MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

Source: U.P. Law Center EFFECT OF AMENDMENT TO A PLEADING Ingr an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land filed in the Regional Trial Court, the defendanDefendant through his lawyer, filed an answer therein admitting the averment in the complaint that the land was acquired y the plaintiff through inheritance from his parents, the former owners thereof. Su sequently, the defendant changed his lawyer and, with leave of court, amended the answer. !n the amended answer, the a ovementioned admission no longer appears" instead, the alleged ownership of the land y the plaintiff was denied coupled with the allegation that the defendant is the owner of the land for the reason that he ought the same from the plaintiff#s parents during their lifetime. $fter trial, the %egional &rial Court rendered a decision upholding the defendant#s ownership of the land. 'n appeal, the plaintiff contended that the defendant is ound y the admission contained in his original answer. !s the contention of plaintiff correct( )hy( SUGGESTED ANSWER NO, ecause pleadings that have een amended disappear from the record, lose their status as pleadings and cease to e *udicial admissions. )hile they may nonetheless e utili+ed as against the pleader as e,tra*udicial admissions, they must, in order to have such effect, e formally offered in evidence. - Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 94) A!TERNATI"E ANSWER YES, ecause an admission in the original pleading does not cease to e a *udicial admission simply ecause it was deleted in an amended pleading. &he original answer, although replaced y an amended answer does not cease to e part of a *udicial record, not having een e,punged therefrom. - Dissenting opinion in Torres vs. Court of Appeals, 1 1 SCRA !4) REMEDIES OF A PARTY DECLARED IN DEFAULT )hat are the availa le remedies of party declared in default: ../ 0efore the rendition of *udgment" .1 2./ $fter *udgment ut efore its finality" and 21 3./ $fter finality of *udgment( 21 SUGGESTED ANSWER &he availa le remedies of a party declared in default are as follows:

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../

0efore the rendition of *udgment -a/ he may file a motion to dismiss under oath to set aside the order of default on the grounds of fraud, accident, mista;e or e,cusa le negligence and that he has a meritorious defense -Sec. 3< = of %ule > /" and if reconsideration is denied, he may file the special civil action of certiorari for grave a use of discretion tantamount to lac; or e,cess of *urisdiction - Sec. . of %ule ?@ /" or - / he may file a petition for certiorari if he has een illegally declared in derfault e.g. during the pendency of his motion to dismiss or efore the e,piration of the time to answer. - 6atute v. C$, 2? SC%$ A?B" $costaC'falia v. Sundial, B@ SC%$ D.2/.

2./ $fter *udgment ut efore its finality, he may file a motion for new trial on the grounds of fraud, accident, mista;e, e,cusa le negligence or a motion for reconsideration on the ground of e,cessive damages, insufficient evidence or the decision or final order eing contrary to law - Sec. 2 of %ule 3A/" and thereafter, if the motion is denied, appeal is availa le under %ules DE or D., whichever is applica le. $fter finality of the *udgment, there are three ways to assail the *udgment, which are: -a/ a petition for relied under %ule 3B on the grounds of fraud, accident, mista;e or e,cusa le negligence" - / annulment of *udgment under %ule DA for e,trinsic fraud or lac; of *urisdiction" -c/ certiorari if the *udgment is void on its face or y the *udicial record. -0alangcad vs. Fustices of the Court of $ppeals, G.%. :o. B3BBB, 8e ruary .2,.>>2, 2E? SC%$ .A. / DEATH OF A PARTY )hat is the effect of the death of a party upon a pending action( SUGGESTED ANSWER )hen the claim in a pending action is purely personal, the death of either of the parties e,tinguishes the claim and the action is dismissed. )hen the claim is not purely personal and is not there y e,tinguished, the party should e su stituted y his heirs or his e,ecutor or administrator. -Sec. .? of %ule 3/. !f the action for recovery of money arising from contract, e,press or implied, and the defendant dies efore the entry of final *udgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not e dismissed ut shall instead e allowed to continue until entry of final *udgment. $ favora le *udgment o tained y the plaintiff shall e enforced in the manner provided in the 3./

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rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. - Sec. 2E of %ule 3/ THIRD PARTY CLAIM; WRIT OF INJUNCTION 5nforcing a writ of e,ecution issued y the Pasig %egional &rial Court in a civil action, the sheriff attached several pieces of machinery and equipment found in defendant#s place of usiness. $ntonio Sadalay filed with the sheriff an affidavit of thirdCparty claim stating that the attached properties elong to him, not to the defendant. -a/ Can Sadalay intervene in the case and as; the Pasig %&C to resolve his thirdCparty claim( - / !f Sadalay decides to file a separate action in the %egional &rial Court in 6a;ati to vindicate his claim, may he validly o tain a writ of in*unction from the 6a;ati %&C to en*oin the sale in e,ecution of the levied properties( SUGGESTED ANSWER a./ NO, Sadalay may not intervene in the case ecause intervention is allowed only efore or during the trial of the case. !n this case there is already a final and e,ecutory *udgment. -Sec. 2, %ule .>" 0ayer Phils. 7s. $gana, ?3 SC%$ 3@@/ However, he may as; the Pasig %&C to resolve preliminarily whether the sheriff acted rightly or wrongly in levying e,ecution on the properties in question. -'ng vs. &ating, .D> SC%$ 2?@/ ./ YES, ecause a *udgment rendered in his favor y the 6a;ati court declaring him to e the owner of the properties levied on would not constitute interference with the powers or processes of the Pasig Court which rendered the *udgment to enforce the e,ecution. !f that is so, an interlocutory order such as the writ of preliminary in*unction against the sheriff, upon a claim and prima facie showing of ownership, cannot e considered as such interference. -A"iera vs. CA, 4# SCRA 14$ S% vs. Disca%a, 1&1 SCRA '&) WRIT OF EXECUTION Plaintiff sued to recover an unpaid loan and was awarded P333,EEE.EE y the %&C of 6anila. Defendant did not appeal within the period allowed y law. He died si, days after the lapse of the period to appeal. 8orthwith, a petition for the settlement of his estate was properly filed with the %&C of Pampanga where an inventory of all his assets was filed and correspondingly approved. &hereafter, plaintiff filed a motion for e,ecution with the 6anila court, contending therein that the motion was legally *ustified ecause the defendant died after the *udgment in the 6anila court had ecome final. %esolve the motion and state your reasons.

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. /Under the same set of facts as -a/, a writ of e,ecution was issued y the 6anila court upon proper motion three days after the lapse of the period to appeal. &he corresponding levy on e,ecution was duly effected on defendant#s parcel of land worth P???,EEE.EE a day efore the defendant died. )ould it e proper, on motion, to lift the levy on defendant#s property( State the reasons for your answer. SUGGESTED ANSWER -a/ 6otion for e,ecution denied. $lthough the defendant died after the *udgment had ecome final and e,ecutory, it cannot e enforced y a writ of e,ecution against the estate of the deceased which is in custodia legis. &he *udgment should e filed as a proven money claim with the %&C of Pampanga. -(aredes vs. )o%a, 61 SCRA #!') - / :o, since the levy on e,ecution was duly effected on defendant#s parcel of land a day efore the defendant died, it was valid. &he land may e sold for the satisfaction of the *udgment and the surplus shall e accounted for y the sheriff to the corresponding e,ecutor or administrator. -Sec. '*c) of Rule 9) COUNTERCLAIM I filed an action for damages against & arising from the latter#s tortuous act. J filed his $nswer with a counterclaim for damages suffered and e,penses incurred on account of I#s suit. &hereafter, I moves to dismiss the case since he lost interest in the case. J did not o *ect. &he court dismissed the action without pre*udice. J moved the to set the reception of his evidence to prove his counterclaim. !f you were the *udge, how would you resolve the motion( 5,plain. SUGGESTED ANSWER ! would deny the motion. !nasmuch as J#s counterclaim for damages incurred on account of I#s suit cannot remain pending for independent ad*udication, J should have o *ected to the dismissal of the complaint. His failure to o *ect deprived him of the right to present evidence to prove his counterclaim. - Sec. ! of Rule 1'$ +notorio v. Lira, 1! SCRA 69 ). ADJUDICATION OF CASES WITHOUT TRIAL Can civil and criminal cases e ad*udicated without trial( 5,plain SUGGESTED ANSWER Civil Cases may e ad*udicated without trial, such as in the following rules: a./ Summary Fudgment ./ Fudgment on the Pleadings

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c./ Summary Procedure d./ Sec. 3 of %ule .A Criminal cases as a rule may not e ad*udicated without trial. Some e,ceptions are the following: a./ Plea of guilty ./ 6otion to quash on the ground of dou le *eopardy or e,tinction of criminal action or lia ility c./ 6otion to dismiss on the ground of violation of the right to a speedy trial. PETITION FOR CERTIORARI; WHEN MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION NOT NECESSARY !s the failure to file a motion for reconsideration in the lower court as a condition precedent for the granting of the writ of certiorari or prohi ition always fatal( 5,plain. SUGGESTED ANSWER NO, ecause there are e,ceptions, such as the following: a./ &he question of *urisdiction was squarely raised efore and decided y the respondent court ./ Pu lic interest is involved c./ Case of urgency d./ 'rder is patent nullity e./ !ssue is purely of law f./ Deprivation of right to due process EXTRA TERRITORIAL SER!ICE OF SUMMONS )hen is e,traCterritorial service of summons proper( SUGGESTED ANSWER 5,traterritorial service of summons is proper when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the su *ect of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in e,cluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has een attached within the Philippines. -Sec. .A of %ule .D/ !t is also proper when the defendant ordinarily resides within the Philippines, ut is temporarily out of it. -Sec. 1& of Rule 14) RES JUDICATA

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5velyn filed a complaint for a sum of money against Foan ut the complaint was later dismissed for failure to prosecute Kwithin a reasona le length of time.L &hereafter, 5velyn filed another case ased on the same facts against Foan. Foan moved to dismiss the same on the ground that the cause of action therein is arred y a prior *udgment -res *udicata/. 5velyn opposed the motion claiming that re *udicata has not set in since Foan was not served with summons and the complaint in the first case was earlier dismissed, so that the trial court never acquired *urisdiction over her person and, consequently, over the case. How would you decide the motion of Foan( 5,plain. SUGGESTD ANSWER &he motion to dismiss is denied. 'ne of the essential requisites of res *udicata is *urisdiction over the parties. !nasmuch as Foan was not served with the summons in the first case which was earlier dismissed, the court did not acquire *urisdiction over her person and, hence, the dismissal was without pre*udice to the filing of another action against her. -%epu lic Planters 0an; vs. 6olina, Septem er 2B, .>BB/ LIFE SPAN OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER )hat is the life span of a temporary restraining order issued y a trial court( 6ay this life span e e,tended( 5,plain fully SUGGESTED ANSWER &he life span of a restraining order is twenty days. &his life span may not e e,tended. $ preliminary in*unction may no longer e granted without notice to the adverse party. However, if it appears that great or irrepara le in*ury would result to the applicant efore his application for preliminary in*unction could e heard on notice, the *udge may issue a temporary restraining order with a limited life span of twenty days from date of issue. !f no preliminary in*unction is granted within said period, the temporary restraining order would automatically e,pire on the 2Eth day. !f efore the e,piration of the 2ECday period, the application for preliminary in*unction is denied, the temporary restraining order would also e deem automatically vacated. -Sec. @ of %ule @B" Dionisio vs. C8! of South Cota ato, .2D SC%$ 222/ ERROR OF JUDGMENT !S# ERROR OF JURISDICTION Distinguish etween error of *udgment and error of *urisdiction. SUGGESTED ANSWER $n error of *udgment is one which the court may commit in the e,ercise of its *urisdiction. Such an error does not deprive the court of *urisdiction and is correcti le only y appeal" whereas an error of *urisdiction is one which thcourt acts without or in e,cess of its *urisdiction. Such an error renders an orde

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*udgment void or voida le and is correcti le y the special civil action of certiorari.-De la Cru+ vs. 6oir, 3? Phil. 2.3" Cochingyan vs. Clori el, A? SC%$ SETTING ASIDE A FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT 6ay a *udgment which has ecome final and e,ecutory still e questioned, attac;ed or set aside( !f so, how( !f not, why( Discuss fully. SUGGESTED ANSWER &here are three ways y which a final and e,ecutory *udgment may e attac;ed or set aside, namely: a./ 0y petition for relief from *udgment under %ule 3B on the grounds of fraud, accident, mista;e or e,cusa le negligence within si,ty days from learning of the *udgment and not more than si, months from its entry# ./ 0y direct to annul or en*oin the enforcement of the *udgment when the defect is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained in the *udgment" c./ 0y direct action, such as certiorari, or y a collateral attac; against the *udgment which is void on its face or when the nullity of the *udgment is apparent y virtue of its own recitals. - M%&%'()*&(+ ,# P-./+-01 H.2-1(3- %)4 H.51()* C.6/#, 72 SCRA 32$8 SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE; SELF ADJUDICATION; SUMMARY SETTLEMENT %ene died intestate, leaving several heirs and su stantial property here in the Philippines. ../ 2./ 3./ $ssuming %ene left no de ts, as counsel for his heirs, what steps would you suggest to settle %ene#s estate ! the least e,pensive manner( $ssuming %ene left only one heir and no de ts, as counsel for his lone heir, what steps would you suggest( $ssuming that the value of %ene#s estate does not e,ceed P .E,EEE.EE, what remedy is availa le to o tain a speedy settlement of his estate(

SUGGESTED ANSWER ./ &o settle %ene#s estate in the least e,pensive manner, an e,tra*udicial settlement of the estate y agreement of the parties should e made through a pu lic instrument to e filed with the %egister of Deeds, together with a ond in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as certified under oath y the parties concerned and conditioned upon payment of any *ust claim that may e filed within two -2/ years y an heir or other person unduly deprived of participation in the

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estate. &he fact of e,tra*udicial settlement or administration shall e pu lished in a newspaper of general circulation once a wee; for three -3/ consecutive wee;s. * Sec.1, Rule '4.) 2./ !f %ene left only one heir, then the heir ma ad*udicate to himself the entire estate y means of an affidavit of selfCad*udication to e filed also with the register of deeds, together with the other requirements a ovementioned. -id./ 3./ Since the value of %ene#s estate e,ceed P.E,EEE.EE, the remedy is to proceed to underta;e a summary settlement of estates of mall value y filing a petition in court and upon hearing, which shall eheld not less than one -./ month nor more that three -3/ months from the date of the last pu lication of a notice which shall e pu lished once a wee; for three -3/ consecutive wee;s in a newspaper of general circulation in the province and after such other notice to interested persons as the court may direct. &he court may proceed summarily without the appointment of an e,ecutor or administrator, and without delay, grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any, to estate, and to apportion and divide among them after payment of such de ts of the estate as the court shall then find to e due. &he order of partition if it involves real estate, shall e recorded y the proper register#s office. - Sec.!, rule '4). AMENDMENT !S# SU9STITUTION OF INFORMATION )ithin the conte,t of the rule on Criminal Procedure, distinguish an amendment from a su stitution of an information. SUGGESTED ANSWER $n amendment may e made in su stance and form, without leave of court, at any time efore an accused pleads, and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, y leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can e done without pre*udice to the rights of the accused. Su stitution may e made if it appears at any time efore *udgment that a mista;e has een made in charging the proper offense, in which case, the court shall dismiss the complaint or information upon filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with %ule ..>, Sec. .., provided that the accused would not e placed there y in dou le *eopardy and may also require the witnesses to give ail for their appearance at the trial. - Sec. 14, Rule 11,$ Tee-an.ee, /r. vs. )ada%ag, !,' SCRA 1 4 /. STOP AND FRISK SEARCH )hat is a &erry search - or so called Kstop and fris;L /( !s it *ustified under e,isting law and *urisprudence( 5,plain. SUGGESTED ANSWER

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$ &erry search is a stopCandCsearch without a warrant. !t is *ustified when conducted y police officers on the ases of prior confidential information which were reasona ly corro orated y other attendant matters. - $niag, Fr. vs. Comelec, 23A SC%$ D2D /. DOU9LE JEOPARDY George was charged with falsification. 'n the date of initial trial, the fiscal moved for the postponement on the ground that the case had een assigned to a special prosecutor of the D'F who was out of town to attend to an urgent case, and who had wires him to request for postponement. &he fiscal manifested that he was not ready for trial ecause he was unfamiliar with the case. &he *udge then as;ed the accused as well as his counsel whether they were amena le to a postponement. 0oth George and his counsel insisted on a trial. &he *udge ordered the case dismissed. Upon learning thereof, the special prosecutor filed a petition for certiorari under %ule ?@ of the %ules of Court alleging that the dismissal was capricious and deprived the government of due process. George opposed the petition invo;ing dou le *eopardy. a./ !s dou le *eopardy a ar to the petition( 5,plain. ./ Suppose that trial on the merits had in fact proceeded and the trial *udge, finding the evidence to e insufficient, dismissed the case, would your answer e the same( 5,plain. SUGGESTED ANSWER a./ NO, ecause this is not an appeal y the prosecution asserting a dismissal to e erroneous. !t is a petition for certiorari which assails the order of dismissal as invalid and a nullity ecause it was capricious and deprived the Government of due process. Considering that this was the first motion for postponement of the trial filed y the fiscal and the ground was meritorious, the *udge gravely a used his discretion in ordering the case dismissed. I; 3<-6- (1 ). ,%+(4 4(12(11%+ .6 3-62()%3(.) .; 3<=%1-, 3<-6- (1 ). '%1(1 ;.6 (),.&()* 4.5'+- >-./%64?# -(eople vs. 0o1e2, !, SCRA !9 ) ./ NO, ecause in such case, the order of dismissal would e valid, even if erroneous, and would e tantamount to an acquittal. DISMISSAL ON NOLLE PROSEQUI )hen a criminal case is dismissed on nolle prosequi can it later refilled( SUGGESTED ANSWER e

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$s a general rule, when a criminal case is dismissed on nolle prosequi efore the accused is placed on trial and efore he is called on to plead, this is not equivalent to an acquittal and does not ar a su sequent prosecution for the same offense. * 0alve2 vs. CA, ! ' SCRA 6&# 319944 ). FORMAL OFFER OF E!IDENCE During the preCtrial of a civil case, the partied presented their respective documentary evidence. $mong the documents mar;ed y the plaintiff was the Deed of $ solute Sale of the property in litigation - mar;ed as 5,h. KCL /. !n the course of the trial on the merita, 5,h. C was identified y the plaintiff, who was crossCe,amined thereon y the defendant#s counsel" furthermore, the contents of 5,h.C were read into the records y the plaintiff. However, 5,h. C was not among those formally offered in evidence y the plaintiff. 6ay the trial court consider 5,h. C in the determination of the action( )hy( SUGGESTED ANSWER YES, ecause not only was the Deed of $ solute Sale mar;ed y the plaintiff as 5,h. C during the preCtrial, it was identified y the plaintiff in the course of the trial and the plaintiff was crossCe,amined thereon y the defendant#s counsel. 8urthermore, the contents of 5,h.C were read into the records y the plaintiff. Hence, the trial court could properly consider 5,h.C in the determination of the action even though it was not formally offered in evidence. &his is an e,ception to the rule that the court shall consider no evidence which has not een formally offered. * Sec. # of Rule 1 !) PAST RECOLLECTION RE!I!ED I states on direct e,amination that he once ;now the facts eing as;ed ut he cannot recall them now. )hen handed a written record of the facts, he testifies that the facts are correctly stated, ut that he has never seen the writing efore. !s the writing admissi le as past recollection recorded( 5,plain. SUGGESTED ANSWER :', ecause for the written record to e admissi le as past recollection recorded, it must have een written or recorded y I or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he ;new that the same was correctly written or recorded. - Sec. .? of %ule .32/ 0ut in this case I has never seen the writing efore.

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JUDICIAL NOTICE a./ ./ c./ Give three instances when a Philippine court can ta;e *udicial notice of a foreign law. How do you prove a written foreign law( Suppose a foreign law was pleaded as part of the defense of defendant ut no evidence was presented to prove the e,istence of said law, what is the presumption to e ta;en y the court as to the wordings of said law(

SUGGESTED ANSWER a./ &he three instances when a Philippine court can ta;e *udicial notice of a foreign law are: ../ )hen the Philippine courts are evidently familiar with the foreign law 2./ )hen the foreign law refers to the law of nations - Sec. . of %ule .2>/ 3./ )hen it refers to a pu lished treatise, periodical or pamphlet on the su *ect of law if the court ta;es *udicial notice of the fact that the writer thereof is recogni+ed in his profession or calling on the su *ect. - Sec. D?, %ule .3E/ $ written law may e evidenced y an official pu lication thereof of y a copy attested y the officer having the legal custody of the record, or y his deputy, and accompanied if the record is not ;ept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. !f the office in which the record ids ;ept is in a foreign country, the certificate may e made y the secretary of the em assy or legation, consulCgeneral, consul, viceCconsul, or consular agent or y any officer in the foreign country in which the record is ;ept, and authenticated y the seal of his office. - Sec. 2D of %ule .32/ &he presumption is that the wordings of the foreign law are the same as the local law. &his is referred to as the doctrine of processual presumption. HEARSAY RULE Gerry is eing tried for rape. &he prosecution#s evidence sought to esta lish that at a out >:EEpm of Fanuary 2E, .>>D, Gerry went to complainant Fune#s house to invite her to watch the festivities going on at the town pla+a. Fune accepted the invitation. Upon reaching the pu lic mar;et, which was *ust a stone#s throw away from Fune#s house, Gerry forcily dragged Fune towards the anana grove ehind the mar;et where he was a le to have carnal ;nowledge with Fune for a out an hour. Fune did not immediately do home thereafter, and it was

./

c./

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only in the early morning of the following day that she narrated her ordeal to her daughter Li+a. Li+a testified in court as to what Fune revealed to her. a./ !s the testimony of Li+a hearsay( ./ !s it admissi le in evidence against the o *ection of the defense( SUGGESTED ANSWER a./ J5S, Li+a#s testimony is hearsay. $ witness can testify to those facts which he ;nows of his personal ;nowledge, that is, which are derived from his own perception e,cept as otherwise provided in the rules - Sec. 3? of %ule .3E/. :', it is not admissi le in evidence against the o *ection of the defense, ecause it is not one of the e,ceptions to the hearsay rule. !t cannot e considered part of the res gestae ecause only statements made y a person while a startling occurrence is ta;ing place or immediately prior or su sequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may e given in evidence as part of the res gestae. - Sec. D2 of %ule .3E/ She narrated her ordeal to her daughter only in the morning of the following day, as she did not immediately go home after the incident which occurred at >:EE pm. She could have made up the story. She should e placed on the witness stand, not Li+a whose ;nowledge of the event is hearsay.

./

$lternative answer: Li+a#s testimony is admissi le in evidence as to the tenor ut not as to the truth of what Fune revealed to her. DEAD MAN0S STATUTE 6a,imo filed an action against Pedro, the administrator of the estate of deceased Fuan, for the recovery if a car which is part of the latter#s estate. During trialm, 6a,imo presented witness 6ariano who testified that he was present when 6a,imo and Fuan agreed that the latter would pay a rental of P2E,EEE for the use of 6a,imo#s car for one month after which Fuan should immediately return the car to 6a,imo. Pedro o *ected to the admission of 6ariano#s testimony. !f you were the *udge, would you sustain Pedro#s o *ection( )hy( SUGGESTED ANSWER NO, the testimony is admissi le in evidence ecause witness 6ariano who testified as to what 6a,imo and Fuan, the deceased person, agreed upon, is not disqualified to testify on the agreement. &hose disqualified are parties to a case, or persons in whose ehalf a case is prosecuted against the administrator of Fuan#s estate, upon a claim or demand against his estate as to any matter of fact occurring efore Fuan#s death. * Sec. ! of Rule 1 ,).

