Consociationalism

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Consociationalism .pronounced //0nsoie0n0l10m/2 kn-SOH-shee-AY-shn--lizm3 is a form of government involving guaranteed group representation2 and is often suggested for managing conflict in deeply divided societies4 +t is often viewed as synonymous with power-sharing2 although it is technically only one form of powersharing4567 Consociationalism is often seen as having close affinities with corporatism8 some consider it to 'e a form of corporatism while others claim that economic corporatism was designed to regulate class conflict2 while consociationalism developed on the 'asis of reconciling societal fragmentation along ethnic and religious lines4597 Consociationalism was discussed in academic terms 'y the political scientist Arend $ijphart4 :owever2 $ijphart has stated that he had ;merely discovered what political practitioners had repeatedly < and independently of 'oth academic e perts and one another < invented years earlier;45=7 >ohn Mc"arry and ?rendan (@$eary trace consociationalism 'ac/ to 6A6B2 when it was first employed in the %etherlands45C7 +ndeed2 $ijphart draws heavily on the e perience of the %etherlands in developing his argument in favour of the consociational approach to ethnic conflict regulation4 The %etherlands2 as a consociational state2 was 'etween 6DEB and 6AFB divided into four non-territorial pillarsG Calvinist2 Catholic2 socialist2 and li'eral2 although until 6A6B there was a plurality .@first past the post@3 electoral system rather than a consociational one4 +n their heyday2 each comprised tightly-organised groups2 schools2 universities2 hospitals and newspapers2 all divided along a pillarised social structure4 The theory2 according to $ijphart2 focuses on the role of social elites2 their agreement and co-operation2 as the /ey to a sta'le democracy4 The goals of consociationalism are governmental sta'ility2 the survival of the powersharing arrangements2 the survival of democracy2 and the avoidance of violence4 &hen consociationalism is organised along religious confessional lines2 it is /nown as confessionalism2 as is the case in $e'anon4

Definition
)olitical scientists define a consociational state as a state which has major internal divisions along ethnic2 religious2 or linguistic lines2 with none of the divisions large enough to form a majority group2 yet nonetheless manages to remain sta'le2 due to consultation among the elites of each of its major social groups4 Consociational states are often contrasted with states with majoritarian electoral systems4

Characteristics

$ijphart identifies four /ey characteristics of consociational democraciesG5E7 Name "rand coalition Explanation Elites of each pillar come together to rule in the interests of society 'ecause they recogni1e the dangers of non-cooperation4 Consensus among the groups is reHuired to confirm the majority rule4 Mutuality means that the minority is unli/ely to successfully 'loc/ the majority4 +f one group 'loc/s another on some matter2 the latter are li/ely to 'loc/ the former in return4 Representation is 'ased on population4 +f one pillar accounts for =IJ of the overall society2 then they occupy =IJ of the positions on the police force2 in civil service2 and in other national and civic segments of society4 Creates a sense of individuality and allows for different culturally-'ased community laws4

Mutual veto

)roportionality *egmental autonomy

Consociational polities often have these characteristics5citation needed7G

Coalition ca'inets2 where e ecutive power is shared 'etween parties2 not concentrated in one4 Many of these ca'inets are oversi1ed2 they include parties not necessary for a parliamentary majority8 ?alance of power 'etween e ecutive and legislative8 Decentrali1ed and federal government2 where .regional3 minorities have considera'le independence8 +ncongruent 'icameralism2 where it is very difficult for one party to gain a majority in 'oth houses4 %ormally one cham'er represents regional interests and the other national interests8 )roportional representation2 to allow .small3 minorities to gain representation too8 (rgani1ed and corporatist interest groups2 which represent minorities8 A rigid constitution2 which prevents government from changing the constitution without consent of minorities8 >udicial review2 which allows minorities to go to the courts to see/ redress against laws that they see as unjust8 Elements of direct democracy2 which allow minorities to enact or prevent legislation8 )roportional employment in the pu'lic sector8 A neutral head of state2 either a monarch with only ceremonial duties2 or an indirectly elected president2 who gives up his party affiliation after his election8 Referendums are only used to allow minorities to 'loc/ legislationG this means that they must 'e a citi1en@s initiative and that there is no compulsory voting4 EHuality 'etween ministers in ca'inet2 the prime minister is only primus inter pares8 An independent central 'an/2 where e perts and not politicians set out monetary policies4

