Integrity and Disrespect: Principles of a Conception of Morality Based on the Theory of Recognition Author(s): Axel Honneth Source: Political

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INTEGRITY AND DISRESPECT Principlesof a Conception of Morality Basedon the Theoryof Recognition
AXELHONNETH Universityof Frankfurt

IN Natural LawandHuman HIS BOOK Dignity,EmstBlochsoughtto uncovera single moralintuition at the heartof the widely divergent apin thetradition law.As is well known, proaches taken of natural theconcluin thisstudy, sion he reached whichremains a fascinating document forthe modemreader, was thatunlikethe eudemonic intentions characteristic of socialutopias, law takesas its goaltheprotection natural of human dignity. a soberidiomcharacterized Employing distinctions andutterly by analytical devoidof the expressiveness of whichhe was a master, Blochwritesat a decisivepointin thebook:

Social utopias primarilyaim to bring abouthappiness,or at least to eliminatedistress and the conditions which preserve or generate it. Theories of naturallaw aim ... primarilyto bring about dignity, humanrights,juridicalguaranteesfor the security or liberty of man, treatingthese as categoriesof humanpride. Social utopiasare, accordingly, oriented predominantlytoward the elimination of human misery, naturallaw towardthe eliminationof humandegradation.I predominantly

The fact thatBloch approaches the problem here revealstwo negatively considerations of principle whichfunction as determining in his premises reasoning: first,thatthe essenceof everything which,in moraltheory, is known as"human canonlybeascertained indirectly by determining dignity" the formsof personal andinjury; degradation andsecond,thatit was only suchnegative of disrespect andinsultthatturned thenormative experiences
AUTHOR'S NOTE: This essay is a modified version of the inaugural lecture held at the on June 28, 1990. Departmentof Philosophy,Universityof Frankfurt
POLMCAL THEORY,Vl. 20 No. 2, May 1992 187-201 C 1992SagePublications, Inc. 187

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goal of securinghumandignityinto a drivingforce in history. The first premise would appear to reston a proposition put in the termsof moral philosophy, thesecond premise ona thesisascribable towhatmight be called moralsociology. SinceBlochemploysthetwo only as a theoretical foil for a Marxist of thenatural he allowsbothto stand law tradition, appropriation as unresolved he situates themat the philosophical hypotheses. Although center of his arguments on moral in order to uphold thehermeneutic theory, framework of his study, he refrains fromturning thesepremises themselves intoanobject of independent reflection. Thisapproach, caused him however, to overlook whatactually is thephilosophical thrust of hisbook.If in a conceptof thedignity, thecomplete of manis onlyto be approximated integrity by determining whatformspersonal insultanddisrespect take,then,conversely,it wouldholdthattheconstitution of human is dependent integrity on theexperience of intersubjective Without recognition. realizing it, Bloch availshimself of a normative of mutual theory to this recognition; according theory,the integrity of humansubjects, vulnerable as they are to injury through insult anddisrespect, ontheir depends andrespect receiving approval fromothers. In the remarks thatfollow,I attempt to go one stepfurther in clarifying this projectof an interrelation betweendisrespect and humanintegrity outlinedin negativetermsby Bloch, but not followedthrough by him. fromthefirstpremise Starting of Bloch'sstudy, I seekto drawa systematic distinction between different formsof personal disrespect. Thisdifferentiationof three basicforms of disrespect will,ina subsequent step,yieldindirect insightsinto the totalityof experiences of recognition on whicha person dependsfor the safeguarding of his integrity. Onlyafterundertaking this excursus intothe theory of recognition can I conclude by treating Bloch's secondpremise, which, cast in the termsof moralsociology,deemsthe experience of personal disrespect to represent a moraldriving forcein the process of societaldevelopment.

Thelanguage of everyday life is stillinvested witha knowledge-which we takefor granted-thatwe owe ourintegrity, in a subliminal way,to the receipt of approval orrecognition fromother persons. Up to thepresent day, when individuals who see themselves as victimsof moralmaltreatment describe themselves, theyassigna dominant roleto categories that,as with "insult" or "degradation," arerelated to formsof disrespect, to thedenialof

