American Society of Church History

Belated Crusaders: Religious Fears in Anglo-French Diplomacy, 1654-1655 Author(s): Ruth Kleinman Reviewed work(s): Source: Church History, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Mar., 1975), pp. 34-46 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Society of Church History Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3165097 . Accessed: 23/10/2012 11:34
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Belated Crusaders: Religious Fears in Anglo-FrenchDiplomacy 1654-1655

RUTH KLEINMAN Historians have commonly taken the secularization of politics and diplomacy as one of the great themes of the seventeenth century, and rightly so. But secular attitudes in matters of state did not move in an unbroken, irresistible progression; until well into the century they coexisted with more traditional modes of thought and developed against resistance from many people who still believed it immoral to divorce religion from politics. Moreover it was by no means always clear which trend was the stronger. Thus long after the Peace of Westphalia, for example, the possibility of international religious war continued to seem real, even to the point where fears of it entered into considerations of diplomacy. One interesting case of this kind arose in the course of Anglo-French negotiations during the mid-1650s, when apprehension of a Catholic crusade on the one side and rumors of a Protestant one on the other added a special dimension to an already complicated situation. By the summer of 1654 Cromwell and the English Council of State had not between France and Spain for either war or alliance. Both were decided yet courting England, and since Cromwell had concluded peace with the Dutch, the Commonwealth was at liberty to embark on new military ventures if interest should point the way in one direction or another. Spain's West Indies trade was very tempting to Englishmen, but on the other hand France and England were already fighting an undeclared small-scale privateering war in the channel. Besides, France was sheltering the Stuarts and their plots for restoration; at the moment indeed one of the French envoys in London was being expelled for participation in the latest royalist conspiracy.1 Thus the anti-French and the antiSpanish party in the Council each had their arguments. Even from the religious point of view the choice was difficult, given Cromwell's preoccupation with what he called the "Protestant Interest." Modern historians have debated the genuineness of Cromwell's commitment to the international Protestant cause. The most skeptical one among them has treated the Protector's concern for the good of Protestants on the continent as mere window-dressing.2 He found apparent corroboration in the reports of contemporary Protestant ambassadors in London who were constantly trying to penetrate Cromwell's "real" motives because they found it hard to credit his professed ones, and were generally inclined to take his religious statements on foreign
1. This was Baron de Baas, Mazarin's personal representative who had been sent to second the ambassador Antoine de Bordeaux. In joining the plot against Cromwell Baas apparently acted independently; at least no evidence has ever proved Mazarin was involved and Cromwell took Mazarin's word for his innocence. See Wilbur C. Abbott, ed., The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell (Cambridge, Massachusetts' Harvard University Press, 1937-1947), 3:303-349. 2. Abbott, 3:365-366.

Ms. Kleinman is associate professor of history in the City University of New York, Brooklyn College. 34

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affairs as a deliberate cover for mundane political calculations.3 The diplomats' predicament, however, proves nothing except their own secular evolution. The most balanced and most recent judgments hold that Cromwell was sincere in his efforts to combine religious and material interests in his foreign policy.4 They thus bear out Gardiner's classic assessment of the man: "His mind still worked on the lines of the Elizabethan period, when the championship of Protestantism abroad was imposed on Englishmen by interest as well as by duty."5 If we take Cromwell at his word, therefore, the religious attitude of France and Spain counted in any decision for or against either,6 and here the two powers looked to be almost even. Although France might have seemed friendlier than Spain to Protestantism because French Huguenots enjoyed official toleration, Cromwell did not feel sufficiently reassured about their continued safety. From the beginning of his administration he had expressed a sense of special obligation to help them if they found themselves oppressed, since they had looked to England in the 1620s and had, in his opinion, been betrayed by Charles I.7 And Cromwell had acted on his belief. In 1651, when the French Fronde was at its height and Bordeaux, the hub of a region with a heavily Protestant population, declared itself for the prince of Conde and prepared to resist royal authority, Cromwell had sent a number of agents to the city in order to determine how far the rebels were ready to go and what support actually existed for English intervention.8 But the radical republican group which eventually took control of Bordeaux was a small minority; its sentiments found little echo among most of the inhabitants of either the city itself or the surrounding province. Besides, although the revolutionary committee sent delegates to London with promises of concessions for England in return for aid against the royal army, they balked at handing over the city to the English altogether, and Cromwell decided conditions did not favor the dispatch of an expedition. Huguenots did not in any case predominate among the Bordeaux radicals, and by far the majority of their coreligionists in southwestern France gave no sign of wishing to rebel at all. Conde and his friends tried to persuade Cromwell otherwise; they also tried to persuade the Huguenots to rally to the Fronde, without success in either case.9 Yet Cromwell continued to watch the situation closely through reports from a variety of informants. In January of 1654 he sent the minister of the London Huguenot congregation, Jean-Baptiste Stouppe, on a mission into the Rhone valley to verify accounts of Huguenot distress and desperation.1? He himself, without waiting for what Stouppe might have to say, complained repeatedly to the French am3. Abbott, 4:48. 4. Antonia Fraser, Cromwell: The Lord Protector (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), pp. 408-410, 536, 553; Robert S. Paul, The Lord Protector: Religion and Politics in the Life of Oliver Cromwell (London: Lutterworth Press, 1955), pp. 334-342. 5. Samuel R. Gardiner, History of the Commonwealthand Protectorate (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1894-1901), 2:88. See also Charles H. Firth, Oliver Cromwell and the Rule of the Puritans in England, 2d ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1900), p. 363; and Jacob N. Bowman, The Protestant Interest in Cromwell's Foreign Relations (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1900), passim. 6. Abbott, 4:139. 7. Ibid., 3:112. 8. Ibid., 2:524-525; Gardiner, 2:92-94; Philip A. Knachel, England and the Fronde: The Impact of the English Civil War and Bevolution on France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 161. 9. Knachel, pp. 201-214; Sal A. Westrich, The Orme of Bordeaux (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Pressi 1972), pp. 40-59, 92-95. 10. Abbott, 3:259; Gardiner, 2: 425.

