ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo
Quezon City

ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCE

AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
NATIONAL POLICY

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COURSE CLASS 53

BY

SEMINAR GOLF

16 September 2009

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and does not necessarily
reflect the views of the AFPCGSC. This document may not be released for open publication
until it has been cleared by the College.
Page | 2
 CONTENTS

Introduction – The bureaucracy and military as

instruments of national policy
Measuring National Power provides a country-specific
dynamic process where security is finite and safety is a
function of possessing a differential advantage in military
power which is a necessary strategy to balance or equalize
another entity’s power.

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I. The politico-administrative dichotomy of

Israel
National power can be defined simply as the capacity of a
country to pursue strategic goals through purposeful action. It
therefore presupposes a model which is defined by four
interrelated systems which determine the nation’s capacity to
transform its resources to the effective combination of civilian
and military possible.

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II. The role of defense industry of Israel

in building national capability
With increasing competition from the major world
aerospace players, Israeli companies tend to specialize in
niche markets, or have sought to combine forces through
mergers or joint marketing efforts.

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III. Israel Defense Force: History,

Resources, customs and traditions
In Israel, the military is one of the most respected
institutions in Israeli society and has long been a unifying
agent for the many groups comprising Israel’s diverse
population.

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Conclusion

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 The examination of military capability as a vector of
national policy is patterned analogously to the larger
framework for assessing national power.

Page 11

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 Introduction: The bureaucracy and military as
instruments of national policy
The economic fundamentals of production contend that
for any given country, notwithstanding the state-society
structure would focus on minimum production of
intermediate goods (goods which are used as inputs i.e.
steel) to maximize military capability to reduce insecurity at
the maximum degree. 1 It is therefore logical to expect that a
country facing serious threats to concentrate considerable
degree of its resources on national defense since it is
essentially a non-rival and non-excludable public good.
Moreover, increasing tension within a country could be
effectively managed by ensuring adequate support from the
military and other enforcement agencies to maintain and
uphold peace and order which will complement our national
policies at the local level. (SSR, 2001; PFIF, 2009; Mobekk,
2006)

Figure 1 Map of
This scenario is widely observed in Africa, Russia,
Israel China, and most of Asia. This partly explains the fiscal imbalances
in terms of military spending as against sectors in support of human development.
While the debate of which sector should be considered as a main priority in national
objectives is arguable, countries which are vulnerable to attacks internally and
externally are tolerated for their discretion.
Meanwhile, politico-military instruments such as technology, arms control and
countering WMD, defense engagements for peacekeeping, international defense
security engagements, as well as peacekeeping operations all
necessitate resources, financial, human capital, and a
prominent drive for innovation. These resources elicit
unconventional responses to emerging threats such as
terrorism, insurgency, drug trafficking, and human
displacement. The likelihood that the response would be
effective and adequate when security issues arise is
significantly determined by the available resources to maintain
and sustain the operations of the defense forces. Given this
premise, we find high correlation between high economic
growth, human security, and national development in peaceful
countries as compared to war-stricken nations. (Boswood,
2007) There is also substantial evidence illustrating high
defense spending with effective public policy. (Eschborn, 2005)
While these instruments serve as options for decisionFigure 2 The Ink Flag as
makers who are most likely to uphold the safety and security, ita symbol of Israel’s
victory in 1948
1
Measuring National power provides a country-specific dynamic process where security is
finite and safety is a function of possessing a differential advantage in military power
which is a necessary strategy to balance or equalize another entity’s power. As such, the
defense sector assumes as front liners to ensure national security in aid of national
objectives.
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is also within their best interest to choose the superior but cost-effective methods
that minimize collateral damage or engage in limited military intervention if
necessary. At any given time when national security is put at risk, the military
becomes a key element in the whole-of-government approach to defense and
security.

I. The politico-administrative dichotomy of Israel

National power can be defined simply as the capacity of a country to pursue
strategic goals through purposeful action. The national goals are embodied in the
strategies and policies that steer the nation’s sectors and determines its outcomes at
the national and local levels. In a parliamentary setting, the crafting of the national
policies remains as an executive function while the administration and execution
remains bilaterally at the government and the military. It therefore presupposes a
model which is defined by four interrelated systems which determine the nation’s
capacity to transform its resources to the effective combination of civilian and military
possible (Figure 1).

