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THE AMBIGUITY OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC SITUATION AND ITS RELATION TO THE ANALYSTS REVERIE
Eystein Victor Vpenstad, PsyD
Oslo, Norway
This article is about ambiguity in psychoanalysis, an ambiguity that is particularly striking in the psychoanalytic relationship between patient and analyst. The analyst is a professional in his consulting room, in his chair behind the patient, but he is at the same time a gure in the patients realization of his inner world of objects. The analyst is a transference gure, but he is also a real person with his own inner private reverie and a subjective contribution to the analytic process. For some patients, the ambiguous analyst is an enormous challenge or threat. This article describes parts of the analytic process with one such patient, a man with an early history of severe trauma who at the start of his treatment completely denied this ambiguity and felt every reminder of his analyst being anything else but professional as a threat to his sanity. The author tries to show how the improvement of the patients tolerance for ambiguity depended on the work done in the analysts private reverie, a quite demanding process for the analyst. Keywords: ambiguity, early trauma, reverie, authentic analyst, analyst exposure
Eystein Victor Vpenstad, PsyD, private practice, Oslo, Norway. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Eystein Victor Vpenstad, P.O. Box 7217 Majorstua, 0307 Oslo, Norway. E-mail: vaapenst@online.no
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The patient tells me that last night he was really scared in a shop. He was about to buy some new headphones, but he is not easy to satisfy, and the purchase took some time. Patient (P): I became increasingly scared that the salesman would be angry. Analyst (A): Sometimes you are not completely satised here either. Maybe you are scared that Im going to be angry with you when you say so. P: No, no, no! You are a professional, and its me that Im not satised with. That I dont manage to say everything like you said I should do, and that I cant keep up my attention all the time.
Every time we touch on our relationship, every time the transference is mentioned, the patient exclaims: But you are a professional! When I acknowledged this but also put forward that he also met me here as a person, the patient showed no sign of trying to understand this duplicity or ambiguity, and he just said again and again: But I see you as a professional, and you are just doing your job. Sometimes I tried to say something like this: Its important for you that I am professional so that I can take all the bad and difcult stuff that can come into our sessions. He took this as a conrmation of my professionalism and did not hear the rest of the message in the interpretation. The ambiguity is obvious in the transference: The analyst is a concrete (professional) person in his consulting room, in his chair behind the patient, but he is at the same time a gure in the patients realization of his inner world of objects. In the transference, the patient can attribute to, and imagine the analyst as, almost anything. Working through the transference can give the patient a more realistic picture of the analyst as analyst and as a person, but it will not eradicate the ambiguity of the psychoanalytic relationship, only move it from an omnipotent wish to dene the analyst in one particular way to an ability to live with the fact that it is impossible to know everything about the other. Ambiguity is that something or someone has several meanings and cannot be understood or described in only one denite way. For instance, in the diagnostic process we can discover that the patient can t into a diagnosis, but that she is so much more than this particular diagnosis. Then let us move to the second question: Can we say that ambiguity is a relevant concept for psychoanalysis? I think that we can, and in much the same way as Freud used everyday concepts to illustrate what is happening in psychoanalysis. Ambiguity is also a central part in some of the most important psychoanalytic theories: Consider Winnicotts (1971) description of potential space and transitional phenomena (and objects), where the most important thing seems to be the double meaning an object or a fantasy can have as a representative for the space between play and reality. Bion (1962) produced a theory about K. This is, among other things, the awareness of the fact that our increasing knowledge also means that there is much we still do not understand or know anything about. This is what Bion (after Keats) called negative capability, a capacity that Bion according to Symington and Symington (1996) regarded as not an immediate mental discipline to be engaged in just prior to the session, but rather a way of life (p. 169). The paradigm of mentalization, described by, for instance, Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, and Target (2004), is just this capability to see the manifold and ambiguous in others, in ourselves, and in the relationship. A good capacity to mentalize is characterized by an appreciation of how our own contribution and the reaction of the other can have several meanings. And mentalization is about our capacity to tolerate the fact that the mind of others (and our own) is complex and intricate. A central contribution is that of Melanie Klein (1946/ 1997). Her descriptions of the development from a paranoid/schizoid position, character-