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bassador about alleged infringements of the Edict of Nantes which had been brought to his attention.1 Such concern for French domestic affairs was something Mazarin could not approve even though he was willing to be accommodating in other respects, suggesting, for example, that France was not wedded to the idea of supporting the Stuarts.l2 He had to be accommodating because he preferred to have England as an ally or at least a benevolent neutral rather than an additional enemy in France's continuing war against Spain. Internally too France was vulnerable, just recovering from the Fronde; civil peace still seemed very fragile while the exiled prince of Conde was keeping up his efforts to get English help for raising fresh rebellion.13 Moreover the government noted uneasily the communications between Huguenots and their sympathizers in England.14 Nobody took the loyalty of the Huguenots for granted. During the Fronde Reformed ministers had condemned the English example of revolt and regicide as strongly as had Catholic preachers,l5 and indeed with only individual exceptions the French Huguenots had resisted all blandishments and remained singularly peaceful. The crown had done its best to keep them in that mind by issuing the Declaration of SaintGermain in May of 1652, which expressed gratitude for their obedience, assured them of their privileges under the Edict of Nantes and hinted at greater though unspecified benefits to come.ls On the whole they were disposed to trust the crown's good will and it has been pointed out that their loyalty was the more reliable since they had lost their autonomous military power and become dependent solely on the authority of the king for their continued toleration.17 That is clearer in retrospect however than it was to contemporaries. At the time Cromwell's solicitude on their behalf did not look reassuring. Mazarin continually assured Cromwell that his intelligence regarding the Huguenots must be faulty and urged him to believe they were satisfied with their lot.'8 But it seemed Cromwell was unwilling to do that. During the spring and summer of 1654 diplomatic rumors persisted that he was thinking of sending an expedition against one or another
11. France, Archives Diplomatiques du Ministare des Affaires Etrangares, Correspondance Polztique: Angleterre (henceforth cited as CPA), 63, folios 190-190 verso, Baas to Mazarin, 23 March 1654; 64, folios 63-64, Bordeaux to Mazarin, 18 May 1654; 62 folios 536-537, Bordeaux to Brienne, 6 July 1654. All these and subsequent dates are new style. 12. Jules Mazarin, Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin pendant son Ministare, ed. by P. A. Ch6ruel and G. d'Avenel, Collection de Documents In6dits sur l'Histoire de France, 3e S6rie, Histoire Politique, 27 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1872-1906), 6:121, to Bordeaux, 6 February 1654; 136, to Bordeaux and Baas, 25 March 1654. 13. Barribre, Conde's chief agent in London, collaborated with the Spanish ambassador in urging a Spanish alliance on Cromwell and also tried to lure Cromwellinto an invasion of France by constant reports of Huguenot suffering and readiness to revolt. French concern over his activities and Mazarin's efforts to counteract his arguments formed one of the main themes in the diplomatic correspondencefor the years 1653-1655, with examples too numerous to mention. 14. For typical instances see Mazarin, Lettrcs, 6:123, to Bordeaux, 6 February 1654; 144, to Bordeaux, 7 April 1654; 156 to Bordeaux 3 May 1654. Mazarin especially wanted to know the names descriptions and hiding places of the Huguenot ministers Cromwell was reportedly sending into France. 15. Georges Ascoli, La Grande Bretagne devant l'Opinion Frangaise au 17e Siacle, Travaux et M6moiresde l'Universit6 de Lille, nouv. s6rie, fasc. 13, 2 vols. (Paris: Gamber, 1930), 1:76. 16. Ruth Kleinman, "Gratitude Revisted: The Declaration of Saint-Germain,1652," French Historical Studies 5 (Spring 1968): 249-262. 17. Knachel, pp. 107-111; W. J. Stankiewiez, Politics and Beligion in 17th Century France (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), pp. 136-147. et passim. 18. Mazarin, Lettres, 6: 131-134, memorandumto Baas and Bordeaux, 25 March 1654; 170, to Bordeaux, 24 May 1654; 227-228, to Bordeaux, 20 July 1654.