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a form recognition. Negativeconcepts of thiskindareusedto characterize an injustice it constrains thatdoes notrepresent of behavior solelybecause such the subjectsin theirfreedom for actionor does themharm.Rather, behavioris injurious becauseit impairsthese personsin theirpositive means. of self- anunderstanding understanding acquired by intersubjective of "disrespect" of theconcepts Therecanbe no meaningful use whatsoever to a subject's claimto be or "insult" wereit not for the implicitreference life, which granted recognition by others. Hencethe language of everyday of course,contains the reference to a Bloch himselfinvokesas a matter this conceptholds the conceptbasedon the theoryof intersubjectivity; on approval being invulnerability andintegrity of human beingsto depend butespefromothers.Not only Hegel'stheory of recognition forthcoming transformed thisintuitive socialpsychology knowledge ciallyG. H. Mead's tothistheory, of a systematic According intoa basisfortheframework theory. can unfolda humanindividuation is a processin which the individual of reassuring himselfof practical identityto the extentthathe is capable to communication.2 Subjects recognition by a growingcircle of partners as individuals solely by capableof languageand actionare constituted to relateto fromthe perspective of otherswho offer approval, learning, themselves as beingswho possesscertainpositivequalities andabilities. Thusastheir consciousness of their individuality grows, theycometodepend to aneverincreasing of recognition theyareafforded extent ontheconditions of theirsocialenvironment. vulnerThatparticular human by thelife-world of "disrespect" arisesfromthisinterlocking abilitysignified by theconcept basedtheir of individuation andrecognition on whichbothHegelandMead Mead would call inquiries. Since,in hisnormative imageof self- something is dependent of constant his "Me"- every individual on the possibility reassurance by the Other; the experience of disrespect posesthe riskof an injury thatcancausetheidentity of theentire person to collapse. It is obviousthatwe use the terms"disrespect" in everyday or "insult" injuryto a languageto designatea varietyof degreesof psychological Theuseof a singleexpression subject. wouldthreaten to effacethecategorwhichis bound ical difference between theblatant upwiththe degradation of basichuman andthesubtle humiliation thataccompandeprivation rights ies publicstatements However, thefact as to the failingsof a givenperson. thatwe are also intuitively inclinedto breakdown the positivecounterintoa number of intuitive already implies conceptof "respect" gradations Kant's thatinternal differences existbetween individual forms of disrespect. of theconcept of respect intothefieldof moral theory is attested introduction toina discussion of thenotion avariety of means stillunderway today. There,

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- be they phenomenological or drawnfrom an analytical philosophy of - has been employed in an attempt language to distinguish betweenthe of respect accorded another differing degrees in terms of whichof his person traits personality As I seekto setupa achieve andin whatway.3 recognition systematic classification of three forms of "disrespect," I will implicitly refer backto this debate. The differences betweentheseformsaremeasured by thedegree towhichtheycanupseta person's to selfby practical relationship thisperson of therecognition depriving of certain claimsto identity. If we base ourstandards of comparison on suchan approach, it would appear sensibleto startfroma typeof disrespect thatpertains to a person's physical integrity. Thoseformsof practical in whicha person maltreatment is forcibly'deprived of anyopportunity to disposefreelyoverhis ownbody represent themostfundamental typeof personal Thisis thecase degradation. becauseeveryattempt to seize control of a person's his will, bodyagainst irrespective of theintention involved, causesa degree of humiliation, which, by comparison to otherformsof disrespect, hasa moreprofoundly destructiveimpact onanindividual's practical toself.For whatis special relationship about suchformsof physical as exemplified injury, orrape,is not by torture the rawpainexperienced by thebodybutthecoupling of thispainwiththe feelingof beingdefenselessly atthemercy of another to thepointof subject, beingdeprived of allsenseof reality.4 Thephysical maltreatment of a subject represents a type of disrespect thatdoes lastingdamageto the subject's confidence, acquired at an earlystate,thathe cancoordinate his ownbody autonomously. Henceone of theconsequences, weddedto a typeof social is thelossof self-confidence shame, andtrust in theworld, andthisadversely affectsall practical interaction withothersubjects, evenat a physical level. Through the experience of this typeof disrespect, therefore, the personis of that deprived formof recognition that is expressed inunconditional respect for autonomous control overhis own body,a formof respect acquired just through experiencing emotional attachment in thesocialization process. lhe successful integration of physical andemotional qualities of behavior is thus shattered postfactofromwithout, crippling the mostfundamental formof thepractical relationship to self, namely, confidence in oneself. This extremetype of disrespect, which interrupts the continuity of a positiveimageof self evenatthecorporeal level,is tobe distinguished from formsof degradation thataffecta person's normative understanding of self. I amreferring tothoseforms of personal disrespect whicha subject undergoes by beingstructurally excluded fromthepossession of certain rights withina givensociety.Wecanconstrue theterm"rights" to signifythoseindividual claimsthata personcan legitimately expectsocietyto fulfill,since, as a