The bureaucracy and instruments of national policy

The environment The environment

Thepolitical system
Theadministrative
Political parties system
Publicpolicies,
Pressuregroups laws, etc.
Interestgroups Bureaucracy
Resources Military

Executes/ enforces

Thejudicial system Interprets Thepublic/ civilians

Sentiments, publicopinion,behaviour
The environment The environment
Figure 3 The Bureaucracy and instruments
of national policy
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 In the Israeli political spectrum, Israel’s Parliament is based on Basic Law, or
the Knesset, with 120 members elected by secret ballot each with 4-year term. As a
Parliamentary democracy, the key bureaucratic institutions include the Presidency,
the Knesset (parliament), the Government (cabinet), the Judiciary and the State
Comptroller. Suffrage is universally discretionary among Israeli citizens aged 18
years and above provided that they appear in the voter’s list.

Israel’s administrative system is comprised of Groups which are sometimes

associated with the political left or right, especially in international circles, according
to their stance on issues important to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Parties who identify
themselves as neither are considered as centre parties. Interest groups range from
agricultural, feminist, and citizens empowerment to those seeking financial
obligations from the Government.

Although the laws of numbers suggest a struggle between parties, with small
parties possibly disproportionate or barred from the parliaments, formation of
coalitions to overcome the threshold becomes a usual setting. Ironically enough,
these coalitions also accounts for the short life span of the Israeli government as
tedious peace process, religion, and political outrages cause them to break up.
Needless to say, although the civilian supremacy over the military is
rarely challenged, the serious and longstanding external and incidental
threat to Israeli security justifies its massive militarization which gives
rise to the term “garrison democracy”.

The Israel Military Government holds a functional command within the

General Staff as military governors, with a separate civilian administration to
exercise the military powers of the military government including advisory, guidance,
coordinating body, and supervisor of all government ministries, state institutions, and
public authorities in the occupied territories. Needless to say, although the civilian
supremacy over the military is rarely challenged, the serious and longstanding
external and incidental threat to Israeli security justifies its massive militarization
which gives rise to the term “garrison democracy”. As such, it is inevitable that the
military has served as a channel of political interest groups, which entails political
careers to former servicemen during retirement. The Israel Defense Force leaders
eventually climb into the bureaucratic ranks as well as leadership appointments in
public institutions.

The Israel Defense Force is a composite defense army managed by a

General Staff. The Chief of the General Staff, the sole Officer with a rank of
Lieutenant General is recommended in the seat by the Defense Minister and
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appointed by the cabinet with the nod of the Prime Minister of Israel. Given the
power vested upon him, he reports directly to the former and indirectly to the latter.

Meanwhile, the Judiciary is an independent branch of the Government

comprised of three-tier system: The Magistrate Courts, the District courts, and the
Supreme Court.

The separation of powers in the Israeli government preserves the balance in

the formation of national objectives, development and enforcement of national
policies, and the strict compliance of the laws. Although the military plays a
significant role in all aspects of every Israeli life, the dichotomy of the interrelated
systems guarantees that abuse of powers especially to the civil society will be
prevented.

II. The role of defense industry of Israel in building

national capability

Israel’s defense industry was initiated

primarily to respond to the situation previously
described. With the domestic production
fluctuating at an annual range of 5 percent, the
sudden drop at a record low of negative 1
percent in 2002 indicates a significant disaster in
Israel’s economy brought about by the appalling
Israeli-Palestinian conflict where the casualties
reached about 2,309. In this given scenario, the
Israeli government reinstated the role of the
military as civil disorders and terrorism started in
2000, with national policies geared towards
intensifying military capability to respond to the
growing uncertainty and tension not only in the
region but also within the confines of Israel.

Israeli Merkava Mark 4 MBT

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Figure 5 Israel’s economy at
a glance

Israel’s defense industry found its roots in response to the growing hostilities of
the Arab nation. Evolving from small arms manufacturing in 1930’s to a real dealer
as the Israel Military Industry in 1948 for the IDF. Perhaps the major catalyst for the
metamorphosis of the weapons industry came after the six day war and instigated by
the imposition of tariff on imports from France. These events inspired the Israeli
defense industry to nurture its weapons development capability to empower the
nation and to secure its borders from the growing conflict in the region.
There are approximately 150 defense firms in Israel, with combined revenues
of an estimated $3.5 billion. The three largest entities are the government-owned IAI,
IMI and the Rafael Arms Development Authority. Each produces a wide range of
conventional arms and advanced defense electronics. The medium-sized privately
owned companies include Elbit Systems and the Tadiran Group, which focus mainly
on defense electronics. The smaller firms produce a narrower range of products. In
all, the industry employs close to 50,000 people, all of whom share a commitment to
high levels of research and development and the ability to make use of the IDF's
combat experience.