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part of the southwestern French coast, and the French ambassador seriously believed it possible that Cromwell might be preparing to use the religious issue as a pretext for an open break with France.'9 Nevertheless Mazarin worked to keep alive prospects for an Anglo-French alliance. That involved maintaining the spirit of the Declaration of Saint-Germain and following the advice the ambassador sent home from London: to show favor to the Huguenots and give them no cause for grievances.20 No fundamental legal alterations were made; rather it was a matter of continuing the relaxed interpretation of the Edict of Nantes so congregations could multiply beyond the strict limits imposed earlier and Protestants could occasionally reappear in offices they had not been permitted to hold for a long time.2' More important than specific benefits, though, was the promise of greater ones which the Huguenots read into them. Their confidence grew so much that even one of their partisans later had to admit that "the Reformed triumphed a little too loudly."22 Mazarin left them to enjoy their hopes for the sake of winning English friendship. Given the circumstances this was a rational course, but it was not a popular one. A good many Frenchmen disagreed with his objective in the first place-instead of dealing with Cromwell they would have liked to see Louis XIV mounting an invasion of England to help his cousin Charles to his rightful place, and they also tended to equate heresy, republicanism and rebellion.23 Furthermore the government's benevolent posture towards the Huguenots aroused the official opposition of the French clergy. The bishop of Montauban acted as their spokesman when he preached Louis' coronation sermon in June 1654; he reminded the king of the oath he had just taken to protect the Roman Catholic Church, complained of recent royal leniency in permitting Huguenots to hold offices and send unauthorized deputations to court and admonished Louis to return to the more rigorous interpretation of the Edict of Nantes prevailing before the Fronde.24 For the time being Mazarin ignored the protest but he could not make it disappear; the clergy's displeasure remained constant.25 At this juncture, while Mazarin was trying to gauge Cromwell's intentions
19. CPA, 62, folios 428-428 verso, Bordeaux to Brienne, 26 March 1654; folios 433 verso434 verso, Bordeaux to Brienne, 30 March 1654; 63, folios 337-340 verso, Baas to Mazarin, 21 April 1654; folios 394, 395 verso, 397-398 verso, Baas to Mazarin, 30 April 1654; folios 453-454, Louis XIV to Bordeaux and Baas, 17 June 1654; 64, folios 138-139, Bordeaux to Mazarin, 16 July 1654. For Bordeaux's opinion regarding Cromwell's use of the religious pretext see 63, folios 360-363, Bordeaux to Mazarin, 27 April 1654. 20. CPA, 63, folios 313 verso-314, Bordeaux to Mazarin, 16 April 1654. 21. Elie Benoist, Histoire de I'Edit de Nantes. . . (Delft: A. Beman, 1693-1695), 3, pt. 1: 156-212. Above all a friendly and encouraging tone was maintained when Huguenots brought complaints to court. One English informant noted that Mazarin seemed to have become their advocate, and he also noted the reason: the cardinal was telling Catholic clergy that since the Huguenots only asked for the justice due them and had done nothing to forfeit it, he had neither reason nor inclination to make war on themespecially while England was so well armed. John Thurloe, A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe, Esq., Secretary, first to the Council of State, and afterwards to the Two Protectors, Oliver and Richard Cromwell, ed. by Thomas Birch (London: printed for executor of F. Gyles, 1742), 2:69, from Monsieur Augier's secretary in Paris, 14 February 1654. 22. Benoist, 3, pt. 1:158. 23. Ascoli, 1:76, 112-113. du Saulzet, 2d ed. (Paris: Veuve de F. Muguet et al., 1768-1771), 13:672-687, 8 June 1654. 25. Not to mention individual protests, the Assembly of the Clergy presented a formal remonstrance on 2 April 1656. Assembl6es du Clerge de France, Becuel . . 13:62464&
24. Assemblees du Clerg6 de France, Becueil des Actes, Titres et Menmoires .... ed. by M.

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on the one hand and placate him with benevolence towards the Huguenots on the other, he received a strange combination of intelligence and advice to reverse his policy completely. In July of 1654 the royal pensioner and sometime informant Theodore Brachet de La Milletiere submitted a memorandum warning of an immediately impending threat from Cromwell and all European Protestants and urging as a preventive measure the prompt conversion of the French Huguenots.26 According to La Milletiere Cromwell was sending emissaries around Protestant Europe to prepare the reunion of the various denominations into one common confession, centering on the proclamation as an article of faith that the pope was Anti-Christ.27 To that end the English Parliament which was to meet in September would issue a call for deputies from all the Protestant states.28 Cromwell's object in promoting such a reunion was to start a grand war of religion in which France would be the first victim while he kept Spain at bay until later with hopes of an alliance against what he would call their common enemy. Furthermore he would pave the way for his invasion of France by enlisting the sympathies of the Huguenots and arousing them to revolt against their king.29 As proof that these plans were already afoot La Milletiere cited trips across the Channel by Protestant ministers, of which the government was aware, and particularly a recent passage through France by the minister of the French Huguenot congregation in London.80 La Milletiere's character and background did not make him the most reliable informant. He had a mania; the single object of his life was to convert the Calvinists of France to Catholicism. There were reasons for this, some of them material, some of them not. He had been born into a Huguenot family of the robe, his father holding the office of intendant in the household of Navarre.31 In his youth he had been sent to study at the University of Heidelberg and trained for a career in the law, but he became an amateur theologian rather than a practicing lawyer or royal jurist. While still a young man he was named an elder in the consistory of Charenton, the congregation drawing on Paris, and took active part in religious and political conferences. The queen-mother appointed him to serve for a term as Huguenot deputy-general for the third estate; the 1620 Assembly of La Rochelle used him as secretary and envoy to the Dutch StatesGeneral; the Assembly of Milhau entrusted him with similarly responsible func26. CPA, 60, folios 359-377, "Advis A Monseigneur le Cardinal sur le dessein du Protecteur d'Angleterre de r6unir, en une, toutes les communions protestantes avec le moyen de le pr6venir et de l'en empacher", 21 July 1654. Part of the "Advis" was published d'Angleterre et de Cromwell,1649by Franqois P. G. Guizot in Histoire de la WRpublique 1658 (Paris: Didier, 1854), 2:426-436, but Guizot omitted La MilletiBre's recommendations for preventive action. 27. OPA, 60, folios 359, 361, 361 verso. 28. CPA, 60, folios 359 verso, 360. 29. CPA, 60, folios 360, 361 verso, 362-366 verso. 30. CPA 60, folios 359 verso-360. 31. Almost all that is known about La MilletiAre's life was collected and published by Emile Haag and Eugene Haag, La France Protestante (Paris, Geneva: J. Cherbuliez, 18461858), 2:494-497. Some references to La Milleti6re's earlier career are to be found in Benoist, 2:423, 514-515, 578; 3, pt. 1:33-34; ard in Jack A. Clarke, Huguenot Warrior: The Life and Times of Henri de Bohan, 1579-1638 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966). pp. 38, 131. In Socie6t du Protestantisme Frangais, Bulletin 8 (1859):252-253, the editors published a brief biographical notice which contributed nothing new except the claim that La Milletiere had been Mazarin's confidential agent, but other than a reference to a short discussion of the "Advis" in Guizot, 2:76 they presented no evidence for that.