Favourable conditions
$ijphart also identifies a num'er of @favoura'le conditions@ under which consociationalism is li/ely to 'e successful4 :e has changed the specification of these conditions somewhat over time45F7 Michael #err summarises $ijphart@s most prominent favoura'le factors asG5B7

*egmental isolation of ethnic communities A multiple 'alance of power The presence of e ternal threats common to all communities (verarching loyalties to the state A tradition of elite accommodation *ocioeconomic eHuality A small population si1e2 reducing the policy load A moderate multi-party system with segmental parties

$ijphart stresses that these conditions are neither indispensa'le nor sufficient to account for the success of consociationalism4 5E7 This has led Rinus van *chendelen to conclude that ;the conditions may 'e present and a'sent2 necessary and unnecessary2 in short conditions or no conditions at all;45D7 >ohn Mc"arry and ?rendan (@$eary argue that three conditions are /ey to the esta'lishment of democratic consociational power-sharingG elites have to 'e motivated to engage in conflict regulation8 elites must lead deferential segments8 and there must 'e a multiple 'alance of power2 'ut more importantly the su'cultures must 'e sta'le4 5A7 Michael #err2 in his study of the role of e ternal actors in power-sharing arrangements in %orthern +reland and $e'anon2 adds to Mc"arry and (@$eary@s list the condition that ;the e istence of positive e ternal regulating pressures2 from state to non-state actors2 which provide the internal elites with sufficient incentives and motives for their acceptance of2 and support for2 consociation;45B7

dvantages
+n a consociational state2 all groups2 including minorities2 are represented on the political and economic stage4 *upporters of consociationalism argue that it is a more realistic option in deeply divided societies than integrationist approaches to conflict management4 56I7 +t has 'een credited with supporting successful and non-violent transitions to democracy in countries such as *outh Africa45citation needed7

Criticisms
!rian !arry

?rian ?arry has Huestioned the nature of the divisions that e ist in the countries that $ijphart considers to 'e @classic cases@ of consociational democracies4 !or e ample2 he ma/es the case that in the *wiss e ample2 ;political parties cross-cut cleavages in the society and provide a picture of remar/a'le consensus rather than highly structured conflict of goals;45667 +n the case of the %etherlands2 he argues that ;the whole cause of the disagreement was the feeling of some Dutchman444that it mattered what all the inha'itants of the country 'elieved4 Demands for policies aimed at producing religious or secular uniformity presuppose a concern444for the state of grace of one@s fellow citi1ens;4 :e contrasts this to the case of a society mar/ed 'y conflict2 in this case %orthern +reland2 where he argues that ;the inha'itantsKhave never shown much worry a'out the prospects of the adherents of the other religion going to hell;4 5697 ?arry concludes that in the Dutch case2 consociationalism is tautological and argues that ;the relevance of the @consociational@ model for other divided societies is much more dou'tful than is commonly supposed;45667

"inus van #chendelen

Lan *chendelen has argued that $ijphart uses evidence selectively4 )illarisation was ;seriously wea/ening2; even in the 6AEIs2 cross-denominational co-operation was increasing2 and formerly coherent political su'-cultures were dissolving4 :e argued that elites in the %etherlands were not motivated 'y preferences derived from the general interest2 'ut rather 'y self-interest4 They formed coalitions not to forge consociational negotiation 'etween segments 'ut to improve their parties@ respective power4 :e argued that the %etherlands was ;sta'le; in that it had few protests or riots2 'ut that it was so 'efore consociationalism2 and that it was not sta'le from the standpoint of government turnover4 :e Huestioned the e tent to which the %etherlands2 or indeed any country la'elled a consociational system2 could 'e called a democracy2 and whether calling a consociational country a democracy isn@t somehow ruled out 'y definition4 :e 'elieved that $ijphart suffered severe pro'lems of rigor when identifying whether particular divisions were cleavages2 whether particular cleavages were segmental2 and whether particular cleavages were cross-cutting45D7