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SUMMARY OF DOCTRINES OF SELECTED CASES CI!IL PROCEDURE !LASON ENTERPRISES CORPORATION ,1# COURT OF APPEALS AG#R# N.1# 121$$2 $4# J5+? $, 1999#B !t is wellCsettled that an amended pleading supersedes the original one, which is thus deemed withdrawn and no longer considered part of the record, it does not follow ipso facto that the service of a new summons for amended petitions or complaints is required. 5-ere t-e defendants -ave alread% appeared "efore t-e trial court "% virtue of a su11ons on t-e original co1plaint, t-e a1ended co1plaint 1a% "e served upon t-e1 6it-out need of anot-er su11ons, even if ne6 causes of action are alleged. After it is ac7uired, a court8s 9urisdiction continues until t-e case is finall% ter1inated. Conversel%, 6-en defendants -ave not %et appeared in court and no su11ons -as "een validl% served, ne6 su11ons for t-e a1ended co1plaint 1ust "e served on t-e1. !t is not the change of cause of action that gives rise to the need to serve another summons for the amended complaint, ut rather the acquisition of *urisdiction over the persons of the defendants. !f the trial court has not yet acquired *urisdiction over them, a new service of summons for the amended complaint is required. UNITED HOUSING CORPORATION ,1# DAYRIT, ET AL# AG#R# N.# 7$422# J%)5%6? 22, 199@#B A 9udg1ent upon co1pro1ise 6-ic- is a 9udg1ent e1"od%ing a co1pro1ise agree1ent entered into "% t-e parties in 6-ic- t-e% 1a.e reciprocal concessions in order to ter1inate a litigation alread% instituted is not appeala"le, is i11ediatel% e:ecutor% and -as t-e effect of res 9udicata. $ *udgment rendered upon a compromise agreement, not contrary to law or pu lic policy or pu lic order has all the force and effect of any other *udgment, it eing a *udgment on the merits, hence, conclusive upon the parties and their privies. $s such, it can e enforced y writ of e,ecution. 9A FINANCE CORPORATION ,1# RUFINO CO, ET AL# AG#R# N.# 1@"7"1# J5)- 3@, 1993#B &he rule is that a compulsory counterclaim cannot Mremain pending for independent ad*udication y the court.M &his is ecause a compulsory counterclaim is au,iliary to the proceeding in the original suit and merely derives its *urisdictional support therefrom. T-us, it necessaril% follo6s t-at if t-e trial

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court no longer possesses 9urisdiction to entertain t-e 1ain action of t-e case, as 6-en it dis1isses t-e sa1e, t-en t-e co1pulsor% counterclai1 "eing ancillar% to t-e principal controvers%, 1ust li.e6ise "e si1ilarl% dis1issed since no 9urisdiction re1ains for t-e grant of an% relief under t-e counterclai1. 8or the guidance of 0ench and 0ar, if any of the grounds to dismiss under Sec. 3, %ule .A, of the %ules of Court arises, the proper recourse for a defendant who desires to pursue his compulsory counterclaim in the same proceeding is not to move for the dismissal of the complaint" instead, he should only move to have plaintiff declared nonCsuited on the complaint so that the latter can no longer present his evidence thereon, and simultaneously move that he e declared as in default on the compulsory counterclaim, and reserve the right to present evidence e, parte on his counterclaim. &his will ena le defendant who was un*ustly haled to court to prove his compulsory counterclaim, which is intertwined with the complaint, ecause the trial court retains *urisdiction over the complaint and of the whole case. &he nonCdismissal of the complaint, the nonCsuit notwithstanding, provides the asis for the compulsory counterclaim to remain active and su sisting. HEIRS OF FLORENTINA NUGUID !DA# DE HA9ERER ,1# CA AG#R# N.1# L 42$99 3. L 427@9# M%? 2$, 19:1#B )here a party dies in an action that survives, and no order is issued y the court for the appearance of the legal representative or of the heirs of the deceased in su stitution of the deceased, and as a matter of fact no such su stitution has ever een effected, the trial held y the court without such legal representatives or heirs and the *udgment rendered after such trial are null and void ecause the court acquired no *urisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs upon whom the trial and the *udgment would e inding. TAN ,1# DUMARPA AG#R# N.# 13:777# S-/3-2'-6 22, 2@@4#B &he remedies availa le to a defendant declared in default are as follows: -a/ a motion to set aside the order of default under Section 3- /, %ule > of the %ules of Court, if the default was discovered efore *udgment could e rendered" -2/ a motion for new trial under Section .-a/ of %ule 3A, if the default was discovered after *udgment ut while appeal is still availa le" -3/ a petition for relief under %ule 3B, if *udgment has ecome final and e,ecutory" and -D/ an appeal from the *udgment under Section ., %ule D., even if no petition to set aside the order of default has een resorted to.M GOLDEN FLAME SAWMILL ,1# COURT OF APPEALS AG#R# N.# 11"$44# A/6(+ ", 199"#B

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Prior to preCtrial therefore, in particular, efore a party is considered nonC suited or declared as in default, it must e shown that such party and his counsel were each duly served with a separate notice of preCtrial. T-e a"sence, t-erefore, of t-e 1andator% notices of pre;trial nullifies t-e order of default 6-ic- suffers fro1 a serious procedural vice. <nder suc- circu1stances, t-e grant of relief to t-e part% declared in default "eco1es a 1atter of rig-t$ and t-e proceedings "eginning fro1 t-e order of default do6n to t-e default 9udg1ent itself s-ould "e considered null and void and of no effect . &hus, upon a showing that a separate notice of preCtrial was not served either upon a party or his counsel of record or upon oth, the Court has consistently nullified and set aside the order of default. !n addition, the Court remands the case for preCtrial and trial efore the trial court, ordering the latter thereafter to render *udgment accordingly. QUE9RAL ,1# CA %)4 UNION REFINERY CORP# AG#R# N.# 1@1941# J%)5%6? 2", 199$#B $ demurrer to evidence a reviates proceedings, it eing an aid or instrument for the e,peditious termination of all action, similar to a motion to dismiss, which the court or tri unal may either grant or deny. However, whoever avails of it gam les his right to adduce evidence. Pursuant to the aforequoted provisions of %ule 3@, if the defendantNs motion for *udgment on demurrer to evidence is granted and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, *udgment is rendered in favor of the adverse party ecause the movant loses his right to present evidence. MAYUGA, ET AL# ,1# CA, ET AL# AG#R# N.# 123:99# A5*513 3@, 199$#B =:ecution proceedings are not auto1aticall% sta%ed "% t-e filing of a petition for relief fro1 9udg1ent. &he filing of their petition for relief and the su sequent appeal from the order denying relief stayed the e,ecution proceedings efore the trial court. :either are e,ecution proceedings stayed y the perfection of the appeal from the order denying relief from *udgment. !n ordinary appeals, perfection of an appeal under section > of %ule D. divests the trial court of *urisdiction over its *udgment and e,ecution proceedings ecause the *udgment has not yet attained finality. $n appeal from an order denying relief from *udgment under %ule 3B is different. Here, the Fudgment is already final and e,ecutory and as aforestated, the only way y which e,ecution could e suspended is y the issuance of a writ of preliminary in*unction. :o in*unction was secured y petitioners. RODRIGUEC ,1# PROJECT $ MARKET SER!ICE COOPERATI!E, INC# AG#R# N.# 799$:# A5*513 23, 199"#B !n this *urisdiction, the general rule is when a court *udgment or order ecomes final and e,ecutory, it is the minsterial duty of the trial court to issue a writ of e,ecution to enforce this *udgment. $ writ of e,ecution may however e

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refused on equita le grounds as when there is a change in the situation of the parties that would ma;e e,ecution inequita le or when certain circumstances which transpired after *udgment ecame final render e,ecution of *udgment un*ust. PHILIPPINE NAILS AND WIRES CORPORATIO ,1# MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC# AG#R# N.# 143933# F-'65%6? 14, 2@@3#B Under the old %ules, specifically Section 2 of %ule 3> of the preC.>>A %ules of Court, the trial court is granted, upon good reasons, the discretion to order an e,ecution even efore the e,piration of the time to appeal. T-e present Rules also grant t-e trial court t-e discretion to order t-e e:ecution of a 9udg1ent or a final order even "efore t-e e:piration of t-e period to appeal, also upon good reasons stated in a special order after due -earing. Such discretion, however, is allowed only while the trial court still has M*urisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record, or the record on appeal, as the case may e, at the time of the filing of such motion.M &he mere filing of a ond y the successful party is not a good reason for ordering e,ecution pending appeal, as Na com ination of circumstances is the dominant consideration which impels the grant of immediate e,ecution<"= the requirement of a ond is imposed merely as an additional factor, no dou t for the protection of the defendantNs creditor.NM REXLON REALTY GROUP, INC# ,1# CA AG#R# N.# 12:412# M%6=< 1", 2@@2#B 8irstly, it must e remem ered that, in the amended petition of %e,lon for annulment of *udgment, respondent Paramount was impleaded for the reason that the prayer therein sought the nullification of the new titles issued in the name of respondent Paramount. >nas1uc- as a petition for annul1ent of 9udg1ent is classified as an original action t-at can "e filed "efore t-e Court of Appeals, t-e said court can ad1it, "% 6a% of an a1end1ent to t-e petition, ne6 causes of action inti1atel% related to t-e resolution of t-e original petition. Hence, respondent Paramount ecame a necessary party in the petitionerNs original cause of action see;ing a declaration of the e,istence and validity of the ownerNs duplicate copy of the su *ect certificate of title in the possession of the latter, and an indispensa le party in the action for the declaration of nullity of the titles in the name of respondent Paramount. !ndeed, there can e no complete relief that can e accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim su *ect of the action, if we do not touch upon the necessary consequence of the nullity of the new duplicate copy of the su *ect certificate of title. &he %ules of Court compels the inclusion of necessary parties when *urisdiction over the person of the said necessary party can e o tained. :onCinclusion of a necessary party when there is an opportunity to include him would mean waiver of the claim against such party.

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ANDAYA ,1#, A9ADIA, ET AL# AG#R# N.# 1@4@33# D-=-2'-6 27, 1993#B Furisdiction over su *ect matter is essential in the sense that erroneous assumption thereof may put at naught whatever proceedings the court might have had. Hence, even on appeal, and even if the parties do not raise the issue of *urisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that it has no *urisdiction over the case. !t is elementary that *urisdiction is vested y law and cannot e conferred or waived y the parties or even y the *udge. !t is also irrefuta le that a court may at any stage of the proceedings dismiss the case for want of *urisdiction. 8or this matter, the ground of lac; of *urisdiction in dismissing a case is not waiva le. Hence, the last sentence of Sec. 2, %ule >, %ules of Court, e,pressly states: M)henever it appears that the court has no *urisdiction over the su *ect matter, it shall dismiss the action.M OFELIA HERRERA FELIX ,1# CA AG#R# N.# 14373$# A5*513 11, 2@@4#B $ voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. $n appearance in whatever form, without e,plicitly o *ecting to the *urisdiction of the court over the person, is a su mission to the *urisdiction of the court over the person. )hile the formal method of entering an appearance in a cause pending in the courts is to deliver to the cler; a written direction ordering him to enter the appearance of the person who su scri es it, an appearance may e made y simply filing a formal motion, or plea or answer. &his formal method of appearance is not necessary. He may appear without such formal appearance and thus su mit himself to the *urisdiction of the court. He may appear y presenting a motion, for e,ample, and unless y such appearance he specifically o *ects to the *urisdiction of the court, he there y gives his assent to the *urisdiction of the court over his person. 5-en t-e appearance is "% 1otion o"9ecting to t-e 9urisdiction of t-e court over -is person, it 1ust "e for t-e sole and separate purpose of o"9ecting to t-e 9urisdiction of t-e court. >f -is 1otion is for an% ot-er purpose t-an to o"9ect to t-e 9urisdiction of t-e court over -is person, -e t-ere"% su"1its -i1self to t-e 9urisdiction of t-e court. REYNALDO HALIMAO ,1# ATTYS# DANIEL !ILLANUE!A %)4 INOCENCIO PEFIANCO FERRER, JR# AA42# C%1- N.# 3:2"# F-'65%6? 1, 199$#B 'n the other hand, when a motion to dismiss is ased on payment, waiver, a andonment, release, compromise, or other form of e,tinguishment, the motion to dismiss does not hypothetically, ut actually, admits the facts alleged in e,istence of the o ligation or de t, only that plaintiff claims that the o ligation has een satisfied. So that when a motion to dismiss on these grounds is denied,

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what is left to e proven in the trial is no longer the e,istence of the de t ut the fact vel non of payment y the defendant. GARCIA ,1# CA %)4 SPOUSES UY AG#R# N.# :3929# J5)- 11, 1992#B $s for private respondentsN -defendantsN/ loss of standing in court, y reason of having een declared in default, again we rule that a party in default loses the right to present his defense and e,amine or crossCe,amine witnesses. !t does not mean that eing declared in default, and there y losing oneNs standing, constitutes a waiver of all rights" what is waived only is the right to e heard and to present evidence during the trial while default prevails. $ party in default is still entitled to notice of final *udgments and orders and proceedings ta;en su sequent thereto. PACIFIC 9ANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ORGANICATION ,1# CA AG#R# N.# 1@9373# M%6=< 2@, 199"#B 5lucidating the crucial distinction etween an ordinary action and a special proceeding, Chief Fustice 6oran states: $ction is the act y which one sues another in a court of *ustice for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while special proceeding is the act y which one see;s to esta lish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Hence, action is distinguished from special proceeding in that the former is a formal demand of a right y one against another, while the latter is ut a petition for a declaration of a status, right or fact. )here a party litigant see;s to recover property from another, his remedy is to file an action. )here his purpose is to see; the appointment of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special proceeding to esta lish the fact or status of insanity calling for an appointment of guardianship. GARCIA ,1# LLAMAS AG#R# N.# 1"4127# D-=-2'-6 :, 2@@3#B $ summary *udgment is a procedural device designed for the prompt disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal, not a genuine, issue regarding any material fact. Consequently, facts are asserted in the complaint regarding which there is yet no admission, disavowal or qualification" or specific denials or affirmative defenses are set forth in the answer, ut the issues are fictitious as shown y the pleadings, depositions or admissions. $ summary *udgment may e applied for y either a claimant or a defending party. 'n the other hand, under Section . of %ule 3D of the %ules of Court, a *udgment on the pleadings is proper when an answer fails to render an issue or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse partyNs pleading. &he essential question is whether there are issues generated y the pleadings. 3B $

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*udgment on the pleadings may e sought only y a claimant, who is the party see;ing to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or crossCclaim" or to o tain a declaratory relief. HEIRS OF RICARDO OLI!AS ,1# HON# FLORENTINO A# FLOR %)4 JOSE A# MATAWARAN AG#R# N.# L 7:343# M%? 21, 19::#B !n the guise of a position paper, private respondent filed a 6otion to Dismiss. )hile this is, indeed, a prohi ited pleading -Sec. .@<a=, %ule on Summary Procedure/ it should e noted that the 6otion was filed after an $nswer had already een su mitted within the reglementary period. !n essence, therefore, it is not the pleading prohi ited y the %ule on Summary Procedure. )hat the %ule proscri es is a 6otion to Dismiss, which would stop the running of the period to file an $nswer and cause undue delay. DACOYCOY ,1# IAC AG#R# N.# 74:"4# A/6(+ 2, 1991#B Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of the proceeding, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in the courts of first instance -now %&C/, may e waived e,pressly or impliedly. )here defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided y Section D of %ule D of the %ules of Court, and allows the trial to e held and a decision to e rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action e permitted to challenge elatedly the wrong venue, which is deemed waived. NORTHERN CEMENT CORPORATION ,1# IAC %)4 SHIPSIDE INC# AG#R# N.# L $:$3$# F-'65%6? 29, 19::#B &here have een instances where the Court has held that even without the necessary amendment, the amount proved at the trial may e validly awarded, as in &ua+on v. 0olanos, where we said that if the facts shown entitled plaintiff to relief other than that as;ed for, no amendment to the complaint was necessary, especially where defendant had himself raised the point on which recovery was ased. &he appellate court could treat the pleading as amended to conform to the evidence although the pleadings were not actually amended. $mendment is also unnecessary when only clerical errors or nonCsu stantial matters are involved, as we held in 0an; of the Philippine !slands v. Laguna. !n Co &iamco v. Dia+, we stressed that the rule on amendment need not e applied rigidly, particularly where no surprise or pre*udice is caused the o *ecting party. $nd in the recent case of :ational Power Corporation v. Court of $ppeals, we held that where there is a variance in the defendantNs pleadings and the evidence adduced y it at the trial, the Court may treat the pleading as amended to conform with the evidence.

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S/.51-1 GO ,1# TONG AG#R# N.# 1"1942# N.,-2'-6 27, 2@@3#B %ule D@ of the %ules of Court specifically states that in all cases, the C$Ns decisions, final orders or resolutions O regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved O may e appealed to this Court through a petition for review, which is *ust a continuation of the appellate process involving the original case. .@ 'n the other hand, a special civil action under %ule ?@ is an independent suit ased on the specific grounds provided therein. $s a general rule, certiorari cannot e availed of as a su stitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under %ule D@. DELGADO ,1# CA AG#R# N.# 137::1# D-=-2'-6 21, 2@@4#B &he principle of res *udicata does not apply when the dismissal of the earlier complaint, involving the same plaintiffs, same su *ect matter, same theory and the same defendants, was made without pre*udice to its refiling at a future date, or in a different venue, as in this case. &he dismissal of the case without pre*udice indicates the a sence of a decision on the merits and leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a su sequent action as though the dismissal action had not een commenced. >n ot-er 6ords, t-e discontinuance of a case not on t-e 1erits does not "ar anot-er action on t-e sa1e su"9ect 1atter. YAO KA SIN TRADING ,1# CA, ET AL# AG#R# N.# "3:2@# J5)- 1", 1992#B Under Section ., %ule 3 of the %ules of Court, only natural or *uridical persons or entities authori+ed y law may e parties in a civil action. !n Fuasing Hardware vs. 6endo+a, this Court held that a single proprietorship is neither a natural person nor a *uridical person under $rticle DD of the Civil Code" it is not an entity authori+ed y law to ring suit in court. SPOUSES ELANIO C# ONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS AG#R# N.# 144":1# J5+? ", 2@@2B !t ears stressing that the 6&CC cannot admit the elated certification on the ground that plaintiffs -respondents/ were not anyway guilty of actual forum shopping. &he distinction etween the prohi ition against forum shopping and the certification requirement should y now e too elementary to e misunderstood. To reiterate, co1pliance 6it- t-e certification against foru1 s-opping is separate fro1 and independent of t-e avoidance of t-e act of foru1 s-opping itself. T-ere is a difference in t-e treat1ent "et6een failure to co1pl% 6it- t-e certification re7uire1ent and violation of t-e pro-i"ition against foru1 s-opping not onl% in ter1s of i1posa"le sanctions "ut also in t-e 1anner of enforcing t-e1. T-e for1er constitutes sufficient cause for t-e dis1issal 6it-out pre9udice of t-e co1plaint or initiator% pleading upon 1otion

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and after -earing, 6-ile t-e latter is a ground for su11ar% dis1issal t-ereof and for direct conte1pt. &he rule e,pressly requires that a certification against forum shopping should e attached to or filed simultaneously with the complaint or other initiatory pleading regardless of whether forum shopping had in fact een committed. $ccordingly, in the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for unlawful detainer must follow as a matter of course. =/=CT)=?T CAS=@ Aailure of t-e defendants to allege lac. of cetification of non;foru1 s-opping is not a 6aiver of t-eir rig-t to assert t-e defect )hile not raised in the parties# pleadings, it is necessary to mention that the failure of petitioners# answer filed in the e*ectment case to allege the lac; of certification of nonCforum shopping did not result in the waiver of their right to assert the defect. 'ur decision in Pho v. Court of $ppeals where this Court ruled that y virtue of Sec. ., %ule >, #$$% Rule& of Civil 'rocedure, o *ections of this ;ind are forfeited when not raised in the answer4comment earlier tended to a petition for special civil action of certiorari, is not controlling. T-e instant case is governed "% t-e 1991 Revised Rules on Su11ar% (rocedure 6-ere a 1otion to dis1iss is generall% proscri"ed e:cept for lac. of 9urisdiction over t-e su"9ect 1atter or failure to co1pl% 6it- conciliation proceedings and 6-ere t-e onl% 1atters dee1ed 6aived for failure to assert in t-e ans6er are negative and affir1ative defenses. Clearly, petitioners were e,cused from filing a motion to question the a sence of the certification and, concomitantly, their failure to include the o *ection in their answer did not result in the waiver thereof since the o *ection is neither a negative nor an affirmative defense. &o clarify, nonCcompliance with the requirement of certification does not give rise to an affirmative defense, i.e., the allegation of new matter y way of confession and avoidance, much less a negative defense since the underta;ing has nothing to do with the operative facts required to e alleged in an initiatory pleading, such as allegations on the cause of action, ut with a special preCrequisite for admission of the complaint for filing in court. GUMA9ON !S# LARIN DGR N.# 142"23 NO!# 27,2@@18 &hus, the .>>A %ules of Civil Procedure now provide that the court may (otu proprio dismiss the claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on the record that: .. the court has no *urisdiction over the su *ect matter" 2. there is another cause of action pending etween the same parties for the same cause" or 3. where the action is arred y a prior *udgment or y statute of limitations. 8rom the foregoing, it is clear that a court may not (otu proprio dismiss a case for improper venue, this ground not eing among those mentioned where the

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court is authori+ed to do so. !n fact, the applica le rule would e Section ., %ule > of the .>>A %ules of Civil Procedure providing that Kdefenses and o *ections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.L 8urthermore, Section ?, %ule .? of the .>>A %ules now provides that if no motion to dismiss has een filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided in this %ule Q which includes the ground that venue is improperly laid -Section .<c=/ Q may e pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer, and in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may e had thereon as if a motion to dismiss has een filed. %espondent not having raised improper venue in a motion to dismiss or in his answer, he is deemed to have waived the same. )ellC;nown is the asic legal principle that venue is waiva le. 8ailure of any party to o *ect to the impropriety of venue is deemed a waiver of his right to do so. 9ENITO C# SALACAR vs. HON# TOMAS R# ROMAQUIN AG#R# N.# 1"1@$:# M%? 21, 2@@4B &he pleadings of the accused and copies of the orders or resolutions of the trial court are served on the People of the Philippines through the Provincial Prosecutor. However, in appeals efore the Court of $ppeals and the Supreme Court either -a/ y writ of error" - / via petition for review" -c/ on automatic appeal" or, -d/ in special civil actions where the People of the Philippines is a party, the general rule is that the 'ffice of the Solicitor General is the sole representative of the People of the Philippines. A cop% of t-e petition in suc- action 1ust "e served on t-e (eople of t-e (-ilippines as 1andated "% Section , Rule 46 of t-e Rules of Court, t-rougt-e Bffice of t-e Solicitor 0eneral. T-e service of a cop% of t-e petition on t-e (eople of t-e (-ilippines, t-roug- t-e (rovincial (rosecutor 6ould "e inefficacious. T-e petitionerCs failure to -ave a cop% of -is petition served on t-e respondent, t-roug- t-e Bffice of t-e Solicitor 0eneral, s-all "e sufficient ground for t-e dis1issal of t-e petition as provided in t-e last paragrap- of Section , Rule 46 of t-e Rules of Court. <nless and until copies of t-e petition are dul% served on t-e respondent, t-e appellate court -as no ot-er recourse "ut to dis1iss t-e petition. EMERITO REMULLA vs. JOSELITO DP# MANLONGAT AG#R# N.# 14:1:9# N.,-2'-6 11, 2@@4B !n a num er of cases, the Supreme Court has in fact rela,ed the period for perfecting an appeal, especially on grounds of su stantial *ustice, or when there are other special and meritorious circumstances and issues. 7erily, this Court has the power to rela, or suspend the rules or to e,empt a case from their rigid operation when warranted y compelling reasons and the requirements of *ustice. !n the present case, the late filing CC y only one day CC of the prosecution#s :otice of $ppeal was e,cusa le, considering respondent#s diligent efforts.

