erefore difficult to define. But ,e s ould not assu*e t at t is is necessarily t e reason t at G(ales ave a "eardG is true for t e *ost part. -or even if t e definition of t e concept beard posed no pro"le*, it still could "e t e case t at G(ales ave a "eardG is true only for t e *ost part. 11. Aristotle sees t is clearly , en at r. Anal. 4#"#% e re*arks t at GAnd propositions t at are for t e *ost part are @derivedA fro* syllogis*s ,it pre*ises t at are for t e *ost part, eit er all or so*e of t e*.G 16. ' e ,ay ) ave 1uoted E.11 *ay give t e i*pression t at t e forBt eB*ostBpart locution does not occur in Aristotle.s te&t. Actually E.11 is a continuation of E.1$, and it is 1uite clear t at t e forBt eB *ostBpart locution , ic appears at t e "eginning of E.1$ applies to "ot : G:ne oug t for t e *ost part to return services . . . @E.1$A /ust as @ A one oug t to pay "ack a loan @E.11A.G )n "ot e&a*ples Aristotle.s concern is ,it t e e&ceptions to t ese t,o state*ents. )n E.16, o,ever, Aristotle does not use t e locution. But ere again t e concern is ,it , at is true for t e *ost part, , at as e&ceptions or fails to old in all cases: GAs a general rule @ "ut t ey *ay not "e "est for a particular case.G A...

1#. ) append ere one e&a*ple fro* M.M. : G)f for t e *ost part and at *ost ti*es left retains t e fa*iliar c aracter of life, and rig t of fig t, t e distinction @"et,een left and rig t andA is a natural oneG >1.##.6$.F?. :n t e ot er t,o occasions , ere t e aut or of M.M. uses t e p rase Gfor t e *ost partG >1.##.61.4, 6.H.6.4? e gives no particular e&a*ples of t ings t at are for t e *ost part or propositions t at are true for t e *ost part "ut instead *akes so*e o"servations a"out t e nature of "eing for t e *ost part. 14. +o*e of t e e&a*ples fro* t e logical treatises *ay not "e e&a*ples of t ings t at Aristotle actually takes to "e for t e *ost part or propositions t at e considers to "e true for t e *ost part. ' ey

could "e only e&a*ples for t e purpose at and, na*ely, to illustrate so*e logical features. ' ey see*, o,ever, not to "e any different fro* t e e&a*ples e gives else, ere. )t is reasona"le to conclude t at *ost pro"a"ly Aristotle vie,s t e* as e&a*ples of t ings t at are for t e *ost part or propositions t at are true for t e *ost part. 1%. -or additional t ings t at are for t e *ost part, see G.A. F6%"1F, F6F"1#, F6Ha#, F#9a#6, F%$"##, FEHa64, FF4"9, .A. EE#"#$, E9$a1$, H.A. %$H"6, %66a#, %66a16, %4%"4, "1H, "66, %%#aE, %E$"6$, %E6"4, "1%, and so fort . 1E. )t *ay see* in t is conte&t t at Aristotle is putting fort a vie, t at can "est "e descri"ed as actB conse1uentialis*. -or e see*s to "e suggesting t at, regardless of t e contracts or de"ts one as entered into or incurred, , at is proper for i* to do depends on t e conse1uences of t e action and not on previous contracts or agree*ents. But t is is not so. Aristotle takes t e general rule stating t at ,e are re1uired to pay our de"ts to "e true: G-or a de"tor oug t to pay , at e o,esG >11E#"6$?. <is point, of course, is t at t ere are e&ceptions to suc rules. 1F. ' is suggestion ,as *ade to *e in conversations ,it Professors C arles 7oung and (ikael Darlsson. 1H. ' e vie, t at Aristotle links , at is al,ays ,it , at is "y necessity as "een forcefully defended "y L. <intikka, GIecessity, Universality and 'i*e in Aristotle,G A$atus 6$ >19%F?, pp. E%B9$, and *ore recently "y +. 2aterlo,, assage and ossibility >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 19H6?. 19. 0ic ard +ora"/i, Necessity' Cause and 6lame >Jondon: 3uck,ort , 19H$?, especially pp. 16HB1#%. 6$. Dant argues t at t ere is no real distinction "et,een universality and necessity in t e Criti/ue of ure Reason , especially B #B4. 61. ) o,e t is e&a*ple to Professor C arles 7oung. 66. Aristotle refers to suc assertoric syllogis*s at Rhet . 1#%E"1F: GBut , en, certain t ings "eing posited, so*et ing different results fro* t e*, fro* t eir "eing true universally or for t e *ost part, in 3ialectic suc reasoning is called a syllogis*, in 0 etoric an ent y*e*e.G

!even #emonstration and What Is for the Most Part

1. A*ong t e ancient co**entators, 8ustratius and Ale&ander of Ap rodisias are clearly a*ong t ose , o concluded t at t e ine&actness of et ics *akes it nonBde*onstrative. ' e latter, in particular, t oug t t at t ere could "e no syllogis*s , ose pre*ises consist of forBt eB*ostBpart propositions >see "elo,?. (ore recently, t e vie, as, in one for* or anot er, "een defended "y 2. Laeger, Aristotle> <undamentals of the History of His He+elopment >:&ford: :&ford University Press, 194H?, especially, pp. 66HB6%H4 C. L. 0o,e, #he Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics> A !tudy in the He+elopment of Aristotle0s #hought >Ca*"ridge: Proceedings of t e Ca*"ridge P ilological +ociety, 19F1?, especially pp. E#BFE4 L. Burnet, , o in is co**entary on t e N.E. >Jondon: (et uen, 19$$? *aintains t at ine&actness i*plies t at Aristotle.s o,n treatise is not de*onstrative "ut dialectical t roug out >especially pp. vB&vi?4 J. <. G. Green,ood, , o, alt oug critical of so*e of BurBnet.s vie,s, nonet eless agrees ,it i* t at et ics is dialectical "ecause its propositions are not necessary or universally true=see is Aristotle> Nicomachean Ethics' 6oo- "I >Ca*"ridge: Ca*"ridge University Press, 19$9?, especially pp. 1#1B1##4 <. <. Loac i*, , o also concludes fro* t e supposition t at et ical propositions are not necessary t at et ics cannot "e de*onstrative=see is Aristotle> #he Nicomachean Ethics >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 19%%?, especially p. 1%. 2. -. 0. <ardie argues against t e vie,s of Burnet, Green,ood, and Loac i* and does not take ine&actness to i*ply t at et ics cannot "e de*onstrative. 7et e re*arks t at, G)t is reasona"le to t ink t at, in olding t is vie, @t at et ical

state*ents ave e&ceptions or are true for t e *ost partA, Aristotle is rig t as against t ose p ilosop ers , o ave "elieved t at *oral rules can "e de*onstrated as in geo*etry, a co*pany , ic includes Jocke as ,ell as +pino9a,G Aristotle0s Ethical #heory >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 19EH?, p. #6. Jast, '. )r,in, , o at ti*es clai*s t at et ics is an ine&act science >see ne&t note?, on at least one occasion argues t at "ecause et ical propositions are a"out , at is for t e *ost part, et ics cannot "e a science: GConcern ,it t e usual @, at is for t e *ost partA deprives et ics of e&actness, and prevents it fro* "eing a scienceG=see is translation of and co**entary on t e N.E. >)ndianapolis: <ackett, 19H%?, p. 4#$. ' e vie, t at et ics cannot "e a science is not confined to Aristotelian sc olars4 it is accepted "y *any p ilosop ers , o at ti*es appeal to Aristotle.s aut ority. ' us <. Putna*, invoking Aristotle.s re*arks at N.E. 1$94"19B6F, clai*s t at, G)n fact, t ere is no prospect of a .science. of et ics, , et er in t e sense of a la"oratory science or of a deductive science4.. see is Reason' #ruth and History >Ca*"ridge: Ca*"ridge University Press, 19H4?, p. 1#%. 6. (any sc olars ave glossed Aristotle.s o,n ,ords "y clai*ing t at et ics is not an e&act or strict science. (ost recently, '. )r,in as *ade suc a clai* in is co**entary on t e N.E. : G-or t e sa*e reason, et ical trut s are only usual @for t e *ost partA and ence lack t e e&actness t at ,ould "e needed for a science in t e strict sense. . . . ' is lack of e&actness @ aving e&ceptionsA *eans t at et ics cannot *eet Aristotle.s strictest criteria for science,G Nicomachean Ethics >)ndianapolis: <ackett, 19H%?, pp. #9H, #99. #. (ost translators and co**entators ave assu*ed t at Aristotle takes et ics to "e like r etoric or t e e&actness of et ical investigations to "e t at proper to r etorical practice or activity. 4. ' is is *ost often overlooked "y t ose concerned ,it Aristotle.s conception of t e natural sciences, and in particular of t e ones studying "iological p eno*ena. But suc p eno*ena are, according to Aristotle, 1uite ine&act and t erefore pose t e sa*e pro"le*s in relation to de*onstration t at *atters of conduct or *edical p eno*ena do. ' us, in is e&cellent article on t e a&io*aticBde*onstrative c aracter of .A. , A. Gott elf see*s to overlook t is pro"le* altoget er4 see is G-irst Principles in Aristotle.s arts of Animals ,G in A. Gott elf and L. Jenno& >eds.?, hilosophical Issues in Aristotle0s 6iology >Ca*"ridge: Ca*"ridge University Press, 19HF?. ) agree, o,ever, ,it Gott elf t at, contrary to Barnes.s clai*s, t e .A. is i*plicitly an a&io*aticBdeductive treatise. %. By insisting t at not every valid and sound inference is an e&planation, Aristotle avoids t e pro"le* e*piricists face "y identifying e&planation ,it suc an inference and analy9ing cause in ter*s of it= na*ely, t e pro"le* of aving to ad*it t at t e inference fro* t e lengt of t e s ado, of a to,er to t e eig t of t e to,er is a causal e&planation of t e eig t of t e to,er. E. Aristotle, of course, recogni9es different kinds of induction. Besides ordinary or enu*erative induction, e also speaks of intuitive or rational induction, t e cognitive activity e associates ,it grasping t e "asic principles of t e various disciplines >see ost. Anal. )).&i&?. Aristotle argues at lengt t at t is latter kind of induction is not de*onstration4 it does not prove anyt ing. But enu*erative or ordinary induction as al,ays "een t oug t to rese*"le in so*e respects de*onstrative reasoning t at produces scientific kno,ledge or e&planation >see ost. Anal. F1a%, H1a4$?. ' e 1uestion, o,ever, is , et er ordinary induction can "e a proof in t e ,ay a de*onstrative syllogis* presu*a"ly is or can produce kno,ledge of t e kind produced "y suc a syllogis*. F. ' e necessity Aristotle speaks of ere is *ost pro"a"ly t at , ic e associates ,it t e relation of pre*ises to conclusion in a valid argu*ent and not t at of t e necessity of t e pre*ises or of t e conclusion. <is point is t at t e person , o uses division does not *ake a deductive inference, , ereas de*onstration is a deductive inference >F1"1H?.

H. ' e vie, t at t e ter* Aristotle uses , en e speaks of de*onstration enco*passes anyt ing t at s o,s or reveals t at so*et ing is t e case as "een defended "y L. Barnes, GAristotle.s ' eory of 3e*onstration,G hronesis 14 >19E9?, pp. 16#B1%6. Barnes.s vie, as "een critici9ed "y L. <intikika in is G:n t e )ngredients of an Aristotelian +cience,G Nous , vol. E, no. 4 >19F6?, pp. %%BE9, , ere e argues t at t e ter* Aristotle uses for de*onstration as a core of *eaning t at e&cludes a variety of ,ays or *eans t at ,e *ay "e ,illing to designate as *eans or ,ays of s o,ing t at so*et ing is t e case. (ost interpreters of Aristotle.s account of de*onstration or de*onstrative science old vie,s t at differ fro* t ose of Barnes on t is issue. +ee, in particular, <. +c ol9, G' e Ancient A&io*atic ' eory,.. in L. Barnes, (. +c ofield, and 0. +ora"/i >eds.?, Articles on Aristotle , vol. 1 >Jondon: 3uck,ort , 19F%?, and (. Burnyeat, GAristotle on Understanding Dno,ledge,G in 8. Berti >ed.?, Aristotle on !cience >Padova: 8ditrice Antenore, 19H1?. 9. As Barnes says, GA de*onstration is a species of *odal syllogis*. )n a de*onstration all t e propositions are necessary . . .G, Aristotle0s osterior Analytics >:&ford: Claredon Press, 19F%?, p. &vi. Barnes.s ,ay of e&plicating Aristotle.s notion of de*onstration rules out t e possi"ility t at t ere are de*onstrations ,it pre*ises t at are not necessary or t at are true for t e *ost part. Aristotle, ) "elieve, does not s are t is vie,. 2 at Barnes says is true of strict or a"solute de*onstration only and not of all de*onstration. 1$. L. Barnes, GAristotle.s ' eory of 3e*onstration,G hronesis 14 >19E9?, pp. 16#B1%6. But Aristotle need not necessarily s are Barnes.s vie,s on t is *atter, for e see*s to t ink t at so*e de*onstrations are "etter or G*ore truly de*onstrationsG t an ot ers >see "elo,?. 11. -or a discussion concerning t e assu*ptions a"out teleology, rationality, and so on t at underlie Aristotle.s opening state*ents in t e N.E. a"out t e good and t e structure of desire and pursuits, see B. 2illia*s, GAristotle on t e Good: A -or*al +ketc ,G #he hilosophical Buarterly , vol. 16, no. 49 >19E6?, pp. 6H9B69E. Concerning action and teleology, see 3. C arles, Aristotle0s hilosophy of Action >)t aca, I.7.: Cornell University Press, 19HE?. 16. ' us L. J. Austin as re*arked t at Gt e relation "et,een ."eing . and ."eing desired. is one of t e *ost "affling pu99les in Aristotle.s, or for t at *atter Plato.s, et ical t eoryG4 see is DAgathon and Eudaimonia in t e 8t ics of Aristotle,G in L. (. 8. (oravcsik >ed.?, Aristotle >Garden City, I.L.: Anc or Books, 19EF?, p. 69E. Austin.s paper is a response to <. A. Pric ard.s G' e (eaning of Agathon in t e Ethics of Aristotle,.. in L. (. 8. (oravcsik, op. cit. Pric ard argues t at t e relation "et,een G"eing G and G"eing desiredG is one of *eaning.

1#. P. + orey takes Plato to ave anticipated G. 8. (oore.s t esis t at Good is indefina"le4 see is co**ents in is translation of Plato.s Republic >Ca*"ridge: ' e Joe" Classical Ji"rary, 19E9?, vol. 6, p. 9%. 14. ' e classic discussions on t ese issues are to "e found in PoincarR.s essays, G(at e*atics and JogicG and G2 y +pace <as ' ree 3i*ensionsG in is Mathematics and !cience> (ast Essays and G)ntuition and Jogic in (at e*aticsG in is #he "alue of !cience . +ee also in t is connection t e discussion of so*e of t ese issues "y (. +teiner, Mathematical Fno)ledge >)t aca, I.7.: Cornell University Press, 19F%?. 1%. Professor (ark 2ilson as also pointed out to *e t at t e sa*e pro"le* arises , en ,e try to for*ali9e in a syste*atic ,ay t e infor*al Peano a&io*s for natural nu*"ers. 1E. 0. Gale, #he (anguage of #ime >Jondon: 0outledge W D. Paul, 19EH?.

