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BENCHMARKING COST AND VALUE OF LANDMARK FOOTBRIDGES

Brian DUGUID Associate (Bridges) Mott MacDonald Manchester, UK brian.duguid@mottmac.com

Summary In recent years, a number of footbridge design competitions have failed to proceed to construction. One cause is the failure of many promoters to match their aspirations for iconic, landmark structures to their available budget, in part because of a lack of clear guidance on the costs of such designs. Promoters also fail to properly evaluate the likely outturn costs of designs submitted to them, particularly for bridges of unusual structural form. The paper reports the results of an extensive survey of the costs of landmark footbridges built in the last 15 years, highlighting the wide range of outturn capital costs and drawing attention to key points of interest. Understanding of cost must go hand-in-hand with appreciation of value. Landmark footbridges are frequently suggested to bring major economic benefits over and above their connective function, by acting as a beacon for regeneration and development funding. It is unclear whether this suggestion is supported by reliable evidence, and whether the economic value generally outweighs the cost. However, value cannot be measured only in monetary terms. While other metrics for value are possible, there will always be elements of value which are intangible but desirable. Keywords: pedestrian bridges; cost; value; benchmarking. 1. 1.1 Are Landmark Footbridges Good Value? The Rise and Fall of the Landmark Footbridge

Within the last two decades, pedestrian bridges have increasingly been promoted for reasons other than the purely functional. In addition to their primary role in permitting the passage of pedestrians, cyclists and horse riders (collectively, non-motorised users) across obstacles, footbridges have been designed consciously as instruments of social and economic regeneration, as signposts to new developments, as symbols or icons of a community, and as urban sculptures. In a number of footbridge schemes, there has been a clear disjuncture between the aspirations of a bridge promoter, and their available budget. In some cases, this has led to scheme costs rising significantly above those originally anticipated. Often, it has been impossible to fund the gap, and schemes have ended prematurely. Notable examples in the United Kingdom in recent years include a proposed footbridge over the River Clyde in Glasgow (see Fig. 1), where the 50m tendered costs greatly exceeded the 35m budget set at design competition stage [1]; a footbridge over the River Avon at Stratford, where costs estimated during design (3.3m) rose beyond the initially allocated funding (2m) [2]; and a bridge at Sheffield Parkway, where again the initial 1.5m budget proved inadequate [3]. This may be partly due to the difficulty that designers have in forecasting the real costs of their designs, but also appears to be because promoters have little idea of how much a bridge might cost which matches their aspiration for a landmark or iconic structure. This is not entirely unexpected, as there is little published guidance on the likely cost of such schemes, and few promoters take the time to benchmark their ambitions against structures which have actually been built.
Fig. 1 Glasgow Bridge 3

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1.2

Cost Versus Value

One aim of this paper is therefore to better understand the real costs of landmark footbridges, by means of a benchmarking survey. The results of this survey are discussed further in section 3 below. However, any appreciation of cost must be matched by an understanding of value. For conventional bridges, which are essentially functional, the value of a bridge can be quantified by consideration of reduced or more reliable journey times and distances. This information can be used to assess reduced accident frequency, time savings and reductions in pollution, particularly for highway bridges. Few landmark footbridge have their cost justified in this way, and instead their function as a beacon to promote economic regeneration is normally cited as their justification. It is, however, unclear whether the regeneration benefits do, in fact, outweigh the costs involved, particularly for some of the more unconventional footbridges which have been built. The difficulty in determining the value of a landmark footbridge is discussed further in section 4 below. 2. 2.1 Identifying landmark Footbridges Definition

In the simplest terms, a landmark footbridge is any pedestrian bridge which can be seen from a distance and used for orientation. For the purposes of this study, it is any footbridge with a significant aspect to its design which derivesfrom other than purely functional and least-cost considerations. Generally, its a bridge which adopts an unusual structural form for its aesthetic impact rather than or in addition to its structural performance. 2.2 Scope

Over 40 such structures have been reviewed, covering a 15 year period beginning in 1995. Only completed bridges have been included. The majority are in the United Kingdom, as I have found it easier to locate the relevant data for these footbridges, such as length, width, span, cost etc. It would be possible to expand the survey if further information can be provided by others. 3. 3.1 Benchmarking the Costs Measures of Cost