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ized by a one-dimensional preoccupation with part-objects, to a depressive position where there is an increasing capability to endure the doubleness of relationships to whole persons, must be central to the psychoanalytic understanding of ambiguity in the human existence. Meltzer and Williams (1988) describe in The Apprehension of Beauty how the childs encounter with the beauty of the mother-object triggers an ambiguity about the interior of the object because this interior is basically unknown and unobservable, and this also contains the recognition of the fundamental difference between self and other. The authors describe how the epistemological instinct, the urge to know about the interior of the containing object, which later on develops into a more general motivation for knowing and learning, starts at this point. But it can take different directions: One is the curious exploration of the ambiguous world; another is the attempt to destroy the interior of the object and deny the paradoxical and double qualities of the world. We should also consider Freuds (1918/1955) concept of Nachtra glichkeit. Ku nstlicher (1994) describes in his illustration of Nachtra glichkeit how Freud made this concept have at least two meanings: how earlier experiences get their meaning in retrospect through actual fantasies in the psychoanalytic situation, and how the original traumas are transferred into the future as a pathological process, what Freud called repetition compulsion. Karlsson (2000), in discussing the existential and hermeneutical meaning of Nachtra glichkeit, points out that the existence of nachtra glichkeit illustrates this unnished character of experiences (p. 20). I would like to say that this unnished character of experiences is the same as the ambiguity of life that Merleau-Ponty is talking about when he says that everything we live or do always has several meanings and will never be nally understood. Another Freudian concept that touches upon the fundamental ambiguity of life is overdetermination. A basically hermeneutic approach to psychoanalytic epistemology makes it difcult to think that the concepts of ambiguity and overdetermination cover the same phenomenon. I agree with Sass (1998) when he says that:
The hermeneutic assumption of fundamental ambiguity should not be confused with the Freudian notion of overdetermination, which also acknowledges a multiplicity of meanings. Overdetermination presupposes not ambiguity but what I would prefer to call complicatedness. It views a given psychological event as the end point of a number of different trains of association or other causal chains, perhaps more than one is ever likely to uncover, yet each of which links a discrete and determinate set of events. Hence, on principle at least, the causal chains could all be discovered, thereby providing a complete explanation of the phenomenon in question. (p. 279)
Ambiguity is central to the hermeneutic way of understanding psychoanalysis (Mitchell, 1993; Orange, 1995; Sass, 1998; Sass & Woolfolk, 1988; Stern, 1997). Mitchell (1993) says that the basic data of psychoanalysis, that which is to be understood or analyzed is fundamentally ambiguous (p. 56). Mitchell (1993) and Sass and Woolfolk (1988) warn against conating ambiguity and overdetermination. Mitchell (1993) writes the following: To say that human experience is fundamentally ambiguous is not the same thing as saying it is complex (p. 57). Sass and Woolfolk (1988), criticizing the work of Donald Spence (1982), say that it seems that Spence, like all positivists, accepts what one might call the complicatedness of the world, but not its fundamental ambiguity (p. 447). According to Orange (1995), ambiguity and confusion differ (p. 53). The concept of overdetermination promises a nal solution to the confused patient or analyst. The hermeneutic notion of fundamental ambiguity cannot give such a promise, only a new set of questions. We must simply live with ambiguity, as opposed to complicatedness, which can be sorted out through the understanding of overdetermination.
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bring forward the past. Adler discusses the concepts of projective identication and transitional phenomena in the light of what he calls the essential ambiguity (p. 81) in the psychoanalytic situation. Adler says that the analytic process creates an ambiguity that prepares for a creative development, especially in the transference. The ambiguity in the analytic situation arises from the fact that it is unclear to both participants how much of the actual difculties in the therapy come from the transference, and how much comes from the real relationship between patient and analyst. Hoffman (1998) describes how the analyst appears in a fundamentally ambiguous way and how the patient tries to interpret the analysts experience of the patient, himself and the relationship. This is not made any easier by the fact that the analyst might have an ambiguous relationship with himself, and what comes from the analyst can also be a compromise between conscious and unconscious forces. Hoffman claims that what the patients transference accounts for is not a distortion of reality but a selective attention and sensitivity to certain facets of the analysts highly ambiguous response to the patient in the analysis (1998, p. 119). He points out the ambiguity in the relationship between psychoanalysis as a ritual with a clearly dened asymmetry and the mutuality and spontaneity in the concrete exchange between patient and analyst. The analyst is both an authority and a coworker. In this landscape, the analyst has a superior responsibility to act as wisely as possible, says Hoffman. Skolnikoff (1996) says that psychoanalytic education should help analysts to endure this ambiguity rather than create an illusion of authoritative knowledge.