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of a community, in member he hasanequalrightto participate full-fledged denied certain its institutional order. he nowbe systematically Should rights is thathe is not deemedto possessthe same of this kind,the implication of moral asother members of society. degree Thedistinguishaccountability or as typified of rights ing feature of suchformsof disrespect, by thedenial restrictions on thus lies not solely in comparative by social ostracism, with the of these restrictions but in the combination personalautonomy of full-fledged to interaction lacksthestatus feelingthatthesubject partners who all possessthe samemoralrights.Forthe individual, havingsocially validlegalrights fromhimorhersignifies aviolation of theperson's withheld as a subject intersubjective expectation thathe or she will be recognized of reaching Tothisextent, moral theexperience of being capable judgments. deniedrights is typically witha loss of self-respect, of theability coupled to relate to oneselfas a partner to interaction in possession of equalrights on a par with all otherindividuals.5 the experience of this type of Through theperson is deprived of thatformof recognition disrespect, therefore, that takestheshapeof cognitive formoral respect Thelatter, for accountability. itspart, wasonlypainstakingly acquired intheinteractive processes involved in socialization. This second type of disrespect, which has a detrimental effect on a normative of self, is to be set off froma thirdand subject's understanding finaltypeof degradation, whichentails negative consequences forthesocial value of individuals or groups.Onlywhenwe consider these,as it were, evaluative formsof disrespect, namely,the denigration of individual or collective life-styles, do we actually arrive attheformof behavior forwhich oureveryday language provides suchdesignations as "insult" or "degradation." The"honor," "dignity" or,to usethemodem term, "status" of a person canbe understood to signifythedegree of socialacceptance forthcoming for a person's method of self-realization withinthehorizon of cultural traditions in a givensociety.6 If thishierarchy of societalvaluesis structured so as to individual formsof livingandconvictions downgrade forbeinginferior or thenit robsthesubjects in question deficient, of everyopportunity to accord theirabilities socialvalue.Onceconfronted withan evaluation thatdowngradescertain patterns of self-realization, thosewho haveoptedfor these cannot patterns relate to their modeof fulfillment assomething invested with positivesignificance withintheircommunity. The individual who experiences this type of socialdevaluation typicallyfalls preyto a loss of self- that esteem in a position is, he is nolonger toconceive of himself asa being whosecharacteristic traitsandabilities areworthy of esteem.Through the of thistypeof disrespect, experience theperson therefore, is deprived of the

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in society'sapproval of a type of form of recognition thatis expressed self-realization thatthe personhad only been able to acquire an through in the of form arduous process involving encouragement group solidarity. of the threegroupsof experiences It is a standard of disrespect feature thattheirconsequences in the foregoing forthe indidistinguished analysis fromstatesof decay vidualareregularly withmetaphors derived described thepersonal of thehuman studies body.Psychological afterefinvestigating or rapefrequently torture fects of experiencing speakof "psychological of beingdeniedrightsand death." intothe collectiveprocessing Research nowroutinely socialostracism, whichtakesslavery as its example, operates with the conceptof "socialdeath." And the category of injury occupiesa with privileged positionin discussions of the kindof disrespect associated thecultural of a formof living.7 Thesemetaphorical allusions downgrading to physicalsuffering anddeathexpressthe fact thatthe variousformsof for psychological take on the samenegativerole that disrespect integrity Theexperience of organicdiseasesplay in the contextof bodyprocesses. socialdegradation andhumiliation theidentity of human jeopardizes beings to the samedegreeas the suffering of illnessesjeopardizes theirphysical If thereis anytruth well-being. in thislinksuggested of by theconventions ourlanguage, it followsthatoursurveyof thevarious formsof disrespect shouldalso enableus to drawconclusions as to the factors thatfosterwhat maybe termed "health" psychological orhuman integrity. Seenin thislight, thepreventive of illnesses treatment wouldcorrespond tothesocialguarantee of relations of recognition thatarecapable of providing thesubject withthe greatest possibleprotection froman experience of disrespect. In the next a briefexplanation section,I venture of the thesiswhichthis connection
implies.