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ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DE!ELOPMENT CORP# !S# CA DGR N.# 1$@242, M%? 17,2@@"8 &he purpose of Section .., %ule ? of the %ules of Court is to permit a defendant to assert an independent claim against a thirdCparty which he, otherwise, would assert in another action, thus preventing multiplicity of suits. $ll the rights of the parties concerned would then e ad*udicated in one proceeding. &his is a rule of procedure and does not create a su stantial right. :either does it a ridge, enlarge, or nullify the su stantial rights of any litigant. &his right to file a thirdCparty complaint against a thirdCparty rests in the discretion of the trial court. &he thirdCparty complaint is actually independent of, separate and distinct from the plaintiff#s complaint, such that were it not for the rule, it would have to e filed separately from the original complaint. T-e t-ird;part% co1plaint does not -ave to s-o6 6it- certaint% t-at t-ere 6ill "e recover% against t-e t-ird;part% defendant, and it is sufficient t-at pleadings s-o6 possi"ilit% of recover%. >n deter1ining t-e sufficienc% of t-e t-ird;part% co1plaint, t-e allegations in t-e original co1plaint and t-e t-ird; part% co1plaint 1ust "e e:a1ined. A t-ird;part% co1plaint 1ust allege facts 6-ic- pri1a facie s-o6 t-at t-e defendant is entitled to contri"ution, inde1nit%, su"rogation or ot-er relief fro1 t-e t-ird;part% defendant. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE vs. HON# RALPH C# LANTION AG#R# N.# 1394$"# J%)5%6? 1:, 2@@@B !n a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3, %ule ..2 of the %ules of Court guarantees the respondent#s asic due process rights, granting him the right to e furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to su mit counterCaffidavits and other supporting documents within ten days from receipt thereof. 6oreover, the respondent shall have the right to e,amine all other evidence su mitted y the complainant.RSR &hese twin rights may, however, e considered dispensa le in certain instances, such as: ../ !n proceedings where there is an urgent need for immediate action, li;e the summary a atement of a nuisance per &e -$rticle AED, Civil Code/, the preventive suspension of a pu lic servant facing administrative charges -Section ?3, Local Government Code, 0. P. 0lg. 33A/, the padloc;ing of filthy restaurants or theaters showing o scene movies or li;e esta lishments which are immediate threats to pu lic health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution" 2./ )here there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is not precluded from en*oying the right to notice and hearing

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at a later time without pre*udice to the person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent ta,payer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee" and 3./ )here the twin rights have previously een offered ut the right to e,ercise them had not een claimed. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ,1# MODESTO TEE %#&#%# ESTOY TEE AG#R# N.1# 14@"4$ 47# J%)5%6? 2@, 2@@3#B &hus, it has een held that term Mnarcotics paraphernaliaM is not so wanting in particularity as to create a general warrant. :or is the description Many and all narcoticsM and Mall implements, paraphernalia, articles, papers and records pertaining toM the use, possession, or sale of narcotics or dangerous drugs so road as to e unconstitutional. $ search warrant commanding peace officers to sei+e Ma quantity of loose heroinM has een held sufficiently particular. &ested against the foregoing precedents, the description Man undetermined amount of mari*uanaM must e held to satisfy the requirement for particularity in a search warrant. :oteworthy, what is to e sei+ed in the instant case is property of a specified character, i.e., mari*uana, an illicit drug. 0y reason of its character and the circumstances under which it would e found, said article is illegal. $ further description would e unnecessary and ordinarily impossi le, e,cept as to such character, the place, and the circumstances. &hus, this Court has held that the description Millegally in possession of undetermined quantity4amount of dried mari*uana leaves and 6ethamphetamine Hydrochloride -Sha u/ and sets of paraphernaliaM particulari+es the things to e sei+ed. &he search warrant in the present case, given its nearly similar wording, Mundetermined amount of mari*uana or !ndian hemp,M in our view, has satisfied the ConstitutionNs requirements on particularity of description. &he description therein is: -./ as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow" -2/ e,presses a conclusion of fact O not of law O y which the peace officers may e guided in ma;ing the search and sei+ure" and -3/ limits the things to e sei+ed to those which ear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is eing issued. Said warrant imposes a meaningful restriction upon the o *ects to e sei+ed y the officers serving the warrant. &hus, it prevents e,ploratory searches, which might e violative of the 0ill of %ights. PEOPLE !S# CA9ILES A 2:4 SCRA 199 B Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning y the authorities, ut given in an ordianry manner where y the accused orally admitted having committed the crime. ESQUI!EL ,1# THE SANDIGAN9AYAN AG#R# N.# 137237, S-/3-2'-6 17, 2@@2B

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!n Rodrigo, )r* v&* Sandigan+ayan, ,inay v&* Sandigan+ayan, and !ayu& v&* Sandigan+ayan, we already held that municipal mayors fall under the original and e,clusive *urisdiction of the Sandigan ayan. :or can ,arangay Captain 6ar; $nthony 5squivel claim that since he is not a municipal mayor, he is outside the Sandigan ayan#s *urisdiction. R.A. '9'#, as a1ended "% R.A. ?o. &!49, provides t-at it is onl% in cases 6-ere Dnone of t-e accused are occup%ing positions corresponding to salar% grade E!'C or -ig-erD t-at De:clusive original 9urisdiction s-all "e vested in t-e proper regional trial court, 1etropolitan trial court, 1unicipal trial court, and 1unicipal circuit court, as t-e case 1a% "e, pursuant to t-eir respective 9urisdictions as provided in Fatas (a1"ansa Flg. 1!9, as a1ended.D :ote that under the .>>. Local Government Code, 6ayor 5squivel has a salary grade of 2A. Since ,arangay Captain 5squivel is the coC accused in Criminal Case :o. 2DAAA of 6ayor 5squivel, whose position falls under salary grade 2A, the Sandigan ayan committed no grave a use of discretion in assuming *urisdiction over said criminal case, as well as over Criminal Case :o. 2DAAB, involving oth of them. OFFICE OF THE OM9UDSMAN ,1# RU9EN ENOC,-3#%+ AG#R# N.1# 14"9"7 $:, J%)5%6? 2", 2@@2B Section .@ of %$ ?AAE gives the 'm udsman primary *urisdiction over cases cogni+a le y the Sandigan ayan. &he law defines such primary *urisdiction as authori+ing the 'm udsman Mto ta;e over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.M T-e grant of t-is aut-orit% does not necessaril% i1pl% t-e e:clusion fro1 its 9urisdiction of cases involving pu"lic officers and e1plo%ees cogni2a"le "% ot-er courts. &he e,ercise y the 'm udsman of his primary *urisdiction over cases cogni+a le y the Sandigan ayan is not incompati le with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed y pu lic officers and employees. !ndeed, it must e stressed that the powers granted y the legislature to the 'm udsman are very road and encompass all ;inds of malfeasance, misfeasance and nonC feasance committed y pu lic officers and employees during their tenure of office. SALACAR !S# PEOPLE A GR N.# 1"1931, S-/3-2'-6 23, 2@@3 B !f demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted y the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case , unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil lia ility may arise did not e,ist. >f t-e trial court issues an order or renders 9udg1ent not onl% granting t-e de1urrer to evidence of t-e accused and ac7uitting -i1 "ut also on t-e civil lia"ilit% of t-e accused to t-e private offended part%, said 9udg1ent on t-e civil aspect of t-e case 6ould "e a nullit% for t-e reason t-at t-e constitutional rig-t of t-e accused to due process is t-ere"% violated . &his is so ecause when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the accused has not yet

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adduced evidence oth on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. &he only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution. )hat the trial court should do is to issue an order or partial *udgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused" and set the case for continuation of trial for the petitioner to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case, and for the private complainant to adduce evidence y way of re uttal after which the parties may adduce their surCre uttal evidence as provided for in Section .., %ule ..> of the %evised %ules of Criminal Procedure. CASUPANAN !S#LAROYA A GR N.# 14"391, A5*513 2$, 2@@2 B Under Section . of the present %ule ..., the independent civil action in $rticles 32, 33, 3D and 2.A? of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action ut may e filed separately y the offended party even without reservation. &he commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. T-e suspension in Section ! of t-e present Rule 111 refers onl% to t-e civil action arising fro1 t-e cri1e, if suc- civil action is reserved or filed "efore t-e co11ence1ent of t-e cri1inal action. GA9IONCA !S# CA AGR N.# 14@311, M%6=< 3@, 2@@1B $n amendment which merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information, and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is an amendment to form that can e made at any time. Furisprudence allows amendments to information so long as: -a/ it does not deprive the accused of the right to invo;e prescription" - / it does not affect or alter the nature of the offense originally charged" -c/ it does not involve a change in the asic theory of the prosecution so as to require the accused to undergo any material change or modification in his defense" -d/ it does not e,pose the accused to a charge which would call for a higher penalty" and, -@/ it does not cause surprise nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment. !n the case at ar, it is clear that the questioned amendment is one of form and not of su stance. T-e allegation of ti1e 6-en an offense is co11itted is a 1atter of for1, unless ti1e is a 1aterial ingredient of t-e offense. >t is not even necessar% to state in t-e >nfor1ation t-e precise ti1e t-e offense 6as co11itted unless ti1e is a 1aterial factor. !t is sufficient that the act is alleged to have een committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the Complaint or !nformation will permit. LALICAN !S# !ERGARA AGR N.# 1@:$19, J5+? 31, 1997B

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&his Court has consistently defined the proper procedure in case of denial of a motion to quash. &he accused has to enter a plea, go to trial without pre*udice on his part to present the special defenses he had invo;ed in his motion and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authori+ed y law. Certiorari is not t-e proper re1ed% 6-ere a 1otion to 7uas- an infor1ation is denied. T-at t-e appropriate recourse is to proceed to trial and in case of conviction, to appeal suc- conviction, as 6ell as t-e denial of t-e 1otion to 7uas-, is i1pelled "% t-e fact t-at a denial of a 1otion to 7uas- is an interlocutor% procedural aspect 6-ic- cannot "e appealed nor can it "e t-e su"9ect of a petition for certiorari. T-e re1edies of appeal and certiorari are 1utuall% e:clusive and not alternative or successive. 9AYAS !S# SANDIGAN9AYAN AGR N.1# 143$:9 91, N.,-2'-6 12,2@@2B &here is nothing irregular or unlawful in stipulating facts in criminal cases. &he policy encouraging it is consistent with the doctrine of waiver, which recogni+es that M. . . everyone has a right to waive and agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the enefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can e dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any pu lic right and without detriment to the community at large.M !n the present case, the Foint Stipulation made y the prosecution and petitioners was a waiver of the right to present evidence on the facts and the documents freely admitted y them. &here could have een no impairment of petitionersN right to e presumed innocent, right to due process or right against selfCincrimination ecause the waiver was voluntary, made with the assistance of counsel and is sanctioned y the %ules on Criminal Procedure. 'nce the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed y the parties and their counsels, they ecome inding on the parties who made them. &hey ecome *udicial admissions of the fact or facts stipulated. 5ven if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not e allowed to rescind them unilaterally" it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage. !f the accused are allowed to plead guilty under appropriate circumstances, y parity of reasoning, they should li;ewise e allowed to enter into a fair and true pretrial agreement under appropriate circumstances. YAP !S# CA AGR N.# 141"29, J5)- $, 2@@1B !t militates emphasis that petitioner is see;ing ail on appeal. Section #, Rule 114 of t-e Revised Rules of Cri1inal (rocedure is clear t-at alt-oug- t-e grant of "ail on appeal in non;capital offenses is discretionar%, 6-en t-e penalt% i1posed on t-e convicted accused e:ceeds si: %ears and circu1stances e:ist t-at point to t-e pro"a"ilit% of flig-t if released on "ail, t-en t-e accused 1ust "e denied "ail, or -is "ail previousl% granted s-ould "e cancelled. !n the

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same vein, the Court has held that the discretion to e,tend ail during the course of the appeal should e e,ercised with grave caution and for strong reasons, considering that the accused had een in fact convicted y the trial court . SALES !S# SANDIGAN9AYAN AGR N.# 143:@2, N.,-2'-6 1$, 2@@1B &he determination of pro a le cause is a function of the *udge" it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. 'nly the *udge and the *udge alone ma;es this determination" 2.= &he preliminary inquiry made y a prosecutor does not ind the *udge. !t merely assists him in ma;ing the determination of pro a le cause. !t is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes, if any, and all other supporting documents ehind the prosecutorNs certification which are material in assisting the *udge in his determination of pro a le cause" and 3.= Fudges and prosecutors ali;e should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines pro a le cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should e held for trial or e released. 5ven if the two inquiries e made in one and the same proceeding, there should e no confusion a out their o *ectives. T-e deter1ination of pro"a"le cause for purposes of issuing t-e 6arrant of arrest is 1ade "% t-e 9udge. T-e preli1inar% investigation proper G 6-et-er or not t-ere is reasona"le ground to "elieve t-at t-e accused is guilt% of t-e offense c-arged and, t-erefore, 6-et-er or not -e s-ould "e su"9ected to t-e e:pense, rigors and e1"arrass1ent of trial G is t-e function of t-e prosecutor. ROXAS !S, !ASQUEC A3": SCRA $3$B !n criminal prosecutions, a reinvestigation, li;e an appeal, renders the entire case open for review. US !S# PURGANAN A GR N.# 14:"71, S-/3-2'-6 24,2@@2B &he filing of a petition for e,tradition does not per se *ustify the issuance of a warrant of arrest against an e,traditee. &he petition, in some instances, may not contain sufficient allegations and proof on the issue of whether the possi le e,traditee will escape from the *urisdiction of the e,traditing court. )hen the petition for e,tradition does not provide sufficient asis for the arrest of the possi le e,traditee or the grant of ail as in the case at ar, it is discretionary for the e,tradition court to call for a hearing to determine the issue. $n e,traditee has the right to apply for ail. &he right is rooted in the due process clause of the Constitution. !t cannot e denied simply ecause of the silence of our e,tradition treaty and law on the matter. &he availa ility of the right

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to ail is uttressed y our other treaties recogni+ing civil and political rights and y international norms, customs and practices. &he e,traditee may apply for ail ut its grant depends on the discretion of the e,traditing court. &he court must satisfy itself that the ail will not frustrate the ends of *ustice. !n deciding whether to grant ail or not to a possi le e,traditee, the e,traditing court must follow a higher and stricter standard. &he e,traditee must prove y clear and convincing evidence that he will not flee from the *urisdiction of the e,traditing court and will respect all its processes. !n fine, that he will not frustrate the ends of *ustice. TULIAO !S# RAMOS A 2:4 SCRA 37: B $ *udge should demand the presentation of the originals of the required documents efore approving a ail ond. PEOPLE !S#NARCA AGR N.# 1@:4::, J5+? 21, 1997B &here is nothing in the %ules which renders invalid a preliminary investigation held without defendantNs counsel. :ot eing a part of the due process clause ut a right merely created y law, preliminary investigation if held within the statutory limitations cannot e voided. $ppellantNs argument, if sustained, would ma;e a moc;ery of criminal procedure, since all that a party has to do to thwart the validity of the preliminary investigation is for their counsel not to attend the investigation. !t must e emphasi+ed that the preliminary investigation is not the venue for the full e,ercise of the rights of the parties . T-is is 6-% preli1inar% investigation is not considered as a part of trial "ut 1erel% preparator% t-ereto and t-at t-e records t-erein s-all not for1 part of t-e records of t-e case in court. (arties 1a% su"1it affidavits "ut -ave no rig-t to e:a1ine 6itnesses t-oug- t-e% can propound 7uestions t-roug- t-e investigating officer. >n fact, a preli1inar% investigation 1a% even "e conducted e:;parte in certain cases. YUSOP !S# SANDIGAN9AYAN AGR N.# 13::"9 $@, F-'65%6? 22, 2@@1B &he defenseNs failure to crossCe,amine 5li+a eth %eglos was occasioned y her supervening death. Lac; of crossCe,amination due to the death of the witness does not necessarily render the deceasedNs previous testimony e,pungi le. 0esides, mere opportunity and not actual crossCe,amination is the essence of the right to crossCe,amine. )e also find unmeritorious appellantsN argument that 5li+a ethNs testimony, having een ta;en during the ail hearings d under Section B, %ule ..D, as amended y Circular .2C>D, Mevidence

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SOLID TRIANGLE SALES CORP# !S# THE SHERIFF OF RTC, QC# E3#%+ AGR N.# 1443@9, N.,-2'-6 23, 2@@1B &he effect of the quashal of the warrant on the ground that no offense has een committed is to render the evidence o tained y virtue of the warrant Minadmissi le for any purpose in any proceeding,M including the preliminary investigation. DE LOS SANTOS REYES !S# MONTESA AAM RTJ 93 9:3, A5*513 7, 199"B >n satisf%ing -i1self of t-e e:istence of pro"a"le cause for t-e issuance of a 6arrant of arrest, t-e 9udge, follo6ing t-e esta"lis-ed doctrine and procedure, s-all eit-er *a) personall% evaluate t-e report and t-e supporting docu1ents su"1itted "% t-e prosecutor regarding t-e e:istence of pro"a"le cause and, on t-e "asis t-ereof, issue a 6arrant of arrest, or *") if on t-e face of t-e infor1ation -e finds no pro"a"le cause, -e 1a% disregard t-e prosecutor8s certification and re7uire t-e su"1ission of t-e supporting affidavits of 6itnesses to aid -i1 in arriving at a conclusion as to t-e e:istence of pro"a"le cause. -Supreme Court Circular :o. .2, dated 3E Fune .>BA" Soliven vs. 6a;asiar, .?A SC%$ 3>3 <.>BB=" Cru+ vs. People, 233 SC%$ D3> <.>>D=./ &his procedure is dictated y sound pu lic policy" otherwise *udges would e unduly laden with the preliminary e,amination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed efore their courts. At t-is stage of a cri1inal proceeding, t-e 9udge is not tas.ed to revie6 in detail t-e evidence su"1itted during t-e preli1inar% investigation$ it is sufficient t-at -e personall% evaluates t-e report and supporting docu1ents su"1itted "% t-e prosecution in deter1ining pro"a"le cause. T-is 9udicial function does not carr% 6it- it a 1otu proprio revie6 of t-e reco11endation of t-e prosecutor in a capital offense t-at no "ail s-all "e granted. Suc- a reco11endation is t-e e:clusive prerogative of t-e prosecutor in t-e e:ercise of -is 7uasi;9udicial function during t-e preli1inar% investigation, 6-ic- is e:ecutive in nature . !n such cases, once the court determines that pro a le cause e,ists for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the warrant of arrest shall forthwith e issued and it is only after the accused is ta;en into the custody of the law and deprived of his li erty that, upon proper application for ail, the court on the asis of the evidence adduced y the prosecution at the hearing called for the purpose may, upon determination that such evidence is not strong, admit the accused to ail. PEOPLE !S# NADERA AGR N.1# 1313:4 :7, F-'65%6? 2, 2@@@B Convictions "ased on an i1provident plea of guilt are set aside onl% if suc- plea is t-e sole "asis of t-e 9udg1ent . !f the trial court relied on sufficient and credi le evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must e sustained,

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ecause then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused ut on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged. PHIL# RA99IT 9US LINES !S# PEOPLE A GR N.# 1477@3, A/6(+ 4, 2@@4 B $n appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional safeguard against dou le *eopardy and throws the whole case open to a review y the appellate court. &he latter is then called upon to render *udgment as law and *ustice dictate, whether favora le or unfavora le to the appellant. &his is the ris; involved when the accused decides to appeal a sentence of conviction. !ndeed, appellate courts have the power to reverse, affirm or modify the *udgment of the lower court and to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed. ALONTE !S# SA!ELLANO 2:7 SCRA 24" $fter the case has een filed in court, any pardon made y the private complainant, whether y sworn statement or on the witness stand, cannot e,tinguish criminal lia lilty. PEOPLE !S# ESCANO 349 SCRA $74 &he acquittal on appel of certain accused ased on reasona le dou t enefits a coCaccused who did not appel or who withdrew his appeal. PEOPLE !S# MADERAS 3"@ SCRA "@4 )here the accused escapes from actual custody or flees from constructive custody, the Court may motu proprio or on appellee#s motion dismiss the appeal for a andonment. E!IDENCE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs# E!ANGELINE GANENAS % UR9ANO AG#R# N.# 1414@@# S-/3-2'-6 $, 2@@1B &he alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses refer to minor or trivial incidents that do not detract from the fact that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto as a result of the uyC ust operation. &he identities of the leader and the mem ers of the police team are nonessential matters that have no direct earing upon the actual commission of the offense. 5itnesses

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testif%ing on t-e sa1e event do not -ave to "e consistent in ever% detail, as differences in recollections, vie6points or i1pressions are inevita"le. So long as t-e% concur on t-e 1aterial points of t-eir respective testi1onies, slig-t differences in t-ese 1atters do not destro% t-e veracit% of t-eir state1ents 're&u(ption of Regularity in the 'erfor(ance of -fficial Duty &he testimonies of the police officers with respect to appellant#s participation in the drugCrelated transaction, which was the su *ect of the operation, carried with it the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. Courts accord credence and full faith to the testimonies of police authorities, as they are presumed to e performing their duties regularly, a sent any convincing proof to the contrary. !n this case, no sufficient reason or valid e,planation was presented to deviate from this presumption of regularity on their part. !n almost every case involving a uyC ust operation, the accused put up the defense of frameCup. &he Supreme Court views such claim with disfavor, ecause Kit can easily e feigned and fa ricated. E!ANGELINE CA9RERA ,1# PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES %)4 LUIS GO AG#R# N.# 1"@$1:# J5+? 24, 2@@3#B !n this case, the prosecution failed to adduce in evidence any notice of dishonor of the three postdated chec;s or any letter of demand sent to and received y the petitioner. &he are testimony of Luis Go that he sent letters of demand to the petitioner notifying her of the dishonor of her chec;s is utterly insufficient. Aor failure of t-e prosecution to s-o6 t-at notices of dis-onor of t-e t-ree postdated c-ec.s 6ere served on t-e petitioner, or at t-e ver% least, t-at s-e 6as sent a de1and letter notif%ing -er of t-e said dis-onor, t-e pri1a facie presu1ption under Section ! of F.(. Flg. !! t-at s-e .ne6 of t-e insufficienc% of funds cannot arise. T-us, t-ere can "e no "asis for esta"lis-ing t-e presence of Dactual .no6ledge of insufficienc% of funds.M !n light of such failure, we find and so declare that the prosecution failed to prove eyond reasona le dou t all the elements of violation of 0.P. 0lg. 22. Hence, the need to reverse and set aside the decisions of oth the Court of $ppeals and the trial court convicting the petitioner of the crime of violation of 0.P. 0lg. 22. However, we uphold the decision of the C$ affirming the trial courtNs decision ordering the petitioner to pay to the private respondent the total face value of the chec;s in the amount of P2E>,.A@.D@. )e stress that a chec; is an evidence of de t against the drawer, and although may not e intended to e presented, has the same effect as an ordinary chec;, and if passed upon to a third person, will e valid in his hands li;e any other chec;. Hence, the petitioner is o liged to pay to the private respondent Luis Go the said amount of P2E>,.A@.D@ with .21 legal interest per annum, from the filing of the information until the finality of this decision, the sum of which, inclusive of interest, shall e su *ect thereafter to .21 per annum interest until the amount due is fully paid,

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conforma ly to our ruling that when an o ligation is reached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e. a loan or for earance of money, the interest due should e that which may have een stipulated in writing. !n the a sence of such stipulation, the rate shall e .21 per annum computed from default, i.e. *udicial or e,tra*udicial demand. 2@ !n this case, the rate of interest was not stipulated in writing y the petitioner, the private respondent and 0oni Co. &hus, the applica le interest rate is .21 per annum. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GO!ERNMENT DPCGG8 ,1# AG#R# N.# 13212@# F-'65%6? 1@, 2@@3#B !n the face of the $ffidavit and the Supplemental $ffidavit, it is indeed strange how the om udsman could have ruled that there was no testimonial evidence on the said matters. &hat he ruled thus clearly shows that he whimsically opted to disregard those pieces of evidence and there y demonstrated his capricious and ar itrary e,ercise of *udgment. &he complainant is required to file affidavits Mas well as other supporting documents to esta lish pro a le cause,M as stated in the %ules of Court: M-a/ &he complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall e accompanied y the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to esta lish pro a le cause.M &his requirement was fulfilled y the PCGG. &he Supplemental Complaint was accompanied y the $ffidavits of witnesses as well as y a host of other supporting documents, all of which O ta;en together O esta lished pro a le cause. >t s-ould "e noted t-at t-e Rules on =vidence recogni2es different for1s of evidence G o"9ect, docu1entar% or testi1onial G 6it-out preference for an% of t-e1 in particular. 5-at s-ould reall% 1atter are t-e 6eig-t and t-e sufficienc% of t-e evidence presented. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ,1# CARLITO MARAHAY ? MORACA AG#R# N.1# 12@$2" 29# J%)5%6? 2:, 2@@3B )hile the fatherCdaughter relationship of accusedCappellant and the victims, 6ylene and 0elinda, remains undisputed, the minority of the victims, though alleged, was not satisfactorily esta lished. !t is the urden of the prosecution to prove with certainty the fact that the victim was elow .B years of age when the rape was committed in order to *ustify the imposition of the death penalty. !n the recent case of People vs. 6anuel Pruna y %amire+ or 5rman Pruna y %amire+, this Court laid down the following guidelines in appreciating age, eit-er as an ele1ent of t-e cri1e or as a 7ualif%ing circu1stance@ M.. &he est evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live irth of such party.