1F. :n at least t,o occasions , en Aristotle defines Gsyllogis*G e appears to rule out suppressed pre*ises, for e insists t at t e conclusion of a syllogis* follo,s fro* t e propositions t at ave "een laid do,n as pre*ises > r. Anal. 64"6$4 #op. 1$$a1H?. 8lse, ere, o,ever, e recogni9es syllogis*s , ose pre*ises *ay not ave all "een laid do,n. )n t is connection, see (. -rede.s discussion of so*e features of Aristotle.s account of syllogistic reasoning, G+toic vs. Aristotelian +yllogistic,G Archi+ fLr Geschichte der hilosophie %E >19F4?, pp. 1B#6. 1H. ' is vie, of t e role of ent y*e*atic reasoning is stated t roug out t e Rhet . and at ti*es in t e #op. 19. L. Barnes, Aristotle0s osterior Analytics >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 19F%?, p. 1#%. 6$. ) ave in *ind Muine.s discussion of necessity in G',o 3og*as of 8*piricis*.G Muine as, of course, attacked t e , ole idea of necessity, "ut , at e says a"out t e ,ay so*e propositions stand fast or are less likely to "e revised can "e looked upon as offering a notion of necessity t at ad*its of degrees. Putna* suggests t at t ere can "e degrees of necessity in is G' e Analytic and t e +ynt eticG in is Mind' (anguage' and Reality >Ca*"ridge: Ca*"ridge University Press, 19F%?. ' e vie, is, o,ever, e&plicitly stated and defended in is G)t Ain.t Iecessarily +o,G in is Mathematics' Matter and Method >Ca*"ridge: Ca*"ridge University Press, 19F%?, , ere e argues t at state*ents a"out species >e.g., GCats are ani*alsG? are less necessary t an purely analytic state*ents >e.g., ..Bac elors are not *arriedG?. 61. ' at t e essence cannot "e de*onstrated is t e *ain topic of discussion in ost. Anal. )).iiiB&, as ,ell as Met. 1$6%"14, 1$E4a. 66. +ee Anim. 466"6E, 4#E"#4 E.E. 1669"4 G.A. F66"#6, F41"11, FH6a, etc. 6#. ' is tendency in Plato.s t oug t is *ost strongly e&pressed in t e (iddle 3ialogues, especially t e haedo and t e Republic >see Republic %69?4 at least Aristotle understood i* as e&cluding t e ,orld of t e senses fro* t e do*ain of kno,ledge >see Met. 9HFa#4?. 64. Alexandri in Aristotelis Analyticorum riorum (ibrum I Commentarium' 1E9.%4 L. Jukasie,ic9, Aristotle0s !yllogistic >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 19EF?, p. 6$#. 6%. L. Barnes, Aristotle0s osterior Analytics >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 19F%?, p. 1H4, and see also is GAristotle.s ' eory of 3e*onstration,G hronesis 14 >19E9?, especially p. 1##ff. 6E. Barnes clai*s t at Aristotle pursues t is line of argu*ent at ost. Anal. F%"##BE and 9H"69 and refers to <. <. Loac i*.s discussion of t e topics of t ese passages in t e latter.s edition of t e Gen. et Corr. >see Barnes, GAristotle.s ' eory of 3e*onstrationG?. But , at Aristotle is concerned ,it in t e first passage is t e relation of de*onstration to inter*ittent events, e.g., t e occurrence of an eclipse. )n t e second passage Aristotle is concerned ,it t e pro"le* of , et er a cause is co**ensurate ,it its effects. And t ese are t e topics Loac i* discusses in t e introduction to is edition of Gen. et Corr. >:&ford: :&ford University Press, 1966?. 6F. G' e +cience of (edicine,G in G. 8. 0. Jloyd >ed.?, Hippocratic Gritings >Jondon: Penguin Books, 19FH?, p. 146. 6H. +ee Barnes, op. cit.' and r. Anal. 6%"14 and Rhet. 1#%Fa#F. Barnes as also suggested t at Aristotle so*eti*es Gtreats .for t e *ost part. as a 1uasi *odal operator . . . and uses it to e&press la,s of nature. . . . -ro* 6y nature C0s are 6 and by nature 60s are A it does not o"viously not follo, t at 6y nature C0s are A G4 see is Aristotle0s osterior Analytics >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 19F%?, p. 1H4. ) t ink Barnes is correct. ) also argued earlier t at Aristotle takes , at is for t e *ost part to "e a co*ponent of t e regularities of nature. And t ere is no dou"t t at t e conclusions of so*e suc

syllogis*s , ere Gfor t e *ost partG is treated as "eing e1uivalent to G"y natureG are true. +uc syllogis*s are nonet eless not valid. 'o use an e&a*ple fro* Aristotle, t e pre*ises of t e syllogis*, GBy nature fissepedes produce *any offspring and "y nature t e elep ant is a fissepede, t erefore "y nature t e elep ant produces *any offspring,G are true, "ut t e conclusion is not >see "elo,?. 69. ' is is not to say t at Aristotle does not recogni9e inductive reasoning. <e does, "ut e tends to restrict its use to purposes t at are different fro* t ose e assigns to de*onstrative reasoning, i.e., different fro* e&planation or scientific understanding. #$. As Barnes as pointed out, Aristotle does not distinguis "et,een propositions , ic e&press trut s t at are necessary, e.g., G8very *an is an ani*al,G and propositions , ic e&press t e necessity of trut s, e.g., GIecessarily: every *an is an ani*alG >see is Aristotle0s osterior Analytics , pp. 116B 11#?. +i*ilarly, e does not distinguis "et,een propositions t at are true for t e *ost part and propositions asserting t at so*et ing is true for t e *ost part. Aristotle al*ost invaria"ly t inks in ter*s of t e for*er. #1. Barnes ,rites, GAnd t e paradig* de*onstrative *ood is 6arbara . . . . Aristotle never sets t is paradig* out ,it any clarity or e*p asis4 and in several passages , et er deli"erately or "y oversig t, e lets t e fetters of necessity rela& and is even unfait ful to 6arbara . -or all t at, it is, ) t ink, surely rig t to take t e syllogis* in 6arbara ,it necessary co*ponents as t e *odel of de*onstrative reasoningG > Aristotle0s osterior Analytics , p. &vi?. #6. Aristotle.s e&a*ple co*es fro* 8uripides. Hecuba , H%H. ##. Aristotle takes *atter to "e capa"le of "eing ot er,ise, to lack necessity > Met. 1$#9"6F?. And if universality in trut i*plies necessity, lack of necessity, as pointed out earlier, ,ill i*ply lack of universality of trut . #4. 0oss, in is co**entary on t is passage, speaks of *at e*atical proof, and 1 take i* to "e t inking of de*onstrative proofs of t e rigor encountered in *at e*atics and not of proofs t at involve ele*ents of *at e*atics. ' ese are, of course, different kinds of t ings. #%. Met. 1$H$"6%: G' e case of lines, planes, and solids is si*ilar. -or so*e t ink t at t ose , ic are t e o"/ects of *at e*atics are different fro* t ose , ic co*e after t e )deas4 and of t ose , o e&press ot er,ise so*e speak of t e o"/ects of *at e*atics and do so *at e*atically @ A= vi9. t ose , o do not *ake t e )deas nu*"ers or say t at )deas e&ist . . . *at e*atically.G ' e p rase, t en, Gto speak *at e*atically,G t at Aristotle uses in t e a"ove passage and in t e one 1uoted in t e te&t >99%aE? , en e speaks of t e kinds of proofs de*anded "y listeners can, and does, *ean ..to use t e language of *at e*atics.G Iotice, also, t e identical gra**atical structure of Gspeaking *at e*aticallyG > ? and Gspeaking "y e&a*pleG > ? in Aristotle.s te&t.

#E. ' at p ysics is a t eoretical and de*onstrative science is asserted at Met. 1$6%"6E, 1$6EaF, 1$E4". #F. +o G. 8. 0. Jloyd, Aristotle> #he Gro)th and !tructure of His #hought >Ca*"ridge: Ca*"ridge University Press, 19EH?, p. 6$4, even translates Aristotle.s ,ords in F.4 as saying, G)t is inappropriate to de*and de*onstration in et ics,G , ereas , at Aristotles says is t at it is foolis to de*and de*onstrations fro* a r etorician. )n fact, ,e see t at Aristotle does not even say t at t e r etorician gives no proofs=per aps so*eti*es e does or at least e can="ut t at it is unreasona"le, inappropriate, or foolis to de*and proofs fro* i*. 2e *ust also keep in *ind t at , en Aristotle speaks of t e r etorician in t e present conte&t e *eans so*eone , o practices r etoric and not so*eone , o investigates t e nature of r etorical p eno*ena. And , ereas it *ay "e inappropriate to

de*and proofs fro* t e for*er it *ay not "e fro* t e latter, for t eir activities and purposes are different >see c ap. 9?. )n any case, t e i*portant point to stress is t at Aristotle does not say t at et ics is like t e practice of r etoric or t at it does not give proofs. #H. ' at several of Aristotle.s propositions a"out t e good and appiness and t eir relation to goals or desires are necessary propositions is *aintained "y B. 2illia*s, op. cit. , p. 6944 see also *y GAristotle on -unction and t e Attri"utive Iature of t e Good,G in 3. 3epe, >ed.?, #he Gree-s and the Good (ife >)ndianapolis: <ackett, 19H$?. #9. As ) said earlier, t e tec ni1ue of restricting t e universal or t e su"/ect is used "y Plato. ' at Aristotle also uses it as "een recogni9ed "y 2. -. 0. <ardie, op. cit. , p. ##. 4$. +ee also FF1a6$ , ere Aristotle e&plains , y si9e is t e cause.

'ight 3ariation) Indefiniteness) and '*actness

1. Aristotle takes c ildren to ave de"ts to,ard t eir fat ers: G<ence it ,ould appear t at a son never oug t to diso,n is fat er, alt oug a fat er *ay diso,n is son4 for a de"tor oug t to pay , at e o,es, "ut not ing a son can do co*es up t e "enefits e as received, so t at a son is al,ays in is fat er.s de"t. But a creditor *ay disc arge is de"tor, and t erefore a fat er *ay diso,n is sonG >11E#"1H?. 6. <. J. <art in is #he Concept of (a) >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 19E1?, pp. 166B16E, points to pro"le*s ,it for*ulating la,s or rules t at are si*ilar to t e ones Aristotle identifies. But <art argues t at suc pro"le*s *ay ste* fro* t,o different sources. :ne is t e use in for*ulating rules or la,s of general ter*s t at often defy precise definitions. ' e ot er, o,ever, is , at e calls Gour relative indeter*inacy of ai*s.G And t e indeter*inacy of ai*s results, in turn, in an indeter*inacy of our rules. +o t at t e indeter*inacy of a la, concerning t e distri"ution of land *ay not necessarily result fro* t e indeter*inacy of t e ter* GlandG or t e concept land , "ut fro* t e indeter*inacy of our ai*s regarding land. #. -. 2ais*ann, GKerifia"ility,G in A. -le, >ed.?, (ogic and (anguage , -irst +eries >Garden City, I.L.: Anc or Books, 19E%?. ' e *ost detailed e&a*ination of t e notion of open te&ture is to "e found in L. (. Brennan, #he Kpen4#exture of Moral Concepts >Ie, 7ork: (ac*illan, 19FF?. Brennan *akes so*e i*portant distinctions in is discussion of open te&ture, "ut at ti*es e see*s to identify open te&ture ,it so *any and 1uite different features of our *oral concepts t at e al*ost undercuts t e usefulness of t e notion >see especially pp. 11EB1#4?. 4. At olit. 1#6Ea#% Aristotle re*arks, GBut t ere is a due *easure of *agnitude for a cityBstate as t ere also is for all ot er t ings=ani*als, plants, tools4 eac of t ese if too s*all or e&cessively large ,ill not possess its o,n proper efficiency, "ut in t e one case ,ill ave entirely lost its true nature and in t e ot er ,ill "e in a defective condition4 for instance, a s ip a span long ,ill not "e a s ip at all, nor ,ill a s ip a 1uarter *ile long, and even , en it reac es a certain si9e, in t e one case s*allness and in t e ot er e&cessive largeness ,ill *ake it sail "adly.G Aristotle see*s to "e saying t at our concepts provide us ,it ans,ers even in situations t at are si*ilar to t ose 2ais*ann i*agines. %. G. -rege, G:n t e Concept of Iu*"er,G in <. <er*es, -. Da*"artel, and -. Daul"ac >eds.?, <rege> osthumous Gritings >C icago: University of C icago Press, 19F9?, p. FF. E. G. 8vans, GCan ' ere Be Kague :"/ects;G Analysis #H >19FH?4 I. U. +al*on, Reference and

Essence >Princeton, I.L.: Princeton University Press, 19H1?, p. 64#ff.4 P. Unger, G' ere Are Io :rdinary ' ings,G !ynthese 41 >19F9?, pp. 11FB1%44 +.C. 2 eeler, G:n ' at 2 ic )s Iot,G !ynthese 41 >19F9?, pp. 1%%B1F#. F. Kp . cit. , p. 1EE. H. P. Geac and (. Black >eds.?, #ranslations from the hilosophical Gritings of Gottlob <rege >Ie, 7ork: 0o,*an and Jittlefield, 19%6?, p. 1#9. 2ittgenstein responds to -rege.s clai* at hilosophical In+estigations ).F1 as follo,s: G-rege co*pares a concept to an area and says t at an area ,it vague "oundaries cannot "e called an area at all. ' is presu*a"ly *eans t at ,e cannot do anyt ing ,it it. =But is it senseless to say: .+tand roug ly t ere;. +uppose t at ) ,ere standing ,it so*eone in a city s1uare and said t at. As ) say it ) do not dra, any kind of "oundary, "ut per aps point ,it *y and= as if ) ,ere indicating a particular spot. And t is is /ust o, one *ig t e&plain to so*eone , at a ga*e isG >see also FE, FF?. 9. ' us, (. Black, Margins of recision >)t aca, I.7.: Cornell University Press, 19F$?, ,rites G+o far as ) can see all e*pirical concepts are .loose. in t e sense , ic ) ave e&plainedG >p. E? and GIo, if all e*pirical concepts are loose, as ) t ink t ey are . . .G >p. F?. 1$. -or a discussion of t e clai* t at kno,ledge of t e definition of - is necessary for kno,ing t at so*e & is - and of t e +ocratic -allacy in general, see c ap. 6 and t e references in notes H and 69 of t at c apter. +ee also L. J. Austin.s discussion of t is issue in is GAre ' ere A riori Concepts;G in is hilosophical apers >:&ford: :&ford University Press, 19F$?. 11. ' is line of argu*ent is developed "y G. 0yle in is #he Concept of Mind >Jondon: <utc inson University Ji"rary, 1949?. 16. ' e *ost i*portant criticis*s of t e clai* t at any definition of - is "y itself sufficient for deter*ining , et er so*et ing is an - are t ose developed "y 2ittgenstein in t e hilosophical In+estigations . 2ittgenstein, "y e&a*ining t e conditions t at need to "e *et for applying a rule correctly, concludes t at no rule is "y itself sufficient for deter*ining anyt ing. A , ole syste* of "eliefs and practices is, according to i*, presupposed or re1uired in applying any rule. 1#. +ee Aristotle.s discussion of t is *atter in ost. Anal. )).&i& and Anim. )) and t e perceptive co**ents of (. 2edin in is GAristotle on t e (ec anics of ' oug t,G Ancient hilosophy 9 >19H9?, especially pp. H$BH1. 14. +ee t e discussion "y (. Black, op. cit. , pp. 11B16. 1%. -or t e pro"le* of t e identity of vague o"/ects, see G. 8vans and I. U. +al*on, op. cit. ' e pro"le* ,it t e transitivity of identity of suc o"/ects as "een discussed "y +. Dripke, Naming and Necessity >:&ford: :&ford University Press, 19H$?, p. %1. 1E. ' us, -rege ,rites t at G' e la, of t e e&cluded *iddle is really /ust anot er for* of t e re1uire*ent t at t e concept s ould ave a s arp "oundary,G op. cit. , p. 1#9. 1F. B. 0ussell, GKagueness,G Australasian Iournal of sychology and hilosophy ) >196#?, p. HH. +ee 2ittgenstein.s criticis*s of t is vie, in hilosophical In+estigations ), 1$4, 1$%, 1$E, 1$F. 1H. ' is point as "een *ade "y L. Jear, Aristotle and (ogical #heory >Ca*"ridge: Ca*"ridge University Press, 19H$?, pp. 11$B111. 19. Black, , o agrees ,it Aristotle t at all e*pirical concepts are GlooseG or t at Gnot ing percepti"le can "e precisely defined,G points to t e un,elco*e conse1uence of denying t e possi"ility of valid reasoning ,it i*precise or vague concepts: GIo, if all e*pirical concepts are loose, as ) t ink t ey are, t e policy "eco*es one of a"stention fro* any reasoning fro* e*pirical pre*ises. )f t is is a cure,