*I

If, takingour cue fromErnstBloch,we regard the defenseof human integrity through protection fromdegradation andinsultas thecentral moral of thevarious thrust strands of thenatural law tradition, thenwe canbegin toreformulate ourproblem inpositive terms. Theclassification of three forms of disrespect, whichhasbeenthefocalpointof thepresent inquiry upto this point,itselfcontains an indirect reference to intersubjective relationships of recognition whose collectiveexistenceformsthe prerequisite for human integrity. As HegelandMeadconvincingly demonstrated, subjects capable of actionowe theirpotential fordeveloping a positive relationship to self to

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self-confidence theexperience of mutual Sinceit canonlylearn recognition. of theapproving reactions of partners andself-respect fromtheperspective relationon intersubjective to interaction, theirpractical Ego is dependent Thisbeingthecase, of experiencing shipsin whichit is capable recognition. the of mutual it mustbe possibleto applyto theserelationships recognition formsof social as we haveobserved between thevarious samedistinctions thatwe examined Afterall, eachtypeof insultanddegradation disrespect. to self, involvedthe injuryof a specificinstance of positiverelationship which,in turn,it seemscanonly come aboutif the corresponding specific relation of recognition exists.Tothisextent, thedifferentiation of three forms an identical number of of disrespect us withthekey to classifying provides If this argumentation is accurate, then relationships of mutual recognition. in of a sociallife-world theserelationships establish themoral infrastructure whichindividuals can bothacquire andpreserve theirintegrity as human beings. in actsof I basedmy distinctions on thoseformsof disrespect present or rape.Thesecouldbe classedas the physical humiliation, suchas torture mostfundamental because of typeof human degradation theystripa person what has becomea physicalautonomy in interaction with self and thus in theworld.What to thistypeof destroy partof hisbasictrust corresponds of recognition, itenables is a relation because theindividual disrespect which, to developthisbody-related in thefirstplace,takestheform self-confidence of emotional attachment of the sort thatHegel, the Romantic, soughtto in theconcept in a certain As needsandemotions, express of "love." sense, can only receive"confirmation" by being directlysatisfiedor answered, in thiscasemustitselftaketheformof emotional recognition approval and Thisrelation of recognition thusalso depends on the conencouragement. cretephysical of otherpersons existence who acknowledge with eachother Thepositive attitude whichtheindividual specialfeelingsof appreciation. is of assuming capable toward himselfif he experiences thistypeof emotional recognition is thatof self-confidence. I amreferring, in otherwords,to the underlying layer of anemotional, body-related senseof security inexpressing one's ownneedsandfeelings,a layerwhichforms thepsychological prerequisitefor thedevelopment of all further attitudes of self-respect.8 Thereare no moregeneraltermsfor this modeof reciprocal recognition beyondthe circleof primary socialrelationships suchas areto be foundin emotional ties pattemed afterfamilies, andlove affairs. friendships, Becauseattitudes of emotional affirmation are tied to the prerequisites of attraction which individuals do not haveat theiruniquedisposal, theseattitudes cannotbe to cover a largernumber indefinitely extended of partners to interaction.

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Hencethis relation of recognition entailsa moralparticularism inherently whichno attempt at generalization cansucceedin dissolving. The physicalmaltreatment, which has as its positivecounterpart the in primary emotionalattachments of this kind,was distinrelationships guished froma secondformof disrespect, someone namely, denying rights and ostracizing themsocially.Withthis form,a humanbeing incursthe dishonor of having thecommunity refuse to grant himthemoral accountability thata full-fledged legalmember of thatcommunity wouldhave.Accordingly, this type of disrespect mustbe pairedwith a condition of mutual inwhichtheindividual recognition learns to seehimself fromtheperspective of his partners to interaction as a bearer of equalrights. Themechanism by whichthistakes placewasidentified by Mead astheprocess of assuming the perspective of a "generalized Other," who, at the sametimeas prescribing certain the Self (as in thepractical responsibilities, guarantees relationship to self) thatspecificclaimswill be fulfilled.It followsthat,in contrast to intimate relationships, thistypeof relation of recognition is invested witha primarily cognitivecharacter: ego andaltermutually recognize eachother as legal persons, in thattheysharea knowledge of thosenorms by which theirparticular community superintends the rightsandresponsibilities to which they are equallyentitled.The positiveattitude thata subjectcan assume toward if he experiences himself thiskindof legalrecognition is that of fundamental self-respect. He is able to consider himselfa personwho shares with all othermembers of his community thequalities of a morally accountable activesubject.9 Thislegal relationship contrasts withthe relationsof recognition in theprimary relationship forit permits thatmedium of recognition unique tothesubject tobegeneralized intwodirections: it allows fortheexpansion of rights on bothobjective andsocialgrounds. Inthefirst instance,the rightsare enhanced in termsof theirmaterial content; as a the individual consequence, in the opportunities differences for realizing intersubjectively guaranteed freedoms areincreasingly takenintolegalacInthesecond count. instance, however, thelegalrelationship is universalized in the sense thata growingcircle of hitherto excludedor disadvantaged groups hasthesamerights extended to it asareenjoyed by allother members of thecommunity. Hencethe conditions under whichrightsarerecognized inherently entaila principle of universalism, whichunfolds in thecourseof historical struggles. Finally,the thirdtype of disrespect distinguished in the foregoing proposedclassification involvesthe downgrading of thesocialvalueof forms of self-realization. Suchpatterns of denigrative evaluation of certain forms of livingrobthe subjects in question of the potential for takinga positive