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M2. !n the a sence of a certificate of live irth, similar authentic documents such as aptismal certificate and school records which show the date of irth of the victim would suffice to prove age. M3. !f the certificate of live irth or authentic document is shown to have een lost or destroyed or otherwise unavaila le, the testimony, if clear and credi le, of the victimNs mother or a mem er of the family either y affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the e,act age or date of irth of the offended party pursuant to Section DE, %ule .3E of the %ules on 5vidence shall e sufficient under the following circumstances: a. !f the victim is alleged to e elow 3 years of age and what is sought to e proved is that she is less than A years old" . !f the victim is alleged to e elow A years of age and what is sought to e proved is that she is less than .2 years old" c. !f the victim is alleged to e elow .2 years of age and what is sought to e proved is that she is less than .B years old. MD. !n the a sence of a certificate of live irth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victimNs mother or relatives concerning the victimNs age, the complainantNs testimony will suffice provided that it is e,pressly and clearly admitted y the accused. M@. !t is the prosecution that has the urden of proving the age of the offended party. &he failure of the accused to o *ect to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not e ta;en against him. M?. &he trial court should always ma;e a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.M &hus, although the defense does not contest the age of the victim, it is still essential that the prosecution present independent proof thereof, pursuant to :o. @ of said guidelines. $s a matter of fact, the minority of the victim must e proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. Under Section DD, %ule .3E of the %ules on 5vidence, a irth certificate is the est evidence of a personNs date of irth. !n the instant case, the prosecution did not present the certificates of live irth of oth 6ylene and 0elinda or other similar authentic documents to prove their ages. :ot even the victimsN mother or the victims themselves, or any other relative qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree, were presented y the prosecution to esta lish the victimsN ages at the time the crimes were committed. Such failure of the prosecution to discharge its urden constrains this Court to hold that the qualifying circumstance of minority cannot e appreciated in these cases. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ,1# MARLON MORALDE AG#R# N.# 131:$@# J%)5%6? 1$, 2@@3#B Having een positively and unmista;a ly identified y the complainant as her rapist, the appellantNs defense of ali i cannot prosper. Categorical and consistent positive identification, a"sent an% s-o6ing of ill;1otive on t-e part of t-e e%e6itness testif%ing t-ereon, prevails over t-e defenses of denial and ali"i

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6-ic-, if not su"stantiated "% clear and convincing proof, constitute self; serving evidence undeserving of 6eig-t in la6. $li i, li;e denial, is inherently wea; and easily fa ricated. 8or this defense to *ustify an acquittal, the following must e esta lished: the presence of the appellant in another place at the time of the commission of the offense and the physical impossi ility for him to e at the scene of the crime. &hese requisites have not een met. HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEC SA9ANPAN ,1# AL9ERTO C# COMORPOSA AG#R# N.# 1"2:@7# A5*513 12, 2@@3#B Pleadings filed via fa, machines are not considered originals and are at est e,act copies. $s such, they are not admissi le in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic. &he Certification, on the other hand, is eing contested for earing a facsimile of the signature of C5:% 'fficer Fose 8. &agorda. &he facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in Garvida. &he one mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced y mechanical means ut recogni+ed as valid in an;ing, financial, and usiness transactions. :ote that the C5:% officer has not disclaimed the Certification. !n fact, the D5:% regional director has ac;nowledged and used it as reference in his 'rder dated $pril 2, .>>B: M. . . . C5:% 'fficer Fose 8. &agorda, in a NC5%&!8!C$&!':N dated 22 Fuly .>>A, certified among others, that: . . . per records availa le in his 'ffice, . . . the controverted lot . . . was not allocated to any person . . . .M !f the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director would not have used it as reference in his 'rder. !nstead, he would have either verified it or directed the C5:% officer to ta;e the appropriate action, as the latter was under the formerNs direct control and supervision. PetitionersN claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on appeal is incorrect. $s early as the pretrial conference at the 6unicipal &rial Court -6&C/, the C5:% Certification had already een mar;ed as evidence for respondents as stated in the PreCtrial 'rder. &he Certification was not formally offered, however, ecause respondents had not een a le to file their position paper. N-(3<-6 3<- 65+-1 .; /6.=-456- ).6 >56(1/654-)=- E.5+4 1%)=3(.) 3<%42(11(.) .; -,(4-)=- 3<%3 <%1 ).3 '--) ;.62%++? .;;-6-4 456()* 3<- 36(%+# 953 3<(1 -,(4-)3(%6? 65+- (1 %//+(=%'+- .)+? 3. .64()%6? 36(%+1, ).3 3. =%1-1 =.,-6-4 '? 3<- 65+- .) 1522%6? /6.=-456- F =%1-1 () E<(=< ). ;5++ '+.E) 36(%+ (1 <-+4 Pro ative value of the $ffidavit of Petitioner#s witnesses Petitioners assert that the C$ erred in disregarding the $ffidavits of their witnesses, insisting that the %ule on Summary Procedure authori+es the use of

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affidavits. &hey also claim that the failure of respondents to file their position paper and counterCaffidavits efore the 6&C amounts to an admission y silence. T-e ad1issi"ilit% of evidence s-ould not "e confused 6it- its pro"ative value. Ad1issi"ilit% refers to t-e 7uestion of 6-et-er certain pieces of evidence are to "e considered at all, 6-ile pro"ative value refers to t-e 7uestion of 6-et-er t-e ad1itted evidence proves an issue. T-us, a particular ite1 of evidence 1a% "e ad1issi"le, "ut its evidentiar% 6eig-t depends on 9udicial evaluation 6it-in t-e guidelines provided "% t-e rules of evidence. )hile in summary proceedings affidavits are admissi le as the witnessesN respective testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to reply does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven. Petitioners still ear the urden of proving their cause of action, ecause they are the ones asserting an affirmative relief. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ,1# SATURNINO TUPPAL AG#R# N.1# 1379:2 :"# J%)5%6? 13, 2@@3#B &he 'ffice of the Solicitor General counters that findings of the trial court during the ail hearing were ut a preliminary appraisal of the strength of the prosecutionNs evidence for the limited purpose of determining whether appellant is entitled to e released on ail during the pendency of the trial. Hence, we agree with the 'SG that said findings should not e construed as an immuta le evaluation of the prosecutionNs evidence. !t is settled that the assessment of the prosecution evidence presented during ail hearings in capital offenses is preliminary and intended only for the purpose of granting or denying applications for the provisional release of the accused. TEODORO K# KATIG9AK ,1# THE SANDIGAN9AYAN AG#R# N.# 14@1:3# J5+? 1@, 2@@3#B $ careful scrutiny of the documentary evidence adduced y the prosecution does not support the charge of violation of Section 3, paragraph -e/ of %$ 3E.>, as amended, in the instant information against the petitioners. Significantly, the said pieces of documentary evidence were offered only for the purpose of esta lishing the participation and lia ility of their coCaccused, %o ert 0alao, as noted in the written 8ormal 'ffer of 5,hi its 3@ of the prosecution dated Septem er 22, .>>A. &he same was prepared and signed y $tty. :icanor 7. 7illarosa, counsel of the private complainant, with the written approval of Prosecutor 6anuel 6. Corpu+ of the 'ffice of the Special Prosecutor. !n this connection, the rule is e,plicit that courts should consider the evidence only for the purpose for which it is offered. &he prosecution relies heavily on :H$ 0oard %esolution :o. 2D@3 dated 6arch .2, .>>2 to esta lish the alleged conspiracy etween the petitioners and their coCaccused. However, the Court is othered y the une,plained failure of the prosecution to include in its formal offer of e,hi its such a very vital piece of evidence in proving the e,istence of the alleged conspiracy among the petitioners.

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5e e1p-asi2e t-at an% evidence a part% desires to su"1it for t-e consideration of t-e court 1ust for1all% "e offered "% -i1. Suc- a for1al offer is necessar% "ecause it is t-e dut% of t-e 9udge to rest -is findings of fact and -is 9udg1ent strictl% on t-e evidence offered "% t-e parties at t-e trial$ and no finding of fact can "e sustained if not supported "% suc- evidence. Docu1ents not regularl% received in evidence during t-e trial 6ill not "e considered in disposing of t-e issues in an action. REPU9LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ,1# HONORA9LE SANDIGAN9AYAN %)4 FERDINAND E# MARCOS AG#R# N.# 1"21"4# J5+? 1", 2@@3#B 8erdinand Fr.Ns pronouncements, ta;en in conte,t and in their entirety, were a confirmation of respondents# recognition of their ownership of the Swiss an; deposits. $dmissions of a party in his testimony are receiva le against him. !f a party, as a witness, deli erately concedes a fact, such concession has the force of a *udicial admission. !t is apparent from 8erdinand Fr.Ns testimony that the 6arcos family agreed to negotiate with the Philippine government in the hope of finally putting an end to the pro lems esetting the 6arcos family regarding the Swiss accounts. &his was dou tlessly an ac;nowledgment of ownership on their part. &he rule is that the testimony on the witness stand parta;es of the nature of a formal *udicial admission when a party testifies clearly and unequivocally to a fact which is peculiarly within his own ;nowledge. )e have always adhered to the familiar doctrine that an admission made in the pleadings cannot e controverted y the party ma;ing such admission and ecomes conclusive on him, and that all proofs su mitted y him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should e ignored, whether an o *ection is interposed y the adverse party or not. &his doctrine is em odied in Section D, %ule .2> of the %ules of Court. !n the a sence of a compelling reason to the contrary, respondentsN *udicial admission of ownership of the Swiss deposits is definitely inding on them. &he individual and separate admissions of each respondent ind all of them pursuant to Sections 2> and 3., %ule .3E of the %ules of Court. T<- 4-=+%6%3(.)1 .; % /-61.) %6- %42(11('+- %*%()13 % /%63? E<-)-,-6 % G/6(,(3? .; -13%3-G -H(131 '-3E--) 3<- 4-=+%6%)3 %)4 3<- /%63?, 3<- 3-62 G/6(,(3? .; -13%3-G *-)-6%++? 4-).3()* % 15==-11(.) () 6(*<31# C.)1-I5-)3+?, %) %42(11(.) .; .)- () /6(,(3? E(3< % /%63? 3. 3<- 6-=.64 (1 =.2/-3-)3# W(3<.53 4.5'3, /6(,(3? -H(131 %2.)* 3<- 6-1/.)4-)31 () 3<(1 =%1-# A)4 E<-61-,-6%+ =. /%63(-1 3. 3<- 6-=.64 %6- >.()3+? ()3-6-13-4 () 3<- 15'>-=3 2%33-6 .; 3<- =.)36.,-61?, 3<- %42(11(.) .; .)- (1 =.2/-3-)3 %*%()13 %++# PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ,1# RAQUIM PINUELA AG#R# N.1# 14@727 2:# F-'65%6? 3, 2@@3#B $ccusedCappellant further argues that the prosecution did not present Henry Hualde ecause his testimony would e adverse to the case. )e are not

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persuaded. !t is the prosecution that determines who among its witnesses are to testify in court, and it is neither for the accused nor the court to override that prerogative. Corollarily, the failure of the prosecution to present a particular witness does not give rise to the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would e adverse if produced, where that evidence is at the disposal of oth parties or where the only o *ect of presenting the witness would e to provide corro orative or cumulative evidence. 8inally, accusedCappellant contends that the trial *udgeNs intervention during crossCe,amination of the prosecution witnesses was pre*udicial to him. However, a scrutiny of the questions propounded y the trial *udge, fails to disclose any ias on his part which would pre*udice accusedCappellant. &he questions were merely clarificatory. &he trial court *udge is not an idle ar iter during a trial. He can propound clarificatory questions to witnesses in order to ferret out the truth. &he impartiality of a *udge cannot e assailed on the ground that he as;ed clarificatory questions during the trial. GRACE J# GARCIA vs# REDERICK A# RECIO AG#R# N.# 13:322# O=3.'-6 2, 2@@1B $ divorce o tained a road y an alien may e recogni+ed in our *urisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who o tained the divorce must e proven. 'ur courts do not ta;e *udicial notice of foreign laws and *udgments" hence, li;e any other facts, oth the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must e alleged and proven according to our law on evidence. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 9ASED ON REMEDIAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE CI!IL PROCEDURE Q# How is *urisdiction over the person of the defendant acquired y the trial court( E(3<-6 '? <(1 ,.+5)3%6? %//-%6%)=- () =.563 %)4 <(1 15'2(11(.) 3. (31 %53<.6(3? .6 '? 1-6,(=- .; 1522.)1# &he service of summons and the complaint on the defendant is to inform him that a case has een filed against him and, thus, ena le him to defend himself. He is, thus, put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner. )ithout such service in the a sence of a valid waiver renders the *udgment of the court null and void. Furisdiction cannot e acquired y the court on the person of the defendant even if he ;nows of the case against him unless he is validly served with summons. Summons and

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complaint may e served on the defendant either y handing a copy thereof to him in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, y tendering it to her. However, if there is impossi ility of prompt service of the summons personally on the defendant despite diligent efforts to find him, service of the summons may e effected y su stituted service as provided in Section A, %ule .D of the said %ules: S5C. A. Su stituted service. O !f, for *ustifia le causes, the defendant cannot e served within a reasona le time as provided in the preceding section, service may e effected -a/ y leaving copies of the summons at the defendantNs residence with some person of suita le age and discretion then residing therein, or - / y leaving the copies of defendantNs office or regular place of usiness with some competent person in charge thereof. * Anc-eta vs. Anc-eta, 0R? 14# ',, )arc4, !,,4 ) Q# )hen can the court resort to su stituted service( !n 6iranda v. Court of $ppeals, we held that the modes of service should e strictly followed in order that the court may acquire *urisdiction over the person of the defendant. &hus, it is only when a defendant cannot e served personally within a reasona le time that su stituted service may e made y stating the efforts made to find him and personally serve on him the summons and complaint and the fact that such effort failed. &his statement should e made in the proof of service to e accomplished and filed in court y the sheriff. &his is necessary ecause su stituted service is a derogation of the usual method of service. !t has een held that su stituted service of summons is a method e,traordinary in character" hence, may e used only as prescri ed and in the circumstances categori+ed y statutes. * Anc-eta vs. Anc-eta, 0R? 14# ',, )arc- 4, !,,4 ) Q# $re indispensa le parties required to e *oined( YES# Section A, %ule 3 of the %ules of Court, as amended, requires indispensa le parties to e *oined as plaintiffs or defendants. &-e 9oinder of indispensa"le parties is 1andator%. 5it-out t-e presence of indispensa"le parties to t-e suit, t-e 9udg1ent of t-e court cannot attain real finalit%. Strangers to a case are not ound y the *udgment rendered y the court. &he a sence of an indispensa le party renders all su sequent actions of the court null and void. Lac; of authority to act not only of the a sent party ut also as to those present. &he responsi ility of impleading all the indispensa le parties rests on the petitioner4plaintiff. - Do1ingo vs# Sc-eer.

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Q# )ill the nonC*oinder of an indispensa le party e a ground for the dismissal of the petition( NO# &he nonC*oinder of indispensa le parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may e added y order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and4or such times as are *ust. !f the petitioner4plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensa le party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint4petition for the petitioner4plaintiffs failure to comply therefor. /Do1ingo vs. Sc-eer) Q# $ case for collection of sum of money was filed y respondent against herein petitioner. &he sheriff failed to serve the summons intended for the petitioner ecause the former could not locate the petitionerNs address as indicated in the complaint. &hereafter, petitioner filed a 6otion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lac; of *urisdiction over his person. &he court denied said motion and ordered the issuance of alias summons on the petitioner. !s the denial and issuance of alias summon proper ( YES# &he trial court was merely e,ercising its discretion under %ule .?, Section 3 of the .>>A %ules of Civil Procedure when it denied the petitionerNs motion to dismiss. Under said rule, after hearing the motion, a *udge may dismiss the action, deny the motion to dismiss or order the amendment of the pleading. &he trial court denied the motion to dismiss ased on its finding that the issues alleged y the respondent in its complaint could not e resolved fully in the a sence of the petitioner. !n its desire to resolve completely the issues rought efore it, the trial court deemed it fitting to properly acquire *urisdiction over the person of the petitioner y ordering the issuance of alias summons on the petitioner. 5vidently, the trial court acted well within its discretion. * Te- vs. CA, 0R? 14', &, April !4, !,, ) Q# )hen will the rule on forum shopping apply( T<- 65+- .) ;.652 1<.//()* %//+(-1 E<-6- 3<- -+-2-)31 .; +(3(1 /-)4-)3(% %6- /6-1-)3 .6 E<-6- % ;()%+ >54*2-)3 () .)- =%1- E(++ %2.5)3 3. 6-1 >54(=%3% () 3<- .3<-6# %es *udicata applies only where *udgment on the merits is finally rendered on the first. *David vs. Spouses ?avarro) Q# )ill su sequent compliance with the requirement to file a certificate of nonC forum shopping cure the defect to file the same in the first instance(

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NO# &his Court held in 6elo vs. Court of $ppeals, et al., that the requirement under $dministrative Circular :o. EDC>D for a certificate of nonCforum shopping is mandatory. &he su sequent compliance with said requirement does not e,cuse a partyNs failure to comply therewith in the first instance. !n those cases where this Court e,cused the nonCcompliance with the requirement of the su mission of a certificate of nonCforum shopping, it found special circumstances or compelling reasons which made the strict application of said Circular clearly un*ustified or inequita le. !n this case, however, the petitioner offered no valid *ustification for her failure to comply with the Circular. * Fato% vs. RTC, 0R? 1!6& , Ae"ruar% 1', !,, ) Q. !s there a valid motion for reconsideration when there is a failure to incorporate any notice of hearing( NO. Section 2, %ule 3A of the %ules of Court provides that a motion for reconsideration or a motion for a new trial shall e made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefor, a written notice of which shall e served y the movant on the adverse party. Such written notice is that prescri ed in Sections D and @, %ule .@ of the %ules of Court. Under Section D, paragraph 2 of said rule, a notice of hearing on a motion shall e served y the movant to all the parties concerned at least three days efore the date of hearing. Section @ of the same rule requires that the notice of hearing shall e directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and place of the hearing of the motion. &he requirements, far from eing merely technical and procedural as claimed y the petitioners, are vital elements of procedural due process.&he requirements entom ed in Sections D and @ of %ule .@ of the %ules of Court are mandatory and nonCcompliance therewith is fatal and renders the motion pro forma. /Repu"lic vs. (eralta 0RH1#, !', /une 1&,!,, ) Q# Can the appellate court resolve issues that are not raised on appeal( YES. &he Court has ruled in a num er of cases that the appellate court is accorded a road discretionary power to waive the lac; of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned. !t is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal. !nasmuch as the Court of $ppeals may consider grounds other than those touched upon in the decision of the trial court and uphold the same on the asis of such other grounds, the Court of $ppeals may, with no less authority, reverse the decision of the trial court on the asis of grounds other than those raised as errors on appeal. )e have applied this rule, as a matter of e,ception, in the following instances:

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-./ -2/ -3/

-D/

-@/ -?/

Grounds not assigned as errors ut affecting *urisdiction over the su *ect matter" 6atters not assigned as errors on appeal ut are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law" 6atters not assigned as errors on appeal ut consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a *ust decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of *ustice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal *ustice" 6atters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal ut raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some earing on the issue su mitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored" 6atters not assigned as errors on appeal ut closely related to an error assigned" and 6atters not assigned as errors on appeal ut upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent. / Iiron Transpo. Is. CA, 0RH11',!,,April 4, !,, )

Q# !s it a ministerial duty for the sheriff to e,ecute the *udgment of the court( Y-1# T<(1 C.563 <%1 =.)1(13-)3+? <-+4 3<%3 G3<- 1<-6(;;J1 453? 3. -H-=53- % >54*2-)3 (1 2()(13-6(%+#G $ purely ministerial act is one Mwhich an officer or tri unal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescri ed manner, in o edience to the mandate of the legal authority, without regard to the e,ercise of his own *udgment upon the propriety of the act done.M /E+ero v&* 0a1ati City Sheriff&. Q# )hat are the grounds to annul the *udgment or final order or resolution in civil actions of the %&C( $n original action in the Court of $ppeals under %ule DA of the %ules of Court, as amended, to annul a *udgment or final order or resolution in civil actions of the %&C may e ased on two grounds: -a/ e,trinsic fraud" or - / lac; of *urisdiction. !f ased on e,trinsic fraud, the remedy is su *ect to a condition precedent, namely, the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer availa le through no fault of the petitioner. &he petitioner must allege in the petition that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from *udgment, under %ule 3B of the %ules of Court are no longer availa le through no fault of hers" otherwise, the petition will e dismissed. !f the petitioner fails to avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or relief from *udgment through her own fault or negligence efore filing her petition with the Court of $ppeals, she cannot resort to

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the remedy under %ule DA of the %ules" otherwise, she would enefit from her inaction or negligence. !t is not enough to allege in the petition that the said remedies were no longer availa le through no fault of her own. &he petitioner must also e,plain and *ustify her failure to avail of such remedies. &he safeguard was incorporated in the rule precisely to avoid a use of the remedy. $ccess to the courts is guaranteed. 0ut there must e limits thereto. 'nce a litigantNs rights have een ad*udicated in a valid final *udgment of a competent court, he should not e granted an un ridled license to sue anew. &he prevailing party should not e ve,ed y su sequent suits. Q( !n a petition for annulment of *udgment under %ule DA, is it always necessary to allege that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration is no longer availa le( !t depends on what ground the petition is ased. $n original action in the Court of $ppeals under %ule DA of the %ules of Court, as amended, to annul a *udgment or final order or resolution in civil actions of the %&C may e ased on two grounds: - %8 -H36()1(= ;6%54; .6 D'8 +%=& .; >56(14(=3(.). !f ased on e,trinsic fraud, the remedy is su *ect to a condition precedent, namely, the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer availa le through no fault of the petitioner. &he petitioner must allege in the petition that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from *udgment, under %ule 3B of the %ules of Court are no longer availa le through no fault of hers" otherwise, the petition will e dismissed. !f the petitioner fails to avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or relief from *udgment through her own fault or negligence efore filing her petition with the Court of $ppeals, she cannot resort to the remedy under %ule DA of the %ules" otherwise, she would enefit from her inaction or negligence. >n a case 6-ere a petition for t-e annul1ent of a 9udg1ent or final order of t-e RTC filed under Rule 4' of t-e Rules of Court is grounded on lac. of 9urisdiction over t-e person of t-e defendantJrespondent or over t-e nature or su"9ect of t-e action, t-e petitioner need not allege in t-e petition t-at t-e ordinar% re1ed% of ne6 trial or reconsideration of t-e final order or 9udg1ent or appeal t-erefro1 are no longer availa"le t-roug- no fault of -er o6n. &his is so ecause a *udgment rendered or final order issued y the %&C without *urisdiction is null and void and may e assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or y resisting such *udgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invo;ed, unless arred y laches. * Anc-eta vs. Anc-eta, 0R? 14# ',, )arc- 4, !,,4 )

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Q# )hat is the nature of a *udgment on the question of ownership in e*ectment cases( Prefatorily, in e*ectment cases, the issue is the physical or material possession -possession de facto/ and any pronouncement made y the trial court on the question of ownership is provisional in nature. $ *udgment rendered in e*ectment cases shall not ar an action etween the same parties respecting title to the land and shall not e conclusive as to the facts found therein in a case etween the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession of the same property. * Alorencio vs. de leon, 0R? 149#',, )arc- 1!, !,,4 ) SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Q# 6ay an interlocutory order e su *ect of a petition for certiorari under %ule ?@ of the %ules of Court( NO# S5=< .64-6 (1 2-6-+? %) ()3-6+.=53.6? .)- %)4 3<-6-;.6).3 %//-%+%'+-# N-(3<-6 =%) (3 '- 3<- 15'>-=3 .; % /-3(3(.) ;.6 =-63(.6%6(# Such order may only e reviewed in the ordinary course of law y an appeal from the *udgment after trial. $lthough the special civil action for certiorari may e availed of in case there is grave a use of discretion or lac; of *urisdiction on the part of the lower court, or ody, it would e a reach of orderly procedure to allow a party to come efore the appellate court every time an order is issued with which a party does not agree. Hence, as a general rule, there must first e a *udgment on the merits of the case efore it may e questioned via a special civil action for certiorari. &he remedy of the aggrieved party is to file an answer to the complaint and to interpose as defenses the o *ections raised in his motion to dismiss, proceed to trial, and in case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case y appeal in due course. However, the rule is not ironclad. Under certain situations, recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, that is, -a/ when the trial court issued the order without or in e,cess of *urisdiction" - / where there is patent grave a use of discretion y the trial court" or, -c/ appeal would not prove to e a speedy and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the in*urious effects of the patently mista;en order maintaining the plaintiffs# aseless action and compelling the defendant needlessly to go through protracted trial and clogging the court doc;ets y another futile case. /Ca+alle& v&* 'ere23Si&on. 9. )hat do you mean y lac; of *urisdiction, e,cess of *urisdiction and grave a use of discretion( )hen will the special civil action for certiorari lie(

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T<- 36('5)%+ %=31 E(3<.53 >56(14(=3(.) (; (3 4.-1 ).3 <%,- 3<+-*%+ /56/.1- 3. 4-3-62()- 3<- =%1-; 3<-6- (1 -H=-11 .; >56(14(=3(.) E<-6- 3<- 36('5)%+, '-()* =+.3<-4 E(3< 3<- /.E-6 3. 4-3-62()- 3<=%1-, .,-613-/1 (31 %53<.6(3? %1 4-3-62()-4 '? +%E, T<-6- (1 *6%,%'51- .; 4(1=6-3(.) E<-6- 3<- 36('5)%+ %=31 () % =%/6(=(.51, E<(21(=%+, %6'(36%6? .6 4-1/.3(= 2%))-6 () 3<- -H-6=(1- .; (31 >54*2-)3 %)4 (1 -I5(,%+-)3 3. +%=& .; >56(14(=3(.)# !t was incum ent upon the private respondent to adduce a sufficiently strong demonstration that the %&C acted whimsically in total disregard of evidence material to, and even decide of, the controversy efore certiorari will lie. A 1/-=(%+ =(,(+ %=3(.) ;.6 =-63(.6%6( (1 % 6-2-4? 4-1(*)-4 ;.6 3<- =.66-=3(.) .; -66.61 .; >56(14(=3(.) %)4 ).3 -66.61 .; >54*2-)3# )hen a court e,ercises its *urisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of its *urisdiction eing e,ercised when the error is committed. *C-ing vs. Court of Appeals) Q# )hat should the sheriff include in his enforcement of the writ of attachment( )hat are the remedies in case the sheriff fails to attach the right properties( )hat is the procedure followed y the court( S<-6(;; 2%? %33%=< .)+? 3<.1- /6./-63(-1 .; 3<- 4-;-)4%)3 %*%()13 E<.2 % E6(3 .; %33%=<2-)3 <%1 '--) (115-4 '? 3<- =.563# )hen the sheriff erroneously levies on attachment and sei+es the property of a third person in which the said defendant holds no right or interest, the superior authority of the court which has authori+ed the e,ecution may e invo;ed y the aggrieved third person in the same case. Upon application of the third person, the court shall order a summary hearing for the purpose of determining whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties in the e,ecution of the writ of attachment, more specifically if he has indeed levied on attachment and ta;en hold of property not elonging to the plaintiff. !f so, the court may then order the sheriff to release the property from the erroneous levy and to return the same to the third person. !n resolving the motion of the third party, the court does not and cannot pass upon the question of the title to the property with any character of finality. !t can treat the matter only insofar as may e necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted correctly or not. !f the claimantNs proof does not persuade the court of the validity of the title, or right of possession thereto, the claim will e denied y the court. &he aggrieved third party may also avail himself of the remedy of MterceriaM y e,ecuting an affidavit of his title or right of possession over the property levied on attachment and serving the same to the office ma;ing the levy and the adverse party. Such party may also file an action to nullify the levy with damages resulting from the unlawful levy and sei+ure, which should e a totally separate and distinct action from the former case. &he a ovementioned remedies are cumulative and any one of them may e