The review covers only the initial capital cost of each footbridge. I am conscious that infrastructure development can involve other costs, such as environmental and social impacts. These may include measures of a bridges sustainability, such as its carbon footprint or embodied energy. The review also takes no account of whole-life costs, including those for maintenance, although these can have a significant environmental impact. These omissions are due to the lack of sufficient published data, although it would be an illuminating exercise for others to pursue. 3.2 Sources of Data

Bridge data have been obtained from a wide variety of published sources, and the number of these is such that it would be impractical to list them all here. In general, Structurae and Wikipedia have proven invaluable, and I have always sought information from the designers website or their published technical papers in preference to other, often conflicting, information. No attempt has been made to separate out pure construction costs from the costs involved in land purchase, design etc, so some costs will include all of these, and some will not. This, and the general inaccuracy of sources consulted, means that some figures will be unreliable at best and misleading at worst. However, it is still possible to derive useful conclusions, as broad trends are still evident. 3.3 Currency and Inflation

All costs are reported in Euros. For bridges built before the introduction of the Euro, 1999 exchange rates have been used for reference. Historic currency exchange rates have been determined from data made available online by OANDA
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Corporation [4], with the mean exchange rate in each year used. Once converted to Euros, all costs have been increased by inflation to give an equivalent 2010 price, using a nominal inflation rate of 2.5%. Although space does not allow all the currency data to be presented here, it is hoped to make available online a comprehensive set of data as part of an uncut version of this paper. 3.4 Other Surveys

The present study is not the first attempt to review the costs of the landmark footbridge. Woodruff and Billington [5] evaluated the wide range in cost for four major bridges (Turtle Bay, Solferino, London Millennium, and Arroyo Cangrejillo, although the last is not a pedestrian bridge), ranging between US$1,180 and US$32,600 per square metre of deck, at 2004 prices. For a range of more ordinary, but purportedly exemplary footbridges across the United States, the costs ranged between US$1,050 and US$9,610 per square metre. The equivalent in Euros in 2010 for the exemplary footbridges is 1,515 to 13,855 per square metre. Woodruff and Billington were making the moral case in favour of more rational and hence more economic design, but nonetheless their figures revealed wide variation in what might be considered exemplary, and how much it should be expected to cost. In 2007, the IABSE British Groups Henderson Colloquium extensively discussed bridge design competitions. Firth [6] tabulated costs for typical landmark footbridges in the UK as between 4,000 and 6,000 per square metre, with the most expensive as 9,615. The equivalent in Euros for the typical bridges is 5,425 to 8,135 per square metre, which can be seen to be broadly comparable with the American findings. 3.5 How Much Does a Landmark Footbridge Cost?

The bridges surveyed here cost between 570k (Svratka River Bridge, Brno) and 48m (Millennium Bridge, London). Taking account of the total length of each bridge, the five most expensive bridges are:
Table 1 Most expensive bridges
Bridge Millennium Bridge, Gateshead Millennium Bridge, London Ponte della Costituzione, Venice Golden Jubilee Footbridge, London Turtle Bay Sundial Bridge, Redding Cost per metre length (2010 equivalent) 350,425 144,970 126,030 121,475 102,922

The five least expensive are:

Table 2 Least expensive bridges
Bridge Can Gili Footbridge, Granollers Merchants Bridge, Manchester Svratka River Bridge, Brno Pedro & Ines Bridge, Coimbra Studenci Footbridge, Maribor Cost per metre length (2010 equivalent) 14,350 13,635 13,273 13,264 10,256

The first conclusion is that the variation in cost for landmark footbridges is enormous, an order of magnitude between lowest and highest, and bridge promoters should therefore understand that out-turn cost is highly sensitive to the details of individual designs. Inevitably, the costs are sensitive to the place of construction, with two Eastern European bridges in the least expensive bracket. There is also a span effect, with the more expensive bridges generally having longer spans, although there are numerous exceptions to this trend, such as the Nesciobrug, which spans 171 m yet cost only 17,472 per metre length. There is an obvious trend in that lower cost is associated with modesty, rational structural form, and the generation of structural form from an engineering rather than an architectural concept. The more expensive bridges tend to share flamboyance, structural inefficiency, and the desire to fit the structure to a preconceived visual concept. This should not be read as a criticism of such bridges: least cost is not necessarily preferable if it also results in least value.
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50,000 45,000 40,000 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000