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- of the abilitiesthatthey have view- in the sense of social acceptance of thisform thecounterpart inthecourse of their lives.Accordingly, acquired thatcan aid the individual in is a relationship of recognition of disrespect this kind of self-esteem -a conditionof solidarity with, and acquiring would enablethe life-styles.This condition approval of, unconventional basedon mutualencouragement given their subjectsto find recognition has beenformed whoseindividuality as persons by specialcharacteristics of recognition Meadhadthistypeof relation in theirspecificbiographies. thatbecausethe Self (as in thepractical relationship mindwhenhe argued but an itself thatit was not only an autonomous to self) had to reassure of a "genertoassume theperspective individuated being,it wasalsoforced for is forthcoming fromwhomwithintersubjective approval alizedOther" for Thepotential thistypeof andirreplaceability.10 its claimto uniqueness in recognition is provided of mutual by a condition ethicalself-reassurance of valuesand one another against a horizon whichego andalterencounter theindispensable Other signifthesesignalto therespective goals,whereby could as thisformof recognition icanceof Ego'slife forhimor her.Insofar of commonly shared burdens and notexistwereit notforthevitalexperience moment of thecognitive responsibilities, it alwaysgoes beyondthebounds of solidarity element and an emotional of ethicalknowledge, incorporating canassume toward himself Thepositiveattitude whicha subject sympathy. if he receives in thisform is thatof acquiring esteemforhimself: recognition to interaction as a personwhose since he is respected by his partners the subjectis capableof individuality has beenformedby his biography, unreserved identification withhisparticular andabilities. ForMead, qualities lies in the of ethicalrecognition of sucha relation then,thespecificfeature of a successive factthatit is geared thepossibility opening internally toward in to the tendencies Theethicalnorms thatthe Self hasfor self-realization. thelightof whichindividuals characterrecognize theirindividual mutually bytheprocess of detraditionalization. beinginfluenced isticsareopentotheir As thisprocess levels strip thesenorms of generalization unfolds, increasing of their in whichtheygenerate hierarcharacter andthemanner prescriptive chies. Thusa principle of egalitarian of difference inheresin the relation thatcanunfold orethics,andit is a principle recognition basedon solidarity if individualized to bear. subjects bring pressure -set -love, rights,and solidarity of recognition These threepatterns withinwhich downthe formalrequirements for conditions of interaction Thesepreconor integrity. human of their"dignity" beingscanfeel assured on ditionsare"fonnal" in the sensethatthey,andthe typesof recognition features of whichthey arebased,are meantonly to distinguish structural

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theinstitutional formsof communication. Theydo notgo asfaras to outline thethree inwhichtheseforms framework mayberealized. By listing patterns thata social of recognition, we have specifiedthe moralinfrastructures if it is to be ableto protect itsmembers. mustexhibit life-world Accordingly, hereagain"integrity" can only meanthata subject mayregard societyas of his practical to self. If himovertheentirerange supporting relationships in a sociallife-world inwhichthetripartite thesubject participates hierarchy is present, of the concrete of patterns of recognition formthese regardless to self in the positivemodesof selftake,he may anchor his relationship inother Thislineof thought, andself-esteem. confidence, self-respect, words, provides a way of restating in positivetermsthemoral-philosophical thesis in his majorstudy.Morality, thatBloch expounded if understood as an institution for the protection of human defendsthe reciprocity of dignity, love, the universalism of rights, andtheegalitarianism of solidarity against in favorof forceandrepression. In otherwords, theirbeing relinquished morality in thecultivation inherently contains aninterest of thoseprinciples thatprovide a structural basisforthevarious forms of recognition. Now,the secondpremise of Bloch'sstudy,andwe regarded it as a piece of moral is thatanelement in thehistorical sociology, of socialreality process must, whenviewedin thislight,helpfostermorality. Thefinalsectionaddresses this secondpremise, the argument although will be restricted to references to a few keyexamples.

