The STATE OF: IGNORANCE The Want Of Knowledge Ignorantia facti excusat, ignorantia juris non excusat defined:

Ignorance of facts excuses, ignorance of law does not excuse. 1 Co. 177; 4 Bouv. Inst. n 3828. See Ignorance. A Law Dictionary: John Bouvier 1856 IGNORANCE defined The want of knowledge. 2. Ignorance is distinguishable from error. Ignorance is want of knowledge; error is the non-conformity or opposition of our ideas to the truth. Considered as a motive of our actions, ignorance differs but little from error. They are generally found together, and what is said of one is said of both. 3. Ignorance and error are of several kinds. 1. When considered as to their object, they are of law and of fact. 2. When examined as to their origin, they are voluntary or involuntary, 3. When viewed with regard to their influence on the affairs of men, they are essential or non-essential. 4.1. Ignorance of law and fact. 1. Ignorance of law, consists in the want of knowledge of those laws which it is our duty to understand, and which every man is presumed to know. The law forbids any one to marry a woman whose husband is living. If any man, then, imagined he could marry such a woman, he would be ignorant of the law; and, if he married her, he would commit an error as to a matter of law. How far a party is bound to fulfill a promise to pay, upon a supposed liability, and in ignorance of the law, see 12 East, R. 38; 2 Jac. & Walk. 263; 5 Taunt. R. 143; 3 B. & Cresw. R. 280; 1 John. Ch. R. 512, 516; 6 John. Ch. R. 166; 9 Cowen's R. 674; 4 Mass. R. 342; 7 Mass. R. 452; 7 Mass. R. 488; 9 Pick. R. 112; 1 Binn. R. 27. And whether he can be relieved from a contract entered into in ignorance or mistake of the law. 1 Atk. 591; 1 Ves. & Bea. 23, 30; 1 Chan. Cas. 84; 2 Vern. 243; 1 John. Ch. R. 512; 2 John. Ch. R. 51; 1 Pet. S. C. R. 1; 6 John. Ch. R. 169, 170; 8 Wheat. R. 174; 2 Mason, R. 244, 342. 5.-2. Ignorance of fact, is the want of knowledge as to the fact in question. It would be an error resulting from ignorance of a fact, if a man believed a certain woman to be unmarried and free, when in fact, she was a married woman; and were he to marry her under that belief, he would not be criminally responsible. Ignorance of the laws of a foreign government, or of another state; is ignorance of a fact. 9 Pick. 112. Vide, for the difference between ignorance of law and ignorance of fact, 9 Pick. R. 112; Clef. des Lois Rom. mot Fait; Dig. 22, 6, 7. 6.-2. Ignorance is either voluntary or involuntary. 1. It is voluntary when a party might, by taking reasonable pains, have acquired the necessary knowledge. For example, every man might acquire a knowledge of the laws which have been promulgated, a neglect to become acquainted with them is therefore voluntary ignorance. Doct. & St. 1, 46; Plowd. 343. 7.-2. Involuntary ignorance is that which does not proceed from choice, and which cannot be overcome by the use of any means of knowledge known to him and within his power; as, the ignorance of a law which has not yet been promulgated. 8.-3. Ignorance is either essential or non-essential. 1. By essential ignorance is understood that which has for its object some essential circumstance so intimately connected with the: matter in question, and which so influences the parties that it induces them to act in the business. For example, if A should sell his horse to B, and at the time of the sale the horse was dead, unknown to the parties, the fact of the death would render the sale void. Poth. Vente, n. 3 and 4; 2 Kent, Com. 367. 9.-2. Non-essential or accidental ignorance is that which has not of itself any necessary connection with the business in question, and which is not the true consideration for entering into the contract; as, if a man should marry a woman whom he believed to be rich, and she proved to be poor, this fact would not be essential, and the marriage would therefore be good. Vide, generally, Ed. Inj. 7; 1 Johns. h. R. 512; 2 Johns. Ch. R. 41; S. C. 14 Johns. R 501; Dougl. 467; 2 East, R. 469; 1 Campb. 134: 5 Taunt. 379; 3 M. & S. 378; 12 East, R. 38; 1 Vern. 243; 3 P. Wms. 127, n.; 1 Bro. C. C. 92; 10 Ves. 406; 2 Madd. R. 163; 1 V. & B. 80; 2 Atk. 112, 591; 3 P. Wms. 315; Mos. 364; Doct. & Stud. Dial. 1, c. 26, p. 92; Id. Dial. 2, ch. 46, p. 303; 2 East, R. 469; 12 East, R. 38; 1 Fonb. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, Sec. 7, note v; 8 Wheat. R. 174; S. C. 1 Pet. S. C. R. 1; 1 Chan. Cas. 84; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. Sec. 137, note 1; Dig. 22, 6; Code, 1, 16; Clef des Lois Rom. h.t.; Merl. Repert. h.t.; 3 Sav. Dr. Rom. Appendice viii., pp. 337 to 444. A Law Dictionary: John Bouvier 1856 Id possumus quod de jure possumus defined: We may do what is allowed by law. Lane, 116. A Law Dictionary: John Bouvier 1856 Id quod nostrum est, sine facto nostro ad alium transferi non potest defined: What belongs to us cannot be transferred to another without our consent. Dig. 50, 17, 11. But this must be understood with this qualification, that the government may take property for public use, paying the owner its value. The title to property may also be acquired, with the consent of the owner, by a judgment of a competent tribunal. See: http://www.scribd.com/doc/198850504/BANK-ACT-1864-Original-Common-Law-Remedy