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resorted to y one thirdCparty claimant without availing of the other remedies. *Bng vs. Tating$ C-ing vs. CA) Q# )hat will e the effect if no supersedeas ond has een filed on appeal to stay the e,ecution( C.563 (1 2%)4%3-4 3. (115- % E6(3 .; -H-=53(.) , conforma ly to Section .>, %ule AE of the %ules of Court, as amended. *David vs. Spouses ?avarro) Q. )hether or not the petitioner in a petition for review on certiorari can raise questions of facts( !t ears stressing, however, that in a petition for review on certiorari, only questions of law may e raised in said petition. &he *urisdiction of this Court in cases rought to it from the Court of $ppeals is confined to reviewing and reversing the errors of law ascri ed to it, findings of facts eing conclusive on this Court. &he Court is not tas;ed to cali rate and assess the pro ative weight of evidence adduced y the parties during trial all over again. 2. !n those instances where the findings of facts of the trial court and its conclusions anchored on said findings are inconsistent with those of the Court of $ppeals, this Court does not automatically delve into the record to determine which of the discordant findings and conclusions should prevail and to resolve the disputed facts for itself. &his Court is tas;ed to merely determine which of the findings of the two tri unals are conforma le to the facts at hand. 22 So long as the findings of facts of the Court of $ppeals are consistent with or are not palpa ly contrary to the evidence on record, this Court shall decline to em ar; on a review on the pro ative weight of the evidence of the parties.*Superlines Transpo vs. >CC) CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Q# Can unmar;ed sworn statements e used to convict an appellant( NO. Private complainantNs Sworn Statements, which formed part of the records of the preliminary investigation, cannot e used to convict appellant, ecause they do not form part of the records of the case in the %&C. &hey were not mar;ed, much less formally offered efore it. 5vidence not formally offered cannot e ta;en into consideration in disposing of the issues of the case. -(eople of t-e (-ils. vs. Ra1ire2, 0R? 1#,,'9;&,, /une 1,,!,,4 8

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Q# Should cases where an improvident plea of guilt is entered e remanded always to the trial court( NO. !mprovident plea of guilty on the part of the accused when capital crimes are involved should e avoided since he might e admitting his guilt efore the court and thus forfeit his life and li erty without having fully comprehended the meaning and import and consequences of his plea. &he trial court convicted the appellants of ro ery with homicide on the asis of their plea of guilty during their rearraignment. O64()%6(+?, 3<- =%1- 1<.5+4 '- 6-2%)4-4 3. 3<- 36(%+ =.563 ;.6 3<- /6.1-=53(.) %)4 3<- %//-++%)31 3. %445=- 3<-(6 6-1/-=3(,- -,(4-)=-1# H.E-,-6, 3<6-=.641 1<.E 3<%3 4-1/(3- 3<- /+-% .; *5(+3? .; 3<- %//-++%)31, 3</6.1-=53(.) %445=-4 (31 -,(4-)=-. &he appellants li;ewise adduced their evidence to prove their defenses. T<- C.563 E(++ 6-1.+,- 3<- =%1- .) (31 2-6(31 ()4-/-)4-)3 .; 3<- /+-% .; *5(+3? .; 3<- %//-++%)31 6%3<-6 3<%) 6-2%)4 3<- =%1- 3. 3<- 36(%+ =.563# D (eople vs. Daniela, 0.R. ?o. 1 9! ,. April !4, !,, ) Q# !s an accused deprived of his right to crossCe,amine a witness when the cross e,amination of such witness was not conducted due to his counsel#s own doing( NO. %ight to crossCe,amine is a constitutional right anchored on due process. !t is a statutory right found in Section .-f/, %ule ..@ of the %evised %ules of Criminal Procedure which provides that the accused has the right to confront and crossCe,amine the witnesses against him at the trial. However, the right has always een understood as requiring not necessarily an actual crossCe,amination ut merely an opportunity to e,ercise the right to crossCe,amine if desired. )hat is proscri ed y statutory norm and *urisprudential precept is the a sence of the opportunity to crossCe,amine. &he right is a personal one and may e waived e,pressly or impliedly. &here is an implied waiver when the party was given the opportunity to confront and crossCe,amine an opposing witness ut failed to ta;e advantage of it for reasons attri uta le to himself alone. !f y his actuations, the accused lost his opportunity to crossC e,amine wholly or in part the witnesses against him, his right to crossC e,amine is impliedly waived. * (eople vs. =scote, 0.R. ?o. 14,'#6. April 4, !,, ) Q# $ police inspector with a salary grade of 23 was charged with 6urder. $fter preliminary hearing, the %&C ordered the transmittal of the case to the Sandigan ayan on the ground that the crime was committed y the accused Kin relation to his office.L Does the Sandigan ayan have *urisdiction over the case( NO# Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office ut occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade elow M2A,M the proper %egional &rial Court or 6unicipal

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&rial Court, as the case may e, shall have e,clusive *urisdiction over the case conforma ly to Sections 2E and 32 of 0atas Pam ansa 0lg. .2>, as amended y Section 2 of %.$. :o. A?>.. !n cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade M2AM or higher, as prescri ed in the said %epu lic $ct :o. ?A@B, or P:P officers occupying the ran; of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, e,clusive *urisdiction thereof shall e vested in the proper %egional &rial Court, 6etropolitan &rial Court, 6unicipal &rial Court, and 6unicipal Circuit &rial Court, as the case may e, pursuant to their respective *urisdiction as provided in 0atas Pam ansa 0lg. .2>. However, for the Sandigan ayan to have e,clusive *urisdiction under the said law over crimes committed y pu lic officers in relation to their office, it is that the crime charged Q# !s it necessary that accused e identified through ;nowledge of his name( NO. &he identification of a person is not solely through ;nowledge of his name. !n fact, familiarity with physical features, particularly those of the face, is the est way to identify a person. 'ne may e familiar with the face ut not necessarily the name. &hus, it does not follow that to e a le to identify a person, one must necessarily ;now his name. M5,perience shows that precisely ecause of the unusual acts of estiality committed efore their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, can remem er with a high degree of relia ility the identity of criminals. )e have ruled that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and o serve the manner the crime was committed. 6ost often, the face and ody movements of the assailant create an impression which cannot easily e erased from their memory.M %elatives of the victim have a natural ;nac; for remem ering the face of the assailant for they, more than any ody else, would e concerned with see;ing *ustice for the victim and ringing the malefactor to face the law. -(eople of t-e (-ils. vs. De La Cru2, 0R? 1 1, #, Ae"ruar% !&, !,, ) Q# How is the crime charged in the information determined( !n determining what crime is charged in an information, the material inculpatory facts recited therein descri ing the crime charged in relation to the penal law violated are controlling. )here the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged such specific intent must e alleged in the information and proved y the prosecution. !f the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to ;ill the victim, the incidental deprivation of the victimNs li erty does not constitute the felony of ;idnapping ut is merely a preparatory act to the ;illing, and

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hence, is merged into, or a sor ed y, the ;illing of the victim. &he crime committed would either e homicide or murder. )hat is primordial then is the specific intent of the malefactors as disclosed in the information or criminal complaint that is determinative of what crime the accused is charged with O that of murder or ;idnapping. Specific intent is used to descri e a state of mind which e,ists where circumstances indicate that an offender actively desired certain criminal consequences or o *ectively desired a specific result to follow his act or failure to act. -(eople of t-e (-ils. vs. Deli1 et. al., 0R? 14!'' , /anuar% !&, !,, 8 Q. !s failure of the witnesses of the prosecution to appear at the preCtrial a ground for dismissal of the case under %$ BD>3( NO. Under %.$. BD>3, the a sence during preCtrial of any witness for the prosecution listed in the !nformation, whether or not said witness is the offended party or the complaining witness, is not a valid ground for the dismissal of a criminal case. $lthough under the law, preCtrial is mandatory in criminal cases, the presence of the private complainant or the complaining witness is however not required. 5ven the presence of the accused is not required unless directed y the trial court. !t is enough that the accused is represented y his counsel. * (eople vs. Tac;An, 0R? 14&,,,, Ae"ruar% !',!,, ) Q# )ill the reinstatement of a case which was dismissed y the lower court without *urisdiction or with grave a use of discretion amounting to lac; or e,cess of *urisdiction constitute dou le *eopardy( NO. &he Court of $ppeals also erred in ruling that the reinstatement of the case does not place the private respondent in dou le *eopardy. &his Court ruled in Saldana vs. Court of $ppeals, et al. .3 that: )hen the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is there y violated to raise the defense of dou le *eopardy, three requisites must e present: -./ a first *eopardy must have attached prior to the second" -2/ the first *eopardy must have een validly terminated" and -3/ the second *eopardy must e for the same offense as that in the first. Legal *eopardy attaches only -a/ upon a valid indictment, - / efore a competent court, -c/ after arraignment, -d/ a valid plea having een entered" and -e/ the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the e,press consent of the accused -People vs. Jlagan, @B Phil. B@./. &he lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its *urisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process.

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!n effect, the first *eopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and4or trial efore the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first *eopardy, and does not e,pose the accused to a second *eopardy. Q# )hether or not an information for Plunder which contains ri ery -$rticle 2.E of the %evised Penal Code/, malversation of pu lic funds or property -$rticle 2.A, %evised Penal Code/ and violations of Sec. 3-e/ of %epu lic $ct -%$ :o. 3E.>/ and Section A-d/ of %$ ?A.3, charges more than one offense, hence, in violation of the %ules of Court. NO. &he acts alleged in the information are not charged as separate offenses ut as predicate acts of the crime of plunder. !t should e stressed that the $ntiCPlunder law specifically Section .-d/ thereof does not ma;e any e,press reference to any specific provision of laws, other than %.$. :o. AEBE, as amended, which coincidentally may penali+e as a separate crime any of the overt or criminal acts enumerated therein. &he said acts which form part of the com ination or series of act are descri ed in their generic sense. &hus, aside from NmalversationN of pu lic funds, the law also uses the generic terms NmisappropriationN, NconversionN or NmisuseN of said fund. &he fact that the acts involved may li;ewise e penali+ed under other laws is incidental. &he said acts are mentioned only as predicate acts of the crime of plunder and the allegations relative thereto are not to e ta;en or to e understood as allegations charging separate criminal offenses punished under the %evised Penal Code, the $ntiCGraft and Corrupt Practices $ct and Code of Conduct and 5thical Standards for Pu lic 'fficials and 5mployees.M-Serapio vs. Sandigan"a%an, ) Q# )hat is the remedy of the party whose motion to quash has een denied( Case law has it that a resolution of the Sandigan ayan denying a motion to quash the information is an interlocutory order and hence, not appeala le. :or can it e the su *ect of certiorari. &he remedy availa le to petitioners after their motion to quash was denied y the Sandigan ayan was to proceed with the trial of the case, without pre*udice to their right to raise the question on appeal if final *udgment is rendered against them. -Torrres vs. 0arc-itorena, 0R? 1# 666, Dece1"er !', !,,! ) Q# $ccused are pu lic officials who are charged with violation of the $nti Graft and Corruption Law for having allegedly caused the reclamation of a piece of land registered in the name of the respondent. &hereafter, the Solicitor General

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instituted a civil case for the reversion of the su *ect land to the State. &he accused now prays that the criminal case against them e suspended on the ground of a pre*udicial question# &hey contend that it ehooved the Sandigan ayan to have suspended the criminal proceedings pending final *udgment in the Civil Case ecause a *udgment in that case that the property su *ect of the charge is foreshore land will elie the respondent#s claim that its proprietary right over the su *ect property had een violated y the accused when they had the su *ect property reclaimed. !s the contention of the accused tena le( ?B. A pre9udicial 7uestion is understood in la6 as t-at 6-ic1ust precede t-e cri1inal action and 6-ic- re7uires a decision "efore a final 9udg1ent can "e rendered in t-e cri1inal action 6it- 6-icsaid 7uestion is closel% connected. T-e civil action 1ust "e instituted prior to t-e institution of t-e cri1inal action . !n this case, the !nformation was filed with the Sandigan ayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case :o. A.?E filed y the State with the %&C in Civil Case :o. A.?E. &hus, no pre*udicial question e,ists. 0esides, a final *udgment of the %&C in Civil Case :o. A.?E declaring the property as foreshore land and hence, inaliena le, is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the petitioners in the criminal case. !t ears stressing that unless and until declared null and void y a court of competent *urisdiction in an appropriate action therefor, the titles of S%! over the su *ect property are valid. S%! is entitled to the possession of the properties covered y said titles. !t cannot e illegally deprived of its possession of the property y petitioners in the guise of a reclamation until final *udgment is rendered declaring the property covered y said titles as foreshore land. - >"id.) Q# )hat is the effect of SC Circular :o. .> with respect to the issuance of a search warrant( )e also held that Circular :o. .> was never intended to confer e,clusive *urisdiction on the 5,ecutive Fudge mentioned therein" it is not a mandate for the e,clusion of all other courts and that a court whose territory does not em race the place to e searched may issue a search warrant where the application is necessitated and *ustified y compelling consideration of urgency, su *ect, time and place, thus: 5vidently, that particular provision of Circular :o. .> was never intended to confer e,clusive *urisdiction on said e,ecutive *udges. !n view of the fact, however, that they were themselves directed to personally act on the applications, instead of farming out the same among the other *udges as was the previous practice, it was ut necessary and practical to require them to so act only on applications involving search of places located within their respective territorial *urisdictions. &he phrase a ove quoted was, therefore, in the nature of an allocation in the assignment of applications among them, in recognition of human capa ilities and limitations, and not a mandate for the e,clusion of all other courts . . .

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MUrgentM means pressing" calling for immediate attention. &he court must ta;e into account and consider not only the Msu *ectM ut the time and place of the enforcement of the search warrant as well. &he determination of the e,istence of compelling considerations of urgency, and the su *ect, time and place necessitating and *ustifying the filing of an application for a search warrant with a court other than the court having territorial *urisdiction over the place to e searched and things to e sei+ed or where the materials are found is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court where the application is filed, su *ect to review y the appellate court in case of grave a use of discretion amounting to e,cess or lac; of *urisdiction. D (eople vs. Ro"ert C-iu + 5an, et al. 0.R. ?os. 14!91#;16. Ae"ruar% !', !,,4.4) Q# $n !nformation was filed charging appellant 6ontane+ of 6urder. During trial, appellant presented Daniel Sumaylo as surre uttal witness. Sumaylo testified that he did not ;ill the victim ut also stated that he did not ;now the ;iller. However, the following day, Sumaylo e,ecuted an $ffidavit admitting to have ;illed the victim. $n $mended !nfromation was then filed considering him as an additional accused. Sumaylo pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of Homicide. $fter trial, the court rendered *udgment convicting the appellant of murder as principal and convicting Sumaylo of homicide. &he appellant filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision. &he court issued an order partially granting the motion and convicting the appellant of murder, ut only as an accomplice. &he appellant appealed the decision, asserting that there was no proof of conspiracy etween him and Sumaylo. &he Court of $ppeals rendered *udgment reinstating the trial courtNs decision convicting the appellant of murder as principal y direct participation. $ppellant argues that it was illogical for the trial court to convict him of murder as an accomplice, although Sumaylo, who was the principal y direct participation for the ;illing of the victim, was convicted of homicide. &here is no evidence on record that he conspired with Sumaylo in ;illing the victim. His mere presence at the scene of the ;illing did not render him criminally lia le as an accomplice. %ule on the contention of the appellant. T<- %//-++%)3J1 15'2(11(.) <%1 ). 2-6(3. Sumaylo#s testimony is given scant attention y this Court O M&he Court has held in a num er of cases that a recantation of a testimony is e,ceedingly unrelia le, for there is always the pro a ility that such recantation may later on e itself repudiated. Courts loo; with disfavor upon retractions, ecause they can easily e o tained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary consideration. T-e "arefaced fact t-at Daniel Su1a%lo pleaded guilt% to t-e felon% of -o1icide is not a "ar to t-e appellant "eing found guilt% of 1urder as a principal. >t "ears stressing t-at Su1a%lo plea;"argained on -is re;arraign1ent. =ven if t-e pu"lic prosecutor and t-e fat-er of

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t-e victi1 agreed to Su1a%lo8s plea, t-e State is not "arred fro1 prosecuting t-e appellant for 1urder on t-e "asis of its evidence, independentl% of Su1a%lo8s plea of guilt. :either is the appellant entitled to acquittal merely ecause Sumaylo confessed, after the appellant had rested his case, to eing the sole assailant. &he trial court dis elieved SumayloNs testimony that he alone ;illed the victim and that the appellant was not at all involved in the ;illing. &he Court of $ppeals affirmed the *udgment of the trial court. !t ears stressing that when Sumaylo testified for the appellant on surre uttal, he declared that he did not ;now who ;illed the victim. He even declared that the appellant did not ;ill the victim. However, he made a complete volteCface when he e,ecuted an affidavit and testified that he alone ;illed the victim and that the appellant was not at all involved in the ;illing. )e are convinced that SumayloNs somersault was an afterthought, a lastCditch attempt to e,tricate the appellant from an inevita le conviction. / (eople vs. Cesar )ontane2 and Daniel Su1a%lo, 0R? 14&!#', )arc14,!,,4) Q# 6ay the trial court give retroactive application to the provisions of the %evised %ules of Criminal Procedure( YES# Alt-oug- t-e cri1e 6as co11itted "efore t-e Revised Rules of Cri1inal (rocedure too. effect, t-e sa1e s-ould "e applied retroactivel% "ecause it is favora"le to t-e appellant . Hence, the aggravating circumstance of nighttime should not e appreciated against him. &he !nformation failed to allege the aggravating circumstance of nighttime as required y Section B, %ule ..E of the %evised %ules of Criminal Procedure, which reads: S5C. B. Designation of the offense. O &he complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given y the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. !f there is no designation of the offense, reference shall e made to the section or su section of the statute punishing it. * (eople vs. Torres, 0R? 1 4'66, /anuar% 16,!,,4 ) Q# Upon the sworn complaint of the victim Lucelle Serrano, two !nformations for %ape and two !nformations for acts of lascivousness were filed against her uncle, herein appellant. -Criminal cases, >AC3B@, AAC3B?,AAC3BA and >AC3BB/ &he appellant, assisted y counsel, pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. Foint trial of all the cases ensued. $fter the prosecution had rested its case, the trial court reset the hearing for the appellant to adduce his evidence. )hen the case was called for trial as scheduled, his counsel manifested to the court that the appellant was changing his

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plea in Criminal Cases :os. >AC3B@ and >AC3BA from Mnot guiltyM to Mguilty.M He also manifested that he would no longer adduce any evidence in his defense in Criminal Cases :os. >AC3B? and >AC3BB ecause the prosecution failed to prove his guilt eyond reasona le dou t for the crimes charged therein. )hen told y the court that he could e sentenced to death for the rape charges, the appellant stood pat on his decision to plead guilty in Criminal Cases :os. >AC3B@ and >AC 3BA, and to no longer present any evidence in his defense in the other two cases. &he appellant was reCarraigned in Criminal Cases :os. >AC3B@ and >AC3BA with the assistance of the same counsel and entered his plea of guilty to the charges. &he trial court rendered *udgment convicting the appellant of all the crimes charged. 'n appeal, the appellant does not contest his conviction for rape in Criminal Cases :os. >AC3B@ and >AC3B?, and the validity of the proceedings in the said cases in the trial court. He pleads, however, that he e spared the death penalty. ../ !n reviewing criminal cases, is the appellate court limited to the assigned errors( NO# $ppeal in a criminal case is a review de novo and the court is not limited to the assigned errors. 2. $n appeal thus opens the whole case for review, and the appellate tri unal may consider and correct errors though unassigned and even reverse the decision of the trial court on the grounds other than those the parties raised as errors. 22 2./ Did the trial court err in appreciating the appellant#s plea of guilt( YES. $ppellantNs Plea of Guilty in Criminal Case :o. >AC3B@ was !mprudently 6ade. !n Criminal Case :o. >AC3B@, the appellant was charged with qualified rape, i.e., the rape of his niece, who was a minor, punisha le y death under $rticle 33@ of the %evised Penal Code, as amended y %epu lic $ct :o. A?@>. U)4.5'3-4+?, 3<- %//-++%)3 E%1 =<%6*-4 E(3< % =%/(3%+ .;;-)1-# W<-) 3<- %//-++%)3 ();.62-4 3<- 36(%+ =.563 .; <(1 4-=(1(.) 3. =<%)*- <(1 /+-% .; G).3 *5(+3?G 3. G*5(+3?,G (3 '-<..,-4 3<- 36(%+ =.563 3. =.)45=3 % 1-%6=<()* ()I5(6? ()3. 3<,.+5)3%6()-11 %)4 ;5++ =.2/6-<-)1(.) .; 3<- =.)1-I5-)=-1 .; <(1 /+-% %1 2%)4%3-4 '? S-=3(.) $, R5+- 11$ .; 3<- R-,(1-4 R5+-1 .; C6(2()%+ P6.=-456-. >n (eople vs. Ca1a%, t-is Court enu1erated t-e follo6ing duties of t-e trial court under t-e rule@ 1# T-e court 1ust conduct a searc-ing in7uir% into t-e voluntariness and full co1pre-ension 3"% t-e accused4 of t-e conse7uences of -is plea$ !. T-e court 1ust re7uire t-e prosecution to present evidence to prove t-e guilt of t-e accused and precise degree of -is culpa"ilit%$ and

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. T-e court 1ust re7uire t-e prosecution to present evidence in -is "e-alf and allo6 -i1 to do so if -e desires. &he raison dNetre for the rule is that the courts must proceed with e,treme care where the imposa le penalty is death, considering that the e,ecution of such sentence is irrevoca le. &here is no hard and fast rule as to how the trial *udge may conduct a searching inquiry. !t has een held, however, that the focus of the inquiry must e on the voluntariness of the plea and the full or complete comprehension y the accused of his plea of guilty so that it can truly e said that it is ased on a free and informed *udgment. 3./ How should a searching inquiry e conducted( !n People vs. $ran+ado, 2? we formulated the following guidelines as to how the trial court may conduct its searching inquiry: -./ $scertain from the accused himself -a/ how he was rought into the custody of the law" - / whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations" and -c/ under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. &hese the court shall do in order to rule out the possi ility that the accused has een coerced or placed under a state of duress either y actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging quarters. -2/ $s; the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely e,plained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty. -3/ 5licit information a out the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socioCeconomic status, and educational ac;ground, which may serve as a trustworthy inde, of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty. -D/ !nform the accused the e,act length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. :ot infrequently indeed an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon ad advice or ecause of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or e,press remorse. !t is the duty of the *udge to see to it that the accused does not la or under these mista;en impressions. -@/ %equire the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against him or ma;e him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or cause him to supply missing details or significance. !n People vs. 'stia, we held that the trial court is also required to pro e thoroughly into the reasons or motivations, as well as the facts and circumstances for a change of plea of the accused and his comprehension of his plea" e,plain to him the elements of the crime for which he is charged as well as the nature

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and effect of any modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense, inclusive of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, as well as the qualifying and special qualifying circumstances, and inform him of the imposa le penalty and his civil lia ilities for the crime for which he would plead guilty to. I) 3<(1 =%1-, 3<- 36(%+ =.563 ;%(+-4 3. 2%&- % 1-%6=<()* ()I5(6? ()3. 3<%//-++%)3J1 ,.+5)3%6()-11 %)4 ;5++ =.2/6-<-)1(.) .; <(1 /+-% .; *5(+3?# D./ )ill an improvident plea of guilt automatically a solve the accused from criminal lia ility( NO# $s a rule, this Court has set aside convictions ased on pleas of guilty in capital offenses ecause of the improvidence thereof, and when such plea is the sole asis of the condemnatory *udgment. H.E-,-6, E<-6- 3<- 36(%+ =.563 6-=-(,-1, ()4-/-)4-)3+? .; <(1 /+-% .; *5(+3?, -,(4-)=- 3. 4-3-62()- E<-3<-6 3<- %==51-4 =.22(33-4 3<=6(2-1 =<%6*-4 %)4 3<- /6-=(1- 4-*6-- .; <(1 =6(2()%+ =5+/%'(+(3? 3<-6-;.6, <- 2%? 13(++ '- =.),(=3-4 (; 3<-6- (1 %2/+- /6..; .) 6-=.64, ).3 =.)3()*-)3 .) 3<- /+-% .; *5(+3?, .) E<(=< 3. /6-4(=%3- =.),(=3(.)# !n this case, the prosecution had already rested its case when the appellant decided to change his plea. !n fact, the trial court granted the prosecutionNs motion that the evidence it had presented e considered proof of the degree of culpa ility of the appellant. !t is, thus, incum ent upon this Court to determine whether the evidence adduced y the prosecution in Criminal Case :o. >AC3B@ is sufficient to esta lish eyond reasona le dou t the appellantNs guilt for qualified rape. "#8 Should the appellant e convicted of %ape in criminal case >AC3B@( YES# &he Prosecution $dduced Proof of the $ppellantNs Guilt 0eyond %easona le Dou t of the Crime of %ape in Criminal Case :o. >AC 3B@. )e have reviewed the evidence on record and we are convinced that the prosecution adduced proof eyond reasona le dou t that the appellate raped the victim in :ovem er .>>?. &he victim declared in her sworn statement, on direct e,amination and her testimony on clarificatory questions made y the trial court, that indeed, the appellant raped her in :ovem er .>>?. W- 4. ).3 %*6-- E(3< 3<- 65+()* .; 3<- 36(%+ =.563 3<%3 3<- =.)3-)31 .; 3<- 1E.6) 13%3-2-)3 .; L5=-++- %6- <-%61%?, 1(2/+? '-=%51- 1<- 4(4 ).3 3-13(;? 3<-6-.) %)4 2-6-+? (4-)3(;(-4 <-6 1(*)%356-1 3<-6-()# 0y hearsay evidence is meant that ;ind of evidence which does not derive its value solely from the credence to e attri uted to the witness herself ut rests solely in part on the veracity and competence of some persons from whom the witness has received the information. !t signifies all evidence which is not founded upon the personal ;nowledge of the witness from whom it is elicited, and which, consequently, is not su *ect to crossC