it is one t at kills t e patientG > op. cit. , p. F?. Black goes on to argue along lines t at Aristotle ,ould pro"a"ly ave found congenial: G)n using a loose concept, ) *ust kno, t at t ere are instances t at are indisputa"ly .clear. and *ust "e a"le to recogni9e suc cases4 and ) *ust also "e a"le to recogni9e ."orderline cases.. ) *ust understand t at t e use of t e custo*ary logical principles presupposes an ad hoc de*arcation, so*e, ere in t e region of cases t at are not indisputa"ly clear4 and, finally, ) *ust understand t at t ere are no rules for dra,ing suc lines. Provided ) understand all t is, ) *ay properly use a loose concept and reason ,it it, even at ti*es a"out cases , ic are not indisputa"ly clearG > op. cit. , p. 16?. 6$. +ee ost. Anal. ).&&vii and Met. A.#, as ,ell as t e discussion in c ap. 4 a"ove. 61. )t *ay "e o"/ected in t is connection t at Aristotle takes t e *oral virtue >vice? of courage >co,ardice? not to "e si*ply a natural disposition, since, according to i*, it cannot e&ist ,it out practical ,isdo* > N. E. K).&iii?. But ,e cannot conclude fro* t is t at no causalBe&planatory account of t e *oral virtue >vice? of courage >co,ardice? can "e given. -or, a*ong ot er reasons, it is not o"vious t at no causalBe&planatory account cannot "e given in t e case of practical ,isdo* itself. 66. ) do not, of course, *ean t at t ere are no causal e&planations purporting to e&plain , y cities co*e into "eing or , y t ey gro, t e ,ay t ey do. ) a* only 1uestioning , et er t e causal e&planation of t ese kinds of p eno*ena a"out cities is relevant to t e 1uestion concerning t e vagueness or indefiniteness of GcityG or of t e concept city . 6#. A. Grant, #he Ethics of Aristotle >Ie, 7ork: Arno Press, 19F#?, p. 4HH, and 8ustratius. co**entary in G. <eyl"ut >ed.?, Eustratii et Michaelis et Anonyma in Ethica Nicomachea Commentaria >Berlin: 0ei*er, 1H96?, p. 16E. 64. Aristotle i*self defines art >craft? in a fe, lines at N.E. 114$a6$ , ile e devotes *ost of t e oet. to defining tragedy. Concerning t e pro"le*s ,it defining tragedy, see t e discussion "y B. Kickers, #o)ards Gree- #ragedy >Jondon: Jong*an, 19F#?, especially c s. 1 and 6. 6%. -or a discussion of t e pro"le* of trying to *ake et ical concepts *ore e&act "y assigning to t e* nu*erical values, see D. Baier, #he Moral oint of "ie) >)t aca, I.7.: Cornell University Press, 19%H?, pp. EEBF6. 6E. ) ave in *ind ere Aristotle.s argu*ent fro* function at N.E. ).vii , ere e concludes t at t e G u*an good turns out to "e activity of soul in confor*ity ,it e&cellence @or virtueAG >1$9Ha1%?. 6F. L. 0a,ls, A #heory of Iustice >Ca*"ridge: <arvard University Press, 19F6?, p. #99. 6H. 2. 3. 0oss, #he Right and the Good >:&ford: :&ford University Press, 19#$?, p. EF.

1ine '*actness and Pragmatics

1. +ee ost. Anal. ).&ii, &&vii, and discussion a"ove >c ap. 4?. 6. 2. -. 0. <ardie, Aristotle0s Ethical #heory >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 19EH?, p. #1, for instance, clai*s t at G, at *et ods and procedures are proper in a science depends on its purpose . . .G "ut stops s ort of concluding t at t e *et od of et ics is nonde*onstrative. #. ost. Anal. F1"1E, 96"19, 9#a1$, 9Ha6$4 Anim. 4$6a. ' e ter* , o,ever, is often used to *ean si*ply t e ,ay so*et ing is done, , ic *ay ave not ing to do ,it t e *et od an in1uiry or investigation uses=e.g., #op. 1%Ea1%, r. Anal. #6"H. 4. Aristotle uses t is ter* *ost often to signify t e *anner of o"taining t e ele*ents or pre*ises of a

syllogis*, e.g., r. Anal. %#a6, 4#a61. At ot er ti*es, o,ever, e uses it to signify so*et ing t at is closer to t e ,ay or *et od of proving so*et ing, e.g., r. Anal. 4E"64, ost. Anal. H6"#$. But in *any instances , at Aristotle considers to "e different *et ods are really different syllogistic for*s. %. Aristotle, using t e sa*e ter*, speaks again of t e ,ay to t e first principles at ost. Anal. H4"6#. E. -or t e use of see N.E. 1$99"14 >, ere so*e in1uiry t at studies *atters pertaining to t e gods is distinguis ed fro* t e in1uiries of et ics and politics?, 11$6a16, 114E"14. -or t e use of , see E.E. 161Fa#, #op. 1%6"16, and for t at of 4$#"6%. F. At E.E. 161E"#%B#9 Aristotle ,rites, GAnd in every investigation @or *et od, argu*ents @accountsA stated in p ilosop ical for* are different fro* t ose t at are not A , N.E. 1$9Ea11, 1116"61, Anim.

p ilosop ical . . . since t at is t e p ilosop ical ,ay in every investigation @ A.G Alt oug it is not altoget er certain t at t e ter* *eans Gin1uiryG in its first occurrence, it *ost pro"a"ly does. ' e ter* is, o,ever, used at 1614a14 to clearly *ean Gfield of in1uiry.G H. +ee olit. 16E$"#%, 16F9"16, 16H9a6%, 169#"69, 169%a1, 1#1Fa1H, "##, 1#64a6, a61. 9. (. +intonen, #he ragmatics of !cientific Explanation ><elsinki: Acta P ilosop ica -ennica, vol. #F, 19H4?, p. 69. ) 1uote +intonen.s state*ent "elo,. 1$. 2. -. 0. <ardie, op. cit. , p. #1, clai*s t at G, at *et ods and procedures are proper in a science depends on its purpose, on )hat are the /uestions to )hich ans)ers are sought . . .G >*y italics?. 11. 2 at Aristotle says in t is passage >1$9H"? is not ,it out its pro"le*s. <e urges t at ,e do not de*and t e cause in t e sa*e ,ay in all cases > ?. Aristotle.s ,ords ave "een rendered in a variety of ,ays: G)n all *atters alike . . . an e&planation of t e reason , yG >0ack a*?, G' e cause in all t ings alikeG >Apostle?, G' e cause in all *atters alikeG >0oss?, G' e sa*e de*and for an e&planation in all casesG >)r,in?. 0ack a* and )r,in, in rendering as e&planation, e&press agree*ent ,it t e vie, defended recently "y several sc olars t at Aristotelian causes are to "e understood in ter*s of e&planationBsee L. Barnes, Aristotle0s osterior Analytics >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 19F%? and 0. +ora"/i, Necessity' Cause' and 6lame >Jondon: 3uck,ort , 19H$?. Apostle and 0oss, o,ever, take Aristotle to "e speaking a"out causes. ' ese translators also go on to render differently , at Aristotle says a"out , at ,e *ig t do if ,e are not to seek t e Gcauses.G Aristotle says t at in so*e cases, and in particular in t e case of t e principles, it is sufficient to s o, ade1uately t at so*et ing is so > ?. (ost translators render Aristotle.s ,ords in suc a ,ay t at t ey distinguis , as Aristotle see*s to ,ant to do, "et,een proving or e&plaining >"y giving t e causes of? t e principles on t e one and and in so*e ,ay s o,ing or esta"lis ing >0ack a*, 0oss? or indicating >Apostle? t e* on t e ot er. )r,in, o,ever, renders Aristotle.s ,ords "y saying, G)t is enoug to prove t at so*et ing is true ,it out e&plaining , y it is true.G ' ere is, at least pri*a facie, so*et ing pu99ling ,it t e idea t at it is possi"le to prove so*et ing ,it out e&plaining it. 16. +ee 8ustratius.s discussion, op. cit. , pp. F#BF4, , ere e contrasts s arply , at t e "uilder does "y

using t e 'Bs1uare, t e carpenter.s ort ogonal triangle, and t e leaden ,eig t for o"taining a straig t line or a rig t angle to , at t e geo*etrician does. 1#. GAnd after aving given an art a single na*e in , at as preceded, t ere"y *aking us t ink t at it ,as a single art, does not t e discussion no, assu*e t at t e sa*e art is t,o and ask , et er t e art as practiced "y t e p ilosop er or t e nonBp ilosop er ,as t e *ore e&act;G >%FC?. 14. +o*eti*es Plato.s ,ords at hilebus %FB are translated as follo,s: G2ell, ad not t e discussion already found in , at preceded t at t e various arts ad various purposes @ A and various degrees of e&actnessG >translated "y <. I. -o,ler, Joe" Classical Ji"rary?. But actually , at Plato says in t is passage is t at Gdifferent arts, dealing ,it different t ings @ AG possess different degrees of e&actness. 0. <ackfort .s rendering of t is passage in , ic e attri"utes variation in e&actness to t e differences of t e o"/ects arts or disciplines deal ,it is t e correct one= lato0s Examination of leasure >)ndianapolis: ' e Ji"rary of Ji"eral Arts, 194%?. 1%. )ts goals are, as Plato and Aristotle often insist, purely t eoretical4 it ai*s at kno,ledge for t e sake of kno,ledge. 1E. Grant in is co**entary on 1$9Ha#$ >9.6? see*s to *e to ave so*et ing like t is in *ind , en e points to t e different aspects or conditions of de*onstration and t e possi"ility t at et ics *ay differ fro* *at e*atics "ecause it does not satisfy all of t ese conditions or at least not to t e degree or in t e ,ay *at e*atics does. 1F. ) do not *ean to clai* ere t at Aristotle does not identify any *et ods ot er t an de*onstration for investigating into certain do*ains or for discovering t e "asic principles. <e clearly does. )n ost. Anal. )).&i& e argues t at so*e type of induction, and not de*onstration, is t e ,ay "y , ic t e "asic principles are to "e grasped. At #op. 1$1a#F e argues t at t e starting points of t e sciences are arrived at "y using dialectic. And at N.E. 1$9H"# e clai*s t at principles Gare studied "y *eans of induction, perception, a"ituation and ot er *eans.G But t ese *et ods, as G. 8. J. :,en as pointed out, are not *et ods of e&plaining, proving, or producing scientific understanding =see G. 8. J. :,en, GAristotle: (et od, P ysics, Cos*ology,G in C. C. Gillespie >ed.?, Hictionary of !cientific 6iography >Ie, 7ork: +cri"ner, 19F$?. 1H. +ee ost. Anal. F9a1%, HH"1#4 Met. 1$6%a, 1$E4a. 19. +ee is co**entary on t is passage in is translation of t e N.E. >3ordrec t: 3. 0eidel, 19F%?. 6$. ' is translation is "y P. + orey in t e Joe" Classical Ji"rary edition. + orey, co**enting on Plato.s use of t e ,ord GludicrousG to c aracteri9e t e language of doing t at is e*ployed "y so*e in relation to geo*etry, says t at Gt e very ety*ology of .geo*etry. i*plies t e a"surd practical conception of t e science.G 2 y t e conception is, o,ever, a"surd is not o"vious. Plato i*self did not re*ove geo*etry fro* any and all practical applications >see "elo,?. 61. ' e goal of eli*inating fro* *at e*atics t e kind of language or proofs t at Plato finds ludicrous as al,ays "een a part of t e ideal of *at e*atical kno,ledge, even in t e earliest stages of t e istory of t e discipline of *at e*atics. ' is is "roug t out 1uite clearly in t e co**ents of '. J. <eat on 8uclid.s Elements . <eat 1uotes t e follo,ing fro* +c open auer: G) a* surprised t at, instead of t e elevent a&io* @t e ParallelBPostulateA, t e eig t is not rat er attacked: .-igures , ic coincide are e1ual to one anot er.. -or coincidence is eit er *ere tautology, or so*et ing entirely e*pirical, , ic "elongs, not to pure intuition, "ut to e&ternal sensuous e&perience. )t presuposes in fact t e *o"ility of figures4 "ut t at , ic is *ova"le in space is *atter and not ing else. ' us t is appeal to coincidence