Mean
10,000 5,000 0 0 50 100 150 200 250

Median

Fig. 2 Cost per square metre vs longest span

400,000 350,000 300,000 250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 0 0 50 100 150 200 250

Mean Median

Fig. 3 Cost per metre vs longest span

Some of the exceptions relate to quirks of geometry e.g. the Nesciobrugs extremely long approach ramps distort its balance of cost. Others relate to peculiarities of construction, e.g. the fact that the Gateshead bridge has an unusual opening form. Nonetheless, the median cost of 37.8k per metre length may represent a suitable benchmark. Half the landmark footbridges surveyed cost less than this, and they include a number of bridges which are attractive and in several cases remarkable. The median cost per square metre, 7,800, is in line with the surveys by Billington and Firth. However, it is unclear to what extent a cost per area is valid for footbridges, which are generally narrow linear structures, and I have preferred the cost per length.
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Table 3 Table of footbridge costs

Year Bridge opened Merchants Bridge, Manchester, UK 1995 Trinity Bridge, Manchester, UK 1995 West India Quay Bridge, London, UK 1996 St Saviour's Dock Footbridge, London, UK 1996 Butterfly Bridge, London, UK 1997 Barrage St Maurice Footbridge, France 1997 South Quay Footbridge, London, UK 1997 Corporation St Footbridge, Manchester, UK 1998 Saint Denis Footbridge, France 1998 Royal Victoria Dock Bridge, London, UK 1998 Lockmeadow Footbridge, Maidstone, UK 1999 Mancunian Way Footbridge, Manchester, UK 1999 Solferino Footbridge, Paris, France 1999 Kent Messenger Bridge, Maidstone, UK 2000 Millennium Bridge, London, UK 2000 Halgavor Footbridge, Bodmin, UK 2001 York Millennium Bridge, York, UK 2001 Goodwill Bridge, Brisbane, Australia 2001 Millennium Bridge, Gateshead / Newcastle, UK 2001 Golden Jubilee Fbridges, London (per bridge) 2002 Figeac Footbridge, France 2003 Greenside Place Link Bridge, Edinburgh, UK 2003 Swansea Sail Bridge, UK 2003 Chiaves Footbridge, Turin, Italy 2004 Turtle Bay Sundial Bridge, Redding, USA 2004 Strasbourg / Kehl Fbridge, France / Germany 2004 Nesciobrug, Amsterdram, Netherlands 2005 Pedro and Ines Footbridge, Coimbra, Portugal 2006 Newport City Footbridge, Newport, UK 2006 Lingotto Footbridge, Turin, Italy 2006 Simone de Beauvoir, Paris, France 2006 Studenci Footbridge, Maribor, Slovenia 2007 Svratka River Bridge, Brno, Czech Republic 2007 University of Limerick Living Bridge, Ireland 2007 Dreilanderbrucke, Germany 2007 Castleford Footbridge, Castleford, UK 2008 Harthill Footbridge, Glasgow, UK 2008 Ponte della Costituzione, Venice, Italy 2008 Passerelle Valmy, Paris, France 2008 Tradeston Footbridge, Glasgow, UK 2009 Forthside Footbridge, Stirling, UK 2009 Lake Hodges Bridge, USA 2009 Infinity Bridge, Stockton-on-Tees, UK 2009 Kurilpa Bridge, Brisbane, Australia 2009 Pennington Road Footbridge, Bootle, UK 2010 Can Gili Footbridge, Granollers, Spain 2010 Diglis Bridge, Worcester, UK 2010 Te Rewa Rewa, New Plymouth, New Zealand 2010 MEAN MEDIAN Total per per sq. metre metre Cost at Longest length Width (m) overall overall 2010 span (m) (m) 913,573 38 67 3 13,635 4,545 4,172,567 54 78.5 4 53,154 13,288 3,642,293 15 94 38,748 1,606,894 15 28 57,389 783,851 32 32 24,495 2,836,976 40 110 6 25,791 4,298 5,225,671 90 180 5.5 29,032 5,278 1,223,572 18 18 67,976 1,026,150 43 43 4.25 23,864 5,615 10,196,431 127.5 127.5 79,972 1,293,206 45 80 2.1 16,165 7,698 3,183,276 50 150 21,222 12,811,094 106 140 13 91,508 7,039 3,694,085 49.5 101.5 3.1 36,395 11,740 48,274,980 144 333 4 144,970 36,242 1,204,188 48 48 25,087 8,429,313 80 150 4 56,195 14,049 16,606,249 102 450 6.5 36,903 5,677 44,153,546 105 126 8 350,425 43,803 38,264,597 65 315 4.7 121,475 25,846 1,307,554 42 42 4 31,132 7,783 3,090,171 46 50 3 61,803 20,601 6,008,666 70 140 5 42,919 8,584 2,319,387 70 140 6.5 16,567 2,549 21,922,359 150 213 7 102,922 14,703 17,395,401 183 281 61,905 13,803,180 171 790 17,472 3,640,872 110 274.5 4 13,264 3,316 8,091,283 145 145 5 55,802 11,160 9,864,776 150 365 4 27,027 6,757 23,180,071 190 304 12 76,250 6,354 1,292,269 42 126 4 10,256 2,564 570,752 43 43 13,273 12,922,688 44 350 5.5 36,922 6,713 9,692,016 229 248 5 39,081 7,816 4,275,178 26 131 4 32,635 8,159 6,679,966 70 90 74,222 11,846,848 81 94 7.4 126,030 17,031 2,941,750 88 88 4.5 33,429 7,429 8,046,518 48 104 77,370 7,471,767 88 113 4 66,122 16,530 7,738,538 100.5 302 3.65 25,624 7,020 17,242,539 120 240 5 71,844 14,369 36,222,368 120 470 6.5 77,069 11,857 807,848 20 20 40,392 574,000 33 40 2 14,350 7,175 2,077,323 66 66 3.5 31,475 8,993 1,496,522 68.7 83 18,030 9,418,023 54,366 11,252 4,750,424 37,835 7,800