In this view, there is an ambiguity: Enactments are viewed as the only route to some aspect of the patients psychic reality, but at the same time as a mistake. Aron (1992), being a little bit more reluctant to view enactments as a mistake, points to another ambiguity inherent in the phenomenon of enactments:
The analysts goal, however, is to understand these patterns with the patient, and while recognizing the inevitability of participating and enacting and even welcoming this development as the necessary next step in the progress of the analysis, the analyst should not be
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participating, that is, taking on any particular role, purposefully or deliberately. Participating should be done inadvertently, as much as possible as a response to the patient, rather than as a deliberate provocation or suggestive interpersonal inuence. Viewing the analysts participation as inevitable is a description, rather than a prescription of analytic activity. (p. 493)
We cannot decide to enact, it is not a deliberate gesture, and we even consciously try to avoid it, but according to Aron, we sometimes welcome it as the necessary next step in the analytic process. This is a demonstrative example of the essential ambiguity in contemporary psychoanalysis. Hoffman (2006), in discussing enactments in psychoanalysis, has shown how the analyst, when working with a severely traumatized patient, can move from an objectivist framework, where the analyst always knows exactly what the patient needs and how to provide it, to a constructivist framework in which what the patient needs and what the analyst is doing are both characterized by ambiguity and uncertainty (p. 724). This recognition of the fundamental ambiguity of the analytic situation will not take away the potential for enactment of pathogenic experiences of the past, but this potential for enactments is always present along with the potential for new experience (p. 724, italics in original). And Hoffman continues: Excessive zeal about being the good object can blind the analyst to the multiple conscious and unconscious meanings that his or her participation could have for the patient, as well as for himself or herself (p. 724).
The Patient
The patient is a single man in his mid-thirties. He comes from a medium-sized town in the very south of Norway. In infancy he was diagnosed with a severe form of cancer. He was in treatment for almost 4 years. The treatment was extremely painful and traumatic, both for him and for his parents. His childhood was difcult and marked by several different psychological and emotional problems. At present he lives alone and supports himself with part-time jobs and social welfare. His daily life is all about obsessive control and developing systems to deal with everything, especially relationships. His anxiety is ever-present, and he has a lot of psychosomatic pain. Early in his analysis, he told me about his earliest memories and the time of the cancer treatment. He was very afraid of dying, but also angry with the adults who forced him to have very painful injections and undergo surgery. He thought they were about to kill him several times. He remembers very intense pain. They had to tie him to the bed to prevent him from pulling out the medical apparatus. His parents took part in the treatment and were among those who had to restrain him by force to carry it out. More than once they thought he was cured, but there was another relapse. His parents were exhausted.
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create coherence between inner and outer reality. Anzieu (1989) describes the impact of intense pain on the young infant: Pain bursts through the network of contact-barriers, destroys the facilitations which channel the circulation of excitation, short-circuits the relays which transform quantity into quality and cancels out differentiation [emphasis added], reduces the differences in level among the psychical subsystems and tends to spread in every direction (p. 200). It seems difcult for the patient just to be in the world. He experiences himself as being in constant danger and has an ever-present alertness against every sort of impression. Winnicott (1949) describes how a mental apparatus is created as a consequence of a (bodily) trauma. When the psychosomatic being is disrupted, there must be a thought instead. Thinking has to take care of and make up for the lack of safety, the absent continuity of being. It becomes what Phillips (1995) observes: Whenever the world is not good enough one has a mind instead (p. 235). The result of this, says Winnicott (1949), is an intense memorizing or cataloguing (p. 248) as an effort to deal with the overwhelming emotional experiences resulting from the environmental impingements. Phillips (1995) says that in the absence of relatively reliable environmental provision the mind becomes a kind of enraged bureaucrat (p. 235). He proceeds to describe this process as a military coup where a dictator or terrorist exterminates the unconscious (the ambiguous) because, since they are extremely efcient bureaucrats, everything has already been accounted for (p. 236). Kohon (2007) describes the same phenomena:
The subjects state of mind cannot tolerate uncertainty, inconsistency, ambiguity [emphasis added], or contradiction. It is a mind that cannot play; there is only a frantic search for reassurance that is never fullled. Something in them turns into an internal tyrant, a terrorist, a Maoso, who is idealized and to whom they gladly submit. (p. 214)
The ambitious bureaucrat in the patients mind cannot accept any form of ambiguity. If he should use the service of a psychoanalyst, this analyst must be professional and nothing else. When I failed to be a good environment for him, he mobilized his bureaucrat-mind and became aware of his body. This could happen, for instance, when I tried to introduce my own version of reality or interpreted the transference too directly.
