8

th
EPRI Turbine-Generator Conference, August 25-27, 2003, Nashville, Tennessee 1
L-0 BLADE FAILURE INVESTIGATION
AT SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT

Darryl A. Rosario
Structural Integrity Associates, Inc.
3315 Almaden Expressway, Suite 24
San Jose, California 95118

ABSTRACT
A last-stage (L-0) turbine blade failure was experienced at South Texas Project Unit 2 shortly after
restart from the Fall 2002 refueling outage. This unit has one high-pressure turbine and three tandem-
compound low-pressure turbines with 40-inch last-stage blades. The blade that failed was in the middle
LP turbine (LP22) and subsequent non-destructive examination indicated that approximately half of the
266 blades in the L-0 row of this turbine had cracks. A significant number of L-0 blades in LP turbine
connected to the HP (LP23) also had cracks but the LP turbine connected to the generator (LP21) was
crack free. Inspections performed during the prior Unit 2 outage in Spring 2001 had identified two
cracked blades in LP23. Laboratory evaluation of the cracking from both outages indicates the failure
mechanism to be high cycle fatigue (HCF), initiating at the trailing edge, concave side of the steeple
outermost fillet radius.
Structural Integrity Associates (SI) was contracted to assist with the L-0 blade failure investigation. The
investigation included a comprehensive testing, analysis and monitoring program to identify the root
cause of the cracking and to help identify remedial measures.
This paper provides an overview of the L-0 failure investigation, which led to the identification of
torsional vibrations near 120 Hz as the primary contributor to the observed failure and the development
of fracture-mechanics-based vibration limits and on-line monitoring to ensure that this type of failure
would not reoccur.
8
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EPRI Turbine-Generator Conference, August 25-27, 2003, Nashville, Tennessee 2
INTRODUCTION
STP Nuclear Operating Company operates two Westinghouse PWR units rated at 1300 MW each at
South Texas Project. Each unit has one HP turbine and three tandem-compound six-flow Westinghouse
BB380 LP turbines with 40-inch last stage blades (TC6F40). Units 1 and 2 started commercial
operation in August 1988 and July 1989, respectively.
On December 15, 2002 an LP turbine blade failure was experienced at STP Unit 2 after 11 days of
operation following restart from the Fall 2002 refueling outage (2REO9). This unit has three LP
turbines, designated LP21 (connected to the generator), LP22 (middle), and LP23 (connected to the HP
turbine). The blade that failed was #127 in the last (L-0) row Governor-End of LP22, as shown in
Figure 1. Subsequent NDE revealed that approximately half of the 266 blades in L-0 row of this turbine
had cracks. A significant number of blades in LP23 were cracked as well, but LP21 was crack free.
Inspections performed during the prior Unit 2 outage in March 2001 (2REO8) had identified two
cracked blades in LP23. Laboratory evaluation of the cracking from both outages indicated the failure
mechanism to be high cycle fatigue (HCF), initiating at the trailing edge, concave side of the steeple
outermost fillet radius. The failed L-0 blade was located in the middle of the group. It punctured a hole
in the exhaust flow guide and caused some collateral damage to the adjacent blades in the group.
Structural Integrity Associates was contracted by STP to assist with the L-0 blade failure investigation.
The investigation included a comprehensive testing, analysis and monitoring program to identify the
root cause of the cracking and to prevent additional blade failures.
This paper summarizes the L-0 failure investigation, which led to the identification of torsional
vibrations near 120 Hz as the primary contributor to the observed failure, the development of fracture-
mechanics-based vibration limits and implementation of on-line monitoring to ensure that this type of
failure would not reoccur.
INITIAL SITE VISIT
Following the initial failure, SI visited the site to collect available information relevant to the failure and
to develop recommendations for follow-on testing and analysis to mitigate the risk of additional blade
failures. Figure 1 shows the failed blade (#127) in the turbine and the crack initiation site. The fracture
surface is shown in Figure 2 with various features identified by metallographic examination.