*eans leaving pure space, t e sole ele*ent of geo*etry, in order to pass over to t e *aterial and e*piricalG > Hie Gelt als Gille und "orstellung , vol. 6, 6d edition, p. 1#$?. 8uclid i*self e&presses reservations a"out t e use of superposition of figures in geo*etry, "ut, as <eat o"serves, superposition is funda*ental in geo*etry and an insepara"le ele*ent of so*e of t e co**on notions or a&io*s, especially 1.4=G' ings , ic coincide ,it one anot er are e1ual to one anot erG=: GBut seeing o, *uc of t e Elements depends on 1.4, directly or indirectly, t e *et od can ardly "e regarded as "eing, in 8uclid, of only su"ordinate i*portance4 on t e contrary, it is funda*ental. Ior, as a *atter of fact, do ,e find in t e ancient geo*eters any e&pression of dou"t as to t e legiti*acy of t e *et od,G Euclid0s Elements >Ie, 7ork: 3over Pu"lications, 19%E?, vol. 1, p. 66%. ' e pro"le*s associated ,it interpreting Plato.s vie,s on t e nature of *at e*atical and scientific kno,ledge in general ave "een recently discussed "y G. Klastos, G' e 0ole of :"servation in Plato.s Conception of Astrono*y,G and A. (ourelatos, GPlato.s 0eal Astrono*y: Republic K)) %6F3B%#13,.. in L. P. Anton >ed.?, lato on !cience and the !ciences >Ie, 7ork: 8idos Books, 19H$?4 see also *y discussion of t ese papers in GPlato on t e +ciences,G In/uiry 6E >19H#?, pp. 6#FB64E. 66. According to <eat , op. cit. , p. 66E, Aristotle accepts t e *et od of superposition in geo*etry. But it ,ould not "e true to accuse Aristotle of failing to understand t e nature of *at e*atical kno,ledge and of *at e*atical propositions=t at is, of confusing t e* ,it e*pirical propositions on t e "asis of t e fact t at e accepts t e kinds of proofs t at presu*a"ly Plato re/ects. -or e dra,s a s arp distinction "et,een t e proof one uses and t e nature of , at one proves=Gt e geo*etrician does not infer anyt ing fro* t e e&istence of t e particular line , ic e i*self as *entioned, "ut only fro* t e facts , ic is diagra*s illustrateG > ost. Anal. FFa?. +ee also Met. 1$FHa6$, 1$H9a6%, and <eat .s discussion of Aristotle.s vie,s in is A History of Gree- Mathematics >Ie, 7ork: 3over Pu"lications, 19H1?, vol. 1, pp. ##EB##F. 6#. Aristotle argues at ost. Anal. F6a#$ and N.E. 11#9"#6 t at our kno,ledge of t e "asic principles of a science *ust "e superior to our kno,ledge of t e propositions derived fro* t e* >its t eore*s?. 64. +ee Met. 1$6Fa: GAnd t at t e "uilder produces ealt is an accident, "ecause it is t e nature not of t e "uilder "ut of t e doctor to do t is="ut t e "uilder appened to "e a doctor. Again, a confectioner, ai*ing at giving pleasure, *ay *ake so*et ing , oleso*e, "ut not in virtue of t e confectioner.s art4 and t erefore ,e say .it ,as an accident., and , ile t ere is a sense in , ic e *akes it, in t e un1ualified sense e does not. -or to so*e t ings correspond faculties productive of t e*.G 6%. ' e point ere is not affected "y t e fact t at Aristotle is *istaken a"out t e function of t e "rain. 6E. +ee in t is connection t e i*portant discussion "y 0. Draut in is G' e Peculiar -unction of <u*an Beings,G Canadian Iournal of hilosophy 9 >19F9?, pp. 4EFB4FH. Aristotle as at ti*es "een critici9ed for assu*ing t at t ings ave uni1ue functions or for e1uating t e function of so*et ing ,it any activity t at *ig t "e uni1ue to it4 see, for e&a*ple, '. Iagel, GAristotle on Eudaimonia ,G in A. 0orty >ed.?, Essays on Aristotle0s Ethics >Berkeley and Jos Angeles: University of California Press?, pp. FB14. 6F. -or a discussion of Putna*.s e&a*ple see "elo,. ' at an ine&act e&planation, instruction, or concept *ay e , at is re1uired in certain conte&ts or for certain purposes is a vie, put fort "y 2ittgenstein in t e hilosophical In+estigations . :ur language, 2ittgenstein often argues, is /ust t e ,ay it s ould "e if it is to serve t e purposes it serves: G)f ) tell so*eone .stand roug ly ere.=*ay not t is e&planation ,ork perfectly; And cannot every ot er one fail too; But isn.t it an ine&act e&planation;=7es4 , y s ouldn.t ,e call it .ine&act.; :nly let us understand , at .ine&act. *eans. -or it does not *ean .unusa"le. G > hilosophical In+estigations , ), HH?. 6H. (. +intonen, op. cit. , p. 694 see also pp. 96B1$$. -or GesB1uestionsG and GseBans,ersG read

G8&planationBseeking 1uestionsG and G+cientificBe&planatory ans,ers,.. respectively. 69. <. Putna*, Mind' (anguage and Reality >Ca*"ridge: Ca*"ridge University Press, 19F%?, p. 69%. #$. Kp. cit. , p. 69E. #$. Kp. cit. , p. 69E. #1. Ibid. #6. <. Putna*, Meaning and the Moral !ciences >Jondon: 0outledge W D. Paul, 19F9?, p. 4F. ##. (. +criven, G8&planations, Predictions, and Ja,s,G in <. -eigle and G. (a&,ell >eds.?, Minnesota !tudies in the hilosophy of !cience , vol. # >(inneapolis: University of (innesota Press, 19E6?, p. 19E. #4. B.C. van -raassen, G+al*on on 8&planation,G #he Iournal of hilosophy , vol. H6, no. 11 >19H%?, p. E4$. #%. ' e vie, t at *at e*atics can, and in fact does, use less rigorous types of proofs, e.g., inductive evidence, as "een recently defended "y (. +teiner, Mathematical Fno)ledge >)t aca, I.7.: Cornell University Press, 19F%?, especially c . #. #E. +ee on t is point *y GAristotle on -unction and t e Attri"utive Iature of t e Good,G in 3. 3epe, >ed.?, #he Gree-s and the Good (ife >)ndianapolis: <ackett, 19H$?. #F. ' e goals of et ics, t en, are not *erely psyc ological, as <ardie suggests, op. cit. , p. #1. :r, at least, t ey are not psyc ological in t e sense ,e often understand t is ter*, i.e., as i*plying so*et ing t at is *erely su"/ective. #F. ' e goals of et ics, t en, are not *erely psyc ological, as <ardie suggests, op. cit. , p. #1. :r, at least, t ey are not psyc ological in t e sense ,e often understand t is ter*, i.e., as i*plying so*et ing t at is *erely su"/ective. #H. 2ittgenstein re*arks at hilosophical In+estigations , ), HH:G .)ne&act. is really a reproac , and .e&act. is praise. And t at is to say t at , at is ine&act attains its goal less perfectly t an , at is *ore e&act. ' us t e point ere is , at ,e call t e .goal.. A* ) ine&act , en ) do not give our distance fro* t e sun to t e nearest foot or tell a /oiner t e ,idt of a ta"le to t e nearest t ousandt of an inc ;G )n so*e cases, of course, t e e&act is , at attains its goals=e.g., as Aristotle clai*s, an account in et ics is e&act if it attains t e level of detail or specificity t at is needed in order to attain t e goals of t e discipline. )t is also true, o,ever, t at so*eti*es ,e designate certain accounts, descriptions, or e&planations as ine&act "ecause t ey fail to *eet certain standards of e&actness=e.g., Aristotle considers e&planations in et ics to fail to *eet t e e&actness of t e e&planations ,e give in *at e*atics. But, 2ittgenstein retorts, GIo single ideal of e&actness as "een laid do,n4 ,e do not kno, , at ,e s ould "e supposed to i*agine under t is ead=unless you yourself lay do,n , at is to "e so called. But you ,ill find it difficult to it upon suc a convention4 at least any t at satisfies youG > ibid. ?. #9. -or Aristotle.s use of geo*etric proportion in is account of distri"utive /ustice, see t e e&cellent discussion of 3. Deyt, G3istri"utive Lustice in Aristotle.s Ethics and olitics ,G #opoi 4 >19H%?, pp. 6#B 4%. 4$. ' is is, of course, Plato.s line of argu*ent in t e Gorgias , , ere e argues in support of t e vie, t at r etoric, *edicine, cooking, and so fort cannot "e left to *ere sop istic treat*ent or guess,ork. 'oo *uc depends on suc arts, and if ,e go ,rong , en using t e* t e effects can "e at ti*es fatal. 41. L. de 0o*illy, Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece >Ca*"ridge: <arvard University Press, 19F%?.

+ee also t e co**ents of '. )r,in in is translation of t e Gorgias >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 19F9?. 46. <. <. Loac i*, Aristotle> #he Nicomachean Ethics >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 19%%?, p. 1E.

Ten '*actness) 4niversalit") and Truth

1. 2 en speaking of principles in t e present conte&t ) s all so*eti*es *ean general or universal state*ents, and not necessarily , at Aristotle often as in *ind , en e speaks of principles=na*ely, t e "asic propositions of a discipline. 6. +ee +artre.s discussion of t e place or role of general principles in et ical c oice in is essay G8&istentialis*,G in is Existentialism and Human Emotions >Ie, 7ork: P ilosop ical Ji"rary, 19%F?, p. 6%ff. #. L. (c3o,ell, GKirtue and 0eason,G #he Monist , vol. E6, no. # >19F9?, p. ##E. 4. Kp. cit. , p. #4#. 4. Kp. cit. , p. #4#. %. Ibid. E. A. Baier, ostures of the Mind >(inneapolis: University of (innesota Press, 19H%?, p. 61Hff. +ee also t e so*e, at si*ilar vie,s of P. -oot in er G(oral Argu*ents,G Mind EF >19%H?, pp. %$6B%1#, and G(oral Beliefs,G roceedings of the Aristotelian !ociety %9 >19%HB19%9?, pp. H#B1$4. F. A. Baier, op. cit. , p. 6F4. ' e GnegativeG rules Baier refers to ere are so*e of t e 'en Co**and*ents of t e :ld 'esta*ent. H. B. 2illia*s, Ethics and the (imits of hilosophy >Ca*"ridge: <arvard University Press, 19H%?, especially c s. 1 and 64 see also is G8t ical Consistency,G roceedings of the Aristotelian !ociety , suppl. 69 >19E%?, pp. 1$#B164, and GConsistency and 0ealis*,G roceedings of the Aristotelian !ociety , suppl. vol. 4$ >19EE?, pp. 1B66. -or a critical discussion of 2illia*s.s vie,s, see P. -oot, G(oral 0ealis* and (oral 3ile**a,G #he Iournal of hilosophy , vol. H$, no. F >19H#?, pp. #F9B#9H. 9. +ee (. Iuss"au*, Aristotle0s DHe Motu AnimaliumD >Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19FH?, especially essay 4, and #he <ragility of Goodness >Ca*"ridge: Ca*"ridge University Press, 19HE?, pp. 69HB#$F. Iuss"au* stresses Aristotle.s concern ,it t e universal aspects of et ical t eory in er GIature, -unction, and Capa"ility,G Kxford !tudies in Ancient hilosophy , suppl. vol. 1 >19HH?, pp. 14%B1H4, and GIonB0elative Kirtues: An Aristotelian Approac ,G Mid)est !tudies in hilosophy 1#>19HH?, pp. #6B%#. 1$. '. )r,in, Aristotle> Nicomachean Ethics >)ndianapolis: <ackett, 19H%?, p. 4#$. 11. A. Lonsen and +. 'oul*in, #he Abuse of Casuistry> A History of Moral Reasoning >Berkeley and Jos Angeles: ' e University of California Press, 19HH?. 16. Unlike Plato, Aristotle as often "een looked upon as aving no interest in t eory or as failing to develop a t eory a"out so*et ing or ot er. ' us, L. J. Ackrill clai*s, G<e @AristotleA does not direct is ga9e steadily upon t e 1uestions .2 at is an action;. and .2 at is an action;. G Ackrill concludes t at, alt oug Aristotle ad t e *eans of developing a t eory of action, e does not4 see is GAristotle on Action,G Mind , vol. HH, no. #4H >19FH?, pp. %9%BE$1. -or Aristotle.s t eory of action, see 3. C arles, Aristotle0s hilosophy of Action >)t aca, I.7.: Cornell University Press, 19HE?. 1#. +ee also 1146a1% , ere Aristotle ,rites, G' e reason is t at practical ,isdo* in addition @

A is concerned ,it t e particular . . .G ' e in t is p rase is o*itted "y one of " t e *anuscripts >( ? "ut all t e editors of Aristotle.s te&t agree on its inclusion. ' e conte&t *akes it clear t at Aristotle is again contrasting t eoretical kno,ledge >e.g., geo*etry or arit *etic? t at deal only ,it t e universal to practical kno,ledge t at deals ,it "ot t e universal and t e particular. 14. Aristotle is often concerned ,it , at e takes to "e t e insufficiency of t e kno,ledge of , at is virtuous or , at is ealt y to produce virtuous actions or ealt y and vigorous conditions respectively >11$%"1$, 114#"6%?. <e is t us critical of t e +ocratic t esis t at virtue is kno,ledge. But t e pro"le* Aristotle sees ,it t e +ocratic t esis a"out virtue is different fro* t e *ore narro, 1uestion of , et er t e kno,ledge re1uired for action is of t e universal or particular kind. 1%. A*ong t e co**entators, Burnet, +te,art, and Grant see* to e*p asi9e kno,ledge of t e particular. <. G. Apostle even translates as G e kno,s , at e does,G , ic suggests t at t e agent kno,s t e particular circu*stances, alt oug it *ay also *ean t at e kno,s t e nature of is action. <. 0ack a* t inks t at "ot kinds of kno,ledge are involved. 1E. +ee also N.E. 11$%a#$ and 1144a1H. 1F. ) do not, of course, *ean to endorse Aristotle.s clai* a"out t e alleged ina"ility of ani*als to for* general concepts or rules. Aristotle.s clai* is, indeed, a pu99ling one, for it see*s to i*ply t at a dog as no general concept or precept of, for e&a*ple, cat, "ut only i*ages of individual cats. )t also i*plies t at, in contrast to , at Aristotle says a"out t e s ading of nutritive soul into t e sensitive soul >see t e discussion in c ap. H a"out t e gradations in nature and t e Gduali9ingG "et,een "eing a plant and an ani*al of certain living t ings?, t ere is no s ading of t e sensitive into t e intellectual soul >or faculty?. 7et at ot er ti*es Aristotle see*s to "e of different *ind a"out t is. ' us, at rotrept . B69 e re*arks, GAni*als ave so*e s*all sparks of reason @ prudence= A and practical ,isdo* @intelligence,

A "ut are entirely deprived of t eoretical ,isdo*.G And at G.A. F#1a#6 e

clai*s t at Gall ani*als ave in addition, so*e *easure of kno,ledge of a sort @ A... "ecause t ey ave senseBperception, and senseBperception is, of course, a sort of kno,ledge.G -inally, at N.E. 1141a6F e clai*s t at ..even so*e of t e lo,er ani*als are said to ave practical ,isdo* @or intelligence, life.G 19. Kp. cit. , p. #4F. 6$. And for t e reasons Aristotle gives and t at ) discussed a"ove. 61. +ee ost. Anal. H%"6E , ere Aristotle clai*s t at Gt erefore, t e universal is t e causeG and see also HHa%. 66. ' e *ost sustained argu*ent against any e&planatory role for et ical t eory as "een developed "y G. <ar*an in is #he Nature of Morality >Ie, 7ork: :&ford University Press, 19FF?. <ar*an.s argu*ent, o,ever, rests on a rat er narro, e*piricist conception of causal e&planation=a conception t at as little to do ,it Aristotle. -or critical discussion of <ar*an.s argu*ent see, 2. Muinn, G'rut A, na*ely t ose , ic display a capacity of foret oug t as regards t eir o,n

1H. L. (c3o,ell, op. cit. , p. #44.

and 8&planation in 8t ics,G Ethics , vol. 9E, no. # >19HE?, pp. %64B%44, and G. +ayreB(cCord, G(oral ' eory and 8&planatory )*potence,G in G. +ayreB(cCord >ed.?, Essays on Moral Realism >)t aca, I.7.: Cornell University Press, 19HH?. 6#. Baier, op. cit. , p. 6F#. 64. Co*pare t e vie,s of Ayer, Carnap, and +tevenson on t is *atter. All deny t at et ical /udg*ents ave trut values, "ut for different reasons. 6%. G. 0yle, #he Concept of Mind >Jondon: <utc inson University Ji"rary, 1949?, c . %. 6E. +. C. 2 eeler, G:n ' at 2 ic )s Iot,G !ynthese 41 >19F9?, pp. 1E4B1E%. 6F. B. 0ussell, GKagueness,G Australasian Iournal of sychology and hilosophy 1 >196#?. 6H. L. Jukasie,ic9, Aristotle0s !yllogistic >:&ford: Clarendon Press, 19%F?, p. 6$4. 69. +ee '. Du n, GJogic of 3iscovery or Psyc ology of 0esearc ,G in ). Jakatos and A. (usgrave >eds.?, Criticism and the Gro)th of Fno)ledge >Ca*"ridge: Ca*"ridge University Press, 19F$?, pp. 1F1, 6$E4 B. van -raassen, #he !cientific Image >:&ford: :&ford University Press, 19H$?, c . 14 I. Cart,rig t, G' e 'rut 3oesn.t 8&plain (uc ,G American hilosophical Buarterly , vol. 1F, no. 6 >19H$?, pp. 1%9B1E#.