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The patient goes on to tell me about a psychiatrist whom he had seen on an American TV program, and that the psychiatrist was so active and direct.
A: You wanted to speak to him; this psychiatrist could tell you what was right and wrong. P: Yes, he was very loud and clear . . . but now I start to think that I am too critical about you . . . that makes me scared . . . I just want to say that I think you are a professional and that you probably have heard much worse than I bring here.
In this session, as in many sessions with this patient, I discovered that I was thinking about many other things, everyday problems and different daydreams. Sometimes I thought about an old skating rink not far away from my ofce. For many years this stadium was the main arena for major long-distance skating championships. There is an expression from the old championships, buljongpar (bouillon-heat), whose meaning I have explained above. It became obvious to me how the sessions with this patient had become the bouillon-session of the day. In his Sessions I could leave the arena and go to my inner cafeteria to get myself something hot to drink in the form of a daydream or a trivial set of thoughts. Many times I tried to analyze my own thoughts, dreams and fantasies to see if there was anything I could use in my understanding of the patient. During one period my thoughts were about a small chink in the windscreen of my car. This could of course have something to do with the patient, but I was not able to use this for anything concrete. I think that my travel into this private thought and dream world was a result of the patients wishes to keep me away from the relationship and make me into a professional robot that should not think or feel too much about him. But I also think that it was a result of my reduced capability at that time to contain and be moved by the patients situation; his suffering found no resonance in me. It seems as though the patient prevented every sort of emotional contact. Such a contact became too ambiguous and dangerous for the patient and maybe for the analyst as well.
On the Patients Use of Strong Methods and How His Defense Almost Collapsed
After approximately 2 years in analysis, the patients defense against the relational ambiguity came to a critical point. The patient was increasingly occupied with the idea that he could use very strong methods to nd out exactly what others might think about him, and if he did not nd out, he could use his imagination to decide for himself what the other person was thinking. He did not have any doubt about his fantasy being a correct measurement of other peoples minds, and he did not agree with my suggestion that this had something to do with magic. He practiced to become even more certain about the inner life of others, and he was in apprenticeship with a clairvoyant woman in his hometown. In this period he was constantly dreaming about violence, but he was reluctant to speak to me about his dreams in any detail. On the other hand, he told me a daydream in which he surprised a rapist and took a cruel revenge on this violent criminal. At the same time his mind was occupied with reasoning about how the Nazis could have been even more effective in their extermination of annoying individuals. He emphasized again and again that he was not a Nazi, and he dissociated himself from everything that the Nazis did or said, but he could feel the same urge to annihilate all the things that perturbed and tormented him in an effective and systematic way. He wanted to kill every doubt and ambiguity.
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I thought that it was me or my private inner sanctuary that he wanted to erase. He wanted to eradicate my effort to bring forward the ambiguous and frightening idea that I could have something in my mind regarding him, something that he could not grasp or control. Maybe that is why he did not want to tell me any details from his dreams. He said that everything that was said in our sessions came back to him in his daydreams and troubled him. He said: I just want to clean out all those thoughts from my brain. I suggested that he wanted to clean my brain too, but this interpretation only made him anxious, gave him an urgent need to visit the toilet, and made him say: No, no, no, I cant get in there! The next day, he started the session by describing how his entire body ached. He did not sleep at all the previous night, and he was worried and afraid, and he was certain that he was suffering from CFS (chronic fatigue syndrome). This morning in the shower he thought that he would pour out.