Lustic$ on hegemonic control

+an $ustic/ has argued that academics lac/ an alternative @control@ approach for e plaining sta'ility in deeply divided societies and that this has resulted in the empirical overe tension of consociational models456=7 $ustic/ argues that $ijphart has ;an impressionistic methodological posture2 fle i'le rules for coding data2 and an indefatiga'le2 rhetorically seductive commitment to promoting consociationalism as a widely applica'le principle of political engineering;56C72 that results in him applying consociational theory to case studies that it does not fit4 !urthermore2 $ustic/ states that ;$ijphart@s definition of @accommodation@444includes the ela'orately specified claim that issues dividing polari1ed 'locs are settled 'y leaders convinced of the need for settlement;456C7

%ther criticisms

Critics point out that consociationalism is dangerous in a system of differing antagonistic ideologies2 generally conservatism and communism45citation needed7 They state that specific conditions must e ist for three or more groups to develop a multi-party system with strong leaders4 This philosophy is dominated 'y elites2 with those masses that are sidelined with the elites having less to lose if war 'rea/s out4 Consociationalism cannot 'e imperially applied4 !or e ample2 it does not effectively apply to Austria4 Critics also point to the failure of this line of reasoning in $e'anon2 a country that reverted 'ac/ to civil war4 +t only truly applies in *wit1erland2 ?elgium and the %etherlands2 and not in more deeply divided societies4 +f one of three groups gets half plus one of the vote2 then the other groups are in perpetual opposition2 which is largely incompati'le with consociationalism4 Consociationalism focuses on diverging identities such as ethnicity instead of integrating identities such as class2 institutionali1ing and entrenching the former4 !urthermore2 it relies on rival co-operation2 which is inherently unsta'le4 +t focuses on intrastate relations and neglects relations with other states4 Donald $4 :orowit1 argues that consociationalism can lead to the reification of ethnic divisions2 since ;grand coalitions are unli/ely2 'ecause of the dynamics of intraethnic competition4 The very act of forming a multiethnic coalition generates intraethnic competition < flan/ing < if it does not already e ist;456E7 Consociationalism assumes that each group is cohesive and has strong leadership4 Although the minority can 'loc/ decisions2 this reHuires 6II per cent agreement4 Rights are given to communities rather than individuals2 leading to over-representation of some individuals in society and under-representation of others4 "rand coalitions are unli/ely to happen due to the dynamics of ethnic competition4 Each group see/s more power for itself4 Consociationalists are critici1ed for focusing too much on the set up of institutions and not enough on transitional issues which go 'eyond such institutions4 !inally2 it is claimed that consociational institutions promote sectarianism and entrench e isting identities4

Examples
The political systems of a num'er of countries operate on a consociational 'asis2 including2 ?elgium2 $e'anon2 The %etherlands .from 6A6B until 6AFB32 *wit1erland and %igeria4 *ome academics have also argued that the European ,nion resem'les a consociational democracy456F756B7 Additionally2 a num'er of peace agreements are consociational2 including the Dayton Agreement that ended the 6AA9-6AAE war in ?osnia and :er1egovina2 which is descri'ed as a ;classic e ample of consociational settlement; 'y *umantra ?ose56D7 and ;an idealtypical consociational democracy; 'y Ro'erto ?elloni256A7 and the ?elfast Agreement of 6AAD in %orthern +reland59I7 .and its su'seHuent reinforcement with 9IIF@s *t Andrews Agreement32 which ?rendan (@$eary descri'es as ;power-sharing plus;45967