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tions.32 In those years he defended the right of Huguenots to rebel against royal authority if the crown violated its obligations under the Edict of Nantes. Moreover he suited his actions to his theory by working for the duke of Rohan, one of the moving spirits behind the outbreak of civil war in 1625.33 That led to La Milletiere's arrest and condemnation to death in 1627-1628, though Louis XIII granted him his life. How he turned himself around we do not know, but he emerged from several years in prison with a royal pension, carried out a mission on behalf of the crown to pacify the Protestants of Nimes and devoted the last thirty years of his life to controversial writings urging the return of the Reformed Church to Rome. His former brethren had their own opinion concerning the reason for his defection. When he was finally read out of the Reformed Church in 1645, the minister repeated to him Christ's words to Judas, and upon La Milletiere's protest that he was no Judas, the minister replied that that indeed was so, "since Judas already had the purse and you are still hunting it."34 Though he became a Catholic convert in the same year, Catholics apparently did not trust him either. According to the most charitable judgment of him he was "a good man, but vain, with something unhinged in his head".35 During the 1630s he tried to serve Richelieu in promoting a project of Catholic-Protestant reunion which the cardinal was known to favor,36and it is likely that he thought news of Cromwell's alleged plans might prompt Mazarin to revive the scheme. Since 1628 La Milletiere had published a long series of books and pamphlets arguing the merits of the Catholic position on justification, free will, the real presence, as well as other disputed points of doctrine.3 He evidently considered himself an irrefutable authority on these matters, for he proposed, in the same memorandum to Mazarin, that two of his works, The Light of the True Church and The Light of the True Faith, be used to convince the Huguenot ministers who in turn would persuade their congregations to convert.38 So far the ministers had ignored both books but La Milletiere attributed their lack of response to confusion in the face of truth.39 Moreover he believed he had found an original line of argument which would compel them to yield once and for all: if it were demonstrated to them that debates on points of belief only exalted human reason above faith and therefore encouraged. skepticism and atheism instead of religion, they would have to admit that the Protestant reformers had been wrong to divide the church on the strength of their own opinions. And, since the original grievances against Church corruption
32. The Hugenots complained about violations of the Edict of Nantes while their noble leaders sought special profits in opposing the crown, and the Assemblies of La Rochelle and Milhau among others endorsed the principle of armed resistance. 33. This civil war ended in Rohan's defeat, the siege and capture of La Rochelle by the royal army and the modification of the Edict of Nantes through the peace of Alais in 1629, by which the Huguenots lost their rights to fortify their cities, arm themselves, and hold political assemblies. For a favorable interpretation of Rohan's role in these events, see Clarke Huguenot Warrior. 34. Haag and Haag, 2:496. This and subsequent translations are the author's. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid., p. 495; between 1634 and 1637 he published three books on means of reuniting the Reformed churches with Rome, and although the Sorbonne found his theology wanting, Richelieu 's intervention protected him from open censure. For Richelieu's own interest in reunion projects see William F. Church, Richelieu and Reason of State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 87, n. 222; p. 189, n. 43. 37. Haag and Haag, 2:494-497 list 48 titles altogether for the years 1628-1664, not counting his 1622 discourse justifying armed rebellion, 38. CPA, 60, folios 369 verso-370. 39. CPA, 60, folio 369 verso.