Cost 416,000 1,900,000 1,700,000 750,000 375,000 2,058,000 2,500,000 600,000 763,000 5,000,000 650,000 1,600,000 FR 60,000,000 1,760,000 23,000,000 600,000 4,200,000 AU 23,000,000 22,000,000 19,750,000 1,100,000 1,800,000 3,500,000 2,000,000 US 23,500,000 15,000,000 12,200,000 3,298,450 5,000,000 8,937,000 21,000,000 1,200,000 530,000 12,000,000 9,000,000 3,200,000 5,000,000 11,276,000 2,800,000 7,000,000 6,500,000 US 10,500,000 15,000,000 AU 63,000,000 700,000 574,000 1,800,000 NZ 2,800,000

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4. 4.1

Determining the Value Cost-benefit Analysis

Cost must never be seen in isolation. Many of the commentators on the cost of landmark bridges take the view that economy is imperative, and that the cost premium for a more attractive bridge can be limited and should be limited. According to Billington and Woodruff, the drive for landmark bridges has led some engineers to disregard the engineering ethic of economy with some recent footbridges [5]. Christian Menn has advised that additional costs ranging from 5 to 20% (or even higher for pedestrian bridges) above the least expensive solution can be justified to improve the visual appearance of bridges [7], and that if a structural concept leads to higher additional costs, it is not suitable and should be abandoned [8]. These, and many other commentators, ignore the value of a landmark footbridge, the benefit that it can bring to users or to the community it is located within. So long as the value exceeds the cost, why does structural efficiency matter? With the cost known, it is unfortunately far from a simple matter to determine the benefit (or value) that a landmark footbridge provides. Cost-benefit analysis for highway schemes is, in comparison, straightforward, if traffic flows and patterns before and after are known or forecast. As has already been mentioned, few promoters seek to justify their expenditure on landmark footbridges purely in terms of their functional value. Nonetheless, these structures are generally funded by public bodies, and it is perhaps surprising that little meaningful attempt is made to determine whether they represent an effective return on the investment incurred. 4.2 Does Regeneration Exist?