III

At various pointsin his book,Bloch,alwaystrue,however, to thefervor thatwashistrademark, focusesattention on thesources of moral motivation social change.Wereit not for the addedfeelingof wounded underlying dignity, Blochwrites, themereexperience of economic distress andpolitical dependence would have neverbecome a drivingforce of the practical revolutionary movements inhistory. Toeconomic privation orsocialrepression alwayshadto be addedthe feelingof individuals thattheirclaimto hadbeendisregarded.'1 personal integrity Blochadvances reflections of this kind,forwhichhis studyis admittedly veryshort on historical evidence, in order topinpoint a moral disposition inman whichheregards asanempirical to themorality counterpart of natural law,defined by himin negative terms. canexpectpractical Morality support withinsocialreality to comenotfrom suchsources of positive motivation as altruism orrespect butrather fromthe of socialdisrespect, experience whichmanifests itselfrepeatedly andspon-

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that toward anapproach Tomymind,thislineof argument points taneously. to deal the failure of contemporary moraltheory to redress servespartially necesHowever, thisapproach of motivation."2 withthequestion adequately of morality moredirectlyin the the responsibilities sitatesour anchoring thecase,to take thanis currently subjects claimsof corporeal intersubjective of language. in thetheory withattempts to ground morality oneexample, to self, human beings relationship a productive If they areto establish by Hegel andMead one last time to the insightsshared are-to return andachieveof theirabilities recognition on the intersubjective dependent fail to arise at any level of ments.Shouldthis form of social approval gap withinthe perit opensup, as it were,a psychological development, emomeans of the negative seeksto express by whichtheperson sonality, of The experience offenseor contempt. of shameor anger, tionalreactions by emotionswhich alwaysaccompanied is, as a consequence, disrespect himof certain societyis depriving inprinciple, that, to theindividual disclose It wouldseem advisable to drawon the conceptof formsof recognition. by JohnDeweyin his pragmaticist originally putforward emotions human atleastthevestigesof in order to give thiscomplex proposition psychology plausibility. conception that thewidespread Insomeof hisearlyessays,Deweyargued emotional state to aninner as formsthatlentexpression of human emotions onestilltobeencountered thatsucha conception, Hemaintained waswrong. of emotions thefunction misjudged inevitably James, intheworkof William with regardto action,for it always assumedthat psychic activitywas Dewey,by the actionsthatwere aimed"outwards."13 something "inside" thatemotionsin the horizonof contrast, proceedsfrom the observation of ontheexecution ornegatively positively depend either experience human successful of particularly the experience actions.They eitheraccompany based in theformof corporeally "communication" (withthingsorpersons) felt in unsuccessful, of therepellence or ariseas theexperience excitement of suchexperiences Itis theanalysis to executeanaction. attempts disrupted of repellence thatprovides Dewey with the key with whichto devisean revealsthat This analysis emotions. of human conception action-theoretic and sorrow,comprisethe negativefeelings,such as anger,indignation, shiftshis inevitably involved concerned whentheperson affective response consethe further the moment attention to focuson his own expectations Positivefeelfor a completed actionarenotforthcoming. planned quences to being reaction the subject's ings, suchas joy or pride,are,by contrast, beenable by having stateof excitement freedsuddenly froma burdensome Thus to find a suitablesuccessfulsolutionto a pressingactionproblem.

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reactions as the affective from Deweyregards feelings,in principle, arising of our therepelled successorfailure of theintentions actions. as the generalstartingpoint, then we can If we take this approach that thetypesof "disruptances," differentiate emotions stillfurther, assuming human actionsto fail, canbe distinwhichmayin principle causehabitual moreclosely.Giventhatsuch disruptances guishedfromone another or of the orientational failuresare to be assessedagainstthe background the completion of the action,we can makean expectations thatpreceded Routine initial,roughdivisionbetween twodifferent typesof expectations. of humanactionscan come up againstobstacles eitherin the framework successor in the contextof normative expectations of instrumental behavioralexpectations. actionsfail, owingto theirenShouldsuccess-oriented unforeseen obstructions in theareain whichthetaskshaveto be countering in thewidestsenseof carried out,thenthisleadsto "technical" disruptances theword.Should, to specificnorms rebound actions thatadhere by contrast, in certain of thenorms to be situations owingto a violation thatareassumed valid,thenthisleadsto"moral" in thesociallife-world. Thissecond conflicts formof disruptances in thecompletion of actions constitutes thehorizon of experiences thatservesas the practical location of human moral emotional reactions. Thelatter canbe understood in Dewey'ssenseas thoseformsof emotional excitement thatariseas theperson's the reaction to experiencing unforeseen of his actionas a consequence of a violationof repellence normative behavioral expectations. Thedifferences between the individual canbe measured interms feelings quiteelementarily of whether theviolation of a norm whichhinders anaction is caused by thesubject himself orby the to interaction. In theformer partner case,therepellence of anactioncauses theperson toexperience afeelingof guiltand,inthelatter, moral indignation. In bothcases,however, whatDeweyregarded as typicalforsuchsituations in which repelledactionsare experienced affectivelyholds true.For,by shiftingone's attention to focus on one's own expectations, one becomes conscious also of the cognitive elements of thoseexpectations-inthisinmoral stance, knowledge, elements ofwhichinformed theoriginally planned, nowhindered action. Shameis the mostopenof ourmoralfeelings,to the extentthatit does notrefersimplyto shynessat the exposure of the person's body,a shyness whichevidently has deepanthropological roots.In the case of shame,it is not clearfromtheoutsetwhichof the partners to interaction is responsible for thatviolation of the normwhich,as it were,the subject can no longer draw oninorder tocontinue routinely withhisaction. Theemotional contents of shameconsist,as psychoanalytical and phenomenological approaches