A: Your skin could not hold you together? P: Exactly. I am so ugly, disconnected and incoherent, Im not able to say anything in a proper way, I cant express myself here, not show any emotionality, only all those things I want to get rid of, Im so exhausted. A: You dont expect me to understand you either; Im just a professional, only doing my job. And you cant reach me. P: Oh no, I dont want to say that about you. You are completely awless; the problem is my ever-present lack of an ability to express myself in a proper way. A: Can you see how you take the blame, the whole responsibility again, and how you let me off? Its always you who do something wrong. Its you who dont say or express yourself well enough. P: But if you should take to your heart everything I say, you would be exhausted too. A: So thats what you think about being a professional, its avoiding exhaustion and defending myself from being affected by all the things you bring to our sessions. P: I cant stop it, its my responsibility, and it must be! A: Its impossible for you to let me be responsible, to let me take care of you. P: (crying) I should have been in an institution, and you should have been there too. Then I could have been cared for 24 hours a day. A: I think that you are telling me that you feel that I dont quite understand in what an awful state you are between the sessions. You need the analysis 24 hours a day and not just four times a week. P: But thats impossible . . . or maybe . . . in a way . . . yes . . .
This session was followed by some weeks when I did not think the sessions were as boring as they used to be. On the contrary, it was increasingly uncomfortable to be with the patient, and when he emerged in my thoughts outside the sessions, it was as if he came closer, and it was more annoying to meet him, but it was not possible for me to say what this was all about. For instance, he started to complain about my ofce not being fully
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soundproof, and suddenly I was not sure myself after many years at the same ofce. There was something that could pour out, that could not be held together, something which neither he nor I could keep inside any longer.
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not a surgeon. It is a bit uncomfortable, but I am not really worried about the old man on the operating table, as he is sleeping. I decide to wait for the surgeons to arrive. But then the newborn infant wakes up and start to scream; it is covered with excrements and urine. I try to nd the alarm button, as the infant falls out of the bed. I realize that I have to sort out this mess on my own. It is an intense feeling of helplessness and incompetence, but not hopelessness. My own child is still asleep.
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of not being more alert and in contact with the patient and his suffering. The patients improvement must go through my own gradual realization and processing of my private reverie. In the analysts private reverie we will nd the key to both the patients and the analysts recovery. The inner work of the analyst in this subjective and ambiguous way is not always connected directly to the patients material, but will in any case have a signicant effect on the analyst, the relationship, and the whole treatment because the analyst is developing his analytic attitude and liberates attention to his work as an analyst. This liberation of attention is, I think, similar to Freuds (1912/1958) recommendation of an evenly suspended attention, which puts the analyst in the position of being sensitized to her or his own unconscious impulses or fantasies (Ellman, 2002, p. 155). This evenly suspended attention when visiting the analysts private and personal life does not have to leave immediately, but can, on the contrary, prolong the stay. A mother who can contain her childs pain and help the child to tolerate it, is not a saintly mother, but a esh and blood mother who knows about her own wishes to be rid of troublesome problems (Pick, 1985, p. 358).
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I got a sudden idea about him sleeping in his parents bed and that it is both exciting and safe. Not long after this session, it was Easter and a 10-day break. In the rst session after Easter, he started by saying that he had considered talking about the analytic relationship. He had noticed that I had talked about our relationship many times. He said that he too was now interested in this topic. But it was so difcult because he was so good at being careful and hiding, he explained. During the Easter holiday, he had gone through his papers, and he had come across a feature article written by me some years back. He had read it again and got especially interested in what I had written about how the helper can be affected by what the sufferer brings to treatment. During Easter he had also been dreaming about a clairvoyant woman (Miss B) with whom he was still in contact in his hometown. In the dream, Miss B came to visit him in his childhood home, arriving in a Mercedes with a chauffeur. Miss B invited him to join her, but his parents asked her how she could do this without testing him. He answered them by saying that she knew him so well and was condent in his special abilities. They drove away to a strange place, where he had to ght alone against an intense blue light which could make him forget everything, and that was something he did not want to happen. He got away from the blue light and awoke. There are several interesting topics in this dream, but I will only give an account of an exchange we had about the Mercedes:
A: You may have noticed that I drive a Mercedes? P: As a matter of factyes I have. Mercedes . . . thats like those government cars, with a big bonnet, its a here-I-come-car, so different from Miss B. A: You think it suits me better? P: Aaaaoooo (stuttering) . . . I dont know about that, but I think it is a car that ts those who want to endure everything.