Figure 1. Location of Failed L-0 Blade and Crack Initiation Site (Arrow).
8
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EPRI Turbine-Generator Conference, August 25-27, 2003, Nashville, Tennessee 3









A Origin area with beach marks, which are not obvious in these photos
B Area with no clear beach marks
C Area with heavy beach marks
D Area with very few to no obvious beach marks
E Area of final overload (white line)
Figure 2. Photograph of Fracture Surface Identifying Regions and Measurement Locations used in the
Metallurgical Analysis.

Principal conclusions based on metallographic examination of the failed blade and preliminary
stress/fracture mechanics calculations were: (i) the failure was due to high-cycle fatigue, (ii) a series of
intermittent events or load changes (about 30, based on the number of beach marks) contributed to the
crack propagation, (iii) vibratory stresses on the order of 6 ksi would have been sufficient to propagate
a 0.050-inch initial crack. Follow-on recommendations to identify the root-cause and develop
mitigation strategies included blade-tip and torsional vibration monitoring, bladed-disk dynamic
analysis and modal testing, torsional vibration analysis, material testing and additional fractography.
With the exception of blade-tip vibration monitoring and torsional modal analysis, which was performed
by the OEM, key elements of the testing, analysis and monitoring program implemented by SI are
described below.
L-0 BLADED-DISK DYNAMIC EVALUATION
The objective was to assess whether the dynamic response characteristics of the L-0 bladed-disk row
could have contributed in any way to the observed failure. This evaluation included both modal testing
and a finite element dynamic analysis, performed by STI Technologies Inc., under sub-contract to SI.
The L-0 row has a total of 133 blades in 19 groups of 7, with the 7-blades in each group connected by 3
tiewires. Zero speed testing included a roving impact-hammer modal test of one 7-blade group,
followed by a modal analysis of 70 blades in the row (more than one half of the row). Modal test and
FE results are summarized in Table 1. The FE model representing one L-0 blade sector along with the 3
tiewires, generated using the EPRI BLADE code [1] is shown in Figure 3.
A
B
C
D
E
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EPRI Turbine-Generator Conference, August 25-27, 2003, Nashville, Tennessee 4

Figure 3. 3D FE Model of L-0 Bladed Disk.

Table 1. Summary of L-0 Bladed-Disk Natural Frequencies
Mode # Mode Shape/Family 0 RPM Test 0 RPM FEA 1800 RPM FEA
1 First Tangential 59.2 - 62.7 55.67 - 55.74 77.12 - 77.27
2 First Axial 107 - 131 129.77 - 133.66 142.52 - 147.31
3 Torsional ('X') 157 - 166 150.94 - 152.45 169.12 - 170.72
4 U' Mode 209 - 224 222.30 - 222.40 251.47 - 251.57
5 Second Tangential 309.02 - 322.76 335.48 - 350.59
6 Second Axial

225 -265
366.95 - 368.11 403.59 - 404.65

The results in Table 1 show that these modes are reasonably well tuned. Dynamic stresses due to
possible resonance of the 5
th
(145.57 Hz) or 8
th
(251.56 Hz) nodal diameter modes, for a 3% stimulus
level, yielded maximum resonant stresses in the root of less than 1.6 ksi. Therefore, bladed-disk
dynamic characteristics of the L-0 row were assessed to be a non-contributor to the observed failures.
The location of the maximum stresses in the blade root due to steady and dynamic loading, however,
was consistent with the observed crack initiation site trailing edge, concave side at the outermost fillet
radius. Simulation of a unit rotational acceleration of 10 radians/sec
2
yielded a maximum stress of 1381
psi at the location of the observed cracking, and maximum blade tip tangential deflection of 0.007973
inch. These 3D FE stresses and blade tip deflections were used in the development of vibration limits.