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e,amination. &he asis for the e,clusion appears to lie in the fact that such testimony is not su *ect to the test which can ordinarily e applied for the ascertainment of truth of testimony, since the declarant is not present and availa le for crossCe,amination. !n criminal cases, the admission of hearsay evidence would e a violation of the constitutional provision while the accused shall en*oy the right to confront and crossC e,amine the witness testifying against him. G-)-6%++?, 3<- %;;(4%,(31 .; /-61.)1 E<. %6- ).3 /6-1-)3-4 3. 3-13(;? .) 3<- 3653< .; 3<- =.)3-)31 3<-6-.; %6- <-%61%? -,(4-)=-# S5=< %;;(4%,(3 2513 '- ;.62%++? .;;-6-4 () -,(4-)=- %)4 %==-/3-4 '? 3<- =.563; .3<-6E(1-, (3 1<%++ ).3 '=.)1(4-6-4 '? 3<- =.563 ;.6 3<- 1(2/+- 6-%1.) 3<%3 3<- =.563 1<%++ =.)1(4-6 15=< -,(4-)=- ;.62%++? .;;-6-4 %)4 %==-/3-4# !n this case, Lucelle testified on and affirmed the truth of the contents of her sworn statement which she herself had given. $s gleaned from the said statement, she narrated how and when the appellant raped and su *ected her to lascivious acts. She was crossCe,amined y the appellantNs counsel and answered the trial courtNs clarificatory questions. &he prosecution offered her sworn statement as part of her testimony and the court admitted the same for the said purpose without o *ection on the part of the appellant. ?./ Should the appellant e convicted for qualified rape in criminal case >AC3B?( YES# &he Prosecution Proved 0eyond %easona le Dou t that the $ppellant %aped the 7ictim in 8e ruary .>>A. &he appellant admitted to the arangay chairman on 6arch @, .>>A, that he raped Lucelle in 8e ruary .>>A. A+3<.5*< 3<- %//-++%)3 E%1 ).3 %11(13-4 '? =.5)1-+ %3 3<- 3(2- <- *%,- <(1 13%3-2-)3 3. 3<- '%6%)*%? =<%(62%) %)4 E<-) <1(*)-4 3<- 1%2-, (3 (1 13(++ %42(11('+- () -,(4-)=- %*%()13 <(2 '-=%51<- E%1 ).3 5)4-6 %66-13 ).6 5)4-6 =513.4(%+ (),-13(*%3(.) E<-) <*%,- <(1 13%3-2-)3. &he e,clusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. $s intended y the .>A. Constitutional Convention, this covers Minvestigation conducted y police authorities which will include investigations conducted y the municipal police, the PC and the :0! and such other police agencies in our government.M &he arangay chairman is not deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section .2-./ and -3/ of $rticle !!! of the Constitution. Under these circumstances, it cannot e successfully claimed that the appellantNs statement efore the arangay chairman is inadmissi le.

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A./ )hat circumstances, if any, should the court consider in imposing the proper penalty upon the accused in a crime for rape( )ere they duly esta lished in this case( NO. $rticle 33@ of the %evised Penal Code, as amended y Section .. of %epu lic $ct :o. A?@>, which was the law in effect at the time of the commission of the su *ect rapes, provides in part: K$%&. 33@. )hen and how rape is committed. O %ape is committed y having carnal ;nowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances. .. 0y using force or intimidation" 2. )hen the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious" and 3. )hen the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. &he crime of rape shall e punished y reclusion perpetua. )henever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or y two or more persons, the penalty shall e reclusion perpetua to death. ,,, ,,, ,,, &he death penalty shall also e imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: .. )hen the victim is under eighteen -.B/ years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepCparent, guardian, relative y consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the commonClaw spouse of the parent of the victim. ,,, ,,, ,,,L T<- I5%+(;?()* =(6=5213%)=-1 .; 2().6(3? %)4 6-+%3(.)1<(/ 2513 =.)=56# M.6- (2/.63%)3+?, 3<-? 2513 '- '.3< %++-*-4 %)4 /6.,-4, () .64-6 3. I5%+(;? 3<- =6(2- .; 6%/- %)4 E%66%)3 3<- (2/.1(3(.) .; 3<4-%3< /-)%+3?# !n addition to the requirement that the qualifying and aggravating circumstance must e specifically alleged in the information, it must e esta lished with certainty that the victim was elow eighteen -.B/ years of age or that she was a minor at the time of the commission of the crime. !t must e stressed that the severity of the death penalty, especially its irreversi le and final nature once carried out, ma;es the decisionCma;ing process in capital offenses aptly su *ect to the most e,acting rules of procedure and evidence. T<- 6-+%3(.)1<(/ '-3E--) 3<- %//-++%)3 %)4 3<- ,(=3(2 <%1 '--) %4-I5%3-+? -13%'+(1<-4# T<- %++-*%3(.)1 () '.3< I);.62%3(.)1 3<%3 3<%//-++%)3 (1 3<- ,(=3(2J1 G5)=+-,G G% 6-+%3(,- '? =.)1%)*5()(3? E(3<() 3<- 3<(64 =(,(+ 4-*6--G (1 1/-=(;(= -).5*< 3. 1%3(1;? 3<- 1/-=(%+ I5%+(;?()* =(6=5213%)=- .; 6-+%3(.)1<(/#

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T<- 1%2- =%)).3, <.E-,-6, '- 1%(4 E(3< 6-1/-=3 3. 3<- %*- .; 3<,(=3(2# !n 'eople v* 'runa, the Court, after noting the divergent rulings on proof of age of the victim in rape cases, set out certain guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as qualifying circumstance I) 3<- /6-1-)3 =%1-, ). '(63< =-63(;(=%3- .6 %)? 1(2(+%6 %53<-)3(= 4.=52-)3 E%1 /6-1-)3-4 %)4 .;;-6-4 () -,(4-)=- 3. /6.,- L5=-++-J1 %*-# )hile the victim testified that she was orn on 8e ruary .>, .>B?, therefore .. years old when the appellant twice raped her, the same will not suffice as the appellant did not e,pressly and clearly admit the same as required y Pruna. &he corro oration of LucelleNs mother as to her age is not sufficient either, as there is no evidence that the said certificate of irth was lost or destroyed or was unavaila le without the fault of the prosecution. &he fact that there was no o *ection from the defense regarding the victimNs age cannot e ta;en against the appellant since it is the prosecution that has the urden of proving the same. 6oreover, the trial court did not ma;e a categorical finding of the victimNs minority, another requirement mandated y Pruna. B./ &he appellantNs conviction for two counts of rape having een duly proven y the prosecution, we now come to the question of the penalty to e meted upon him. Should the accused e sentenced to death penalty( !n the determination of whether the death penalty should e imposed on the appellant, the presence of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime is crucial. !n the cases at ar, although the relationship of uncle and niece etween the appellant and the victim has een duly proven, the alternative circumstance of relationship under $rticle .@ of the %evised Penal Code cannot e appreciated as an aggravating circumstance against the appellant. )hile it is true that the alternative circumstance of relationship is always aggravating in crimes against chastity, regardless of whether the offender is a relative of a higher or lower degree of the offended party, it is only ta;en into consideration under $rticle .@ of the %evised Penal Code Mwhen the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted rother or sister, or relative y affinity in the same degree of the offender#G &he relationship of uncle and niece is not covered y any of the relationships mentioned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/-6/-35% ;.6 -%=< =.5)3 .; 6%/-, =.);.62%'+? 3. A63(=+- $9 .; 3<R-,(1-4 P-)%+ C.4-# / (eople vs. <lit, 0R? 1 1'99;&,1, Ae"ruar% ! , !,,4 ) Q. Can a trial *udge e,amine a witness( YES. &his Court emphasi+ed that a presiding *udge en*oys a great deal of latitude in e,amining witnesses within the course of evidentiary rules. &he presiding *udge should see to it that a testimony should not e incomplete or o scure. $fter all, the *udge is the ar iter and he must e in a position to satisfy himself as to the respective claims of the parties in the criminal proceedings. &he trial *udge must e accorded a reasona le leeway in putting such questions to witnesses as may e essential to elicit relevant facts to ma;e the record spea; the truth. &rial *udges in this *urisdiction are *udges of oth L$) and the 8$C&S, and they would e negligent in the performance of their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of *ustice as a result of a failure to propound a proper question to a witness which might develop some material earing upon the outcome. !n the e,ercise of sound discretion he may put such question to the witness as will ena le him to formulate a sound opinion as to the a ility or the willingness of the witness to tell the truth. $ *udge may e,amine or crossCe,amine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the credi ility of the witness and to e,tract the truth. !t cannot e ta;en against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party. Parenthetically, under Sections .> to 2. of the %ule on 5,amination of a Child )itness which too; effect on Decem er .@, 2EEE, child witnesses may testify in a narrative form and leading questions may e allowed y the trial court in all stages of the e,amination if the same will further the interest of *ustice. ' ligations to question should e couched in a manner so as not to mislead, confuse, frighten and intimidate the child: Sec. .>. 6'D5 of 9uestioningC &he court shall e,ercise control over the questioning of children so as to ./ facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, 2/ ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child, 3/ protect children from harassment or undue harassment, and D/ avoid waste of time. -(eople vs. Ka.ingcio Canete, 0.R. ?o.14!9 ,,)arc- !&, !,, ) Q# Does the failure to state the precise date the offense was committed ipso factor render an !nformation for %ape defective on its face( NO. 8ailure to specify the e,act dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ip&o facto ma;e the information defective on its face.

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&he reason is o vious. &he precise date or time when the victim was raped is not an element of the offense. &he gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal ;nowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under $rticle 33@ of the %evised Penal Code. $s long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as near to the actual date when the offense was committed an information is sufficient. !t is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed e,cept when it is material ingredient of the offense. &he offense may e alleged to have een committed on a date as near as possi le to the actual date of its commission. - (eople vs. )auro, )arc14,!,, .8 Q# !n a criminal case, what should e the contents of a valid *udgment( %ule .2E, Section 2 of the .>B@ %ules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides: MS5C. 2. 8orm and contents of *udgment. O &he *udgment must e written in the official language, personally and directly prepared y the *udge and signed y him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted y the accused and the law upon which the *udgment is ased. !f it is of conviction, the *udgment shall state -a/ the legal qualification of the offense constituted y the acts committed y the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there are any" - / the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact" -c/ the penalty imposed upon the accused" and -d/ the civil lia ility or damages caused y the wrongful act to e recovered from the accused y the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil lia ility y a separate action has een reserved or waived.M D(eople of t-e (-ils. vs. Li2ada, 0R? 14 46&;'1, /anuar% !4, !,, 8 Q# How is a criminal case revived( !s there a need for a new preliminary investigation( &he case may e revived y the State within the timeC ar provided in Section of %ule ..Aeither y the refiling of the !nformation or y the filing of a new !nformation for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein. &here would e no need of a new preliminary investigation. Lo6ever, in a case 6-erein after t-e provisional dis1issal of a cri1inal case, t-e original 6itnesses of t-e prosecution or so1e of t-e1 1a% -ave recanted t-eir testi1onies or 1a% -ave died or 1a% no longer "e availa"le and ne6 6itnesses for t-e State -ave e1erged, a ne6 preli1inar% investigation 1ust "e conducted "efore an

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>nfor1ation is refiled or a ne6 >nfor1ation is filed. $ new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein" or if under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has een upgraded" or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal lia ility of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal. D (eople vs. Lacson, 0.R. ?o. 1494# . April 1, !,, .) Q# Should the timeC ar rule under the Section B of %ule ..A retroactively( e applied

&he timeC ar of two years under the new rule should not e applied retroactively against the State. !n fi,ing the timeC ar, the Court alanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum pre*udice to the State and the accused. !t too; into account the su stantial rights of oth the State and of the accused to due process. &he Court elieved that the time limit is a reasona le period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. &he timeC ar fi,ed y the Court must e respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule ecomes a denial of *ustice. * i"id.) Q# )hat do you mean y e,press consent to a provisional dismissal( !s the inaction or silence of the accused equivalent to e,press consent( 5,press consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. !t is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. )here the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case :o ' *ection or )ith 6y Conformity, the writing amounts to e,press consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. &he mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to o *ect to a provisional dismissal does not amount to e,press consent. * >"id.) Q# )hat is the effect of a plea for forgiveness made y the accused to the victim and4or her family( $ plea for forgiveness may e considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise. !n criminal cases, e,cept those involving quasiCoffense -criminal negligence/ or those allowed y law to e compromised, an offer

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of compromise y the accused may e received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. :o one would as; for forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong, for to forgive means to a solve, to pardon, to cease to feel resentment against on account of wrong committed" give up claim to requital from or retri ution upon -an offender/. D(eople vs. Ale: )analo, 0R? 14 ',4, )arc- !&, !,, ) Q# !n resolving a motion for ail, what does a trial court mandated to do( &he trial court is mandated, in resolving a motion or petition for ail, to do the following: D./ !n all cases, whether ail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for ail or require him to su mit his recommendation -Section .B, %ule ..D of the %ules of Court, as amended/" @./ )here ail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for ail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of ena ling the court to e,ercise its sound discretion" -Sections A and B, supra/ ?./ Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong ased on the summary of evidence of the prosecution" A./ !f the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the ail ond -Section .>, supra/. 'therwise, the petition should e denied. * >"id. ) Q# )hat rights are involved in an application for ail( $ ail application does not only involve the right of the accused to temporary li erty, ut li;ewise the right of the State to protect the people and the peace of the community from dangerous elements. &hese two rights must e alanced y a magistrate in the scale of *ustice, hence, the necessity for hearing to guide his e,ercise of *urisdiction. * >"id. ) Q# Distinguish a permanent dismissal from a provisional dismissal of the case. $ permanent dismissal of a criminal case may refer to the termination of the case on the merits, resulting in either the conviction or acquittal of the accused" to the dismissal of the case due to the prosecutionNs failure to prosecute" or to the dismissal thereof on the ground of unreasona le delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accusedNs right to speedy disposition or trial of the case against him. !n contrast, a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is a dismissal without pre*udice to the reinstatement thereof

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efore the order of dismissal ecomes final or to the su sequent filing of a new information for the offense within the periods allowed under the %evised Penal Code or the %evised %ules of Court. * Condrada vs. (eople, 0R? 141646, Ae"ruar% !&, !,, ) Q# )hat are the e,ceptions to the rule that dou le *eopardy will not attach if the first case was dismissed with the consent of the accused( &here are two e,ceptions to the foregoing rule, and dou le *eopardy may attach even if the dismissal of the case was with the consent of the accused: first, when there is insufficiency of evidence to support the charge against him" and second, where there has een an unreasona le delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accusedNs right to speedy trial. * >"id.) E!IDENCE Q# !s the testimony of a single prosecution witness sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused( YES. &he testimony of an eyewitness, coupled with the fact of the victimNs death are sufficient proof of the guilt of the appellants eyond cavil of dou t for murder. T-e Court -as consistentl% ruled t-at t-e testi1on% of a single prosecution 6itness, as long as it is positive, clear and credi"le is sufficient on 6-ic- to anc-or a 9udg1ent of conviction. Corro"orative or cu1ulative evidence is not a prere7uisite to t-e conviction of t-e accused. &ruth is esta lished not y the num er of witnesses ut y the quality of their testimonies. &he are denial y the appellants of the criminal charge is a selfCserving negative evidence which cannot prevail over the clear, positive and categorical testimony of the eyewitness pinpointing the appellants as the culprits. - 'eople v&* Si+onga GR4$5$6#, )une #7, 8669. Q# !s an ali i sufficient to prove the innocence of the accused( NO# $li i is one of the wea;est if not the wea;est of defenses in criminal prosecution as it is easy to fa ricate and hard to disprove. 8or ali i to e elieved, the following requisites must concur: -a/ the presence of accused at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense" and - / the physical impossi ility for him to e at the scene of the crime. 6ore importantly, ali i cannot e given credence in light of the unwavering and positive identification y the private complainant of accusedCappellant as her defiler and the father of her child. !n cases in where the offender is positively identified y the victim herself who har ored no ill motive against him, the defense of ali i is invaria ly re*ected. -(eople vs. (agsan9an 0RH1 9694, Dece1"er !',!,,!)

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Q# !n the Law on 5vidence, is selfCdefense considered as a strong argument( NO# L(&- %+('(, 1-+; 4-;-)1- (1 % E-%& 4-;-)1- '-=%51- (3 (1 -%1? 3. ;%'6(=%3-# W<-) 3<- %==51-4 ()3-6/.1-1 1-+; 4-;-)1-, <- 3<-6-'? %42(31 <%,()* &(++-4 3<- ,(=3(2# &he urden of proof is shifted on him to prove with clear and convincing evidence the confluence of the essential requisites of a complete selfCdefense, namely: -a/ unlawful aggression on the part of the victim" - / reasona le necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it" and -c/ lac; of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. D Rugas vs. (eople, 0R? 14''&9, /anuar% 14,!,,4 8

Q# )ill the testimony of young rape victims e given full credence y our courts of *ustice( YES# W- <%,- =.)1(13-)3+? 65+-4 3<%3 E<-6-, 3<- 6%/- ,(=3(21 %6- ?.5)* %)4 .; 3-)4-6 %*-, 3<-(6 3-13(2.)(-1 4-1-6,- ;5++ =6-4-)=%)4 1<.5+4 ).3 '- 1. -%1(+? 4(12(11-4 %1 % 2-6- ;%'6(=%3(.), -1/-=(%++? E<-6- 3<-? <%,- %'1.+53-+? ). (++ 2.3(,- 3. 3-13(;? %*%()13 3<- %==51-4# !t is doctrinally settled that the factual findings of the trial court which are supported y evidence, especially on the credi ility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not e distur ed on appeal. *(eople vs. Li1os. Q# Do inconsistencies in the testimony impair the credi ility of the witness( NO.&he victim died ecause of multiple wounds and the appellant is charged with murder for the ;illing of the victim, in conspiracy with the other accused. !n this case,the identity of the person who hit the victim with a hollow loc; is of de minimis importance and the perceived inconsistency in the account of events is a minor and collateral detail that does not affect the su stance of her testimony. &he witness has een consistent in her testimony that the appellant was one of the men who sta ed the victim and such corro orated y the autopsy report.-(eople vs. (ilola 0RH1!1&!&, /une !', !,, ) Q# Give the rationale why the trial courts are in the est position to weigh the testimony of a witness. T<- E-(*<()* .; 3<- 3-13(2.)(-1 .; E(3)-11-1 (1 '-13 +-;3 3. 3<36(%+ =.563 1()=- (3 (1 () 3<- '-13 /.1(3(.) 3. 4(1=<%6*- 3<%3 ;5)=3(.)#

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&he trial *udge has the advantage of personally o serving the conduct and demeanor of witnesses, an opportunity not availa le to an appellate court # $ sent compelling reasons, we will not distur on appeal the trial court#s findings on the credi ility of a witness. /(eople vs. ?uguid. Q# )hat is the quantum of proof in administrative proceedings( !n administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is 15'13%)3(%+ -,(4-)=- or such relevant evidence as a reasona le mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 8urther, the complainants have the urden of proving, y su stantial evidence, the allegations in their complaints. /="ero vs. )a.ati Cit% S-eriffs) Q# !s it proper for the appellate court to distur the finding of the court as to the credi ility of witnesses( NO. )hen the issue is one of credi ility of witnesses, an appellate court will normally not distur the factual findings of the trial unless the lower court has reached conclusions that are clearly unsupported y evidence, or unless it has overloo;ed some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which, if considered, would affect the result of the case. &he rationale for this rule is that trial courts have superior advantages in ascertaining the truth and in detecting falsehood as they have the opportunity to o serve at close range the manner and demeanor of witnesses while testifying. - (eople vs. Dalag, 0.R. ?o. 1!9&9#. April ,, !,, / Q# $ccused herein was convicted of %ape with Homicide and $ttempted 6urder. He now asserts that his conviction should not e sustained in the a sence of direct evidence to prove his guilt eyond reasona le dou t. !s his contention tena le( NO# )e agree with the appellant that the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence to prove that he raped and ;illed 6arilyn on the occasion or y reason of the said crime. However, direct evidence is not indispensa le to prove the guilt of the accused for the crime charged" it may e proved y circumstantial evidence. !n People v. Delim, we held, thus: . . . Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the e,istence of the main fact may e inferred according to reason and common e,perience. )hat was once a rule of ancient practica ility is now entom ed in Section D, %ule .33 of the %evised %ules of 5vidence which states that circumstantial evidence,

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sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence, is sufficient as anchor for a *udgment of conviction if the following requisites concur: M. . . if -a/ there is more than one circumstance" - / the facts from which the inferences are derived have een esta lished" and -c/ the com ination of all the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt eyond reasona le dou t.M &he prosecution is urdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact mass of circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each eing confirmed y the proof of the other, and all without e,ception leading y mutual support to ut one conclusion: the guilt of the accused for the offense charged. )e are convinced that, ased on the evidence on record and as declared y the trial court in its decision, the prosecution adduced circumstantial evidence to prove eyond cavil that it was the appellant who raped and ;illed 6arilyn on the occasion or y reason of the rape. Hence, he is guilty eyond reasona le dou t of rape with homicide, a special comple, crime. - (eople vs. Darila%, 0R? 1 9'#1;#!, /anuar% !6, !,,4 / Q. !s medical evidence a condition sine qua non in all se,ual crimes to prove that the victim is a mental retardate( NO. Clinical evidence is necessary in orderline cases when it is difficult to ascertain whether the victim is of a normal mind or is suffering from a mild mental retardation. 6edical evidence is not a condition sine qua non in all cases of rape or se,ual crimes for that matter to prove that the victim is a mental retardate or is suffering from mental deficiency or some form of mental disorder. However, the conviction of an accused of rape ased on the mental retardation of private complainant must e anchored on proof eyond reasona le dou t of her mental retardation. -(eople of t-e (-ils. vs.Dalandas, 0R? 14,!,9, Dece1"er !', !,,!/ Q# !s it necessary that a witness# sworn statement or affidavit e consistent with his testimony in open court( NO. Case law has it that: $ Sinumpaang Salaysay or a sworn statement is merely a short narrative su scri ed to y the complainant in question and answer form. &hus, it is only to e e,pected that it is not as e,haustive as oneNs testimony in open court. &he contradictions, if any, may e e,plained y the fact that an affidavit can not possi ly disclose the details in their entirety, and may inaccurately descri e, without deponent detecting it, some of the occurrences narrated. 0eing ta;en e, parte, an affidavit is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions, and sometimes from the want of suggestions and

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inquiries. !t has thus een held that affidavits are generally su ordinated in importance to open court declarations ecause the former are often e,ecuted when an affiantNs mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has transpired. 8urther, affidavits are not complete reproductions of what the declarant has in mind ecause they are generally prepared y the administering officer and the affiant simply signs them after the same have een read to her. D(eople of t-e (-ils. vs.0arcia, 0R? 14##,#, )arc14, !,, 8 Q# Can the accused rely on the wea;ness of the evidence of the prosecution( &he accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the wea;ness of the evidence of the prosecution" ecause even if the prosecutionNs evidence is wea;, the same can no longer e dis elieved. D (eople vs. Ca9urao, 0.R. ?o. 1!!'6'. /anuar% !,, !,,4 8 Q# )ho has the urden of proving the guilt of the accused eyond reasona le dou t( !n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall e presumed to e innocent until the charge is proved. &he prosecution is urdened to prove the guilt of the accused eyond reasona le dou t. &he prosecution must rely on its strength and not on the a sence or wea;ness of the evidence of the accused. D (eople vs. )alate, et al., 0.R. ?o. 1!& !1. )arc- 11, !,,4 8 M. )hat is meant y reasona le dou t( 0y reasona le dou t is not meant that which of possi ility may arise ut it is that dou t engendered y an investigation of the whole proof and an ina ility, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. * i"id.) M. !n criminal cases, if an evidence is suscepti le to two interpretations how should the court appreciate the same( !f the evidence is suscepti le of two interpretations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, the accused must e acquitted. &he overriding consideration is not whether the court dou ts the innocence of the accused ut whether it entertains a reasona le dou t as to his guilt. *>"id)

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Q# Can a testimomny prevail over physical evidence( $ testimony cannot prevail over physical evidence. $fter all, physical evidence is evidence of the highest order. !t spea;s more eloquently than a hundred witnesses. *>"id.) Q# )hat is the e,tent of the discretion of the pu lic prosecutor in presenting the witnesses( &he pu lic prosecutor has the discretion as to the witnesses he will present as well as the course of presenting the case for the prosecution. &he prosecution is not urdened to present all eyewitnesses of the crime on the witness stand during the trial. &he testimony of only one eyewitness may suffice so long as it is credi le and trustworthy. D (eople vs. Fada9os, 0.R. ?o. 1 969!. /anuar% 1#, !,,4) Q# $ccused 6anny Domingcil was found GU!L&J under Sec. D of $rt. !!, %$ :o. ?D2@, as amended, otherwise ;nown as the Dangerous Drugs $ct of .>A2 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. 'n appeal, he contends that contrary to the collective testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, he was instigated to uy mari*uana and the trial court erred in not giving credence and pro ative weight to his testimony and in considering the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution. !s the appeal of the accused meritorious( NO# )hat is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the sale actually too; place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. !n this case, the prosecution adduced proof eyond reasona le dou t that the appellant sold one -./ ;ilo of mari*uana to poseurC uyer SP'. 'rlando Dalusong in the entrapment operation. &he testimonies of the principal prosecution witnesses complement each other, giving a complete picture of how the appellantNs illegal sale of the prohi ited drug transpired, and how the sale led to his apprehension in flagrante delicto. &heir testimonies esta lish eyond dou t that dangerous drugs were in the possession of the appellant who had no authority to possess or sell the same. 6ore importantly, all the persons who o tained and received the confiscated stuff did so in the performance of their official duties. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the mem ers of the uyC ust team were inspired y any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the uyC ust operation deserve full faith and credit.

