TechnicalMatters

Case studies covering technical issues and their solutions

March 2012 Issue 6

Technical Matters March 2012

CAS E ST U D Y 1

Water tank cracking

Vessel LNG carrier (see front cover) Issue Excessive aft end vibration

An investigation was initiated by the repeated cracking of water tanks in the aft body of an LNG carrier due to high local vibrations at the aft end. To identify the source of vibrations and advise the owner on possible remedial actions, vibration sensors were placed at a number of strategic locations. In addition, hull pressures were recorded near the propeller, and borescope observations were made. All recorded data was analysed with MATLAB, a technical computing language, using frequency domain representations. The results showed that the tanks natural frequencies coincided with the third, fourth and fth blade passing frequencies, resulting in structural resonances with velocities well above the 30 mm/s peak value (the maximum recommended at those frequencies in Lloyds Registers Ship Vibration and Noise Guidance Notes).

Such higher order blade frequencies do not normally transmit sufcient energy to cause large excitations, so this was an unusual case. Borescope observations showed that signicant sheet cavitation was generated each time a propeller blade passed the top dead centre position. The shed cavitation interacted with the sheet cavitation on the following blade, resulting in periodic bursts of high energy pressure excitation. This behaviour indicated a strongly retarded ow into the propeller plane. Based on the advice of Lloyds Registers Technical Investigation Department (TID), the client installed vortex generators ahead of the propeller. These generators improved the inow into the propeller plane and reduced the cavitation signicantly. No further cracking of the water tanks has occurred since then.

Velocity transducers on panel structure

LESSON Strongly retarded inow in the propeller plane can result in dynamic cavitation and higher order excitations that could lead to resonances in aft end structures.

Time histories of vibration and hull pressure

Frequency analysis of vibration time histories showing principal modes

Technical Matters March 2012

CAS E S T U D Y 2

Gas dispersion
Vessel Crude oil tanker Issue Safe operational loading windows

Natural evaporation of organic chemical compounds during the loading of crude oil carriers leads to tank pressure build-up. When this exceeds the set safety standard, gaseous compounds are vented via a riser mast. Because inhalation of these compounds poses a health risk, safety limits are set for permitted concentration levels. At the clients request, Lloyds Registers Technical Investigation Department (TID) provided a Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) study on the dispersion of these organic compounds. This included three different wind speeds, two wind headings and two riser heights. In all cases the concentration of hydrogen sulphide (H2S) and hydrocarbons (CxHy) were recorded. These analyses clearly demonstrated that a threshold wind speed exists, below which concentration levels onboard and in the vessels direct surroundings exceeded safety limits. Concentrations were particularly high at the aft deck due to re-circulation behind the wheelhouse. The results further showed that riser height had little inuence on dispersion patterns. Of even more signicance was the velocity of riser emissions as greater velocities increase dispersion volumes.

Hydrocarbon dispersion cloud

Hydrogen sulphide on aft deck

Given the limited number of case studies and the likelihood of exceeding safety levels, further analyses were recommended to provide a denite answer. For the time being, the client was advised not to vent

at low wind speeds. Two possible solutions suggested to the client were to remove the heavier hydrocarbons from the emissions or to pre-mix the riser emissions and increase the outow velocity.

LESSON CFD analyses can signicantly contribute to dening operational windows for the safe loading of crude oil tankers.
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Technical Matters March 2012

CAS E S T U D Y 3

Stern tube bearing damage

Vessel Container ship Issue Damage sustained during sea trials
checks carried out. Stern bush wall thickness measurements were also taken, and on-board documentation was reviewed. The failure of the stern tube bearing could have been caused by any one of, or combination of, several modes of failure. It was necessary to examine each one in turn and, where justied, discount possible modes, to arrive at the most probable cause of failure. Potential causes were considered and some discounted. The slope of the stern tube bearing bush housing was satisfactory and it was probable that the slope of the original stern tube bearing had been satisfactory before failure. The original clearances between the bearing and tail shaft were within the manufacturers recommended limits. A small gap existed between adjacent bearing bush sections but in this case had not signicantly affected the bearing load carrying capacity. Measurements by TID on other vessels have demonstrated that manoeuvring at high speed imposes additional loads on the stern tube after bearing. The additional loads are particularly severe during turns to starboard when high pressures and consequent thin oil lms are generated at the aft edge at the ve o clock position looking forwards. The vessel was in the light ballast condition during the sea trials. This was only just sufcient to immerse the propeller and would have generated an adverse bending moment with the centre of thrust below the shaft centre line. Records also indicated that the vessel was undergoing high speed manoeuvring immediately before the stern tube bearing damage occurred. This excessive manoeuvring in the light ballast condition was therefore considered to be the most probable cause of the damage.

