CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1. What is the underlying principle behind the rule that what has been delegated cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegare potest)? What are its exceptions? ANS: a. The rule is based upon the ethical principle that delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment & not thru the intervening mind of another. (Cruz, Philippine Political Law,
2002 ed., p.91)

b. Exceptions to the rule: (PETAL) i. Delegation to the People at large ii. Emergency powers of the President iii. Tariff powers of the President iv. Delegation to Administrative bodies (power of subordinate legislation) v. Delegation to Local government units
(Cruz, Phil. Political Law, 2002 ed., p.92-93)

ANS: The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project designating the MMDA as the implementing agency may be sustained. It is ultra vires there being no legal basis therefor. It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125 as amended, it is the DOTC, & not the MMDA, w/c is authorized to establish & implement such project. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority thru the instrumentality of the DOTC w/c, by law, is the primary implementing & administrative entity in the promotion, development & regulation of networks of transportation, & the one so authorized to establish & implement such project. By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering the EO ultra vires. (MMDA v. Viron Transportation, Aug. 15, 2007). 3. What does the VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS RULE/DOCTRINE provides? ANS: The void-for-vagueness rule/doctrine provides that a statute w/c either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its leaning & differ as to its application, violates the first essential requisite of due process of law. (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, Nov. 19, 2001) A law is void if it is couched in such definite language that it is not possible for men of ordinary intelligence to determine therefrom what acts or omissions are punished. (People vs. Nazario, Aug. 31, 1988). 4. What is meant by the OVERBREADTH PRINCIPLE? ANS: The overbreadth doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means w/c sweep unnecessarily broadly & thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, Nov. 19, 2001). It permits a party to challenge the validity of a statute even though, as applied to him it is not unconstitutional, but it might be if applied to others not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. (Justice Mendozas
concurring opinion in Cruz vs. DENR, Dec. 6, 2000)

2. The President issued an Executive Order (EO) providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transport System. The EO was issued because the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets & the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes; and the MMDA had recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along Metro Manila thoroughfares & providing more & convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities which plan is referred to under the EO as the Greater Manila Mass Transport System Project (the Project). The EO designated the MMDA as the implementing agency of the project. Consequently, X Transportation Company filed a case in the RTC alleging that MMDAs authority does not include power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon their existing bus terminal to thus deprive them of the use of their property. Decide whether the EO is a valid exercise of police power.

5. What

is INTEREST? ANS:

the

COMPELLING

STATE

It is a test used to determine if religious freedom of an individual should yield to the interest protected by the state, w/c is so compelling that the violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In applying the test, the following inquiries should be made: a. Whether the statute or governmental action created a burden on the free exercise of religion The courts often look into the sincerity of the religious belief but w/o inquiring into truth of the belief because such is covered by the Free Exercise Clause. b. Whether there is a sufficiency compelling state interest to justify the infringement of religious liberty. c. Whether the state in achieving its legitimate purpose used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state.
(Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, Aug. 4, 2003)

government & in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed & the weak. Indeed, laws & actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts w/ a heavy presumption against their validity. The so called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament & must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people & is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place & manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, maximum tolerance is for the benefit of the rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally permits is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally sound clear & present danger standard.
(Bayan v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169848, April 25, 2006)

6. The Sec. of Justice & the NTC issued a warning to television stations against playing the Garci tapes under the pain of revocation of their licenses on the ground of violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. Was there an infringement of freedom of expression & of the press & the right of the people to information on matters of public concern? ANS: Yes. Governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the CLEAR & PRESENT DANGER RULE. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media. (Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No.
168338, Feb. 15, 2008)

9. Enumerate the instances when a public assembly may be held in the absence of a permit. ANS: The permit for public assembly is not necessary if the meeting is to be held in a a. Private place b. Campus of a government-owned or operated educational institution; and c. Freedom park (BP 880) 10. Ms. Johnson was on her trip to the US. On her way to check in her luggage, the airport detector alarmed. Consequently, she was subjected to a body frisk by the guard. The lady guard felt something was bulging in her abdominal area. When asked about it, Ms. Johnson said that its just a panty girdle, which she needs because she just gone through ectopic pregnancy operation. Not convinced, the lady guard reported it to her superior & she was ordered to bring Ms. Johnson to the nearest ladies room for a strip search. After the said search, it was found that the bulging in the abdominal area was in fact bags of shabu. During trial the counsel for defense argued that the bags of shabu are inadmissible in evidence because they are products of an illegal search. Is the search valid?