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have concurrently shown, of a form of loweringone's own feeling of self-esteem. Thesubject who is ashamed of himself whenexperiencing the repellence of his action, himselfas beingof lowersocialvalue experiences thismeansthatthe thanpreviously assumed. Psychoanalytically speaking, violation hasa negative noton the norm action-inhibiting of a moral impact SuperEgo buton the subject's Sucha formof shameis exEgo ideals.'4 to interaction of a realor imaginary perienced onlyin thepresence partner thedashed whois, asit were,accorded theroleof witnessing This Egoideals. it or alternatively typeof shamecanbe causedby theperson experiencing maybetheconsequence Intheformer theperson of extemal causes. instance, experiences himselfas inferiorbecausehe has violateda moralnorm, Inthelatter adherence a principle of hisEgoideals. towhichconstituted case, by contrast, the personis oppressed by the feelingof lackingself-esteem hispartner in interaction because violatesmoral adherence to which norms, hadenabled himto countas theperson whichhe desired to be interms of his Egoideals.Inthiscontext, themoral crisisin communication is triggered by thefactthat normative aredashed, whichtheactive expectations expectations personbelievedhe could have with regardto the interactive partner's to respect willingness him.To thisextent,thissecondtypeof moral shame represents theemotional excitement thatovercomes a person whois notable simplyto continuewith his action,owing to his being confronted with disrespect for his Ego claims.In this affectivesituation, whatthe person abouthimselfis the constitutive experiences dependence of his personon recognition by others. In other words,a morality thatattempts to bring theprinciples of mutual recognition to bearcan only finda weakempirical footingin the affective reaction of shame, forthecognitive conviction thatthepractical occurrence of disrespect inflictsdamageon the intersubjective conditions of human societalization always in suchprinciples. emerges Theprinciples of a morality construed in terms of a theory of recognition onlyhavea meager chance of beingrealized in thesociallife-world to theextent that human subjects are of reacting incapable withneutral feelingsto socialinjury, suchas physical abuse, underprivileging, anddegradation. Anynegative emotional reactions elicitedby theexperience of disrespect paidto claimsto recognition potentially enablethe subjectin questionto acquirea cognitivegraspof the injustice he hassuffered. Tothisextent, thefeelings of moral indignation withwhichhuman beings reactto insultanddisrespect contain thepotential foranidealizing anticipationof conditions of successful, undistorted recognition. Theadmitted weaknessof thispractical of morality pillar within societal is evidenced by reality

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the fact thatthese emotional do not automatically reactions disclosethe injustice whichdisrespect entailsbut only bearthe potential for doingso. Whether in thefeelingsof socialshameand thecognitive inherent potential offenseevolvesintoa moral conviction depends largely on theformthatthe politicalandcultural of the subjects in question environment takes.If the of disrespect experience is to becomea sourceof motivation for acts of politicalresistance, thena socialmovement mustexistvia whichit canbe articulated andthusmanifest itselfin positiveform.Oncethe emotionally fired condemnation of disrespect and insulttakes the shapeof a social it represents struggle, however, an empirical interest whichcorresponds to the theoretical concerns of morality. A conceptof morality basedon the theory of recognition wouldrely,therefore, on thesupport of historical and sociological studiesthatarecapable of showing thatmoral progress is born of thestruggle forrecognition.