8
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EPRI Turbine-Generator Conference, August 25-27, 2003, Nashville, Tennessee 5
MATERIAL TESTING AND FRACTOGRAPHY
This evaluation included fatigue crack growth testing and fractography, fracture toughness, and, tensile
property testing of the 17-4 PH L-0 blade material to determine these critical material properties, for
input to fracture mechanics calculations and for comparison with available literature data. Average
yield and tensile strengths of 109 and 143 ksi were measured per ASTM E8, with a 20% elongation and
66% reduction of area. An average fracture toughness of 128 ksiinch (117 min, 141 max) was
measured per ASTM E813. Fatigue crack growth test results, per ASTM E647, are shown in Figure 4,
along with literature data [2] for comparison. A fit of the test data to the Paris equation, da/dN=C K
n
,
yielded a coefficient, C =3.371e-10, and an exponent, n = 3.0, for crack growth in inch/cycle and K in
ksiinch. In summary, tensile and fracture property test results agreed well with available literature data
for 17-4 PH blade material.
Summary of Fatigue Crack Growth Data
1.0E-09
1.0E-08
1.0E-07
1.0E-06
1.0E-05
1.0E-04
1 10 100
K (ksi.inch)
d
a
/
d
N

(
i
n
/
c
y
c
l
e
)
Lit. Data (Dry Argon)
Lit. Data (100% Humidity)
HCF Tests [R~0.8]
HCF Tests [R~0.5]
Test Specimen Striation Counts
Fit of Test Specimen Striation Counts
Failed Blade Striation Counts

Figure 4. Fatigue Crack Growth Test Results versus Fractography Striation Counts.

Detailed fractographic examination of FCG test specimens was performed to develop a correlation
between observed (apparent) striation spacing and stress intensity factor range (K) to estimate the
magnitude of vibratory loading in the failed blade. Results, which are also included in Figure 4, indicate
that K values for a majority of the failed blade fracture surface were in the range of 12 to 17 ksiinch,
implying very rapid crack propagation rates during the intervals between beach-marks on the fracture
surfaces. At this crack growth rate, and a vibration frequency of 120 Hz, the crack could traverse the
spacing between beach-marks in about one hour. Given the fact that there were about thirty fatigue
beach-marks on the fracture surface, there could have been thirty or so periods of very high amplitude
vibration, with durations of about an hour or so, during the 18-month period of operation prior to the
failure.
8
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EPRI Turbine-Generator Conference, August 25-27, 2003, Nashville, Tennessee 6
FRACTURE-MECHANICS-BASED VIBRATION LIMITS
The objective was to develop fracture-mechanics-based vibration limits to prevent future L-0 blade
failures. Blade failure includes two stages of damage: (i) Initiation: This phase includes the
accumulation of damage due to strain-cycling leading to the initiation of a crack. A fatigue damage
summation approach can be used to estimate the cumulative number of cycles to crack initiation, and,
(ii) Propagation: The next phase includes propagation of an initiated (or an existing) crack to failure due
to cyclic loading. For both these phases, there exists a cyclic load threshold below which an infinite
number of cycles can be sustained without damage. For initiation, this limit is known as the endurance
limit of the material, which is typically used in the design stage along with an appropriate safety margin
to ensure that cracking will not initiate during the life of the part. For the crack propagation phase, most
steels exhibit a fatigue crack growth threshold (K
th
) below which crack propagation is insignificant [3].
Because the detailed strain-cycling history of the blades in service was unknown, and, to account for
detectability limits of the surface NDE methods (eddy-current, magnetic particle) used to inspect the
blade roots, K
th
was used to develop vibration limits to assure non-propagation of a small (
1
/16-inch)
existing crack. Based on test and literature data for high levels of mean stress, K
th
values in the range
of 2.0 to 3.0 were evaluated. Stresses from the 3D FE analysis were input to SIs pc-CRACK fracture
mechanics computer code [4] to calculate stress intensity factors for a range of vibratory stress levels.
The resulting vibration limits in terms of torsional acceleration and blade tip deflection are shown in
Figure 5.
(a) Torsional Displacement (b) Blade-Tip Deflection
Figure 5. Fracture-Mechanics-Based Vibration Limits.