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had meanwhile been answered by reforms within Catholicism, the ministers would have no reasonable option left except to return to Rome.40 Actually neither La Milletiere's main argument nor its corollaries had the least originality. They had all been commonplaces of Catholic polemic since the sixteenth century, so that La Milletiere's confidence in his powers was a measure of his self-delusion. But how much of the information he was offering as bait for his project was also a delusion? Considering the circumstances of his departure from the Reformed Church, Huguenot ministers or other leading members of the Reformed community who might have been in touch with English emissaries and correspondents were unlikely to take La Milletiere into their confidence. Whatever news he gleaned must therefore have been second-hand at best. Mazarin could not have been ignorant of his limitations, seeing that the man had been trying to make himself useful to the government in the same way for some twenty years. Nevertheless La Milletiere's report, however self-serving, was not altogether negligible. It contained plausible elements, and first of all two verifiable facts: Cromwell's first Parliament under the Instrument of Government had indeed been called for early September, and Cromwell had sent the minister Stouppe to survey the situation of the French Huguenots. Mazarin knew something of that already and had Stouppe's account of his travels almost as soon as Cromwell did, in fact almost simultaneously with La Milletiere's memorandum.41 As it happened Stouppe had found no inclination to revolt, though that was no guarantee for the future. Even La Milletiere's assertion that there was a plan afoot to reunite the Protestant churches seemed to be confirmed by independent information. Mazarin evidently convinced himself of this, for in October he wrote Bordeaux in London as though it were an accepted fact that Cromwell was "still thinking of getting himself elected protector of all the Huguenots and Protestants."42 And he added something La Milletiere had not known at all, namely, that besides having . . ordered several ministers of the so-called Reformed Church on secret trips in this kingdom [Cromwelll moreover has recently sent people to Switzerland and Germany to work for the accomplishment of this design.43 Mazarin's intelligence was accurate. A Scottish minister devoted to ecumenism, John Dury, was indeed staying in Switzerland under the wing of the English ambassador John Pell, in order to investigate the possibility of agreement between the Swiss and English churches. His inquiry was to extend into southern Germany and the Netherlands as well, and he had the backing of Cromwell for his mission. It only remained to be seen whether the enterprise meant what La Milletiere thought it did, and if so, what might have to be done about it. Meanwhile the English had their own fears of religious war. Some months before La Milletiere warned Mazarin of the alleged Protestant plot against the Catholic powers, Cromwell had been telling the Swiss ambassador an exactly opposite story, saying he knew ". . by notification from every side, and especially from my correspondence,that the Pope actually seeks to reconcile Spain and France with each other to turn the weapons of both these powers against the evangelical states."44 There is no evidence that Cromwell had any specific grounds for this belief. Apparently he interpreted reports of papal efforts to mediate between
40. CPA, 60, folios 369-371. 41. CPA, 63, folios 530-532, Bordeaux to Servien, 23 July 1654. 42. Mazarin, Lettres, 6:333 to Bordeaux, 3 October 1654. 43. Ibid 44. Abbott, 3:159-160, 25 January 1654

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France and Spain in the light of ancient enmity, without regard to the realities of papal power at the moment.45 He was so sure of his judgment, however, that he warned the Swiss they might well be first in line of attack because of their geographic position, and he thought the best precaution would be a "confidential correspondetce" among the Protestant Swiss cantons, England and the Netherlands.46 John Pell's embassy three months later was the consequence of those ideas, and Dury's mission made a complement to it. A defensive league seems to have been all Cromwell had in mind at the time, not an offensive one, nor an actual confederation. Yet he had in the past entertained thought of a Protestant confederation, and it was a subject close to Dury's heart. In a sense John Dury was the counterpart of La Milletiere, more respectable but equally singleminded. His career in the ministry could be considered an ecumenical movement in itself, since he had been ordained in both the Presbyterian and Anglican rites, had served English communities in the Netherlands and East Prussia, and had cultivated contacts with Lutheran pietists in Sweden and Denmark as well as Germany.47 He had been involved in projects for Protestant reunion before, first on the Continent under the sponsorship of Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden and later in England itself.48 Throughout his life his aim was to stir up . . . thoughts of brotherly kindnesse, of meekness, and of peace; to the end that some waves may be taken up, which will help to reconcile the affections of many divided about Circumstantials; and to preserve and keep entire the Unity which remains about Fundamentals; and to prevent or cure the manifold Misprisions, which increase our confusions, and obstruct the Remedies of our diseases.49 Dury's certainty of shared fundamental beliefs did not however extend to Catholicism. He saw the Catholic church as a menace to Protestants everywhere, though particularly in Germany, and in fact was convinced that the house of Austria intended to exterminate Protestantism altogether. He had arrived at this conclusion in the 1630s and a remedy had suggested itself to him at the same time. In his opinion the safety of Protestantism could best be secured by a confederation "joyning the Protestant states [of Europe] together in counsels and actions of peace and war tending to their mutual preservation."50 The confederation would of course have to be accompanied and fortified by collaboration among the various churches for a united ideological front. Moreover he thought it desirable that England should take the lead in forming the organization, since the effort would first of all bring domestic benefits by drawing together Anglicans and Presbyterians.61
45. Abbott, pp. 160-161. 46. Ibid., p. 160. 47. For the fullest account of Dury's life and work see John M. Batten, John Dury: Advocate of Christian Reunion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940); pp. 1-83 deal with the earlier period, up to 1640. See also Wilbur K. Jordan, The Development of Religious Toleration in England (1932-1940; rpt., Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1965), 2:364-370; and Ruth Rouse and S. C. Neill, eds., A History of the Ecumenical Movement, 1517-1948,2d ed. (Philadelphia: WestminsterPress, 1967-1970), 1:134-136. 48. John Dury, A Summarie Account of... . JD.'s Former and Latter Negotiation for the . . ongst the Protestant Churches, and Academies Procuring of True Gospel Peace .. (London: printed for author, 1657), pp. 1-24; Batten, pp. 18-119. 49. As cited in Batten, p. 105. 50. John Dury, A Summary Discourse Concerning the Work of Peace Ecclesiasticall, How It May ConcurreWith the Aims of a Civill ConfederationAmongst Protestants: Presented to the Consideration of My Lord Ambassador Sir T. Bow, eto. at Hamburg . . . 1639 (Cambridge: Roger Daniell, 1641), p. 1. 51. Ibid., passim.