I remembered my previous private reverie concerning the need to change the windscreen after the spray of gravel. I said: Yes, you have experienced me as one who wants to take everything, and maybe thats been important to you too, but now I think that you are starting to acknowledge that it may not be like this, that I cant endure everything, and that you have to ght on your own, as in the dream. He was quiet for a while, and after some hesitation he said that he didnt mean to say anything bad about Mercedes, and he wondered if my Mercedes was rather old. In the session following this one about the Mercedes, he constantly had the impression that there had been a woman in my ofce just before he entered. He always sensed a mild ladies perfume in the room. He wondered whether he had said something about Mercedes that had offended me when I omitted to conrm his idea about a recent female visitor in my ofce. I tried to say something about his fear of offending me with his utterances about my Mercedes, and that he became afraid when he sensed that he could have been right. In one of those sessions after Easter, he said that he knew that I was also a clinical child psychologist, and he said that he should probably have started his analysis with me when he was 6 or 7 years old. He thought that at that age he had fewer psychological defenses and his sadness and despair were more at the surface. If I had started at a later age, it would have been too late, and I was not ready to start earlier, he said. But in my hometown, there was no psychoanalyst or child psychologist who could help me, only my parents . . . they got some help. Besides, I would have wanted
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my analyst to be in independent practice, I dont like the quality of those in the public sector. I said that he told me that he would have wanted to start his analysis much earlier, and that he now wanted me to talk to the little boy in him. He said that it was obviously many years since he was six, and that you may have been just out of university and pretty green. I said: You want me to help the little boy too. He looked down and started to cry.
Toward Greater Tolerance for Ambiguity and Increased Ability to Express Distress
Two months later, the patient started a session by saying that he now thought that his treatment was marked by cooperation.
P: I am also more condent in your capacity, I think its sufcient, but I also think that anyway I cant use it. Lately I have noticed that I have tried to destroy your capacity, and this makes me really sad. Are all those years in analysis a waste of time? A: Maybe we have to cooperate to understand this. P: But you will disappear, sooner or later you too will be gone.
I felt sick and lled with thoughts of my own difculties and my own anxiety regarding fatal loss.
A: You can feel how grave it is that one day we will not be together any more. P: But this couch is actually rather good, hard but good. I feel sad in my mind, but my body is calm, only a little stiffness in my neck. A: You can feel that the couch can hold you together, that we can be together when you are lying down and Im sitting up, even when there is something sad here as well.
He was quiet for a while. I could feel an urge for a new bouillon-break, but fortunately the inner sickness was too strong. I had some thoughts about a strong windscreen without fractures.
P: oh dear, my chest has started to ache. A: Maybe something came to your mind? P: Oh no, its the chest, can I stay on the couch . . . I have to get up!
He got up and approached the chair. This was a great disappointment for me, and I wondered if he had noticed.
P: Am I just to give up, it turns around so quickly, whats good cant last, I need so much more. A: You need more than 45 minutes here. P: Yes, thats correct, but now I just have to wait for my breakdown, thats how it feels right now.
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I could feel that something was collapsing in me too when he stood up. It was unpleasant, but it also felt as if something had opened up, that I was less professional and more human.
A: You can feel it and speak about it; maybe thats because you can stand it a little bit more too. P: It doesnt feel like that at the moment, but my GP always says to me, when I want her to take another sample or test, that we can measure almost anything, but we dont always know what the results really mean. Shes probably right.
After a weekend break a few weeks later, the patient came to a session in a happy and enthusiastic mood. My weekend had been rather noisy, with fussing and nagging from kids. The patient described his relationship to his 2-year-old nephew; he was so fun to play with. I said something about the difference between husband and friend, and father and uncle, how good it is to be an uncle who can enjoy the happy moments with a child and then leave when the trouble starts. He probably sensed that my own experience was seeping out and forming my response (enactment). I thought that the next coming from him would be a litany of bodily complaints, but his reaction was a good laugh, a laughter I did not know he had. He said: Yes I know, you must be right, you are the one to know. He was silent for a while, then he remembered a dream from his childhood, a dream he had several times just after he was cured from his cancer. In the dream he wakes up at night and starts to move in the direction of his parents bedroom, but outside the door he is blinded by an intense light and lifted up in the air. My association to the dream was the fact that his brother must have been conceived just before his nal recovery at the age of almost four; the brother was born about ve months after he had ended his oncological treatment. I told him this, and he replied: Yes, thats true; they had to nd comfort in something, and then they made my brother. In my own reverie I was living through my own ambiguous family life and the creation of my own child, which must have taken place approximately a year into his analysis. After 5 years, we had a session containing a discussion on the unconscious and the fact that many things in life are ambiguous and not always easy to understand. The concept of ambiguity had entered our common vocabulary. He was concerned with the fact that, after all, he wanted to achieve as much clarity and understanding as possible.