When the stern tube bearing of a new container ship was damaged during sea trials, Lloyds Registers Technical Investigation Department (TID) was asked to investigate the possible causes. The propeller was removed from the tail shaft and radial run-out measurements were taken along with clearances between the shaft and stern tube bearings. The tail shaft was removed and a visual examination carried out on the stern tube bearings and shaft. Bearing bore and tail shaft diameter measurements were taken and alignment

Damaged areas

Grooving Black band Washways

Damage to stern tube aft bearing

Damage to propeller tail shaft

LESSON There should be adequate propeller immersion at all times and excessive manoeuvres at high speed using large rudder angles should be avoided.
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Technical Matters March 2012

CAS E S T U D Y 4

Propeller optimisation
Vessel Motor yacht Issue Improving propeller inow
Lloyds Registers Technical Investigation Department (TID) receives each year. One possible solution is to install ns or vortex generators (VGs) to inuence the ow towards the propeller. By introducing a n or VG on a strategic location, the inow in the propeller plane can be improved signicantly. In general, the more uniform the propeller inow becomes the lower vibration levels are likely to be. Aided by Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD), the design and location of ns and VGs can be optimised. In this particular case, a strong tube vortex was identied at the end of the wing propellers bossing. At full speed ahead, the tube vortex interacted with the tip vortex, leading to violent cavitation shedding. By placing four shaped ns on the shaft casing, the tube vortexs strength was largely diminished and its path altered. Instead of going through the tip region, it now passed through the root section of the propeller. As a result of the modication the propeller inow improved considerably.

Design limitations and power requirements often force propeller designers to accept certain levels of cavitation. Striking the balance between acceptable cavitation and the risk of damage is a delicate matter however. This is reected in the signicant number of propeller-induced vibrations cases that

LESSON With the aid of CFD analysis it is possible to test and optimise ow improvement devices prior to installation.

Before ow improvement

After ow improvement

Technical Matters March 2012

CAS E S T U D Y 5

Environmental impact of wave making

Vessel Articulated tug barge Issue Waves generated in shallow waters
Using CFD techniques, the project was split into two stages. The rst (main) investigation involved 12 parametric runs covering the operation of the ATB assembly under two loading conditions (load and ballast draughts) and six speeds (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 knots) at zero trim condition. The output of each parametric run was then used to predict values for the maximum wave height at distances of up to 200 metres from the sailing line of the ATB. A validation study was carried out to corroborate the CFD predictions. The study modelled the ow around the ATB at load draught at 10 knots. This study allowed qualitative comparison with photographs of a similar ATB travelling at the same speed, thus increasing condence in the results of the main investigation. Comparison between the computed wave patterns, in particular the bow wave, at 10 knots load draught and the photograph of a similar ATB at the same speed indicated a good qualitative match. The actual maximum peak-to-trough wave height at a distance of 25 metres from the sailing line of the ATB is around 0.3 metres and this was observed for the 6 knot load case using CFD techniques. It was also predicted that the rate of wave height decay is generally larger near the ship and decreases with distance. The CFD techniques also conrmed that wave height, as expected, decreases with decreasing ship speed. Wave heights at ballast draught were predicted to be roughly two-thirds of those at the same speed at load draught.

Lloyds Registers Technical Investigation Department (TID) was asked to make a Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) parametric study of the wave-making characteristics of a shallow water articulated tug/barge (ATB) assembly. The studys key objective was to estimate the maximum height of the waves generated by the ATB while operating in a shallow, 5 metre deep, river and assess its environmental impact.