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Cooper, L. Reason and Human Good in Aristotle . Ca*"ridge: <arvard University Press, 19F%. Cornford, -. (. 'ranslation of Plato.s Republic . Jondon: :&ford University Press, 19FE. Cro*"ie, ). (. lato> #he Mid)ife0s Apprentice . Jondon: 0outledge W D. Paul, 19E4. 3a l, I. :. ractical Reason' Aristotle' and Gea-ness of the Gill . (inneapolis: University of (innesota Press, 19H4. de 0o*illy, L. Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece . Ca*"ridge: <arvard University Press, 19F%. 8uripides. Hippolytus and Hecuba . )n G. (urray >ed.?, Euripides <abulae , vol. 1, :&ford: Clarendon Press, 19EE. 8ustratius. In Ethica Nicomachea I Commentaria . )n G. <eyl"ut >ed.?, Eustratii et Michaelis et Anonyma in Ethica Nicomachea Commentaria . Berlin: 0ei*er, 1H96. 8vans, G. GCan ' ere Be Kague :"/ects;G Analysis #H >19FH?: 6$H. -ere/o n, (. G3efinition and t e ',o +tages of Aristotelian 3e*onstrationPG Re+ie) of Metaphysics #E >19H6B19H#?: #F%B#9%. -oot, P. G(oral Argu*ents.G Mind EF >19%H?: %$6B%1#. 5 4## 5 ===. G(oral Beliefs.G roceedings of the Aristotelian !ociety %9 >19%HB19%9?: H#B1$4. ===. G(oral 0ealis* and (oral 3ile**a.G #he Iournal of hilosophy H$, no. F >19H#?: #F9B#9H. -rede, (. Essays in Ancient hilosophy . (inneapolis: University of (innesota Press, 19HFP ===. GP ilosop y and (edicine in Anti1uity.G )n A. 3onagan, A. Perovic , Lr., and (. 2edin >eds.?, Human Nature and Natural Fno)ledge . 3ordrec t: 3. 0eidel, 19HE. ===. G+toic vs. Aristotelian +yllogistic.G Archi+e fLr Geschichte der hilosophie %E >19F4?: 1B#6. -rege, G. G:n t e Concept of Iu*"er.G )n <. <er*es, -. Da*"artel, and -. Daul"ac >eds.?, <rege> osthumous Gritings . C icago: University of C icago Press, 19F9. Gale, 0. #he (anguage of #ime . Jondon: 0outledge W D. Paul, 19EHP Gaut ier, 0. A., and Lolif, L. 7. Aristote> (0Ethi/ue a Nicoma/ue . Jouvain: Pu"licationes Universitaires, 19F$. Geac , P. GPlato.s Euthyphro : Analysis and Co**entary.G #he Mouist %$ >19EE?: #E9B#H6. Geac , P., and Black, (. >eds.?. #ranslations from the hilosophical Gritings of Gottlob <rege . Ie, 7ork: 0o,*an W Jittlefield, 19%6. Gott elf, A. G-irst Principles in Aristotle.s arts of Animals .G )n A. Gott elf and L. Jenno& >eds.?, hilosophical Issues in Aristotle0s 6iology . Ca*"ridge: Ca*"ridge University Press, 19HF. Grant, A. #he Ethics of Aristotle . Ie, 7ork: Arno Press, 19F#. Greene, (. A ortrait of Aristotle . C icago: University of C icago Press, 19E#. Green,ood, J. <. G. Aristotle> Nicomachean Ethics' 6oo- "I . Ca*"ridge: Ca*"ridge University Press, 19$9. Gulley, I. #he hilosophy of !ocrates , Jondon: +t. (artin.s Press, 19EH.

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5 4#H 5 ===. Ethics and the (imits of hilosophy . Ca*"ridge: <arvard University Press, 19H%. 2ittgenstein, J. hilosophical In+estigations . :&ford: Black,ell, 19%#. 2oodruff, P. GPlato.s 8arly ' eory of Dno,ledge.G )n +. 8verson >ed.?, Epistemology . Ca*"ridge: Ca*"ridge University Press, 199$. Cenop on. Atheniensium Respublica . )n 8. C. (erc ant >ed.?, Jenophonis Kpera Kmnia , vol. %. :&ford: Clarendon Press, 19EH. 5 4#9 5

Inde*. Passages from Aristotle's Works

de Anima 4$6a 4$H , 46# 4$6a# 1$E , 164 4$6a1% #6E 4$#"6% 46# 416"6$ #%4 41#a9 1$E , 4$6 41#a1$ 1## , 4$6 41#"1#ff 1#4 414"1# 1#4 414"69 4$6 41E"69 4$6 41E"#$ 1#F , 4$6 41Ha 4$F 419a9 1$E 461a16 1$E 461a66 1$E 466"6E 41H 464a1E 4$6 469a1$ 1#4 4##"6$ 4$6 4#E"# 41H

Athenian Constitution 9.6.1 1$4 , 1$% de Audibilibus H$4a6H 1$E H$4a#$ 164 H$4a#1 1$E de Caelo ).&ii 66# )K.iBiv 1#4 6E9"66 1#4 6E9"6# 164 6F9a69 1$E 6HE"4 1#4 6HE"% 4$6 6HF"19 1$E 5 44$ 5 6HF"6$ 164 6HHa 164 #$#a9 4$6 #$E"6F 141 , 4$6 Categories 1"6H 4$6 H"16 E# 11"6$ 4$6 Eudemian Ethics )).i 11$ )).iii #1% 1614a14 #6E , 46# 161E"16 F$ , F# , F4 , 9% , #%1 161E"6$ E9 , F$ , F4 , 9% , 9F 161E"6# #H4 161E"## 1## 161E"#% 94 , 9F , #6E 161E"#%B#9 46# 161E"#9 #6E 161Fa# 46# 161F"1H 1%H , 1E1 , 1E6 161Ha#$ #H4

1619a1% #%# B#%4 1619"6E 6H4 166$a1% 1#1 , 1%H , 1EE 166$a1E 1## , #H4 166$"1# 6$6 , 614 , 61F 1661a 4$F 1661a# 16F 1661a1% #1F 1661a69 16F 1661a#% 4$F 1661"H 1$% , 1%H , 1E$ , 1E1 , 1F$ , #1F 1661"9 164 1661"6$ 4$F 1666"#H 1#H , 1%H , 1E1 , 1E6 , 6F% 1666"4$ 164 166#a% 4$1 166Fa1 4$6 166Fa1$ 164 , 1#H , 1%H , 1E1 , 1E6 166Fa11 1$% 166Ha64 1%H , 1E1 , 1F$ 166H"4 6$6 166H"% 614 , 61F 1669" 41H 16#1a6% 614 , 61% 16#1a6H 6$6 16#1" 164 , 1#4 , 1%9 , 1F$ 16#1"6 #1F , 4$6 16##a69 16F 16##"6$ 4$E 16#4" 1F$ 16#E"1% 164 5 441 5 164Fa#6 6$6

164Fa## 664 , 66% 164Fa#% 6$6 164F" 6EH 164F"6H 6$6 , 614 , 61% 1649"% 1%9 , 1EE , #H4 de Generatione Animalium )K.iii 669 F1%a# 1F4 F1E"#6 164 F1H"1E 19# F1H"6E 619 F1H"#$ 19# F19" 616 F61"#6 1E$ F66"#6 41H F6%"1F 414 F6F"1# 414 F6F"69 6$# F6F"#$ 661 F6Ha# 414 F6H"14 164 F#$a#$ 616 F#$"## 616 F#1a#6 469 F#6"1$ 616 , 66F F#4a#4 6F6 F#Ha1E 69% F#Ha1H 164 F#9a#6 414 F41"11 41H F4Fa64 616 F49"6H 1HH , 19# F%$a16 19# F%$"## 414 F%1aH 66E

F%1"H 66E F%1"#6 66E F%6"1Eff 1#F F%#a#6 66E F%#"1% 164 , 1#F F%Ea#4 #6F FE#"H 66E FEF"## 1F% FEHa64 61$ , 414 FEH"1# 1FF FE9a#% 4$6 FF$"16 6$# , 619 FF1a6$ 6F6 , 46$ FF1a6% 1HF FF1"# 1HF , 6F6 FF1"E 6HE 5 446 5 FF1"1$ 6F6 FF1"11 6HE FF1"#% 69% FF6"# 6F# FF4"% 6F# FF4"9 414 , 6F# FF4"#% 6F# FF%a 6F# FF%a1$ff 6F# FFEa6# 69% FFFa6$ 66$ , 661 FFFa61 6$# FFF"1Eff 69% , 69E FFHa% 69% FFHaE 4$6 FFHaF 14%

FFH"H 69% FFH"1F 194 FF9a#1 19# FF9"69 19# FH1"% 19# FH1"1$ 1HH , 19# FH6a 41H FH4a6 4$H FH4"#F 164 de Generatione et Corruptione #69a6F 1#E ###"H 666 ###"64 1$% , 6#H , 6E$ ##F"#% 66# Historia Animalium 4HFa16 4$6 4HF"1$ 1#1 , #$9 4HH"64 164 , 1#4 4H9"1F 1#F 49$a16 4$F 49$"1$ 4$F 49$"#1 4$F 491aF 1#6 491aH 164 , 4$6 491a1$ 11F 491"4 61% , 61E , 6FF 496a1 61% , 61E , 6FF 496a14 4$F 496a6% #1$ 49#" 164 , 1#4 49#"64 61% , 61E , 666 B66# 494a6 4$F 494"1E 1$E 494"6$ 416 49F" 416 49F"1% #1$

49Ha1F 4$F 5 44# 5 499"16 #1$ 499"61 #1$ %$$"6$ #1$ %$1aH #1$ %$1"6# 61% , 61E %$6aE #1$ %$6a1E #1$ $4a#% #1$ $%"6H 1#F %$%"69 4$F %$F"# 1#F %$H"6 414 %$9a6F #1$ %$9"6# 164 %11a1# 164 %11"11B%1%a 1#F %1#a9 4$6 , 4$4 %1%"9 4$F %1F"1$ #1$ %19"6% 416 %61"1E 66E %66a# 414 %66a16 414 %66a#$ 1#F %6%"% 4$F %6Fa#% 416 %6F"#% 416 %69"64 #1$ %#H"6H 416 %46"% 61E B61F %46"1# 66E

%4%"4 414 %4%"H 414 %4%"66 414 %4%"6F 69% %4H"1H #$9 %49aH #$9 %%6"#$ 4$F %%#a1 4$F %%#aE 414 %%4"16 66E %%H"1$ 616 , 66F %E$"6$ 414 %E1a#B%E6" 1#F %E6"4 414 %E6"1% 414 %E4"1$ 66E %F4a1E 1HH %H#a6$ 4$6 %H4a#% 69% E6#"% 4$F 5 444 5 Magna Moralia 1.4.1$.4 1$4 , 1$% , 4$9 1.%.1.#. 4$9 1.16.1.% 1$4 , 1$% , 4$9 1.1#.4.4 4$9 1.##.6$.F 6$6 , 414 1.##.61.4 6$6 , 414 1.#4.#.6 4$9 6.1.1.% 4$# 6.H.6.4 6$6 , 414 de Memoria et Reminiscentia 4%$a#1 1E$ 4%$"% 1E$ Metaphysics A.#

466 9%Ha1F 4$6 9%9a1% 4$6 9H1a1$ 6H4 B6H% 9H1a1% 1F# , 1FE , 1FH , #E9 9H6a1% 164 9H6a6% 1$E , 1$F , 164 9H6a6F 111 9H6"% 4$# 9H%a16 1$E , 1## 9HEa1# 1$E , 164 9HE"4 4$6 9HE"66 4$6 9HE"69 4$6 9HFa#4 41H 9HHa1F 1$% 9HHa#4 1## 9H9"1H 4$# 99$"1% 1$E 99#a6$ 4$# 99#a66 4$6 99#"6$ F$ , F6 , F# 99%a 16E 99%aE 6F9 99%aH 6H$ 99%a1% 114 , 164 , 14% , 616 , 6## , 6#4 , 6#F , 6F9 , 6H$ , 4$1 99H"1% %9 999a6% 196 999a6F 1H# 999a6H 196 999"6 196 999"#4 1F% 999"#% 1FF 1$$#a1# 196

1$$#a14 H% , #FE 1$$%a11 6%1 1$61"61 #44 1$6%a F6 , HE , 46% 5 44% 5 1$6%a1% 661 1$6%a61 661 1$6%" 16$ , 4$% 1$6%"F 1$% , 6#9 1$6%"1$ 164 1$6%"14 41H 1$6%"6%ff 4$1 1$6%"6E 4$1 , 419 1$6Ea 4$1 1$6EaF 4$1 , 419 1$6E"1$ 416 1$6E"#$ 61H 1$6E"#6 61H , 661 1$6E"#E 61% , 61E , 61F , 61H , 661 , 6FF 1$6Fa #99 , 46E 1$6Fa11 6#E , 41# 1$6Fa1H 61H , 661 1$6Fa6$ 669 1$6Fa66 61$ 1$6Fa6% 61% , 61E , 61H , 6#1 , 6## , 6#4 , 6#F , 6E4 1$6F"16 6#9 , 646 1$69aF 4$6 1$#$a1% 1$% 1$#$a1E 164 1$#1aF 1$E 1$#4a6$ %9 1$#%a1# 164 1$#%"# #H4 , 4$6

1$#9"6F 196 , 4$4 , 419 1$#9"#$ 196 1$4#"6% 6%# 1$4Ha#% 6%$ 1$%1a66 ##H 1$%#a 111 , 164 , 4$6 1$%#a1 1$E 1$%H"6 1HH 1$%H"1# 1HH 1$%9"64 H% , #FE 1$E$a4 1H# 1$E$"19 H% , #FE 1$E4a F6 , 16$ , 41H , 46% 1$E4a% 164 , 4$% 1$E4a% 1$% , 61H , 6#9 , 4$% 1$E4aF 1$E 1$E4a1$ 4$1 1$E4a#6 4$1 1$E4a## 4$1 1$E4" 4$1 , 419 1$E4"1% 61H 1$E4"## 61H 5 44E 5 1$E4"#% 61H , 661 1$E4"#E 61H 1$E4"#F 61H 1$E%a 6#1 B6#6, 6## , 6#4 , 6#F , 6E4 1$E%a#4 6EH 1$F1a6$ 1F% 1$FHa 11# 1$FHa4 114 1$FHa9 11# 1$FHa1$ 1$H , 116 , 164

1$FHa1% 1$H , 114 1$FHa1E 11# 1$FHa6$B6E 11# , 46E 1$FHa61 11# 1$FHa#1 4$E 1$FH"1HB#$ 1F 1$F9a1# 164 1$H$a1$ 164 1$H$"6% 419 1$H9a6% 46E 1$9$"H 6E# 1$94"6% 4$4 1$9Ha6F 4$4 Meteorology #41a16 1#F #E#"#6 4$6 #H6"# 1#F #HH"1$ 1#F de Mundo #9F"1$ 4$# #9F"16 4$6 Nicomachean Ethics ).i 11$ , 6H# ).iii 11$ , 111 , ##6 ).vii 11$ , 1EE , 466 ).&iii 11$ )).i #F$ )).ii #F$ )).iv #F$ , #F1 )).vi 11$ ))).i #EH ))).v 1EH ))).viBi& 1#% , 1EH ))).&B&ii 1#% )K.i 1#% , #EE K.& 41$ K).i 11$

