Beyond Good and Evil

This book, subtitled "Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future," concluded the series
of three books at the middle of Nietzsche's productive thought, spanning the
period from 1882 to 1886. Nietzsche had finished Zarathustra, Part IV, in April
1885 and published only 40 copies for distribution. Meanwhile, he began pulling
together notes for Beyond Good and Evil. His letters, during this period, disclose
a great deal of personal frustration. None of his books had been successful and
his publishers were not even distributing them. In an attempt to solidify and
justify his thought, Nietzsche was beginning to re-work his older books.
Eventually, having re-acquired his rights to publication, he would put out new
editions. Beyond Good and Evil itself was finished by April of 1886, with some
follow-up work extending throughout the summer. In the summer of 1886, he also
began laying out the structure of a large work which he called "The Will to Power:
Attempt at a Transvaluation of All Values." He never completed this work but did
leave extensive, though somewhat confusing notes.

In his "Preface" to Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche begins with the astonishing
suggestion, "supposing truth is a woman --- what then?" Given the notoriously poor
performance of philosophers at winning women (and Nietzsche should know), is it
any wonder that none of them have won truth as such? Indeed, as Nietzsche says,
"every kind of dogmatism is left standing dispirited and discouraged." It is
appropriate, thus, that Nietzsche's first chapter discusses "the Prejudices of
Philosophers."

We should begin by returning to aphorism #110 of The Gay Science. Nietzsche makes
a radical distinction between truth and knowledge. Knowledge, one must recall, is
whatever has evolved through time and whose value can only be supposed as having
been life-preserving, species-preserving. It is there, but we can never know why
except to acknowledge that it must have had utility through a long time depth.
Nietzsche calls these elements of knowledge "errors" precisely because of these
obscure origins. On the other hand, in a far shorter period of human history, and
therefore really untested, the pursuit of truth has evolved. Just as knowledge
represents value given out of our will to power, a truth claim (which is a special
value given to an element of knowledge over and against another element of
knowledge) is a value given out of our will to power (or our will to truth, as
Nietzsche abbreviates it). The will to truth is, in effect, modern man's attempt
to work the erroneous elements of human knowledge into a coherent system of some
kind. One of the unexpected consequences of the will to truth is that God has
become unbelievable.

That being said, we see that philosophers are exemplars of the will to truth. They
propose systematic points of view that organize and, hence, give value to elements
of knowledge. But we need to be very suspicious about philosophers. Are they
really "disinterested" or are they, in fact, always driven by their own
unconscious "interests"? Reading even the most obscure philosophy, we should
always ask, "toward what morality is this reasoning aimed." As Nietzsche says,
"every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal confession of its
author." Also (#6), "in the philosopher . . . there is nothing whatever that is
impersonal; and above all, his morality bears decided and decisive witness to who
he is."

Of course, there is some kind of blatant "self-contradiction" going on here

because Nietzsche himself is a philosopher! Right? Yes, but he is one of a new
bunch. "In all seriousness: I see such new philosophers coming up." Note that the
first paragraph of aphorism #2 is a quote. It is, in fact, a model of what the old
philosophers say and reason. So Nietzsche's reply to the old philosophers is in
his second paragraph. It is this model assumption that has justified all
philosophies that attempt to ground their "truths" in metaphysics. Therefore, if
we throw out the assumptions built into this "model," and if we question the very
roots of the will to truth and the grounds of any systematization, with our
dangerous "maybes," we will come up with a brave new bunch of philosophers. In
this whole section, Nietzsche goes a long way in clarifying what The Gay Science
was really all about.

But what is the answer? Note in aphorism #10 that the answer is not nihilism.
Nietzsche's course is clearly somewhere between metaphysically based moralities
and nihilistically motivated lack of value commitments.

From here to the end of the first chapter, Nietzsche sustains a systematic and
coherent attack on the typical prejudices of modern philosophers. Central to this
attack is Nietzsche's account of how the human will has been misunderstood and,
consequently, misused. This discussion is quite important to an understanding of
the very different way in which Nietzsche uses the term 'will' in his expression
"the will to power." "Willing seems to me to be above all something complicated,
something that is a unit only as a word --- and it is precisely in this one word
that the popular prejudice lurks." (#19)

Moving on to the second chapter, "The Free Spirit," Nietzsche develops the theme
of those up-coming philosophers who seek the overman through self-overcoming. He
begins, however, with an amazing declaration regarding the utility of simple
errors. While we continually sing praises to the truth, Nietzsche always demands
that we really don't know whether the truth is that valuable. And, in fact, when
we really honestly examine our situation, isn't it always the case that our lives
run far more simply and more smoothly banking on error and ignorance. "Here and
there we understand it and laugh at the way in which precisely science at its best
seeks most to keep us in this simplified, thoroughly artificial, suitably
constructed and suitably falsified world." [If one doubts Nietzsche on this, one
should study thermodynamics which is purely a fantastic invention built upon the
non-existent "ideal gas."]