CFD prediction of wave pattern at 10 knots which allows a qualitative comparison

LESSON Computational Fluid Dynamics provides a viable alternative to extensive model testing for predicting wave heights at varying distances from the sailing line.
Articulated tug barge travelling at 10 knots with surrounding wave pattern

Technical Matters March 2012

CAS E S T U D Y 6

Stabiliser n failure
Vessel Passenger/ro ro ship Issue Material failure
Fracture surface on section of stabiliser stock

After six years of active service, one of a pair of retractable stabilising ns attached to the side of a passenger/ ro ro ship was to be found missing. During examination of the remaining part of the stabiliser stock at the Lloyds Register Materials and NDE Laboratory it was found that a fatigue crack, caused by cyclic unidirectional bending, had formed from a single initiation point at a tear drop artefact. This artefact was due to a lack of fusion between successive weld beads within the intermediate weld between the parent material and the stainless steel cladding. The purpose of the ferrous intermediate weld was not clear, although it may have been used to reduce the carbon content of the material to which the austenitic stainless steel cladding was to be laid down. However the interface between the carbon steel parent metal and austenitic stainless steel cladding would normally be facilitated using a higher alloy weld material for the rst weld layer onto the carbon steel,

followed by laying down the austenitic stainless steel cladding layer. The material properties and dimensions of the parent material and the stainless steel cladding were within design specication. The distinct bands of slow and fast crack propagation indicated considerable variation in service loading due to the variable sea conditions. The crack propagation extended almost the entire diameter of the shaft before the shaft failed due to overload. This indicated that the n stock shaft had a high margin against failure for the operational bending stresses experienced. It was recommended that the reason for the intermediate weld should be identied. Recommendations were also made that the stabiliser stocks should be examined both visually and by non-destructive examination (NDE) techniques for the presence of cracks. Replacement stabiliser stocks should be examined visually and ultrasonically for cracks after two years in service.

Fracture initiation zone showing beach marks indicative of fatigue fracture

Section through initiation point at tear drop artefact

LESSON Poor manufacturing practices can often lead to early failure during service life. Understanding material properties and the mechanisms of failure can lead to more robust solutions.

Technical Matters March 2012

CAS E S T U D Y 7

Auxiliary engine crankshaft problems

Vessel Passenger/ro ro ship Issue Balance weight failure
After the failure and subsequent overhaul of an auxiliary diesel engine on a passenger/ro ro ship, a crankshaft balance weight was discharged through the side of the engine soon after the ship went back into service. Lloyds Registers Technical Investigation Department (TID) was asked to investigate the cause of the damage and to ascertain whether the failure was linked to a recent overhaul carried out by the engine manufacturers personnel. The engine was examined along with operational documentation. The cause of the damage was fatigue fracture of the balance weight which, along with the securing studs, was submitted to Lloyds Register Materials and NDE Laboratory for further metallurgical examination. The fatigue crack had propagated from a llet radius in the balance weight. Subsequent rupture caused the impact damage and shutdown of the engine. The crack initiation site was within a heataffected zone associated with the amecutting procedure used in the original balance weight manufacturing process. The failure mechanism had previously been identied by the manufacturers some 13 years previously. Finite element analysis determined the magnitude of the stress at the fatigue fracture initiation point. Based on this value, fracture mechanics calculations indicated a crack depth up to 2 mm might exist before propagation to rupture is likely. The fatigue crack had propagated in two phases. The rst was during the period of operation after the engine was built. The second, more recent, propagation followed from a sudden stoppage of the engine caused by a dropped valve and cooling water ingress into a cylinder. Regular inspections as part of the vessels planned maintenance routine failed to identify any crack. In this regard, the inspection procedures suggested by the manufacturers were considered inadequate. Following the rupture of the balance weight and subsequent repair of the engine, all the original balance weights were replaced with those of the new design.