7. What is MAXIMUM TOLERANCE? ANS: Maximum tolerance means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police & other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same. (Sec. 3[c], BP 880) 8. Is the Calibrated Pre-emptive Response Policy adopted by the Government valid? ANS: No. In cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against the

ANS: Yes. In People vs. Johnson, the court held that the warrantless search is valid. Persons may lose that protection of the search & seizure clause by exposure of the person of property to the public & in a manner reflecting, a lot of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation, society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is explicit in airport security procedures with increased concern of an airplane hijacking & terrorism, has increased security aviation airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft rottenly pass through metal detectors. Their carry-on baggage as well as a check-in baggage is rottenly subjected to x-ray scan should this procedure suggest the presence of suspicious objects; physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is a little question that such searches are reasonable, given the minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of safety interest involved under those privacy expectations associated in airline travel. (People vs. Johnson, G.R. No 138881, Dec. 18, 2000) 11. Can a person subject to extradition claim the right to bail? ANS: Yes. The SC in Govt of Hong Kong vs. Olalia said that it cannot ignore the modern trend in public international law which places a primacy on the worth of the individual person & the sanctity of human rights. While the Declaration of Human Rights is not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community. The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion & protection of human rights. Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, & the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Its object is to prevent escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime & to secure his return to the state from

which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. The premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant & the temporary detention is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that, once granted bail: (a) He or she will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; & (b) There exist special, humanitarian & compelling circumstances. (Govt of Hong
Kong vs. Olalia, G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007)

12. What is the standard to be used in granting bail in extradition cases? ANS: Clear & convincing evidence is the standard that should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. This standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. (Govt of Hong Kong vs. Olalia, G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007). 13. Can Congress enact a law adding drug testing as a requirement for candidacy for Senator? ANS: No. The Constitution expressly limits the qualifications of a person to run & become a Senator as those that are limited to the following matters: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, & (5) residency. Congress power to legislate while given broad recognition must not overflow the bounds set by the Constitution. Where the Constitution has expressly set out the qualifications, these are exclusive & may not be broadened by legislative fiat. 14. Does random drug testing of students, office workers and that of persons charged with offenses violate their right to privacy, right against unlawful search & seizure & right against self incrimination? ANS: On random drug testing of students: NO. The Court adverting to US Supreme Court rulings on the matter gave the following reasons for the validity of such testing: a. Schools & their administrators stand in loco parentis w/ respect to their students. b. Minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, & are subject to the custody & supervision of their parents, guardians, & schools.

c. Schools, acting in loco parentis have a duty to safeguard the health & well being of their students & may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty. d. Schools have the right to impose conditions that are fair, just, & nondiscriminatory. On random drug testing of office workers: NO. The random drug testing in the workplace does not violate the employees right to privacy & against unreasonable searches & seizures. The employees privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the companys work policies, the CBA, if any, entered into by management & bargaining unit, & the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline & efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is reduced; & a degree of intrusion upon such privacy may validly be done. In addition, the intrusion in a narrowly drawn & affords a degree of protection to the employee subject to such testing. The randomness of the testing & the subsequent confirmatory tests & confidentiality of the results are mechanisms by w/c such intrusion may be said to be minimal & reasonable. On mandatory testing of persons accused of an offense punishable by not less than 6 years & 1 day of imprisonment: YES. The testing of such persons is unconstitutional. Absent in such a situation is the randomness & suspicionless elements present in the random drug testing of students & employees. Such testing effectively singles out its subject & seeks to violate his rights against selfincrimination & privacy. A person accused of an offense, unlike the student & the employee, does not consent to such testing & neither does he waive his right to privacy simply by being a person accused of a crime.
(Social Justice Society [SJS] et. al. vs. Dangerous Drugs Board & PDEA, G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633, 161658, November 3, 2008)