But how does the free spirited philosopher emerge? "The long and serious study of
the average man, and consequently much disguise, self-overcoming, familiarity, and
bad contact --- this constitutes a necessary part of the life-history of every
philosopher, perhaps the most disagreeable, odious, and disappointing part." Also,
note that, "independence is for the very few; it is a privilege of the strong. And
whoever attempts it even with the best right but without inner constraint proves
that he is probably not only strong, but also daring to the point of
recklessness."

Aphorism #32 begins a series of powerful statements that are crucial to

understanding Nietzsche's project. While in primitive time the value of an act was
identical with its practical effect, we have passed through an admirable period of
development in which the value of an act has been identified with its origin,
called an "intention." Nietzsche actually sees this is a great step forward and,
in fact, a necessary prelude to self-overcoming. But now we must understand that
the final phase of development lies in precisely understanding the conscious
intention as only skin deep. "Indeed, we believe that the intention is merely a
sign and symptom that still requires interpretation --- moreover, a sign that
means too much and therefore, taken by itself alone, almost nothing." "Nietzsche
continues, "the overcoming of morality, in a certain sense even the self-
overcoming of morality --- let this be the name for that long secret work which
has been saved up for the finest and most honest. . . the whole morality of self-
denial must be questioned mercilessly and taken to court --- no less than the
aesthetics of "contemplation devoid of all interest" which is used today as a
seductive guise for the emasculation of art, to give it a good conscience."
The remaining aphorisms constitute a powerful set of "directives" in the sense
that they offer a sustained statement of how the free spirit must emerge and
survive. "Whatever philosophical standpoint one may adopt today, from every point
of view the erroneousness of the world in which we think we live is the surest and
firmest fact that we can lay eyes on." Aphorisms #32 to #36 give us an especially
vivid demonstration of Nietzsche's understanding of human psychology and how it is
that the will to power stands centrally in this perspective.

Also note aphorisms #42 and #43. "A new species of philosophers is coming up . .
." And they should be called 'Versucher'" (translated as "attempters" but
ambiguously also meaning "tempters"). "Are these coming philosophers new friends
of 'truth'?" Yes, as The Gay Science preliminarily suggests, Nietzsche's program
is a part of the overall untested program of the will to truth, but they will not
be dogmatists! "One must shed the bad taste of wanting to agree with many."

"What Is Religious" is one of the more amazing chapters of this book. Before
embarking, read Kaufmann's note regarding the title. It is not entirely clear what
the English title ought to be, and either "the being of religion" or "the essence
of religion" might also do. The early aphorisms of this chapter are exactly what
we expect of Nietzsche and they "anticipate" the sustained arguments of his
Genealogy of Morals. Nietzsche's critique of Christianity is unrelenting and
vitriolic. Yet aphorism #49 betrays Nietzsche's actual direction. "What is amazing
about the religiosity of the ancient Greeks is the enormous abundance of gratitude
it exudes: it is a very noble type of man that confronts nature and life in this
way. Later, when the rabble gained the upper hand in Greece, fear became rampant
in religion, too --- and the ground was prepared for Christianity." The religious
as such can be a powerful instrument in human and cultural development if it is in
noble hands and devoted to positive life-affirming ends. This idea is amplified
and completed in the concluding aphorisms (#61 and #62). "The philosopher as we
understand him . . . will make use of religions for his project of cultivation and
education, just as he will make use of whatever political and economic states are
at hand." There are genuine virtues to religion when in the right hands and
directed toward to right purposes. The problem, of course, is that Christianity
precisely lost its "right purposes" and focused, instead, on those who suffer and
brought everything downward in pitying. "In a total accounting," Nietzsche says,
"the sovereign religions we have had so far are among the chief causes that have
kept the type "man" on a lower rung --- they have preserved too much of what ought
to perish." The outcome, far from a "cultivated" type of human, is "a smaller,
almost ridiculous type, a herd animal, something eager to please, sickly, and
mediocre . . . the European of today." Not only is the "religious" itself not
unfit for Nietzsche's plan, but he outlines the general form of his "religious
life" in #295, at the book's end, where he identifies it with "no less a one than
the god Dionysus, that great ambiguous one and tempter god."