Israel's defense exports are coordinated and regulated through SIBAT. It is a

Foreign Defense Assistance and Defense Export Organization which is run by the
Ministry of Defense. SIBAT's tasks include licensing all defense exports as well as
marketing products developed for the IDF, from electronic components to missile
boats and tanks. Each year, SIBAT publishes a defense sales directory, an
authoritative guide to what the industry has to offer.

With increasing competition from the major world aerospace players, Israeli
companies tend to specialize in niche markets, or have sought to combine forces
through mergers or joint marketing efforts. In addition, declining global defense
spending has provided them with new opportunities as foreign governments seek to
upgrade their existing arsenal rather than buy new equipment.

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 III. Israel Defense Force:
History, Resources,
customs and
traditions
In Israel, the military is one of the
most respected institutions in Israeli
society and has long been a unifying
agent for the many groups comprising
Israel’s diverse population. The mission of
the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is “To
defend the existence, territorial integrity
and sovereignty of the state of Israel. To
protect the inhabitants of Israel and to
combat all forms of terrorism which
threaten the daily lives of its citizens.” In
order to accomplish the IDF mission,
Israel has defined some basic points of IDF doctrine:
• Israel cannot afford to lose a single Figure 6 Israel’s Domestic defense war.
• Conduct strategic level defense withspending
no territorial ambitions.
• Avoid war by political means and a credible deterrent posture.
• Prevent escalation.
• Determine the outcome of war quickly and decisively.
• Combat terrorism.
• Maintain a very low casualty ratio.

Like the other systems in the framework,

the military is a significant determinant of
national capability and is often one of the most
influential and effective instrument in ensuring
that national objectives are met and national
policies are promulgated. More importantly, in a
period of disasters and when events threaten
national security, the defense force responds
most effectively and efficiently. Since the IDF is
at the front lines of Israel, whether in social or
political spectrum, it is treated with high regard asFigure 7 Casualties near one of
Gaza strip
the world’s most advanced and well-equipped countries.

Historically as well as technically, the IDF as a paramilitary organization has

been considered as a defense force for external defense. However, as the concept
of war evolved, the concept of military capability has improved and pushed beyond
what was previously imagined in terms of the effective coercive strength and
advanced munitions. Given the high demand for superior defense capability due to
the persistent tension in the East Asia, the IDF continues to build the world’s most
advanced weapons technology for security. Israel’s capability at present time is far

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beyond its state four decades ago when it has very limited resources that even the
military personnel were deprived of wages. 2

Israel, because of the longstanding wars that were fought, lost, and won, has
developed an intrinsic defense strategy and have learned and adapted to the threat
environment against their adversaries and with emphasis on the external volatilities,
socio-politico-economic uncertainties, the complexities from ‘development’, and
ambiguities that unfold in modern day events.

The Israel Defense Forces or simply the IDF was found following the
establishment of the State of Israel by virtue of Prime Minister David Ben- Gurion’s
order on May 26, 1948. The directive called for the abolition of all other Jewish
armed forces which allowed for the integration of existing forces provided that the
internal affairs, including purchases of arms would be centrally made. (Ben-Gurion,
1971)

Although the IDF keeps its force strength at concentrated numbers, leading
security analysts attest that the IDF ground forces are highly mechanized, with
heavily armed personnel and armored vehicles with modern antitank capabilities and
guided missile systems situated in all strategic points outnumbering the combined
armies of potential aggressors along the mid-section of Asia. With almost 9 percent
of its budget allocated for military spending in 2007, Israel continues to fuel
innovation into the defense sector not only for the advanced capabilities but also to
sustain the fiscal security of the Defense forces and safeguard their morale. (Figure
3) In terms of public-private partnerships as part of national policy, domestic as well
as international firms thrive in the Defense sector. This ensures the continued
development and innovation of the technology, strategy, and capability of the IDF.