15. X was induced to buy a gold bar owned by a Y. X later on discovered that the said gold bar was fake. He then proceeded to Ys house to inform the latter that the gold bar was fake. Y replied that they had to see her friend Z & that she had nothing to do with the transaction. X brought Y to the NBI where the latter signed an amicable settlement w/ waiver of right to counsel in w/c Y made an acceptable of fault. Subsequently, X

filed a criminal complaint against Y & three others for the crime of estafa before the Manila RTC. Other accused remained at large; only Y was arraigned & entered a plea of not guilty. The RTC found that Y conspired w/ Z & two others in committing the crime of estafa, giving credence to the amicable settlement as additional proof of Ys guilt as an amicable settlement in criminal cases is an implied admission of guilt. The CA affirmed in toto the said decision of the RTC & denied Ys motion for reconsideration. Y ascribe error to the CA when it gave due weight & consideration to the amicable settlement w/ waiver of right to counsel that she signed in the NBI during the custodial investigation, claiming that it violates her rights under the Miranda Rule pursuant to Sec. 12(1) [9] of the Constitution. Was the amicable settlement executed in the NBI admissible as evidence? ANS: YES. The constitutional guarantee for rights under the Miranda Rule begins to operate only when a person is already under custodial investigation w/c involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Custodial investigation has been extended to situations in w/c an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been invited for questioning. In the instant case, it is evident that when petitioner was brought by respondent before the NBI to be investigated, she was already under custodial investigation & the constitutional guarantee for her rights under the Miranda Rule has set in. However, the custodial investigation on the inquiry or investigation for the crime was either aborted or did not push through as the parties, petitioner, & respondent agreed to amicably settle. Furthermore, petitioner was provided w/ a competent & independent counsel whose interests are not adverse to her, & petitioner is deemed to have engaged such lawyer since she never raised any objection against the lawyers appointment during the course of the investigation & she thereafter subscribed to the veracity of her statement before the swearing officer. Hence, petitioners constitutional rights

were not breached. (Juanito Aquino vs. Teresita

Paiste, G.R. No. 147782, June 25, 2008).

16. What are the ways of naturalization? ANS: Naturalization can be direct or derivative. a. DIRECT NATURALIZATION is effected by i. Individual proceedings, usually judicial under the general naturalization law or CA No. 473 as amended; ii. Special act of the legislature, often in favor of distinguished foreigners who have rendered some notable service to the local state; iii. Collective change of nationality as a result of cession or subjugation; iv. Administrative naturalization under RA 9139; v. Adoption of minors as nationals of the state where they are born. b. DERIVATIVE NATURALIZATION is conferred on i. The wife of the naturalized husband; ii. The minor children of naturalized parent; iii. An alien woman upon marriage to a national provided that she herself might be lawfully naturalized. 17. X, a natural born citizen of the Philippines; acquires American citizenship through derivative naturalization when, still a minor, his father became a naturalized citizen of the US. Later on, he was admitted as a balikbayan for one but was arrested thereafter because his passport had been revoked by the US Dept. of Justice & he was a subject of a warrant of arrest for possession of firearms & sexual battery. The Bureau of Immigration & Deportation ordered his arrest & deportation. Upon arrest, X filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that he had acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance w/ RA 8171, & that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the Bureau. Did X validly reacquire his Philippine citizenship? ANS: NO, because he is not qualified for repatriation under RA 8171. The privilege of repatriation

under RA 8171 is available only to natural born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, & to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a situation where a former Filipino subsequently had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship & automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship: the children acquire the citizenship of their parents(s) who are natural-born Filipinos. To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On their own, the minor children cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents. In the instant case, X was no longer a minor at the time of his repatriation. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of the petition for repatriation. Nevertheless, X can possibly reacquire Philippine citizenship by availing of the Citizenship Retention & Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (RA 9225) by simply taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
(Tabasa vs. CA, G.R. No. 125793, Aug. 29, 2006).