After his "Epigrams and Interludes," Nietzsche begins his main task, a critique of
morality. The historical efforts have all been aimed at providing a rational
foundation of morality and not at offering a critique of morality itself. We
naturally assume that moral prescriptions exist; the only issue, therefore, is how
we are informed about them and why we must feel obligated to adhere to them.
"Every morality," says Nietzsche, "is . . . a bit of tyranny against 'nature';
also against 'reason'."

Having said this much, Nietzsche begins the real natural history of morals at #194
where he notes that we not only live under different "tablets of goods" but that
we also differ "in what [we] take for really having and possessing something
good." Morality evolves out of the self-protective urges of the herd. Fear is "the
mother of morals." "Everything that elevates an individual above the herd and
intimidates the neighbor is henceforth called evil." The "good" is appropriated
from its former, nobler origins and identified, instead, with community or herd.
The pathology of all this can be seen in the Judeo-Christian religions and, then,
in the movement toward democracies. Nietzsche's comments regarding democracy (end
of #202) are especially interesting. While we like to think of ourselves creating
and maintaining "free societies," Nietzsche proposes that, "in fact they are at
one with the lot in their thorough and instinctive hostility to every other form
of society except that of the autonomous herd." [Is this why virtually all fascist
states arise out of democracies?] How "free" are democracies? Nietzsche claims,
"they are at one in their tough resistance to every special claim, every special
right and privilege (which means in the last analysis, every right . . .)."
Freedom as truly "individuation" is really not a value in Christianity or
democracy. We are much more secure if everyone conforms to our own self-imposed
limits. Indeed, we are more secure if we imagine (with some degree of bad
conscience) that these limits are ancient and traditional rather than self-
imposed. Then, we don't have to blame ourselves for our timidity and we can feel
virtuous in freely criticizing others.

The material presented in "We Scholars" is essential to the overall project. After
all, where Nietzsche makes reference to "new philosophers upcoming" and similar
expressions, aren't we led to believe that the overman lies in some familiar
academic direction. The chapter, then, is a disappointing summary of the ills of
contemporary scholarship, and no one --- philosopher or scientist --- gets off
without rejection.

It is a chance to look around and at ourselves, today, and to take in what we are
all about. What really do scientists and philosophers aim at today? How is our
"embrace of truth" motivated? Nietzsche suggests there is bad conscience here as
well as in morality. In the end, however, the chapter delivers few answers to many
questions. In the end, philosophy cannot be taught but has to arise out of blood
and experience. At best it is "cultivated" but by what. The leading message seems
to be an attack against "objectivity" and "skepticism." Both of these create
separation and remoteness. Nietzsche desires engagement and a self-confident
"subject." The problem is not in being "interested;" the problem lies in denying
our "interests" and acting disinterested with bad conscience. We need commitment,
not timidity.

Moving along to his chapter, "Our Virtues," Nietzsche has further opportunities to
suggest what it is that characterizes his philosophers of the future. Will even
they have their "virtues," and what will these be? All of this is, of course,
preceded by a fairly typical tirade on the shallowness of all virtues, as
exhibited past and present. Whenever goodness is connected with a human
characteristic or capacity, mustn't we explore it critically and especially
examine it for all kinds of "bad faith." On the positive side, Nietzsche continues
his consistent suggestion that "our virtues" must include risk taking, hardness,
and a tolerance for pain. We must be severe even when that may result in pain to
others. These are discussions that understandably create suspicion that Nietzsche
really did believe in cruel conquests and a thirst for command over others.

In the end, though, in #230 Nietzsche drives home the central thesis which really
recovers the momentum of The Gay Science. "This will to mere appearance, to
simplification, to masks . . . is countered by that sublime inclination of the
seeker after knowledge who insists on profundity, multiplicity, and thoroughness,
with a will which is a kind of cruelty of the intellectual conscience and taste."
He continues, "indeed, it would sound nicer if we were said, whispered, reputed to
be distinguished not by cruelty but by 'extravagant honesty,' we free, very free
spirits." [bold-face emphasis mine] "Why did we choose this insane task? Or,
putting it differently: 'why have knowledge at all?'" Here, then, is Nietzsche's
life-question. Has he found an answer? In #231, he exclaims, "Learning changes us;
it does what all nourishment does which does not merely 'preserve'." But there is
a kind of "spiritual fate" at the bottom of this will. "A thinker cannot relearn
but only finish learning."