Regeneration, investment in deprived areas with the aim of improving economic activity, is the single most common reason given for building footbridges which are landmarks, or iconic. The bridge is seen as a visual symbol of confidence in a community, and its role in wider improvements to the public realm can make a location more attractive to private business investors. Generally, the public purse is used to subsidise private investors (who would rather not have to pay for the bridge themselves) in order to facilitate laudable public policy, principally the reduction in deprivation and inequality, and the other problems that accompany them (crime, poor health etc). In the United Kingdom, public expenditure of this sort follows the investment principles set out in the Treasury Green Book [9]: The general rule is that benefits should be valued unless it is clearly not practicable to do so. In a paper on the evaluation of regeneration expenditure, David Potts suggested that an important issue in the evaluation of regeneration projects is the question as to whether any attempt should be made to estimate a money value for the benefits. It could be argued that it is only when such a value is placed on the benefits that it can really established whether the expenditure represents value for money [10]. This deals only with value for money, rather than a wider definition of value, which I will come to shortly. The key argument against putting a financial value on regeneration benefits is that the benefits are simply too diverse or diffuse to evaluate. It is also difficult to disentangle benefits resulting from one investment (e.g. a footbridge) from other actions (often related, e.g. public realm improvements), or from improvements which could have taken place anyway (e.g. due to changes in the broader economic environment). I have not been able to find any evidence that value-for-money has been assessed for any of the footbridges surveyed. This should not be considered unusual: in considering wider regeneration expenditure in the UK, Potts reported that what is striking is not only the fact that there appears to be no real attempt to get even a rough valuation of the benefits but there is not a great deal of discussion as to why there should not be beyond the general point that regeneration benefits are diverse and often difficult to measure [10]. In essence, many millions of pounds of taxpayers money are routinely invested in grandiose footbridge schemes, with no serious attempt to determine whether this expense is effective in achieving the regeneration aims suggested. 4.3 How Else Can Value Be Measured?

For improvements to the environment, common evaluation methods include revealed preference approaches and stated preference approaches. In the former approach, a proxy market is used to see how real financial value is gained from environmental change. This can include consideration of property prices, which can translate into a real gain in the wealth of the local
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community. While the use of public money to enhance the wealth of the deprived in this way may be uncontroversial, in practice many new landmark footbridges are located in regeneration developments that appear mainly to attract new and wealthier occupiers into an area (the phenomenon of gentrification, or yuppification). It is unclear how much value is gained by existing local communities, and in many instances much of the public investment is simply a direct subsidy to property developers. The stated preference approach may be more helpful. In its contingent valuation guise, users and residents are surveyed not to determine what value they have gained, but what they would be prepared to pay for an improvement. This method may give at least a broad indication of the value of landmark footbridge developments. However, it would seem to be dependent on respondents ability to pay (wealthier users will assign higher values), with the unwelcome implication that the less privileged secure less value and are hence less entitled to investment. 4.4 Non-monetary Value

All these techniques seek to establish a financial value for a project, on the grounds that there is little else that can be meaningfully compared against cost. However, it must be recognised that many of the benefits of a landmark footbridge are inherently difficult to attach monetary values to. Indeed, the obsession with money shared by both engineers and their clients may encourage them to ignore wider indicators of value (as I suggested was the case with Billington, Menn and others). At its most simple level, the creation of an object of beauty is clearly valuable in its own right, both for its direct effect on the happiness of observers, and as something that sets visual standards for other developers. The moralists would argue that beautiful bridge can be produced by optimising structural form and avoiding lavish expense, but structural efficiency is a measure mainly of interest to engineers, and only to the public through its effect on their cash or if it happens to result in slenderness and elegance (which it does not always do). The structural efficiency of artworks such as sculpture is of no relevance to their aesthetic value. Great and inspiring art is generally non-functional in nature, including many of the most admired and visited works of public architecture, such as the Egyptian Pyramids. Contingent valuation methods may allow a price to be put on beauty, while recognising that the aesthetic impact of a landmark footbridge is valuable precisely because of the pleasure in its unnecessary and useless aspects. Footbridges can also play a part in changing the patterns of behaviour of an environment. In highway bridge cost-benefit assessment, the most valuable bridge is one which facilitates rapid and reliable traffic flow. For a landmark footbridge, there may be as much value in encouraging people to break their movement, to take time to pause and enjoy their surroundings, to gather, or to reflect. Many footbridges consciously foster this behaviour, by providing lean-rails or widened overlooks, and by creating new viewpoints both on and off the bridge. 5. 5.1 Some Conclusions A First Modest Proposal