TORSIONAL VIBRATION MONITORING
In parallel with the testing and analysis work, SIs Transient Torsional Vibration Monitoring System
(TTVMS) [5] was installed in Unit 2 in time for the January 2003 restart. Sensors included two zero-
speed proximity probes and two magnetic rotational speed probes at the turning gear, and, one magnetic
probe at the HP-gear. In addition, the three phases of generator current were recorded. The gear-probe
signals were frequency-demodulated with a National Instruments SCXI 1126 8-channel, frequency
conversion card on a bandwidth of 320 Hz. The analog output of the SCXI-1126 were fed to a SCXI-
1141 anti-alias filter and amplification card. The noise level at 120 Hz with the plant at zero power and
the rotor at 1800rpm was 0.0084 radians/second peak for the magnetic probes. All signals were anti-
alias filtered, AC coupled and simultaneously acquired at a rate of 1024 samples per second per channel.
The recorded bandwidth was approximately 1 Hz to 300 Hz. The raw time-history data is stored
Threshold Flaw Sizes for Crack Propagation - Frequencies Near 120 Hz
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.10
0.11
0.12
0.13
0.14
0.15
0.16
0.17
0.18
0.19
0.20
0.000 0.010 0.020 0.030 0.040 0.050 0.060 0.070 0.080 0.090 0.100 0.110 0.120 0.130 0.140 0.150
Torsional Vibration Amplitude (mRad @ 120 Hz)
A
l
l
o
w
a
b
l
e

C
r
a
c
k

S
i
z
e

(
i
n
c
h
)
Kth=3 (WH)
Kth=3 (SI, Flaw Depth/Length=0.1 to 0.5)
Kth=2 (SI, Flaw Depth/Length=0.1 to 0.5)
NDE Detectability (~ 0.06 inch Depth)
Alarm 1 (FCG Threshold Exceeded)
Alarm 2 (FCG Level Very High)
Vib. Level: HIGH
(0.050 - 0.100 mRad)
DO NOT EXCEED
24 HOURS
Vib. Level: VERY HIGH
(above 0.100 mRad)
SHUTDOWN IF
> 10 HOURS
Vib. Level: LOW
(below 0.050 mRad)
SAFE TO OPERATE
IN THIS REGION
Threshold Flaw Sizes for Crack Propagation - Frequencies Near 120 Hz
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.10
0.11
0.12
0.13
0.14
0.15
0.16
0.17
0.18
0.19
0.20
0.000 0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020 0.025 0.030 0.035 0.040 0.045 0.050 0.055 0.060 0.065
L-0 Blade Tip Vibration Amplitude (inch @ 120 Hz)
A
l
l
o
w
a
b
l
e

C
r
a
c
k

S
i
z
e

(
i
n
c
h
)
Kth=3 (WH)
Kth=3 (SI, Flaw Depth/Length=0.1 to 0.5)
Kth=2 (SI, Flaw Depth/Length=0.1 to 0.5)
NDE Detectability (~ 0.06 inch Depth)
Alarm 1 (FCG Threshold Exceeded)
Alarm 2 (FCG Level Very High)
0.023 0.045
Vib. Level: HIGH
(0.023 - 0.045 inch)
DO NOT EXCEED
24 HOURS
Vib. Level: VERY HIGH
(above 0.045 inch)
SHUTDOWN IF
> 10 HOURS
Vib. Level: LOW
(below 0.023 inch)
SAFE TO OPERATE
IN THIS REGION
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EPRI Turbine-Generator Conference, August 25-27, 2003, Nashville, Tennessee 7
directly to disk in binary format. The monitoring part of the system was set up to trigger when a signal
exceeds a specified alarm level (initially set at 0.05 mRad or 0.038 Rad/sec at 120 Hz). Upon
triggering, one minute of data is recorded for all channels with 10 seconds prior to the trigger, and 50
seconds after the trigger included in the data file.
January 2003 Startup: Power and torsional vibration trends recorded by SIs TTVMS system are shown
in Figure 6 for the Unit 2 January startup.
Power & Torsional Vibration Trends for Unit 2 1/22/03 Startup
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1/22/03 0:00 1/22/03 12:00 1/23/03 0:00 1/23/03 12:00 1/24/03 0:00 1/24/03 12:00 1/25/03 0:00
Time
P
e
r
c
e
n
t

E
l
e
c
t
r
i
c
a
l
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.20
T
o
r
s
i
o
n
a
l

D
i
s
p
l
.