2
Global Security.org provides an elaborated discussion of how the IDF managed to survive
notwithstanding the economic deficiency.
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 Figure 8 Israel’s military
spending (% GDP)

18

16 15.40 15.30

14
12.90
12.50

12 11.30
11.60

9.90
10 9.20
8.70 8.60 8.60 8.60
8.50 8.40 8.30 8.20
7.90 7.80 7.90
8 7.70

Source: CIA Fact book, 2009

Consistent with the previous discussions, the IDF was organized by the
government to respond to external threats and to mitigate heavy casualties in Israel
during the Arab-Israeli war when Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Saudi
Arabia and Yemen declared war on Israel. These events led to the rise of Israeli
defense industry, which reaped appreciation and praise in terms of military capability
and as an effective national instrument in upholding the most significant national
policy for all defense forces- to safeguard the peace and security in the nation state.
Without an option to lose in any war, the Government continues to put its defense
sector in the front lines as its main instrument in upholding national policies and
meeting national objectives while diverting most of its national budget in aid of
defense sector development. Upon the end of the 1948 war, the IDF shifted into low
intensity conflict against the previous aggressors. This trend resulted mostly from the
widespread call for peaceful negotiations in view of the International laws which
proscribes war and armed conflict.

With the IDF reaching its height, the strategic acumen is mirrored in the
successful military feats such as 1948 War of Independence, the rapid conquest of
the Sinai in 1956, the daredevil capture of Adolf Eichmann in 1960, the stunning
Israeli triumph at the beginning of the 1967 Six Day War, and the intrepid hostage
rescue at Entebbe in 1976 against a larger backdrop of bloodstained failures such as
the Gaza assault. As such, Israel Defense Force as it appears from its current
activities is focused on restoring its “deterrent” nature.

IV. Conclusions
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 The examination of military capability as a vector of national policy is
patterned analogously to the larger framework for assessing national power. It
identifies the following variables of interest:
Figure 9 Evolution of Israel’s
military strategy

(1)T
he

strategic resources a military receives from the government it serves, which include
defense budgets, manpower, military infrastructure, combat RDT&E institutions, the
defense industrial base, and the war fighting inventory and support;

The national government of Israel puts prime in ensuring the fiscal

sustainability and capability development of the Israel defense force. This strategy is
justified by the significant role of the IDF encompassing various sectors and the
safety of its citizens.

Given this stature, it is the responsibility of the IDF to ensure the fiscal support
is maximized effectively and that cost-effective measures are observed in the
procurement and development of its capabilities to ensure peace and security in and
along the borders of Israel. Moreover, it is in the core function of the IDF to build a
comprehensive defense army that will effectively and efficiently respond to the call
for peace and national security of the bureaucracy.
(2) The variables bearing upon the means by which these resources are
converted into effective capabilities, for example, the threats facing a country and
the strategy developed to cope with them; the structure of civil-military relations, the
density of foreign military-to-military relations, the nature of doctrine, training, and
organization, and, the potential and capacity for innovation; and

Keeping in mind that the Israel’s defense sector was created as a necessity to
respond to the rising hostilities in the Middle East, the IDF plays a critical role in
proper implementation and enforcement of national policies, maintaining a strategic
direction to further its defense capability. Consequently, the role of the military in the
development of national policies is to ensure the consistency and complementarities
of its military capability plans, programs, and strategy.

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 (3) The capabilities of the combat force itself, understood via a spectrum of
war fighting competencies that may be attained to a greater or lesser degree and
which may be compared across countries.

In a national scenario, the IDF’s role in combating the existing and emerging
threats adheres to the Rules of engagement of Israel as well as the internal rules of
war. Given its advanced weapons industry, it is of the Government of Israel’s interest
to safeguard the rights of its citizens through a capable and responsible defense
force. It is therefore imperative that the IDF maintains direct and transparent dealings
that are deemed appropriate and prudent by the Defense ministry and the
Parliament.

(4) The Group recognizes a basic asymmetry between Israel and the
Arab/Iranian world.3

This asymmetry concerns attitudes toward the overall desirability of peace;

the absence of democratic regimes in the Arab/Iranian world; the acceptability of
terror as a legitimate weapon by the Arab/Iranian world; the zero-sum conception of
conflict vis-à-vis Israel held by some states of the Arab/Iranian world; the
overwhelming demographic advantage of the Arab/Iranian world; and the greater
tendency of the Arab/Iranian world to make mistakes in strategic calculations. Taken
as a whole, these asymmetries point toward an intemperate Arab/Iranian plan for
protracted war against Israel that is wedded to an unquenchable desire by some to
develop Weapons of Mass Destruction for use in this war.

In view of the above-mentioned asymmetries, non-conventional exchanges

between Israel and adversary states in the Middle East must be avoided. It is not in
Israel’s interests ever to engage in WMD warfare with these adversary states.
Therefore; Israel must maintain conventional supremacy in the region. This will be
indispensable to maintaining the threshold of WMD warfare at the highest possible
level.