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Dury elaborated on these ideas in a further pamphlet, Motives to Induce the Protestant Princes to Mind the Worke of Peace Ecclesiasticall, and tried to interest Charles I in both the domestic and foreign aspects of his scheme.52 Whatever the king may have thought of the proposals, he was not to have the leisure for ambitious novelties in any case. But once the civil war was over and the Council of State began to concern itself with English relations abroad, Dury returned to the charge. He was part of Milton's circle, which welcomed his ecumenical and anti-Catholic orientation,53 and he also had sympathizers on the council and among Independents generally. Thus he secured appointment as librarian of Saint James's Palace with an additional salary for services as a pamphleteer.54 His views on the necessity for Protestant reconciliation and confederation had not changed over the years, despite the Peace of Westphalia and the fact that the German Protestants were obviously holding their own, and he still saw England as the natural leader of the international Protestant cause.55 He now used his position to urge his program on both the council and the Protector. A number of historians have noted a close correspondence between Dury's projects and Cromwell's actual foreign policy, though only John Batten has gone so far as to credit Dury with the molding of that policy.56 By way of proof Batten pointed to the reports of contemporaries, including La Milletiere, which connected Dury's name with various Cromwellian schemes for an anti-Catholic league.57In the case of La Milletiere at least, this historian misread the text, for La Milletiere never mentioned Dury and attributed to Cromwell himself the plans he was discussing.58 There is no direct evidence to tell us just how decisive Dury's influence was, assuming he did influence Cromwell. All that can safely be said is that to a remarkable extent Cromwell shared Dury's opinions regarding the usefulness of religious and political unity among Protestant countries. In negotations with the Netherlands in the course of the Dutch war he actually proposed the creation of an Anglo-Dutch state with reciprocal membership in each other's representative bodies.59 The Dutch found this hard to take seriously, so that Cromwell had to drop the notion in the final peace talks of 1654. Apparently he never took it up again with any other power, but he did pursue more limited plans for a Protestant diplomatic league, and in these Dury sometimes played a part. It seems Dury had no connection with the Dutch project. While that was still under discussion, however, the Council of State sent him along with the English ambassador to Sweden, Bulstrode Whitelocke. Whitelocke had instructions from Cromwell to negotiate a treaty of trade and friendship and, beyond that, to enlist Sweden if possible for a grand Protestant alliance.60 Dury presumably was to renew old acquaintances with Swedish divines and second Whitelocke's efforts by working on the religious front. In the event, the treaty which was signed in
52. John Dury, Motives to Induce the Protestant Princes to Mind the Worke of Peace Ecclesiasticall Amongst Themselves. . . (n.p., 1639). Batten, p. 86 cites a London printing of 1641. 53. David Masson, The Life of John Milton (London: Macmillan and Co., 1877), 4:631; 5:158, 200, 230, 235-236, 315, 448. 54. Batten, pp. 118-119, 143. 55. Ibid., pp. 143-145. Dury still held to the same militant ideas in later years, judging by the pamphlet generally attributed to him: The Interest of England in the Protestant Cause (London: no pub., 1659). 56. Batten, pp. 143-146. 57. Ibid., p. 144. 58. CPA, 60, folios 359-361. 59. Abbott, 3:45-125; Paul, pp. 281-284. 60. Batten, pp. 145-146, Gardiner, 2:377-380.

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the summer of 1654 had only practical economic objectives, with no mention of a general Protestant alliance or any reunion of denominations.61 Far from being discouraged, Dury had meanwhile obtained permission from Cromwell to accompany Pell to the Protestant Swiss cantons.62 Pell was going in order to fortify Anglo-Swiss relations and keep an eye on French policy in the area, and Dury for his part was to confer with theologians in the various cantons about the possibility of establishing the necessary fundamentals on which all Protestant churches could agree as a basis for collaboration. He went about this work from May of 1654 through the next year, concluded with a lengthy circuit through friendly southern German courts and the Netherlands and returned to England in 1657.63 La Milletiere had been fantasizing when he alleged the condemnation of the pope as Anti-Christ would be the cornerstone of the proposed reunion. Dury concentrated on the scriptures and on basic Christian charity; he was not interested in adding new doctrines to the old ones. La Milletiere was wrong also in his assumption that a union of Protestant churches would succeed-Dury returned to England with empty hands. Wherever he went churches received him with respect and dismissed him with professions of good will; no one offered him any firm commitments. Theologians in the different cantons could not even agree on the expressions of sympathy they were willing to place on record, and the story was the same in Germany and the Netherlands.4 The political side of the English mission in Switzerland did not fare much better. The Swiss had not invited Cromwell's friendship from fear of an outside Catholic attack. They had more immediately practical aims than that, as Pell soon found out. At the time, they were negotiating the renewal of their traditional agreement to furnish mercenaries to the French crown, and although some of the clergy indeed opposed dealings with a Catholic power, the politicians worried more over French arrears in payments under the previous contract and over the future status of their toll exemptions in the parts of Alsace which France had gained from the Habsburgs in 1648.65 What they wanted from England was diplomatic pressure on France to pay her obligations and assure them of their trade privileges.6 They showed no interest in a formal Protestant alliance: so it must have been clear to all observers, and especially to Mazarin, that they were not likely to be carried away by religious enthusiasm into dangerous political experiments. In one respect however La Milletiere's warning of a Protestant crusade was not completely fanciful. Even if an actual Protestant confederation was highly improbable, a military coalition of Protestant states under the leadership of England remained a possibility. Cromwell had spared no effort in the past to bring such an alliance about; before trying it with the Swiss he had urged it successively on the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark. Nor did he give up the idea-he reverted
61. Abbott, 3:911-915. 62. Ibid., pp. 232-238. 63. Dury, A. Suinmarie Account . .., pp. 24-46. See also K. Brauer, Die Unionstaetigkeit John Duries unter dem Protektorat Oliver Cromwells (Marburg: printed for author, 64. Brauer, pp. 79-89. 65. Robert Vaughan, The Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell, and the State of Europe during the Early Part of the Reign of Louis XIV (London: H. Colburn, 1838-1839), 1:5-7, Pell to Thurloe, 12 June 1654; 16-17, Pell to Thurloe, 11 July 1654; J. A. Pupikoser and J. Kaiser, eds., Die Bidgenoessischen Abschiede aus dem Zeitraume von 1649 bis 1680, Amtliche Sammlung der Aelteren Eidgenoessischen Abschiede 6 (Frauenfeld: J. Huber, 1867), 1:219-467 passim. 66. Vaughan, 1:54, Pell to Thurloe, 19 September 1654.