At this point, the chapter takes a bizarre turn. Nietzsche decides to address "a
few truths about 'woman as such'" and, from #232 to the end at #239, he takes on
the "defeminization" of woman. All of this has, of course, become tastelessly
offensive in our own time. How is all of this relevant to "our virtues"? I
suspect, in fact, that it is relevant. Tasteless and offensive as this discussion
is, shouldn't it call our own attention to the virtue of an "extravagant honesty"?
Perhaps all honest inquiries press toward tastelessness and offensiveness because
they press past the socially accepted norms of the age and demand more, even when
it begins to tighten and hurt. Perhaps, in fact, the collective energy of distaste
is a pretty accurate sign to the effect that there is a need for genuine honesty.
This is not to say that Nietzsche was correct in his judgments about woman but it
is, I think, an interesting glimpse at what the problems of honesty may be.
Perhaps these eight aphorisms are not such a bizarre turn at all.

"Peoples and Fatherlands" I leave for cultural historians.

The volume concludes with "What is Noble." It is in this final chapter that
Nietzsche makes clear how he sees the idea of "evil" arising and how, therefore,
we can (and must) step through and beyond the dichotomy of good and evil. All of
this is preliminary to his Genealogy of Morals. His leading assumption is that all
human advancement has occurred because of the nobility of individual humans.
Nietzsche calls these the "aristocracy" but it is a term we have to watch
carefully. It is a class of nobility and not a class of decadence and privilege.
The noble person Nietzsche has in mind is self-aware and self-confident, perhaps
to an extreme.

On the basis of this assumption, Nietzsche posits the evolution of two great moral
systems --- "master morality" and "slave morality." Master morality is constructed
on the basis of nobility and hangs on the general idea that what the noble person
does is "good." There is little or no need for a dichotomous term, "bad," because
it just blankets the rest of what gets done. We simply have the ascent of
excellence and whatever gets in the way is brushed aside or crushed. To excel is
important enough to human advance, the will to life, that the rest is irrelevant
or suppressed. Put crudely, slavery may be essential. As with Nietzsche's
discussion regarding "woman," we are likely to take offense to these ideas because
we imagine ourselves to live under democratic principles/ideals of equality and we
paid dearly in the middle-19th Century to separate ourselves literally from
slavery. But this is an important occasion in which to take Nietzsche's teachings
quite forthrightly and demand the highest truths regarding what we actually are as
a people. American political idealism is probably full of bad conscience!

It is in slave morality, that the dichotomy of good and evil arises and this is
because the slave mentality, out of fear and resistance, needs to make the noble
human "evil." The leading theme of slave morality is to defend against and
destroy, if possible, the nobleman, with all his attitudes and exploitations. It
is also, therefore, the theme of leveling and conformity to a non-threatening
herd-like existence. In Nietzsche's eyes (see #262), the evolution from master
morality to slave morality is virtually an expected part of human natural history.
There simply comes a time when the age of nobility has generated an abundant and
secure society in which the evolution of new egalitarian ideals can occur. The
great acquired power of the aristocracy has given rise to a general empowerment of
the people and mediocrity can come to be idealized. But once the mass man has been
empowered, what then?
[Compare this to Jose Ortega y Gasset's theme in his Revolt of the Masses. These
are questions we should be asking in relation to American politics today, I
suspect. One might want to take seriously Nietzsche's suggestion (#242) that "the
democratization of Europe is at the same time an involuntary arrangement for the
cultivation of tyrants." The tendency toward fascism in Europe was already
apparent in Nietzsche's time and did nothing but live up to Nietzsche's insights
in the next century. Why does fascism so successfully evolve out of democratic
republics? Because it is an easy step from the idealization of mediocrity to the
placement of all power in the image of the truly mediocre politician. Slave
morality becomes state morality.]

It is really this society of decadence in which Nietzsche locates himself and, for
that matter, us. The master morality and its age of self-confident conquerors is
gone and not likely to return; the cultural environment is that of slave morality
and the politics of common tyrants. Nihilism is a natural result of this
decadence. The question, then, is what can be noble in this society. How can a
sub-culture of self-overcoming free spirits emerge? And who will be their gods?
Nietzsche is far from a nihilist, obviously. His free spirits will not be
commanders of people, like the nobility of the past, but rather people who possess
extravagant honesty about all things and the personal courage to step away from
the herd in at least their person acts. (See his #273) [Was #275 written with
Clinton in mind?] What are the virtues of the noble individual? Nietzsche suggests
(in #284) "courage, insight, sympathy, and solitude." [See Kaufmann's footnote
#32.] But we should especially view #287. Nietzsche is rarely so forthcoming with
deliberate formulae! "The noble soul has reverence for itself." The god of this
noble self (#295) is, of course and at long last, Dionysus.