Balance weight fracture surface

LESSON Poor manufacturing processes can often lead to early failure. When such problems are identied it is essential that adequate remedial guidance is provided and appropriate in-service inspections carried out.
Damaged balance weight after discharge through side of engine

Technical Matters March 2012

CAS E ST U D Y 8

Diesel pump failure

Subject Pumping station Issue Failure in service
stopped. None of the engine alarm/trips were activated at the time of the failure. A visual examination was made of the engine components, the records were reviewed and pumping station personnel interviewed. The engine was tted with a turbocharger, with the rotor supported by two oil lubricated ball bearings. The evidence pointed to failure of the turbocharger turbine end bearing. This would have started a chain of events leading to high exhaust gas temperatures, reduced scavenge air ow and higher cylinder temperatures causing a crank case explosion. The failed turbocharger bearing, which had been tted at the time of rebuild, had been stationary for prolonged periods. Other running diesel engines could have caused vibration at the contact points between the stationary bearing rolling elements and raceway causing impression damage consistent with false Brinelling and eventual bearing failure. No routine checks were carried out before the engine started or while it was running.

After a diesel engine failed in service at a water pumping station, an investigation was carried out by Lloyds Registers Technical Investigation Department (TID) to pinpoint the cause. The diesel engine was the prime mover for a pump, which pumped oodwater from the local drainage system. The engine had been rebuilt two years previously following total immersion in oodwater, and when the failure occurred only 42 running hours had been accumulated since the rebuild. The diesel pump had been running for 95 minutes when there was a bang, the engine hall lled with smoke and the engine

End bearing showing evidence of ball race collapse and overheating

This was inappropriate for the age of the plant and the adequacy of the remote monitoring systems. While not the primary cause of the failure, a second watch-keeper and a high exhaust gas temperature alarm/ trip may have averted the failure. Recommendations were made regarding repairs to the diesel engine, watch-keeping procedures and the level of remote monitoring.

LESSON Prolonged periods of diesel engine idleness should be avoided. Routine checks should be carried out prior to starting and while it is running. Appropriate levels of remote monitoring should be provided that are consistent with the levels of watchkeeping.

Severe overheating of turbocharger casing and covers

Technical Matters March 2012

CAS E S T U D Y 9

Propulsion thruster damage

Vessel Tug Issue Contamination and damage
The damage process was likely to have involved a number of contributory factors relating to the original installation and commissioning. It is probable that air was trapped in the hub and this would have caused poor lubrication of the blade operating mechanism. This may have contributed to the initial damage which then led to water ingress and accelerated wear. The height of the oil tank reservoirs and various ow restrictions resulted in the total head of the static oil system at each propeller hub being less than the design specication. Contraction of the air and uid in the hub after operations, along with ow restrictions in the propeller shaft seal body, is thought to have produced a low pressure head in the hub resulting in an ingress of water. Recommendations included repositioning the static oil system gravity tanks to a height appropriate for the thruster unit design pressure head range. This included replacing the interconnecting pipework with pipes of larger diameter and rerouting with a continuous fall of at least 5 thus reducing the risk of air traps being formed. Recommendations were also made regarding venting procedures to ensure air did not become trapped when lling the static oil system. These recommendations included lling the static oil system up from the hub to the gravity tank and reconciling the amount of oil added with the volume of the system.

A tug had been experiencing contamination of the propulsion thruster units. Oil samples were found to contain high concentrations of water and wear products. The propellers were subsequently removed and dismantled. A large amount of a ne paste as well as ice was found in the hubs and in the propeller shaft seals. Lloyds Registers Technical Investigation Department (TID) was asked to investigate and advise. Each thruster unit was examined along with the associated static oil and lubricating oil systems.

LESSON Care needs to be taken in the design and installation of podded propulsors and their associated static oil systems. In particular, the installed pipework must not lead to air locks and gravity tanks should be located at sufcinet height to maintain adequate system pressure at all times.