1905).

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to a similar combination two years later, in 1656.67 He also maintained correspondence with the elector of Brandenburg and lesser German princes and altogether acted as though he were at least unofficially the "protector of all the Huguenots and Protestants" of Europe, to use Mazarin's phrase. Mazarin, as we have seen, took seriously Cromwell's potential for acting in the name of religion. He did not need to weigh the sincerity of the Protector's motives-the political implications for France were the same whether Cromwell was sincere or a hypocrite as long as she had Protestant neighbors as well as a Huguenot minority inside the kingdom whom he could cultivate as friends and clients. Contrary to what La Milletiere had hoped however, fear of a Protestant league did not deflect Mazarin from his aim of securing the English alliance. In the months that followed the only question in his mind concerned Cromwell's ability to maintain himself in power given his current difficulties with Parliament.68 No doubt he would have preferred to do without Cromwell, but as long as Cromwell did rule England Mazarin accepted his commitment to international Protestantism as a condition of dealing with him. He therefore ignored the major part of La Milletiere's memorandum with its recommendations for speedy conversion of the Huguenots just as he ignored the remonstrances of the French clergy, and concentrated instead on the task of convincing Cromwell of Louis XIV's good will towards his Huguenot subjects. That task indeed took on prime importance. By late July of 1654 the English commissioners had finally reached the point of presenting their list of proposed treaty terms, and they insisted on formal guarantees for the rights of the Huguenots despite French efforts to head off such a demand.69 Since treaty guarantees for its own subjects were unacceptable to the crown as derogatory of its authority, Mazarin could only counter with the assurance that they were unnecessary. The memoranda prepared in Paris and the instructions sent to London all repeated this line of argument: the refusal of an article in favor of the Huguenots should not be construed by Cromwell as a sign of hostility towards them, because the king held them in affection, esteemed the loyalty they had shown during his minority, and was enforcing all the laws which protected them.70 There was even a suggestion that he might reconfirm the Edict of Nantes if necessary.71 Even so it took almost a year and a half to bring Cromwell around to the French point of view, and in the interim France had further to prove her good religious intentions by intervening on behalf of the Waldensian Protestants in Savoy. These people had resisted the duke of Savoy's attempts to restrict them to their original places of residence. Resistance led to punitive action in the spring of 1655, and unfortunately the duke used some French troops which had been detached to his service. As soon as news of the massacres in Piedmont arrived in London Cromwell mobilized financial and diplomatic re67. Abbott, 4:352-354, 410. 68. Mazarin, Lettres, 6:333, to Bordeaux, 8 October 1654. 69. CPA, 62, folios 546-549 verso, Bordeaux to Brienne 23 July 1654; 63, folios 530-532, Bordeaux to Servien, 23 .uly 1654: folios 540-541, 542 verso, Bordeaux to Servien, 5 August 1654; folios 543-543 bis, 545 verso, Bordeaux to Servien, 6 August 1654; folios 558-560, Bordeaux to Servien, 13 August 1654; folios 566-566 verso, Bordeaux to Mazsrin, 13 August 1654; 62, folios 564-566, 568, Bordeaux to Brienne, 15 August 1654; folios 578-579 verso, Bordeaux to Brienne 27 August 1654. 70. CPA, 64, folios 153-157, unsigned memorandum, 1 August 1654; 63, folios 548, 550-550 verso, memorandum from Servien, 13 August 1654; folios 554-556 verso, memorandum from Servien, 13 August 1654; folios 571-575 verso, memorandum from Servien, 27 August 1654. 71. CPA, 63, folios 554-556 verso, memoranalm from Servien, 13 August 1654.