P: I will try to focus even more on . . . (he checked himself and said with a groan): that was indeed an ambiguous way to defend oneself against ambiguity. A: An ambiguous way to defend against ambiguity? P: Yes, because in the word try we have a double meaning and an emergency exit. Your intention can be to do it, but you could also say that you tried, but that it didnt go. A robot would not understand the word try. You might say that the unconscious needs loud and clear orders. A: But maybe even thats not enough. The unconscious is not a robot. P: No, thats true; its always something more, always! Ooh, this is difcult!
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The use of our self-knowledge in this way, Ogden argues, is meant primarily to increase our understanding of the patient. Michael Feldman is concerned with how the analysts inner work is demanding but decisive for the patients ability to improve and grow. It is important that the analyst should not just shove aside his reverie, but preserve and retain the belief that inside his reverie there might be something useful, even if it does not seem so at the moment.
If the analyst can retain the belief that the outcome of this intercourse will, on balance, be a constructive one, this offers him some freedom from the tyranny of the demand for exclusive attachments to particular internal objects, as a means of avoiding anxiety and guilt (Feldman, 1993, p. 282). The paradox that we encounter in analytic work is that it is painful and threatening for the patient that the analyst should be able to think for himself, engage in an intercourse within his own mind from which the patient is excluded, [but] the patient relies on the analysts capacity to do this (Feldman, 1993, p. 284).
If the analyst is able to contain himself and his own material, his own private dreamlike states of mind, then this might make him more supportive of the development of a similar state in the patient. Gradually I was able to accept being an ambiguous analyst. To be professional does not mean to be distant or to try to hide everything that happens inside you. This realization came as a gradual and reective process (when the patient, and
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consequently I myself, became aware of the poor sound insulation of my consulting room, and in the analysts paternity leave and the subsequent dream). But it also happened in a more spontaneous cooperation with the patients increasing openness to, and communication of, his experience of the relationship (as when I said that both of us had survived and I became painfully aware of my own fear of losing a child, or when I said that he might be right in his idea about my relationship with Mercedes cars). We can see a change in the patient in the session where he remembers being at the hospital with his father when he was 10 years old. With the discovery of what was inside this memory, and our ability to connect it to the relational situation (the transference) in the analysis, it was possible for the patient to open up and tolerate a more ambiguous relationship to me. This is also illustrated in the session shortly afterward, when he arrived with his head full of gments. I think gments are his word for the fact that more of what is ambiguous in the relationship can enter his mind. From then on he produced many fantasies about his analyst and our relationship, and simultaneously I became more touched by the patient and the sessions was no longer as boring as they used to be.