K).ii 1#% , #EE K).iii 11$ K).iv 11$ K).v 11$ K).&iii 466 K)).iii #F# C.vi 1EF 5 44F 5 C.i& #E9 1$94a F6 , #6E , #9H 1$94a1$ F$ , F1 1$94a6# F4 1$94a6% H4 , 149 , 1%E , 1E$ , 1E% , 1EF , 1F$ , 4$6 , 41$ 1$94a6F F4 1$94" E9 1$94"# H4 , #9H 1$94"1$ H4 , #6E 1$94"11 F4 , 1$# 1$94"1# EF , H# , 16# , 164 , 144 , 149 , 6$1 , 6$6 , 6$# , 6$4 , 6$% , 6F# , 4$6 1$94"14 164 1$94"1% 6$6 , 6$# , 6$4 , 6$% , 6$E , 6$F , 6$H , 61$ , 611 , 61# , 61% , 6#6 , 6E% , 6F$ , 6F# , 6F% , 6H9 , 691 , 696 , 699 , ##6 , ##4416 1$94"1F 61# , 61% 1$94"1H 61# , 61% 1$94"19B64 41% 1$94"6$ 14% , 1%1 , 4$6 , 4$9 1$94"6# 1F4 1$94"64 1$E , 6#6 , 6## , 6#4 , 6#F , 6E4 , 6H6 , 4$6 1$9%a% E9 , F$ , F4 , H# 1$9%"6 16$ 1$9%"4 4$E 1$9Ea11 46# 1$9E"6# H$

1$9E"#$ 1#H , 1%E , 1E1 , 4$6 1$9Fa1$ H% 1$9Fa16 1FH 1$9Fa1% #9H 1$9Fa64 1%E , 1F$ 1$9Ha1% 1EE , #44 , 466 1$9Ha19 1$E 1$9Ha6$ 1#1 , 1%1 , 1%E , 1E$ , 1E% , 1EE , 1EF , 1F$ 1$9Ha6% 144 , 149 , 6$6 , 6$# , 6$% , 6$E , 6F# , #66 B#6#, #6F , #69 , ##6 , #41 , #44 , #4% , #4E , #%$ 1$9Ha6F 164 , 14$ 1$9Ha6H H4 1$9Ha#$ #6# , #6F , #6H , #69 , ##$ , ##6 , ### , ##4 , #41 , #4E , #%$ , #%6 , 464 1$9H" #69 1$9H"# 464 1$9H"6$ 149 1$9H"6# H$ 1$99"14 46# 5 44H 5 1$$a 16$ 1$$"6# 1H# 1$1a 1H# 1$1a6% 1%E , 1E1 , 1H6 , 1H# 1$1a6E 1$% 1$1a6F 14$ , 4$6 1$1a#$ 1H9 1$1"14 #H# 11$1"69 #H# 11$1"#4 4$6 11$6a 1#H , 1%E , 1%F , 1E6 11$6a16 H4 , 46# 11$6a6% 4$6 , 4$H 11$6a6E 16E 11$#a% H$

11$#aF #H# 11$#"66 611 11$#"6% E9 , F$ , F4 , H4 , 9% 11$4a 164 , 144 , 14% , 149 , 1%1 , 6H9 , 691 , 696 , 699 , #1% , #FF 1$4a1 1$4 , 4$6 , 4$9 1$4aE H% , 1F6 1$4a16 611 1$%a% H4 1$%a1$ H4 1$%a6% #F6 1$%a#$ 469 1$%" #F# 11$%"1$ 46H 11$%"1% 9F 11$Ea1 #H# 11$Ea1% 6H4 , #1% 11$Ea1E #44 11$E"14 164 , 4$6 11$E"6% #H# 11$Fa 6H4 11$Fa1$ #FE , 4$F 11$Fa16 14# , 611 11$Fa6F #FF 11$Fa6H 1F% 11$Fa69 1F6 11$Fa#$ #H4 , 416 11$Fa#1 1F# 11$F"1 16H 11$F"# 16H 11$F"E 16H 11$F"14 1$4 , 149 , 1%1 , 1%F , 1E$ , 1E1 , 1EH , 1F$ , 4$6 11$F"1% 164 , 1#% , 4$6 11$F"69 16F 11$F"## #H#

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F#"1E 64# F#"6E 6HH F4"% %H , 64# F%a #9F F%a6H 64# F%"# 41H F%"1% E$ , 416 F%"64 6#H FEa64 E$ 5 4%% 5 FE"11 E$ FE"1% 6%F FFa 46E FHa1# %H FH"1# 11F FH"#% 119 FH"#H 11F FH"#9 E$ F9a 119 F9a6 111 , 11F F9a4 11E F9a1$ 114 , 11E , 11F F9a1# 11E F9a1% F6 , HE , 119 , 414 , 46% H1a4$ 641 , 41E H1"% 196 H6"#$ 46# H4a% 64E H4"6# 46# H%"9 64E H%"1% 64E H%"6% 641 H%"6E 469

H%"6F 64E HEa1$ 64E HEa1F 1$E , 164 HE"6H 64F HFa64 114 HFa#1 1$E , 164 HFa#6 114 HFa#% 111 HFa#F 111 HFa#H 11F HF"6$ 61H , 661 , 669 , 6#1 , 6## , 6#4 , 6#F , 6E4 , 6E% , 6F$ , 6F% HF"6# 66H HF"6E 6$# HF"#6 66H HF"#% 646 HF"#F 196 HF"#H H% , 646 , #FE HHa% 641 , 469 HHa1% 646 HH"1# E$ , F6 , HE , 46% HH"#$ %H , H% , #FE H9a1F %H 9$"4 %9 9$"1H %9 9$"64 %9 9$"6% %9 9$"#1 %9 5 4%E 5 91"14 641 91"## 641 91"#% 641 96"F %9 96"19 46#

96"6E %9 9#a1$ 46# 9#a6$ #1$ 9#"% #11 9#"#$ %9 9EaH 64E 9Ea1$ 66H 9Eal6 61$ , 614 , 61E , 6FF 9F"6$ #1% 9F"6H H% , 6H% 9Ha6$ 46# 9H" #1$ 9H"69 41H 99a6# %9 , #$H , #9F 99a69 #11 1$$"H 1$E rior Analylics ).ii 6#$ ).&iii 66# 64a1H 6#$ 64"14 E# , 1$E 64"1% 164 64"6$ 41F 6%a 14% 6%"14 666 , 41H #6a% 61$ #6"% 614 , 61E , 661 , 6FF #6"F 61H #6"H 46# #6"1% 666 #Ea1$ 6F$ 4#a61 46# 4#"#% 6$# , 41# 4Ea69 E# , 1$E 4Ea#$ 164

4E"64 46# 4E"## 6F$ %#a6 46# F$a4 614 , 61E , 661 , 6FF roblems 916"6% 164 91Ea#% 1$4 , 4$6 9%%a6H 4$6 rotrepticus B69 469 B4H 164 BF# 9F de Respiratione 4FFaF 1#F 5 4%F 5 4FH" 1$4 , 1#F Rhetoric ).ii. 1#6%F l.ii. 146F$ ).&iii. 11 B14 41$ ).&&&iii 4$H ).&&&iv 4$H 1#%#a#1 6F6 1#%E"1F 414 1#%E"69 H% 1#%E"#6 1H# 1#%Fa#F 41H 1#%9"16 #%4 1#E$"% 4$6 1#E1"## 4$4 1#E1"#4 1#4 , 4$6 1#E1"#% 69E 1#E6a#4 614 , 61E 1#E6"#F 66F 1#E4"F 141 1#E9a#4 164 1#E9"l 666 , 4$6

1#E9"#1 1$# 1#E9"#6 164 , #44 1#F$"1$ 614 , 61E 1#F1a#6 614 , 61E 1#F1"14 61% , 61E 1#F1"6# 61% , 61E 1#F4a #$4 1#F4a6H 6F1 1#F4a#$ #FH , #F9 1#F4a#% 1H6 1#F4"1E 66E 1#H1a 69E 1#94a6# 6F1 B6F6 1#94a#1 #FH 1#94" 6#9 , 6E# , #F% 1#94"# 6F6 1#94"% 696 1#9%"1 4$E 1#9Ea## 1$% 1414aH #44 141%"F 4$6 1419"#1 4$6 de !omno et "igilia 4%E"6 1#F #opics 1$$a1H 41F 1$1a1H 4$6 1$1a66 1$4 , 4$6 1$1a#F 464 1$#a1 4$6 1$#aF 4$6 5 4%H 5 1$%"19 4$6 111aH 1$# 116" 66$

116"1% 661 169a 66% , 66E 169a# 66% , 66E 169a9 66F 14$"% 4$6 141a1$ #99 141"1% 6%# 141"6% 6%# 146a6H 6%# 14#a% F6 14E"6$ E$ , #$1 , #1$ 1%6"16 46# 1%#a16 1#H 1%Ea1% 46# 1%Fa14 4$6 5 4%9 5

Inde*. %e" +reek Words

61E , 61H , 66# , 66% , 66E , 6FF , 6H# 66# 119 , 16$ E# , 1$# , 1$4 , 1$E , 1%E B1E$, 6$6 , 6#6 , #66 B#6# 114 , 16E B16F, 6## , 6H$ %H , 61H , 66# , 66% 16F

69$ ff 1H6 , 1H# 6#H , 64$ , 64% , 64E %F , %H , 6#1 , 6#H ff, 64$ , 641 , 646 , 64E 641 641 6$6 , 6$4 , 6H9 ff 6$9 , 619 , 66$ 641 %F , %H , F4 , H% , HE , 119 , 6#H ff, #%4 H4 , #6E 1F1 B1H$ 1$4 , 1F% B1H$, 66H , 6F1 , #F4 1$% , 6E# F4 , H4 , #6# B#6E, #69 , ##6 , ##4 , ##E #44 6H9 ff, 699 #6# , ### , #4$ , #41 B#46

F4 , H4 , #6E 1FE , 1FF 1$# , 1#$ B1#1, 1E$ , 6#$ B6#1 H4 , #6E 641 61H H% , #6E #6% E# , 1$4 , 1%E B1E$, 1EH , 6$E 61H FF BH6, 6## 666 , 664 6$6 , 66$ , 666 , 664 , 66E , 66F , 6F6 5 4E$ 5

Inde*. 1ames and !ub(ects

A
A"straction, 116 B11# Action, as particular, 1F1 B1H$, 19E B19H ActionBtype:

and e&actness!ine&actness, 1H$ B1H#4 and particulars, 1FE B1H$ Ale&ander of Ap rodisias, 6EF Allan, 3onald L., E6 , F$ , F4 , FF , FH Ana&agoras, 14 Antist enes, 6%# Apostle, <ippocrates G., ##F Arc itec onic structure of desires, 64H B649 Aristotle: on e&actness of et ics, 1 4 p ilosop ical significance of is vie,s on e&actness, 4 , % 4 and p ilosop ical tradition, 1F , 19 B6$ Asy**etry of desire, 649 Augustine, +aint, 6%$ , 6%E

Baier, Annette, 1$$ , #E4 , #E% , #H1 , #H6 Barnes, Lonat an, %H , 1$E B1$H, 114 , 11F , 119 , 64% , 6%F , 6EF Being al,ays: and "eing for t e *ost part, 666 B6694 and causal regularities, 664 B66%4 and necessity, 666 B669 Being for t e *ost part: as affir*ative universal proposition, 6E9 , 6F# 4 attri"ution of, F 4 and "eing al,ays, 666 B6694 and causal regularities, 661 B666, 6#1 , 6FF 4 and congruence, 144 , 14% B14E4 and contingency, F BH, 61E B6664 and criticis* of +ocrates, 46 4 and definition, #$6 B#$#4 and de*onstration, H , 6#1 B6HF4 and do*ain of conduct, #F B#H, E1 4 as episte*ic, 6EF B6EH4

and e&actness!ine&actness, 6#4 , 6F# B6F%4 for*al and *aterial, 199 , 6$# B6$F, 6EH , 6F$ 4 and t e fortuitous, 66$ B6664 and la,, 6F$ B6F14 and *a&i*s, 6F1 B6F64 and *et od of et ics, 11 4 as *odal operator, 6EH , 41H n.6H4 nature of, 61# B6664 and necessity, 46 , 61E B666, 6E% 4 nonfor*al re*inders of, 6F% 4 restricting t e su"/ect, 14E B14F4 scope of, 199 B6$$, 6$F B61#4 and syllogis*s, 6E% 4 ter*s for, E# , 6$% 4 and trut , 6F$ , #HE 4 and validity, H , 6EE B6FH4 and variation, 691 . !ee also -luctuation4 'rue for t e *ost part Being in outline, F , 1%# B19H4 and account of virtues, 1EH B1E94 eli*ina"ility of, 1F$ 4 and for*al ine&actness, 1%4 , 1E1 4 and goals of et ics, 1F1 B1H$4 relative, 1E9 4 sources of, 1%4 B1%%4 ter*s for, 1%4 , 1E$ B1E14 te&tual references to in Aristotle.s ,orks, 1%E B1E$ Burnet, Lo n, FH , 1FE

$
Cart,rig t, Iancy, #HE Causal regularities: and "eing for t e *ost part, H , 6EH B6E9, 6FF Charmides , 1H , 4$ C erniss, <arold, 44

C o*sky, Ioa*, 6%6 Circular proofs: and de*onstration, 64$ Cognitive faculties: related to o"/ects t ey cogni9e, 91 Cognitive goals of et ics, E% BEE4 and 5 4E1 5 ancient co**entators, EH 4 Aristotle on, E , E9 B1$14 and e&actness!ine&actness, #%F 4 and practical goals, ##9 , #%H , #E$ 4 and t eoretical disciplines, E 4 and ulti*ate goals, HF Congruence: Aristotle on, 1$6 B1$#4 and "eing for t e *ost part, 199 , 6$# 4 "et,een t e ,orld and our representations, 6 4 and definitions, #4 4 and do*ain of conduct, 6H4 4 and eli*ina"ility, ##9 4 and +ocrates, #F , 4# 4 and variation, 696 Congruence t esis, 14$ B14F4 Aristotle on, F 4 assu*ptions "e ind, 14% B14E4 falsity of, 14E B14F4 possi"le interpretations, 141 B1444 trut of, 144 B14F Contingency: and "eing for t e *ost part, 6$1 , 61E B666, 6EH , #$6 B#$#4 and de*onstration, 6#% 4 and do*ain of conduct, 6$9 4

and syllogis*s, 6F% Cooper, Lo n, F9

#
3efinitions: in Aristotelian conception of kno,ledge, 6# 4 deficiency of, #F , #9 4 de*onstrative role of, %H B%94 and essentialis*, E$ 4 and e&actness! ine&actness, #1F 4 no*inal and real, %9 4 and variation, #$# B#$H. !ee also +ocratic definitions 3egrees of e&actness!ine&actness. !ee 8&actness!ine&actness, degrees of 3egrees of investigation, ##4 3e*onstration: and "eing for t e *ost part, 666 , 6#1 B6#H, 41% n.14 and causality condition, 64$ 4 core of, 6#9 B646, ##F 4 and do*ain of conduct, E1 4 and episte*ological priority, 64$ 4 and et ics, 99 , #4$ 4 and giving reasons, 11H 4 and goals of a discipline, ##F 4 and induction, 64$ B6414 and *at e*atics, #%6 4 and *et od, #6% , ##E 4 and necessity, 61H , 669 , 6E4 B6EE4 and s o,ing, 646 4 and +ocrates, 6$ B664 soft, H , 9 , 194 B19%4 strict, H 4 strict and soft, E1 , 6#4 B6#%, 6#F , 6#H B6#94 and variation, 6HH B6H9, 699 B#$#4 ,eaker for* of, see +oft de*onstration. !ee also +oft de*onstration4 +trict de*onstration