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Did the trial court err in not appreciating the defen&e of denial of the accu&ed and that he :a& (erely in&tigated to co((it the cri(e; NO. &he appellantNs are denial of the crime charged and his arefaced claim that he was merely instigated y 'liver into procuring the mari*uana cannot prevail over the straightforward and positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. !t is a,iomatic that for testimonial evidence to e elieved, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credi le witness ut must also e credi le in itself such that common e,perience and o servation of man;ind lead to the inference of its pro a ility under the circumstances. !n criminal prosecution, the court is always guided y evidence that is tangi le, verifia le and in harmony with the usual course of human e,perience and not y mere con*ecture or speculation. &estimonies that do not adhere to this standard are necessarily accorded little weight or credence. 0esides, instigation, or the appellantNs claim of a frameCup, is a defense that has een invaria ly viewed y this Court with disfavor ecause the same can easily e concocted and is a common standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs $ct. I& the pre&entation +y the pro&ecution to pre&ent the police infor(ant a& :itne&& indi&pen&a+le( NO.&he failure of the prosecution to present 'liver, the police informant, does not enfee le the case for the prosecution. !nformants are almost always never presented in court ecause of the need to preserve their invalua le service to the police. &heir testimony or identity may e dispensed with inasmuch as his or her narration would e merely corro orative, especially so in this case, when the poseurC uyer himself testified on the sale of the illegal drug. - (eople vs. Do1ingcil, 0R? 14,6'9, /anuar% 14,!,,4/ Q# How should the court treat inconsistencies in a witness# testimony( !t is horn oo; doctrine that a witnessN testimony must e considered in its entirety and not y truncated portions or isolated passages thereof. !n People v. 'rtega, we held that it is sound policy that selfCcontradictions in testimonies should e reconciled, if possi le" contradictory statements should e considered in light of e,planations and attending circumstances and whether inconsistencies result from misconceptions of an innocent witness or are a result of mere willful and corrupt misrepresentation. &his Court has held that even the most candid of witnesses commit mista;es and may even ma;e confused and

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inconsistent statements.- (eople vs. +ong Aung +uen 0R? 14#,14;1#, Ae"ruar% 1&,!,,4 8 Q# !s the testimony of the victim#s mother in a %ape case as to the age of her daughter sufficient to esta lish the aggravating circumstance of minority so as to impose the penalty of death upon the accused( NO# !n the present case, no irth certificate or any similar authentic document was presented and offered in evidence to prove %achelNs age. &he only evidence of the victimNs age is her testimony and that of her motherNs -Sally de Gu+manNs/ Sinumpaang Salaysay, which was adopted as part of the latterNs direct testimony, attesting to the fact that her fiveCyearCold daughter was raped. SallyNs testimony regarding %achelNs age was insufficient, since %achel was alleged to e already five years old at the time of the rape, and what is sought to e proved is that she was then less than seven years old. Her testimony will suffice only if it is e,pressly and clearly admitted y the accused. &here is no such e,press and clear declaration and admission of the appellant that %achel was less than seven years old when he raped her. 6oreover, the trial court made no finding as to the victimNs age. However, SallyNs testimony that her daughter was five years old at the time of the commission of the crime is sufficient for purposes of holding the appellant lia le for statutory rape, or the rape of a girl elow twelve years of age. Under the second paragraph of $rticle 2??C0, in relation to $rticle 2??C$-./-d/ of the %PC, carnal ;nowledge of a woman under twelve years of age is punisha le y reclusion perpetua. &hus, the appellant should e sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, and not the death penalty. - (eople vs. Antivola, 0R? 1 9! 6, Ae"ruar% , !,,4 / Q# !n an ordinary civil case, to whom does the urden of proof elong( ' viously, the urden of proof is, in the first instance, with the plaintiff who initiated the action. 0ut in the final analysis, the party upon whom the ultimate urden lies is to e determined y the pleadings, not y who is the plaintiff or the defendant. &he test for determining where the urden of proof lies is to as; which party to an action or suit will fail if he offers no evidence competent to show the facts averred as the asis for the relief he see;s to o tain, and ased on the result of an inquiry, which party would e successful if he offers no evidence. !n ordinary civil cases, the plaintiff has the urden of proving the material allegations of the complaint which are denied y the defendant, and the defendant has the urden of proving the material allegations in his case where he sets up a new matter. $ll facts in issue and relevant facts must, as a general rule, e proven y evidence e,cept the following:

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$llegations contained in the complaint or answer immaterial to the issues. 2./ 8acts which are admitted or which are not denied in the answer, provided they have een sufficiently alleged. 3./ &hose which are the su *ect of an agreed statement of facts etween the parties" as well as those admitted y the party in the course of the proceedings in the same case. D./ 8acts which are the su *ect of *udicial notice. @./ 8acts which are legally presumed. ?./ 8acts peculiarly within the ;nowledge of the opposite party. D Repu"lic vs. ?eri, 0R? 1 9#&&, )arc- 4,!,,4 8 Q# )hat is the effect of a presumption upon the urden of proof( &he effect of a presumption upon the urden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created there y which if no proof to the contrary is offered will prevail" it does not shift the urden of proof. * i"id ) Q. !s direct evidence indispensa le to prove the guilt of an accused( NO. Direct evidence is not always indispensa le to prove the guilt of an accused. &he prosecution may prove the guilt of the accused for the crimes charged either y direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. 8or circumstantial evidence to warrant the conviction of an accused under %ule .33, Sec. D of the %evised %ules of 5vidence, the prosecution is urdened to prove the confluence of the following: a/ &here is more than one circumstance" / &he facts from which the inferences are derived are proven" and c/ &he com ination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction eyond a reasona le dou t. 8acts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, constitute evidence which in weight and pro ative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the court. Unless required y law, the testimony of a single witness, if found credi le and positive, is sufficient on which to anchor a *udgment of conviction. $fter all, the truth is esta lished not y the num er of witnesses ut y the quality of their testimonies. &he witness may not have actually seen the very act of the commission of the crime charged, ut he may nevertheless identify the accused as the assailant as the latter was the last person seen with the victims immediately efore and right after the commission of the crime. -(eople vs. Rafael Calo2a /r.,0.R. ?o. 1 &4,4, /anuar% !&,!,, ) Q# How can a witness e impeached y evidence of inconsistent statement(

../

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!t is done y Klaying a predicateL. 0efore a witness can e impeached y evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must e related to him with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must e as;ed whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to e,plain them. !f the statement is in writing they must e shown to the witness efore any question is put to him concerning them. &he crossCe,aminer must lay the predicate or the foundation for impeachment and there y prevent an in*ustice to the witness eing crossCe,amined. &he witness must e given a chance to recollect and to e,plain the apparent inconsistency etween his two statements and state the circumstances under which they were made. &his Court outlined the procedure in United States vs. 0aluyot, for instance, if the attorney for the accused had information that a certain witness say Pedro Gon+ales had made and signed a sworn statement efore the fiscal materially different from that given in his testimony efore the court, it was incum ent upon the attorney when crossC e,amining said witness to direct his attention to the discrepancy and to as; him if he did not ma;e such and such statement efore the fiscal or if he did not there ma;e a statement different from that delivered in court. !f the witness admits the ma;ing of such contradictory statement, the accused has the enefit of the admission, while the witness has the opportunity to e,plain the discrepancy if he can. 'n the other hand, if the witness denies the ma;ing any such contradictory statement, the accused has the right to prove that the witness did ma;e such statement" and if the fiscal should refuse upon due notice to produce the document, secondary evidence of the contents thereof would e admissi le. &his process of crossCe,amining a witness upon the point of prior contradictory statements is called in the practice of the $merican courts Klaying a predicateL for the introduction of contradictory statements. !t is almost universally accepted that unless a ground is thus laid upon crossCe,amination, evidence of contradictory statements are not admissi le to impeach a witness, though undou tedly the matter is to a large e,tent in the discretion of the court. -(eople vs. Castillano et. al, .0.R. ?o. 1 941!, April !, !,, ) Q# )hat is the nature of a sweetheart defense( )hen will it e given credence y the court( 0eing an affirmative defense, the allegation of a love affair must e supported y convincing proof. $ sweetheart defense cannot e given credence in the a sence of corro orative proof li;e love notes, mementos, pictures or to;ens that such romantic relationship really e,isted. - (eople vs. Ale: )analo, 0R? 14 ',4, )arc- !&, !,, )

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Q# )ould a love affair etween the rape victim and the accused preclude the prosecution of rape( &his fact would not preclude rape as it does not necessarily mean there was consent. $ love affair would not have *ustified carnal desires against her will. Definitely, a man cannot demand se,ual gratification from a fiancee and, worse, employ violence upon her on the prete,t of love. Love is not a license for lust. * >"id) Q# !s the moral character of a rape victim material in the prosecution of rape( 5ven assuming arguendo that the offended party was a girl of loose morals, it is settled that moral character is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction for rape for even prostitutes can e rape victims. - >"id / Q. 6ay a child witness testify in a narrative form( Parenthetically, under Sections .> to 2. of the %ule on 5,amination of a Child )itness which too; effect on Decem er .@, 2EEE, child witnesses may testify in a narrative form and leading questions may e allowed y the trial court in all stages of the e,amination if the same will further the interest of *ustice. ' *ections to questions should e couched in a manner so as not to mislead, confuse, frighten and intimidate the child: Sec. .>. 6ode of questioning. O &he court shall e,ercise control over the questioning of children so as to -./ facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, -2/ ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child, -3/ protect children from harassment or undue em arrassment, and -D/ avoid waste of time . * (eople vs. Canete, 0R? 14!9 ,, )arc- !&, !,, )

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9AR TYPE QUESTIONS QUESTION 1K Shirley was charged of violation of 0P 22. $fter Shirley pleaded K :ot GuiltyL to the charge, the Prosecutor filed a motion with the Court praying for leave to amend the !nformation to change the amount of the chec; from P 2E,EEE to P 2EE,EEE. Shirley opposed the motion on the ground that the amendment of the !nformation is su stantial and will pre*udice her. &he Court granted the motion of the Prosecution and allowed the amendment. ../ !s the order of the Court correct( 5,plain. 2./ )ould your answer e the same if, instead of praying for leave to amend the !nformation, the Prosecutor prayed for leave to withdraw the !nformation and to su stitute the same with another !nformation containing the amount of P2EE,EEE and the court granted the motion of the Prosecution( 5,plain. SUGGESTED ANSWERSK ../ YES# Sec. .D of %ule ..E pertinently provides that after the plea and during trial, a formal amendment may only e made with leave of court and when it can e done without causing pre*udice to the rights of the accused. &he change of the amount of the chec; in this case is only a matter of form and not of su stance. $ su stantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the *urisdiction of the court. $ll other matter are merely of form. $n amendment which merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction of the crime charged is a formal amendment as in the instant case. 2./ NO. Su stitution is not proper in this case ecause the new information would refer to the same offense charged in the original information - i.e. 7iolation of 0.P. 22/ and that would result to dou le *eopardy. QUESTION 2K Fuana issued and delivered on 8e ruary .@, .>>@ in ! a, Tam ales, to Perla, her townmate, two -2/ chec;s, one of which was for P?E,EEE, postdated 6ay ., .>>@, and the other for P.EE,EEE postdated Fune ., .>>@ against her account with 6etro an; in Limay, 0ataan in payment of *ewelries Fuana purchased from Perla. Perla deposited the chec;s, on due date, in her account with the $sia 0an;, in 6anila. )hen the chec;s were dishonored for insufficiency of funds, Perla signed and filed, without prior conciliation proceedings efore the 0arangay officials, one -./ verified criminal complaint for violation of 0P 22 with the 6anila 6&C against Fuana. &he court issued an order dismissing the case, motu propio, the criminal complaint.

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../ 2./

!s the order of dismissal correct( 5,plain. !f the court issued an order quashing the criminal complaint would such order e correct( 5,plain.

SUGGESTED ANSWERSK ../ NO. 7iolation of P0 22 is now covered y the %ules on Summary Procedure. $s such, the court is mandated to issue an order declaring whether or not the case shall e governed y the %ules on Summary Procedure. He cannot outrightly dismiss the case without ma;ing such determination. 2./ !t depends on what ground the motion to quash is ased. $ motion to quash is a prohi ited pleading under the rule of summary procedure. However, under Sec. .> -a/ of the rule the said prohi ition does not apply when the motion is ased on lac; of *urisdiction over the case or failure of the complainant to refer the case to arangay conciliation.

QUESTION 3K Pedro and Fuan were charged of 5stafa under $rticle 3.@ of the %evised Penal Code, under an !nformation, ased on the complaint of Fessica. $fter the prosecution rested its case, Fuan, without prior leave of court, filed a K Demurrer to 5vidence.L Despite the opposition of the Prosecutor, the Court issued an order granting the demurrer on the ground that there was insufficient evidence of estafa committed y Pedro and Fuan and dismissed the case against oth of them ut ordered Fessica to file a separate civil complaint for the civil lia ility of oth accused. ../ !s the order of the court dismissing the case against oth Pedro and Fuan correct( 5,plain. 2./ !s the order of the court ordering Fessica to file a separate civil complaint against them in their civil lia ility correct( 5,plain. 3./ Does the order of the court amount to an acquittal of oth Pedro and Fuan( 5,plain. SUGGESTED ANSWERK ../ YES. $fter the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon demurrer to evidence filed y the accused with or without leave of court. However, when the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives his right to present evidence and su mits the case for *udgment on the asis of the evidence for the prosecution. Sec. ! , Rule 119 ) 2./ YES# )ell settled is the rule in criminal procedure that e,tinction of the penal action does not carry with it the e,tinction of the civil action,

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3./

unless the e,tinction proceed from a declaration in a final *udgment that the fact from which the civil lia ility might arise did not e,ist. Hence, the court may order for the filing of a separate civil complaint for the civil lia ility of oth accused. YES# !f the demurrer to evidence is sustained, such dismissal eing on the merits is equivalent to an acquittal. - (eople vs. Cit% Court of Sila%, et. al. L;4 '9,, Dec. 9, 19'6 /

QUESTION 4K Fuan, Pedro and 7ictor were charged of %ape with the %&C on complaint of Fessica. $ll of the $ccused filed a petition for 0ail. &he Prosecutor did not oppose the petition. :evertheless, the court set the hearing of said petition during which the Prosecutor presented three -3/ witnesses, including Fessica and rested its case on said Petition. Fuan, Pedro and 7ictor testified in support of their Petition. &he court issued an order denying the Petition, in this language: K'rder 8or lac; of merit, the Petition for 0ail is here y denied.L &he prosecutor then filed a motion with the court for the discharge of Pedro as a state witness. Fuan and 7ictor opposed the motion on the grounds that -a/ the prosecution has already rested its case" - / the denial y the court of the Petition for 0ail of the accused precluded the prosecution from praying for the discharge of one of the accused as a state witness. ../ )as it proper for the Court to set the Petition for 0ail for hearing and receive evidence even if the prosecutor did not oppose the petition( 5,plain. 2./ !s the order of the court denying ail to the accused proper( 5,plain. 3./ !s the petition of the prosecution to discharge Pedro as a state witness proper and meritorious( 5,plain. D./ !f the court denied the petition of the prosecution for the discharge of Pedro, may Pedro testify for the prosecution( 5,plain. @./ !s it proper for the court to consider only the evidence presented during the Petition for 0ail in resolving the petition for the discharge of Pedro as a state witness( 5,plain.

SUGGESTED ANSWERSK ../ YES. Since %ape is a capital offense eing punisha le y death, ail is not a matter of right. &he court will still have to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of granting the petition for 0ail. !n view thereof, a hearing is necessary even if the prosecution did not oppose the petition.

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2./

3./

D./ @./

NO. &he 'rder of the court denying or granting a petition for ail should spell out at least a resume of the evidence on which its order is ased. !n once case it was held that an order of the court merely stating the num er of witnesses and the court#s conclusion that the evidence of guilt was not Ksufficiently strongL such order is defective in for m and su stance and consequently voida le. - Carpio, et.al. vs. )aglalang, etc. 0.R. ?o. '&16!, April 19, 1991 ). NO. Under %ule ..>, Sec. .A, when two or more persons are *ointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution, efore resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to e discharged with their consent so that they may e witnesses for the State. &hus, where the motion is made after the prosecution rests its case, such motion is not proper and meritorious. NO. &o order Pedro to testify for the prosecution despite denial of the prosecution#s motion for his discharge as state witness would violate his right against selfCincrimination. NO. !n a petition for ail, the court receives evidence to determine whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. 'n the other hand, in a petition for the discharge of an accused to e a state witness, the prosecution presents evidence to prove that: -a/ &here is a solute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is required" - / &here is no other direct evidence availa le for the proper prosecution of the offense committed e,cept the testimony of said accused" -c/ &he testimony of said accused can e su stantially corro orated in its material points" -d/ Said accused does not appear to e the most guilty" and -e/ Said accused has not at any time een convicted of any offense involving moral turpiture.

QUESTION "K Peter was charged with the %&C of the crime of murder. $t arraignment, he pleaded K :ot GuiltyL to the charge. $fter the prosecution rested its case, Peter filed, without prior leave of court, a K Demurrer to 5vidence.L &he prosecution opposed the motion. &he court then promulgated a decision declaring that Peter committed only KHomicideL convicting him of said crime. ../ $ssuming that the Prosecution proved only Homicide, was it proper for the Court to render a Decision on the asis of said demurrer convicting Peter for said crime( 5,plain. 2./ )ould it e proper for the Prosecutor to file a motion for the reconsideration of the Decision of the Court without placing Peter in dou le *eopardy( 5,plain. SUGGESTED ANSWERSK ../ YES. )hen the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives his right to present evidence and su mits the case for *udgment on the asis of the evidence for the prosecution. Hence,

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where the evidence presented y the prosecution proves Homicide, the court may render a decision convicting the accused of Homicide. NO# Section . of %ule .2. does not provide for a motion for new trial or reconsideration y the prosecution as the reopening of the case and introduction of additional evidence y the prosecution, without the consent of the accused, would result in dou le *eopardy.

QUESTION $K %ene drove his car with gross negligence resulting in his car colliding with the car of 0ert. 0ecause of the impact, the car of 0ert umped the car owned y Lando. $s a result of said accident, the cars of 0ert and Lando wee damaged at the cost of P .EE,EEE each. 0ert died while %osa, his wife who was also in the car, sustained serious physical in*uries. $fter Preliminary investigation, the prosecutor filed two -2/ separate !nformation, namely an !nformation for K %ec;less !mprudence resulting in Homicide, Damage to Property - referring to the car of 0ert / and Serious Physical !n*uriesL and another !nformation for K%ec;less !mprudence resulting in Damage to Property for the damage to the car of Lando. ../ )as it proper for the prosecutor to file two -2/ separate informations( 5,plain. 2./ )ould it e proper for the prosecutor to file only one -./ information ased on said accident( 5,plain. 3./ !f two -2/ separate !nformation were filed y the prosecutor, may the trial of the 2 cases e consolidated in one court( 5,plain. SUGGESTED ANSWERK ../ YES. Sec. .3 of %ule ..E states that a complaint or information must charge only one offense, e,cept when the law prescri es a single punishment for various offenses. !n this case, the two felonies allegedly committed y the accused must e contained in two separate informations ecause they have different o *ects. 2./ NO. &he felonies involved do not constitute as an e,ception to the rule proscri ing duplicity of offense. &he two offenses do not fall under the comple, crime under the %PC where a single penalty is imposed and the special comple, crimes or composite crimes penali+ed therein. 3./ YES, this is authori+ed y Sec. 22 of %ule ..> which provides that charges for offenses founded on the same facts or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character may e tried *ointly at the discretion of the court. QUESTION 7 $fter 6ario pleaded K :ot GuiltyL to the charge of %ape, 6ario proceeded to the house of Perla and threatened to ;ill her unless she agreed to marry him.