18. During an inquiry in aid of legislation, the Senate cited AG for contempt & ordered him incarcerated indefinitely for his contumacious refusal to answer some of the questions propounded on him. a. How long may a private individual be imprisoned by the legislature for contempt? b. What are the limitations on Legislative Inquiries? ANS: a. In Arnaut vs. Nazareno (G.R. L3820, July 18, 1950), the SC held that the offender could be imprisoned indefinitely by the Senate, it being a continuing body, provided that the punishment did not become so long as to violate due process. As for the House of

Representatives, the same decision declared that the imprisonment could last not only during the session when the offense was committed but until the final adjournment of the body. b. The limitations are as follows: It must be in aid of legislation; It must be in accordance with duly published rules of procedure; & The rights of persons appearing & affected by such inquiry shall be respected. (Sec. 21, Art. VI, 1987 Constn) 19. The Senate sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department to be resource speakers in several investigations, more prominent of w/c were the investigations regarding the North Rail Project & the alleged wiretapping incident involving the President in the May 2004 elections. The invited officials requested that said hearings be postponed for one reason or another. The invitations were reiterated to the same officials, but this time Executive Secretary Ermita sent a reply letter informing the Senate President of the issuance of EO 464, mandating that certain senior officials should first secure the consent of the Chief Executive before they are allowed to attend Congressional hearings, & that such consent was not yet secured. Can the officials invited refuse to attend the inquiries conducted by the Senate by invoking EO 464? ANS: NO. In resolving the issue, the Court delineated between Sec. 21 (inquiry in aid of legislation) & Sec. 22 (question hour) of Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution. It stated that Secs. 21 & 22, Art. VI, while closely related & complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One (Sec. 21) specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of w/c is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other (Sec. 22) pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of w/c is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes w/c it has issued, its right to such

information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Sec. 22, in keeping w/ the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in w/c Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Sec. 21, the appearance is mandatory. And the only way for department heads to exempt themselves from it is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence beyond the reach of Congress except thru the power of impeachment. (Senate of
the Phil. vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006)

20. Respondent Mr. X was elected as Senator. During his term, he was also elected as Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) by the Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Constitution, prohibiting a Senator or member of the House to hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, instrumentality thereof, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries during his term w/o forfeiting his seat. Is the office of the PNRC Chairman a govt office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Constitution? ANS: NO. The government does not control the PNRC. Under the PNRC Charter, as amended, only 6 of the 30 members of the PNRC Board of Governors are appointed by the President of the Philippines, while the other 24 members, or 4/5, are elected or chosen by the private sector members of the PNRC. The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including students. Hence, the PNRC is controlled by private sector individuals. Also, it is the PNRC Board that can review, reverse, or modify the decision or actions of the PNRC Chairman, & not the President. Thus, the PNRC is not a GOCC but privately owned, privately funded, & privately

run charitable organization. (Liban et. al. vs.

Gordon, G.R. No. 175 352, July 15, 2009)

referendum, & recall. (Makalintal vs. COMELEC,

G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003)

21. What

& basis of CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT? What are its categories? ANS: The power of Congress does not end with the finished task of legislation concomitant with the principal power to legislate is the auxiliary power to ensure that the laws it enacts are faithfully executed. Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of & influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns postenactment measures undertaken by Congress: a. To monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives; b. To determine whether agencies are properly administered; c. To eliminate waste & dishonesty; d. To prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority; & e. To assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest. The acts of Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided into three categories, namely: a. Scrutiny b. Investigation c. Supervision

is the concept

23. What is EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE? ANS: Executive privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, exempts the executive from disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental operations, & extends not only to military & diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the executives domestic decisional & policy making functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank expression necessary in intra-governmental advisory & deliberative communications. (As
cited in Senate vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006)

22. Can Congress, in the exercise of its oversight power, review, revise, amend & approve the Implementing Rules & Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC? ANS: NO. It is not correct to hold that because of its extensive legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority. By vesting itself w/ the powers to approve, review, amend, & revise the IRR promulgated by the COMELEC, Congress exceeded the permissible exercise of its oversight powers for the following reasons: a. It restricts the COMELECs constitutional grant of power to promulgate rules & regulations; and b. It invades COMELECs exclusive constitutional domain to enforce & administer all laws & regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,

24. What are the three varieties of Executive Privilege? ANS: a. STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE Its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. b. INFORMERS PRIVILEGE The privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law officers charged w/ the enforcement of that law. c. GENERIC PRIVILEGE for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations & deliberations comprising part of a process by w/c governmental decisions & policies are formulated. (Cited in Senate vs. Ermita,
G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006)