Typical galling damage of crank pin ring blade foot axial bearing surface

Typical galling damage of blade foot axial bearing surface in hub

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Technical Matters March 2012

CAS E ST U D Y 1 0

Overhead crane failure

Subject Power station Issue Failure during overhaul
witnesses. Markings on the trolley and traversing beam also showed where the trolley wheels had slid over the beams lower plate before the trolley tipped and fell from the beam. TID created a template the same width as the traversing beams lower ange, placing on it the trolley wheels in the same position as the trolley had been. The team discovered that by tilting the board, thus simulating the trolleys instability, it was possible for the trolley to tip over and fall from the beam. It was also found that while the lateral clearance between the trolley wheels and traversing beams lower ange were satisfactory when the trolley was resting normally on the lower ange with its wheels intact, when it was tilted, the lateral clearance became excessive and allowed the trolley to fall off. The TID team recommended that the trolley be modied to reduce the lateral clearances between it and the traversing beams lower ange, and to restrict the angular movement of the trolley.
Template tilted to simulate the trolley tilting and then sliding over the traversing beam lower plate

After an incident in which the trolley of a power station overhead crane fell from an L-shaped traversing beam during an overhaul, a team from Lloyds Registers Technical Investigation Department (TID) was asked to make an on-site investigation. The TID team discovered that during the incident the cranes winch motor windings had been removed, and during the operation the trolley became unbalanced and fell from the traversing beam. Team members examined the trolley and the traversing beam, interviewed the power stations personnel and took down and reviewed statements from

It was found that there were shortcomings in the management system, with no written procedures produced by a competent person. The team advised that, in future, detailed procedures including provision for adequately supporting the balance weight side of the trolley prior to removal of the motor windings be produced before such work started.

LESSON Written procedures should be in place prior to overhaul. These should include provision for adequately supporting the balance weight side of the trolley prior to removal of the motor windings.

Trolley on traversing beam before removal of winch motor windings

Trolley tilting and sliding on the traversing beam after removal of winch motor windings

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Technical Matters March 2012

Technical Investigation Team

We are a large group of highly experienced specialists and support staff. If you have any technical queries or issues that need a rapid response, please contact one of the following:
Lloyds Registers Technical Investigation Department
When the unexpected occurs or you require indepth technical advice, you need to seek out the best advice and support. Enter Lloyds Registers Technical Investigation Department who will be able to assess, evaluate and solve your problem.

Donald Cameron Manager 020 7423 1758 or donald.cameron@lr.org Donald joined Lloyds Register in 1989 and has been with TID for most of that time. He is responsible for overall management, recruitment, budgeting, tendering, service delivery, and monitoring and assessing performance.

Peter Filcek Technical Manager 020 7423 1765 or peter.lcek@lr.org Joined LR in 1977 and has been with TID since 1979. Peter oversees the technical quality of TID services and training, and is responsible for the allocation of project managers and project teams. He represents TID in the discipline of marine failures.

John Maguire Structural Engineering Section Manager 020 7423 1770 or john.maguire@lr.org After joining LR in 1989 and the TID team in 1994, John has overseen a wide range of investigations, particularly those relating to structural engineering (marine and non-marine), including structural dynamics, fatigue and fracture.

Peter Davies Machinery Section Manager 020 7423 1761 or peter.davies@lr.org Peter, who joined LR in 1995 and has been with TID since then, is responsible for a wide range of investigations, particularly those relating to machinery, propulsion and shafting systems.

Dejan Radosavljevic Fluid Dynamics Section Manager 020 7423 1774 or dejan.radosavljevic@lr.org Dejan, who has been with LR and TID since 1994, is responsible for a wide range of investigations, particularly those relating to uid dynamics (marine and nonmarine), including computational uid dynamics (CFD). Lloyds Register Asia T +852 2287 9333 F +852 2526 2921 E asia@lr.org Suite 3501, China Merchants Tower, Shun Tak Centre 168200 Connaught Road Central Hong Kong, SAR of PRC

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Technical Matters Editor: Christopher Browne, Marine Communications Department T +44 (0)20 7423 2305 E chris.browne@lr.org Designer: Pipeline Design T +44 (0)1480 462589 E dawn@pipelinedesign.it
Technical Matters is produced by Lloyds Registers Marine Communications Department and designed by Pipeline Design. Care is taken to ensure that the information in Technical Matters is accurate and up to date. However, Lloyds Register accepts no responsibility for inaccuracies in, or changes to, such information.

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March 2012

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