The classic paradigm of war between national armies is becoming less

relevant in the present Middle East. In time, it can be made more efficient for Israel
to increase the emphasis on high-tech solutions (thereby expending fewer
resources).Traditionally, short-range threats (terrorism) and long-range threats
(ballistic missiles and WMD) have been under-evaluated.

The strategic paradigm for Israel must now shift to meet the expanding threats
from terrorism and long-range WMD attacks. In doing so, of course, there must be a
corresponding reduction in the resources Israel can devote to classical war fighting.
Modern technology should allow Israel to reduce its defense expenditure while
maintaining or even enhancing effectiveness and lethality in classical war fighting.
Critical to this transformation in war fighting doctrine are a range of new technologies
such as a drastic increase in weapons’ lethality (ton x miles per target destroyed)
achieved through increased range, precision, warhead efficiency; EW and other
defenses; reduced IR and RF signatures and on course + final percussion (data link)
feed-back. Efficient use of sophisticated weapons is only possible if pre- and post-
strike, real time intelligence, both tactical and strategic is available and accurate, and
3
Israel’s Strategic Future, The Final Report of Project Daniel, Louis René Beres.. April 2004
Page | 14
if strike command, control & communications are computer interfaced with real time
intelligence (C4I).

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References:

Ben-Gurion, David (1971) Israel: A Personal History. New York: Funk and Wagnalls.
Beres, Louis René (2004). Israel’s Strategic Future, The Final Report of Project
Daniel
Boswood, Kate (2007). Linking governance and security: Defence’s role in South
East Asia.
Eschborn (2005) Promoting Good Governance in Post-Conflict Societies. Division
State and Democracy Project on Democracy and the Rule of Law
Gelber, Yoav and Yad Ben Tzvi (1986). Nucleus for a Standing Army.
Herzog, Chaim (1982). The Arab-Israeli Wars. London: Arms and Armour Press.
http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4 (2009)
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2002/6/Facets%20of%20the%20I
sraeli%20Economy-%20The%20Defense%20Industry
Jordan, Jarrett D. (2000) The Trinity in Balance: Israel’s Strategy For Victory In The
Six Day War.
Kessel, Jerrold and Pierre Klochendler (2009) Mideast: Israel at Crossroads
Between Ceasefire and Occupation.
Klieman, Aaron (1987) Israeli Military Exports. Journal of Defense Democracy Vol. 5
No.12.
Lucas, Noah (1974). The Modern History of Israel. London: Weidenfeld and
Nicholson.
Mobekk, Eirin and Stuart Freedman (2006). BINUB: Good Governance, Security
Sector Reform and Enhancing Human Rights Establishing Priorities.
Ostfeld, Zehava (1994). Shiftel, Shoshana. ed. An Army is Born. Israel Ministry of
Defense. ISBN 965-05-0695-0.
Peri, Yoram (2002) The Israel Military and Israel’s Palestinian Policy: From Oslo to
the Al Aqsa Intifada.
Rosenthal, Donna (2003). The Israelis. Free Press. ISBN 0-7432-7035-5.
SIPRI (2001) SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
www.adb.org (2009)
www.globalsecurity.org (2009)
www.worldbank.org (2009)
Yehuda Shif, ed (1982). IDF in Its Corps: Army and Security Encyclopedia (18
volumes). RevivimPublishing.
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 Index of figures

Figure 1 Map of Israel was adopted from mfa.gov.il.................................................................................4

Figure 2 Israel’s victory over Arabian countries was adopted from mfa.gov.il............................................................4

Figure 3 The Bureaucracy and instruments of national policy was formulated by LE Milo-Picar, Ph.D and Prof. Danny Reyes, Ph.D...........5

Figure 5 Israel’s economy at a glance data were consolidated by the authors from the World Bank World Development Indicators Report (2008),

ADB, UNDP.................................................................................................... ...7

Figure 4 Israel’s defense capability was adopted from mfa.gov.il ......................................................................7

Figure 6 Israel’s Domestic defense spending was adopted from mfa.gov.il.............................................................8

Figure 7 Casualties near Gaza strip illustration was adopted from Kessel, Jerrold and Pierre Klochendler (2009)...........................9

Figure 8 Israel’s military spending (% GDP) data used were adopted from CIA facts 2009..............................................10

Figure 9 Evolution of Israel’s military strategy as proposed by Louis René Beres......................................................11

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