25. The petitioners filed a petition to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary & the DFA to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate for its concurrence in accordance w/ Sec. 21, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution. It is the theory of the petitioner that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic & international law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow

it to exercise its discretion w/ respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty law & customary international law. Were respondents duty-bound to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute even w/o the signature of the President? ANS: No. Ratification is the act by w/c the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed & approved by a State. By ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses willingness to be bound by the provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the states representative, the President, being accountable to the people, is burdened w/ responsibility & the duty to carefully study the contents of the treaty & ensure that they are not inimical to the interest of the state & its people. Thus, the President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or not to ratify the same. It has been held that a state has no legal or even moral duty to ratify a treaty w/c has been signed by its plenipotentiaries. There is no legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes w/o saying that the refusal must be based on substantial grounds & not on superficial or whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the other state would be justified in taking offense. Under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is w/in the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty w/c has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is w/in the competence of the President alone, w/c cannot be encroached by the Court via a writ of mandamus. (Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., et. al. vs. Office of
the Exec. Sec., et. al., G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005)

ANS: NO. A distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare a state of emergency & to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Sec. 18, Art. VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected w/ public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. Sec. 17, Art. XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected w/ public interest is just another facet of emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Sec. 17 states that the the State may, during the emergency & under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected w/ public interest, it refers to Congress, not the President. Whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. (Randolf S. David, et. al. vs.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et. al., G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006)

27. What is JUDICIAL POWER? ANS: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights w/c are legally demandable & enforceable, & to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. It is vested in one Supreme Court & in such lower courts as may be established by law. (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution) 28. What is JUDICIAL REVIEW? Give its requisites? ANS: a. Judicial review is the power of the courts to test the validity of executive & legislative acts in light of their conformity w/ the Constitution. This is not an assertion of superiority by the courts over the other departments, but merely an expression of the Constitution. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
No. 45081, July 15, 1936)

26. Does the proclamation of a state of national emergency authorize the President under Sec. 17, Art. XII to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected w/ public interest?

b. Requisites of judicial review: There must be an actual case or controversy. The constitutional question must be raised by the proper party (locus standi). The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity.

The determination of constitutionality of the statute must be necessary to a final determination of the case.
(People vs. Vera, No. 45685, Nov. 16, 1937)

29. Does the moot & academic principle prevent the court from resolving a case? ANS: NO. The moot & academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases otherwise moot & academic: a. If there is grave violation of the Constitution; b. The exceptional character of the situation & the paramount public interest is involved; c. When constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar & the public; & d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. (David vs. Macapagal Arroyo) 30. What is the function & composition of the Judicial & Bar Council (JBC)? ANS: a. The JBC has the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may also exercise such other functions & duties as the SC may assign to it. (Sec. 8[5],
Art. VIII)

day & cause of his capture & detention, to do, submit to, & receive whatsoever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf. b. The writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, & security has been violated or is threatened w/ violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ covers extralegal killings & enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
(Sec. 1, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, 25 Sept. 2007)

c. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting, storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home & correspondence of the aggrieved party.
(Sec. 1, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, 22 Jan 2008)

33.

b. The JBC is composed of Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, & a representative of Congress as ex officio members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the SC, & a representative of the private sector. The Clerk of the SC shall be the secretary ex officio. (Sec. 8[1&3], Art. VIII) 31. What is the procedure for appointment of Justices in the SC? ANS: The Justices in the SC are appointed by the President of the Philippines from among a list of at least three nominees prepared by the JBC for every vacancy; the appointment shall need no confirmation. (Sec. 9, Art. VIII). Any vacancy in the SC shall be filled w/in 90 days from the occurrence thereof. (Sec. 4[1], Art VIII). 32. What is the WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS? WRIT OF AMPARO? WRIT OF HABEAS DATA? ANS: a. The writ of habeas corpus is a guarantee against deprivation of liberty of a person. Habeas corpus is Latin phrase w/c literally means you have the body. Basically, it a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time & place, w/ the