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sources to relieve the Waldenses.72The presence of French soldiers in Savoy had to be explained,and he made it clear he would considerFrench help for the PiedmonteseProtestants as a positive inducementto proceed with the pending treaty.73 Mazarin did more than help; he took the lead in mediation because, aside from concern over the English treaty, the royal council feared that unless the duke of Savoy could be persuadedto settle his troubles speedily England might raise troops in the Protestantcantons and also rouse the French Huguenots in order to make war on him.74 Indeed apprehension regardingCromwell's interestin the Huguenotswas constantlyin the background.Until well into 1655 Mazarin received reports from the French ambassadoras well as from other sources that Cromwell,in concert with the prince of Conde and the Spaniards, had designs on La Rochelleand the island of Re.75That happenedto be wishful but on the thinking on the part of Conde'speople and the Spanish ambassador, other hand Condehad not yet met a final rebuffin his efforts to get some sort of while the Reverend Stouppe was still passing along the corEnglish support,76 his French friends to Cromwell'schief of intelligence.77Uncerof respondence when Cromwellopenly committedhimself against Spain and ended tainty finally in November 1655 signed the treaty of Westminster,by which commercialdifficulties were resolved and, what was at least equally important,the contracting parties undertookto give no aid to each other's presently declared enemies or rebels.78That left English protectionof the Huguenots up to discretion,much as the French had suggestedall along: ". . . it is better . . . to leave out of the when intreaty the freedom of both parties to make amicable representations of to the will be dicated,which proofs friendshipthey receive respectedaccording matters."79 in other from one another Mazarin'spatience and persistencethus paid good dividends, a great deal better than could have been expected had advice such as La Milletiere's prevailed. 1654-1655was no time for France to provoke Cromwellwith a Catholic crusade,spiritualor otherwise. After all, though in the summerand fall of 1654 Cromwell and the Council of State were already planning a naval expedition against the Spanish West Indies, naval warfareoverseas did not mean England would have to ally herself with France. The Council of State did not even believe that such an expedition would escalate into war with Spain in Europe.80 When Cromwelldid decide in favor of the treaty with France, he claimed the
72. Abbott, 3:717-743. 73. Ibid., pp. 726-728; CPA, 66, folios 60-60 verso, Cromwell to Mazarin, 4 June 1655; folios 61-61 verso, Cromwellto Louis XIV, 4 June 1655. 74. CPA, 65, folios 137-140, Bordeaux to Brienne, 24 June 1655; Gardiner, 3:380-381. 75. CPA, 62, folios 599 verso-600, Bordeaux to Brienne, 17 September 1654; folios 638 verso, 640-640 verso, Bordeaux to Brienne, 9 November 1654; 64, folios 287-288,, 289 verso, Bordeaux to Mazarin, 24 December 1654; 66, folios 2-6 verso, Whyte to Mazarin, undated but with notation of January 1655; 65, folios 57-59 verso, Bordeaux to Brienne, 25 February 1655; 66, folios 49-53, Propositions and advice given by an English merchant to His Eminence 25 April 1655; 65, folios 137-140, Bordeaux to Brienne, 24 June 1655. 76. His agent Barribre did not leave London until the spring of 1656; CPA, 65, folios 268268 verso, Bordeaux to Brienne, 15 May 1656. 77. Thurloe, 2:555-556, 600-601, 614-615, 624-625, 646-647, 665, 678, 680-681, 692, 697-698, 702, 711, 718-719, 739; 3:92. 78. Abbott, 3:876-877; CPA, 66, folios 122-135, Cromwell's ratification of the treaty, 7 November 1655; folios 136-137, Cromwell's ratification of the secret articles, 7 November 1655. 79. CPA, 64, folio 154 verso, unsigned memorandumprobably drafted by Servien, 1 August 1654. 80. Abbott, 3:260-261.

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French crown's good treatment of the Huguenots had been part of the considerations which moved him to it.81 Since the treaty of Westminster followed almost immediately upon the pacification of Savoy under French auspices, Cromwell's words were probably true. He went on to a military alliance with France in 1657 and to joint operations in the Spanish Netherlands which gave the English Mardyck and Dunkirk and the French the final edge over Spain in their long drawn-out war. Although he continued watchful over the Protestant interest in France and elsewhere in Europe, he never was able to enlist other Protestant powers in an anti-Habsburg coalition, nor did he resume the project for reunion among Protestant denominations. John Dury, disappointed when he received no further official backing after 1657, eventually denounced Cromwell most bitterly as a hypocritical opportunist who had simply used him and his ideas to enhance his own reputation.82 In the light of all the evidence this was an unfair as well as an ungrateful judgment.83 Cromwell had to accommodate himself to political realities on the international scene, and Dury was a bad loser. La Milletiere on the other hand apparently resigned himself to the slip of what he had thought a great opportunity. There is no record of his again offering advice to the government on the conduct of foreign or religious affairs; he returned to his previous occupations and produced two more books before he died in 1665.84 It is true that once the treaty of Westminster had been safely signed, the French crown began to yield discreetly to clerical pressure for stricter regulation of the Huguenots. In 1656 the Assembly of the Clergy was more successful than the bishop of Montauban had been at Louis' coronation two years earlier; its formal remonstrance against the Declaration of Saint-Germain was answered by a succession of edicts and legal decisions which gradually deprived the Huguenots of the gains they had made, or had been allowed to think they had made, since 1648.85 Yet those were domestic matters. Not even the Assembly of the Clergy thought to suggest the terms of foreign policy; there secular calculations reigned supreme.
81. Abbott, 4:139, Cromwell's instructions to Colonel William Lockhart, his ambassador to France, April 1656. 82. As cited in Batten, p. 172; Dury was addressing an appeal to Charles II for support. 83. Ibid.; Brauer, pp. 197-201. 84. Haag and Haag, 2:496-497. 85. F. A. Isambert, ed., Beeueil G6neral des Anciennes Lois Frangaises, depuis I'An 420 jusqu'd la Bvolution. . . (Paris: Bellin - Le Prieur, 1821-1833), 17:335, Declaration to the effect that the Edict of Nantes and the declarations, judgments and regulations given in consequence of it, will be kept and observed, and that two commissionerswill be sent to have them enforced, 18 July 1656; 339, Declaration . . . prohibiting the Protestants from practicing their religion in cities which are the seats of archbishops or bishops, and in places or lordships belonging to clergy; and that ministers may not preach outside their place of residence, December 1656; 346, Judgment of the royal council which revokes that of 21 May 1652, and prohibits ministers of the Reformed Religion from preaching in more than one place, 11 January 1657; 346, Judgment of the royal council which orders that temples built by Protestant highjusticiars will be demolished when the [present] lord is Catholic, and that whoever acquires the domain may not establish Protestant exercises under cover of the high justice included in the domain rights, 11 January 1657; 356, Prohibition of any Reformed colloquies other than the annual synod, which must be held in the presence of a royal commissionerand may not discuss matters other than church discipline, 26 July 1657.