3e*onstrative disciplines: and et ics, E$ BE1 3e*onstrative kno,ledge: and definitions, E$ 4 and et ics, %E BE14 and e&actness! ine&actness, 11 B16, 1H9 B19%4 and -or*s, 4E 4 and necessity, %F B%H 3e*onstrative *et od: Aristotle.s use of, 1$ 3e*onstrative rigor: and "eing for t e *ost part, 6$E B6$F4 and congruence, #%6 4 degrees of, 64% 4 in et ics, #4$ , #%9 4 and e&actness!ine&actness, 19$ B191, ##9 3e*onstrative role of definitions, 6F , %H B%94 pro"le*s ,it , #H B#94 and variation, #$F B#$H 3e*onstrative syllogis*s: and "eing for t e *ost part, 6#$ 4 and do*ain of conduct, 6#F 4 t,o kinds of, E1 . !ee also +yllogis*s 3etail, 141 . !ee also Being in outline 3evelop*ent of Aristotle.s t oug t, E1 BE4 3iagnostic role of definitions: pro"le*s ,it , #9 B4$4 t,o interpretations of, #$ 4 and variation, #$4 B#$%. !ee also +ocratic definitions, diagnostic role of 3ialectic: and e&actness in et ics, 49 3ialectical *et od: Aristotle.s use of, 1$ , 11 4 and e&actness, 4H 4 and particulars, %$

3isciplines: function of, #%4 4 *edicine and et ics, H% 4 and sciences, F6 4 t eoretical, practical, and productive, E9 BF$, F# , F4 , HE , HH , 19% , #41 4 and universality, #FE B#FF 3ivision: and de*onstration, 641 3octrine of t e *ean: and lacunae, 16H B1#1 3o*ain of conduct: and "eing for t e *ost part, 6$F B61#4 and congruence, 6$# B6$44 and definitions, #6 B##4 and de*onstration, 9 , 6H$ B6H1, 6H# 4 and do*ain of nature, #11 B#16, #1% B#194 and eli*ina"ility of ine&actness, ##9 4 and et ics, F% 4 and for*al and *aterial e&actness!ine&actness, 164 4 kno,ledge in, #H 4 and necessity, 4E , 194 4 and +ocrates, 1% 4 and vagoeness, 9 4 and variation, #1E B#19 3o*ain of nature: and "eing for t e *ost part, 6#E , 6EH 4 and de*onstration, 9 , 6H$ 4 and vagueness, 9 4 and variation, 69% , #$9 B#11 5 4E6 5

'
8li*ina"ility of ine&actness, F , 9 , 14F B1%64

Aristotle on, 1$# 4 and "eing for t e *ost part, 6$$ , 616 B61#4 due to "urdenso*e task, 1E4 B1E%, 1H# B1H44 and causal *ec anis*, 6HE B6HF4 and do*ain of conduct, 6#H 4 and fi&ity of goals, #%% 4 and for*al ine&actness, 6H# B6HF4 and goals of et ics, E% 4 due to inappropriateness of discipline, 1E# B1E4, 1H4 4 and *aterial ine&actness, 16% 4 and practical goals of a discipline, #4E 4 and prag*atis*, #66 4 and variation, #$H B#19 8inpedocles, 6E$ B6E1 8inpiricis*: and develop*ent of Aristotle.s t oug t, E1 BE4 8nt y*e*es: and "eing for t e *ost part, 6F6 4 and de*onstration, 6%F 4 and soft de*onstration, 64F 8piste*ic uses of definitions, #6 . !ee also +ocratic definitions, episte*ic uses of 8piste*ological condition: and +ocrates, 61 8piste*ological priority: and "eing for t e *ost part, 6FF 8ssence: of a discipline, #%4 4 and universality, #E 8ssential attri"utes: and "eing for t e *ost part, 6$9 , 61F B6664 and definitions, E$ 4 and do*ain of conduct, 6H4 4 and necessity, 6E1 B6E6, #$6 B#$#4 and variation, #$$ B#$#

8ssentialis*: and Aristotle, % , E , 9 , #F , %E BE14 and definitions, #4 , #% , #E , #H , %9 4 and do*ain of conduct, #F 4 and kno,ledge, 1% 4 and variation, #$$ B#$#, #$4 B#$H 8t ics: Aristotle on t e need for e&actness in, 4$ 4 co*pared to *edicine, H4 4 defined "y cognitive goals, F% 4 as a de*onstrative discipline, 1 4 as an e&act discipline, % 4 as an e&planatory science, 119 B1614 and fi&ity of goals, #%% 4 identity of, E9 4 as an in1uiry, F4 BF%4 as practical, 19E B19H4 and practical ,isdo*, F% BHF4 +ocrates. conception of, 46 4 su"ordinate to politics, EE , E9 , F$ BF14 and universality, #E4 B#E%, #F% , #FF 8udo&us, 14 8ustratius, 14 , ##$ , ##1 , ##E , ##F Euthyphro , 1% , 1H , 6$ , 6H , 69 , #1 , #6 , #% , 4$ , #$$ 8vans, Garet , % , 69H 8&actness: as a c aracter trait, 4 4 i*possi"ility of attaining, 1H$ B1H94 Plato on t e need for, in et ics, 4F 8&actness!ine&actness: analogy to e&planation, #49 4 ancient vs. *odern usage, 6 4 attri"ution of, 6 , F 4 and definitions, 6# , #F , %9 4

degrees of, ##6 B##4, #4% , #%$ 4 and de*onstration, 11F B11H4 and de*onstrative rigor, 6#6 4 and develop*ent of Aristotle.s t oug t, E1 BE44 episte*ological conse1uences of, # , F , 16 , 96 , 1H9 B19%4 and first principles, 1$9 4 and goals of a discipline, #6# B#6%, ### , ##9 , #4# B#444 and goals of et ics, E% , ##% 4 levels of, 166 B16%4 *aterial and for*al, 1$6 4 and *et od, #6$ B#61, #6F B##%4 *isunderstanding of Aristotle.s re*arks on, 14 4 and particulars, 1H$ B1H94 and p ilosop ical tradition, # B4, ## , #F , #H B#94 in Platonis*, 6H6 , #41 4 political di*ension, 4 4 and practical disciplines, 1%% 4 and prag*atis*, #61 B#664 and productive arts, EF BE94 and 1uestions, #6F B#694 relative, #%# 4 si*plicity of a discipline, 1$F 4 and +ocratic t eory! practice, 6F 4 ter*s for, 6 , F , E# BE4, 1$6 4 and t eoretical and practical kno,ledge, 91 B964 and tragedy, 4 4 and trut , #E# , #H6 B#HH4 types of, 6 4 and ulti*ate goals, HF 4 and universality, #E# B#H64 and variation or indefiniteness, #F , #H . !ee also Being for t e *ost part4 Being in outline4 'er*s for e&actness!ine&actness4 Kariation 8&ceptions: and syllogis*s, 6FE B6FF4

and universality, 6FF , #F9 B#H$4 and variation, 69# 8&planation: and prag*atis*, #4H 4 and universality, #H$ 8&planatory disciplines: and e&actness, 11E B11H 8&traneous pre*ises: and soft de*onstration, 6E$

-a*ily rese*"lance: and variation, #$6 5 4E# 5 -er*at.s last t eore*: and suppressed pre*ises, 6%% -eyera"end, Paul, #6F -i&ity of goals: and e&actness!ine&actness, #%% -luctuation: and convention, 6$% 4 of nonessential attri"utes, 61$ B6114 ter*s for, 6$4 . !ee also Being for t e *ost part -or*al ine&actness, F 4 sources of, 1$6 , 16E B14$ -or*s: Aristotle.s criticis*s of, as guides to conduct, %# B%E4 and congruence, 146 4 and et ical kno,ledge, 4% 4 e&a*ples of, 4% 4 of t e good4 4H , 49 , %$ 4 kno,ledge of, sufficient for action, %1 B%E4 and t e ontological t esis, ## B#44

and variation, #$$ B#$#, #$% -ortuitous, t e: and "eing for t e *ost part, F , 6$1 , 66$ B6664 as episte*ic, 6EH -rege, Gottlo", % , 9 , 144 , 69H , #$F , #$H , #H4 -unction: and degrees, #46 B#4#4 and e&actness!ine&actness, #41 B#464 and fi&ity of goals, #%# B#%4

+
Gale, 0ic ard, 6%E Geac , Peter, #1 Goals of a discipline, #%4 4 Aristotle on, 1$ 4 and degree of rigor, 9# 4 and degrees of e&actness!ine&actness, ##9 B#4E4 and de*onstration, ##% B##94 and eli*ina"ility of ine&actness, 14H 4 fi&ity of, #4E , #%# 4 and prag*atis*, #66 , #64 , #4F B#4H Goals of et ics, E% BF%4 and a"straction, 116 B11E4 and ancient co**entators, EF BE94 and eli*ina"ility, 1%% 4 and ine&actness, E , F 4 *any, EH 4 t eoretical and practical, E% BEE Goals of scientific in1uiry: and e&planation, #4H B#49 Godel.s t eore*: and suppressed pre*ises, 6%% B6%E Gold"ac .s con/ecture: and suppressed pre*ises, 6%%

Good, t e: ine&actness of Aristotle.s account of, 1E% B1EF, 4$9 n.F4 and Plato, 649 4 and suppressed pre*ises, 64H , 649 Good*an, Ielson, 6%6 Gorgias , 64 , F1 Grant, Ale&ander, 1$F , #1%

5
<ardie, 2illia* -. 0., FE , H1 , H4 , HF <are, 0ic ard, #E4 , #F6 , #FF <ar*an, Gil"ert, 1$$ <eat , ' o*as, 11F <il"ert, 3avid, 6%% Hippias Ma$or , 1H , 6H , #1 <u*e, 3avid, #E4 <ypot esis, *et od of: and +ocrates, 6$ B66, #9# nn.1% and 1E4 and virtue, 64 , #9# n.6$

I
)**ediate purpose: and goals of a discipline, 1#% )nappropriateness of discipline: and ine&actness, 14H , 1E6 B1E# )ndefiniteness, 14E . !ee also Kagueness4 Kariation )ndividuals: and action, 1F4 B1H$ )nduction: Aristotle.s use of, 1$ 4 and de*onstration, 641 )ne&actness: in all of nature, 96 4 of all preanalytic kno,ledge, 1## 4 and eli*ina"ility, F

)ntellectual virtues: and practical ,isdo*, FE )ntuitionists: and pri*itives, 6%6 B6%# )r,in, 'erence, F9 , 11$ , #E%

6
Laeger, 2erner, E6 Loac i*, <arold <., 9E , #%H , #%9 , #E$ , #E1 Lonsen, Al"ert, #E%

%
Dant, )**anuel, 66H , #E4 Dno,ledge: Aristotle on, 6# , %H 4 of causes, 1$$ , 1$H , 11E B11H, 16$ 4 conditions of, 6%4 4 corresponding to su"/ect *atter, 91 4 and de*onstration, H% BHE, 4$$ n.69, 6#9 B64$, 641 , 6%6 4 and diagnostic role of definitions, 69 , #1 4 of -or*s, 4% , %$ B%E4 as a goal of et ics, EE 4 +ocratic!Platonic conception of, 14 B1%, 1E , 19 B66, #96 n.114 t eoretical vs. practical, HH B94, 1%% 5 4E4 5 Dripke, +aul, % , 461 n.1% Du n, ' o*as, #6F , #HE

0
(athes , 1H , 64 , 6% , 6E , #6 , #% , 4$ , #$$ Jacunae: and congruence, 14# 4 and doctrine of t e *ean, 169 4 and opposition t esis, 169 B1#$

(a)s , 19E Ja,s: and particulars, %% , 19F 4 and universality, 6F$ B6F1, #FE B#FF Jess e&act de*onstration. !ee +oft de*onstration Ji*its: and do*ain of conduct, #1# 4 and variation, 69# B69%, 699 , #$E B#$F Jukasie,ic9, L., 6EF (ysis , 1H , 6H , #$$

M
(c3o,ell, Lo n, #E4 , 6F4 , #F9 (aterial and for*al ine&actness. !ee Congruence4 Congruence t esis (aterial ine&actness: ancient and *odern co**entators on, 16% (at e*atics: and a"straction, 116 B11E4 and de*onstration, E$ , E6 , 6F9 B6H$4 and essentialis*, #% B#E4 and et ics, 16$ 4 and e&actness!ine&actness, #H , 4# , 44 , %E , 141 , #%1 B#%64 and -or*s, 4% , 4E 4 goals of, F4 4 and Meno , 6$ 4 and Platonis*, 6%H 4 and suppressed pre*ises, 64F B64H, 6%1 , 6%% 4 t eoretical or practical, H9 (a&i*s: and universality, 6F1 B6F6, #FH (edicine: analogy to et ics, 11# B1144 as cognitive discipline, F# 4 as e&planatory science, 16$ B1614

and particulars, HF 4 and practical goals, F6 4 proper goals of, F# 4 and universality, #FE B#FF Meno , 1% , 1H , 6$ , 61 , 64 , 6% , 6E , #% , 4$ , 41 , 61$ (etap ysical essentialis* t esis, #% . !ee also 8ssentialis* (etap ysical realis*: in et ics and science, #H$ 4 of +ocrates, #4 (et od: Aristotle.s, and is predecessors, 1# 4 of a discipline, #6$ 4 of et ics, 1$ , 99 , #6# B#64, ##$ 4 and e&actness! ine&actness, 11 , #6# B#64, #6F B##%4 and goals, #6F B##%4 and strong prag*atic t esis, ##% 4 ter*s for, #6% B#6E (et odological ine&actness: necessity of, 1#6 (et odology: dataBdriven, # (iddle Platonis*: and Aristotle.s criticis*s, 44 (odality: of pre*ises in a de*onstrative syllogis*, %F B%H (odel of t e painter: introduced, %6 4 pro"le*s ,it , %# B%E (oderate prag*atists: and Aristotle, #49 , #%# (onan, L. 3onald, FH (oore, G. 8., 6%# , 6%4

1
Iarro, universals: and de*onstrative syllogis*s, 196 B19%4 and do*ain of conduct, 6H4 B6H%4 and e&actness! ine&actness, 1H$ B1H#4 and particulars, 1FE B1H$ Iature. !ee 3o*ain of nature Iature of a discipline, #6$ Iecessity: and "eing al,ays, 66# B6694 and "eing for t e *ost part, F , 6$1 , 61E B6664 degrees of, 6E1 B6E64 and de*onstration, 6E4 B6EE, 6FH 4 and do*ain of conduct, 6$9 , 6H# 4 and e&actness!ine&actness, 11$ B1114 and narro, universals, 19# 4 of pre*ises, %F B%H4 and soft de*onstration, 64F 4 and strict de*onstration, 646 B64# Iecessity condition: and "eing for t e *ost part, 6E% B6EE4 and soft de*onstration, 6E4 IeoBprag*atists: and e&planation, #4E B#49 Nichomachean Ethics> account of t e good in, 1E% B1EF IonBcognitivis*: and trut , #H6 B#H# Iuss"au*, (art a, #E%