(
m
R
a
d
)
%Power
Avg. Displ. (mRad) at 120 Hz
Max. Displ. (mRad) at 120 Hz
Alarm 1 (0.05 mRad: Threshold)
Alarm 2 (0.1 mRad: High)
Alarm 3 (0.15 mRad: Very High)

Figure 6. Power and Torsional Vibration Trends for January 2003 Startup.

Immediately following synchronization to the grid at about 10% power, vibration levels increased above
the 0.05 mRad threshold and then reduced to a level below 0.03 mRad until the power level reached
about 70%. Above this power level, vibration levels increased dramatically above SIs fracture-
mechanics-based vibration limits, with peak levels as high as 0.20 mRad at 120 Hz after 100% power
was attained. STP initiated a power reduction in an attempt to reduce torsional vibration levels. This
failed to reduce vibration levels and STP decided to shut the plant down. Following shutdown,
inspection of the L-0 blades indicated numerous cracks in the root area of LP22 (61 cracks) and LP23 (8
cracks), validating SIs fracture-mechanics-based vibration limits. Had the plant not been shut down, SI
calculated that these cracked L-0 blades would have failed within 24 to 48 hours of additional operation
at these elevated vibration levels.
To mitigate the high vibration levels recorded during the January 2003 startup, the OEM was tasked
with performing modifications to the LP rotors to de-tune torsional vibration modes at/near 120 Hz.
These included modifying the L-0 disk contour to increase flexibility and the addition of mass-rings to
two of the jackshafts connecting the LPs. Additional off-line vibration testing was scheduled prior to
restart in March 2003 to confirm that torsional modes close to 120 Hz had been de-tuned. Testing
indicated that the closest mode to 120 Hz was at 119 Hz. Following ascension to full power, peak
torsional vibration levels remained well below SIs recommended limits. With the exception of five
very brief torsional transient events, which lasted a total of about 4 seconds, Unit 2 has been operating
successfully below the vibration limits without any further L-0 blade failures.
8
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EPRI Turbine-Generator Conference, August 25-27, 2003, Nashville, Tennessee 8
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A comprehensive testing, analysis and monitoring program was implemented by SI to help STP
determine the root cause of the L-0 blade failure and to develop vibration limits to prevent future
failures. Torsional vibrations at 120 Hz were identified as the principal contributor to the failure.
Fracture-mechanics-based vibration limits proved to be effective in preventing imminent L-0 blade
failure following initial restart of Unit 2. Continuous torsional vibration monitoring has been
implemented for both units to guard against future blade failures.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author would like to thank all the STP personnel who assisted with this investigation, and in
particular, the following SI personnel - Peter Riccardella, Wendy Weiss, Larry Dorfman and Miroslav
Trubelja, who contributed to various phases of the investigation.

REFERENCES
1. BLADE-ST Users Manual, STI Technologies Inc., Version 4.2R, 2002.
2. H. J. Rack and D. Kalish, The Strength, Fracture Toughness, and Low Cycle Fatigue Behavior of
17-4 PH Stainless Steel, Metallurgical Transactions, Vol.5, July 1974-1595.
3. J. M. Barsom and S. T. Rolfe, Fracture and Fatigue Control in Structures, Second Edition,
Prentice-Hall Inc., 1987.
4. pc-CRACK
TM
for Windows Version 3.1, Structural Integrity Associates Fracture Mechanics
Software, 2000.
5. TTVMS, Structural Integritys Transient Torsional Vibration Monitoring System, Users Manual,
2003.