My first proposal is simply that bridge promoters use the data given here to benchmark their schemes, and to set budgets according to their capacity to accept extravagance. Three examples were given in section 1.1 where landmark bridge projects were cancelled due to cost. Would any of these have turned out differently had reference been made to benchmark costs? The Glasgow scheme required a bridge with a span of approximately 100 m, and a total length of at most 140 m. Using the median benchmark cost, a project value of 5.3m would be calculated, which is well below the original schemes 35m budget or 50m tender (although both figures include construction works other than the bridge). Even using the data for the most expensive fixed bridge, the London Millennium Bridge, would give a benchmark figure of about 20m, suggesting that the original budget was excessive, and that the design was needlessly adventurous. However, the structure eventually built at this site cost a reported 6m in 2009 [11], broadly in line with the benchmark figure. The Stratford bridge was 50 m long, for which a median benchmark cost of 1.9m would be calculated. The actual project budget of 2m was therefore adequate for a landmark bridge, with the out-turn cost of 3.3m suggesting that the design was out-of-step with the promoters aspirations. The length of the Sheffield structure is not known, but I estimate it as about 100 m from published images [12]. The median benchmark is therefore 3.8m, suggesting that either the clients 1.5m budget was never sufficient, or that only
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a shorter or less ambitious bridge would have been successful. The benchmark figures should clearly be treated with caution. Promoters uncertain of the level of structural flamboyance which they are seeking may wish to use figures well in excess of the median values. Proposals obtained through the design competition route should be carefully scrutinised for features (e.g. unusual structural behaviour) which may drive the cost away from benchmark comparisons. 5.2 A Second Modest Proposal

It is clear that promoters have limited understanding of the real value which a landmark footbridge provides. In response, designers can offer a sense of vision and point to the intangible benefits of beauty and spectacle. However, I think it would be helpful if this could be supplemented by a more quantitative assessment of the benefits of such bridges. My second proposal is therefore for promoters (or researchers) to carry out real surveys in order to estimate the valueadded by landmark bridges. Some possible techniques for this are outlined in section 4.3, and explained in more detail in specialist literature. This may allow bridge developers to justify their investment in much more definitive terms. Promoters of stalled landmark bridge schemes (of which there are many landmark footbridge designs which have been obtained for sites without adequate funding in place) would also benefit if the value of investment could be demonstrated more clearly. A survey of this sort might also help in clarifying what reasonable cost means in the phrase attractive structures at reasonable cost, as simply benchmarking cost against similar schemes is of limited assistance without also considering the relative value of each scheme. The cost of the most expensive landmark footbridges may well be reasonable if their value is also the greatest. There is a risk that any survey would show that many landmark footbridges actually offer a very poor ratio of value to cost, discouraging future investment. However, where public money is involved (and particularly where it is essentially being used to pump-prime or subsidise private investment), this is surely no bad thing. If there is a better use for our money than in building landmark footbridges, then so be it. 6. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] References A bridge too far over budget, The Scotsman, 4 March 2006. 3.3m bridge cancelled due to costs, Birmingham Post, 15 July 2008. Double blow for youngest RIBA winner, Architects Journal, 30 July 2009. Historical Exchange Rates, OANDA, http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates, accessed December 2010. WOODRUFF S. and BILLINGTON D.P., Aesthetics and Ethics in Pedestrian Bridge Design, Footbridge 2005. FIRTH I., Essential Ingredients for a Good Design Competition, IABSE Henderson Colloquium 2007 (unpublished). MENN C., The Place of Aesthetics in Bridge Design, Structural Engineering International, Vol. 2/96, 1996, pp. 93-95. MENN C., Functional Shaping of Piers and Pylons, Structural Engineering International, Vol. 4/98, 1998, pp. 249-251. The Green Book: Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government, HM Treasury, The Stationery Office, 2003. POTTS D., Assessing the Impact of Regeneration Spending: Lessons from the UK and the Wider World , Regeneration and Wellbeing conference, Bradford, 2008. Broomielaw-Tradestone Bridge, Clyde Waterfront website, http://www.clydewaterfront.com/projects/glasgowcity-centre/infrastructure/broomielaw_tradeston_bridge, accessed 5 January 2011. Sheffield Parkway Iconic Bridge, Nrlund Architects website, http://www.norlundarkitekter.dk/iconic_ bridge_en.html, accessed 5 January 2011.

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