O
:ntological t esis: and e&actness!ine&actness, ## B#4 :pen te&tured concepts:

and variation, 69F :pposition t esis: of *ean and e&tre*es, 16H :utline: and congruence, 146 4 ter*s for, E# :vervie,: of argu*ent, % B16 :,en, G. 8. J., 1$ B11

P
Particulars: and de*onstrative rigor, 191 B19%4 and dialectic, %$ 4 and eli*ina"ility 5 4E% 5 of ine&actness, 14H 4 episte*ological conse1uences, 9# 4 and et ics, 1$ , 11 , H# , #%F 4 and e&actness!ine&actness, 1F1 B1H$, #4$ 4 and e&perience, %4 4 and *edicine, HF 4 and practical ,isdo*, #EE B#EF4 and practice, F , H6 4 and +ocratic definitions, 69 , #$ , #1 , ## , #9 4 and sources of ine&actness, 14$ 4 t,o *eanings, 1F4 B1H$4 and universal -or*s, %# , #9E n.49 Pedagogy: and ine&actness, 1#1 B1#4 Perception: and de*onstration, 641 B6464 and diagnostic role, #$% B#$E4

in et ics, 11 4 and variation, #$E haedo , 44 , 4% , 4E , %E , 6%1 hilebus , 44 , 1#1 , ##$ , ##E , ##F , #41 P ilosop ical tradition: as "ackground for Aristotle, % , E , 1# BE4 Plato: and assu*ptions, E 4 and essentialis*, % 4 and e&actness!ine&actness, 6 , 4# B%E4 and necessary trut s in et ics, 4E 4 in p ilosop ical tradition, 4# B%E4 *entioned, 6 , 4 , % , 9 , 1$ , 14 , #6 , #E , #9 , 4$ , 4# , %E , %H , %9 , F1 , H1 , 91 , 94 , 9F , 1$9 , 1#$ , 141 , 146 , 19% , 19E , 61$ , 611 , 641 , 64# , 649 , 6%1 , 6%# , 6%4 , 6EE , 6H$ , 6H6 , 6H# , #$$ , #$6 , #$# , #$4 , #$% , #$H , ##$ , ##1 , ##E , ##F , ##H , #4$ , #41 , #4# , #%1 , #%6 , #%# , #%% , #%E , #%H , #E$ , #E1 , #E6 , #F$ Platonic dialogues: 8arly, (iddle, and Jate, 44 Platonic -or*s. !ee -or*s Platonis*: and cognitive goals of et ics, #%F 4 and develop*ent of Aristotle.s t oug t, E1 BE44 and et ics, 6H6 4 and *at e*atics, 6%H 4 and strict de*onstration, 64# , 6H1 Platonist conception of kno,ledge. !ee Dno,ledge, +ocratic!Platonic conception of4 +ocratic!Platonic conception of kno,ledge PoincarR, <enri, 6%% Politics: and su"ordination of et ics, 11$ Potentiality: and suppressed pre*ises, 6%$ Practical disciplines: analogy to productive arts, EF BE94 and degrees of e&actness! ine&actness, #%$ 4

and universality, #FE . !ee also 3isciplines, t eoretical, practical, and productive Practical goals of a discipline: and e&actness!ine&actness, #61 B#66, #41 , #4# , #4% Practical goals of et ics, E , %$ 4 and a"stractness of t e -or*s, %# B%E4 and e&actness!ine&actness, 1$ , %# , 1F1 B1H$, 1H% B1H94 and variation, #14 B#1% Practical intellect: and et ics, FE 4 goals of, F4 BF% Practical kno,ledge: and et ics, EE Practical role of definitions, #6 B##4 pro"le*s ,it , 4$ . !ee also +ocratic definitions, practical role of Practical ,isdo*: Aristotle.s use of t e ter*, F9 BH14 and deli"eration, FF BF94 and et ical in1uiry, EE , F% BHF4 and politics, H$ BH14 and universality, #EE B#EF, #F4 4 ,ide and narro, vie,s of, FF BHF, 6H1 Practice: and e&actness!ine&actness, #%E 4 and particulars, F Prag*atic principle: and goals of a discipline, #64 4 and *et od of et ics, #6% . !ee also +trong prag*atic principle4 2eak prag*atic principle Prag*atis*: and e&planation, 1$ , #61 , #6F , #4E B#494 and goals of a discipline, #66 Pri*itives: and tacit kno,ledge, 6%6 B6%# Productive arts:

analogy to et ics, EF BE9, 16% . !ee also 3isciplines, t eoretical, practical, and productive Proper e&actness: and fi&ity of goals, #4E B#E6 Proper goals: of all disciplines as cognitive, F# 4 of et ics, E , EE 4 and transitivity principle, F1 rotagoras , 64 , 6E , #6 Prudence. !ee Practical ,isdo* Psyc ology: and e&traneous pre*ises, 6E$ 4 and su"ordination of et ics, 1$9 B11$ Putna*, <ilary, 6E1 , #4% , #4E , #4F , #4H , #49 , #%#

Q
Muestions: and de*onstration, #6H B#694 and *et od, #6F B##% Muine, 2. K. :., 6%6 , 6E1

&
0ack a*, <arris, 1FE 0adical prag*atis*: and e&planation, #49 4 and *at e*atics, #%6 B#%# 0a,ls, Lo n, % , 94 , #4$ , #%E , #%H , #E$ 5 4EE 5 0ealis*: and congruence, 14% 4 in et ics and science, #H$ Republic , 1H , 6E , 44 , 4% , 4F , 49 , %1 , %# , %4 , %E , 91 , 19E , 6%4 , ##F , #41 , #%1 0 etoric: cognitive goals of, #%H 0o"inson, 0ic ard, #1

0o*illy, Lac1ueline de, #%F B#%H 0oss, 2. 3., #1 , 11F , 119 , 6F9 , #1H 0o,e, C ristop er, E6 0ules of inference: and soft de*onstration, 6E6 0ussell, Bertrand, % , 9 , #$F , #$H 0yle, Gil"ert, #H#

!
+al*on, Iat an, 69H +antas, Gerasi*os C., 6H , 69 , #$ , #1 +artre, LeanBPaul, #E4 +cience: and "eing for t e *ost part, 6F6 4 and definitions, E$ 4 de*onstrative! e&planatory structure of, 11H B119, 4$% n.#64 do*ain and principles, F6 4 et ics as a, H4 4 *et od of, 11 4 and nont eoretical disciplines, HE 4 +ocrates on, 46 4 and universality, #F6 B#F#, #FE +criven, (ic ael, #4H +i*plicity: anti a"straction, 1$H 4 and congruence, 146 B14#4 and de*onstration, 116 4 episte*ological conse1uences, 111 B1164 and principles, 1$F +intonen, (atti, #6F , #4E , #4F , #4H , #49 , #%# +ocrates, 1# B4#4 and assu*ptions, E 4 on essentialis*, % 4 and Plato, 1E 4

and r etorical 1uestions, 6% B6F4 *entioned, % , E , 9 , 1# B4#, %E , %9 , 9F , 19% , 19E , 61$ , 611 , 649 , 6%1 , 6HH , #$$ , #$6 , #$# , #$4 , #$% , #$H , #F$ +ocratic definitions: a"stractness of, #9 , 4$ 4 aitiological role of, 6# , 6H B#64 Aristotle on, 1F , 6E , 6F 4 de*onstrative role of, 66 B6H4 diagnostic role of, 6# , 6H B#64 episte*ic roles of, 1F , 6# , #6 4 as necessary and!or sufficient for kno,ing properties, 64 B6H4 practical role of, #6 B##4 roles of, 1E B19, 66 B##4 searc for, 1H 4 and universality, 1H B19, 6F , #4 +ocratic -allacy, #6 , #94 n.69 +ocratic!Platonic conception of kno,ledge: and develop*ent of Aristotle.s t oug t, E1 BE44 anti necessity, 41 , 644 B64%, 6E1 4 and soft de*onstration, 644 B64%, 6E6 B6E#, 6EE . !ee also Dno,ledge, +ocratic!Platonic conception of +ocratic!Platonic universality t esis: Aristotle on, 61$ B611 +ocratic t eory!practice, 1% B1E4 Aristotle on, 6F 4 consistency "et,een, 1E , 6H 4 diagnostic and aitiological roles of definitions in, 6H B#64 and suppressed pre*ises, 6%1 +oft de*onstration: Aristotle on, 6E# B6EE4 and et ics, 6H6 4 and e&traneous pre*ises, 6E$ 4 as inductive, 6E9 4 and Platonis*, 64# B6E#, ##F B##H4 ter*s for, 6E# . !ee also 3e*onstration, strict and soft4 +trict de*onstration

+oundness: and +ocrates, 61 +ources of ine&actness: "urdenso*e task, 16E B16F, 1E4 4 discipline neutral, 1#9 4 and eli*ina"ility of ine&actness, 14F B14H4 goals of a discipline, 1#9 B14$4 i**ediate purpose, 1#4 B1#%4 inappropriateness of discipline, 1#E B1#9, 1E6 4 lacunae in classification, 16F B1#14 *et od or nature of a discipline, #6$ B#614 r etorical or *et odological, 1#1 B1#44 stageBspecific, 1#% , 1#H 4 topicBspecific, 1#% , 1#H +pino9a, Benedict de, % , 94 , #4$ , #%% +tandards of e&actness, 1E4 B1E%, 1F$ 4 and cognitive goals of et ics, 19F 4 deter*ined "y ulti*ate goals, 1F1 4 and eli*ina"ility, 1H# B1H9 !tatesman , %% , #41 +trict de*onstration: conditions of, 64# 4 and do*ain of conduct, 6H1 B6H64 and necessity, 646 , 6E1 4 and suppressed pre*ises, 6%E . !ee also 3e*onstration, strict and soft4 +oft de*onstration +trong prag*atic principle: and *et od of et ics, #6% , ##4 +u"ordinate arts: defined "y proper goals, F1 BF6 +u"ordinate goals: asy**etrical and not irrefle&ive, 94 4 and transitivity, F1 +u"ordination: of disciplines, F$ BF6, 1$9 4

episte*ological conse1uences, 11$ +u"strate: and a"straction, 114 4 and soft de*onstration, 64% +uppressed pre*ises: and et ics, 64H 4 *aking e&plicit, 6%1 , 6%% , 6%H 4 and 5 4EF 5 nature of o"/ects, 6%9 4 and si*ples, 6%4 4 and soft de*onstration, 64F B6E$. !ee also 'acit kno,ledge +yllogis*: Aristotle on, H , %E B%F4 and "eing for t e *ost part, 6E9 , 6F6 B6F#4 and de*onstration, %F 4 and essentialis*, #H 4 and particulars, 191 B19%4 and practical goals of et ics, F 4 pre*ises, H1 4 and +ocrates, 19 B6$, 6E , 6F , 41 4 and universality, #E , #H 4 and virtue, 61

T
'acit kno,ledge: *aking e&plicit, 6%6 4 and *ystical e&perience, 6%4 . !ee also +uppressed pre*ises 'eic *uller, Gustav, FH 'eleological aspect of desire: *ade e&plicit, 649 'er*s for e&actness!ine&actness, 1$6 B1$F4 ine&actness of, 161 B166

#heaetetus , 4# , 44 , 6%# ' eoretical disciplines, 9H 4 et ics as one, #%9 B#E$. !ee also 3isciplines, t eoretical, practical, and productive ' eoretical intellect: and et ics, FE BFF ' eoretical interest: and et ics, #E$ ' eoretical kno,ledge: and do*ain of conduct, 94 , 9% 4 and kno,ledge of causes, 94 4 and *edicine, 9E 4 neit er sufficient nor necessary for acting correctly, 9F 4 and practical i*portance of a discipline, 9E , 9F , 9H 'oul*in, +tep en, #E% 'ransitivity of desires, E , EE , F$ , F1 4 *ade e&plicit, 649 'ransparency: and soft de*onstration, 64% 'rendelen"urg, -riedric , FH 'rue for t e *ost part: not preserved, 6F% B6FF4 and validity, 6F% . !eealso Being for t e *ost part 'rut : and "eing for t e *ost part, 6$E , 6FH 4 and et ics, F4 , #E# , #H6 B#HH4 and e&actness!ine&actness, #E# 4 and nonBcognitivis*, #H6 B#H#4 in science, #HE 'rut condition: and "eing for t e *ost part, 6E% 4 and soft de*onstration, 6E#

4
Ulti*ate goals of et ics:

Aristotle on, E 4 as practical, F , EE , #E$ 4 and proper goals, EE Uncodifia"ility: in et ics, #E4 B#E%, #F9 Unger, Peter, 69H Universality: and "eing for t e *ost part, 666 B66#, 6#E , 6E9 B6F64 and causal *ec anis*, 6HE B6HF4 and do*ain of conduct, #H 4 and et ics, 1$ , H6 , #E# B#H64 of every discipline, H% 4 and e&actness!ine&actness, #E# B#H64 of -or* of goodness, ## B#44 narro,ing, 1H1 B1H94 and necessity, 41 , 6F4 4 and practical ,isdo*, #EE B#EF4 and +ocratic definitions, 6F , #1 , ## , #4 , #% , #E , #9 4 and soft de*onstration, 64E 4 of t eoretical disciplines, 99 B1$$4 and virtue, #E4 B#E%, #EF B#EH, #F$ B#F% Universality of trut of definition t esis, #4 4 Aristotle on, #F Ut*ost e&actness: Plato on, in et ics, 4F B494 and practical goals of et ics, %#

3
Kague concepts, 9 4 and logic, #$F 4 and variation, 69F B699 Kagueness: attri"ution of, 9 4 and *et od of et ics, 11 4

and trut , #H4 4 and universality, #H1 . !ee also Kariation Kalidity: and "eing for t e *ost part, 6#4 , 6#% B6#E, 6E4 , 6EE B6FH4 of deductive inference, %F 4 and universality, #H 4 and vague concepts, #$H Kalidity constraint: and +ocrates, 61 van -raassen, Bas, #6F , #4H , #HE Kariation: a"straction fro*, 14E B14F4 Aristotle on, 6H9 B6914 and causal definitions, #1$ B#11, #16 B#1#4 and definitions, 699 B#$#, #$# B#$H4 and do*ain of conduct, #1# B#144 eli*ination of, #$H B#194 and essentialis*, 6HH 4 and functional definition, #11 4 and li*its, 69# B69%4 *aterial and for*al, 696 , 69F 4 and necessary and sufficient conditions, 69# 4 scope of, 699 4 sources of, 69E B69F4 and virtue, #1E B#19 Kirtue: a"stractness of Plato.s accounts, %$ B%E4 and *et od of ypot esis, 61 4 +ocrates on, 61 , 64 , #9# n.6$, #94 n.614 and universality, #E4 B#E%, #EF B#EH, #F$ B#F%4 and variation, #1E B#19

W
2ais*ann, -riedric , 69F

2alter, Lulius, FH , F9 , H1 5 4EH 5 2eaker de*onstration. !ee +oft de*onstration 2eak prag*atic principle: and e&actness! ine&actness, ##% 4 and goals of a discipline, ##4 4 and *et od of et ics, #6% 4 reasons for, ##E 2 eeler, +a*uel C., 69H , #H4 ,#H% 2iggins, 3avid, F9 2illia*s, Bernard, 1$$ ,#E% 2ittgenstein, Jud,ig, % , #$6 , #4% , #H6

7
Oeller, 8duard, FH
Preferred Citation: Anagnostopoulos, Georgios. Aristotle on the Goals and Exactness of Ethics. Berkeley: University of California Press, c1994 1994. ttp:!!ark.cdli".org!ark:!1#$#$!ft9t1n"%&k!