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Joseph (1983) accentuates how this can be a painful process for the analyst. She says that psychoanalysis must be an experience to both patient and analyst if it is to have any effect. The analyst must learn to appreciate his own inabilities, inadequacy and incompetence. It becomes important for the analyst to nd a new way of regulating himself, a way that take into account the inevitability of loss, mistakes and our own vulnerability (Benjamin, 2004; Slochower, 1996). If the patient can manage to regard the analyst as less omnipotent, and not only as a professional, then he can nd a more realistic and endurable strength in the analyst. The patient can identify with this durability and introject it as a more realistic (ambiguous) relational experience and a more endurable inner object (Feldman, 1993). Feldman (1993) puts forward that it is important that the patient can experience that his attempts to destroy the analysts reverie has not succeeded. This brings the patient in contact with an analyst who is capable of caring for his ability to think for himself and to have a private mind. Ambiguity does not necessarily mean that something is hidden while something else is visible. Merleau-Ponty said that our existence always has several different meanings and that this existence can never be denitely registered or nally understood. If we think that we have discovered something about ourselves or someone else, there will always be something else that is yet to be discovered and that could expand or change our apprehension (this equates to Fonagy et al.s (2004) and Bions (1962, 1965) fundamental principle of never-ending learning from experience). This patient wished that his (and my) existence should be accounted for once and for all; he wanted an unambiguous settlement. When the patient started to open his mind to the ambiguous, it happened through his courage in discovering me, and at the same Time I let myself be discovered (exposed). This does not mean that I have self-disclosed who I really am or that the patient has revealed the actual person of the analyst. What it means is that he has conrmed that there is something more about me that he can discover, but I will never be nally accounted for. Through the discovery of parts of the analysts reverie, the patients belief in the possibility of enduring different mental states and their ambiguity increased. It is not only the contents of the analysts reverie that are important for the patient, but also the discovery of its function. One example was when the patient gave more than one meaning to cutting his nger, one concrete and one symbolic. He understood that there is a place where his wound can be healed without his being active or having to look after it all the time. Another example occurred in the session when he could see through my reaction to the story about his nephew. I may have invited the patient to say something about his experience of my person too soon, and this was very scary for him. At the beginning he consistently reacted by denying that he had seen or captured anything about me. If I had encouraged him to say something about, for instance, my Mercedes in the rst years of the analysis, this would have resulted in a litany of bodily discomfort, pain and agony, and he would have had to leave the session to visit the toilet. Simultaneously he probably noticed that I was not ready to receive him and his experience of our relationship and me. Courage works both ways. When the analyst increases his courage to stand an enhanced exposure of his own person, the patient can dare to come forward with his perception of the relationship.
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everything, increased my ability to be more open and alive and less occupied with being so clever and always available with all my knowledge. In one session the patient said that he thought his analyst had become something other than what the rst impression had suggested, and it was now possible for the patient to come forward with his wish to start analysis with me as a 6-year-old. It seems as though he started to understand the ambiguity of his being here both as a grown-up and as a child. He probably tried to make this concrete by asking if I was newly educated at that time. I perceived his question as an attempt to keep the fantasy alive, more than as a ight away from the ambiguity in his presence and in the age difference between us. The patient apprehended that the analyst had changed from a newly educated need to be clever type of analyst to a more experienced analyst after 5 years. A fresh analyst probably needs to cling to a one-dimensional and unambiguous professionalism. Experience is marked by a more exible and authentic attitude and an increased negative capability and an ability to encounter ambiguity. My analytic attitude was gradually marked by a decreasing need to follow the patient all the time and never disappear into my own thoughts and daydreams. When I could tolerate the fact that private thoughts had a place in my mind, I could also tolerate the patients strong attempts to keep me away. One of the consequences of this was the patients growing interest in several parts of my person (for instance, the women in my ofce and what could have happened there) and his growing ability to establish a stronger transference through the memory of his father not being able to help him at the hospital when he broke his leg as a 10-year-old.
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was helplessness, but not hopelessness. This gave me a greater tolerance for my own ambiguous position including a decreased need to be clever all the time. The analysis became more important for me personally. It changed from being a boullion-pair to becoming a treatment process that I wanted to write about. As Klauber (1986) has put it, being this patients psychoanalyst started to give me some satisfaction:
The most neglected feature of the psychoanalytic relationship still seems to me to be that it is a relationship. [. . .] Patient and analyst need one another, [. . .] the analyst also needs the patient in order to crystallize and communicate his own thoughts, including some of his inmost thoughts on intimate human problems which can only grow organically in the context of the relationship. They cannot be shared and experienced in the same immediate way with a colleague, or even with a husband or wife. It is also in his relationship with his patients that the analyst refreshes his own analysis. It is from this mutual participation in analytic understanding that the patient derives the substantial part of his cure and the analyst his deepest condence and satisfaction. (p. 46)
The analyst must acknowledge and contain his need to take care of both his professional and his private life. And the analyst must understand that there is no way that he can make a soundproof wall between his private and professional life. My dream concerned both my personal life and the patients treatment. The patient was gradually able to take advantage of my increased ability to endure the exposure of my subjectivity in the analysis. This process developed from an almost exclusive meeting with myself in my own private reverie to an intersubjective and experiential dimension (Wachtel, 2008) in living through a meeting of minds (Aron, 1996).
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