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$fraid, Perla married 6ario. !mmediately thereafter, Perla filed a complaint with the %&C for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage to 6ario. During preC trial in the criminal case, 6ario filed a motion to quash the !nformation on the grounds of e,tinction of the crime of %ape and of his criminal lia ility for said crime. 6ario attached to his motion a certified true copy of his marriage contract with Perla. &he prosecutor opposed the 6otion of 6ario claiming that such a motion cannot e filed after arraignment. &he prosecutor moved that the criminal case e suspended until after the termination of the civil case for nullity of the marriage. 6ario opposed the motion of the prosecutor and moved that the civil case should e suspended instead. %esolve the respective claims4motions of the Prosecutor and 6ario. SUGGESTED ANSWERK $s a general rule, a motion to quash must e filed efore the arraignment, otherwise, they are deemed waived. &his rule however admits of several e,ceptions. 'ne of which is when the ground invo;ed is that the criminal action or lia ility has een e,tinguished. !n case of %ape, marriage of the offended woman and the accused e,tinguishes criminal lia ility. Hence, the motion to quash filed y 6ario can still e entertained y the court even after his arraignment. &he motion of the Prosecutor to suspend the criminal case is proper. &he decision in the civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is pre*udicial to the outcome of the criminal case. $lthough one of the elements of a pre*udicial question is that is must have een previously instituted than the criminal case, the same should not e strictly applied in the case at ar. &he resolution in the case for declaration of the nullity of marriage etween the herein accused and the offended party is determinative of whether the case for rape will prosper. !f the marriage is declared void, the criminal lia ility of 6ario would not e distinguished and will result to the denial of his motion to quash. QUESTION :K Pedro was charged of the comple, crime of K6urderL and K8rustrated 6urderL under $rt. 2DB in relation with $rticles ? and DB of the %PC, punisha le with death penalty. !t was alleged in the !nformation that Pedro shot Fuan and %odolfo with his licensed gun ;illing Fuan and inflicting serious physical in*uries on %odolfo who managed to survive despite his wounds. Upon arraignment, Pedro offered to plead guilty to the Klesser offense of K6urder.L ../ 6ay the court grant Pedro#s offer if the Pu lic Prosecutor and the heirs of Fuan agree ut %odolfo does not( 5,plain. 2./ !f %odolfo, the heirs of Fuan, the Pu lic Prosecutor and the Court agree to the offer of Pedro, is the Court mandated to conduct searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of Pedro#s plea( 5,plain. SUGGESTED ANSWERSK

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../

2./

NO. 8or a plea of guilty to a lesser offense, the consent of the prosecutor, as well as of the offended party, and the approval of the court must e o tained. )here these requirements were not o served, the accused cannot claim dou le *eopardy if he should e charged anew with the graver offense su *ect of the original information or complaint. - Sec. 2, %ule ..? / YES. &he rules provide that when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpa ility . - Sec. 3, %ule ..? /

QUESTION 9K $ppended to the !nformation for %ape against )illiam were the $ffidavits of Perla, the private complainant, the 6edicoCLegal %eport on Perla, and the Police %eport on the Police investigation of Perla#s comlaint. 6ay the trial court rely solely on the allegations of the information and the appendages thereof for the purpose of ascertaining pro a le cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against )illiam( 5,plain. SUGGESTED ANSWERK NO. &he case involved in the present case requires a preliminary investigation. $s such, the *udge conducting the preliminary investigation cannot outrightly issue a warrant of arrest solely on the asis of the information and supporting affidavits of the prosecution. &he respondent shall have the right to e,amine the evidence su mitted y the complainant which he may not have een furnished and to copy them at his e,pense. He shall thereafter su mit his counterC affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. &he warrant of arrest may only issue if the trial *udge is satisfied that a pro a le cause e,ists and that in his sound *udgment there is necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of *ustice. QUESTION 1@K $lthough $le, committed the special comple, crime of K%o erry with HomicideL under $rt. 2>D par. . of the %PC, the Pu lic Prosecutor filed two - 2 / separate !nformations against $le, for K%o eryL and KHomicide.L &he court ordered a *oint trial of the 2 cases. 6ay $le, file, efore arraignment, a K6otion to 9uashL the !nformation for KHomicideL on the ground of dou le *eopardy( 5,plain. SUGGESTED ANSWERK NO. $s a general rule the %ules prohi it a duplicitous information and declares the same to e quasha le including a situation where a comple, crime

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which should properly e charged in a single information is made the su *ect of several informations y charging each component crime thereof separately. However, in People vs. 6ilflores - LC32.DDCD@, Fuly 3E, .BB2 /, where the accused was charged with multiple murder in one information and murder in another, although said offenses constituted a single comple, crime caused y a single e,plosive, it was held that since said cases were 9ointl% tried, the technical error was deemed cured and the accused could not claim dou le *eopardy. QUESTION 11K &he court rendered *udgment convicting Fo*o of KLess Serious Phyical !n*uriesL and imposed on him the penalty of four - D / months of arresto mayor. However, the court did not, despite the evidence on record, order Fo*o to pay actual damages and moral damages. $ day after the promulgation of the Decision, Fo*o filed a KPetition for Pro ationL with the court. &wo -2/ Days after Fo*o had filed his petition, the private prosecutor, without the conformity of the Pu lic Prosecutor, filed a K 6otion for %econsiderationL of the Decision only on the civil lia ility of Fo*o. ../ Did the decision of the court ecome final and e,ecutory when Fo*o filed his Petition for Pro ation( 5,plain. 2./ Did the court retain *urisdiction over the case to ta;e cogni+ance of and resolve the motion of the Private Prosecutor( 5,plain. 3./ !f the court granted the motion of the Private Prosecutor, may the court amend its Decision to include civil lia ility of Fo*o without violating Fo*o#s right against dou le *eopardy( 5,plain. SUGGESTED ANSWERSK ../ YES. Section A of %ule .2E provides that a *udgment in criminal case ecome final -a/ when no appeal is seasona ly filed" - / when the accused commenced to serve sentence: -c/ when the right to appeal is e,pressly waived in writing, e,cept where the death penalty was imposed y trial court, and -d/ when the accused applies for pro ation as he there y waives the right to appeal. 2./ YES. &he trial court can validly amend the civil portion of its decision within .@ days from promulgation thereof even though the appeal had in the meantime een perfected y the accused from the *udgment of conviction. - People vs. Ursua, ?E Phil 2@2 /. !t can, within the said period, order the accused to indemnify the offended party, although the *udgment had ecome final. - People vs. %odrigue+, >A Phil 3D> /. &he reason for this is that the court continues to retain *urisdiction insofar as the civil aspect is concerned. $fter the lapse if the .@Cday period, there can no longer e any amendment of the decision. 3./ YES. &his is an e,ception to the rule that a *udgment of conviction cannot e modified after it has ecome final, otherwise such modification would amount to dou le *eopardy. $s previously stated,

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the trial court can validly amend the civil portion of its decision within .@ days from promulgation thereof. QUESTION 12K &he trial court found $llan guilty of violation of PD .B?? - possession of unlicensed firearm / and meted on him the penalty of from fifteen -.@/ years of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to .B years of reclusion temporal, as ma,imum. $llan appealed the Decision to the Court of $ppeals. During the pendency of the appeal, %$ B2>D too; effect. &he Court of $ppeals affirmed the Decision of the trial court ut reduced the penalty to one -./ year of prision correctional as minimum, to @ years of prision correccional, as ma,imum. &he decision of the Court of $ppeals ecame final and e,ecutory after which the records of the case were remanded to the trial court. !s $llan entitled to pro ation under the Pro ation Law( 5,plain. SUGGESTED ANSWERK NO. Section D of PD >?B - Pro ation Law/ provides that no application for pro ation shall e entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the *udgment of conviction. &hus, when $llan has perfected his appeal, his right to apply for pro ation was lost. QUESTION 13K Pedro was charged in the %&C of the crime of theft under $rt. 3EB of the %PC. However, the !nformation did not allege the value of the property stolen. !f you are the counsel of Pedro, would you file a K6otion for a 0ill of ParticularsL or a K6otion to 9uashL the !nformation( 5,plain. SUGGESTED ANSWERK ! would file a 6otion for a 0ill of Particulars praying that the prosecution specify the value of the property stolen to ena le my client, Pedro, to properly plead and prepare for trial. !f the value of the property is considera ly small, my client could raise the defense that one of the elements in the crime of theft is lac;ing, i.e., intent to gain. QUESTION 14K $fter the requisite preliminary investigation, the 'm udsman approved a resolution finding pro a le cause against Governor Pedro for violation of the $ntiCGraft and Corrupt Practices $ct. Governor Pedro filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Sandigan ayan, under the provisions of %$ A>A@, questioning the factual asis for the resolution. However, the Sandigan ayan dismissed the Petition contending that the Petition should e filed with the Supreme Court pursuant to Sec. 2A of the %$ ?AAE. !s the Sandigan ayan correct( 5,plain.

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SUGGESTED ANSWERK NO. !n <a+ian v&* Di&ierto / GRN #8$%=8, Sept* #7, #$$>. , Sec. 2A of %$ ?AAE, which authori+es an appeal to the Supreme Court from decisions of the 'ffice of the 'm udsman in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared violative of the proscription in Sec. 3E, $rt. 7!, of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate *urisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advice and consent. !n addition, the Court noted that %ule D@ of the .>>A %ules of Civil Procedure precludes appeals from quasiC*udicial agencies, li;e the 'ffice of the 'm udsman, to the Supreme Court. Consequently, appeals from decisions of the 'ffice of the 'm udsman in administrative cases should e ta;en to the Court of $ppeals under %ule D3, as reiterated in the su sequent case of Na(uhe v* -(+ud&(an. !n oth <a+ian and Na(uhe, the petitions were referred to the Court of $ppeals for final disposition and considered as petitions for review under %ule D3 of the .>>A %ules of Civil Procedure. * Iillavert vs. Disierto, 0R? 1 '1#, Ae"ruar% ! ,!,,, ) QUESTION 1"K Upon the filing of the !nformation of Homicide against Pedro, who was then at large, he filed a K6otion to 9uashL the !nformation on the ground of lac; of territorial *urisdiction of the Court and a K6otion to Suspend the !ssuance of a )arrant of $rrestL pending resolution of his K6otion to 9uash.L ../ 6ay Pedro file the 6otion to 9uash efore he is arrested or efore he surrenders( 5,plain. 2./ 6ay the court hold in a eyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Pedro pending resolution of his K6otion to 9uashL( 5,plain. SUGGESTED ANSWERSK ../ YES. &he %ules provide that Kat any time efore entering his plea, the accused may move to quash the complaint or information.L - Sec. ., %ule ..A / 2./ NO. QUESTION 1$K Fuan was charged of K8rustrated 6urderL with the %&C. During the pendency of the trial, the victim of the crime died ut the !nformation was not amended to K 6urderL although the prosecution informed the court of the death of the victim. !f the court finds Fuan criminally lia le for the ;illing of the victim, would it e proper for the court to convict Fuan of K6urderL ( 5,plain. SUGGESTED ANSWERK

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NO. !n the a sence of an amendment, with leave of court, to the original complaint of 8rustrated 6urder, the accused cannot e convicted of 6urder ecause that it would e in violation of his right to e informed of the nature of the accusation against him. However, such conviction shall not e a ar to the filing of a case for 6urder. Sec. A of rule ..A provides that the conviction of an accused shall not e a ar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint when the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the former charge. QUESTION 17K Fuan was charged of 6urder with the %&C. During the trial, the prosecution, over the o *ection of Fuan, presented evidence that the victim of the murder was the illegitimate son of Fuan. $fter the prosecution rested its case, Fuan escaped from detention. &he court, thereupon, rendered its Decision convicting Fuan of parricide with one generic aggravating circumstance and sentenced Fuan to death. &he court declared in its Decision that the !nformation was deemed amended to Parricide to conform to evidence. ../ )as it proper for the court to render *udgment after the escape of Fuan form detention( 5,plain. 2./ !s the Decision of the court convicting Fuan of parricide on the premise that the information was deemed amended to conform to evidence correct( 5,plain. 3./ )ould it e proper for the court to promulgate its Decision despite the a sence of Fuan( 5,plain. D./ )ill the decision of the court ecome final and e,ecutory after the lapse of .@ days form promulgation if Fuan is not arrested or does not surrender within said period( 5,plain. SUGGESTED ANSWERSK ../ NO. &he escape of Fuan from detention does not warrant an immediate rendition of *udgment as the trial can proceed in a+&entia. 2./ NO, ecause after arraignment during trial , the prosecution cannot alter, add or modify the accusations stated in the information over the o *ection of the accused. 3./ YES, provided that notice was properly served in accordance with Sec. ? of %ule .2E of the %evised %ules in Criminal Procedure. &he said rule provides that if the accused was tried in a sentia ecause he *umped ail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall e served at his last ;nown address. D./ YES, if Fuan does not surrender within .@ days from promulgation of *udgment, he shall lose the remedies availa le in the %ules. QUESTION 1:K

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)hat court has e,clusive original *urisdiction over the following offenses( ../ Li el punisha le with prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine from P 2 EE to P ?,EEE, or oth" 2./ 7iolation of 0P 22 covering a chec; in the amount of P3EE,EEE SUGGESTED ANSWERSK ../ &he 6etropolitan &rial Courts, 6unicipal &rial Courts and 6unicipal Circuit &rial Courts have *urisdiction since the imposa le penalty does not e,ceed four years and two months and a fine of not more than four thousand pesos. - Sec. 3. <2= of 0P .2> / 2./ &he *urisdiction for violation of 0P 22 elongs to the aforesaid courts ecause it is now governed y the %ules on Summary Procedure. QUESTION 19K Under what circumstances may the 6&C issue a warrant of arrest under the %ules on Summary Procedure( 5,plain. SUGGESTED ANSWERK Section .? of the %evised %ules on Summary Procedure provides that K the court shall not order the arrest of the accused unless for failure to appear whenever required. I,,,,,L QUESTION 2@K 6ay the $ccused file a KDemurrer to 5videnceL under the %ules on Summary Procedure( 5,plain. SUGGESTED ANSWERK YES. $ petition for Demurrer to 5vidence is not among the prohi ited pleadings under the %ules on Summary Procedure. QUESTION 21K Pedro was charged of the crime of squatting penali+ed y PD AA2. Pedro, in turn, filed a civil complaint against Fuan, the Private Complainant in the criminal case, claiming ownership over the said property. &hereafter, Pedro filed, in the criminal case, a motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of a pre*udicial question. &he court issued an 'rder granting the said motion. )hile Pedro was adducing evidence in the civil case, PD AA2 was a solutely repealed. !s the order of the court suspending the criminal case for squatting, on the ground of a pre*udicial question correct( 5,plain. SUGGESTED ANSWERK NO# !t has een held that a pre*udicial question that which must precede the criminal case and the resolution of which is detrminative of the innocence or

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guilt of the accused. !n this case, the civil case was filed after the institution of the criminal case, thus, it is not a pre*udicial question. QUESTION 22K 6ay the filiation of illegitimate children e proved y hearsay evidence( 5,plain. SUGGESTED ANSWERK YES, under Section 3E of %ule .3E, pedigree may e proved y acts or declarations of relatives - whether legitimate or illegitimate since the law does not distinguish/ provided that: -a/ the actor or declarant is dead or una le to testify" - / the act or declaration is made y a person related to the su *ect y irth or marriage" -c/ the relationship etween the declarant or the actor and the su *ect is shown y evidence other than such act or declaration" and -d/ the act or declaratioin was made ante litem mortam, or prior to the controversy. QUESTION 23K !f an $ccused e,ecuted a valid e,tra*udicial confession, may he e convicted of the crime charges if the Prosecution adduced, in addition to the confession, only circumstancial evidence to prove corpus delicti( 5,plain. SUGGESTED ANSWERK YES. Section 3 of %ule .33 states that a mere voluntary e,tra*udicial confession uncorro orated y independent proof of the corpus delicti is not sufficient to sustain a *udgment of conviction. &here must e independent proof of the corpus delicti. &he evidence may e circumstantial ut *ust the same, there should e some evidence su stantiating the confession. - US vs. De la Cru,, 2 Phil. .DB / QUESTION 24K )ould you answer to the immediately preceding question e the same if the Prosecution adduced, an addition to the confession, only su stantial evidence to prove corpus delicti( 5,plain. SUGGESTED ANSWERK YES. )hat is required is that some evidence apart from the confession would tend to show that the crime was in fact committed. &his may e supplied y su stantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasona le mind might accept as adequate to *ustify a conclusion. QUESTION 2"K

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Lucio was charged of Parricide. Upon arraignment, Lucio pleaded not guilty. During preCtrial, Lucio, with the assistance of counsel, admitted that the deceased was his wife and that he ;illed her. &he court issued a PreC&rial 'rder em odying the admissions of Lucio during the preCtrial. 0oth Lucio and his counsel signed the PreC&rial 'rder. ../ $re the admissions of Lucio during the preCtrial *udicial admission against penal interest( 5,plain. 2./ )ould your answer e the same if the admissions of Lucio, during the preCtrial, were not em odied in a KPreC&rial 'rderL of the Court( 5,plain. 3./ !f the Court rendered a Decision convicting Lucio of Parricide on the asis of his $dmissions during the preCtrial em odied in the PreC&rial 'rder of the Court, is not Lucio there y deprived of his right to adduce evidence in his ehalf( 5,plain. SUGGESTED ANSWERSK ../ YES. &he testimony of the accused in a parricide case to the effect that he was married to the victim is an admission against his penal interest and can sustain his conviction even in the a sence if independent evidence to prove such marriage. - People vs. $ling, LC 3BB33, 6arch .2, .>BE /. &he same can e applied to the admission made y the accused during the preCtrial. 2./ NO. )here the admission is not em odied in the PreCtrial 'rder, the same cannot e used against the accused. 3./ NO# &he admission of the accused in em odied in the PreCtrial order, eing a *udicial admission, does not require further proof. &he admitter can no longer contradict such admission unless to show that it was made through palpa le mista;e or that no such admission was made. >?T=R AL>A 9ANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS ,1# ALS MANAGEMENT L DE!ELOPMENT CORP# AG#R# N.# 1"1:21# A/6(+ 14, 2@@4#B PANGANI9AN, J#K FACTSK 'n Fuly 2>, .>B@, petitioner 0P! !nvestment Corporation filed a complaint for a Sum of 6oney against $LS 6anagement and Development Corporation alleging that the respondent failed to pay the necessary e,penses for the registration of the Condominium Certificate as stipulated in the contract. !n its $nswer with Compulsory Counterclaim, respondent averred among others that it has *ust and valid reasons for refusing to pay petitionerNs legal claims ecause it is in clear and direct contravention of Section 2@ of Presidential Decree :o. >@A which provides that N:o fee e,cept those required for the registration of

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the deed of sale in the %egistry of Deeds shall e collected for the issuance of such titleN, the <petitioner= has *ac;edCup or increased the amount of its alleged advances for the issuance and registration of the Condominium Certificate of &itle in the name of the <respondent=, y including therein charges which should not e collected from uyers of condominium units. %espondent further alleged that the petitioner has reached conditions of their contract. &he appellate court sustained the trial courtNs finding that Mwhile petitioner succeeded in proving its claim against the respondent for e,penses incurred in the registration of <the latterNs= title to the condominium unit purchased, . . . for its part respondent in turn succeeded in esta lishing an even igger claim under its counterclaim.M Hence, this Petition. ISSUEK )hether or not the Honora le Court of $ppeals erred in not holding that the trial court had no *urisdiction over the respondentNs counterclaims. HELDK NO# Pursuant to Sec. . of PD .DD -5mpowering the :ational Housing $uthority to !ssue )rits of 5,ecution in the 5nforcement of !ts Decisions Under Presidential Decree :o. >@A/ the respondentNs counterclaim O eing one for specific performance -correction of defects4deficiencies in the condominium unit/ and damages O falls under the *urisdiction of the HLU%0 and not the %&C. However, the issue of *urisdiction can no longer e raised in the instant case. &he general rule is that any decision rendered without *urisdiction is a total nullity and may e struc; down at any time, even on appeal efore this Court. !ndeed, the question of *urisdiction may e raised at any time, provided that such action would not result in the moc;ery of the tenets of fair play. $s an e,ception to the rule, the issue may not e raised if the party is arred y estoppel. !n the present case, petitioner proceeded with the trial, and only after a *udgment unfavora le to it did it raise the issue of *urisdiction. &hus, it may no longer deny the trial courtNs *urisdiction, for estoppel ars it from doing so. &his Court cannot countenance the inconsistent postures petitioner has adopted y attac;ing the *urisdiction of the regular court to which it has voluntarily su mitted. &he Court frowns upon the undesira le practice of su mitting oneNs case for decision, and then accepting the *udgment only if favora le, ut attac;ing it for lac; of *urisdiction if it is not. )e also find petitioner guilty of estoppel y laches for failing to raise the question of *urisdiction earlier. 8rom the time that respondent filed its counterclaim on :ovem er B, .>B@, the former could have raised such issue, ut failed or neglected to do so. !t was only upon filing its appellantNs rief 2? with the C$ on 6ay 2A, .>>., that petitioner raised the issue of *urisdiction for the first time. !n &i*am v. Si onghanoy, we declared that the failure to raise the question of *urisdiction at an earlier stage arred the party from questioning it later.

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&hus, we struc; down the defense of lac; of *urisdiction, since the appellant therein failed to raise the question at an earlier stage. !t did so only after an adverse decision had een rendered. )e further declared that if we were to sanction the said appellantNs conduct, Mwe would in effect e declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced . . . and compel the *udgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. &he inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent ut revolting. JOSE LAM ,1# ADRIANA CHUA AG#R# N.# 1312:$# M%6=< 1:, 2@@4B AUSTRIA MARTINEC, /#K FACTSK 'n 6arch .., .>>D $driana Chua filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage y $driana Chua against Fose Lam in the %egional &rial Court of Pasay City. $driana prayed that the marriage etween her and Fose e declared null and void ut she failed to claim and pray for the support of their child, Fohn Paul. &he trial court declared the marriage etween Lam and Chua null and void and Fose Lam was ordered to give a monthly support to his son Fohn Paul Chua Lam in the amount of P2E,EEE.EE. 'n :ovem er 3, .>>D, Fose filed a 6otion for %econsideration thereof ut only insofar as the decision awarded monthly support to his son in the amount of P2E,EEE.EE. He argued that there was already a provision for support of the child as em odied in the decision dated 8e ruary 2B, .>>D of the 6a;ati %&C wherein he and $driana agreed to contri ute P2@E,EEE.EE each to a common fund for the enefit of the child. 'n $ugust 22, .>>@, the Pasay %&C issued an 'rder denying Fose Lam#s motion for reconsideration ruling that the compromise agreement entered into y the parties and approved y the 6a;ati %&C efore the marriage was declared null and void a+ initio y the Pasay %&C, is of no moment and cannot limit and4or affect the support ordered y the latter court. Fose then appealed the Pasay %&C#s decision to the Court of $ppeals which affirmed the Pasay %&C#s decision in all respects. Fose filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision ut in a %esolution dated 'cto er 2A, .>>A, the Court of $ppeals denied the same. Hence, Fose filed the present petition for review on certiorari under %ule D@ of the %ules of Court. ISSUESK .. )hether the %&CCPasay is arred from awarding support in favor of Fohn Paul Law in view of the previous compromise agreement entered into y the parties. 2. )hether the decision rendered y the %&CCPasay is tainted with irregularities. HELDK

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.. :'. &he Pasay %&C and the Court of $ppeals are oth correct insofar as they ruled that the amount of support is y no means permanent. !n Advincula v&* Advincula, we held that another action for support could e filed again y the same plaintiff notwithstanding the fact that the previous case for support filed against the same defendant was dismissed. )e further held in said case that: . . . Fudgment for support does not ecome final. &he right to support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional" for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may e modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. !t cannot e regarded as su *ect to final determination. &hus, there is no merit to the claim of Fose that the compromise agreement etween him and $driana, as approved y the 6a;ati %&C and em odied in its decision dated 8e ruary 2B, .>>D in the case for voluntary dissolution of con*ugal partnership of gains, is a ar to any further award of support in favor of their child Fohn Paul. &he provision for a common fund for the enefit of their child Fohn Paul, as em odied in the compromise agreement etween herein parties which had een approved y the 6a;ati %&C, cannot e considered final and re& ?udicata since any *udgment for support is always su *ect to modification, depending upon the needs of the child and the capa ilities of the parents to give support. 2# YES# &he Court notes four circumstances that taint the regularity of the proceedings and the decision rendered y the trial court. F(613, the only ground alleged in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed y $driana with the Pasay %&C is the psychological incapacity of Fose without any prayer for the support of her child. 0ut on a motion to reCopen filed su sequently y her, the trial court set the case for reception of evidence and su sequently allowed $driana to present evidence on two previous marriages contracted y Fose with other women to prove that the marriage etween $driana and Fose was null and void for eing igamous. !t is only later on that respondent $driana first claimed support for Fohn Paul when she testified in open court. &he petition of $driana was, in effect, su stantially changed y the admission of the additional evidence. &he ground relied on for nullity of the marriage was changed from the psychological incapacity of Fose to that of e,istence of previous marriages of Fose with two different women with an additional claim for support of the child. Such su stantial changes were not reflected in the petition filed with the trial court, as no formal amendment was ever made y $driana e,cept the insertion of the handwritten phrase KAnd for re&pondent to &upport the child of petitioner in an a(ount thi& @onora+le Court (ay dee( ?u&t and rea&ona+le L found at the ultimate paragraph of the petition, as allowed y the Pasay %&C. &here is nothing on record to show that petitioner Fose was notified of the su stantial changes in the petition of $driana. S-=.)4, the Pasay %&C did not give Fose an opportunity to e present on Fuly ?, .>>D for the presentation of evidence y $driana and to refute the same. T<(64, the records do not show that petitioner was sent a copy of the 'rder dated Fuly ?, .>>D wherein the trial court granted the Urgent 6otion to %eC'pen of

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respondent $driana and forthwith allowed her to present her evidence to prove that petitioner herein contracted previous marriages with different women. F.563<, the evidence presented y respondent regarding her claim for support for Fohn Paul is glaringly insufficient and cannot e made a valid asis upon which the Pasay %&C could have determined the monthly amount of P2E,EEE.EE for the support to e given to Fohn Paul y petitioner Fose. $ party who has een declared in default is entitled to service of su stantially amended or supplemental pleadings.Considering that in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage or annulment of marriage, there can e no default pursuant to Section ?, %ule .B of the %evised %ules of Court in relation to $rticle DB of the 8amily Code, it is with more reason that petitioner should li;ewise e entitled to notice of all proceedings. 8urthermore, it is also a general principle of law that a court cannot set itself in motion, nor has it power to decide questions e,cept as presented y the parties in their pleadings. $nything that is decided eyond them is coram nonC *udice and void. T<-6-;.6- E<-6- % =.563 -)3-61 % >54*2-)3 .6 %E%641 6-+(-; '-?.)4 3<- /6%?-6 .; 3<- =.2/+%()3 .6 3<- 1=./- .; (31 %++-*%3(.)1 3<-H=-11(,- 6-+(-; (1 ).3 2-6-+? (66-*5+%6 '53 (1 ,.(4 ;.6 E%)3 .; >56(14(=3(.), %)4 (1 ./-) 3. =.++%3-6%+ %33%=&# &he appellate court also ruled that a *udgment of a court upon a su *ect within its general *urisdiction, ut which is not rought efore it y any statement or claim of the parties, and is foreign to the issues su mitted for its determination, is a nullity. -5mphasis supplied/ Pursuant to the foregoing principle, it is a serious error for the trial court to have rendered *udgment on issues not presented in the pleadings as it was eyond its *urisdiction to do so. &he amendment of the petition to reflect the new issues and claims against Fose was, therefore, indispensa le so as to authori+e the court to act on the issue of whether the marriage of Fose and $driana was igamous and the determination of the amount that should have een awarded for the support of Fohn Paul. )hen the trial court rendered *udgment eyond the allegations contained in the copy of the petition served upon Fose, the Pasay %&C had acted in e,cess of its *urisdiction and deprived petitioner Lam of due process. !nsofar as the declaration of nullity of the marriage etween $driana and Fose for eing igamous is concerned, the decision rendered y the Pasay %&C could e declared as invalid for having een issued eyond its *urisdiction. :onetheless, considering that Fose, did not assail the declaration of nullity of his marriage with $driana in his motion for reconsideration which he filed with the Pasay %&C. !n the petitions he filed in the Court of $ppeals and with us, he li;ewise did not raise the issue of *urisdiction of the Pasay %&C to receive evidence and render *udgment on his previous marriages with other woman which were not alleged in the petition filed y $driana. Petitioner Fose is estopped from questioning the declaration of nullity of his marriage with $driana and therefore, the Court will not undo the *udgment of the Pasay %&C declaring the marriage of $driana and Fose null and void for eing igamous. !t is an a,iomatic rule that while a *urisdictional question may e raised at any time, this, however, admits of an e,ception where estoppel has supervened.

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