NOTES
1. ErnstBloch, Naturrechtund menschlicheWurde Suhrkamp,1961), 234. (Frankfurt: 2. In my Habilitationschrift, I undertook a detailedreconstruction of this concept;see Axel

Honneth, Kampfum Erkennung, Ein Theorieprogramm in Anschluss an Hegel undMead

(Frankfurt, 1989). 3. Forexamples,see AronGurewitsch,Zur GeschichtedesActungbegriffs undzur Theorie der sittlichen Gefuehle, Inauguraldissertation(Wuerzburg,1897); Rudolf von Ihering, Der Zweck im Recht, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1905), 388ff. A modern study from the perspective of linguisticsis put forwardby StephenL Darwall,"TwoKindsof Respect," Ethics 88, no. 1, 36ff. 4. Foran excellent studyof loss of realityas a resultof torture, see Elaine Scary,TheBody in Pain: TheMakingand Unmakingof the World(New York:OxfordUniversityPress, 1985), chap. 1. A survey of the literature is providedby GuenterFrankenberg, "PolitischesAsyl- ein Menschenrecht?" in KritischeJustiz. 5. On the connectionbetween rightsand self-respect,see Joel Feinberg,"TheNatureand

Value of Rights," in hisRights, Justice andtheBounds ofLiberty: Essaysin SocialPhilosophy

(Princeton, NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1980), 143ff. Amore differentiated versionhas since been providedby AndreasWild,Recht undSelbstachtung(manuscript, 1990). 6. Among the exhaustiveliterature on the subject,the clearestexposition of this phenomenon is, in my opinion, Wilhelm Korff,Ehre, Prestige, Gewissen (Cologne, 1966). Of interest from the sociological perspective are Peter Berger, "On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honor,"in EuropeanJournal of Sociology 11(1970): 339, and Hans Speier, "Honorand Social

Structure," in SocialOrder andtheRisksof War: Papersin PoliticalSociology (NewYork,

1952), 36ff. 7. Among studies pointing to the category of "psychologicaldeath"are those of Bruno Bettelheim,in Survivingand OtherEssays (London:Thames & Hudson,1979), especially part 1. On the category of "social deal," see, among others, OrlandoPatterson, Slavery and Social

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ANDDISRESPECI 201 Honneth / INTEGRITY

MA:Harvard A Comparative Death: Study (Cambridge, University Press,1982),andClaude Meillassoux, derSklaverei 1989),part1, chap.5. Anthropologie (Frankfurt, of attachment of experiences as theresult 8. Fora systematic analysis of "self-confidence" in early childhood, see Erik H.Erikson, andtheLife-Cyck (London: 1980).Fora study Identity in terms of theory of recognition drawing on Hegelian concepts butusingadvanced psychoanFeminism andthe TheBondsof Love:Psychoanalysis, alyticaltools,see JessicaBenjamin, Problem of Domination (NewYork, 1988),esp.chap.1. undGesellschaft 9. Onthispoint,see G. H. Mead, Geist,Identitaet (Frankfurt, 1973), 263ff.A reconstruction fromtheperspective of self-respect is undertaken by Ernst Tugendhat, Selbstbewusstsein undSelbstbestimmung (Frankfurt, 1979),lecture 12,282ff. seeMead, focuses onthisissue; seeHonneth, 10.Onthispoint, 244ff.Myownreconstruction Kampf umAnerkenmung (Frankfort: Suhrkamp, forthcoming), esp. 183ff. 11.See Bloch,309 ff. 12. Foranexamination withreference to thetheories of MaxHorkheimer, see of thispoint Herbert Schnaedelbach, MaxHorkheimer unddieMoraphilosophie desdeutschen Idealismus, inMaxHorkheimerheute: Werk undWirkiung, edited by Norbert Altwicker and Alfred Schmidt (Frankfurt, 1986),52ff. I"Psychological Review 13.SeeJohnDewey, "The Theory of Emotion (1894): 553ff.,and "TheTheory of Emotion II,"Psychological Review (1895):13ff.Fora usefuldiscussion of Dewey'stheory of emotion, see Eduard Baumgarten, Dies giestigenGrundlagen des amerikanischen Gemeinwesens, vol. 2, Der Pragmatismus: R. W Emerson, W.James, J. Dewey (Frankfurt/Main, 1938),274ff. 14.As examples of thisargument, seeGerhart Piers andMilton B. Singer, Shame andGuilt: A Psychoanalytic anda Cultural Study (NewYork,1971),esp.23ff.;andHelenM. Lynd, On Shame andtheSearch for Identity (NewYork, 1958),chap.2. Georg Simmel wasaiming at a in this"Zur similar definition Psychologie derScham" (1901)published in his Schriften zur Soziologie, edited by J.-J.Dahme and0. Rammstedt (Frankfurt/Main, 1983),140ff.

AxelHonneth is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Frankfurt andauthor of them several TheCritique books, among of Power andSocial Action and Human Nature.

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